Final Evaluation Report

P06132 Independent Evaluation Provider to the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)

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Final Evaluation report prepared by WYG:

Kathleen Latimer (Team Leader, WYG); **Sophie Timms** (Evaluation Lead, WYG); **Brendan Whitty** (Qualitative Research Lead); **Alastair McPherson** (Quantitative Research Lead); **Umaru Ibrahim Yakubu** (National Research Lead); **Chris Boyd** (Project Director, WYG); **Elbereth Donovan** (Associate Director WYG) with thanks to researchers from the **Centre for Research Documentation** (CRD) in Kano (National Research Team), and special thanks to **Mohammad Bello** (CRD Research Lead).

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List of Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
APS	Annual Perception Survey
BC	British Council
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CHRICED	Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education
CPP	Community Peace Partnership
CRD	Centre for Research Documentation
CSC	Conflict Sensitive Communications
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CV	Coefficient of Variation
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DM	Dialogue Mechanism
DMC	Dialogue Mechanism Committee
DSCMA	Delta State Conflict Management Alliance
EEGM	Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting
EMT	Environmental Monitoring Team
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQUALS	Evaluation Quality and Learning Services
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GBP	Great British Pound
IA	International Alert
ICA	Inclusion, Coordination and Accountability
KII	Key Informant Interview
KWPSN	Kano Women's Peace and Security Network
KSCMA	Kano State Conflict Management Alliance
LGA	Local Government Area
LWU	Land and Water Use Dialogue
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Platform
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NAP	National Action Plan
NIEP	Nigeria Independent Evaluation Provider
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIPSS	National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NPSF	National Peace and Security Forum

NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
NSS	National Security Strategy
OAS	Organization of American States
ONSA	Office of National Security
PE	Political Economy
QA	Quality Assurance
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
ROA	RAPID Outcome Assessment
RSSDA	Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency
SAP	State Action Plan
SCMA	State Conflict Management Alliance
SDD	Social Development Direct
SEQAS	DFID's Independent Quality Assurance Service for Evaluation Outputs, now known as EQUALS
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SRO	Senior Responsible Officer
TOC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
UQ	Upper Quartile
VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
VfM	Value for Money
WPS	Women Peace and Security
WPSN	Women Peace and Security Network

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Appendix A Addressing the Evaluation Questions

Table 0.1 Strength of Evidence by TOC Level

TOC Level	Outcome	Evidence	Assumptions
Outcome Level 1	Improved communication between stakeholders	**Strong Evidence:** Where platforms have been formed, and are meeting regularly, the convening function has mobilised and contributed to strengthened coordination, communication and information flow between a wide range of conflict management stakeholders from differing standpoints, including mixes of state and non-state actors depending on the environment and context. These relations are crucial to the peace architecture.	**Key assumption: That capable and credible 'agents of change' exist at federal, state and LGA levels.** The evaluation research highlighted this assumption as particularly important. Across all NSRP's platforms and initiatives there is strong evidence to confirm the need to build, maintain and leverage positive relationships with well-networked 'champions of change' (typically actors representing a state institution) who can engage and maintain the buy-in of critical stakeholders in the policy and practice environment. The structural risks associated with working with champions of change (resulting from turnover and inevitable departure of champions) were also highlighted. The evaluation demonstrates the ongoing fragility apparent in some of the platforms/ initiatives' institutionalization as a result of this flux and turnover, and case study research suggests that risks of this nature can only be mitigated by persistence and by extending the pattern of personal linkages and relationships within the government to more long-term, formally recognised relationships at the institutional level. NSRP is clearly highly aware of these structural risks and the need for perseverance and determination in order to establish relationships at the institutional - not just individual – level; at times NSRP has successfully mitigated these risks (e.g. NSPR has maintained a strong working relationship with ONSA even following
	Broader Societal Participation, including voices of marginalized	**Mixed evidence:** Organisations representing marginalised groups (predominantly youth and women) are represented in all platforms (although Women are under-represented as a share of the population). There is limited evidence for involvement of organisations representing other marginalised groups (including persons living with a disability). Women form the majority of participants in the WPSNs, but are also well represented in other platforms. Youth groups are often seen as influential partners and to a lesser extent so are women's groups - they are not passive or peripheral members. Perceptions of inclusivity amongst platform members (including female participants) have improved over time and are high.	
	More frequent, and more conflict/gender sensitive activity and media coverage by stakeholders	**Strong evidence:** Among supported partners, outcomes are being achieved across all outputs and through a range of interventions. The picture is particularly positive in relation to NSRP's work to increase conflict sensitivity amongst the media. Individuals within all NSRP's partner radio stations are now adopting and applying CSC principles/ approaches as a result of workplace mentoring and training. The MTE highlighted the potential risk of these outcomes not being sustained and change not being institutionalized in the absence of ongoing CSC training/mentoring and if/as specialist NSRP staff inputs deceased. There is some evidence of supported partners cascading CS/GS (albeit in isolated cases). Comprehensive programme level assessment is not possible. **Moderate evidence:** Among supported partners there is awareness of the media's ability to inflame conflict and some evidence of outcomes being achieved across supported partners in at least four states.	

TOC Level	Outcome	Evidence	Assumptions
	Uptake of knowledge on conflict-related issues, and capacity to use that knowledge	**Moderate evidence** (in relation to the capacity to use knowledge)**:** There is moderate evidence on the capacity to use knowledge: 74% of stakeholders stated that they strongly agree with the statement that they 'have better information on the factors which may lead to conflict', but this does not address the actual use of new evidence or the capacity to use it, simply its availability. Cases 3, 5 and 9 all indicate that evidence is a (usually but not always minor – cf. case 3) part of a wider field of advocacy and lobbying strategy. However, these are at the federal and state levels and there is limited evidence to suggest that there has been an improvement in capacity to use evidence rather than an improvement in the availability of research. Only 6 % of stakeholders across all platforms said they conducted direct research, but that is not their primary function. **Limited evidence** (in relation to uptake of operational knowledge on conflict-related issues) There is limited case evidence that operational knowledge (real-time conflict reporting) has improved immediate operational responses to conflict - in Case 8, for example, an Early Warning System was used to good effect to pass information on to the police or relevant conflict mediation body. **Moderate evidence** (in relation to uptake of evidence): discussed more in Level 2 ("Decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this").	the departure of their initial champion of change at ONSA) but at times has also been unable to mitigate these risks (e.g. xx). Any future programme should ensure that these risks are acknowledged from the outset, tracked and monitored and mitigation measures put in place. Looking back at how NSRP managed to identify champions and broaden these relationships; the key skillsets their champions have brought to the table and any skillsets they have felt have been lacking; what actions to take if champions are not found; and the mitigation measures that can be employed to address inevitable flux could also be helpful. Drawing out these lessons would undoubtedly prove highly useful for future programming.
Outcome Level 2	Improved alignment in strategic priorities and actions of stakeholders	**Limited Evidence:** There is limited evidence that stakeholders are increasingly aligned in their priorities and actions or that the strategic priorities of stakeholders have greatly changed. However, this is to some extent to be expected. Given the wide range of stakeholders/institutions engaged by the programme it is likely that they will have different priorities and goals. What emerges as important is that these different institutions are willing to work together, to complement one another, are coordinated in their approaches, are clear on their remit and how it fits within the bigger picture, and do not duplicate one another's efforts. The platforms have a key role to play here in facilitating coordination, complementarity and compromise between actors with differing perspectives and priorities.	**Key assumption: State and non-state actors perceive benefits from listening to broader society including marginalised groups:** There is strong evidence that this assumption holds *to some extent.* One key aspect is the extent to which stakeholders see the involvement of marginalized groups as intrinsically or instrumentally important. The instrumental value of broader societal participation in the platforms appears to differ by platform. The QCA identifies the breadth of platform composition as a factor, if not a

TOC Level	Outcome	Evidence	Assumptions
		There was moderate evidence from the evaluation that although different stakeholder's/institution's views may not always strategically align, stakeholders do, in many cases, come to shared positions on the matters to hand. Collaborating is in itself a significant step forward.	necessary condition, for platforms working at the local level (CPP and LWUs), one may speculate that this is due to a lack of government representation at the community level, but there is insufficient data to substantiate this. At the higher level, a relatively narrower bandwidth of key stakeholders is necessary for success. Intrinsically, there is relatively strong evidence that the voices of marginalised groups are included through civil society organisations, and they suggest that they have a voice and feel safe. Their influence within the (non-women's) platforms appears to be less than other actors. **Key assumption: Spaces can be opened for inclusive dialogue and debate and that these spaces act as a catalyst for individuals and organisations to act:** the convening function – that is, the creation of spaces for dialogue and debate – was crucial to the work of many of the platforms. Similarly, in many of the cases there were representatives of marginalised groups (civil society and community based organisations; women's and youth groups) present. This offers strong evidence validating the assumption that there was the possibility to create a space for dialogue and debate. The vibrant and relatively inclusive discussions and multi-stakeholder nature of the platforms confirms this. **Key assumption: Increased inclusion of empowered groups leads to more public scrutiny and public demand for change:** there is moderate evidence to suggest that public
	Mainstreaming of conflict and gender sensitive activity and media coverage reduces potential for violence to be inflamed	**Limited evidence** (in relation to conflict sensitive media coverage)**:** Anecdotally, NSRP partners perceive that conflict sensitive coverage has reduced potential for violence to be inflamed (particularly in relation to the 2015 election). The approach is not yet institutionalized, however. The 2017 APS data supports this finding, with 65% of citizens believing that a 'more conflict sensitive media' has helped resolve conflict – a link that is well established in the literature. However, isolating NSRP's contribution was not possible at the FE stage.	
	Decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this as well as by increasing public pressure for change	**Moderate evidence** (in relation to decision makers having access to more/better evidence): NSRP increased its research outputs in 2014-2015, and there is evidence that research is accessible via a range of channels, and that NSRP research is, in some cases, being taken forward and deepened by others. **Mixed evidence** (in relation to decision makers being influenced by evidence and by increasing public pressure for change): The evaluation found anecdotal examples of NSRP's research influencing changes in practice through identifying and targeting key powerholders (as would-be users of research and evidence) in the conflict management arena. However, the evidence in this area (drawn from NSRP's monitoring tools) remains weak and somewhat piecemeal. In Case 3, the evidence produced was said to validate stakeholders' existing approach; in Case 6 the shift in policy was due to convening the right actors and persuading of the recognized need to shift a patently failing policy, rather than specific evidence; in Case 5 a review of evidence preceded the code of principles produced, but seemed relatively marginal to the argument; in Case 9 evidence was cited but played limited role, where the main advocacy thrust was to change the political agenda on a known problem (the prevalence of VAWG) and where media focus on particularly bad examples of abuse were more important than statistics (which were at any rate of poor quality as indicators of VAWG prevalence).	

TOC Level	Outcome	Evidence	Assumptions
		Typically, evidence was therefore deployed where available, but as part of a wider spectrum of advocacy and lobbying tools. The TOC should reflect that wider set of lobbying tools, of which evidence-use is only one. **Limited evidence** (increasing public pressure for change): There is limited evidence of the extent to which NSRP platforms / initiatives mobilized wider public pressure for change. Case 9 suggests that the advocacy strategy adopted by the Kano WPSN was successful in raising public awareness of the importance of VAWG, and contributed to changes in the prioritization of this issue politically. All other states with WPSNs have a SAP, which is indicative of a broader and considerable success of the strategy adopted to increase public pressure and public awareness of the issue. This was not the approach adopted in any other cases.	scrutiny has not happened extensively, but that public demand for change has some traction. In none of the case studies has involvement expanded beyond the stakeholders involved in the platform. The links of many of the stakeholders to the public often appear remote to their constituents – civil society organisations do not typically include their constituents in their governance structure and the state agencies are linked through the democratic processes. This suggests that the assumption should be reframed, away from the simple fact of inclusion in the platforms (which is important) and towards the use of advocacy strategies which focus media and public attention. Case 9 and the WPSNs show the potential for such advocacy strategies. **Key assumption: The media are willing to play their part in deterring violence and in not inflaming conflict.** There is strong evidence to suggest that the media is willing to engage in deterring violence. NSRP report a "marked improvement in the level of conflict sensitivity of radio discussion programmes". NSRP's work to conflict sensitise the Nigerian media provides a strong example of NSRP's capacity to positively influence step changes in practice, this time through training in conflict sensitive ways of action (Case 4). Individuals within all NSRP's partner radio stations are now adopting and applying CSC principles and approaches as a result of workplace mentoring and training. There have been marked improvements in the conflict sensitivity of radio discussion programmes. The 2017 APS data revealing that 65% of citizens believe that a
	Engagement platforms are institutionalized and societal capacity to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change is built	**Strong evidence** (in relation to the platforms being institutionalized): there is strong evidence to suggest that the platforms have been moderately well institutionalized, in that they meet regularly and show a vibrancy of connections. However, it is unclear the extent to which these institutions will persist after NSRP funding: 16% of respondents say it will continue unchanged; 64% that there would be some reduction in activities; only 7% that it would be discontinued; and 11% that they would meet in other forums. **Strong evidence** (in relation to societal capacity to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change): Here we adopt a focus on the broader field of advocacy strategies than simply deployment of evidence to legitimize a position; moreover, societal capacity is understood to be expressed through NSRP's platforms. Certain actors are consistently perceived to be influential members and important for the platform to achieve its goals – most notably, state security institutions and CBOs who were consistently cited in the top 5 'influencers' across most NSRP platforms. The evidence suggests that many of the important stakeholders for success are socially marginal (in particular, youths groups), suggesting inclusive programming. Other groups, including women's groups, are intensely networked but are not seen as the most successful or important partners in peoples' work. Such groups are less crucial for achieving change but are active members of the networks.	
	Dialogue and debate to understand and	**Limited evidence** (in relation to the influence over structural drivers of change): the case studies suggest that in the convening and mediation functions, there have *in some cases* been efforts to address the structural	

TOC Level	Outcome	Evidence	Assumptions
	influence the structural drivers of change	drivers of change. Sometimes, as in Case 7, these appear successfully to respond to the causes of local conflicts; wider structural political economic conflicts are harder to address (see Case 8 and the herders/farmers conflict). In the advocacy and influencing functions, there has been limited evidence that *in some cases* they have sought to identify and address the structural political economic problems, notably in Cases 3 and 6, which both identified the structural drivers of the insurgency and ways to respond.	'more conflict sensitive media' has helped resolve conflict.
Outcome Level 3	Communities and platforms are empowered. Their voices are heard and their capacity to manage conflict improved through inclusive sustainable mechanisms	**Strong Evidence** (in relation to the extent to which *platforms* are empowered to participate in conflict management processes)**:** there is strong evidence that the platforms have played a role in conflict management processes – often through fostering existing spaces or creating new spaces and bringing new actors in, creating new opportunities to be involved. This can be seen both for platforms working in the convening and mediation functions, but also those who are working in advocacy and training primarily. Community-based, youth and women's group are often considered important partners for success. There is strong positive evidence that participation by members is frequent and diverse. Organisations representing youth are suggested to be the most frequent contributors at platform meetings, followed by security sector institutions and women's groups. The great majority of platform members that participated in the platform participant survey also feel able to scrutinise and challenge the actions of conflict management stakeholders. Platform members, and the peace architecture more broadly (including the media and other donor programmes), have benefited from their involvement in NSRP-supported platforms and NSRP training because of new/ enhanced knowledge, understanding and awareness (of their roles and responsibilities in relation to conflict management and of conflict management processes); increased confidence to raise issues of concern; and enhanced skills and capacities which are supporting their role as effective contributors to the conflict management process. Barriers to active participation in platforms appear low and the platforms appear safe spaces for open discussion. However, state actors feel most able to speak up and express their views at platform meetings. **No evidence** (in relation to *communities'* empowerment): Evidence is not sufficient to claim that NSRP has contributed to broader societal participation	**Key Assumption: That stakeholders are willing and able to change their behaviours and act to address grievances:** there is clear evidence that stakeholders have been willing and able to change their behaviours in some but not in all cases. In Case 7, there was a locally brokered change of underlying institutions of LWU which removed the triggers of conflict; in Case 8, in contrast, the underlying driver of the behaviour of one key protagonist (the herdsmen) was high-level political support, and this combined with the police's failure to prosecute meant the behaviours did not change. The assumption holds, therefore, provided the right people are involved and the state shows a willing to moderate fairly as a final arbiter. **Key Assumption: That there is appetite, will and capacity amongst decision makers to engage with and use the emerging evidence base to achieve better and more evidence-based policy and practice.** No evidence exists that producing evidence on its own – as opposed to a wider field of advocacy and lobbying techniques – will be sufficient for decision-makers to change their policy and practice. The platforms used a more sophisticated spread of techniques, which have been shown to have

TOC Level	Outcome	Evidence	Assumptions
		in conflict management processes beyond the immediate beneficiaries of its interventions and members of its platforms as envisaged at this higher level of the TOC. NSRP's media work is an exception here.	traction in several of the case studies as well as in the NSRP monitoring tool. The TOC should be adapted to reflect a wider set of advocacy tools, of which evidence use is only one and not necessarily the most important.
	Increased accountability, capacity and responsiveness of decision makers	**Limited evidence** (in relation to increased accountability)**:** There is some *prima facie* evidence – by virtue simply of the processes adopted and the cross-sectoral discussions including civil society and state actors – that there is greater accountability. The format/composition of the platforms itself leads to greater accountability. The cases show some indications of state agencies changing their behaviour, notably in Case 8. **Limited evidence** (in relation to increased responsiveness): there is no or very limited evidence of increased responsiveness of decision-makers. Again, it seems likely that the regular processes of tabling and addressing fresh conflicts, and the efforts to respond to them including state actors and decision-makers at platform level are presumably an improvement and increase the responsiveness of key decision-makers. In Case 8, the police were consistently described as being more responsive in relation to outbreaks of violence and the newly-introduced Early Warning System was instrumental to this. **Moderate evidence** (capacity)**:** There is moderate evidence that platform participants (including decision makers) have increased their capacity through the training and support work provided through the NSRP platforms. The platform perception survey reported high perceptions of improvement.	
	Changes in policy and practice and narrative around violence	**Inconclusive evidence:** The evaluation research finds a range of examples at all levels of where NSRP has successfully influenced key actors/ institutions in the conflict arena resulting, in some cases, in key policy and practice changes that have enhanced stability and reconciliation. However, this evidence is drawn almost entirely from the 9 evaluation Case studies and is weakened somewhat as a result of positive bias. Looking more broadly across the programme, NSRP's has reported 38 instances of influence across the near-5-year programme period. Occasions of reported policy or practice change are particularly low for Output 1 and 2 platforms/initiatives, and only four instances were reported in Year 4 of the programme. However, the numbers suffer from methodological and conceptual issues. Accurately assessing the extent of NSRP's contribution is	

TOC Level	Outcome	Evidence	Assumptions
		also made more difficult as a result of potentially low levels of reporting through NSRP's M&E system which in turn could result in NSRP's contribution in this area being underestimated.	
Outcome Level 4	Conflict is managed non-violently more often in NSRP's target states	**Mixed/Inconclusive Evidence:** The formal NSRP monitoring data suggests that the programme resolved / prevented 89 for all platforms across a 5-year period. However, weaknesses in the monitoring data and in the indicators themselves, combined with the more positive case study evidence, suggest that this picture may underestimate the value of the programme (although this cannot be quantified).	**Key assumption: That the combined effect of NSRP's Outcome pathways affects change in the way in which people think about violence and respond to it, reducing the acceptability and inevitability of violence:** there is limited evidence that the outcome pathways are interacting at this stage to achieve a shift in the way in which the broader society is thinking about violence and responding to it. That deeper culture change has not yet happened.

Appendix B Rapid Outcome Assessment Case Studies

Case No.	1	Outcomes of peace clubs in countering violence against persons living with disability in Kaduna State

Introduction

NSRP is supporting a Civil Society Organisation (CSO) in Kaduna – Women with Disability and Self Reliance Centre (WWDSRC) – to establish and facilitate peace clubs for adolescent girls, women and adolescent boys in Kaduna South and Kaduna North. This aspect of the NSRP programme sits under **Output Stream 3 (Output 3.2 Improving the prevention of and response to violence against girls and women by supporting safe spaces for girls and women and building a constituency of support amongst leaders, men and male youth).**

A purpose of the grant for "Inclusive Peace Clubs for Tudun Wada and Kakuri Communities of Kaduna South Local Government Areas (LGA)" is to *"increase women's and girls' participation in peace initiatives and to create awareness towards reduction of gender-based violence [GBV]"*.[1] The project aims to *"create a platform where women and girls will be socially included at various levels of development, and will build their capacity to increase the voice of these socially excluded groups."*[2] The stated purpose is to "*have an inclusive voice and to reduce violence against women and girls with disability.*"[3] It aims to promote gender and social inclusion as persons with disability and other vulnerable groups are brought together and trained to voice one another's issues, share experiences and enhance their self-esteem.[4] Specifically, the peace clubs aim to provide the following: [5]

- Safe spaces within which participants can learn life skills relating to conflict, participation in decision-making and advocacy; 6
- Enhanced self-esteem;
- Tools to negotiate conflict in their own lives and in the wider community;
- A place where participants can learn that GBV is a violation of rights and develop strategies accordingly;
- A place where participants learn to speak up for themselves according to their life stages;
- Healthy living choices;
- Rights literacy;
- Learning about peer leadership or peer organisation; and
- Skills to report violence against members and other people in the community.

The clubs build members' capacity to *"identify themselves as human beings,"* [7] by helping members to advocate for themselves and others. The peace club curriculum promotes inclusion, peaceful coexistence, and teaches pupils how to relate to teachers, one another, and marginalised persons or groups. By pairing together able-bodied, disabled facilitators and children (to some extent), both communities learn from, and about, one another. The clubs are divided into smaller "clublets": in theory, these are clublets for girls (aged 10–13 years); big sisters (aged 13–14 years); aunties – as mentors and direct beneficiaries (18-24 years); 'brothers' - boys (aged 10–13 years); and big brothers (14-17 years old).[8] In reality, the ages in the clublets appear to be more fluid.[9]

[1] WWDSRC (2013), *Grant Application,* p.2.
[2] WWDSRC (2013), *Grant Application,* p.2.
[3] WWDSRC (2013), *Grant Application*, p.5.
[4] WWDSRC (2013), *Grant Application,* p.4.
[5] Adapted from WWDSRC, Project Proposal, p. 2.
[6] 'Safe spaces' refers both to autonomous, physical spaces for women and girls and to ensuring that public space is safe for them.
[7] Interview with WWDSRC, 08.10.2015.
[8] NSRP, *Concept Note for NSRP Peace Clubs,* p. 4.
[9] Aunties in the Sanusi club are aged 13-24 years [22].

Definition of the Impact Event

The impact event explored is the outcome of the peace clubs on countering violence against persons living with disability. "Violence" is understood broadly to cover physical, sexual, and psychological/emotional violence.[10]

Inputs

NSRP is supporting WWDSRC with technical and financial assistance (GBP 49,814.11 or NGN 12,453,572) from February 2014.[11] 25 percent of the grant pays a maximum of four staff.

Activities

Reported activities are the following:

- Choice of suitable facilities for peace clubs and permission gained to establish them.
- Establishment and running of 3 peace clubs in Kaduna South, plus two additional "replicated" clubs in Kaduna South/North due to demand. The peace club facilitators utilise the NSRP Peace Club Manual to guide their activities but have adapted it to focus on *inclusion* of both able-bodied and persons living with disability.[12]
- Regular peace club meetings. Debates, quizzes and cooking competitions to encourage children to attend. Ongoing informal "mentoring" of peace club members by facilitators.
- Funding for small businesses for women with disability e.g. in poultry, weaving.

Training and capacity-building:

- Training and ongoing capacity building of 50 peace club facilitators (18 disabled, 32 able-bodied).
- VAWG incident reporting training for some peace club facilitators and peace club members.
- In-school education for all peace clubs and peers on the effects of drugs on youths (able-bodied and disabled) as an inflator of conflict.
- Life skills, mediation and media advocacy workshops focusing on women's rights, support for persons with disability, and education for parents on the care and treatment of children with disability.
- Workshops on self-reliance.

Advocacy:

- Advocacy visits to community members including police stations, community and religious leaders, principals of schools, Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development to raise awareness about disability rights and VAWG.
- Media advocacy by peace club members.

Outputs

WWDSRC has established the following peace clubs in Kaduna South LGA:

- Government day secondary school for boys in Kargi.
- Kaduna State Rehabilitation Centre in Kakuri. This is a residential skills acquisition centre offering courses e.g. in shoe-making, tailoring, cane-weaving.
- Government day secondary school for girls in Tudun Nupawa.

The MTE is focusing on outcomes for the above three peace clubs as key informant interviews were undertaken there.

Two new clubs were formed in 2015 following requests to WWDSRC to "replicate" the existing clubs:

- Sanusi Aunties' Club in Kaduna South.
- Federal Technical College Malali in Kaduna North.

The five clubs have been facilitated and are overseen by WWDSRC. The number attending the peace clubs is unclear with conflicting information available from different sources. Similarly, the number of facilitators is unclear, again due to conflicting information. There are a total of 38 facilitators in the original 3 peace club locations, and a further 12 in the new replicated clubs, according to WWDSCR, giving a total of 50. Key informants at the facilities said there were 24 facilitators (6 in the secondary school for boys, 13 in the rehabilitation centre and 5 in the girls' school). Table 1 illustrates the numbers reportedly attending various peace clubs, broken down by source of information. It illustrates a clear disparity between what is reported by the grantee and the peace club facilities.

Sources of information	Peace club locations					
		Secondary school for boys	**State rehabilitation center**	**Secondary school for girls**	**Sanusi Aunties' Club**	**Federal Technical College**
	WWDSRC	320	150	350	38 (38f)	100 (40m, 60f)
	Principal, secondary school for boys, Kargi	200 boys, no disabled				
	Peace club facilitators, rehabilitation centre, Kakuri		120 (55m, 65f), 100 disabled			
	Staff member, secondary school for girls, Tudun Nupawa			75 girls, no disabled		
	Female peace club members			45 girls, no disabled		

An additional club has been formed in the Department of Science and Rehabilitation, in the Federal Polytechnic Kaduna. This is run by a peace club facilitator who is in the department and receives minimal support from WWDSRC to implement activities.

Case timeline

August 2013 – January 2014 – Development of the peace club manual by NSRP.

February 2014 – WWDSRC became a grantee of NSRP.

March 2014 – Facilitators chosen by WWDSRC (involving community reconnaissance, outreach, identification of community facilitators)[13] and meetings held to explain the project, including advocacy visits to traditional leaders.

April 2014 - Selection of schools in which to establish peace clubs.[14] Training of peace club facilitators by NSRP on the Peace Club Manual and inauguration of facilitators, attended by the Permanent Secretary of the Kaduna State Ministry of Women Affairs.

April 2014 - Establishment of peace club in secondary school for boys and girls in Tudun Nupawa.

[10] The project understands violence broadly as per international human rights law e.g. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, defines violence against women as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life." Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. New York, United Nations, 23 February 1994 (Resolution No. A/RES/48/104).

11 To date, GBP 9,632,125.81 has been disbursed. Information provided by NSRP, 03.11.2015.

12 The Peace Club Manual focuses on the following: i). Life skills: mediation and negotiation; advocacy and speaking up; how to participate in decision-making; leadership. ii). Rights: knowledge about entitlements; gender-based violence – what it is, why it is wrong, what they can do about it, how to report it. This includes sessions on: causes and management of conflict; self-esteem and assertiveness; relationship and negotiation skills; age appropriate adolescent reproductive health; and gender, including topics for boys to help them understand and appreciate girls.

13 Criteria for facilitators at the rehabilitation centre were literacy and membership of an association assisting persons living with disability e.g. Physically Handicapped Association of Nigeria (PHAN), National Association for the Blind (NAB), Nigeria National Association for the Deaf.

14 In early 2014, following several visits from WWDSRC, the head of Kargi school told WWDSRC to write to the Ministry of Education through the zonal director seeking permission to establish peace clubs in the school. The ministry accepted the application and instructed the principal to cooperate with WWDRSC.

April - May 2014 – Training of 10 facilitators in the rehabilitation centre by Education is a Vaccine (EVA)[15] on the identification and reporting of cases of Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG). This involved a "basic orientation", including on the existence of the Observatory Steering Committee (OBSTEC).

May 2014 – Establishment of peace club in Kaduna State Rehabilitation Centre, Kakuri.

May/ June 2014 – Establishment of Peace Club Support Committee by National Directorate of Employment (NDE), and including the State Ministry of Education and State Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development.

June - August 2014 - Training of peace club facilitators by WWDSRC. Peace clubs grow following the introduction of popular activities e.g. quizzes, debates on disability issues, cooking competitions. Refreshments were offered in addition to prizes e.g. notebooks and bags.

August 2014 – Training for Aunties (20 mentors) and peace club members (20 mentees) in mediation life skills. The focus of the training was on: mediation and negotiation; communication; trust; gender roles; gender-based violence; and causes and management of conflict. Informal mentoring and follow up of peace club members took place as a result. Ongoing advocacy visits to community and religious leaders led to growing support. Visits include district head (Kakuri), religious leaders and schools, including some selected Almajiri schools.

September - October 2014: Separation of boys from girls and movement of boys to Kargi school.

Since January 2015 - Requests for replication of the peace clubs from external parties. In April 2015 a Technical College in Malali, Kaduna North wrote to WWDSRC to ask it to establish a club, noting that clubs fostered peaceful coexistence among students and the integration of disabled persons. Two new clubs were formed: Sanusi Aunties' Club in Kaduna South, and Federal Technical College Malali, following training of facilitators. Both clubs are monitored by WWDSRC staff.

January - February 2015 – One weeks focus for all peace club members and their peers on the effects of drug use as an inflator of conflict, involving WWDSRC staff, peace clubs facilitators, the OBSTEC chairperson, EVA and a member of the Women, Peace and Security Network.[16]

February 2015 – Establishment of peace club in Kargi boys' school.[17] EVA trained 5 to 6 facilitators on reporting cases of VAWG. Peace Clubs Members and other youths in both schools were also trained by EVA/WWDSRC on reporting incidents of violence.

Since June 2015 - Involvement of parents of persons with disability in sessions on care of their children. Ongoing advocacy by WWDSRC: letters written to community persons and the police to seek to educate them about disability issues. Visits to the Commissioner of the Ministry of Women's Affairs and community leaders. Growing support from community leaders for the peace clubs reported.

July 2015 – Training for Aunties' to improve their advocacy skills. The rehabilitation centre was closed indefinitely due to a lack of funds for food. The peace club members advocated with the centre to re-open it. The centre advocated with the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which appealed to the Governor who provided the necessary funding. The centre resumed in July 2015 after a month's break, which was a planned holiday.

From August 2015 – Aunties' use of radio to discuss disability issues. Peace club members have been on air on Liberty FM, Freedom Radio, Kaduna State Media Corporation (KSMC) and the Federal Radio Corporation, interviewed in Hausa and English. With KSMC they paid for six slots and were given 12, while airtime on the other stations was free.

15 EVA's role within NSRP is to create a virtual repository of incidences of VAWG and facilitate a local multi-stakeholder's response team to address cases in Kaduna and Kano states. The sources of these VAWG cases are media reports, direct reporting, and through NSRP partners working with young people at community level through the peace clubs.

16 WWDSRC, Submission of Activity Reports Covering Expenditures for the Financial Report for December 2014 – February 2015 for Grant Number 716607, 18 March 2015, p.5.

17 The delay was due the principal being cautious about "interfering" with the primary objective of education in the school.

The process of change

Operating context pre-NSRP intervention

Prior to the NSRP intervention the operating environment was one characterised by the routine and chronic marginalisation of women and girls living with disability. This manifested itself in relation to poor access to education and health, thereby leading to chronic poverty.[18] Women and girls were more likely to experience gender-based violence (GBV) and less likely to speak up about it, partly due to their reliance on care-givers who are often the perpetrators of the violence.[19] There is no specific data in Nigeria on the numbers of persons with disabilities in general, and women and girls with disabilities in particular.[20] There is no law to safeguard the rights of persons with disabilities, except at state level e.g. in Lagos, Plateau, Bauchi, Ogun. Where these laws do exist, *"like most laws that are passed in Nigeria, the greater challenge always lies in the implementation of the law,"* according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.[21] The National Disability Bill has been passed by Nigeria's Parliament and is awaiting Presidential assent.

Before the WWDSRC intervention, many persons living with disability in Kaduna South suffered from physical, sexual, psychological and emotional violence. The major forms of abuse include discrimination and stigma, which affect persons with disability in almost all walks of life. In schools, work places and in public buses people with disability were discriminated against, according to peace club facilitators. Some disabled persons were stopped from marrying because of their disabilities [KI, peace club facilitators]. When persons with disability sought rented accommodation, they were often openly denied it, even if they had the money to pay [KI, peace club facilitators]. Crimes such as theft deliberately targeted persons with disability [KI, police in Kaduna].

Parents of children with disability often lacked knowledge about how to manage their children. This resulted in discriminatory behaviour towards children, partly resulting from discrimination against parents of such children, and also from a lack of economic means to support their children [KI, WWDSRC]. Women and girls living with disability were at the very bottom of the social structure, at the bottom of the group of "marginalised" people and even lower down than other women. Some parents treated their disabled children as *"animals*" with terrible treatment being endured and demoralising language used [KI, WWDSRC]. Peace club facilitators reported that parents were mostly guilty of violating their children's rights: "*They don't regard them as humans."* Parents' anger and frustration were often directed at their disabled children.

During violent conflict, women and girls with disabilities were less able to flee and became even more vulnerable to exploitation and violence due to being reliant on others. The violence experienced forms a continuum with experiences during times of relative peace.[22] Persons with disability were more likely to experience violence, stigma and marginalization and continued to be excluded from decision-making processes as well as peace and security interventions and programmes.[23] Generally speaking, women with disabilities are not included in the development/drafting of laws, programmes and policies as they *"are not mainstreamed into general women's movement in Nigeria"* according to the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights.[24]

Before NSRP, some of the peace club facilitators were already working with WWDSRC in the area of mobilization and organizing workshops for persons with disability. From 2008, WWDSRC was involved in organizing sensitization workshops in Kaduna South. It was also involved in enlightenment campaigns on human rights and providing guidance and counselling to victims of violence. This was in addition to staging a campaign against HIV/AIDS in 2008, where pamphlets and other educational materials were distributed.

18 NSRP/Inclusive Friends (n.d), What violence means to us: women with disabilities speak, p.13.
19 NSRP/Inclusive Friends (n.d), What violence means to us: women with disabilities speak, pp. 1-2.
20 OHCHR (n.d), Questionnaire for the preparation of the analytical study on Violence against women and girls and disability (A/HRC/RES/17/11), p. 1.
21 OHCHR (n.d), Questionnaire for the preparation of the analytical study on Violence against women and girls and disability (A/HRC/RES/17/11), p. 1.
22 NSRP/Inclusive Friends (n.d), What violence means to us: women with disabilities speak, pp.1-2.
23 NSRP/Inclusive Friends (n.d), What violence means to us: women with disabilities speak, pp.1-2.
24 OHCHR (n.d), Questionnaire for the preparation of the analytical study on Violence against women and girls and disability (A/HRC/RES/17/11), p.2.

However, its capacity was limited, according to NSRP, particularly in the areas of budgeting/accounting and reporting.

Operating environment as a result of NSRP

There has been a reported reduction in discrimination against and stigma of persons with disability in targeted areas of Kaduna South. There is more hope among peace club members and facilitators, including those who are living with a disability. *"With the intervention of NSRP a lot has changed now. The NSRP project has brought persons living with varying disabilities to work together. It has created some sort of hope and self-esteem among the facilitators. This is being rolled out to the participants of the peace clubs,"* according to a key informant [KI, peace club facilitators]. This is accompanied by a reported greater understanding of disability rights and the violence that persons with disability are often subjected to within the community [KIs, peace club facilitators, male peace club members, older peace club members (Aunties)]. "*There is improvement in the way people treat the disabled. People are now aware that the disabled are humans like everybody and there is ability in disability,"* according to one key informant [KI, "Aunty" peace club member]. "*The attitudes of people toward women living with disabilities are gradually changing for good…Many people are willing to help them."* Female community members reported a greater awareness of women's rights and a reduction in violence targeting women and female children [KI, female community members]. Male community members reported better inter-religious relations, fewer inciteful statements, better relations between men and women, and a heightened awareness of the danger of violence [KI, male community members]. "*Men no longer under rate women in their communities,"* said one male key informant.

The NSRP project has brought persons living with varying disabilities and able-bodied persons together, thereby enhancing understanding of their potential, abilities and capabilities. Issues affecting persons with disabilities are generally more appreciated, including by traditional and religious leaders. Overall, the work of the peace club members and WWDSRC has reportedly contributed to creating more visibility on disability issues and VAWG. The general behaviour of the male peace club members, in particular, has improved.

Key informants attributed reported changes to a great range of both WWDSRC-related activities and external events. Peace club-related influencers of positive change in targeted LGAs include the following:

Establishment of the peace clubs and their regular meetings;
Training of the peace club facilitators;
Peace club motivating activities e.g. refreshments, quizzes, competitions;
Support from traditional leaders for the project;
Advocacy training and work; and
Workshops and sensitization/town hall meetings.

A number of external events were also cited as being significant in terms of changing attitudes or behaviours. These include:

The 2012 Special Olympics as part of which Nigeria won several medals.
The separation of male and female secondary students in September/October 2014, following a meeting with traditional and religious leaders organized by the police to address the problem of the boys "terrorizing" the community.
The Independent National Electoral Commission's (INEC) invitation to persons with disabilities to be observers during the 2015 General Election and voter education seminar.
The ban on street begging in Kaduna State introduced by the Governor in April 2015.25
The placement of a Special Adviser on Disability Matters to the Executive Governor of Kaduna State.
The work of other NGOs and organizations including the Development Peace Initiative of the Catholic diocese of Kaduna, Women's Peace and Security Network, Hope for the Village Child, Rotary Club, Physically Challenged Welding Multipurpose Cooperative, Mercy Corps.
The introduction by the Kaduna State Governor of free education from primary to junior secondary school in mid-2015, which is being used as an advocacy tool by WWDSRC.

However, despite the positive changes outlined above there is little tangible evidence of a reduction in physical or other violence targeting persons with disability as a direct result of NSRP's intervention, partly because of the project's inadequate monitoring and evaluation system. A strengthened data gathering system with support from NSRP to systematically collate and analyse findings is required.

25 Fewer persons with disability are seen begging [KIs with male community members, Aunties in peace clubs].

Outcomes (and impacts) – The evidence base

Reporting mechanism for VAWG

A reporting mechanism was established as part of the project to monitor incidents of violence targeting women and girls.[26] In theory, reporting of incidents is undertaken by peace club facilitators to another NSRP grantee, EVA, which in turn reports to the Kaduna Observatory Steering Committee (OBSTEC).[27] However, the MTE concluded that the system was dysfunctional:

i. **Allowances and expertise.** Peace club facilitators are expected to report incidents of violence, and to "follow-up" on cases when necessary.[28] Peace club facilitators described a lack of "motivation" to report cases to EVA and follow up on cases (including by taking people to hospital) due to a lack of funds. "*The facilitators have to be motivated with some allowances or salaries. This is because, the facilitators are the ones close to [the] victims, so in cases where they are being abused, funds are required to report and follow-up on it*" [KI, peace club facilitators]. They described their allowance as grossly inadequate. [29] They were required to use their own resources and were often not refunded [KI, peace club facilitators]. They complained that air-time, phones and refreshments were needed. They also said they lacked technical expertise to follow up effectively on cases. One key informant noted: "*Following up is not effective, as a lot of technical knowledge is required which the facilitators do not have, like medical, legal, counselling, etc*" [KI, peace club facilitators].

ii. **Functionality of OBSTEC.** A total of 29 cases of violence were reported to EVA by peace club facilitators between July 2014 and September 2015, out of a total of 114 reports received.[30] The MTE observed that some cases are being reported to EVA, but not being recorded in good time.[31] OBSTEC, in turn, reports a tiny number of cases for the whole of Kaduna State from multiple sources: in June 2015, 5 cases were reported; in May 2015, two cases; in April 2015 four cases; in March 2015, three cases; in February 2015, two cases; and in January 2015 no cases at all.[32] Given the prevalence of VAWG in Kaduna state, these figures are negligible: the latest Demographic and Health Survey (2013) for Nigeria showed that 13.5% of women in Kaduna State (population = 3,023,065[33]) had experienced physical or sexual violence in the past 12 months from any husband or partner (n=1,262).[34] A total of 43.1% of women aged 15-49 had experienced physical, sexual or emotional

26 Generally speaking, the success of peace clubs is supposed to be measured by the number of incidents of VAWG, as reported by the clubs' participants. Measurement of the prevalence of VAWG comes from reports of club members, measured against a base line, and from the cohort studies. NSRP, Peace Club Concept Note, p.5.

27 OBSTEC KADUNA was inaugurated on 26, May 2014 and is coordinated by EVA. OBSTEC meets bi-monthly with ad hoc meetings where necessary and has had 8 meetings so far. OBSTEC is made of volunteer persons with various expertise including legal, shelter, medical, and psychosocial support. The Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development is the Vice Chair for the Kaduna OBSTEC. The Department of Child Welfare is under the Ministry.

28 WWDSRC confirmed that 1,000 NGN (3.31 GBP) was paid per person, including a transportation allowance.

29 WWDSRC confirmed that 1,000 NGN (3.31 GBP) was paid per person, including a transportation allowance.

30 Partial data set from EVA viewed. Records were incomplete.

31 Observation made by field researcher.

32 June 2015 is the latest data available. Reports from NSRP and partners on reported cases of VAWG to OBSTEC Kaduna. See, for example, NSRP et al (2015), Violence Affecting Women and Girls in the Eight NSRP Target States, Monthly Memo #11, March 2015 Data, 19 May.

33 See National Population Commission, Nigeria at http://www.population.gov.ng/index.php/kaduna-state

34 National Population Commission (NPC) [Nigeria] and ICF International. 2014. Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2013. Abuja, Nigeria, and Rockville, Maryland, USA: NPC and ICF International, p. 320.

violence (n=1,262).[35] When these figures are considered alongside the OBSTEC data it suggests that there is significant under-reporting of the issue.

iii. When cases of VAWG do reach OBSTEC from peace club facilitators, it is unclear whether they are systematically followed up in a timely manner. It can be difficult to engage with OBSTEC because of individual members' – who are volunteers – with personal and professional engagements leading to delays, according to a key informant. NSRP acknowledges this as a constraint [KI, NSRP]. One key informant said that response delays were not frequent but gave the example of the rape of a child of 7 or 8 years old: the Ministry of Women's Affairs was not available to reach out to the family until a week after the incident and, even then, a sociologist was sent as the counselor was on another assignment, suggesting an inappropriate response.

Awareness of violence targeting persons with disability, including VAWG

There is a heightened awareness of the kinds of violence and discrimination that disabled persons are subjected to [KIs, school principal, male community members, peace club facilitators]. Hawking and begging by girl children has reportedly reduced, according to Aunties and male community members, although this may be connected to the Governor's ban on begging in 2015. A general increased awareness of disability issues, including women's and girls' rights is reported. This has been facilitated in multiple ways by WWDSRC including through the inclusive nature of the peace club facilitation, the direct contact among able-bodied and disabled in some of the clubs, the outreach work of the Aunties, WWDSRC's advocacy work with traditional and religious leaders,[36] workshops and sensitization meetings, town-hall meetings every last Saturday of the month at the WWDSRC office, and through the use of media. WWDSRC has successfully worked to progressively raise awareness among an ever-wider range of people from public school heads, to traditional and religious leaders (e.g. district heads), school children, parents of disabled persons and the wider public. It plans to engage private schools in the future as this is a key institutional setting where abuse takes place.

Violence targeting boys

Despite the fact that boys with disabilities are part of the peace clubs, there is no mechanism for recording cases of violence targeting them and it is unclear what follow up there is. "*We are not sure what happens to cases against boys. The Observatory has been marketed and communicated as a VAWG service only,"* said one key informant. This places boys, who may be just as vulnerable to violence as girls, at a distinct disadvantage. It also risks perpetuating myths around boys not being vulnerable to violence, including sexual violence, thereby doing harm. Another key informant commented:

> *"On a general ground, incidences of violence against women and girls are mostly reported, but reporting cases of boys' violation are not taken seriously. This is strange in a way, because as priority is not placed on violence against boys, a lot of infringement can be meted on them without any action taken"* [KI with peace club facilitators].

Inclusivity of peace clubs

The peace clubs are run by a disability rights CSO with the goal of promoting inclusivity and participation. The aim of bringing able-bodied and disabled persons together with a view to breaking down discrimination and reducing violence is laudable. Yet, paradoxically, the school clubs are not inclusive and in this sense the WWDSRC model is weak. Among the 200 members of the peace club in Kargi boys' school, the only person with a disability enrolled in November 2015. One other disabled member graduated in 2014. A peace club member commented:

> "*We have not yet visited any place where people with disability stay or work, but one of our*

35 National Population Commission (NPC) [Nigeria] and ICF International. 2014. Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2013. Abuja, Nigeria, and Rockville, Maryland, USA: NPC and ICF International, p. 316.

36 Obtaining buy-in for the project from traditional leaders was considered particularly important as it gave the project wide acceptance in the community.

facilitators is physically challenged and she is the one who brought those gifts[37] *at the inception ceremony of the peace club…Our facilitators said we will be visiting remand homes and WWDSRC['s] office to interact with people living with disabilities so as to know the kind of challenges they face."*

None of the six facilitators in the boys' school has a disability. Similarly, in the girls' school, there are no disabled members, [38] although 2 out of a total of five facilitators are persons with disability [KIs at the schools]. Female peace club members have visited the WWDSRC office and interacted with persons with disability. The uninclusive nature of the clubs is attributed by WWDSRC to the lack of facilities to allow physical access, the poor enrolment of children with disabilities in schools by parents, and the absence of a disability-friendly programme and policy in state schools. In the rehabilitation centre, in contrast, there are 120 persons attending (65 female, 55 male) of whom 100 are living with a disability and 7 of the 13 facilitators are persons with disability. Figures provided by WWDSRC for the Technical College (100 members of whom 60 disabled, 40 able-bodied) and the Sanusi club (38 Aunties of whom 20 are able-bodied and 18 disabled) have not been verified.

More positive attitudes to persons with disability

There is a perception of changing attitudes towards persons with disability as a result of the peace clubs and related advocacy. Key informants commented:

"The attitudes of people toward women living with disabilities are gradually changing for good. They understood that there is ability in disability. Many people are willing to help them" [KI, Aunties].

"The attitude of its [peace club] members to conflict resolution has changed which in turn has affected their behaviour positively toward peaceful resolution of conflicts and peaceful coexistence. They are more aware of the disabled in the society and how best to behave towards them and ways of countering violence towards them" [KI, male community members].

"The rate of girl-child hawking (begging) has reduced as a result of frequent sensitization programmes. Some of the girls who still hawk do that after the school hours" [KI, female community members].

"The peace club has helped to stop violence against people living with disability by making us understand that they are to be treated with respect like anyone else" [KI, male peace club members].

"We relate with people with physical disability normally…we learnt that physical disability does not stop people from living a normal life" [KI, female peace club members].

There is a perception of a reduction in violence among some key informants [KIs, male peace club members, female community members, Aunties]. Evidence is anecdotal, however. Evidence provided by WWDSRC shows that in 2012, there were 5 girls living with a disability at the rehabilitation centre who were pregnant and some "drop out" cases while in 2013, there were four cases of pregnancy and "some drop outs". Since 2014, there have been no such cases. Without further information, as to the circumstances of the pregnancies and data on attendance, it is impossible to make a judgement on this.

Confidence and self-esteem

The peace clubs are operating successfully and are a popular initiative. Messages around assertiveness, disability and women's rights, building self-esteem, relating to others (including marginalised groups) and halting discrimination, are powerful [KIs, school principals, male peace club members, male and female community members]. Female community members reported: "*First of all, the club helped in teaching the disabled persons about their rights as human beings and [to] report cases of violations to the police*." Aunties reported the following: "*Most members know their fundamental human rights and their confidence of life has increased. They can now talk in public without fear. As a result, they now attend wedding and naming ceremonies with confidence. They learnt how to fight for their rights using peaceful means."*

Peaceful co-existence

Key informants reported that the peace club in Kargi Boys Secondary School had contributed to the reduction of violence in the school and outside [KIs, school principal, male peace club members, police]. The police confirmed this: "*…we know that the level of notorious activities perpetrated by the students from GDSS have reduced since we barely receive complaints from the community on violence by the students. We may attribute that to the activities of WWDRSC and consider it as a change in the community."* Club members have reportedly become advocates for peace in the school and in their community and have been given the

37 This is a reference to prizes for various peace club activities.
38 According to WWDSRC there are two.

necessary mediation skills. Discipline amongst the students has improved. Students are attending classes more and have stopped playing truant and getting into trouble outside school, leading to fewer complaints from the public.[39] The separation of the boys from the girls in September/October 2014, following a meeting called by the police and involving traditional and religious leaders, may also have contributed to the improvement in behaviour. This resulted from the boys "actively terrorizing" the community, according to the police.

Male community members reported better relations between persons of different religions, a greater awareness of the dangers of violence, and a reduction in inflammatory statements. Female peace club members said: "*We don't differentiate between ourselves because of our tribes or religion…when I joined this school I don't want to associate with the Yorubas even though I am Yoruba because of the stereotype attached to the tribe….so I use[d] to avoid interacting with them, but now I know differently, we need to learn to live peacefully with each other, we should coexist and show good example"* [KI with female peace club members].

The draft 2014 NSRP Cohort Study for Kaduna State confirms that the peace clubs have brought "peaceful co-existence, enlightenment on peace building, amicable resolution of conflict, unity among different ethnic groups and religion[s], and cooperation and solidarity between different groups".[40]

Capacity of disability rights CSO (WWDSRC)

WWDSRC, whose capacity is considered to be weak,[41] is now better connected to other actors who have responsibility for disability issues in Kaduna State. Its reporting, accounting and advocacy skills have improved as a result of NSRP training and mentoring. This, in turn, has resulted in its staff being able to train the peace club facilitators themselves and an increased ability to engage in advocacy around disability issues and to form a disability rights platform. In an unprecedented move, the State Ministry of Women's Affairs invited WWDSCR to make a presentation on education, employment, access, deprivation, health and empowerment on 30th September 2015, illustrating clearly that WWDSCR's profile (and hopefully its message) is growing. As outlined previously, the Ministry also advocated for the re-opening of the rehabilitation centre after it was closed in mid-2015 due to a gap in funding.[42] This led to the Governor of Kaduna State providing the necessary funds. This increased profile of a disability rights CSO is to be welcomed.

Increase in school attendance

Two key informants reported an increase in school attendance by persons with disability. According to WWDSRC, a total of 8 peace club members (aged 14-24) who finished their skills acquisition in the rehabilitation centre went on to enroll in schools to further theireducation as a result of the peace clubs.[43] The schools enrolled in were Alihudahuda Zaria (an inclusive school), Fadan Kaje (an inclusive school) and Kaduna Special School. This was not verified. WWDSRC also reported that several members of the Sanusi peace club (comprising girls and women aged 13-24) were enrolled in the Tudun Nupawa girls' school and other children with disability were referred and enrolled in the Kargi boys school. School principals in the boys' school reported one child with a disability enrolling in the school in November 2015. No persons with disability are reported to be attending the girls' school.

Peace club support committee

The committee is supposed to include the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women's Affairs, NDE, community leaders, and the State Universal Basic Education Board. Its role is to support the peace clubs, provide

39 Despite this, however, membership in the peace clubs is reportedly not encouraged due to the constant involvement of teachers [13]. WWDSRC involves teachers in its work in the boys' school, especially English, Geography and Civic Education teachers.

40 NSRP/Hafsat Lawal Kontagora with Yusuf Ibrahim Suleiman (2014), Draft NSRP Youth Peace Club Cohort Study Kaduna State, 22 December, p.18. The draft Cohort Study reflects the views of 109 peace club members (aged 14-17), of whom 40 are from Tudun Wada and the rehabilitation centre.

41 WWDSRC has nine staff full time staff (3 men and 6 women) and three volunteers.

42 Peace club members engaged in advocacy to discuss the closure of the centre. The Centre's manager spoke with her superior who visited the Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Women's Affairs. The Governor then released the required funds. The centre resumed in July 2015 after a month's break (which was a planned holiday). Normally, this incident might have resulted in riots but in this instance it was resolved amicably.

43 Many of the students in the rehabilitation centre dropped out of formal school or had no formal schooling at all.

advisory technical support and to empower and support pilot clubs. It is unclear what has come out of this initiative. Key informants in the NDE and the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development did not mention it.

To conclude, there are a number of positive outcomes from this project. However, the evidence-base in relation to a reduction in violence, which is the focus of this study, is anecdotal. Claims around activities and outcomes appear exaggerated. While the peace clubs appear to be having a positive general and educative impact in the facilities where they are operating, and even beyond, the project also risks doing harm (see "unintended effects" discussion in Section I below).

Furthermore, the design and implementation of the project appear to be confused, in the view of the evaluation team. It is not clear what it is trying to achieve: is it aiming to increase participation in peace initiatives? (Formal peace initiatives? Peace initiatives in the home?) Create a platform where women and girls are socially included in various forms of development? Reduce Violence Against Women and Girls only? Or reduce violence against "persons" living with disability i.e. both sexes? If so, why are cases of violence against boys not responded to? The Grant Application lacks conceptual clarity.

The 'contribution' of NSRP

NSRP is the sole funder of WWDSRC and as such, has facilitated the above positive and less positive outcomes of the peace clubs. It is understood that this particular grant is small and that WWDSRC is the only disability rights organisations running peace clubs for NSRP [KI, NSRP]. For this they are to be commended and it is also recognised that the peace clubs are at a relatively early stage in their evolution. The peace clubs are about countering VAWG and this case looks at how this type of work can be delivered by a disability rights organisation and whether the approach leads to more inclusivity in practice. It is also understood that the funding was considered to be "experimental" in terms of seeing what this small CSO could achieve [KI, NSRP]. This experimental and open approach is welcomed. The outcomes in this instance are clearly mixed, however. It is recommended that NSRP pursue a more strategic approach to its Output 3 grantees, with fewer grants and a focus on better M&E, scalability and sustainability.

Key learning

The NSRP TOC in practice

Aspects of the lowest level of the NSRP Theory of Change (ToC) are fulfilled. NSRP located a committed agent of change (WWDSRC, although with limited capacity), provided technical assistance to that agent of change, and created "safe spaces" for peace club members through that agent. That said, in this case, gender is not understood in an inclusive manner and conflict sensitivity is lacking in the sense that aspects of the project actually risk doing harm unintentionally. This is due to the absence of a reliable reporting mechanism for cases of violence and the lack of capacity in relation to violence targeting boys. The evidence base around the project's effectiveness is also weak in that while there is anecdotal evidence of many positive outcomes of the peace clubs, there is little that is concrete and tangible in relation to a reduction of violence. Level 1 of the ToC is partially reflected: there is some evidence of improved communication among stakeholders; broader societal participation is occurring in that some of the peace clubs are inclusive of disabled or marginalised persons and there has been an uptake in knowledge on conflict-related issues and capacity to use this knowledge has been strengthened. Again, the conflict and gender sensitivity aspects of the project need strengthening. Assumptions around stakeholders' willingness to work with NSRP have proven true. Level two of the ToC is not yet in evidence.

Unintended effects

While the project has some positive outcomes including anecdotal evidence of more awareness of disability issues, more positive attitudes towards persons living with disability, and improved behaviour among male peace club members, NSRP risks doing harm through this project due to the following:

The absence of a reporting mechanism for violence targeting boys living with disability risks overlooking males who are being abused and perpetuating myths about their "lesser" vulnerability. This has the unintended effect of making boys more vulnerable to predation.

The lack of "motivation" to report cases risks perpetuating the idea that adults (even those supposed to help) do not value persons with disability.

The WWDSRC model is too reliant on poorly resourced and under-qualified facilitators who may or may not report cases to EVA and by extension OBSTEC. OBSTEC members who are professionals in their fields may

have limited time to offer. Whether they have the necessary expertise in child protection is unclear.44 The focus should be on the timely and professional protection of the rights of persons with disability by persons who are mandated, fully equipped, and have the knowledge to do so.

Value for money:

More evidence is required in order to comment on value for money. The determinable outcomes of the project are few at this MTE stage and a scale up of the project is deemed neither desirable in its current format, nor possible due to WWDSRC's limited capacity.

Recommendations/ final observations

Gender should always be understood in an inclusive manner. The UK Department for International Development should consider whether funding for projects addressing violence against women and girls, to the exclusion of boys and men who may also be targeted for gender-based violence, is desirable.

The project illustrates bigger picture challenges related to the functionality of OBSTEC. In an environment where the prevalence of GBV is high, the OBSTEC "volunteer" model is considered weak. If NSRP is seeking to meaningfully and sustainably address violence against persons with a disability, for example, it should seek to strengthen and capacity-build existing, sustainable (child protection) mechanisms and services in Kaduna State. This should happen for able-bodied and disabled persons as part of a systems-based strategic approach to tackling such violence.

NSRP should seek to develop an M&E system for this project that will record behavioural change and facilitate ongoing learning. This project illustrates the negative impact of NSRP not embedding solid M&E systems in a project from its inception.

The objectives of this project need to be clarified, such that there is conceptual clarity of its purpose for NSRP and the grantee.

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WWDSRC (2013), *Grant Application, Inclusive Peace Clubs for TUDUN WADA and KAKURI Communities of Kaduna south LGA, Kaduna state.*

WWDSRC (2014), *Mediation Training Report Kaduna, 4-8 August.*

WWDSCR (2015), *Submission of Activity Reports Covering Expenditures for the Financial Report for December 2014 – February 2015 for Grant Number 716607,* 18 March.

44 According to EVA, the OBSTEC in Kaduna received a two-day basic training on child protection.

Case No.	2	Outcomes of Community Peace Partnerships on peaceful conduct during 2015 elections in Kaduna South LGA

Introduction

NSRP is supporting a Civil Society Organisation (CSO) in Kaduna South Local Government Area (LGA) – the Aid Foundation – to facilitate and support a Community Peace Partnership (CPP). This aspect of the NSRP programme sits under **Output Stream 1: Security and Governance** and, specifically, under **Output 1 Component 3: Supporting target communities to address their security concerns and local level conflicts, improve relations with security providers, and link with state level structures.**

This component of the NSRP programme aims to support inter and intracommunity conflict management initiatives at LGA level, taking into account conflict dynamics specific to the targeted LGAs. Where possible, NSRP aims to facilitate the evolution of existing conflict management and peacebuilding structures into permanent multi-stakeholder CPPs. There is a significant focus on developing inclusive[45], coordinated and accountable forums/platforms, and strengthening and building the capacity of these platforms in order that they can:

- Facilitate inter-community dialogue and debate around issues emerging at local-level;
- Improve coordination and accountability in the management of conflict;
- Undertake effective conflict mediation;
- Conduct effective sensitisation; and
- Map and monitor tensions and drivers of conflict at community level to enable early warning and early prevention.

Embedded in the design of this component is coordination, not just between actors at the community and LGA level, but improved coordination and alignment between community, LGA and state level conflict management actors and mechanisms. Through its partners, NSRP aims to build links between the CPPs and NSRP-facilitated State Conflict Management Alliances (SCMAs).

NSRP's support to CPPs is rooted in the Nigerian context which is characterised by multiple forms of violence including domestic and family conflicts; inter-personal conflicts; intra-community conflicts; inter-community conflicts; and conflicts between communities and authorities. As alluded to in the Output statement above, the CPP model aims to consider these different forms of violence and effectively address specific, localised security concerns and conflicts. In Kaduna South, prior to the intervention, the conflict and security context was characterised by violent ethno-religious identity conflicts and the long-standing polarisation of the LGA along political lines. There is a history of electoral and political violence and intimidation in LGA politics and elections were recognised as a key trigger event for violence. The Kaduna South CPP was designed with these contextual factors at the fore and it is clear that many (although not all) of the activities undertaken by the CPP were focused directly on the prevention of political violence during the 2015 elections. As such, this case study focuses specifically on the contribution of the Kaduna South CPP to outcomes in relation to peaceful conduct during the 2015 elections.

Inputs

NSRP is supporting the Aid Foundation with technical expertise and financial assistance (GBP 124,123/ NGN 37,237,250). The Aid Foundation was selected as a CPP partner in October 2013 and received the first installment of grant funding in February 2014; to date 85% of funds have been disbursed. The grant runs for three years and is due to come to a close in February 2017.

Activities and outputs

NSRP is funding a range of activities related to the Kaduna South CPP as follows:

Mapping existing conflict resolution mechanisms and identifying key actors

45 CPP's are intended to mirror the multi-stakeholder approach of the SCMAs.

In 2011 NSRP undertook an in-depth mapping exercise of local level conflict prevention actors and peace initiatives in Kaduna and Plateau states[46]. The research enabled NSRP to identify potential programme partners and to better understand the local drivers of violence in both states as well as the relevant actors in instigation, prevention and management at the state and LGA level. Actors and institutions identified through the mapping as relevant, influential and as key to the success of CPPs included the police, state security service, community vigilantes, youth groups, faith-based organisations, CSOs, the LGA itself, the media, traditional and community leaders, and religious leaders [47]. The identification of key conflict management actors and institutions was also informed by a major NSRP study commissioned in 2012 on Community-level Conflict Management Mechanisms in the Niger Delta, Middle Belt and North-East Zones of Nigeria[48].

Advocacy and consultative meetings with key actors

In 2014 the Aid Foundation undertook advocacy visits and consultative meetings with local government and community level stakeholders and gatekeepers in Kaduna South LGA to introduce the programme, discuss modalities for partnerships, gain buy-in and elicit support[49]. These stakeholders included the state security outfits, local government offices, traditional rulers and district heads, women leaders and youth leaders.

Establishing and running the CPP

NSRP worked with the Aid Foundation and the Kaduna South LGA to establish the CPP and successfully engage a wide range of CPP members. The selection process was informed by the in-depth mapping exercises outlined above as well as criteria developed jointly by NSRP and the Aid Foundation[50], with participants drawn from the community level as well as security actors operating at LGA level. CPP members include:

- Traditional leaders, including the District Heads of Barnawa and Kurmin Mashi;
- Religious authorities, including Jama'atul Nasril Islam;
- Local government representatives - the Chairman of the LGA chairs the CPP and a local government Community Development Officer is also a CPP member;
- Police-community relations councils, including the Kaduna South Divisional Police Officer;
- Community Vigilante members;
- Security actors, including the Kaduna South Department of State Services (DSS);
- Representatives of faith based organisations, including the Christian Association of Nigeria;
- Disability organisations, youth organisations (including the National Youth Council of Nigeria) and women's organisations; and
- Representatives from the media including KSTV.

In total there are 25 members, 12 of whom are women. The CPP's were designed to meet on a monthly basis and in reality are meeting on a near-monthly basis (the CPP has held 8 meetings over 11 months from December 2014 – October 2015)[51]. Emergency meetings to respond to specific challenges or plan discreet activities are also supported[52]. The CPP is working in each of Kaduna South's 13 wards.

46 NRSP (2011a) NSRP Mapping Conflict Prevention Actors and Initiatives in Selected States: Report for Plateau and Kaduna States
47 NSRP (2014c) Output 1: Programme Logic Document, p.22.
48 NSRP (2012b) Report on the Study on Community-level Conflict Management Mechanisms in the Niger Delta, Middle Belt and North East Zones of Nigeria
49 Aid Foundation (2014), Grant Application, p.5.
50 Criteria included "representation of marginalised groups, leaders in the communities, religious leaders, police, traditional institutions and district heads" [14]
51 Collated CPP data provided by NSRP, December 2015
52 NSRP (2014c) Output 1: Programme Logic Document, p.23.

Technical Assistance to the Aid Foundation

Training for all CPP partners from across NSRP's eight focal states was provided by NSRP in January 2014. Three-four people from each partner organization attended including four Aid Foundation staffers. Ongoing technical expertise (for example, support to develop the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the CPP; technical support to key stakeholders) and quality assurance is also provided by NSRP.

Technical Assistance and training for the CPP Members and Stakeholders

A five-day training workshop and general orientation was organised by NSRP in Saminaka, (Lere LGA) in December 2014 for all Kaduna South CPP members. Members were trained in reconciliation; mediation; early warning systems, referrals and response; networking; report writing; development of action plans; as well as provided with guidance around their role and key expectations[53]. The CPP members interviewed agreed they valued the training, stating that it has given them a *"huge head start"* and that they feel better trained than other NGOs and CSOs they work with as a result of NSRP's training [FGD, CPP members].

Following the initial five-day training, the CPP received technical support from Aid Foundation and NSRP in December 2014 to develop an Action Plan/Work Plan setting out key activities and priorities. In the longer term, the CPP receive ongoing support and guidance from Aid Foundation in the organisation of key events, setting of meeting agendas, ensuring action plans are followed up, etc. Direct beneficiaries of the CPP's activities also commented on the support they received directly from NSRP. For example, People's Democratic Party (PDP) members and activists spoke positively of the technical and financial support they received through *"the entire process"* directly from NSRP's Programme Officer and Regional Manager.

Logistical Support

The Aid Foundation provide ongoing logistical and administrative support to the CPP including for the organisation of meetings and events; photocopying; printing of sensitisation material; and through the provision of a secretariat for key meetings.

Case timeline

The timeline below provides a catalogue of the key 'moments' or events related to this case as identified by those consulted as well as the major external factors that have influenced the operating environment. Although the timeline starts in October 2013 (with the selection of the Aid Foundation as a CPP partner), the CPP itself was not established until December 2014. As seen below, the key activities and events for this case are clustered around the period from December 2014 – March 2015 and the case therefore focuses closely on this time period.

TIMELINE	CASE SPECIFIC EVENTS	EXTERNALITIES
October 2013	• Aid Foundation (AF) selected as CPP partner.	
January 2014	• NSRP delivers capacity building training for all CPP partners including AF.	
Sept October 2014	• AF contacts prospective CPP members inviting them to join CPP. • Kaduna South LGA Chairman agrees to be CPP Chair.	• Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) begin intensive campaign advocating for peaceful elections. INEC Headquarters direct all INEC offices to carry out ongoing sensitisation and consultations with multiple stakeholders including CSOs to ensure peaceful election.
December 2014	• CPP members inaugurated and CPP established. CPP coordinator, Chairman and Vice-Chairman elected by CPP members.	• Intensive INEC campaign for peaceful elections continues. • PDP primary election.

	• CPP members attend five day training workshop/ general orientation organised by AF. • CPP members hold first meeting and develop Action Plan with support of AF and NSRP setting out key priorities. • CPP meet with leaders of the PDP to introduce the project and attain buy-in. Meeting is led by District Head, a CPP member.	
January 2015	• CPP meet with traditional rulers to introduce the project and discuss importance of violence free elections. Encourage rulers to work with and support youths. • CPP visit religious leaders to introduce project, its objectives and to attain buy-in. • CPP meet with leaders of the All Progressives Congress (APC) party to introduce the project and attain buy-in. • PDP female party members undertake door-to-door sensitisation visits within the community lasting two weeks • Religious leaders (Reverend, ECWA Church and Chief Imam, Danfodio Central Mosque) lead interfaith reconciliation visits for youths: on 23 January Christian youths visit Danfodio Central Mosque, Anguwan Sanusi; and on 25 January Muslim youths visit Kakuri Gwari 1st ECWA Church. • CPP members attend Kaduna SCMA meeting. • CPP organise sensitisation event for Youth Association. Leaders at Kaduna South government secretariat. • CPP facilitate community peace dialogue at District Head's Palace in Barnawa. Dialogue led by Office of the District Head, a CPP member. • CPP facilitate sensitisation meeting on effects of drug abuse at Tudun Wada District Head's house. Village heads, ward heads, women, youth leaders, religious leaders, and APC and PDP party members all present. • CPP facilitate town hall meeting at Barnawa Clinic on causes of political violence. • CPP meet with youth leaders from all 13 wards and map perceived 'hotspots' of violence and the key instigators and perpetrators of violence in Kaduna South's 13 wards (January 26th) • CPP meet with religious leaders (including Imams and Pastors from each ward), community and traditional leaders (including all 7 District	▪ Intensive INEC campaign for peaceful elections continues ▪ Youth groups in Kaduna South champion sensitisation programmes ▪ Convergence of national actors (including INEC/state and national media/ CSOs/ traditional and religious leaders) and international actors (e.g. UN) working to promote peace in the lead up to the election. ▪ Memory and experience of the electoral violence in 2011 as well as people's experience of ongoing violence in Kaduna South considered to drive people's desire for peace. Communities hungry to know what they can do to contribute to ensuring peace.

[53] Aid Foundation (2014), *Grant Application,* p.5.

