Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership

May 2018
Introduction

This presentation is part of a series produced by the UK negotiating team for discussion with the EU, in order to inform the development of the future framework.

It focuses on an element of the vision for our future relationship set out by the Prime Minister in Munich and at Mansion House.

The future framework will set out the terms of our future relationship, to be translated into legally binding agreements after the UK’s withdrawal.

The UK and the EU will conclude the future framework alongside the Withdrawal Agreement later this year.
PART I  CONTEXT
PART II  INTERNAL SECURITY
PART III  EXTERNAL SECURITY
Our vision for the future partnership

The United Kingdom wants to build a **new, deep and special partnership** with the European Union.

It should be a partnership that **protects our shared interests and values**, ensuring we act together for our mutual benefit.

It should deliver for **the whole United Kingdom** and our wider family of overseas territories, as well as for the EU.

This partnership should have **two core parts**.

- An **economic partnership**, that goes beyond any existing FTA, covering more sectors and with deeper cooperation.

- A **security partnership**, maintaining and strengthening our ability to meet the ever evolving threats we both face.

These will sit alongside **cross-cutting areas** such as data protection.
## Structure of discussions on the future framework

The UK and EU negotiating teams have jointly agreed the **structure for discussions on the future framework**, reflecting the breadth of the partnership both sides want to build.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Basis for Cooperation</strong></th>
<th>Structure, governance, interpretation and application, dispute settlement, non-compliance and participation and cooperation with EU bodies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Partnership</strong></td>
<td>Aims of the economic partnership, goods, agricultural, food and fisheries products, customs, services and investment, financial services, digital and broadcasting, transport, energy, horizontal measures and mobility framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Partnership</strong></td>
<td>Aims of the security partnership, law enforcement and criminal justice, foreign, security and defence and wider security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-cutting/Standalone</strong></td>
<td>Data protection, cooperative accords (science and innovation/culture and education) and fishing opportunities</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Our common challenges have become more complex, intertwined and dangerous as the world has become more uncertain and volatile.

As the Prime Minister stated in Munich, the threats we face do not recognise the borders of individual nations or discriminate between them. We need to develop and leverage a full spectrum of capabilities to respond. The security partnership must be responsive to the challenges outlined in both the EU Global Strategy and UK National Security Capability Review.
Principles of the security partnership

Europe’s security is the UK’s security. **The UK is unconditionally committed to maintaining it.**

The interests that the UK and EU project and defend are rooted in *shared values* - respect for human dignity, human rights, freedom, democracy and equality. The *shared threats* we both face will continue to intensify and evolve.

It is only by **strengthening and deepening our full range of partnerships** in Europe and beyond that we will both be able to effectively respond together to our shared threats.

The UK wants to reach a **security partnership with the EU that promotes our shared security and develops our cooperation.**

It must **respect both the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.**

**No existing security agreement between the EU and a third country** captures the full depth and breadth of our envisaged relationship. **The UK’s proposals are ambitious and achievable.**
The concept of the security partnership

The UK therefore proposes a security partnership of unprecedented breadth and depth, reflecting the complex challenges we both face.

The security partnership would form part of a wider framework covering the future relationship.

Cooperation would be based upon three distinct pillars, covering the full spectrum of means at our disposal.

It would be underpinned by cross-cutting provisions on the exchange of data, information and secondees, and governance.

It should be sufficiently flexible, containing a mix of legal and political agreements.

It should be dynamic, adaptable and responsive to crises.
## Statements on internal security

The UK and the EU have been clear on the importance of maintaining strong cooperation on governance, data driven law enforcement, dispute settlement, and participation with EU bodies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Prime Minister, Munich, 17 February 2018</th>
<th>Article 50 Guidelines, 23 March 2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The challenge for all of us today is finding the way to work together, through a deep and special partnership between the UK and the EU, to retain the co-operation that we have built and go further in meeting the evolving threats we face together.”</td>
<td>“Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters should constitute an important element of the future EU-UK relationship in the light of geographic proximity and shared threats”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“People across Europe are safer because of this [practical co-operation, data driven law enforcement and co-operation with EU agencies] cooperation and the unique arrangements we have developed between the UK and EU institutions in recent years.”</td>
<td>“The future partnership should cover effective exchanges of information, support for operational cooperation between law enforcement authorities and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We will need to agree a strong and appropriate form of independent dispute resolution across all the areas of our future partnership in which both sides can have the necessary confidence.”</td>
<td>“Strong safeguards will need to be established that ensure full respect of fundamental rights and effective enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The UK’s Data Protection Bill will ensure that we are aligned with the EU framework. But we want to go further and seek a bespoke arrangement to reflect the UK’s exceptionally high standards of data protection.”</td>
<td>“As regards personal data, protection should be governed by Union rules on adequacy with a view to ensuring a level of protection essentially equivalent to that of the Union.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Statements on external security**

