



HM Treasury

# Treasury Minutes

**Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Twelfth to the Nineteenth reports from Session 2017-19**

**This publication includes a correction to the Eighth report**



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## Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Twelfth to the Nineteenth reports from Session 2017-19

**This publication includes a correction to the Eighth report**

Presented to Parliament  
by the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury  
by Command of Her Majesty

March 2018



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## Government responses to the Committee of Public Accounts Session 2017-19

#	Report Title	Page
8	Mental health in prisons <i>Ministry of Justice / Department of Health and Social Care</i>	1
12	HMRC performance in 2017-17 <i>HM Revenue and Customs</i>	8
13	NHS continuing healthcare funding <i>Department of Health and Social Care</i>	14
14	Delivering Carrier Strike <i>Ministry of Defence</i>	17
15	Offender monitoring tags <i>Ministry of Justice</i>	21
16	Government borrowing and the Whole of Government Accounts <i>HM Treasury</i>	25
17	Retaining and developing the teaching workforce <i>Department for Education</i>	28
18	Exiting the European Union <i>Department for Exiting the European Union / Cabinet Office / HM Treasury</i>	33
19	Excess Votes 2016-17 <i>HM Treasury</i>	38

# **Eighth Report of Session 2017-19**

## **Ministry of Justice / Department of Health and Social Care**

### **Mental health in prisons**

#### **Introduction from the Committee**

There were 84,674 adults in prison in England and Wales in 2016–17, between 10% and 90% of whom are thought to have mental health issues. Rates of self-inflicted deaths and self-harm in prisons have risen significantly in the last five years, suggesting that mental health and overall well-being in prison has declined. There were 120 self-inflicted deaths in prison in 2016 and 40,161 incidents of self-harm, the highest on record. Prisoners with mental health issues face huge challenges in our prison system which witnesses told us that the current prison environment is often ill equipped to deal with.

HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) is responsible for the management and operation of prisons in England and Wales and ensuring that the prison environment is safe, secure and decent. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for prison policy and commissioning services in prisons. NHS England is responsible for healthcare in prisons, both for physical and mental health. In 2016–17, NHS England spent an estimated £400 million providing healthcare in adult prisons in England, of which it estimates £150 million was spent on mental health services and substance misuse services, although it could not provide an exact figure.

Based on a report by the NAO, the Committee took evidence, on 23 October 2017, from the Ministry of Justice, HM Prison and Probation Service, and NHS England. The Committee published its report on 13 December 2017. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

#### **NAO / PAC Reports and Treasury Minutes**

- NAO report: *Mental health in prisons* – Session 2017-19 (HC 42)
- PAC report: *Mental health in prisons* – Session 2017-19 (HC 400)
- Treasury Minutes: March 2018 (Cm 9575)

#### **Government responses to the Committee**

**1: PAC conclusion: *The deteriorating prison estate and long-standing understaffing have created an environment which exacerbates the mental health issues faced by prisoners.***

**1a: PAC recommendation: *NHS England should, by the end of March 2018, reduce the time taken to recruit new mental health staff and get them working in prisons.***

1.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

1.2 NHS England commissions healthcare services from providers to conform to the quality requirements set out in the relevant Service Specifications. The new Service Specification for Mental Health will be used to commission services from April 2018. The service specification does not call for a particular level of staffing, rather the providers are expected to recruit and manage staffing levels themselves to deliver the services and meet the quality expectations of commissioners. Providers have delays in obtaining the necessary security clearance checks to get these staff working in prisons. Security clearance checks are provided through other government departments and a third-party HR service provider (Shared Services Connected Ltd) on behalf of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and HMPPS.

1.3 MOJ is tackling recruitment process waiting times with immediate fixes, such as a HM Revenues and Customs (HMRC) check that enables faster employer referencing, reducing the reliance on references from previous employers. In December 2017, the Department automated the clearance process for roles which require BPSS Disclosure Scotland, DBS Standard and DBS Enhanced Checks. The Department is also focussing on longer-term improvements to IT systems and processes to make them more efficient, whilst continuing to provide the appropriate vetting assurance.

1.4. Data samples for the new fully electronic process for employee background checks show significant reduction in clearances being completed:

- BPSS Disclosure Scotland Check - 3 working days (previously up to 25 working days)
- DBS Standard Check – 7 working days (previously up to 25 working days)
- DBS Enhanced Check – 9 working days (previously up to 25 working days).

**1b: PAC recommendation: *HM Prison and Probation Service should by the end of March 2018, reduce the time taken to recruit new prison officers and get them working in prisons.***

1.5 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Summer 2018.

1.6 An independent Occupational Psychologist was commissioned by the Department to carry out a review of the recruitment process. The review identified several ways to improve aspects of the Prison Officer Recruitment process, including reducing the overall time-to-hire. The review's recommendations have been agreed in principle and a central project team is assessing and implementing these. The Department has also been working closely with both internal and external stakeholders, with additional resource being made available to Shared Services Connected Limited (SSCL), the third-party supplier responsible for transactional HR and Payroll and Procurement services, to reduce the average time-to-hire.

1.7 Whilst this review has been underway, HM Prison and Probation Service's Prison Officer Recruitment Programme has acted to improve time-to-hire:

- pre-employment checks have moved online through Disclosure Barring Services and Disclosure Scotland solution Disclosure;
- Prison Officer applicants are given time limits to submit responses at each stage of recruitment. If three deadlines are missed, the application is terminated to ensure resources are focussed on progressing genuine applications;
- Additional Service Level Agreements (SLAs) agreed between MOJ / HMPPS and SSCL have been introduced to ensure the progress of submitted applications; and
- Specialist recruitment campaigns have been introduced to alleviate vacancies in the hardest to fill sites.

1.8 Progress continues to be made in reducing the time taken for pre-employment checks, which remains a bottleneck in the recruitment process. To get prison officers into post more quickly, the Department is, where possible, permitting new starters to begin work in a prison whilst continuing to conduct higher level checks, subject to operational agreement and baseline checks being completed.

1.9 The Department will continue to improve the time-to-hire across the workforce and will update the Committee in Summer 2018.

**1c: PAC recommendation: *HM Prison and Probation Service should, by the end of January 2018, write to the Committee with details of the number and proportion of prison officers who have participated in the new mental health training.***

1.10 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

1.11 All prison staff including key workers will receive the mental health awareness training that is being rolled out as part of the revised Suicide and Self-Harm Prevention (SASH) training course. Since May 2017, over 11,000 staff have been trained in at least one of the modules of this training. The Department will write separately to the Committee with updated training figures. The mental health

awareness module aims to inform staff of the most prevalent mental health issues in prison, including how a prisoner's mental health might affect how they present themselves and how an officer might interact positively with prisoners presenting with mental health needs.

1.12 The Department is currently undertaking a needs analysis on mental health training requirements. This is with a view to revising the awareness package (included in the SASH training) and rolling out a new 'enhanced mental health' training package to members of staff who have more specialised roles. The revised mental health awareness package will include all the information staff will need to identify an individual with mental health issues, refer them for medical assessment and support them in their everyday interactions. The enhanced package will build on this knowledge providing more in-depth information around specific mental health conditions and how to manage risk in these individuals. The Department is reviewing the findings of the ongoing needs analysis to determine the next steps, including timings and the identification of resource to take this work forward.

**1d: PAC recommendation: *HM Prison and Probation Service should, by the end of July 2018, write to the Committee with details of the number of additional staff that have been recruited, deployed to prisons, and how many more have resigned since the National Audit Office (NAO) report.***

1.13 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** July 2018.

1.14 As part of the Prison Safety and Reform White Paper published in November 2016, the Government committed to an increase of 2,500 prison officers by the end of 2018. The increase in staff will ensure that all male prisoners across the closed estate will have access to a key worker. These key workers will build constructive relationships with prisoners, reduce levels of frustration and, ultimately, reduce levels of violence. The impact of the keyworker model across the open estate is currently being considered.

1.15 Between the end of October 2016 (the closest data point in time to when the commitment was made) and the end of September 2017, the number of Band 3 to 5 prison officers (FTE) has risen from 17,955 to 19,210, a net increase of 1255 FTE officers. At the end of September 2017, there were also 1211 candidates who had received a job offer and been booked onto future Prison Officer Entry Level Training (POELT).

1.16 The September 2017 leaving rate for Band 3-5 Prison Officers was 9.6%. This is a decrease of 0.1 percentage points compared to the year ending 31 March 2017. The overall leaving rate across HMPPS over the last year stood at 8.5%, a 0.2 percentage point fall compared to the year ending 31 March 2017.

1.17 The Government is on track to deliver the increase of 2500 officers by December 2018 by continued deployment and development of attraction and marketing techniques, utilising a variety of communication channels including social media, programmatic and radio advertising. This is supplemented by local recruitment attraction plans and a recruitment and retention strategy for operational staff.

1.18 The Government will write to the Committee with updated recruitment, deployment and resignation figures by July 2018.

**2: PAC conclusion: *The failure to establish effective screening procedures means the Ministry of Justice, HM Prison and Probation Service and NHS England do not know the full extent of the number of prisoners with mental health issues.***

**2: PAC recommendation: *HM Prison and Probation Service, the Ministry of Justice and NHS England should, by the end of March 2018, write to the Committee to explain how they will improve their screening processes and use the resulting data to make sure they have a complete understanding of the number of prisoners with mental health issues and the treatment they need.***

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** March 2018.

2.2 The Government will write to the Committee by March 2018 to provide an update on how it will improve health and justice screening processes to improve its understanding of mental health need in prisons.

2.3 The Basic Custody Screening Tool is an initial questionnaire conducted by the offender management unit within 72 hours of entry into prison. It is a tool used for sentence and resettlement planning primarily, however, but it can identify prisoners suitable for referral to mental health services, including those at risk of self-harm and suicide (SASH). This questionnaire is completed by prison staff and is not a clinical diagnostic tool for mental health and substance misuse issues. Therefore, all prisoners receive a full health screening upon reception, conducted by a healthcare professional.

2.4 To improve the screening process, NHS England is rolling out new healthcare screening templates for first night reception screening and for the full healthcare screen that is required within one week of reception into prison.

2.5 The templates have been designed to match the current NICE guidance on healthcare screening, and will be in live operation across all prison healthcare services by March 2018. As part of the roll out, staff at all sites will receive training and are supported by a regional project manager. The screening is designed to identify mental and physical health needs, and everyone entering the prison estate will be screened. Where mental health needs are identified, referrals will be made to the mental health services in prisons. The new templates will ensure that screening data is entered into the clinical ICT system in a consistent way across England. In the future, this will provide an understanding of mental health prevalence, at a national and regional level, to inform strategic planning and policy development. It will also allow local and regional commissioners to more closely monitor the healthcare needs of the prison population, together with the performance of providers.

**3: PAC conclusion: *Increased availability of drugs in prisons has contributed to the increase in mental health issues of prisoners.***

**3: PAC recommendation: *HM Prison and Probation Service and NHS England should review their detection and treatment programmes to ensure that they reflect the current behaviours and needs of prisoners.***

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Autumn 2018.

3.2 The Government agrees that the level of drugs in our prisons is too high and is determined to build on the significant steps already taken to deliver a holistic approach to tackle the supply and use of these drugs across our estate. HMPPS has already improved its search capabilities through investment in search dogs, body searches and metal-detecting scanners in every prison.

3.3 Over £2 million of additional resource will be invested in national and regional search capability to provide dedicated search teams in prisons across England and Wales, over the course of the year. This will significantly enhance HMPPS' capability to tackle those behind the supply of illicit drugs. The Department is also reviewing its drug testing procedures to help better understand drug use trends in prison and inform drug offender management policies.

3.4 NHS England is developing a new service specification which instructs the commissioning of quality substance misuse services. This is currently under consultation and will come into effect from 1 April 2018.