	Heads) to validate hotspots identified by youth leaders (January 27th). CPP begin working directly with key instigators and perpetrators of violence identified during mapping exercise. • CPP meet with INEC to discuss sensitisation of electoral process. CPP raise key issues including access to the process for disabled and other marginalised groups. INEC train CPP on use of card readers (30th January).	
February 2015	• CPP visit KSMC, Capital TV and Freedom Radio media houses to introduce the project and discuss areas for collaboration. • CPP organise stakeholders' workshop on violence free elections. Youths, traditional leaders (including village and ward heads), women, religious leaders and media attend as well as APC and PDP party members and activists (including youth and female party members/ activists) • CPP hold town hall meeting at community level and "step down" training received from INEC. On the morning of the training, KSTV deliver a TV programme informing the public about the training and encouraging people to attend. Meeting is attended by traditional leaders, Youth Association Leaders and youths ("over 200 in total" as reported by CPP members) including youths living with disabilities. Participants engage in dialogue and discuss conduct during elections and their responsibilities. • KSMC, Capital TV and Freedom Radio run interactive programmes on peacebuilding and allow CPP dedicated time on air. • CPP facilitate interactive sensitisation session in Kakuri Gwari on peaceful election conduct and other key issues including use of drugs – session attended by approximately 40 youths. During the session CPP members work with youths to identify drug users – also known as "jungles". CPP goes on to engage "jungles". • CPP organise sensitisation meeting at Standard Global Secondary School. Youth leaders, village head, ward heads, women leaders, youth leaders and religious leaders all present. • CPP organise sensitisation event for APC and PDP activists and party members (including APC Women's wing) • CPP members contribute personal funds for the purchase of equipment (for example, grinding machines) to provide targeted youths (youths identified as instigators/ perpetrators of violence) with safer alternative livelihoods.	• Intensive INEC campaign for peaceful elections continues. • Ongoing convergence of National and international actors working to promote peace.

March 2015	• CPP deliver sensitisation events in wards. Bring people from different wards (including members of youth clubs supported by NSRP) together for harmonisation • KSTV give CPP free spot to go on air during busy "Peace Arena" weekend programme and advocate for peace. • KSMC, Capital TV and Freedom Radio run interactive radio programmes on peacebuilding and allow CPP dedicated time on air. • CPP facilitate a community dialogue with the police in Kurmin Marshi.	• Intensive INEC campaign for peaceful elections continues • President Muhammadu Buhari elected on 31 March 2015. Marks the first time an incumbent President has lost re-election in Nigeria. • Former president Goodluck Jonathan accepts the results of the elections by congratulating Muhammadu Buhari.
April 2015	• KSTV give CPP free spot to go on air during busy "Peace Arena" weekend programme and advocate for peace. • LGA Chairman (CPP Chair) hosts 3 youth leaders from each of Kaduna South's 13 wards at his office.	
May 2015	• Youths attend CPP-organised town hall meeting. Youths have opportunity to discuss peace/ reconciliation/ security/ their concerns and grievances with police representative and are said to be "enlightened". People with disability as well as women attend. CPP review action taken before and during election and review the way forward for youths and others supported by CPP.	• Present-elect sworn in on 29 May 2015
June 2015	• CPP identify skill acquisition centre and shelter for disabled people in need of rehabilitation. Advocate for support from LGA.	
August 2015	• CPP go on air on KSTV: call for calm and provide information on the ministerial appointments in the LGA. • Aid Foundation organise training session on 'Youth and Governance'	• Ministerial Appointments (tensions begin to rise again in Kaduna South)
September 2015	• Two of the youths originally identified as instigators/ perpetrators of violence go on air and underline importance of peace. CPP arrange for this to happen.	

The process of change

The operating context

Conflict and security context

The conflict and security context in Kaduna South in 2014, prior to the intervention, was characterised by significant ethno-religious tensions and undercurrents of discontent between (predominant) Christians and (minority) Muslims. Nine key informants spoke of the long-standing polarisation of the LGA along religious and political lines which has driven and resulted in ongoing episodes of violence, loss of lives and property. These tensions have come to a head at different points. Across Kaduna State more widely communal feuds broke out in 1992 between Katafs and Hausas and metamorphosed into inter-religious crises between Muslims and Christians in major cities, leaving over 1,500 dead and countless properties destroyed. The reaction to the adoption of Sharia law in Kaduna state in 2000 also erupted into another crisis resulting in

heavy casualties: over 2,000 people died across the state, 123 churches and 55 mosques were destroyed[54]. Reprisal attacks followed and were only quelled with the brokering of a peace declaration by several interfaith partnerships that brought relative peace in Kaduna from 2002 to 2011. Following the 2011 presidential elections violence erupted again in Kaduna State resulting in 1,500 deaths and the destruction of 158 churches and 74 mosques[55].

Elections are recognised as a key trigger event for violence. As alluded to above, there is a history of high levels of electoral and political violence and intimidation in LGA politics. Nine key informants observed that throughout 2014, in the lead up to the 2015 elections, significant tensions existed between the main political parties (PDP and APC) and between party supporters. Pockets of violence (for example, in Barnawa community) between party supporters were becoming more widespread. In the months preceding the election Christians had begun to vacate Muslim areas and vice versa through fear of violence. One interviewee spoke of the migration of people out of Barnawa [FGD, Muslim community member] and another recalled how people had even started migrating from Kaduna South to other LGAs in Kaduna as well as leaving Kaduna state all together, driven by a sense that "their security was more guaranteed" elsewhere [FGD, political party member and activist].

In the lead up to the election politicians were also seen to be mobilising and manipulating youths along religious and political lines. Youths were being used as tools for violence [KI, Muslim religious leader], a point corroborated by political party members themselves who stated that *"political thuggery was on the increase"* [FGD, political party member]. The electoral rigging and personalised politics that characterised the 2011 elections had resulted in a loss of confidence amongst the public in Nigeria's INEC in 2014 including amongst citizens in Kaduna South [KI, political party member].

Conflict management structures and mechanisms

During the period of NSRP's design (2011-2012), at the macro level Nigeria's conflict prevention architecture was recognised as weak and failing to function effectively. The NSRP business case refers to Nigeria's conflict management institutions and structures as *"a complex myriad of insufficiently coordinated institutions with no overarching strategy or clearly defined roles between institutions"*[56]. Some of the key deficiencies identified included the failure of state and non-state actors to share information; and the exclusive nature of conflict prevention and management forums[57]. Across Nigeria, women, girls and young men were excluded from major decision-making forums, which tended to be dominated by older men from community to national level[58].

At the Kaduna South LGA and community levels, some functioning conflict management mechanisms existed as well as ward level development committees in 2011-2012. However, the dearth of organised, coordinated structures and platforms bringing together key actors focused on early warning and conflict prevention was palpable. One interviewee referred specifically to the complete absence of "*interfaith stakeholder collaboration"* to *"curtail the deep-seated hatred among the followers of the two major religions"* [KI, Aid Foundation]. Community peacebuilding structures also lacked links between them, as well as between those and statutory structures. And similar to the state and federal level picture, societal participation in and oversight of conflict management mechanisms at the local level was weak[59].

The key players

Case study research identified a number of key actors in relation to LGA level conflict management and prevention structures:

54 Abdu, H, and Umar, L. 2002."Ethnic and Religious Crisis in Kaduna." In Hope Betrayed : A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria". World Organization Against Torture (OMCT publications). Pp. 83-104.
55 Aid Foundation (2014), Grant Application, p.1-2.
56 DFID (2012b) NSRP Business Case
57 DFID (2012b) NSRP Business Case
58 DFID (2012b) NSRP Business Case
59 NSRP (2014c) Output 1: Programme Logic Document

- Traditional community leaders;
- Religious leaders;
- Youths (including youth leaders as well as key instigators and perpetrators of violence);
- Political party members and activists;
- Local level politicians;
- Kaduna South LGA staff and officers;
- INEC;
- Security agents; and
- The media.

The behaviours of key players at the start of the case timeline

Religious Leaders and Traditional Community Leaders

Seven key informants reported that before the intervention in 2014 some religious leaders were inciting violence, preaching hatred and intolerance against different religions, and encouraging people to vote along religious lines. Key informants also describe the *"increasing hatred amongst traditional leaders of different communities, especially Tudun Wada and Kakuri communities*" [FGD, political party member]. More broadly, across parts of Nigeria traditional and religious rulers were also seen to have lost some legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Having traditionally played an important role in facilitating dialogue and mediating conflicts in the past, some were becoming increasingly politicised and had lost popular credibility, especially amongst youths and in urban areas[60].

Youths (including youth association leaders as well as key instigators and perpetrators of violence)

Before the CPP intervention there was evidence of high levels of mutual distrust and hostility between (predominant) Muslim and (minority) Christian youths and also between youths of different ethnicities, as reported by five different key informants. Muslim and Christian youth key informants outlined how youths of different religions did not socialise or mingle and were polarised along religious and political lines. In the lead up to the 2015 elections this polarisation and mistrust manifested itself through youths leaving their communities and homes and relocating out of fear and mistrust, as witnessed in Barnawa [FGDs, Christian youths, Muslim community members].

Prior to the intervention, some youths and youth leaders were also known for violent behaviour [KI, NSRP], the causes of this behaviour was rooted in longstanding socio-economic and political marginalisation[61]. There was also a sense amongst informants (Muslim religious leader and Christian youths) that some youths were vulnerable to being easily mobilised along religious and political lines and manipulated by politicians, as seen in the 2011 elections [KI, Muslim religious leader; FGD, Christian youths]. This point was also made by a female PDP party member who noted that *"Before Aid Foundation got involved the situation was not good. Our jobless youth were just instruments in the hands of evil politicians to cause confusion in the community. These were the trouble prone people who are ready to shed blood at the slightest or no provocation at all"* [FGD, political party member]. A male PDP party also outlined how prior to the intervention, drug abuse amongst youths was increasing "*especially amongst those youths used as political thugs*" [FGD, political party member].

Local level politicians, political party members and political activists

Through 2014 in the build up to the 2015 elections significant tensions and high levels of political intolerance existed between the two dominant political parties in Kaduna South - the PDP and APC. Ten different key

60 DFID (2012b) NSRP Business Case

61 The UN define 'Youth' as the 15-24 age group. However, in Nigeria as elsewhere in Africa youth is a term used to refer a wider group of boys and men, typically between 15-39, that have certain life factors in common. They are likely to (a) have left school with few or no qualifications; (b) be unemployed or work in the informal sector; (c) have little status in the wider society; (d) have no voice in decision making, including at community level; and (e) be highly mobile geographically (they comprise the majority of rural to urban migrants)" DFID (2012b) NSRP Business Case, p.4.

informants reported that the LGA was polarised along political lines, and historical characteristics were presenting themselves including intimidation by politicians and the mobilisation and manipulation of youths by politicians along both political and religious lines. A political party Chairman and political party members themselves acknowledged the dangerous role that politicians and party members were playing with key informants stating that "*youths were being used by politicians as political thugs*" and *"political thuggery was on the increase"* [FGD, political party chairman and members]. Separately, one key informant also noted that politicians were not only using youths but were also turning religious leaders against one another [KI, NSRP].

LGA staff and officers

Few key informants spoke about the behaviours of local council staff and officers before the intervention. One informant noted that the "*LGA did little to curtail the deep-seated hatred among the followers of the two major religions"* and there "*was no stakeholder collaboration to address the problem*" [KI, Aid Foundation]. Referring to the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, the DFID business case states that council leaders are often perceived as corrupt and clients of their state-level politician patrons and, as such, tend to be less respected than non-government mediation actors (religious leaders, village and ward heads). This trend does vary across contexts; what does not vary is the socially exclusive nature of all mediation mechanisms which did not involve women or youth[62].

Other key actors

Although INEC, security agents and the media were all identified as key actors in relation to LGA level conflict management and prevention structures, they were mentioned less than a handful of times by interviewees when discussing behaviour and behaviour changes. As such, this case focuses less on these actors and more on the actors amongst whom observable changes in behaviour occurred including youths, traditional and religious leaders, and political party members and activists.

Observed behaviour changes among key players over the course of the case timeline

Youths

There is evidence that youth association leaders; youths identified at the beginning of the project as instigators and/or perpetrators of violence; "jungle" youths; and other youths not necessarily involved in violence all actively engaged in the CPP's activities and sensitisation work [KI, NSRP, religious leaders; FGDs, Christian youths, Muslim youths, Christian community members, Muslim community members. Each of these categories of youths are also perceived to buy-into and benefit from the CPP's work to some extent. Christian and Muslims youths interviewed state that through the CPP-organised town hall meetings, interfaith visit and community peace dialogue youths have been "*enlightened*"; their awareness and understanding of the dangers of violence and drug abuse improved; and their attitudes and behaviours changed as a result [FGDs, Christian youths, Muslim youths, Christian community members, Muslim community members].

Six consultees recalled increasing levels of "*unity", "trust*" and *"peaceful co-existence"* between youths of different religions and ethnicities in January 2015 following the interfaith visit, linking this to the fact that those youths attending the visit came away with a better understanding of one another's religions and ethnicities. A Muslim religious leader interviewed noted that "*People's attitude towards religious violence and violence against women have changed due to the visit"* [KI, Muslim religious leader], and a Christian youth interviewed noted that "*prior to the CPP intervention, people of Kaduna South were not mingling with one another because of religious and ethnic sentiments. It became very difficult for a Muslim from Tudun Wada to stay around Television area beyond 6pm and Christian from Kakuri to stay beyond 6pm in Tudun Wada. Now, people mingle freely with one another*" because the fear of "*attack has reduced due to increased understanding*" [FGD, Christian youth].The same consultee concluded that there is *"peaceful coexistence in the communities now*", adding that this *"can be attributed to the inter-faith exchange*" [FGD, Christian youth].

62 DFID (2012b) NSRP Business Case

Other interviewees commented on the behaviour change of Muslim youths, stating that *"Before now, specifically in the 2011 elections, there were violent outbursts in different parts of the state, but with the CPP initiative the youth who are usually the instruments of violence were enlightened and participated positively to ensure that elections were peacefully conducted"* [FGD, Muslim youths]. Christian youths outlined that "jungle" leaders attending the interactive sensitisation session in Kakuri Gwari in February 2015 "*promised to conduct themselves peacefully during election, which they did"* [FGD, Christian youths]; and a Christian leader and Muslim community members affirmed that the *"CPP has helped in sensitising the youths about the evil/dangers of violence,"* [KI, Christian religious leader] and that *"Tolerance has increased and communities have learned to live harmoniously with one another"* [FGD, Muslim community members]. In Barnawa community, Christian community members mentioned that as a result of the CPP's intervention, Christian and Muslim youths now relate freely adding that "*when you go to the football pitch, here in Barnawa, you will find both Christians and Muslims jointly playing football"* [FGD, Christian community members].

APC and PDP members also noted youths "*are living in peace and tolerating one another despite religious and ethnic differences",* that the level of *"drug abuse has now reduced to a minimum level*" and that *"people are more united now as a result of the youth engagement"* [FGD, political party members].

Key informants also linked the work of the CPP to reductions in political manipulation of youths, with one stating that as a result of the CPP's sensitisation activities *"the politicians could not manipulate the youths to resort to violence"* [KI, Muslim religious leader]; and another group of contributors stating that "*politicians used to manipulate the people by using religion to cause problems…but prior to 2015 elections the politicians could not achieve that*" [FGD, Muslim community members].

Religious leaders

Two religious leaders were directly engaged by the CPP: the Reverend of ECWA Church and Chief Imam of Danfodio Central Mosque. The engagement of these actors appears to be quite limited and focused mostly on the interfaith visits that took place in January 2015. Both actors welcomed the idea of the interfaith visit when first introduced to it by the CPP and willingly engaged, facilitating two exchange visits by Muslim and Christian youths at one another's places of worship and speaking to the youths about reconciliation, acceptance and peace. It is notable that these religious leaders were strategically identified and targeted by the CPP as they had always been *"quite supportive"* in pushing for reconciliation [KI, NSRP]; this links into the lower level output of the NSRP Theory of Change (TOC) which focuses on the identification and engagement of committed agents of change.

There is some evidence that the engagement of these religious leaders led to other changes in behaviour amongst them. For example, following the interfaith visits the Christian Reverend went on to work with the Imam of Makera to organise a joint rally on peaceful conduct of 2015 election for Christians and Muslims, the idea for which *"came up as a result of the interfaith exchange"* [KI, Christian religious leader].

More broadly, religious leaders across Kaduna South's 13 wards engaged in the CPP's activities and sensitisation meetings. For example, at the hotspot mapping meeting an Imam and Pastor from each of Kaduna South's 13 wards were present (see timeline for more detail of other key moments involving religious leaders). Behaviour amongst religious leaders is perceived to have changed in the lead up to the elections between January – March 2015. Seven different groups of interviewees, including Christian youths, political party members and a Christian religious leader, outlined that incidences of Pastors, Imams and their followers preaching hatred against one another and using inciting statements reduced. A Muslim religious leader interviewed stated that Chief Imams were encouraging other Imams to emphasise the importance of peace during prayers and daily preaching. This informant also commented that daily preaching by Christians against violence was taking place during this period in the lead up to the election [KI, Muslim religious leader]. Three different groups of political party members and activists also noted the proactive role religious leaders were increasingly playing in the lead up to the election in cautioning politicians and party members and underscoring the need for peace [FGDs, political party members].

Referring specifically to the religious (and traditional) leaders who are members of the CPP itself, a key informant from NSRP noted that their attitudes towards female CPP members did not seem to have changed (since joining the CPP). The key informant notes these members continued to fail to recognise female members of the CPP as equal partners: women's views and contributions are heard in the CPP but they do

not play a critical role and female members do not lead on critical activities for the CPP [KI, NSRP]. This suggests that women are being *included* in the CPP platform but face barriers in actively *participating*. The key informant was not able to identify the reasons for this. This view is only made by one consultee and the NIEP team was unable to verify this perception with female CPP members themselves.

Traditional leaders

The CPP worked directly with Kaduna South's seven district heads, first making contact in January 2015 to introduce the project and attain their buy-in[63]. One of the key reasons for engaging these leaders was because of their prominent role in local communities and their capacity to influence. Unfortunately, the NIEP team was unable to interview any traditional rulers during the primary research. However, through the references made to these actors by other interviewees it is possible to see that these actors engaged with the CPP in a number of ways (see timeline for detailed summary). All 7 district heads, for example, worked in collaboration with the CPP in January during the mapping of the 'hotspots' and key youth perpetrators of violence. Traditional leaders (including village and ward heads) attended the CPP-organised stakeholders' workshop in February on violence free elections. And traditional leaders attended the CPP training session/ sensitisation in February 2015 on the elections and voter card readers (see timeline for summary of all key moments traditional leaders were engaged in). These sensitisation meetings - also attended by youths, women, political party members, and religious leaders – provided opportunities for dialogue and discussion around conduct during the elections and peoples' responsibilities.

As well as attending and engaging in sensitisation events, some respondents noted the proactive role traditional leaders took on in calling for peace in the lead up to the elections: traditional leaders were making ongoing efforts to reprimand political party members for any use of violence and were calling for peace [FGD, political party member and activist]. They became a "*rallying point"* for the youths and were "*very active*" in the CPP process, renouncing violence and calling for peace [KI, NSRP]. They took the messages from the CPP and "stepped them down" to communities, demonstrated, for example, by the district head of Tudun Wada who called all the Imams under him together in February 2015 and told them about the objectives of CPP and the importance of peaceful conduct [FGD, political party member].

Political party members and political activists

There is evidence that PDP and APC members and activists are willing to engage and work in partnership with the CPP. Key informants noted how on introduction to the CPP, the PDP Chairman "*accepts*" and "*praises*" the initiative and following the meeting "*immediately transferred the activities of the partnership to the youth vanguard of the party and fan club*" [FGDs, political party members and activists]. A group of female PDP members also undertook door-to-door sensitisation visits within the community lasting two weeks, raising awareness of the CPP and the importance of peace. A PDP party member also referred to a live phone-in radio programme on Captial Radio on the importance of peace and shunning violence which PDP members organised in collaboration with the CPP and youth leaders.

Evidence from interviews with APC members and party activists suggest they were also willing to engage with the concepts and activities being promoted by the CPP. APC members interviewed stated that the party and the CPP "*work as partners in peace*" and "*jointly conducted the youth engagement, advocacy and sensitisation programme"* [FGDs, political party members]. There are examples of this partnership playing out with the APC members attending and collaborating in CPP activities [see timeline]. Political party members interviewed from both parties also made reference to the CPP-training on the electoral process and the use of card readers. One informant confirmed that following the training the party members went back to their respective communities to share what they had learnt and "*enlighten them, especially the women*" [FGD, political party member].

One of the key behaviour traits observed amongst politicians and party members before the intervention was *"political thuggery"* and the use and manipulation of youths. Party members themselves commented that there have been changes relating to this, with an APC member noting that "*political thuggery has reduced to a large extent*". It is difficult to disentangle the driver of this change and state whether youths

63 Kaduna South comprises seven Districts - Tudun Wada, Makera, Kakuri, Ung Maazu, Baranawa and Sabon Gari. Each District has a District Head.

themselves were in a stronger position to say 'no' to manipulation or whether the politicians themselves changed their modus operandi. An interviewee notes that "*the politicians could not manipulate the youths to resort to violence"* as a result of the sensitisation, suggesting the former [KI, Muslim religious leader]. In contrast, community members in Barnawa said the politicians refrained from the use of hate speeches and manipulation suggesting the latter [FGD, Christian community members].

Another key behaviour observed in 2014 prior to the intervention was mistrust between political parties. A political party member commented on this, stating that *"the followers of both PDP and APC now coexist and relate with one another more friendlily with their individual affiliation to the parties"*. A different political party member as well as a community member in Barnawa also noted the increased tolerance between parties.

Political party members' engagement and genuine commitment to peaceful elections was, however, questioned when the APC Governor and PDP politicians failed to attend a key CPP-facilitated meeting on 10th February at which both parties leadership were expected to sign and commit to a peace accord. PDP was perceived to have boycotted the event whilst the APC governor was said to have been attending another event [KI, Aid Foundation].

The contribution of NSRP

The discussion that follows is framed in relation to Outcome Levels 1 and 2 of the NSRP Theory of Change. Specifically, this section analyses NSRP's contribution (through its support to the CPP) to **improved communication between stakeholders (L1); broader societal participation, including marginalised voices (L1); dialogue and debate to understand and influence the structural drivers of violence (L2);** and ultimately, the contribution of the intervention to the higher-level outcome of peaceful **conduct during the 2015 election**.

Communication and coordination between key conflict management stakeholders

There is strong evidence that the key stakeholders needed for effective conflict management structures at community and LGA level are being successfully brought together through the CPP platform. Three key informants referred to the diverse multi-stakeholder composition of the CPP as "*quite innovative*" and "*unique"* [FGDs, political party members] and six key informants spoke positively about the CPP's ability to bring peacebuilding actors and champions together. Referring to the intervention, a political party member notes that if the Aid Foundation "*had not intervened, we still would have had meetings for our community's growth and progress but may be not on as large a scale as this with this great impact*" [FGD, political party member]. Another respondent notes that "*before Aid Foundation, we as a people have been preaching peace through our religious leaders, community leaders and association. But their intervention helped to cement our efforts to bring a beautiful result as seen in the general elections*" [FGD, political party member]. **NSRP's additionality and contribution at this level is clear.** In the absence of NSRP support, it is likely that many of the key local-level actors would still have been active in the field of peace building. However, NSRP has played a critical role in **bringing together and coordinating** this diverse range of actors into one multi-stakeholder platform both through the provision of financial and technical support[64].

There is also evidence to suggest that through the CPP platform NSRP is filling a key gap in the local level conflict prevention architecture in Kaduna South. When asked whether there are other mechanisms or structures similar to the CPP, key informants confirm that the CPP is not duplicated and does not exist elsewhere, referring specifically to the multi-stakeholder composition of the CPP as well as its inclusive approach to sensitisation and reconciliation. A key informant from the Aid Foundation notes that prior to the NSRP intervention there *"was no organised platform"* and concludes that if NSRP had *"not intervened, we would not have been able to achieve what we have now done".* **In this sense we believe that NSRP, through the Kaduna South CPP, has added unique value. However, in the absence of a comprehensive mapping of other structures it is not possible to draw complete conclusions.**

Specifically referring to the effective functioning of the CPP, the CPP is holding meetings on an almost-monthly basis (eight meetings between December 2014 – October 2015). Average attendance by members

64 NSRP worked closely with the Aid Foundation to develop the ToRs for the CPP and led on the strategic identification and engagement of supportive 'agents of change'.

at meetings has been relatively high (at 88%[65]) and there is positive evidence the platform is enabling improved communication, information flows and coordination amongst its members [KI, NSRP, Aid Foundation; FGD, CPP members]. **NSRP's financial support is considered key to the running of these meetings and to the effective functioning of the platform.**

Inclusivity of the CPP membership

The CPPs were designed with inclusion very much at the fore, as articulated in the NSRP Output 1 logic document[66] and NSRP appear to have practical steps in place to ensure and monitor this inclusion. For example, NSRP played a prominent role in the selection and composition of the CPP members, co-developing the criteria for selection with Aid Foundation. NSRP's indicator framework also contains specific targets for the CPPs around inclusivity[67].

In practice, there is evidence that NSRP and the Aid Foundation have gone some way in successfully bringing together and ensuring the inclusion of key marginalised groups. Of the CPP's 25 members, 12 are female and one member is living with disabilities[68]. The average percentage of women in attendance at CPP meetings is relatively high at 40%, however, attendance of youths at meetings is low at 10%. Interestingly, the Kaduna South CPP has exceeded its **logframe target** for 2015 for '**inclusivity'** (at least 30% of participants in > 50% of meetings per year are women, youth and members of other marginalised groups). However, these targets appear relatively unambitious and disguise the fact that the inclusion of certain groups, such as youths, is low. At this stage it is unclear why some marginalised groups appear to have been successfully included (especially women) and others (youths) less so.

In terms of **participation** of marginalised groups, **the picture is mixed**. The NIEP observed during its consultation with CPP members (which included speaking to a group of five CPP members including two women and one disabled person) that all five members contributed, participated and spoke with confidence. The dynamic between the members appeared to be respectful and positive. Moreover, the female and disabled members of the group each spoke of the specific roles they play in the CPP as well as particular initiatives they are leading on (for example, one female CPP member is an anchor at KSTV and has taken the lead in developing and maintaining a strong relationship between the CPP and KSTV). However, as alluded to previously, an NSRP key informant directly challenges the notion that women are actively participating, referring to the unequal relationship between women and religious/ traditional leaders within the CPP [KI, NSRP, Abuja].

Inclusivity in terms of who the CPP is engaging and targeting

When asked what factors have facilitated or inhibited the success of the CPP, six key informants specifically referred to inclusion. Quotes include: "*every member of the community was involved irrespective of gender, physical ability and financial status"* [FGD, political party members]; "*everybody was involved*," "*no one was left behind*," "*(the CPP) have done so much. We are the better for it. They brought us all (different ethnic groups, religions and political affiliations) under one umbrella, for peace and progress"* [FGD, political party member]. Another respondent referred to the inclusion of people from the Association of Persons Living with Disability and the National Council for Women in Society (NCWS) stating they "*participated in almost all the activities*" and that "*marginalised groups are included in the entire activities of the CPP*" [FGD, political party member]. Collectively this evidence suggests that the CPP is targeting and successfully engaging key

65 NSRP, CPP Monitoring Data [analysis by the NIEP]
66 The NSRP Output 1 logic document, when referring to the CPPs, states that "Particular attention will be paid to the inclusivity of these groups, ensuring representation from marginalised groups, including women and youth as well as ethnic and religious minorities. NSRP will ensure that activities proposed by CPPs are inclusive and sensitive to the conflicts identified at local level".
67 Indicator 1.3a: No. of 12 targeted Local Government Areas with a functioning, inclusive and accountable Community Peacebuilding Partnership (CPP). 'Inclusive' and 'Accountable' defined as a) FUNCTIONAL: holding meetings at least 2 times per year, b) INCLUSIVITY: at least 30% of participants in >50% of meetings per year are women, youth and members of other marginalised groups, c) ACCOUNTABILITY: >50'% of resolutions for state action has been implemented per year
68 NSRP, CPP Monitoring Data [analysis by the NIEP]

marginalised groups, with a particular focus on youths (even though the CPP membership itself has a low percentage of youth members). Key informants report that youths are being provided access to platforms for dialogue and engagement with police, traditional leaders, and key religious leaders leading to opportunities to speak about their grievances and be listened to [FGD, female and male Muslim community members].

This inclusive approach is a defined and clear part of the NSRP model and strategy which identifies youths as a key source and driver of conflict in the Kaduna South context, and it is clear that this vision is being successfully embraced and put into practice by the Kaduna South CPP. Whether this focus within the CPP on marginalised groups is as a direct result of NSRP's training, technical support and oversight to the Aid Foundation and the CPP is not, however, conclusive at this stage. There is some evidence to suggest that NSRP have ***facilitated*** this approach through upfront technical assistance and in putting a number of formal and informal agreements and structures in place to ensure inclusion, including, for example:

- Through an initial intense five-day training workshop for the CPP members during which NSRP delivered specific sessions on inclusion/ exclusion; sensitisation and reconciliation; mediation; early warning systems, referrals and response. CPP members highlighted the value of this training in terms of deepening their understanding of key technical areas stating that it gave them a *"huge head start"* and that they felt better trained than other NGOs and CSOs they work with as a result of NSRP's training [FGD, CPP Members].
- Through communicating clear expectations to the CPP members around their role and responsibilities
- Supporting the CPP to develop a clear work plan/ action plan which specifically prioritises and targets marginalised groups

Apart from this support, key informants were unable to 'pin point' the specific contribution of NSRP's technical support beyond a general strengthening of their approach to running the CPP. The CPP members themselves appear to be taking the NSRP model and running with it, ensuring inclusion infiltrates its approach and each of its activities.

Dialogue, debate, increased awareness and understanding

Between January and March 2015 the CPP undertook a significant number of sensitisation events with the aim of bringing together key stakeholders, facilitating dialogue, discussion and the sharing of information around the drivers of conflict (particularly political and electoral-related violence). This was done with the ultimate aim of empowering key actors to understand their roles and responsibilities in the 2015 elections and make good decisions. Those interviewed cited many examples of this: Female political party members noted how they were *"taught on the problems of the community (poverty and unemployment) and the need for peaceful co-existence*" and male political party members referred to a CPP-organised meeting used to "*identify and discuss the sources of violence in the electoral process"*. A Christian religious leader stated the "*CPP has helped in sensitising the youths about the evil and dangers of violence. This was seen during the 2015 election*".

Seven participants referred specifically to the interfaith exchange visits as a key moment contributing to increased understanding and awareness: a Muslim leader notes that "*the inter-faith visits have increased the level of understanding between the two religions (Christians and Muslims)"* and "*People's attitude towards religious violence and violence against women have changed due to the visit*", and a Christian leader stated that "*After the inter-faith visit, both the Christians and the Muslims understood that none of the two religions preaches violence"*. Muslim youths interviewed concluded that *"the pre-election meeting went a long way to enlighten the youth and in turn the entire community on the ills of election violence and on how the youth can positively contribute to peaceful elections*", a point also corroborated by Christian youths who spoke of being *"enlightened*" and of their awareness and understanding of dangers of violence and drug abuse improving.

There is also evidence of 'snowballing' whereby those attending the meetings are using the knowledge they have gained to enlighten others: both the Muslim and Christian youth association leaders interviewed noted that following the interfaith visit they returned to their communities, "*enlightened"* and "*influenced"* them.

The training the CPP received from INEC (on the use of card readers) and subsequently "stepped-down" at the community level is also identified as a key moment driving change. Political party members and activists stated that the training "*led to improved understanding of the electoral process*" and that their capacity had been built on the use of voters cards. Muslim and Christian youths interviewed also identified the training as a key moment. There is evidence that this training had broader outcomes beyond immediate capacity building. As a result of the training people now have *"more confidence*" in the activities of INEC and INEC is seen as more *"credible"* [FGD, political party members]. There is also evidence that those trained are *"stepping-down*" the training themselves, for example, a female political party member notes that *"following the training the party members went back to their respective communities to enlighten them, especially the women*". Referring to the card reader training as well as the sensitisation events the CPP organised more broadly, this same interviewee concludes that these events were "*key moments that helped us to experience a successful peaceful, violent-free elections as witnessed in this year's general election*" [FGD, political party member].

Again, **NSRP's financial support** is considered key to the running of the many meetings and events that the CPP undertook and delivered in the pre-election period and key informants report that without this funding it is unlikely that many of the meetings would have taken place [FGDs, CPP Members, Christian Youths; KI, Aid Foundation, Muslim Religious Leader]. However, evidence of NSRP's role beyond the provision of financial support and the upfront training and technical assistance provided to the CPP is limited. In terms of the organisation and chairing of the meetings, key informants report that the Aid Foundation and the CPP members themselves are leading on this and playing a visible role, with NSRP's contribution limited here.

Increased tolerance and engagement and more peaceful coexistence

Looking at the case timeline, it is clear that many of the activities undertaken by the CPP between January and March 2015 can be categorised as community-based reconciliation and sensitisation work aimed at reducing tensions between key groups and thus reducing the potential for instability and violence. Interventions of this nature are recognised as a key mechanism for addressing both the causes and effects of conflict and fragility[69], and the evidence gathered during fieldwork suggests this approach contributed to positive outcomes, manifested specifically in the peaceful passing of the 2015 Nigerian general election. Christian youths interviewed outlined how difficult it had become for a Muslim from Tudun Wada to stay in Kakuri prior to the intervention, but that people now *"mingle freely"* with one another because the fear of attack has reduced due to increased understanding [FGD, Christian youths]. The same consultee concluded that there is *"peaceful coexistence in the communities now",* adding that this *"can be attributed to the inter-faith exchange"*. A Christian leader interviewed outlined that as a result of the CPP there is *"more accommodation and understanding among the people despite ethnic, religious and party differences"* and that Muslims and Christians now live together again in peace. Muslim community members agreed, noting that tolerance has increased and communities have learned to live harmoniously with one another irrespective of religious and political differences as a result of CPP activities. The same group of consultees concluded that the community peace dialogue facilitated by CPP's district head of Barnawa was a "*major factor*" leading to peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims in Barnawa [FGD, Muslim community members].

Others interviewed substantiate these findings: male PDP party members and activists state that *"Traditional leaders of different communities, especially Tudun Wada and Kakuri, now engage more freely with one another"* as a result of CPP activity, and when referring specifically to the interfaith exchange state that "*the outcome was improvement in religious tolerance*" as well as *"political tolerance*" [FGD, male political party members]; female party members interviewed state that "*Aid Foundation's intervention through the CPP was very important in bringing all members of the community together irrespective of our ethno-religious and political differences. This singular action has helped us to respect other people's rights to have differing views from us and be at peace with it*". A Christian community member in Barnawa added *"businesses have improved for both Muslims and Christians in the community, people now stay longer in their shops for businesses unlike in 2014 when there was no peace in the community"*.

69 DFID (2012a) Building peaceful states and societies: a DFID practice paper

Peaceful conduct during the 2015 elections with fewer episodes of violence

The Aid Foundation was one of a myriad of CSOs working towards peaceful elections in 2015, and the CPP is one of many conflict prevention mechanisms working in Kaduna South. Many factors influenced the outcome of the elections, which were considered to be relatively peaceful, despite fears of widespread violence.

When asked about these external factors three key informants spoke about the significant impact that resulted from the convergence of national (e.g. INEC/ state and national media/ CSOs/ traditional and religious leaders/ government) and international actors (eg. the UN) promoting peace in the lead up to the election. Eight key informants identified the memory and experience of the electoral violence in 2011 as well as people's experience of ongoing violence not related to election cycle in Kaduna South as key factors driving people's desire for peace, including peaceful 2015 elections. Interviewees noted that communities were hungry to know what they could do and how they could contribute to ensure peace. The media was also specifically identified as contributing to the positive changes witnessed in Kaduna South in the lead up to the election. One interviewee highlighted that Kaduna State Radio and TV stations were engaged in massive awareness creation on peaceful conduct of elections, and this played a contributory role [FGD, political party member]. Others highlighted the positive role played by youth groups who championed sensitisation programmes [FGD, Muslim community members] and one interviewee referred to the "influential" role played by the National Peace Committee in ensuring peaceful elections [KI, NSRP]. The fact that Former president Goodluck Jonathan accepted the results of the elections by congratulating Muhammadu Buhari was also critical in ensuring peace.

Disentangling the role of NSRP (through the CPP) and that of the host of other actors, organisations and structures involved in efforts towards peaceful elections is complex. However, among those consulted there is a perception that the CPP played a direct role in bringing about peaceful elections in Kaduna South through the range of activities and subsequent outcomes outlined above. Female political party members highlight that "*this year, our general elections were conducted peacefully and they can be attributed in part to these (the CPP) activities*. They also note that the CPP facilitated the "*improvement in political and religious tolerance"* seen in Kaduna South and the "*peaceful conduct witnessed at the 2015 election*" [FGD, political party members]. Three consultees observed that as a result of the CPP's sensitisation work and subsequent increases in understanding and knowledge, youths (including the youths identified as perpetrators and instigators of violence) started to think through their actions and change their behaviours through shunning violence [KI, NSRP, Aid Foundation; FGD, CPP members]. Others noted these youths committed to peaceful elections and to not being tools of violence during their engagement with the CPP, stating that these observed changes in behavior were directly resulted from the work undertaken by traditional leaders [FGDs, Muslim youths; KI, Christian leader].

The CPP's strategy to engage influential perpetrators/instigators of violence appears to have had a positive effect not only on the behaviour of these actors themselves but also more widely amongst other youths in their communities who see the "*thugs*" and youth leaders changing behaviour and "*follow suit*" [FGD, CPP members]. One key informant spoke about the outcomes of the CPP on the behaviour of the "jungle" leaders stating that the "jungle" leaders made a "*promise to conduct themselves peacefully during (the) election*" at one of the CPP sensitisation events [FGD, Christian youths].

Replication

There is evidence that traditional leaders and local government officers have observed the activities and achievements of the Kaduna South CPP and are calling for replication of the CPP structure in their LGAs. For example, the Chairman of the Local Government Council in Kaduna North made a verbal and written request to the NSRP and the Aid Foundation in January 2015 to support him to establish a CPP in Kaduna North. The Chairman is currently working with Aid Foundation and the district head of Doka to set up a CPP. NSRP have also received formal requests from the Igabi and Chikun LGA District Heads (both in Kaduna) in February 2015, both asking for support to replicate the CPPs in their LGAs. The Kaduna South CPP members themselves have received requests from Igabi, Kaduna North and Chikun LGAs to support "hotspot" mapping. A key informant notes that *"the people of Chikun Local government were amazed with the activities of CPP and they want this to be introduced in their area"* [FGD, political party member]. It is

also noted that requests have been made to NSRP from Kaura, Jaba and Zangon Kataf LGAs in Kaduna for support to establish CPPs. It is understood that another of NSRPs partners, Development Peace Initiative, is supporting and facilitating the process in these LGAs.

Summary

In the absence of NSRP support, it is likely that many of the key local-level actors in Kaduna South would still have been active in the field of peace building. In the case of this specific activity the added value has been as a result of a broad and coordinated multi-stakeholder approach to quelling the potential for election violence. NSRP has contributed to this through 'enabling' (with long-term grant support) the Aid Foundation to convene and support the CPP. NSRP's upfront training and technical assistance is also appreciated by the group, although key informants were unable to 'pin point' the specific contribution beyond a general strengthening of their approach to running the CPP.

NSRP was conceived as a peace-building programme intended to '**play a facilitating role'** [ref to business case I think]. This case study is demonstrative of success in that regard. NSRP has facilitated constructive dialogue for change between those involved in violence (as perpetrators and as holders of authority, including young men, government, religious and traditional leaders) and those who live with its consequences, including those (such as women and girls) who are rarely consulted but who are most severely affected. However, it is noted that this case study represents only one aspect of the CPPs work. Its effectiveness in other areas, and NSRP's specific contribution, is not known.

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Case No.	3	The contribution of NSRP-funded research on Radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation and De-radicalisation to outcomes among key actors in relation to the approach to countering violent extremism (CVE)

Introduction

NSRP supported a major research study exploring issues of radicalisation in northern Nigeria. The study sits under NSRP **output stream 4: research, media and advocacy** (output 4.1: Increasing quality, quantity and availability of knowledge about violent conflicts in Nigeria) to build an evidence base contributing to improved policy and practice on conflict management and peace-building.

The study - **Radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation, and De-radicalisation in Nigeria** – was undertaken by the Oxford Nigeria Research Network (ONRN); an established network comprising European, American and Nigerian academics, and managed, on-the-ground, by the Development Research Projects Centre (DRPC); ONRN's regular research partner based in Kano, Nigeria.

The study was conceived by, and conducted in conjunction with, the Government of Nigeria (GON), Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) (which has retained ownership of the study's policy relevant outputs) to address the dearth of empirical evidence on radicalisation and countering forces.

This case study considers the contribution of this NSRP-funded research to outcomes among key actors in relation to the approach to countering violent extremism (CVE).

Inputs

NSRP provided financial assistance to the research study (GBP £162,907[70]) over the period January 2014 – October 2014 and has supported quality assurance, communication and dissemination of research findings.

Activities

The research study explored the various dimensions of radicalisation and the counteracting actors, forces and conditions as a framework for understanding violence.[71] Primary research took place in the FCT Abuja and in northern states - Borno, Jigawa, Plateau, Katsina, Kano, Kaduna, Zamfara and Sokoto.

The multi-faceted nature of the study, and interdisciplinary research team, meant that no single methodological approach was suitable. Instead, the research project was undertaken as a series of sub-projects. Each sub-project was required to undertake fresh research – collecting and analysing 'new' data – to prepare detailed research reports and focused policy briefs.[72]

Outputs

The study resulted in eight research papers produced by national and international researchers. These were condensed into five policy briefs, each providing a series of recommendations to counter the insurgency.

- **Violent radicalisation in northern Nigeria: economy and society;**
- **Violent radicalisation in northern Nigeria: the macro regional context;**
- **Understanding the complex causes and processes of radicalisation;**
- **Religious and ideological dimensions of radicalisation;**
- **Comparative perspective on the evolution of JAS insurgency and its future scenarios.**

Research findings, centring around the five policy briefs, were presented at a dissemination workshop in Abuja on 16 March 2015. The event, which was facilitated by NSRP, was chaired by ONSA and featured

70 This included £98,340 in direct research costs and £64,567 in project related expenses.
71 NSRP (2015) Dissemination Workshop of Research Findings on Radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation and De-radicalisation
72 NSRP (2014) Project Proposal, Fieldwork Plans, & Budgets - Radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation, and De-radicalisation in Nigeria Research Project [unpublished]

presentations from the research study's lead academics – Professor Abdul Raufu Mustapha (University of Oxford) and Professor Sani Umar (Ahmadu Bello University). The purpose was to disseminate research findings to stakeholders and invite discussion with policy makers on the best ways to tackle the insurgency in northern Nigeria.

The timing of the research, to be completed quarter 3 2014, prior to the ramp up of campaigning in the national election, was deliberate as NSRP/ ONSA wanted the research evidence to be available in order to inform debate during the election campaign.[73]

Case timeline

TIMELINE	CASE SPECIFIC EVENTS	EXTERNALITIES
Late-2013	• Approach by ONSA to NSRP	
January-March 2014	• Conceptualisation of research • Desk-based research	• GON's 'soft' approach to CVE unveiled following one year of development (19 March 2014)
April - June 2014	• Field-based research	
July-September 2014	• Analysis and drafting of research reports (end-July) • Preparation of draft Policy Briefs (August) • Validation meeting to consider individual reports and Policy Briefs (start-September)	• NSRP provides funding and technical assistance to ONSA/ MCC for development and implementation of capacity building programme for selected clerics (August)
October – December 2014		• ONSA (in collaboration with development partners SAVE) brings together 40 CSOs. • Delivery of ONSA/ MCC capacity building programme (22-24 October 2014) • Ongoing results monitoring of ONSA/MCC capacity building programme
January-March 2015	• NSRP/ ONSA research dissemination workshop in Abuja (16 March 2015)	• Roll out and results monitoring of ONSA/MCC capacity building programme
31 March 2015		• President Muhammadu Buhari elected (first time an incumbent President has lost re-election in Nigeria)
April-June 2015		• Present-elect sworn in (29 May 2015) • First General Assembly of PAVE (26 June)
July-September 2015	• Policy Briefs prepared as a volume for Government • Lead researchers invited to present research findings to various fora.	• Intellectual designer of ONSA's CVE programme steps down.

73 Statement made by three key informants – 1 from Government of Nigeria; 2 from academia.

The process of change

The operating context:

As the timeline in section E shows, the initial approach to NSRP from ONSA regarding the desirability of a bespoke research study on radicalisation in the Nigerian context was in late 2013. However, tracing back, it is apparent that the process of change which led to the conceptualisation of the research began prior to this.

Key informants involved in the development of this case study concur that the process of change started to become apparent in 2012/13 driven primarily by ONSA. At this point the perception was of growing recognition across the GON and other key actors that the insurgency in the north (which started in 2009) had become a major issue and that the response of security forces was exacerbating the crisis.[74] However, among many key actors, the military response remained the 'only response'. Key Informants consider that lack of information and failure to recognise alternative approaches to CVE resulted in little systematic attempt to understand or address the structural drivers of extremism. Comments include:

> *"The military option was viewed as the only one – they had to try to 'defeat the insurgents in the field'.* **[KI, Government of Nigeria]**
>
> *"The military's ethos at that time was to 'smoke them out' …this was one dimensional"* **[KI, Donor Programme]**
>
> *"The 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act did not contain a 'soft approach' to CVE"* **[KI, Government of Nigeria]**

Within ONSA however the situation was somewhat different as there was realisation that the existing approach was not working and a longer term strategy was needed. At this point[75] ONSA embarked on development of a new *holistic* programme to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) led by newly recruited psychologist Dr. Fatima Akilu (then Director of Behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communications at ONSA).

The aim of the CVE programme was to understand and prevent radicalisation, essentially *"cutting off the oxygen"* to the insurgents **[KI, Government of Nigeria].** The programme, which has been heralded as 'ground-breaking'[76] – has four pillars: ***de-radicalisation*** – working to rehabilitate insurgents currently in detention; ***counter-radicalisation*** – working across Government and society to prevent radicalisation; ***strategic communications*** – research, development and communication of counter-narratives to be projected by key agencies (including military communications and law enforcement agencies); ***development*** – development of a framework for economic revitalisation and provision of support to traumatised communities[77] **[KI, Government of Nigeria].**

Key informants from ONSA, consulted as part of this case study, commented on a strong desire for evidence within ONSA at the time they were developing the new programme and it was this that led ONSA to approach

74 This perception is reinforced in research literature. See for example Chatham House (2014: p.4) "The actions of Nigeria's security forces have been a significant determinant in the trajectory of the crisis. Since the military repression of the Boko Haram uprising in July 2009, continued massacres, extra-judicial killings and arrests without trial have widened the gap between communities and the armed forces".

75 KIs could not pin-point a specific date. The gradual process of change was apparent from 2012 onwards.

76 The Telegraph (2015) Meet the former NHS psychologist trying to get inside the mind of Boko Haram, 02 June 2015; available online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11644162/Meet-the-former-NHS-psychologist-trying-to-get-inside-the-mind-of-Boko-Haram.html

77 Premium Times (2014) Nigeria rolls-out Soft Approach to Counter Terrorism, 20 March 2014; available online at: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/157111-boko-haram-nigeria-rolls-soft-approach-counter-terrorism.html

NSRP. While there are research studies in relation to radicalisation/ counter-radicalisation[78], none were considered informative in the Nigerian context and hence there was a need for new, bespoke research to be undertaken.[79] Architects of the CVE programme suggested two factors driving the push for evidence – firstly, ONSA wanted evidence to inform their thinking on the development and implementation of the new programme, and secondly, ONSA wanted evidence in support of their approach which would help galvanise support behind the programme and secure buy-in of other key actors to the process **[KI, Government of Nigeria].**

The key players:

This case study research has identified a number of key actors in relation to CVE in Nigeria. These are:

- The wider Government of Nigeria (including the Presidency/ Vice Presidency and other Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs));
- The Military (including the public facing military communications department);
- The Nigeria Prison Service;
- Civil Society Organisations (CSOs);
- Faith-based organisations;
- Schools;
- The media.[80]

At the start of the timeline the evidence from case study contributors' points to a lack of coordination among these different players, diverse attitudes/ behaviours and varying levels of involvement in relation to CVE policy and practice.[81]

The behaviours of key players at the start of the case timeline:

At the start of the case timeline (late-2013), active players in relation to CVE were highlighted as central departments of GON (the Presidency and Vice Presidency) and the military, with wider Ministries, Departments and Agencies playing minor if any roles (this is consistent in the responses of relevant key informants interviewed in relation to this case study). Among these active institutional players the focus was firmly on the military response to violent extremism and there was little 'hunger' for evidence about the nature of the insurgency. This is considered in contrast to what was happening within ONSA.

Outside of these institutional players, other organisations were playing a role in relation to CVE at the start of the case timeline – international donors through peace, security, justice and accountability programming; the media through reporting and commentary on the insurgency and issues of radicalisation[82]; and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) through delivery of 'grassroots' development programmes (not necessarily badged as CVE at that point) at national, State, LGA and local community level.

At the start of the case timeline other actors did not feature prominently; the Nigeria Prison Service was not active in relation to CVE beyond its statutory role in the detention of perpetrators. Similarly, faith-based organisations and schools were not involved in any structured way in efforts to address extremism. This early lack of involvement was explicit in the responses of key informants from ONSA and one representing

78 See for example Schmid, A.P (2013)
79 These assertions were made by academic contributors, donor programme staff and those representing the Government of Nigeria.
80 While mentioned in passing by contributors to this case study, the media do no feature heavily in this write up as they were not a focus for 'behaviour change' as a result of the specific research study under consideration. The role of the media (and NSRP interaction with the media) is discussed in depth in case study 4.
81 This perception emerged consistently from key informants involved in the case study – including representatives of the Government of Nigeria (2); donor programme staff (2); academics (2).
82 The media has historically projected strong and often simplistic views on the insurgency and on the issue of radicalisation; views considered to be based on "prejudice and ignorance – not evidence" by two key informants involved in this case study.

a faith-based organisation. It can also be inferred by the lack of reference to these actors from other key informants.

Observed behaviour changes among key players over the course of the case timeline:

Over the course of the case timeline to the present day, changes in the behaviours of some key players have been observed. Within central departments of GON and the military change appears to have been a gradual process starting from 2013 onwards as realisation spread that the approach to tackling the insurgency was not working. This gradual process was described by key informants from ONSA, academia and donor programme staff. One consultee recalled that 'strategic communications' as an approach to CVE was first commented on centrally in a workshop in 2013 **[KI, Government of Nigeria]**; while another noted that there were always "*small pockets"* within GON centrally that were seeking change and that these small pockets began to "*ripple*" from 2013 onwards. With regards the military, the same respondent commented that *"recognition grew that this was no longer a conventional war and their tactics were not working"* **[KI, Government of Nigeria].**

By mid-2014 the perception was of much greater coordination between GON agencies in relation to CVE and a stated commitment to the more holistic approach promoted by ONSA[83]. This coordination was formalised through the SAVE forum[84] and is apparent in the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2014-16 which sets out roles and responsibilities for more than 40 GON Ministries, Departments and Agencies.

March 2015 saw the election of President Muhammadu Buhari. In the period since the new Government was sworn in (May 2015-present[85]), contributors to this case study did not comment on any observable change in the 'discourse' of GON in relation to CVE; the 'holistic' programming appears to be continuing, although the intellectual designer of ONSA's CVE programme is no longer in post. Two academic contributors to this case study now perceive greater openness of the GON to evidence (this was spurred by specific invitations to present research findings to the Office of the Vice President)[86]. It is not possible to comment any further on the approach of the new administration at this time.

With regards other actors, the period under consideration in this case study has seen the widening of formal participation in relation to CVE across a range of state and non-state actors. Case study contributors variously observed the increased/ changed role of the Nigeria Prison Service, faith-based organisations, schools and CSOs.

- **The Nigeria Prison Service:** The Prison Service is now involved in a pilot programme - part of ONSA's holistic approach to CVE – which has seen the development and roll out of training to prison officers and support staff (including prison Imams, psychologists, sports coaches etc) in conflict-sensitivity and approaches to detainee de-radicalisation.[87]

- **Faith-based organisations:** None of the case study contributors perceived that faith-based organisations played a key formal role in CVE programming at the start of the case timeline. However, in October 2014 the Muslim Community Centre (MCC) delivered a 2-day capacity-building programme (conceived by ONSA with NSRP providing funding and technical assistance to development and implementation) to over 50 selected Imams/ female religious scholars from 'high-risk' states (Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Kogi, Borno and Yobe). The sessions aimed to raise awareness of the role of Imams/ female religious teachers in promoting peace and security and the importance of embedding conflict-sensitivity in their teaching.[88] The workshop was followed with a six month monitoring period (October

83 This came from two key informants representing a central GON department.
84 Society Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) is a federal cross-government initiative which undertakes activities to promote counter-radicalisation.
85 Time of writing November 2015
86 At the time of writing the presentation had not yet happened but an invite has been issued.
87 This was discussed by two key informants representing a central GON department and one academic contributor.
88 NSRP (2014) Terms of Reference: Capacity Building for Imams and Islamic Scholars to Enhance De-radicalisation, 1 August 2014 [unpublished]

2014-February 2015) during which participants were recorded to see if the messages from the capacity building workshop were being taken on board and cascaded into local communities.[89]

- **Education providers** were not formally involved in CVE programming at the start of the case timeline**.** In early 2015 ONSA developed a bespoke curriculum/ training programme for schools as part of its wider CVE approach. Pilot implementation of this programme is currently underway in Kano and Kaduna. The schools programme, which is still in its pilot phase, has three components - critical thinking, logical reasoning, and national identity.[90]

- **CSOs:** Only one contributor (representing a central GON department) commented explicitly on the role of CSOs over the course of the case timeline**,** expressing that CSOs have always been active in relation to 'grassroots' CVE and advocating for change. The major shift has been that institutional actors have now started to listen and interact with CSOs. Specifically, in late 2014 ONSA, in collaboration with SAVE and international development partners, brought together 40 CSOs in a forum that led to the creation of the 'Partnership Against Violent Extremism' (PAVE) – a multi-stakeholder coalition of CSOs and government which aims to foster awareness of CVE among CSOs, build capacity of state and non-state actors to combat extremism and strengthen links between key stakeholders with a role in CVE policy and practice.[91] The first General Assembly of PAVE was held in June 2015.

The above actors and their relative roles were not mentioned consistently by all contributors to the case study – this is to be expected as different contributors have been involved in CVE in different, and sometimes quite specific, ways and would not be expected to comment on the full range of actors.

The contribution of NSRP

The contribution of the NSRP-funded research to the process of change observed above is not easy to isolate. This is in keeping with findings of other studies considering the outcomes of research for policy and practice.[92]

The discussion that follows is framed in relation to level 1 and level 2 of the NSRP Theory of Change (TOC). Specifically, uptake of research evidence among key stakeholders and the extent to which decision makers are influenced by research evidence in developing policy and practice.

Uptake of evidence:

At a basic level, case study evidence in relation to *uptake* of research/ knowledge (i.e. interest, acceptance, curiosity etc.) is relatively positive. In key informant interviews and focus group discussions to inform the programme-level evaluation of NSRP, the radicalisation research study was mentioned in unprompted conversation about NSRP's research component (by two strategic partners and another donor programme) and in discussion about grantee activities in the North East (by NSRP regional staff).

The research dissemination event held on 16 March 2015 was attended by around 90 individuals representing a range of stakeholders – mainly donors and diplomatic staff, donor programmes, NGOs and CSOs, research organisations and think tanks and the media (although the attendee list also includes a number of staff from ONSA and one representing SAVE).[93] The policy briefs (while ONSA branded) are

89 This was discussed by two key informants representing a central GON department; two staff members from NSRP and a representative of a faith-based organisation.
90 This was only discussed by one representative of a central GON department.
91 Blueprint (2015) 'Partnership Against Violent Extremism holds first General Assembly', 29 June 2015 available at: http://www.blueprint.ng/2015/06/29/partnership-against-violent-extremism-holds-first-general-assembly/
92 See for example Young, J., (2008) 'Impact of research on policy and practice', Capacity.org; Issue 35 available online at: *r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Articles/YoungImpactofResearch.pdf*
93 The research dissemination event attendee list was provided by NSRP.

accessible on the NSRP website[94] and NSRP has disseminated over 2,500 copies to partners and stakeholders. The research findings have also been promoted via social media (Facebook and Twitter) and NSRP Blog Posts.[95] Outside of NSRP, the research dissemination event was covered by local media (Blueprint Newspaper, 16 March 2015 cited by NSRP). In-mid-2015 the policy briefs were prepared as a volume and presented to the new Government. This has resulted in an invitation for the lead researcher to present to the Vice President (and a wider invitation to present to the Lake Chad Basin Commission).[96]

The evidence is that among key strategic players (federal-level) there is a level of engagement with, and discussion of, the research findings. There is insufficient evidence through this case study research to comment on the extent of engagement/ discussion at state- and local-level.

Outcomes in relation to the application of research evidence are less clear. Contributors directly involved in the development of the GON/ ONSA CVE programme and those involved in the NSRP-funded research study concur that the process of developing the new *holistic* CVE approach was well underway by the time the NSRP-funded research was conceived and commissioned (the programme was launched before the research was finalised). The course was therefore largely set and key informants from GON consider that the CVE programme would have developed along the same lines in the absence of the NSRP-funded research; a finding that is not disputed by NSRP or academic contributors.

For ONSA, the major benefit of the research study seems to have been in validating their approach, providing an evidence base in support of their chosen course which could help garner wider support and secure buy-in from key stakeholders during implementation of their new programme. The prevailing view from case study contributors is that this has been successful and that the research is among the factors which has contributed to the observed changes in the attitudes/ behaviours of key actors (other factors being widespread and growing disillusionment with the response to the increasing activity of insurgents; the drive from ONSA to progress a *softer* and more *holistic* approach to CVE; and long standing calls from CSOs and development partners to recognise and address social and economic causes of unrest). Respondents were not, on the whole, able to rank the relative importance of various contributing factors, seeing instead a range of mutually reinforcing drivers. Three respondents were however explicit that the **NSRP-funded research was more of a secondary contributing factor when considered alongside other forces**.

Influence of evidence:

Probing further on specific elements of this case study, three examples emerged in which the NSRP-funded research is seen to have made a more direct contribution to outcomes; albeit the specific contribution is still quite vague. These are in relation to activities involving the Muslim Community Centre, schools and other development partners.

- **Contribution of NSRP-funded research to activities involving the Muslim Community Centre:** During the period in which the research outputs from the radicalisation research were being finalised, ONSA approached NSRP to support the design and implementation of a project to build capacity of respected Imams and Islamic Scholars to provide a counter-narrative to the radical interpretations of Islam proffered by JAS and similar groups (NSRP, 2014:3).[97] NSRP supported the initiative with NGN 25,008,500 (approximately GBP £85,000) and technical support through the NSRP Deputy Programme Manager and an assigned Senior Programme Officer. A total of 54 participants (36 males and 18

94 Website analytics show very low numbers of downloads for the policy briefs since they were posted in March 2015. This is attributed to the fact that a large number of print copies were produced and widely disseminated.
95 NSRP (2015) Blog Post: NSRP / NSA disseminate research findings on radicalisation in Nigeria, available at: http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/2015/03/17/nsrp-nsa-disseminate-research-findings-on-radicalisation-in-nigeria/ [accessed 1 December 2015].
96 At the time of writing this presentation had not happened. The lead researcher felt that it would likely take place in early 2016.
97 NSRP (2014) Terms of Reference: Capacity Building for Imams and Islamic Scholars to Enhance De-radicalisation , 1 August 2014 [unpublished]

females)98 attended the workshop (MCC, 2015: iii). In media coverage, participants reportedly described the workshop as "timely", saying that "people in general are forgetting that peace is an essential ingredient in society" (Daily Trust, 21 October 2014)99. A key informant, formerly of ONSA, noted that the radicalisation study contributed to conceptualisation of the capacity building programme:

> ***"****We relied heavily on the content of the research to plan all our programs, a lot of the capacity building was already planned prior to the research but we certainly adjusted some aspects of it based on the research findings and recommendations"* **[KI, (former) Government of Nigeria].**

Follow up M&E activity sought to track participants across the six target states. Over a period of six months, MCC M&E officers maintained communication with participating Imams and Islamic Scholars via telephone, email and in person. Data collection involved recording sermons and public/ class-based lectures and/ or collating printed copies. The MCC reports that it maintained contact with 81%100 of participants (MCC, 2015: 12). Over the six-month monitoring period MCC analysed the content of 35 sermons/ lectures/ preaching. Of these, 91% were considered in line with one or more topics contained in the MCC curriculum and 42% were "modelled" on the MCC curriculum (defined as in line with two or more of the curriculum topics) (MCC. 2015: 14). It is not possible to independently verify this data.

Since implementing this initiative the MCC has been represented at CVE events facilitated by other organisations. This initiative remains in a prominent position on the organisations' website. However, no further activity of this nature has been delivered key informants did not specify any plans to do so at this stage.

- **Contribution of NSRP-funded research to activities involving schools:** In relation to the schools component of the CVE programme, NSRP-funded research provided evidence around the multiple drivers of and routes to extremism. For some, the 'search for identity' was found to be a 'pull factor'. As previously stated, the CVE programme for schools covers 'national identity' and one key informant, formerly of ONSA, said that the "*NSRP-funded research provided the impetus for this".* While this direct link was only made by one contributor, the central role this person had in ONSA structures lends weight. The intention for a change in programming to include elements of CVE activity in the school curriculum is validated in local media coverage (see This Day Live, 15 October 2014).

Within other elements of the CVE programme, the contribution of the NSRP-funded research, beyond general statements from key informants around its role 'supporting', 'informing' and/or 'validating' implementation, is less clear.[101]

- **Contribution of NSRP-funded research to activities of other development partners:** This case study research has highlighted two instances of the radicalisation research (potentially) acting as a catalyst for supplementary research in this area. Examples are from two separate organisations (an NGO and a UN Agency) which appear keen to replicate the methodology of the NSRP study in constructing case histories of those who have been radicalised in order to inform their own programming by deepening the evidence base. This outcome was mentioned by NSRP and also by a lead member of the study team from the radicalisation study. In one case a research Concept Note has been drafted and the research team are ready to deploy. Sensitives around the nature of the research prohibit further comment at this time. These developments may however be considered as evidence that NSRP is

98 6 males and 3 females from each target state.
99 Daily Trust (2014) 'Nigeria: Islamic Clerics Brainstorm On Promoting Peace and Security in the North, 21 October 2014, available online at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201410220177.html [accessed 1 December 2015].
100 78% Borno; 100% Kano; 67% Kaduna; 100% Kogi; 100% Plateau; 56% Yobe
101 For example, ONSA was keen for the research study to involve those in detention awaiting trial. This was not possible on grounds of academic research ethics protocols. This case study does hence not suggest a strong or direct contribution of the NSRP-funded research in relation to the work of the Nigeria Prison Service as part of GON's CVE programme.

contributing to an ongoing process to provide decision makers with access to "more and better evidence" (level 2 in the theory of change)

Summary

The picture presented in this case study in one in which the approach to CVE has changed substantially; the period under consideration has seen conceptualisation and pilot implementation of a new 'softer' and 'holistic' approach to CVE as well as a change in the nature of communication among key actors. **The NSRP-funded research has contributed (if only in a secondary capacity) to this mainly through validating ONSA's approach**.

Considering the NSRP TOC, at the level of activities and outputs, all case study contributors concur that in this case NSRP successfully *commissioned and disseminated policy relevant research* [activity].[102] NSRP has also attempted (via the development of policy briefs and facilitation of a well-attended dissemination event) to ensure that this *policy relevant research was made accessible to stakeholders* [output]. The TOC, to the extent that it is directly within the control of NSRP, has been successfully implemented.

In relation to outcomes, at level 1 of the TOC (*uptake of knowledge on conflict-related issues and capacity to use that knowledge*) there is evidence that a range of stakeholders are engaging with the research. However, with the exception of three (somewhat vague) examples, outcomes in terms of the *influence of evidence* (level 2 of the TOC) are not yet confirmed.

Further, it is not possible to draw findings in relation to capacity to use research evidence on the basis of this case study. In the examples provided 'new knowledge' from NSRP may have resulted in alterations/ additions to the GON ONSA CVE approach but, this is not considered a true test of ONSA's capacity to utilise research evidence (overcoming any barriers that may exist) as the emerging evidence reinforced their existing beliefs as opposed to challenging them and testing their ability to respond.

Key learning

This case study research and analysis has identified a small number of factors which are seen to have facilitated achievements to date. Some of these may also be viewed as inhibitors to the achievement of outcomes going forward. Points to note are:

- **Facilitating factors:**
  - **The moment:** At the point that the research study was commissioned the time was right within the key implementing agency (ONSA) for the resulting evidence to be harnessed. Within ONSA there was recognition that a revised approach to CVE was needed. Further, growing institutional and public disillusionment with the military response to the insurgency in Northern states created an environment in which a significantly 'new approach' with a supporting evidence base was more likely to be taken on board by decision makers. In this way, '*the moment*' was a facilitator of success.
  - **Ownership:** There is very clear ownership of the Radicalisation, De-radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation research study from ONSA. The study was conceived by ONSA and the agency has retained ownership of key outputs. By publishing the policy briefs with ONSA branding,[103] the agency is outwardly promoting the research and GON contributors involved in this case study were keen to state that it has made a positive contribution to their work[104]. It is not clear if the same research commissioned and undertaken without the involvement of a central GON agency would have been acknowledged in the same way. [105]

102 Albeit this was not done alone.
103 NSRP and DPRC branding is also visible at the back.
104 Although it was not always possible to pin down the specific nature of the contribution.
105 Young (2008) notes the importance of "engagement with policy makers throughout the process, from identifying the problem, undertaking the research itself, drawing out recommendations for policy and practice from the results".

- **The champion:** Ownership of the research process by ONSA (and the resulting prominence of the research) appears largely linked to one individual – the intellectual designer of the CVE programme. Comments from academic contributors and donor programme staff are all in agreement on this point – ONSA was hungry for research evidence to inform programming and this individual was the key driving force (a committed '*agent of change'* to use the terminology from the TOC). The idea of an internal champion is known in this area of the research literature.[106]

- **Inhibiting factors:**

  - **The moment: '***Harnessing the moment'*, while necessary, could also be viewed as a constraining factor in this case. Academic contributors to this case study commented that the drive from NSRP/ ONSA to complete and publish the research in advance of election campaigning is perceived to have limited the depth of analysis.

  - **The champion:** As noted in the analysis above, the driving force of this research piece has now stepped down from her post. In the absence of 'the internal champion' as a central figure within ONSA, will the research study, its findings and recommendations remain visible?

Value for money:

To deliver the research NSRP contracted established and respected researchers from the Oxford Nigeria Research Network (ONRN) with field support from their established partners from the Development Projects Research Centre (DPRC). This approach is perceived to have added weight and credibility to the research outputs and, by utilising existing logistical capacity of DPRC, maximised the budget available for the creation and dissemination of knowledge. In the absence of NSRP support, it is likely that ONSA would have found funding from another source. However, key informants from GON commented on NSRP as "*way up there"* in terms of partners; ONSA chose NSRP as they felt NSRP could add value.

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106 Young (2008) notes "Individual champions and opponents frequently play a major role, as does serendipity – or chance".

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13. Young, J., (2008) 'Impact of research on policy and practice', Capacity.org; Issue 35

Case No.	4	Outcome of conflict sensitivity training on reporters' coverage of the 2015 elections in Kano, Borno, Plateau and Rivers States

Introduction

NSRP aimed to support Nigeria to manage conflict through non-violent means during the 2015 election period by assisting media outlets to report more professionally and objectively in a conflict sensitive manner, including by recognizing and not further propagating hate speech. This aspect of the programme sits under **Output 4.3: Conflict sensitizing Nigerian media and increasing opportunities for audiences to contribute to governance and peace building**. The criteria for choosing partner stations were as follows: capacity to reach a wide population; private ownership (as it is harder to influence government-owned entities); and the existence of talk show programmes. The strategy was partly based on a NSRP media mapping study undertaken in 2011, which identified radio as having the potential to help resolve conflict.[107] The NSRP perception studies have also identified radio as being a major source of information on conflict-related issues.[108] The model was to focus on a limited number of radio stations with a sympathetic management, who were willing to be engaged, and who could lead by example.

Table 1. NSRP media partners for ROA Case 4

State	Partner station	Private/Public
Kano	Wazobia FM, Freedom Radio	Private
Rivers	Wazobia FM, Rhythm FM	Private
Plateau	Silverbird Rhythm FM and TV	Private
Borno	BRTV (radio and TV)	Government-owned

The focus of this study is on NSRP activities in Kano, Rivers, Plateau and Borno States from November 2014 to mid-May 2015, as agreed with NSRP.

Definition of the Impact Event

The impact event explored is the outcome of the conflict sensitivity training on reporters' coverage of the 2015 elections. "Training" is understood to cover training, mentoring and other advocacy activities in the pre-election period. NSRP managed and implemented the vast majority of the activities itself, using a combination of its own staff and NSRP contractors for the training and mentoring. The only non-NSRP activities discussed are those implemented by NSRP grantee, the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD).

