

# UGANDA POLICE PROJECT EVALUATION

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DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

EVALUATION REPORT EV: 591

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In May 1997 the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) was replaced by the Department for International Development (DFID). References in this report to the ODA apply to events, actions, etc prior to the changes of title and functions.

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development.



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## PREFACE

Each year the Department for International Development (DFID) commissions a number of ex post evaluation studies. The purpose of the DFID's evaluation programme is to examine rigorously the implementation and impact of selected past projects and to generate the lessons learned from them so that these can be applied to current and future projects. It should be borne in mind that the projects concerned were inevitably the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed may, in many cases, have since changed in the light of changing DFID knowledge.

The DFID's Evaluation Department is independent of DFID's spending divisions and reports direct to the DFID's Director General (Resources).

Evaluation teams consist of an appropriate blend of specialist skills and are normally made up of a mixture of in-house staff, who are fully conversant with ODA's procedures, and independent external consultants, who bring a fresh perspective to the subject-matter.

For this evaluation the team consisted of the following:

Christopher Raleigh (Team leader), Head Evaluation Department

Keith Biddle (Police Consultant)

Celia Male (Social Development Consultant)

Stella Neema (Consultant, University of Makerere)

The evaluation involved the following stages:-

- initial desk study of all relevant papers;
- consultations with individuals and organisations concerned with the project, including a field mission to collect data and interview those involved;
- preparation of a draft report which was circulated for comment to the individuals and organisations most closely concerned;
- submission of the draft report to the DFID's Director General (Resources), to note the main conclusions and lessons to be learned from the study on the basis of the draft report.

This process is designed to ensure the production of a high quality report and Summary sheet (EVSUM) which draw out all the lessons.



This study is one of a series of evaluations of projects in the police sector. A synthesis study which draws out the conclusions and lessons from all these evaluations will also be available from Evaluation Department later in 1999.

DFID, Evaluation Department

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are most grateful to everyone who gave so generously of their time in helping us understand this project, in particular to the High Commissioner and to Ms Petra Byrde in the High Commission in Kampala, Rick Woodham and colleagues in BDDEA, Roger Wilkins (British Council, Kampala) and above all to the Uganda Police Force itself. Needless to say, the responsibility for any misperceptions or misjudgements that remain rests entirely with the authors.



## ABBREVIATIONS LIST

AGHCD	Africa, Greater Horn and Coordination Department ODA (now DFID)
BDDEA	British Development Division in Eastern Africa
BHC	British High Commission in Kampala
BPTT	British Police Training Team
CID	Criminal Investigation Department.
CLO	Community Liaison Officer
DFID	Department for International Development
DPC	District Police Commander
DTO	District Training Officer
FPU	Family Protection Unit
GoU	Government of Uganda
INSSTEP	In-Service Secondary Teacher Education Project
LIO	Local Information Officer
NRM	National Resistance Movement
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
OPA	Overseas Police Adviser
PCR	Project Completion Report
TCO	Technical Cooperation Officer
TPU	Training Planning Unit
UMI	Uganda Management Institute
UNAFRI	United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
UPF	Uganda Police Force.



## SUMMARY

1. The Uganda Police Project ran, in two phases, from late 1990 to March 1998 at a cost to ODA of a little under £4 million. Its main initial purpose was to help restore the capability of the Uganda Police Force (UPF) to maintain law and order and the confidence of the public. Later (1993) this was reformulated to cover the development of law and order in Uganda, thus creating an enabling environment for stability and sustained economic growth.
2. The competence and reputation of the UPF had been badly damaged during the period between 1971 and 1986, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government came to power. There was therefore an urgent need to enhance the capacity, increase the numbers, and improve the image of the UPF, but local resources to do this were severely constrained. UK support for the UPF had been provided on an ad hoc basis since 1986, mainly in the form of training and transport. The Uganda Police Project of 1990 represented an attempt to bring UK support together under one umbrella, and to promote wider institutional and management reforms.

### *Findings*

3. Detailed assessment of project impact is hampered by the indistinct nature of the project objectives, and the lack of assessable indicators of achievement (4.1). Nevertheless there appears to be a close correlation between the sustainability of different project components and their long-term recurrent cost to the UPF (4.13).
4. The decision to structure the initial project around a Project Co-ordinator, resident in Kampala, enhanced not only the impact of advice from visiting consultants, but also the design of Phase II (2.8).
5. The UPF and Ugandan Ministry of Finance were more optimistic about their ability to finance the local costs of the project than proved justified in the event. Their inability to fund even modest project support costs - local training materials, for example, or travel costs for trainees - although not fatal to the impact of the project as a whole, did have a more selective effect in those areas (notably the Police Workshop and, to an extent, local training) which depend on the availability of non-salary costs (2.11).
6. Despite their occasionally differing perspectives, the British Development Division East Africa (BDDEA) and the British High Commission (BHC) combined well in managing the project (2.13). But arrangements for the provision of professional advice, particularly during Phase I, were less satisfactory (2.15 and 16).

7. The project was instrumental in promoting a revised UPF statement of purpose and objectives, and in helping to re-organise the police command structure on a sounder basis (3.3). It had relatively little impact on financial planning (3.4).
8. The training of police officers and support staff needs to be set in the context of a comprehensive human resource strategy if it is to focus on the strategic needs of the organisation and ensure that valuable skills gained in training are not wasted through unnecessary transfers. The latter has been a pervasive and wide-ranging problem for the UPF (3.14). The establishment of a fully staffed and equipped Training Planning Unit has however proved a significant achievement (3.22).
9. The institutionalisation of community policing within the UPF, by means of a national system of Community Liaison Officers (CLOs), has helped to promote the advantages of a community approach in the minds of police and public alike (3.39). The obstacles, however, to a full realisation of the benefits of community policing remain formidable. The UPF tends to regard community policing primarily as a means of instructing local populations, rather than of listening to them. It thus learns less than it might, while doing little to mitigate its authoritarian image (3.40). It is important to recognise the distinctions between community policing in rural and in urban areas (3.44).
10. A start has been made in creating a greater sense of gender awareness within the UPF, particularly since the gender awareness raising workshop conducted by BDDEA in Kampala in May 1996 (3.47). But all too often gender issues are still seen exclusively as women's issues. More needs to be done to institutionalise and strengthen the role of Family Protection Units (FPU) (3.48).
11. Whether or not it appears to do so, aid support for the police involves issues of human rights. It also has potential political implications for the donor concerned. BDDEA was arguably slow to recognise the risks to the UK's reputation if the UPF was to be found guilty of serious abuse of human rights while being supported by UK aid - although it is doubtful whether earlier recognition would in practice have affected this project's design or implementation (3.49).
12. Important issues of prioritisation and allocation can arise in the provision of police transport (3.55).
13. Lack of local finance to maintain and improve the police workshops, and to procure spare parts, tools and materials, has proved seriously damaging to operational effectiveness (3.61). Had the maintenance position been clearer at the time it is questionable whether ODA should have proceeded with the provision of vehicles on the scale it did (3.62).

14. The right kind of radio equipment can revolutionise communication between police stations and patrolling police officers, although by itself it may not lead to the introduction of more unarmed patrols (3.65). Comparing procurement arrangements for the two project phases there is little doubt that the use of competitive bidding, and of a specialist consultant with local knowledge, paid off handsomely in terms of improved technical performance (3.73).

15. The value of training in specialist areas such as ballistics can be compromised if no specialist equipment is available locally (3.76). More generally, training can also be compromised by a personnel policy that does not specifically recognise its importance (4.15). A specialist contractor with local as well as UK representation will often be better placed than DFID to organise in-country training (3.21).

16. The project's impact has proved strongest in those areas where implementation has cost the UPF nothing, or where minimal costs have proved acceptable for wider reasons (4.14). Despite recognising the risk in theory, ODA in practice consistently over-estimated the Ugandan capacity to meet the project's local costs, interpreting a condition of long-term chronic under-funding as one of short-term cash flow (4.12).

### **Lessons**

17. The main lessons to emerge from this evaluation are:-

- i. local government agreement to meet local project costs does not exonerate DFID from considering whether such commitments are realistic (paragraphs 5 and 16);
- ii. DFID overseas offices need to think carefully about the provision of professional advice where this is not available locally. In some cases it may be possible to justify arrangements, if there are several interventions on-going or planned, that would not be possible to justify individually (paragraph 6);
- iii. support for institutional strengthening needs to operate consciously within the orbit of the possible. This means, among other things, tailoring advice to what is likely to prove affordable (paragraphs 3, 5, 13 and 16);
- iv. replication of community policing from urban to rural areas needs to take account of differences in infrastructure, and transport, as well as local community needs and priorities. The importance of listening, as well as of telling, needs to be emphasised in police training on community policing (paragraph 9);



- v. all too often gender issues are seen exclusively as women's issues. If lasting progress is to be made in this area men (in particular) have to be persuaded otherwise. In the case of aid projects this means mainstreaming gender analysis and planning in project design (paragraph 10);
- vi. whether or not it appears to do so, aid support for the police involves issues of human rights. These need to be recognised clearly in project design and documentation (paragraph 11);
- vii. the value of specialist training may often depend on the availability of appropriate equipment. The two need to be thought about together (paragraph 15);
- viii. there can be a marked difference between project indicators which look good (and may thus help project approval) and those which offer a realistic prospect of assessment. Those in DFID who approve projects, as well as those who design them, need to bear this in mind - and, when in doubt, to err in favour of the assessable (paragraph 3); and
- ix. there is a difference between identifying risk and managing it. Both are important (paragraph 16).

### ***Overall Success***

18 The indistinct nature of the project objectives, and the lack of clearly measurable indicators of achievement, make precise assessments difficult. The impact of the project on poverty, and on enhancing productive capacity, we found too tenuous to permit firm judgements, although there is some evidence that both were present in the minds of those responsible for designing and implementing the project. Technically we judged the project to have been successful, largely on the strength of the suitability and practicality of the radio equipment supplied (particularly under phase two). The social and institutional impacts of the project we found were mixed, and, in some cases, less evidently sustainable. Improvements in police planning, and in developing training capacity appear likely to last. Whether the concept of community policing, fostered by the project, will take root in a way that genuinely enhances public perceptions of the role of the police remains for us an open question. We have tried to reflect these and other similar considerations in reaching our overall view that the project should rate as **partially successful** (paragraph 1.8).

## EVALUATION SUCCESS RATINGS

The Overall Success Rating for a project is allocated on a scale from **A+** to **D** according to the following rating system:-

**Highly Successful (A+):** objectives completely achieved or exceeded, very significant overall benefits in relation to costs

**Successful (A):** objectives largely achieved, significant overall benefits in relation to costs

**Partially Successful (B):** some objectives achieved, some significant overall benefits in relation to costs

**Largely Unsuccessful (C):** very limited achievement of objectives, few significant benefits in relation to costs

**Unsuccessful (D):** objectives unrealised, no significant benefits in relation to costs, project abandoned

The judgement on the Overall Success Rating is informed by a tabulated series of judgements on individual aspects of performance, including the project's contribution to achievement of ODA's **priority objectives** (listed in the upper section of the table). First an assessment is made of the relative importance in the project of each criterion or objective, which may be **Principal** or **Significant**; or, if not applicable, it is marked " - ". Where no specific objective was established at appraisal, the importance assessment is given in **brackets**. Each performance criterion is then awarded a rating, based only on the underlined sections of the five-point scale above.

Project Performance	Criteria Relative importance	Success Rating
Economic Liberalisation	-	-
Enhancing Productive Capacity		
Good Governance	Principal	B
Poverty Impact		
Human Resources: Education		
Human Resources: Health		
Human Resources: Children by Choice		
Environmental Impact		
Impact upon Women	Significant	B
Social Impact	Principal	B
Institutional Impact	Principal	B
Technical Success	Principal	A
Time Management within Schedule	Significant	C
Cost Management within Budget	Principal	A
Adherence to Project Conditions	Significant	D
Cost-Effectiveness	-	-
Financial Rate of Return	-	-
Economic Rate of Return	-	-
Financial Sustainability	Principal	B
Institutional Sustainability	-	-
Overall Sustainability	Principal	B
<b>OVERALL SUCCESS RATING</b>		<b>B</b>



# 1

## BACKGROUND

1.1. The Uganda Police Project began in January 1991 (the Project Memorandum having been signed in December 1990) and continued, in two phases, to March 1998. The first phase ran to July 1993. The second, originally intended to continue for two years from August 1993, came to an end in March 1998. The combined allocation for both phases was £3,821,000 (details at Annex D).

1.2. Our terms of reference for this Study (Annex A) required us to look particularly at the period from 1990-95, that is to say up to the end of Phase II as originally conceived. In practice we have found it necessary to go beyond this original deadline in order to give a clearer picture of the project as a whole. Phase II has never formally been extended nor has its Logframe been modified (although its allocation has been increased). For the purposes of this Study we regarded Phase II as covering the period from August 1993 to the date of our visit (October 1997).

1.3. We have undertaken no separate or structured research in the compilation of this report, which rests therefore on judgements reached during our visit to Uganda and Nairobi, and on our reading of the project papers. Our itinerary is at Annex B, a list of those we met at Annex C.

1.4. The Uganda Police project dates from a time when Uganda was still emerging from a protracted period of violence and unrest, and drew from the beginning on a style and pattern of UK assistance to the Uganda Police Force (UPF) that went back several years. The original project memorandum is very aware of this connection. It notes that UK support had long been provided to the UPF for training, equipment, vehicles, rehabilitation of the police college at Kibuli, and of the mechanical workshops. But all this had been done “in an uncoordinated fashion largely responding to the needs of an institution in a state of collapse following the troubles of the 1970s and 1980s”. The new project, by contrast, “would seek to bring future British assistance to UPF under one umbrella so that it may be targeted to maximise the benefits of the Force”.

1.5. Its opportunistic origins continue to show through in the design and implementation of the

project's first phase, which concluded in July 1993, and to some extent of the second which (with an informal extension) continued until recently. In other words, the project dates from a time (1990) when the last vestiges of uncoordinated ODA assistance were being disciplined into project form, but before the liberating concept of the process project had fully taken hold.

### **Objectives**

1.6. The wider objectives of the project's phase were:

- i. to help restore in the police force the capability to maintain law and order and the confidence of the public;
- ii. to create a climate in which other forms of aid will increase and be effective; and
- iii. to combat an increasing crime and road accident rate.

Under Phase II these were adapted to:-

- i. to contribute to the development of law and order in Uganda, thus creating an enabling environment for stability and sustained economic growth; and
- ii. to contribute to the practice of Good Government in Uganda.

1.7. These objectives, as indeed the design of the project more generally, were drawn up following a detailed needs analysis commissioned by BDDEA and carried out by a Police Consultant in 1989, subsequently slightly modified in discussion with the UK Training Advisory team in Uganda at the time. Two features of the resulting design are particularly worth noting. The first is the assumption, so obvious it barely needs stating, that support for the police - associated in the case of Uganda with UK support for the judiciary and parts of the civil service - represented a crucial part of the development agenda for both sides; second, and related, that the fundamental reason for seeking to improve the capability of a police force such as the UPF is that economic growth depends on social stability, which in turn depends on an effective and respected police force. The economic section of the first project memorandum recognises that the benefits of the project will not be measurable in precise economic terms, resting instead on the proposition that if the UPF were to become more efficient the prospects for economic development would improve. This analysis is repeated for Phase II, supplemented, however, in that case by reference to considerations of cost-effectiveness. In the case of neither phase is any attempt made (probably wisely) to propose crime statistics as a measure of police efficiency or police improvement. The project memorandum for Phase II notes that the recent high rate of economic growth in Uganda has coincided with a major increase in criminal activities but draws from this the not entirely logical conclusion that the role of the police must therefore be

becoming even more important. (There can of course be real problems about using incidence of crime statistics as a measure of police efficiency particularly where, as in the case of community policing, it may be part of the intention to increase the reporting of crimes that had previously gone unreported).

### **Overall Success**

1.8 The indistinct nature of the project objectives, and the lack of clearly measurable indicators of achievement, make precise assessments difficult. The impact of the project on poverty, and on enhancing productive capacity, we found too tenuous to permit firm judgements, although there is some evidence that both were present in the minds of those responsible for designing and implementing the project. Technically we judged the project to have been successful, largely on the strength of the suitability and practicality of the radio equipment supplied (particularly under phase two). The social and institutional impacts of the project we found were mixed, and, in some cases, less evidently sustainable. Improvements in police planning, and in developing training capacity appear likely to last. Whether the concept of community policing, fostered by the project, will take root in a way that genuinely enhances public perceptions of the role of the police remains for us an open question. We have tried to reflect these and other similar considerations in reaching our overall view that the project should rate as partially successful.



## 2

### IDENTIFICATION, DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT

2.1. File evidence strongly suggests that the design of the first project, although to some extent shaped by the discussion with the UPF that went on during the needs analysis of 1989, was very much the work of the UK side, with direct Ugandan inputs kept to a minimum. This view is borne out by an (uncharacteristic) episode in July 1990, when the BHC in Kampala found itself having to withdraw the proposed project memorandum, put together by BDDEA and submitted the month before, in the face of Ugandan unease over some of the project conditions (notably improvements to police accommodation they knew they could not afford). The memorandum was accordingly revised (although not substantially changed) and it was five months (December 1990) before the revision was signed.