3.5 The new specification will address issues resulting from the rise in the use of Psychoactive Substances (PS) and the resulting problematic behaviour. The new specification covers health needs assessments for substance misuse services and is refreshed annually, giving local commissioners the opportunity to vary services according to the need of each prisoner cohort.



3.6 The substance misuse specification is closely aligned with NHS England's recently revised mental health service specification (which will also be in use from 1 April 2018). Together, these specifications will ensure that prison-based mental health and substance misuse healthcare services are commissioned to operate a 'no wrong door' policy, enabling individuals presenting with co-morbid or co-existing mental health and substance misuse problems to have their needs rapidly and holistically met through joined-up services.

**4: PAC conclusion: *Poor co-ordination and a lack of sharing information means that prisoners are not receiving continuity of treatment as they move between prison and the community.***

**4a: PAC recommendation: *NHS England should, by the end of March 2018, evaluate the effectiveness of the link between NHS records in the community and in prison.***

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

4.2 NHS England have evaluated the link between NHS records in the community and in prison. This evaluation found that data-sharing between community and prisons is often not effective as it relies on a number of manual processes. On reception, healthcare services often ask community GP services to fax clinical records. On release from prison, patients are given a printed summary of their clinical record, which may not always find its way to a healthcare professional, for example if there is a delay in registering with a GP in the community.

4.3 In response to this, NHS England has already committed to improve the way that NHS records are linked to enhance data-sharing and progress is underway. The Health and Justice Information Service (HJIS) programme, which was initiated in November 2017, will improve the link between prisons and community by introducing a system of sharing clinical records between community and prison on reception, and from prison back to the community on release. This functionality will go live in a phased rollout from May 2019.

**4b: PAC recommendation: *NHS England should, by the end of March 2018, establish and disseminate information sharing protocols between prison, healthcare and probation staff so that all parties are fully informed about the services and support that prisoners will require on their release.***

4.4 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date: March 2018.**

4.5 Dissemination of information sharing protocols is a local requirement and the joint responsibility of NHS England with HMPPS, via the National Prison Health Partnership Board (NPHPB) and the National Partnership Agreement (NPA), to deliver. The Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) should be agreed at an establishment level between the relevant local commissioners and service providers. The local Prison Health Partnership Board is the forum where the ISA is agreed and monitored.

4.6 NHS England, through the NPHPB and jointly with HMPPS via the NPA will have a responsibility to ensure that all establishments have an ISA in place and that all staff are aware and comply with the requirements set out. Together, NHS England and HMPPS will undertake an audit of all prisons in England to identify which establishments have a current ISA in place, the date it was signed and date it was last reviewed. This will highlight which establishments require an ISA to be agreed and implemented and was completed in January 2018.

4.7 A standardised ISA template will also be developed and agreed, which reflects the imminent changes to the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).

4.8 This will be completed by 31 March 2018 and instructions will be issued to each establishment where an ISA is outstanding, or out of date, to confirm, via the Local Prison Health Partnership Board, that they have an agreed and implemented, or are in the process of reviewing, an ISA that complies with current legislation and the imminent GDPR requirements.

**5: PAC conclusion: *It is a disgrace that too many prisoners wait far too long to be transferred to hospital or secure units.***

**5: PAC recommendation: *HM Prison and Probation Service and NHS England should, by the end of January 2018, publish quarterly data on the number of prisoners transferred to hospital or secure units, how many prisoners are waiting at the time of publication, and how long both groups have waited.***

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Autumn 2020.

5.2 HMPPS and NHS England are unable to publish quarterly data by the end of January 2018 as there is currently no reporting system in place at a national level to collect all the data requested. HMPPS and NHS England propose an annual publication of national level data on secure transfer waits both to and from hospitals or secure units, which will require a new reporting system to be created.

5.3 NHS England's 10 Point Plan for Transfer and Remission to and from Mental Health Hospitals outlines the steps towards publication of accurate data. This includes a review of service specifications for both prison mental health services and secure hospitals. These specifications will be implemented and commissioned against by April 2018, setting out the timescales against which commissioned services must be delivered.

5.4 Alongside this, NHS England is reviewing the guidance for hospital transfers and remissions. Significant discussions have already taken place to identify new clinically informed timescales. Publication of updated guidance to reflect these timescales will be drafted by April 2018. NHS England will begin a programme of training and implementation to ensure delivery against these timescales in 2018-19.

5.5 Currently a closed system is used to record clinical data. The Health and Justice Information Service system (HJIS), being rolled out from 2018-2020, will have the ability to share information with community healthcare services; this is integral to the collection of the relevant data that is quality assured and robust.

5.6 To permit the annual publication of national level data on secure transfer waits from August 2020, NHS England plans to introduce central reporting. The HJIS will record from the first point of referral in prison until the patient is transferred to a Mental Health hospital bed. It is essential to have new clinically informed timescales in place before this reporting commences. It is anticipated that data collection will begin in 2019. Annual publication will be possible once data has been collected and quality assured.

5.7 HMPPS and NHS England have committed to a benchmarking audit on an annual basis which will give the Government a snapshot at a point in time. This will take place in October each year, with headline data for the most recent audit available in April 2018.

**6: PAC conclusion: *NHS England's oversight of its contracts to provide mental health services has been weak.***

**6: PAC recommendation: *NHS England should write to the Committee by the end of January 2018 to confirm what actions it will take to ensure that it is getting value for money and that taxpayers' money is not being wasted by paying for services that are not delivered or are well below the standards expected.***

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

## **Recommendation implemented.**

6.2 In NHS England's follow-up letter to the Committee, it set out the actions it was taking to ensure that it is getting value for money for the services it contracts for.

6.3 NHS England contracts outline a series of steps that must be taken where non-delivery of services occurs – this entails issuing remedial and then breach notices and the provider delivering against an agreed action plan. It is only after these avenues have been exhausted that the option for financial penalty can be invoked. However, this is dependent on the specific element of service in question being costed and clearly identified in the contract to enable financial claw back – this is legitimately not detailed in all large multimillion pound prime provider contracts.

6.4 It should be noted that healthcare providers often deliver services over and above what they are technically contracted for – for example: the recent rise in NPS incidents and the significant number of resulting “codes” diverts healthcare staff away from routine activities to attending emergencies.

6.5 Non-delivery of healthcare can occur and can be attributed to a number of factors - some down to the provider and others outside of their control. These include reasons to do with the prison regime, such as lockdowns, lack of prison officers to escort patients, or the lack of suitable accommodation within which healthcare can be delivered. Commissioners have to display a degree of flexibility in the context of a highly-restricted environment. If a provider struggles with a key clinical vacancy for a few months, but flexes other services to provide cover then NHS commissioners would not usually seek to use contracting levers but would work with the prison and provider to ensure continuity of care, and only use contractual measures as a last resort.

# Twelfth Report of Session 2017-19

## HM Revenue and Customs

### HMRC Performance in 2016-17

#### Introduction from the Committee

In 2016–17, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) raised £574.9 billion of tax revenues, an increase of £38.1 billion (7.1%) on 2015–16. HMRC’s estimate of the tax gap has fallen from £35 billion (7.9%) in 2005–06 to £34 billion (6.0%) in 2015–16. HMRC paid out £39.1 billion in benefits and credits, approximately one-fifth of the government’s total benefits expenditure. HMRC’s estimate of error and fraud resulting in Tax Credits overpayments increased to 5.5% (£1.57 billion) in 2015–16 (the most recent year available), from 4.8% in 2014–15. The cost of running HMRC in 2016–17 was £3.3 billion, up from £3.2 billion in 2015–16. In 2016–17, HMRC improved its customer service by handling 92% of calls, compared to 72% in 2015–16. Its average speed to answer calls—measured from after a caller has listened to recorded messages and enters a queue to speak to an adviser—fell from 12 minutes in 2015–16 to under four minutes in 2016–17. HMRC transformation plans include 15 major programmes, including closing its national network of offices and relocating to 13 large regional centres, introducing new digital services for individuals and businesses, and updating major systems such as the Customs Declaration Service.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 6 November 2017, from HM Revenue and Customs. The Committee published its report on 10 January 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee’s report.

#### NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: *HM Revenue and Customs Annual Report and Accounts 2016-17* – Session 2017-19 (HC 18)
- PAC report: *HMRC’s Performance in 2016-17* - Session 2017-19 (HC 456)

#### Government responses to the Committee

**1: PAC conclusion: *The ‘Paradise Papers’ leak suggests potentially serious and extensive allegations of tax evasion and avoidance.***

**1: PAC recommendation: *HMRC should obtain the information from the ‘Paradise Papers’ as soon as possible, and report back to the Committee by March 2018 to set out its response, including any additional revenue likely to be at stake.***

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

#### Recommendation implemented.

1.2 The Department welcomes all information that could assist in its work on tackling tax evasion and avoidance. The Department has therefore sought access to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) material. However, the ICIJ (which is based outside the UK’s jurisdiction) has refused to provide the Department with material beyond that already publicly available.

1.3 The Department has requested access to the ICIJ material that was used by the *BBC* and *The Guardian*. The Department has also encouraged these media organisations to pass on any information that points to wrongdoing and is prepared to look at every allegation in full. Only the *Guardian* have responded, explaining that they are not in possession of the data, and only have access to it through the ICIJ and therefore cannot help our enquiries.

1.4 The Department is looking very closely at all the information the ICIJ and its members have disclosed in both the media and on the ICIJ published database. The Department is also reviewing this information in relation to existing enquiry work.

**2: PAC conclusion: HMRC is unclear how far it can close the tax gap with existing resource.**

**2a: PAC recommendation: HMRC should set target levels for reduction of the tax gap, including for the SME sector.**

2.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

2.2 The Department's published estimates of the tax gap provide the Department and the public with important information on long term trends in tax compliance. The Government is clear that it aims to drive down the tax gap, and the indication from recent years is that this approach is working, with the 2015-16 tax gap estimated to be a joint record low since 2005-06. The Government will continue to relentlessly take action to drive down the tax gap. However, the tax gap is a lagged measure (the Department's most recent estimates cover the tax year 2015-16), and cannot reflect the impact of the Department's compliance activity in a sufficiently timely way to be useful as a target.

2.3 Whilst the Department uses tax gap analysis to inform its compliance activity, and accepts it is right to be assessed on movement in the tax gap over time, tax gap reduction is not suitable as a performance target. The Department uses a range of real-time operational targets - which are set out in HMRCs Annual Reports and Accounts - to focus on performance. In practice, tax gap estimates are reviewed and revised each year to reflect updated data, such as changes to National Accounts statistics, in line with best statistical practice. For example, the 2014-15 tax gap estimate was revised downwards by £2.6bn in the "Measuring Tax Gaps 2017 edition" publication in October 2017, one year after the estimate's original publication in October 2016. This would make measuring performance against an annual target uncertain.

**2b: PAC recommendation: HMRC should set out how it will be more responsive to emerging risks.**

2.4 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented.**

2.5 The HMRC Strategy document, published in July 2017, sets out how HMRC promotes compliance by designing it into systems and processes, prevents non-compliance by spotting mistakes and personalising services, and responds strongly to deliberate non-compliance. The production of this document has led to the development of six subsidiary strategies. These reflect the different risks and approaches needed for large, medium and small businesses, the wealthy, individual customers and criminals. The Department aims to secure compliance as early as possible from each population segment, tailoring their approach to behaviour and risk.

2.6 The Department currently identifies emerging risks, and changes in the profile of risk, by bringing together the data, intelligence and technical expertise at its disposal. The publication of the tax gap also provides an important and systematic view of the impact of risks and how they have changed over a longer timeframe.

2.7 The Department continuously reviews the potential of new data and information to add to its understanding of risk. When there are opportunities to improve its ability to identify risks, the Department works to acquire and apply these. This helps ensure risks are better understood and managed, allows better targeting of resources, and also protects the honest majority by allowing compliant taxpayers to be excluded from unnecessary compliance activities.