Inputs

NSRP supported 6 partner stations with technical and mentoring support in the four states. The approximate value of this support is the following:

107 One media mapping study recommended the following: "because of its reach, radio based advocacy programmes/campaigns should be used/encouraged; programmes produced in the different local languages on peaceful coexistence should be sponsored; journalists covering conflicts in the black states should be trained on how to cover conflicts objectively". British Council (2011), Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme Media Mapping, Borno, Yobe, Plateau, Kaduna, December, p. 9.
108 There are four major self-reported sources of information about conflicts: radio (mentioned by 68% of respondents); friends (56%); television (51%); family (46%). All four sources are reportedly trusted "a bit" by survey respondents. NOI Polls/NSRP (2014), The 2014 Annual Perception Survey Draft Quantitative Report For the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), July, p. 8.

Table 2. Estimated NSRP spending on ROA Case 4 as of November, 2015[109]

ACTIVITIES	COST (NGN)	COST (GBP)
Mac Arthur/CITAD workshop on countering hate speech	13,640,629	47,861.86
Conflict Sensitive Communications trainings (Abuja, Kaduna,[110] Kano, Plateau, Borno, Rivers)	9,404,940	32,999.79
Governorship debates (Kano & Rivers)	4,514,000	15,838.60
Media mentor trainings (Borno, Plateau, Kano, Rivers)	3,672,760	12,886.88
Stakeholders' forum on hate speech	2,000,000	6,611.88
Salary costs for media mentors	3,361,020	11,653.71
Roundtable forum for media owners	1,746,400	6,304.69
Total Spend[111]	**38,339,749**	**134,157**

Selected activities

Workplace mentoring of journalists.

NSRP supported media mentors in each partner station to "*advise and assist radio stations chosen by NSRP in the production of high quality, conflict sensitive, news production and talk shows*".[112] They were also charged with supporting NSRP international trainers to deliver workshop training to media partners and other media organisations on Conflict Sensitive Communications (CSC). Specifically, the mentors were charged with encouraging balance, fairness and impartiality; truthfulness and accuracy; public accountability; avoidance of emotionally or politically laden terms and words; and demonstrating awareness of the dangers of reporting on conflict and trauma.[113] For talk shows and phone-ins they were charged with the production of an entertaining, well-constructed and well-managed show; original or different ways of looking at conflict issues; careful definition and framing of the topic; helping listeners understand the issues in a constructive manner; managing difficult callers and guests well; separating out facts, values and opinions; separating positions from interests; questioning extreme views and assumptions; tackling stereotyping; and being respectful and non-judgemental.[114] Mentors worked with between 5 and 10 people in each station. Mentored programmes were chosen for their wide audiences and interactive components.

Table 3. Overview of NSRP mentoring for ROA Case 4

State	Mentoring
Kano	Began in May 2014 in Wazobia FM and Freedom Radio. 3 journalists mentored, five days per month per station. Programmes mentored: **Barka da Hanste** and **Kano How Una See Am**
Rivers	Began in 2013 in Rhythm FM and Wazobia FM. 19 journalists mentored, 12 days per month. Programmes mentored: **Pitakwa How Una See Am** and **All things in All Ways and All Times (Triple A)**
Plateau	Began in Nov 2014 in Silverbird Rhythm FM. 4 editors, 1 on-air personality and 6 interns/volunteers mentored, almost every day.[115] Programme mentored: **Building Trust.**

109 Email from NSRP, 12.11.2015.
110 Kaduna is not included in this case study.
111 This excludes the cost of the media score cards.
112 NSRP (n.d), Terms of Reference, Media Mentors, p. 1.
113 NSRP, (n.d), Terms of Reference, Media Mentors, p. 1.
114 NSRP, (n.d), Terms of Reference, Media Mentors, p. 1.
115 The key informant was unsure of the official number of days but said he works on it almost every day.

Borno	Began in May 2014 in BRTV. 6 journalists mentored, 10 days per month. Programme mentored: **Frank Talk.** Radio Corporation of Nigeria unofficially mentored.

Training on election reporting.

A specially designed training manual was developed and utilised in the pre-election period for partner and other stations.[116] The learning outcomes from this module, designed as a four-day course, included the following:

- Understand and be able to differentiate between what is meant by fact and opinion in the context of interactive programmes.
- Thoroughly understand how to approach difficult, dangerous, sensitive and/or complex issues in ways that will not exacerbate a conflict.
- Be able to identify and manage the risks inherent in any subject and prepare suitably.
- Understand and be able to use social media in programmes to include more voices and opinions.
- Identify some of the risks associated with different forms of collaboration.
- Explain different ways in which statements or reports on social media may be verified.
- Explain how to create and manage collaborations, and avoid the associated dangers.[117]

It is important to understand the above training as forming part of a continuum with earlier mentoring and training on CSC, which also touched on election reporting. Earlier relevant trainings include the following:

- March 2013, Kano & Port Harcourt/ May 2013, Jos/ November 2013, Maiduguri: elections were specifically discussed in training on talk shows under “taking on hot issues”.
- July 2014, Kano & Port Harcourt: 4-day workshops, 2 days of which were specifically focused on elections.

In total, approximately 400 journalists have been trained by NSRP.

Other activities.

- **Radio stations used for voter education and to appeal for peace.** Partner radio programmes were used to appeal for calm and peace during the election period using jingles and in interviews. In Borno, for example, discussions were held on “Frank Talk” (BRTV) on the importance of peaceful coexistence. The Independent National Election Commission (INEC), youth organizations, elders, senior police, the Joint Task Force (JTF) and security personnel all spoke on the programme. In Plateau, "Building Trust" (Silverbird Rhythm) discussed voter education and voter rights. Election officials were invited to speak on air and security agencies appealed for calm. In Rivers, there were “*quite a number of programmes discouraging violence against women and girls during election[s]*” [KI, media].
- **Media interviews on conflict sensitivity** conducted by NSRP staff.[118]
- **Advocacy** by CITAD (NSRP grantee) and NSRP at different fora e.g. Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC), Guild of Editors, Guild of Corporate Online Publishers and other regulatory agencies and media houses.

116 NSRP/Rolt (2014), Workshop manual: conflict sensitive communication and election report modules, 3 and 4, v1.3, July.
117 NSRP/Rolt (2014), Workshop manual: conflict sensitive communication and election report modules, 3 and 4, v1.3, July, p.2.
118 The NSRP media manager granted Cool FM an interview on the campaign against hate speech. This was aired and then picked by BBC Media Action which aired it on 104 radio stations across the nation at peak hours during the electioneering campaign and immediately after the elections. NSRP (n.d), Activity Report, CSC Success Story in the Run Up to the 2015 elections.

- Sporadic **media monitoring** of supported radio programmes to assess their adoption of a conflict-sensitive and audience-driven approach to news reporting and interactive programming, utilising a score card system (see Box 1).
- **International conference on hate speech** (22-23 January 2015) organised with CITAD and Mac Arthur Foundation and attended by civil society, journalists, security agents, and representatives of political parties.
- **Monitoring of hate speech by CITAD** from 2 January 2015 until 31 January 2016 to generate an analysis that was useful for early warning, to track and predict dangerous/hate speech online and provide monthly analytics to NSRP; to increase the scalability of social media monitoring of hate speech to include NSRP media partners; to create awareness through advocacy; to examine the implications of dangerous/hate speech and violent conflict; and to provide consistent and positive responses to counter hate speech.[119] A system was established for monitoring of hate speech online as well as a mechanism for citizens to forward hate speech to CITAD using email (reporthate@citad.org), WhatsApp and Facebook.
- **Stakeholders forum on hate speech** on 23 March 2015 to discuss the latest developments on hate speech, efforts to combat hate speech by state and non-state actors and consider necessary actions before the elections. Attended by 45 people, the meeting had the goal of sharing *"understanding of the framework on hate dangerous speech monitoring and categorisations and to identify other gaps that may possibly be filled up before the general elections in areas of dissemination of findings".*[120]
- **Roundtable forum for media owners,** managers and members of organisations (2 February 2015) to discuss conflict sensitive communications, hate speech and media marketing.

Selected outputs

- Media mentoring on CSC in 6 stations.
- Series of trainings on CSC for journalists from partner stations and other media outlets.
- Media score cards.
- Stakeholders' forum on hate speech, 23 March 2015.
- International conference on hate speech, 22-23 January 2015.
- Roundtable forum for media owners, managers and members of organisations to discuss conflict sensitive communications, hate speech and media marketing, 2 February 2015.
- Partnership with CITAD (20,037,700 NGN or approximately 66,224 GBP) between January 2015-February 2016).

Case timeline

The following timeline extends beyond the dates for this case study. Additional events are included where considered informative for this case.

2013 - Start of NSRP media mentoring. NSRP signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Silverbird Communications (which owns and operates Rhythm FM, Port Harcourt and Rhythm FM, Jos) from 1 Feb 2013-31 Sept 2017. As part of the MOU NSRP agreed to conduct training for journalists; provide mentoring on CSC; to pay 50 percent tuition costs for selected staff to study for a post graduate distance education diploma in conflict sensitive communication offered by Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria (to be developed with the support of NSRP);[121] provide social media software and hardware; and provide recording

119 NSRP (2015), Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, Grant Agreement for the Centre for Information Technology and Development, pp. 21-22.
120 NSRP (2015), Activity Report Stakeholders' Forum on Hate Speech, 23 March.
121 This initiative has been significantly delayed.

and other equipment needed to facilitate conflict sensitive reporting.[122] Silverbird Communications undertook to provide time off for selected staff to attend the CSC training workshops; give NSRP access to mentors; and dedicate one hour of programming to using conflict sensitive communication (CSC) production approaches.[123]

April-November 2014 - Training on talk show and election reporting held in all four states for partner stations and other media outlets.

November 2014 - May 2015 – Media mentoring ongoing in partner stations in all four states. NSRP staff contributed to radio shows several times during this period to discuss conflict sensitivity. It also undertook advocacy to regulatory bodies.

January 2015 - NSRP led and organised an international hate speech event in partnership with CITAD and the Mac Arthur Foundation in Abuja. Its aims were to: examine the implications of dangerous/hate speech for the 2015 general elections; strategize on how dangerous/hate speech monitoring could be mainstreamed into early warning systems; share experience in dealing with dangerous/hate speech from other countries; and develop harmonized partner engagement on dangerous speech monitoring in the country.[124] NSRP started working more with the Peace and Security Working Group after this event, feeding into its analysis on electoral risks. From January, NSRP grantee, CITAD, engaged in monitoring and actively countering hate messages by confronting people putting out hate speech on-line. [125] This was continued throughout the whole election period. CITAD also held stakeholders meetings, press conferences and issued press releases to counter hate speech.[126]
February 2015 – Media managers' round-table forum targeting media owners and managers to expose them to ideas of conflict sensitivity as it related to elections. The message to media managers was to take charge and reduce support to hate speech. All NSRP partner stations were present, in addition to others. This was a shift for NSRP from targeting journalists to their managers and bosses, in an effort to make maximum impact.

February-March 2015 – Facilitation of gubernatorial debates in Kano and Rivers States. The aims included the following: to give the governorship candidates and their deputies a broad, fair and equal opportunity to present their proposed policies, projects and programmes to voters in a civilized but competitive manner; to give the electorate an opportunity to know the candidates better and also sharpen their knowledge and views of the various governorship candidates and their proposals; to reduce, and possibly diffuse the current and growing inter-party political tension in the states; to discourage supporters of the various candidates and their parties from making elections a "do or die affair"; and to employ conflict sensitive communication principles, where candidates are given equal opportunity to speak without hateful speech.[127] CS instruction was given to the candidates beforehand and the debates were aired on radio and television.

February-May 2015 - The *Election Violence: Count Me Out* campaign ran on Wazobia FM in Kano State, initiated by a media mentor following CSC training. This three-month campaign involved 18,000 slots and

122 NSRP (2013), NSRP and Silverbird Memorandum of Understanding Between The Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) And Silverbird Communications Limited (Rhythm FM, Port Harcourt and Jos), pp. 2-3.
123 NSRP (2013), NSRP and Silverbird Memorandum of Understanding Between The Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) And Silverbird Communications Limited (Rhythm FM, Port Harcourt and Jos), pp. 2-3.
124 NSRP (2015), Activity Report International Conference on Dangerous Speech, 22-23 January, p. 1.
125 NSRP (2015), Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, Grant Agreement for the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD).
126 Two press releases are available at: http://www.citad.org/category/press-statements/.
127 Adapted from NSRP (n.d), Concept note on issue-based 2015 governorship candidates debate, Rivers State.

endorsements from 47 prominent personalities on air, ranging from actors, musicians, community leaders, Imams and the Deputy Governor (now elected Governor). All of them "counted themselves out" of violence on air. Whenever Wazobia had guests they were also encouraged to use this language. The campaign visited 6 schools to record "voice drops" among youths. Freedom Radio (also NSRP's partner) began a similar campaign due to its popularity and the Police Commissioner in Kano requested other stations to conduct campaigns, which they reportedly did.[128]

Notably, two events which were considered key in bringing about behavioural change by NSRP were not mentioned by key informants in the states: the CITAD hate speech event in January 2015 and the media managers' round-table forum in February 2015.

Other actors and events

In the pre-election period, a host of other actors became involved in efforts towards peaceful elections. Key actors include the following:

The **National Broadcasting Commission (NBC)** is a parastatal of the Federal Government of Nigeria, empowered to regulate the broadcasting industry by Act no. 38 of 1992, as amended by Act no. 55 of 1999. It has powers to impose sanctions on media outlets for infringements of the Nigeria Broadcasting Code[129] including by shutting them down, revoking licenses, reducing broadcasting hours and imposing fines. It does not regulate social media and is considered to be pro-government and therefore unbalanced in the application of its mandate, according to two key informants [KIs, media]. For the first time, however, the NBC's head appeared in conferences with a message that the NBC would clamp down on hate speech. No arrests were made but the appearances were still considered significant, according to NSRP. Some stations were fined and written warnings were issued.

The **National Human Rights Commission** engaged in advocacy with political parties, community service organizations and media, and had a blog reporting on hate speech. It worked with the National Orientation Agency, as a member of the State Conflict Management Alliance, on key peace messages around the elections.

The **Independent Nigeria Electoral Commission (INEC)** organised platforms in Plateau State to douse tensions, give responses to queries and explain itself when accused of skewing the voters' register.

Advertising Practitioners' Council of Nigeria (APCON) authorizes advertisements and receives complaints on hate speech. It has powers to fine media organizations but not close them down. In Plateau, a media mentor was able to send a jingle that had already been paid for by a gubernatorial candidate and "*was practically hate speech*" to APCON, knowing that it would not be allowed on air. The jingle was sent back to the candidates, revamped and then aired.

Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a civil society election monitoring group, monitored hate speech in mass media, political rallies and other media using Rapid SMS technology in the pre-election period.

The Nigerian **diaspora** engaged in peace messaging on social media and also in person as people returned to Nigeria to vote.

Cross-learning from other international contexts on election violence was considered to have played a key role in pushing for peace. The Umati group from Kenya, which participated in the NSRP hate speech event in January 2015, was considered particularly influential.[130] Their message to journalists was to be cautious about reporting, but not to self-censor as happened in Kenya's 2013 elections.

128 Express radio, ARTV and Rahma Radio all reportedly conducted their own campaigns. This was not verified.
129 NBC (2010), Nigeria Broadcasting Code, Fifth edition.
130 See http://www.ihub.co.ke/uploads/default/files/umati/Umati_Report_Oct-Jan_2013.pdf

Extensive **donor funding** was provided for peace building programmes. The **memory of earlier political violence**, particularly in 2011, also played a role in dousing tensions.

Furthermore, Muhammadu Buhari and former-President Goodluck Johnathan signed a peace deal on 14 February 2015 where they committed to free, credible and violence-free election and renewed it on 26 March,[131] resulting in pressure on all state governors to uphold the peace.

Numerous jingles were used by media outlets, with on-air personalities cautioning people to avoid electoral violence.

The process of change

Operating context pre-NSRP intervention

Since the end of military rule, Nigeria has conducted four nation-wide electoral contests: in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. The relatively successful conduct of the 2011 elections marked a turning point in the country's democratic trajectory, as it contrasted sharply with the electoral mismanagement and widespread fraud of previous polls.[132] However, violence in some northern cities in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of election results caused over 800 deaths and few electoral offenders were prosecuted. In 2011, media outlets were not considered to be conscious of the impact of their reporting, according to NSRP. As a result, more than 400 people in Kano and Kaduna were killed, largely as a result of a social media campaign.

From the inception period of NSRP, it was clear that among media organisations, knowledge of conflict sensitivity was poor. Media reporting was often unfounded, lacking in evidence, politicized, and used ethnic terms. It was full of hate speech, used by all types of media, and there was no accountability. Inflammatory and sensational reporting was common in the pre-election period. Language was used that was combative and insensitive, while stories were unbalanced. According to CITAD, in the period from January-March 2015, 76% of hate speech in Nigerian social media was transmitted through Facebook, followed by online articles and Twitter.[133] About 70% of people using hate speech online were identifiable, and the majority (65%) were male. English was the most common language used, followed by Hausa. Much of the hate speech used coded language that had been used to incite violence or harm in the past. The prevalence of hate speech on social media relating to election issues was considered high.[134] Key electoral figures used it liberally. For example, in November 2014, the Governor of Katsina state, Barrister Ibrahim Shema "*delivered a classical hate speech in which he likened the opposition to cockroaches only worthy of being crushed,*" according to CITAD.[135]

Political figures were considered to have an "overbearing influence" on media managers during the election campaign.[136] Advertisements were made with no regard for the need for APCON certification. NBC and the

131 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/03/jonathan-buhari-meet-renew-peace-accord/
132 National Democratic Institute (2015), Statement of the National Democratic Institute's International/observer Mission to Nigeria's March 28 Presidential and Legislative elections, 30 March. See statement on https://www.ndi.org/nigeria-election-observation-statement-march-2015.
133 CITAD, Report of one-day stakeholders' forum on hate speech and the 2015 elections in Nigeria, p. 2-3.
134 NSRP (2015), Monthly Report 1, February, p. 3.
135 CITAD (2014), Text of the Press Conference by Kabiru Saidu Dakata, Senior Programmes Officer, on behalf of other Kano pro-democracy CSOs, 29 November.
136 CITAD, Report of one-day stakeholders' forum on hate speech and the 2015 elections in Nigeria, p. 6.

Nigerian Press Council meted out sanctions to media houses in what was considered an unevenhanded manner.[137]

Imprisonment, violent threats, and arrests were all faced by journalists on occasion.[138] At the same time, they easily incited violence, both deliberately and due to thoughtless or poor quality journalism. For example, in 2013 in Wazobia FM (Kano), a recorded broadcast that discussed a polio vaccine as being a western design to harm Muslims was credited with leading to 9 polio vaccinators being killed [KI, media].

Radio was a key source of information for people on conflict-related issues, after friends, television and family.[139] Partner stations in Kano, Plateau and Rivers were perceived to have a "bit" of a role in solving political conflict and violence (scores ranged from 4.06 to 4.39 out of a total of 5, with 4= "a bit").[140] People's trust in the same stations was also "a bit" (scores ranged from 3.22 to 3.49, with 3= "a bit trust").[141] There was a recognised need for more synergy among the various regulatory bodies to combat hate and dangerous speech in the mass media, for a review of the enabling laws of regulatory agencies to provide steeper fines and sanctions for media houses disseminating hate speech, and the need for a collective push for legislation to counter hate speech following the elections.

Operating context as a result of the NSRP intervention

As a result of the NSRP interventions, and during the 2015 election period, there was an increased awareness among targeted journalists about not inflaming an already tense situation, removing emotions from reporting, and reporting all angles of a story in a neutral manner. Journalists had the confidence and the skills to manage stories and situations on air that could lead to violence. In a highly charged political atmosphere they were able to nip situations in the bud, before they became explosive. There was more of an understanding of their individual and collective responsibility to report in a balanced manner, as well as the need for social inclusion. Key informants' comments include the following comments:

- **Rivers State:** "*Prior to NSRP's intervention in Port Harcourt, media organizations were part of fuelling electoral violence. For instance, Rhythm journalists didn't initially know that some of their activities also fuel electoral violence … but this has now changed and rhythm radio station is now cautious of conflict sensitive issues, and this is attributed to NSRP" [*KI, media]. *"Many of the issues that would have triggered electoral violence were curtailed systematically by the journalists"* [KI, media].
- **Plateau State:** *"During election period, competition was fierce, lots of different interests pre-election, had to be careful about jingles being used, news stories. People wanted to capitalise on elections to cause further conflict. [The] role of media very significant – we knew this. [We] stepped up more meetings, spent more time with team and on programmes. [We] rejected certain jingles, rejected stories without balance, if objectivity not there"* [KI, media].
- **Kano State. "***Prior to the training provided by NSRP [mentor] had never received CSC training – the concepts and approach were new and the training made a lot of difference. Personally for [mentor] the training has enabled him to understand better that radio could be used for development. He has learned how to apply CSC to day-to-day discussions and broadcasting. Before the training, he as a producer and broadcaster felt he and his guests could say whatever they wanted - he would let people on air discuss things in inflammatory ways"* [KI, media].

137 CITAD, Report of one-day stakeholders' forum on hate speech and the 2015 elections in Nigeria, p. 6.
138 Interviews with media mentors for MTE.
139 See footnote 2 above.
140 NOI Polls/NSRP (2014), The 2014 Annual Perception Survey Draft Quantitative Report For the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), July, p. 39.
141 NOI Polls/NSRP (2014), The 2014 Annual Perception Survey Draft Quantitative Report For the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), July, p. 39.

In Plateau State, fear played a considerable role in shaping Silverbird's pre-election coverage. A politician's house was burnt down after he went on air making inflammatory statements on Unity FM. The station was also threated. This was a "*wake up call*" for stations and led to self-censorship [KI, media]. There were constant meetings about coverage with station managers in Silverbird as a result, due to the fear of creating the impression of bias. A key informant commented: "*Threat messages played a significant role"* [KI, media]. In addition, Silverbird planned to organise gubernatorial debates in Plateau. Plans were made to bring the candidates to the studio and the station began to advertise. Lots of calls were received from political parties and friends of candidates who were not happy with the sound bites being used from the candidates. Individual journalists and the station were threatened with attack. Eventually, staff were forced to change the sound bites to calm the situation and cancelled plans for the debates.

It is recognised that almost all of the sources of information on the CSC training were all directly involved in the NSRP programme, either as recipients or managers/mentors, thereby introducing a bias into the MTE interviews. However, evidence suggests that the training and mentoring does seem to have been highly valued by those concerned and to have been utilised intensely in the pre-election period. A recent mid-term review of the training and mentoring by the NSRP media advisor – whose assessment was also based on interviews with beneficiaries of the programme - confirms this: *Overall, the core work of building capacity amongst partner radio stations is going well and the CSC agenda has been embraced by broadcasters with enthusiasm.*[142] **A key finding of the MTE is that a *combination* of training and mentoring seems to be most effective in bringing about behaviour change.**

Outcomes (and impacts) – The evidence base

The main outcomes of the NSRP intervention in the four states were increased knowledge about CSC in a limited number of media outlets (radio, TV), leading to more professional journalism in the pre-election period. This, in turn, helped to shape coverage significantly, thereby not inflaming the very tense political situation. The mentoring, in particular, was highly valued as journalists were constantly reminded of the CSC approach [KI, media]. The fact that NSRP does training and then – unlike other actors - follows up through the mentoring system was highly appreciated [KI, media]. The NSRP approach filled a clear gap. It was the first introduction to ethical or conflict sensitive journalism for some of the journalists, awakening their sense of personal responsibility.

Raised professional standards in mentored partner stations. Key informants spoke of a heightened awareness among journalists on the responsibility to report in a conflict sensitive manner and their role in "*dousing"* conflict instead of stoking it [KI, media]. The following changes of behaviour were emphasized:

- Careful planning of programmes/stories and post-mortems of programmes to examine how issues/guests were handled [KIs, media in 4 states].
- Adoption of a neutral tone and focus on reporting the facts in a non-judgemental, unpoliticized, balanced manner [KIs, media in 3 states].
- Use of editorial meetings to mentor on CSC approach [KIs, media in 3 states].
- Rejection of stories, jingles, and other paid content that was not conflict sensitive [KIs, media in 3 states].
- Careful use of language by avoiding inflammatory terms and hate speech and using alternatives [KIs, media in 3 states].
- Careful choice, preparation and management of radio guests before shows to ensure they are CS [KIs, media in 2 states].
- Use of social media to increase interaction with listeners and mainstream the people's voices [KI, media in 1 state].

142 Adam, Gordon (2015), Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), Media Component Mid-term Review, p. 2.

- Use of CS news headlines [KI, media in 1 state].
- Use of CS sound bites [KI, media in 1 state].
- Introduction of a right of reply [KI, media in 1 state].

It is not possible to comment on media partners who received training (in the absence of mentoring) due to a lack of follow up and monitoring data.

Confidence to use CS skills. Increased confidence to act in a conflict sensitive manner and to cover any story, however sensitive, was reported in 3 states. This was confirmed as part of the mid-term review by NSRP's media advisor: "*The influence of the conflict sensitive communication (CSC) workshops and on-the-job mentoring was clearly evident in the coverage of the recent election campaigns. The prospect of election violence was very real, and the journalists interviewed had new-found confidence as a result of their training to do their job thoroughly and yet at the same time have the necessary skills to avoid exacerbating the situation."*[143]

Reported "stepping down" of information within stations beyond those trained/mentored by NSRP. This was reported by media KIs in all four states. A key informant in Kano commented: "*Today if you listen to the news and programmes being broadcast by Wazobia and Freedom compared to other stations there is a lot of difference. You do not hear the anchors/ broadcasters using non-conflict sensitive words, they are working in [a] CS way… NSRP has been successful in not only getting the targeted mentees on board, but also the heads of news at the two stations. The two heads of news who [mentor] works with are fully on board, have changed their behaviours."* Similarly, in Plateau it was considered significant that NSRP obtained buy-in from the management of Rhythm FM as part of a Memorandum of Understanding.

Increased participation on air. A general effort - not exclusive to the election period – has been made to include voices from women and other marginalized groups, as well as cover stories that affect these groups [KIs with media in 4 states], as a result of NSRP. Women's voices increased somewhat with the use of dedicated lines for women in Kano (Freedom Radio) and Port Harcourt (Wazobia). A journalist who received NSRP training in 2014 reportedly developed the Platform radio programme within BRTV, which is dedicated to women [KI, media].

Use of media to educate. Partner programmes were utilised to educate the public on voter education and to air peace messages and jingles in the election period. CSC training led to a highly successful 3-month peace campaign being developed in Kano (***Election Violence: Count me Out***). Over 18,000 jingles and voice messages on peace were aired on the two stations in Kano state [KI, NSRP].

Improved understanding of hate speech. The hate speech event in January 2015 led to the formation of a stakeholders forum on hate speech to coordinate a campaign against hate speech, a commitment from stakeholders to work to counter hate speech, and the establishment of international linkages for the hate speech monitoring community. NSRP grantee, CITAD, led the monitoring and countering work.

Media scoring of supported programmes

NSRP supports independent scoring of supported radio programmes. As Table 4 illustrates, the scores hovered between a reasonably good 3.5 and 4.2 out of a total of 5 in the election period, which broadly supports the findings above. However, the following caveat should be noted. The scoring is highly irregular, despite the fact that the scores are key indicators of progress for the media component in the NSRP log frame. The mid-term review by the NSRP media advisor noted that "*the system of scorecard monitoring of conflict sensitivity amongst media partners has broken down."*[144] Furthermore, it noted that the quality of the

143 Adam, Gordon (2015), Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, Media Component Mid-term Review, p. 2.
144 Adam, Gordon (2015), Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), Media Component Mid-term Review, May, p. 2.

system was questionable. The review recommended that the score-card template should be revised, noting that one reason for the lapse in reporting included problems in providing recordings of the NSRP supported media programmes to the contractor (Garga Media).[145] Garga also reported difficulties in entering data on the online portal. "*There was inadequate information provided in the tables which record the 'conflict sensitivity' of the radio programmes which made it difficult to assess the basis on which the conflict sensitivity score was calculated. No description of the topics being analysed was provided,"* the review noted. *"It was quite unclear how the conflict sensitive average scores were calculated,"*[146] it added.

Nevertheless, as this is the only independent data on the conflict sensitivity of supported media programmes, relevant scores are included here. Programmes are scored for their conflict sensitivity under a variety of headings such as who the guests are, guests' knowledge of the issue under discussion, and level of public participation.

Table 4. NSRP media scores for supported programmes

Barka da Hanste	Kano How una see am	Frank Talk	Pitakwa How una see am	Building Trust	Triple A
3.5 (21.01.2015)	3.8 (12.01. 2015)	3.9 (12.11.2014)	4.0 (18.03.2015)	No scores available	3.9 (18.02. 2015)
3.8 (24.03.2015)		3.8 (12.11.2014)			3.9 (23.02.2015)
		3.7 (10.02.2015)			4.0 (23.02.2015)
		4.2 (11.03.2015)			4.2 (23.02.2015)
					3.8 (23.02.2015)
					4.0 (23.02.2015)
					3.8 (23.02.2015)
					4.1 (23.02.2015)

145 This was confirmed by NSRP.
146 Adam, Gordon (2015), Review of Garga Media's NSRP media reports, 9 September, p.1.

In sum, the MTE found that while CSC knowledge and skills were both welcomed and utilised, they are not yet institutionalised. Journalists in two states (Borno and Rivers States) said they did not know whether the approach would continue in their stations in the absence of NSRP, despite buy-in from their managers. In Rivers, five out of a group of six journalists from three stations, all of whom had either been mentored or trained, said without NSRP the situation could slide back.

Box 1: Outcomes in Borno

NSRP has trained a total of 20 journalists (radio, print and television) in the North East in BRTV, Peace FM, the Nigerian Television Authority, Yobe Broadcasting Corporation, Yobe television, Daily Trust, and News Agency of Nigeria. For many, this was their first introduction to conflict sensitivity, gender sensitivity and ethical journalism. A key informant media mentor (also a news producer and presenter of a current affairs programme) attended two trainings by NSRP, the first of which was in December 2013 and focused on CSC and hate speech. He became a media mentor in BRTV in April 2014 and works directly with 8 people in his team. In total he has "*stepped down*" the training (at least to some extent) to 16 people in BRTV, all reporters and editors [KI, media]. A second key informant also attended training in 2013 on writing news in a CS way; making CS radio presentations; ensuring issues related to gender, children and other marginalised groups are bought to the fore; and the use of social media to enhance communications. In April 2014 he began to produce and anchor a new weekly programme, "Frank Talk", which was inspired by the CSC training and originally financed by a NSRP grant to the National Union of Journalists. It airs weekly in English, Kanuri and Hausa. At the time of its inception, supporters of the different political parties in Borno were perceived to be emotional, and tensions were rising along political lines. Frank Talk was designed to provide a forum for people to talk about key issues around conflict sensitivity and peace building. Every programme opened with a jingle: *"This is frank talk, a radio programme meant to enhance peaceful coexistence and tolerance in society"* [Ki, media]

Prior to the 2015 elections the situation in Maiduguri was extremely tense, having been identified as one of the most volatile states in Nigeria, with a high threat level.[1] Before the NSRP training on CSC, there were many issues that journalists and producers in BRTV felt they could not discuss [KI with media]. After the training, this changed: it is *how* you discuss it that counts, and *how* you prepare the mind set of the interviewee so that they know the facts. A key informant said: "*NSRP's singular effort has opened a lot of new perspectives into the act of news reporting in Borno state for those who attended the workshops. [It] gave people [a] wider perspective about how to approach many issues"* [KI, media]. The key informant has a changed perspective as a result and is able to use this to work with and help his colleagues in BRTV. "*You can address all issues – even JAS, even issues of women and children – [you] just have to do it in sensitive way*. *The training is infiltrating down through BRTV – people have courage to address difficult issues in CS way. People can identify stakeholders, bring in guests that are appropriate* [KI, media]."

As a government-owned station, BRTV has traditionally been very focused on reporting on the state governor and his activities and successes. There was resistance to Frank Talk initially. A number of staff were concerned about the implications for the station and worried about people calling in and voicing their opinions freely on air. NSRP underscored that producers and anchors had been suitably trained and would be fully supported. BRTV's management has since changed its view and allowed the "Frank Talk" programme to continue even since the NUJ funding has ceased. However, within BRTV there is also a perception that key informants are spending too much time on NSRP-related work, which is causing resentment.

Recommendations from Borno key informants:

- CSC skills are seeping across BRTV but there is a need for sustained training and with more journalists, in more than one station.
- Engage with the Nigerian military in the North East on the use of CSC for radio.

To conclude, the outcomes of the conflict sensitivity training were very positive, partly because they built on existing knowledge and training within partner stations. Key persons within all partner stations adopted the CSC approach and were able to adapt it to pre-election coverage. People adopted a new set of professional standards, guiding principles and behaviours during the pre-election period that would not have been possible, without NSRP. NSRP was part of a broad civil society effort in the run-up to the elections to maintain peace, with numerous other actors playing a

role in "*dousing*" tensions [KI, media]*. Its role was innovative,[147] filled a key gap, and has the potential to result in a lasting impact if continued. It is also associated with increased stations' and personal credibility in Rivers [KIs, media]. One key informant said that knowing that CSC is good for business was a motivation. When people knew that a station was conflict sensitive, it built confidence and attracted patronage, he added* [KI, media].

The 'contribution' of NSRP

NSRP was one of many civil society actors working towards peaceful elections in 2015. Many factors influenced the outcome of the elections, which were considered to be relatively peaceful, despite fears of widespread violence. However, they were still marred by "*systemic weaknesses, misuse of incumbency, use of violence, and an increasingly pressured environment for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC),*" especially in the south of Nigeria.[148] Incidents of violence were reported in all parts of the county.

Among some key informants and even NSRP staff, there is a perception that NSRP played a great role in bringing about peaceful elections. In Borno, for example, a NSRP key informant made a direct link between the clean election, the media coverage before the election, and the training to media partners and practitioners supported and facilitated by NSRP, explaining that because journalists covered the elections in the way they did there was increased awareness [of the potential for conflict], and people were more aware of their responsibility. This may be true but there was also an extraordinary effort made in Borno to keep the peace. The Governor, Joint Military Task Force, Sheikh of Borno, politicians and police all made statements banning violence and appealing for peace before the election.

Given the absence of relevant data, it is only possible to comment on the *positive contribution* that NSRP made to partner media stations and their coverage in the pre-election period, which in turn contributed – among many other actors and events - to the peace.

What is clear is that as of the beginning of this case study, NSRP was the only known organization addressing the issue of CSC and implementing these skills in partner media organizations as well as other media outlets through training and mentoring. {Two other DFID-funded programmes known to NSRP had an explicit media support component (ENABLE and SAVI) prior to the elections. Their support to various media outlets around the election had the same objective, but without using any specific CSC methodology}.

Key learning

The NSRP ToC in practice

Level 1 of the Theory of Change (ToC) is clearly illustrated by this case: NSRP has facilitated improved communication among stakeholders (between journalists and the public and among journalists); broader societal participation including marginalised voices (women, youth, groups representing minorities such as persons with disabled); generated more frequent conflict and gender sensitivity media coverage (although on gender, more could be done); and resulted in the uptake of knowledge on conflict-sensitive issues and capacity to use that knowledge. Level one outcomes are underpinned by some of the activities outlined in the ToC: the identification of agents of change (journalists and media managers); convening and strengthening existing fora for dialogue and debate (via radio programmes); and providing technical assistance/conflict and gender sensitive training. The assumptions that stakeholders want to work with NSRP (although there is also some resistance reported), that credible agents of change exist, that stakeholders are willing to use their knowledge on conflict resolution, and that the media are aware of their

147 For example, mass media are currently perceived to play a very limited role in conflict management (2% unprompted, 5% prompted). NOI Polls/NSRP (2014), The 2014 Annual Perception Survey Draft Quantitative Report For the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), July, p. 8.
148 European Union Election Observation Mission, Second Preliminary Statement, 13 April 2015.

capacity to enflame conflict have proven true. Level 2 of the ToC (mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity within media coverage reduces the potential for violence to be enflamed) is also partially evident. While it is not possible to comment on the degree to which partner media stations have *mainstreamed* CSC in all of their programmes in the absence of broader scoring from NSRP, it is clear that the take up of the CSC approach in at least some programming does reduce the potential for violence to be enflamed.

Value for money

- Since May 2015 (end of election period) the Count me Out has run monthly programmes on different themes e.g. “Rape - Count Me Out”. Frank Talk continued after the NUJ grant finished.
- Non-NSRP radio stations have recognised the benefit of the CSC approach and have contacted NSRP to request support e.g. Peace FM Maiduguri wants a partnership with NSRP.
- In an example of the multiplier effect, as a result of NSRP activities around the elections in Kano state, the Kano Commissioner for Police requested other radio houses (numbering about 10 in Kano State) to adopt the ‘Election Violence: Count Me Out Campaign’. This was reportedly done at no additional cost in several media outlets, although it has not been verified.
- Key informant interviews and limited media monitoring of supported programmes suggest that learning on CSC appears to have been largely maintained in the post-election period {with the exception of *Pitakwa How Una See Am* in Rivers State (Wazobia FM)}, although there are concerns about sustainability, as described above.

Recommendations

- The media mentors are absolutely fundamental to the process of behavioural change in targeted stations. NSRP should invest in them and provide more oversight to ensure the quality of their work. There is a concern that they are trained and then largely left to their own devices.
- Target media regulatory bodies in order to ensure they become more proactive in the effort to regulate media practice in a balanced manner, especially during election periods.
- Monitor the outcomes of training. There is currently no systematic monitoring in place.
- As the training and mentoring is expanded to other media partners,[149] it is essential that the focus be maintained on existing partner stations and to the same extent. **CSC knowledge is not yet institutionalised.**
- Dedicate more resources and staff to this component of NSRP’s programme, which has great potential to make a lasting change to conflict dynamics in Nigeria.

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Case No.	5	Adoption of Code of Principles and Standards on government employment programmes in Kano state

Introduction

NSRP is supporting the Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education (CHRICED) in three Local Government Areas (LGAs)[150] in Kano State to advocate to government agencies for transparency and fairness in their employment and empowerment programmes. This aspect of the NSRP programme sits under **Output Stream 2 (Output 2.1: Supporting economic programmes in target states to be more transparent, accountable and reach a greater number of beneficiaries**).

Following advocacy activities and a number of high-level and increasingly inclusive round tables, CHRICED finalised a Code of Principles (*Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State: Draft Principles for Programme Design and Implementation)*[151] in February 2015 to aid employment/empowerment agencies' programme design and implementation. The Code includes recommendations on improving transparency, inclusion and coordination and has been validated by a number of government state actors in Kano. It is a voluntary, non-binding document that CHRICED hopes to transform into legislation. CHRICED's project is entitled *Promoting Youth Employment and Participation in Kano State*. As such, its focus is broader than the Code of Principles. It also places a heavy emphasis on self-empowerment of youths, peaceful coexistence, inter-communal tolerance and peace building.

Definition of the Impact Event

The impact event explored is the outcome of the adoption of the Code of Principles on government employment programmes in Kano state. The desired outcome of the Code of Principles is a more transparent, accountable and all-inclusive stakeholder participation in the design, implementation, control and evaluation of youth employment/empowerment programmes and in particular the effective participation of youths in those programmes.[152] A further aim is to move youth from unemployment to sustainable and adequate employment in a lawful activity involving decent work that yields enough for their basic needs (and those of their dependents).[153]

Inputs

NSRP is supporting CHRICED with technical and financial assistance (approximately 226,472 GBP or 56,618,128 NGN) for three years from February 2014.[154]

Selected activities

NSRP is funding a range of activities related to the Code of Conduct, including the following:

- Conceiving and drafting the Code of Principles and three stages of peer review: i) by NSRP; ii) through an Experts meeting; iii) and by influencers and managers of government-run employment programmes.

150 The project focuses on two wards in each of the LGAs.
151 Referred to as the Code of Principles throughout.
152 CHRICED (2015), Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State: Draft principles for programme design and implementation, p. 8.
153 CHRICED (2015), Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State: Draft principles for programme design and implementation, Legitimacy and accountability principles, p. 10.
154 Information provided by NSRP. A total of 45,287,659.26 NGN has been disbursed to date.

- Advocacy visits to employment agencies, local government authorities, and traditional and religious leaders in the three LGAs. These were undertaken by CHRICED both separately and with youth groups.[155] Limited media coverage has accompanied these efforts.[156]
- Advocacy materials requesting youths to demand access to employment schemes and reject violence.[157]
- Town hall meetings, seminars and workshops to enhance interaction between unemployed youths and government employment/empowerment agencies.
- Printing the Code of Principles and disseminating it through partners (e.g. Kano State Ministry of Planning and Budget, Kano State Ministry of Finance).
- Advocacy training for youth, media and community-based organisations in relation to youth employment and participation.
- Training for government agency staff: NSRP training on conflict sensitivity for the Kano State Directorate of Youth Development (DYD), including on improving information sharing and feedback mechanisms in all 44 LGAs; and CHRICED training/seminars to which government agency staff are invited.

Outputs

The Code of Principles is divided into two sections:

- A **Preamble** or analysis of youth unemployment in Kano State;
- ***Draft Principles in the Management of Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes***, which comprises principles on legitimacy and accountability, programme management, and distributive justice.

The document places emphasis on the obligation of relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to apply and manage relevant resources in a manner that serves the people of Kano State. Participation of youth is at its heart, aided by transparent information-sharing by MDAs with those who legitimately represent different stakeholder groups.[158] Ensuring that MDAs are free of "*undue political interference*"[159], including by permitting continuous internal and external monitoring of their operations and results is also key.

155 For example, early advocacy visits were made by CHRICED to the Hakimi (District Head) of Doguwa on 16 April, 2014. This was followed by a visit to the Hakimi of Bichi on April 29 and repeat visits to him and his Council, as well as the Bichi LGA Executive and the Divisional Police Officer on 1 May, 2014. A visit to the Hakimi of Kumbotso and his Council, the LGA Executive, was made on 30 April, 2014. A repeat visit to Doguwa where unemployed youth gathered in the Hakimi's palace was on 2 May, while visits to the Kano State Agriculture and Rural Development Agency (KNARDA) and the Ministry for Budget and Planning were on 5 and 6 May 2014. Advocacy visits were undertaken by youth groups from June 3-18, 2015. Visits to the Directorate of Youth Development (DYD), National Directorate of Employment (NDE), and Subsidy Re-Investment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) were made on 3 June. Visits to KNARDA and the Ministry for Local Government were made on 4 June and to the three LGAs on 12 June (Bichi), 16 June (Doguwa) and 18 June (Kumbotso).
156 An inaugural press briefing was held on 16 August, 2014 that was shown on local television. Radio jingles in Hausa and English were made and broadcast between between June – Aug 2014. On October 11, 2015 The Guardian included an article on the Code of Principles.
157 See CHRICED, Stop the Killing, Come Let's Think leaflet.
158 CHRICED (2015), Draft Principles for Programme Design and Implementation in Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State, p. 11.
159 CHRICED (2015), Draft Principles for Programme Design and Implementation in Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State, p. 11.

Affirmative action is called for, for youth with special needs, women and persons with disability, and equitable distribution of benefits across different categories of persons.[160]

The purpose of the Code of Principles is to enable unemployed youth to move from "*the state of unemployment to that of sustainable and adequate employment*",[161] with a focus on job creation in the informal sector. More broadly, CHRICED aims to tackle the threat to peace and security that arises from feelings of alienation and frustration among youth. As one key informant in Doguwa explained: "*The whole objective centres on how to liberate youths from unemployment, drug abuse and violence*." This linkage between tackling unemployment (and related poverty) and reducing violent conflict is grounded in research.[162]

Case timeline

February 2014 – CHRICED was awarded a NSRP grant (funding delayed until May 2014).

March 2014 – CHRICED consultant began drafting of the Code of Principles.

Since April 2014 – CHRICED began a series of advocacy meetings on youth unemployment among relevant agencies.

May 2014 (and Feb 2015) – CHRICED undertook advocacy training (for youths, media, and employment managers) in relation to youth employment and participation, leading to advocacy visits by youth leaders.

12-14 August 2014, 9-11 June 2015 – CHRICED held town hall meetings involving employment agencies, youth groups, and traditional leaders from the three LGAs.[163] Attending agencies made presentations on their programmes, available opportunities and accessing those opportunities. Youth also spoke about their experiences as unemployed.

September 2014 – CHRICED organised an experts' meeting to review the Code of Principles, attended by NSRP, National Directorate of Employment (NDE), Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), academics, and youth representatives leading to a sign-off of the document by CHRICED on 15 October 2014.

February-March 2015 – CHRICED held a Final Review of Code of Principles in Design and Management Workshop for Influencers and Managers of Government-Run Employment Programmes. The Code of Principles was validated and publicly endorsed by multiple agencies.[164]

July 2015 – CHRICED began to disseminate 2,000 hard copies of the Code of Principles.

August 2015 – NSRP Trained 51 DYD staff on Conflict Sensitivity.

September 2015 – The Director General of DYD wrote to NSRP Regional Manager to say he was "*willing to support and collaborate with you [on] any youth employment programme in the state"*.[165] CHRICED held a Stakeholders' Consultative Meeting on Youth Employment and Empowerment in Kano State at which a

160 Gender, education, faith, disability status, health status and ethnicity are mentioned as categories. CHRICED (2015), Draft Principles for Programme Design and Implementation in Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State, p. 13.
161 CHRICED (2015), Draft Principles for Programme Design and Implementation in Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State, pp. 9-10.
162 NSRP (n.d), Winners or Losers: Assessing the Contribution of Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes to Reducing Conflict Risk in Nigeria.
163 Meetings held in each LGA between 9-11 June 2015 included 379 participants. A total of 6 employment and empowerment agencies attended in Bichi, 7 in Kumbotso, and 7 in Doguwa.
164 NDE, Kano State Agricultural and Rural Development Agency, Kano State House of Assembly Committee on Youth Development, Industrial Training Fund, SURE-P, Ministry of Budget and Planning, SERVICOM, DYD, Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development, Ministry for Local Government Affairs were all present and endorsed the Code with a signature. The NDE State Coordinator moved a motion to officially adopt the Code, which was seconded by the Kano State Director of DYD.
165 Letter from Abdu Mohd Ahmed, Director Youth Development for Director General, 8 September 2015.

Steering Committee was established to advance the Code of Principles.[166] Its mandate includes preparing the Code into a Bill format for presentation to the Kano State House of Assembly and identifying and lobbying members of the Kano State House of Assembly to sponsor the bill. An "Achievements so far and action planning" workshop was held on the Code of Principles with youths from Bichi/Kumbotso.

The process of change

Operating context pre-NSRP intervention:

Both the federal government and the government of Kano state have established numerous agencies since the early 1980s to address the problem of youth unemployment that have singularly failed.[167] A sense of alienation coupled with chronic poverty has led to many youth engaging in crime, which in turn presents a security threat. *NSRP's Winners or Losers: Assessing the Contribution of Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes to Reducing Conflict Risk in Nigeria* study notes that in Nigeria there is evidence of a close correlation between youth unemployment and rising armed violence.[168] Unemployment and lack of economic opportunities are widely considered to be significant factors aggravating conflict and increasing the chance of youth being drawn into violence by politicians.[169] This relationship between unemployment, poverty and youths engaging in violence (in Kano) is confirmed in the 2014 NSRP Perception Survey.[170]

Inequities in the distribution of the benefits of youth employment and empowerment schemes in Kano have contributed to the failure of these programmes and intensified youth antagonism towards the government and society in general.[171] This has resulted from a lack of transparency and accountability in the design, control and evaluation of employment/empowerment programmes and their benefits, which have allowed powerful interests to monopolise them and to use them to serve their own interests.[172] Furthermore, unemployed youth have played no part in designing or implementing these programmes and information about the programmes and their modalities is often not freely available.

There are no state-level statistics for youth unemployment in Kano State. With an estimated 40-50% youth unemployment, an extrapolated youth population of 114,168 for Bichi, 64,271 for Doguwa, and 136,824 for Kumbotso, leads to working figures of between 45-57,000 unemployed youth in Bichi, 26-32,000 in Doguwa, and 55-68,000 in Kumbotso.[173] A greater proportion of women than men has been adversely affected, although no disaggregated data is available.[174] Similarly, there is no data available on disabled persons' access to employment opportunities but it is widely acknowledged that they do not enjoy the same access

166 Mambayya House, CHRICED, NDE-/Sure-P, Freedom Radio, Kano Civil Society Forum, Office of the Special Advisor on Special Duties, Christian Association of Nigeria, National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, Women, Peace and Security Network and unemployed youth from the three LGAs are members of the Committee. CHRICED provides the secretariat.
167 These include the NDE, Industrial Training Fund (ITF), National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), Youth Employment and Social Support Operation (YESSO), Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YouWin), Kano State Ministry of Employment, Ministry for Local Government, Kano State Agricultural and Rural Development Agency (KNARDA), and Local Government Community Development.
168 NSRP (n.d), Winners or Losers: Assessing the Contribution of Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes to Reducing Conflict Risk in Nigeria, p. 14.
169 NSRP (n.d), Winners or Losers: Assessing the Contribution of Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes to Reducing Conflict Risk in Nigeria, p. 14.
170 NOI Polls/NSRP (2014), The 2014 Annual Perception Survey, Draft Qualitative Report For The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, July, pp. 15-16.
171 CHRICED (2015), Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State: Draft principles for programme design and implementation, p. 8.
172 CHRICED (2015), Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Kano State: Draft principles for programme design and implementation, p. 8.
173 Youths and Unemployment in Kano State, Background Research on Unemployed Youths in Bichi, Doguwa, and Kumbotso Local Government Areas, provided by CHRICED, p. 6.
174 Youths and Unemployment in Kano State, Background Research on Unemployed Youths in Bichi, Doguwa, and Kumbotso Local Government Areas, provided by CHRICED, pp. 4-5.

to education and employment as able-bodied persons.[175] Communities in targeted LGAs are characterised by high unemployment rates and chronic poverty, with large numbers of people engaged in the informal economic sector where they are frequently exploited. Insanitary conditions, crowded housing, high crime rates, and the abuse of powers by the police,[176] are coupled with low literacy rates and high birth rates, which further contribute to exclusion and marginalisation.

The NSRP 2014 Perception Study confirms that solutions to current conflict dynamics in Kano are perceived to include youth empowerment schemes, skill acquisition programmes, capacity building, education and industrial development, provision of jobs, job creation, capital for entrepreneurs and scholarships.[177]

Operating context as a result of the Code of Principles:

Limited positive changes have been noted within the NDE-Subsidy Re-Investment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) and the DYD as a result of NSRP's intervention through CHRICED.[178] Where changes are observed, the key influencers of change are perceived to be the following:

- Town hall meetings, which have facilitated contact between employment agencies and youths and also among employment agencies.[179]
- The inclusive process of drafting the Code of Principles.[180]
- The training and seminars for youths on advocacy, empowerment and communications undertaken by CHRICED.[181]
- The advocacy work on unemployment issues undertaken by CHRICED and youth groups.[182]

NDE

NDE was involved in the Code of Principles review process from September 2014. Thanks to this and the town hall meetings, there was a realization of the need to connect more with youths and to develop criteria for selecting people for placements. A key informant from NDE reported that this was due to a better understanding of the links between conflict and employment opportunities. Previously, NDE acknowledges that such information was deliberately restricted. NDE began to share information on opportunities with CHRICED as a result of being engaged on the Code of Principles, moving away from sharing solely through Local Government Chairmen in what was considered to be a highly politicized and unfair selection process. *"In reality…people ended up choosing party loyalists and excluding those from different parties. The wrong people were being chosen which was affecting programme delivery,"* said one KI [KI, Government agency].

According to CHRICED, the following opportunities were shared by NDE/SURE-P as a result: [183]

- August 2014 - training on the production of solar panel and welding for 10 youth in Bichi.
- September 2014 - 8 youth in Kumbotso invited to NDE office and registered for skill acquisition training.

175 Youths and Unemployment in Kano State, Background Research on Unemployed Youths in Bichi, Doguwa, and Kumbotso Local Government Areas, provided by CHRICED, pp. 4-5.
176 CHRICED (2014), NSRP Grant Application & Guidance on Completion, p. 2.
177 NOI Polls/NSRP (2014), The 2014 Annual Perception Survey, Draft Qualitative Report For The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, July, p. 7.
178 NDE and SURE-P are managed by the same person in Kano State.
179 For example, NDE reportedly developed a closer relationship with the DYD as a result of the town hall meetings. Finding confirmed in four separate KIIs with representatives from two youth associations, a youth leader and a government employment agency.
180 Finding confirmed in six separate KIIs with two government employment agencies, representatives from one youth association, one youth leader, the IP and NSRP.
181 Finding confirmed in eight separate KIIs with representatives from 3 youth associations, two youth leaders, two community groups (women) and the IP.
182 Finding confirmed in 5 separate KIIs with 2 youth associations, one youth leader, the IP and NSRP.
183 Email from CHRICED, 11 October 2015.

- January 2015 - 45 youth in Bichi registered for skill acquisition training.
- February 2015 - NDE commenced an empowerment programme for 50 women in Kumbotso.
- February 2015 - NDE offered to move its mobile training unit to train youth in Doguwa to save them paying bus fares. CHRICED has been engaging the Local Government Council to sponsor the training programme.
- June 2015 - 60 youth in Bichi and 60 in Kumbotso were promised skill acquisition training.

This information was passed to CHRICED information officers in relevant LGAs who act as a liaison between CHRICED, youth groups and employment agencies. The role of the information officers is to inform youth groups and to come to an understanding with them about who should apply for the positions. CHRICED seeks to ensure that 50% of opportunities go to Christians/Muslims and 50% to men/women. Youth groups shortlist themselves and applicants are taken in person to NDE or they go direct to apply for the positions.

NDE said it is applying criteria for choosing applicants as a result of the Code of Conduct: candidates must be unemployed; and possess the necessary background and meet the criteria for each scheme. Opportunities are granted on a "first come first served" basis by committees chaired by the NDE State Coordinator, who says that he ensures the process is fair and transparent. However, only NDE staff sit on the committees[184] and a CHRICED key informant was unaware of the criteria being used to select candidates.

NDE maintains that because of CHRICED's work around the Code of Principles, many more youth are informed and are registering in its job centre. It also says that CHRICED has *"opened its eyes*" to the concept of town hall meetings as a mechanism for connecting with people and supporting them [KI, NDE].

Actual placements:

Concrete information on actual placements in government-run schemes has been extremely difficult to obtain due to a lack of monitoring. The following was reported in key informant interviews and focus group discussions informing the development of this case study, but often by only one source:

- 1 male from Bichi was trained by NDE in solar energy in March 2015.[185]
- An unclear number of youths in Kumbotso were trained by NDE on satellite installation and video shooting in 2015.[186]
- Three women were trained in hairdressing in Kumbotso and given capital to establish businesses.[187]
- A Micro Enterprise Enhancement Scheme, begun in November 2014, benefited approximately 20 youths (including 6 women) in Kumbotso and was implemented fairly by NDE using the following process: make courtesy call to local authorities in the focal LGAs; hold town hall meetings with youths, women and disability groups, in an effort to make the process transparent, inclusive and participatory; after obtaining primary data on micro enterprises in the LGAs and determining needs, micro business sites were inspected to ensure their existence before receiving a grant. A total of 300 persons (women, disabled and youths) have benefited in 6 LGAs, each being given the sum of 10, 000 NGN. CHRICED was invited as an observer to the scheme because of its work on the Code of Principles.[188]

184 A recommendation has been made by the NDE State Coordinator to include NGO representatives on the committee.
185 KI with representative from NDE.
186 FGD with representatives from youth association.
187 FGD with representatives from youth association.
188 KI with IP and confirmed by NSRP.

- 10 youths were trained by NDE: 5 men in welding and computers and 5 women in tailoring and hairdressing.[189]

- Industrial Training Fund, NDE and Global Alliance trained 50 youths on job creation and self-reliance.[190]

In Doguwa, a youth leader was unaware of any placements, with the exception of a commitment by NDE to train through the mobile training unit. A 2015 CHRICED activity report on the Code of Principles noted that "*enrolment of youth on the government-run empowerment programmes was not as high as expected.*"[191]

DYD

The DYD became familiar with the Code of Principles in late February 2015, at the final review workshop. Since March the relationship between CHRICED and DYD has reportedly become stronger. Following the workshop, it formally requested NSRP to provide it with 'technical support".[192] In August 2015, NSRP trained 51 members of the DYD on Conflict Sensitivity as part of which the Code of Principles was introduced.[193] In August 2015, the DYD sent 72 youth (all male) for training at the Peugeot Automobile Nigeria Limited and shortlisted 28 others from the 44 LGAs in the state. This process was reportedly guided by the Code of Principles and done fairly and transparently as a direct result of the Code.[194] The positions were announced publicly, including via media houses, a selection committee was established, and screening and interviews were held. The criteria used for selection included the following: i) 1 person per LGA in Kano but 2 for each of the 8 metropolitan LGAs given the severe state of unemployment; and ii) education requirement of a secondary school certificate.

In September 2015 a letter was sent to NSRP on behalf of the Director General of the DYD to say he is "*willing to support and collaborate with you on any youth empowerment programmes".*[195] It is also reportedly in talks with the House Committee Youth Development and Employment on legislating on the Code and is keen to influence this process, but no further information is available.

According to NSRP, MDAs at the federal level are beginning to coordinate their activities around youth employment. The Kano State Ministry of Information has been involved in the dissemination of information on employment opportunities within the state. The activities of other employment generating agencies have been publicized through the ministry on occasion. The federal Ministry of Youth Affairs has also recognized NSRP's role in working on youth (un)employment.[196] Dissemination of the Code is being reportedly undertaken through a number of actors including the Kano State Ministry of Planning and Budget and the Kano State Ministry of Finance. These early, tentative signs of progress should be closely monitored and supported.

Other agencies

The State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) is aware of the Code of Principles, recognises its value, and has reportedly informed its "partners" about it with a view to the government applying it in service delivery, but no tangible progress is visible so far. A key informant from SPARC explained: "*The major factor that has changed is that now the information is out there".* The Kano State Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (KNARDA) and Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social

189 KI with IP.
190 FGD with representatives from youth association.
191 CHRICED, 2015, Phase Five Project Report on promoting Youth Employment and Participation in 3 Local Government Areas in Kano State/Nigeria, p. 6.
192 Letter viewed from Abdu Mohd Ahmed on behalf of Director General, March 2015.
193 CHRICED, Activity Report for Conflict Sensitive Training for Directorate of Youth Development Kano, 18-19 August 2015.
194 KI with representative from the DYD.
195 Letter viewed from Abdu Mohd Ahmed for the Director General DYD, 8 September 2015.
196 An invitation has been sent to NSRP to make a presentation in a ministry workshop coming up later in 2015.

Development are also aware of the Code, but again, no changes in behaviour are noted. Other MDAs that have been involved in CHRICED's activities on the Code of Principles, and have officially endorsed it, have yet to illustrate any behaviour changes.

Outcomes (and impact) – The evidence base

- **Awareness-raising on opportunities.** Through town hall meetings, and advocacy/consultative meetings the project has created more awareness on opportunities for unemployed youths and the roles of relevant agencies.[197] Town criers are used to spread information on meetings, in addition to youths using telephones and social media. One key informant in Bichi reported: "*By inviting NDE, ITF, SURE-P, KNARDA and DYD to the workshops, we were opportune to meet and interact with these agencies for the first time…in fact some of the youths were just getting to hear about some of the opportunities such as that of the Industrial Training Fund (ITF) and National Directorate of Employment."*

  There is a related **realisation that the government cannot provide jobs for youths and a push towards self-reliance**. One key informant explained: "*A lot has been achieved due to the adoption of the code, youths have now come out in mass to benefit from the programme, what fascinates me is the attitudinal change that instigate positive behaviour among youths, we are now serious on seeking livelihood especially skilled jobs, before most youths that have tertiary education look out for white collar jobs, now the situation is different, many youths prefer to start business[es] of their own and use their education for the improvement of themselves and others."*

  However, **understanding of the Code of Principles by youths is poor**. This was highlighted in focus group discussions with youths in Bichi and Kumbotso.[198] Youths reported that copies are not made available to them and many are unaware of its content. Out of 7 key informants (youths) in Bichi, for example, only 1 had a copy of the Code and two others had ever seen it.[199] In Kumbotso, a youth leader described the code in a manner that is unrecognizable: "*The code, tries to provide the ways of solving these problems, for example by introducing entrepreneur courses in secondary and tertiary institutions, vocational trainings, skills acquisition, the kwankwasiyya vehicle intervention, education scholarship and many more."*

- **Unprecedented contact between unemployed youth and government employment agencies.** This occurs at town hall meetings, during advocacy visits and at CHRICED seminars and trainings where agencies are invited to attend and speak. This contact is unprecedented, is empowering, and the MTE team believes it could potentially help to keep pressure on relevant agencies to perform in a professional manner if sustained.

- **Awareness-raising on link between unemployment and conflict.** Designers and managers of two key employment and empowerment programmes self-report that they have become better aware of the (conflict-generating) consequences of inequities in the distribution of the programmes benefits.[200] In addition to the Code of Principles, they have also been sensitized on issues of conflict-, gender- and minority-sensitivity with regards to their work. This means that − at least theoretically – they have been equipped with the knowledge and skills to design and implement programmes that are transparent and accountable.

197 This was reported in three separate interviews by representatives from two youth associations and one youth leader.
198 Observation made by CRD, email 06.11.2015.
199 Observations during interview with Bichi youths, 6 October 2015.
200 Two CHRICED workshops have involved managers: in May 2014 and March 2015. NSRP also trained the DYD in August 2015.

- **Empowerment of youths.** Youths have been empowered with increased knowledge, increased confidence, new dialogue and mediation skills, and an increased willingness and ability to advocate for the fair distribution of opportunities.[201] This finding was reported by representatives from 3 separate youth associations, one youth leader and a key MDA. Related workshops and seminars, including on women's empowerment, are greatly appreciated.[202] At least some youths are now speaking in a more unified manner and have a greater sense of purpose. For example, the Bichi Youth Association organised two advocacy visits since 2014 to the District Head of Bichi and the Chairman of the LGA to discuss measures that the local government can employ to address the issue of unemployment amongst the youths and how to empower women. A major concern is the discriminatory nature of employment in Kano with non-indigenous people having no opportunities in government establishments, according to one key informant. In Bichi, at least, youths feel they are being listened to: the District Head promised that whenever the state government is employing he will follow up to make sure people are given equal opportunities; the Chairman of Bichi promised to employ youths whenever the state gives him the opportunity.[203] However, no concrete progress has been noted.

  Moving forward, following the launch of SERVICOM in August 2015 by the Kano State Governor,204 the plan is for youth groups from the three LGAs to engage with relevant empowerment agencies and make demands that they be invited to participate when the MDAs are developing their SERVICOM documents. This would provide the opportunity for the provisions in the Code of Principles to be mainstreamed into the social contract documents of the MDAs.

- **More peaceful communities.** Among those consulted in the development of this case study, there is a strong perception of heightened religious tolerance, peacefulness, less political violence, less thuggery and less drug abuse in targeted LGAs as a result of CHRICED's broad activities, including on the Code of Principles. This was referred to by representatives of three youth associations, two community groups (women), and one youth group leader.[205] It is impossible to make a judgement on this without further information as to what other factors may be influencing behaviour, such as the memory of political violence in 2011, the formation of youth associations to counter such violence, the threat from Boko Haram,[206] the effect of peace clubs, and the role of traditional and religious leaders.

NSRP's Youth Cohort Studies do not provide any useful information on attitudes among youths given the unrepresentative size of the sample (20 persons from Kumbotso LGA).

In conclusion, it is too early to tell whether the emerging signs of change noted above will lead to the Code of Principles being mainstreamed into government agencies, such as the DYD and NDE. All considered, tangible progress so far has been very limited, although the Code is still young, and the radical changes of behaviour that it promotes could take years to implement. Evidence suggests that actual government placements so far have been negligible.

External factors influencing behaviour

201 This has happened as part of ongoing formal trainings and seminars (108 trained in total) and at town hall meetings.
202 This was confirmed in 7 separate interviews by representatives of 3 youth associations, two community groups (women) and two youth leaders.
203 In August 2015, the local government chairman, asked university graduates in Bichi to submit their applications for temporary employment. He also wrote to the state government to obtain permission to employ youths. So far there has been no response, however.
204 SERVICOM is a social contract or service charter between public agencies and target beneficiaries of MDAs' services.
205 One of CHRICED's leaflets reads: "Let all unemployed youths come together and reject being used for violence and killings. Let them demand that employment and empowerment programmes at federal, state and local government levels be open to all, that all unemployed youth – and not only the family and friends of the rich and powerful – should get the benefits."
206 Especially in Doguwa bordering Bauchi, which is affected by Boko Haram.

February-June 2015 was considered to be a period of uncertainty due to the presidential, gubernatorial and national assembly elections. Project activities were negatively affected (e.g. by price increases for venues or services) and were forced to slow down. Since President Muhammadu Buhari came to power in May the environment is considered to be more favourable than during the previous administration as he has publicly committed to fighting corruption and reducing youth unemployment. However, the new government is still considered to be finding its feet and change, if it comes, will take time.

In a positive move, since the elections, the new Governor of Kano State has restructured the DYD – which was long underfunded and neglected - by merging it with the Directorate of Youth Empowerment. This merger has reportedly led to more recognition of its work.

The 'contribution' of NSRP

NSRP was the sole funder and facilitator of the Code of Principles, which coupled with related advocacy and information-sharing activities, has led to limited behaviour changes within NDE/SURE-P and the DYD. These include public endorsements of the Code of Principles, the introduction of the town hall meeting as an information-sharing mechanism, and a commitment to working with NSRP/CHRICED. These limited changes have been achieved almost entirely through NSRP's funding and technical support to CHRICED. However, as noted above, very little has been achieved to date in terms of youth *accessing* placements for the unemployed. Furthermore, the NDE's and DYD's (and other agencies') levels of commitment to the Code will become apparent through their actions over time, not words. It is important that NSRP continually monitors progress.

Comments from government key informants include the following:

> *"The partnership with CHRICED has been fruitful, as they have been able to show the implication of irregularities in employment and empowerment programmes, but all that is at an advisory level, because people in government, mostly the top echelon do not regard such due process in either appointments or empowerment programme[s]. As it is now, even if another employment is to be done, not much would change, because of [the] vested interest of public officers in such exercise[s]"* [KI, representative of Government agency 1].

> *"The code of principle is a good concept. However, devising a concept is one thing and implementing it is another. The nature of the Kano State government like other governments in Nigeria is that there is a lot of high-level political interference in job distribution. So, to make the code effective, NSRP and CHRICED will have to influence the high level political players of the state"* [KI, representative of Government agency 2].

Key learning

The NSRP TOC in practice:

In practice, Case 5 illustrates many aspects of Level 1 of the Theory of Change. NSRP identified an agent of change (CHRICED), facilitated dialogue and debate on unemployment (between CHRICED, employment agencies and youths), supported CHRICED to become involved in employment issues thereby increasing its capacity,[207] assisted it to mainstream conflict sensitivity into its work, and used policy relevant research to underpin its work.[208] Assumptions around the willingness of stakeholders to work with NSRP have proven true to a limited extent (e.g. NDE and DYD but not others[209]), and that marginalised groups (e.g. male youth) are able and willing to come together around conflict resolution have proven at least partially true. It is too early to say whether government agencies are willing to use new knowledge on conflict resolution and willing

207 Before NSRP, CHRICED was working on human rights issues.
208 NSRP (n.d), Winners or Losers: Assessing the Contribution of Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes to Reducing Conflict Risk in Nigeria.
209 There are approximately 10 MDAs, which have responsibility for youth unemployment and empowerment schemes in Kano State.

and able to mainstream the Code into their work. Level 2 outcomes are not yet apparent, in part due to the short implementation period and uncertainty surrounding the commitment of some of the stakeholders.

Unintended effects:

There is evidence of a gender imbalance in relation to CHRICED's activities. For example, female attendance at town hall meetings has been poor. In town hall meetings in August 2014 in the three LGAs, 612 youth attended. In Bichi, there were 3 females and 125 males; in Kumbotso 28 females and 118 males; and in Doguwa 51 females and 287 males (a total of just 13% female attendees).[210] At the June 2015 meeting, 379 persons attended, of whom 94 were female (just 25%).[211] Furthermore, of 60 training placements promised by NDE for Bichi LGA, only one third were allotted to women by youth groups. Comments from key informants include:

> *"Women find it very difficult to participate in CHRICED activities due some societal customs"* [KI, representative of youth group 1]
>
> *"Women were involved but not as much as men. Men benefitted more than the women*" [KI, representative from youth group 2].
>
> *"There is involvement of married women in our meetings and association[s] after taking permission from the elders and their husbands"* [KI, youth leader].