2.2. This was, so far as we are aware, the only occasion, during either phase, when the Ugandan side sought changes in the project document. The memorandum for the second phase, by contrast, was approved by the Ministry of Finance in four days (omitting to consult the UPF in the process). As a general rule Ugandan support for the project, both in the UPF and in the Ministry of Finance, was continuous and largely uncritical, a state of affairs which probably simplified implementation more than it sharpened design.

2.3. Ugandan support at the political level, however, should not necessarily be taken to represent unanimity of view as to what the project was primarily about. If the main object of the UK side was to contribute to the practice of good government in Uganda, the main ambition on the Ugandan side seems to have had more to do with improving the facilities available for operational policing. Much of the time these ambitions rubbed along together well enough. But there were moments when, in informal discussion with the UK Project Co-ordinator, the Ugandans felt they could do with more equipment and less advice.

2.4. We are not able to say how far the objectives of the project were understood and shared more widely in Uganda. To do so would have required a much more structured approach to stakeholder participation within the project, including a different selection of project indicators. But we are not inclined to question the basic rationale of the project - that, in the circumstances



of Uganda in 1990, improving the quality of policing was a reasonable way to improve the prospects for economic development - which seems to us not only self-evident, but also a view widely shared by those in Uganda, outside the police force, with whom we discussed it. Whether the project's design and implementation were, in fact, well calculated to improve the quality of Uganda policing, and what its impact has in practice been, are more complex issues on which it has seemed to us more profitable to concentrate.

2.5. Although they varied in details, both phases of the project were built around three main components: training, equipment (including some capital refurbishment) and support for institutional change. These components were coordinated and overseen, until his departure in May 1995, by the Project Co-ordinator who represented, so far as anyone did, the "umbrella" under which UK aid was targeted for maximum effect. Also resident for most of the period of the first phase were a Training Co-ordinator and a Workshop Adviser (who had been in Uganda since 1988 and who left in November 1992).

2.6. We examine each of these components in more detail in Chapter 3. But it is worth taking an initial look at how far these three main inputs worked together to achieve the greater combined effect described in the project memorandum.

2.7. Two things distinguish the design of this project from that of the more ad hoc support provided before 1990. The first is the inclusion within the original project of specifically institutional objectives, notably the rationalisation and definition of senior police responsibilities, the publication of a statement of purpose, and the improvement of personnel practices and decision-making processes. There were failures here, as we shall see, but, on the whole, this aspect of the project proved over time to have been well directed and successful, and gave the project as a whole a unifying framework of sorts.

2.8. The second distinguishing feature lies in the role of the Project Co-ordinator himself. As so often, it took time to build up the detailed knowledge and mutual confidence necessary for effective collaboration. For much of the first phase the Co-ordinator was too closely engaged in this process to be able to shape events to the extent that he came to do later (particularly in relation to the design of Phase II). Much of the training and equipment provided under Phase I is little different in kind from what went before. Nevertheless the position was in fact subtly different. Simply by virtue of his presence, and of good working relations developed with senior members of the UPF, the Co-ordinator was able to direct and follow up the institutional advice provided by project consultants in ways that would probably not otherwise have been possible: for example, by helping to ensure the publication of such key documents as the Inspector General's Strategy Statement (September 1992), co-ordinated job descriptions, and properly drafted inspection procedures. More importantly in the longer run probably, the design of Phase II, with its enhanced emphasis on community policing and gender issues, owes much to the

understanding gained by the Project Co-ordinator under Phase I.

2.9. It would, nevertheless, be wrong to present the project as a coherent structure from the beginning, in which all inputs, orchestrated by the Co-ordinator, led equally and inexorably towards the achievement of the wider objectives. For one thing the context in which it was operating was difficult and confused, particularly early on. The civil war, which ended only in 1986, had left its mark on the UPF as on much else. Numbers had to be built up swiftly, from around 6,000 in 1986 to around 15,000 today - with an intended establishment of 30,000. Many police officers are therefore relatively new and inexperienced, besides operating in very difficult conditions with seriously inadequate resources. Against this background it is not perhaps surprising if, despite all the Co-ordinator's efforts, the pursuit of certain project objectives faltered, particularly where they depended significantly on the provision of local finance. Chief among these was the police workshop, endlessly harried into order by the Workshop Adviser, only to falter afresh each time the monthly budget failed to materialise.

### **Project Conditions**

2.10. That the Government of Uganda (GoU) should provide an adequate budget to enable the Police Workshop to maintain the vehicle fleet was one of three conditions of Phase I. The other two were that the GoU should consider all organisational and other proposals from the Co-ordinator and help the UPF to implement those which were agreed; and that it should review the conditions of service and remuneration of police officers with a view to establishing improvements.

2.11. The GoU and the UPF were in our view conscientious in responding to proposals from the Co-ordinator, many of which (most notably the formation and modus operandi of the Policy and Management Committee) they put into effect. The two budgetary conditions, however, remained largely beyond them, an eventuality which should perhaps have been clearer to the UK side than it was, given the earlier flurry over improvements to accommodation (paragraph 2.1). In fact the inability of the Ugandan Government to fund even modest project support costs - local training materials, for example, or travel costs for trainees - let alone a substantive improvement in police conditions, was not in itself fatal to the impact of the project as a whole. But it did (and does) have a more selective effect in those areas, (notably the Police Workshop and, to an extent, local training), which depend on non-salary costs (eg for maintenance or travel). All too often these were (and are) simply not available.

**Local Government agreement to meet local project costs does not exonerate DFID from considering whether such commitments are realistic.**

### ***Project Management***

2.12. On the UK side the project was initiated and managed by BDDEA. But if theirs was the main, it was by no means the only UK voice in shaping its progress. The BHC strongly supported the project, which it saw as “very sensitive and highly political” and “a key element in our overall strategy for our aid to Uganda”. Indeed it is evident from the files that for most of its life the Uganda Police project was seen as a higher priority by the BHC than it was by BDDEA. A temporary difference of view over proposed project management arrangements prompted the High Commissioner to remonstrate in November 1991: “This project is not just about some police training at the margins. It is about the fundamental reorganisation and restructuring of the country’s police force”. By May 1993 we find unease in some quarters of BDDEA that the BHC is exerting unreasonable pressure to drive up the capital scope of Phase II. So far as the BHC was concerned the project’s political and strategic importance gave it a pre-eminent position in the UK aid programme. For BDDEA the project was but one component, and by no means the most prominent, of a substantial aid portfolio in Uganda.

2.13. Despite occasional tensions of this kind the BHC and BDDEA generally seem to have worked well together on the project, with a good understanding of each other’s roles. The BHC was notably active, if not notably successful, in lobbying the Ministry of Finance over the GoU’s financial commitments to the project and to the police, and the BHC discussed progress with the President on more than one occasion during Phase I. In this sense the BHC judgement that the project was “sensitive and political” was both accurate and self-fulfilling. Neither the BHC nor, when the time came, BDDEA could, for example, overlook the fact that the pressure to increase the capital component for communications equipment in Phase II came in large part from the President himself.

2.14. BDDEA has no resident Police Adviser, and until 1994 had no Social Development Adviser in Nairobi. Professional advice in these two areas came originally from Advisers based in ODA Headquarters as - in the case of policing issues - it still does. In our view these arrangements, however standard at the time, had a weakening effect on the project’s design and implementation, particularly during the period up to 1994.

2.15. The difficulties were particularly acute on the Overseas Police Adviser (OPA) side. During Phase I of the project there was only one OPA visit, in August 1991. Indeed, from the beginning of the project to the end of 1995 there were altogether only four professional Advisory visits to Uganda - by three different Police Advisers. Police Advisory capacity was seriously constrained during the early years of the project and further limited in the case of Uganda by changes in Advisory personnel. It is clear that the lack of OPA capacity to deal adequately with “this complex, far-reaching project” was recognised at least from the time of the first OPA visit

(August 1991). Unfortunately, no workable solution to this dilemma was found. The 1991 visit led the OPA to propose a Project Field Manager to visit Uganda periodically and to liaise between the Project Co-ordinator and the various UK Police Authorities contracted to supply consultants and training. The idea was rejected by the BHC and the Project Co-ordinator on the grounds that such a post had all the attributes of a fifth wheel but no satisfactory alternative was found, even after responsibility for police advice moved from the FCO to ODA in 1992. The project and the Project Co-ordinator, as a result, received less professional attention than they required and the OPAs were less well-placed than they might have been to pursue action on crucial matters, such as the long-delayed recruitment of the Police Training Adviser for Phase II.

**In the case of Regional Offices, particular thought needs to be given to the provision of professional advice where this is not available locally. This may best be done on a regional rather than a case by case basis if more than one such intervention exists or is planned.**

2.16 The lack (until 1994) of a resident Social Development Adviser in BDDEA was probably less significant, although it is hard to believe that Phase I would have been drawn up in quite the way it was, with virtually no recognition of the social or gender aspects of police work, had a Social Development Adviser been present to take a hand in the design. As it was, social development advice during Phase I tended to be sought and supplied from London on an ad hoc basis as particular issues arose. Phase II was significantly more ambitious from a social development view point partly as a result of insights gained by the Project Co-ordinator during Phase I, so it was fortunate that for most of this time BDDEA was able to call on the services of a resident Adviser.

2.17 BDDEA was not the only ODA geographical department with a direct involvement in the Uganda police project. Africa, Greater Horn and Co-ordination Department (AGHCD) in London retained a number of residual responsibilities. It was closely involved, at the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, in the discussions that took place with the High Commission and BDDEA over the proposal for a Project Field Manager (paragraph 2.15). It also provided the point of contact in what proved to be a long-drawn-out and unsuccessful attempt by the BHC to attract major capital funding for the UPF from the European Commission. From this distance, the involvement of AGHCD in some of the more peripheral aspects of the project seems confusing, although there is no evidence that it seemed so to those who were involved at the time. That it worked as well as it did is nevertheless more a tribute to the judgement of AGHCD staff involved than to the diverse system under which they operated.

2.18 The key players on the Ugandan side have been the Inspector General of Police, his Deputy, and the Assistant Commissioner for Planning and Research. These are all competent officers who, unusually for the UPF, have retained their positions and their responsibilities, and have thus been able to provide an important element of continuity. Without their involvement

it is doubtful if the project could have succeeded to the extent it has.

# 3

## IMPLEMENTATION

### 1. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

3.1. Both phases of the project included a number of directly institutional objectives. Phase I aimed to promote a statement of UPF purpose, with measurable objectives, a rationalisation of the responsibilities of senior personnel, and improved consultation across a wide range of police business (including personnel, training and vehicle fleet management). Phase II sought improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of resource use, and the development of monitoring capacity. More recently, support has been provided for corporate planning.

3.2. These objectives were pursued within the project by two main routes. First, individual police consultants visited Uganda to advise on specific issues: organisation, staff inspection, financial planning, traffic control, corporate planning. Second, the Project Co-ordinator took personal responsibility for the pursuit of certain objectives, most notably the UPF statement of purpose, while reinforcing as far as he could, sometimes by means of workshops, the advice provided by visiting consultants.

3.3. Assessing the achievement of the project in these areas is not always easy. A UPF statement of purpose and objectives was produced in September 1992 which, although necessarily general in nature, gave new and valuable currency to the concept of police accountability to the community. The proposed re-organisation of the police command structure has been successfully implemented and the districts are managed and organised in line with the ensuing recommendations. The District Police Commander (DPC) is responsible for the conduct of all policing activity within his district and has full command of all resources. The system in use is very similar to that employed in the United Kingdom and represents, in principle, a sound way forward even though the full benefits of unitary district commands will only be realised when communications are improved.

3.4. On the other hand, support provided under the project for staff inspection skills has not been sustained, essentially for want of transport and cash for up-country allowances, while the development of a consultative, intelligible personnel policy remains a long way off. Project

advice on financial planning, although sorely needed, turned out to be of little use because it largely disregarded the painful realities of GoU budget planning. Probably more useful in this context was the support provided by the Project Co-ordinator in helping the UPF to obtain authority to vire expenditure across budget heads. The traffic study led to a number of low-tech suggestions for catching speeders, tried only briefly before being dropped.

**Support for institutional strengthening needs to operate consciously within the orbit of the possible. This means, among other things, tailoring advice to what is likely to prove affordable.**

3.5. UPF capacity for monitoring police activities, including force objectives, remains largely undeveloped. Some progress has however been made in improving the process of consultation and decision-making between senior UPF officers. With strong encouragement from the Project Co-ordinator, the Policy and Management Committee has turned itself into a reasonably effective decision-making body, the minutes of whose meetings are, in effect, taken by the UPF as policy decisions. A more recent (1997) and potentially more far-reaching development has been the preparation, for the first time and with project support, of a draft Five Year Corporate Strategy and Development Plan (1998-2002). The draft is based on desirable objectives, rather than costed policy options, but does nevertheless prioritise the areas to be given attention in the immediate term. We understand that, since our visit, the Plan has been costed and submitted to the Ministry of Finance. Whether it will succeed in unlocking a more substantial and assured budget for the UPF remains to be seen. But it looks like an important step in the right direction.

## **2. TRAINING**

### ***Origins of Training Assistance***

3.6. UK involvement with the training of Ugandan police officers stretches back to the immediate post Amin years but the assistance provided during this project has its roots in assistance given since 1986.

3.7. Between 1986 and 1990 a British Police Training Team (BPTT) was resident in Uganda and assisted in the basic training of recruits, promotional training, the education of direct entry graduate cadet superintendents and criminal investigation training. The BPTT also provided inputs on policing by consent and helped to train police officers in some of the processes of community policing. The BPTT included a female superintendent who was able to undertake some training in sexual offence and family violence investigation techniques together with general training in gender-related issues.

3.8. The needs analysis carried out for the project in 1989 recognised the importance of training to the UPF's development and recommended that future assistance to the UPF should include trainers with the skills to organise courses in such specialist areas as criminal investigation, traffic policing and scene-of-crime techniques. These recommendations formed the basis of the training component of both phases of the project.

### **Infrastructure**

3.9. The Uganda Police Force (UPF) has three training establishments:

- The Recruit Training Centre at Masindi;
- The Police Training School at Kibuli;
- The Police Staff College at Naguru.

3.10. The Recruit Training Centre at Masindi received little attention under the ODA/DFID project apart from some modest support for curriculum reform. Masindi was not visited during the evaluation. Reports prepared by both British and Ugandan observers describe it as of poor quality and unsuitable for the purpose of introducing young people into the police service.

3.11. By contrast, the purpose-built Police training School at Kibuli received considerable assistance to refurbish the fabric of the buildings (mostly under a separate UK rehabilitation programme) and to improve its training capacity (under the present project).

3.12. The Government of Uganda (GoU) has allocated the premises of the Police Staff College at Naguru to UNAFRI and it is no longer available for the training of managerial police officers. Management training is undertaken either at Kibuli or on specially designed courses at the Uganda Management Institute (UMI). The UPF intends to re-style Kibuli as The Police College and to conduct all in-service and management training there once it has been fully refurbished.

3.13. The Director of Training is based at Kibuli, with responsibility for recruit training at Masindi and in-service training at Kibuli. The Training Planning Unit at Kibuli, developed since 1995 with UK support, is also part of his responsibility.

### **Human Resource Issues**

3.14. The wider institutional context in which UPF training has been taking place - both within the project and more generally - has had an important bearing on the nature of the training and



its outcome. In Uganda, as elsewhere, the training of police officers and support staff needs to be set in the context of a comprehensive human resource strategy if it is to ensure that training is focused on the strategic needs of the organisation and that valuable skills gained in training are not wasted through unnecessary transfers. The problem of transfers has been pervasive and wide-ranging in the UPF, with countless examples of officers transferred without apparent regard to the training investment made in them. This issue, which reflects wider weaknesses in personnel policy, was raised by project staff on many occasions over the life of the project but without real improvement. With the wisdom of hindsight, it would have been preferable for the development of a UPF human resource strategy to have been made an integral part of the original project design, rather than leave it to Phase II.

### **Phase I (1991-93)**

3.15. The first phase identified training as a priority. A training adviser was appointed “to assist the UPF to develop a national and comprehensive self sustaining training department”. Because of doubts about the effectiveness and sustainability of training assistance provided before 1990 the role of the training adviser was specifically intended “to draw together the whole training organisation into a force-wide training department, to prepare a strategy and, as far as possible, the implementation of it.”

3.16. This demanding challenge called for a TCO with a broad experience in all aspects of police training including training management. The TCO appointed had been in Uganda previously and had a sound knowledge of the country, its customs and the problems faced by the UPF. His training expertise was however confined largely to the area of criminal investigation support, with little experience of the management and development of training for general police duties, so it is hardly surprising if the most significant advances at this time were made in the training of officers for the Identification Bureau in scene of crime examination and fingerprints.

3.17. These limitations were recognised by the Overseas Police Adviser during his visit in August 1991 but his recommendation that professional help was needed by the UPF to formulate its strategy for training was not acted upon until the design of Phase II in 1993. As a result an opportunity was missed to enhance UPF training capacity at an early stage.

**It is important to ensure that selected TCO personnel have the skill set demanded by the job description of the post they are to fill. Once appointed it is difficult to replace them prematurely.**

3.18. Important progress was nevertheless made under Phase I in the following areas:-

- analysis of the basic training course curriculum,
- the introduction of training in community policing skills,
- the revision of traffic training in the light of work done by project consultants,
- the bringing up to international fingerprinting standards of Identification Bureau personnel (this positive development is now threatened by the imminent retirement of qualified personnel),
- the bringing up to, and sustaining, of the force's scene of crime investigation capability,
- the development of much needed courses for CID officers.

3.19. There was also an attempt to introduce effective regional training by the appointment of **District Training Officers (DTOs)**. This went some way towards establishing the value of the DTO system but did not immediately take root, being dogged by the lack of equipment, stationery and finance. The initiative did however act as a stimulus for developments in the next phase.

### **Phase II (1993-97)**

3.20. The project extension, approved in July 1993, included the provision of assistance to develop UPF capacity to design course curricula, monitor and evaluate training, undertake training needs analysis and manage the training function as recommended by the OPA some two years earlier. In contrast to the previous training appointment the new broader-based training post was put out to competition. Recruitment was delayed for a variety of reasons - including the last-minute withdrawal of one selected candidate - and it was not until early 1995 that a final appointment was made. This delay, which meant that the Training Adviser arrived in Uganda barely three months before the Project Co-ordinator left, had a major effect on the shape of the project, which has undergone de facto extension to accommodate the delay. It did, however, lead to the recruitment of a well-qualified candidate who, following extensions to his contract, was until recently still working in Uganda.

**A properly conducted selection competition will generally produce a well-qualified TCO. But this does also need to be completed in a timely manner.**

3.21. Under Phase I in-country training had been organised by the Project Co-ordinator in conjunction with Recruitment Section in East Kilbride. This proved a cumbersome and unsatisfactory arrangement. Under Phase II the British Council were contracted to handle the in-country training programme. This has proved a more efficient if more expensive way of organising short term TCO inputs to training development and courses.

**A specialist contractor with local as well as UK representation will often be better placed than DFID to organise in-country training.**

3.22. Despite the long delay in getting started, the training component of Phase II has proved generally very successful. **The Training Planning Unit (TPU)** is securely in existence, with counterparts trained and in place. It is fully staffed and has been equipped, through the project, with state of the art personal computers and peripheral hardware. More remarkably, the TCO appears to have negotiated security of tenure for the staff he has trained, which should help to ensure the sustainability of the TPU and safeguard the quality of training provided. A (female) superintendent has gained experience of managing the Unit on her own initiative and should be well placed to cope following the departure of the TCO. A **Training Strategy** has been formulated within the UPF Five-Year Plan.

3.23. The development of **District Training Officers** has progressed but is still dogged by a lack of finance and materials. In the districts where the DPC has shown a real interest progress is being made but this is very patchy. The project provided support to the Head of Training and senior management to put the DTO initiative on a firmer footing. The UPF recognises the value of the system but facilities for training are less than adequate and local training budgets fall well short of what is required.

3.24. Short term training inputs have included:

- strategic crime management,
- quality of service,
- the development of internal inspectorate skills,
- intervention in hostage taking situations, and
- gender issues courses (see also Annex J).

### ***Training and Study in the United Kingdom***

3.25. Training and study in the United Kingdom have been used to provide opportunities for key UPF personnel to gain experience and know-how that could not be obtained either through in-country training or day to day experience. A schedule of the courses and study undertaken is at Annex K.

3.26. During the evaluation we met a number of officers who had trained in the United Kingdom. All were appreciative of the value of their visits and many were able to point to examples of good practice, learned in the United Kingdom, being applied to the policing of Uganda. The original initiative towards community policing in Old Kampala, for example, flowed from knowledge that an officer acquired whilst on the Overseas Command Course at the Police Staff College. This does not, however, alter our judgement that all too often officers have been transferred to duties which make no use of their specialist knowledge gained in the United Kingdom.

### ***Conclusion***

3.27. After a slow start, marked by the establishment of the Training Planning Unit, the training of police officers in Uganda has now entered a period of consolidation. The project has been of significant value in helping to formulate, develop and implement a training strategy for the UPF. There is still much for the UPF and the GoU to do, especially in the provision of finance for improvements to the training estate, the development of training at district level, and the provision of training materials. Further thought needs to be given to the structure of the Initial Training Course at Masindi. A recent Review of the Criminal Justice System, funded by DFID, has revealed a number of areas where the training of all police officers in the investigation of crime needs to be modernised.

3.28. As criminals become more sophisticated so police organisations need to invest more in training if their officers are to provide an effective and professional response to crime control and community safety. In this sense no police training is ever complete. But a good start has been made.

### **3. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE**

3.29. Work to develop criminal intelligence began during the first phase of the project, with support from the TCO Training Adviser, and continued during the second phase with a TCO dedicated to the development of criminal intelligence gathering and community policing.

3.30. The intention of Phase II was to develop a criminal intelligence system at the same time as spreading community policing nationwide. The use of the word “intelligence” turned out to be unfortunate, particularly in the early stages of the project, because of the general fear associated with this term amongst the civil population. “Intelligence” had led to the demise of many people, including police officers, during the difficult years between 1972 and 1986.

3.31. In practice the concept of “intelligence” soon gave way to the more innocuous “information”. Local Information Officers (LIOs) - frequently termed collators - were established at all district commands. The primary aim of the LIO is to gather information (for example on traffic black spots, drug distribution networks, or the activities of local criminals) in order to assist the district police commander better to direct his resources, and help to improve safety and security. The LIO is also responsible for gathering intelligence for interpretation and dissemination to operational units to enable them to act against criminals. In theory this allows information to be passed to the headquarters criminal intelligence department for central analysis thereby enabling (for example) travelling criminals to be identified and appropriate action taken. Details of crimes can also be analysed so as to detect patterns of criminal behaviour which can then be subjected to proactive police action.

3.32. In the course of the project detectives were trained in the role of local intelligence gathering, and local information offices were set up at district commands. A headquarters criminal intelligence unit was also established, with computer support provided through the project. The HQ intelligence officer trained at New Scotland Yard.

3.33. We found little evidence that this initiative has been effectively sustained since the departure of the Project Co-ordinator in 1995. The LIO offices at Wandegeya and Kawempe (districts within the suburbs of Kampala) continue to function, but to little effect. The records examined were merely subject cards showing arrests made, not local information. Intelligence is not being interpreted, nor retrieved from the headquarters computer system. Neither of the LIOs we saw had a dedicated telephone or easy access to one.

3.34. The situation at CID headquarters was similar. The two personal computers supplied under the project are still in good working order but the intelligence product consists almost exclusively of details of arrest. This information replicates the accurate criminal records maintained in the Identification Bureau. There is no dedicated office telephone.

3.35. The project intention of introducing a criminal intelligence system in tandem with community policing no doubt seemed reasonable at the time. But experience has shown that it was not sustainable without the continuing support of UK consultants, and that it might have been better to introduce it as a criminal investigation tool before seeking to use it to complement community policing. The history of criminal intelligence development in the United Kingdom (in the early 1960s) shows that the role of the LIO followed the development

of criminal intelligence, not the other way round.

#### **4. COMMUNITY POLICING**

3.36. Community Policing receives only passing mention in the first (1990-93) Uganda Police Project Memorandum. "The social impact", this says, "will come from the improved public confidence in the police; the greater incidence of crime prevention and detection resulting from a more efficient force and partly from the planning, expansion, and improvement of community policing schemes; and the improved capacity for economic and social development". "Number of community policing schemes" is cited in the logframe as a means of verifying the increased public demand for police activity which the project was intended to promote. But no direct support for community policing was included in the project design.

3.37. During the first phase, community policing was pursued by the UPF on its own initiative in two or three districts of Kampala but this faltered after only a few months (see Annex G). The TCO Project Co-ordinator had however noted its potential and pressed for the inclusion of a specific community policing component in Phase II. As a result, a Community Policing TCO with experience also in criminal intelligence, was recruited for Phase II with terms of reference that required him to help to establish appropriate and viable community policing in all parts of Uganda. "Extension of community policing and local intelligence systems from Kampala to the rest of the country" became one of the immediate objectives of Phase II, with "increased community consultative meetings" as an indicator of achievement. The important procedural differences between community policing in urban and in rural areas, underscored by lack of transport, do not appear to have been considered at this stage. Nor, more fundamentally, is it clear that sufficient thought was given to the relevance of the UK model of community policing to Ugandan circumstances.

3.38. However that may be, the establishment of community policing was perceived by police and public alike as a key element in the establishment of the UPF as a credible and effective force. Widely seen (not least by the Ugandan press) as corrupt, inefficient and brutal, the UPF itself tended to see community policing as a promising way to bridge the gap between the UPF and the public, and establish a new approach to policing based on mutual trust and cooperation. It was also the hope of the UPF, if not a specific intention of the project, to use community policing to improve its public image, and thus help to secure public confidence and cooperation.

3.39. Project support during the 18 month period of the Community Policing/Crime Intelligence Co-ordinator appears to have gone some way in helping to lay the foundation for Community Policing on a national basis. The institutionalisation of community policing within the UPF, by means of a national system of Community Liaison Officers (CLOs), has helped to

promote the advantages of a community approach in the minds of police and public alike. The advantages of the approach are clearly apparent to senior UPF officers, although some others have reservations about promoting greater public knowledge of civil and legal rights (see also Annex G). The response of the public to the introduction of community policing has on the whole been positive, if muted.

3.40. Without clear indicators and wider research it is hard to be certain, but it seems doubtful if Community Policing, as currently practiced, has yet led to any substantive change in the public image of the UPF. Indeed the obstacles to a full realisation of the benefits of Community Policing in Uganda remain formidable. In discussion with police and non-police sources alike we found clear signs that the police regard community policing primarily as a means of instructing local populations, rather than of listening to them. They thus learn less than they might, while doing little to mitigate their authoritarian image. A more practical problem is that the lack of an effective monitoring support service for CLOs in the field means they are left largely to their own devices to interpret and deliver training.

3.41. Despite these difficulties, recent integration of Community Policing in basic and promotional training has further established it as a core police activity in Uganda. There is senior management commitment to the programme and funds for training from HQ (the programme is now locally owned, being organised and taught by HQ staff without the involvement of the Training Adviser). There are 140 CLOs in place around the country, for whom the provision of a small budget at district level enables limited mobility.

3.42. An initial impact study carried out by local consultants to assess the effectiveness of the community policing component was undertaken in mid-1997. Although the evaluation team has some reservations about the methodology used, this study suggests that community policing remains a "popular" concept, in high demand, and that despite weaknesses of execution its inclusion in the UPF project has helped to forge a new link between police and people.

3.43. Like other parts of the Uganda public sector, the UPF is still subject to severe resource constraints and poor incentives. Important concerns must remain about the sustainability of the support provided so far, the capacity of the UPF to maintain the pace of work required to consolidate activities, and the future direction and development of the gains achieved. The fact remains that since the departure of the Community Policing Co-ordinator in April 1995 no financial support for community policing has been provided through the project. That the UPF should have sustained the CLO programme to the extent that it has is already a notable achievement.

3.44. A particular challenge is how community policing can best be undertaken in rural areas where transport and fuel are in such limited supply. Experience of Community Policing in the Western Cape suggests there can be advantage in involving all stakeholders to consider the

future direction of Community Policing and develop an overall strategy, including the identification of practical training needs and support materials, to ensure its sustainability.

**Replication of community policing from urban to rural areas needs to take account of differences in infrastructure, and transport, as well as local community needs and priorities. Police officers responsible for community policing need to develop close relations with local representative bodies if lasting impact is to be achieved. The importance of listening, as well as of telling, needs to be emphasised in police training on this subject.**

## 5. GENDER ISSUES

3.45. Only 12% (1997) of the UPF are women. For women, as for men, salaries are low and often late in arriving and the housing appalling, with one room often having to be shared with others. We found some evidence that women are more deterred than men by the requirement to transfer regularly throughout their police careers. UPF policy is that women and men should be treated equally and have the same promotion opportunities, although proportionally there are fewer women than men in the senior ranks. (For a more detailed analysis see Annex J).

3.46. Little if any thought seems to have been given in 1990 to the particular needs of women and how these might be addressed during the project's first phase. By 1993, when the second phase of the UPF project was designed, there was greater recognition of the needs of women both within the UPF and in relation to the wider population. Domestic violence, sexual abuse and harassment of women and girls were identified as key issues. Equal opportunities and crimes against women were issues highlighted in the Training Adviser's terms of reference and have, as a result, now become part of the UPF training curriculum.

3.47. Three related project activities deserve special mention:-

- i. Two courses in (a) self-defence and (b) investigation of sexual offences were organised for 30 women police officers in January 1995. The intention was that the techniques of self-defence should be passed on to other women's groups. So far as we could ascertain this has not happened. The evaluation team was in any case inclined to doubt the wisdom of trying to pass on to women in general, techniques of self-defence specifically designed for police women. By contrast, the course on sexual offences, which included counselling skills as well as investigation, appears to have been highly successful and to have led directly to the establishment of Family Protection Units (FPUs) - originally called Gender Desks - at major police stations.



- ii. Linkages were formed by CLOs with the DFID-funded In-service Secondary Teacher Education Project (INSSTEP), leading to the training of police officers from 31 districts in gender issues (including sexual abuse of children by teachers) in secondary schools. Linking the INSSTEP and UPF projects in this way is generally considered to have been a valuable initiative. By contrast, efforts by CLOs to convey information on the universal rights of the child to primary school children appear to have been less well adapted to their audience.
- iii. Following a gender awareness-raising workshop conducted by BDDEA in Kampala in May 1996, a gender strategy to strengthen the FPU programme was developed by the Training Adviser and the UPF officer with specific responsibility for training women police officers. This led in January 1997 to a gender-related training course for 60 police women aimed at dealing with all types of gender abuse within the criminal justice system. This was followed by a Training of Trainers course in Child and Family Protection Work in October 1997.

3.48. Opportunities to do more were, however, missed. An early Social Development Adviser recommendation that short-term consultancy support should be provided to assist the training officer to propose a training strategy for (i) equal opportunities and (ii) awareness of women's legal rights was not pursued. The FPU initiative has moreover yet to be institutionalised into the UPF training programme, and without continuing donor support its future looks uncertain.

**All too often gender issues are seen exclusively as women's issues. If lasting progress is to be made in this area men (in particular) have to be persuaded otherwise. In the case of aid projects this means mainstreaming gender analysis and planning in project design.**

## 6. HUMAN RIGHTS

3.49. The promotion of human rights, as such, was not included among the objectives of either phase of the project which, as we have seen, hinged on the proposition that economic growth depends on social stability and hence on effective policing. More surprising perhaps is the failure to consider, until February 1993 when plans for Phase II were getting under way, the potential risks to the reputation of the UK if the UPF were to be found guilty of serious abuses of human rights while being supported by British aid. For donors who involve themselves in police projects this is not infrequently a consideration of some importance. It is in our view doubtful whether earlier consideration of this issue would have affected the design or implementation of Phase I. Nevertheless it is arguable in this case that such consideration as went on was both too little and too late.

**Whether or not it appears to do so, aid support for the police involves issues of human rights. These need to be recognised clearly in project design and documentation.**

3.50. At the outset of the project there were few local organisations addressing human rights issues. The rise of a number of credible NGOs concerned with human rights and child rights issues provides UPF with valuable additional sources of information and advice in this area. This development represents a potentially important opportunity for the UPF. That the UPF is aware of the importance of these issues can be seen in the attempts it has made to publicise the UN Rights of the Child by CLOs. How far it is inclined to look to other organisations for insight into the promotion of human rights in Uganda, more generally, is less clear.

## **7. EQUIPMENT**

### ***Provision of Motor Vehicles***

3.51. Motor vehicles are essential policing tools, which in Uganda have always been in very short supply. The provision of UK-funded police vehicles, including off road four wheel drive Land Rovers, specialist vehicles and motor cycles, began on a substantial scale in 1986 and continued on a rather more modest basis under the project.

3.52. The Motor vehicles were originally supplied with spare parts. In 1992 and 1996 additional Land Rover spares were provided.

3.53. The poor survival rate of the Land Rovers is due partly to the high accident rate (itself a function of road and traffic conditions in Uganda) and partly to inadequate maintenance and repair facilities. The police workshop yard is littered with the remains of collision-damaged Land Rovers. This apart, the Land Rover is highly regarded by the UPF and has given it good service in difficult conditions. The motor cycles have also given good service although those which survive are now beginning to show their age.

3.54. The following table outlines the position

YEAR	VEHICLES SUPPLIED	IN SERVICE 1997	COMMENTS
1986	20 Land Rovers	6	
1987	80 Land Rovers	6	74 commandeered by Uganda Army and not returned.
1987	16 BSA motor cycles	0	All written off - either through accident damage or having reached end of life.
1988	10 Land Rovers	6	
1989	65 Land Rovers	34	
1990	15 Land Rovers 1 Bedford Recovery Lorry	9 1	Includes 2 Land Rovers converted as mobile workshops.
1991	1 Land Rover	1	Staff vehicle for IGP
1992	14 Land Rovers 1 BSA motorcycle	14 1	
1993	2 Land Rovers 10 BSA motor cycles	2 10	
1995	3 Land Rovers 1 Leyland - Daf Personnel carrier	2 1	For use of training school
1996	1 Land Rover	1	For use of Communications Department

3.55. How appropriately the vehicles were selected, and how effectively they have been used, are more difficult to determine since these were never monitored. In practice, most of the landrovers appear to have been taken over by Regional and Divisional Police Commanders, whose personal property in a sense they became. Given the crucial importance of mobility, and

the lack of alternative resources for this purpose, we have no reason to suppose that the vehicles were not in the main well used - and indeed it is hard to see how any other system of allocation could have worked. Nevertheless, important issues of prioritisation can arise in the provision of police transport - for example between landrovers, motorcycles, and bicycles. In this case these do not seem to have been considered either during the design of the project or afterwards.

### ***The Uganda Police Force Workshop***

3.56. UK support for the police workshops in Kampala goes back to January 1987 but was subsequently incorporated within the project until its conclusion in September 1992. The assistance covered:

- a resident full time TCO adviser/ workshop manager;
- the refurbishment and re-equipping of the workshops; and
- training for the counterpart to the TCO adviser/workshop manager and other key personnel.

3.57. The job of the TCO adviser/workshop manager was to rehabilitate the workshops, which had become almost totally run down during the difficult years between 1972 and 1986, and to train staff.

3.58. The fabric of the building was largely rebuilt between 1987 and 1990, at a cost of £288,000, and tools to the value of £10,000 were provided. A further supply of tools, together with ten fully equipped professional toolboxes, followed in 1992.

3.59. During this time the productivity of the workshop improved but never reached its true potential. The main reason for this was the failure of the UPF to provide the recurrent cash budget for the workshop on time, or in some cases at all. Much time was spent by the Workshop Adviser, and subsequently by the Project Co-ordinator and the High Commission, chasing the UPF and the Ministry of Finance - with generally limited success.

3.60. There were nevertheless some significant if temporary achievements:-

- a user friendly workshop manual was provided;
- a stores system was established for spare parts, tools and consumable materials;
- staff were trained.

3.61. Unfortunately these achievements have not been sustained. Lack of finance to maintain and improve the workshops, and to purchase spare parts, tools and materials, has proved seriously

damaging to the operational effectiveness of the workshop in the longer run. A further problem is that of the nine local mechanics trained in the UK only one is still in post. Most have left for the commercial sector where, using skills acquired in the UK, they have been able to command better earnings. Shortly after the Workshop Adviser returned to the UK in 1992 his counterpart, trained as workshop manager, was transferred to other duties.

3.62. The workshop appears to be held in low regard by many Ugandan police officers, partly because of the length of time taken to effect repairs, and partly because of what is seen as the risk that parts may be taken to repair the vehicles of more senior officers. Had the maintenance position been clearer in the late 1980s it is at least questionable whether ODA should have proceeded with the provision of vehicles on the scale it did.

3.63. In December 1997 the UPF Inspectorate reported on the workshop, identifying broadly similar problems to those listed above. As a result, improved workshop management has been identified as an important priority in the (first) UPF Annual Policing Plan 1998/99.

### ***Radio Communications***

3.64. The provision of radio equipment under Phase One began in 1990 but was not completed until 1994. The intention was to provide personal hand-held radios for police officers patrolling the streets of Kampala. In total six Local Area Radio Networks (LAN) were introduced in the greater Kampala conurbation.

3.65. Despite some technical shortcomings (see below) the LAN has revolutionised communication between police stations and patrolling police officers. Improved radio communications have also given some impetus to community policing initiatives, as well as giving officers more confidence in dealing with street incidents by providing a means to summon support quickly. It was hoped, certainly on the UK side, that this greater confidence would lead to the introduction of unarmed patrols. A policeman without a Kalashnikov AK 47 assault rifle remains, however, a rare sight on the streets of Kampala and in this respect at least the introduction of effective radio communication has yet to deliver the wider benefits originally hoped of it.

3.66. Technically there were a number of problems:

- the relationship between the UPF and the supplier was not always satisfactory;
- the equipment was not always sufficiently robust for the working environment in Uganda;
- batteries for both base stations and hand-held radios lacked resilience and had too

short an operational life;

- there were memory problems with hand-held radios;
- the battery chargers supplied could not always cope with the fluctuations in the Ugandan power supply.

3.67. Despite concerns about the efficiency and operational resilience of the equipment supplied in Phase One, the LAN was regarded not only as a success but as a model upon which a wider personal radio communications system could be built. A former UK senior police officer, with wide experience in the specification and installation of police related technology, was appointed to oversee Phase Two. A full user requirement study was undertaken and a detailed technical specification drafted for circulation to potential suppliers. The contract to supply, install, train key personnel and provide after-installation service was let after a competitive tendering process. Crown Agents managed the procurement, with the UK consultant acting as on site project manager to ensure that timebound tasks were efficiently executed.

3.68. Phase Two extended the LAN from the six districts within Kampala to cover Jinja, Mbarara, Fort Portal, Kasese, Mbale, Arua, Entebbe, Kabule, Masaka, and Gulu.

3.69. Phase Two made as much use as possible of the civilian telecommunications aerial infrastructure. The use of military communications installations was briefly considered but rejected in view of the need to maintain a proper distance between the functions of the military and the civil authorities. To increase cost efficiency, and make as much use as possible of renewable energy sources, solar power was used whenever practical to power radio installations.

3.70. In Phase Two a total of 350 radios (of different manufacture from those supplied under Phase One) were delivered to the UPF. This figure included specially encrypted radios for use by Special Branch and the Anti-Narcotics Branch. The eventual aim is for all patrolling police officers to be in possession of an effective radio, although to achieve this some 8500 personal radios will be required.

3.71. We saw the Local Area Networks in operation at Kibuli, Mbarara and Masaka, where they appeared to be working well. Unlike Phase One, there were no complaints about the quality of the equipment but several regrets about the inadequate number of radios for patrolling officers.

3.72. Computer equipment and tools were supplied to the UPF radio workshop together with a Land Rover for its exclusive use. 18 FAX machines were also supplied to improve communications between UPF headquarters in Kampala and key districts. Morse code, however, is still widely used for routine messages and provides a cheap and efficient system for non-urgent communications.

3.73. Looking at Phases I and II together there is little doubt that the use of competitive bidding,

and of a dedicated specialist consultant, paid off handsomely in terms of improved technical performance. That the UPF has valued the equipment and the support it has received from the supplier in Phase Two, is shown by its decision to go ahead with a further purchase of LAN equipment valued at £200,000 from its own resources. It seems reasonable to conclude that this element of the project has proved its worth and will be fully sustainable.

### ***Provision of Equipment to the Identification Bureau***

3.74. The Identification Bureau maintains the UPF criminal records and fingerprint collection. It also provides expertise in scene of crime work and ballistics.

3.75. During the course of the project, equipment to the value of £72,345 was provided to the Identification Bureau together with professional training for key personnel. The equipment included 11 BSA motorcycles for scene of crime work - all of which are still in daily use, 10 Pentax P30 cameras, 10 studio cameras, 6 enlargers, a photocopier and a "Photofit" identification kit. Also supplied were large quantities of film, photographic processing chemicals, fingerprint reagents and other consumable items. The equipment has evidently been carefully used and maintained to a high standard. The consumable items still in stock have been well cared for.

3.76. Ballistics is one area that does not seem to have been particularly well served by the project. In a country where the criminal use of firearms is common, forensic ballistics have an important role to play. The UPF ballistics expert based in the Identification Bureau received lengthy, and expensive, training in the United Kingdom. However, for want of appropriate equipment his role has since proved seriously limited. A request from the UPF for effective ballistic examination equipment (estimated cost £45,000) was not pursued. Providing the training, without providing the associated equipment, seems to us in this case to have led to operational inefficiency and nugatory expenditure.

**The value of specialist training may often depend on the availability of appropriate equipment. The two need to be thought about together.**

## **8. CAPITAL WORKS**

3.77. The buildings used by the UPF are generally in a poor state of repair, to an extent where operational effectiveness is frequently compromised. The project provided support for the repair and refurbishment of two buildings (see below). Limited help in the form of brick-making

equipment was also provided, to facilitate minor improvements to police living accommodation.

**a. Re-roofing of Kampala Central Police Station**

3.78. At an early stage, the Project Co-ordinator proposed that project funds should be used to refurbish the flat roof of the central police station in Kampala which was leaking in several places, preventing the upper floors from being fully utilised. The task was authorised and completed at a cost of £64,693. Although only indirectly related to the main project's objectives we see some force in the argument, advanced at the time by BDDEA, that the Kampala police station was the "flagship" of the UPF and that refurbishment would help to raise the morale of police officers.

**b. Refurbishment of the Police Training School at Kibuli**

3.79. The UPF Training School at Kibuli is close to the centre of Kampala and provides for all training with the exception of basic recruit training which is undertaken at Masindi. In 1986 Kibuli was in a state of almost total disrepair with neither electricity nor clean water.

3.80. Under an earlier UK project important improvements were made to Kibuli's residential accommodation, teaching blocks, and administrative centre. Under the Uganda Police project, work was funded to bring the kitchens up to a reasonable standard.

3.81. We visited Kibuli during the evaluation and in the main found it in a reasonable state of repair. The kitchens, however, were not functional and meals were being cooked outside in large cauldrons over wood fires. Despite numerous attempts to rectify the situation a key component of the kitchen range remains unserviceable. Unless this problem can be overcome, our support for the kitchen refurbishment must be regarded as a failure.





## 4

### IMPACT

4.1. Tracing the longer term impact of the Uganda Police project is not straightforward. In some areas, for example development planning, work is still continuing (it remains too early to assess, for example, the practical value of the Corporate Strategy and Development Plan). A more general problem is that many of the logframe indicators, together with their means of verification, have proved highly elusive in practice. Much reliance is placed in the logframe on “observation”, “police records” and “government statistics” to establish such indicators as “increased police presence”, “detection rates”, “increased public confidence in the police”. The specificity of the two project logframes (no less than 30 indicators of achievement for Phase I alone) would be daunting enough for a Western police force with detailed statistical procedures and baselines from which to work. For the UPF, with few such procedures or baselines, most of the indicators were never really assessable.

**There can be a marked difference between project indicators which look good (and may thus help project approval) and those which offer a realistic prospect of assessment. Those in DFID who approve projects, as well as those who design them, need to bear this in mind - and when in doubt to err in favour of the assessable.**

4.2. None of this should be taken to imply that the project was inadequately monitored, much less that its objectives necessarily remain unachieved. Monitoring was never going to be easy, given the very limited supply of basic information the UPF was able to generate, and the problems in securing enough OPA time (see 2.15). Against this background, the project monitoring carried out by the High Commission and by BDDEA seems to us to have been at least as thorough as could reasonably have been expected in these circumstances; while the quarterly reports of the Project Co-ordinator (mostly drafted by reference to his own set of objectives) provided a detailed contemporary account of what was going on. On this basis it was possible to know quite a lot about the general health and progress of the project without having any clear picture of the fate of most of the project indicators.

4.3. Interim judgements on project impact were made both by BDDEA and the UPF in 1993 and 1994. The Project Completion Report for Phase I, completed in August 1993, identified significant drawbacks with the realisation of outputs, mainly because of “cash-flow problems” in the GoU, but nevertheless concluded that there was every prospect that the project would achieve its immediate objectives, and would prove sustainable. Flexibility of design was identified in the PCR as a key positive feature, with delays in recruitment the main problem. (The Project Co-ordinator’s quarterly reports contain numerous references to recruitment delays and to his having felt compromised in Ugandan eyes as a result. This was one of the factors that led to the use of the British Council to manage in-country training in Phase II).

4.4. The UPF view of the project, prepared in July 1994 to coincide with the visit to Uganda (and to the Police Training College at Kibuli) of the Minister for Overseas Development, is unreserved - “the best thing to have happened to the Uganda Police Force in recent times”. The tone of this document may well owe something to its intended use as an appeal for further UK support (totalling £850,000 over the years 1995-97). Nevertheless, the UPF assessment is interesting for the emphasis placed on the wider institutional benefits of the project: “the restructuring, system rationalisation, adoption of new management practices, and appropriate training support have created a basis for development of a solid institutional base on which the force will build for the future”. Such evidence as we have from both phases suggests that wherever possible (that is to say where money has not been an overriding factor) the UPF has in practice responded very positively to the opportunities opened up by the project. The 1994 document and other material in similar vein, however, suggest that its enthusiasm could significantly outrun its capacity to implement.

#### ***The ‘Without Project’ Scenario***

4.5. The view of the project taken by the UPF in July 1994 is in a sense all the more striking in that, at that time, it was usual for the Ministry of Finance to trim departmental budgets, including that of the police, by the amounts that each received in aid. Had there been no Uganda Police project, the UPF budget would in theory have been enhanced by the amount foregone. It is hard to know how far to push this analysis - for at least two reasons. In the first place it is inconceivable that the Ministry of Finance could have made up the difference across the board had aid support for the public sector in Uganda suddenly ceased. In the second, public sector financial planning in Uganda has now moved onto a new basis, under which annual budgets are settled in relation to departmental corporate plans. In this limited sense bilateral aid projects are now seen as adding to, rather than substituting for, departmental budgets.

4.6. It would be wrong in any case to over-emphasise the budgetary significance of the project. The capital budget undoubtedly had its attractions for the UPF. But both sides consistently

recognised the importance of the institutional objectives. Even if the Ministry of Finance had been able to finance the transport, radio and other equipment provided under the project, it could not have begun to shape the management and other UPF reforms traceable, sometimes at a distance, to the influence of UK Advisers funded under the project. This, in turn, is not to say that the project was the only way of achieving these. As the Inspector General expressed it to us, when invited to consider how things might have turned out without the UK project, “we would either have gone to the dogs, or woken up and done things for ourselves”.

### **Poverty**

4.7. Before drawing up any final balance sheet it is important to recognise that, for whatever reason, there were issues which the project did not in any direct sense set out to address. Most conspicuous of these is poverty - a word that occurs once in passing in the second project memorandum but otherwise not at all.

4.8. This omission was probably less surprising in 1990, or even 1993, than it would be now. Implicit in much of the early consideration of the project is the assumption that, when dealing with a least developed country like Uganda, poverty is so widespread that almost any support for the public sector cannot but touch on it. Key references in both project memoranda to strengthening policing as a way of promoting economic activity (and more effective aid) carry this resonance. No attempt was made, as it might conceivably have been, to argue that the limitations and inadequacies of the policing system in Uganda at that time bore most heavily on the poorest, who had therefore most to gain from its improvement. It was enough that better policing should lead to greater social stability, and thus to enhanced economic performance.

4.9. It might not be too difficult to pick away at the links in this chain. But we have already indicated (see 2.4) that we see little to be gained by trying. The important consequence for the Uganda Police project is not that it did not serve to address the needs of the poor, but that there are no easily verifiable means of demonstrating that it did.

### **Environment**

4.10. Similar considerations apply in the case of the environmental impact of the project. The project was not expected to have any environmental relevance “except that an efficient police force will be better able to deal with breaches of environmental legislation”. This exception, carefully phrased as a generalisation, is nevertheless disingenuous. Breaches of environmental legislation are a remote consideration in the present circumstances of the UPF. Not surprisingly, the project logframes contain no environmental indicator.

### **Risk**

4.11. The main assumptions necessary for project success were on the whole accurately and comprehensively set out in the logframes for the two project phases. Taken together they represent a fairly strenuous exercise in optimism.

4.12. Not all by any means have proved unjustified. Like Uganda more generally, the project has benefited from continued (relative) political stability and adherence to structural reform. But “adequate GoU funding” was always likely to present major difficulties and so it has proved. Nor does it seem reasonable to have supposed that police and other statistics could be collected, compiled and interpreted with anything like the speed and precision necessary to influence the course of the project. In the case of GoU funding in particular there seems to have been little attempt to manage the risk identified. It is true that this is unlikely to have been easy. But recognising that, over the lifetime of the project at least, the UPF budget was unlikely to be able to accommodate even the most basic spending on items such as in-country training materials or vehicle maintenance, might have helped to encourage a rather tighter project design and to avoid the provision of advice the UPF had little prospect of putting into effect. As it was, BDDEA seems for too long to have interpreted what was in fact a condition of long-term chronic under-funding as one of short-term cash flow (for example in the Project Completion Report (PCR) of August 1993).

**There is a difference between identifying risk and managing it. Both are important.**

### **Conclusion**

4.13. There is a close, if not exact, correlation between the sustainability of different project components and their long-term recurrent cost to the UPF. This is most evident in the case of the vehicle workshop which lacks the necessary recurrent budget to retain trained staff or to procure spare parts, and where any lingering project influence is now almost impossible to detect. It is visible indirectly in the relatively high attrition rate for vehicles, whose proper maintenance has proved financially prohibitive. (One of the many merits of the radio equipment by contrast, particularly that supplied under Phase II, has been that it costs virtually nothing to maintain and run). It shows itself again in the limited impact of the District Training Officers, whose efforts both to receive and to impart training have been constrained for lack of even the most basic budget.

4.14. The impact of the project has proved strongest, not surprisingly, in those areas where implementation costs nothing, or where minimal costs have proved acceptable for wider reasons. The re-organisation of UPF command structures in line with project recommendations, or the

use of the Policy and Management Committee to settle key operational issues, are examples of the former. The establishment (and equipment) of the Police Training College at Kibuli and the decision to provide mobility allowances to Community Liaison Officers show how, when persuaded of the policy arguments, the UPF has been willing to take on the modest recurrent expenditure involved.

4.15. Most problematic of all are some of the longer term institutional and policy reforms set in hand by the project, whose fate remains for the time being uncertain. Decision-making processes may be clearer than they were, but remain some way from being clear. To the extent that it exists at all, UPF personnel policy seems dominated by a compulsion to keep officers on the move, limiting perhaps their opportunities for corruption, but limiting also their chances to develop a fuller understanding of the job they are doing, or to make use of specialist training. Corporate planning has started in earnest, but not yet in a format that requires costs and transparent prioritisation of objectives. Community policing has, more evidently, set down roots, but in a form that has so far done little to enhance the public image of the UPF or to simplify the processes of local policing. What has been achieved in these areas is very far from negligible. But its sustainability remains to a large extent in the balance.



## TERMS OF REFERENCE

## ANNEX A

**EVALUATION OF UK ASSISTANCE TO THE UGANDA POLICE****Introduction**

1. The Evaluation Department of the Department For International Development (DFID) wishes to appoint a team of consultants to undertake an evaluation of UK government assistance to the Uganda Police Force (UPF).

**Background**

2. Recent ODA/DFID support to the UPF began in 1990, with a three year project, subsequently extended by two years to 1995, and for a further two years to 1997.

3. The evaluation will cover the period from 1990 to 1995 through an ex-post study, and also contribute to a review to be undertaken by the British Development Division in Eastern Africa (BDDEA) of the current phase of support.

4. The intention of ODA/DFID assistance has been to support the UPF in its efforts to establish a credible and efficient force after a prolonged period of national instability, during which the reputation and effectiveness of the force had been severely compromised.

5. The original goal of the project was to “increase the professional capability of the Uganda Police, thus improving its public image and securing public confidence and cooperation”. The project logical framework was revised for the first extension phase (1993-95), with the goal being redefined as being “to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in Uganda, thus creating an enabling environment for public tranquility and sustained economic growth”, and “to contribute to the development of Good Government in Uganda”.

6. Project work has been undertaken during a period of significant change and reform in Uganda and this has been reflected in the development of innovative components, including the introduction on a national scale of community-based approach to policing and an increasing concern with gender issues.

7. An overview of the project is provided in the project brief and project history (both attached<sup>1</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> It has not been considered necessary to reproduce these documents in this report.



### **Objectives of the Evaluation**

8. The evaluation will assess the outcome of the project against its stated objectives, covering all aspects of its direct and indirect impact, including on institutional, social, and economic factors, with a particular interest in gender concerns and issues of good government and public accountability. The actual and likely impact of completed project elements will be assessed, and preliminary judgements made about the likely impact of continuing components. In parallel to the evaluation study, BDDEA will be making its own assessment of what further support, if any, might be offered to the UPF.

9. The project frameworks, and approved project memoranda, will be important points of departure for the study. The emphasis of the evaluation will be on determining the impact and sustainability of project outcomes. The Terms of Reference are not exhaustive and other issues of importance identified during the evaluation study may be included in the report.

10. The evaluation will be conducted along the lines set out in “Guidelines for Evaluators” (attached). In particular, the evaluation will:

- assess the extent to which the defined purpose of the project was consistent with the priorities and policies of the target group(s), recipient institutions and government, and donors
- consider how far project design, appraisal, implementation, and outputs provided a coherent and realistic means of achieving the project purpose
- determine to what extent the outputs were achieved, and whether the most cost efficient and effective approach was adopted
- assess the overall institutional, social, and economic impact and sustainability of the project and establish whether the stated purpose was achieved
- make a judgement on success, including whether the costs have been justified by the benefits that have accrued from the project activities.

11. The arrangements for project management, monitoring, and implementation will be reviewed, and judgements made about their appropriateness and effectiveness. Issues of local project ownership (both in GoU and the wider community) and stakeholder participation will also be explored.

12. In addition to the themes set out above, the following specific questions, related to project design and implementation, will also be addressed:

*Project identification, design and appraisal*

- how the programme was identified as a priority area for financing
- the extent to which, and how effectively, the Project Framework was used in managing the programme and monitoring the achievement of objectives
- the criteria used to select project personnel
- whether appropriate conditions and undertakings were attached to the assistance
- how effective were the channels and methods used for this type of aid and which alternatives could have been used or might be considered in future

*Implementation*

- whether the assistance programme met its targets for physical implementation and how accurately those targets reflected the potential for achievement; and if targets were not met, the main reasons for under-achievement
- the ability of UK personnel working in Uganda to develop a rapport with the recipients
- the extent and effectiveness of the strategies adopted to bring about institutional strengthening and ensure local ownership;
- the level of co-operation provided by the recipients and how far any conditions attached to the assistance programme were fulfilled
- the quality and appropriateness of advice provided by the project personnel
- whether project design was sufficiently flexible to take into account changing circumstances and assumptions
- whether the risks at each stage were properly assessed and acted upon

13. The evaluation will contribute to a wider synthesis study of British Government support to the police in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, to be prepared by Evaluation Department, which will assess the effectiveness of ODA/DFID-funded police projects in contributing to good government and promoting democratic, accountable policing in developing countries.

*Methodology*

14. A participatory approach will be taken to the evaluation, to ensure that the perspectives of all major stakeholders are taken into account. A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods will be used.

15. The evaluation study will consist of a review of key documents in the UK and the BDDEA, dialogue with representatives of all major stakeholder groups, and structured consultations with primary stakeholders in the field. Relevant data available from the UPF and the University of Makerere will also be analysed and reviewed.

### **Outputs**

16. The evaluators will produce a report according to the standard format specified by Evaluation Department and within the time norms for report completion, as set out in the guidelines. Specific recommendations should be separate to the report. A draft two page evaluation summary (EVSUM) will also be produced.

### **Management and reporting arrangements**

17. The consultants will report to the Social Development Adviser, Evaluation Department, who will be responsible for the overall management of the study. A team leader will be appointed by EvD, with overall responsibility for the satisfactory completion of the Terms of Reference, and day-to-day coordination of the study, including the allocation of tasks to other team members. Details of financial and other management arrangements will be subject to negotiation between ODA's Contracts Branch and the consultants. An internal consultative group will be established within ODA to provide oversight to the implementation of the study and to review the findings.

### **Timing**

18. The study will be conducted over an eight-week period, including a three week field mission, commencing in September 1997.

### **Consultancy skills required**

19. A team of consultants will be required with a mix of skills, covering the social, and institutional, as well as technical and managerial, dimensions of police assistance work in an African context. Expertise in both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the use of participatory evaluation methods, and gender analysis, will also be required.

20. Members of the team may be subject to a routine security check to allow them access to documentation not in the public domain.

### **Evaluation Department**

**May 1997**

## UGANDA POLICE EVALUATION: OUTLINE ITINERARY

## ANNEX B

**Monday, 20 October**

10.00 am	Briefing in High Commission
11.00 am	Discussions with Aid Section and TCO Training Adviser
11.45 am	ACP Research & Planning
12.00 noon	Deputy Inspector General of Police
2.30 pm	ACP Community Affairs

**Tuesday, 21 October**

9.00 am	Visit Kabale
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**Wednesday, 22 October**

Morning	Visit Mbarara
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**Thursday, 23 October**

Morning	Visit Masaka
	Back to Kampala
6.30 pm	Reception at the Nile Hotel

**Friday, 24 October**

9.00 am	ACP Research and Planning
10.00-12.00 noon	Mechanical Workshop Jinja Road
2.30 pm	Visit Wandegeya
3.30 pm	Visit Kawempe

**Sunday, 26 October**

To Nairobi

**Monday, 27 October**

Discussions BDDEA

**Tuesday, 28 October**

Morning

BDDEA

Afternoon

Return Kampala

**Wednesday, 29 October**

Morning

Discussions with UPF

2.30 pm

Discussions with Director, CID O/C Narcotics,  
ACP/Identification, Bureau & Intelligence, CID Headquarters**Thursday, 30 October**

Morning

Call on Inspector General

ACP/Finance

**Friday, 31 October**

Morning

Round up discussions in High Commission

Afternoon

Leave for London

**PERSONS MET IN EAST AFRICA****ANNEX C**

Mr Michael Cook	High Commissioner, Kampala
Petra Byrd	First Secretary (Development) Kampala
David Fish	Head of DFID East Africa
Rick Woodham	Programme Manager (Uganda) DFIDEA
Roger Wilkins	British Council, Kampala
Mr J C Odomel	Inspector General, UPF
R Nabudere	Assistant Commissioner for Planning and Research
David Tingle	Training Adviser
Pat Fisher	INSSTEP Project Coordinator
Susan Bufton	Staffordshire Police
David J Bufton	Staffordshire Police
Fredrick Yiga	Senior Superintendent Commandant Police Training School
I-Mubira Mukasa	Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Police, Chief Identification Bureau
Mrs Sekagya	FIDA
Victoria Mirembe	Human Rights Commission
C J Bakiza	Director of CID/Head of NCB
J Opio	ACP Traffic and Road Safety
P Nasimolo	ACP Signals
S Okwalinga	ACP Personnel

**KABALE POLICE STATION**

Mr Ebiu, SSP	DPC
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Mr Kagwa-Kalebu, C/ASP	O/C Station
Mr Drandua, D/ASP	O/C CID
Mr Twinomugisha, D/ASP	O/C SB
IP Burahe	CLO
AIP Bararemwa	O/C MCB
AIP Kitagyenda	O/C Traffic
AIP Rwakiru	I/C Duties
Mr Turyagyenda	Headmaster Kigezi High School
Headmaster	Butobere Primary School
Teachers	Butobere Primary School

**MBARARA POLICE STATION**

Mr Gala, ACP	RPC
Mr Nabongo, SP	DPC
Mr W Ongom, ASP	O/C Station
Mr Tumuhimbise, D/ASP	O/C CID
W/IP Kataha	Women Desk
IP Kahangire	G/Duties
D/IP Kansiime	CID
D/AIP Kanyankole	CID
D/AIP Tindyebwa J	CID
D/AIP Kabuye	CID
D/AIP Kwezi	CID
Mr Tibwomwe D/ASP	O/C SB
AIP Twebaze A	O/C Traffic

**MASAKA POLICE STATION**

Mr Odora, ASP	O/C Station
W/IP Butazi	CLO
AIP Okwonga	G/Duties
AIP Mujurizi	G/Duties
Mr Bwango, D/ASP	O/C CID
D/IP Rwenduru	CID
Mr Muyirima, SSP	RPC

**WANDEGEYA POLICE STATION**

Mr Bitwire, ASP	DPC
Mr Muhairwe, ASP	O/C Station
Mr Otim, D/ASP	O/C CID

**KAWEMPE POLICE STATION**

Mr Tibayungwa, ASP	DPC
Mr Ngobi, D/ASP	O/C CID

**CID HEADQUARTERS**

Mr Bakiza, D/SACP	Director, CID
Mr Garyahandere, D/SSP	ACP/Crime
Mr Gumisiriza, D/SP	O/C Interpol
Mr Byamugiza, D/SSP	O/C Property
Mr Ayela, D/ASP	O/C Anti-Narcotics
Mr Bangirana, D/SSP	O/C Fraud



Mr Onyiggi, D/ASP

O/C Crime Intelligence

Mr Okumu, D/SSP

Administrator

Mr Opio, D/ACP

Deputy Director, CID

Mr Mukasa, D/SP

ACP/IB.

## UGANDA POLICE PROJECT: UK ALLOCATIONS

## ANNEX D

Phase I (December 1990)	Initial Allocation	£ 1,085,000	TC
		£ 500,000	Capital
	Allocation increase	£ 25,000	TC
	(23 December 1992)	£ 259,000	Capital
Total Phase I		£ 1,110,000	TC
		<u>759,000</u>	Capital
		£ 1,869,000	
Phase II (July 1993)		£ 649,000	TC
		£ 855,000	Capital
	Allocation increases:		
	(1) July 1994	£ 30,000	Capital
	(2) December 1995	£ 138,000	TC
	(3) January 1997	£ 280,000	TC
Phase II		£ 1,067,000	TC
		<u>£ 885,000</u>	Capital
		<u>£ 1,952,000</u>	
<b>Total Phases I and II</b>		<b><u>£3,821,000</u></b>	



## POLICING IN UGANDA

## ANNEX E

**1. The Development of the Uganda Police Force**

E1. Uganda came about as a nation following the signing of an agreement between the British Government and the Kabaka of Buganda in 1890. This agreement meant that Great Britain administered Buganda and other neighbouring territories as the Uganda Protectorate until independence was achieved in October 1962. The development of policing can be split into two phases: colonial and post independence.

**1a. The British Colonial Police**

E2. The first formal police unit was formed in 1899 as a para-military force, the Uganda Armed Constabulary, with the role of pacifying civil disturbances and quelling local wars between tribes.<sup>2</sup>

E3. In 1906 the first Inspector General of Police (IGP) was appointed and the Uganda Police Force (UPF) established as a civilian police service. The UPF developed along the lines of police forces throughout the former British Empire and with a close resemblance to the Metropolitan Police of London.

E4. White Europeans formed the officer corps of the UPF and were drawn from United Kingdom police forces or other colonies. African and Asian members of the UPF had their own rank structure and were prevented from attaining the higher ranks which became the exclusive preserve of the white European. This racial rank structure continued until the mid 1950s.

E5. The style of policing developed was such that it contributed to the safety and security of everyday life for all Ugandans and the UPF required the consent of community members to execute its duties. The operational and administrative systems employed were based upon those in United Kingdom police forces and have been carried on to the present time. Indeed, a police officer trained in the United Kingdom during the early 1960s has little difficulty understanding UPF operations and bureaucracy.

E6. At the time of independence in 1962 the UPF was totally independent of the armed forces, efficient, adequately equipped, well led, professionally trained, housed in good quality premises (both police stations and police officers' living accommodation), its police officers were paid a good living wage, and had sufficient resources to discharge its duty. To be a police officer was regarded as a prestige position within the community. At this time the UPF was "renowned for its efficiency".<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Uganda Police Force Student lesson Notes: The History of the Uganda Police.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

### **1b. The Post Independence Era**

E7. The UPF went through a transitional period from 1962 until 1964 when Mr E W Oryema was appointed as the IGP. Between 1962 and 25 January 1971 the UPF continued to develop and enjoy a reputation as one of the finest police forces in the Commonwealth. It served the people of Uganda well and maintained its independence as a body for ensuring that the rule of law prevailed. However, this changed when the lawful government was overthrown by the military coup led by Idi Amin. Since that day the UPF has undergone several traumas which are explained to all recruits as follows:<sup>4</sup>

“On the 25th of January 1971, the government to which the instruments of power had been handed over, was over-thrown. On 1st July the Inspector General was replaced by Mr Ochieno. The strength of the force had swollen to a figure of 18,300. This number however, reduced tremendously following the misrule that characterised the era. Other changes took place in this period, including the recruitment of illiterates, disbanding of the Special Force Unit, and rampant promotions without merit within cliques.

During Amin’s era Mr Ochieno was removed and replaced with Luke Ofungi, on the 23rd December 1973. On 28th August 1974 Mr Odria became IGP. He commanded the force until Amin was overthrown in April 1979. Mr D Barlow was then appointed IGP and stayed in command until replaced by Mr W B Musoke in January 1980. The force was screened by removing ‘dead wood’ and recruitment of officers with academic backgrounds was commenced. Many cadet assistant superintendents (CASP) were recruited.

The command of the force kept changing hands with the regimes of Professor Lule, Lukwonga Binaisa, the Military Council, Obote II and Lutwa Governments.

During these times the Uganda police were faced with the task of quelling civil uprisings and was in the front line of assuring the security of the state. Many police stations were attacked and many police officers lost their lives.

When the current government came to power in January 1986 the number of police officers dropped from 15,000 to about 8,000. The Special Forces Unit was disbanded and replaced by the Mobile Police Patrol Unit. The aim was to recruit 30,000 police officers by the year 1994. The Police training School at Bombo was closed and relocated to Masindi. In time the number of police officers has risen, in 1996 to about 18,000. Security has improved. Anti robbery squads have been introduced, foot and mobile patrols now operate.

The force is currently under the command of J C Odomel and facing problems with

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

housing and accommodation. As far as transport, communications and training are concerned thanks should be extended to the British Government who have equipped the police with both knowledge and equipment.”

E8. The UPF of today has to be seen against the background of the turmoil and cataclysmic events described above. Its logistical capacity, infrastructure, experience base and leadership were almost totally destroyed. Rebuilding the UPF from the foundations upwards in the socio-economic climate of the closing stages of the twentieth century is an infinitely more difficult and complex task than that faced at the turn of the century by Brigadier General W F S Edwards, the first IGP, and the Colonial Government.

## **2. The Uganda Police Force of Today**

E9. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) headed by President Museveni came to power in 1986 following a long civil war. The NRM Government of Uganda (GoU) has a reputation for sound economic performance and competence<sup>5</sup>. The GoU is committed to the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, that the rule of law should reign supreme and that the UPF should be fully accountable for all its actions through parliament and the courts.<sup>6</sup>

E10. In 1986 the effective strength of the UPF had been reduced to around 8,000 police officers and this was further reduced to some 5,000 when those considered to be below the standards required were retrenched. The UPF through a presidential inspired recruitment programme quickly increased its operational strength to between 15,000 and 16,000 with a GoU commitment for the establishment to be raised to 30,000 in the longer term.

E11. A major consequence of the reduction in effective operational strength and the debilitating effects of the civil war upon the UPF has been the lack of investment in both human resources and materiel. Despite the considerable efforts that have been made by the Ugandans and donor countries, the UPF of today still has a long way to go before it can be once again said to be a leading police service.

<sup>5</sup> Uganda: EIU Country Report 1st Quarter 1997, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited

<sup>6</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995: Chapters 4 & 12

### **3. The Police Statute 1994: Role and Responsibility of the Uganda Police Force, Accountability and Financing**

#### **3a. Role and Responsibility of the Uganda Police Force**

E12. Section 5 Police Statute 1994 sets out the functions of the UPF as:

- to protect the life, property and other rights of the individual;
- to maintain security within Uganda;
- to enforce the laws of Uganda;
- to ensure public safety and order;
- to prevent and detect crime in the society;
- subject to section 10, to perform the services of a military force; and
- to perform any other functions assigned to it under this Statute.

This section also authorises all members of the UPF to carry and use, in strict accordance with the law, firearms in connection with their duties.

E13. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 (The Constitution) sets out the principal priorities of the police. The Constitution omits direct mention of the need for UPF to sometimes act as a military force and sets out the functions as:

- to protect life and property;
- to preserve law and order;
- to prevent and detect crime; and
- to co-operate with the civilian authority and other security organs established under this Constitution and with the population generally.

E14. The priorities set by the Constitution are very much in line with police responsibilities in developed countries and emphasise the community service approach to policing. A detailed description of the UPF initiatives in community policing is to be found at Annex G.

#### **3b. Accountability**

E15. The IGP and the Deputy Inspector General (DIGP) are appointed by the President and

their offices regulated by the Police Statute 1994.

E16. The IGP is answerable to the Courts in respect of his operational decisions but in respect of policy issues the Minister for Internal Affairs (The Minister) may give directions to the IGP, who must comply with those directions.<sup>7</sup> The practical effect of these provisions is that the IGP has wide and independent discretion in his operational command. This system of legal and political accountability closely mirrors that found in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

E17. The Police Statute makes provision for statutory bodies to assist the Minister and the IGP to more effectively discharge their responsibilities and provides for consultative mechanisms.

E18. The Police Statute 1994<sup>8</sup> establishes a **Police Authority** chaired by the Minister and consisting of the IGP, DIGP, the Attorney General, the senior officer of the UPF Administration Department together with three other persons appointed by the President. The secretary to the Police Authority is the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Internal Affairs (PS). Its duties are<sup>9</sup>:

- to advise the Government on policy matters relating to the management, development and administration of the Force
- to advise the President on the appointment of the Inspector-General of Police and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police
- to recommend to the President appointments and promotions of police officers above the rank of assistant superintendent of police
- to determine the terms and conditions of service in the Force
- to hear and determine appeals from decisions of the Police Council
- to determine, by statutory order, the ranks, precedence, command and seniority of the Force
- to empower the Force to perform the services of a military force.

E19. The Police Authority has a signal role to play in determining the development of the UPF and provides both the Minister and the IGP with a forum in which to air their views.

E20. Also established is a formal committee to assist the IGP in discharging his responsibilities and to provide junior officers with the opportunity to be heard at the highest levels. The **Police**

<sup>7</sup> The Police Statute 1994; Section 6

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. Section 9

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. Section 10



**Council** is chaired by the IGP and consists of:

- the Deputy Inspector-General of Police-;
- the Director Criminal Investigation Department;
- the Director of Special Branch;
- the Commandant of the Mobile Police Patrol Unit;
- Regional Police commanders;
- all officers holding the rank of Assistant Commissioner (ACP)
- the following- members .appointed by the Inspector General in consultation with the police the police unit commanders-
  - (i) an officer of the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP);
  - (ii) an officer of the rank of Inspector of Police (IP);
  - (iii) three non-commissioned officer and
- the officer responsible for the administration of the Force who shall be the secretary.

The functions of the Police Council are:

- \* to appoint and promote police officers up to the rank of inspector of police;
- \* to exercise disciplinary control over all police officers through the police courts;
- \* to advise the Police Authority on the ranks structure in the Force;
- \* to formulate terms and conditions of service of members of the Force subject to approval by the Police Authority;
- \* to formulate and establish standards of recruitment and training within the Force;
- \* to determine the types and quality of equipment and supplies to be procured by the Force;
- \* to formulate and advise the Police Authority on the policies of the Force and ensure the implementation of that policy;
- \* to ensure efficient organisation and administration of the Force; and
- \* to ensure that the Force is of a national character and composition.

Similarly a **District Police Committee** is established to help district police commanders (DPC)

to manage their responsibilities and make recommendations for consideration by the Police Council.

### **3c. Financing**

E21. Policing is an expensive business for all governments, including those of the most prosperous countries in the world, and the financing of the UPF is a constant source of problems.

E22. The GoU manages a tight cash economy as part of its strategy to bring prosperity to the nation and to keep inflation within manageable parameters. Budget votes are prepared each year and approved by the GoU but the IGP is not free to spend his budget. This is simply because the cash released to the UPF each month varies in relation to the revenue collection. Consequently, it is frequently the case that only around half of the monthly budget is released.

E23. Clearly this makes it extremely difficult for the UPF to manage its administration and cash flow smoothly. There are concomitant problems of failure to discharge debts, or to pay police officers' expenses, or to be able to purchase consumable items.

E24. The project co-ordinator was successful in assisting the UPF to obtain authority of virement across budget heads and this has helped to smooth out some of the problems caused.

E25. Reference is made elsewhere in the report to the plans the IGP has made to develop a five year strategic development plan but until the GoU amends its financing strategy for the UPF, little real progress will be made to achieve the UPF's objectives in either the short or medium term.

E26. The irregular and inadequate financing of the UPF has significantly limited this project's impact and affected the sustainability of initiatives.

## **4. Problems Facing the Uganda Police Force**

E27. Uganda faces a number of operational problems common to most countries in both the developed and rapidly developing world.

- The international airport at Entebbe is being used by drug smugglers as an entrepot to move drugs through to South Africa and Europe. An unwelcome concomitant effect is the markedly increasing misuse of hard drugs within Uganda and the petty crime and prostitution associated with drug abuse. The indirect effects of drug abuse must add pressure to the already over stretched health services: Uganda has a high incidence of AIDS.

- In the north of Uganda the military forces and the UPF are battling against insurgents. This inevitably affects policing and other essential social services by diverting them from their primary tasks and starving them of the necessary financial investments.
- It is common for criminals to be heavily armed and to use their weapons to gain their objectives. Grenade attacks and the use of light machine guns are sometimes encountered, in addition to the ubiquitous use of the Kalasnikov AK 47 assault rifle. Consequently, the UPF has to be armed and the chosen weapon is the AK 47: a weapon which is not the most suitable for a civil policing role in the crowded streets of cities such as Kampala. The sight of police officers carrying AK 47 assault rifles is totally incongruous to the ethics and practices of consensus community policing. This incongruity is recognised by the IGP and his senior officers but faced with heavily armed criminals they see no immediate alternative to the AK 47 being the personal weapon of the UPF patrolling police officer.<sup>10</sup>
- Insufficient motor transport to enable wide police coverage of the country and speedy reaction to calls for assistance from members of the public.
- Telecommunications are not sufficient for UPF needs. Most police stations outside Kampala have no more than one telephone line. This is more often than not located in the senior officer's office and not readily available for general use.
- Radio communication is insufficiently sophisticated to provide countrywide coverage. There are three systems in use:
  1. short-wave Morse transmissions,
  2. a VHF system which is spread nationwide although confined to police stations
  3. at eleven locations there are UHF local area networks (LAN) which provide good radio communication between the local police station and patrolling officers. However, there are insufficient radio transceivers to be issued to all patrolling officers and 34 district police stations do not have a LAN system. (The eleven LAN systems were installed through the ODA/DFID project)

E28. The shortage of reliable UHF radio equipment affects the confidence of police officers that are required to patrol in dangerous areas and affects response to calls for assistance from the public.

- The UPF believes that it is understaffed but will be unable to reach its target of 30,000 police officers in the foreseeable future because of financial pressures and a lack of suitable operational premises and living accommodation for police officers.

<sup>10</sup> Discussion between Mr JC Odomel, Inspector General of Police, and DFID Evaluation Team on 30 October 1997.

- Most of the operational and administrative buildings of the UPF are in a state of disrepair and require refurbishment. Prisoner-holding accommodation is appalling.
- By far the worst problem is the living accommodation provided for police officers. The more substantial properties were built in the 1950s and were, at that time, more than acceptable. They consisted of two bedroom apartments for married officers and rooms for single officers. Today these residential units are in a poor state of repair, the sanitary facilities have broken down, and they are totally overcrowded being in many cases occupied by more than one family. Single officers' quarters are allocated to families with as many as seven people living eating and sleeping in one room. Supplementary buildings have been erected to house police officers and their families. These buildings are single-room galvanised metal rondavels which are during the daytime as hot as an oven and during the night almost as cold as a refrigerator. They are without sanitary facilities. The overall impression is one of squalor and the general appearance of police barracks is akin to an informal township close to Johannesburg. The IGP and his senior officers have brought the plight of their officers to the notice of the GoU but, other than a small provision for self-build and maintenance nothing has been done. A massive injection of capital is required to bring accommodation back to an acceptable standard.
- Allegations of police corruption are widespread and generally admitted to be true by many of the most senior officers of the UPF. Salary levels are low and do not reflect the responsibility and importance of the police officer in the community. A police constable earns only 62,000 Uganda shillings per month (US\$62.00).

## **5. Future Plans**

E29. The IGP has brought the needs of the UPF to notice of the GoU and donor countries. Large scale investment is needed if there is to be a marked improvement in the overall situation.

E30. The IGP and his senior management team are in the advanced stages of producing a five year development plan for consideration by the GoU aided by a DFID-funded consultant. It is the intention of the IGP that his plans for the future are shared with donor countries and organisations. However, without a substantial commitment of new money from the GoU it is likely that donors will not be too enthusiastic. To bring the UPF up to a high standard is likely to be an expensive process.

## **6. Conclusion**

E31. The UPF has the background and potential to become an efficient police service but there

is a considerable way to go before marked progress can be achieved. This will be a long haul - perhaps more than ten years - and will be very expensive.

## ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE UGANDA POLICE FORCE ANNEX F

**1. Introduction**

F1. The Uganda Police Force (UPF) headquarters provides policy direction together with strategic command and logistical support for territorial policing, which is organised into eleven regions and forty four district commands. The regional tier of command provides a co-ordinating function and links police headquarters to districts. For everyday policing activity the point of service delivery to the people of Uganda is provided by the district commands, which control the activities of local police stations.

F2. The UPF is a traditional hierarchical organisation and has inherited a military-like air from the former colonial policing style and military intervention in policing during the difficult era from 1972 to 1986. A military style of discipline and obedience is hard to avoid in a police force which is extensively armed. The UPF's militarism is, however, less conspicuous than that sometimes observed in other countries, in Africa and elsewhere. The relationship between Headquarters, Regions and Districts has been remodelled during the currency of the ODA project, partly as a result of consultancy advice extended over a number of visits.

F3. The command structures follow loosely the Government of Uganda (GoU) strategy of decentralisation of power: taking essential service provision closer to the people. The command and control of routine police activity is vested in the district police commander (DPC).

F4. The main headquarters function is that of policy formulation and the acquisition of resources from the GoU and donors. Operational support in the form of criminal investigation expertise, traffic policing, special branch, transport, logistics, personnel and training are also controlled from headquarters departments. Specialists located at regional and district level have professional reference lines to headquarters. For example, CID officers receive their wider investigation policies from the office of the Senior Assistant Commissioner (SACP) CID but tactical deployment is the responsibility of the local DPC, whose performance is supervised by the Regional Police Commissioner (RPC).

F5. UK consultancy advice recommended that the UPF considered severing these professional reference lines but the Inspector General (IGP), together with his Policy and Management Committee, decided against immediate implementation of this particular recommendation, which they viewed as a step too far. There is, however, no doubt that the ODA/DFID project helped the UPF to modernise its command and managerial arrangements, and is continuing to do so by concentrating on improving and streamlining strategic management.

## 2. Management Committees

F6. To manage an organisation as complex and widespread as the UPF requires an integrated management committee structure. The principal bodies in Uganda are prescribed through the Police Statute 1994: they are the **Police Authority**, chaired by the Minister for Internal Affairs; the **Police Council**, chaired by the IGP; and **District Police Committees** chaired by the local DPC. The roles and duties of these bodies, as described in Annex E are mainly of an advisory and consultative nature and do not focus upon the day to day managerial grind towards greater efficiency and effectiveness at best cost. That function is undertaken by the **Policy and Management Committee (PMC)** whose minutes of the proceedings are published to the UPF as policy decisions.

F7. Departmental heads chair meetings dealing with the specialisms under their commands. These committees tend to deal with more routine matters and are subordinate to the statutory bodies and the **PMC**. UK consultants have helped to structure the work of the committees and, in the early days, encouraged the publication of the minutes of proceedings. The Project Co-ordinator's progress reports frequently comment upon the importance of the need to explain the policy making process and the way that decisions affecting the work of police officers in the field were made. Despite these efforts, however, there is still not a widespread publication of the **PMC's** proceedings.

F8. One of the original UK project's objectives was "to improve the process of consultation, debate and decision making between UPF senior officers."<sup>11</sup> Much has been done towards achieving this aim but the decision making processes still seem to be a mystery to the lower ranks. More work still needs to be done to communicate policy decisions to the lower echelons of the UPF and to involve more police officers of lower rank in the process. The situation is, however, considerably better than it was.

## 3. Consultation With The Minister for Internal Affairs

F9. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (The Constitution)<sup>12</sup> and the Police Statute 1994<sup>13</sup> place the operational control of the UPF with the IGP but also provide for him to receive policy direction from the Minister for Internal Affairs who is accountable to Parliament for the UPF. Additionally, the Constitution says<sup>14</sup>:

"the President may give policy directions to the Inspector General".

11 Uganda: Assistance to the Uganda Police Force (Wider Objective 6). December 1990.

12 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Article 213(4)

13 The Police Statute 1994, Section 5.

14 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Article 213(4)

During discussion<sup>15</sup> with the DFID Evaluation Team, the IGP said that he was not subject to any operational direction from the political level and that the accountability arrangements worked well. The IGP said that relationships were excellent at both the personal and professional levels, that he had free access to the Minister for Internal Affairs; and that he was able to contact the President at any time on any matter.

F10. The IGP indicated that informal consultation was abundant and vibrant, especially with the Minister who needed to be well briefed so as to be able to put the UPF case fully, in Cabinet.

F11. There are also formal structures within the GoU in respect of financing and government administration upon which the IGP sits, or is represented at senior level. Of these, the **Police Authority**, chaired by the Minister, is the principal formal body for providing transparency to the accountability, consultative arrangements and policy making in respect of the policing of Uganda. The minutes of the proceedings of the **Police Authority** are public documents. Similar formal and informal mechanisms are to be found in other democratic Commonwealth countries. Consultancy advice provided under the project has helped both the GoU and UPF to formulate and operate the procedures laid down.

#### **4. Regional Commands**

F12. There are eleven regional commands spread throughout Uganda. Their purpose is to co-ordinate the operational activities of groups of district commands. The regional tier of command acts as a link between district commands, from where operational policing services are directed, and the IGP.

F13. In police forces in the developed world co-ordinating command structures have almost disappeared. They have been made redundant by modern communications systems and information technology which have made it relatively simple for headquarters to command and control service delivery. In Uganda, and the UPF in particular, modern communications and networked computer systems are not widely spread. Indeed, telephone communication between headquarters and out stations is almost non-existent.

F14. The regional tier of command has a real role to play in the UPF's management and command and will continue to do so until the UPF is able to take advantage of the technological revolution. Technological advances can only be made with considerable capital investment which Uganda cannot at present afford. These financial constraints need to be borne in mind when considering possible alternative command structures, which otherwise risk basing themselves on unachievable expectations.

15 Meeting between DFID Evaluation Team and Mr JC Odomel, Inspector General of Uganda Police Force on 30 October 1997.



## 5. District Commands

F15. District commands are located throughout the country and are based within the major towns. The capital city, Kampala, is subdivided into districts and these have precisely the same status as district commands elsewhere in Uganda.

F16. A district command embraces several police stations whose work is supervised from the district headquarters. Police stations range from substantial large buildings commanded by officers of superintendent rank to police outposts in villages staffed by constables.

F17. District commands have the most important function of all; the delivery of everyday services to the communities they police. They are the focus of community policing and, because of the general lack of effective communications and vehicles within the UPF, the charge office is the centre of police activity. In Uganda, as elsewhere in the developing world, home telephones are a rare exception, and if people want to make reports or seek help from police officers they generally have to visit the police station to do so.

F18. In consequence, charge offices are very crowded and busy places. It is not unusual to find members of the public making reports about serious incidents standing alongside arrested persons. How this confusion affects the public's confidence in attending police stations one can only imagine. It is however likely that people will only visit police station charge offices if they have business to transact so police stations remain in this sense remote from the vast majority of the community they serve.

F19. Due to the absence of computerised support all events are carefully logged in a hard-backed folio-numbered occurrence book, which is the foundation document for all incidents reported to police. The administrative systems in use are old fashioned and bureaucratic but until greater capital investment is made they will continue to serve adequately the UPF's purposes.

F20. One of the indicators of achievement for the original project was that there should be "a reduction in administration and duplication of effort."<sup>16</sup> Only limited progress has been made in this direction. In large part this is because the communications infrastructure of the UPF remains extremely weak and without vast capital expenditure could not be brought up-to-date. Nevertheless, some important gains were made.

F21. The review of the command structures was successful and the districts are managed and organised in line with the ensuing recommendations. The DPC is responsible for the conduct of all policing activity within his district and has full command of all resources. The system in use is very similar to that employed in the United Kingdom and is, in principle, a sound way forward. The full benefits of the unitary district commands will, however, only be realised once

<sup>16</sup> Uganda: Assistance to the Uganda Police Force. December 1990.

communications, both in the telecommunications and managerial senses, are brought up to date.

F22. The DPC is a key figure in promoting community policing, both within his command and with key players in the community. Many DPCs are young, well educated superintendents who have benefited from support provided under the project, notably in relation to community policing. However, they face mammoth problems:

- insufficient resources (money, transport, communications) to police effectively the geographical area they command;
- the lack of any predictable or consultative personnel policy;
- inadequate and dilapidated police stations, with no privacy for persons making reports;
- squalid and overcrowded barracks accommodation.

## 6. Accommodation

F23. The problems over barracks accommodation and the inadequacy of police stations were recognised when the project was designed and in an early (June 1990) version of the project memorandum were made the subject of conditionality:

“No force of law and order can hope to fulfil its responsibilities to the public if it is forced by poor pay and conditions to break the laws it seeks to uphold. **Thus it must be a main plank of this project** that the Government (of Uganda) for its part examines ways by which officers’ conditions may be improved. **This, therefore, is one of the conditions of British support.**”<sup>17</sup>

F24. This condition was removed, following GoU representations, in the December 1990 memorandum. This omission, although it may have been realistic, is deeply revealing of the constraints under which the GoU knew itself to be working at the time. It is arguable that it should have made more impression than it did on the UK perception of these constraints.

F25. More recently the IGP has brought these issues to the notice of the GoU and arranged for politicians to see the conditions for themselves.<sup>18</sup> The issues were clearly articulated in the UPF Operational Policing Review<sup>19</sup>, which pulled no punches. The Project Co-ordinator in his quarterly progress reports, frequently drew attention to the appalling living conditions of police officers and the frequent failure to pay their salaries on time. Regrettably, little has been done to correct this situation, which must be affecting the morale of many police officers.

<sup>17</sup> Uganda: Assistance to the Uganda Police Force. June 1990 (See paragraphs 7.15 to 7.17)

<sup>18</sup> Meeting between the DFID Evaluation Team and Mr JC OdomeI, Inspector General of Police on 30 October 1997

<sup>19</sup> Operational Policing Review, 1994. Report prepared by team led by Deputy Inspector General of Police.

F26. The problems of pay and accommodation were clearly recognised by those responsible for designing the ODA/DFID project. But very little has been done to stimulate action in this area. A small amount of brick-making equipment was provided under the project, but achieved little in the face of local inability to provide other necessary materials. Whether more might have been achieved had self-help accommodation been pursued with greater energy it is hard to judge. Certainly, self accommodation was not treated as a priority within the project.

## **7. Strategic Planning**

F27 Support under the project is currently continuing to assist the UPF leadership to refine its strategic planning and produce a Corporate Strategy and development plan (CSDP). A CSDP covering a five year period (1998 - 2002) is in final draft form and the IGP hopes to present it to the GoU in time for the next round of financial bidding. For each of the five years, an annual policing plan is prepared but, so far, the annual policing plan for 1998 is in the form of desirable objectives rather than costed policy options. Nevertheless, the plan does prioritise the areas to be given attention in the immediate term. It complements the 156 recommendations made in the UPF Operational Policing Review and reflects the views expressed about the pay and living conditions of police officers. Whether it will succeed in unlocking a more substantial and assured budget for the UPF, to enable policing in Uganda to meet citizens' expectations, remains to be seen but the preparation of the plan appears to be an important step in the right direction.

## COMMUNITY POLICING IN UGANDA

## ANNEX G

**Background**

G1. The Uganda Police Force (UPF) was established to ensure law and order, discipline and allegiance of people to government. Over the years, their operational strategies became almost entirely “reactive”; taking complaints, conducting investigations and recording statements, with little personal interaction. As Uganda passed through political turmoil during the 1970s and 1980s the allegations of incompetence, brutality and corruption badly tarnished the UPF’s image, and led to great fear and mistrust by the public. The report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Violation of Human Rights in Uganda from 1962 to January 1986, pointed out that the UPF was one of the state agencies implicated in atrocities during the Idi Amin military junta era and the second UPC-Obote government 1980-1985. For some time afterwards, the resulting fear and mistrust discouraged the public from supporting the police and working together in a partnership against crime. These attitudes have steadily been changing in recent years with improved police discipline and performance. The UPF itself, however, has made little systematic attempt to market its image and solicit public support.

G2. The UPF has tended to see members of the public’s role exclusively in terms of the help they can provide in the combat and prevention of crime and has for some time been pursuing strategies aimed at promoting a partnership against it. The focus has been on sensitising the public on their role and what they can do to contain crime. There has been much less emphasis on listening to public priorities and concerns.

**Introduction of Community Policing in Uganda.**

“Every police Officer should be a Community Police Officer”

DPC Wandegeya Police Station Kampala

G3. Community policing was introduced into Uganda in 1989 by the District Police Commander (DPC) of Old Kampala Police Division. The initiative assumed significance as a pilot project in response to conflict between different community groups and increased instances of theft of electrical items. The community criticised the performance of the police, whom they accused of incompetence, indifference and corruption. The conflict assumed political overtones and the DPC initiated a public relations campaign. Four British Police Officers who were conducting training courses in the Country at that time, together with the DPC, Pauline Bangirana, introduced the idea of sensitising the public, offering crime prevention advice and property marking. The Community Police Officers (CPOs ) were provided with bicycles to

enable them to “mobilize the community”. In addition to their work as mobilizers, the CPOs operated as beat officers and, in discharging their beat duties, they were to interact with the public and discuss with them issues related to crime, security and welfare. This initiative faltered when the divisional head was transferred.

### ***Conceptualisation of Community Policing***

What is “Community Policing” ?.

G4. This has been defined in many different ways. The following, provided by the Community Liaison TCO and published in the UPF magazine, sums up the basic approach.

“ In its most basic form it is aimed at removing the barriers between the Police and the public. It is also described as a policy and strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime and improved quality of life. It is aimed at improving Police service and legitimacy through proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime causing conditions. It assumes a greater accountability of the Police and a greater public share in decision-making. It should show greater concern for civil rights and liberties. This can be summed up as a partnership approach to policing, the police and the public together”

G5. The reactivation of Community Policing and its extension throughout the country commenced with the training of 60 Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) at Kibuli Police Training School in December 1993. The Training Notes produced for this three day course clearly outline an approach to community policing aimed at “lowering and if possible, removing those real or imaginary barriers which exist between the public and the police”. The Notes go on:

“ The role of a Community Liaison Officer is to be a Police Officer in that he will go to the public, teach them, assist them in their dealings with the police, advise them on crime prevention matters, demystify the law and police procedures and form an open, friendly and readily available conduit of communication between the public and the police”

For the two project TCOs, the need to “prevent crime” seems to have been central to their approach to community policing. This does not seem to have been quite how the UPF saw it. For them crime prevention, although important, was a less immediate issue than improving their public image and community-police relations generally. It was concern over the image of the police that lay behind the original initiative in Old Kampala.

G6. Following brief training, CLOs were deployed to all Districts of Uganda. In 1994 a further batch of 60 CLOs were trained and, in April 1995, 40 more officers were trained to supplement

those in the field. In August 1996, 50 inspectors were appointed and in March 1997 were formally trained to become District Community Liaison Officers. Despite having trained a total of 220 police officers there are to date only 140 officers, including 6 women, in post around the country. Community Policing comes under the Department of Welfare and Community Affairs. The unit is co-ordinated by 2 CPOs under the command of APC/W and CA.

G7. The UPF target is to have 4 CLOs in each of the 55 police stations and one CLO in each of the 445 police posts throughout Uganda. To date, UPF has in post 24% of its required officers.

### ***Community Policing Activities***

G8. A wide variety of community policing initiatives has been undertaken by CLOs. Community groups, including Local Committees (LCs), school children, drivers, herbalists, street children, church members, opinion leaders, civil servants, among others have “received instruction through community policing”. This instruction is intended to acquaint people with legal and civic issues such as:

- a) the role of the police;
- b) powers of local councils;
- c) basic human rights, principles pertaining to arrest, detention, police bonds; and
- d) neighbourhood watch.

In total the UPF estimates that some seven million people have been touched by Community Policing activities, and over 1700 schools have been visited.

G9. In addition to legal and civic issues, community policing activities have included fire safety seminars and lectures, road safety seminars and lectures, property marking schemes and crime prevention programmes. In Kawempe District of Kampala a variety of one, three and four month long courses have taken place since 1994. Participants attend for one to two hours once a week over a three to four month period.

### ***Some Reactions to Community Policing***

G10. “Of late there have been a series of grenade attacks in Kampala in crowded areas. Information from Community Police Associations ( not unlike neighbourhood watch) has led to arrests. People now appreciate the value of police work and see how they can contribute” ( APC Research and Planning Unit).

“Increased community consultation measured by “complaints file” that was not in existence before 1989” ( APC Community Affairs)

“People ran to alert the police that there was a case of a fourteen year old girl who was being forced into marriage by her father and mother, but the neighbours intervened by informing the police, who took action to prevent the marriage taking place” (DPC Kawempe Police Station).

“Some colleagues of ours are not supportive and not interested in community policing because it is assisting the public to become aware of the law and their rights. Some do not wish the public to know about community policing issues such as bond and bail. They say community policing is spoiling our things” ( Female CLO).

### ***The Image of the Police***

G11. Community Policing has focused on crime prevention, and only limited efforts have been made to improve the image of the police. Significant work remains if the police are to regain their credibility and the trust of the public.

“The police must regain the trust of the people”

Student Kigazi High School Kabali

Following a lesson to the students at Kigazi High School by the CLO Kabali, based on notes produced through the DFID-funded In-Service Secondary teacher Education Project (INSSEP), students were asked if they would report a case of defilement to the local police. A female student replied:

“ We still have some fear and are not prepared as yet to go to the police if one of us is defiled because we think the person can influence the police and bribe them, which we as students do not have, so that the case is dropped. We also fear that the police could do the same crime to us”.

One of the boys questioned about police behavior took a more sympathetic approach:

“ The police should not be blamed so much because the conditions they are working under are appalling; poor housing, poor facilities and low salary. These conditions need to be improved to make them work better”.

### **Related NGO Activity**

G12. Community policing is a subject of some interest to the Uganda Association of Women Lawyers (FIDA) which was established to:- take the law to the people so as to create an awareness of their rights; promote family stability through legal advice and counselling; promote responsible upbringing of children; promote the wellbeing of Ugandans through emphasis on the laws that stimulate economic development. They are a relatively new organisation and have no information on the impact of their initiatives.

### **Crime Preventors Programmes**

G13. In Wandegaya District, those attending crime preventors' seminars and courses graduate with a certificate of attendance containing their photograph. The principle of training crime preventors is to create a conscious group of people who will influence members of the community to change their behaviour. In Old Kampala divisions, crime preventors and instructors were important entry points to the community in the implementation of community policing.

The Managers of Uganda Taxi operators and Drivers Association ( UTODA) have a crime prevention programme under which 200 people have been trained as crime preventors. There are periodic seminars for drivers lasting two weeks, to sensitise them on traffic matters. This is one of a number of positive responses by the public to of community policing. It also indicates the emerging role of civil society in policing that could help to shape the future organisation of law enforcement.

The prominence of crime preventors is at present largely confined to Kampala, where community policing is said to be more successful in terms of sensitisation. In up-country Districts, sensitisation has been the main activity of CLOs. Their seminars have largely been attended by local administrative officials, civil leaders and to a certain extent schools. The majority of members of the public have not participated.

### **Media Campaigns**

G14. Community Policing programmes are a regular feature on Radio Uganda. Fifteen weekly



Radio Programmes are consistently running on the 3 Channels of Radio Uganda (Red, Blue and Butebo) in 9 different regional languages (English, Luganda, Swahili, 4Rs, Iteso, Luo, Lumasaba, Lukonzo, Lugwere). A weekly programme is running on CBS 88.8 and 89.9 FM and a monthly three hour programme (Parliament Yaffe). Other radio programmes are running on radio Marina of Mbarara and Radio Freedom of Gulu. The Pearl Communications radio listenership survey of October 1996 indicates that over 10 million people have been exposed to community policing through radio programmes.

### ***Property Marking***

G15. The DFID provided property marking kits for every District became the entry activity for community policing, having been undertaken at least once in every district. It is reported that activities have ceased. The reasons for this are unclear but the exercise was riddled with problems:-

- No reason for bicycle marking was given
- People thought it was for the purpose of taxation
- CLOs extorted charges ranging from 100/= to 500/= shillings to mark bicycles
- People with unmarked bicycles were arrested.

G16. Overall, Community Policing activities appear to be on the increase. Activities have been supported by an additional 300,000 Ush per month specifically for the support of these initiatives.

### ***Identification of Community Needs***

G17. Community Policing is centrally controlled from Police Headquarters. Monthly returns are filed covering meetings, problems encountered, and assessments of the local situation. Headquarters officials write to each District telling them "what to cover during the following month". Assessing community needs tends to reflect policing priorities in crime detection. There is no evidence (such as focus group reports, lists of focus group questions; questionnaires; needs assessment guides) of any systematic consultation of community members to determine their needs and priorities. CLOs are expected to develop their own course outlines and content. There is no feed-back or monitoring system in place for community policing, and no indicators for measuring the impact of activities.

### **Impact Assessment**

G18. Following a recommendation of the Mid-Term review in March 1995 an impact study to assess the effectiveness of the community policing component, and to identify needs for the further strengthening and institutionalisation of this approach was undertaken by Samuel B. Tindifa (Principal Investigator Human Rights Center) and Juliet Kiguli (Makerere Institute of Social Research), to establish whether it was properly conceptualised. The study was based on the collection of data from primary sources, which consisted mainly of interviews with police personnel, local leaders, students, teachers, women, sex workers and street children. Secondary sources, including documents, manuals and reports were also considered, along with a few completed questionnaires. The study highlights the following design and implementation issues:-

- without the support of the project community policing might not have been revived in 1994;
- community policing was not clearly conceptualised; lack of consensus and conflicts of interest significantly reduced its acceptance;
- police officers selected as CLOs were not necessarily interested or motivated. Criteria for the selection of CLOs should be established;
- more specific indicators would have made the impact measurable;
- implementation appears to have been an ad hoc series of activities, that lacked an overall strategy within an institution framework;
- motivation of CLOs, in terms of promotional opportunities, has not been institutionalised;
- community policing has suffered due to “un-coordinated transfers”;
- community consultation and participation in decision making as to the nature, contents and most acceptable and appropriate form of community policing would promote the partnership being sought;
- consultation with the general public concerning appropriate time of meetings, notice required and seasonal preferences would promote better attendance;
- the role of Community policing vis- a-vis local administration Police (LAP) has not been clarified;
- provision of guidelines and training materials to CLOs would facilitate a more effective, efficient and targeted approach to community policing;
- training of CLOs should include communication skills for different age and interest groups;

- strategic planning with specific objectives and targets would have enabled the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system that measured impact rather than performance;
- the restoration of public confidence and trust should be central to community policing;
- despite public relations campaigns, the image of the police remains poor; considerable effort will be required by all police officials to restore public confidence;
- establishment of community policing has forged a link between the people and the police that has enhanced the UPF's capacity in crime intelligence;
- there is an improved relationship between the police and the local authority;
- community policing is now recognised as a core activity of policing in Uganda;
- civil society is adopting community policing, making it a community-based activity;
- there is a high demand for increased COL activities from Districts;
- community policing is a "popular" concept accepted by public and police;
- pressure from colleagues not to "take the food from their mouths" by informing the public of their rights to release on bond";

wider understanding of release on bond has led to a reduction in mob justice.

**SOCIAL BACKGROUND****ANNEX H*****Introduction***

H1. This annex considers in more detail some of the social questions raised by the Uganda Policing Project.

***Socio- Economic Background***

H2. Life expectancy in Uganda is among the lowest in Africa. One fifth of all children born in Uganda will die before the age of five years and maternal mortality is also high. In addition, the prevalence of HIV/ AIDS is so high that a lowering of life expectancy (to about 40 years) is projected over the next five years. Low literacy ( 54% of all adults ) especially among women (44%) has a critical bearing on vulnerability and equity.

H3. Although one of the most rural countries in Africa, the population density is rising with the high growth rate. Population density is uneven, varying from several thousand per sq km in the urban district of Kampala down to 12 persons per sq km in Moroto in the North. The variation affects equal service coverage.

H4. Planners need to allow for the greater distances people and police officers have to travel in low density areas compared to high density districts or urban communities serviced by taxis and buses. There is little evidence that they do in fact do this.

H5. Uganda's economy is based on agriculture (60% of GDP and about 98% of export earnings). Most farming is labour intensive and women provide 60-80% of labour.

H6. Uganda inherited a good colonial economy at independence in 1962, but this was reversed during the Amin regime in 1971 and by 1980 the GDP had dropped by 18.8%. By 1986, when President Museveni came to power, inflation was around 260% per year and agreement was reached with the IMF and World Bank for a Structural Adjustment Programme. Growth since 1986 has been significant but most studies suggest increasing inequality of income distribution. In addition, the national revenue base collectible through taxes is small, and there is high dependency on external aid to meet public sector deficits. Government salaries have been below subsistence level for many years, and tend to lead to corruption and inefficiency. No public servant, however frugal, can survive on salary alone.

H7. Uganda's recent turbulent political history has been largely a result of its geographical and ethnic divisions. The form of government and the leadership that emerged at independence were not capable of overcoming these historical divisions. Two decades of violence ensued.

Only in the past ten years has there been relative peace.

H8. General statements about Uganda often mask major regional differences related to cultural and ecological characteristics. There are four main language groups with several sub-divisions: Bantu, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamatic and Sudanic. The Bantu inhabit the more fertile and developed southern half of the country, while the other groups are found in the drier North.

H9. These distinctions are broadly co-terminous with differences in traditional social and political organisations and economic activity. While the original political institutions that divided these groups no longer exist, many of the attitudes and forms of organisation inherent in these traditions impinge on modern life.

H10. Culturally, a broad distinction may be made between the Bantu monarchic societies and the Nilotic, Nilo-Hamatic, and Sudanic, which were loose federations or alliances of villages based on territorial or kinship groupings. These cultural differences have been reinforced by ecological factors and economic developments before independence. There are also considerable variations across many key social and economic indicators.

H11. Different conditions and different patterns of crime exist in different areas of Uganda. For example, in Karamoja cattle raiding and, more recently, gun trafficking from Kenya, Somalia and Sudan, are an essential element of life; whereas in Kampala, or Mbale, robbery or car jacking are more serious threats.

### ***Project Identification and Design***

H12. Community policing, in particular, requires a holistic approach if it is to address the full range of community concerns. In the case of the Uganda project little consideration seems to have been given to differing community needs and priorities or to local conditions, customs and traditions. How these differences and conditions affect policing needed to be considered as part of the project design.

H13. In particular, the training needs for community policing in different geographical areas, with distinct traditions and groups, require careful study before devising nationwide solutions. Community Policing in the urban environment of Kampala, for example, with easily patrolable beats and a dense concentration of people, is very different from community policing in scarcely populated rural areas of the northern and southern regions. While training at force level may be generic, it also needs to take account of local conditions, through a more modular approach.

H14. Institutionalisation of community policing has been assured through its inclusion in basic training. Its longer term impact does, however, depend significantly on its being endorsed by senior officers, possibly by touring the country to promote its merits and by encouraging every

police officer to become a community officer.

### **Local Councils (LCs)**

H15. Within a relatively centralised structure, the Government has developed a decentralised system involving Local Councils (originally called Resistance Councils). These councils are locally elected by the people and represent five levels. The councils start at district level with LC V, descending to LC IV at county level, LC III, LCII, and LCI at village level, where they cover approximately 30 to 150 households. Within the LCs there are various posts of responsibility: for example, health, defence, youth, women's affairs. All citizens above 18 years of age constitute the village council and are eligible to vote in local village committee elections. At higher administrative levels committees are elected from within the membership of the committees that directly report to them. At each level there has to be a women's representative, although women can also stand for any other committee post. Each district has an elected women's representative in the National Council or Parliament. The LC system is intended to give individuals and local committees a greater voice in policy making and law enforcement.

H16. At the lower levels (basically I-III) LCs have well-defined powers to try by law offenses whether criminal or civil. They thus provide an avenue for the informal resolution of conflicts at community level. These methods of compensation and settlement generally work well, but can overlap with the formal system of criminal justice. This appears to be particularly common in cases of defilement where there appears to have been a significant increase since the raising in 1992 of the legal age of consent to sexual intercourse and marriage from 14 to 18 years of age.

“ A rapist gives a few cows to the family and after that they do not mention it any more”  
Women's Vision-New Vision Tuesday, July 15, 1997

H17. Although police Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) regularly inform LC members and the community that their powers do not include judgement of defilement cases, (defilement being a capital offence) villagers continue to bring such cases to the LCs, rather than the police. This is hardly surprising. Cases conducted through the courts tend to be long-drawn-out affairs, with opportunity costs of time and travel, whereas LC courts are held summarily in the village with villagers (including sometimes, although improperly, LC members) benefiting from compensation awards.

### **Vulnerable Groups**

H18. Rural areas in Uganda are much poorer than urban areas and northern districts are poorer than those in the south. Access to schools, health units, utility services, employment and

industrial development are all poorer in the North, which also has considerable problems related to border security. The Karamojong of Moroto and Kotido Districts have never been integrated into the mainstream of national economic life. Traditional cattle raiding continues to be commonplace and has been exacerbated by the use of modern weapons. Since 1985 cattle raiding has expanded beyond traditional boundaries, in conjunction with rebel activities, and is responsible for destabilising neighbouring northern districts.

H19 Whether the North, as the poorest area, should have been singled out for special attention under the police project is debatable. After prolonged national instability, during which their reputation and effectiveness had been severely compromised, the need to establish a credible and efficient national police force called for nationwide interventions. Nevertheless there was a need, particularly in the North, for differentiated support to handle some of the more difficult policing issues, such as border security, cattle raiding, and gun trafficking.

H20 By the same token, conditions in urban areas also need to be considered separately. Squatter areas with limited services and facilities tend to present particular patterns of crime. In Kampala these areas have been a focus of community policing initiatives. It is possible that more might have been done to share best practices and lessons from initiatives in those areas with CLOs in other urban areas around the country.

### ***Vulnerability Within the Police Force***

H21. In colonial times height restriction on recruitment determined that the majority of those in the police and the army were from the northern ethnic groups. The main language was Swahili, to enable colonial officers to communicate with different language groups. More recent policies have enabled other tribes to join the police force, although “Northerners” still dominate numerically. The language of instruction has become English which is the medium of instruction in secondary schools.

H22 One Assistant Commissioner felt that NCOs were being recruited with poor educational backgrounds because of the great disparity between secondary schools in Uganda. Graduates from “good schools” achieve better results and are able to attend University, from which they enter the police force as officers. Students from “poorer schools” are not afforded the opportunity to proceed to High Schools and enter the UPF after “O” levels.

H23 Poor housing and pay adversely affect morale and undermine self-respect. Few, if any, new police houses have been built since 1965, when the force numbered 6,000. It now numbers about 15,000 so that sharing single room accommodation has become common. At Kawempi barracks, it is usual for two families (including children) to share one room. In some cases single NCOs share a single room with a family. Cooking areas and latrines ( in Kawempi barracks 10 for 50

families) are also shared. Compounds are cramped, and dilapidated from years of neglect. Salaries for NCOs are around Ush 62,000 per month and with secondary school fees ranging from Ush 137,00 to 150,000 per term, police officers are unable to afford to provide for their children the education they themselves have had, unless they have supplementary income. Pensions are low and often paid two or three months in arrears. So it is hardly surprising if many feel that they “must make their pension while at the desk”.

### ***Relationship with Good government and Poverty Alleviation***

H24. Support for the police has been a central element of UK support for Good Government in Uganda. This is based on a recognition that maintenance of law and order is a prerequisite for economic recovery and social development and for effective aid. The same reasoning has lain behind DFID support for the judiciary, the state prosecution service and the revision of Uganda’s laws.

**“ When people are living in constant fear, no development can be realised”**

(interview undertaken in Jinja for A Situation Analysis of Women, Adolescents and Children in Uganda, 1994)

H25. But support for good government goes beyond establishing the prerequisite conditions for economic recovery. It also has a more direct relationship with the alleviation of poverty. This relationship is echoed in the 1997 World Bank World Development Report, which insists that good government is not a luxury but a vital necessity for development and that raising standards of governance is central to poverty elimination. Accessible and effective systems of justice help address family and to personal insecurity and the role of the police is usually critical in these respects. Poor people, and especially poor women, are likely to be the last to enjoy these rights unless they receive support. In developing countries it is the poor who suffer most when these rights are denied or are otherwise unenforceable.

### ***Accountability: The Uganda Human Rights Commission***

H26. The Uganda Human Rights Commission, established under Article 51 of the Constitution, was set up following the Commission of Enquiry into the Violation of Human Rights (1962-1986) and has extensive powers. The Commission is the principal institution outside Government for upholding, protecting and promoting human rights in Uganda. It has the mandate to investigate, at its own initiative or following a complaint, against violation of



human rights; to visit jails, prisons, and places of detention to view and assess conditions of inmates; to establish programmes of research, education and information to enhance respect for human rights, and to create and sustain within society the awareness of the constitution. The relationship between the UPF and the Human Rights Commission is still at a formative stage.

## GENDER AND THE UPF

## ANNEX J

J1. Uganda is a patrilineal society and the economic status of women is low compared to men. A female Ugandan's life is more difficult than for her male counterpart; she works longer hours, has more economic responsibilities, and has additional health risks because of child bearing. She is less likely to go to school and thus to be able to improve herself, and has few opportunities to participate in community activities. Traditionally, marriage is regarded as an honourable estate for women, with child bearing an imperative.

J2. While global concern for women was developing in the 1970s and 1980s, Uganda's civil strife precluded any advancement in this field. In the late 1980s the NRM Government moved to redress this through deliberate affirmative action to improve the status of women. The Vice President of Uganda is a woman, as is the deputy speaker and there are six women ministers in the present cabinet. The Government has formulated explicit strategies to promote gender equity and equality in all spheres of life. The Affirmative Action Policy has established a position of secretary for women at each level of Local Council committees and every district is required to have at least one women delegate in the National Assembly. Women have been incorporated into the Local Committees, and a minimum of one seat per district is reserved for them on the National Council. In addition some laws that are prejudicial are being revised. A Ministry of Gender and Community Development has been created which serves as the focal point for the development of strategies to address the concerns and needs of women. The Ministry has implemented sensitisation programmes in a number of Ministries, but not for members of the police force. There appears to be much confusion in Uganda over the concept of "Gender" which it is invariably interpreted to mean "female".

J3. The gender division of labour, gender roles and access and control over resources are important to understanding the position of women in Ugandan society and to mainstreaming gender issues in the UPF. Systematic awareness raising / sensitisation to gender issues, both within the police force and the community, could do much to promote gender sensitive policing that is not in conflict with traditions on Uganda society. At present gender training still forms a "low priority" in basic training.

***Gender Considerations in the Project***

J4. No consideration of gender issues or positive discrimination appears to have been made in the design of the first phase of the project, and there are no gender specific indicators to measure impact. By the time of Phase II it was recognised that the UPF needed to be more fully

oriented towards the needs of women, and that equality of opportunity should form part of a human resources strategy for the UPF in the longer term. The terms of reference for the Training Officer were accordingly drafted to include particular attention to the training needs of women police officers and of all officers in the areas of women's rights ie; legal rights, sexual abuse and harassment.

J5. The Social Development Adviser responsible (in London) for advising on the Uganda programme recommended in March 1993 that a consultancy should be mounted at an early stage with the objective of assisting the Training Officer to propose a strategy to address issues of training for (i) equal opportunities; and (ii) awareness of women's legal rights. This does not appear to have been acted upon.

### **Family Protection Unit**

J6. A three day gender course in Kampala, organised by BDDEA in May 1996, provided new impetus for the inclusion of gender issues within the project. This course, which involved an element of gender planning, spurred the Training Officer, in collaboration with his (female) counterpart, to develop a strategy for strengthening the Family Protection Unit (FPU).

J7. In recent years there has been an alarming increase in reported cases of defilement (unlawful sexual intercourse), rape and domestic violence. The FPU, which comes under the Community Policing and Welfare department of UPF, was established to "fight violence" and sensitize the public to the rights of women and children. It is the first point of contact for men, women and children who wish to complain about cases of rape, defilement, domestic violence, child abuse, etc and who can now do so to specially trained officers (mostly women) with skills to investigate such cases in a sensitive and sympathetic manner.

J8. There had in fact already been some attention, within the project, to the special needs of women. In response to a request of the Inspector General, two courses for 60 women officers were held in January 1995. The aim of the courses, conducted by WPC training officers from the U.K was to provide:

- a) Self- defence training with those trained returning to their posts to train both colleagues and women in the community as part of the community policing programme;
- b) Investigating / counselling skills to facilitate investigation of cases of rape, defilement, child abuse, domestic violence. The approach included an emphasis on counselling of victims and their families and liaison with other concerned agencies.

J9. Addressing community policing with self-defence training may have been a somewhat aggressive response to a culture of violence, lack understanding of and of alternative ways of

promoting social cohesion between sexes and communities.

J10. A further "Gender Related Course" for 60 Police Women was held in January-February 1997 with the aim of providing "skills and abilities to investigate and appropriately respond to victims of all types of abuse within the criminal justice system". Followed by a Training of Trainers Course in "Child and Family Protection Work" for two weeks in October 1997. Trainers were to be selected from those officers who had attended either the 1995 self-defence/gender issues course or one of the two courses conducted in early 1997. In the event only five had attended previous courses. These courses were conducted by and based on British methods, with some adaptation to the Ugandan situation.

J11. These trainers also investigated the progress of the FPU in the districts of Jinja, Soroti, Masaka and Mpigi and found that most trainees were utilising their newly acquired skills to positive effect and with considerable impact.

J12. Helen Alyak (in charge of the Police Training Unit) should be congratulated on being awarded the 35th International Recognition and Scholarship Award for her work in strengthening the FPU within the UPF, the first African to win this annual policing award.

J13. One of the strengths of the project has been its ability to react to developing and changing situations in Uganda. The introduction of skills for dealing with victims of crimes is such an initiative. At present there is however no formalised system of recording and dealing with family protection and domestic violence in the UPF, and therefore no means of measuring the demand for the service, or its effect. The optimal assignment of trained staff, as part of an overall strategy, will require such information.

J14. Training in the treatment of victims should be viewed as a catalyst for change and should lead to an improvement in response and service to victims of violent crimes. This will however only be sustainable with management backing at the highest level, the provision of resources and the establishment of follow-up advisory services for field officers. A long term training and implementation strategy, combined with awareness raising of Senior Officers, may well be the right way forward.

### ***Equality of Opportunity***

J15. There is no gender policy in the UPF as such. Fewer women than men apply to join but both are reported to be treated equally during training and to "get the same promotional chances"

J16. Many policing activities are gender neutral. Taking evidence in cases of rape, domestic violence, child abuse and defilement, where in the majority of cases the victim is female, tends to be undertaken by a WPO. Several women police officers interviewed insisted they were

officers- not women- first and wanted to be equal.

J17. This does not mean that women police officers are proportionately represented in the higher ranks. The highest ranking women in the UPF is at Assistant Commissioner Level.

J18. The table below shows the number of women Police Officers in the Uganda Police Force according to their respective ranks for the month ended October 1997.

<b>RANK</b>	<b>NUMBER</b>
ACP	1
SSP	0
SP	4
SASP	0
ASP	22
IP	22
AIP	44
HCM	0
HC	3
S/SGT	6
SGT	150
CPL	200
PC	1400
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1852</b>

Source: UPF Personnel Records

J19. A number of reasons suggested themselves for this lack of progress:-

- “Tradition hinders our progress” (Senior WPO).
- UPF policy on women attending training courses with babies. (Officially women recruits in training are “not allowed to have babies”. After initial training, police women are “not allowed to come with their babies” to promotional or refresher courses. If women cannot

organise child care they cannot attend the course and must await a future chance to attend. The result is that women find it much more difficult than men to attend the courses on which promotion depends).

- UPF policy of frequently transferring personnel, so that they do not become too familiar with the local community, bites harder on women than it does on men. (If a police woman marries a man from the town in which she is posted, she may appeal against transfer through her immediate superior. If the appeal is turned down she must either take up her new post or resign).
- Women were alleged to be more reluctant than men to work extra or anti-social hours.

### ***Sexual Harassment***

J20. Two senior officers who spoke to the team said that they had never experienced sexual harassment from colleagues, but this was not the experience of some of the younger newly appointed WPOs to whom we spoke. Many WPOs interviewed by the team were married to policemen. They said there was little chance to meet prospective husbands outside the barracks.



LIST OF UK-BASED STUDY - COURSES UNDERTAKEN BY UPF STAFF ANNEX K

**COURSE OF STUDY & YEAR**

**1986/1987**

Aircraft Maintenance Engineering

Overseas Detective Training

**1987/1988**

Police Administration Skills

Overseas Detective Training

**1988/1989**

Drugs Investigations

Crime Prevention

**1989/1990**

Vehicle Workshop Management

Overseas Detective Training

**1990/1991**

Overseas Command Course

Vehicle Fleet Management

Supplies and Stores Management

Vehicle Maintenance Management

Overseas Detective Training



Criminal Records Management

MA in Criminology

Fraud investigation

**1991/1992**

Overseas Command Course

Motor Mechanic Training

Stores Management

Uganda Senior Officers Course

**1992/1993**

Overseas Detective Training

Police Administration Skills

Overseas Command Course

MA in Mass Communication

Diploma in Crime Control

**1993/1994**

Evaluation and Assessment

Overseas Command Course

Overseas Detective Training

Criminal Intelligence

Firearms and Ballistics

Management Development

**1994/1995**

Crime Prevention

**1995/1996**

Human Resources - Budgeting and

Job Inspection Skills

Personnel Management

Dog Training

Forensic Science

Radio Communications

**1996/1997**

Management of Training

Uganda Senior Officers Course

Inspection Skills

International Commanders Course.

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