**3: PAC conclusion: HMRC's transformation programme is not deliverable as planned due to unrealistic assumptions, and increased pressure from the additional workload caused by Brexit.**

**3: PAC recommendation:** *In the Committee's recent report 'Brexit and the future of Customs' the Committee recommended that HMRC should report back to the Committee by March 2018 with clear plans on how it will manage the many challenges it faces due to Brexit and its ongoing transformation programmes. Building on this, HMRC should: update its original assumptions and amend its forecasts for its transformation programme, particularly those concerning customer demand for its various services; and set out the financial implications of this for the Committee by April 2018.*

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Spring 2018.

3.2 The Department recognised in the Autumn of 2017 the need to ensure that its skills and expertise are focused where they will best support the Government's key priorities. Therefore, in November 2017, the Department began an extensive audit and prioritisation of the work being delivered by its transformation portfolio. The programme is one of Europe's largest organisational transformations and includes more than 250 individual projects, ranging from the creation of digital services for customers, to a wholesale modernisation of its estate, through to the delivery of a new Customs Declaration Service.

3.3 The prioritisation exercise recognised the scale and ambition of the transformation portfolio. The results of this prioritisation exercise form a key part of the Department's 2018-19 business planning round. The Department will update the Committee when these discussions have concluded.

**4: PAC conclusion:** *The Committee is not convinced that HMRC will obtain value for money from long-term leases, without break clauses, for its new estate of 13 large regional centres.*

**4: PAC recommendation:** *HMRC and the Government Property Unit should use their strong negotiating position to ensure they gain sufficient flexibility in the terms for the four regional centre leases yet to be signed, and should examine ways to build in greater flexibility from the eight regional centre leases already signed.*

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

4.2 The Department has a clear long-term locations strategy which is fully aligned with the Government Estates Strategy and is confident that it will remain in its regional centre locations for the foreseeable future. As a protection against future changes in technology and working practices, the Department has ensured that their future estate will have flexibility of lease lengths (some leases will be 20-25 years, and a number will be of 20 years or less) and occupancy, creating a much more staggered end to lease terms that they inherited. This approach achieves the best combination of flexibility and value for money for the programme.

4.3 The Department's design of regional centres builds in flexibility for future change, from the outset, in the building layout, in the ability to easily separate out every floor of the buildings, so that space can be reallocated. The new workspaces have been designed to a Government standard ensuring they can be shared with other Government Departments easily and are all planned on the basis of Cabinet Office guidance for managing void risk in a locality, set out in the Government Property Acquisition Strategy so should the Department's demand for space reduce, it could be reallocated to other government departments within the regional centre.

4.4 In addition to the Department's ability to sub-let space across wider Government, arrangements have been agreed that provide flexibility for Government to sublet to third parties outside government at most sites. Further flexibility is obtained during the lease term, via the ability to assign leases to non-Government bodies, subject to landlord's consent. These provisions have been agreed with Government Property Agency and incorporated in standard Heads of Terms.

**5: PAC conclusion:** *The Committee recognises the improvements in customer service since the unacceptable levels of 2015–16, but are concerned about HMRC’s ability to maintain this level of performance.*

**5: PAC recommendation:** *HMRC should ensure it continues to deliver a consistent and reasonable level of service to all its customers. The Committee will be monitoring performance and will return to this issue.*

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented.**

5.2 The Department has sustained its improved customer service performance over the last 2 years, delivering the consistent and reasonable service that customers expect. So far in 2017-18, the average speed of answer on telephones is 4 minutes 32 seconds, which is well within the target of 5 minutes.

5.3 The Department has continued to expand its online services which reduce the need for customers to contact them by traditional means. The strategic direction for HMRC Customer Services is to offer a multi-channel experience to customers, including Personal Tax Accounts, i-forms, SMS messaging, webinars, webchats and a virtual assistant. There are now 13.9 million Personal Tax Account (PTA) users compared to 9.4 million at the end of 2016-17 and customer satisfaction with HMRC digital services is on target at 80%. So far in 2017-18, the Department has received over 935 thousand i-forms compared to 1 million in total in 2016-17 and has responded to 92.4% of them within 7 days.

5.4 The Department has also seen more Self-Assessment returns filed than ever, on time and with the highest number recorded online. 10.7 million (93.5%) customers filed on time to meet the deadline (compared with 92.8% at the same point in 2017). Of those, 9.9 million (92.5%) filed online. During January 2018, the Department issued 6.7 million email and SMS reminder messages to customers, supplemented with marketing, social media, press and web-chat channels to remind them to file on time and get support. Notably the Department’s high performance on key customer service metrics remained consistent ahead of the Self-Assessment deadline, for example with the average speed of answering a customer call in January at 4:20 minutes, below the target of 5 minutes.

5.5 The Department also introduced a new postal framework for this year that better serves their customers’ needs. The Department aims to meet the 80% target for the remaining months of the year.

5.6 The Department publishes customer service data on a monthly and quarterly basis on GOV.UK.<sup>12</sup> This is an innovation of the Government since March 2017 and demonstrates our commitment to making the Department’s customer service performance more transparent.<sup>34</sup>

**6: PAC conclusion:** *The average time it takes for customers to speak to an adviser when they call is longer than HMRC claims.*

**6: PAC recommendation:** *HMRC should introduce a new set of measures that better reflect the actual experience of customers. Automated telephony time should be included within the 5-minute speed to answer target.*

6.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

6.2 The Department’s Customer Services Group are committed to using performance measures that fully reflect the experience of customers, whatever channel they use.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/hmrc-monthly-performance-reports>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/hmrc-quarterly-performance-updates>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/hmrc-monthly-performance-reports>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/hmrc-quarterly-performance-updates>

6.2 The Department is already undertaking a review of the way it measures the performance of its helplines to ensure that they capture the full experience of our customers.

6.3 Automated messaging helps the Department to provide information relevant to customers' enquiries and route them to the appropriate advisor. The Department has made several improvements to its automated service including the introduction of automated security checks to reduce time once a call is answered and voice biometrics to improve security. The Department has an Average Speed of Answer (ASA) telephony target of 5 minutes using the current methodology. This measures the time from when a customer leaves the automated messaging system to the time their call is answered by a customer advisor. An ASA of 5 minutes using the current methodology is the level to which HMRC is funded and resourced.

6.4 There is no industry standard for measuring call waiting times, or whether time spent in automated messaging should be included; many private sector organisations do not include automated messaging when measuring call waiting times. Moreover, the amount of time spent in automated messaging varies significantly depending on the customer query and can result in the customer's query being addressed to their satisfaction without the need to speak to an advisor. It is therefore not a good indication of the customer experience.

6.5 The Department has sustained its improved customer service performance over the last 2 years, delivering the consistent and reasonable service that customers expect.

**7: PAC conclusion: *Vulnerable people receiving Tax Credits are at increased risk of financial problems as they transfer to Universal Credit.***

**7: PAC recommendation: *HMRC should report back to the Committee by March 2018 to explain how it will take care of the interests of vulnerable people receiving Tax Credits. This should include how it will work with DWP to manage claimants' transition to Universal Credit, and protect them against aggressive departmental activity to reclaim overpayments due to error and fraud.***

7.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

### **Recommendation implemented.**

7.2 The Department has worked closely with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to manage claimants' transition to Universal Credit (UC). This includes establishing a Joint Enquiry Team to provide assistance to claimants moving to UC, including those who need help understanding their transferred debts. Vulnerable claimants needing additional support from the Department are referred to its Enhanced Support Team.

7.3 If tax credits claimants have been overpaid, the Department has the ability to take deductions from their ongoing tax credits payments. Deductions from payments can be reduced where claimants suffer hardship. Where there is no ongoing entitlement to tax credits, the Department will seek to recover the overpayment either in full immediately, where the claimant has the means to pay, or through alternative repayment plans, if the claimant is in financial difficulty.

7.4 When claimants move to UC, the Department sends them a summary of any outstanding debts, advising that these will be transferred to DWP. Debts are only transferred when they are not subject to ongoing disputes or appeals.

7.5 In most cases, DWP recovers tax credits overpayments through deductions from UC payments. There are legislative safeguards in place to protect claimants from large deductions being taken at one time; for example, deductions for debt recovery purposes taken from the UC award are limited to an amount equivalent to a maximum of 15% of their UC standard allowance for claimants without earnings. Budgeting support is also available to help people manage their money. In all instances, DWP advises claimants of the amount of the deduction and gives claimants the opportunity to get in touch if they feel this would lead them to hardship. In such instances, DWP staff will consider reducing the recovery amount.



7.6 Where deduction from ongoing UC awards is not possible, DWP uses other methods, such as a Direct Earnings Attachment (DEA).<sup>5</sup> Before a DEA is issued, all claimants are given the opportunity to set up an affordable and sustainable repayment plan. DEA recovery rates and limits are set out in legislation and, in cases of hardship or vulnerability, DWP staff will reduce or suspend DEA recovery.

**8: PAC conclusion: *The Committee is alarmed to hear that the level of Tax Credits error and fraud has risen and is only going to get worse.***

**8: PAC recommendation: *HMRC should set out its strategy for tackling Tax Credits error and fraud, given the additional risks posed by transfer to Universal Credit, including a cost-benefit analysis of its approach***

8.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented.**

8.2 The Department's strategy for tax credits error and fraud is to minimise losses to the Exchequer, whilst treating its customers fairly and with respect. It does this by promoting voluntary compliance through education and process design and bearing down on dishonest behaviour.

8.3 The Department deploys significant resource on tax credits, supporting the Government's overall objective to implement sustainable welfare reform. HMRC also works closely with DWP on the delivery of UC, including putting plans in place to ensure the smooth transfer of tax credits claimants to UC over the timeframe for transition. HMRC reviews and refines these plans with DWP and is investing in additional analytical resource specifically to deepen its understanding of the risks arising from the transfer to UC. The Department will use this insight to further inform its approach.

8.4 The Department continues to devote significant effort to understanding and addressing the causes of tax credits error and fraud. It monitors the size of each compliance risk and deploys resources accordingly, using targeted interventions driven by data and risk modelling. The Department prioritises its resource to challenging the most significant compliance risks whilst also providing appropriate coverage across all risk areas.

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<sup>5</sup> Direct Earnings Attachments (DEA) are issued to employers, who make deductions from debtors' wages. Employers may also make additional deductions to cover administrative costs. These additional charges are borne by the debtor. Employers send the deducted money to DWP, who credit this as a repayment against the outstanding debt

# Thirteenth Report of Session 2017-19

## Department of Health and Social Care

### NHS continuing healthcare funding

#### Introduction from the Committee

NHS continuing healthcare (CHC) is a package of care provided outside of hospital that is arranged and funded solely by the NHS for individuals who have significant ongoing healthcare needs. Such individuals are eligible for NHS funding if their healthcare needs go beyond what can legally be provided by local authorities, but this is a highly complex and sensitive area, with potentially significant cost implications for the individual. If someone is assessed as eligible for CHC, the NHS is responsible for funding the full package of health and social care. However, if someone is not eligible for CHC, they may have to pay for all or part of their social care costs, depending on their financial circumstances.

The Department of Health and Social Care (the Department) is responsible for the legal framework for CHC, including setting criteria for assessing eligibility for CHC through a national framework. Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) are responsible for determining eligibility for CHC and for commissioning this care. NHS England is responsible for making sure CCGs comply with the national framework. People can access CHC funding through two processes: a standard CHC process and a fast-track process for people with rapidly deteriorating conditions who may be nearing the end of their life. The number of people assessed as eligible for CHC funding has grown by an average of 6.4% over the last four years. In 2015–16, almost 160,000 people received, or were assessed as eligible for, CHC funding.