Women themselves in Doguwa felt that they had benefited equally. The majority of the women in targeted LGAs are Hausa and practice Islam, which reportedly discourages free mixing of men and women in public events.[212]

Value for money:

The outcomes of this large grant in terms of its impact on government employment programmes are very limited. However, the Code of Principles is a worthwhile document and endeavour. It was developed as part of an initiative working in just 3 LGAs in Kano State. Yet it has implications for the entire state if and when employment agencies − which operate state-wide − fully endorse it, at no extra immediate cost to the UK Department for International Development.

Recommendations

- NSRP should work to ensure that monitoring and evaluation of the outcomes of the Code of Principles by CHRICED is improved.
- It is imperative to identify and systematically engage high-level government officials in Kano on implementation of the Code of Principles to build a consensus. These would include the Governor, the Office of the Head of Service in the Kano State Civil Service, and the Office of the Secretary to the State Government. This is in addition to ongoing engagement of the NDE, DYD and other employment and empowerment agencies.
- It is crucial that expectations among youth groups engaging with CHRICED on the Code of Principles are not raised too high as this could lead to conflict. As a community member (women) in Doguwa said: "*We think CHRICED does not have efficient funds because they seem to have good plans but are unable to implement them."*
- NSRP must ensure that CHRICED holds separate events for women to ensure that they benefit equally from the project.

210 Monitoring data provided in email from NSRP staff member, received 30 September 2015.
211 CHRICED, Project Report, April-June 2015, p. 4.
212 Email from CRD, 06.11.2015.

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Case No.	6	The impact of the Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meetings (and follow-up meetings) on national security policy and practice: development of comprehensive, inclusive, coordinated National Security Strategy

Introduction

This case study looks at the development of Nigeria's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the impact of the Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meetings (EEGMs) on this process. This area of work sits within NSRP's output stream 4: research, media and advocacy and, specifically, under output 4.2: Strategic partnerships with key Nigerian institutions to enable them to address stability and reconciliation more effectively in their policies and practices.

Methodology

The case was developed using RAPID Outcome Assessment (ROA), a method that explores the operating environment pre-intervention; identifies the key actors who influence and shape this environment; tracks changes in the behaviour of actors over time and subsequent changes in the policy or practice environment. The approach provides a means to explore NSRP's contribution relative to other factors in the operating environment. As part of the research consultations were undertaken with 10 representatives from ONSA, NIPSS, NDC and civil society. Relevant documents provided by NSRP and those sourced independently were also reviewed. The information gathered from the different sources was triangulated to produce this study.

Key Findings

The situation pre-intervention

- A narrowly focused Nigerian security strategy and militaristic approach to security management which failed to address the wide-range of existing and emerging threats at that time.
- An exclusive approach to security management. Security was seen as strictly a military affair, excluding key groups such as CSOs and women, traditional and religious institutions, and research-based institutions.
- A lack of coordination amongst security actors and instruments.
- ONSA, the department charged with producing national security strategy and policy, is seen as a 'closed', elusive department that had little engagement with actors outside the traditional security sector.
- As an institute, NIPSS itself held its own suspicions, in particular against any ideas or support "coming from the West". However, NIPSS do recognise importance of including traditional leaders in security management.
- Nigeria's security agencies are highly resistant to opening up security management, strategy and policy processes to external inputs. Security discourse was perceived as something that should remain under the control of the security agencies and military.
- Traditional and religious institutions, identified as key stakeholders in security strategy, policy and implementation, were also largely excluded.

Over the case timeline to the present day

- ONSA increasingly recognise and accept the need to "open up" and work with a wide range of actors to manage and address the multiple security threats facing Nigeria. Senior leadership within the government (including within ONSA) realise government alone cannot deal with existing/emerging threats and there is a willingness to go beyond military solutions and involve other actors (including CSOs, students, religious and traditional institutions).
- ONSA recognise the need for a new, comprehensive NSS and new approach to addressing multiple drivers of conflict.
- For NIPSS, a shift in the institution's role and contribution to the development and implementation of national security policy and practice is apparent. Previously perceived to have been fairly excluded and absent, NIPSS was a leading figure in the NSS drafting process.

- The NDC becomes actively involved in security strategy and implementation, and collaboration between NDC, ONSA and NIPSS on a range of security issues flourishes. Indeed, these three institutions are considered the leading figures in the NSS drafting process
- Contrasting evidence emerged during the research in relation to behaviour change within the government more broadly, including the defence and security agencies. There is some evidence to suggest ongoing suspicions amongst Nigeria's security agencies and continuing resistance to open up and work with actors outside the core security agencies; in contrast, other evidence points to a change in modus operandi within the security agencies and government including a much greater willingness to work with a broader range of actors.
- CSOs become progressively more aware, more engaged and more included in security management.
- The support held for traditional institutions within NIPSS pre-2012 remains and from 2012 there is evidence of positive changes in attitudes within the government and ONSA towards traditional

Outcomes

The picture presented in this case study is one in which the approach to drafting and developing national security strategy in Nigeria has changed substantially. The period under consideration has seen the development of a new more inclusive, comprehensive National Security Strategy developed through a more inclusive, coordinated approach than any of its predecessors.

Considering the NSRP TOC, at the level of activities and outputs, all case study contributors concur that NSRP successfully engaged an influential, committed 'agent of change' in NIPSS; and through the EEGMs/ NSS Stakeholder Forum/ NSS Validation Meeting successfully brought together a wide range of stakeholders to debate prescient peace and security issues, enhanced communication and coordination, strengthened relationships and enabled network members to better understand each other's remit.

NSRP also set out to ensure the NSS drafting process was inclusive, collaborative and coordinated. Weighing up the evidence presented, there is no doubt the process was more inclusive and coordinated than any preceding it. Looking back to the context and highly closed approach to security strategy- and policy-making pre-2012, it is clear that significant strides have been made. However, civil society actors raise important points around the genuine nature of inclusion, and the extent to which the NSS process represented a safe space for democratic dialogue and genuine participation.

In relation to outcomes at Level 3 of the Theory of Change [*Changes in policy and practice and narrative around violence]* the 2015 NSS is perceived overwhelmingly by interviewees to be a comprehensive, coordinated document that builds significantly on the security strategies preceding it. It moves beyond the conventional understanding of security to accurately capture the multiple security threats in Nigeria; sets out a comprehensive approach and response to addressing these threats; encapsulates the shift from a state-centric to people-centric approach to security; has brought about greater synergy, coordination and collaboration amongst Nigeria's security agencies; and recognises gender security for first time.

At the time of its launch, buy-in and ownership of the NSS by a wide range of stakeholders appeared to be greater than that achieved by any previous strategy (although there was still room for improvement according to CSO Key Informants (KIs)); however, the extent to which the NSS is being successfully implemented and monitored under

The 'contribution' of NSRP

NSRP have contributed to the outcomes outlined above through:

- The provision of financial and technical inputs, support and advice to the 2012 and 2013 EEGMs and throughout the NSS drafting process. A key area in which NSRP are seen to have contributed is through pushing forward and keeping the NSS drafting process tangible timelines and deliverables – NSRP's proactivity, contacts/networks and knowledge of local systems aided this. The evidence also demonstrates that NSRP's advisory inputs are highly valued.

- Its strong, ongoing focus on inclusion. There is strong evidence that NSRP broadened the drafting process by identifying a wide range of stakeholders- previously excluded - and ensuring their inclusion and participation.
- Its ability to maintain neutrality, advising/ providing technical inputs but never leading.
- Its platforms - the NPSF and CSO Peace and Security Network.

Contributions from Other Actors/ External Factors

- Ongoing and emerging changes in the security and threat context in 2012 made a profound contribution to behaviour changes observed within ONSA and the broader government. NSRP recognised and took advantage of this 'space' in which there was potential to capitalise and influence.
- ONSA's leadership, coordination and convening power; and its willingness to engage in an inclusive process and 'open up' are key factors contributing to the success of the drafting process.
- Similarly, NIPSS's status as an influential, credible institution; its convening power; and its drive for inclusion

Key learning

Points to note are:

- Timing was key: NIPSS were looking for a partner that shared its values and vision, and NSRP was known to NIPSS and offered exactly this.
- NSRP's focus on inclusion and broader societal participation was complemented by NIPSS's push for inclusion, emphasising the importance of finding 'champions' or agents of change that share similar objectives.
- NSRP's proactivity, contacts/networks and knowledge of local systems aided the NSS drafting process and are highly valued.
- NSRP's contributions in terms of stakeholder engagement and management, process management and governance of the NSS drafting process were key.
- NSRP's ability to achieve a successful balance between discretion and neutrality (for acceptance), proactivity (to keep things moving) and the provision of technical advice was key.
- More broadly, the importance of bringing key stakeholders from across the state and non-state divide and facilitating debate and discussion has been illustrated here. In this case study, the positive outcomes of improved collaboration in relation to improved security strategy are palpable. In the absence of NSRP, key institutions such as NIPSS and ONSA are likely to have still pushed for the development of a new NSS; however, the evidence suggests that the NSS drafting process would not have been as inclusive, collaborative and coordinated and the final NSS

Introduction and background

This case study looks at the development of Nigeria's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the impact of the Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meetings (EEGMs) on this process. This area of work sits within NSRP's output stream 4: research, media and advocacy and, specifically, under output 4.2: Strategic partnerships with key Nigerian institutions to enable them to address stability and reconciliation more effectively in their policies and practices.

The case was developed using RAPID Outcome Assessment (ROA), a method that explores the operating environment pre-intervention; identifies the key actors who influence and shape this environment; tracks changes in the behaviour of actors over time and subsequent changes in the policy or practice environment. The approach provides a means to explore NSRP's contribution relative to other factors in the operating environment.

What is the EEGM?

The EEGM is an annual 'multi-stakeholder' forum on peace and security engaging high-level stakeholders to debate solutions to security issues. NSRP has supported the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) – a Nigerian policy, research and leadership training institute – since 2012 to convene annual EEGMs, with the aim of exerting positive influence on stability and reconciliation in Nigeria. This case is specifically interested in the 2013 EEGM, the goal of which was to contribute to the development of a comprehensive and widely acceptable National Security Policy for Nigeria (NIPSS, 2015). NSRP also supported NIPSS to convene a number of key high-level meetings following the 2013 EEGM which are also the focus of this case.

Description of NSRP Inputs

NSRP has provided four 'strategic' grants totalling N57,790,500 (circa. £193,133)[213] to NIPSS to convene and deliver four EEGM's in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2016. NSRP also provided funds totalling N27,010,500 (circa. £100,000) to NIPSS for the drafting and development of the NSS. The majority of this grant supported NIPSS to convene and organise a key meeting following the 2013 EEGM – the Stakeholders Forum[214]. As well as providing financial support, NSRP provided technical support throughout the NSS drafting process and facilitated follow-up action on the forum's decisions (NSRP 2014: 14).

Description of NSRP Outputs

In October 2011 NIPSS developed a concept note for the EEGM and reached out to a number of different organisations for funding, including NSRP and USAID. At this time NSRP was known to NIPSS and there were clear synergies and areas of shared interest between the two organisations. According to one NIPSS key informant (KI), "NIPSS was looking for sponsors and NSRP came at exactly the right time"; both organisations shared the same plan, vision, perspective and direction (KII,4). This view is shared by other KIs from NIPSS. For NSRP, NIPSS represented an institution that had the "authority and strategic position to convene a broad cross section of state and non-state actors at the highest levels for dialogue towards the development and amendment of policy and practice" (NSRP, 2014a: 14). Engaging NIPSS demonstrated NSRP's ability to engage an influential institution (a committed 'agent of change' to use the terminology of the NSRP Theory of Change(ToC)), a partnership that continues to be "mutually beneficial" (KII,1).

The EEGM's brought together a wide range of stakeholders, experienced in the topical thematic areas, to debate peace and security issues. In total, 166 participants attended the 2012 EEGM; 109 the 2013 EEGM; and 134 the 2014 EEGM.

213 Four separate grant envelopes were provided including: N10,000,000 (£39,370) for the 2012 EEGM; N10,000,000 (£39,063) for the 2013 EEGM; N11,979,000 (£48,000) for the 2014 EEGM; and N25,811,500 (£66,700) for the 2016 EEGM (Data provided by email from NSRP, 05/12/16).
214 N26,867,508 was provided to NIPSS for the NSS Stakeholders Workshop held in May 2014.

Case timeline

Timeline	Case Specific Events	Externalities
2012		Changes in the nature of the threat environment. Advent of Boko Haram, extremism and radicalisation. Other national security threats become prevalent including herders and farmers clashes, kidnapping, proliferation of arms, religious intolerance and Niger-Delta militancy.
		CSOs embark on sensitisation and advocacy campaigns preaching importance of civil-military relations from 2012 onwards.
May 2012	Appointment of new Director of Behavioural Analysis within ONSA.	New trend of younger, highly experienced and well-educated people becoming traditional rulers.
August 2012	**NIPSS convene 2012 EEGM on 'Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria'**	
August 2012	**2012 EEGM Communique ('Kuru Declaration') presented to President/ policy makers**	
2013	New 'soft' approach to CVE and CT is piloted	Creation of Civil-Military Desk for Defence HQ
December 2013	**NIPSS convene 2013 EEGM on 'Transforming the Security Strategy in Nigeria'. Consensus reached on need for comprehensive NSS**	
December 2013	**2013 EEGM Communique shared with National Security Adviser and presented to President and other policy makers**	
March 2014	ONSA launch new 'soft' approach to CVE/CT	Creation of Civil-Military Desk for Army (2014)
12 & 26 March 2014	NSS Planning Committee (constituting NIPSS, ONSA, NDC and NSRP) come together for two NSS planning meetings	
12 – 13 May 2014	**NIPSS organise and convene Stakeholders Forum for the drafting of an inclusive Nigeria NSS in Abuja (12-13 May).**	
17 June 2014	**Validation Meeting of the Draft Comprehensive National Security Strategy**	
Nov 2014	Final draft of the NSS presented to President. Signed and endorsed by President	President also signs NACTEST & National Cyber Security Policy Strategy at same time. These are sub-documents of the NSS
Nov 2014	NIPSS convene 2014 EEGM on 'Elections and Security in Nigeria'	

5 February 2015	**NSS, NACTEST and Cybercrime Strategy launched at a Council of State meeting.**	Creation of Civil-military desk for Navy (2015)
March 2015	Implementation Workshop on the NSS	
31 March 2015		President Muhammadu Buhari elected
21 May 2016	ONSA disseminate NSS at CISLAC-hosted, NSRP-supported Civil Society Forum	Creation of Civil-military desk for Air Force (2016)

The process of change

The Operating context/ policy environment pre-NSRP intervention

Pre-2012, prior to NSRP's engagement with NIPSS and the initiation of the EEGMs, the National Security Policy and Practice environment in Nigeria was characterised by a number of key features.

Most prominent of these was the narrow focus of Nigeria's security strategy and the militaristic approach to security management which failed to address the wide-range of existing and emerging threats at that time. In 2012, although a range of policy instruments existed, there was no comprehensive national security policy or strategy (NIPSS, 2013; KII 1(1&2),2,4).

An exclusive approach to security management and a lack of coordination amongst security actors and instruments were also features of the security environment pre-2012. Many important stakeholders were excluded from the administration of national security, including traditional institutions, civil society, citizens and representatives from relevant government departments and agencies, (2013 EEGM Communique). The strategies in place thus failed to achieve buy-in and traction and were short-lived (KII,7). There was a need for strategies to be consolidated and a whole-of-government approach adopted.

This argument was supported by key informants interviewed as part of the case study who highlighted the incoherence, lack of coordination and exclusive nature of security policy and practice (KII, 1(1&2)). Security was seen as strictly a military affair (KII, 6), excluding key groups such as CSOs and women (KII, 3), traditional and religious institutions (KII,5) and research-based institutions (KII,4). A number of interviewees noted that prior to the emergence of the NSS there was no unified, coordinated security structure, with individual agencies working in silos (such as the police and military), "doing their own thing" (KII,4), making it difficult to identify who was responsible for the management of security (KII, 6).[215] The 2013 EEGM Communique stated that the multidimensional threats to Nigeria's national security at that time could not be addressed within the context of the existing security architecture (NIPSS, 2013).

Key Actors

Case study research identified the following key actors in relation to the development and administration/ implementation of national security policy and strategy in Nigeria:

215 Other features that dominated the security management context pre-2012 included the absence of strategic communications and coordinated security messaging and vision resulting in a lack of support for national objectives (2013 EEGM communique); the proliferation of security agencies/actors - leading to confusion about roles and mandates - and increasing inter-agency rivalry and struggles for supremacy (especially between the policy and military); key security institutions including the police continually neglected and with low capacity; military forces acting beyond the rule of law without evidence, violating human rights, and a failure by government to hold them to account (2013 EEGM Communique, KII,6); and a breakdown in trust between the state and citizens, with armed forces losing credibility and grievances and tensions rising amongst citizens (KII, 5,6).

1. Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)[216]
2. National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS)[217]
3. National Defence College (NDC)
4. Wider Nigerian Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs)
5. Civil Society Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations
6. Traditional Leaders and Institutions
7. Religious Leaders and Institutions
8. Citizens

Behaviours of key actors at the start of the case timeline

Pre-2012, ONSA, the department charged with producing national security strategy and policy, was seen overwhelmingly by those interviewed (including ONSA staffers themselves) as a 'closed', elusive department that had little engagement with actors outside the traditional security sector. Engagement with CSO's and traditional leaders, for example, was very limited (KII,1 (1&2)) as was engagement with academic institutions, such as NIPSS (KII,7). As an institute, NIPSS itself held its own suspicions, in particular against any ideas or support "coming from the West" (KII,5). Within NIPSS there was, however, recognition of the importance of including traditional leaders in security management (KII, 4,5)

Nigeria's security agencies were considered highly resistant to opening up security management, strategy and policy processes to external inputs. Security discourse was something that should remain under the control of the security agencies and military (KII,4,5). One KI from NIPSS noted that security personnel were hostile to CSOs and NGOs (KII,5) and a non-state KI felt there was a perception amongst the military that CSOs were often too hasty in disseminating information to the public (KII, 3). As a result, pre-2012 CSOs and NGOs had little involvement in security policy and strategy development or security management processes despite their interest in this area (KII,5,6,7).

Traditional Institutions, identified by nearly all those interviewed as key stakeholders in security strategy, policy and implementation, were also largely excluded, often only used to mobilize for elections (KII,6). There was a dissatisfaction amongst these leaders about the relegation of the traditional institution in governance (which took place following the creation of local governments in Nigeria) and a desire for greater constitutional responsibilities including in the security arena (KII,4,5). Similarly, religious leaders, identified as key stakeholders in this arena by a number of interviewees (KII,1,3,5), were described as excluded pre-2012 (KII,6). None of interviewees made reference to NDC's behaviour pre-2012. However, NDC were identified as a key actor by multiple interviewees post 2012 (as discussed below).

Observed behaviour changes of key actors over the case timeline

Over the course of the case timeline a range of behaviour changes were observed in relation to the key actors.

ONSA

ONSA are increasingly seen to recognise and accept the need to "open up" and work with a wide range of actors to manage and address the multiple security threats facing Nigeria. When exactly this change occurred varies according to different KIs. Four KIs highlight how in early 2012 senior leadership within the government (including within ONSA) realised government alone could not deal with existing/emerging threats (KIIs, 1,2,3) and that from 2012 there was a willingness to go beyond military solutions and involve other actors (including CSOs, students, religious and traditional institutions) (KII, 1,2,5). According to others, this did not happen until 2013 (KII, 7) and 2014 (KII, 6). What is conclusive, however, is that over the period 2012 – 2015 ONSA increasingly and proactively engaged a wider range of actors. Changing attitudes within ONSA are evidenced through ONSA's active engagement in EEGMs; four Directors attended the 2013 EEGM, for example.

216 Established in 2010, ONSA advises the President on all security-related issues. ONSA has responsibility for producing the security strategy of the government and coordinating security agencies (inc. the State Security Service; Defence Intelligence Agency; and the National Intelligence Agency).
217 Established in 1979, NIPSS serves as the government policy centre on strategic studies, peace and conflict, mandated with carrying out inter-disciplinary research; training public officials and decision-makers; and organising workshops and seminars. (NSRP, 2014a: 14). NIPSS is thus seen to play a central role in policy and decision-making.

Over the case timeline ONSA recognised the need for a new, comprehensive NSS and approach to addressing multiple drivers of conflict. Discussions around the need for a new NSS that reflects a 'softer', human-security approach began in 2012 (KIIs, 1,2,3) (see also UQ, 2016 including ROA Case Study 3).

NIPSS

For NIPSS, a shift in the institution's role and contribution to the development and implementation of national security policy and practice is apparent. Previously perceived to have been fairly excluded and absent, NIPSS was a leading figure in the NSS drafting process and over the timeline becomes an increasingly prominent body and voice in this sphere (KII, 1,5). In response to the changing security, economic and social context, emerging threats, and the weak response to these threats, NIPSS has become more assertive in pushing its position that a broader group discussion is essential and that they have the convening power to facilitate this (KII, 1(1)).

NDC

From 2012 the NDC becomes actively involved in security strategy and implementation - in particular around Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) - and collaboration between NDC, ONSA and NIPSS on a range of security issues – facilitated by NSRP according to one KII (KII, 1(1)) - is seen to flourish. Indeed, these three institutions are considered the leading figures in the NSS drafting process (KII,1(1&2),2,4,5,7). NDC's commitment to the NSS was highlighted by one KI who noted that after NIPSS they had the most representatives at the 2013 EEGM (KII,7). The NDC recognised a need to broaden security management out to those not previously included; for example, one KI highlighted that the NDC perceive NGOs and CSOs as key actors who made "impactful contributions" at the EEGM (KII,7). Outside the NSS process, ONSA and NDC engage throughout 2013 onwards, with ONSA increasingly receiving invitations from NDC to speak at national/annual lectures for military/defence personnel on key issues (KII,1(2)).

Wider Government MDAs

Contrasting evidence emerged during the research in relation to behaviour change within the government, including the defence and security agencies. One non-state KI referred to ongoing suspicions amongst Nigeria's security agencies and a resistance to open up and work with actors outside the core security agencies (KII,3). Referring specifically to the NSS drafting process, there was seen to be pushback by security agents to an inclusive NSS drafting process, with security forces "readily wary" of including CSOs for fear of making classified information public (KII,3). These sentiments were shared in part by another KI from NIPSS - "it was a battle for NIPSS to try to take security discourse outside the parameters of security agencies" (KII, 4). However, this KI acknowledged that in the end many of the meetings held during the drafting process did include a broad range of actors, indicating a gradual acceptance/change in behaviour amongst security agencies (KII,4).

In contrast, three KIIs from NIPSS, NDC and the non-state sphere described a change in modus operandi within the security agencies and government, citing positive changes in behaviour including a much greater willingness to work with a broader range of actors (KII,5,6,7). NGOs and CSOs are now recognised and valued actors amongst those previously hostile to them (KII, 5,6); as are traditional rulers (KII,5); and citizens (KII,5).

CSOs

In relation to CSOs there was consensus across all but one interviewee that over the time period under consideration CSOs (and citizens) have become progressively more aware, more engaged and more included in security management (KII,1,2,5,6). From 2014 CSOs are perceived to be increasingly aware of their role and responsibilities, and the opportunities to engage (KII, 1,6). Indeed, CSOs actively engaged in the NSS drafting process and brought expertise in human capacity development, human rights, poverty and health to the process, widening the scope of the NSS (KII,2,5,6)).

More broadly, from 2012 CSOs are seen to have contributed "greatly in security" through driving forward key peacebuilding initiatives (KII,6), mobilising and building security consciousness amongst communities (KII,5), and through research and capacity building (KII,2). Ongoing advocacy by CSOs from 2012 is said to have led to the creation of Civil-Military Desks for Defence Headquarters (2013); Army (2014); Navy (2015); Air Force (2016), created in recognition by the military, and by extension the government, of the important role being played by CSOs (KII,6).

Traditional Institutions

The support held for traditional institutions within NIPSS pre-2012 remains (KII,2,5), and from 2012 there is evidence of changing attitudes within the government and ONSA towards traditional actors/institutions. ONSA and wider government MDAs increasingly see traditional institutions as important actors because of their influence amongst their communities. A new trend of younger, well-educated individuals being appointed as traditional leaders is also a factor influencing the government to work more with traditional institutions (KII,5)[218].

In relation to their participation in security management and their specific contribution to the NSS drafting process (including in the stakeholder and validation meetings), the evidence is mixed.[219] Traditional leaders are seen by some to face challenges in terms of their capacity and understanding of their role and responsibilities. However, there is a sense that this is progressively changing and capacity and awareness are growing as the new set of younger traditional leaders grows. This is resulting in a gradual change in the mind-set and capacity of these leaders (KII,6). Indeed, KIs from NIPSS and the non-state sphere indicated that traditional leaders are far more involved in security management now than in the past (KII,4,6).

Outcomes (and impact) – the evidence base

The discussion that follows is framed around the NSRP Theory of Change. Specifically, this section analyses NSRP's contribution (through its support to the EEGM and the NSS drafting process) to improved communication between stakeholders (Outcome Level 1 (L1)); broader societal participation, including marginalised voices (L1); improved alignment in strategic priorities and actions of stakeholders (L2); dialogue and debate to understand and influence the structural drivers of violence (L2); and ultimately, the contribution to the higher-level outcome of positive changes in policy, practice and narrative around violence (L3).

Improved communication between stakeholders

The MTE found evidence that at the federal level NSRP facilitated platforms (including the EEGM) are playing a role in enhancing communication and coordination of state and non-state actors by physically bringing people together, strengthening relationships and enabling network members to better understand each other's remit. Anecdotal evidence from the MTE suggested that as a result of the EEGM, certain relationships have strengthened, for example, that between ONSA and NIPSS (UQ, 2016: 47). Research for this case study confirmed that the EEGMs successfully attracted a wide range of stakeholders[220] and there is evidence that, as one off events, they undoubtedly represent important, unique opportunities for communication and information sharing between key stakeholders in the security management sphere.

Broader societal participation, improved alignment, and increasing dialogue and debate to understand and influence the drivers of violence

This section explores firstly, the extent to which, and in what ways, meaningful participation in dialogue and debate, including the voices of those not normally included, has been achieved through the 2013 EEGM and during the NSS drafting process; and, secondly, the extent to which, and in what ways, the 2013 EEGM and subsequent drafting meetings facilitated improved coordination and alignment of strategic priorities and actions among key security management stakeholders.

Looking at the step-by-step process undertaken to draft the NSS, it was collaborative and consultative, involving a series of stakeholder meetings[221] and providing a range of opportunities for stakeholder input. The evidence on whether genuine inclusion, participation and coordination was achieved is, however, mixed.

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218 These younger leaders have often already held key offices in the past - for example, as governors or security personnel - and have a broader perspective of security in the country.

219 A KI from NIPSS noted that traditional leaders were involved but "their contribution was not much" (KII,5). Another KII, notes that no traditional leaders attended the validation meeting (KII,3) and NSRP's activity report for the stakeholder meeting states "that traditional rulers were evidently absent" (NSRP Activity Report). Conversely, a KI from ONSA stated that the traditional rulers contribute "immensely" (KII,2), and CSO and NIPSS KIs refer to the contributions made by traditional leaders at the Stakeholders Meeting, the validation workshop, and separately to the fact that more broadly they are far more involved in security management now than in the past (KII,4,6).

220 In total, 166 participants attended the 2012 EEGM; 109 the 2013 EEGM; and 134 the 2014 EEGM.

221 Following the 2013 EEGM, ONSA and NIPSS convene the NSS Stakeholders' Forum in May 2014 (134 participants attend), followed by the NSS Validation Workshop in June 2014 (67 participants attend).

Six KIs felt the NSS drafting process was highly inclusive, referring to the range of actors and issues included in the 2013 EEGM, the Stakeholders' Forum and Validation Meeting (KII 1(1&2),2,4,5,7). Indeed, traditional institutions, CSOs, academics, religious leaders (including imams and pastors) government MDAs (including those previously excluded such as the Ministry of Youth Development, Ministry of Women Affairs, and paramilitary institutions), and the security sector were all present in the process[222]. One KI noted that the 2013 EEGM represented an "initial gate-opening for people's participation in the NSS development process" (KII,6), while another notes that the wide range of aspects included in the NSS reflect the inclusive nature of the drafting process (KII,7).

Although there was mostly consensus on the inclusive nature of the process, two KIIs did not concur. Both these KIs acknowledge that the final, endorsed NSS presented a broader, redefined, more comprehensive definition and approach to security. Both also acknowledged that, compared to previous security strategy processes, the NSS drafting process was a "step in the right direction", embodying "some semblance of inclusiveness" through its attempts to involve people not usually included in the security management sphere (KII,3(1&2)). However, overall, these KIs perceived that the process was not inclusive enough, that ONSA had a "predetermined mind-set", that the EEGM was "more an elitist gathering of friends of government", and that attempts to engage a broader range of people were "tokenistic" (KII,3(1&2)).

Another KI sits somewhere between the contrasting positions outlined above, stating that overall the process *was* inclusive, "it was better than any preceding it, many more inputs were received than for previous strategies, it is people-centric not state centric" and it provided opportunities for CSOs to engage in security management (KII,6). However, it was also noted that there was some resistance within ONSA to an inclusive process, that participants were ready to "frustrate the process, especially from ONSA" and "there were signs of nonchalance" (KII,6). He concludes by saying that "the drafters (ONSA and NIPSS) could have done better" (KII,6) and that in his view many of the submissions made by CSOs and other organisations were not captured in the final NSS (KII,6).

Referring to the 2013 EEGM, one KI also suggested the forum didn't necessarily represent a truly safe space for engagement and participation, noting that because "the EEGM was a new initiative people were afraid of speaking open-mindedly" (KII,6). This fear is seen to have limited the strength and scope of discourse at the meeting. However, the same KI concludes that "NIPSS eventually used its expertise in going round the challenges" (KII,6).

NSRP's Activity Report for the Stakeholders Forum also notes the absence of key groups, referring to the "inadequate presence of women among presenters and discussants", "gender related issues were not discussed in prime time", and the absence of traditional rulers (NSRP, 2014b: 4), observations which NSRP "conveyed to NIPSS". Another key group noted for their absence was the police.

Weighing up the evidence presented above, there is no doubt that the NSS drafting process was more inclusive and coordinated than any preceding it. Looking back to the context and highly closed approach to security strategy- and policy-making pre-2012, it is clear that significant strides have been made. However, some actors raise important points around the genuine nature of inclusion, and the extent to which the NSS process represented a safe space for democratic dialogue and genuine participation[223].

Positive changes in policy, practice and narratives around violence

In November 2014, the new NSS was signed and endorsed by then-President Good luck Jonathan, and on 5th February 2015 was officially launched by the then-President at a Council of State meeting. The NSS was also endorsed by the Federal Executive Committee. The new NSS is perceived overwhelmingly by

222 At the Stakeholder Forum 34 government agencies were represented (including the Ministry of Defence, Immigration Service, security sectors actors from the Police, Army, Air Force, military, para-military, Chief of Defence Staff, Service Chiefs), 16 persons from academia, six NGOs and CSOs (including CLEEN and CISLAC), FBOs (including FOMWAN), the NDC, two trade organisations and one consultancy company (NSRP Stakeholders Meeting Activity Report). However, not all invited CSOs attended (NSRP Activity Report, 2014: 2) and "traditional rulers were evidently absent" (NSRP Activity Report, 2014: 3). At the Validation Workshop government agencies, security personnel, members of the academia, civil society organisations (including CLEEN Foundation and CISLAC), a FBO (WOWICAN) and traditional institutions representatives were all present.

223 Unfortunately, no traditional and religious leaders were interviewed as part of the research despite the NIEP attempts to engage them.

interviewees to be a comprehensive, coordinated document that builds significantly on the security strategies that came before it. Specifically, it is perceived to:

- Move beyond the conventional understanding of security to accurately capture and characterize the multiple existing and emerging security threats in Nigeria including in the NE (KII,1,2,4,5,7)

- Set out a comprehensive approach and response to addressing these threats. The scope and perspective of the new NSS is considered wider than any of its predecessors, institutionalising the government's CVE approach and conceiving security and security management from multiple perspectives – for example, ethnic, climate, food, unemployment, gender, cyber, aviation and communal-related insecurity among many others are at the fore of the NSS (KII,1,2,4,5,7)

- Encapsulate and demonstrate the shift from a state-centric to people-centric approach to security. "The new NSS reflects that security is no longer just a military affair" (KII,4). The concept of security management has been broadened, for example, through mandating the inclusion of CSOs, FBOs and NGOs and through recognizing the important role that traditional institutions and others (including vigilante groups) play in addressing violent extremism (Interview 1(1&2),2,6).

- Provide the Nigerian state and government MDAs with a clear position on key security challenges and how to address them.

- Have brought about greater synergy, coordination and collaboration amongst Nigeria's security agencies. As a result of the NSS, for example, the security agencies are working together in the NE resulting in a degraded threat in the NE (KI,1(1&2)).

- There has been a significant reduction in inter-service/inter-department rivalry within government (KI, 1(1&2)), however, this rivalry has not completely gone (KII,6). Clear-cut roles are also now in place for all security agencies which has also facilitated greater coordination and a better structured response mechanism (KII,6)

- Recognise gender security for first time (KI,1(4)).

The research did reveal some weaknesses and limitations of the new NSS, including the lack of political guidance, leadership and vision through the drafting process, with the "political class" identified as a key group missing from the process (KI refers specifically to the President) (KII,7).

Sustainability of outcomes (and impact)

Commitment and buy-in to the NSS

There was broad consensus across those interviewed that the NSS has more buy-in, ownership and traction across a wide range of stakeholders compared to it's predecessors, a direct result of the collaborative, inclusive drafting process facilitated by the EEGMs/follow-up meetings. One KI notes that "without the EEGM, this ownership would be lost (KI,2) and another KI states that the "inclusive NSS drafting/ development process resulted in an NSS that has public ownership, it isn't linked to a specific person or institution", it is "known to and accepted by all who contributed", therefore having "wide buy-in" (KI,5). Two KIs did, however, challenge these findings stating there is "no acceptance of the NSS" because key stakeholders were not engaged in its development (KI,3) and that the NSS "has not been widely accepted" (KI,7). This contradiction mirrors previous findings around the inclusivity of the NSS drafting process, where nearly all those interviewed agreed that the process was highly inclusive and coordinated *compared* to previous processes but with some non-state KIs arguing that the process could still have been *more* inclusive.

Implementation and monitoring of the new NSS

The evidence in relation to implementation is very limited as 'implementation' was not a focus of this case study. However, there are some limited findings.

Since the launch of the NSS in February 2015 there have been a number of key contextual changes including the 2015 General Election[224] - which saw a change in President and ruling party, with President Muhammadu Buhari (of the All Progressives Congress) defeating President Goodluck Jonathan (of the People's Democratic Party) – and there is anecdotal evidence that the change in government has posed challenges for the implementation of the NSS. In March 2015 ONSA organised and funded a NSS Implementation Workshop during which policy implementation frameworks were developed, presumably to kick-start the implementation process. However, changes to ONSA's architecture and staff in 2015 are seen by some to have stalled progress. According to a government KI, however, the NSS is being used by the current administration and is perceived to be "a useful document" (KI, 8).

One point that did emerge strongly during this case study research is the absence of any form of ongoing review or monitoring of NSS implementation. A monitoring plan was not put in place when the NSS was being developed and the NSS has not been reviewed since its launch (KI,8). This is seen as a "key flaw" and weakness (KI,7). NIPSS acknowledge that their monitoring of the NSS has been weak and attribute this to funding challenges (NIPSS, 2015). Those interviewed suggested the NSS should be monitored by an external agency or body, such as a CSO network, and that it should be reviewed regularly in order to ensure it remains relevant to the ever-changing context. A government KI outlined that the government does intend to review the NSS but a decision is yet to be made on when; the KI did state that when a review does take place "hopefully all stakeholders who were involved in the development of the current NSS will be invited to contribute to the process (KI,8).

Factors contributing to change

This section looks at the key behaviour changes and positive outcomes discussed so far and explores NSRP's contribution to these versus the contribution of other external factors.

The "opening up" of ONSA and the government more broadly amidst recognition of the urgent need for a new approach to security

Three key factors appear to have contributed to the "opening up" of ONSA and the wider government: contextual changes; the 2012 and 2013 EEGMs; and two other NSRP-support platforms, the NPSF and CSO Peace and Security Network.

Contextual changes, especially the changing threat environment. Ongoing and emerging changes in the security and threat context in 2012 made a profound contribution to behaviour changes observed within ONSA and the broader government (KII,1,2,3,5,5,6). In the words of a government KI, "it became an imperative" to look at security in a new light, beyond the traditional militaristic approach, and to develop a new NSS (KII, 2). CSO actors also validated this assertion (KII, 3).

The 2012 EEGM. Although not the focus of this case study, the 2012 EEGM – which focused on diversifying away from a military approach to security to a human-centred approach - was highlighted by a number of interviewees both as a key moment and key driver of the changes witnessed within ONSA and government (KII 1(1&2)). A government KI spoke about the positive impact of having "so many people in one place for first time" and referred to the level and quality of interaction at the EEGM as being a "very significant" factor driving the opening up of ONSA (KII, 1(2)). The declarations/agreements made during the EEGM and the communique that was developed were identified as vehicles that drove ONSA "to commit to the outcomes of the EEGM" and a new more inclusive, coordinated, comprehensive approach to security (KII, 1 (2)).

The 2013 EEGM built on this success with consensus reached on the need for a comprehensive, coordinated NSS (KII, 1(1&2)). This meeting "pushed ONSA to develop the NSS", galvanised stakeholders into acting as well as leading to further collaboration and coordination between NIPSS, ONSA and NDC (KII, 1 (1)). As with the 2012 EEGM, the communique produced at the 2013 EEGM played an important role in ensuring momentum was maintained and key recommendations referred upwards to influential decision makers[225].

224 Held on 31st March 2015

225 The 2013 EEGM communique was picked up by ONSA representatives at the EEGM and presented to the National Security Advisor and the President. The communique contained a set of recommendations including the need to move beyond the military model and adopt a more comprehensive security approach; the need for a more harmonised inter-agency communication strategy laying out objectives,

Collectively, the EEGMs and accompanying communiques are seen as leading to the "beginning of a collective response" to the multiple threats facing Nigeria (KII,1(1)) and a turning point in the discourse of national security, rooted in the bringing together of different stakeholders and different perspectives (KII, 7).

Two other NSRP-supported platforms, the NPSF and CSO Peace and Security Network, also appear to have influenced attitudes and behaviour changes within ONSA and the government. Both these platforms bridge the state/non-state divide, bringing together government actors with non-state actors, CSOs, traditional and religious leaders as well as other marginalised groups. A number of KIs noted that these platforms have influenced the perception of security actors towards CSOs/citizens, and that CSOs have been considered [by security actors] as important partners in security matters due, partly, to the activities of these platforms (KII,7). A government KI also noted that ONSA's increasing engagement with CSOs has been facilitated and achieved through these platforms (KII,1).

Increased awareness amongst CSOs/NGOs (and citizens) of role and responsibilities; and increased engagement and inclusion of CSOs/NGOs

Three factors are perceived to have contributed to the positive behaviour changes observed in relation to the empowerment, inclusion and engagement of CSOs, NGOs and citizens in the NSS drafting process and in security management more broadly. As with ONSA (see above) the changing threat environment (in which CSOs and NGOs have become increasingly engaged in order to fill the security vacuum and step in where the state security institutions are failing to deliver security services); and the role of NSRP-supported platforms (particularly the NPSF and National CSOs Consultative Forum (KII,6)) are felt to be significant contributing factors. Through these platforms awareness, confidence and capacity of CSOs has been built. These platforms have also facilitated improved relationships, confidence and trust between the government, security agencies and CSOs (KII,6). The advent of civil-military desks was also identified as a factor facilitating CSOs involvement (KII,6).

An inclusive, comprehensive, coordinated process

The evidence is that positive outcomes have been facilitated as a result of the NSS drafting process being (more) inclusive, comprehensive and coordinated. ONSA, NIPSS, NDC and NSRP – and the partnership that was established between these organisations – are seen to have played a role in this.

ONSA. As "one of the most influential sources of advice to the President on security issues, and the clearing house for all intelligence gathered by the intelligence services" (NSRP, 2014a: 13), ONSA's gravitas and convening power went a long way in ensuring experts and eminent people from across a wide range of sectors were engaged and committed to the process. ONSA's position within government and its strong, pre-existing relationships with key agencies such as the State Security Service, Civil Defence Corps and National Intelligence Agency also ensured buy-in at the highest levels (KII, 2). In terms of the inclusivity of the process, some KIs identified ONSA as driving this forward, with one noting that "ONSA made it possible" (KII,2) and another stating that "ONSA's willingness to engage many people and ensure inclusion was [a] key factor enabling [the] inclusive drafting process" (KII, 1 (2)).

NIPSS. NIPSS played a significant role in organising and coordinating the key meetings outlined in this case study. Drawing on its capacity, credibility and influence, NIPSS worked with ONSA to ensure the attendance of high level thinkers and decision makers at each of these meetings[226]. There is also evidence that NIPSS drove forward the inclusive, comprehensive NSS drafting approach through its decision-making, leadership and through raising inclusion on multiple occasions (KII, 2); it was NIPSS that suggested the drafting of the new NSS through an all-inclusive process and NIPSS subsequently called for the 2013 EEGM (the forum

goals, actions, benchmarks and timetables for delivery; the establishment of an inter-agency ministerial security committee; the need for a paradigm shift in security strategy from regime security to people–centred security strategy as well as harmonizing the interest of individuals with those of the collective; that the Federal Government should approach the development of national security policy and strategy as a composite of various causalities not conventionally regarded as related to the subject of security; the expansion of the security intelligence community and integration of traditional and religious institutions as well as civil society groups into the security system (to play the vital role of monitoring the conduct of actors in the security sector); and the need to pursue gender mainstreaming into the National Security Policy to make it more inclusive (NIPSS, 2013).

226 NIPSS credibility is seen in part to derive from its position as a training ground for many high-level government officials who subsequently have an ongoing affiliation with the institute.

recognised by 5 KIs as a gate-way for broader participation and inclusion in the NSS process) (KI, 1(1&2)). It was also on the advice of NIPSS that ONSA facilitated the Stakeholders Forum in May 2014 (KII,2).

When asked what would have been different in the absence of the 2013 EEGM and the subsequent drafting meetings, one NIPSS KI notes that the "without the EEGM, eventually, necessity would have forced us [NIPSS] to intervene. However, the EEGM fast tracked the process"; successfully convincing ONSA and the wider government including the military to adopt an inclusive process "was as a result of the EEGM" (KII,5). Another KI notes that if it has not been for the EEGM "it would have been business as usual" (KII,6).

NSRP. NSRP's contribution to the process can be broken down into a number of categories. NSRP's financial support is perceived as an important enabler, facilitating NIPSS to convene the EEGMs/ follow-up meetings (KII,1,3,4,5). One KI, whilst acknowledging NSRP's financial inputs, did, however, note that monetary inputs were "minimal" and that "NIPSS could have gone ahead with the EEGM and NSS drafting process without NSRP's funding" (KII,4). This view was not held by others, though, suggesting overall that NSRP's financial support was important.

A key area in which NSRP are seen to have contributed is through pushing forward and keeping the process moving, focusing participants on tangible timelines and deliverables – their proactivity, contacts/networks and knowledge of local systems aided this and there is evidence that NSRP's involvement enabled the process to happen within a compressed timeframe. **Box 1** presents a number of quotes from the research to illustrate this.

Box 1

- NSRP "contributed through their ongoing interest in the process, through continually pushing forward the process, through helping stakeholders achieve results. This is where they added value" (KII,4)
- "NSRP was the bridge to realizing the production of a NSS for Nigeria". "NSRP's efforts regulated the process of change as they had in focus an action plan and they worked at the background to ensure its realisation". "NSRP contributed immensely in the process" through its guidance. "If it hadn't been for NSRP's intervention, the NSS drafting process would not have been successful. It was essentially the push from NSRP that facilitated the process" (KII,3)
- "Without NSRP, the NSS would still likely be a work in progress" and I am "not too sure that we would have the NSS document we have today" (KII,1(1))
- "Bureaucracy in the Nigerian Government can stall engagement, inclusion and getting things done - NSRP fills the gaps, keeps things moving". "NSRP have the skill sets to get things done which don't exist in Government" (KII,1(2))
- "The activities and meetings between NSRP and the DPs pushed things forwards. Government is sometimes lacking the skillsets needed. This is where NSRP added real value, helped move things forward, put action plans in place" (KII,1(2)).
- NSRP have many local contacts, understand local systems and approaches (KII,1(2))

The research found specific examples of where NSRP had made suggestions to ensure things keep moving forward, including the suggestion that all agencies involved in the drafting process identify and designate a key contact(s). This was to "ensure institutional memory and avoid a situation where MDAs sent different representatives" to different meetings which would undoubtedly slow progress (Email, NSRP Programme Manager, 23.11.16). ONSA followed this advice and sent requests to MDAs to designate representatives. Looking back to the beginning of the NSS process, NSRP are also seen to have made an important contribution by facilitating the initial collaboration between ONSA and NIPSS (KII,1(1)).

There is also strong evidence that NSRP broadened the drafting process by identifying a wide range of stakeholders previously excluded and ensuring their inclusion and participation (KII,2,3,4). Quotes and extracts to evidence this are captured in **Box 2**.

Box 2

- "Without NSRP's support it is possible the EEGM or a similar body would have been convened. However, the EEGM may not have been held so quickly and it would not have been widely inclusive because NSRP facilitated the wide inclusion process. Most of the external stakeholders were involved because of NSRP" (KII,5).

- The fact that an outside body [NSRP] was involved in the process, it made it inclusive. NSRP supported the process that brought different stakeholders together. Diverse groups participated in the EEGM. This could not have happened in the past if NDC or NIPSS alone invited them" (KII,7).
- "NSRP made recommendations which had influence. If the process was left to ONSA to drive alone, the process would not have been different from previous efforts" (KII,3)
- NSRP's role "is very huge". "Several developments have occurred that would not have been possible, especially in the timeframe, without the intervention and support role played by NSRP. In sum, NSRP contributed through identifying stakeholders and coordinating a unified approach to the NSS drafting process; stimulating government to act on various issues" (KII,6)

In sum, NSRP contributed in terms of stakeholder engagement and management, process management and governance of the process.

NSRP also successfully struck the delicate balance between advising on the process but remaining on the outside; advising/ providing technical inputs but never leading. This was seen as key. One KI outlined that NSRP was never meant to "own" or "influence" the process, "they were outsiders giving support to a national process" and it was critical for "NSRP to push the NSS drafting processes from the outside rather than be at the centre because that will create suspicion" (KII,4).

The evidence demonstrates that NSRP's inputs are highly valued. One KI notes that "NSRP contributed immensely to the process of developing the NSS", "participated fully" and "as of today, NSRP is the most important NGO in the ONSA" (KII,2). Another notes that NSRP's inputs were "crucial" (KII,4) and yet another KI noted that "without NSRP there wouldn't have been an EEGM" and that NSRP "advised on how to make EEGM (including the concept and the approach) much more successful" (KII,1(1)).

KEY LEARNING

In Summary

The picture presented in this case study is one in which the approach to drafting and developing national security strategy in Nigeria has changed substantially. The period under consideration has seen the development of a new more inclusive, comprehensive National Security Strategy developed through a more inclusive, coordinated approach than any of its predecessors.

Considering the NSRP TOC, at the level of activities and outputs, all case study contributors concur that NSRP successfully engaged an influential, committed 'agent of change' in NIPSS; and through the EEGMs/ NSS Stakeholder Forum/ NSS Validation Meeting successfully brought together a wide range of stakeholders to debate prescient peace and security issues, enhanced communication and coordination, strengthened relationships and enabled network members to better understand each other's remit.

NSRP also set out to ensure the NSS drafting process was inclusive, collaborative and coordinated. Weighing up the evidence presented, there is no doubt the process was more inclusive and coordinated than any preceding it. Looking back to the context and highly closed approach to security strategy- and policy-making pre-2012, it is clear that significant strides have been made. However, some non-government actors raise important points around the genuine nature of inclusion, and the extent to which the NSS process represented a safe space for democratic dialogue and genuine participation.

In relation to outcomes at Level 3 of the Theory of Change [Changes in policy and practice and narrative around violence] the 2015 NSS is perceived overwhelmingly by interviewees to be a comprehensive, coordinated document that builds significantly on the security strategies preceding it. It moves beyond the conventional understanding of security to accurately capture the multiple security threats in Nigeria; sets out a comprehensive approach and response to addressing these threats; encapsulates the shift from a state-centric

to people-centric approach to security; has brought about greater synergy, coordination and collaboration amongst Nigeria's security agencies; and recognises gender security for first time.

At the time of its launch, buy-in and ownership of the NSS by a wide range of stakeholders appeared to be greater than that achieved by any previous strategy (although there was still room for improvement); however, the extent to which the NSS is being successfully implemented under President Buhari's administration is not clear.

NSRP have contributed to the outcomes outlined above through the provision of financial and technical inputs, support and advice to the 2012 and 2013 EEGMs and throughout the NSS drafting process; through its strong, ongoing focus on inclusion; through its platforms - the NPSF and CSO Peace and Security Network - and ongoing capacity building and advocacy work with civil society.

Key learning

This case study research has identified a number of factors seen to have facilitated achievements to date. Points to note are:

- Timing was key: NIPSS were looking for a partner that shared its values and vision, and NSRP was known to NIPSS and offered exactly this.
- NSRP's focus on inclusion and broader societal participation was complemented by NIPSS's push for inclusion, emphasising the importance of finding 'champions' or agents of change that share similar objectives.
- NSRP's proactivity, contacts/networks and knowledge of local systems aided the NSS drafting process and are highly valued.
- NSRP's contributions in terms of stakeholder engagement and management, process management and governance of the NSS drafting process were key.
- NSRP's ability to achieve a successful balance between discretion and neutrality (for acceptance), proactivity (to keep things moving) and the provision of technical advice was key.
- More broadly, the importance of bringing key stakeholders from across the state and non-state divide and facilitating debate and discussion has been illustrated here. In this case study, the positive outcomes of improved collaboration in relation to improved security strategy are palpable. In the absence of NSRP, key institutions such as NIPSS and ONSA are likely to have still pushed for the development of a new NSS; however, the evidence suggests that the NSS drafting process would not have been as inclusive, collaborative and coordinated and the final NSS would not have been as comprehensive. Ownership and buy-in to the NSS is also likely to have been less wide-ranging.

References

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Case Study No.	7	The Role of Dialogue Mechanism Committees in the Prevention and Resolution of Land and Water Use Conflict Between Farmers and Pastoralists in Bokkos City and Daffo Plateau State

Introduction

This case study concerns NSRP's Output 2.2 which supports communities in northern Nigeria to manage land and water use (LWU) conflict by strengthening mechanisms on policy for sharing natural resources and for dispute resolution.

The case study research focuses on the role of Dialogue Mechanism Committees (DM) in the prevention and resolution of land and water use conflict in Bokkos town and Daffo. The study assesses the change process of LWU conflict and the contributions of NSRP, through its grantee - Social Justice and Human Development for Peace Initiative (JDPC), to the reduction of LWU violence in Bokkos town and Daffo.

Methodology

The case research adopts Rapid Outcome Assessment (ROA) as the approach to data collection and analysis. The approach allows for an assessment of the case context pre-intervention, identification of key actors and their contributions to the change process post-intervention.

Three full ROAs were conducted with JDPC, Bokkos and Daffo DMs. Also, 12 validation focus group discussions were organized with male and female farmers, pastoralists and youth in Bokkos town and Daffo. During the case research, relevant documents provided by NSRP and those sourced independently were reviewed. The information gathered from the different sources were triangulated to produce this report.

Key Findings

The situation pre-Intervention (2014)

- There were frequent cases of violence between farmers and pastoralists and among farmers over land and water use in Bokkos LGA.
- Farmers were seen to be cultivating cattle routes resulting in encroachment of farmlands by cattle.
- Irrigation farmers were blocking water flow thereby denying other farmers access to water.
- Traditional leaders and security agencies were mainly involved in the resolution of LWU conflict. However, traditional leaders were seen to be partisan because the process was not inclusive.
- Youth were the major perpetrators of violence in the area. Unemployment and drug use were seen as contributing factors.
- Security agencies were actively involved in the suppression of LWU conflict to prevent full-blown violence.
- The broader Indigene-Settler issue across the state created suspicion and bitterness between the indigenes (mostly farmers) and settlers (pastoralists) in Bokkos town and Daffo.
- Other actors, including Search for Common Ground, were active in creating awareness and capacity development towards LWU conflict resolution.

The situation at the present time

- Dialogue Mechanism Committees now inclusive platforms for the manageme resolution of LWU conflict.
- There are noticeable changes in practice farmers and pastoralists towards LWU resolution. Some of the changes include:
  - Development of timetables for water us farmers.
  - Demarcation of cattle routes.
  - Demarcation of water sources.
  - Mediation/negotiation in LWU conflict re
- The nature of LWU conflict has not significantly, however, the perception is severity of conflict has gone down.
- Persisting issues of youth unemployment a use pose a risk to the relative peace being in the area as they may be easily used t violence.
- The Indigene-Settler issue is identified as a trigger of violence in the area in future.

The 'contribution' of NSRP

NSRP provided both financial and technical support to JDPC to establish and manage the Dialogue Mechanism Committees in Plateau State.

- Financial Support: NSRP has disbursed NGN37,801,597.00 to JDPC from a total grant of NGN39,548,497.00 to implement activities under Output 2.2 which include establishing and managing 6 DMs in Plateau State for 3 years.
- Technical Support: NSRP built the capacity of JDPC on mediation and dialogue mechanisms towards the management of LWU conflict in Plateau State. In collaboration with JDPC, NSRP trained members of the DMs in Bokkos town and Daffo on mediation and dialogue mechanisms. Also, NSRP provided technical support to JDPC on how to make the DMs inclusive to accommodate major stakeholders within the local communities.

Contributions from Other Actors

Case research shows that others were also active in the resolution of LWU conflict in Bokkos and Daffo through advocacy, training and sensitization of community members. These actors include: Country Women Association of Nigeria, Women for Women, National Human Rights Commission and Search for Common Ground. Among these actors, the research shows that Search for Common Ground was more visible and had intervened in the area since 2013 (before NSRP's intervention in 2014).

NSRP's intervention was different from other actors because of the establishment of DMs as an inclusive platform in LWU conflict resolution.

Conclusions and Key Learning

- The nature of LWU conflict has not changed significantly in Bokkos town and Daffo, but the severity has gone down.
- Dialogue Mechanism (DM) Committees have contributed to peaceful resolution of LWU conflict in Bokkos and Daffo through sensitization, negotiation and mediation. KIIs speak about many anecdotal examples.
- As a result of the DMs (and training provided by NSRP/JDPC) a shift in the approach of Traditional Leaders (who play a highly significant role in the resolution of LWU conflict) has been observed. Their approach is now more inclusive.
- Increased participation and/or a changed approach to LWU conflict resolution is also noted among community leaders, religious leaders and security agencies.
- As a result of the DMs, women are now involved in LWU conflict resolution (can inherit and own land). However, their participation in LWU conflict resolution is still relatively low.
- Youth that are members of the DMs are actively involved in LWU conflict resolution and in the sensitization of other youth in Bokkos LGA to shun violence. However, their participation in LWU conflict resolution in general is still relatively low.
- All the key informants interviewed, except one, reported that in the absence of NSRP and the DMs, the severity of LWU conflict could have remained the same, or even become worse
- In the absence of NSRP's intervention, the DMs in Bokkos town and Daffo would not have been established. NSRP's research activities identified the value of this approach.
- NSRP's support to JDPC facilitated the inclusive nature of the DMs which have members drawn from all major stakeholder groups in the local communities. This has made community members (including farmers and pastoralists) widely accept the platform and the agreements facilitated by it. Inclusivity has facilitated success.
- Context is important in the functioning and sustainability of outcomes as a result of DMs. For example,

- More LWU conflicts are recorded during the dry season when water sources easily dry up and competition among farmers and between pastoralists and farmers to access the available water sources is heightened.
- High prevalence of drug abuse among youth remains a potential danger to the relative peace being enjoyed in Bokkos LGA.
- The Indigene-Settler feud across the state is brewing animosity among settlers (pastoralists) towards indigenes (mostly farmers) in Bokkos LGA. This could be a trigger of further violence in the LGA.

Introduction and background

This case concerns NSRP's Output 2 stream of work which is focused on mitigating the drivers of conflict through reducing grievances in target areas around economic opportunities and the distribution of resources. Specifically, this case study falls under Component 2 of Output 2: supporting target communities in northern Nigeria to manage conflict around the use of land and water.

NSRP aims to strengthen mechanisms for agreeing the rules for sharing natural resources and provide dispute resolution mechanisms between groups [KI NSRP]. The desired outcome is that NSRP will have contributed to a measurable improvement in the functioning of policies and structures that enable communities to agree rules around land and water use, mediate disputes when they break out and before they turn violent" [KI NSRP].

The NSRP theory of change is premised on the assumption that if NSRP can "support initiatives that actively encourage users of shared natural resources to work cooperatively to address access, distribution and use issues, and if there is sufficient popular pressure to convince politicians to support rather than scupper reforms, then NSRP will contribute to reducing grievances over LWU and thus the frequency of violent conflicts between user groups".

Since 2014 NSRP has provided technical, facilitation and financial support to the Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) (in Plateau state) to establish Land and Water Use (LWU) Dialogue Committees (DMs)

JDPC has established 6 DMs in three LGAs across Plateau State. Two out of the 6 DMs were established in Bokkos town and Daffo. These mechanisms are set up to bring together traditional rulers, representatives of resource user groups, leaders of ethnic groups, representatives of communities (including women and young men), religious bodies, LGA councillors and state government.

The DMs meet bi-monthly (some meet monthly) to identify and address brewing conflicts before they turn violent, thereby promoting and helping to ensure peace. The DM also undertakes other initiatives to promote peace including:

- Sensitisation of community representatives on laws and policies around LWU
- Advocacy by the DM to security agencies and LGA authorities
- Training (to traditional rulers, ethnic and religious leaders as well as other members of the DM) on negotiation, mediation and advocacy skills. Training was also available to council officials and their supervisors at the state level as well as leaders of community based associations.
- Facilitating the inclusion, participation and mainstreaming of women and women's voices in rule-setting, decision-making (for example, around land inheritance) and mediation structures
- Engagement with mining companies and state parliament to prevent/ resolve conflicts induced by particular economic activities

Description of Outcome(s) reported by NSRP:

- 19 brewing conflicts have been resolved/ prevented in Bokkos LGA over the last 2.5 years
- Agreements brokered in selected Bokkos communities on the rotational use of streams between farmers and pastoralists resulting in the prevention and reduction of violence conflicts

- Community actors more aware of policies and practices guiding shared natural resources
- Community actors using acquired skills on mediation and negotiation to resolve conflict on shared resources
- Replication of the DM approach in four communities (Ruwi, Mushere, Manguna and Sha) due to the success of the DM approach in Bokkos (with little or no financial support)

Case timeline:

TIMELINE	CASE SPECIFIC EVENTS	EXTERNALITIES
[month?] 2013	• NSRP commissioned the Centre for Peace at the University of Jos to conduct conflict mapping around shared natural resources in Plateau State.	• Search for Common Ground had commenced its Peace programme in Bokkos LGA and 7 other LGAs in Plateau State.
February-April 2014	• In February 2014, NSRP gave grant to JDPC • February-April 2014, JDPC conducted a research on existing federal, state and local governments laws around shared natural resources in Nigeria with a focus on Plateau State.	
July–December 2014	• JDPC trained community stakeholders on mediation and negotiation. • JDPC organized dialogue meetings in project communities from August to September 2014. • In August 2014, JDPC established two Dialogue Mechanism Committees in Bokkos town and Daffo. Members of each DM include; farmers, pastoralists, local chiefs, ardos, religious leaders, women groups, youth groups, LG representative, community leaders, security agencies, etc. • Daffo and Bokkos DMs embarked on sensitization campaigns on peaceful approach to resolving LWU conflict in communities within the two districts. • A Bokkos Chief re-visited a LWU case decided on in 2010. He applied mediation to address the case amicably. • Local chiefs in Bokkos and Daffo started using mediation in collaboration with the DMs to address LWU conflict. • The Bokkos local chief through the DM redefined cattle routes in Mabel.	• Bokkos LGA accepted the idea of having DMs in communities within the LGA • Community members were tired of the lingering violence in their communities which made them accept dialogue as an approach to address LWU conflict.
Early 2015	• JDPC organized a sensitization workshop on LWU conflict for community stakeholders in Ruwi-Bokkos District. • Daffo DM facilitated an agreement among farmers in Josho on a rotational timetable for the use of Didyeng river for irrigation farming.	• Politicians made use of youth as thugs during the 2015 elections to stir up violence in Bokkos LGA.

	• Daffo DM sensitized Mayi community on LWU conflict. • Bokkos DM demarcated a stream in Magi Mbar for farmers and pastoralists' use. • Security agencies were drafted as members of the Bokkos DM. • DMs were established in Ruwi and Manguna. They were facilitated by the Bokkos DM.	
April- May 2015	• In Daffo, traditional leaders and the ardo collaborated with the DM to reach an agreement with pastoralists to stop moving about with bags while grazing their cattle.	
June- August, 2015	• Traditional leaders in Bokkos collaborated with DM to demarcate cattle routes in Kop and Butra. • In Daffo [August 2015], DM facilitated a meeting that helped develop timetable for water use between farmers and pastoralist. Cattle routes were also demarcated. • In June 2015, JDPC created awareness on peaceful means to addressing LWU conflict in Maiduna [Daffo district]. • In mid-2015, a DM was established in Mangar. It was facilitated by the Bokkos DM.	
Late 2015	• In Daffo, women became active members of the DM. • Rotational timetable was developed in Kambai [Daffo district] for farmers and pastoralists over water use. • Major cattle routes were demarcated in Ruwi [Bokkos district]. • A timetable for water use among farmers was facilitated by the Bokkos local chief and DM in Mabel. • Bokkos DM facilitated the establishment of DM in Mangor.	
Early 2016	• The local chief of Bokkos facilitated the demarcation of cattle routes in Takai • In Bokkos, traditional leaders worked with the DM to demarcate a stream in Kop for livestock drinking and for domestic use. • Bokkos DM organized sensitization campaigns on peaceful co-existence between farmers and pastoralists in Kwate and Ruwi. • Bokkos DM facilitated the establishment of a DM in Sha under Bokkos district.	• The National Human Rights Commission organized a seminar on Peace-building in Bokkos LGA.
April–June 2016	• Bokkos local chief pronounced that women should be allowed to own land.	

	• In April 2016, a woman [member of DM] mediated in a conflict between her children and some pastoralists over farm encroachment in Bokkos. • April/March 2016, Bokkos DM banned underage grazing among pastoralists in a meeting of stakeholders that also involved pastoralists.	
July-August 2016	• In July 2016, traditional leaders facilitated the demarcation of cattle routes and a stream in Kambai. • Youth in Daffo refused to protest and cause trouble over the death of a local chief from Bokkos. • Farmers in Warem Hottom agreed to stop cultivating cattle routes after a meeting facilitated by Daffo DM. • In July 2016, Daffo DM organized a sensitization campaign in Josho village on peaceful resolution of LWU conflict. • In July 2016, Daffo DM established a youth group to help counsel youth against drug abuse. • In August 2016, the Divisional Police Officer of Bokkos LGA created a desk office on LWU conflict at the LGA Police Station. The desk officer was made a member of the Bokkos DM. • In July 2016, Bokkos DM organized a workshop on drug abuse for youth in Bokkos.	• Sensitization programmes and jingles on Plateau State radio to encourage peace. This has been an on-going process since 2014.
Sept- Oct. 2016	• In September 2016, a local chief redefined a cattle route that was cultivated by a farmer in Hottom [Daffo district]. • September/October 2016, farmers started harvesting their crops in Daffo because of the fear of cattle encroachment on farmlands which had become a common occurrence during harvest. In the past, crops were harvested from between November and December.	• In October 2016, Search for Common Ground conducted an advocacy for peace between farmers and pastoralists in Tangur [Bokkos district]

The process of change

Operating context/ policy environment pre-NSRP intervention

Bokkos LGA is in the southern part of Plateau State and populated by a diverse range of ethnic groups including Mushere, Kulere, Ron, Hausa and Fulani. There are over 100 villages and towns[227] within the LGA and the inhabitants are mostly farmers and pastoralists who rely heavily on land and water for cultivation and grazing of livestock respectively. The locals (Mushere, Kulere and Ron) are mostly farmers, while the Fulanis are pastoralists and the two groups have co-existed in communities within the LGA for many years.

Key informants reported that prior to NSRP's intervention in 2014, the relationship between the local farmers and Fulani pastoralists was characterized by mutual distrust and deep-rooted animosity as both groups clashed frequently over resource use [KIs, Full ROAs, Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGDs for farmers, pastoralists and youth in Bokkos and Daffo]. The expansion of agricultural production over many years brought

227 Extracted from the 02 ROA Initial Template from NSRP

about stiff competition over land use for farming and grazing between farmers and pastoralists respectively. The increase in farming activities reduced pastoralists' access to land and water for their livestock and changed the relationship between farmers and pastoralists[228]. Hence, violent conflict over the use of land and water – especially amongst pastoralists and farmers - has traditionally been a key characteristic of the LGA.

The hostile relationship between Fulani pastoralists and local farmers in Bokkos LGA was partly rooted in and accentuated by several years of violence between locals (indigenes) and Hausa-fulanis (settlers) in Plateau State generally. There were over 80 episodes of violence between 1999 and 2004 between the locals and Hausa-fulanis in different parts of the State, many of which originated from Jos and spread to other parts of the State[229]. Most of the violence was attributed to the struggle for power between the main ethno-religious groups in Jos- Indigenes and Hausa-fulani settlers. Between 2001 and 2011, an estimated 7,000 people were killed in communal violence in Plateau State and up to 250,000 people were displaced[230]. Land and grazing conflicts were the main disputes in rural areas of the state.

Also, before late 2014 in Bokkos LGA, cases of conflicts were recorded among farmers themselves, especially during the dry season when water becomes scarce resulting in stiff competition among farmers around streams to irrigate farms. Sometimes, farmers spent more than two days on their irrigation farms waiting for their turn of using the stream due to scarcity of water. Key informants reported that the situation easily degenerated into violence among farmers, sometimes leading to loss of lives [KIs, Full ROAs, Bokkos and Daffo].

Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in the LGA were also caused by encroachment on farmlands by pastoralists [KIs, Validation FGDs, Male and Female Farmers in Bokkos and Daffo, Male Pastoralists-Bokkos and Male youth-Daffo], cultivation of cattle routes by farmers [KIs, Full ROA-Daffo, Male and Female Pastoralists-Bokkos and Daffo, Male farmers-Bokkos and Daffo, Female Farmers-Bokkos, Male Youth-Bokkos and Daffo and Female Youth-Daffo], cattle rustling and other criminal activities such as stealing, etc. Pastoralists were always suspected and accused of perpetrating criminal activities in the LGA. This had deepened the distrust between locals, who are largely farmers, and pastoralists in the area. In 2014, Mbar village in Bokkos LGA was attacked by unknown gunmen leading to the death of five people and the burning of farmlands, etc. The Special Task Force in the State arrested a Fulani man who was suspected as the mastermind of the attack[231]. There were other similar cases where Fulani pastoralists were suspected for crimes committed by unknown persons which further deepened the already strained relationship between both parties.

In almost all the 12 validation FGDs conducted in both Bokkos and Daffo districts, youth were reported as the main perpetrators of conflict around resource use in the LGA. The perception is that they are often influenced by drugs to instigate conflict in the area. Also, the high rate of youth unemployment in the area has contributed to their participation in fuelling conflict in Bokkos LGA. Generally, youth unemployment in Nigeria is put at 42.24%[232].

Conflict Management Mechanisms in Bokkos LGA Pre-NSRP Intervention

Generally, the Federal and Plateau State governments responded to various crises in the state by setting up judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate and recommend measures to punish offenders and curb a recurrence of violence in the state. The efforts of the various commissions were not effective as their recommendations were not implemented as evidenced in the recurrence of violence in the state from 1994 to

228 Krause, J. (2011). A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. Geneva Declaration Working Paper. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat.
229 International Crisis Group: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (1): The Jos Crisis. Africa Report No 196- 17 December 2012.
230 Final Evaluation Report (2015). Plateau Will Arise! Building an Architecture for Peace and Tolerance. AN EU-funded project, implemented by Search for Common Ground in 8 LGAs (Bokkos inclusive) of Plateau State.
231 NSRP Conflict Briefing Note, No. 16. September 2014.
232 National Bureau of Statistics (2016), Unemployment/Under-employment Watch. Q1, May 2016.