The UK and the EU have both been clear on the importance of maintaining strong cooperation on foreign, security and defence policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Prime Minister, Munich, 17 February 2018</th>
<th>Article 50 Guidelines, 23 March 2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The fundamental values we share... have created common cause to act together. We are also facing profound challenges to the global order: to peace, prosperity, to the rules-based system that underpins our very way of life.”</td>
<td>“In view of our shared values and common challenges, there should be a strong EU-UK cooperation in the fields of foreign, security and defence policy.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“There are three areas on which we should focus... at the diplomatic level, we should have the means to consult each other regularly... it is clearly in our shared interests to be able to continue to coordinate and deliver operationally on the ground... and it will also be in our interests to continue working together on developing the capabilities to meet our threats.”</td>
<td>The partnership should “foresee appropriate dialogue, consultation, coordination, exchange of information, and cooperation mechanisms.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We need a partnership that respects both the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the sovereignty of the UK.”</td>
<td>“A future partnership should respect the autonomy of the Union's decision-making”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“There is no existing security agreement between the EU and a third country that captures the full depth and breadth of our existing relationship.”</td>
<td>The partnership should “take into account that the UK will be a third country”</td>
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</table>
PART I  CONTEXT

PART II  INTERNAL SECURITY

PART III  EXTERNAL SECURITY
Rationale

The importance of our security relationship reflects the unique starting point created by the UK’s long membership of the EU and the mutual security benefits of a close relationship.

The EU and UK face a common set of challenges and shared threats. Terrorism and serious crime do not respect borders. And threats are increasingly complex and intertwined. Together we have built an effective toolkit of measures to address these challenges.

The shared scale and nature of the threats faced creates a mutual interest in developing a new and ambitious model for cooperation that reflects the UK’s high degree of legislative and operational co-operation with the EU and is able to respond to evolving threats.

Our geographical proximity and the volume of cross-border movements between the UK and the EU further underlines the importance of maintaining operational co-operation.

Crucially, our co-operation is having an impact. Real-time national security alerts protecting the public and the most vulnerable in society and saving lives; thousands surrendered swiftly and brought to justice; and unrivalled co-operation between law enforcement agencies.

And the closeness of our relationship is underpinned by shared values: respect for human dignity, human rights, freedom, democracy and equality.
Analysis of partnership options

The choice of architecture for our new partnership must reflect a **shared understanding of the security implications and operational imperatives**.

**ANALYSIS**

We have **examined all police and criminal justice measures**, including their individual and collective benefits to the UK and EU Member States - also looking at non-EU alternatives.

**OPERATIONAL COSTS**

There would be a clear mutual **loss of operational law enforcement and criminal justice capability** if the UK ceased to participate in and contribute to this toolkit, with substantial security consequences.

**PRECEDENT**

Relying on precedents for EU agreements with third countries as a basis for the future relationship would result in a **patchwork of capability with a real drop in cooperation and serious attendant risks**. Many measures have no precedent for third country participation, others would narrow or reduce capability.

**FRAMEWORK**

It is therefore necessary to agree a framework for cooperation covering a **wide range of interdependent capabilities that** preserves vital capabilities and is sufficiently agile to respond to future developments.
Existing third country precedents

Future UK-EU co-operation based only on existing precedent would lead to a significant reduction or complete loss of co-operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precedents</th>
<th>Examples of relevant EU measures/forms of cooperation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No existing precedent</td>
<td>European Criminal Records Information System (‘ECRIS’)</td>
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<td>Precedent but significant capability gap</td>
<td>Europol</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extradition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Passenger Name Records (‘PNR’)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precedent for smaller capability gap</td>
<td>Eurojust</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Joint Investigation Teams (‘JITS’)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precedent for third country (Schengen) access</td>
<td>Schengen Information System (‘SIS II’)</td>
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<td>Prüm</td>
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</table>
We propose a **new internal security treaty**.

**Range of existing legal precedents** for strategic agreements that provide for EU-third country cooperation on a particular area of the *acquis*.

**Such models all have the same basic proposed structure** – an agreement with overarching horizontal provisions enabling cooperation on the basis of existing EU measures in a specific field, with relevant measures listed in annexes.

**Sustaining cooperation on the basis of existing EU measures** represents the most efficient and effective means of achieving our shared objectives.

Such a treaty would provide the legal basis for ongoing co-operation. **It is clear from consultation with law enforcement partners that it is operationally necessary.**

**Our assessment and engagement suggests there are no insurmountable legal barriers to our proposal.**
Scope

New internal security arrangements should deliver significant mutual operational benefit, across three key areas: practical cooperation, through EU agencies and data-driven law enforcement.

This should include strategic cooperation relating to the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security.

The UK currently participates in over 40 EU measures covering police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three TFEU) and has played a critical role in developing and shaping a number of them.

Cooperation should continue in areas of mutual operational benefit, across three areas:

• practical operational cooperation;
• multilateral cooperation through EU agencies; and
• data-driven law enforcement.

Future cooperation should include reciprocal safeguards to ensure mutual trust, respect for human rights, effective enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms, and rely on robust data protection arrangements.
Practical cooperation

A new internal security treaty should facilitate continued crucial practical operational cooperation.

Access to streamlined, consistent procedures for practical operational cooperation are essential for effective cross-border investigation to protect citizens and uphold justice.

EU measures such as the European arrest warrant (‘EAW’), the European Investigation Order (‘EIO’) and the Prisoner Transfer Framework Decision allow for reliable and efficient provision of assistance between jurisdictions and crucially provide legal certainty for law enforcement authorities and individuals subject to criminal proceedings.

The EAW and EIO have transformed extradition and mutual legal assistance arrangements, moving away from more complex, lengthy and often frustrating old-fashioned processes. The EAW in particular plays a vital role in police cooperation between Ireland and UK (including Northern Ireland).

The ability to swiftly and easily establish and run Joint Investigation Teams, share police intelligence and cooperate cross-border on a practical level are critical in safeguarding our citizens.
French national Zakaria Chadili is alleged to have travelled to Syria in 2013 and spent a month training with Jabhat Al Nousra, a proscribed jihadist organisation. His father travelled to Syria to bring him back but, fearing that his son would be prosecuted in France, arranged for him to stay with relatives in the UK.

He was arrested on the EAW and surrendered to France just 47 days after his arrest. He was sentenced to 6 years in prison.

For every person arrested on a UK issued EAW, UK arrests 8 individuals on EU EAWs

Since 2004, UK has surrendered over 10,000 individuals under the EAW – in 2016 alone we surrendered over 1,400

Over 80% of UK’s incoming mutual legal assistance requests are from EU Member States.

In 2017, UK entered over 25 new JITs. UK participates in around 50 overall.
EU Agencies

A new internal security treaty should **facilitate multilateral cooperation through EU agencies** and protect the capabilities that underpin this.

In tackling serious and organised cross-border crime and terrorism, **the most effective approach is through joined-up multilateral action.**

**EU agencies Europol and Eurojust** are at heart of the efforts to tackle serious and organised crime and terrorism across Europe, providing forums for exchanging expertise, sharing resource, coordinating investigative action and developing new methods for cooperation.

It is critical that the **strength of these bodies are not weakened.**

The UK has worked collaboratively with the EU institutions and Member States in **shaping and developing both the strategic and operational limbs of Europol and Eurojust in particular.** For example, through a focus on intelligence-led investigations in Europol or through the UK’s drive to tackle human trafficking and organised immigration crime.

It is in our mutual interest to **protect the capabilities** which underpin this co-operation when the UK becomes a European country outside the EU but in a new partnership with it.
EU Agencies – examples, facts and figures

The UK is one of the biggest Member State contributors of data, information and expertise to Europol.

EUROPOL

In 2014, UK tasked Europol with investigating the issue of international controllers in relation to money laundering. Europol ran relevant UK information against its databases, identifying connections with a live international investigation into vast criminal network.

Based on UK information, Europol launched operation leading to significant operational activity, extensive cash seizures and the arrest and conviction of a European controller for serious money laundering offences.

VOLUME

In 2017, UK contributed over 6000 pieces of information to the Europol Serious and Organised Crime Analysis Projects. More than any other Member State.

In 2016, UK participated in over 80 coordination meetings at Eurojust, organising over 30 of them ourselves.

The UK has the largest Europol Liaison Bureau of any Member State and has seconded experts to a range of analysis projects.
Data driven law enforcement

A new internal security treaty should facilitate **data-driven law enforcement** as real-time information sharing has proved to be invaluable in recent years.

Swift and efficient **exchange of data is essential in modern law enforcement** to protect citizens and support cooperation.

EU tools that allow for the secure and timely exchange of information include **Schengen Information System II** (‘SIS II’), **European Criminal Record Information System** (‘ECRIS’) and **Passenger Name Record Directive** (‘PNR’).

This includes sharing alerts on wanted or missing persons to **help bring criminals to justice and to protect the most vulnerable**; criminal records to **ensure justice is delivered**; and the sharing of passenger data to **prevent and investigate terrorism and serious crime**.

The UK plays a critical role in these tools: **approximately 20% of the total number of national security alerts on the SIS II system are circulated by the UK alone**.

In some cases, for example ECRIS, there are **no viable existing 3rd country alternatives**. For others the alternative - such as PNR - is sub-optimal, resulting in capability loss. The UK/EU partnership should ensure that these capabilities are maintained.
**Data driven law enforcement – examples, facts and figures**

The swift and effective exchange of data between law enforcement agencies is critical in supporting **practical co-operation in tackling terrorism and serious crime.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIS II</th>
<th>VOLUME</th>
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<tr>
<td>In 2015, entry checks at the UK border using SIS II revealed that a German organised crime group member was wanted by Germany for tax evasion worth €60m. He was arrested and returned pursuant to an EAW and further collaboration led to others in the group being arrested in the UK, Spain and Germany.</td>
<td>In 2016, UK responded to over <strong>13,000 requests for conviction information</strong> from EU Member States via ECRIS. In the same period, the <strong>UK sent over 35,000 notifications</strong> to EU Member States regarding their nationals being convicted in the UK.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>In 2017, <strong>UK sent over 9700 hit reports on EU-issued SIS II alerts</strong>, including 6,000 regarding discreet or specific checks for serious and organised crime and terrorism.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
A dynamic relationship

A new internal security treaty should include provision for a dynamic relationship that can **evolve in response to new threats and changes in technology.**

### COOPERATION ON FUTURE MEASURES

Mechanisms enabling the UK to **continue to cooperate on future versions of current tools** where mutually beneficial.

Should also allow for **new tools and measures to be incorporated into the UK-EU treaty in the future where in the interests of both parties.**

### STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

The EU has a range of dialogues with third countries in relation to developing new policy. The UK wants to **continue exchanging expertise and experience on JHA in the future.**

There are a range of options that would allow for a dynamic relationship on police and judicial cooperation.
Cross-cutting issues

To underpin and enhance our future cooperation, the UK proposes developing regular institutional engagement, including arrangements on secondments and information sharing.

CONSULTATION AND DIALOGUE

A baseline of regular UK-EU discussions on shared law enforcement and security and criminal justice priorities.

SECONDMENTS

The UK and EU could establish a reciprocal UK secondment programme. This would cover EU and UK institutions and agencies. Secondments are beneficial to both the UK and the EU, providing a platform for a cadre of high calibre officials to gain and deploy skills, expertise and experience. A stronger mutual understanding will ensure closer cooperation and coordination.

INFORMATION EXCHANGE

The UK proposes a framework for sharing and protecting classified information with the EU institutions as soon as possible. The exchange of classified information is fundamental to cooperation across the future partnership. This agreement should codify the depth of trust between the UK and EU. Further arrangements could be implemented concerning the provision and exchange of sensitive (‘controlled unclassified’) information.
Governance, human rights and data protection

Our arrangements on internal security will require robust governance provisions, be explicit in safeguarding human rights and rely on comprehensive data protection arrangements.

GOVERNANCE

There should be a strong and appropriate form of dispute resolution across all the areas of our future partnership in which both sides can have the necessary confidence.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The UK will continue its long tradition of commitment to human rights and this will not change after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

DATA PROTECTION

The treaty will need to operate in parallel to a separate UK-EU agreement on the exchange and protection of personal data. After our exit, the UK will remain a global leader on data protection, by promoting both the flow of data internationally and high data protection standards. The UK hopes to explore a bespoke UK-EU model for exchanging and protecting personal data, which builds on the existing adequacy model.
Wider security cooperation

The UK’s proposal is to include other key areas of security cooperation, some of which are set out below.

**Cyber security**: working together to help protect the UK and the EU from those who wish to do us harm, sharing expertise and information and combating cyber crime.

**Health security and protection and civil protection**: working together to tackle serious threats to our citizens across the globe and safeguard the resilience of the UK and EU.

**Asylum and Illegal migration**: taking a “whole of route” approach, collaborating with the EU on our joint priorities and shared migration challenges.

**Sensitive information and intelligence**: ability to share intelligence and information on foreign policy, defence and security issues where we have shared priorities and objectives.

**Counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism**: continued cooperation as the threat and our ability to respond evolves.
## Conclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SHARED THREATS</strong></th>
<th>The shared threats we face are complex, evolving, cross boundaries and blur lines. This requires a common European response to protect our citizens, shared values and interest.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY PARTNERSHIP</strong></td>
<td>The UK wants to reach a security partnership with the EU that maintains our mutual security and develops our cooperation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNAL SECURITY TREATY</strong></td>
<td>The UK proposes a new internal security treaty to underpin our future internal security relationship and provide a legal basis for continued cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES</strong></td>
<td>An overarching treaty is legally viable, should protect operational capabilities and is the best way to protect the security of all our citizens and ensure justice is done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE &amp; DATA PROTECTION</strong></td>
<td>It should include a robust dispute resolution mechanism, be respectful of the UK and EU’s sovereign legal orders, be explicit in how it protects individuals’ rights and rely on comprehensive and robust data protection arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DYNAMIC &amp; FLEXIBLE</strong></td>
<td>The UK and the EU will benefit from arrangements which are capable of responding quickly to ever-changing and increasingly complex threats.</td>
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External security tools

As outlined by the Prime Minister in Munich, UK-EU cooperation on external security could be categorised into three areas, all underpinned by information and secondee exchange.

- **Consultation**
  Institutional and structured dialogue on shared global challenges.

- **Coordination**
  Working together using our diplomatic, defence and development resources, where this delivers the best effect.

- **Capabilities**
  Collaborating on research and development and delivering the means to tackle existing and future threats.

- **Secondees**
  Reciprocal exchange of personnel to support action and foster closer collaboration.

- **Information and Analysis**
  Arrangements for classified and sensitive information to facilitate cooperation across the partnership. Shared assessments, including collaboration in INTCEN, SATCEN and EUMS Intelligence.

Reflecting the convergence and interlinkage of external policies, **UK-EU external cooperation should go beyond foreign, security and defence policy**, and include development, capability collaboration, defence research and industrial development and space security.
Cross-cutting cooperation

To underpin and enhance our future cooperation, the UK wants to develop regular institutional engagement, including specific arrangements on secondments and information sharing.

The UK wants to establish a baseline of **regular structured UK-EU consultation** and **flexible UK-EU thematic and geographic dialogue** on shared priorities.

**The UK wants to establish a reciprocal secondment programme.** This would cover EU and UK institutions and agencies. Secondments are beneficial to both the UK and the EU, providing a platform for a cadre of high calibre officials to gain and deploy skills, expertise and experience. A stronger mutual understanding will ensure closer cooperation and coordination.

**The UK wants to reach an agreement for sharing and protecting classified information with the EU institutions as soon as possible.** The exchange of classified information is fundamental to cooperation across the future partnership.

This agreement would codify the depth of trust between the UK and EU and facilitate common analysis. Arrangements could also be agreed concerning the provision and exchange of sensitive (‘controlled unclassified’) information.
**Consultation: foreign policy**

The UK will continue to tackle major foreign policy challenges – from delivering security in our shared neighbourhood, to building and protecting global norms, to alleviating poverty and humanitarian suffering. **The UK supports a foreign policy relationship which offers the means and choice to combine efforts around the world to the greatest effect**, where in our shared interest.

As part of the Partnership, the UK and EU could agree to:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Consultation Framework</strong>&lt;br&gt;Regular structured UK-EU27 consultation, up to leader level, which would be flexible and scalable according to the depth and ambition of our cooperation in any given area, alongside regular thematic dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Crisis Cooperation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Intensify cooperation in specific circumstances, such as in crises. This could include continued cooperation on consular provision and protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Coordination of Levers</strong>&lt;br&gt;Coordinate the use of foreign policy levers, including an option to agree shared positions and statements, joint demarches, jointly organised events and UK support to EU programmes and election observation missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>International Organisations</strong>&lt;br&gt;Coordinate in International Organisations to promote and defend our shared values.</td>
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## Coordination: restrictive measures

The Prime Minister is clear that we will all be stronger if the UK and EU have the means to cooperate on sanctions and the potential to develop them together in the future.

- **The UK is developing national powers to impose sanctions.** This will mean autonomous national decisions on sanctions in the UK, that can be challenged before UK courts. The powers will mirror existing EU legislative powers and will be used in line with shared foreign policy objectives.

- **The UK will look to carry over all existing EU sanctions.** The UK is reviewing more than 1000 listings and sectoral measures to identify the best way to transfer these into UK law.

As part of the Partnership, the UK and EU could agree to:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Provide information and expertise</th>
<th>Consult and cooperate on measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provision of UK information and technical support and expertise to contribute to existing and future EU listings, and vice versa. Over 50% of existing EU sanctions designations are underpinned by UK evidence.</td>
<td>Close cooperation and consultation on the development and adoption of measures will be in the UK and EU interest. Sanctions are a multilateral tool which are most effective when used in coordination with partners.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Coordination: development and external programmes

Given the UK and EU are both committed to the Sustainable Development Goals, the UK is open to participation in EU external spending programmes and instruments, directing development expertise and spend to support peace and security, humanitarian relief and alleviate poverty.

As part of the Partnership, the UK and EU could agree to:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coordination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Coordination</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coordinate actions in particular theatres or across thematic issues, to ensure their complementarity.</strong> The UK and EU should seek to achieve coherent responses to crises overseas. The UK and EU should also continue to work together to advance development policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Collaboration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Enhance such coordination through the reciprocal exchange of development and humanitarian policy secondees, structured UK-EU consultation and flexible UK-EU dialogue.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Contribution</strong></td>
<td><strong>Explore a mechanism that allows for future UK-EU cooperation in specific geographic and thematic areas, where it is in our mutual interests.</strong> For the UK to make a contribution to an EU programme or instrument, it would need to play an appropriate role in the relevant decision-making mechanisms. UK entities would be eligible to deliver EU programmes and receive funding.</td>
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Coordination: defence

To most effectively tackle crises and support stabilisation, the partnership could enable the UK and EU to cooperate on CSDP operations and missions where there is a mutual interest. The UK could:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Provision of forces and assets</th>
<th>Continue to contribute to Common Security and Defence Policy (‘CSDP’) missions and operations on a case-by-case basis with UK personnel, expertise and assets. UK is open to future contributions to EU Battlegroups and could host Operational HQ where it is in our mutual interest.</th>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strategic enablers</td>
<td>Provide niche capability to support EU deployments, such as strategic airlift capability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Staff and expertise</td>
<td>Provide embedded military and civilian expertise, in Brussels and to EU Missions and Headquarters overseas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Information sharing</td>
<td>Exchange classified and sensitive information, leveraging the UK’s extensive networks and capabilities, to support EU planning and situational awareness.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Contribute to mission-specific and common costs on a similar basis to other third countries, where it participates.</td>
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</table>
Coordination: defence continued

UK participation in a CSDP operation or mission will always be a case-by-case and independent decision for both the EU and the UK.