Based on a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Committee took evidence, on 1 November 2017, from the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England. The Committee published its report on 17 January 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

#### NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: *Investigation into NHS continuing healthcare funding*- Session 2017-19 (HC 239)
- PAC Report: *NHS Continuing healthcare funding* – Session 2017-19 (HC 455)

#### Government responses to the Committee

**1: PAC conclusion: *Too many people are waiting too long to find out if they are eligible for CHC, and to receive the essential care that they need.***

**1: PAC recommendation: *NHS England needs to hold CCGs to account for delays in assessments, and needs to find out the extent of further delays by CCGs in providing care packages once funding is agreed, taking remedial action where needed.***

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Summer 2018.

1.2 NHS England already has an assurance mechanism in place to hold all non-compliant CCGs to account in relation to the NHS CHC National Framework, in respect of NHS CHC assessment. NHS CHC has been part of NHS England's mainstream assurance processes since 2016/17, as it was included in the CCG Improvement and Assessment Framework. From April 2017, Quality Premium payments to CCGs have since April 2017 been linked to compliance with a Best Practice Standard for the timescale within which NHS CHC assessments should be completed. The standard is set at more than 80% of cases to be assessed within 28 days.

1.3 NHS England will continue to regularly monitor the effectiveness of these assurance processes with respect to ensuring NHS CHC eligibility decisions are being made consistently.

1.4 Currently data on time elapsed between eligibility decisions and care package provision commencing is not collected. NHS England will carry out a piece of work to understand the scale of the issue and depending on the outcome, what assurance mechanisms they may need to develop.

**2: PAC conclusion: *Some patients are not receiving the care that they are entitled to because they are not made aware of the funding available, or because the system is too difficult for them to navigate.***

**2: PAC recommendation: *The Department and NHS England need to improve awareness of CHC amongst patients and their families, and amongst health and social care professionals, by establishing where there are awareness gaps, with different patient groups and different health and social care professionals; and reporting back to the committee by April 2018 on how awareness has been raised.***

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Summer 2018.

2.2 The Department and NHS England will carry out an initial joint piece of work to understand the awareness gap, particularly relating to how the NHS CHC process for determining eligibility is understood, linking to the NHS CHC National Framework. Based on the outcomes of the preliminary work, the Department and NHS will devise a plan of action by Summer 2018 and report back to the Committee.

**3: PAC conclusion: *Patients' likelihood of getting CHC funding depends too much on local interpretation of assessment criteria, due to poor quality assessment tools and inadequate training.***

**3: PAC recommendation: *The Department and NHS England should report back to the Committee by April 2018 on what action they have taken to improve the quality of assessment tools and training for staff carrying out assessments; and how it plans to monitor the impact of these changes on reducing variation between CCGs.***

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Autumn 2018.

3.2 The Department has published an updated National Framework for NHS Continuing Healthcare and NHS-funded Nursing Care. The revised Framework is expected to become operational from 1 October 2018.

3.3 Additionally, NHS England will review checklist tools which will be considered as part of the framework review. The Department and NHS England have jointly launched a programme to explore the NHS Continuing Healthcare and NHS-funded Nursing Care initial pathway, which will report by Autumn 2018.

3.4 NHS England has commenced a national workforce programme to support the NHS CHC assessment process. This covers basic training, training for more experienced staff, and development of a competency framework for CCGs.

3.5 There will always be variation in the number of NHS CHC assessments, due to a wide variety of reasons, including (but not limited to) the age dispersion within the local population and variations between geographical areas in terms of their level of health need.

3.6 NHS England intends to carry out work to understand the nature of variation. NHS England is developing an enhanced methodology to identify outliers to take account of variation that can be attributed to population-based factors.

**4: PAC conclusion: NHS England is not adequately carrying out its responsibility to ensure CCGs are complying with the legal requirement to provide CHC to those that are eligible.**

**4: PAC recommendation: NHS England needs to establish a consistent oversight process, using the new data available, to ensure eligibility decisions are being made consistently both within and across CCGs, including by setting out what criteria they will use to identify and investigate outliers, and undertaking an annual sample audit.**

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation. However, the Government disagrees with the Committee's conclusion.

**Target implementation date:** December 2018.

4.2 NHS England already has an assurance mechanism in place to hold all non-compliant CCGs to account and will continue to regularly monitor the effectiveness of its assurance processes.

4.4 NHS England is developing an enhanced methodology to identify outliers to take account of variation that can be attributed to population-based factors.

4.5 NHS England is currently developing a pilot to test the feasibility, cost and resource required to run a sustainable national NHS CHC case-level audit for England, and provide assurance to NHS England on the quality, consistency and fairness of NHS CHC services being provided within and between CCGs. This work is underway and it is expected to conclude in December 2018.

**5: PAC conclusion: It is not clear how CCGs can make £855 million in efficiency savings by 2020–21 without restricting access to care, either by increasing eligibility thresholds or by limiting the care packages available.**

**5: PAC recommendation: NHS England should provide us, by April 2018, with a costed breakdown of how these efficiency savings will be achieved, and assurance that they will not be achieved by restricting access to care for vulnerable patients.**

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

5.2 CHC expenditure (after efficiencies) is forecast to increase over the period to 2020/21, and the identified efficiency opportunity is not predicated on changes to the National Framework in respect of eligibility or on limiting the care packages available.

5.3 How any efficiency is delivered in practice will of course be determined by CCGs locally, consistent with their statutory duties and national guidance in respect of access to CHC. National modelling based on variations in CHC expenditure and practice suggests the following notional efficiency opportunities in 2020/21, amounting to circa £855 million, which it is anticipated will inform local commissioning decisions:

- Working with the Department to provide clarity around the National Framework and improving the way CCGs deliver the National Framework. This includes interventions such as improved data and benchmarking information and reducing the number of CHC assessments in an acute hospital setting – (circa £361 million)
- Improving the commissioning of care packages – (circa £122 million)
- Improving CHC processes including the supporting of staff with Training and Development – (circa £79 million)
- CCGs locally delivered improvement initiatives – (circa £293 million).

# Fourteenth Report of Session 2017-19

## Ministry of Defence

### Delivering Carrier Strike

#### Introduction from the Committee

The Ministry of Defence (the Department) is buying two new aircraft carriers, a fleet of new Lightning II jets and an airborne radar system called Crowsnest fitted to Merlin helicopters. Deploying a single carrier, a squadron of jets and Crowsnest is referred to as Carrier Strike. The Department expects to spend over £14 billion on this equipment up to 2021, when Carrier Strike is to be first used in military operations. Between 2021 and 2026, the Department will then introduce the second carrier and more jets, and complete trials and training to enable the carriers to undertake a range of roles such as acting as helicopter carriers or transporting troops. This represents the full Carrier Enabled Power Projection capability.

The Department is planning for the carriers and jets to be in use for 50 and 40 years respectively, and the Government considers they will form a significant part of its response to changes in global security. The previous Committee reported on Carrier Strike in 2013, concluding that the Department faced major challenges around the affordability of the programme. In November 2013, the Department re-baselined the contract, agreeing a price of £6.212 billion for both carriers with the manufacturing consortium, the Aircraft Carrier Alliance. The Carrier Strike programme is a very high priority for the Department and we expect to return to it as the programme progresses towards being operational in 2021.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 11 October 2017 and 4 December 2017, from the Ministry of Defence. The Committee published its report on 19 January 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

#### NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: *Delivering Carrier Strike* – Session 2016-17 (HC 1057)
- PAC report: *Delivering Carrier Strike* – Session 2017-19 (HC 394)

#### Government responses to the Committee

**1: PAC conclusion:** *Value for money will only be achieved if the carriers are flexibly and fully deployed.*

**1: PAC recommendation:** *In firming up its plans, the Department must ensure they are designed to use the carriers flexibly and to the fullest extent possible in order to secure value for money from the investment. The Committee will continue to monitor this.*

1.1 The Government agrees the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** December 2020.

1.2 In January 2018, the Department agreed a policy statement for Carrier Enabled Power Projection which articulated the flexible use of the Capability, within the constraints of available resource. This policy has been written in order to give the Front-Line Commands the ability to coherently plan the routine use of the capability, whilst acknowledging the requirement to use it in response to crises and significant global events. The Department will now continue to revise and refine its plans, using this policy as a benchmark.

1.3 The Department is conducting detailed planning in 2018 for the first operational deployment of the Capability in 2021, which will be supported by US Marine Corps F-35B embarked in HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH. The Department has agreed to pursue a high level of interoperability with its allies, which will maximise the flexibility of the Carriers in line with the Strategic Defence Review 2015 stated objective of 'International by design'.

**2: PAC conclusion: *Changes in the naval fleet and the availability of other vessels at particular times may limit how the carriers can be used.***

**2a: PAC recommendation: *In the event of unforeseen events in the manufacture of the Type 26 frigates creating a capability gap, the Department should write to the Committee setting out how it will manage the impacts.***

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** December 2027.

2.2 If unforeseen events in the Type 26 programme create a capability gap, the Department will write to the Committee as requested.

**3: PAC conclusion: *There are a number of technical issues with the jets, which may delay operation of Carrier Strike.***

**3: PAC recommendation: *The Department should set out how it plans to maintain its influence on the US Lightning II programme after 2019, for the purposes of ensuring that the jets purchased fully meet UK needs.***

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** December 2019.

3.2 Although the UK loses its status as the only level 1 Partner after the System Design and Development (SDD) phase (2019), the UK remains the non-US partner with the greatest demand for F-35 (currently planned at 138). Whilst the UK's official vote in F-35 negotiations will reduce in line with the Composite Share Ratio to approx. 4.5%, the UK has developed strong relationships with US Services and has many common requirements – close to 90%.

3.3 The embedding of UK personnel in key Joint Programme Office (JPO) positions is already ensuring that UK expertise and experience of Performance Based Logistics is being carried forward into solutions for the Global Support Solution. Equally, the embedding of an RAF officer in the USAF F-35 Integration Office ensures the UK has sight of USAF priorities and can align and influence requirements where necessary. Throughout SDD, the UK and US requirements have proven to be remarkably similar, except for the UK's need to integrate UK weapons. This is where the UK pays to be different. This will continue throughout Continuous Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2).

3.4 The first operational deployment for this capability in 2021 offers the opportunity for further integration with a key US Partner (USMC), thereby ensuring the UK's position as the partner of choice in future conflicts. In addition to this key influence can be maintained with timely and consistent appropriation of funds and investment in a strategically driven UK industrial base that can provide research and development with potential to support the broader F-35 programme.

**4: PAC conclusion: *There is uncertainty over some support and operational costs, which are not fully included within current budgets.***

**4: PAC recommendation: *The Department must develop its estimate of the costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike and we will expect more detailed estimates when we undertake a follow-up inquiry.***

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** December 2020.

4.2 The cost estimates for use of the Carrier Strike capability are maturing coincident with the increasing experience of running both the Carriers and the aircraft. The recent trials period has allowed the Department to review the costs of running the Carriers based upon practical experience, which will inform the 2018 annual budget cycle. However, such trials periods are not fully representative of normal operations and so the Department will further validate the cost estimate model over the coming years. This will include the costing to integrate USMC F-35 into the Carriers as detail of their commitment matures. The same applies to maintenance and spares usage, and the Department is in the process of gathering more data from practical experience in order to further refine the costs of supporting the Carriers.

4.3 The Department routinely updates cost estimates for supporting and operating F-35B Lightning aircraft, based upon the F-35 Joint Programme Office annual cost estimate. These costs are incrementally approved and budgeted for on an annual basis, looking 10 years into the future. As the Lightning Force becomes established in the UK from August 2018, and the Global Support Solution for F-35 reaches maturity in the coming years, the Department will develop its estimate for whole life costs for the aircraft.

**5: PAC conclusion: *The Department is exposed to significant cost pressures in the event of change in foreign exchange rates.***

**5: PAC recommendation: *The Department should urgently resolve ongoing discussions with the Treasury regarding current forward contracts. Given the Department's tight financial position, the Department should establish with Treasury if relief can be provided, and write to the Committee with an update.***

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

5.2 The Department and the Treasury have reviewed the Department's forward purchase arrangements and found that they remain consistent with Treasury policy and cross-Government best practice, and offer a value for money mechanism for providing near term budgetary stability. The Department continues to manage the changes in cost resulting from exchange rate variations within its budget agreed at Spending Review 15. The Modernising Defence Programme will ensure that military capability is delivered in a sustainable and affordable way.

**6: PAC conclusion: *In line with the Government's new Industrial Strategy, the Department must continue to improve its commercial capabilities so that it is well placed to secure additional support contracts and bring high tech and skilled jobs to the UK.***

**6: PAC recommendation: *The Committee will in future hold the Department and Defence Equipment and Support Organisation to account for its progress on improving skills and capabilities, including how they are making the most of DE&S's bespoke trading agency status to recruit and retain the staff it needs.***

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

6.2 DE&S' bespoke trading entity status has allowed it to fundamentally alter the way it operates and manages its people. DE&S' management freedoms enable it to recruit and retain the specialist staff it needs to effectively manage one of the most complex defence portfolios in the world, while delivering improved value for money on an enduring basis. To that end, DE&S has defined and implemented a new grading, performance and reward regime, which is helping the organisation to attract and retain the high calibre people that it needs.

6.3 As part of its transformation programme, DE&S has also introduced and implemented matrix management, whereby all staff are aligned to a function (professional home) and role profile. This enables not only the flexible deployment of people to where they are needed most, but also the development of career pathways which are designed to improve the skills and capabilities of individuals in tune with the needs of the organisation.

6.4 The achievement of DE&S' initial transformation objectives in April 2017 marked a significant waypoint in terms of delivering the future vision for the organisation. The next phase of its transformation is designed to fully embed the changes made and to realise the efficiency and effectiveness benefits expected.

6.5 DE&S has a robust governance structure in place, with the Department holding the organisation to account through its Owner's Council, which is chaired by the Minister for Defence Procurement. This includes monitoring DE&S' performance against its strategic objectives, including transformation progress.



# Fifteenth Report of Session 2017-19

## Ministry of Justice

### Offender monitoring tags

#### Introduction from the Committee

Electronic monitoring allows the police, courts or probation services to monitor an offender's location and their compliance with home curfews. In 2011, the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) launched a programme to develop a new world-leading ankle tag, employing GPS technology to be used by all tagged offenders. The programme was intended to reduce the cost of tagging and provide wider operational benefits and more sentencing options for courts. The new tags were originally due to be rolled out from November 2013. Owing to a series of delays, the new tags are now expected to be rolled-out from early 2019, more than five years late. The Ministry has so far spent over £60 million on the programme, including £7.7 million (plus VAT) of losses which cannot be recovered, yet it still relies on the same form of tagging technology that was commercially available when the programme first started.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 13 November 2017, from Ministry of Justice and HM Prison and probation Service. The Committee published its report on 24 January 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

#### NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: *The new generation electronic monitoring programme* – Session 2017-19 (HC 242)
- PAC report: *Offender monitoring tags* - Session 2017-19 (HC 458)

#### Government responses to the Committee

**1: PAC conclusion: *The Ministry of Justice's unjustified and overly ambitious scope for the programme has proved to be undeliverable.***

**1: PAC recommendation: *The Ministry should ensure that it has a full understanding of the complexity and deliverability of future programmes and that estimates are tested for optimism bias and subject to proper levels of external challenge.***

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### Recommendation implemented.

1.2 All Change Programmes are required to complete a Risk Potential Assessment (RPA) which assesses a programme's inherent risk. The Department's Portfolio Office works with programmes to ensure that these assessments are kept up to date throughout their lifecycle.

1.3 Independent assurance reviews are completed for all the Department's significant programmes. These are co-ordinated within the Department for medium risk projects and by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) for high risk projects. These are completed at key stages in a programme's lifecycle, including prior to initiation so that the complexity and risks and issues to delivery are fully understood early on.

1.4 Programme business cases which have a whole life cost of £10 million or more are subject to a departmental review process which appraises business cases before an investment decision is taken. This involves an independent assessment of all estimates, including optimism bias, and is considered by the Department's appropriate decision-making board before making investment decisions.

1.5 Programmes which exceed the Department's delegated limit are also subject to HM Treasury approval. The Treasury will take assurance from IPA assurance reviews and independently review and approve individual business cases.

**2: PAC conclusion: *The Ministry's weak management of the programme meant that it failed to spot and manage problems.***

**2: PAC recommendation: *The Ministry should ensure that it puts the right skills in place to properly oversee future projects from their outset and keeps them there, particularly those being delivered by private contractors.***

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

2.2 Senior Responsible Owners (SRO) for the Department's major programmes are appointed by the Permanent Secretary following confirmation that the SRO's skills and experience are suitable. SRO appointment takes the form of a letter which sets out what they are accountable for and to whom. The appointment letters are usually published on GOV.UK.

2.3 Subject to rare exceptions, all SROs must have graduated or be in the process of graduating from the Major Project Leadership Academy (MPLA). The MPLA has been established by the Government to ensure that those leading programmes across Government have the capability to provide oversight and instil confidence in stakeholders. The Department also expects programme directors for major programmes to be graduates of the cross-government Project Leadership Programme.

2.4 The Department is building a centralised resourcing model for Project Delivery staff, which will ensure that it has in place skilled resource that is available for deployment on its priority projects and reduce reliance on contingent and contractor labour, while utilising those specialist skills as appropriate.

**3: PAC conclusion: *The Committee is deeply concerned that, despite the programme already running five years late, further delays are now expected.***

**3: PAC recommendation: *The Ministry should, by the end of March 2018, write to the Committee with a full breakdown of the timetable for the programme, and write to us with details of any further slippage as the programme progresses.***

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** July 2018.

3.2 Following the award of the contract to G4S in November 2017 for the supply of electronic monitoring hardware, the Department's Electronic Monitoring programme, working with suppliers, has been assessing the impact of the hardware supplier's products on service designs and plans. Changes will be required to the systems that were being built before the hardware supplier was replaced. Work will start on developing the new Electronic Monitoring system in March and once complete the system will require testing and assurance work to be completed ahead of service go-live decisions. Suppliers have submitted their plans and this will be agreed as part of contract 'reset' which will formally agree new milestones for delivery. The programme expects to conclude the commercial discussions necessary to enable the contract reset in July 2018.

3.3 The Department will update the Committee once the contract reset has been completed and a plan baselined.

**4: PAC conclusion: *The Ministry of Justice's approach to involving small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the programme meant that they were set up to fail.***

**4: PAC recommendation: *The Ministry of Justice should, by March 2018, write to the Committee with details of where it has adapted its approach to working with SMEs to ensure that they are able to participate in similar projects in future.***

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

4.2 The Department is committed to the Government's Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) agenda. Figures for the financial year 2015/16 showed that 34% of the Department's annual spend was with SMEs, the majority through direct contracts.

4.3 The Government's industrial strategy has set an overall target of directing 33% of its spend to SMEs. The Department has agreed a stretch target with the Cabinet Office of 38% to be achieved by 2020.

4.4 Policies and procedures are in place to ensure engagement with SMEs throughout the procurement cycle. This includes short form terms and conditions, and a procurement strategy that removes inappropriate evaluation criteria.

4.5 The Department will strive to further improve its spend with SMEs through supplier engagement events. It is shortly to confirm a commercial SME champion who will be responsible for further developing supply chain opportunities to SMEs. The Department also intends to create a dedicated mailbox to respond to SME queries as well as continuing to advertise opportunities on Contracts Finder. Commercial Category Strategies contain market analysis, which provides intelligence about the potential use of SMEs in the marketplace.

4.6 The structure of the Department's Commercial Function provides additional transparency on the opportunities available for SMEs within each of the commercial category teams. An example of the success of the Department's strategy with change programmes is HMP Berwyn in North Wales, which when it opened in 2017 exceeded its £50 million target spend with SMEs by £30 million.

**5: PAC conclusion: *The programme has so far failed to deliver the intended benefits and potentially undermined confidence in electronic monitoring services, wasting at least £9 million of taxpayers' money.***

**5: PAC recommendation: *The Ministry should, by the end of March 2018, write to the Committee with an update on how it is working with decision makers in the criminal justice system to ensure they have confidence in the electronic monitoring service and understand their options to use tagging as an effective alternative to custody.***

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented.**

5.2 The Department is committed to ensuring that sentencers have full information about community penalties and that decision makers are clear about how best to use Electronic Monitoring.

5.3 The National Probation Service is working to improve the quality of pre-sentence advice to sentencers. The National Sentencer Probation Forum was re-established in 2017 to support sentencers and probation providers to identify issues and solutions around community order delivery. Electronic Monitoring features regularly. The Electronic Monitoring programme also recently met with the Magistrates' Association to understand any specific magistrate concerns around Electronic Monitoring requirements.

5.4 For the introduction of the new Electronic Monitoring Service, the Department is developing a plan for engaging decision makers, at a national and local level, and those who advise decision makers, such as legal advisers and probation court teams. This will include appropriate guidance for decision makers on how to target the new location monitoring capability. The Department will apply the lessons of its location monitoring pilot which has had an explicit focus on informing decision makers about location monitoring and exploring its effectiveness as an alternative to custody.

**6: PAC conclusion:** *The Ministry has paid dearly to learn lessons which should have been common sense, and we are not assured that this situation could not happen again.*

**6: PAC recommendation:** *The Ministry should, by the end of March 2018, publish the lessons it has learned from the programme and how it has used these to improve delivery of its current portfolio of programmes.*

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** July 2018.

6.2 Lessons learned reports from major projects are shared routinely with the Department's project delivery community and the Project Delivery Centre of Excellence is working with the Electronic Monitoring team to share the lessons learned from the programme, including those set out in the NAO report, through a learning event for other project teams in the Department. Following the event the lessons will be published internally and shared with the project delivery community through existing communications channels including the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, the cross-government lead for Project Delivery. The Department will share the publication with Committee.

6.3 The training programmes undertaken by the Department's SROs and Programme Directors – the Major Projects Leadership Academy and Project Leadership Programme – draw heavily on lessons learned from previous major projects and prepare the Department's change leaders to set up projects to succeed. Subject to rare exceptions, the SROs and PDs will have completed, or be completing one of these programmes. A new Project Delivery Academy aimed at middle managers will use case studies gained from lessons learned to further upskill future leaders and further enhance overall capability.

6.4 In addition, lessons have and will continue to be disseminated to specialist, functional services (such as commercial and technology) who provide ongoing independent assurance that projects have been set up effectively and that risks are being effectively mitigated. Functional leads are represented on individual project boards and are also included on the Department's Investment Committee. The Department's approvals process for business cases is subject to a 'keyholder' assessment, by which each of the functional areas give an independent assessment of the strength of the case.

# Sixteenth Report of Session 2017-19

## HM Treasury

### Government borrowing and the Whole of Government Accounts

#### Introduction from the Committee

Government's annual spending has exceeded its income for the last 15 years. To fund the deficit, the Government borrows by issuing government bonds, known as gilts, through the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) to large investors in the capital markets, or by encouraging savers to invest in National Savings & Investment (NS&I) retail products such as Premium Bonds. The Government has a significant amount of debt outstanding from financing past annual deficits and it has targets to reduce levels of borrowing and debt by 2020–21. Public sector net debt (PSND), the Government's preferred measure for reporting on the public finances, was around £1.7 trillion at March 2017.

By comparison, the latest Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), which provides a financial reporting view of the public finances, reports that total debt from borrowing was £1.3 trillion at March 2016: around £47,000 for each UK household. Interest on debt cost government £222 billion in the period 2009–10 to 2015–16. As the Government's economic and finance ministry, HM Treasury has overall responsibility for government's financial strategy and fiscal policy. The Treasury published WGA 2015–16 in July 2017, 16 months after the financial year end.

Based on a report (and accompanying report) by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence from HM Treasury on Government borrowing and the Whole of Government Accounts. The Committee published its report on 26 January 2018. This is the Government's response to the Committee.

#### NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: *Whole of Government Accounts 2015-16 - Session 2017-19* (HC 254)
- NAO report: *Evaluating the government balance sheet: borrowing - Session 2017-19* (HC 526)
- PAC report: *Government borrowing and the Whole of Government Accounts – Session 2017-19* (HC 463)

#### Government responses to the Committee

**1: PAC conclusion:** *UK Government debt remains too high relative to economic performance, potentially reducing the Government's capacity to respond to future shocks and uncertainty.*

**1: PAC recommendation:** *In its formal response to the OBR's report, the Treasury should ensure it sets out its assessment of the key risks to the public finances.*

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** July 2017.

1.2 As required by the Charter of Budget Responsibility, the OBR published its first Fiscal Risks Report (FRR) in July 2017. The Government will respond formally to the FRR within a year, as required by the Charter. The response will set out the Government's approach to managing the key risks to the public finances identified by the OBR

**1: PAC recommendation:** *In its formal response to the OBR's report, the Treasury should explain how it will measure and report on the impact its investment is having on the economy.*

1.3 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

1.4 The impact Government investment is having on the economy is already measured and reported in other ways. In the context of the National Productivity Investment Fund (NPIF) for example, specific funding decisions are subject to *Green Book* compliant business cases and will include arrangements for the evaluation of a specific project. Departments will then assure themselves of value for money in the ongoing delivery of the project. Another example is the Infrastructure and Projects Authority who produce an Annual Report on the Government Major Projects Portfolio.

**2: PAC conclusion: *NS&I faces an inherent tension in balancing the differing interests of the taxpayer, savers, and the wider retail savings market at the same time as delivering specific policy objectives for the Government.***

**2: PAC recommendation: *The Treasury and NS&I must find a way to communicate to Parliament and the public how future products with specific policy objectives strike an appropriate balance between meeting government's wider policy aims and delivering value for money.***

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented.**

2.2 If NS&I launches policy products for the Treasury in the future, the Treasury will consider how it can best set out how it has balanced value for money with meeting the Government's wider policy aims.

**3: PAC conclusion: *It is not yet clear how the move to one annual fiscal event in the autumn will work in practice to enable greater Parliamentary scrutiny.***

**3: PAC recommendation: *By March 2018, the Treasury should set out how and when it will provide Parliament with the opportunity to scrutinise and debate decisions affecting the public finances.***

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented.**

3.2 In December 2017, the Treasury published *The new Budget timetable and the tax policy making process* setting out how and when tax changes will be made in the new Autumn Budget cycle. Building on the approach set out in the 2010 paper *Tax policy-making: a new approach*, where the Government committed to consulting on most significant tax changes, the move to a single Autumn Budget will increase the period between the announcement and implementation of policy, and reduce the frequency with which changes to policy are made. This will make more time available to scrutinise draft tax legislation ahead of its introduction and commencement. At Spring Statement, the Government published 10 tax consultation documents as part of its commitment to ongoing consultation with stakeholders.

3.3 The Finance Bill will also retain its current protected position in the legislative calendar, continuing with its Committee of the Whole House debates and line-by-line Public Bill Committee, while benefiting from the increased time available to scrutinise draft legislation. In addition, the single Autumn Budget should allow for the Finance Bill to reach Royal Assent before the start of the next tax year, ensuring Parliament has scrutinised tax changes before the tax year where most take effect. For spending measures, the Government will keep Parliamentary scrutiny in its traditional form – with debates around the Supply and Appropriation (Main Estimates) Bill and Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Bill, making sure that opportunities for scrutiny remain at their current high level.

**4: PAC conclusion: *The Treasury has made progress in improving the WGA but the time it takes to produce, and the limited information included in some areas, continue to restrict its use as a tool for decision-making and accountability.***

**4: PAC recommendation:** *By March 2018, the Treasury needs to set out its plans and timetable for producing the WGA more quickly after the year end, and for improving the disclosures, as recommended by the previous Committee.*

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** March 2020.

4.2 The current target is to publish WGA within one year of the end date to which the accounts relate and the medium-term aspiration is to reduce that timescale to 9 months. The Treasury will continue to work with stakeholders in central and local government and the NAO to deliver progressive improvements in the timing of future publications and will aim to produce the 2018-19 WGA by January 2020. This relies on planned changes to the local authority statutory deadline in England and the Academies reporting framework enabling the Department for Education to publish accounts by July in line with the rest of central government.

4.3 The Treasury will continue to work on the extra analysis requested by the Committee to enhance the information presented in the accounts. The 2016-17 WGA will provide more information on national and regional splits of expenditure and plans are also in place to implement further incremental improvements in future years.

**5: PAC conclusion:** *Unless actions to maximise the value from assets and reduce liabilities are embedded in routine financial management across departments, any gains from the Treasury's balance sheet review are likely to be short term.*

**5: PAC recommendation:** *The Treasury needs to ensure that its review has a long-term impact on the cost-effective management of government assets and liabilities. It should report to us on its progress by June 2018.*

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Summer 2018.

5.2 The Government agrees that good management of Government assets and liabilities must be embedded in routine to ensure long-term gains to the sustainability of public finances.

5.3 The Government has committed to providing a response the OBR's July 2017 Fiscal Risks Report by summer 2018. The response will include an update on the progress of the Balance Sheet Review, including how the Treasury will monitor balance sheet risks going forward and how the Balance Sheet Review will be embedded into the spending control process.

5.4 As a result, the Government considers that the response will also provide a timely update to the Committee on the Balance Sheet Review, including on the issue of how it will have a long-term impact on the cost-effective management of government assets and liabilities.

5.5 The Balance Sheet Review will not be finished by June 2018, with policy development ongoing throughout summer. The Treasury would not want to pre-empt any conclusions of the Review. Therefore, the response will only be able to provide an update on the process, rather than matters still to be decided by Ministers.

# Seventeenth Report of Session 2017-19

## Department for Education

### Retaining and developing the teaching workforce

#### Introduction from the Committee

At November 2016, some 457,300 teachers worked in state-funded schools in England. During the preceding year, 43,830 teachers (10.1% of the workforce) joined the workforce, including 24,120 newly qualified teachers and 14,200 qualified teachers returning to the state-funded sector. Over the same period, 42,830 teachers (9.9% of the workforce) left the workforce, including 7,760 who retired and 34,910 who left for reasons other than retirement. The school-age population has been growing, increasing the need for teachers. The number of pupils of primary and nursery age in state-funded schools increased by 598,000 (14.6%) in the six years to January 2017, and this larger number is now moving into secondary education. After a reduction between 2011 and 2015, the number of pupils of secondary school age has since begun to increase and is forecast to rise by 540,000 (19.4%) between 2017 and 2025.

The Department for Education is accountable for securing value for money from spending on education services. Schools spend around £21 billion a year on teaching staff, more than half of their total spending. The Department has a range of initiatives aimed at improving the quality of teachers, supporting the retention of teachers and ensuring that teachers are deployed where they are needed most. The Department spent £35.7 million on these activities in 2016–17.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 20 November 2017, from the Department for Education, Thistle Hough Academy, Stoke-on-Trent, Roundwood Park School, Harpenden, the Chartered College of Teaching, and the National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers. The Committee published its report on 31 January 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

#### NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: *Retaining and developing the teaching workforce* – Session 2017-19 (HC 307)
- PAC report: *Retaining and developing the teaching workforce* – Session 2017-19 (HC 460)

#### Government responses to the Committee

**1: PAC conclusion:** *The Department has failed to get a grip on teacher retention.*

**1: PAC recommendation:** *The Department should, by April 2018, set out and communicate a coherent plan for how it will support schools to retain and develop the teaching workforce. The plan should include what the Department is aiming to achieve and by when, the interventions it will use to achieve its aims, and how it will measure success (including the desired impact on the rate of teachers leaving)*

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** July 2018.

1.2 The Department is undertaking a range of activity to improve the retention and professional development of teachers – from reducing workload through to strengthening qualified teacher status (QTS) and improving career progression. The Department will set these activities out in a single plan. Given that a core component will be determined by the Government response to the consultation on strengthening QTS and improving career progression for teachers, the Department will write to the Committee with an update on the plan after the publication of that Government response, by July 2018.



**2: PAC conclusion:** *Workload is the main reason why teachers leave the profession but the Department has not set out what impact it is seeking to achieve from its interventions on this issue.*

**2a: PAC recommendation:** *The Department should work with others in the school sector to set out what is an acceptable level of teacher workload, monitor through its periodic surveys of teachers the impact of its actions to reduce unnecessary workload, and identify possible further interventions.*

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### **Recommendation implemented.**

2.2 The *School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document*<sup>6</sup> sets out the statutory framework on working hours which maintained schools must follow. In addition, the Department works extensively with unions, teachers and Ofsted to remove unhelpful practices that create unnecessary workload. The Department agrees that it would not be helpful to prescribe working hours. Teachers and school leaders decide how to deliver the curriculum in their schools. However, the Department's clear that unnecessary workload that does not improve pupils' education is not acceptable and the Department has set a clear expectation that schools should review and streamline practice according to the principles and recommendations set out in the three independent reports on workload.<sup>789</sup>

2.3 As well as using the Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS), the Department has committed to running regular surveys to monitor workload and assess how this issue is developing. The next TALIS is in 2018; and the next Teacher Workload Survey will be in 2019.

2.4 The Department continues to explore possible further interventions. The Department is hosting a series of regional events showcasing how schools have reduced workload. The Department has published reports from 11 groups of schools that carried out collaborative projects into efficient and effective approaches to workload reduction. It is also working with the profession to develop a free service, to be launched in the first half of 2018, which will provide leaders, teachers and others with practical tools and evidence-based solutions to remove unnecessary workload.

2.5 On 10 March 2018 the Department set out further steps that will be taken to reduce unnecessary workload. The Department announced that it will enter a period of stability for assessment, qualifications and the curriculum, clarify the roles of the different organisations within the accountability system, and take action to bring about culture change in schools.

**3: PAC conclusion:** *Schools are struggling to recruit teachers of the right quality, particularly in some subjects and some parts of the country.*

**3a: PAC recommendation:** *The Department should help schools more to recruit teachers of the right quality. In particular, it should set out its plans for the national vacancy service including the scope, timetable and budget and report back to the Committee by June 2018 on the results of the national vacancy service pilot.*

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** May 2018.

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-teachers-pay-and-conditions>

<sup>7</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/511256/Eliminating-unnecessary-workload-around-marking.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/511256/Eliminating-unnecessary-workload-around-marking.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/511257/Eliminating-unnecessary-workload-around-planning-and-teaching-resources.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/511257/Eliminating-unnecessary-workload-around-planning-and-teaching-resources.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/511258/Eliminating-unnecessary-workload-associated-with-data-management.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/511258/Eliminating-unnecessary-workload-associated-with-data-management.pdf)

3.2 The Teacher Vacancy Service (TVS) will be a free website for schools to publish teacher vacancies to help reduce recruitment costs and make it easier for aspiring and current teachers to find new posts. The Department will test the service, which will consist of a vacancy search and listings service for permanent and fixed term teaching posts, with a representative sample of schools in a phased approach from May 2018. To ensure maximum visibility of vacancy listings, the Department will develop a process for increasing the quality of information and enable vacancies to be more widely disseminated with local authorities and other providers of teacher vacancy services. The Department will also test the value and feasibility of developing additional features such as the ability to track applications, which will be dependent on schools' and teachers' needs.

3.3 The testing phase is expected to last until November 2018 and will be subject to a digital service assessment by the Government Digital Service before the Department moves to the next phase of the project. The budget for this phase is approximately £2 million, which includes building, testing and running the service and promoting it with the education sector.

3.4 The Department will report to the Committee on progress to date in June 2018, ahead of the conclusion of the pilot phase in November 2018.

**3b: PAC recommendation: *The Department should help schools more to recruit teachers of the right quality. In particular, it should write to the Committee by June 2018 setting out the actions it has taken to control agency fees and the results achieved.***

3.5 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** September 2018.

3.6 The Department and Crown Commercial Service are working together to provide a new framework specifically for those schools wishing to recruit a supply teacher. The framework will include a Preferred Supplier list of supply agencies as well as a Managed Service option for larger customers such as Multi Academy Trusts and Local Authorities. The commercial terms will ensure that schools benefit from competitive mark-ups and temporary-to-permanent fees and will require complete visibility of costs as well as promoting the highest standards of agency behaviour.

3.7 The primary objective of the arrangement will be to standardise the fees schools pay for supply teachers by reducing the excessive mark-ups that some agencies charge. The secondary objective of the commercial arrangement is to support the increase in the number of teachers in permanent posts by removing "finder's fees" (after a period of 12 weeks). These fees are often seen as a barrier to the transition of supply teachers into permanent positions.

3.8 The Invitation to Tender will be issued in April 2018 with the contract expected to be awarded in August 2018 and schools able to use the contract from September 2018. The Department will report on progress to date in June 2018.

**3c: PAC recommendation: *The Department should help schools more to recruit teachers of the right quality. In particular, it should work with the schools sector to share good practice in implementing flexible working to help attract former teachers to return to the profession.***

3.9 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** June 2020.

3.10 The Department is committed to promoting flexible working in schools. An announcement in March 2017 by the then Secretary of State stated that flexible working practices should become the norm in schools across the country.<sup>10</sup> A policy paper was published in October 2017, which outlines the definition and benefits of flexible working for schools, as well as potential barriers for school leaders

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<sup>10</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/justine-greening-teacher-development-key-to-school-improvement>

introducing flexible working practices.<sup>11</sup> This was released to coincide with a Departmental flexible working summit on the 30 October 2017.

3.11 Following this event, the Department made a public pledge to “*carry out research looking at changing recruitment practices in schools, to inform our guidance about how schools can introduce flexible working*”. As part of this research work, the Department will manage a pilot which will enable a contractor to work with schools to design, pilot and evaluate flexible working. The contractor will conduct bespoke discovery work with the schools to understand their specific barriers and challenges in introducing flexible working, and working to support schools in redesigning more flexible teaching posts to be offered at the point of hire.

3.12 The schools will be supported to embed flexible working practices, through coaching and training, as appropriate. The Department will then seek to consider how best to share this experience with all schools. The research project will begin in March 2018 and is expected to be completed by June 2020.

**4: PAC conclusion:** *The Committee is concerned that the cost of living, in particular housing costs, is making it difficult to recruit and retain teachers in some parts of the country.*

**4: PAC recommendation:** *The Department should set out how it will take account of the housing requirements for teachers, particularly in high-cost areas, in order to support recruitment and retention. It should take a more strategic role, particularly as this is an issue that goes across Whitehall, when considering initiatives to support teachers to ensure that funding for these has a real impact.*

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** September 2019.

4.2 Evidence on the variations in teacher supply challenges suggests there is no geographical trend; rather, such differences are at the school level, as opposed to local or regional level, which implies cost of living and housing are only one of a range of complex and varied factors affecting teacher recruitment and retention. The Department is investing £30 million in tailored support to help those schools that struggle the most with recruitment and retention. The Department will look at the feasibility of further analysis to understand the relationship between cost of living, house prices and teacher supply and will seek to publish results by December 2018.

4.3 In addition, the Department is already exploring a number of mixed-use developments on new free school sites, siting schools alongside community facilities or housing provision. The Department will continue to make the case for teacher housing as it supports wider cross-government plans, led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, which aim to create 300,000 new homes a year by the mid-2020s.

**5: PAC conclusion:** *The Department could not explain why the quality of teaching varies so much across the country, and what action it would take to improve quality in the Midlands and the North of England in particular.*

**5: PAC recommendation:** *The Department should conduct more work to understand why there are regional differences in teaching quality (for example by engaging more with school leaders in those regions where quality could be most improved) and, in light of its findings, set out how it proposes to improve the quality of teaching in the Midlands and the North of England specifically.*

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** December 2020.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/increasing-flexible-working-in-schools/increasing-flexible-working-opportunities-in-schools>

5.2 The Department is already undertaking a range of activity to improve teacher quality across the country. This is a particular focus of the Department's Opportunity Areas work, seven of which are in the North and Midlands.

5.3 The Teaching and Leadership Innovation Fund, a 3-year investment worth £75 million seeks to improve the education of children and young people through improving the quality of teaching and leadership by funding high quality professional development for teachers and school leaders in the areas of the country and the schools that need it most. The evidence from this work will help support the development of a sustainable market in continuing professional development and leadership development and contribute towards wider efforts to address regional differences in teacher quality.

5.4 The Strategic School Improvement Fund, a 2-year investment, is intended to further build a school-led system and aims to target resources at those schools that require significant improvement in school performance and pupil attainment. Funding for this is distributed based on local priorities.

5.5 The Department's consultation on strengthening qualified teacher status and improving career progression for teachers, which closed on 9 March 2018, sets out a range of options to help embed a culture of continuous professional development throughout a teacher's career. The Department's response to the consultation will be published in summer 2018 and will, subject to the views of respondents, set out further action to improve the quality of CPD for teachers. As part of this work, the Department will consider the case for targeting support at specific regions.

5.6 These different strands of activity will be completed by December 2020 and the Department will update the Committee on their impact.

**6: PAC conclusion:** *Teachers are not getting enough good quality continuing professional development throughout their career, which has implications for teacher retention and quality and ultimately for pupil outcomes.*

**6: PAC recommendation:** *The Department should write to us by April 2018 setting out its plans for improving the quality of CPD available to teachers, its expectations for how much CPD teachers should undertake and how improvements in CPD will be paid for.*

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** Summer 2018.

6.2 The Department's consultation on strengthening QTS and improving career progression for teachers, which closed on 9 March 2018, sets out a range of options to help embed a culture of continuous professional development throughout a teacher's career

6.3 The Department's response to the consultation will be published in summer 2018 and will, subject to the views of respondents, set out in further detail action to improve the quality of CPD available to teachers and entitlements to CPD for teachers and how these will be funded. The Department will write to the Committee when the response to the consultation has been published.

**7: PAC conclusion:** *The Department has not made clear what it means by its aim of improving social mobility through its 12 opportunity areas and how it will measure progress.*

**7: PAC recommendation:** *The Department should write to the Committee by April 2018 to explain in more detail its aims for the opportunity areas over both the short term and long term.*

7.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Recommendation implemented**

7.2 The Department has now published delivery plans for all 12 opportunity areas. Each plan sets out aims, short-term actions and long-term ambitions in each area.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-mobility-and-opportunity-areas>

# Eighteenth Report of Session 2017-19

## Department for Exiting the European Union / Cabinet Office HM Treasury

### Exiting the European Union

#### Introduction from the Committee

The Department for Exiting the European Union (DEXEU) has identified 313 areas, across all departments, where work needs to be done as a consequence of leaving the European Union (EU). Departments must plan for both a negotiated and a 'no deal' scenario, to be ready for when we formally leave the EU in March 2019. The task of implementing the UK's Exit from the EU will require government to develop new policies to operate post-Exit, put in place the necessary primary and secondary legislation, and establish new processes and systems, including in some instances building new infrastructure and setting up new IT systems. The scale of work is substantial and must be completed at pace. The skills required to manage these tasks, particularly in the specialisms of project management, digital and commercial, were already in short supply in government before the need to prepare for Brexit.

A number of departments at the centre are involved in supporting government's implementation of Brexit. DEXEU was set up specifically to manage the process of Brexit from the centre of government and has responsibility for overall coordination and strategy. The Cabinet Office, and the functions that sit within it, have a key role in ensuring departments have the people and skills they need. HM Treasury has overall responsibility for public spending, allocating additional funding for Brexit work as necessary.

Based on 3 reports by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 11 December 2017, from the Department for Exiting the European Union, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. The Committee published its report on 7 February 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

#### NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: *Department for Exiting the European Union and the centre of Government* – Session 2017-19 (HC 593)
- NAO report: *Infrastructure and Projects Authority* – Session 2017-19 (HC 606)
- NAO report: *People and skills – the role of the centre of Government* – Session 2017-19 (HC 626)
- PAC report: *Exiting the European Union* - Session 2017-19 (HC 467)

#### Government responses to the Committee

**1: PAC conclusion:** *DEXEU has not been quick enough to move Departments beyond planning for Brexit and on to getting things done.*

**1: PAC recommendation:** *The Government should provide the Committee with a formal update, no later than 1 June 2018, on progress made with implementation and with recruiting the necessary skills.*

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** June 2018.

1.2 The whole of Government is preparing for the UK to make an orderly and successful exit from the European Union, and the Civil Service is equipping itself with the right capacity and capability across government to make this happen.

1.3 The EU Exit Capacity and Capability Programme brings together departments, functions and professions to inform a strategic response to ensure that the Civil Service has the people and skills needed for exit. The programme has successfully met demand for resources in 2017/18. As the number of specialist and implementation resources required will increase over the next 12 months, the programme is working to increase the level of granularity in demand forecasting. A series of deep dives is underway to examine the capacity and capability requirements of EU exit programmes across government. This activity will improve demand articulation and enable departments, functions and professions to develop detailed plans to recruit the necessary skills.

1.4 The Government will provide a formal update, by June 2018, on progress made with implementation and with recruiting the necessary skills.

**2: PAC conclusion: *Departments have still not faced up to the need to reprioritise existing activity to make space for Brexit.***

**2: PAC recommendation: *By March 2018, departments should re-visit their existing commitments to test their realism against likely capacity and resources. Departments should demonstrate in their published Single Departmental Plans, no later than April 2018, how they have resourced the new priorities, including evidence of what has been de-prioritised as a result.***

2.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

2.2 Government Departments have actively prioritised activity as part of their internal business planning processes for the 2018/19 financial year. This feeds into the preparation of revised Single Departmental Plans (SDP), including workforce, financial and delivery plans. This ensures that Departments' commitments and other essential business can be delivered with the available resource and capacity.

2.3 Departments are supported by the centre of Government. The Cabinet Secretary led a series of stock-takes to examine readiness for EU Exit, to identify barriers to progress, including available capacity and capability, and actions needed to address them. Through the EU Exit Capacity and Capability Programme, the Civil Service takes a strategic approach to prioritising existing capacity. Examples include the targeted redeployment of members of the Fast Stream to priority EU Exit roles and the centralised resourcing of roles in priority functional areas.

2.4 The Government has previously informed the Committee of its intention to publish revised SDPs in May 2018. This timescale ensures that the public versions of SDPs are directly based on Departments' internal planning, which needs to be concluded first. The updated SDPs will set out how each Department's activity is resourced.

2.5 Departments are prioritising their activity in different ways, and any reallocation of resource from one area to another may be partial or temporary. As a result, a binary presentation of prioritised or deprioritised work in the published SDPs is not possible. SDPs for previous years remain available when new versions are published, and can be used to monitor accountability and progress.

**3: PAC conclusion: *DEXEU and the Cabinet Office do not have a credible plan in place to secure quickly the people and skills needed to support Brexit.***

**3: PAC recommendation: *The Cabinet Office, working with departments, needs to act urgently and put into practice credible plans to identify, recruit and get in place people with the skills needed, and in the numbers required, to enable progress of Brexit-related activities against critical milestones.***

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** June 2018.