2004[233]. Also, the Police and Military actions had minimal success because there was no coordination in their approach and they were accused of taking sides in the conflict. Traditional leaders were largely responsible for maintaining peace between the main groups- locals (farmers) and Fulanis (pastoralists)- through regular consultative meetings between them[234]. There was an instance in 2001 after the crisis in Jos when local chiefs and Hausa-fulani community leaders in Bokkos LGA arranged meetings where they agreed to maintain peaceful relationship and urged their communities to refrain from violence[235]. The local government council and security agencies were also involved in the management of conflict within the LGA, but they were usually accused of taking sides, especially with the locals. Pre-NSRP intervention, Bokkos LGA did not have an inclusive mechanism that considered the inputs of various stakeholders in conflict management [KIs, Full ROAs, Bokkos and Daffo]. However, there were donor-supported programmes like Search for Common Ground[236] conducting trainings on peace and identification of early warning signs for security agencies, traditional institutions, civil society organizations and religious leaders, etc.

Key actors and their behaviour over the period

Key actors in relation to the prevention, management and resolution of land and water use conflict in Bokkos town and Daffo
• Traditional Leaders
• Ardos [Fulani/pastoralist traditional leaders]
• Farmers represented and participating in the DMs
• Myetti Allah/Pastoralists represented and participating in the DMs
• Community Leaders
• Youth Association Representatives
• Women Association Representatives
• Religious Leaders
• Security Agencies
• Local government Chairperson (as represented at the DM)

Traditional Leaders (including Ardos- Fulani/Pastoralist Traditional Leaders)

Prior to NSRP's intervention and the establishment of Dialogue Mechanism Committees (DM) in Bokkos and Daffo districts in August 2014, traditional leaders and Ardos in both districts were actively involved in the resolution of land and water use (LWU) conflict between farmers and pastoralists [KI, Full and Validation ROAs in Bokkos and Daffo Districts]. Traditionally, the local Chiefs were responsible for the establishment and protection of cattle routes in the community, and mediated between parties in dispute where such cases were reported to them. On the other hand, the Ardos were mostly involved in the resolution of LWU conflicts among pastoralists over grazing land and between farmers and pastoralists alongside the local chiefs in cases of farm encroachment by pastoralists. A key informant reported that: *the Fulani Ardos were also actively involved in conflict resolution, especially if the conflict involved farmers and pastoralists* [KI, Validation FGD, Male Youth, Bokkos].

233 International Crisis Group: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (1): The Jos Crisis. Africa Report No 196- 17 December 2012.
234 Blench, R. and Dendo, M. (2003). Report to the World Bank/UNDP/DFID-JEWEL- Jigawa Enhancement of Wetlands Livelihood Project). Jos, 13 September 2003.
235 Krause, J. (2011). A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. Geneva Declaration Working Paper. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat.
236 Search for Common Ground implemented a peace programme meant to build active, locally owned and inclusive peace architecture in Plateau State. The project was implemented from 2013 to 2015 in Bokkos LGA and 7 other LGAs of the State.

As the custodians of the customs and tradition of the land, traditionally, local chiefs in both districts resolved LWU conflicts using customs and tradition of the people. The increasing number of cases of conflict around land and water use in the past placed enormous pressure on traditional rulers who had to single-handedly resolve such cases [KI, Full ROA, Bokkos]. The local chiefs are highly respected by the people which made their judgements on LWU cases binding. [KI, Full and Validation ROAs]. However, key informants in both districts reported that in many instances parties to LWU conflicts, especially those found guilty, were usually not satisfied with the judgements of the local chiefs. They were accused of being partisan because they hardly listened to peoples' views before passing out judgements on LWU conflict. In the past, both Ardos and local chiefs were accused of taking sides in LWU conflict resolution that involved farmers and pastoralists irrespective of who was at fault. The Ardos defended the interest of their people by being quick to dismiss allegations against their fellow herdsmen, or by insisting that the pastoralists who committed the alleged offence could not be traced. This often resulted in the escalation of conflict. Similarly, local chiefs tended to support the farmers.

Farmers [in Bokkos and Daffo Districts]

Before the NSRP intervention in late 2014, farmers were seen to be in constant conflict among themselves over water use for irrigation farming, and with pastoralists over land and water use. Key informants in Bokkos and Daffo reported that farmers were seen to be cultivating cattle routes in both districts which left pastoralists with no option but to encroach on farmlands that were along cattle routes, thereby resulting in conflict between farmers and pastoralists [KI, Full and Validation ROAs]. A key informant reported that: *the increase in demand for land to cultivate because of increase in farming' population has compelled some farmers to cultivate cattle routes* [KI, Validation FGD, Male Farmers, Bokkos].

Also, many farmers in both districts are involved in irrigation farming during the dry seasons, relying heavily on the few available water sources [streams] in the areas. During the dry seasons the water sources easily dry up due to heavy usage by farmers. This often resulted in stiff competition among farmers to access water for farming and in many instances farmers were reported to have blocked water flow to accumulate more water for their own usage which prevented other farmers from getting access to water. Hence, most conflict among farmers involved competition over water use [KI, Full and Validation ROAs]. In conflict situations over water use, farmers were usually divided along blood and tribal lines irrespective of who was at fault. Farmers from the same family or tribal lines always supported their members in disputes that involved farmers from other families or tribes. On the other hand, where farmers had disputes with pastoralists, they were usually united against the pastoralists.

Myetti Allah/Pastoralists [in Bokkos and Daffo Districts]

Before the NSRP intervention, pastoralists represented by their association; Myetti Allah, played a very insignificant role in LWU conflict resolution even when they were seen to be in constant conflict with farmers over land and water use in Bokkos and Daffo districts. A key informant reported that pastoralists hardly attended meetings meant to resolve LWU conflict between them and farmers because of the deep-rooted animosity. They were seen to be encroaching on farmlands and destroying farm crops which often resulted in conflict between them and farmers. A key informant reported that; *they* [pastoralists] *always allowed their cattle to stray into farms destroying farm crops…* [KI, Validation FGD, Female Farmers, Daffo]. However, the cultivation of cattle routes by farmers also contributed to the encroachment of farmlands by pastoralists as many cattle routes in both districts were either completely cultivated or made narrowed by farmers. A key informant had this to say: *due to the narrowing of cattle routes by farmers, it became very difficult for pastoralists to pass without destroying crops on farmlands* [KI, Validation FGD, Male Pastoralists, Daffo]. In the past, pastoralists were accused by farmers of stealing their farm crops which usually led to conflict between them. Also, pastoralists were seen to be destroying water banks constructed by farmers to access water for their cattle. This was another source of conflict between farmers and pastoralists in both Bokkos and Daffo districts.

Community Leaders [Bokkos and Daffo]

Before the start of the NSRP intervention, community leaders were not active in the resolution of LWU conflict in both Bokkos and Daffo districts. However, in some cases, they liaised with traditional leaders in the settlement of disputes at the community level [KI, Full ROAs, Bokkos and Daffo]. In Daffo district, there was

internal community leadership strife which prevented them from active participation in LWU conflict resolution [Full ROA, Daffo].

Youth [Bokkos and Daffo]

Before NSRP's intervention and the establishment of DM in both Bokkos and Daffo, youth [pastoralists and farmers] were the main perpetrators of violence in both districts [KIs, Full and Validation ROAs, Bokkos and Daffo]. Unemployment and drug use meant that they could be easily provoked and used by farmers and pastoralists to perpetrate violence [KIs Full ROAs in Bokkos and Daffo]. Youth from both sides-farmers and pastoralists-always supported their own whenever there was a conflict between farmers and pastoralists. Even as the major perpetrators of LWU conflict in the areas, youth were not involved in the resolution of such conflicts as their opinions were not considered important by the traditional leaders who were mainly responsible for the resolution of LWU conflict in the areas [KIs, Full ROA, Daffo and Validation FGD, Male Youth-Daffo].

Women Groups [Bokkos and Daffo]

Traditionally, in Bokkos and Daffo districts, customs and tradition prohibited women from participating in decision making. Women were not involved in LWU conflict resolution in either districts even though they were involved in the instigation of such conflicts in the past [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos, Validation FGDs-Bokkos]. Women farmers were seen to be quick in raising alarm whenever there was an encroachment of farmland by pastoralists which made young farmers attack such pastoralists without investigating the issues. Also, in both districts, women were not allowed to own or inherit land [Full ROAs, Bokkos and Daffo].

Religious Leaders [Bokkos and Daffo]

Before the intervention, religious leaders were not directly involved in the resolution of LWU conflict in both districts. They were generally preaching peace in the communities and were sometimes involved in the settlement of domestic disputes among their members [Full ROA, Bokkos and Daffo]. Cases of LWU conflict were not reported to religious leaders in the past and when such cases were brought to their notice, they referred them on to either the traditional leaders or security agencies [Full ROA, Bokkos and Daffo].

Security Agencies [Bokkos and Daffo]

In the past, security agencies, especially the Police, were uninterested in mediation or negotiation in the settlement of disputes. They treated LWU conflict which involved damage to crops or injuries to the parties involved as criminal cases. Offenders were charged to court for serious cases and minor cases were referred to traditional leaders for settlement [KIs, Full ROAs, Bokkos and Daffo]. Security agencies were largely ignorant of laws governing resource use and they were mostly interested in suppressing LWU conflict to prevent escalation into violence [KIs, Full ROA, Bokkos].

Bokkos Local Government Area

In the past, Bokkos Local Government Council had no interest in local conflicts because most of the Council Chairmen then were Government appointees from other parts of the State who did not share the feelings of the community and did not want to meddle in local issues. This resulted in low participation of the Local Government Council in LWU conflict resolution. Cases of conflicts received by the Local Government Council were immediately referred to either security agencies or traditional leaders for further investigation [KIs, Full ROA, Bokkos]. Also, in the past, Councillors who are political representatives of the community seemed to have shown little interest towards conflict resolution around LWU. Even though they were consulted by the Traditional Rulers from time to time on issues bothering the community, Councillors played an insignificant role in resolving land and water use conflict in the area [KIs Full ROA, Daffo].

Observed behaviour changes among key actors over the course of the case timeline

Traditional Leaders (including Ardos- Fulani/Pastoralist Traditional Leaders)

Local Chiefs and Ardos were trained by NSRP/JDPC on dialogue as an approach to resolving conflict [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo]. Following the training in 2014, evidence shows that their approach to LWU conflict resolution became more inclusive as other stakeholders were invited to conflict resolution meetings. From late 2014, the use of dialogue by local chiefs to mediate between parties to LWU conflict in the area became noticeable [KIs, Validation FGD-Male Pastoralists]. This change was facilitated by the establishment

of Dialogue Mechanism Committees[237] in both Bokkos and Daffo districts. Local Chiefs and Ardos are members of the DMs in both districts and they have been working with other key actors in the DM to resolve LWU conflict through dialogue since the platforms were established. Due to the training received, a key informant reported that the local chief of Bokkos had even reverted to an earlier judgement made in a case that involved two Bokkos farmers in 2010. One of the farmers was not satisfied with the judgement at that time and had been attempting to seek redress in court. The Chief revisited the case in November 2014 and shared the farmland in contention equally to allow both parties equal access to water for irrigation. Hence, both parties were satisfied and the case was withdrawn from the court by the farmer who was initially aggrieved by the Chief's judgement in 2010 [KI, Full ROA, Bokkos].

Since the establishment of DMs, the perception is that traditional rulers are now involving more stakeholders (such as women groups and youth groups) in resolving conflicts; this was not the case before DMs [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. Traditional rulers have reduced the pressure of LWU conflicts on them by referring cases to the DM and have promoted the acceptance of outcomes of conflict resolutions by running an inclusive system of mediation involving other stakeholders [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo].

As evidence of practice change among traditional leaders on LWU conflict, in late 2015 the Bokkos traditional leaders collaborated with other stakeholders-farmers, youth, and women to develop a timetable for water use among farmers in Mabel, which is one of the communities under Bokkos district [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. Male and female farmers from Bokkos confirmed their participation in the meeting that led to the development of the timetable in Mabel. In September 2015, the Ardo in Bokkos who is a member of the Bokkos DM mediated on a case that involved a pastoralist who encroached on a farmland in Butra and destroyed crops worth hundreds of thousands of Naira. The pastoralist was fined 750,000 Naira [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. There are several examples of LWU cases addressed by ardos and local chiefs through the DM that suggest practice change in their approach to the resolution of LWU conflicts in Bokkos and Daffo.

Farmers [Bokkos and Daffo]

Since August 2014 when the DMs were established, the behaviour of farmers towards LWU conflict is perceived to have changed significantly in some instances. Farmers in Bokkos and Daffo districts who have been sensitized and are represented in the DMs have agreed to the use of timetables for rotational use of water sources for irrigation farming,[238] while others have shown commitment to addressing LWU conflict through the demarcation of streams and cattle routes [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGDs-Male Farmers and Pastoralists-Daffo, Female Pastoralists and Male Youth-Daffo]. Also, because of the sensitization campaigns DM organizes in various communities, more farmers now resort to addressing LWU conflict through mediation and negotiation.

However, some farmers also report LWU cases to security agencies for prosecution rather than negotiate with conflict parties. For example: a key informant reported that a farmer in Mandarken, which is under Bokkos district, reported to the police a case that involved a pastoralist who encroached on his farm and destroyed crops [KI, Validation FGD, Male Pastoralist]; another key informant noted that in July 2016 a farmer handed over a herd of cattle that encroached on his farm to the police instead of negotiating with the pastoralist [KI, Validation FGD, Male Pastoralist, Daffo].

Pastoralists [Bokkos and Daffo]

Evidence shows that pastoralists, through their association; Myetti Allah, participated in the training on mediation and negotiation JDPC organized. Also, the DM in Bokkos and Daffo sensitized pastoralists on peaceful resolution of LWU conflict in late 2014 and early 2015 [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGD, Female Pastoralists-Bokkos]. In Bokkos, key informants reported that pastoralists became actively involved in the resolution of LWU conflict in early 2015 because of the sensitization campaigns the DM carried

237 DM is an inclusive platform established by JDPC/NSRP in Bokkos and Daffo districts to manage and resolve LWU conflicts in the communities. Members of the platform include traditional leaders, religious leaders, youth and women groups, farmers and pastoralists among others.

238 It was noted that farmers in communities including Josho, Kambai, Mabel have agreed to rotate the use of water sources to prevent conflict among them [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGD, Male Farmer-Daffo].

out in communities within the local government area [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. Many pastoralists in Bokkos and Daffo participated in several meetings facilitated by the DMs to help address LWU conflict. The outcome of one such meeting held in Ruwi in late 2015 was the demarcation of cattle routes that were cultivated by farmers [KIs, Validation FGD; Male Pastoralists-Bokkos]. In another meeting facilitated by the DM in Daffo between April and May 2015, pastoralists agreed to stop moving about with bags when grazing their livestock [KIs, Full ROA-Daffo].

Despite the sensitization campaigns organized by the DMs in both Bokkos and Daffo, key informants reported that pastoralists still encroach on farmlands and destroy crops, especially during harvest [KIs, Validation FGDs, Male Farmers-Bokkos and Daffo and Female Pastoralists-Bokkos]. However, pastoralists are now willing to negotiate and sometimes pay fines for encroaching and destroying crops on farmlands. In Bokkos [August 2016], a key informant reported that, in a LWU conflict mediated by the Ardo who is a member of the DM, a pastoralist paid NGN750,000 as fine for encroaching and destroying crops on a farmland [KI, Validation, Female Farmer-Bokkos]. Another key informant reported that in Mabel [early 2016], a pastoralist encroached on a farmland and ran away, but the owner of the farm traced him to his home and the issue was addressed amicably [KI, Validation FGD; Male Farmer-Bokkos].

Community Leaders [Bokkos and Daffo]

Key informants reported that community leaders in Bokkos and Daffo were among stakeholders JDPC trained on dialogue mechanism and mediation in the resolution of LWU conflict [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo]. Since then, community leaders have been working with traditional leaders in the resolution of LWU conflict in Bokkos and Daffo. This represents a behaviour change since the establishment of the DMs [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo (inc, Community Leaders)].

Youth [Bokkos and Daffo]

Evidence shows that youth in Bokkos and Daffo participated in the JDPC dialogue and mediation trainings [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo] and that youth are represented in DMs in both districts. There is some evidence that youth have also been involved in the resolution of LWU conflict in Bokkos and Daffo, especially those who are members of the DM. Key informants reported that youth were involved in the resolution of several LWU conflicts in Mabel, Butra, Ambar and Urti among other villages [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos, Validation FGDs; Male Youth-Bokkos and Daffo, Female Youth-Daffo and Male Farmers-Bokkos]. In one such case a youth leader, who is a member of the Bokkos DM, resolved a dispute that involved two farmers fighting over water source in Urti village in February 2016 [Validation FGD, Male Youth-Bokkos]. There are also reports that youth who have been sensitized by the DMs in Bokkos and Daffo refused to join other youths to cause trouble after the assassination of a local chief from Bokkos. Some youth in Daffo stopped other youth from protesting and causing trouble [Validation FGDs; Male and Female Farmers-Bokkos, Male and Female Pastoralists-Bokkos, Male Youth-Bokkos and Daffo, Female Youth-Bokkos and Full ROA-Daffo]

However, key informants reported that, generally, the extent of participation in LWU conflict resolution among youth in Bokkos is low despite DM's efforts to get them involved [Validation FGD, Male Farmers-Bokkos]. In almost all the FGDs conducted in Bokkos and Daffo, key informants reported that many youths in both districts are using drugs and that this motivates them to perpetrate violence in their communities[239] Key informants also report that youth can be manipulated by political leaders to stir up violence, especially during election periods [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos].

Overall, the research suggests more youth involvement in LWU conflict resolution in Daffo than in Bokkos. Comments of key informants suggest a relationship between youth participation and the prevalence of drug use. While such factors are largely outside of the control of NSRP/JDPC, these findings provide important learning for understanding what the 'critical success factors' for DM are in different contexts.

Women Groups [Bokkos and Daffo]

239 In Mushere [Bokkos district], the incidence of youth involvement in LWU conflict was high between January and June 2016. However, the prevalence is considered to have reduced since June 2016 [Validation FGD, Female Farmers-Bokkos].

Evidence shows that even though women's participation in LWU conflict resolution remains generally low, they are becoming more involved in settling LWU disputes through the DMs in Bokkos and Daffo [Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGD-Female Farmers-Daffo]. In Bokkos, women became members of the DM in early 2015 while in Daffo their participation in LWU conflict resolution became noticeable in late 2015 [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo] In April 2016, a woman who was a member of the Bokkos DM mediated on a dispute between her children and some pastoralists over the encroachment of her farm [KI, Full ROA-Bokkos]. Also, through the efforts of the Bokkos DM, women have been recognized by the traditional leader of Bokkos to own land and inherit property [KIs, Full ROA, Validation FGD; Male and Female Farmers, and Male Pastoralists-Bokkos]. The research suggests that more women farmers were involved in LWU conflict resolution, especially in Daffo, than women pastoralists. This is because women pastoralists are not actively involved in the grazing of livestock unlike the men. A key informant commented that; *women pastoralists are not involved in LWU conflict resolution in Daffo* [KI, Validation FGD, Male Pastoralist-Daffo].

Religious Leaders [Bokkos and Daffo]

Religious leaders were trained on dialogue mechanisms and mediation. They are also members of the DMs [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos and Daffo]. Following the training, religious leaders have become active in the resolution of LWU conflict in both Bokkos and Daffo (a change in their behaviour from that observed pre-intervention) as they preached peaceful co-existence between farmers and pastoralists in both districts. A key informant reported that in late 2014, a pastor mediated and resolved a dispute between a farmer and a pastoralist in Dashen village over blocked cattle routes [KI, Full ROA-Bokkos]. In September 2016, another pastor headed a community-based committee that helped resolve a land dispute between two churches in Bokkos [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. In Daffo, a key informant reported that a pastor headed a reconciliation committee established by Bokkos LGA to reconcile aggrieved parties in the community [KI, Full ROA-Daffo].

Security Agencies (Bokkos and Daffo]

Evidence shows that security agencies were involved in the JDPC dialogue mechanism and mediation training [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos and Daffo]. In Bokkos, the Police and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) were drafted into the DM in early 2015 and since then their behaviour towards LWU conflict is perceived to have changed significantly [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. A key informant reported that in August 2016 a desk office on LWU was established in the Divisional Police Station of Bokkos LGA and a desk officer was assigned to man the office. The desk officer also represents the police at the DM. Security agencies now resolve conflicts by encouraging the aggrieved parties to mutually resolve the issues [Full ROA-Bokkos]. They collaborate with Traditional Rulers to collect records and information to help in resolving conflicts [KI, Full ROA-Daffo].

Bokkos Local Government Area

In recent years the Local Government Council has become more involved in local dispute resolution around land and water use through its Local Government Security Committee (unrelated to the DM) which traditional rulers are members of. The Local Government Council is now fully drafted into the DM which has promoted their participation in decision making on LWU conflict. Local Government Chairmen now visit farmlands and settle disputes there after seeing for themselves the interests at stake [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. However, local councillors are still not involved in LWU conflict resolution as they have refused to attend meetings on LWU conflict even when invited [KIs, Full ROA-Daffo].

The 'contribution' of NSRP

NSRP provided both financial and technical support to JDPC to establish and manage the Dialogue Mechanism Committees in Plateau State. NSRP has disbursed NGN37,801,597.00 to JDPC from a total grant of NGN39,548,497.00 to implement activities under Output 2.2 which include establishing and managing 6 DMs in Plateau State for 3 years.[240]

NSRP built the capacity of JDPC on mediation and dialogue mechanisms towards the management of LWU conflict in Plateau State. In collaboration with JDPC, NSRP trained members of the DMs in Bokkos town and

240 Financial support was also provided to other DMs that were replicated in locations outside of the 6 DMs originally established by JDPC.

Daffo on mediation and dialogue mechanisms. Also, NSRP provided technical support to JDPC on how to make the DMs inclusive to accommodate major stakeholders within communities.

In the absence of NSRP's support to JDPC the DMs would not have been established. DM platforms were identified as mechanisms for addressing conflict around resource use by research conducted by JDPC, supported by NSRP, in 2014[241]. The establishment of DMs was an idea shared by both JDPC and NSRP, but NSRP provided financial and technical support to facilitate the process.

Discussion in this section is structured around the NSRP programme level Theory of Change (facilitated by the NIEP prior to the MTE in 2015). Discussion is relevant to outcome levels 1, 2 and 3 of the Theory of Change. Specifically, the section examines NSRP's contributions (through its support to JDPC) to:

- **Level 1: improve communication between Stakeholders**
- **Level 2: dialogue and debate to understand and influence structural drivers of violence**
- **Level 3: changes in policy and practice and narrative around violence**

Improved Communication between Stakeholders

NSRP has significantly contributed to strengthening communication and information sharing among stakeholders in LWU conflict by supporting JDPC to establish dialogue mechanism committees (DM) in Bokkos and Daffo.

- The DM is a platform that facilitates communication and information sharing among stakeholders who are members of the platform. For example, as a result of their involvement, key informants reported instances where the police referred LWU disputes to the traditional leaders for further investigation and resolution and sometimes collect information from the traditional leaders to help them in their investigation of LWU cases [KIs, Full ROA-Daffo]. Another key informant reported an example where the traditional leader of Bokkos referred a LWU dispute to the DM [KI, Full ROA-Bokkos]. The case was initially reported to him for settlement.
- Evidence shows that the DM influenced the establishment of a desk office on LWU conflict at the divisional police station in Bokkos [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos]. The desk officer [policeman] is a member of the DM and this has enhanced the level of communication between the police and other members of the DM as well as with farmers and pastoralists in the LGA.
- Farmers and pastoralists in communities where the DMs have intervened recognize the importance of the platform as there is evidence that they report LWU cases to the platform for peaceful resolution [KIs, Full ROA, Validation FGDs-Female Pastoralists and Male Youth-Bokkos].
- The DMs in both districts have organized various sensitization campaigns in communities to create awareness on peaceful means of resolving conflict and to help address LWU conflict [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGDs; Male Farmers-Bokkos and Daffo, Female Farmers-Daffo, Male Pastoralists and Female Youth-Bokko].

Dialogue and debate to understand and influence structural drivers of violence

NSRP supported the Peace Centre of the University of Jos in 2013 to conduct a conflict mapping around natural resource use in Plateau State and supported JDPC in February 2014 to conduct a research on existing legislation around land and water use [KI, NSRP Output2 Manager]. The two studies informed NSRP/JDPC's adoption of dialogue mechanism committees as platforms for resolving LWU conflicts in Plateau State. Through community sensitization and regular discussions facilitated by the platforms, there is evidence that NSRP has been able to influence some drivers of LWU conflict in Bokkos and Daffo.

241 In 2014 NSRP provided a grant to JDPC to conduct research on legislation governing natural resource use in Nigeria. The research recommended the establishment of dialogue mechanisms to address conflict around resource use. In 2013, NSRP supported another study on conflict around resource use which was conducted by the Peace Centre of the University of Jos. The study also recommended dialogue mechanisms towards the resolution of resource use conflict.

- DM identified the cultivation of cattle routes by farmers as a major driver of conflict in Bokkos and Daffo [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGDs among famers and pastoralists in Bokkos and Daffo]. The platform met with stakeholders in different villages and facilitated the demarcation of some existing cattle routes in a few villages including Mayi, Kambai, Hottom, Takai, Kop and Butra, etc.
- Through meetings facilitated by the platform, water sources which were identified as a source of conflict between farmers and pastoralists in some communities (including Kop and Magi Mbar) within the LGA were demarcated [KIs, Full ROA-Bokkos].
- The platform also identified water scarcity, especially during the dry seasons as a source of conflict in the LGA. Through discussions with different farmers' groups, agreements were reached on the rotational use of water sources for irrigation farming in Mabel, Josho and Kambai, etc. [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGD, Male Farmers-Daffo].
- Also, through dialogue, the platform influenced pastoralists to stop moving about with bags while grazing. There were allegations that such bags were used to steal crops in farms which was seen as a source of conflict between farmers and pastoralists in the LGA [KIs, Full ROA-Daffo].
- However, the platforms are yet to significantly influence a reduction in the prevalence of drug use among young people which has been a major catalyst of conflict in the LGA. The prevalence of drug abuse and rate of unemployment among youth are still very high in the LGA [KIs Full ROA-Bokkos and Daffo, and Validation FGDs in Bokkos and Daffo]. The DM recognize the importance of this issue as it affects LWU conflict. They have worked to sensitize youth on the danger of drug use, but the prevalence remains high.
- An age-long driver of conflict in the state is still brewing within Bokkos LGA. The indigene-settler issue was identified as a driver of conflict in the LGA [KIs, Validation FGD-Male and Female Pastoralists-Bokkos and Daffo], but the platform has not considered it an issue. Although, the issue is outside the mandate of the DMs, it may result in violence between locals and Fulani pastoralists if not addressed, thereby contributing to increased violence between farmers (who are mainly locals) and pastoralists (who are seen as settlers and denied indigene status).

Changes in policy, practice and narrative around violence

As a result of the NSRP/JDPC-supported platforms (DMs), the following practice changes were identified by the research on this case:

- The use of timetables for rotational use of water sources among farmers largely, and between farmers and pastoralists in few communities [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGD, Male Farmers-Daffo].
- The demarcation of existing cattle routes in few communities within the LGA [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGDs among famers and pastoralists in Bokkos and Daffo].
- The banning of under-age herding among pastoralist [KIs, Full ROA, Bokko]
- The banning of pastoralists from moving about with bags while grazing [[KIs, Full ROA-Daffo].
- The demarcation of streams for pastoralist and domestic use [KIs, Full ROAs-Daffo and Bokko, Validation FGD, Female Farmers-Daffo]
- The use of mediation and dialogue in LWU conflict resolution by traditional leaders [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGD, Male Pastoralists-Daffo]

Further, the evidence is that broader societal participation and inclusivity (a principle underpinning the NSRP delivery model) has been greatly increased in the approach to LWU conflict as a result of NSRP/JDPC DMs, In the past traditional leaders were largely responsible for the resolution of LWU conflict without the inclusion of other stakeholders in the deliberations. NSRP contributed to influencing a change in practice through the DMs which allowed traditional leaders to involve other stakeholders, represented at the DM, in conflict resolution. Women and youth groups as well as religious leaders who were not traditionally involved in LWU conflict resolution in the past were drafted into the DM [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo, Validation FGDs, male and female farmers, pastoralists and youth in Bokkos and Daffo].

In the Absence of NSRP/JDPC

All the key informants interviewed on this case, except one, reported that in the absence of NSRP and the dialogue committees, the severity of LWU conflict could have remained the same as was the case before the intervention or even become worse. A key informant commented thus; *the approach by the DM to conflict resolution is unique as all stakeholders are involved in the dispute resolution process* [KIs, Validation FGD, Male Pastoralist-Bokkos].

Other key informants said the various agreements reached between farmers and pastoralists which have contributed to peace could not have been possible if not for the DMs.

However, one key informant commented differently that if NSRP had not intervened in Bokkos, other donor-supported programmes could have done the job, perhaps using a different approach. The informant said Search for Common Ground could have intervened in the area because they started an intervention[242] in Bokkos before NSRP [KI, Full ROA-Bokkos].

The Contributions of Other Actors

This case identified other actors (besides NSRP) working within Bokkos LGA to address LWU conflict between farmers and pastoralists. The table below presents the contributions of these actors to addressing LWU conflict in Bokkos and Daffo as derived from the FGDs conducted during the case research.

Actor	Contribution
Search for Common Ground	Started a peace intervention in Bokkos and seven other LGAs in Plateau State in 2013. Through the intervention, community members and stakeholders in Bokkos LGA were sensitized on the need for peaceful co-existence between farmers and pastoralists. In October 2016 Search for Common Ground were at Tangur village in Bokkos LGA to sensitize farmers and pastoralists to avoid violence during harvest. Overall, Search for Common Ground train major stakeholders including traditional leaders and security agencies on early warning signs, and peaceful resolution of conflict.
Mercy Corps	Mercy Corps was reported to have organized peace meetings in Bokkos LGA.
Community Peace Partnership	Key informants reported that CPP organized sensitization programmes on peace within Bokkos LGA.
National Human Rights Commission	The commission organized a seminar on peace building in Bokkos LGA between March and May 2016.
Plateau State Government	The State government has been involved in awareness creation to promote peace in the state through radio programmes and jingles.
Other	There are other non-governmental organizations including Country Women Association of Nigeria and Women for Women sensitizing communities on peaceful co-existence in the LGA.

Key learning

Overall, this research shows that NSRP/JDPC were not the only actors working in this space. However, the DMs facilitated by NSRP/JDPC have clearly contributed to conflict resolution and peace-building in the target communities – with a number of specific evidenced examples highlighted by KII and FGD participants in this research. The DM approach is different from that of other actors and it appears that it has gained traction with key stakeholders in target communities.

That the approach is valued is further demonstrated by the fact that DMs have been replicated in a few other communities within Bokkos LGA; without the financial support of NSRP. These include DMs in Mangar established in mid-2015 and Sha established in early 2016 [KIs, Follow-up KII-Bokkos]. Anecdotally, some of

242 Search for Common Ground started a peace intervention in Bokkos LGA as well as 7 other LGAs across Plateau State in 2013.

these DMs have been able to negotiate agreements between farmers and pastoralists in their communities and resolved various disputes arising from land and water use between both parties.

This research has identified factors that have contributed to and inhibited the achievement of DMs in Bokkos and Daffo.

Facilitating Factors

- **Desire for change:** Communities were tired of the many years of violence that have claimed many lives and destroyed property in Bokkos and Daffo. They accepted dialogue as an alternative to violence in the resolution of LWU conflict because they wanted an end to the many years of violence in their communities [KI, Validation FGD, Male Pastoralists]. The time was right for introduction of a new approach.
- **Combined effects:** The severity of violence had gone down over the years partly because of the contributions of other donor programmes including Search for Common Ground, Mercy Corps and the state government [KIs, Validation FGDs, Female Pastoralists-Bokkos and Daffo]. The state media also encouraged peace through various peace programme [KI, Validation FGD, Male Youth-Daffo]. NSRP/JDPC have been able to build on these foundations.
- **Community sensitization:** The sensitization campaigns DMs organised on peaceful resolution of LWU conflict contributed to the acceptance of dialogue and mediation as an approach to resolving LWU conflict between farmers and pastoralists [KIs, Validation FGDs, Male Farmers and Pastoralists- Bokkos, Female Farmers-Daffo].
- **Inclusivity:** The establishment of DM as an inclusive platform in Bokkos and Daffo supported non-violent resolution of LWU conflict. The DM facilitates broader participation as all the major stakeholders are members. This way, parties to conflict are confident of getting justice from the DM because they are represented. In the past when only traditional leaders and security agencies were involved in LWU conflict resolution, the level of acceptance of decisions was often low because parties to conflict felt left out in the resolution process [KIs, Full ROA-Daffo, Validation FGDs, Male and Female Farmers-Daffo, Male Pastoralists-Bokkos, Male Youth-Bokkos]. Inclusivity has facilitated the success of the DM.

Inhibitors

- **Wider socio-economic conditions:** Drug abuse and unemployment among youth remain high in Bokkos and Daffo. These have served as drivers of conflict in the areas for many years and are believed to have inhibited youth participation in DMs. If these issues are not addressed and well-managed, there might be a relapse of the achievements recorded to date [KIs in almost all FGDs in Bokkos and Daffo reported this]. This is a factor that NSRP/JDPC should consider when monitoring project risk and sustainability.
- **Deep-rooted animosity between farmers (indigenes) and pastoralists (settlers)** that evolved over many years of violence in Plateau State is still manifested in the relationship between both parties in Bokkos and Daffo. The situation might be the next trigger of violence between the two parties if not addressed as pastoralists have begun to express their disaffection [Validation FGDs, Male and Female Pastoralists-Bokkos and Daffo].
- **Population growth has resulted in the need for more farming land** and contributed to the cultivation of cattle routes by farmers - identified as a major conflict driver in the area [KIs, Full ROAs-Bokkos and Daffo]. Population growth is clearly beyond the control of the DMs. However, as the population continues to grow and demand for land increases, farmers may revert to the cultivation of cattle routes thereby violating existing agreements on the demarcation of cattle routes.

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Case Study No.	8	Changes in Policy, potential in practice: Delta State Conflict Management Alliance and the Herdsmen/Farmer Conflict (*Brendan Whitty, Umaru Ibrahim)*

Introduction

This case study focuses on the Delta State Conflict Management Alliance (DSCMA), which falls under Output 1 focusing on the security and governance context. The DSCMA has helped to foster key relationships between different state and civil society actors, with a view to supporting conflict resolution within Delta State. Crucial to the Theory of Change is the creation and institutionalisation of these. As we will see, the DSCMA created an Early Warning System that facilitated communities to alert the proper security apparatus on incidences of conflict. In order to illustrate the work that this platform has been conducting, the case study looks at their role in responding to the running conflict between the Fulani herdsmen in Delta State, and the communities around whose land – and sometimes on whose lands – the herdsmen graze their cattle. This has been a crucial conflict focus of the DSCMA. This conflict is used to reflect on the wider outcomes from the DSCMA.

Methodology

The methodology might be described as "ROA Plus": that is, the RAPID Outcome Assessment (ROA) is supplemented by additional components. The core ROA approach identifies the key actors who are influential in respect of a particular area of policy; it explores the change in behaviour actor by actor within this operating environment; it then establishes what factors contributed to the change, thereby isolating the contribution of each actor – including notably the DSCMA – to the change, and the overall outcomes in the policy or practice environment.

Pursuing the methodological advantages offered by this approach (one which focuses on the underlying changes in relationships with key actors), the 'plus' part of ROA Plus involves the exploration of the relationship between certain key stakeholders that are crucial to the NSRP theory of change:

- The security agencies responsible in the area, notably the Nigeria Police Force;
- Since the NSRP approach is predicated on inter-linkages between its various outputs and levels, the approach also looks at how the DSCMA capitalised on the wider family of platforms: notably the Community Peace Platforms and Delta Women's Peace and Security Network;
- The quality and extent of the participation **of marginalised groups in the DSCMA.**

Key Findings

The situation pre-intervention

- The conflict between the herdsmen and the farmers developed contemporaneously with the development of the platform – that is, in late 2015 and early 2016. Prior to this, there had been broadly peaceful relations between the two groups, although there have been some incidences of violence dating back as far as 2004;
- More broadly, the attitude of the police was characterised by a lack of reactivity and transparency in respect to their responses to conflicts. There was no obvious means for communities to request the attention of the security agencies.

Over the case timeline to the present day

- The herdsmen / farmer conflict continues as tensions arise in flash-points and sporadic violence, concentrated in particular areas (such as Ossissa) but spread more broadly across Delta State.
- Through the efforts of the DSCMA and to a large extent the Special Adviser on Non-Indigenes Affairs (an ad hoc position appointed by the governor to respond to the conflict) some of the conflicts' effects and tensions have been mitigated and mediated.
- While the police have been generally more reactive to conflicts delivered through the Early Warning System and highlighted during the DSCMA meetings, there is an indication that they have been reluctant to pursue the herdsmen – who are the acknowledged aggressors in the conflict (including by their own representatives, Miyetti-Allah, also known as the Cattle Breeders' Association).

Outcomes

Changes in Policy and Practice and Narrative Around Violence (L3 outcome)

- There are essentially no or very limited changes in the government's policy.

- There have been more significant changes in government practice in particular. The DSCMA and its attendant processes itself marks a considerable change in the practice of the government, in that it entails civilian and security agencies sitting together with civil society organisations and discussing matters of conflict resolution in a regular, structured, transparent and accountable fashion. Given the recent history of Nigeria, this is a considerable and very positive change
- Further, the fact of the Early Warning System and the openness to accepting calls through that process, as well as the subsequent conflict analysis, the creation of sub-committees involving civil society and government agencies, and the interventions are themselves important changes in the ability of communities to provide timely information about conflicts to the government. A key agent in these changes is that of the police, who have become more responsive to distress calls. It is unfortunate for accountability and transparency that no follow-up mechanism has been instituted.
- While the police's general practice does appear to have changed, the reluctance to pursue the herdsmen was attributed to the political interests backing the herdsmen. Several interviewees suggested that no sustainable resolution of the conflict was possible in that regard, and one suggested that communities had diminishing trust in the police.

Decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this, as well as increasing public pressure for change (L2 outcome)

- While the decision-makers did not have or use evidence of 'what works', the Early Warning System, the matters raised in the meetings themselves and the subsequent conflict analyses did provide important operational information which was at times acted upon.
- However, a growing discontent with the lack of prosecutions and with the ongoing weaknesses in the police's implementation of policies resulted in a growing lack of trust from communities, a willingness to "take the law into their hands" and growing criticism from the media. Clearly this is not a product of the availability of data about conflicts, but to the contrary a general weakness in operations including the failure (by the police notably) to respond operationally to data that has been received.

Engagement platforms are institutionalised and societal capacity to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change is built (L2 outcome)

- As observed above, the creation of the platform itself is a significant step forward towards the institutionalisation of the platforms, since it allows a regular meeting between civil society and the government. At the workshop, the provision of a room by the new governor for the DSCMA as a meeting venue was identified as a key element indicating the sustainability of the platform's institutionalisation. There have been enthusiastic champions for the role of the DSCMA within the government, and it seems that these have continued to make possible the ongoing functioning of the platform.
- There is however some questions that the platform's sustainability and therefore its influence is variable and may potentially be weak. Whether the platform can remain sustainable will depend on the ongoing support from the governor and from the support of other champions, which is an inherent vulnerability given the turnover in key positions.

Broader societal participation, including marginalised voices

- Marginalised groups are given a voice in the DSCMA through the involvement of civil society organisations that claim to represent their interests. It is important to emphasise that the creation of a platform where civil society have the opportunity to meet and discuss conflicts of concern to different marginalised groups is a substantial advance.
- However, while the CSOs who were interviewed suggested that they were able to make their views known, it did not appear that they had a powerful role in setting the overall agenda of the DSCMA (i.e. the kinds of conflicts that were prioritised) and their presence was limited to relatively few seats at the table.

The 'contribution' of NSRP

- The NSRP, in fostering the DSCMA, has contributed through the creation of the structures which render possible accountable, transparent structures bringing civil society and government agencies

together to discuss ongoing conflicts. Earlier platforms and organisations receiving complaints (notably the Miyetti Allah) did not bring the security apparatus together with civil society or the due process and balance that the DSCMA is able to bring.

- The Early Warning System allows communities to bring forward their own complaints to the police, notably, which would not be possible without the DSCMA's involvement. These processes are directly attributable to the DSCMA's operations.
- The conflict between the herdsmen/farmers have proved to be impermeable to permanent solution, as a result of the key interests supporting the herdsmen.

Contributions from Other Actors/ External Factors

- The DSCMA relies for its efficacy on its relationship to the government security and civilian agencies, and to the ongoing support of key champions within these agencies.
- The appointment of the SA for Non Indigenous Affairs and his ongoing mediation efforts marked a crucial change in practice for the government. This appointment, of a person who had engaged with the herdsmen in particular, was repeatedly cited as being an effective and important mediator between the herdsmen and the farmers. To a large degree, his work was in parallel to the work of the DSCMA, although both worked in collaboration.

Key learning

- It is useful to read this in conjunction with the conclusions of the Kano WPSN case study, with which there are interesting parallels. In both cases, their own work is necessary but not sufficient to achieve the desired change. In the WPSN work, they positioned themselves well, and were fortunate that a policy window opened with the appointment of the former Commissioner of Women's Affairs; in this case, the DSCMA positioned itself well and created strong relations with the government, but in the case of the herdsmen/farmer conflict there was an obstacle to resolving the conflict peaceably that the DSCMA could not unpick.
- There is a delicate line to walk between cooperating with the government and being coopted by the government's agenda. The working relationship is crucial, but the need to keep the government 'onside' has risks and may limit strategies (in the media, for example) that highlight government deficiencies.
- There are some more specific lessons to be learned from the case:
    - The Early Warning System was simple and worked well. However, the failure to develop a follow up process reduced its transparency and accountability to the reporters of incidents and the ability to generate data about outcomes.
    - The desire to involve the government civilian and security agencies reduced the seats available for civil society, which limited their voice (albeit that it was an achievement to have so many seats on the board).
- The agenda setting process – in terms of the prioritisation of issues - remained somewhat opaque to the evaluation team. The farmer/herdsmen conflict was described as the most common conflict raised; yet other issues were raised but seemed to be neglected. There is good sense in focusing on a single issue and focus resources on this, particularly when it is so prevalent. However, a question remains at what point the lack of traction should feed into a shift in focus.As a final note, it is useful to revisit some of the challenges in using 'conflict resolved' as an indicator. In many instances, the temporary cessation of violence is not an adequate indicator that the conflict has been resolved yet identifying the existence of a long-term peaceful settlement underpinning a cessation of violence will be difficult to enumerate and monitor.

Introduction and background

This case study focuses on the contribution of the Delta State Conflict Management Alliance (DSCMA) to the resolution of the running conflict between the Fulani herdsmen in Delta State, and the communities around whose land – and sometimes on whose lands – the herdsmen graze their cattle. This has been a crucial conflict focus of the platform on whose activities this case study focuses. The change was identified as one of the key changes.[243]

The DSCMA has helped to foster key relationships between different state and civil society actors, with a view to supporting conflict resolution within Delta State. Crucial to the Theory of Change is the creation and institutionalisation of these, and their ability to use evidence. As we will see, the DSCMA created an Early Warning System that facilitated communities to alert the proper security apparatus to incidences of conflict.

The case study primarily provides a response to the Evaluation Question (EQ) 11 "*To what extent have NSRP's Platforms/initiatives (including research) influenced key actors/institutions in the conflict arena, resulting in changes in policy and practice that enhance stability and reconciliation?*" Harnessing a RAPID Outcome Assessment that focuses on changes in specific actors' behaviour, it traces DSCMA's contribution to change.

However, the approach maybe understood as ROA 'Plus' – that, is an ROA similar to the existing case studies conducted within the NSRP evaluation, but with some additional components supporting the exploration of specific parts of the Theory of Change. The 'plus' parts may be summarised as follows:

- An exploration of how the policy change rests on and is a manifestation of a deeper set of changes in relationships between DSCMA and the key government agencies with roles in security and conflict resolution. This responds to EQ5 ("To what extent, and in what ways, have coordination, and alignment of strategic priorities and actions among NSRP stakeholders improved?").
- The four streams of outputs brought together within the programme theory are intended to combine to deliver. A crucial aspect of this is to explore how the DSCMA leveraged the influence of its sister platforms within the NSRP to deliver the desired changes. The study explores the influence of the WPSN, CPPs and media partners.
- Finally, the theory of change seeks to encourage broader societal participation, notably that of marginal voices. By testing the level of participation in the DSCMA's own processes, it helps provide insights into DSCMA's contributions to EQ7 (*"To what extent, and in what ways, has the capacity of broader society to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change been built?")* and to the "broader societal participation" element of the Theory of Change.

What is the SCMA?

The SCMA is a set of eight networks working at the State level. The DSCMA falls under Output 1 of the NSRP, whose function is to facilitate :broader societal participation in and oversight of conflict management mechanisms at federal, state and local level" (NSRP, 2012).

The Delta SCMA is formed of representatives of civil society organisations, government civilian and security entities and representatives of the NSRP platforms.

Description of NSRP Inputs

NSRP has provided a total of GBP 113,731 including:

- funding for the convenor to conduct its ongoing convening functions;
- funding for specific mediation interventions at various times during the conflict.

Description of NSRP Outputs

The support that the NSRP has provided to the DSCMA convenor, Global Peace Development and additional grants has supported the following outputs.

243 In fact, this has been the key focus of the DSCMA since early 2016, taking over from a previous focus on the Vigilante Law. While the DSCMA has a broad remit, it appears that the focus of the work is typically on a relatively narrow set of priorities at any given time.

Bi-monthly meetings.[244] The regular members of the DSCMA (comprising 38 members, of whom nine are CSOs and the remainder either NSRP platforms or members from the government agencies).[245] They meet in a room provided by the Governor of Delta State (see below).

Sub-committee: sub-committees are formed within the DSCMA in the event that a conflict which has been discussed in a DSCMA meeting and "if identified as something proper for their involvement, a sub-committee is set up" (KII, DSCMA member). Its function is to assess and investigate the issue. So one government official, talking of the process with respect to the conflict that is the heart of this case, noted that:

> "The sub-committee was mandated to go to the affected communities and have meetings with the different parties and come up with a communique that would serve as a working tool on how the conflict could be resolved. The committee could identify the causes and effects of the conflict which were included in the communique." (KII, DSCMA member / government official)

The report is conducted by a member of the sub-committee and the findings provided back. How far it may take the response is contingent on funding after an application to the NSRP – if funding is refused "the issue is then referred to the police to address" (KII, NSRP official).[246]

Further Conflict Mediation Work: In the event that funding is approved by NSRP, the DSCMA may conduct additional conflict mediation work: for example, during the first half of 2016, the DSCMA conducted four special dialogue meetings in Obiaruku, Abraka, Ossissa and Okwashi (KII, Special Adviser Non-Indigenes Affairs). They will cover the costs of the mediation efforts. It is worth noting, that there is limited scope for funding these efforts – so in respect of another instance of conflict, it was not possible to conduct dialogue meetings in Obiaruku, Abraka and Isoko. The strategic focus of the NSRP has been on the herdsmen/farmers conflict, and other conflicts have not been funded. It is also not always possible to bring all relevant stakeholders, since the practice of the traditional leaders is to bring "large entourages" to any meeting (KII, convenor).

Early Warning System: A key aspect of the work conducted by the DSCMA depends on the Early Warning System (which was also highlighted in the identification of 'most significant changes'). A call credit system was established as a conflict tracking tool and 24-hour helplines were established and the contact number circulated to communities to call whenever there was an incidence of conflict. The calls are picked up by the DSCMA, are registered and text messages sent to the Police control room and the DSS, or to the Commissioner of Police (KII, police; KII CSOs). The control room or the Police Commissioner sends such messages in form of signals to police posts within the conflict areas for further action. The DSCMA follow up "as best as they can" (KII, DSCMA convenor) on cases reported to the security agencies on occasion in their meetings, and sometimes they get feedback from the police (KII, DSCMA member; KII DSCMA convenor). However, this process has not been consistently applied and insofar as they are, it entails a phone-call to the police.

Conflict Tracking System: Conflicts that are registered should in theory be tracked. However, one interviewee noted that this does not happen regularly (KII, NSRP representative). Feedback is not adequately

244 The bi-monthly meetings was part of the contract signed between the convenor, Global Peace Development, and NSRP (personal communication, convenor)

245 The evaluation team received different responses to these questions, and of course the attendance to the DSCMA bi-monthly meetings fluctuates. One interviewee suggested that the number of CSOs had been cut from nine to six in order to accommodate additional government officials; another contended that this was due to the nature of the issues and thus the relevance of the CSOs' mandates, and that at any rate there were nine CSO members (personal communication, convenor). The maximum attendance for a meeting is forty-five.

246 While NSRP used to give funds as part of the initial contract for SCMAs to implement initiatives, due to delays in use of the funds the process changed to release funds based on initiatives identified as requested by the Convenor of the platform. The process is as follows: "Such requests will be reviewed by the Program Officer and the Regional lead after which it would be forwarded to the Central office for review by the Output Manager for the final approval of the Programme Manager. Such requests are accompanied by an activity description. Inputs are made by the respective Officers and when necessary, the recommendations on how best to achieve objectives are shared with Convenor for before funds are disbursed. The regional team plays more active role in supporting the Convenor for implementation." (Personal communication, NSRP official).

captured by the conflict tracking tool. There are also grounds for distinguishing more clearly instances of conflict and instances of crime.

Case timeline

Timeline	Case Specific Events	Externalities
2013	Pre-engagement meeting, NSRP with security agencies	
Jul-Sept 2014	Engagement of security agencies by GPD (DSCMA convenor) in absence of NSRP support (since this was during the DSCMA inception phase)	Court order demanding herdsmen leave Ossissa
14-16 Sept 2014	Inauguration of DSCMA	
11 May 2015	Commitment by SSG, welcomed DSCMA. Use of conference room.	
July 2015		Patani: Continued conflict – sometime around here, 2 herdsmen killed
Sept 2015	DSCMA convene a meeting in Patani to address the deaths	
Late 2015	Ndokwa East: late 2015 – meeting held, resolved that herdsmen must get permission from traditional rulers to get access to communities	Ndokwa East – havoc perpetrated by herdsmen Abraka: university staff was killed; community launched a reprisal, started killing
Feb 2016	Delta DSCMA: First discussion on herdsmen by SCMA – set up a subcommittee; Obiaruku 3 day meeting with traditional rules in community, herders; DSCMA, police, LG chair, SA non-indigenes (funded by SCMA)	
March 2016	DSCMA holds mediation, bringing together participants identified in the two training sessions Ossisa: meeting facilitated by SA Non-Indigenes; community forgave herdsmen who destroyed the crops, but resolved that they should leave the community Government set up a committee, in turn to set up a task force – a majority civilian committee DSCMA holds sensitisation and conflict resolution training for 70 herdsmen (31 Mar)	Ossisa: Herdsmen accused of destroying crops worth NGN9m
April 2016	DSCMA holds sensitisation and conflict resolution training for 70 farmers (6 Apr)	Ossisa: Herdsmen reneged on commitment to leave, killed a youth leader (Osisa); Abdul Kareem refused to leave
May 2016	Meeting convened with the key participants, including herdsmen and farmers; mediation conducted, farmers reminding herdsmen (10 May)	CP meeting, where he lectured the herdsmen and released those in detention (KII SA-NIA p.55) Herdsmen released from arrest.
Mid 2016	Oibara, Abraka, Ossisa: dialogue /mediation sessions have been held, with	Kidnapping and killing of Ubulu Uku monarch – police tracked his phone to

	agreement reached; [11 July 2016 with the farmers, herdsmen and other stakeholders. The meeting was organized by the SSG in collaboration with the DSCMA. – hectored the herdsmen, basicalyl] Ofagbe: dialogue/mediation session held and resolved contributed money, made sure the corpse was properly buried; NUT on behalf of WPSN presented books and writing materials to the deceased children to support their education.	Abraka market [DSCMA shared their phone numbers, that was their only role in this case] Ofagbe: after dialogue, community had resulted in the shooting of two farmers (inc. one death). in response to the killing, the community closed the mosque; the SA, CP
Late 2016	Further meetings: DSCAM Nov/Dec assembled the communities and herdsmen on need for peace Ulanta, Ulgheli: Police command conduct engagements SA Non-Indigenes appointed Sept 2016 Obiaruku – sensitisation workshops (Nov, Dec 2016)	Obiaruku: Herdsmen attack in September 2016; Obiaruku – 40 people kidnapped, took their phones and valaubales Ossisa: Abdul Kareem detained (November 2016) Ofaghe: normaly restored; mosque reopened
Dec 2016	Investigation of attack in Okpuna Asaba	Rumours of attack Okpuna
Jan 2017	Obiaruku: in response to the kidnapping in Sept, Another sensitization workshop, Christian Association of Nigeria, the JNI, Chairman of the 25 LGFAs, farmers and herdsmen	Abraka: two herdsmen killed – SA came out and responded
Feb 2017	Ugheli North LG Meeting, meeting with Delta State CP.	Ossisa: 2 Fulani boys killed and decapitated as a community reprisal (18 Feb)
March 2017		Ossisa: Fulani head killed, suspected by community (12 Mar) Ossissa, Police convened meeting (27 March) with Fulani to “console and counsel them” Ossisa: Community sued the governor, SA Non-Indigence and CP – being intimidated by arrest of community members Bill placed before the house on grazing – not linked to the work of the DSCMA although they participated in a hearing

The timeline outlined above is not of a coherent single conflict that has a recognisable narrative arc; rather, it is a series of flashpoints and responses, as different groups of herdsmen encounter settled communities and conflict arise. It is useful, nevertheless, to sketch some of the key elements in the timeline. The right-hand column describes some of the crucial conflicts as they were experienced and reported through the DSCMA system. Essentially, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers started emerging in 2015, in particular in Ossissa but also more widely in Ndowka East (Ossissa is a town in Ndokwa East LGA), Obiaruku, Ugheli North. The response from the government and from the DSCMA started in earnest during the first and second quarter of 2016 (before then, they had focussed on the Vigilante Law which was passed in 2013 but which lacked a crucial commission for its implementation – the creation of which had stalled. The first meeting which raised the problem was in February 2016 (aside from an isolated case in Patani in autumn 2015). The DSCMA held a series of dialogue meetings, including three meetings in March/April 2016. In May and July the government also came on board and started to launch more specific efforts to address the problem. From then, the conflict has continued to flare and die down, up to the present time.

The process of change

The Operating context/ policy environment pre-NSRP intervention

It is useful to note that the emergence of the conflict emerged contemporaneously with the evolution of the DSCMA. A "before and after" comparison of the conflict and an exploration of the intervention's influence does not easily permit the tracing of the intervention's effect. Nevertheless, the following section sketches the situation before and after.

Herdsmen and Farming Communities

Prior to the formation of the DSCMA in 2013/14, the herdsmen and the farming communities are reported as having lived relatively at peace:

> "Before now, the herdsmen and the communities were living as one entity. In the past, cattle graze on grass and the cattle go directly to grassland to graze and drink water, but now, the cattle are going into farms." (KII, Ministry of Women's Affairs)

Another said that the relationship had been "cordial" (KII, SA Non-Indigenes Affairs); another that "for 35 years nomadic cattle rearing has never been the way it is now" (KII, traditional ruler). During that period, the herdsmen had moved in identifiable groups – one interviewee states that there were three groups in Delta State in 2014. Generally speaking, the herdsmen would graze their cattle on land not cultivated for agricultural purposes. The relationship was peaceable, and the herdsmen were not armed. However, while that appears generally to have been the case, it seems that at least the potential for violence was present. In Ossissa, for example (one of the areas which has become a significant flashpoint), there was a court order asking the herdsmen to withdraw from the land and police action had taken place when one of the herdsmen failed to do so.

An interviewee from Miyitti-Allah, the cattle-breeder's association normally considered to represent the herdsmen's interests, noted that in the past any complaints about herdsmen's actions would filter to Miyitti-Allah. In other words, there is the risk of conflict due to the passage of nomadic cattle herds through settled agricultural land.

For their part, the farming communities were fragmented, and community leaders and elders did not necessarily represent the entirety of the community (workshop). The traditional leaders were largely passive and unengaged in the issue of conflicts or tensions between settled farmers and the herdsmen.

Government Policy and Practice

The institutional set-up for responding to violence and conflict is as follows:

- Governor of Delta State as head of the executive branch and overall responsibility
- Secretary to the State Government, as the civil service office of the governor
- The Nigerian Police Force
- DSS (the Department of State Services, more properly known as the State Security Services, or the domestic intelligence agency)
- NSCDC (the "Agro-Rangers"), a para-military force with a mandate in rural conflicts;
- From a policy perspective, the Ministry of Justice and the Delta State House of Assembly (in the latter case, insofar as the legislative branch is relevant which in this case was limited);

Of these, the governor as the head of the executive and the police appeared to be by far the most important actors. The two key elements raised by interviewees was the approach of the police focusing on arrest and prosecution; and within that, a general lack or reactivity.

The government practice appears to have lacked any specific focus on the relationship between herdsmen and farmers beyond the usual operation of the police in the event of a conflict (as suggested above). Since this was not a flash-point before the creation of the DSCMA, the research did not identify specific policy or practice.

However, as a general note, interviewees observed that at this time the police were remote and often did not respond quickly to emergencies from communities (KII, DSCMA convenor; KII WPSN member) Moreover, during the workshop and afterwards the interviewees did draw out tensions between the normal practice of the police and the approach recommended by the DSCMA: thus while the DSCMA proposed to use non-coercive

modes of mediation and dialogue, the police – who were the main government agency charged with response – would use their powers of arrest if they were responsive at all.[247]

Civil Society Organisations

The DSCMA is the first platform of its kind in Delta State, and the first time that civil society organisations were given the opportunity to engage directly with government security and civilian agencies around conflict resolution.

A Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council (CMMRC) existed prior to the creation of the DSCMA. This was an initiative of USAID and CALM. They funded Global Peace Development – the same convenor as the DSCMA – to implement their programme. This mechanism involved some of the same critical stakeholders, but the convenor (KII, convenor) noted the following main differences between the two:

- in the first place, the crucial step forward for the DSCMA is the addition of security agencies and government stakeholders such as the Ministry of Justice in the members;
- second is the inclusion of representatives of persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups as members, to try to include their voice; and
- third, the CMMRC did not offer the resources to hold specific interventions and mediation processes.

Observed behaviour changes of key actors over the case timeline

In accordance with the ROA methodology, the report sketches in this section the behaviour of the key actors. It is worth highlighting at this stage, however, that the herdsmen and communities in particular are disparate and may be expected to behave differently – what follows is an effort to extract generalisations about their behaviour and its changes. A more coherent picture can be drawn from the state apparatus.

Herdsmen

The key informants suggest that there have been considerable changes in the behaviour of the herdsmen since the start of the NSRP that have created greater friction with the settled populations and have triggered the incidents of violence. The following quote describes the changes in behaviour:

> "The herdsmen do not have a grazing area as such they encroach into farms of communities to graze their cattle and the farmers are usually agitated by that act … in some instances, the herdsmen uproot cassava from farms to feed their cattle. The issue had always been around in many communities in the state, but it became severe from late 2015 to 2016. The matter became so serious in Ndokwa East and Isoko in 2016 because the herdsmen do not only encroach on farms but do engage in raping of women, kidnappings and robbery…" (KII, CPP)

While similar changes were reported by other key informants, in some interviews there might be tendency to alarmism (for suggesting that drug-use was a driver of the rapes). Nevertheless, a general agreement that there are:

- more herdsmen, (KII, SA - Rural Development and Peace Building): some interviewees attributed these changes to the insurgency in the North East, forcing herders from that region to abandon their traditional grazing spots and migrate south, compounded by climate change reducing the pasture land in the north and north east (workshop; KII, police);
- that they have been involved in grazing their cattle either intentionally or negligently on farmers' lands (KII, NSRP; KII CSO; KII CPP; KII Miyetti-Allah),
- they are now armed,
- they "lack skills in conflict mediation",
- there have been instances of rape (KII, SA-RDPB),
- there have been instances of demanding money from women in particular – one community, Owheru noted that herdsmen request 70,000 naira from women before they are allowed to access their farms (KII, convenor);
- they are encroaching on land more regularly, including even the governor's land (KII, SSG's office), and that they have even been in a running gun-battle with the police (February 2017) during which two police officers died (KII, media; KII, police).
- that minors are increasingly used to graze cattle (KII, Miyetti-Allah; KII convenor) and that some of the damage being created was a matter of a lack of control.

247 A police representative was present at most of the training and sensitization work being conducted.

The matter was complicated by payments made to communities permitting herdsmen to graze their cattle, a practice which one interviewee suggested has always resulted in conflict between farmers and herdsmen. Similarly, while some suggest that the herdsmen are becoming more aware that in fact there are laws protecting the settled communities (KII, MoWA) another reports herdsmen as suggesting that "they are also Nigerians and can stay in any part of the country" (KII, CPP) indicating a disregard for the laws and the rights of the settled communities.[248]

Several of the interviews made clear the importance of the DSCMA and other efforts to mediate by the governor's Special Adviser on Non-Indigenes Affairs (a key representative of the government, see below) or by the police. This has had a varying effect. Some interviewees observed that indeed there had been a moderation of their behaviour:

> "Also, the herdsmen were advised to control their cattle and stop grazing on farmlands [other interviews suggest the communities want the herdsmen to leave their communities]. The herdsmen are more cautious now and have reduced the rate of destruction on farmland." (DSCMA CSO member)

For others, however, any changes of behaviour on the part of the herdsmen did not necessarily endure. For example, after the DSCMA intervention in Owheru in 2016 the herdsmen left, only to return in 2017 (KII, CPP). As another interviewee stated:

> "In many instances, after an attack on the community, the herdsmen leave the community because of the intervention of the [Special Adviser] and other stakeholders. However, they always return after one or two months to cause more havoc. The leadership of the community has always advised the youth in the community not to confront the herdsmen. The community wants a permanent arrangement to address the conflict." (KII community leader/SA)

In other cases, the timely intervention of the DSCMA might have defused tensions. Argued that the interventions have "calm down" (KII, CPP) the level but that there have been recurrences – so after an incident, may prevent reprisals

> "The DSCMA provided some phone numbers to the CPP to call in situations where crisis is imminent between the farmers and herdsmen and when the situation is beyond our control, we call on the DSCMA to carry out the necessary action.[249] The CPP called the DSCMA on 2 or 3 occasions regarding the Ossissa issue when it became obvious that conflict was imminent between the farmers and herdsmen." (KII, CPP)

The efforts of the DSCMA were therefore to defuse and de-escalate tensions, urging herdsmen and communities to avoid reprisal attacks, and to respond quickly and seek to keep dialogue channels open. Two interviewees gave examples where the Early Warning System was crucial (albeit the second on a different kind of conflict):

> "[Member of the CPP] witnessed a kidnapping incident in the bush involving herdsmen. However, the timely intervention of CPP prevented a colossal destruction as the community was preparing to launch a reprisal attack."

> "The CPP got a hint of a likely clash among cult groups in Ashaka, they called the Commissioner of Police, the DSS […]. The early warning signals was useful in quelling crisis before it escalates. The CPP reach out to security agencies through phone calls whenever they receive hint about conflict in the communities" (KII, CPP)

The picture is therefore one where the herdsmen conflict is ongoing with recurrent flaring of trouble. Efforts to mediate and to mitigate the conflict have had some success in preventing incidents and de-escalating tensions but these do not appear to have had a lasting effect.

A crucial question is why these tensions have recently become increasingly frequent and increasingly violent. One official suggested that the change in the attitude of herdsmen "is either a political scheme or sheer wickedness" (KII, MoWA). A strand of implication in the interviews was that the herdsmen were backed by senior political figures. Thus, one interviewee noted "an external influence was responsible for the mayhem unleashed by the herdsmen considering that despite the enormity of their atrocities, nobody has been

248 The so-called 'grazing bill' was intended to introduce protection for the nomadic population. Each farming community has norms and customs regulating the bounds to nomads' legitimate activities, especially regarding farming activities.

249 Later this was clarified as "restoring normalcy" following a violent incident between farmers and herdsmen.

prosecuted" (KII, SA-RDPB). The same interviewee mentioned that "some herdsmen confided in him that the crimes are usually perpetrated by some strange people who hide under the guise of Fulani herdsmen" (KII, SA-RDPB). There does seem to be some triangulation to the idea that there are senior political figures who are supporting the herdsmen, which explains why they appear to be immune from prosecution, are now armed, and are so persistent. The study cannot speculate whether they are supporting purely for financial reasons (i.e. to make money from the cattle), or for some wider political purpose. Another viewpoint that was raised by one interviewee – that the herdsmen, as Muslims, have been encouraged by the inauguration of a Muslim President – was discounted by another interviewee, who noted that settled Muslim villages were also experiencing tensions with nomadic herdsmen in Northern Nigeria (KII, convenor).

Miyetti Allah

Miyetti Allah – the Cattle Breeders' Association – continued to be considered the representatives of the herdsmen. Since the advent of the DSCMA, Miyetti Allah were no longer the first port of call for a member of a settled community making a complaint about the behaviour of these herdsmen.[250] Nevertheless, they continued to play a role in the ongoing efforts to mediate and mitigate the violence – on one occasion, and interviewee reported working "to caution the herdsmen against any reprisal attack" after farmers had murdered two herdsmen in February 2017. The role of the organisation is illustrated in the following description:

> "The Myetti-Allah leadership invited the Osisa community elders to a meeting [in Asaba] and 3 chiefs honoured the invitation during which a date was fixed for a meeting in the community. At the meeting [in 2016], the community complained of the destruction of their crops by cattle. A delegation was sent to assess the level of damage done on the farms and the damage was enormous. The community resolved that the herdsmen must leave and an agreement was reached with the herdsmen to leave within one week. After a week, the community elders paid us (leadership of Myetti-Allah) a visit where they expressed their gratitude for our intervention. They however stated clearly that they are ready to accept any herdsman that would live peacefully with them at the community." (KII, Miyetti-Allah)

They therefore have some of the similar functions and purposes as the DSCMA. While in the workshop it was suggested that they are not neutral, they noted (talking of Ossissa), "in most cases the agitations of the communities are justified". They form important interlocutors and stakeholders for the DSCMA.

Farming Communities

As the discussion thus far indicates, the farming communities are in many cases the victims of the encroachments by herdsmen. However, the internal structures and politics of the communities themselves are important and the simple story is complicated by the actions of the farming communities. It was for example generally accepted that at times communities asked for and received money from the herdsmen to graze their animals on agricultural land:

> "The herdsmen claim to pay the community leaders and were given a portion of land and maybe the money paid by the herdsmen did not reach other members of the community." (KII, CoWA)

> "Before now [2015-date], there was a cordial relationship between farmers and herdsmen but the relationship started to deteriorate when youth in communities started collecting money from the herdsmen for access to grazing land. The community leaders often demand that the herdsmen vacate their communities and deny sending the youth to collect any money from the herdsmen." (KII, SA-NIA)

Several interviewees blamed some part of the community therefore for taking money through improper channels, or by not sharing it in the proper fashion once received. Others suggested that the meetings were by 'youths' rather than the representatives of the community. he DSCMA advised the communities to stop doing this, when it emerged in discussions with farming and herdsmen communities that had contributed to limiting the flashpoints.

Responses to the ongoing incursions by the communities have been varied. One advance has been specifically the provision through the DSCMA of a channel through which they can reach the proper authorities.

> "The communities do not relate with the herdsmen in fear, the communities are now aware that they have a right and they now know the appropriate authorities to call if any issue arises." (KII, MoWA)

250 It is worth stressing that the DSCMA does not merely perform a displacement function from the existing structures: the DSCMA are perceived to be a more neutral body; moreover, their processes and the presence of state security and civilian bodies as well as civil society, would appear to offer more checks and balances and to make a balanced approach to violence more likely.

This has also enabled the engagement of communities in mediation work and in dialogue – however, an important limitation in the extent to which dialogue has been possible is the difficulty in involving herdsmen since they are often told to leave the communities (KII, convenor). Indeed, in general, the communties' stance is that the herdsmen should be removed– for example, in Ndokwa East and Isoko, the communities had a meeting and resolved that the herdsmen should leave their fields and pastureland (KII, CPP).

This is not to say that they have not also responded violently: there have been reprisal attacks and murders by communities; in one a young herdsman was decapitated; in another, two were murdered; in Ossissa, the settled peoples constructed barriers in response to herdsmen. In a fourth case in Ofagbe, a mosque in the community was shut down for several months (the herdsmen being mostly Fulani and therefore Muslim) and required intervention to have it reopened:

> "So, the SA, the [Commissioner of Police] and other stakeholders decided to contribute money and the corpse was retrieved from the mortuary and buried. While [a DSCMA CSO representative]] presented some books [from her own personal resources] to enable the children return to school. In October 2016, normalcy was restored and the mosque in the community was opened

The farmers therefore react variably depending on the opportunities available to them. One interviewee noted that suggests that communities are increasingly resorting to vigilante groups, to "take laws into their hands" as a result of the growing lack of trust with the police (KII, CSO representative). Moreover, the same interviewee described increasing negative coverage in the media, suggesting a growing pressure for change. However, they are not in the main instigators of the violence (a point admitted by Miyetti-Allah, the herdsmen's own civil society representatives, in an interview) but typically react to the actions of the herdsmen.