Noting potential changes to the EU model for third country involvement in CSDP, the potential scope of UK contributions will depend on defined arrangements. These would be scalable and commensurate with the UK contribution to an operation or mission:

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<th>Planning and Liaison</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UK expertise and liaison in the EU Military Staff and EEAS, and sharing of early planning documents, enabling UK input prior to the EU’s decision to launch, and better understanding of what the UK might offer.</td>
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<th>Force Generation and Sensing</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Full involvement in force generation and calls for contributions. The UK could also make an ongoing contribution to the EU Force Catalogue, to help the EU better assess its capability requirements.</td>
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<th>Political military dialogue</th>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Regular political-military dialogue to allow close understanding of EU political objectives, and where the UK can add value (eg. use of the UK role through the UNSC or with other partners).</td>
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<th>Engagement</th>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Depending on UK role, participation could extend to invitations to UK-EU consultations. UK would participate in the Committee of the Contributors.</td>
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</table>
Capabilities: defence

UK-EU defence capability collaboration will support and maintain our shared security, enhance our shared prosperity, and ensure that our defence industries are globally competitive.

In order to consult and coordinate on the development of defence capabilities, an “Administrative Arrangement” with the European Defence Agency could facilitate:

- A coordinated approach to European capability development and planning. This could be achieved in a number of ways, including through EU-UK consultation on capability development priorities and UK input into capability planning processes.
- UK participation in European Defence Agency initiatives and projects. An ambitious Administrative Arrangement would ensure that the UK and EDA could continue to work together on priority projects and initiatives both now and in the future.
- A continued exchange and growth of expertise. Beyond project participation, this could be achieved through regular technical knowledge sharing, supported by a permanent UK liaison presence at the EDA.

For UK contributions to programmes to deliver mutual benefit, the UK would require access to both sensitive information and commercial opportunities.
Capabilities: defence continued

Collaboration in defence research and development will enable the UK and EU to develop cutting-edge capabilities and enhance our ability to act alongside each other.

The UK proposes discussion on models for participation of the UK, and UK entities, in the:

- **European Defence Research Programme.** Options for future UK participation could draw on the experience of civilian EU research programmes, such as Horizon 2020.

- **European Defence Industrial Development Programme projects.** UK participation would ensure that Member States and the UK can continue to work together on projects where EU Member States receive EDIDP funding.

**The UK and EU should also keep open the option for UK participation in PESCO projects.** This would support continued UK-EU collaboration on capability development in the interests of European security, sharing skills and expertise across Europe.

Because of the integration of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and the capabilities the UK offers, **the UK and EU should ensure that the security partnership supports the effective operation of UK and EU defence companies, does not disrupt complex supply chains and does not disadvantage leading companies with EU-UK ownership.**
Capabilities: space

UK-EU collaboration through Galileo would help develop Europe’s world-leading global satellite navigation capability and support the competitiveness and expertise of the European space sector.

The UK is exploring the options for a domestic global navigation satellite system, should the UK and EU be unable to reach agreement on the following:

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<th>Galileo cooperation</th>
<th>PRS access</th>
<th>Security of Information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Providing for continued UK participation in the development and operation of the open signal.</td>
<td>Providing for UK use of the secure, encrypted signal, and participation in its development and operation. It must provide for continued UK access to PRS information, and a right for UK entities to compete fairly for PRS-related contracts. PRS access limited only to user status would not meet UK strategic security requirements and would not provide the basis for continued UK collaboration in Galileo.</td>
<td>Codifying trust between the UK and EU, and enabling the protection and exchange of sensitive security-related information relating to PRS.</td>
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The arrangements for any UK cooperation on Galileo are an important test case of the depth of operational cooperation and information sharing envisaged under the Security Partnership.
Conclusion

The security partnership should be a core chapter of the UK-EU Future Framework. It should:

• provide for close cooperation reflecting the trust and transparency between the UK and EU;
• agree a high level of mutual ambition;
• respect the autonomy of the Union and the sovereignty of the UK; and
• be adaptable and scalable.

To best enable the UK and EU act together, our partnership should be anchored by a combination of political and legal agreements.

These should all provide for: structured UK-EU consultation; regular dialogue on thematic and geographic priorities; and extensive exchange of experts and information.

We should not wait where we do not need to. The UK welcomes the agreement that future arrangements on CFSP and CSDP could become effective during the implementation period, and proposes that further discussions will reflect this. Early arrangements will:

• allow the UK and EU to benefit from closer, more intense and more productive cooperation than the EU enjoys with any partner; and
• ensure there is no drop off in our mutual effort in support of European security.