3.2 Workforce planning is primarily a Departmental responsibility for Permanent Secretaries to determine based on specific operational and policy requirements, supported by functions and professions.

3.3 Each Department has its own spending agreement with the Treasury to ensure they have the right workforce and capability to deliver their commitments, for both EU Exit and business as usual.

3.4 The Cabinet Office is helping to recruit and get in place people with the right skills through a number of coordinated resourcing activities, such as the deployment of Fast Streamers to EU exit posts, the introduction of a Fast Track vetting service to reduce time to hire, establishing contractual frameworks, developing existing civil servants via talent programmes and running central recruitment campaigns for digital and project delivery resources.

3.5 Plans exist at departmental level, and at cross-government level for cross cutting skill areas such as Project and Digital delivery. Existing plans are at different stages of development and granularity and need further refinement.

3.6 Work to build capability in Project Delivery and Digital, Data and Technology delivery has been underway for several years, including the introduction of new professional Fast Stream routes, apprenticeships and capability frameworks. EU Exit strengthens the case for collaboration across government. Working together on coordinated recruitment and attraction for specialist roles tests and evaluates new ways of working to add to the longer-term offer from key central functions. Building capability and ensuring the Civil Service has a skilled professional resource base is a longer-term piece of work, which will deliver EU exit and future Government priorities.

**4: PAC conclusion: Unclear accountabilities risk undermining the speedy decision making resolution of problems and swift progress required to support Brexit.**

**4: PAC recommendation: Government should review, and streamline, the current complex structure of official-level committees to ensure decision-making can take place at the pace needed to support Brexit. DEXEU and the Cabinet should report back on the results of this review by April 2018. This statement should also identify the individual responsible for making sure the overall arrangements for supporting the activity needed for Brexit operate quickly and effectively.**

4.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

4.2 Sufficient progress has been made in the first phase of negotiations and discussions are progressing with the European Commission on the implementation period with the aim of reaching agreement by the March European Council.

4.3 The Government will continue to implement the most appropriate and effective structure of official-level committees and decision making as the negotiations and domestic implementation plans progress. DEXEU has established a series of cross-Government governance arrangements to coordinate work across Whitehall; close collaboration is vital and Whitehall is rising to the challenge. The official-level governance structure, which informs ministerial committees, was published in the National Audit Office report on DEXEU in November 2017.

4.4 The scale of the task of exiting the European Union is comprised of a number of portfolios and programmes, in some cases spanning and requiring coordination across multiple departments and functions. However, accountabilities for individual issues are clear: the negotiation positions are the responsibility of the cross-Government, Senior Responsible Owner (SRO), reporting to the Exiting the European Union sub-committees and delivery is the responsibility of the named SRO and the Permanent Secretary, reporting to their Secretaries of State.

4.5 In terms of roles and responsibilities, the Cabinet remains collectively responsible for the progress of exiting the European Union. The Europe Unit's main role is to advise the Prime Minister on how to lead the government's approach to EU Exit. DEXEU is responsible for supporting its Secretary of State in the negotiations to leave the European Union and establishing the future relationship between the United

Kingdom and the European Union, and for leading and coordinating cross-government work to seize the opportunities and ensure a smooth process of exit, on the best possible terms. The Department supports the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU to ensure a smooth exit and to seize the opportunities presented by leaving the EU.

**5: PAC conclusion: *The paucity of information in the public domain about what Departments are doing to support Brexit is undermining scrutiny of progress.***

**5a: PAC recommendation: *DEXEU should publish by April 2018 details of the 300 plus workstreams to support Brexit, along with regular updated information on the delivery dates for new systems, system upgrades and new infrastructure.***

5.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

5.2 The Government is undertaking a wide range of preparatory work to support UK EU exit negotiations and preparations. This body of work has been ongoing since the referendum and continues to develop as negotiations progress.

5.3 The NAO report set out that, as of November 2017, DEXEU had identified workstreams across departments relating to their preparedness for the UK's exit from the EU. The Government is committed to a reply by April to the Committee requests for workstream details, once careful assessments have concluded on what it will be possible to provide and on what terms.

5.4 The Government will continue to keep Parliament informed through regular statements, Committee appearances, and debates, and working closely with the National Audit Office. To date, the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU has provided evidence to the Select Committee on Exiting the EU five times and to the Lords EU committee four times. In total, there have been 28 occasions where DEXEU ministers have given evidence to a wide range of committees from Environmental Audit to Science and Technology. DEXEU has also provided for ten 'Brexit' themed debates in government time - on issues such as workers' rights, security, global trade and sanctions. The Government will also continue to work closely with the National Audit Office.

**5b: PAC recommendation: *The Treasury should set out by April 2018 how it expects Departments to report the costs of implementing Brexit.***

5.5 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** April 2018.

5.6 The Treasury is committed to transparency on public spending. As part of the 2017-18 Supplementary Estimates process, the Treasury has published the additional allocations made to each Department for EU Exit in that year. These costs will also be reflected in individual Departmental Annual Reports and Accounts.

5.7 Similarly in 2018-19, Supplementary Estimates and Departmental Annual Reports and Accounts will make clear the additional funding allocated to Departments for EU Exit.

5.8 Additionally for 2018-19, the Treasury will inform Parliament of the allocations made to each Department by Summer 2018.

**6: PAC conclusion: *Brexit is a huge challenge for the civil service, but also a real opportunity to make long-term improvements.***



**6: PAC recommendation:** *The Government should demonstrate that it is actively learning from the experience of Brexit to build processes and ways of working which improve the skills and capability of the whole civil service. The Committee will in future hold DEXEU and the Cabinet Office to account, not only for their work to implement the UK's Exit from the EU, but also for what they have done to actively use the experience of Brexit to embed long-term improvements in the way the civil service conducts its business.*

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

**Target implementation date:** June 2018.

6.2 The Cabinet Office functional model and DEXEU led cross-government working approaches have proven invaluable in providing an effective architecture for cross-Civil Service EU Exit capability, policy and delivery planning.

6.3 The Cabinet Office is developing an EU Exit People Framework which will build upon success to date and establish the future direction of the Civil Service's work in this area to ensure that it has the capacity and capability for a successful EU exit. The framework will signal the Civil Service's commitment to embed the new ways of working that have been established as a result of EU exit activity and ensure that processes are in place to share learning throughout the Civil Service.

6.4 The Cabinet Office teams' supporting Brexit are tracking and learning lessons from their engagements and support activities e.g. how to set-up an effective portfolio management office to deliver Brexit projects. The Cabinet Office and DEXEU are sharing experience across programmes and Departments through the EU Exit Programme Directors meeting and a new network for those delivering projects. The Cabinet Office and DEXEU are learning how to work more cross-functionally - aligning support to departments in a coherent and targeted way through the recently formed Functional Support Team (FST). The FST's aim is to accelerate the delivery of projects and programmes in response to EU Exit through unblocking areas dependent on functional expertise.

6.5 The Cabinet Office and DEXEU will also be reflecting on the ongoing lessons in terms of organising and deploying functional support.

# Nineteenth Report of Session 2017-19

## HM Treasury

### Excess Votes 2016-17

#### Introduction from the Committee

The Committee of Public Accounts scrutinises, on behalf of Parliament, the reasons individual Departments exceeded their allocated resources, and reports to the House of Commons on whether it has any objection to the amounts needed to rectify the reported excesses. The Committee may also make recommendations to departments concerning the causes of these excesses.

In 2016–17, two bodies breached their expenditure limits: the Competition and Markets Authority, and the House of Commons (Members Account)

Within this report, the Committee provides further detail on the reasons for these bodies breaching their 2016–17 expenditure limits.

Based on the Committee's examination of the reasons why these bodies exceeded their voted provisions, the Committee has no objection to Parliament providing the necessary amounts by means of an Excess Vote. The Committee published its report on 2 February 2018. This is the Government's response to the Committee.

Department	Resource AME	Capital DEL
	Excess / Amount to be voted	Excess / Amount to be voted
Competition and Markets Authority	£65,506,000	
House of Commons Members Account		£55,000

#### Treasury and House of Commons Reports

- Treasury report: *Central Government Supply Estimates – Supplementary Estimates and New Estimates 2016-17* (HC 946)
- Treasury report: *Central Government Supply Estimates – Main Supply Estimates – House of Commons: Members - 2016-17* (HC 999)
- House of Commons report: *Standing Orders of the House of Commons Public Business* (HC 900)

#### Government response to the Committee

**1-2 PAC conclusions:** *The Competitions and Markets Authority (CMA) breached its Resource Annually Managed Expenditure limit by £65,506,000. The House of Commons: Members Account breached its Capital Departmental Expenditure Limit by £55,000.*

**1-2 PAC recommendations:** *Under the terms of the Standing Order of the House of Commons number 55(2)(d), the Committee recommends that Parliament provides the additional resources by means of an Excess Vote.*

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

#### Recommendation implemented.

1.2 The Treasury agrees with the excesses outlined by the Committee in their report.

1.3 Parliament will respond separately to the Committee's remaining recommendations.

## Treasury Minutes Archive<sup>13</sup>

Treasury Minutes are the Government's response to reports from the Committee of Public Accounts. Treasury Minutes are Command Papers laid in Parliament.

### Session 2017-19

Committee Recommendations: 117  
Recommendations agreed: 105 (90%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 12 (10%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
December 2017	Government response to PAC report 1	Cm 9549
January 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 2 and 3	Cm 9565
March 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 4-11	Cm 9575
March 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 12-19	Cm 9596
May 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 20+	Cm

### Session 2016-17

Committee Recommendations: 393  
Recommendations agreed: 356 (91%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 37 (9%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
November 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 1-13	Cm 9351
December 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 14-21	Cm 9389
February 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 22-25 and 28	Cm 9413
March 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 26-27 and 29-34 <sup>14</sup>	Cm 9429
March 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 35-41	Cm 9433
October 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 42-44 and 46-64	Cm 9505

### Session 2015-16

Committee Recommendations: 262  
Recommendations agreed: 225 (86%)  
Recommendations disagreed: 37 (14%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
December 2015	Government responses to PAC reports 1 to 3	Cm 9170
January 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 4 to 8	Cm 9190
March 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 9 to 14	Cm 9220
March 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 15-20	Cm 9237
April 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 21-26	Cm 9260
May 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 27-33	Cm 9270
July 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 34-36; 38; and 40-42	Cm 9323
November 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 37 and 39	Cm 9351
December 2016	Government response to PAC report 39 (part 2)	Cm 9389

<sup>13</sup> List of Treasury Minute responses for Sessions 2010-15 are annexed in the Government's response to PAC Report 52

<sup>14</sup> Report 32 contains 6 conclusions only.

## Treasury Minutes Progress Reports Archive

Treasury Minutes Progress Reports are the Government's response on the implementation of recommendations from the Committee of Public Accounts. Treasury Minutes Progress Reports are Command Papers laid in Parliament.

<b>Publication Date</b>	<b>PAC Reports</b>	<b>Ref Number</b>
January 2012	Session 2010-12: updates on 13 PAC reports	Cm 8271
July 2012	Session 2010-12: updates on 28 PAC reports	Cm 8387
February 2013	Session 2010-12: updates on 31 PAC reports	Cm 8539
July 2014	Session 2010-12: updates on 60 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 37 PAC reports	Cm 8899
March 2015	Session 2010-12: updates on 26 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 17 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 43 PAC reports	Cm 9034
February 2016	Session 2010-12: updates on 8 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 22 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 27 PAC reports	Cm 9202
July 2016	Session 2010-12: updates on 6 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 15 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 22 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 6 PAC reports	Cm 9320
January 2017	Session 2010-12: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2013-14: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 18 PAC reports	Cm 9407
October 2017	Session 2010-12: updates on 3 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 12 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 26 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 39 PAC reports	Cm 9506
January 2018	Session 2010-12: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 4 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 14 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 52 PAC reports	Cm 9566

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