Government Policy

While many of the government officials stressed the positive changes in behaviour that they had developed, no-one was able to give many specifics or positive examples. The citations of positive change should therefore be taken with great caution.

> "It is difficult to identify changes especially when it has to do with the government. There may be changes around resources expended on security and the government does not reveal what is spends on the security agencies. There is a change in the approach of the government regarding the farmers and herdsmen conflict as it has become a national issue." (KII, project official)

For many of the interviewees, they suggested that the government's approach is in general "not preventive" [KII, SSG] but is "government's approach is more reactionary than proactive", even although funds are apparently available for a more active role. As another interviewee observed:

> "The government only intervenes when the conflict had degenerated into a full-blown crisis". (KII, SSG's Office)

As the SA on conflict resolution observed "even if [the SA does detect brewing conflict, the government may not take it seriously except when it escalates into crisis". While in theory, this is a matter for the government, and while successive government officials wished to suggest that this was important for them, it appeared that it was still not sufficient for them to dedicate resources to solve the issue.

> "The truth of the matter is that the government does not have the time to call for a mediation but we are thankful to the DSCMA for their prompt reaction to crisis and dialogues in communities. This [herdsmen/farmers conflict] is a problem that has lingered for over one year and nine months but the Governor only attended a meeting just once [the meeting organised by the governor." [KII, SA-NIA]

While the government is accepting of help from the DSCMA, their lack of concern does appear to corroborate the position that the herdsmen have high-level political support – there was a sense that influential members of the government own cattle and that this influences their response to the issue. Another suggested that insofar as they do get involved, they do not employ strategies of conflict mitigation:

> "The DSCMA is usually not satisfied with the State Government's tactics as it often involves coercion but the DSCMA's approach is inclusive and it tends to give the farmers and herdsmen a sense of belonging." (KII, SSG's Office)

> "The government's approach has not worked regarding the resolution of the farmers and herdsmen conflict, and the communities tend to prefer independent bodies [such as the DSCMA] rather than the government." (KII, DSCMA CSO member).

The implication was that the communities believe the government was partisan.

The government typically treats this as a matter of law enforcement. This point is returned to when discussing the role of the police below.

However, the picture painted thus far of a disinterested government which uses force as its primary tool of response is not entirely fair to the government of Delta State. While it is true that they have dedicated limited resources to the issue, the standout exception to their essentially passive role is the appointment of an SA to the Governor on Non-Indigene affairs which seems to indicate a level of commitment towards resolving or at least mitigating the farmers/herdsmen conflict. The particular official was appointed because he had been a champion of herdsmen's issues before he became a member of the DSCMA as the head of Jamaatul Nasrul Ilsman (JNI: Movement for the Propagation of Islam")) and had a personal connection with governor before his inauguration as governor. The Commissioner of Police and others recommended him to the Governor for the appointment to help address the herdsmen conflict. Although he was a member of the DSCMA before appointment as SA, interviews suggest that this should not be ascribed to his role in the DSCMA or the work of NSRP but his prior relationships (KII, SA-NIA) It is important to note that he plays an important role in reaching the herdsmen whenever there is conflict between them and farmers because he understands and speaks their [herdsmen] language.

The interviewees suggest that the SA-NIA played a prominent and active role in the attempts to mitigate the conflict. The following is typical:

> "The timely intervention of the DSCMA has prevented the conflict in Ushie from metamorphosing into a full-blown crisis. [The SA on Non-Indigene Affairs (SA-NIA)] also played an important role in the aspect of sensitizing the herdsmen through the Myetti-Allah platform. The outcome of these sensitizations was the signing of agreement in Ossissa that the herdsmen should vacate their community as they have been accused of perpetrating most of the criminal activities in Ossissa." (KII, CPP)

The role of the SA-NIA was to report to the Secretary of the State Government (SSG) and the SSG would then coordinate the security apparatus response. He is therefore the main contact point for the Government on this. In the case of Adonishaka, another SA to the governor contacted the SA Non-Indigene Affairs alongside the police to intervene. It appears following another attack by herdsmen, the leadership of the community contact the SA on Non-Indigene Affairs because they know he was appointed to address such conflicts. The same interviewee suggested that the Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) across the state and some state council members have the SA's phone number and call him whenever there is an attack by herdsmen.

> "|Now there is a medium where farmers and herdsmen are brought together to understand they are all businessmen"

The interviews suggest the SA duplicates or complement the work of the DSCMA. The report returns to the interlinkages below.

Police / Other security agencies

While the security agencies as a whole are involved in the DSCMA, the workshop and the subsequent interviews identified the police as the primary security-sector actors involved in the herdsmen/farmer dispute. While the "agro-rangers" (constituted under the NSCDC as a para-military government organisation) have been cited as important actors in the workshop, we were unable to schedule an interview with them[251] and their role was not evident from the other interviews that were conducted. The following therefore focuses on the police. From the starting point of inactivity, there is some indication that the attitude of the police has changed in two ways. The first refers to the urgency of response:

> "Things have changed, since the coming of the new CP [ten months ago-2016], crime rate has reduced even the DPOs have become proactive. The SA stated that before the coming of the present CP, the crime rate was so high that robbery and kidnapping became the order of the day in Delta State. (KII, SA NIA)

The interviewees suggest that this increase in focus is at least in part a function of the support of the SCMA, who provide the Commissioner of Police gets reports and can then delegate action to outposts (see below). They can then respond. Before, there was very limited responsiveness and according to the police they see

251 The relevant representatives were willing to speak to us, but was refused permission by their superiors.

the SCMA as a "crime prevention mechanism" [KII, Police]. The other change in practice concerns the forms of response that the police might adopt.

> "In the past, the security agents go to the communities and impose force on the herdsmen but now, the police engage in dialogue with herdsmen before using coercion. However, in some situations, the security agents strike first [use force] before engaging the herdsmen in dialogue like in Ossissa. The security had dialogue with the herdsmen, farmers and the communities separately and a joint meeting was organised in April to July 2015." (KII, MOWA)

> "Last week [April 2017], there was an attack on farmers at Ossissa which resulted in the death of one person and some cattle too were killed in the clash. The community resolved to send the herdsmen out of their community while the police provided escort to that effect." (KII, Police)

These two quotes suggest that the police have (a) started to become more reactive to community calls for aid, due in part to the Early Warning System; and (b) to adopt a wider range of intervention styles and modes than simply one of arrest and prosecution.

Both of these changes must be treated with suspicion. Certainly the police convened a meeting intended to support mediation in May 2016, but it seemed that this comprised largely an effort to urge both groups to avoid conflict. It had little effect and there was no corroboration that this was a widespread practice or that it had happened elsewhere. Moreover, some interviewees noted that the police had not really changed their attitude (KII, DSCMA CSO member; KII, peace club convenor). While is suggested that the police use force, as noted above, several interviewees (including some from within the government) noted that none of the herdsmen have been prosecuted and that there was a general sense of them acting with impunity (KII, community leader). The implication that they drew was that the herdsmen were in some way protected. Others (KII, DSCMA CSO member) suggested that the communities preferred to resort to the DSCMA rather than the government.

Concluding remarks: The picture is therefore mixed. While the police are engaging with the DSCMA and are available as a result of the Early Warning System, they appear in the case of the farmer/herdsmen to be somewhat reluctant to pursue the aggressors (who are assumed to be the herdsmen). Efforts at mediation – and a change in attitude to this extent – are weak. Extrapolating from the interview data and speculating somewhat, the DSCMA may offer a less confrontational way to confront the conflict – and therefore the interests behind it – than arrest and prosecution.

Key Relationship: SCMA-State Government

It seems that the DSCMA has generated positive relationships with the security apparatus. In the workshop, the participants – all members of the DSCMA – observed that the DSCMA have good relations with the security agencies. Of course, being members, this might be expected: however, the very fact of a regularly convened meeting which addresses security issues, and the willingness of security agencies to react to calls through the Early Warning System, is indicative of a closeness of relationship. NSRP officials emphasised strongly at the outset of the research that this very fact of convening a platform with civil society and government contributions is an important contribution, given the starting point of considerable scepticism and opposition between civil society and the state, a product of the military rule where civil society formed the de facto opposition. Working together, and overcoming that trust, is of course crucial and – they emphasise – no small achievement. It is also useful to note that precursors in Delta State – the Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council (CMMRC) also convened by GPD, did *not* bring security agencies into the platform. This innovation, and the emphasis on mediation and conflict-sensitive dialogue, is important.

Participants: the participants to the DSCMA from the security agencies includes the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigerian army, the Department of State Services (known formally as the State Security Services, the domestic intelligence agency), the Secretary to the State Governor (SSG), and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). These were supplemented by the Ministry of Information and Women's Affairs. There is, in addition, the presence of two key Special Advisers to the government, the Special Adviser on Non-Indigenes Affairs (as noted already) and the Special Adviser on Rural Development and Peacebuilding[252], both of whom report to the Governor. A perusal of minutes from the meetings suggest they are all regular attendees and contributors to discussions.

252 The SA-RDP was represented by a member of his staff; he was brought in by the DSCMA in late 2016 as part of their sustainability strategy.

However, there are some gaps in the reach of the DSCMA.[253]

- The para-military NSCDC (the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps) for example had not been responsive (KII, NSRP representative) although they do on occasion send representatives. This appeared to be confirmed by the process of preparing this report, since we were unable to secure an interview from the "agro-rangers" (a body constituted under the NSCDC) as a key actor in the farmers/herdsmen conflicts despite persistent efforts.
- We did not interview the Ministry of Justice, since they were not involved in the herdsmen/farmer conflicts. While they were claimed as a member, they appeared not to attend regularly. It may be that this is due to a change in focus in the DSCMA's agenda from the 'Vigilante Law' to the focus on the herdsmen / farmer conflict.
- The Peace Advisory Council was formed 2 years ago to advise the state government on issues regarding peace and security of the state. It has declined to sit on the DSCMA and efforts by the DSCMA to bring the DSCMA and PAC together through meetings have been unsuccessful (although interviewee suggested this was partly due to NSRP not being able to fund their presence). While the Council is not represented at the SCMA now, there is some overlap in membership: notably, the Special Adviser to the Governor on Rural Development and Peacebuilding and the SSG are members of both.

Process of building relationship: it is useful to sketch briefly the process of building the relationship. The GPD, which had managed the USAID funded CMMRC platform, sought in 2013 and 2014 to bring in members of the government and the security agencies. While it was claimed this was due to the learning from their previous experience with CMMRC, it should be noted that it was also central to the concept of the NSRP. A pre-engagement meeting in 2013 led to the institution in September 2014. An initial challenge arose during the inauguration period and the training held for DSCMA members, relating to the lack of a venue for the meetings: although NSRP, the convenor noted that for the purposes of sustainability, they approached the then-SSG. In 2014, following formal correspondence, the Permanent Secretary of the SSG gave them oral permission to use the room.

Importantly, as the administrations changed in 2015, the new Governor accepted and took on the role of the state accepted the idea of hosting the SCMA at the SSG office. In the workshop the participants noted that they were particularly proud of the fact that the previous governor had also supported the project, indicating some degree of continuity. As one well-connected DSCMA member observed, this is an indication of the authority of the DSCMA within the Delta State government (KII, SA-RDPB). The implications are that the DSCMA have a strong in-principle arrangement with the governor, which they can draw upon to support their working relationships with the security apparatus. They continue to have a close relationship.

Nature of existing relationship: First, and perhaps most important, there is a close relationship between the DSCMA and the governor's office. As one official observed, the SSG forms the conduit:

> "when a report gets to the SSG, it is as good as getting to the Governor because the reports are usually presented at the State Executive Council meetings."

The Governor has been supportive of the DSCMA, as evidence by the provision of the office space as noted above. Regarding the conflict between the herdsmen and the farmers the State governor himself "sent a letter to the SCMA requesting it to intervene in the issue" (KII, NSRP).

Government buy-in is crucial to the success of the NSRP theory of change, which is predicated on the creation of increasingly-institutionalised platforms which brings together organisations working in the conflict resolution field to share information, bring in disempowered voices, and support conflict mediation.

By convening a platform that brings together the relevant officials across the government, it is possible to identify quickly the person with the proper authority. As civil society organisations observed, from outside the government apparatus, historically there had been challenges in doing this: without identifying the correct person with responsibility within the government, agendas can stall as letters sit on desks. Identifying and approaching the correct person is crucial. For example, in attempting to reach out to Ministry of Women's Affairs, the DSCMA sent several letters which failed to elicit a response, only for a chance meeting in a workshop was the connection made. Once contacted, blockages can be cleared: the Commissioner of Women's Affairs is now the alternate chair. The existence of a forum for highlighting issues that can be

253 In addition to the challenges of inviting the traditional leaders – key local stakeholders – to attend, as noted above.

allocated to the correct person, through meetings, ongoing contacts, or the identification of sub-committees, appears to facilitate the clearance of these communication problems. If this is so for civil society organisations, it is even more so for community members who lack power and contacts in Asaba/Warri.

There are some indications that the security apparatus are responsive to the DSCMA. For example, they are afforded broad cooperation by the police:

> "The DSCMA can go to any Divisional Police officer (DPO) to make any complaint. There was an instance in 2016 where some women were harassed in Abraka, the DSCMA went to the community to gather information which they shared with the Commissioner of Police. What the DSCMA wanted was a report from the police on the incident." (KII, police)

The early warning system shows that the DSCMA has made progress in forming a bridge between communities and the security apparatus. However, perhaps because of the police's own weaknesses, feedback from the police to the SCMA has not been regular. There were some suggestions that the police's change in behaviour has been slight (KII, peace club convenor, KII, DSCMA CSO member).

If these changes are no small achievements, as always it is worth modulating the point: much appears to depend on the particular incumbent, since membership in the platform attaches to the organisation. The current Police Commissioner has been very open unlike his immediate predecessor who was not always available and kept cancelling appointments to meet with the SCMA (KII, NSRP representative). Similarly, the Governor's own commitment to the DSCMA fluctuates. For example, when the DSCMA was originally created, it was originally the Permanent Secretary of the SSG who would attend; this was then replaced by a director within the agency; and now sometimes it is the administrative officer. The declining seniority appears to suggest that the platform has a reducing influence; the platform sends quarterly security briefing to the governor, although no feedback has been received yet from these and the success of the initiative remains unclear.

A note of caution: while noting the importance of the relationship between the state and the DSCMA to the DSCMA's function, and also noting the value of the introduction of civil society voices, it is nevertheless important to raise a point of caution. Could the relationship be too close? Or, more explicitly, is the DSCMA captured to some extent by the state apparatus?

To some extent this is natural, since they must and can only really function hand-in-hand. One question raised concerns the agenda and who is setting it. One DSCMA member observed that other forms of conflict – such as kidnapping – did not receive attention from the DSCMA because it was not connected to the herdsmen/farmer issue. It appears, more broadly, that the DSCMA focuses its attention on a relatively narrow bandwidth of conflict (the focus was initially dominated by efforts to reform the vigilante law; and then by the herdsmen/farmer issue). It appears that this is due to a strategic decision made by the DSCMA to focus on certain kinds of interventions as a result of the responses that they are receiving from the Early Warning Systems. While the minutes from the meetings do raise other issues (albeit rarely in a sustained fashion), and while there may be good strategic sense in dedicating resources to a particular issue, an NSRP official noted that in Delta the farmers/herdsmen issue was a matter of concern for the government. This raises an unanswered question about the degree to which government capture of the DSCMA is possible, through setting priorities that fits with its goals - and avoiding conflicts that are too politically delicate. There are no strong grounds to think this, but the question is raised about balancing the sustainability of the systems and working with the government to change behaviour must be balanced with distance and independence – naturally, a difficult line to tread. It should be noted that without a very detailed knowledge of the conflict profile and political drivers within Delta State as a whole, it is very hard for this evaluation to draw a conclusion on this matter. However, the point about participation and agenda-setting is returned to briefly in section 3.5.

Key Relationship: other NSRP platforms

SCMA-CPPs

The Community Peace Partnerships are funded under Output Stream 1, like the DSCMA, but they conduct their functions at the level of the Local Government Area (LGA). The intervention component involves "supporting target communities to address their security concerns and local level conflicts, improve relations with security providers, and link with state level structures" (NSRP, 2012). The hypothesis was stated as follows:

> 'If NSRP can strengthen the capacity of local-level peace initiatives, working with institutions and non-state actors that act to prevent and address conflict in each target LGA by making them better co-

> ordinated and more inclusive, then this will enable improved early warning and more conflicts to be addressed and resolved non-violently' (NSRP, 2012: 20)

The CPPs therefore mirror the functions and goals of the DSCMA, but at a more local level. They convene relevant actors who, through dialogue, accountability and coordination, will seek to mediate and head off conflicts. They also liaise directly with the DSCMA. In theory, therefore, through the coordination, they may escalate matters of concern, or conversely, the DSCMA might refer particular points for the attention of a CPP if it relates to a local manner. Since both perform similar functions at different levels of scale, affording each the opportunity to draw on resources at the level that is most suitable to enable response.

Working relationship: In Delta, the DSCMA works with CPPs in only three LGAs. Within these organisations, it appears that there has been a close working relationship with their respective convenors (Accord for Community Development, African People Development Foundation, Academic Associate Peaceworks) which has several components. Firstly, and most simply, there is regular CPP membership on the platform: There is a single Peace Club representative on the platform, and this representative attends the bi-monthly meetings.

Secondly, while the CPP seeks to engage with the police and other security agencies within the LGA, for issues they can handle at the CPP level, for issues they cannot handle, they can access the state-level security officials and the police in particular through the Early Warning System (KII, CPP chairperson). From the state perspective, they therefore provide an important conduit of information to the security apparatus. The chairman of one CPP describe one occasion when they became aware of “a likely clash among cult groups in Ashaka” when they called the police (KII, CPP chairperson). While they have a regular membership spot, other CPPs and Peace Clubs may attend SCMA meetings on an occasional basis, when invited to report on issues that have arisen within their coverage area. This is mutually beneficial, as the security apparatus learn about the status of unfolding conflicts within the LGAs, while the CPPs are able to discuss and highlight conflicts and their particular needs. However, as noted above the peace club convenor noted that there had “been a slight change” in the approach of the police “but it has not really made a significant impact” (KII, peace club convenor).

Thirdly, the CPP can reference problems to the DSCMA network on a more formal basis to bring their expertise and resources to bear. This point was emphasised by more than the change in behaviour of the security apparatus. As one of the chairpersons of the CPP suggested, a particular conflict may be referred to the DSCMA. Typically, the referral takes the form of writing a letter or otherwise requesting the involvement of the – for example, in the case of the extra-judicial killing of three people in Ughelli the CPP wrote a letter to the SCMA to bring it to their attention in June 2016. The precise nature of the reaction and the work of the CPP and DSCMA differs, as the following example suggests:

- The CPP called the DSCMA directly (rather than the police) “on two or three occasions” regarding conflict between herdsmen and farmers in Ossissa when it became apparent that conflict was imminent. On one occasion, the CPP was directly involved in stopping the community launching a reprisal (the CPP member having encountered the problem by chance as the situation was unfolding): “the timely intervention of CPP prevented a colossal destruction as the community was preparing to launch a reprisal attack” (KII CPP chairman – chairman’s own estimation.) On other occasions, the CPP sought to mobilise support from the DSCMA to head off reprisals from the community.

By bringing in the DSCMA, the CPP can use the resources to support the mediation of a conflict which they themselves are unable to handle adequately.

Fourthly, the CPP interviewees the opportunity and platform to relate directly with influential people within the state government who might be able to influence state responses to the conflict. Thus, the Chairman of one CPP suggested that he could easily report issues of conflict from communities in his Local Government Authority to the government and security agencies through the DSCMA:

> “The DSCMA has a larger network and resources, they can easily reach out to the Governor whenever a crisis erupts and the Governor on his part can deploy up to 5 truckloads of police personnel to the area, but the CPP can only reach out to the Divisional Police Officer (DPO).” (KII, CPP)

What was common to the accounts was that there was a good working relationship between the CPP and the DSCMA, and the CPP can bring in the DSCMA into conflicts. It seems, moreover, that the CPP work together with the DSCMA and follow-up on the common cases.

Fifthly, an interview with the CPP chairperson commended strongly the training they were able to receive as part of the NSRP work. The CPP chairman we interviewed suggested that the mediation skills and approaches were new to him and were welcomed (KII, CPP chairman).

Concluding remarks: The structures are in place for the DSCMA and the CPPs to have a close working relationship. Each platform strengthens the other, in the one direction with swift information about emerging conflicts, and in the other with access to the network of relationships with the state security apparatus – in particular the police – and the relationships and resources of the DSCMA itself.

SCMA-WPSN

The WPSN are a member of the DSCMA. They are convened by Community Empowerment and Development Initiative (CEDI- past convening organisation of the WPSN- 2014-2016) and Global Peace Development (present convening organisation of the WPSN - 2017. The WPSN representative on the DSCMA is Afro-Centre for Development, Peace and Justice, an NGO established in 2001 that works on issues bordering on peacebuilding and integrated community development. The executive director represents the organisation in the WPSN (not as chairperson – who is a representative from the National Union of Teachers) and is also the representative on the DSCMA. She has played a role on various sub-committees and been an active member on various forms of activism.

WPSN role in the DSCMA: The WPSN always attend SCMA meetings. They are a member and they informed us that they are able to raise their voice, and were listened to. However, accounts differed on the extent of the role of the WPSN. On the one hand, the issue of gender appears to be strongly represented within the DSCMA. The Ministry for Women Affairs is also the alternate chair of the DSCMA (as well as being a member and key advocacy target for the Delta WPSN). Taking the key focus of the study on the conflict between herdsmen and farmers, the gender implications were clear:

> "Women are mostly farmers and there was an incident where a man was trying to rescue his wife and the herdsmen killed him on the spot in 2015. The DSCMA stepped in and averted a blood shed. Women were raped, beaten and attacked physically by the herdsmen in Ossisa and Abraka but with the help of the DSCMA, the women were told how to alert the security agencies and were taught how to gather themselves and attack the issues objectively contrary to years back where women would be helpless not knowing what to do or whom to report to." (KII, MoWA)

They themselves identified, several distinct actions were noted:

- The WPSN were able to circulate the Early Warning System numbers to women and to sensitise them to the proper use of the system. They also reported their ability to follow-up on issues with the police, although no further details were given of successful (KII, WPSN member).
- The WPSN reported taking on the responsibility of forming "community vanguards" of women to "sensitise" the women on the issue and to provide a forum where the women can present issues with one voice, in response to the ongoing conflict in the area (KII, WPSN member; KII, MOWA). The WPSN themselves pass on reports of conflict that they receive from these community vanguards (KII, WPSN member);
- On one occasion at least the WPSN gave out gifts to women: thus the DSCMA started the Ofagbe mediation (the meeting was held in the presence of the ODA, SSG) and the crisis was resolved around July 2016. The Muslim community were fined NGN70,000 but they could raise NGN30,000 which they gave to the families of the 2-youth shot by the herdsmen. The WPSN gave books and a grinding machine to the family of the deceased while the corpse was released for burial and the conflict was resolved. There are no other reports of this happening.

As a general note, the WPSN's role in the DSCMA is through the DSCMA's ongoing systems and the WPSN DSCMA representative described the DSCMA as "their big brother" (KII, WPSN member).

However, the role of the WPSN in the DSCMA must be seen through their focus on gender and their own focus on the domestication and implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. A peace club convenor noted that the "WPSN has never mentioned any issue regarding the herdsmen conflict at the DSCMA meetings because their major concern is giving women voice" (KII, Peace Club Convenor). While this discounts the activities that have demonstrably happened, it appears that the WPSN's interventions are somewhat ad hoc, since the conflict is to some degree an area that is parallel to their own advocacy work: that is, the WPSN have a clear agenda whose focus is the domestication of the National Action Plan and its implementation.[254] As such, their advocacy focus makes involvement in specific conflicts limited. While they are involved in conflicts which have a clear gender focus (for example, the case where protesting women were

254 See also the accompanying report on the Kano WPSN.

beaten by the military) and noting also that all the conflicts have serious implications for women and girls, it seems that the WPSN has not had much traction within the DSCMA

Concluding remarks: In the case identified, the WPSN were able to use the DSCMA's structures and processes to provide women with the Early Warning System numbers, to follow-up with the police and to engage on ad hoc additional work. However, they appear to be rather peripheral figures within the overall structure and agenda-setting process, perhaps partly due to their focus on their own specific advocacy agenda. While they were able to raise their voice, they do not appear to have been influential – beyond the creation of community vanguards – in the herdsmen/farmers conflict.

SCMA-media

For the sake of completeness, it is useful quickly to note that the media are another partner of the DSCMA and afford free airtime to the DSCMA. A sub-committee has been formed on the media specifically (KII, member DSCMA and WPSN), and the DSCMA members have been afforded free airtime. The media have been used successfully to circulate in particular the contact numbers for the Early Warning System and also by both the DSCMA and by – for example – the SA-NIA to encourage both farmers and herdsmen not to engage in violence. It has not been possible within this evaluation to determine the scope of the influence of the media on the wider population, and while one interviewee suggested it had been positive (KII, member DSCMA and WPSN) the media seldom came up in either the workshop or the interviews as a key stakeholder.

Process and Participation

Representation on the platform

The membership of the DSCMA is heavily oriented toward government agencies. Originally there were nine places of the 39 SCMA members allocated to civil society organisations (although another reported 33: KII, SA NIA; and another 37, KII, NSRP).[255] Aside from the convenors of other NSRP platforms (the Peace Clubs, CPPs and WPSN), the rest of the membership is made up of civil society or government representatives. As noted above, at the time of initiating the process the DSCMA convenor and NSRP made an effort to ensure that all relevant government bodies were involved in the platform. Three refused initially: the Oil and Gas Ministry, the Boundary Commission and the Advisory Council. One interviewee suggested that the Oil ministry and the Boundary Commission accepted to become members of the platform and CSOs were requested to step down to allow for the membership of the three agencies mentioned above: this was disputed by the convenor, who suggested that there was a reduction but it was not linked to the requirement for additional state organisations' involvement.

The six CSOs that were identified to us as being represented at the platform comprised: the National Joint Association of Persons with Disabilities (JONAPWD), The National Council of Women's Societies, the Forum of NGOs, the Christian Association of Nigeria, Jamatul Nasrul Islam and the National Youth Council of Nigeria. The CSOs represent different civil society sectors including two faith-based NGOs (one Christian, one Islamic); others civil society coalition representatives; and finally groups of marginalised, the youth (denoting those outside the structure of elders and traditional leaders, rather than necessarily 'the young'), people with disability and women. Several are umbrella groups who represent smaller CSOs, who in turn claim to represent the marginalised groups. The CSOs are therefore numerically relatively marginal. They are in addition to Miyetti Allah who represented the herdsmen; it is useful to note that the DSCMA struggled to involve traditional leaders, who might have been expected to represent farmers.

Agenda, participation, voice

The agenda is put forward by the convenor and the NSRP Programme Officer in Delta State reviews the agenda. It is comprised, typically, of issues that have been identified from the prior meetings. However, each member is also able to bring forward cases of conflicts that have arisen. These are then analysed briefly and classified (as e.g. land disputes, farmers/herdsmen conflict, etc – KII, CSO representative). The issues are then "prioritised on the basis of importance" (KII, WPSN representative). Conflict analysis is done at each meeting supplemented by information collected in sub-committee visits, using the NSRP manual for conflict sensitivity. The members jointly decide which conflict is critical for discussion which forms part of the agenda for the next meeting (KII NSRP official; KII, Convenor). The convener does not unnecessarily intervene in issues and he had to step aside as a co-chair of the platform in mid-2016 to allow for a lady from the Ministry of Women Affairs to be appointed as co-chair of the platform. Setting the agenda of the actions of the DSCMA

255 The precise criteria for membership was not clear and we received several different answers for this question.

is therefore crucially a matter of prioritising between the conflict – with reference to the prior conflicts and commitments. Of the prioritised areas, sub-committees are identified to analyse the conflict and to propose interventions.

The ability of the representatives of marginalised groups to have their voice heard is defined by these processes. The DSCMA members agreed that each had the right to speak and to give report on the actions and conflicts that had come to their attention over the previous two-month period. However, it seems that their ability to change the course of the prioritisation of conflicts appears to be limited. For example,

- JONAPWD had not set any agenda item since she started attending the meetings, although she stated that "her views are always considered in the platform".
- When asked whether her voice was heard, the WPSN representative observed that she had tabled some conflicts and was secretary to some of the sub-committees. She noted that she had "stood up twice at the DSCMA meeting trying to persuade them on the need to participate" in a particular conference. NSRP were unable to table the funds.

It seems therefore that there are opportunities to raise voice and to contribute to discussions within the core agenda of the DSCMA. However, the overall agenda appears to be set by the DSCMA as a whole, and this is determined necessarily by the weight of participants, which are primarily from the state security and civilian agencies.

Another key link in the representation of the marginalised is the degree to which the CSOs *themselves* are accountable to those they claim to represent. Certainly, the WPSN and JONAPWD describe the specific efforts they made to raise awareness amongst their constituencies about the Early Warning System – the representative of JONAPWD using her own personal resources to distribute copies of the DSCMA flyers in early 2016 (arguably not best-practice but certainly revealing of the level of commitment). Exploring this issue in detail has not been a matter for the present evaluation, and the point raises questions about whether another approach could be done in a cost-effective fashion.

Transparency and openness

Inevitably, it is the case that some of the representatives of the security agencies are "sometimes secretive and not willing to divulge certain information." (KII, NSRP official). However, the DSCMA's structures offer significant ways to counter that. Thus, the Early Warning System, the process of conflict analysis and the sub-committee system offers the opportunity for protracted discussions on particular conflicts. It therefore offers a degree of transparency and accountability, since the deliberation processes and the people responsible are evident and the facts are given the opportunity to be presented and discussed. Moreover, one of the crucial factors of the DSCMA is that the key people engaging with an issue can be identified, and notice of conflicts can be raised. For example, the representative of the JONAPWD suggested that she knows who to contact when there is conflict or to conduct specific advocacy:

- she talked about a deaf person who was held in police custody [accused of physical assault] at Uguwachukwu in early 2017, on whose behalf she was able to intervene;
- met with the Commissioner of Women Affairs in April 2017 to seek support regarding loans for empowerment of persons with disabilities in the state, a meeting facilitated by their memberships of the DSCMA.

Nevertheless, there are limits to the transparency and accountability. One key deficiency in the system is the lack of follow-up on specific cases that have been brought forward through the Early Warning System. This is a clear failing of the convenor's system, and one that has contributed to the lack of monitoring data on the resolution of conflicts. This failure has not been adequately explained by the convenor, but was acknowledged frankly.

Outcomes

The discussion that follows is framed around the NSRP Theory of Change. Specifically, this section analyses NSRP's contribution to the further outcomes. Summarised briefly, the conclusion is that while some relative peace has been achieved in some of the communities including Patani, Obiaruku and Ofagbe, the violence in other areas, notably Ossissa, is ongoing.

At the highest, L3 level, it looks at "changes in policy and practice and narratives around violence" (cf. EQ11[256]).

At the intermediate level of outcomes, there are several aspects which are mutually reinforcing and which are to occur through:

- "decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this as well as by increasing public pressure for change";
- at both the institutionalisation of platforms and their use knowledge, advocate and act for change
- Improved alignment of strategic priorities and actions of stakeholders (cf EQ7)[257]

Finally, the section also looks at a single outcome at the lowest outcome level, which concerns broad societal participation, including marginal voters. The section addresses the implications of the foregoing analysis for each of these elements.

Changes in Policy and Practice and Narrative Around Violence (L3 outcome)

There are essentially no or very limited changes in the government's policy.

- The important point to note is that this conflict is highly political, and it seems possible that there is high level support for the primary aggressors in the conflict, that is the herdsmen.
- A Grazing Bill that was proposed. However, the interviews suggest that this was understood by the communities as legitimising herdsmen's presence on their lands and met with resistance. As a replica of a national grazing bill, it appears partisan and ill-suited to the conflict context in Delta, and has not been passed into law.

There have been more significant changes in practice:

- The DSCMA and its attendant processes itself marks a considerable change in the practice of the government, in that it entails civilian and security agencies sitting together with civil society organisations and discussing matters of conflict resolution in a regular, structured, transparent and accountable fashion. Given the recent history of Nigeria, which saw the military rule vigorously opposed by a civil society acting as a de facto opposition, this is a considerable and very positive change – and an advance over prior conflict management platforms. The symbolic value and authority that the use of the room afforded explicitly by the governor is significant in this regard.
- Further, the fact of the Early Warning System and the openness to accepting calls through that process, as well as the subsequent conflict analysis, the creation of sub-committees involving civil society and government agencies, and the interventions are themselves important changes in the ability of communities to provide timely information about conflicts to the government. It is unfortunate for accountability and transparency that no follow-up mechanism has been instituted.
- A key agent in these changes is that of the police. The DSCMA convenor noted that: "Before the coming of DSCMA, they do not take distress calls seriously" (KII, convenor DSCMA). The reports suggest that they have become more responsive, and the Early Warning System is central to that change.
- However, a distinction should be made between the police's general practice which does appear to have changed, and their practice as regards to the herdsmen/farmers conflict in particular. In this particular case, the police seldom pursued the herdsmen – who were commonly identified as the aggressors – with arrest and prosecution. The suggestion was that the herdsmen had significant political interests supporting them, and the police were unwilling therefore to pursue them. Several interviewees suggested that no sustainable resolution of the conflict was possible in that regard, and one suggested that communities held the police in diminishing levels of trust.
- The crucial difference in practice in the case of the farmers/herdsmen was the appointment of the SA for Non-Indigenous Affairs – an appointment which we conclude was not a consequence of the DSCMA. This appointment, of a person who had engaged with the herdsmen in particular, was repeatedly cited as being an effective and important mediator between the herdsmen and the farmers.

256 EQ) 11 "To what extent have NSRP's Platforms/initiatives (including research) influenced key actors/institutions in the conflict arena, resulting in changes in policy and practice that enhance stability and reconciliation?"
257 EQ5 ("To what extent, and in what ways, have coordination, and alignment of strategic priorities and actions among NSRP stakeholders improved?")

Decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this, as well as increasing public pressure for change (L2 outcome)

- It is useful here to distinguish between the use of evidence leading to a change in policy, as a matter of influencing the government policy, and the routine use of information in daily practice. While the decision-makers did not have evidence of what works, the Early Warning System, the matters raised in the meetings themselves and the subsequent conflict analyses did provide important information which were at times acted upon. The Early Warning System continues to be used, so there is some indication that there is a public commitment for it.
- However, interviewees did observe a discontent with the lack of prosecutions and with the ongoing weaknesses in the police's implementation of policies (such as the vigilante law, anti-kidnapping and anti-cultism laws). One interviewee noted that suggests that communities are increasingly resorting to vigilante groups, to "take laws into their hands" as a result of the growing lack of trust with the police (KII, CSO representative). Moreover, the same interviewee described increasing negative coverage in the media, suggesting a growing pressure for change. Clearly this is not a product of the availability of data about conflicts, but to the contrary a general weakness in operations including the *failure* to respond operationally to data that has been received.

Engagement platforms are institutionalised and societal capacity to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change is built (L2 outcome)

- As observed above, the creation of the platform itself is a significant step forward towards the institutionalisation of the platform, since it allows a regular meeting between civil society and the government. At the workshop, the provision of a room by the new governor was identified as a key element indicating the sustainability of the platform's institutionalisation. There have been enthusiastic champions for the role of the DSCMA within the government, and it seems that these have continued to make possible the DSCMA's ongoing work.
- There is however some questions that the platform's sustainability and therefore its influence is variable and may potentially be weak. The representative sent from the governor has shown declining seniority and the Ministry of Justice representative no longer attends, since the agenda moved away from the Peace and Vigilante Bill and towards the herdsmen/farmer conflict. The previous Commissioner of Police was more sceptical than the present one. Whether the platform can remain sustainable will depend on the ongoing support from the governor and from the support of other champions, which is an inherent vulnerability given the turnover in key positions. Nevertheless, it appears that there are sufficient champions for there to be some hope, and the accretion of custom and the ongoing utility of the platform is some guarantor of its institutionalisation.

Improved alignment of strategic priorities and actions of stakeholders (L2)

- There is little to be said on the alignment of priorities. The platform is not necessarily strategic in its operations beyond a shared commitment to the platform itself – for which see above.

Broader societal participation, including marginalised voices

- Marginalised groups are given a voice in the DSCMA through the involvement of civil society organisation that claim to represent their interests. Again, it is important to emphasise that the creation of a platform where civil society have the opportunity to meet and discuss conflicts of concern to different marginalised groups is a substantial advance.
- However, while the CSOs who were interviewed suggested that they were able to make their views known, it did not appear that they had a powerful role in setting the agenda. The remit of the DSCMA's discussions appeared strangely narrow, comprising a focus on the Peace and Vigilante Bill, which was not passed into law; and then subsequently the conflict between herdsmen and farmers. It is unclear why these were chosen precisely and prioritised over other conflicts, and it seems broader societal participation in these key decisions was limited.
- The processes by which the civil society organisations do indeed represent the interests of those they claim to represent is an open question, and one that lies outside the scope of the present study.

Factors contributing to change

This section looks at the key behaviour changes and positive outcomes discussed so far and explores NSRP's contribution to these versus the contribution of other external factors. Where possible, it references quotes identifying the strength of specific factors.

Herdsmen / farmer conflict

- There have been few lasting positive changes in the herdsmen / farmer conflict since its escalation in late 2015 and early 2016. The conflict is ongoing, and no interviewee suggested that a sustainable solution had been reached (KII, community leader; KII, Miyetti Allah; KII, WPSN).
- Individual flare-ups of the conflict have been mitigated at times, often by mediation work that sought to reduce tensions in particular flash-points, often by agreeing that the herdsmen would move away from the land of a particular farming community and by seeking to prevent reprisals.
- In this, certainly the DSCMA work has played a role through its ongoing efforts to convene and to mediate and the responses following upon the Early Warning System. While the role of the police appears to have been limited, interviewees agree that the Special Adviser for Non-Indigenes Affairs has been a very significant actor in trying to mediate between the actors. Thus, for example, in early 2017, the government met with herdsmen to address the situation. Between July and August 2016, the SA on Non-Indigene Affairs organised a meeting for herdsmen in Asaba to discuss peace. While he is also a member of the DSCMA, his actions were primarily conducted in his formal role.
- The reason for the ongoing failure to find a lasting solution should not be set at the DSCMA's door. They provided the infrastructure, the flow of information and the network with which to respond to the conflicts. Rather, it is the powerful interests that stand at the back of the herdsmen – interests who were never fully revealed in the interviews conducted – and the reluctance of the government to address these issues that have hampered the ability of the DSCMA to make a lasting contribution to resolving the conflict.
- The conclusion from this is that the extent of the DSCMA's power is limited by the extent to which it can gain buy-in by the government, in the event that there are powerful political interests driving a particular conflict that the government security agencies are reluctant to tackle. The DSCMA ultimately relies upon the goodwill of the government agencies, and the power of civil society voice is not nearly sufficient to call for a change in behaviour if the agencies are not willing to address a particular conflict.

Changes in practice

- The DSMA has been clearly crucial in the creation of the systems that have created a root for communities to access the police and other security agencies, and have brought civil society organisations to bring their voice, and have opened the structure up to communities through the Early Warning System (albeit weakened by the lack of accountability).
- This report has stressed the importance of understanding the allocation of responsibilities within the government and the possibility of identifying the proper official within the government agencies who may be approached to address a conflict. The DSCMA has made that possible. As the following quotes make clear, that is intrinsically a function of the DSCMA structure:
    - "…there is so much bureaucracy and before the issue [i.e. the conflict] is given attention the conflict may have escalated. However, with a body like DSCMA, that gap has been bridged. There are significant changes, the government has come up with different committees on the conflict such as the state peace and security committee established in 2014. The committee was mandated to deal with issues of conflict in the state. There are conflicts that have been existing for almost 100 years." (KII MoWA)
    - "The DSCMA is doing well with the little support it is getting from the state government. The state government should give DSCMA the necessary support considering the great work they are doing in conflict resolution in the state. The DSCMA is a bridge between the government and the people"
- The DSCMA has stimulated a change in practice amongst the state security apparatus in terms of their reactivity to calls through the Early Warning System or conflicts raised in the meetings, even though that practice (as seen in the herdsmen/farmer conflict) is not universally applied.
    - "The DSCMA is trying to ensure that the conflicts are resolved in such a way that it would prevent a recurrence"
    - "Before now, issues of conflict were not given the requisite attention but due to sensitization and advocacy by the DSCMA, the security agencies are now alive to their responsibilities.

More so, people are beginning to know the dynamics of the conflict and what to do if they notice a conflict situation." (KII, MoWA)

- [Asked how the DSCMA would rank alongside other agencies in the influence over practice:] "The DSCMA did a lot of work and I would rank them very high. The DSCMA is always ahead of the government in term of conflict resolution. At the time the DSCMA delved into resolving the conflict, the government was still trying to get a grasp of the issue. The DSCMA brought proactive approach into the process. However, ranking the DSCMA above the government one needs to be very careful because the DSCMA may have been able to help in mediation, but the government needs to do the resettlement and resettlement requires a lot of resources." (KII, Security Agency)

- While the DSCMA structure is a necessary component, it is not sufficient: the support of champions within the government agencies is crucial to the ongoing operation of the DSCMA are crucial and necessary allies. The governor, key members within the SSG, the Commissioner of Police and some of the members of the DSCMA have provided that support.
- The interplay between the DSCMA and the government as factors determines the likely outcomes. In the case here, it appears that the police are on one hand openly supporting the agenda, but tacitly not pursuing the herdsmen. While the fact that they feel the need to continue to engage in the DSCMA is important, In the event of wider support being tacitly withheld the efficacy of the DSCMA is weakened.
- A further of caution: if the DSCMA is expending resources, the security apparatus need not. Consider the following statement: "…it was the effort of the DSCMA that helped in resolving some conflicts in the state. The DSCMA had organised more than 28 meetings in different communities since inception." Tentatively, one may hypothesise situations where the DSCMA (and indeed some mediation efforts) may offer a cover for government inaction, by seeming to move forwards but without committing genuine political engagement to the process.

Key learning

It is useful to read this in conjunction with the conclusions of the Kano WPSN case study, with which there are interesting parallels

- In the case of the Kano WPSN, the policy change (adopting the State Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security) was possible due to a combination of the consistent work raising the issue on the agenda, the ongoing lobbying and relationship building and the willingness of the government entities, notably the Kano Ministry of Women's Affairs, to countenance the policy changes. The WPSN was well positioned through its work to take advantage of the opening policy window, and this work was necessary, but it was not sufficient. In the narrow case of the herdsmen/farmer conflict, the DSCMA set up structures that were able to respond quickly to conflicts, and the police and other security agencies engaged – however, the successful resolution of the process was reduced by a failure to pursue by the police. The DSCMA supported mediation efforts conducted by other actors, notably the Special Adviser on Non-Indigenes Affairs, but the ultimate outcomes were not achieved and could not be – as with the WPSN, their work was necessary but insufficient. In their case, the 'policy window' did not open.
- In both cases, therefore, the key lesson is that the key work to be judged is to some degree outside the control of the intervention. What is in their control is the construction of a network of relations with key actors, the persistent lobbying and the raising of the public profile of the issue. If the window opens, they may take advantage of it. The value of these relationships is not to be underestimated.
- There is a delicate line to walk between cooperating with the government and being coopted by the government's agenda. The working relationship is crucial, but the need to keep them onside has risks. For example, greater use could perhaps have been made of the media, to raise the profile of the issue and to put greater pressure on the government. Would this have introduced tensions and a reduced level of cooperation with the government agencies? Ultimately, the evaluation was not able to address these strategic issues (since the focus was on tracing the outcomes).
- There are some more specific lessons to be learned from the case:
  - The Early Warning System was simple and worked well. However, the failure to develop a follow up process reduced its transparency and accountability to the reporters of incidents and the ability to generate data about outcomes,
  - The number of seats available to CSOs was reduced – for reasons that remain unclear - and this left their voice somewhat marginal.
  - The agenda setting process – in terms of the prioritisation of issues - remained somewhat opaque to the evaluation team. The decision-making appears to happen within the DSCMA with respect to the key issues they received through the Early Warning System. However, the

domination of the agenda by the Peace and Vigilante Law and then the farmer/herdsmen conflict to the exclusion of other issues, raises the question about why these were exclusively prioritised, with one interviewee suggesting there were other conflicts that also required attention.

- As a final note, it is useful to revisit some of the challenges in using 'conflict resolved' as an indicator. Consider the following case (peripheral to the study), provided by the facilitator of one of the Peace Clubs, who referred the conflict on to the DSCMA:

  > "Some community members were invited around August 2016 [by the DSCMA]. After some time, we [peace club] made investigation on whether the conflict has been resolved but we [peace club] found out that it had not been settled, as such the Prince of the community was invited [by the DSCMA] but he refused to oblige to the invitation. But since the DSCMA intervened, there has not been any conflict in the community."

  How can it be understood that this case has been resolved or not? The temporary cessation of violence is not an adequate indicator that the conflict has been resolved yet identifying the existence of a long-term peaceful settlement underpinning a cessation of violence will be difficult to enumerate and monitor.

NSRP. (2012). SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE: Improved conflict management mechanisms: Broader societal participation in and oversight of conflict management mechanisms at federal, state and local level. Abuja: NSRP.

Case Study No.	9	Changes in policy, potential in practice: Kano and the Women's Peace and Security Network (*Brendan Whitty and Umaru Ibrahim*)

Introduction

The case study was identified by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) as the most significant change achieved by the state-level Women's Peace and Security Network (WPSN). It focuses on the "domestication" of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security into a "State Action Plan" (SAP). The case study explores how this process happened, what were the behaviour changes across the main actors that led to its inauguration, what contribution did the WPSN made to these changes, and what other factors played a role. Through the analysis of the case study, it generates conclusions on the NSRP theory of change.

Methodology

The methodology might be described as "ROA Plus": that is, the RAPID Outcome Assessment (ROA) is supplemented by additional components. The core ROA approach identifies the key actors who are influential in respect of a particular area of policy; it explores the change in behaviour actor by actor within this operating environment; it then establishes what factors contributed to the change, thereby isolating the contribution of each actor – including notably the Kano Womens' Peace and Security Network (KWPSN) – to the change, and the overall outcomes in the policy or practice environment.

Pursuing the methodological advantages offered by this approach (one which focuses on the underlying changes in relationships with key actors), the 'plus' part of ROA Plus involves the exploration of the relationship between certain key stakeholders that are crucial to the NSRP theory of change:

- The key government body responsible in the area, the Ministry of Women's Affairs;
- Since the NSRP approach is predicated on inter-linkages between its various outputs and levels, the approach also looks at how the KWPSN capitalised on the wider family of platforms: the State Conflict Management Alliance (SCMA), media partners and Observatories;
- The quality and extent of the participation of marginalised groups in the WPSN.

Key Findings

The situation pre-intervention

- The issue of violence against women was not high on the political agenda, and although there were some programmes addressing the issue, they were piecemeal;
- The Ministry of Women's Affairs – and therefore the government as a whole – were not receptive to the civil society lobbying efforts;
- Civil society was not coordinated and lacked a coherent advocacy platform;
- There was a culture of silence around violence against women, where victims were stigmatised, unwilling to come forward;
- Prosecution of cases of sexual violence was highly unusual, with the police not taking it seriously and with reports of corruption in their engagement with cases.

Over the case timeline to the present day

- Considerable advances were made during the period from 2015, on the election of the current governor and appointment of a new Commissioner, to mid-2016, when another

Commissioner was appointed. During this period in particular the State Action Plan was promulgated as policy;

- The WPSN have built and retain strong relationships within MoWA, including to senior members – and they have a growing network with the government more broadly;
- The policy changes and domestication of the SAP have yet to be translated into significant changes in action by government entities or into resources dedicated to policy implementation, and there remained considerable problems with the prosecution;
- But violence against women and girls now has some prominence in the public discourse, in the media, and on the political agenda, and a number of initiatives have been initiated which seem to substantiate this increased focus.

Outcomes

Changes in Policy and Practice and Narrative Around Violence (L3 outcome)

- The key achievement of the KWPSN, and the one that was highlighted as the most significant change was the approval of the SAP but the SAP has not subsequently generated a great change in the practices that might have been expected from the SAP's promulgation.

Decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this, as well as increasing public pressure for change (L2 outcome):

- The growth in prominence of VAWG on the political agenda appears to validate the strategy of advocacy used by the office, with a continual media presence and accompanying the ongoing individual lobbying and advocacy work although this was not the focus of the study.
- One point that is useful here is that the decisive point is not the use of evidence. The very existence of evidence on the incidence of VAWG is not particularly prevalent and has not played much of a role in the discourse.

Engagement platforms are institutionalised and societal capacity to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change is built (L2 outcome)

- There are several elements to the institutionalisation of the platforms. The relationships that the platform has created have been absolutely crucial, much more so than the deployment of evidence as a persuasive force:
- In the first place, the WPSN form a close-knit and harmonised group united and with a clear common purpose and close relationships;
- Secondly, they have formed strong relationships within their key government interlocutor, MOWA.
- Thirdly, they are now formally incorporated into the Implementation Committee which is an ongoing recognised entity;
- Fourthly, they used their membership of the SCMA and in particular the creation of a sub-committee with key allies as a useful platform to bridge links to certain key institutions which leant wider credibility;
- To these, there must be a note of caution: there remains some fragility in this institutionalisation. Their links are based on personal relationships, and are not fully formally recognised. As the departure of the former Commissioner indicates, the movement of some key people can weaken their influence significantly.

Improved alignment of strategic priorities and actions of stakeholders (L2)

- With the inauguration of the SAP, the Government of Kano State has adopted an aligned strategy in policy terms at least with that of the WPSN.

Broader societal participation, including marginalised voices

- As suggested above, VAWG is intrinsically a matter affecting the vulnerable, and notably that of poor women but such women do not themselves appear to represent through any meaningful process.

NSRP's contribution

The NSRP, through its support of WPSN – without which an entity like the WPSN would not exist – has clearly and demonstrably been instrumental in the change in policy by MoWA through its direct advocacy work.

The ongoing advocacy work has contributed to raising the issue within the political discourse in Kano, and NSRP has therefore contributed to generating the political window which have resulted in the climate where other policy changes were possible.

Contributions from Other Actors/ External Factors

Clearly there are other policy actors, notably the Governor, champions within MoWA and the former Commissioner in particular whose support has been crucial and who are of course the key actors in changing policy.

There are other CSOs contributing to the raising of the issue on the political agenda – some of them being other DFID grantees.

Key learning

- This was not a case of evidence being deployed to change decision-maker's viewpoint, nor yet to inform advocacy and accountability efforts. What mattered here was the nature of the relationships that were created through the ongoing lobbying work.
- Any policy change is fragile, and dependent on the environment and on key champions. This is outside the control of the programme: what is important is the creation of a network of lasting relationships that can take advantage of favourable conditions, and weather unfavourable conditions.
- Policy change is necessary but not sufficient to achieve the reduction in conflicts and VAWG. Resources and ongoing commitment to deploy them are also conditions for change in government practice.
- A further crucial element, beyond the direct lobbying, is working to place the issue on the political agenda. WPSN ran what appears to have been a concerted clear campaign (although it was not the precise focus of this study). Again, the legitimacy was not a matter of making "use" of evidence. Insofar as the advocacy approach sought to legitimise its message, the crucial element was the connection to international norms and advocacy opportunities.
- Ongoing direct lobbying, relationship building and wider advocacy campaigns can create the environment for change in policy: whether it happens is then a matter of opportunism, patience and luck.

- Many elements are necessary before practice changes; many of these are valuable in themselves, as well as instrumentally (links between CSOs and government, CSO coordination, raising the awareness of an issue), even if they do not contribute immediately to the resolution of conflicts.

Introduction and background

This case study presents an analysis of the contribution of the Kano Women's Peace and Security Network (KWPSN) to particular change of policy, namely the domestication of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security into a State Action Plan (SAP). This change was identified as the most significant positive example of change accomplished by the network of WPSNs, furnishing the opportunity to study an example of how far the Theory of Change's higher reaches can be validated.

The case study primarily provides a response to the Evaluation Question (EQ) 11 "*To what extent have NSRP's Platforms/initiatives (including research) influenced key actors/institutions in the conflict arena, resulting in changes in policy and practice that enhance stability and reconciliation?*" Harnessing a RAPID Outcome Assessment that focuses on changes in specific actors' behaviour, it traces KWPSN's contribution to change.

However, the approach may be understood as ROA 'Plus' – that, is an ROA similar to the existing case studies conducted within the NSRP evaluation, but with some additional components supporting the exploration of specific parts of the Theory of Change. The 'plus' parts may be summarised as follows:

- An exploration of how the policy change rests on and is a manifestation of a deeper set of changes in relationships between KWPSN and the key policy figures in this field, notably the officials in the Ministry of Women's Affairs. This responds to EQ5 ("To what extent, and in what ways, have coordination, and alignment of strategic priorities and actions among NSRP stakeholders improved?")
- The four streams of outputs brought together within the programme theory are intended to combine to deliver. A crucial aspect of this is to explore how the KWPSN leveraged the influence of its sister platforms within the NSRP to deliver the desired changes. The study explores the influence of the SCMA, Observatories and media partners.
- Finally, the theory of change seeks to encourage broader societal participation, notably that of marginal voices. By testing the level of participation in WPSN's own processes, it helps provide insights into WPSN's contributions to EQ7 (*"To what extent, and in what ways, has the capacity of broader society to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change been built?")* and to the "broader societal participation" element of the Theory of Change.

What is the WPSN?

The WPSN comprises eight networks of chiefly civil society organisations, each of which work at state level in eight different states. The Kano Women's Peace and Security Network (KWPSN) is formed of representatives from a group of 26 civil society organisations for the most part identified through a mapping exercise conducted in 2014 by the NSRP lead on outcome three, but with some subsequent changes. It has been in operation since 2013 and was formally inaugurated on 23 June 2014.

The KWPSN is a lobbying and activist agency, whose strategy revolves round the domestication and then implementation of the SAP as a route to a reduction in VAWG. This is the common strategy to the whole WPSN, which uses the domestication of UN resolution 1325 on women and peace and security from 31 October 2000 into a National Action Plan, to argue for the further domestication into state level policy (interview, NSRP lead). They use the international activism days to raise the profile of Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG), combined with specific lobbying for policy change.

Description of NSRP Inputs

NSRP has provided ongoing support to the Women's Peace and Security Network through support to SWODEN. They provide specific grants for the advocacy work.

Description of NSRP Outputs

The core of the strategy as identified revolves around, in the first place, supporting events that occur broadly quarterly around key dates in the international human rights calendar. This is supplemented by consistent and targeted efforts to lobby and to build relationships and connections to key officials and agencies within the state formal and traditional apparatus.

The outputs involve advocacy around four key moments in the international calendar focusing on fostering women's rights: International Women's Day (8 March); the UN Day of the African Child (6 June); International Peace Day (21 September); and the 16 Days of Activism between International Day Against Violence Against Women (25 November) and International Human Rights' Day (10 December). These events are paced approximately on a quarterly basis, and are used as opportunities to generate public attention, while at the same time capitalising on legitimacy afforded by being part of an international movement. These were accompanied by a range of associated courtesy visits on key lobbying targets, conducted by SWODEN and by the members of the platform; the inputs provided by NSRP were designed to support these advocacy activities.

Case timeline

The focus here is on the particular case of the domestication of the SAP. Further on, the report recruits information on additional changes in policy and practice to support the argument it sets forth.

Timeline	Case Specific Events	Externalities
Nov/Dec 2013	Initial mapping of CSOs by NSRP lead	
Jan 2014	Second strategy meeting involving Ministry of Women's Affairs, NSRP and CSOs	
Jun 2014	Inaugural meeting 23 June, selecting executive members of WPSN	
Q3 2014	Courtesy call on the Commissioner of MOWA	
Feb 2015	(Fortuitous) meeting between governor and Chairperson	Governor reported to have reached out to the Commissioner MOWA
Mar 2015	WPSN presented in SCMA their case for the adoption of the SAP	New governor elected
Jun 2015		Formally inaugurated new Commissioner of Women's Affairs
Jul 2015	5 Jul: SCMA agreed to form sub-committee on domestication of SAP including various government agencies, traditional and religious representatives and	

Aug 2015	18 Aug: SCMA formed advocacy sub-committee on SAP domestication	
Nov 2015	2 Nov: WPSN and SCMA sub-committee met with Commissioner MoWA, with a view to lobbying for the SAP, including presenting hard and soft copies; prepared Executive summary for the Governor, requested for the Governor 17 Nov: Commissioner MOWA met WPSN, authorising them to create an implementation focused committee to draft an SAP that would "fit with the culture" of Kano	15 Nov: Commissioner MoWA meet with Governor with a view to persuade
Feb 2016	27-29 Feb*, workshop chaired by Commissioner MoWA, including WPSN and other CSO members, Ministries of Justice, Health, Education and traditional and religious leaders	
Mar 2016	Presented initial results of drafting process to governor in March	
May 2016	Final draft of State Action Plan presented to Governor	27 May: the SAP, personally endorsed by the governor, and was launched formally by the MOWA
Jul 2016		New Commissioner and Permanent Secretary appointed by Governor; former Commissioner moves to Ministry of Budget and Planning
Aug-Dec 2016	WPSN conducted continued lobbying MoWA, e.g. 8 Oct, one-day dialogue on VAWG by Centre of Gender Studies supported by *SCMA* and one between WPSN and MoWA on 7 Nov; advocacy visits to new Commissioner of Budget and Planning WPSN Request to set up and chair the Implementation Committee rejected	Budget process initiated but funds were not requested
Nov 2016	Implementation Committee for SAP is set up, to be led by Director of Womens' Affairs, MOWA	
Mar 2017	8 March, the launch of the implementation plan by the Commissioner of MOWA, unfunded – the proposed Desk Office not resourced	

* It has not always been easy to get consistent dates from interviewees. We have where possible used dates supported by documentary evidence.

The story of adopting the SAP

The elections in March 2015 led to a change in administration. Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje was elected and sworn in. Until that point, the WPSN had been unable to make much headway within the Ministry of Women's Affairs, and this had curtailed their ability to lobby successfully for changes for all that they observed the former Governor, Kwankwaso, had declared an interest. Their strategy was, and remained, a combination of raising public awareness of the importance of VAWG through events centred on the important international advocacy days and ongoing advocacy with key powerholders within the government. The SAP was crucial since it comprised essentially a comprehensive budget specifying activities that could combat VAWG across five pillars, prevention, protection, participation, promotion and prosecution funded at 74.2 million naira (for context, the capital budget of the MOWA was 927.3 million naira; the personnel budget 147.9 million naira). This policy involved crucial advocacy and training work with other government agencies, notably within the justice sector.

The new governor appointed a new Commissioner who was significantly more receptive to the lobbying than the previous one. The WPSN had persuaded the SCMA to create a sub-committee, whose function was to push for a State Action Plan. They leveraged the influence of the SCMA agencies (incorporating influential security agencies as well as traditional and religious leaders and civil society organisations) to approach the new Commissioner. In a key visit on 2 November 2015, the SCMA subcommittee and notably the WPSN representatives (including its chair) managed to convince the Commissioner to adopt the SAP as MOWA policy. The Commissioner, Barrister Zubaida Abubakar Damakka, then took this to the governor in a meeting on 15 November and obtained his approval and commitment. They proceed, from 17 November onwards to create a drafting committee, whose work was conducted primarily early in 2016. The finished version, approved personally by the governor, was launched in May 2016.

Shortly afterwards, however, the commissioner and permanent secretary were both shuffled, the former to the Ministry of Budget and Planning. Interviewees suggest that the new commissioner was less committed to the SAP. Interviewees speculated that she felt little ownership of the SAP and therefore did not pursue the approach. On 8 March 2017, it was expected that they would launch a desk office, led by a long term supporter of the work of WPSN and the SAP, the Director of Women's Affairs. That desk office was not resourced from the budget, and that remains the case.

The process of change

The Operating context/ policy environment pre-NSRP intervention

This section addresses the operating context that NSRP and WPSN were inaugurated into in November and December 2013.

The following key actors are identified on the basis of the discussions in the workshop and subsequent interviews

- Governor of Kano State
- Former and Current Commissioner of Women's Affairs
- Ministry of Women Affairs personnel, notably the Director of Women's Affairs
- Members of the Ulama
- Members of the State Conflict Management Alliance
- Media organisations
- Police, notably the Sexual Assault and Other Related Offences

Incidence of VAWG

In 2008, a report suggested that 21.8% of 15-24 year olds in North-Central Nigeria were reported as suffering violence (BC, 2012: 49, citing a report not in bibilography). According to a shadow report on Nigeria submitted to the 44th CEDAW Session, around a third of all women in Nigeria had suffered some form of

violence. Since the creation of the police Sexual Assault and Other Related Offences Unit (SOR) in 2015, they suggest that at least 10 cases are submitted daily from across the 44 Local Government Authorities.

Within that overall picture of prevalence, it is very difficult to discern the trends in incidence of VAWG since the reported numbers to agencies such as the police are unreliable as an indicator – as one police interviewee noted (KII, police), any shifts in the reported numbers to the police are as likely to be to do with the incentives around reporting as the incidence itself. They therefore indicate *police practice* and the public expectations of their likely treatment as much as the incidence of forms of violence.

In the context of the general lack of data about the incidence of VAWG, policy discourse does not appear to evolve from evidence. There were anecdotal statements to the effect that the incidence of rape had increased since 2015, but it is unclear what such statements were based on (e.g. KII, State House of Assembly, CSOs, media, workshop). The common narrative around VAWG was to associate it with poverty, single parenthood and vulnerability. In particular, there were persistent statements that young girls engaged in 'hawking' and petty commercial activities were prone to VAWG (KII CSO; KII media). One interviewee suggests that the increase in incidence of sexual assault and rape was due to a halt of a programme disbursing money to vulnerable women (KII, official, Women's Affairs). It is hard to discern the warrant for these statements. As a narrative, it tends to reinforce the cultural norms driving male engagement in economic activity, and indeed one interviewee talked about a programme of arranging mass marriages as a solution to the problem (KII, government official).

One consistent message amongst this indeterminacy was the assertion that victims faced considerable incentives *against* reporting violence due to the social stigma that women faced. In the case of parents whose children had been abused, they wished to avoid the stigma attached to rape and to avoid the information becoming public (workshop; several KIIs). More broadly there was a culture of silence (workshop, KIIs). The level of awareness amongst victims of VAWG and in their communities about how to seek redress was "generally low" (workshop). Many felt they lacked the resources to prosecute the offenders (see discussion of the context within the institutions of justice, below). Indeed, some forms of violence against women were by no means universally accepted as crimes. As a report noted,

> "some women, especially in the Northern part of the country, are of the opinion that the husband can punish the wife if she neglects some of her duties such as taking good care of the children or not putting the husband's food on the table in good time." (NCNC, 2008: 67)

This is a reflection of the broader expectations and norms around domestic violence and the role of women. Nigeria is a strongly patriarchal society where women are subordinated to men both socially and within legal system (NCNC, 2008). In a recent review of the Observatories, the report suggested that Kano was the hardest working environment of all the eight states in which WPSN were working (SDD, 2016: 19). This extends to their ability to voice and to lobby "at times, women and children in Kano State feel as if they do not have anything to say or they do not have anything to contribute" (KII, male CSO representative). I return below to the extent to which the marginalised participate in this policy decision-making.

To conclude, it seems that while there were some public concerns about the rise in particular aspects of VAWG, the patriarchal nature of the social context meant that any progress made by the WPSN would be made against a harsh climate.

Government Policy and Practice

Responsibility for policy in the area of Violence Against Women, then as now, lay primarily with the Ministry of Women's Affairs (responsibilities for prosecution are discussed below, in the Justice Sector). One official from MoWA noted that while they had a Department of Social Welfare whose function was to deal with complaints, but few came in; they suspected it was because women were not in fact willing or able to approach as part of the wider problem of stigmatisation. As noted above, one interviewee suggested that second programme offering stipends to poor women was stopped under the administration of Governor

KwanKwaso led to an increase in VAWG (as well, presumably, as making life exceptionally difficult for its previous beneficiaries already in a very vulnerable position).

There was agreement across the interviews that a broad-based policy on VAWG did not appear to be high or indeed present at all on the political agenda at the inauguration of the WPSN. One key senior politician stated, "

> "In the past [male politicians in the state] did not consider women issues important. It was not common for men to champion the cause of women in the state… There was no policy to address VAWG in the state." (KII, Senior Government Official)

While this statement should be treated with caution since it may be considered politically motivated, other points appear to validate it.

- During the Kwankwaso's administration (2011-2015), the Ministry of Women's Affairs had its budget allocation cut, including the key programme noted above (KII, MoWA Official);[258]
- The civil society organisations reported that it was impossible to gain access to the Ministry, who were entirely disinterested in the SAP (workshop). Since the Ministry was the only way to the governor, they were unable to execute efficacious lobbying;
- Most of our interviewees was able to articulate a specific measure targeted at reducing VAWG by the previous (that is Kwankwaso) administration, noted the "common problem" that such laws that were in place were not implemented (KII, DSS), and that the government showed no commitment towards VAWG in Kano State (KII, media); and
- In the workshop, the participants agreed that "Kano State government was silent on VAWG".

The point could be made broader: it concerns a more general silence. Our interviewees report that there was limited media interest, or interest among other political bodies such as the Kano State House of Assembly, for example, in the issue. While it does seem that particularly disturbing cases of abuse might gain media attention, but that was not translated into systemic policy.

However, this general picture must be modulated somewhat to accommodate some conflicting points raised in the research which do not altogether fit the neat picture thus drawn. One interviewee suggested that Kwankwaso's administration had strongly promoted girl-child education (KII, CSO representative);[259] another that the rape law was amended to increase the penalty under Kwankwaso;[260] and thirdly, NAPTIP (the agency responsible for combating trafficking and child labour) suggested that while the Shekarau administration "hardly collaborated", the Kwankwaso administration resourced patrols against child labour, sought to empower victims and engaged in sensitisation campaigns (KII, NAPTIP).

How to resolve these seemingly contradictory points? While the research did not attempt to gain a complete picture of each of these decisions, one may suspect that each governor has their own policy favourites and must ascribe their limited budgets to them – perhaps under the influence of civil society organisations, including those coordinated by another DFID programme, Justice For All (J4A) there were efforts to address the legal position of rape, child labour and trafficking. MoWA was left stranded by the KwanKwaso administration, who focused such resources and policy attention on other entities – education, and NAPTIP. It seems that the previous administration's substantial cut to the MOWA budget left a Ministry impervious to lobbying. When the WPSN did start lobbying the MOWA Commissioner, they report her complete disinterest

258 One report suggests that it was cut to an extraordinarily limited 100,000 naira (SDD 2016 review, p19), although it should be noted that the budget for 2017 was over 1 billion naira, and the short-fall seems unlikely.
259 Another interviewee suggested that girl-child education was also a priority of the current regime, "partly under pressure" from NGOs, including the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) based in Kano (Express Radio). WPSN was not mentioned in this regard.
260 There was some disagreement between the different interviewees on this – the Commissioner of Women's Affairs suggested that it was done under the current administration.

in SAP and it was only when they approached the governor directly (by chance, in an airport, else he would have referred them directly to MOWA, as the proper ear for such advocacy efforts) in early 2015 that they started to gain traction.

One can therefore say that there was an inhospitable environment for advocacy and lobbying, albeit that there was some potential for change.

Justice sector Rules and Practice

If government policy combating VAWG is one side of the coin, then the work of the justice sector is the other. Consistent with the patriarchal traditions in Northern Nigerian society, the formal penal code does not criminalise all forms of VAWG, notably permitting the "correction of child, pupil, servant or wife" (section 55, Northern Nigeria Penal Code) provided it does "not amount to the infliction of grievous hurt" and excluding marital rape from the definition of rape. As one interviewee suggested, the penalty for rape was at the discretion of the judge and permitted bail (interview, Barr Zubaida).[261]

The *application* of the legal system appears to have been weighted against the protection of women in significant ways. Interviews suggest that the police would seldom refer the case for prosecution in the courts, but instead would "seek mediation". Other interviewees suggest that the process was not transparent, that "the police were not thorough in their investigation of VAWG cases and that offenders could easily be released if they could influence [that is bribe] the police]" (KII. security official). Mediation may be interpreted as offering greater opportunities for bribery. Police officers might not treat VAWG as domestic matters "to be settled within the family" (NCNC, 2008: 67). Moreover, it seems that the central unit that was to become the SOR, then the Juvenile Welfare Centre, did not receive cases for the Hisbah Board which were instead directed to the divisional stations. The lack of centralised follow-up might be assumed further to limit the extent of prosecution.

During the interviews, the Shari'a and traditional institutions were barely mentioned. However, it is important to mention them here for the sake of clarity. Hisbah is an informal kind of mediation proceeding mandated in 1999 after the return to civilian rule. Adamu (2008) suggests that affording the mandate to hisbah in 1999 raised the profile of women's issues (by highlighting inequality in treatment), it also "restricted their mobility and their access to the public sphere" (Adamu, 2008, Mustapha and Mustapha, 2016). Both hisbah and Sharia courts function as the primary forum for litigating and resolving interpersonal disputes. It was not discussed in the interviews, although a recent report suggests that women are 70% of the complainants at some Shari'a courts. While they are speedy, easy and non-technical, they are still too expensive and discouraged culturally to seek redress through litigation. One may, moreover, note that some procedural laws of Sharia are inherently discriminatory against women; for instance, the Sharia law provides that a man who is alleged to have committed adultery can only be punished upon the evidence of four witnesses (NCNC, 2008). Regardless, it seems that these were not targets of advocacy by the civil society organisation, at least until they referred cases to the police and formal agencies.

Civil society

The section closes with brief comments on the state of civil society as articulated by the interviewees and workshop at this time. The mapping process conducted by the NSRP lead in late 2013 identified 26 civil society organisations working on VAWG who might be part of the WPSN. During the interviews, other civil society organisations (the Coalition Agianst Rape and Violence, and the Kano Civil Society Forum) emerged as also working in this space but were not members of the WPSN. This suggests a vibrant group of organisations lobbying in the field of VAWG, many of whom were involved in specific kinds of programming. However, the workshop discussions with the WPSN members stated that there was no common links or common purpose at this time, and there was no collaborative working on advocacy functions. Moreover, it seems that while the use of various international days of activism to raise the profile of women's rights was

261 One civil society and media interviewee noted that the review to the rape law happened under the previous incumbent, but we have discounted this.

a familiar strategy to Nigerian civil society, it may not have been used in a coordinated fashion in Kano State prior to the inauguration of the WPSN (NCNC, 2008: 67).

Observed behaviour changes of key actors over the case timeline

This section considers the changes that the research observed since the process of creating the WPSN started in late 2013.

Civil Society

A crucial change identified in the workshop was the uniting of a previously disparate group of CSOs into a single platform with a coherent vision and strategy for generating change, and with a coordinated approach. The approach was two-pronged, on the one hand using the international advocacy days as opportunities to raise awareness in a coordinated fashion, and the other conducting ongoing lobbying activities, notably with MoWA officials (workshop). The WPSN has enabled them to be more coordinated, to adopt a coordinated strategy around specific wins and specific goals, and to raise their capacity. As a platform, they have also tied in some key officials, such as the Director of Women's Affairs, and linked to other aspects of the NSRP family, notably the SCMA and the Observatories.

I suggest that the WPSN implies a slightly different strategy to that employed by the SCMA. While the SCMA's efforts are to provide linkages between civil society and government agencies, the WPSN emphasises the strength of coordination of like-minded individuals, to lend extra weight to their combined calls and combined advocacy for change (although there were government agencies in the WPSN). Emphasised the importance of SWODEN, the convenor of the WPSN.

Ministry of Women's Affairs

The Ministry of Women's Affairs is the crucial Kano State government agency responsible for policy in the field of Women's Affairs. The change in behaviour here is instructive, since it highlights at one time the strength of the work conducted by the Women's Peace and Security Network, its potential for driving change, and the essential fragility of any progress made. MOWA has in general shifted its stance on VAWG from one that was broadly indifferent, to one where they have put into place the a broad-based and cross-government approach in the form of the State Action Plan. This provides a coherent policy to combat VAWG based on multiple pillars.

However, the problem remains the lack of resourcing. Prior to 2011, as noted above, the primary policy instrument for the mitigation of VAWG was that of financial disbursements to vulnerable women. With the change in government to Governor Kwankwaso's administration, the funding for this intervention stopped and the budget of the MOWA was cut dramatically. The budget remained low, and no resourcing could be found. What is surprising is that there was – according to several well-placed interviewees – little attempt to get the SAP activities funded. The appointment of the new Commissioner is the crucial element to explain this apparent *volte face.* While the former Commissioner was a champion, and was able to swing the governor to her side, accounts from various sources suggest that the new Commissioner did not share her ownership.

The point at which the department was left, therefore, was an unresourced but ambitious policy requiring a large budget, a Commissioner who was civil but unenthusiastic, and an implementation committee with short-term likelihood of implementation.

Wider policy and practice change in the Kano State government

There is little to say at this juncture about the wider changes within the government, since the potential for a coordinated policy implied by the SAP is contingent on resources for its implementation. It is worth noting that the governor, alone of all the SAPs launched, endorsed the agenda personally. However, it appears that his support, as with that of the previous incumbent, is contingent on gaining the interest or attention of the Commissioner.

It appears there has been some traction more broadly within the field of VAWG and women's rights:

- Fagge Local Government: the Chairman of the Local Government Authority of Fagge has successfully championed the domestication of the SAP into Fagge, following advocacy meetings with the chairperson of the WPSN, and rooted in concern over the incidence of VAWG;
- There have been various policy movements with a view to strengthening the laws on rape and on women's rights more broadly, notably that of marriage. I revisit this when discussing traditional authorities below, but suffice it to say at this juncture that the Emir of Kano has championed the revision of a marriage law that seeks to bolster women's rights;
- CARAV, another umbrella civil society body, was created in reaction to a particularly awful case;
- More recently, noting that people were losing faith in the system, the governor directed the State Security Council within the Kano State House of Assembly to address the question of rape, and the Attorney General was appointed to set up special courts to deal with the issue specifically.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the issue is squarely on the political agenda. This was linked to the perception from many of the interviewees that cases of rape were increasing. While there was no evidence to this effect, and it may equally be a function of the breakdown of the culture of silence (KII, media] or an increase in coverage for particular incidents (interviewee, media (KII, media), the idea appears to have common currency. It was articulated by several media organisations, as well as by government officials. The increased attention on the issue has had real implications for policy discourse, with particularly awful recent cases raising the issue further.[262]

Justice Sector

Aside from the tightening up of the law on rape, there have been fluctuations in practice in the manner in which the police handle accusations of incidence of rape and other cases of VAWG.

In 2014, the Juvenile Welfare Centre was replaced by the Sexual Assault and Other related Offences Unit. Cases were to be referred from the Local Government Authority to this central unit; all cases referred by Hisba or through the Department of SS were likewise to be referred to this unit. Since the beginning of that unit, at least 10 incidences were collected daily from the 44 Local Government Authorities. In 2016 SOR recorded a total of 477 cases reported (SOR, 2017), suggesting that perhaps one in seven received are actually prosecuted – an improvement on the previous where (anecdotally) the levels of prosecution were negligible. One senior police officer suggested that people had greater trust in the police, partly due to the increased work that the police were conducting with communities.

However, there are reasons to be concerned about these figures. The police officials interviewed suggest that there was an Increase in reported incidents during 2016, but then more recently a dip that has continued until 2017. This appears to be corroborated by the information from OBSTEC, who suggested that between mid-2015 and early 2016 the rate of VAWG cases went up only to tail off. One interviewee suggested that the problems of bribery, influence in prosecution "from politicians and other influential people in the state" remained significant. One government official noted that recently the State House of Assembly had been urged to address the issue of rape:

> "that rape was a thing of concern to the people in the state and that the people had started losing confidence with the police and the courts…"

The Sexual Assault Referral Centre created under the auspices of the DFID-funded Justice For All programme was never resourced. The claim of an increase in public trust in the police or any great change in the practice should be disregarded: there is limited evidence to suggest that there has been any sustained change, and indeed that the temporary expectations raised may have created harm when they were disappointed. Certainly, several interviewees [KII, CSO representative; KII, Media representative] suggest

262 See e.g. https://www.bellanaija.com/2017/05/aisha-buhari-emir-sanusi-call-for-justice-for-6-month-old-rape-victim-in-kano/

that there has been no real commitment by the government to reduce VAWG. However, the point is that the failure in this regard has become a point of public and political concern – and the issue (as noted above) is rising in importance.

Finally, the interviews again seem to confirm that the role of CSOs is crucial, this time not as a lobbying but as a scrutiny body: that is in cases where the case is being monitored by a civil society organisation, interviewees suggest that it is much more likely to be properly prosecuted and less likely to be subject to bribery (KII, OBSTEC; KII, police; KII, CSO).

Traditional and Religious Leaders

There are some indications that from a position of not paying VAWG much attention, the issue has started to become an issue with resonance not simply within the government but also on the part of traditional and religious rulers.

To illustrate this, it is useful to zoom in on the case of the Marriage Bill proposed by the Emir. The Emir of Kano is both a traditional and a religious authority (albeit subordinated by the political authority under the Nigerian constitution). He has described himself as a "modern Emir". In 2015, he is reported as having suggested in Bayero University that he hopes for a thorough reform of VAWG. He has subsequently sponsored a process, which had its roots also in the work of the Centre for Human Rights and Islam –funded briefly by the NSRP in early 2015 – to revise the marriage law. More recently, there have been extensive drafting retreats and while the work is currently stalled through discussions about particular elements (notably the minimum age of marriage for girls), the attention given to the initiative indicates that the issue is on the political agenda.

The attitude of the Ulama is also crucial to the process of reform of the rules and practice on VAWG and great care has been taken to involve them in the drafting process. The WPSN has made sure to engage the Ulama through lobbying efforts, engagement in drafting and their membership of the SCMA subcommittee on the SAP. The convenor of the SCMA (KII), emphasised the importance of translating the NAP into a culturally appropriate version for Kano State, on the grounds of conflict sensitisation. This process took place through the participatory involvement of the drafting committee chaired by MOWA. They are also involved in the revision of the marriage law. The Ulama are therefore in principle open to reform in the field of VAWG, although in the case of the marriage bill they resisted setting 18 as the minimum age of marriage and the marriage bill has therefore not been finalised.

The argument is not that these have been caused by the direct lobbying of the WPSN, but rather that contributions by the WPSN in raising the issue's visibility has put it more firmly on the political agenda and in the public mind – a fact that pertains to religious and traditional authorities as well as to secular and formal ones.

Key relationship: WPSN-MOWA

The structure of this report, which proceeds actor by actor, does lend to discussing relationships between actors. However, a crucial point in the theory of change and in the story of change that happened in this case is the creation of a network of relationships. The aim of this was to develop an understanding of the changes in relationship between WPSN and key policy actors, as particularly important aspects of changes in behaviour. In this, it is one of the aspects that diverges from the other ROA studies conducted as part of the evaluation.

In this, the relationship between the WPSN and MoWA staff members has proven crucial to have the SAP approved as formal government policy. This relationship has been a matter of both persistence and luck. As noted above, prior to the WPSN's creation and in its early days of operation, the MOWA was impervious to advocacy efforts. The Commissioner was essentially disinterested in the possibility. However, the WPSN persisted in their wider advocacy efforts and in their targeted lobbying. In 2015, with the election of a new governor and the appointment of a new commissioner, they seized the change to lobby for the SAP. A courtesy visit, followed up by lobbying visits carrying the SAP and as part of the SCMA sub-committee

(thereby leveraging the representation of a number of important agencies), was sufficient to persuade the new governor of their seriousness.

In one sense, then, the WPSN is lucky that the commissioner changed and one amenable to their advocacy was appointed. Yet the converse is also the case: as the former commissioner notes, "The WPSN's perseverance was key to convincing the commissioner to accept the proposal to domesticate SAP in Kano State." Certainly, the WPSN have leveraged the advantage. The linkages within the MOWA now goes beyond the former Commissioner.

The Director of Women's Affairs is a member of the WPSN –in the workshop, she was roundly applauded by the participants for her part in the policy changes and the adoption of the SAP; other senior figures (the Director of Administrative Affairs) have become champions of the WPSN and welcome their resources and the approaches; the WPSN is now on the MOWA-chaired Implementation Committee for the SAP; they were described by a member of MOWA as being "one of us" and the WPSN members can visit the Ministry of Women's Affairs and be sure of an interview.

This has remained the case, even since the appointment of a new Commissioner with less enthusiasm for the SAP (for all that the former Commissioner remains a potentially very useful champion, as head of the Ministry of Budget and Planning). In comparison to the period prior to WPSN's creation, therefore, there has been a significant change: being sure of being heard is a fundamental change in behaviour and one that is central to the opportunity for future changes.

The relationship is both crucial to the success of the WPSN's programme, and also a structural risk. As the WPSN has cause to know, the political windows may both open and close rapidly. The success of their policy agenda is extremely vulnerable to turnover and churn amongst the key power holders, notably the Commissioner and the Governor but also key champions within the senior staff of the Ministry. The removal of the past Commissioner has stalled the programme. The risk can only be mitigated by persistence and by extending the pattern of personal linkages and relationships within the government. In particular, they must capitalise on the view within the Ministry that they are seen as a valuable resource and external champion and retain that ease of access and shared agenda that they won from summer 2015.

The other point is that the foothold within the government and the profile offered by the successful adoption of the SAP lends a fulcrum to further influence within the authorities. This fulcrum has enabled them to leverage what appears to be general and widespread concern about the prevalence of rape and child abuse amongst government figures. For example, the Fagge Local Government was contacted and then subsequently approached the NSRP and sought support for the domestication of the SAP to the Local Government level. This has happened, and although it has not been formally approved, reports suggest that is being resourced. Further efforts have been undertaken to reach out to other Local Governments. The example of the domestication of the SAP has been taken up nationally and internationally, with the WPSN being invited to speak in neighbouring states (and the Fagge Chairman was invited to France).

To conclude this section, the proximity of the relationship is a major success of the WPSN, and a credit to the persistence of the WPSN team. However, it is only half-finished and has stalled due to the change in personnel. Its further success is by no means a given, and can only be completed with a combination of luck, persistence and strategic advocacy.

Key relationship: other NSRP platforms

A second divergence from the other ROA studies is to explore the key relationships and linkages with other NSRP platforms. The theory of change is structured around the interlinkages between the output streams.

WPSN-SCMA

The WPSN was made a member of their sister NSRP platform in 2014, having been inaugurated earlier that year. It started to lobby for SCMA engagement with the issue of VAWG in the meeting held on 5 March 2015. This was the start of a process of successive meetings where VAWG and the domestication of the

SAP were placed high on the agenda, a process culminating in the creation of a sub-committee of the SCMA in summer of that year.

The sub-committee of the SCMA involved many of the key agencies involved in the area, including NAPTIP, the Emirate Council, Media, representatives from religious bodies and CSOs. The key approach to the Commissioner of MOWA was done as a representative of the SCMA subcommittee, with WPSN representatives leading and presenting the documents. The involvement of the SCMA and the ability to leverage the wider linkages that the SCMA was able to provide was therefore crucial in the key meetings necessary to persuade the Commissioner of the seriousness of the plan and of the wider support that lay behind it.

However, there are two points to note about the relationship between the WPSN and the SCMA. The first is that the SCMA also contains multiple perspectives, from the civil society to the religious leaders. As its convenor noted, the emphasis on conflict sensitivity within the SCMA is heavily a matter for cultural sensitivity. As such, the SCMA insisted that the NAP be translated into the cultural context of Kano. There is not therefore necessarily the same harmonised perspective on the implementation of the SAP that characterises the WPSN – all of whom are 'true believers' in the advocacy stance that they have taken.

Second, interviewees suggested that in fact the nature of the knowledge about the SAP within the SCMA is actually quite limited. Several newer representatives were unaware of the SAP and what it was trying to do. This underlines the vulnerability of the WPSN to processes of turnover and personnel churn. While this may in part be a function of the SCMA having fulfilled its purpose, to an extent having been overtaken by the new Implementation Committee chaired by the WPSN, the point does emphasise the need for WPSN to remain influential and constant to refresh, to build and to capitalise on the relationships that exist.

WPSN-media

We conducted three interviews with media organisations; that is, radio programmes and presenters. The first (the Head of Stations of Wazobia FM, Cool FM and Arewa Radio) was a partner of NSRP; the second was not a formal NSRP partner but was a member of the WPSN (Express Radio) since 2015; and the third (Radio Kano), the radio programme was involved in sensitisation work on VAWG which it conducted through another organisation, CARAV.

In the case of the first, the stations (that is WAZOBIA, COOL FM and AREWA RADIO) partner with NSRP, entailing the provision of training and mentoring to journalists on "conflict sensitive communications" and the hosting of NSRP partners on its radio programmes. They had started in 2015 a concerted ". As they observed:

> "Rape during that period was a topical issue because of its high rate of occurrence. Many people were talking about the issue, the stations decided to campaign against it as part of their community social responsibility."

In the case of the second, the interviewee used to cover WPSN programmes during 2015, and was invited to become a member of the platform. She is also a member of the SAP implementation committee, and is a champion of the SAP. She noted that her programming "sensitises people on VAWG" and "allows people to use it as a medium to talk about VAWG and encourage girl-child education". Sometimes, the station invites government officials in to discuss what they are doing in this matter; sometimes, to announce the activities and advocacy programme of the WPSN; sometimes to host WPSN officials.

Clearly, therefore, the partnerships with radio organisations have been harnessed to raise attention on the issue with some success – and equally clearly, this is the case not simply for NSRP supported media organisations. It is important to note here that the WPSN and NSRP are not the only actors in this field – the third interviewee suggested that their station was conducting similar work and was affiliated with CARAV. This interviewee had not heard about the SAP, its domestication, and had barely any information about WPSN. He was instead supported through the J4A programme, and its ongoing work which had some level

of overlap. It is therefore important not to emphasise too far the influence of the NSRP platforms, to the exclusion of others.

WPSN-OBSTEC

The final NSRP platform of relevance is the Observatories. The Observatories collect cases directly from members of the public and also from members of the OBSTEC itself. These are then assigned to members whose primary responsibilities refer to that case. Both WPSN and OBSTEC are members of the other.

The relationship with WPSN appears to be strong, and of particular benefit to OBSTEC. Thus the convenor of OBSTEC notes that they had difficulties reaching out to government officials, but since their involvement with the WPSN, that is has "made it easy to engage with the government agencies", especially MOWA. WPSN has also:

> "created visibility for OBSTEC through its media engagements. Whenever WPSN goes for a media programme, they give out OBSTEC phone numbers to the public… This has contributed to more calls being received from the public…"

OBSTEC notes that they are receiving increasing numbers of reports, which the interviewee ascribed to an increase in sensitisation and awareness rather than the changes in the incidence of VAWG. For its part, WPSN is an active member of OBSTEC, and follows up actively on the cases that are reported, depending on how they are allocated. They meet regularly, up to once a week, depending on the nature of the cases that they are both working together on.

Process and Participation

The theory of change cites broader societal participation, notably to encourage the voice of the marginalised. In this section, I briefly discuss the nature of the participation afforded by the WPSN to marginalised groups.

One interviewee noted that "as a group, WPSN represents vulnerable women that are poor." The focus, in line with the dominant narrative on VAWG, is therefore poverty. She noted that differing member organisations work with different groups of vulnerable people, including people living with disabilities. However, the relationship to the poor and to the vulnerable group is primarily one of service provider or supporting institution to beneficiary or – in the case of SWODEN – as a trainer on vocational skills. Marginalised groups are also invited to the advocacy work around the quarterly programme of international days of activism. No marginalised women are presently part of the platform, although the chairperson suggested that this was something that was being considered.

Moreover, the overall agenda of the organisation is articulated as domesticating the National Action Plan (itself a domestication of UN Resolution 1325) into Kano State. This creates an *a priori* agenda that affords little room for further participation. Moreover, the process of domestication took place in a drafting workshop, on the basis of an initial draft provided by the WPSN. This involved a range of organisations – notably, the WPSN, MOWA, but also religious and traditional authorities, and other government entities, including from the justice sector – but did not involve any marginalised groups as such. This drafting process happened on the suggestion of the SCMA, which required the translation of the NAP into something that "" will suit the religion and culture of the people of Kano State" (interview, SCMA member):

> "It was the SCMA subcommittee that made the suggestion to [the Commissioner] because they felt that the NAP is a document that covers people that vary in terms of culture and religions, and any activity that emanates from the SCMA is usually treated with conflict sensitivity to avoid anything that will not be in line with the culture of the people of Kano State." (KII, SCMA CSO member)

The NAP was translated therefore to fit with the (patriarchal) culture of Kano state. In conclusion, there is little *participation* of marginalised women in the WPSN platform. This may be something to be addressed if / when the platform matures.

For completeness sake, it seems that the WPSN itself runs transparently and participatively, balancing the demands of effectiveness with the opportunity for its members to raise their voice. The agenda of each meeting is set by the executive members, who were elected but the agenda can be changed – although this

does not happen frequently. The WPSN has both Whatsapp and Facebook groups, to facilitate the easy exchange of information internally. Responsibilities are shared within the group. The Chairperson suggested that "members are carried along in the activities of the platform". It seems that internally, the organisation permits smooth and transparent exchange of views and is participatory in nature. Again, to judge on the basis of the workshop, there is a shared commitment and all members are comfortable raising their voice and articulating their opinion freely and with trust in their colleagues (the selection of representatives for the workshop itself was conducted participatively, since numbers were restricted).

Outcomes

This section is built around the manner in which the work of the WPSN has contributed to the outcomes articulated in the theory of change.

At the highest, L3 level, it looks at "changes in policy and practice and narratives around violence" (cf. EQ11[263]).

At the intermediate level of outcomes, there are several aspects which are mutually reinforcing and which are to occur through:

- "decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this as well as by increasing public pressure for change";
- at both the institutionalisation of platforms and their use knowledge, advocate and act for change
- Improved alignment of strategic priorities and actions of stakeholders (cf EQ7)[264]

Finally, the section also looks at a single outcome at the lowest outcome level, which concerns broad societal participation, including marginal voters. The section addresses the implications of the foregoing analysis for each of these elements.

Changes in Policy and Practice and Narrative Around Violence (L3 outcome)

- The key achievement of the KWPSN, and the one that was highlighted as the most significant change was the approval of the SAP on 27 May 2016 as formal Kano State policy. Moreover, it was explicitly approved by the governor. The SAP is essentially a costed action plan whose purpose is to combat VAWG in Kano State, much of it through the influence of other agencies. This marks a substantial change in policy, given that VAWG had hardly been an area of policy making on the political agenda.
- However, the SAP has not subsequently generated a great change in the practices that the SAP promises – changes which the SAP envisages happening across the government, driven by training and advocacy visits by the MOWA (almost converting the MOWA into an extended advocacy agent within the government). The SAP suggests changes and resourcing the government set-up, and its various costed initiatives have not been implemented.
- There have been several other possible or actual changes in policy within the government and powerholders have touched on VAWG, such as the creation of the SOR with a view to encouraging proper investigation of VAWG, the revisions to the rape law, the discussions around special courts to handle rape cases and the revision more broadly of the marriage law under the Emir's aegis. This marks a considerable change to the state before the WPSN, where the issue was barely on the agenda (the report discusses below the extent to which they may be attributed to WPSN).

263 EQ) 11 "To what extent have NSRP's Platforms/initiatives (including research) influenced key actors/institutions in the conflict arena, resulting in changes in policy and practice that enhance stability and reconciliation?"
264 EQ5 ("To what extent, and in what ways, have coordination, and alignment of strategic priorities and actions among NSRP stakeholders improved?")

- Lastly, the narrative around VAWG appears to be linked to poverty and to the role of vulnerable women in the economy. This appears unchanged, and one may speculate the extent to which this reproduces or is intended to reproduce existing gender roles in the economy.

Decision makers have access to more and better evidence and are influenced by this, as well as increasing public pressure for change (L2 outcome)

- Many of the wider changes identified above (the creation of the SOR, the marriage law and so on) is a function of the rise in political and public interest in VAWG. The issue is in the public sphere; the climate of silence has been to some extent broken. Interviewees – including those in the government – credit this largely to the work of civil society organisations. These are not solely comprised of WPSN members – others, such as CARAV and the Kano Civil Society Forum were also mentioned – but it seems that the WPSN has contributed through its advocacy and media work to putting the point on the agenda.
- This appears to validate the utility of the strategy of advocacy used by the office, combining quarterly events based around the international days of advocacy, with a continual media presence and accompanying the ongoing individual lobbying and advocacy work. It is not clear how significant the legitimacy afforded by the international nature of the norms: certainly, it has been a centrepiece of their work.
- One point that is useful here is that the decisive point is not the use of evidence. The very existence of evidence on the incidence of VAWG is not particularly prevalent and has not played much of a role in the discourse. What appears to have been crucial is the efforts to build relationships, the leverage of these relationships to generate influence, the ability to get the question put on the political agenda and the use of advocacy efforts to generate change

Engagement platforms are institutionalised and societal capacity to use knowledge, influence and advocate for change is built (L2 outcome)

- As observed above, the relationships that the platform has created have been absolutely crucial – much more so than the deployment of knowledge as a persuasive force. The other factor that seems to have been important in legitimising the KWPSN work has been the deployment of international norms at the centre of the advocacy. That however has not been specifically substantiated. Again, it is worth emphasising that the “use” of knowledge has not been significant in the exercise of influence.
- As discussed above, there are several elements to the institutionalisation. In the first place, civil society organisations have been successfully convened and – if the authors’ direct experience of the workshop is anything to go by – the WPSN form a close-knit and harmonised group united and with a clear common purpose and close personal relationships.
- Secondly, they have formed strong relationships within their key government interlocutor, MOWA. The Director of Women’s Affairs is a clear champion, as are other senior officials within MOWA. As it was said in the workshop, “The ministry now recognises WPSN as one of its own” and they are easily able to gain access to any official. An external champion with lobbying power can be a very useful ally, and clearly they managed to convince the former Commissioner.
- Thirdly, they are now formally incorporated into the Implementation Committee which – although the lack of resources is disappointing in achieving their goals – is an ongoing recognised entity which may be expected to have influence in the future over the implementation of the SAP.
- Fourthly, they used their membership of the SCMA and in particular the creation of a sub-committee with key allies as a useful platform to bridge links to certain key institutions (e.g. NAPTIP, religious leaders, the Emir’s Council), which leant wider credibility at a crucial point. This relationship is institutionalised and strong.
- To this, there must be a note of caution: there remains some fragility in this institutionalisation. Their links are based on personal relationships, and are not fully formally recognised. As the departure of

the former Commissioner indicates, the movement of some key people can weaken their influence significantly.

Improved alignment of strategic priorities and actions of stakeholders (L2)

- The inauguration of the SAP has formed the blueprint to which the Government of Kano State will approach the question of VAWG. With this formal blueprint in place, and the inauguration of the Implementation Committee in 8 March 2017 to deliver.

Broader societal participation, including marginalised voices

- As suggested above, VAWG is intrinsically a matter affecting the vulnerable, and notably that of poor women. However, such women do not themselves appear to represent through any meaningful process. The members of the WPSN work closely with them in various forms, but does not actually represent them or give them a voice. The content of the policy work is articulated through the international commitments to UN Resolution 1325. The manner in which that resolution was translated into the State Action Plan was a matter of making it fit the cultural norms through a participatory drafting process that involved traditional and religious leaders, civil society organisations and state institutions but none of the most vulnerable people themselves.

Factors contributing to change

This section looks at the key behaviour changes and positive outcomes discussed so far and explores NSRP's contribution to these versus the contribution of other external factors. It does so by grouping three forms of influence, ordered from the most to the least direct.

Direct Lobbying

The following appear to be the most immediate factors.

- The persistence of the WPSN and the proper targeting: it seems clear that the well-prepared approach by the WPSN to the Commissioner, having been trailed in previous courtesy visits, was the key point that converted her to her enthusiasm for the SAP and its approach to VAWG. She herself identifies the WPSN as the crucial people and influence in getting the SAP approved.
- Clearly the change of Commissioner was a necessary but insufficient condition. There is therefore a considerable element of luck – but only possible given the underlying persistence. Both the previous and the current incumbent have proved far less amenable to the advocacy of the WPSN. The fact that the luck has run out in the appointment of a new Commissioner has clearly influenced the ongoing lack of resources for the SAP. Although the WPSN retain cordial relations and are involved in the Implementation Committee, they have not yet been able to persuade the new Commissioner to back the SAP with the resources it calls for.
- The former Commissioner's relationship to the governor was a further crucial element: she was able to command the governor's attention, and to persuade him to endorse the report.
- The ability of the WPSN and the Commissioner to steer the translation of the NAP through a potentially difficult drafting process, involving multiple different perspectives, was likewise
- Some interviewees have raised some additional considerations, such as the fact of Inter-state competition (KII, police; KII CSO) – that is, the fact that the National Action Plan had been domesticated in other state – as playing a role in the decision-making. Certainly, the incidence of rape had raised in political significance, a point to which the report returns below. It is difficult to discern how much of an influence such factors may have played, but since they were not consistently reported, it seems unlikely that they were particularly important.

Relationships

While clearly the direct lobbying was influence, it was not the only factor at play. The underlying network of relationships allowed the WPSN to take advantage of the opportunity when it opened up, and the work to continue to generate and maintain that will be important to

- Of these, the work with the SCMA and the creation of a sub-committee appears to have been a particularly important element in persuading the Commissioner to support them. Not only that, but the relationships created with the members enabled them to get onside potential blockers from the state, traditional and religious communities. Clearly other factors like the existence of the SCMA, have also been important.
- The close-knit community within the WPSN appears to enable them to coordinate and push with great vitality for the policy and practice change that they are seeking. Their involvement of media, MOWA and civil society organisations has created a motivated group of people with useful links.

Public agenda

Finally, it is useful to consider the factors in putting the matter on the public agenda.

- A crucial element to the focus on VAWG is the rise in the prominence of the issue on the public and therefore the political agenda. As one interviewee suggested: "So much violence against women and girls, especially rape, made the governor to accept the proposal to domesticate the SAP" (KII, Director Women's Affairs)
- Equally clearly, this is not a matter simply of the WPSN. Some of the interviewees, who were themselves part of advocacy organisations, had barely heard of the WPSN or of the domestication of the SAP. There were other media organisations and other civil society actors working for similar ends (cf. e.g. KII CSOs, who doesn't mention WPSN at all!)
- Nevertheless, equally clearly the WPSN did play a large role in media and advocacy work in raising the profile of the issue. It seems that the prominence that it has at the moment may be as much about the attention given to it – to which WPSN clearly has contributed, amongst others, through its links to media and through its regular advocacy, – as it is the actual increase in incidence (for which there seems little reason for change).
- It therefore is plausible that WPSN has contributed to some of the additional changes, such as the creation of the SOR, the Emir's marriage bill, the review to the rape law and so forth, since the issues rise in prominence is a significant matter in putting it on the political **agenda.**

KEY LEARNING

In Summary

- This was not a case of evidence being deployed to change decision-maker's viewpoint, nor yet to inform advocacy and accountability efforts. What mattered here was the nature of the relationships that were created through the ongoing lobbying work.
- Any policy change is fragile, and dependent on the environment and on key champions. This is outside the control of the programme: what is important is the creation of a network of lasting relationships that can take advantage of favourable conditions, and weather unfavourable conditions.
- Policy change is necessary but not sufficient to achieve the reduction in conflicts and VAWG. Resources and ongoing commitment to deploy them are also conditions for change in government practice.
- A further crucial element, beyond the direct lobbying, is working to place the issue on the political agenda. WPSN ran what appears to have been a concerted clear campaign (although it was not the precise focus of this study). Again, the legitimacy was not a matter of making "use" of evidence. Insofar as the advocacy approach sought to legitimise its message, the crucial element was the connection to international norms and advocacy opportunities.
- Ongoing direct lobbying, relationship building and wider advocacy campaigns can create the environment for change in policy: whether it happens is then a matter of opportunism, patience and luck.
- Many elements are necessary before practice changes; many of these are valuable in themselves, as well as instrumentally (links between CSOs and government, CSO coordination, raising the awareness of an issue), even if they do not contribute immediately to the resolution of conflicts.

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Appendix C Annual Perception Survey Methodology

The methodology set out below is drawn from the 2014 APS report (NSRP (2014) Annual Perception Survey 214, NOI Polls: Abuja, pp 46-52). No significant deviations from the methodology are noted in subsequent APS reports, other that the addition of questions in the 2017 version.

The sampling universe for the annual perception survey was the adult population (≥18 years of age) of NSRPs three target local government authorities (LGAs) in each of the 8 target states (Borno, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers) with the exception of Borno and Yobe, with two (2) LGAs each. LGAs were selected based on levels of significant violence in the last three years and includes at least one urban and one rural LGA in each state.

Interviews were conducted face to face using a fully structured questionnaire to capture the required information. Questionnaires were administered through hand held tablets except when where security concerns or poor network coverage made fieldworkers adopt the traditional paper and pencil method.

The random route walk was used to select households in each EA in the target LGAs. Interviewers were given a starting point based on the EA address/location and required to observe a skipping pattern (systematic sampling) in between households in order to increase the representativeness of the samples. In selecting an adult respondent to be interviewed in each selected household, the Kish grid was used to select either an adult male or female for interview. In cases where the selected respondent was not available for the survey, 3 attempts were made at different times of the day to re-contact the respondent. After that, the household was replaced and a different respondent selected. The table below provides the proposed and the achieved sample size by survey states.

Table 0.2 Proposed and achieved sample size by survey states

State	Proposed sample	Achieved sample
Borno	345	349
Yobe	345	358
Kano	430	535
Kaduna	400	410
Plateau	400	400
Bayelsa	390	406
Delta	430	455
Rivers	430	451
Totals	**3,170**	**3,364**

Sample Selection and Design

The criteria for selection of NSRP LGAs include history of violence, equitable spread across senatorial districts, representation of urban and rural settings, and relative absence of other donor interventions in the area of peace building. The total achieved sample size for the quantitative study was 3,364. A *clustered*, *stratified multi stage area probability sampling* technique was employed, using enumeration areas to generate a fully random sample by state, urbanization and enumeration areas with probability proportionate to population size technique (PPPS).

A two-stage sampling was adopted to select adult respondents (18+) in order to draw a representation sample. The two stages accounted for the random selection of – respondent to be interviewed in a household; households to be interviewed; and localities (Enumeration Areas) in each of the targeted LGAs per survey states. It is to be noted that samples were taken from all the EAs in each of the survey LGAs.

The first stage sample selection involved enumeration area (EA) selection within each targeted survey LGA per state. The following notations were used in the selection process:

- Let $\boldsymbol{P_{1hi}}$ be the first-stage sampling probability of the i^{th} EA in stratum h [each LGAs];
- Let $n_h$be the number of EAs selected in stratum h (LGA);
- Let M_{hi}be the measure of size of the EAs used in the first stage's selection, usually the measure of size in the number of household residing in the EA according to the sampling frame;
- Let $\sum M_{hi}$ be the total measure of size in the stratum h.

The probability of selecting the i^{th} EA in the sample is calculated as follows:
$P_{1hi} = \frac{n_h M_{hi}}{\sum M_{hi}}$.

The second stage sample selection involves the selection of households in each selected EAs. The following notations are used:

- $\boldsymbol{P_{2hi}}$: second-stage sampling probability of the i^{th} EA (household selection).
- let L_{hi} be the number of households listed in the household listing operation in EA i in stratum h;
- let t_{hi} be the number of household selected in the EA.

At the second stage, households were selected with varying probabilities across EAs within each stratum h (LGA). Therefore, the selection probability for each household in the EA was calculated as follows:
$P_{2hi} = \frac{t_{hi}}{L_{hi}}$.

The overall selection probability (P_{hi}) of each household in EA i of stratum h is therefore the product of the selection probabilities of the two stages:

$P_{hi} = P_{1hi} \times P_{2hi}$

Table 0.3 Margin of Errors of Surveyed LGAs and States

		ACHIEVED SAMPLE			POPULATION			Margin of Error	
		MALE	FEMALE	Total (LGA)	Total (LGA)	Total Sample (State)	Total Population (State)	LGA level	State level
Borno	Maiduguri	143	84	227	521,492	349	4,171,104	6.5	5.25
	Jere	64	58	122	211,204			8.87	
Yobe	Potiskum	94	78	172	205,876	356	2,321,339	7.47	5.19
	Bade	84	100	184	139,782			7.22	
Kano	Bichi	144	72	216	277,099	535	9,401,288	6.67	4.24
	Doguwa	68	50	118	151,181			9.02	
	Kumbotso	110	91	201	295,979			6.91	
Kaduna	Kaduna South	84	80	164	402,390	410	6,113,503	7.65	4.84
	Zaria	58	69	127	408,198			8.69	
	Jema'a	63	56	119	278,735			8.98	
Plateau	Jos North	78	81	159	429,300	400	3,206,531	7.77	4.9
	Wase	66	57	123	161,714			8.83	
	Bokkos	56	62	118	178,454			9.02	
Bayelsa	Yenagoa	86	89	175	353,344	406	1,704,515	7.41	4.86
	Ogbia	58	58	116	179,926			9.1	
	Sagbama	61	54	115	187,146			9.14	
Delta	Ndokwa	92	79	171	103,171	455	4,112,445	7.49	4.59
	Warri South	70	53	123	303,417			8.83	
	Ughelli North	77	84	161	321,028			7.72	
Rivers	Abua/Odual	82	61	143	282,988	451	5,198,716	8.19	4.61
	Gokana	65	85	150	228,828			8.0	
	Port Harcourt	79	79	158	541,115			7.8	

Demographic Distribution of Respondents

The socio-demographic distribution of respondents who participated in the 2014 Annual Perception Survey is presented in the tables below**.** In summary, a slight majority of respondents were male **(53%),** while **47%** were female. Also, half of the sample was aged between 18 to 29 years, followed by **29%** that are aged between 30 and 39 years. Furthermore, the slim majority are resident in rural areas **(53%)** and mostly in the Lower Social bracket **(58%).**

In addition, the majority **(39%)** have completed secondary school and earn less than 50,000 Naira monthly at both household **(46%)** and individual **(62%)** levels. In terms of respondent occupation, students dominated the survey **(20%),** followed by self-employed traders and business men/women **(17% each)**. Furthermore, heads of households are mostly business men/women **(22%),** followed by Government Worker / Civil Servant **(19%)**.

Table 0.4 Demographic Distribution of Respondents 1

			Gender		Age-group					Urbanization		Social Class			Religion			Marital Status			
			Male	Female	18 - 29	30 – 39	40 – 49	50 - 59	60 +	Urban	Rural	AB (Upper)	C1 C2 (Middle)	DE (Lower)	Muslim	Christian	Others	Single	Married	Separated/ Divorced	Widowed
TOTAL (%)			53	47	50	29	12	6	3	47	53	3	39	58	44	56	0	44	52	2	2
Borno	%	Total	59	41	48	33	12	6	1	98	2	1	20	79	83	17	0	44	46	6	4
		Maiduguri	63	37	50	31	13	5	1	98	2	1	20	79	82	18	0	44	48	5	3
		Jere	52	48	44	37	11	7	1	97	3	2	20	78	84	16	0	44	44	7	5
	N	Base	207	142	166	113	41	19	4	326	8	5	69	275	280	59	0	154	161	20	13
Yobe	%	Total	50	50	40	25	14	11	10	72	28	1	21	78	94	6	0	24	74	1	1
		Potiskum	55	45	33	26	12	13	16	72	28	2	27	71	93	7	0	23	74	1	2
		Bade	46	54	44	25	16	10	5	71	29	1	15	84	93	6	1	24	75	1	0
	N	Base (N)	178	178	137	89	49	40	36	244	97	5	71	268	331	23	1	85	267	2	4
Kano	%	Total	60	40	50	31	12	6	1	36	64	1	40	59	96	4	0	33	64	2	1
		Bichi	67	33	45	34	11	8	2	2	98	1	36	63	99	1	0	29	70	1	0
		Doguwa	58	42	41	26	24	6	3	5	95	1	23	76	97	3	0	23	70	3	4
		Kumbotso	55	45	60	31	6	3	0	92	8	1	56	43	92	8	0	42	55	2	0
	N	Base (N)	322	213	263	167	65	32	8	195	340	6	215	314	511	24	0	174	344	11	6
Kaduna	%	Total	50	50	50	29	10	6	5	59	41	6	40	54	49	51	0	46	52	1	1
		Kaduna South	51	49	58	34	5	2	1	100	0	5	51	44	45	54	1	58	40	1	1
		Zaria	46	54	51	26	13	7	3	62	38	11	46	43	78	22	0	43	56	1	0
		Jema'a	53	47	42	25	14	8	11	0	100	2	21	77	22	78	0	31	66	0	3
	N	Base (N)	205	205	207	118	43	23	19	243	167	25	166	219	199	210	1	187	216	3	4
Plateau	%	Total	50	50	59	24	11	4	2	37	63	2	25	73	32	68	0	48	48	1	3
		Jos North	49	51	54	31	8	3	4	92	8	4	51	45	9	91	0	59	35	1	5
		Wase	54	46	62	21	11	5	1	0	100	0	11	89	91	9	0	35	63	0	2
		Bokkos	47	53	65	15	14	5	1	0	100	0	5	95	2	98	0	47	49	2	2
	N	Base (N)	200	200	239	94	42	17	8	146	254	6	99	291	129	271	0	193	191	4	12
Bayelsa	%	Total	50	50	46	30	15	6	3	21	79	1	69	30	0	100	0	48	50	1	1
		Yenagoa	49	51	47	29	14	7	3	35	65	1	68	31	0	100	0	47	50	1	2
		Ogbia	50	50	45	34	17	3	1	9	91	0	73	27	0	100	0	49	49	1	1
		Sagbama	53	47	47	26	14	9	4	13	87	3	66	31	1	98	1	48	48	3	1
	N	Base (N)	205	201	188	120	61	25	12	87	319	5	280	121	1	404	1	196	199	6	5
Delta	%	Total	53	47	42	33	14	6	5	36	64	5	50	45	1	98	1	44	51	3	2
		Ndokwa	54	46	40	31	16	5	8	4	96	9	32	59	1	98	1	41	51	3	5
		Warri South	57	43	45	35	11	7	2	80	20	3	63	34	2	96	2	55	44	1	0

			Gender		Age-group					Urbanization		Social Class			Religion			Marital Status			
			Male	Female	18 - 29	30 – 39	40 – 49	50 - 59	60 +	Urban	Rural	AB (Upper)	C1 C2 (Middle)	DE (Lower)	Muslim	Christian	Others	Single	Married	Separated/ Divorced	Widowed
		Ughelli North	48	52	43	34	14	6	3	38	62	3	60	37	1	98	1	39	56	4	1
	N	Base (N)	239	216	194	150	63	27	21	166	289	25	227	203	5	444	6	201	232	12	10
Rivers	%	Total	50	50	61	28	7	3	1	35	65	2	42	56	1	99	0	63	35	1	1
		Abua/Odual	57	43	54	30	11	3	2	0	100	1	34	65	0	100	0	56	40	3	1
		Gokana	43	57	65	26	4	5	0	3	97	1	27	72	0	100	0	61	38	1	0
		Port Harcourt	50	50	63	28	6	1	2	97	3	6	62	32	3	97	0	72	27	0	1
	N	Base (N)	226	225	271	127	32	15	6	158	292	11	186	251	4	446	0	286	156	6	3

Table 0.5 Demographic Distribution of Respondents – 2

	Total	State							
		Borno	Yobe	Kano	Kaduna	Plateau	Bayelsa	Delta	Rivers
	Values in Percentage (%)								
Highest literacy Level									
No formal education/illiterate	11	20	40	15	2	10	1	3	1
Some primary	4	2	4	10	2	6	3	3	1
Completed primary	7	4	6	10	6	8	10	6	2
Some secondary	14	16	6	19	7	16	19	14	13
Completed secondary	39	18	18	32	49	38	52	34	60
Some university/Higher	15	25	15	12	22	14	6	22	10
Completed university/Higher	9	13	8	2	11	7	7	16	12
Post Graduate	1	2	3	...	1	1	2	2	1
Household/Monthly income									
Less than 50,000	46	45	63	52	26	26	66	55	41
50,001 - 100,000	21	26	16	21	10	38	17	14	27
100,001 - 150,000	9	16	4	11	9	12	3	3	12
150,001 - 200,000	4	9	2	6	4	5	2	...	8
200,001 - 250,000	2	1	1	1	4	4	...	1	6
250,001 - 300,000	1	...	...	...	2	1	...	3	2
300,001 - 350,000	1	1	1	...	1	...	...	1	1
350,000+	1	...	2	...	...	...	...	1	1
Don't Know/ Can't Say	13	1	9	8	38	13	12	19	2
Refused	2	1	2	1	6	1	...	3	...
Respondent Monthly income									
Less than 50,000	62	68	77	56	47	66	74	58	55
50,001 - 100,000	14	18	9	16	11	11	9	11	28
100,001 - 150,000	5	5	4	8	3	3	1	3	8
150,001 - 200,000	3	4	1	6	2	2	1	2	4
200,001 - 250,000	1	1	1	3	...	...	...	1	2
250,001 - 300,000	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
300,001 - 350,000	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...
350,000+	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...
Don't Know/ Can't Say	13	3	5	10	31	16	14	21	2
Refused	2	1	1	1	6	2	1	3	1
Respondents' Occupation									
Student	20	26	11	13	22	27	20	21	28
Self-Employed Trader	17	8	8	21	13	17	23	26	18
Business Man/Woman	17	16	6	23	23	15	15	16	18
Farmer/Agric. Worker	11	2	15	11	8	19	17	8	7
Government Worker / Civil Servant	10	15	24	7	11	4	9	8	4
Unemployed Youth / Adult	10	5	23	7	8	9	10	10	8
Artisan	5	14	3	6	9	2	...	3	5
Professional worker	4	3	...	4	3	5	4	5	10
Housewife	3	7	7	6	3	1	...	...	...
Religious Leader / Missionary	1	2	...	1	...	...	1	2	1
Youth Corper	1	1	...	...	...	1	1	1	1
Others	1	1	3	1	...	...	...	...	...
Head of the Household Occupation									
Business Man/Woman	22	25	11	26	26	23	16	24	24
Government Worker / Civil Servant	19	34	37	14	25	13	16	12	12
Farmer/Agric. Worker	18	3	29	22	13	28	23	13	11
Self-Employed Trader	17	8	6	18	13	20	21	28	22
Professional worker	7	5	1	5	7	7	5	5	18
Artisan	5	12	3	7	8	1	1	3	2
Student	4	4	1	3	3	4	6	6	4
Unemployed Youth / Adult	4	3	3	1	4	1	9	6	4
Religious Leader / Missionary	1	2	...	2	1	1	1	3	...
Retiree/ Pensioner	1	2	...	...	...	1	1	...	...
Refused	1	...	8	...	...	...	...	...	1
Others	1	2	1	2	...	1	1	...	2

Appendix D Platform Survey Detailed Findings

General Findings from Platform Survey (Woman's Groups and All Other Groups), including Social Network Analysis.

Table 0.6 Q3.2 - What are the main issues discussed by the Platform

#	Question	Women's' Groups		Other	
1	Bribery/ corruption	2.48%	6	5.35%	63
2	Crime	6.61%	16	10.44%	123
3	Cultism	4.13%	10	5.94%	70
4	Drug abuse	7.44%	18	11.63%	137
5	Human rights abuses	19.83%	48	11.12%	131
6	Kidnapping	3.72%	9	6.96%	82
7	Natural resources conflict (including conflict over land and water use and oil/oil spills)	7.44%	18	12.65%	149
8	Political violence	13.22%	32	11.88%	140
9	Religious violence	9.92%	24	11.12%	131
10	Sexual & Gender Based Violence (SGBV)	23.55%	57	11.46%	135
11	Other (Please specify)	1.65%	4	1.44%	17
	Total	**Total**	**242**	**Total**	**1178**

Table 0.7 Q3.3 - Thinking again about the main issues discussed by the Platform, please indicate the top three issues discussed.

#	Group	Women's' Groups		Other	
1	Bribery/ corruption	1.79%	3	3.42%	21
2	Crime	4.17%	7	6.84%	42
3	Cultism	0.60%	1	4.40%	27
4	Drug abuse	6.55%	11	11.89%	73
5	Human rights abuses	28.57%	48	12.87%	79
6	Kidnapping	1.19%	2	4.56%	28
7	Natural resources conflict (including conflict over land and water use and oil/oil spills)	5.95%	10	20.36%	125
8	Political violence	11.31%	19	12.21%	75
9	Religious violence	7.74%	13	11.40%	70
10	Sexual & Gender Based Violence (SGBV)	30.36%	51	11.73%	72
11	Other (Please specify)	1.79%	3	0.33%	2
	Total	**Total**	**168**	**Total**	**614**

Table 0.8 Q3.4 - Which of the following actions have been taken by the Platform?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Advocacy to state and/ or non-state actors	15.60%	51	10.03%	119
2	Dialogue with conflict management stakeholders and/or community members	10.09%	33	14.91%	177
3	Discussion via media outlets (radio, television or print media)	13.46%	44	9.01%	107
4	Holding community events (including integration events and Town Hall meetings)	10.40%	34	11.12%	132
5	Mediation between conflict parties	9.17%	30	13.73%	163
6	Reporting to authorities	10.40%	34	12.47%	148
7	Research in conflict dynamics	3.98%	13	6.15%	73
8	Sensitisation and awareness raising at community level	15.60%	51	13.06%	155
9	Training of state and non-state actors (for example in mediation skills, conflict and gender sensitivity)	11.01%	36	9.01%	107
10	Other (Please specify)	0.31%	1	0.51%	6
	Total	**Total**	**327**	**Total**	**1187**

Table 0.9 Q3.5 - Thinking again about the main actions taken by the Platform, please indicate the top three actions taken.

#	Group	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Advocacy to state and/ or non-state actors	20.81%	36	8.74%	54
2	Dialogue with conflict management stakeholders and/or community members	9.83%	17	17.96%	111
3	Discussion via media outlets (radio, television or print media)	16.76%	29	7.12%	44
4	Holding community events (including integration events and Town Hall meetings)	8.09%	14	11.65%	72
5	Mediation between conflict parties	4.62%	8	15.86%	98
6	Reporting to authorities	5.78%	10	11.17%	69
7	Research in conflict dynamics	2.89%	5	3.07%	19
8	Sensitisation and awareness raising at community level	23.12%	40	16.67%	103
9	Training of state and non-state actors (for example in mediation skills, conflict and gender sensitivity)	7.51%	13	7.61%	47
10	Other (Please specify)	0.58%	1	0.16%	1
	Total	**Total**	**173**	**Total**	**618**

Table 0.10 Q3.6 - How often do you think the actions of the Platform result in conflict resolution or prevention?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	All of the time	17.24%	10	27.62%	58
2	Most of the time	53.45%	31	51.90%	109
3	About half of the time	8.62%	5	3.33%	7
4	Some of the time	20.69%	12	15.71%	33
5	Never	0.00%	0	1.43%	3
	Total	**Total**	**58**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.11 Q4.2 - Considering all the Platform meetings you have attended, which groups are usually present?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	10.47%	45	9.17%	156
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	8.60%	37	9.81%	167
3	Hizbah Boards	2.09%	9	2.17%	37
4	Vigilante Groups	3.02%	13	7.87%	134
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	7.67%	33	3.23%	55
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	7.44%	32	9.58%	163
7	Academia	4.19%	18	5.82%	99
8	Media	9.07%	39	5.52%	94
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	3.02%	13	2.47%	42
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	2.33%	10	6.87%	117
11	Community Based Organisations	10.23%	44	8.93%	152
12	Women's Groups	11.63%	50	9.69%	165
13	Youth Groups	9.53%	41	10.16%	173
14	Other Civil Society Groups	10.47%	45	7.70%	131
15	Secret Societies/Cults	0.00%	0	0.53%	9
16	Other (please specify)	0.23%	1	0.47%	8
	Total	**Total**	**430**	**Total**	**1702**

Table 0.12 Q4.3 - Considering all the Platform meetings you have attended, how often do the following groups contribute to the issues being discussed? (Other Groups)

#	Question	A great deal		A lot		A moderate amount		A little		None at all	
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	8.03%	53	7.57%	44	12.50%	38	14.78%	17	9.52%	4
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	11.67%	77	11.02%	64	4.93%	15	7.83%	9	4.76%	2
3	Hizbah Boards	2.42%	16	1.55%	9	2.96%	9	2.61%	3	0.00%	0
4	Vigilante Groups	6.67%	44	7.57%	44	10.86%	33	10.43%	12	2.38%	1
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	2.12%	14	2.75%	16	3.62%	11	6.09%	7	16.67%	7
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	11.36%	75	9.12%	53	9.54%	29	4.35%	5	2.38%	1
7	Academia	6.21%	41	5.34%	31	5.92%	18	5.22%	6	7.14%	3
8	Media	4.70%	31	6.37%	37	6.25%	19	4.35%	5	4.76%	2
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	0.61%	4	2.58%	15	4.28%	13	5.22%	6	9.52%	4
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	5.91%	39	7.40%	43	6.91%	21	9.57%	11	7.14%	3
11	Community Based Organisations	10.91%	72	8.43%	49	6.91%	21	6.96%	8	4.76%	2
12	Women's Groups	10.00%	66	9.81%	57	11.18%	34	6.96%	8	0.00%	0
13	Youth Groups	10.91%	72	11.88%	69	7.24%	22	6.96%	8	4.76%	2
14	Other Civil Society Groups	7.88%	52	8.09%	47	6.91%	21	6.09%	7	9.52%	4
15	Secret Societies/Cults	0.30%	2	0.17%	1	0.00%	0	1.74%	2	9.52%	4
16	Other (please specify)	0.30%	2	0.34%	2	0.00%	0	0.87%	1	7.14%	3
	Total	**Total**	**660**	**Total**	**581**	**Total**	**304**	**Total**	**115**	**Total**	**42**

Table 0.13 Q4.3 - Considering all the Platform meetings you have attended, how often do the following groups contribute to the issues being discussed? (Women's Groups)

#	Question	A great deal		A lot		A moderate amount		A little		None at all	
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	9.25%	16	9.24%	17	16.36%	9	30.00%	3	0.00%	0
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	7.51%	13	8.15%	15	16.36%	9	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
3	Hizbah Boards	2.31%	4	2.17%	4	1.82%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
4	Vigilante Groups	1.16%	2	4.35%	8	3.64%	2	0.00%	0	12.50%	1
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	8.67%	15	6.52%	12	9.09%	5	10.00%	1	0.00%	0
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	6.36%	11	8.70%	16	7.27%	4	10.00%	1	0.00%	0
7	Academia	4.05%	7	5.43%	10	1.82%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
8	Media	8.67%	15	8.70%	16	9.09%	5	10.00%	1	25.00%	2
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	0.58%	1	4.35%	8	3.64%	2	10.00%	1	12.50%	1
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	0.58%	1	1.63%	3	9.09%	5	0.00%	0	12.50%	1
11	Community Based Organisations	12.14%	21	10.33%	19	5.45%	3	10.00%	1	0.00%	0
12	Women's Groups	15.61%	27	10.33%	19	5.45%	3	10.00%	1	0.00%	0
13	Youth Groups	10.40%	18	9.78%	18	5.45%	3	10.00%	1	12.50%	1
14	Other Civil Society Groups	12.72%	22	10.33%	19	5.45%	3	0.00%	0	12.50%	1
15	Secret Societies/Cults	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
16	Other (please specify)	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	12.50%	1
	Total	**Total**	**173**	**Total**	**184**	**Total**	**55**	**Total**	**10**	**Total**	**8**

Table 0.14 Q4.5 - Thinking about 2-3 years ago, how included did you feel then in conflict management and peacebuilding decision-making?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Very included	31.58%	18	47.14%	99
2	Somewhat included	33.33%	19	20.00%	42
3	Neither included nor excluded	12.28%	7	4.29%	9
4	Somewhat excluded	8.77%	5	4.76%	10
5	Very excluded	12.28%	7	7.14%	15
6	I was not involved in conflict management/ peace-building 2 to 3 years ago	1.75%	1	16.67%	35
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.15 Q4.4 - How included do you feel in conflict management and peacebuilding decision-making?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Very included	63.16%	36	80.95%	170
2	Somewhat included	36.84%	21	13.33%	28
3	Neither included nor excluded	0.00%	0	3.33%	7
4	Somewhat excluded	0.00%	0	1.43%	3
5	Very excluded	0.00%	0	0.95%	2
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.16 Q5.2 - During Platform meetings, how frequently do you feel able to speak up and express your views when you have something to say?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
5	Always	63.16%	36	64.76%	136
6	Most of the time	28.07%	16	26.67%	56
7	About half the time	1.75%	1	1.90%	4
8	Sometimes	7.02%	4	6.19%	13
9	Never	0.00%	0	0.48%	1
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.17 Q5.3 - Can you explain why you don't always feel able to speak up and express your views?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	I feel embarrassed	12.50%	3	5.75%	5
2	I feel intimidated	4.17%	1	4.60%	4
3	I don't think my point is relevant	8.33%	2	6.90%	6
4	I think I will be ignored	16.67%	4	5.75%	5
5	Someone else made my point	41.67%	10	67.82%	59
6	Other (please specify)	16.67%	4	9.20%	8
	Total	**Total**	**24**	**Total**	**87**

Table 0.18 Q6.2 - How frequently would you say that Platform meetings help you to better understand the opinions of other participants?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
5	Always	50.88%	29	60.95%	128
6	Most of the time	40.35%	23	36.19%	76
7	About half the time	7.02%	4	0.00%	0
8	Sometimes	1.75%	1	2.38%	5
9	Never	0.00%	0	0.48%	1
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.19 Q6.3 - Following discussion at a Platform meeting, how often do you find that your opinion has changed?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
5	Always	7.02%	4	24.29%	51
6	Most of the time	50.88%	29	37.62%	79
7	About half the time	7.02%	4	4.76%	10
8	Sometimes	33.33%	19	28.57%	60
9	Never	1.75%	1	4.76%	10
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.20 Q7.2 - To what extent do you feel that all members of the Platform participate in meetings with the intention of finding solutions to the issues raised?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
5	Always	54.39%	31	59.05%	124
6	Most of the time	38.60%	22	31.90%	67
7	About half the time	5.26%	3	2.86%	6
8	Sometimes	1.75%	1	5.71%	12
9	Never	0.00%	0	0.48%	1
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.21 Q 7.3 - How often do you feel that members try to disrupt the work of the Platform? (for example, to pursue their own interests).

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
5	Always	3.51%	2	6.67%	14
6	Most of the time	3.51%	2	9.52%	20
7	About half the time	1.75%	1	2.38%	5
8	Sometimes	43.86%	25	27.62%	58
9	Never	47.37%	27	53.81%	113
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.22 Q8.2 - As a result of your participation in the Platform, to what extent do you agree with the following statements: "I have greater awareness and understanding of… (Other Groups)

#	Question	Strongly agree		Somewhat agree		Neither agree nor disagree		Somewhat disagree		Strongly disagree	
1	My role and responsibilities in conflict management and peacebuilding	51.59%	195	37.84%	14	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	50.00%	1
2	Conflict management and peacebuilding processes more widely	48.41%	183	62.16%	23	100.00%	3	0.00%	0	50.00%	1
	Total	**Total**	**378**	**Total**	**37**	**Total**	**3**	**Total**	**0**	**Total**	**2**

Table 0.23 Q8.2 - As a result of your participation in the Platform, to what extent do you agree with the following statements: "I have greater awareness and understanding of… Women's Groups)

#	Question	Strongly agree		Somewhat agree		Neither agree nor disagree		Somewhat disagree		Strongly disagree	
1	My role and responsibilities in conflict management and peacebuilding	53.49%	46	40.00%	10	33.33%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
2	Conflict management and peacebuilding processes more widely	46.51%	40	60.00%	15	66.67%	2	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
	Total	**Total**	**86**	**Total**	**25**	**Total**	**3**	**Total**	**0**	**Total**	**0**

Table 0.24 Q8.3 - As a result of your participation in the Platform, to what extent do you agree with the following statements: "I have increased confidence and capacity to… (Other Groups)

#	Question	Strongly agree		Somewhat agree		Neither agree nor disagree		Somewhat disagree		Strongly disagree	
1	Raise issues of concern with relevant actors	55.89%	185	31.67%	19	19.05%	4	33.33%	1	20.00%	1
2	Challenge relevant actors when they are not fulfilling their responsibilities	44.11%	146	68.33%	41	80.95%	17	66.67%	2	80.00%	4
	Total	**Total**	**331**	**Total**	**60**	**Total**	**21**	**Total**	**3**	**Total**	**5**

Table 0.25 Q8.3 - As a result of your participation in the Platform, to what extent do you agree with the following statements: "I have increased confidence and capacity to… (Other Groups)

#	Question	Strongly agree		Somewhat agree		Neither agree nor disagree		Somewhat disagree		Strongly disagree	
1	Raise issues of concern with relevant actors	56.79%	46	37.04%	10	16.67%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
2	Challenge relevant actors when they are not fulfilling their responsibilities	43.21%	35	62.96%	17	83.33%	5	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
	Total	**Total**	**81**	**Total**	**27**	**Total**	**6**	**Total**	**0**	**Total**	**0**

Table 0.26 Q8.4 - As a result of your participation in the Platform, to what extent do you agree with the following statements: "I have … (Other Groups)

#	Question	Strongly agree		Somewhat agree		Neither agree nor disagree		Somewhat disagree		Strongly disagree	
1	Enhanced skills in mediation/ conflict resolution	20.81%	174	20.13%	32	9.09%	3	0.00%	0	6.67%	1
2	Access to a wider range of actors	18.66%	156	25.79%	41	27.27%	9	42.86%	3	6.67%	1
3	Better information on the factors which may lead to conflict	18.66%	156	20.13%	32	24.24%	8	42.86%	3	73.33%	11
4	Enhanced skills and knowledge of gender issues	20.81%	174	17.61%	28	21.21%	7	0.00%	0	6.67%	1
5	Enhanced skills and knowledge of conflict sensitivity	21.05%	176	16.35%	26	18.18%	6	14.29%	1	6.67%	1
	Total	**Total**	**836**	**Total**	**159**	**Total**	**33**	**Total**	**7**	**Total**	**15**

Table 0.27 Q8.4 - As a result of your participation in the Platform, to what extent do you agree with the following statements: "I have … (Women's Groups)

#	Question	Strongly agree		Somewhat agree		Neither agree nor disagree		Somewhat disagree		Strongly disagree	
1	Enhanced skills in mediation/ conflict resolution	16.40%	31	26.74%	23	33.33%	3	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
2	Access to a wider range of actors	16.93%	32	24.42%	21	33.33%	3	100.00%	1	0.00%	0
3	Better information on the factors which may lead to conflict	21.16%	40	18.60%	16	11.11%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
4	Enhanced skills and knowledge of gender issues	24.87%	47	10.47%	9	11.11%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
5	Enhanced skills and knowledge of conflict sensitivity	20.63%	39	19.77%	17	11.11%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
	Total	**Total**	**189**	**Total**	**86**	**Total**	**9**	**Total**	**1**	**Total**	**0**

Table 0.28 Q8.5 - When issues are raised during Platform meetings, generally how satisfied are you by the follow up actions of relevant actors?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
19	Extremely satisfied	36.84%	21	58.10%	122
20	Somewhat satisfied	57.89%	33	34.76%	73
21	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	3.51%	2	3.81%	8
22	Somewhat dissatisfied	1.75%	1	3.33%	7
23	Extremely dissatisfied	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.29 Q8.6 - How frequently do you feel the Platform scrutinises and challenges the actions of relevant actors?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
5	Always	17.54%	10	34.29%	72
6	Most of the time	59.65%	34	45.71%	96
7	About half the time	14.04%	8	5.71%	12
8	Sometimes	8.77%	5	12.38%	26
9	Never	0.00%	0	1.90%	4
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**210**

Table 0.30 Q9.2 - Where does your organisation meet with other organisations to discuss issues of conflict management and peace-building? (Other Groups)

#	Question	At this Platform		Other Coordination Platforms		In one-to-one meetings		Not applicable		Total
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	57.89%	132	21.49%	49	12.72%	29	7.89%	18	228
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	57.64%	132	24.02%	55	12.23%	28	6.11%	14	229
3	Hizbah Boards	22.33%	48	11.16%	24	7.91%	17	58.60%	126	215
4	Vigilante Groups	55.26%	126	17.98%	41	13.60%	31	13.16%	30	228
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	35.75%	79	22.62%	50	8.60%	19	33.03%	73	221
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	58.77%	134	22.37%	51	13.60%	31	5.26%	12	228
7	Academia	53.67%	117	18.81%	41	8.72%	19	18.81%	41	218
8	Media	40.18%	90	23.21%	52	11.61%	26	25.00%	56	224
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	38.53%	84	19.72%	43	11.01%	24	30.73%	67	218
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	53.51%	122	16.23%	37	17.54%	40	12.72%	29	228
11	Community Based Organisations	62.88%	144	21.40%	49	12.23%	28	3.49%	8	229
12	Women's Groups	56.77%	130	22.27%	51	13.10%	30	7.86%	18	229
13	Youth Groups	57.21%	131	24.89%	57	13.97%	32	3.93%	9	229
14	Other Civil Society Groups	51.90%	123	25.74%	61	13.50%	32	8.86%	21	237
15	Secret Societies/Cults	6.64%	14	7.11%	15	5.21%	11	81.04%	171	211

Table 0.31 Q9.2 - Where does your organisation meet with other organisations to discuss issues of conflict management and peace-building? (Women's Groups)

#	Question	At this Platform		Other Coordination Platforms		In one-to-one meetings		Not applicable		Total
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	48.68%	37	28.95%	22	15.79%	12	6.58%	5	76
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	42.67%	32	33.33%	25	18.67%	14	5.33%	4	75
3	Hizbah Boards	14.75%	9	13.11%	8	6.56%	4	65.57%	40	61
4	Vigilante Groups	22.22%	14	31.75%	20	17.46%	11	28.57%	18	63
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	41.43%	29	31.43%	22	12.86%	9	14.29%	10	70
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	28.57%	20	37.14%	26	28.57%	20	5.71%	4	70
7	Academia	27.27%	18	30.30%	20	18.18%	12	24.24%	16	66
8	Media	43.66%	31	29.58%	21	19.72%	14	7.04%	5	71
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	18.75%	12	28.13%	18	10.94%	7	42.19%	27	64
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	13.85%	9	32.31%	21	21.54%	14	32.31%	21	65
11	Community Based Organisations	46.15%	36	35.90%	28	17.95%	14	0.00%	0	78
12	Women's Groups	52.63%	40	28.95%	22	17.11%	13	1.32%	1	76
13	Youth Groups	41.67%	30	36.11%	26	20.83%	15	1.39%	1	72
14	Other Civil Society Groups	47.37%	36	32.89%	25	17.11%	13	2.63%	2	76
15	Secret Societies/Cults	1.72%	1	12.07%	7	8.62%	5	77.59%	45	58

Table 0.32 Q9.3 - How often does your organisation meet with a representative from the following organisations? (Other Groups)

#	Question	Weekly		Monthly		2 or 3 time per year		Once per year or less		Never/ not applicable	
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	6.80%	21	8.17%	116	8.16%	35	7.37%	16	2.76%	21
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	8.41%	26	8.10%	115	8.62%	37	5.53%	12	2.50%	19
3	Hizbah Boards	3.88%	12	3.17%	45	3.03%	13	4.61%	10	16.95%	129
4	Vigilante Groups	11.00%	34	7.47%	106	5.83%	25	4.15%	9	4.60%	35
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	5.18%	16	4.65%	66	5.59%	24	10.14%	22	10.64%	81
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	8.41%	26	8.60%	122	6.06%	26	7.83%	17	2.37%	18
7	Academia	6.80%	21	6.27%	89	8.39%	36	7.37%	16	6.18%	47
8	Media	7.12%	22	5.50%	78	8.39%	36	9.22%	20	6.96%	53
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	3.88%	12	4.86%	69	7.23%	31	11.98%	26	9.33%	71
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	4.53%	14	7.12%	101	6.06%	26	7.37%	16	6.83%	52
11	Community Based Organisations	10.36%	32	9.02%	128	7.23%	31	3.69%	8	1.31%	10
12	Women's Groups	6.80%	21	9.44%	134	6.53%	28	6.45%	14	1.58%	12
13	Youth Groups	7.77%	24	9.09%	129	7.69%	33	5.53%	12	1.45%	11
14	Other Civil Society Groups	8.09%	25	6.91%	98	10.26%	44	5.53%	12	3.94%	30
15	Secret Societies/Cults	0.97%	3	1.62%	23	0.93%	4	3.23%	7	22.60%	172
	Total	**Total**	**309**	**Total**	**1419**	**Total**	**429**	**Total**	**217**	**Total**	**761**

Table 0.33 Q9.3 - How often does your organisation meet with a representative from the following organisations? (Women's Groups)

#	Question	Weekly		Monthly		2 or 3 time per year		Once per year or less		Never/ not applicable	
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	6.86%	7	7.83%	22	10.47%	20	8.43%	7	0.51%	1
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	5.88%	6	7.12%	20	10.99%	21	7.23%	6	2.02%	4
3	Hizbah Boards	1.96%	2	3.20%	9	1.57%	3	3.61%	3	20.20%	40
4	Vigilante Groups	4.90%	5	4.27%	12	4.19%	8	9.64%	8	12.12%	24
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	3.92%	4	6.76%	19	8.90%	17	9.64%	8	4.55%	9
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	9.80%	10	7.47%	21	5.76%	11	9.64%	8	3.54%	7
7	Academia	4.90%	5	4.98%	14	8.38%	16	10.84%	9	6.57%	13
8	Media	10.78%	11	7.47%	21	8.90%	17	6.02%	5	1.52%	3
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	1.96%	2	3.20%	9	6.28%	12	9.64%	8	13.13%	26
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	4.90%	5	3.91%	11	8.38%	16	10.84%	9	8.08%	16
11	Community Based Organisations	10.78%	11	10.32%	29	6.81%	13	2.41%	2	1.01%	2
12	Women's Groups	11.76%	12	11.39%	32	6.28%	12	1.20%	1	0.00%	0
13	Youth Groups	10.78%	11	8.54%	24	7.33%	14	6.02%	5	1.52%	3
14	Other Civil Society Groups	10.78%	11	12.10%	34	5.24%	10	1.20%	1	0.51%	1
15	Secret Societies/Cults	0.00%	0	1.42%	4	0.52%	1	3.61%	3	24.75%	49
	Total	**Total**	**102**	**Total**	**281**	**Total**	**191**	**Total**	**83**	**Total**	**198**

Table 0.34 Q9.4 - In the last 2-3 years, how has the frequency of contact changed between your organisation and the organisations below? (Other Groups)

#	Question	Much more		Somewhat more		About the same		Somewhat less		Much less		Not applicable	
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	7.89 %	119	8.27%	42	7.27 %	16	7.87%	10	7.09 %	10	1.90%	12
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	9.21 %	139	6.10%	31	5.45 %	12	7.09%	9	4.96 %	7	1.75%	11
3	Hizbah Boards	3.45 %	52	3.94%	20	4.09 %	9	1.57%	2	4.96 %	7	18.89%	11 9
4	Vigilante Groups	8.02 %	121	5.91%	30	7.73 %	17	5.51%	7	4.26 %	6	4.44%	28
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	3.98 %	60	7.68%	39	6.36 %	14	11.02%	14	10.64 %	15	10.63%	67
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	8.95 %	135	6.50%	33	4.55 %	10	6.30%	8	5.67 %	8	2.38%	15
7	Academia	6.23 %	94	7.68%	39	8.18 %	18	9.45%	12	8.51 %	12	5.40%	34
8	Media	5.77 %	87	7.87%	40	8.18 %	18	9.45%	12	5.67 %	8	6.98%	44
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	3.51 %	53	8.27%	42	9.55 %	21	6.30%	8	15.60 %	22	10.00%	63
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	6.96 %	105	6.50%	33	8.18 %	18	5.51%	7	12.06 %	17	4.60%	29
11	Community Based Organisations	8.95 %	135	7.48%	38	7.27 %	16	7.09%	9	2.13 %	3	1.27%	8
12	Women's Groups	8.61 %	130	8.07%	41	5.91 %	13	3.94%	5	5.67 %	8	1.90%	12

13	Youth Groups	9.34%	141	6.69%	34	5.45%	12	7.87%	10	0.71%	1	1.75%	11
14	Other Civil Society Groups	7.69%	116	7.09%	36	9.09%	20	8.66%	11	4.96%	7	3.02%	19
15	Secret Societies/Cults	1.46%	22	1.97%	10	2.73%	6	2.36%	3	7.09%	10	25.08%	158
	Total	**Total**	**1509**	**Total**	**508**	**Total**	**220**	**Total**	**127**	**Total**	**141**	**Total**	**630**

Table 0.35 Q9.4 - In the last 2-3 years, how has the frequency of contact changed between your organisation and the organisations below? (Women's Groups)

#	Question	Much more		Somewhat more		About the same		Somewhat less		Much less		Not applicable	
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	8.70 %	28	7.85%	15	5.36 %	3	11.90%	5	9.62 %	5	0.52%	1
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	6.52 %	21	10.47%	20	8.93 %	5	9.52%	4	7.69 %	4	1.56%	3
3	Hizbah Boards	1.24 %	4	4.19%	8	5.36 %	3	0.00%	0	3.85 %	2	20.83%	40
4	Vigilante Groups	4.66 %	15	4.71%	9	10.71 %	6	9.52%	4	9.62 %	5	9.38%	18
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	6.52 %	21	7.33%	14	7.14 %	4	9.52%	4	7.69 %	4	5.21%	10
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	7.14 %	23	8.90%	17	8.93 %	5	9.52%	4	3.85 %	2	3.13%	6
7	Academia	4.66 %	15	9.42%	18	3.57 %	2	7.14%	3	5.77 %	3	8.33%	16
8	Media	10.56 %	34	7.33%	14	5.36 %	3	2.38%	1	7.69 %	4	0.52%	1
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	3.42 %	11	6.28%	12	7.14 %	4	0.00%	0	11.54 %	6	12.50%	24
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	3.42 %	11	6.81%	13	8.93 %	5	19.05%	8	5.77 %	3	8.85%	17
11	Community Based Organisations	11.80 %	38	3.14%	6	7.14 %	4	9.52%	4	5.77 %	3	1.04%	2
12	Women's Groups	11.80 %	38	5.24%	10	5.36 %	3	4.76%	2	3.85 %	2	1.04%	2
13	Youth Groups	8.39 %	27	9.42%	18	7.14 %	4	2.38%	1	5.77 %	3	2.08%	4

14	Other Civil Society Groups	9.94 %	32	7.33%	14	5.36 %	3	2.38%	1	9.62 %	5	1.04%	2
15	Secret Societies/Cults	1.24 %	4	1.57%	3	3.57 %	2	2.38%	1	1.92 %	1	23.96%	46
	Total	**Total**	**322**	**Total**	**191**	**Total**	**56**	**Total**	**42**	**Total**	**52**	**Total**	**192**

Table 0.36 Q9.5 - Which organisations does your organisation work with most successfully in relation to conflict management and peace-building?

#	Group	Women's Groups		Other		Total
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	30.16%	19	69.84%	44	63
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	12.93%	15	87.07%	101	116
3	Hizbah Boards	20.00%	3	80.00%	12	15
4	Vigilante Groups	5.71%	2	94.29%	33	35
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	39.29%	11	60.71%	17	28
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	15.50%	20	84.50%	109	129
7	Academia	6.25%	1	93.75%	15	16
8	Media	45.71%	16	54.29%	19	35
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	5.26%	1	94.74%	18	19
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	3.33%	1	96.67%	29	30
11	Community Based Organisations	24.47%	23	75.53%	71	94
12	Women's Groups	37.29%	22	62.71%	37	59
13	Youth Groups	17.95%	14	82.05%	64	78
14	Other Civil Society Groups	38.89%	21	61.11%	33	54
15	Secret Societies/Cults	100.00%	1	0.00%	0	1
16	Other (please specify)	0.00%	0	100.00%	2	2

Table 0.37 Q9.6 - In the last 2-3 years, has there been any change in the top 3 organisations that your organisation works with most successfully?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
23	Definitely yes	71.93%	41	81.25%	169
24	Probably yes	15.79%	9	15.38%	32
25	Probably not	3.51%	2	0.96%	2
26	Definitely not	8.77%	5	2.40%	5
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**208**

Table 0.38 Q9.7 - You indicated that there has been a change in the top 3 organisations that your organisation works with. Thinking about the last 2-3 years, which organisations did you previously work with most successfully in relation to conflict management and peace-building?

#	Group	Women's Groups		Other		Total
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	15.87%	10	84.13%	53	63
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	15.45%	17	84.55%	93	110
3	Hizbah Boards	21.05%	4	78.95%	15	19
4	Vigilante Groups	5.71%	2	94.29%	33	35
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	34.62%	9	65.38%	17	26
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	16.67%	18	83.33%	90	108
7	Academia	23.53%	4	76.47%	13	17
8	Media	53.57%	15	46.43%	13	28
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	15.79%	3	84.21%	16	19
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	4.00%	1	96.00%	24	25
11	Community Based Organisations	21.05%	20	78.95%	75	95
12	Women's Groups	35.48%	22	64.52%	40	62
13	Youth Groups	14.86%	11	85.14%	63	74
14	Other Civil Society Groups	29.17%	14	70.83%	34	48
15	Secret Societies/Cults	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0
16	Other (please specify)	0.00%	0	100.00%	2	2

Table 0.39 Q9.8 - Thinking about the work of your organisation in conflict management and peace-building, are there any organisations with which you would like to have stronger relationships?

#	Group	Women's Groups		Other		Total
1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	20.69%	18	79.31%	69	87
2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	19.83%	24	80.17%	97	121
3	Hizbah Boards	9.09%	1	90.91%	10	11
4	Vigilante Groups	2.70%	1	97.30%	36	37
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	41.82%	23	58.18%	32	55
6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	23.28%	27	76.72%	89	116
7	Academia	13.64%	3	86.36%	19	22
8	Media	41.46%	17	58.54%	24	41
9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	20.59%	7	79.41%	27	34
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	3.13%	1	96.88%	31	32
11	Community Based Organisations	22.03%	13	77.97%	46	59
12	Women's Groups	27.91%	12	72.09%	31	43
13	Youth Groups	22.45%	11	77.55%	38	49
14	Other Civil Society Groups	15.56%	7	84.44%	38	45
15	Secret Societies/Cults	57.14%	4	42.86%	3	7
16	Other (please specify)	0.00%	0	100.00%	2	2

Table 0.40 Q10.2 - How successful do you think this Platform has been in resolving violent conflict in the last 2-3 years? (BY RESOLVING, WE MEAN STOPPING ONGOING/CURRENT VIOLENT CONFLICTS)

Question	Women's Groups		Other		Total
5	31.25%	10	68.75%	22	32
6	32.35%	11	67.65%	23	34
7	36.67%	11	63.33%	19	30
8	16.67%	8	83.33%	40	48
9	15.22%	7	84.78%	39	46
10	14.04%	8	85.96%	49	57
2	25.00%	1	75.00%	3	4
4	25.00%	1	75.00%	3	4
0	0.00%	0	100.00%	2	2
1	0.00%	0	100.00%	1	1
3	0.00%	0	100.00%	5	5

Table 0.41 Q10.3 - How successful do you think this Platform has been in preventing violent conflict in the last 2-3 years? (BY PREVENTING, WE MEAN STOPPING THE EMERGENCE OF NEW VIOLENT CONFLICT)

Question	Women's Groups		Other		Total
4	14.29%	1	85.71%	6	7
5	26.92%	7	73.08%	19	26
6	30.77%	12	69.23%	27	39
7	25.00%	8	75.00%	24	32
8	27.59%	16	72.41%	42	58
9	9.52%	4	90.48%	38	42
10	16.67%	8	83.33%	40	48
3	33.33%	1	66.67%	2	3
1	0.00%	0	100.00%	1	1
2	0.00%	0	100.00%	7	7

Table 0.42 Q10.4 - In the absence of continued funding for this Platform, which of the following would happen?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Platform would continue to operate unchanged	17.43%	19	16.18%	56
2	The Platform would meet less frequently	19.27%	21	19.94%	69
3	The number of Platform members would reduce	17.43%	19	18.50%	64
4	The range of Platform activities would reduce	25.69%	28	25.43%	88
5	The Platform would discontinue	5.50%	6	7.80%	27
6	Platform members would meet in other fora	13.76%	15	9.83%	34
7	Don't know	0.00%	0	1.73%	6
8	Other (Please specify)	0.92%	1	0.58%	2
	Total	**Total**	**109**	**Total**	**346**

Table 0.43 Q11.2 Respondent Gender

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Male	33.33%	19	73.30%	151
2	Female	64.91%	37	26.70%	55
3	I would rather not say	1.75%	1	0.00%	0
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**206**

Table 0.44 Q11.3 - What is your age?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Under 18 years' old	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
2	18-25 years' old	5.26%	3	3.88%	8
3	26-35 years' old	28.07%	16	24.76%	51
4	36-50 years' old	40.35%	23	48.06%	99
5	51+ years' old	21.05%	12	22.82%	47
6	I would rather not say	5.26%	3	0.49%	1
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**206**

Table 0.45 Q11.4 - What type of organisation do you represent on this Platform?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	Government Agency (Federal, State or LGA level)	8.77%	5	12.14%	25
2	State Security Institution (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	3.51%	2	9.71%	20
3	Hizbah Board	0.00%	0	2.43%	5
4	Vigilante Group	1.75%	1	1.94%	4
5	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia courts)	1.75%	1	1.94%	4
6	Traditional and Religious Institution	1.75%	1	10.68%	22
7	Academia	3.51%	2	5.83%	12
8	Media	1.75%	1	0.97%	2
9	Private Sector Organisation (including oil companies)	1.75%	1	1.94%	4
10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	0.00%	0	4.37%	9
11	Community Based Organisation	17.54%	10	15.05%	31
12	Women's Group	19.30%	11	11.17%	23
13	Youth Group	8.77%	5	10.68%	22
14	Other Civil Society Group	24.56%	14	6.80%	14
15	Secret Society/Cult	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
16	Other (please specify)	5.26%	3	4.37%	9
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**206**

Table 0.46 Q11.5 - Why did you decide to attend this Platform?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	I was invited by the convenor	22.54%	16	17.87%	42
2	I was invited by the Platform	32.39%	23	39.15%	92
3	I heard about it and thought I could make a useful contribution	18.31%	13	22.98%	54
4	I was directed to attend by my superior	22.54%	16	17.87%	42
5	Other (please specify)	4.23%	3	2.13%	5
	Total	**Total**	**71**	**Total**	**235**

Table 0.47 Q11.6 - Approximately how many times have you attended meetings of this Platform in the last 12 months?

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
1	1	1.75%	1	1.94%	4
2	2	3.51%	2	2.91%	6
3	3	14.04%	8	9.71%	20
16	4	12.28%	7	5.83%	12
17	5	10.53%	6	7.28%	15
18	6	10.53%	6	7.77%	16
19	7	7.02%	4	4.85%	10
20	8	5.26%	3	14.08%	29
21	9	1.75%	1	2.91%	6
22	10	5.26%	3	7.28%	15
23	11	1.75%	1	4.85%	10
24	12	5.26%	3	11.65%	24
25	13+	21.05%	12	18.93%	39
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**206**

Table 0.48 Respondents by Platform Level

Level	Women's Groups		Other	
Federal	15.52%	9	5.19%	11
State	84.48%	49	30.19%	64
Local	0.00%	0	64.62%	137
	Total	**58**	**Total**	**212**

Table 0.49 Respondents by Women's Groups and All Other Groups

	%	Count
Women's Groups	21.48%	58
Other	78.52%	212
Total	**100%**	**270**

Table 0.50 Respondents by Organisation Type

#	Question	Women's Groups		Other	
State Actors	State Actors	14.04%	8	23.79%	49
Traditional & Religious Institutions	Traditional & Religious Institutions	1.75%	1	13.11%	27
Non-State Actors	Non-State Actors	84.21%	48	63.11%	130
	Total	**Total**	**57**	**Total**	**206**

Findings from Social Network Analysis

Analysis of the network properties of the NSRP platforms was undertaken using SNA. SNA is the process of investigating social structures using networks and graph theory. It characterizes networked structures in terms of elements (organisations or survey respondent within the network) and the connections (relationships or interactions) between them.

The analysis seeks to assess the strength and depth of linkages among platform members. In addition, the analysis seeks to identify those members within platforms that act as 'local connectors' or 'hubs', and how this varies within and between platforms and by platform type and location.

The SNA undertaken includes a visual representation of the connections within the networks using a stakeholder map (or sociogram) in which elements are represented as points or circles and connections are represented as lines (both circles and lines may vary by colour and/or width to represent the strength of a measure or relationship).

In addition, metrics are presented as 'Degree Centrality' within the networks. Degree centrality counts the number of connections an element has. In general, elements with high degree are the 'local connectors / hubs' (but aren't necessarily the best connected to the wider network). This information assists in consideration of the current and potential effectiveness of platforms.

Degree has also been adjusted using connection weights. When weighted, degree represents the total value of an element's connections instead of just the count. Responses to the Societal Participation Platform Survey provided scores for weighting (specifically questions 9.3 and 9.5[265]).

The web-based application, 'Kumu', was used to undertake the network analysis (further information on the method can be found here www.kumu.io).

265 Q9.3: ('How often does your organisation meet with a representative from the following organisations?') (answer provides one choice on Likert scale 'weekly', 'monthly', '2 to 3 times per year', 'once per year or less', 'never/ not applicable'). Q9.5: ('Which organisations does your organisation work with most successfully in relation to conflict management and peace-building?') (answers provide top three organisations in rank order). Frequency of contact was scored from 1 to 5 ('does not meet' to 'meets weekly') and successful working relationship was scored from 1 to 3 (3rd most successful working relationship to most successful working relationship). The higher scores represented the 'stronger' association.

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Programme-wide Analysis

Frequency of Contact

Map 0.1 shows a pervasive level of contact across the network, involving frequent meetings between respondents and a wide range of stakeholders (a dense network of blue lines between respondents and stakeholders).

For the network, CBO's, Women's Groups and Youth Groups are the most prominent connectors/hubs (Map 0.1 and Table 0.51) (as shown by the large dark blue circles). Traditional and Religious Institutions and State Security Institutions are also important.

The level of contact (and degree centrality) is somewhat reduced for Secret Societies / Cults, Hizbah Boards, and the Private Sector, although these are still frequent contacts for many respondents within the network (as shown by the smaller number of blue connecting lines and smaller, lighter shaded circles).

The Media has a moderate role as a connector/hub.

Works with Most Successfully

Map 0.2 and Table 0.52 show a more selective pattern for those stakeholder organisations identified by respondents as being in their top three most successful work partners. The range of stakeholders mentioned is still wide, but Traditional and Religious Institutions, State Security Institutions and CBO's are the most prominent across the network as connectors/ hubs (and to a lesser extent Youth Groups, and Government Agencies), when it comes to effectiveness.

Women's Groups and the Media have a perceived moderate role as connectors/ hubs, when it comes to effectiveness.

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Map 0.1 NSRP All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.51 NSRP All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Community Based Organisations	1015
#2	Women's Groups	999
#3	Youth Groups	984
#4	Traditional and Religious Institutions	946
#5	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	941
#6	Other Civil Society Groups	935
#7	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	933
#8	Vigilante Groups	867
#9	Media	835
#10	Academia	816
#11	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	795
#12	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	721
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	684
#14	Hizbah Boards	534
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	384
#16	76	75
#17	109	74
#18	160	67
#19	17	66
#20	72	66

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Map 0.2 NSRP All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.52 NSRP All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T1

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	394
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	384
#3	Community Based Organisations	371
#4	Youth Groups	351
#5	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	340
#6	Other Civil Society Groups	326
#7	Women's Groups	314
#8	Media	306
#9	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	299
#10	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	299
#11	Vigilante Groups	298
#12	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	296
#13	Academia	288
#14	Hizbah Boards	285
#15	Other	272
#16	Secret Societies/Cults	271
#17	158	19
#18	27	19
#19	20	19
#20	245	19

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Table 0.53 NSRP All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T0

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	361
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	359
#3	Community Based Organisations	343
#4	Women's Groups	319
#5	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	317
#6	Youth Groups	305
#7	Other Civil Society Groups	301
#8	Media	293
#9	Vigilante Groups	291
#10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	291
#11	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	289
#12	Academia	281
#13	Hizbah Boards	281
#14	Other	275
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	271
#16	158	17
#17	27	17
#18	20	17
#19	245	17
#20	119	17

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Platform-by-Platform Analysis

National Peace and Security Forum (NPSF)

(Note: based in Abuja)

Frequency of Contact

For the NPSF, Map 0.3 indicates a relatively intense level of connectivity between respondents and a wide range of stakeholder organisations via weekly or monthly meetings (shown by the blue lines). However, less intense links are found between respondents and the following stakeholder organisations:

- Secret Societies/ Cults;
- Private Sector Organisations;
- Academia;
- Traditional and Religious Institutions; and
- Media.

For this national-level network (see Map 0.3 and Table 0.54), many organisations play a role as local connectors/ hubs (i.e. they have a relatively high number of connections, as indicated by the large blue circles).

The most prominent local connectors/ hub stakeholders include:

- Community Based Organisations;
- State Security Institutions; and
- Other Civil Society Groups;
- Women's Groups;
- Government Agencies; and
- Youth Groups.

The least prominent local connectors/ hub organisations include:

- Secret Societies/ Cults;
- Hizbah Boards;
- Vigilante Groups;
- Judiciary;
- Private Sector Organisations; and
- Academia.

Organisations with a moderate role as local connectors/ hub organisations include:

- Traditional and religious institutions;
- Media; and
- Trader's/ Producer's Groups.

Respondents vary widely by number of connections in this network (indicated by the different sized purple circles on Map 0.3): this indicates that some members have relatively few connections and are relatively isolated participants in the network (in terms of meeting frequency).

Works with Most Successfully

In addition to frequency of meeting, the data allows examination of the quality or value of relationships (as perceived by survey respondents). Map 0.4 indicates that a relatively small group of stakeholder organisations are identified by respondents as the most successful work partners (indicated by green lines). This group includes:

- Government Agencies;
- Women's Groups;
- Judiciary;
- Youth Groups;
- Community Based Organisations; and
- State Security Institutions.

Several organisations do not appear at all in the top three ranked most successful work partners, including:

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- Secret Societies/ Cults;
- Hizbah Boards;
- Vigilante Groups;
- Academia; and
- Trader's/ Producer's Groups.

It is noted that some of these groups feature more prominently within other state-level platforms. However, they have a less significant role at the national level.

In terms of number of connections (degree centrality), by far the most prominent organisational connector/hub is the Government Agencies group (i.e. the most number of connections weighted by strength of connection) (followed by Women's Groups, and the Judiciary) (see Map 0.4 and Table 0.55).

The analysis suggests a pivotal role for government agencies at the national level, as drivers of change, supported to a lesser extent by range of other stakeholders.

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Map 0.3 NPSF: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.54 NPSF: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	224	65
#2	225	63
#3	219	60
#4	222	55
#5	223	49
#6	Community Based Organisations	44
#7	221	42
#8	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	42
#9	Other Civil Society Groups	42
#10	220	40
#11	Women's Groups	40
#12	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	38
#13	Youth Groups	37
#14	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	37
#15	Media	37
#16	217	36
#17	Traditional and Religious Institutions	34
#18	216	33
#19	218	33
#20	Academia	32

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Map 0.4 NPSF: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.55 NPSF: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T1

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	19
#2	225	19
#3	223	19
#4	222	19
#5	221	19
#6	226	19
#7	216	19
#8	218	19
#9	220	19
#10	217	19
#11	219	19
#12	224	16
#13	Women's Groups	15
#14	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	15
#15	Community Based Organisations	14
#16	Youth Groups	14
#17	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	14
#18	Other Civil Society Groups	13
#19	Traditional and Religious Institutions	12
#20	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	12

I

Table 0.56 NPSF: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T0

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	17
#2	225	17
#3	223	17
#4	222	17
#5	221	17
#6	226	17
#7	216	17
#8	218	17
#9	220	17
#10	224	17
#11	Women's Groups	17
#12	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	17
#13	217	17
#14	219	17
#15	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	13
#16	Community Based Organisations	13
#17	Secret Societies/Cults	11
#18	Academia	11
#19	Vigilante Groups	11
#20	Hizbah Boards	11

I

Federal Women Peace and Security Network (FWPSN)

(Note: based in Abuja)

Frequency of Contact

The FWPSN respondents meet frequently with a smaller range of stakeholders than the NPSF (Map 0.5). Key connectors /hubs are Youth Groups; Women's Groups; Other Civil Society Groups; and Community Based Organisations (Map 0.5 and Table 0.57).

The Media is as a less prominent hub and State Security Institutions also have a relatively low role as a hub for this platform (in terms of meeting frequency).

Works with Most Successfully

While State Security Institutions do not figure highly in term of number of meeting connections, they are nonetheless one a of small number of stakeholders that the FWPSN respondents cite as influential in successful working, along with Traditional and Religious Institutions, Community Based Organisations, Government Agencies, and Women's Groups

I

Map 0.5 FWPSN: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



I

Table 0.57 FWPSN: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	209	57
#2	215	54
#3	207	51
#4	208	51
#5	214	43
#6	Youth Groups	38
#7	Women's Groups	37
#8	Other Civil Society Groups	37
#9	Community Based Organisations	36
#10	212	36
#11	211	35
#12	213	32
#13	210	30
#14	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	30
#15	Traditional and Religious Institutions	29
#16	Academia	29
#17	Media	29
#18	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	23
#19	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	23
#20	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	23

I

Map 0.6 FWPSN: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



I

Table 0.58 FWPSN: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	210	19
#2	209	19
#3	212	19
#4	207	19
#5	214	19
#6	215	19
#7	211	19
#8	213	19
#9	208	19
#10	Traditional and Religious Institutions	16
#11	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	16
#12	Community Based Organisations	14
#13	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	12
#14	Women's Groups	11
#15	Youth Groups	10
#16	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	10
#17	Other Civil Society Groups	10
#18	Secret Societies/Cults	9
#19	Academia	9
#20	Vigilante Groups	9

I

Community Peace Partnerships (CPPs)

(Note: respondents based in Kano, Plateau, Yobe, and Bayelsa)

Frequency of Contact

There are a relatively large number of CPP platform respondents, and consequently the pattern of meeting frequency is like that shown for 'NSRP All Platforms'. However, Vigilante Groups take on a more important hub role for CPPs (see Map 0.7, Table 0.59). Vigilante Groups are the most prominent connectors/hubs, followed by Youth Groups, and Women's Groups.

The Media has a low to moderate role as a connector / hub.

Works with Most Successfully

CPP respondents cite State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force); Traditional and Religious Institutions; Community Based Organisations; and Youth Groups as influential in successful working

Both the Media and Women's Groups are less frequently cited as connectors/ hubs when it comes to successful working partners.

Vigilante groups are not as well rated when it comes to number of quality-related connections, despite their high meeting frequency ratings.

I

Map 0.7 CPP All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.59 CPP All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Vigilante Groups	405
#2	Youth Groups	404
#3	Women's Groups	401
#4	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	401
#5	Traditional and Religious Institutions	398
#6	Community Based Organisations	398
#7	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	396
#8	Other Civil Society Groups	355
#9	Academia	352
#10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	351
#11	Media	316
#12	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	304
#13	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	296
#14	Hizbah Boards	259
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	164
#16	109	74
#17	17	66
#18	270	64
#19	244	63
#20	267	62

I

Map 0.8 CPP All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.60 CPP All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T1

Rank	Label	Value
#1	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	153
#2	Traditional and Religious Institutions	152
#3	Community Based Organisations	149
#4	Youth Groups	140
#5	Other Civil Society Groups	130
#6	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	122
#7	Vigilante Groups	121
#8	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	120
#9	Media	118
#10	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	117
#11	Women's Groups	115
#12	Hizbah Boards	114
#13	Academia	113
#14	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	112
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	107
#16	Other	107
#17	27	19
#18	20	19
#19	245	19
#20	184	19

I

Table 0.61 CPP All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T0

Rank	Label	Value
#1	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	143
#2	Traditional and Religious Institutions	139
#3	Community Based Organisations	137
#4	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	127
#5	Vigilante Groups	123
#6	Youth Groups	123
#7	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	119
#8	Women's Groups	117
#9	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	117
#10	Other Civil Society Groups	117
#11	Academia	111
#12	Hizbah Boards	111
#13	Media	111
#14	Secret Societies/Cults	107
#15	Other	107
#16	27	17
#17	20	17
#18	245	17
#19	268	17
#20	184	17

I

Land & Water Use Dialogue Mechanisms / Committees (LWU-DM/C)

(Note: respondents based in Plateau only)

Frequency of Contact

Traditional and Religious Institutions, Vigilante Groups, Youth Groups, Women's Groups, and Community Based Organisations are the most significant actors in terms of meeting frequency and number of weighted connections (Map 0.9 and Table 0.62).

It is noted that State Security Institutions play a moderate role as connectors/hubs, and that the Media has relatively low relevance to this group in terms of meeting frequency.

Works with Most Successfully

Youth Groups, Traditional and Religious Institutions, and Women's Groups are also important as successful working partners (Map 0.10 and Table 0.63).

As for CPPs, Vigilante groups are rated less highly as successful working partners, despite their high meeting frequency.

I

Map 0.9 LWU-DM/C All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.62 LWU-DM/C All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	96
#2	Vigilante Groups	96
#3	Youth Groups	93
#4	Women's Groups	89
#5	Community Based Organisations	88
#6	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	74
#7	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	68
#8	Other Civil Society Groups	66
#9	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	65
#10	95	60
#11	92	57
#12	Academia	55
#13	90	55
#14	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	55
#15	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	55
#16	111	53
#17	Media	53
#18	88	51
#19	85	51
#20	112	50

I

Map 0.10 LWU-DM/C All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.63 LWU-DMC All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T1

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Youth Groups	37
#2	Traditional and Religious Institutions	34
#3	Women's Groups	32
#4	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	30
#5	Community Based Organisations	28
#6	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	27
#7	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	26
#8	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	25
#9	Vigilante Groups	24
#10	Secret Societies/Cults	22
#11	Academia	22
#12	Hizbah Boards	22
#13	Other	22
#14	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	22
#15	Other Civil Society Groups	22
#16	Media	22
#17	119	19
#18	120	19
#19	114	19
#20	93	19

I

Table 0.64 LWU-DMC All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T0

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	32
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	32
#3	Community Based Organisations	28
#4	Youth Groups	28
#5	Women's Groups	28
#6	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	26
#7	Vigilante Groups	24
#8	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	22
#9	Secret Societies/Cults	22
#10	Academia	22
#11	Hizbah Boards	22
#12	Other	22
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	22
#14	Other Civil Society Groups	22
#15	Media	22
#16	119	17
#17	120	17
#18	114	17
#19	93	17
#20	117	17

I

Environment Monitoring Teams (EMT)

(Note: respondents based in Bayelsa only)

Frequency of Contact

The network for EMTs is broadly like that of the LWUs, although a smaller, less intensive network. Community Based Organisations, Youth Groups, Vigilante Groups, and Traditional and Religious Institutions are most prominent as local connectors/ hubs, whereas State Security Institutions and the Media have a moderate role (Map 0.11 and Table 0.65).

Works with Most Successfully

For this platform, there is a divergence in the stakeholders worked with frequently, and those identified as important in achieving success. In contrast to the platforms considered thus far, the Media plays a relatively important role for this network as a local connector/ hub when 'works with successfully' connections are examined, as do Government Agencies and State Security Institutions (Map 0.12 and Table 0.66).

Youth Groups and Women's Groups are less prominent as local connectors/ hubs for 'quality' of relationship.

I

Map 0.11 EMT All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.65 EMT All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	42	47
#2	40	42
#3	43	39
#4	38	36
#5	44	34
#6	Community Based Organisations	34
#7	45	32
#8	Youth Groups	28
#9	Vigilante Groups	25
#10	Traditional and Religious Institutions	24
#11	41	22
#12	46	21
#13	Women's Groups	21
#14	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	21
#15	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	21
#16	Other Civil Society Groups	21
#17	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	18
#18	Media	18
#19	39	15
#20	Academia	13

I

Map 0.12 EMT All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



I

Table 0.66 EMT All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	44	19
#2	41	19
#3	42	19
#4	39	19
#5	46	19
#6	38	19
#7	45	19
#8	40	19
#9	43	19
#10	Media	15
#11	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	14
#12	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	14
#13	Other Civil Society Groups	13
#14	Traditional and Religious Institutions	12
#15	Community Based Organisations	11
#16	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	11
#17	Secret Societies/Cults	9
#18	Academia	9
#19	Vigilante Groups	9
#20	Hizbah Boards	9

I

Women Peace and Security Network (WPSN)

(Note: respondents based in Kano, Plateau, Yobe, and Bayelsa)

Frequency of Contact

Map 0.13 illustrates a large and intensive network with a lot of frequent contact between respondents and many different stakeholder institutions.

The most prominent local connectors / hubs are Women's Groups, Other Civil Society Groups, and CBO's. The Media is also ranked highly (Table 0.67).

Least prominent are Vigilante Groups, Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies), Hizbah Boards, and Secret Societies/Cults.

Works with Most Successfully

The range of stakeholder organisations identified as representing the most successful working partnerships is diverse and broad-based. However, the most prominent local connectors / hubs for quality of relationship are State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force), Traditional and Religious Institutions, and CBO's.

I

Map 0.13 WPSN All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.67 WPSN All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Women's Groups	190
#2	Other Civil Society Groups	188
#3	Community Based Organisations	181
#4	Media	175
#5	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	169
#6	Youth Groups	169
#7	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	167
#8	Traditional and Religious Institutions	162
#9	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	151
#10	Academia	132
#11	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	129
#12	Vigilante Groups	124
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	102
#14	Hizbah Boards	93
#15	160	67
#16	Secret Societies/Cults	65
#17	10	63
#18	239	62
#19	232	60
#20	3	60

I

Map 0.14 WPSN All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.68 WPSN All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	71
#2	Traditional and Religious Institutions	69
#3	Community Based Organisations	68
#4	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	62
#5	Media	62
#6	Other Civil Society Groups	60
#7	Vigilante Groups	58
#8	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	58
#9	Hizbah Boards	56
#10	Academia	54
#11	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	54
#12	Women's Groups	54
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	52
#14	Youth Groups	51
#15	Other	50
#16	Secret Societies/Cults	49
#17	159	19
#18	9	19
#19	236	19
#20	174	19

I

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSP)

(Note: respondents based in Bayelsa only)

Frequency of Contact

Map 0.15 indicates a relatively small and low-intensity network (by meeting frequency), although this contact is widely distributed between stakeholder organisations.

Community Based Organisations, Youth Groups, Other Civil Society Groups, and Women's Groups are the most prominent local connectors/ hubs (Table 0.69).

Works with Most Successfully

A smaller range of stakeholders are identified as the most successful partnerships. Community Based Organisations, Youth Groups, and Women's Groups are important local connectors/ hubs for successful working relationships (as they are for meeting frequency). However, the most prominent are Traditional and Religious Institutions (Map 0.16 and Table 0.70).

I

Map 0.15 MSP All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



I

Table 0.69 MSP All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	49	41
#2	47	37
#3	54	37
#4	48	37
#5	Community Based Organisations	36
#6	Youth Groups	36
#7	55	35
#8	51	35
#9	53	35
#10	Other Civil Society Groups	34
#11	56	32
#12	50	32
#13	Women's Groups	32
#14	58	31
#15	Media	31
#16	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	30
#17	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	30
#18	Academia	29
#19	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	29
#20	52	22

I

Map 0.16 MSP All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.70 MSP All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	20
#2	49	19
#3	52	19
#4	56	19
#5	47	19
#6	55	19
#7	54	19
#8	58	19
#9	50	19
#10	48	19
#11	51	19
#12	57	19
#13	53	19
#14	Community Based Organisations	18
#15	Youth Groups	18
#16	Women's Groups	18
#17	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	15
#18	Other Civil Society Groups	15
#19	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	14
#20	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	13

I

State Conflict Management Alliances (SCMA)

(Note: respondents based in Kano, Plateau, Yobe, and Bayelsa)

Frequency of Contact

A large and intensive network where a wide range of stakeholders are engaged on a frequent basis. The platform is like the CPPs in this regard. However, different stakeholders take the most prominent rankings as local connectors / hubs: that is, Community Based Organisations, Other Civil Society Groups, and Women's Groups. Whereas, Vigilante Groups and Youth Groups are more important for CPPs (see Map 0.17. and Table 0.71).

Works with Most Successfully

A diverse group of stakeholders are identified as most successful working partners. The most prominent local connectors/ hubs are Traditional and Religious Institutions, Youth Groups, State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force), Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level), and Community Based Organisations (Map 0.18 and Table 0.72).

Women's Groups have a moderate role as connectors/ hubs and the role of the Media is relatively low.

I

Map 0.17 SCMA All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.71 SCMA All Areas: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Community Based Organisations	198
#2	Other Civil Society Groups	192
#3	Women's Groups	189
#4	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	187
#5	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	184
#6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	181
#7	Youth Groups	179
#8	Media	176
#9	Academia	174
#10	Vigilante Groups	157
#11	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	153
#12	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	144
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	121
#14	Hizbah Boards	96
#15	76	75
#16	Secret Societies/Cults	74
#17	72	66
#18	74	63
#19	167	60
#20	161	59

I

Map 0.18 SCMA All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.72 SCMA All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T1

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	79
#2	Youth Groups	72
#3	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	71
#4	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	70
#5	Community Based Organisations	69
#6	Other Civil Society Groups	63
#7	Women's Groups	60
#8	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	60
#9	Academia	58
#10	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	58
#11	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	57
#12	Media	56
#13	Vigilante Groups	54
#14	Secret Societies/Cults	52
#15	Hizbah Boards	52
#16	Other	52
#17	158	19
#18	142	19
#19	167	19
#20	206	19

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Table 0.73 SCMA All Areas: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality, T0

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	74
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	70
#3	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	66
#4	Community Based Organisations	62
#5	Women's Groups	60
#6	Youth Groups	58
#7	Hizbah Boards	56
#8	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	56
#9	Other Civil Society Groups	56
#10	Media	56
#11	Academia	54
#12	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	54
#13	Secret Societies/Cults	52
#14	Vigilante Groups	52
#15	Other	52
#16	158	17
#17	142	17
#18	167	17
#19	206	17
#20	76	17

I

State-by-State Analysis

Abuja

(Note: analysis includes NPSF, FWPSN platforms)

Frequency of Contact

The network pattern is reflective of the two constituent federal platforms already examined: the NPSF and the FWSPN. As such the network shows relatively frequent engagement with a wide range of stakeholders.

The most prominent stakeholders at the federal level are Community Based Organisations, Other Civil Society Groups, Women's Groups, and Youth Groups (see Map 0.19 and Table 0.74).

Works with Most Successfully

The most successful work partners are less widely distributed across the stakeholders. The most prominent local connectors / hubs are Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level), State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force), and Traditional and Religious Institutions (Map 0.20 and Table 0.75).

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Map 0.19 Abuja All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.74 Abuja All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Community Based Organisations	80
#2	Other Civil Society Groups	79
#3	Women's Groups	77
#4	Youth Groups	75
#5	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	68
#6	Media	66
#7	224	65
#8	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	65
#9	Traditional and Religious Institutions	63
#10	225	63
#11	Academia	61
#12	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	60
#13	219	60
#14	209	57
#15	222	55
#16	215	54
#17	207	51
#18	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	51
#19	208	51
#20	223	49

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Map 0.20 Abuja All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.75 Abuja All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	31
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	30
#3	Traditional and Religious Institutions	28
#4	Community Based Organisations	28
#5	Women's Groups	26
#6	Youth Groups	24
#7	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	24
#8	Other Civil Society Groups	23
#9	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	21
#10	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	21
#11	Media	21
#12	Secret Societies/Cults	20
#13	Academia	20
#14	Vigilante Groups	20
#15	Hizbah Boards	20
#16	Other	20
#17	210	19
#18	225	19
#19	209	19
#20	223	19

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Kano

(Note: analysis includes WPSN, SCMA, CPP platforms)

Frequency of Contact

The network incorporates a range of platforms and displays a dense and frequent contact pattern across all stakeholders (except for secret societies/cults). The most prominent local connectors/ hubs are Community Based Organisations, Hizbah Boards, and Women's Groups (see Map 0.21 and Table 0.76).

The prominence of Hizbah boards is noted in contrast to other states.

Works with Most Successfully

Most successful partners are drawn from a more restricted pool of stakeholders. The most prominent local connectors/ hubs are State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force), Traditional and Religious Institutions, and Community Based Organisations (see Map 0.22and Table 0.77).

Hizbah boards are not very commonly cited as a one of the most successful work partners despite the high intensity of contact. Community Based Organisations have both high meeting intensity and are frequently seen as a successful work partners. Meeting contact with State Security Institutions is moderate, but they are nonetheless ranked as the most prominent local connector/ hub for successful work outcomes.

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Map 0.21 Kano All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.76 Kano All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Community Based Organisations	208
#2	Hizbah Boards	204
#3	Women's Groups	204
#4	Youth Groups	201
#5	Other Civil Society Groups	201
#6	Traditional and Religious Institutions	199
#7	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	198
#8	Vigilante Groups	194
#9	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	190
#10	Academia	189
#11	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	178
#12	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	166
#13	Media	151
#14	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	136
#15	76	75
#16	Secret Societies/Cults	71
#17	72	66
#18	270	64
#19	244	63
#20	74	63

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Map 0.22 Kano All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.77 Kano All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	82
#2	Traditional and Religious Institutions	72
#3	Community Based Organisations	68
#4	Youth Groups	68
#5	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	62
#6	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	62
#7	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	61
#8	Media	61
#9	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	59
#10	Academia	58
#11	Women's Groups	58
#12	Other Civil Society Groups	58
#13	Vigilante Groups	57
#14	Hizbah Boards	55
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	54
#16	Other	54
#17	245	19
#18	9	19
#19	76	19
#20	78	19

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Plateau

(Note: analysis includes WPSN, LWU-DM/C, CPP, SCMA platforms)

Frequency of Contact

The meeting frequency pattern is like Kano except for Hizbah Boards, which are not prominent in Plateau. Three of the top four local connectors/ hubs are also the same: Youth Groups, Women's Groups, and Community Based Organisations. These are joined by Traditional and Religious Institutions (see Map 0.23 and Table 0.78).

Works with Most Successfully

The pattern for ‘works with most successfully’ is also like Kano. The top four local connectors / hubs in terms of successful work outcomes are the same: Traditional and Religious Institutions, State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force), Youth Groups, and Community Based Organisations (see Map 0.24 and Table 0.79).

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Map 0.23 Plateau All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.78 Plateau All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Youth Groups	302
#2	Women's Groups	300
#3	Traditional and Religious Institutions	299
#4	Community Based Organisations	298
#5	Vigilante Groups	291
#6	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	277
#7	Other Civil Society Groups	273
#8	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	267
#9	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	258
#10	Media	254
#11	Academia	231
#12	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	229
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	191
#14	Hizbah Boards	112
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	110
#16	109	74
#17	127	62
#18	121	61
#19	95	60
#20	102	60

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Map 0.24 Plateau All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.79 Plateau All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	116
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	106
#3	Youth Groups	103
#4	Community Based Organisations	102
#5	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	94
#6	Other Civil Society Groups	94
#7	Vigilante Groups	89
#8	Women's Groups	88
#9	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	84
#10	Media	83
#11	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	80
#12	Academia	78
#13	Hizbah Boards	78
#14	Secret Societies/Cults	75
#15	Other	75
#16	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	75
#17	119	19
#18	120	19
#19	142	19
#20	114	19

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Yobe

(Note: analysis includes WPSN, SCMA, CPP platforms)

Frequency of Contact

Again, Yobe displays a similar pattern of meeting frequency to Plateau and Kano (except for Hizbah Boards). Three of the top four local connectors/ hubs are the same: Traditional and Religious Institutions, Community Based Organisations, and Women's Groups. However, Government Agencies are more prominent in Yobe at the expense of Youth Groups (when compared with Plateau) (see Map 0.25 and Table 0.80).

Works with Most Successfully

A similar pattern repeats for Kano, Plateau and Yobe: the four top local connectors/ hubs are the same (Community Based Organisations, State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force), Traditional and Religious Institutions, and Youth Groups) (see Map 0.26 and Table 0.81).

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Map 0.25 Yobe All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.80 Yobe All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	178
#2	Community Based Organisations	178
#3	Women's Groups	178
#4	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	177
#5	Youth Groups	169
#6	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	167
#7	Other Civil Society Groups	162
#8	Media	150
#9	Academia	148
#10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	146
#11	Vigilante Groups	144
#12	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	134
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	132
#14	Hizbah Boards	95
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	71
#16	160	67
#17	17	66
#18	12	62
#19	167	60
#20	11	60

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Map 0.26 Yobe All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.81 Yobe All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Community Based Organisations	71
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	69
#3	Traditional and Religious Institutions	68
#4	Youth Groups	63
#5	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	60
#6	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	58
#7	Other Civil Society Groups	58
#8	Women's Groups	55
#9	Media	55
#10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	54
#11	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	54
#12	Vigilante Groups	53
#13	Hizbah Boards	53
#14	Academia	51
#15	Other	50
#16	Secret Societies/Cults	49
#17	158	19
#18	27	19
#19	20	19
#20	167	19

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Bayelsa

(Note: analysis includes EMT, MSP WPSN, SCMA, CPP platforms)

Frequency of Contact

A pattern of meeting frequency is found that is like the other states. Community Based Organisations and Women's Groups are prominent as local connectors/ hubs, as they are in Kano, Plateau, Yobe, and Abuja. Youth Groups are also in the top four of all states, except for Yobe, where it is ranked fifth (Map 0.27 and Table 0.82).

Works with Most Successfully

The pattern for successful work partners is broadly consistent across all geographic areas, including Bayelsa (see Map 0.28 and Table 0.83). The following stakeholders are ranked in the top 5 prominent local connectors/ hubs in all locations: Traditional and Religious Institutions, Community Based Organisations, State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force), Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level), and Youth Groups.

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Map 0.27 Bayelsa All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.82 Bayelsa All Platforms: Meets Frequently by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Community Based Organisations	251
#2	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	242
#3	Women's Groups	240
#4	Youth Groups	237
#5	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	223
#6	Other Civil Society Groups	220
#7	Media	214
#8	Traditional and Religious Institutions	207
#9	Vigilante Groups	198
#10	Academia	187
#11	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	174
#12	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	153
#13	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	143
#14	Secret Societies/Cults	101
#15	Hizbah Boards	91
#16	239	62
#17	152	61
#18	183	60
#19	232	60
#20	203	57

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Map 0.28 Bayelsa All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality



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Table 0.83 Bayelsa All Platforms: Works with Successfully by Degree Centrality

Rank	Label	Value
#1	Traditional and Religious Institutions	110
#2	Community Based Organisations	102
#3	State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force)	97
#4	Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level)	95
#5	Youth Groups	93
#6	Other Civil Society Groups	93
#7	Women's Groups	87
#8	Media	86
#9	Academia	81
#10	Trader's/ Producer's Group (including farmers /pastoralists)	81
#11	Vigilante Groups	79
#12	Hizbah Boards	79
#13	Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies)	79
#14	Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and Sharia Courts)	79
#15	Secret Societies/Cults	73
#16	Other	73
#17	184	19
#18	49	19
#19	236	19
#20	206	19

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Appendix E Value for Money (Effectiveness)

Output 1: Security and Governance

- **Spend per output for SCMAs:** By the end of May 2017, SCMAs had discussed a total of 198 conflict or peacebuilding issues during meetings and had taken 116 actions in response. Some 12 specific instances of conflict being averted or resolved have been identified and 2 policy and/or practice changes achieved. A total of £1,862,935 has been spent on this component including grants, TA, regional and central costs;
- The average cost to the programme in each of the three categories has fallen steadily over the life of the programme. For instance, the NSRP expenditure per action taken by the SCMA was just over £16,000 (NSRP 2017 p7); and
- However, it has not proved possible to assess the number of citizens that have benefitted from the work of the SCMAs due to the variable nature of the issues that they have dealt with.
- **Cost per head of engaging community members and other key stakeholders to form the Community Peacebuilding Partnerships (CPP):**
- Twenty-eight CPPs or "CPP-like" mechanisms have been established and run across eight states and 28 LGAs with the support of NSRP.
- It costs GBP 26,000 to set up a CPP and an average of GBP 11,000 annually to run a CPP.
- The programme has invested £3.03 m to date (inclusive of grants, fee and running costs) mainly in the form of 12 grants to support establishment and running of CPPs. CPP grants closed out in Q1 FY 2017.
- The CPPS have a cumulative membership of 715 across eight states, with a cost per member of £627 at year 5.
- The expenditure per member has reduced by 50% over the length of the programme.

It is noted that effectiveness measures are not reported by NSRP for one Output 1 platform, i.e. the NPSF.

Output 2: Economic and Natural Resources

- **Spend per output for Land and Water Use Dialogue Mechanisms**: By the end of May 2017, Plateau LWU Mechanisms had discussed a total of 74 local issues during meetings and had taken 60 actions to respond to them. 40 specific instances of conflict being averted or resolved have been identified;
- A total of £1,113,563 has been spent on this component including grants, TA, regional and central costs;
- The average cost to the programme in each of the three categories has fallen steadily over the life of the programme. At the end of May 2017, the average spend per issue resolved had fallen by over 75% since the end of Year 2 of the programme;
- Evidence from the APS about perceptions of the way that conflicts over land or water have been resolved in the past one year suggested significant improvement in Plateau of 26 percentage points from 45% to 71% in three years; and
- Effectiveness data was not available for Kaduna (the other state in which the LWU platform was active).

It is noted that effectiveness measures are not reported by NSRP for other Output 2 activities and platforms including:

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- Youth Employment Programmes; or
- Multi-Stakeholder Platforms.

Output 3: Women and Girls in Peacebuilding and Conflict Management

- **Spend per Output on Women Peace and Security Networks (WPSN):** Nine WPSNs have been supported by NSRP, one at federal level and eight across NSRP's focal states;
- By the end of May 2017, the nine WPSNs had prioritised 70 specific activities contained in NAP/SAPs and had taken a total of 150 actions to implement them;
- Some nine of the outcomes specifically set out in NAP/SAPs had been achieved and a further nine policy and/or practice changes had been influenced;
- A total of £1,628,088 had been spent on this work area including grants, TA, regional and central costs (NSRP 2017 pp8-9);
- The NSRP comments that the average cost to the programme of an action has fallen steadily over the life of the programme and is now around one-fifth of the cost that it was at the end of Year 2;
- **Spend per Peace Club Member**: The NSRP supports 37 peace clubs across 6 states (as at June 2017);
- A total of 16,051 young people have participated in Peace Clubs over the life of the programme;
- In the three and a half years to June 2017, Peace Club members have made a total of 345 contributions to conflict management or peacebuilding in their communities. Whilst this is a relatively modest number at just 2% of overall membership, the number of contributions recorded since the beginning of Year 4 of the programme was a more substantial 296, as NSRP report data capture mechanisms taking hold; and
- A total of £1,744,601 has been spent on this component including grants, TA, regional and central costs since the programme began.

Output 4: Research and Advocacy, Media and Conflict Sensitivity

- NSRP has supported the publication of 78 separate pieces of research since the programme began.
- This research has been referenced or used by others on 53 identified occasions and has contributed to 17 separate policy or practice changes at various levels;
- The programme has so far spent a total of £2,303,863 in this area including grants, TA, central and regional costs (to June 2017) (NSRP 2017 pp9-10).
- Therefore, the unit cost per piece of research that has been specifically referenced is high (although falling) at an average of over £40,000.

It is noted that effectiveness measures are not reported by NSRP for other Output 4 activities including:

- Work with Strategic Partners; or
- Media work.

For those platforms not reported by NSRP, or with limited reporting in their 2017 VfM report, the IEP has indicated total spend (to July 2017) (see table E1 below). Consistent with other platforms, a high unit cost per output in indicated.

Table E1: Spend by Platform, FTE

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Platform type	No Platforms	No. meetings	No. of conflict issues discussed	No. of actions taken by Platform	No. of conflicts resolved/prevent ed	% of successful actions	Total Spend by 2017 (£)
National Peace and Security Forum	1	20	56	28	1	4%	1.3m
Community Peace Partnerships	27	279	334	145	44	30%	3.0m
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms on Oil Spills (Southern states only)	3	20	26	6	0	0%	1.3m

Source: NSRP Monitoring Data (March 2017), and NSRP Financial Data (July 2017)

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Appendix F Value for Money (Costs)

Tables F1 and F2 present the relative costs of each of the four outputs along with details of spend on M&E and programme management at MTE and final evaluation points.

AT MTE, table 18 shows that each of the outputs has underspent its original budget by a margin of between 10% and 36%. The exception was Output 4 which has overspent its original budget by over two-thirds (67%).

At the MTE point it was highlighted that M&E spend was below budget by 36%, and represented just 3% of total spend. At the MTE evaluation point, the IEP expressed the view that programme M&E data, in its then form, could not support programme learning and adaption in a meaningful way. It was however noted that, at 3% of spend, NSRP is at the upper end of the scale in terms of guidelines for M&E development interventions (OECD, 2013: p21).[266] The M&E spend had increased to 4% at FTE.

Table F1: NSRP component costs at MTE

Item	Budget	Actual	% Variance	% of total
Output 1 Activities	£3,481,993	£3,129,667	-10%	20%
Output 2 Activities	£2,946,414	£1,872,877	-36%	12%
Output 3 Activities	£3,098,686	£2,307,695	-26%	14%
Output 4 Activities	£2,607,879	£4,350,070	+67%	27%
Sub-total	**£12,134,972**	**£11,660,309**	**-4%**	**73%**
M&E	£808,800	£520,502	-36%	3%
Prog. Mgt.	£3,713,666	£3,794,571	+2%	24%
Total	**£16,657,438**	**£15,975,382**	**-**	**100%**

Source: NSRP Financial Data, February 2016

Table F2: NSRP component costs at FTE

Item	Budget	Actual	% Variance	% of total
Output 1 Activities	-	£5,797,055	-	22%
Output 2 Activities	-	£3,234,955	-	12%
Output 3 Activities	-	£4,125,974	-	16%
Output 4 Activities	-	£5,894,391	-	23%
Sub-total	**-**	**£19,052,375**	**-**	74%
M&E	-	£948,780	-	4%
Prog. Mgt.	-	£5,903,825	-	23%
Total	**-**	**£25,904,980**	**-**	100%

Source: NSRP Financial Data, 31st May 2017

However, based on the positive evidence gathered through the MTE it was concluded that increased investment in Output 4 had been worthwhile.[267] Case study evidence presented for the MTE concludes NSRP's work to conflict-sensitise the Nigerian media provides another strong example of NSRP's capacity to support key stakeholders through training in conflict sensitive ways of action.

[266] "*There has been considerable debate about what percentage of funds is required to ensure adequate monitoring and evaluation at the programme level. Some organisations have fixed 1% or 3% as a rough guide*" (OECD, 2013: p21)

[267] The MTE has found evidence that NSRP is achieving the outcomes captured in the lower levels of its TOC in relation to Output 4.

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At the MTE, for Outputs 1, 2 and 3, questions remained over whether the investment being made by NSRP was too small to make a meaningful difference on its own. At final evaluation stage, we have presented evidence that a series of gains are being made in strengthening the peace architecture, bringing about broader societal participation, and exerting influence. However, these are at high unit cost per output and there is little evidence to attribute these low to moderate levels of outcomes to increased public perception in target states of reduced conflict.

Table F3 shows estimated NSRP spend by region and by state over the implementation period up to July 2017. This shows little change in distribution from that at the MTE: 31% of spend at Federal level, 29% for Middle Belt states, 18% for Niger Delta, 11% for the North East, and 11% for the North West.

NSRP does not set state level budgets so it is not possible to conclude whether geographical distribution of spend is as anticipated. As noted at the MTE, it is not possible as things stand to conclude the relative VfM of programme spend across states. For example, what represents VfM in Borno is likely to be different from what represents VfM in Kaduna or Plateau.

Table F3: NSRP Spend by region and state, 2016-17 (Estimated)

		2016		2017	
Region	**State**	**Actual (£)**	**% of total**	**Actual (£)**	**% of total**
Federal	Federal	£5,254,376	33%	£5,385,305	31%
Sub-total		**£5,254,376**	**33%**	**£5,385,305**	**31%**
Middle Belt	Kaduna	£1,500,325	9%	£1,671,514	9%
	Plateau	£3,216,171	20%	£3,494,114	20%
Sub-total		**£4,716,496**	**29%**	**£5,165,628**	**29%**
Niger Delta	Bayelsa	£334,303	2%	£528,365	3%
	Delta	£368,199	2%	£489,212	3%
	Rivers	£1,868,104	12%	£2,101,413	12%
Sub-total		**£2,570,606**	**16%**	**£3,118,998**	**18%**
North East	Borno	£1,205,566	8%	£1,446,252	8%
	Yobe	£337,615	2%	£453,346	3%
Sub-total		**£1,543,181**	**10%**	**£1,899,598**	**11%**
North West	Kano	£1,890,724	12%	£2,056,017	11%
Sub-total		**£1,890,724**	**12%**	**£2,056,017**	**11%**
Total		**£15,975,382**	**100%**	**£17,625,546**	**100%**

Source: NSRP Financial Data, February 2016, August 2017

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Appendix G Value for Money (Qualitative Assessment)

Catalytic effects – replication and scaling up

- **Replication of CPPs:** The MTE identified that some CPPs are acting as catalysts for more and larger scale action [KI, NSRP; FGD, CPP members]. NSRP has received direct requests to scale up from the Chairman/Chief Administrative Office (Special Services) in Plateau State (the state where the CPP model appears to be functioning the best). Similarly, in Kaduna state, NSRP's partners have received a number of requests to support the replication of CPP structures in other LGAs. The evaluation team has been made aware of six examples:
  - The Aid Foundation – convener of the Kaduna South CPP - received a request from the Chairman of the LGA council to support replication of the structure in Kaduna North (request made in January 2015). The MTE research found that the Aid Foundation is working with the Chairman as well as a District Head in the LGA to take this forward [KI, NSRP and Implementing Partner].
  - Other requests have been made to the Aid Foundation from the District Heads in two other LGAs across Kaduna - Igabi, Chikun [KI, NSRP and Implementing Partner].
  - The Development Peace Initiative (DPI), convener of another CPP, also in Kaduna state, has received requests for support from Kaura, Jaba and Zangon Kataf LGAs [KI, NSRP].
- **Replication of Peace Clubs:** The MTE identified that the Peace Club model has been rolled out more widely than initially intended and there is anecdotal evidence that the model is being replicated in non-NSRP target schools/locations. [KI, Implementing Partner].

Crowding in /demonstration effects

- The MTE found that technical assistance by NSRP to its media partners to increase journalists' skills in CSC has reportedly been cascaded or "*stepped down*" within target stations to persons who were not direct beneficiaries of the NSRP support [case study 4]. "Stepping down" is also reported to have occurred outside of partner stations in some cases[268] [Case study 4].
- Case study 5, which explores the Adoption of a Code of Principles and Standards on government employment programmes in Kano state, shows some potential for demonstration effects amongst institutions and organisations not originally involved in the project if, and when, employment agencies - which operate state-wide - fully endorse it.

Combination effects resulting from integration

Integration across NSRP's output streams is adding value in some cases:

- There are examples of NSRP's research informing other areas of programming, particularly other Output Stream 4 activities and activities under Output Stream 2.
- Conflict sensitive and gender sensitive training and support is benefiting all areas of NSRP programming.

Efficiency (and effectiveness) gains

- NSRP is achieving efficiency gains through levering existing networks. For example, to deliver research on Radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation and De-radicalisation NSRP contracted

[268] For example, in Kano, the Broadcast Media Chiefs Forum met and agreed to a *Training of Trainers* before the 2015 elections; an NSRP trainer assisted with this. Each editor reportedly then trained some of their own staff [case study 4].

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established and respected researchers from the ONRN and Development Project Research Centre (DPRC). This added weight and credibility to the research and, by utilising existing logistical capacity of DPRC, maximised the budget available for the research process [Case study 3].

- Efficiency and effectiveness can be increased through selection of appropriate partners. The evidence of NSRP's success in this area is mixed. In selecting IPRC/CISLAC and NIPSS as convenors of the NPSF and Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting (EEGM) respectively, NSRP appears to have selected the correct partners to access and engage relevant stakeholders. The variable success of SCMAs and CPPs may suggest that the correct organisations (i.e. those with convening power) are not always selected. The evaluators acknowledge that the number and capacity of suitable grantees may be limited (particularly in the most conflict-affected states) however in these cases, cost versus potential benefit must be considered. The fact that all SCMA/CPP convenors have drawn down similar proportions of their funding envelopes despite varied success, suggests this is not the case.

Duplication

- Convening and strengthening new and existing platforms is at the heart of the NSRP model and represents a significant part of NSRP's investment. However, at the MTE, a central key informant raised the question of whether these platforms need to or could be rationalised. There is a perception of overlap and duplication with many of the same people attending the different platforms; for example, members of the WPSNs are also members of the SCMA.

Sustainability

A marker of NSRP's VfM would be sustainability of activity post-funding. The MTE offered two insights on this:

- NSRP's monitoring systems were not sufficient to track sustainability and longer-term outcomes. While these have improved, this point is less relevant given the changed status of the programme.
- Positive outcomes were identified as a result of NSRP's CSC training and mentoring to the mass media. However, it was also suggested that this had not been firmly embedded and that results were not sustainable at that time.

At the FTE, findings on sustainability remain inconclusive.

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Appendix H Organisations Consulted

Type	Role	Organisation
Programme Staff	Programme Manager	NSRP
	Deputy Programme Manager	NSRP
	Output 1 Manager	NSRP
	Output 2 Manager	NSRP
	Output 3 Manager	NSRP
	Output 4 Manager	NSRP
	M&E Manager	NSRP
	M&E Manager	NSRP
	Grant Manager	NSRP
	Gender Adviser	NSRP
	Peacebuilding Adviser	NSRP
	Media Manager	NSRP
	Research Officer	NSRP
	Component 4.2 Lead	NSRP
	Interventions and Development Manager	NSRP
	Regional Manager and 2 Regional Programme Officers - Middle Belt (Plateau and Kaduna)	NSRP
	Regional Manager and 2 Regional Programme Officers - North West (Kano)	NSRP
	Regional Manager and 2 Regional Programme Officers - Niger Delta	NSRP
	Regional Manager - North East (Borno and Yobe)	NSRP
Strategic Partners	Director General and seven staff members	National Advisory Committee
	[Former] Director of Policy and Strategy	Office of the National Security Advisor
	Director General and four staff members	National Orientation Agency
	Director Women and Gender Affairs	Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development
	Director of Research	National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies
	Component Manager for Issues Driven Work	Federal Public Administration Reform
	5 staff members	Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency
	Secretary	Federation of Muslim Women of Nigeria
	Chair Person	Observatory Steering Committee
NSRP Supported Platform(s)	15 Members	National Peace and Security Forum (NPSF)
	6 Members including WPSN Chair, Financial Secretary and Secretary	Women's Peace and Security Network – Kano
	3 Members	Women's Peace and Security Network – Rivers
	5 Members including representatives from police intelligence bureau, Kano Civil Society Forum, and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency	State Conflict Management Agency (SCMA) – Kano
	4 Members including representatives from Nigeria Police, Phalga Peace Initiative/Accord, Christian Association of Nigeria and the University of PH	State Conflict Management Agency (SCMA) – Rivers
	5 Members including representatives from KSTV, disability organisation, Nigeria Security	Community Peace Partnership (CPP) – Kaduna

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	and Civil Defence Corps, B/RWA Annur Women Multi Cooperation Society and the National Youth Council of Nigeria	
Implementing partners (Grantees)	National Peace and Security Forum Convenors (Grantee/ IP)	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR); Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)
	SCMA Kano Convenor (Grantee/ IP)	Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training (AKCDRT)
	CPP Kaduna South Convenor (Grantee/ IP)	Aid Foundation
	Observatory Coordination CSO (Grantee/ IP)	Christian Women for Excellence and Empowerment in Nigerian Society (CWEENS)
Donors and Donor Programmes (DPs)	Conflict Advisor	DFID – Nigeria
	Programme manager/ Field Coordinator	Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC)
	Programme manager	Voices for Change (V4C)
	Programme manager	Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NIAF)
	Programme Manager/ Field Coordinator	State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI)
	Monitoring and Evaluation Director, Mercy Corps	Community-Based Conflict Management and Cooperative Use of Resources (CONCUR)
Case study 1		
Type	**Role**	**Organisation**
Case Lead	Output 3 Manager	NSRP
Programme Contact	Conflict and Gender Advisor	NSRP
Programme Contact	Regional Manager – Kaduna	NSRP
Collaborator	Executive Director	Women with Disability and Self Reliance Centre (WWDSR)
Collaborator	Programme Coordinator and Programme Assistant	Education as a Vaccine
Collaborator	8 Peace Club Facilitators	Peace Club
Collaborator	Principal	Government Girls' Secondary School, Tudun Nupawa
Boundary Partner	Permanent Secretary	Kano State Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development
	Divisional Police Officer	Police Department, Tudan Wada
Beneficiaries	7 Peace Club Members of 'Aunties Club'	Tudan Wada 'Targeted' Peace Club Members / 'Aunties Club'
	4 Community Members (2 females and 2 males)	Local community members in Tudan Wada
	Principal	Government Boys' Secondary School , Kargi
	4 Peace Club Members (boys)	Government Boys Secondary School Kargi
	5 peace club members (girls)	Government Girls Secondary School, Tudun Nupawa
Case Study 2		
Type	**Role**	**Organisation**
Case Lead	Output 1 Manager and Deputy Programme Manager	NSRP
Programme Contact	Regional Team - Middle Belt (Plateau and Kaduna)	NSRP
Collaborator	5 CPP including CPP secretary. Members consulted included representatives from KSTV, disability organisation, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, B/RWA Annur Women	Kaduna South CPP

	Multi Cooperation Society and the National Youth Council of Nigeria	
Collaborator	Executive Director	Aid Foundation
Boundary Partner	Assistant Electoral Officer	Independent National Electoral Commission
	APC party members and activists (1 female and 5 males) PDP party members and activist (4 males including party Chairman and 1 female)	Political Party Members and Activists engaged by CPP
	1 Christian Reverend and 1 Muslim Imam	Religious Leaders engaged by CPP
	3 Christian Youths	Youths engaged by CPP
	3 Muslim Youth Association Leaders	Youths engaged by CPP
Beneficiary	16 Muslim Community Members (10 males from Barnawa and 6 females from Kurmin Mashi)	Community Members in CPP area
Beneficiary	9 Christian Community Members (3 males from Barnawa and 6 females from Kurmin Mashi)	Community Members in CPP area
Case study 3		
Type	**Role**	**Organisation**
Case Lead	Deputy Programme Manager	NSRP
	Research Manager	NSRP
Collaborator	Lead Researcher	Oxford Nigeria Research Network (ONRN)
Collaborator	Lead Researcher	Oxford Nigeria Research Network (ONRN)
Boundary partners	[Former] Director, Behaviour Change and Communications	Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA)
	Head Of Department of Behavioural Analysis	Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA)
	Representative	Muslim Community Centre (MCC)
Case study 4		
Type	**Role**	**Organisation**
Case Lead	Output 4 Manager	NSRP
Programme Contact	Conflict Advisor	NSRP
Programme Contact	Gender and Conflict Advisor	NSRP
Programme Contact	Regional Manager – North East	NSRP
Collaborator	Consultant on Conflict Sensitive Communications (CSC)	iMedia
Collaborator	Media Mentor to Rhythm and Wazobia (Port Harcourt)	Rhythm FM and Wazobia FM, Port Harcourt
Collaborator	Media Mentor to Wazobia and Freedom (Kano)	Wazobia FM and Freedom FM, Kano
Collaborator	Media Mentor to Silverbird Rhythm TV and Radio (Jos/ Plateau)	Silverbird Rhythm FM/TV, Jos
Collaborator	Media Mentor to BRTV (Maiduguri)	BRTV, Borno
Collaborator	Six journalists (Port Harcourt)	Rhythm FM, Wazobia FM and Nigeria Info, Port Harcourt
Collaborator	Producer and Anchor (Maiduguri)	BRTV, Borno
Boundary Partners	Head of Station (Port Harcourt)	Wazobia FM, Port Harcourt
	Head of Station (Port Harcourt)	Rhythm FM, Port Harcourt
Beneficiary	Deputy Superintendent and Spokesperson (Port Harcourt)	Rivers State Police Service
Case study 5		

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Type	Role	Organisation
Case Lead	Output 2 Manager	NSRP
Case Contact	Deputy Programme NSRP	NSRP
Programme Contact	Kano Regional Manager	NSRP
Programme Contact	2 Programme Officers Kano	NSRP
Collaborator	Executive Director – Kano	Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education (CHRICED)
Collaborator	Programme Manager – Kano	Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education (CHRICED)
Boundary Partners	Kano State Coordinator	National Directorate of Employment
	Kano State Director	Directorate of Youth Development
Boundary Partners	Manager	Federal Public Administration Reform Programme (FEPAR)
Boundary Partners	State Programme Manager/ Senior Technical Officer	State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC)
Boundary Partners	Director Human Resources	Kano State Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (KNARDA)
Beneficiaries	Youth Leader/ Representative	Youth Association (Bichi)
	Youth Leader/ Representative	Youth Association (Kombosto)
	7 Young people (all males)	Youth Association (Bichi)
	12 Young people (7 males and 5 females)	Youth Association (Kombosto)
	18 Young people (11 males and 7 females)	Youth Association (Dogwa)
Case study 6		
Type	**Role**	**Organisation**
Case Lead	Output 2 Manager	NSRP
Programme Contact	Regional Programme Officer	NSRP
Beneficiaries	Community chiefs	
	Youth and women's association representatives	Youth and Women's associations (Bokkos City)
	Security	Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA)
	Bokkos LGA chair person	Bokkos chair person
	Local government	
	Religious leader	
	Bokkos CPP chair person	Bokkos chair person
	Farmers and pastoralists representatives	
Case study 7		
Type	**Role**	**Organisation**
Case Lead	Output 4 Manager	NSRP
Case Contact	Manager Strategic Partnerships	NSRP
Boundary Partner	Director of Research at the Naional Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies	Naional Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS)
Boundary Partner	Director Policy and Strategy (DPS)	Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA)
Boundary Partners	Director Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC)	Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA)