

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

Russia and The Former Soviet Union

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



HM TREASURY

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC

& Associated Consultants

Country/Region Case Study 1

Russia and The Former Soviet Union

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March 2004

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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author/s and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development nor of the other government departments who have assisted in managing this evaluation (Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, HM Treasury).

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PREFACE

P1. The Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) are a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID) mechanism for funding and managing the UK's contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) covers sub-Saharan Africa while the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) covers the rest of the world. The CPPs were established by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) in April 2001, following a government-wide review of UK conflict prevention work in 2000. The rationale behind the CPPs is that by bringing together the interests, resources and expertise of FCO, MOD and DFID, greater effectiveness can be achieved. To this end, the CPPs share a joint Public Service Agreement (PSA) target, expressed as follows:

Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution.

P2. HMG commissioned the first evaluation of the CPPs to inform the Spending Review 2004 (SR04). DFID has managed this evaluation through Evaluation Department in collaboration with an Evaluation Management Committee (EMC) that also included the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat (Chair), the FCO's United Nations Department, MOD's Directorate of Policy and Planning, DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and DFID's Africa Conflict Team (now the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit), situated in the Africa and Greater Horn Department (AGHD).

P3. The establishment of a cross-Whitehall Evaluation Management Committee was an innovative approach to managing an evaluation in DFID, and followed the ethos of the joint working of the CPPs. It allowed for extensive consultation between the various departments and conflict prevention teams. Many thanks are due to the various EMC members who contributed to the management of this evaluation. These include: Chris Chalmers, Benjamin Saoul and Anthea Dolman (Cabinet Office), Clare Barras and Stephen Evans (HMT), Joan Link, Euan Wallace and Karen Wolstenholme (FCO), Bernard Harborne and Malcolm Hood (AGHD), Tom Owen-Edmunds, Catherine Masterman and Ben le Roith (CHAD), Alicia Forsyth, Charlotte Brown, Campbell McCafferty (MOD).

P4. The study was managed by Mary Thompson, Iain Murray and Dale Poad (DFID Evaluation Department) in collaboration with the EMC. It was edited by Caryn Maclean.

P5. The evaluation was undertaken by Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, the PARC & Associated Consultants. The GCPP Russia and Former Soviet Union (FSU) Case study was carried out by Dr Greg Austin with Mr Paul Bergne. Work was conducted in three phases. The first was London-based, and considered the Russia and FSU Strategy's activities in the context of UK approaches to conflict prevention in the region and the overall policy framework of the GCPP. The second phase involved fieldwork in Georgia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, whilst the third phase involved consultations in London.

P6. The aim of the evaluation of the CPPs is to assess current government approaches to Conflict Prevention through the GCPP and the ACPP, and to provide an overview of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward. The purpose of evaluation generally is to examine the design, implementation and impact of selected programmes in order to learn lessons from them so that these can be applied to current and future work, and also to help strengthen HMG's accountability. It should be borne in mind that any programmes or projects examined are the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed have often changed in the light of HMG's developing knowledge.

P7. The Russia and FSU Case Study is one of six studies undertaken within the framework of the evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the Inception Report, the Evaluation placed maximum emphasis on the macro level: the policy processes in Whitehall by which decisions on allocations are made and implemented by the CPPs. Considerable attention has also been placed on the meso level: the degree to which CPP policies and activities in a given conflict form part of a coherent package of direct interventions by the international community and local actors to the problems of particular large scale deadly conflicts or potential conflicts. The micro-level of analysis (review of specific projects) confines itself largely to the way in which projects impact on the meso and macro levels. The Evaluation has not analysed systematically whether specific projects funded by the CPPs have been well managed and whether they have achieved their specific project goals. Single projects have been analysed to the extent that they reflect on the macro and meso levels.

P8. The main findings of the evaluation, reflected in this Synthesis Report, are that the CPPs are doing significant work funding worthwhile activities that make positive contributions to effective conflict prevention, although it is far too early in the day to assess impact. The progress achieved through the CPP mechanisms is significant enough to justify their continuation. Overall, the consultants believe that worthwhile improvements could be achieved through:

- a. more consistent approaches to joint assessment and priority setting;
- b. more determined pursuit of coordinated international responses;
- c. and by allocation of more administrative resources and staff trained appropriately in the associated processes.

The Russia and FSU study notes that when the GCPP was established, UK ministers agreed that Russia and the FSU should be accorded a high priority in GCPP activities.

P9. Overall the consultant's main findings are as follows:

- a. Many activities funded under the GCPP in Russia and the FSU appear to represent best practice in conflict prevention. Georgia was highlighted as a specific case where the GCPP funds a suite of conflict prevention activities that are having positive effects on some dimensions of the conflict dynamics. The picture of GCPP operations in the rest of the FSU, including Russia, reveals some successful projects, but much less

coherence and much less overall effectiveness in achieving specific GCPP aims at the country level than is visible in Georgia.

- b. Georgia is again singled out for attention for GCPP effects on international arrangements were the consultants find that many of the activities provide a useful complement to other UK policies in support of conflict prevention, and to the policies of other actors, both internal and external, in support of the same aims.
- c. Inter-departmental coordination in the Russia-FSU strategy appears to vary from country to country. The consultants note that in Georgia the GCPP process has increased consultation among FCO, DFID and MOD, though there is room for improvement. In Russia and other FSU countries coordination is said to be lacking. In all countries monitoring of progress and outputs has been patchy in country, with an apparent lack of synergy between country offices and London. Better coordination and more guidance on funding priorities would improve the situation.
- d. The financial management processes of the Global GCPP are the subject of an independent review, due to report early next year. This was launched in recognition that there is some disorder in the GCPP on this front. Similar findings were observed by the Evaluation Team in the Russia—FSU strategy.

P10. The evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools is comprised of the following reports which can be found on the corresponding web-site links:

Synthesis Report	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647synthesis.pdf
Security Sector Reform, Nicole Ball	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf
United Nations, Pierre Robert & Andrew Mack	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647un.pdf
Sudan, Emery Brusset	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sudan.pdf
Sierra Leone, Jeremy Ginifer & Kaye Oliver	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf
Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647afghanistan.pdf
Russia and the FSU, Greg Austin & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf
Portfolio Review, Greg Austin & Malcolm Chalmers	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647portfolio.pdf

Evaluation reports can be found at the DFID website:
<http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/>

Michael Hammond
 Head of Evaluation Department
 2 April 2004

EVALUATION TEAM ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The members of the Evaluation Team would like to acknowledge the support of the Evaluation Management Committee (EMC), especially Dr Mary Thompson, Social Development Adviser to DFID's Evaluation Department, and Mr Tom Owen-Edmunds, who on behalf of the EMC, accompanied Dr Austin on the field visits to Russia and Georgia respectively. The Evaluation Team also acknowledges the strong support of relevant officials in conducting the interviews and fieldwork, in particular the personnel in the Embassies in the countries visited.

The Evaluation Team has been supported effectively by Ms Janet Wilson, the Programme Officer at Bradford University's Centre for International Cooperation and Security. Research assistance has been provided by Mr Todd Krannock, Mr David Newton, Mr Rob Lawton, Mr Nick Robson and Mr Thom Oommen. Mr Ken Berry has provided review assistance for the synthesis report and some case study reports, as well as having drafted some background material.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
AGHD	Africa and Greater Horn Department
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
CoE	Council of Europe
CPPs	Conflict Prevention Pools
DA	Defence Attaché
DFID	Department for International Development
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
EMC	Evaluation Management Committee
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
HMA	Her Majesty's Ambassador
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HMT	Her Majesty's Treasury
IA	International Alert
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
MiA	Missing in Action
MD	Military District
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD after the Russian <i>Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del</i>)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI	Open Society Institute
P5	Five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council

PoW	Prisoner of War
PPI	Public Policy Institute
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RCDS	Royal College of Defence Studies
RCMS	Royal College of Military Science
RFAF	Russian Federation Airforce
RMA	Royal Military Academy
RN	Royal Navy
RRP	Russian Resettlement Programme
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SCCP	South Caucasus Cooperation Programme
SGS	Small Grants System
SSR	Security Sector Reform
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UND	United Nations Department
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

S1. In 2001 when the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) was established, the UK Government agreed at Ministerial that Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) should be accorded a high priority in GCPP activities.¹ For FY2001/2 and 2002/3, the geographic scope of the 'Russia and FSU Strategy' in the GCPP management system included 10 countries (Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and Moldova) and did not include the other five former republics of the USSR (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine). These countries were part of the Central and East European (CEE) Strategy. With the prospective membership of the European Union (EU) for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 2004 and the graduation of three countries in East Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership, the GCPP Steering Committee decided to end the CEE Strategy with effect from 2004. For 2003/4, programmes for Ukraine and Belarus were transferred to the Russia and FSU Strategy. But no new strategy document for the Russia and FSU Strategy has been yet written that takes this change into account.

S2. Funded at about 8 million in 2002/3 and 11 million in 2003/4 (or about 10 per cent of total GCPP programme allocations in both years), the Russia and FSU Strategy sat alongside the Balkans Strategy² as the most important strategies in terms of level of funding. But in both financial years, the two regional strategies were overshadowed by GCPP spending on Afghanistan.³ Given that the regional strategies actually fund activities in a number of countries, the low level of funding that flows to Russia itself (give the narrow focus of the programmes funded) does not suggest that the GCPP does accord Russia a particularly high priority. The GCPP spends more money on Georgia (programmes plus peacekeeping) than on Russia. The programme elements of the Russia and FSU Strategy are managed in London by an inter-departmental steering group chaired by the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices's (FCO's) Eastern Department. Peacekeeping expenditure in Russia and the FSU is managed by the FCO's United Nations Department (UND) or the department handling Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Effect on Preventing New Conflicts and Containing Existing Ones

S3. Many activities funded under the GCPP in Russia and the FSU appear to represent best practice in conflict prevention. This appears to be especially the case in Georgia, where the GCPP funds a suite of conflict prevention activities that are having positive effects on some dimensions of the conflict dynamics. The picture of GCPP operations in the rest of the FSU, including Russia, reveals some successful projects, but much less coherence and much less overall effectiveness in achieving specific GCPP aims at the country level than is visible in Georgia.

¹ See FCO, DFID, MOD, 'Global Conflict Prevention Fund: "Strategy for Russia and Parts of the FSU"', 15 March 2001.

² The Balkans strategy was funded at 8.5 million and 11.5 million in the same two financial years.

³ The Afghanistan Strategy was funded at 18 million and 15 million in the same two financial years.

S4. In the case of Russia, this judgment must be heavily qualified on two counts. First, Russia presents a unique profile in relation to the GCPP as it has so far evolved. The appearance of the GCPP as a challenge fund for approval of relatively low-cost ad hoc 'projects' can reasonably lead people to see it as not particularly relevant to countries like Russia, where the UK has massive strategic interests. Russia is the wealthiest, most powerful and most developed country where GCPP programme activities are undertaken. It is also the only member of the permanent five members of the Security Council of the United Nations (P5) in which GCPP programme activities are undertaken on any scale. The bulk of GCPP spending around the world is on the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and this is in most circumstances not conceivable in Russia on any scale. These considerations must inevitably shape the way in which GCPP activities can be undertaken in Russia.

S5. The second qualification is that, notwithstanding a very low profile for GCPP activities in Russia, the one big project funded on the programme side, the Russian Resettlement Programme (RRP), is a notable success both for the beneficiaries and for the promotion of UK strategic interests.

S6. The range of activities funded by the GCPP in respect of the Nagorny Karabagh conflict and in Kyrgyzstan is much smaller than in Georgia. Though the programmes are of varying degrees of relevance to the problems of conflict prevention, they are essentially projects supporting conflict prevention without a formal conflict prevention strategy specific to their target country. By themselves, they have not made a significant contribution to conflict prevention. They are nevertheless important contributions.

S7. The GCPP funds very few programmes that address in any significant way the last three of the four country-specific goals set out in the formally approved GCPP strategy for Russia and the FSU; and the formal strategy had no component at all addressing the most violent and the most strategically significant conflict in the region—Chechnya.

Effect on International Arrangements

S8. Many of the activities funded by the GCPP in Georgia provide a useful complement to other UK policies in support of conflict prevention, and to the policies of other actors, both internal and external, in support of the same aims. In some cases, the UK is ahead of other donors in positive support of conflict prevention in Georgia, and some GCPP-funded activities are held up as useful directions for future policy by other actors, both external and internal.

Effect on Inter-Departmental Processes

S9. The achievements of the GCPP in Georgia have so far been built largely on bureaucratic structures and activities that would have existed had the GCPP not been created. The main gain from the GCPP for the work in Georgia appears to have been a stronger buy-in by the FCO to the work of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Georgia that was previously funded by Department of International Development (DFID). The existence of the GCPP appears to have provided the opportunity for, and subsequent greater confidence in, actual implementation of the FCO proposal to appoint

a Special Representative for Georgia and the Southern Caucasus. It is the near unanimous testimony of officials that the GCPP process for Georgia has improved consultation among FCO, DFID and Ministry of Defence (MOD), though this coordination is not yet as trilateral as it could be.

S10. The MOD programmes funded by the GCPP in Georgia are seen by most officials, including in the MOD, as operating alongside the GCPP process rather than as part of it. Some MOD activities in Georgia do contribute to the aims of conflict prevention there but all of them are more or less 'ring-fenced', both in terms of funds management and policy review by any specific GCPP process. They are of course subject to normal ambassadorial review and normal Whitehall review by both the FCO and MOD, but this would occur regardless of the whether the GCPP process existed.

S11. On balance, the achievements of the UK Government in Georgia appear to have been boosted by the creation and modus operandi of the GCPP. However, the achievements can probably be put down to the personnel involved, both in Whitehall and the field rather than to the inherent quality of the formal GCPP processes. The Steering Group responsible for managing the Russia and FSU Strategy is attempting to move toward a more strategic approach.

S12. However, the weaknesses in GCPP management processes of a systemic kind have been all too visible in the case of Russia and other FSU countries. The absence for two years of any projects on the programme side of the GCPP to address the conflict in Chechnya would appear to have been a major oversight. This lacuna shows up starkly the degree to which, in the past at least, the strategy for Russia and the FSU has been written much more around pre-existing programmes rather than with an eye to addressing the most urgent priorities for conflict prevention.

S13. With regard to Nagorny Karabagh and Central Asia, the effectiveness of the GCPP processes is less positive than in Russia. For much GCPP work in these places, inter-departmental coordination of project management is lacking, while monitoring of progress and effect of projects by embassies is patchy. There has not been a good synergy between the embassies and London in generating new ideas. There is also confusion as to what projects qualify for GCPP funding. Risks have also been taken when external (non-official) associates of GCPP projects have failed to consult embassies over the political implications of some projects. Some of these shortcomings are a result of the small size of embassy staff in countries whose importance does not generally loom large in the scale of international UK interests. The areas of potential conflict in some of these countries are often remote and difficult to visit. Potential European and international associates in conflict prevention work in these other countries are often themselves over-stretched or un-represented. Contacts with the NGOs implementing projects are infrequent. The whole basis for GCPP projection in such countries may need re-assessing unless the UK contribution can be shown to be making more of a difference.

Recommendations

S14. The Russia and FSU Strategy could be made more coherent and 'strategic', with greater involvement by posts, better training, better promotion with contacts, and ideally more dedicated amounts of staff time. At present, the Strategy is moving in a positive

direction and many of the problems identified derive from the relatively recent establishment of the GCPP, from the requirement that spending commence from the time of establishment without much of a prior planning/training period, and from the wholesale import of the MOD Outreach programme which, while its focus has adapted, was not itself originally designed with the GCPP in mind.

S15. There needs to be a more disciplined and focused process for providing conflict assessments that serve as a continuing template for policies, one that can be updated regularly and one which has a stamp of authority that is widely respected in all three departments and by embassy staff. The conflict assessment process and other GCPP interests would be well-served by establishing a new post in Moscow and/or Tbilisi funded by the GCPP. The existing Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) model is an excellent one in principle, but it needs to be mainstreamed by adapting it and by adopting it. It should be noted that the Russia and FSU Strategy has been in the lead in the GCPP in attempting to do just that.

S16. The regional Russia and FSU conflict strategy is too generalized to be an effective template for policy affecting the GCPP work in the region. As a normal principle, conflict strategies should be conflict specific. Thus, while a Russia and FSU framework might continue to exist within the GCPP, it should not have its own 'conflict strategy'. There arguably could be separate strategies for Georgia, Chechnya, Nagornyi Karabagh, the Ferghana Valley and Moldova. These need not be lengthy documents, but they must be highly relevant to policy, they must comprehensively address the main sources of conflict, and they must map the responses of other key actors apart from the UK. They would also need to be sensitive to regional implications. The 'road-map' model currently used by the Indonesia desk of the FCO for the GCPP and other purposes provides a useful model.

S17. The Russia and FSU Strategy has reflected the highly developed appreciation of its leading officials in keeping in close contact with leading external specialists and NGOs. These linkages might usefully be developed through the appointment of one academic specialist and a senior NGO activist to the Russia and FSU steering group on a permanent basis. These posts should be honorary, and should not be held by recipients of GCPP funding. The appointment of a regional conflict adviser for Russia and the FSU, possibly based in Moscow, might add more coherence to GCPP programmes and help to mobilise and apply the necessary specialist conflict prevention advice that a number of officials believe is lacking

1. BACKGROUND

1. An Evaluation of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) in the case of Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) must depend totally on what one believes the GCPP's purpose to be. The 2000 cross-cutting reviews that led to the creation of the two Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) envisaged that they would cover all direct conflict prevention work where a joint approach would add value. They specifically excluded humanitarian and governance-related conflict prevention work; and they were oriented primarily (but not exclusively) to the 'developing world'. In endorsing these exclusions, the Ministers may have sought to give a clear lead away from structural conflict prevention normally associated with the concept of long-term 'peace-building'. The Department for International Development (DFID) left the bulk of its long-term development programmes with a conflict prevention goal out of the GCPP, and DFID-administered projects in the GCPP are a small share compared with those of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).⁴ Subsequent debates as to what new activities should be eligible for funding from the GCPP have been resolved more in the negative and largely in order to exclude certain military-related activities.

2. To date however, the broad mission statements for the GCPP—both in general and in respect of Russia and FSU—have allowed a permissive environment: officials have found it difficult to agree on the priority that activities of the GCPP should be accorded, either in relation to each other or in relation to other UK policy measures toward Russia and the FSU. This permissiveness and lack of transparent in-country prioritisation according to the conflict dynamics has been amplified by the need to tolerate within the GCPP many costly legacy projects whose link with direct conflict prevention is quite remote.

3. Based on the testimony of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) officials and other stakeholders interviewed for this case study, there have been five main operational perspectives:

- to view the GCPP as a challenge fund: a relatively small pot of money which can be used to fund projects related to conflict prevention but not necessarily of high priority when an outside group approaches HMG for support as long as the project is broadly in line with the agreed conflict prevention strategy for Russia and the FSU;
- to view the GCPP as a strategic organising tool closely linked to the policies of HMG on the big issues of war and peace in Russia and the FSU in which all spending should be highly prioritised according to an agreed strategy document;
- to view the GCPP as a mobilisational tool to promote or stimulate additional efforts at conflict prevention either by local actors or by external actors (either states, such as Russia, or international organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE));
- to view the GCPP as a budget line for assessed contributions to UN and OSCE peacekeeping missions of a military or preventive character;

⁴ In common parlance, direct conflict prevention measures are those intended to have a short to medium term effect on the political choices of actors in a particular conflict. They normally include such things as special diplomatic measures, offers of economic aid (as distinct from its long-term delivery), preventive deployment, or military action.

- to view the GCPP as a budget line for continuing activities previously funded by areas swept under the remit of the GCPP at the time of its establishment, such as the MOD Outreach programme, as long as a link, no matter how tenuous, could be drawn to conflict prevention.

4. Against this background, there are some unique factors to the work of the GCPP in Russia and the FSU that complicate matters for this case study. It is the only 'region' case study in the Evaluation, and as such was required to address comprehensively conflict prevention responses in several countries and on a regional basis.⁵

5. The case study is also unique in the Evaluation because one of the countries covered is Russia—the wealthiest, most powerful and most developed country where GCPP programme activities are undertaken. And the UK has a number of vital strategic, political and economic interests at play which are not present to anywhere near the same extent in other GCPP partner countries as they are in Russia.

6. The case study is further unique because Russia is one of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council of the United Nations. This gives rise to three considerations. First, Russia is the only P5 member in which GCPP activities are undertaken on any scale.⁶ Second, as a P5 member, Russia is a principal partner for the objectives pursued in UK conflict prevention around the world. Russia and the UK must work together in the UN and its agencies, in the European regional organisations (OSCE, Council of Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-Russia Council), and even in cooperative activities in other parts of the world, such as the development of African peacekeeping capabilities, the advancing of G8 conflict prevention initiatives or joint participation in UN-sponsored peace enforcement operations.

7. Third, though of far less operational significance, is the underlying consideration that in some limited circumstances, Russia could be a potential adversary. This was demonstrated on a minor scale during the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 when Russian forces took positions at an airfield to pre-empt NATO doing just that. As long as Russian and UK strategic interests remain quite closely aligned, this sort of consideration is not at issue. But the goals and tactics of UK conflict prevention policies towards a country like Russia are unique because of the requirement to place good relations above many other considerations. The UK needs good relations with Russia in a way that is not so clearly the case with many other GCPP target-countries.

8. Thus, Russia and the FSU as a regional target for the GCPP present it with some of its biggest challenges. Accordingly, in 2001 when the GCPP was established, the UK Government agreed at Ministerial level that Russia and the FSU should be accorded a high priority in GCPP activities.⁷ The 2001 strategy endorsed by Ministers specifically identified the need for the GCPP activity to support the work of international organisations

⁵ There are other regional strategies in the GCPP: a Balkans Strategy and a Middle East and North Africa Strategy. A South Asia Strategy did exist for a time but was broken up into country programmes on the supposition that none of the conflicts were directly linked with the other. A Central and Eastern Europe strategy also existed for a time but is being wound up.

⁶ There are some minor projects in China.

⁷ FCO, DFID, MOD, 'Global Conflict Prevention Fund, "Strategy for Russia & Parts of the FSU"', 15 March 2001

(OSCE, Council of Europe (CoE), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union (EU)) in the region.

9. For FY2001/2 and 2002/3, the geographic scope of the 'Russia and FSU Strategy' in the GCPP management system included 10 countries (Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and Moldova) and did not include the other five former republics of the USSR (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine). These countries were part of the Central and East European (CEE) Strategy. With the prospective membership of the EU for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 2004 and the graduation of three countries in East Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) to NATO membership, the GCPP Steering Committee decided to end the CEE Strategy with effect from 2004. For 2003/4, programmes for Ukraine and Belarus were transferred to the Russia and FSU Strategy. But no new strategy document for the Russia and FSU Strategy has been yet written that takes this change into account.

10. This report is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the benchmarks against which GCPP policies and measures in Russia and the FSU might be measured, and briefly assess the extent to which GCPP approaches appear consistent with these benchmarks. Sections 3 to 6 address the following questions laid out in the Terms of Reference (ToRs):

- effect on targeted conflicts;
- effect on international arrangements and organisations;
- effect on inter-departmental processes;
- do the outputs of the GCPP represent good value for money?

11. Section 7 contains summary comments on relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. Section 8 provides recommendations on whether the Strategy should be continued and how it could be improved. Section 9 provides recommendations on benchmarking, targets and performance indicators. Annex 2 provides some briefing materials on conflicts in Russia and the FSU.

2. BENCHMARKS IN RESPONDING TO THE CONFLICTS

12. Groups such as International Alert (IA) or the International Crisis Group (ICG) regularly publish policy recommendations to donor countries to mobilise them into more effective action in conflict prevention and mitigation in developing countries. Inter-governmental organisations, such as the Council of Europe or OSCE Assembly also publish similar sets of recommendations. Such independently-derived sets of policy proposals can be used in this case study as a base-line for consideration of whether the GCPP has selected an optimum portfolio of activity and whether the components selected are mutually reinforcing to achieve optimum synergy. The purpose of contrasting GCPP policy goals to those recommended outside of government will not necessarily be to suggest that one is necessarily superior to the other, but to identify possible gaps in policy coverage by GCPP.

13. Apart from conflict-specific benchmarks, there is a need to rely on lessons learned from conflict prevention experience in general, especially the way in which measures must be prioritised according to the conflict cycle. Timing in the use of one tool or another can be everything,⁸ and not all tools are available at each stage of the conflict cycle.⁹ Another important reference point here is a recent study undertaken with part UK funding by the International Peace Academy in New York. This study concluded on the basis of a large number of case studies that conflict prevention was least likely to succeed where only a few measure were deployed and where significant causes of conflict were left unaddressed.¹⁰ By contrast, the aim of a comprehensive conflict prevention package is to position the international community with entry points for influence in most of the main leadership groups, institutions and communities at relatively low cost.

14. Whatever one's view of the relative virtue of funding direct conflict prevention to the neglect of long-term peace-building, it is beyond dispute that, as a conflict escalates, more effort (and resources) must be put into direct measures to influence the choices of political leaders away from use of force or deadly violence. Where the total amounts of money available are small, explicit choices must be made whether direct measures would be more cost-effective than indirect, structural ones. This dilemma arose after 9/11 in Georgia (Pankisi Gorge), the northern Caucasus inside Russia and in Central Asia, when there was an increase in military operations of one sort or another against Chechen rebels or armed Islamist groups in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

15. The managers of the GCPP and its spending in Russia and the FSU need to take account not just of in-country priorities from the point of view of the phase of the conflict/s there, but need also to be able to prioritise between conflicts according to the phase of the conflict. One question here is whether there should continue to be high and increasing

⁸ See Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) pp 86–90.

⁹ This is a common theme in the literature. For a useful and brief treatment of it, see Bruce W. Jentleson, 'Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons' in Jentleson (ed), *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997) p 330.

¹⁰ Chandra Lekha Sriram, 'Insights from the Cases: Opportunities and Challenges for Preventive Actors' in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester (eds), *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) pp 355–56.

spending on a conflict that is essentially 'frozen', if other conflicts or potential conflicts with a higher risk of deadly violence are receiving less priority (or none at all). On the knowledge that conflict prevention is complex and costly, and that there has only been some 8 million to 11 million to spend in Russia and the FSU each year of the last two, it is important to evaluate decisions on priorities between countries within the regional Strategy and decisions on priorities within conflicts.

2.1 Chechnya

16. There is a continuing guerrilla war in Chechnya, inside Russia, after two devastating invasions by Russian forces to reverse the region's secession. Since 1999, on top of the 100,000 killed in the first Chechen war (1994–96), between 80,000 and 250,000 Chechens, both combatants and civilians, may have died. UNHCR reports that approximately 350,000 Chechens have been displaced, with 150,000 in the neighbouring Ingushetia inside Russia, and another 30,000 in the rest of Russia. According to the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, nearly half of the territory's pre-war population is now either dead or displaced.¹¹ Russia continues to restrict access to Chechnya by most humanitarian relief organisations and journalists. Those who remain in Chechnya are often subject to atrocities, such as 'disappearances' and extra-judicial execution, not to mention rape and robbery at the hands of the Russian forces. The US Helsinki Commission reported that Chechnya is the site of the 'most egregious violations of international humanitarian law anywhere in the OSCE region'. In September 2003, the US reported to the OSCE that the 'violation of human rights in Chechnya continues to be an issue of the gravest concern' for it.¹²

17. In Annex 3, Table 1 presents a series of recommendations from the OSCE Assembly in 2001 for action to address the violent conflict in Chechnya¹³ (see Column 1).¹⁴ It shows in Column 2 that the UK has been active in advancing the recommendations of the OSCE Assembly, but in Column 4 that the GCPP has not been funding any activities in support of the recommendations, even though the GCPP has funded activities in support of similar recommendations for other conflicts where access is difficult or where political sensitivities for important UK strategic interests are acute (Column 3). The GCPP in fact funds no activities directly related to the conflict in Chechnya, apart from minor contributions to the work of OSCE.

18. Recommendations on conflict prevention in Chechnya from other groups have focused very heavily on the need to bring to account the perpetrators of war crimes. This measure

¹¹ See <http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/background.htm>.

¹² Testimony of Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State, to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 16 September 2003, available http://www.csce.gov/witness.cfm?briefing_id=266&testimony_id=414.

¹³ See Paris Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted during the Tenth Annual Assembly, 10 July 2001, www.osce.org/pa/annual_session/paris/paris_declaration_english.pdf.

¹⁴ The first column in each of these tables contains recommendations for action in support of conflict prevention or management. The second column indicates in terms of a Yes (Y) or No (N) whether the UK Government is pursuing these recommendations through non-CPP mechanisms. The third column indicates in terms of a Yes (Y) or No (N) whether the GCPP is funding activities that might flow from similar recommendations for other conflicts. The fourth column indicates in terms of a Yes (Y) or No (N) whether the GCPP is funding activities that might flow from similar recommendations.

has been regarded as an important direct conflict prevention measure because it is designed to deter either political leaders or military personnel from war crimes. While recognising the need for quiet diplomacy on some aspects of bringing the perpetrators of such crimes to justice, the UK Government has recognised the need in principle for public diplomacy in this direction in other conflicts, such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Sierra Leone. It is largely through vigorous public diplomacy, especially within the target country, on the need for war crimes justice, that the potential perpetrators of such crimes can be influenced (if at all). In 2003, the UK took a strong position at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in support of a resolution on Chechnya that was pressing for accountability for war crimes and demanding access for UN monitors. However the Russia and FSU Strategy of the GCPP has not funded any work in this area by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).¹⁵

2.2 Georgia And Nagorny Karabagh

19. In Annex 3, Table 2 presents a series of recommendations from Cornell Caspian Consulting for action to address the violent conflicts in Georgia and Nagorny Karabagh (Column 1). It shows in Column 2 that the UK is active in advancing the policies a broad suite of policies relevant to conflict prevention and that the GCPP is funding a number of these (Column 4). The table shows that the GCPP is not funding a range of other recommendations for Georgia and Nagorny Karabagh while it has funded activities in support of similar recommendations for other conflicts (Column 3).

20. Another important yardstick by which to judge the appropriate nature of GCPP activities has been the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) prepared for Nagorny Karabagh. The SCA favoured long-term processes of internal change within the two parties to the conflict over short term initiatives under what it called the 'conventional Western approach of bringing people together to analyse the situation and find ways forward'. In the same vein, the SCA advocates addressing the issue of governance and increasing the voice of the people affected through democratisation. According to the SCA, this approach might include:

- deeper and broader support for civil society initiatives; helping them to develop in a democratic manner and including better representation of poor people;
- building up community based organisations especially on livelihood issues;
- develop longer-term strategies to build links between civil society actors going beyond isolated work-shop type events;
- do more to involve organisations from Nagorny Karabagh;
- more effective use of the potential leverage provided by the parties' membership of the Council of Europe (Track One) and their commitments for improved governance in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers jointly developed with the World Bank;
- preparations for the return of refugees in the event of a settlement;
- application of 'best practice' in the implementation of conflict sensitive aid over the long term.

¹⁵ A proposal in 2002 for GCPP funding from the Don Women's Union (a group recognised internationally for its reconciliation work in Chechnya) was rejected with negligible feedback to the group as to why. Source: interviews with officials and representatives of the Don Women's Union.

2.3 Kyrgyzstan

21. In 2001, DFID commissioned a SCA for Kyrgyzstan, which appeared in due course under the title, *Disturbing Connections: Aid and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan* (while commissioned by DFID, this SCA was undertaken by independent consultants). This study concluded with a number of recommendations that can be taken as valid for the GCPP, even though they were set out as a general guide for aid policy before the creation of the GCPP. These recommendations, which are addressed separately to the International Community and International Aid Donors, are set out in Annex 3 (Table 3). The SCA called upon the international community to:

- work collectively to achieve a shift in the balance of strategy from short-term security interests to developing long-term structural stability within the region;
- recognise that the issues of regional security are not just drugs, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism but poor governance and growing inequalities that fuel greed and grievance dynamics;
- recognise that China and India share similar concerns about security in the region and should be included in the development of a strategic responses;
- recognise that support for good governance is essential if emerging 'greed' and 'grievance' dynamics are to be addressed;
- take the initiative perhaps through a conference on the region to develop medium and long-term strategies and consider their relationship to the current short term strategies (market economics and security containment);
- include the international financial institutions (IFIs) in this process and ensure that their strategies reflect the risk of conflict; and
- monitor and jointly analyse events that might constitute triggers for conflict.

22. In addition to the SCA's recommendations, the ICG has presented a series of its own recommendations for action to address the violent conflicts in Central Asia (See Annex 3, Table 4). This table shows in Column 2 that the GCPP is active in advancing none of the policies recommended by ICG (Column 4) while it has funded activities in support of similar recommendations for other conflicts (Column 3). ICG receives funding support from the GCPP for its analysis on Central Asia.

3. EFFECT ON PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONTAINING EXISTING ONES

23. There has been broad consensus within the GCPP policy toward Russia and the FSU on the way in which funded activities constitute effective conflict prevention; and there is a formally agreed 'Strategy' for the region—*Strategy for Russia and Parts of the FSU 2002/3*¹⁶ Considerable effort has been made to identify priorities under this broad strategy through the development of SCAs for countries such as Georgia and Tajikistan, and the conflict in Nagorny Karabagh. But, according to a number of HMG officials interviewed, this SCA process still is not delivering the required focus on the issue of how to set in-country priorities. The limited impact so far of the SCA process can probably be linked closely to the lack of consensus among the three departments involved on how to operationalise the goals of the GCPP most effectively and most efficiently. But it may also arise from the lack of a disciplined and standardised process for writing and publishing SCAs in a format that meets the policy needs it is supposed to address.

24. The departure point for addressing the question of effect of the GCPP activities must be to test the relevance of GCPP-funded activities to conflict prevention in the target conflicts. This section compares in overview fashion GCPP-funded activities in Russia and selected FSU countries with the benchmarks for conflict prevention priorities set out in Section 2 (and Annex 3). It shows that across the board, even in the case of Georgia, there are major gaps in GCPP activity relative to the demands. Where no gap exists, the level of activity undertaken appears, at least prima facie, in more than a few cases too low level or too far removed from the political sphere to be likely to have any direct effect. This is particularly the case with some MOD Outreach activities (see later discussions).

25. The *Strategy for Russia and Parts of the FSU 2002/3* set itself the following goals in summary statement prepared for the 2002/3 spending review:

- Find solutions or compromises to resolve frozen or potential conflicts in Georgia, Nagorny Karabagh (Armenia and Azerbaijan), and Moldova.
- Reduce tensions in Central Asia (especially the Ferghana Valley).
- Deal with the potentially destabilising effect on Central Asia of allied military action in Afghanistan.
- Encourage a responsible Russian foreign policy toward its neighbours, especially in respect of Georgia and Kaliningrad.

26. Funded at about 8 million in 2002/3 and 11 million in 2003/4 (or about 10 per cent of total GCPP programme allocations in both years), the Russia and FSU Strategy sat alongside the Balkans Strategy¹⁷ as the most important strategies in terms of level of funding. But in both financial years, the two regional strategies were overshadowed by GCPP spending on Afghanistan.¹⁸ Given that the regional strategies actually fund activities

¹⁶ Undated document provided by the FCO. The early 2002 strategy has not been amended and remains the overarching strategic plan for the GCPP in Russia and the FSU. It has not been updated yet to reflect the shift of Ukraine and Belarus into the geographic remit of the strategy.

¹⁷ The Balkans strategy was funded at 8.5 million and 11.5 million in the same two financial years.

¹⁸ The Afghanistan Strategy was funded at 18 million and 15 million in the same two financial years.

in a number of countries, the low level of funding that flows to Russia itself (given the narrow focus of the programmes funded) does not suggest that the GCPP does accord Russia a particularly high priority. The GCPP spends more money on Georgia (programmes plus peacekeeping) than on Russia. The programme elements of the Russia and FSU Strategy are managed in London by an inter-departmental steering group chaired by the FCO's Eastern Department. Peacekeeping expenditure in Russia and the FSU is managed by the FCO's United Nations Department (UND) or the department handling OSCE. The reason for this is that the peacekeeping costs are based mostly on decisions within the UN or OSCE where the UK expenditure is assessed as a fixed share of the total cost of the operation. Discretionary peacekeeping costs are usually also associated in some way with a UN or OSCE peacekeeping mission.¹⁹

27. In 2002/3, the GCPP initial allocations funded very few programmes that addressed in any significant way the last three of the four specific goals in the Strategy. For example, in that year's allocations there were no significant GCPP projects specifically addressing the major sources of conflict in the Ferghana Valley, the consequences for Central Asia of military operations in Afghanistan, or the framing of Russian foreign policy.

28. It is of equal note that the bulk of GCPP money allocated to Russia in 2002/3, close to 70 per cent, was spent on the retraining of up to 2,000 retiring military personnel, mostly junior or middle-ranking officers.²⁰ This Russian Resettlement Programme (RRP) undoubtedly serves UK foreign policy interests but its connection to the four high priority conflict prevention goals identified in the 2002/3 Strategy is far from a direct one. The retraining programme would be one of the lowest priority 'conflict prevention' activities that could be pursued in Russia, either in the terms of the GCPP strategic goals or in terms of any externally recommended set of strategic conflict prevention goals involving Russia.

29. It is also worthy of note that until now, the Russia and FSU Strategy has funded no projects inside Russia or Chechnya directly addressing the sources of that conflict—the most violent and the most strategically significant conflict in the region. Leading European institutions, of which the UK is a member, have drawn attention to the urgency of mitigating this conflict. The Russia and FSU Strategy does not even refer to Chechnya.

30. At a superficial level, the purposes for the creation of the GCPP and the establishment of a Russia and FSU Strategy within it appear to be quite well met in Georgia, but far from being met in Russia and Central Asia; and do not appear to be much closer in Armenia and Azerbaijan. As discussed below, there are understandable reasons why the three departments charged with implementing the new conflict prevention agenda have not moved more comprehensively to implement it as effectively as some of the foundation documents might have implied. These reasons hinge around competing priorities, lack of administrative resources, lack of appropriate expertise within government, lack of training, the short length of time that the GCPP has been operating, and the absence of an overarching and agreed concept on what exactly it is that the GCPP is supposed to do. These are to some degree valid arguments. It is clear that a transition is under way and that the evolution is certainly

¹⁹ Important exceptions to this in the GCPP can include costs for peacekeeping in situations where the UN or OSCE are not involved.

²⁰ Annual net reductions in the armed forces have been of the order of 100,000 in some recent years, but the number of retirements is always higher.

heading in the right direction. It must be noted that it is impossible for the Evaluators to offer any substantiated assessment of whether the officials involved could have (or even should have) moved more quickly or more vigorously in the face of competing priorities.

31. At the same time, as mentioned above, officials have routinely attested to continuing confusion about the purposes of the GCPP (challenge fund or strategic policy tool, or both), and note the lack of appropriate yardsticks for decision-making. There is some disgruntlement about the management and administrative pressures involved, especially the disconnect between DFID and MOD officials in serious review of MOD programmes funded by the GCPP in Russia and the FSU. This sort of direct and consistent testimony is enough evidence to suggest that were better management systems in place, there might have been more rapid progress toward implementing the GCPP aims.

32. Of course, the situation could be more complex. One view would be that the problem may lie more with the GCPP idea itself—as an external imposition on previously well-oiled and effective processes operating in support of long-standing core business of the three departments of state involved. There are two reasons why this view should be discounted.

33. The first is that the GCPP idea arose out of increasing recognition by the UK and the international community through the 1990s that business as usual was far from adequate for taking the opportunities presented to prevent large scale deadly conflicts, especially in Rwanda and Bosnia. The second is that the UK has signed up to a range of international instruments and commitments, such as support for implementation of the Brahimi report (2000) or the G8 Miyazaki communique on conflict prevention (2000), that imply a more vigorous effort on its part than that which it was delivering before the GCPP was established. Until all officials involved in the three departments working on the Russia and FSU Strategy start to read off the same page in respect of these international commitments by the UK to enhance its own capacities for direct conflict prevention and coordinate with those of its major international partners, then there will be no opportunity for consensus on how fast and how far any changes from business as usual before 1999 must proceed within the framework of the GCPPs.

34. Gaps or low levels of activity in GCPP coverage can be justified by the consideration that other areas of UK policy or other actors are prominent in those areas where the GCPP is not. But almost without exception for the countries selected, the programming has to date been undertaken with little formalised comprehensive mapping of how the GCPP activities might relate to other UK policies and activities or to what other actors are contributing. The efforts to achieve a comprehensive mapping through the SCA process (in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Nagorny Karabagh, Tajikistan and Moldova) have changed this picture somewhat. But these products, the SCAs, are yet to have a major impact. In some cases, the lack of a comprehensive approach in the SCAs as drafted, undermines their usefulness.²¹ Officials involved have therefore relied on their own experience and knowledge, and wide consultation. This has been effective in many cases. Yet this process has shortcomings that are probably in the long term not as effective as an agreed written strategy that has some buy-in from the local stakeholders.

²¹ The judgement about lack of comprehensiveness of some of the SCAs is based on the template provided in DFID, 'Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes', January 2002.

35. Many activities funded by the GCPP in Russia and the FSU in 2001/2 and 2002/3 did not meet the most basic test of relevance or in-country prioritisation. This test is that for named political leaders most likely to affect the prospects for conflict prevention or management, what change were the GCPP initiatives trying to bring about or promote in their behaviour? By 2003/4, this situation had begun to change noticeably and new projects seemed to address previously forgotten issues. But beyond that, even now, there is little by way of prioritisation in the GCPP activities in Russia and the FSU, either within countries or between countries. This lack of in-country prioritisation arises from having no coherent over-arching strategy that directly and credibly relates most specific programmes to amelioration of the major sources of conflict.

3.1 Russia

36. The Embassy is conducting a complex suite of conflict prevention policies and activities in Russia. The overwhelming share of these activities is not funded by the GCPP and includes normal diplomatic, development cooperation activities and some defence diplomacy activities. Though the GCPP funds most of the defence diplomacy of the UK in Russia under 'baseline elements', the nearly exclusive focus of the GCPP programme elements in Russia (non-baseline) appears to date to have been the Russian Resettlement Programme (RRP) which is discussed later (see Annex 4 for more discussion of baseline elements). There are no peacekeeping activities in Russia funded by the GCPP, though the UK was involved multilaterally through the OSCE's work in the Chechnya coordination office while it operated. The GCPP funds, through the MOD Outreach programme, a small number of activities that support broader UK interests in stable security relations with Russia.

37. An officer in the UK Embassy in Moscow described Chechnya as the most troubling deadly conflict in Europe. But, as a senior official noted in a subsequent discussion, there may not be the sort of opportunity for GCPP work on Chechnya of the sort conducted elsewhere. He noted that the Embassy does test out from time to time interest among Russian officials in learning from the UK's experiences in civil conflict. He observed, as many commentators have, that it may take a long time for the Russian government to face up to facts in Chechnya and accept advice from outside. There is reason for some hope on this front, he observed, given attitudes at certain levels of the Russian government and the work in the UN peacekeeping school outside Moscow. But the fairly regular resurgences of more nationalistic positions in both the domestic and foreign policies of Russia may however make Moscow less susceptible to persuasion in this regard. Especially worrying is the rhetoric inside some circles inside Russian society that regularly promotes genocide as a possible solution to Russia's problems in Chechnya.

38. Yet the GCPP currently funds no activities directly relating to mitigating the Chechnya war or even to maintaining dialogue with several key actors in the conflict. It is of some concern that the MOD maintains little active contact on the Chechnya issue with those parts of the Russian federal agency that has a large share of responsibility for the fighting in Chechnya, the Ministry of Interior. This Ministry has its own military units operating in Chechnya and surrounding areas (the UK Defence Attache Office works only with the branches of the armed forces of Russia that correspond to the UK armed forces, such as

the navy, army and air force and with the Ministry of Defence. The Embassy does have continuing contact with the Ministry of Interior, but mainly on issues of transnational crime. It should be noted as well that the authors of this study did not have access to classified information that might relate to any contacts on Chechnya as may exist between UK agencies and the Russian security and intelligence agencies that are most closely involved in Chechnya).

39. There are good reasons why the UK needs to subsume its approach to the war in Chechnya in a carefully constructed and sensitively delivered diplomatic strategy quite independent of the GCPP. The project-oriented appearance of parts of the GCPP and its more public face may in many ways be ineffective or even counter-productive for UK efforts to influence Russian approaches to Chechnya. And Russia is resistant to any foreign involvement inside Chechnya. Moreover, the UK is party through several international or intergovernmental organisations, such as OSCE, the EU or Council of Europe, to important initiatives on Chechnya. Nevertheless, as long as there is a Russia component in the GCPP, there may be some virtue in a more deliberate and more visible articulation of the UK responses to Chechnya in the context of the Russia and FSU Strategy under the GCPP. It would also be useful as part of the UK's public diplomacy to demonstrate some consideration of the value of a variety of possible projects for Chechnya under the GCPP.

40. The GCPP's rejection (with relatively little explanation) of a proposal from the Don Women's Union for a Chechnya-related project may have been a missed opportunity. The reason cited to us by an embassy official, whose direct knowledge of it was not strong, that 'Russia is not a high priority for the GCPP' may be worthy of re-examination on a number of levels. While the particular proposal might have been deficient in a number of ways, it does not appear to have benefited from the same high level of engagement from UK officials in post that has been evident in many other GCPP projects.

41. The GCPP currently has a proposal before it from the Eurasia Foundation that does relate to Chechnya, and this proposal has benefited from embassy support. However, in the absence of an articulated GCPP approach to Chechnya in the Russia and FSU Strategy, it is difficult to see on what basis a judgement might be made about its suitability for funding. The Eurasia Foundation noted that it was important for the GCPP processes to be transparent, predictable and well-known in public. One member commented on the 'philanthropic' appearance of the fund. And in fact, there appear to be divergences of opinion about whether the GCPP is merely a fund for ad hoc projects or whether it has a much more ambitious scope that implies more visible and longer term strategic direction. Moreover, the proposal addresses issues other than the high politics of the war.

42. A number of GCPP activities not nominated as Chechnya-related do have some important impact. These include support for OSCE monitors on the Georgian side of the border, support for MOD Outreach activities in Georgia that help provide influence on the issue of arms transfers from Georgia to Chechnya or other neighbouring Russian territories, and a research project funded by the Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy of the GCPP on that subject in the Caucasus.²²

²² See Anna Matveeva and Duncan Hiscock (eds), *The Caucasus: Armed and Divided* (London: Safer World, April 2003).

43. In Russia, in 2003/4, the defence diplomacy projects identified for likely funding²³ under the GCPP Strategy included:

- A one-week course for 10–12 UK interpreters in Russian (20,500 total).
- Two places at the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) and associated English training (117,400).
- One place Advanced Command and Staff Course: Army module (69,000).
- Three places on one month international disaster management course at RCMS (31,600).
- Two cadets from Russian Naval Academy to attend Britannia Royal Naval College for seven months (17,700).
- Visit by Russian naval officers to Maritime Warfare Centre (26,200).
- 12 RN officers at Russia/UK/US talks 2003 for one week (45,900).
- Bilateral staff talks to complete Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on submarine rescue (3,600).
- Peace Support Briefing Programme for five Russian Army peacekeeping instructors (22,000).
- Visit by four Russian Army Officers to view Sandhurst officer training (4,600).
- Visit to UK by Commander Russian Naval Infantry to explore possibilities for future joint or multilateral operations (6,100).
- UK lecture at Russian course on Law of Armed Conflict (3,500).
- Seminar in Moscow on armed forces financial planning (15,400).
- Visit to Kaliningrad by Royal Engineers to advise on mine clearance and disposal of unexploded ordnance (22,200).

44. The programme also included a number of multilateral events which related to Russia along with other countries of the FSU and or Eastern Europe:

- A share of operating costs, including staff capiton costs, for the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) at Vyskov in the Czech Republic apportioned according weight of course places/teams deployed to each country (up to £439,600).
- Multilateral seminars, on such topics as international humanitarian law, European security, Black Sea security, military recruitment, personnel management, NCO training, Peace Support Operation (PSO) doctrine, and military justice systems (up to £98,700).

²³ These projects and the funding levels indicated represent a possible programme. The events selected have been chosen as priority activities, but the level of funding is indicative only.

- Sharing the set-up costs of the Junior Staff Officers' Course for candidates from the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU. Of a total cost of £536,600, the FSU Strategy was identified as potentially contributing 33 per cent (up to £178,880).
- English Language Training (up to £268,600).

45. There are few MOD activities funded under the GCPP in Russia that have a direct bearing on the conflict in Chechnya. One notable exception, though quite low level, is the UK lecture at a Russian course on the Law of Armed Conflict. The inherent conservatism of key Russian institutions and their resistance to change was a serious obstacle to any discussion with outsiders of any big political-military issues, and this is especially true of questions related to Chechnya. According to several officials, the embassy was finding enough difficulties in merely getting alongside the Russian defence establishment, let alone influencing it. It is fairly easy to conclude that the demands of developing strong relationships with Russia extend well beyond the demonstrated capacities of GCPP trilateral processes (and the relative seniority of the officials normally involved in managing the Russia and FSU Strategy). The GCPP process makes no distinction in the structures for managing the UK's defence relations with a small country, like Georgia, and those with a country like Russia.

46. Nevertheless, the divergences between Russia and the UK in defence relations have occurred in areas that might have benefited from a more joined up approach if the GCPP was really exploited to its full potential. One official noted that Russia was seeking further UK cooperation on peacekeeping, especially in Afghanistan, and that this might be exploited as long as the UK was able to advance its views of best practice appropriate to the circumstances.

47. Track Two diplomacy between Russia and the UK, either exclusively bilateral, or on a multilateral basis, may be an area that could be examined by the GCPP as an area for early significant development. Track Two diplomacy was originally conceived as 'an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict'.²⁴ But this process also serves to smooth out differences between the foreign policy elites of countries that are not as close in their security relations as they may want to be, or as close as well-informed constituencies on the countries concerned are advocating. What this means in practice, is that the security relationship between Russia and the UK could be more vigorously supported outside the framework of defence diplomacy through GCPP mechanisms. The seeds of further development already exist in the GCPP, in such GCPP activities as multilateral seminars on European security, in which Russian and UK representatives participate. Russia is heavily integrated into Asia-Pacific Track Two Processes, and is involved in some US Track Two initiatives for Europe, but the GCPP does not have a profile in this area in Russia.

²⁴ 'Integrating Track One and Track Two Approaches to International Conflict Resolution: What's Working? What's Not? How Can We Do Better?', Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Ambassador Donald K. Steinberg, Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning; Mr. Alan Lang, Chairman of the Open Forum; and Conference Members, Remarks to the Open Forum, Washington DC, 23 September 2002. See <http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/14387.htm>.

48. Typical Track Two activities include high-level seminars and study groups led by academics or other specialists, including retired ambassadors or retired senior military officers, but including serving senior officials of the target countries, and addressing the more contentious security issues. These might include differences in approach to training on the humanitarian laws of war or great power politics towards Islamist resurgence. Track Two initiatives are important in their own right to underpin and promote cooperative tendencies in the security relations between states, but they are even more important where the two states have difficulty in establishing deep relations at a formal level. Whether the UK pursued more Track Two projects with Russian counterparts should probably depend on a mapping of what is happening in this domain between Russia and key European organisations (EU and NATO).

49. *Russian Resettlement Programme (RRP)*: this programme, which was first devised in 1992 and commenced in substance in 1995, is designed to provide retraining opportunities for retiring military officers in order to reduce the levels of disgruntlement in the Russia armed forces and thereby reduce tension in relations between the Russian MOD and the civilian political leadership. The programme was highly evaluated by its beneficiaries and by the UK embassy. The Ambassador noted that the RRP is squarely in UK interests regardless of the GCPP. This is almost certainly the case. The programme has high visibility among Russian officers and represents light at the end of the tunnel for them in an otherwise bleak situation. The ability of the project team, principally Squadron Leader, Max Jardim, to achieve the results they have in difficult circumstances is laudable.

50. At the same time, there are a number of observations that can be made about this project from the perspective of the Evaluation of the GCPP. The programme would benefit from some engagement with DFID and the FCO in its subsequent development, given the need articulated by the Ambassador for the programme eventually to graduate into an exclusively Russian-funded one. It is also of some note that of the 20 or so beneficiaries interviewed in two groups, none saw the programme as impacting on the prospects for a confrontation between the armed forces and the civilian leadership of Russia, even though this remained one of its justifications in HMG working documents. The view of the programme among beneficiaries was judged much more in other terms, principally social and economic benefits of an individual kind.

51. That said, the RRP does give the UK some credits in terms of relations with senior Russian officials, and President Putin has commented positively on it. The participation in it of even a handful of relatively senior retiring military officers has important flow-on effects for the conduct of UK security relations with Russia. It may be important in the future to build on this more consciously, and to link up some of the more senior beneficiaries of the RRP to a deliberately articulated Track Two strategy.

3.2 Georgia

52. HMG is conducting a fairly comprehensive suite of conflict prevention policies and activities that appear to be reasonably effective in terms of immediate outputs. The main focus of the GCPP programme elements (as opposed to defence diplomacy or peacekeeping funded by the GCPP) appears to be related to conflict resolution. Table 1

lists the programme elements for Georgia for FY 2002/3 and FY 2003/4. The yearly spend is recorded by allocation, not by the timing of the actual outlay. The reference to a department of state in the second column indicates the department formally assigned management responsibility, though in some cases, other departments have been involved. This set of policies and activities was highly praised by most interlocutors. The high evaluation by local interlocutors of the overall UK effort does appear to be justified on the basis that for the most part the inputs, processes and immediate outputs are appropriate to best practice for conflict prevention. These activities include both those funded by the GCPP and those not funded by the GCPP (through normal diplomacy, military relations and development cooperation).

Table 1: GCPP Programme Elements Exclusively for Georgia

		2002/3	2003/4
		£	£
Georgia: Strategic Conflict Assessment and Peace-building	DFID	45,000	0
Georgia: Conflict Transformation & Peace-building in Georgia/Abkhazia (CR)	FCO	576,000	0
Georgia: Transforming the Conflict in Abkhazia (IA)	FCO	394,323	0
Georgia: NATO Georgia Trust Fund	FCO		71,500
Georgia: UK Special Representative	FCO		100,000
Georgia: OSCE HCNM Javakheti Programme	FCO		250,000

53. One GCPP project, the funding of the UK Special Representative, Sir Brian Fall, was not expensive but was judged by most interlocutors to be one of the most important UK contributions to conflict resolution. This project is one of the few GCPP projects operating in the high level political sphere. It overcomes the limitations on diplomats accredited to one country in that it provides for high-level contact by one senior retired UK diplomat with the several governments, particularly Russia, and non-government groups considered to be parties to the conflicts. The project is one of several example of how GCPP projects in Georgia conform to best practice at the input stage. Outputs of this initiative have been highly praised by Georgian government ministers, NGOs and academic specialists.

54. The GCPP-funded activities of the international NGO, Conciliation Resources, also routinely received high praise. Conciliation Resources was known to almost all interlocutors, while the other International NGOs (INGOs) (such as IA and LINKS) had a lower profile. Notwithstanding high praise for the work of Conciliation Resources, a number of observers in Georgia made a plea for some of their activities to be refocused and complemented by activities judged to be likely to achieve a more telling impact than the seminars, meetings and other reconciliation style activities.

55. In Georgia, of 46 activities listed as possible MOD Outreach activities, some 17 were identified for possible funding in 2003/4. These included:

- provision of civilian defence advisor to Georgian MOD to advise on budget management (150,000);
- military advice and training assistance to Georgian Interior Ministry in support of Counter-insurgency operations in Pankisi Gorge (130,000);

- funding support for the International Security Advisory Board (75,000);
- two-week place for Georgian military academy instructor on NATO Junior Staff Officers Course (200);
- travel costs for Georgian students' travel to BMATT courses and for DPA during course (14,200);
- travels costs for two Georgian students to attend Baltic Defence College (4,000);
- one place on a two week course for International Intelligence Directors' course (7,100);
- visit by Georgian chaplaincy staff to UK (3,500).

56. The activities of the International Security Advisory Board would appear to be able to provide an important channel for influence on the Georgian government in selected areas of military policy. This sort of contact, involving a senior UK military officer, is normally a high priority activity in conflict prevention work. But on the basis of the small amount of information made available to the authors on this subject, it is difficult to make much more comment. The funding for a visit by chaplaincy staff is not without potential for some impact, but it is less than certain that the visit was either conceived or is likely to be followed up for any conflict prevention impact beyond low level exchange.

57. The GCPP-funded peacekeeping activities in Georgia have been conducted by the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and OSCE. About 2.2 million was directed through assessed contributions to UNOMIG and OSCE, with most going to UNOMIG; and just under 1 million was provided as discretionary funding. This discretionary funding in Georgia is in direct support of the activities funded through the assessed contributions, rather than any new activities. Both UNOMIG and OSCE maintain well-staffed offices in Georgia, and these along with other international agencies, such as UNHCR and UNDP, provide a rich resource for regular analysis and assessment in support of conflict prevention initiatives.

58. The GCPP-funded peacekeeping activities in Georgia, both through the UN and OSCE, are regarded highly by the Georgian government but some interlocutors noted dangers in allowing the continuation of a situation in Abkhazia where the Russian forces were simultaneously the main element of the peacekeeping force but widely regarded as a party to the conflict.

59. While the GCPP-funded activities supported a wide-range of conflict prevention tools and were directed toward a wide audience, there were some important gaps. In particular, several interlocutors noted that key parties to the Georgian conflict, the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and former combatants, were not consistently or effectively targeted by existing GCPP-funded NGO projects. A number of interlocutors identified the IDP community as the main domestic political force keeping alive the idea of use of force by Georgia to retake Abkhazia. This gap is one that an internal review commissioned by Conciliation Resources had also identified.

3.3 Nagorny Karabagh

60. The range of activities funded by the GCPP in respect of the Nagorny Karabagh conflict is much smaller and the two UK embassies affected (Baku and Erevan) have been much less prominent in supporting conflict resolution and reduction. The potential for UK involvement is complicated by difficulty of access to the disputed territory. The currently unforgiving attitude of the government of Azerbaijan threatens sanctions against any UK diplomat who visits the enclave. The staff of the Yerevan embassy are anyway so few in number and carry such a heavy load that they would find it hard to find the time to travel to this extremely remote area even if these sanctions did not exist. NGO representatives also face penalties unless visits are cleared with Baku. Given the present atmosphere clearance is unlikely to be given.

61. The restrictions over visiting Nagorny Karabagh have meant that much of the conflict prevention activity, even of international organisations, is administered from Tbilisi. The UK Defence Attaché (DA) to the South Caucasus is based there, as is the representative of the OSCE chairman in office, the Eurasia Foundation, and others. The role of the UK Special Representative for Georgia, Sir Brian Fall, was extended to cover the other two countries Southern Caucasus. This remains one of the GCPP's most prominent and the only high-level political initiative in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

62. The headquartering of regional Southern Caucasus projects in Tbilisi has the advantage of maintaining some equidistance from the two protagonists in the Nagorny Karabagh dispute, Armenia and Azerbaijan. And this consideration, along with others, has led to the development of some projects for addressing this conflict under a regional rubric rather than one exclusively devoted to Nagorny Karabagh. In the initial allocations for 2003/4, there were only three GCPP projects funded out of initial allocations for Armenia and Azerbaijan. These were the UK Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus and a media development project under the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), a London-based NGO with excellent reach into the conflict zones it covers through development support to local journalists.

63. In 2003/4, the GCPP addressed the Nagorny Karabagh conflict with a large new grant of £2 million over three years to an NGO consortium (IA, Conciliation Resources, Catholic Relief Services and LINKS) to build on their earlier, separate work on conflict reduction in the region. This project is named the Project for Underpinning the Nagorny Karabagh Conflict Resolution Process, but known by the short name Consortium Initiative. A lengthy period of gestation culminated in September 2003 in the award of a contract to the consortium of four NGOs to work out a coordinated programme of activity aimed at overcoming the numerous obstacles in the path of achieving a peaceful settlement. This consortium's first task has been to draw up an inception report by December 2003. So far neither Conciliation Resources nor IA have finalised their proposals for work to be financed out of this project's budget, although in the case of the latter, it seems likely that an attempt will be made to build on what has been achieved up to now in encouraging regional contacts in the private sector as well as in sensitising actors in commerce and investment to the implications their projects might have for the conflict.

64. Another project funded for one year in 2002/3 was a Southern Caucasus Economy and Conflict Project aiming to use the private sector to bring the two sides together. This is run by IA and funded to the tune of £232,994. In Armenia, two groups have been recruited to undertake research into how the mechanisms which might facilitate greater contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani traders. One project organized by Artush Mkrtchian, dates back to before the GCPP was set up. Mkrtchian approached the then British ambassador with his proposal for meetings of local mayors from all three countries and succeeded in persuading him to support it. This is the only project in Armenia which originated in this way. Since then it has been taken on by IA. The project is planned to involve not only Armenia and Azerbaijan but also Georgia and Turkey. Indeed, Mrs Aragvi Karakhanian, one of IA's actors, admitted that they were concentrating far more on that country than on the Azeris.

65. GCPP has also supported the South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative, organized by the NGO, Links, and financed for the year 2002/3 to the tune of £59,000. This project brings together parliamentarians from Armenia and Azerbaijan in the hope that by talking together they will shed their 'demonisation' attitudes and maybe eventually come up with constructive proposals for a peace settlement which they will then champion in their respective parliaments. This project has had a bumpy ride. At the latest Tbilisi meeting, the Azeris walked out amid recriminations from both sides. There is also evidence that Azeri delegations, on their return to Baku, have concealed their participation in such meetings. Despite these set-backs, LINKS (the organiser) has succeeded in keeping the show on the road and a further meeting is planned in Scotland this winter. Senior UK officials stressed the importance of varying the list of invitees to each of these conferences, and LINKS is fully seized of this need.

66. The Public Policy Institute (PPI) initiative is run by the Eurasia Foundation in conjunction with Soros and SIDA in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The aim of this project is to build up a private sector source of expertise and advice (a 'think tank') to which the government can turn in policy formation. This activity appears to be still in the early stages. Two preparatory seminars have been held for participants from all three countries, and projects have been launched in both Armenia and Azerbaijan for the harmonization of information technology and media legislation, and of academic qualifications (the Lisbon convention). In theory these projects have mirror image opposite numbers in Baku—where the Baku press association and a group called Yeni Nesil are meant to be involved. However, with the current resentful and suspicious atmosphere in Baku, media work there has more or less ground to a halt, indeed the Eurasia representative there went so far as to say that conflict prevention work in Azerbaijan was now a non-starter. So far little progress seems to have been achieved on the actual establishment of the PPIs. The whole programme is managed from Eurasia's Tbilisi office. As things now stand, GCPP funding for this South Caucasus Cooperation Programme (SCCP—sometimes known as the Synergy project) is channelled through Eurasia's US HQ. This may be desirable for practical reasons but does mean that few of those involved in the field are aware of the UK contribution. Boris Navarsadian of the Yerevan press club had no idea that any of the money they were receiving for activity on media legislation and sociological research came from the GCPP. The Eurasia official paper on the SCCP mentions a host of financial backers but not the GCPP.

67. In contrast to all this activity in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the GCPP effort in Nagorny Karabagh itself is not impressive. Reference has already been made above to the reasons for this. This is not to say that nothing is being done there. The Nagorny Karabagh Helsinki Citizens' Association is active on various fronts, with the support of the Dutch Yellow Tulip Organisation and the Inter-Church Peace Council and, modestly, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Some of their projects like 'peace houses', 'temples of reconciliation' and 'common villages' sound somewhat over-idealistic and their efforts at reconciliation have not always been well received. The rehabilitation of the Shusha mosque for example had been deliberately misinterpreted by both sides. Nor have efforts for the tracing of MiAs and PoWs born much fruit. The IWPR has received GCPP funding within the 2003/4 budget for local production in Armenia and Azerbaijan of the newspaper Panorama, which has until now been published in Georgia and Abkhazia trying to address 'demonising' attitudes towards the perceived enemy.

68. The MOD Outreach activities, funded from the 'baseline', were not large scale. In Armenia, five activities not covered by multilateral reporting headlines for the FSU (see above) were identified for funding with a total possible spend up to 22,600:

- Three places on a four-day France/UK/Georgia seminar.
- Places on a two-week defence export course.
- Travel costs for Armenian students to BMATT course.
- Place on Intelligence Directors' course.
- Visit to UK by Armenian chaplaincy staff (combined with Georgian representatives).

69. In Azerbaijan, four activities not covered by multilateral reporting headlines (see below) were identified for funding with a total possible spend up to 19,100:

- Three places on a four-day France/UK/Georgia seminar.
- Places on a two-week defence export course.
- Travel costs for Azerbaijan students to BMATT course.
- Place on Intelligence Directors' course.

70. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, assessed and discretionary peacekeeping costs in 2002/3 were as follows:

	Assessed £ million	Discretionary £ million
Nagorny Karabagh—OSCE	0.150	0.550
Azerbaijan—OSCE	0.047	0.055
Armenia—OSCE	0.036	0.055
Sub-Totals	0.233	0.660

3.4 Kyrgyzstan

71. In Kyrgyzstan, as discussed below, the main projects identified as such have not had much positive impact, if any, on the conflict dynamics. They have either been poorly conceived, poorly targeted or simply irrelevant to the main conflict dynamics. By contrast, GCPP support for two leading international NGOs (IWPR AND ICG), each reaching into the local and international communities in different ways, is almost certainly having a positive impact. (see discussion below.) This funding deploys human resources to conflict prevention in a way that promotes mobilisation of wider resources, especially ones based in the affected communities, to the task of preventing conflict.

72. The management of GCPP projects in Kyrgyzstan is complicated by the fact that the UK has no embassy in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. In addition to the modest programme in Kazakhstan, FCO supervision of GCPP projects in Kyrgyzstan has therefore to be mediated through the embassy in Almaty. Supervision is further complicated by the fact that the focus of conflict is located in the relatively distant South of the Kyrgyz Republic in the provinces of Osh and Jalalabad, in the Ferghana Valley. DFID maintains project management staff in both Almaty and Bishkek, but their responsibilities do not include GCPP-funded projects. FCO supervision, such as it is, has to be exercised on a visiting basis from the embassy in the former Kazakh capital, Almaty. The FCO is under pressure from the Kazakh authorities to move the embassy to the new capital Astaneh some six hundred miles to the North-West of Almaty. At present, it is hesitantly predicted that it will move in 2006, but an earlier date is possible. With the embassy in Astaneh, if GCPP work is still continuing in the region, management from such a distance will not be practicable. The obvious course will then be to open an embassy in Bishkek, but financial restraints may require a more modest arrangement. There have not, luckily, been any serious conflicts in Kazakhstan itself, although there are tensions in the South of the country, while the government's record with regard to human rights and good governance leaves much to be desired and is getting worse. The few GCPP projects that are under way in Kazakhstan can probably be managed from Astaneh, although the sheer size of Kazakhstan, a country as big as Western Europe presents practical difficulties of access wherever the management base is located. The GCPP manager in Almaty for example recently visited the Southern city of Chimkent, which is the main focus of Islamic activity in Kazakhstan. His obligations to visit other parts of the country mean that he is unlikely to return there for another year.

73. There have been five GCPP projects or sets of activities in Kyrgyzstan, one with a pronounced regional focus:

- OSCE Police Adviser Project,
- Training on Management of Inter-Ethnic Relations.
- MOD Outreach activities.
- Boundary Delimitation Workshops—Central Asia.
- International Watercourse Law.

74. The goal of the OSCE Police Adviser Project is to make territorial policing more effective and efficient by raising the knowledge, skills, and capabilities of law enforcement personnel both operational and under training at the police academy, to enlarge the external network of professional contacts as a source of continuing influence and expertise, and to develop a police code of ethics. The first phase has been funded by Norway. The GCPP has agreed to fund Phase II, and has allocated £125,000 for this project. The implementing agency is the OSCE working through the Police Adviser in Vienna, Richard Monk. This project has proved controversial. Somehow its details were leaked to the Kyrgyz opposition press who fastened on Article 6 in the Memorandum of Understanding, which provides for training the police in riot control and providing them with riot control equipment such as rubber and plastic bullets. Against the background of the Aksy riots and marches involving the democratic opposition to the repressive polices of the Kyrgyz government, the GCPP project was seen in the South of the country (where the police are almost universally regarded as the corrupt tools of a repressive Northern dominated regime) as a project directed against them. A small demonstration in front of the OSCE HQ in Bishkek was followed by a Kurultai (assembly) of opposition parties which demanded the recall of OSCE chief in Bishkek Mr Aydin Idil. Neither the British Embassy nor the OSCE offices in Bishkek or Osh were consulted in advance as to the political implications of this project. Despite these problems the project is going ahead and will be managed entirely from Vienna, using the OSCE office in Bishkek.

75. The goal of the project for Training on Management of Inter-Ethnic Relations is to aid in the reduction in inter-ethnic related tensions that are exacerbated by lack of understanding in the Executive and by under-representation of minorities within government structures. The project was to provide 18 seminars on inter-ethnic conflict training to raise awareness of inter-ethnic issues and appropriate management issues involving minorities. A range of professionals was targeted for these training sessions (five sessions for secondary and tertiary educators, two for journalists, two for customs officers, two for police officers and two for border guards). The majority of the seminars were hosted in Southern Kyrgyzstan, where inter-ethnic relations are most complex. The Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities is the implementing agency for this project, and the GCPP allocated £69,028 for it in 2002/3. According to the regional OSCE office in Osh, the training stage of this project is now over and it is now known both there and in the Bishkek office as the 'monitoring project' since its function has moved on to the gathering of information on local ethnic issues in the South of the country. Those trained were mainly journalists, but even with their experience, many of them proved either incapable or at best inadequate when it came to writing dispassionate reports about the ethnic situation in the South of the country. Their current role is to send their reports to the OSCE office of National Minorities in The Hague, which processes the reports before sending them on to the Kyrgyz government in Bishkek. In this way, the 'writers' could be regarded as agents of the unpopular government in the North. Indeed some are fearful of their role becoming widely known in their localities. This project is run by Rolf Ikeus in The Hague using a single locally-engaged man in the Osh OSCE office. Neither the OSCE office in Bishkek nor the British embassy in Almaty is kept informed on the progress of the project. The Osh office is quite unaware that this is a UK-financed project. As a Programme 2 project this too must be regarded as potentially controversial.

76. Under MOD's Outreach Programme, a comprehensive programme of GCPP-financed security sector reform (SSR) activities is managed by the DA's office in the Almaty embassy. In any year they have a whole range of projects, the funds for most of which come out of the GCPP. These include the usual portfolio of seminars on peace-support operations, international law, and defence diplomacy, as well as courses in military English both in Kazakhstan and the UK. There is considerable demand for this training and the DA has asked for an additional officer to help carry the load. The FCO side of the embassy is not involved at all in the management of these programmes, which are exclusively the concern of the DA's office. Her Majesty's Ambassador (HMA) could see no sign of GCPP inter-departmental cooperation here. The bulk of these SSR projects are simply continuations of out-reach programmes dating back to the pre-GCPP period. It is also interesting that the MOD is permitted to include in their project budgeting the cost of personnel, which is not allowed to the FCO or DFID projects.

77. In Kyrgyzstan, 10 activities not covered by multilateral reporting headlines (see below) were identified for funding with a total possible spend up to 172,200:

- Travel costs for Kyrgyzstan students to BMATT course.
- Attendance at Royal Military Academy (RMA) Sandhurst.
- Two places for Kyrgyzstan mine clearance instructors.
- Medical training for trainers in support of counter-terrorist operations.
- Reserve place on Intelligence Directors' course.
- Royal Marines training in border security.

78. The purpose of the project on boundary delimitation workshops is to host a series of workshops regarding border delimitation for participants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Moldova. The workshops were organized by Durham University's International Boundaries Research Unit, and workshop topics included 'Maritime Boundary Delimitation' and 'Demarcation and Maintenance of International Borders'. The goal of the project is to equip officials involved with boarder negotiations with an understanding of international law as it relates to border delimitation, which will enable actors to negotiate more effectively and in line with international norms. The GCPP allocated £19,760 for this project in 2002/3. Although this is a GCPP project and therefore theoretically under FCO supervision, the embassy in Almaty is not involved with its management nor is it kept informed on its progress.

79. The project on international watercourse law has now been completed. The main objective was to train key Kyrgyz Government officials in this field. The aim was to lessen the potential for conflict in Central Asia on water management issues. According to an FCO report, Kyrgyzstan has started to implement laws to charge downstream neighbouring countries for water use. As a result, such actions have created tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan. Although tensions are currently low, the potential exists for tensions to flare up, especially in years of drought. The GCPP allocated £150,000 for this project in 2002/3. Looking back at this project, observers (the Kyrgyz MFA, the Kyrgyz Department for Water Management, and the British Embassy) agreed that it had been

very well run. On the other hand, the same observers expressed doubts as to its effect. True, responsible Kyrgyz officials were better informed about the law than they had been. However, their newly found skills were likely to prompt the downstream states to arrange similar training for their own officials. Indeed, there were already proposals for similar courses to be arranged for the Uzbeks and Kazakhs. In short, this course was perceived as having raised expectations and improved skills but without changing the basically antagonistic attitudes of all the states involved. For this reason it could be described as counter-productive. HMA went so far as to point out that the £150,000 spent on this project of doubtful value would have been more than enough to finance the opening of an embassy in Bishkek.

80. Under the rubric of 'Confidence-building and Conflict Information', the GCPP allocated £200,000 to regional activities in 2002/3 to supporting the work of the IWPR in Bishkek (headed by the formidable ex-minister and former head of the Open Society Institute (OSI) Chinara Jakypova), and £100,000 to support the work of the ICG in Central Asia. These operations publish regular coverage of social, political and other developments in Kyrgyzstan or elsewhere in the region. Funding for the IWPR project is due to finish by the end of this calendar year.

81. In Kyrgyzstan, assessed and discretionary peacekeeping costs in 2002/3 were as follows:

	Assessed £ million	Discretionary £ million
Kyrgyzstan—OSCE	0.055	0.055
Uzbekistan—OSCE	0.045	0.055
Tajikistan—OSCE	0.135	—
Sub-totals	0.235	0.110

82. The minimal positive impact on the conflict dynamics of many of these activities (funding for IWPR and ICG excepted) has almost certainly been overshadowed since September 2001 by the sharp tilt of Western governments and the UK toward close relations with the Kyrgyz government in order to secure high levels of cooperation in support of military operations in the region. The main reason for this is that the Kyrgyz government is itself a major source of confrontation in the society.

4. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

4.1 Russia

83. In Russia, the main positive effect of GCPP activities on international arrangements has been the fostering of Europe-wide, common approaches to security problems, especially through a range of multilateral military activities. There has also been some support for enhancing Russian observance of humanitarian law and Russian participation in UN peacekeeping. On the negative side of the ledger, the lack of GCPP (and UK) attention in public to the grave breaches of international law in Chechnya and the relative neglect of the humanitarian crisis almost certainly undermine much if not all of any positive gains to international order from the limited amount of other GCPP activities in Russia.

4.2 Georgia

84. Almost all interlocutors attested to extremely poor coordination among international donors on the ground in Georgia, though there were important exceptions to this and the UK embassy in Georgia was routinely praised as being a leader in consultation with counterparts. There is an international coordination group that has been set up in advance of parliamentary elections in Georgia, and the OSCE office is playing a good coordinating role in respect of South Ossetia. But the GCPP has almost no relationship with the coordinating activities of these groups. The appointment of a UK Special Representative for Georgia, funded by the GCPP, is almost certainly having a very strong positive effect on coordination of external actors interested in conflict resolution in Georgia. The EU, arguably one organisation with good potential leverage over Russian policy in Georgia, is widely judged by observers in Georgia to be engaged elsewhere.

4.3 Nagorny Karabagh

85. As far as Nagorny Karabagh is concerned, the international organisation most involved in searching for a settlement is the OSCE. Aside from the Track One activities of the Minsk Group described above, there is a representative, Andrzej Kasprzyk, permanently based in the Southern Caucasus, whose role is to keep the chairman-in-office informed of the situation. Although he takes care not to retain a residence in Nagorny Karabagh, he does travel there, and Kasprzyk has to keep a low profile on his visits to Baku. Even his title expressly omits any reference to Nagorny Karabagh. He is there because of the 'conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk conference'. As for UK support, the country is not represented on the high level planning group, nor did Kasprzyk know of any plans for the UK to take part in any peace-keeping operations if it should come to that. He has little or no contact with UK missions in the South Caucasus. However, the UK had financed the post of field assistant for him which had proved invaluable. As long as the negotiations between Aliiev and Kocharian were continuing, he had had some success with confidence building measures (CBMs) like water-sharing arrangements, but since the collapse of the talks these were all stalled.

86. In neither Baku nor Erevan is there significant cooperation between UK missions and their EU colleagues. HMA Erevan found them inefficient and uninterested. HMA Baku

felt the lack of common ground with his French and US colleagues whose countries were co-chairs of the Minsk Group and who are not always inclined to share information with him. Such exchanges as he is able to contrive depend on the level of personal rapport he can establish, and varies from individual to individual.

4.4 Kyrgyzstan

87. In Almaty, although EU missions involved in conflict prevention work meet regularly, there does not appear to be much active cooperation with other missions in the proposing and management of GCPP or related CP projects. The only example of such cooperation is in joint monitoring of local elections. The Germans have in the past proposed cooperation in Kyrgyzstan, but this idea foundered on the absence of a British embassy there and the departure of the German diplomat who made the proposal. The international organisations most concerned with CP matters are the UN and the OSCE. The Adil Soz project in Kazakhstan was adopted for GCPP funding on the basis of an OSCE recommendation.

5. EFFECT ON INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES

5.1 Russia

88. Russia does not figure high in the priorities of the Global GCPP in terms of a coordinated approach to conflict prevention that ties together all of the main departments in London and their counterparts in the UK embassy in Moscow, not to mention key stakeholders in Russia. It must be emphasised though that this is not a comment about the levels of coordination between departments on traditional activities such as defence diplomacy (involving the FCO and MOD) or development cooperation (FCO and DFID). Embassy officials regarded in-post coordination (outside of GCPP issues) as excellent.

89. The programme activities funded by the GCPP in Russia were all in existence prior to the establishment of the GCPP or are largely the preserve of one department only.

90. For the above reasons, the GCPP-funded activities in Russia do not appear to have benefited at all from the existence of the GCPP as a trilateral mechanism joining up the three departments. The main decisions for FCO-managed GCPP activities appear to come from London with little share in that process from the political section of the embassy. The received wisdom in the post has been that the GCPP process is vague and unclear, and that working with it for new projects may not be a constructive use of time given competing priorities. Even though the post has supported the new bid for the Eurasia Foundation proposal, there is not a high degree of confidence about the bid procedures in London.

91. There is no formal process in the post for coordination among FCO, MOD and DFID on GCPP work. As in other posts, bilateral FCO-MOD consultation was seen as good, with the Ambassador seen as having the best overview of all GCPP activities. The Ambassador, like other officials in post, expressed a readiness to work more with the GCPP if a much clearer mandate was communicated and provided appropriate resources were available. The Ambassador underscored the need for processes to be user-friendly, with clear timelines for decision and good feed-back on proposals. Managers needed to avoid cumbersome and costly processes. Several officials noted the strong contrast between the effective operation of the Global Opportunities Fund and the Human Rights Promotion Fund on the one hand and the less than effective coordination of the Global GCPP on the other.

92. The MOD-implemented activities funded by the GCPP appear to be subject to more input from the post and appear to have benefited from a closer working level involvement with management and decision process in London. The broad parameters of the MOD programmes have also been set in London. The DFID office has almost no involvement in the formulation of GCPP programme proposals and no involvement at all in the RRP. There appeared to be little effective link on GCPP issues between the post and Russian civil society institutions that may be considered stakeholders on these policies.

93. Given the mixture of objectives which this activity involves (e.g. encouraging interoperability, supporting UK training), some officials have expressed regret that this whole programme was put into the GCPP. A key perceived difference between MOD and FCO/DFID was that the main MOD resource in the GCPP was the expertise of HMG

personnel, service and civilian, while the other departments were seen as spending many of their resources on NGO's.

5.2 Georgia

94. The programme and peace-keeping activities funded by the GCPP in Georgia are for the most part programmes that were in existence prior to the establishment of the GCPP or are largely the preserve of one department only. For these reasons, the GCPP funded activities in Georgia do not, for the most part, appear to have benefited much from the existence of the GCPP as a trilateral mechanism joining up the three departments. At the same time, the three GCPP-related sections of the Embassy (FCO, MOD and DFID) and the corresponding desk areas in London attested to effective and cooperative consultation on GCPP matters where judged appropriate. There was no distinct GCPP-oriented process for formal deliberations in the Embassy.

95. The basis on which decisions had been made about of the amounts of GCPP money to be spent on particular projects as against others in Georgia was far from clear. There seems little evidence of review of the size of spend for certain types of projects funded by the GCPP relative to others on a comparative basis.

96. A number of key projects on the Programme side are based on decisions made in London, with only a small input from the Embassy. The main recommendations for GCPP activities and the decisions for FCO-implemented projects appear to come from London with little share in that generation process from the political section of the embassy. The international NGOs funded by the GCPP (such as Conciliation Resources, IA and LINKS) for conflict-related work in Georgia do work closely with the Embassy even if the Embassy has not always been informed when they apply in London for a new phase of their programmes. The MOD-implemented activities appear to be subject to more input from the post and appear to have benefited from a closer working level involvement with the management and decision process in London. The broad parameters of the MOD programmes have also been set in London, though the DA has had considerable input into selection of more appropriate activities in the Outreach programme and the moving aside of others he judged to be less important. The DFID office, staffed exclusively by locally-employed staff, appears to be active and effective in monitoring GCPP matters though they have only limited involvement in the formulation of GCPP programme proposals. The locally employed staff in the DFID section were seen by many interlocutors to be an important, integral part of the Embassy team in this regard. (DFID Georgia funds some conflict-related activities from its small grants fund, not from the GCPP, and DFID development projects not formally designated as conflict-related do contribute to reducing the risk of conflict.)

97. The Embassy had not had significant input into the *Strategy for Russia and Parts of the FSU 2002/03*, partly because there was no elaborated Georgia part of the Strategy. But one official also expressed the view that the Strategy was determined largely in London. A number of officials identified the lack of adequate staff resources as the major constraint. And officials believed that this constraint would remain, even though there had been some relief with the creation of a new Third Secretary post to take the political section from two

(Ambassador plus 40 per cent of the Deputy Head of Mission's time) to three. One of the responsibilities of the new Third Secretary post is to improve understanding of the GCPP process and to keep in touch with the decision making process in the FCO. The GCPP is not the only pool that the Third Secretary has to manage. The small DFID section (three locally employed staff) has consistently been fully committed, primarily on other duties, but has maintained an activist role in promoting ties between Georgian NGOs and potential GCPP-funding opportunities operated on a proxy basis by INGOs. Several officials noted the information flow from London had improved since the appointment of the Third Secretary but could still be better. There was a suggestion from the Embassy for a more systematic way of sharing ideas for best practice in conflict prevention.

98. Officials in London had been conscious of the decision by the FCO early in the life of the Pool for the London-based officials to retain a heavier share of the inputs into the Pool Strategy. They saw this decision as having been based on the need to protect small, relatively new posts from yet another burden. But another functional cause of this imbalance that was not articulated by officials could simply be the lack of an elaborated Georgia component in the *Strategy for Russia and Parts of the FSU 2002/03*. The Strategy does not say much about Georgia except for short references, such as the need to resolve its several frozen conflicts, or the virtue of new programmes (not approved) to support the withdrawal of Russian military units and resettlement training of their officers.

99. Officials in the Embassy saw some virtue in moving 'to the next stage of formal deliberations' but as the Ambassador noted, small embassies of the size of the UK Embassy in Tblisi are not compartmentalised. The Ambassador is head of the political section, line manager for the DA, and has oversight of DFID work and close engagement with the team and the projects. Several interlocutors inside and outside the Embassy described her coordinating functions and mobilisational skills as highly effective in promoting the aims of the GCPP, regardless of whether that was somehow tagged with a GCPP label. Even so, the Ambassador saw some further room to more deliberately weave together GCPP projects generated by the centre and potential Embassy follow up and reinforcement for them. The Ambassador did note that the Embassy is involved with all of the projects to some extent, and deeper engagement might be over-ambitious, but that Embassy could usually enhance delivery of projects if it was involved earlier in their planning.

100. Another constraint identified by several officials was the mis-match between the background of FCO staff, both in London and the post, in project development management work and conflict prevention or development cooperation.

101. The Embassy and officials in London had placed considerable hopes in the development of a SCA in setting an approach to conflict prevention in Georgia that was not only agreed by the pool members but also could provide a strategy for going beyond the work already done by the Embassy. The Ambassador was keen for the SCA to pay particular attention to practical approaches. But it appears that there are widely differing perspectives of the SCA as a process and of the issues the particular draft SCA for Georgia covered. For a number of reasons, the drafting of the SCA became the subject of extended negotiation and its finalisation has been delayed. The SCA as now drafted is judged by several interlocutors, both inside and outside government, to offer the basis for an agreed,

more joined up approach. Yet the same interlocutors saw it as unlikely to have the strategic effect that had been hoped for. An agreed, common approach was elusive. A new 'Strategy' had proved more difficult to pin down and a number of interlocutors took the view that the SCA would not provide as comprehensive a management tool as it might have.

102. For the Embassy in Georgia, the GCPP is seen as a 'tool to further our aims, not an activity in its own right'. As the Ambassador noted, the 'Embassy has, with other parts of the UK establishment, worked on analysing what it is we want to achieve in Georgia, and what we should do in Georgia, or encourage others to do, given our limited resources. This has led to various recommendations, such as, the funding of the Special Representative. Others approaches to generate outcomes include working with the British Embassy in Moscow, defining recommendations for defence sector reform and so on.'

5.3 Nagorny Karabagh

103. Neither of the embassies in Erevan and Baku is much involved in the management of GCPP activity in their countries. Out of consideration for their small staffs, the FCO tries to limit their load of paper-work and administration. The FCO does not organise special training in the principles or practicalities of CP work for officers going out to post. Where embassy staff do have experience in this field it comes from having served in departments concerned with CP work. The ambassadors in Baku and Almaty are examples. The great majority of GCPP projects are managed directly by NGOs operating either from the UK or from regional offices in Tbilisi. Contact with them is patchy and embassies rarely have time to keep more than half an eye on progress and content themselves with including GCPP activity in their annual reviews. Given the political sensitivities of conflict issues generally, this position is fraught with potential dangers. The ambassadors in both Erevan and Baku were aware of this although they seemed torn between the theoretical desirability of keeping abreast of GCPP work and the practical difficulty of doing so in a small embassy.

104. There are two locally engaged DFID staff in the embassy in Erevan (one was on attachment to DFID in London at the time of the case study visit), while the former DFID post in Baku was closed last April. This situation reflects the relative enthusiasms in the two countries for the 'development' aspects of CP work. These DFID staff are mostly concerned with administering and monitoring DFID projects the initiatives for which have come from the UK. In theory they have no responsibility for GCPP work. However, on occasion this division of responsibilities becomes blurred. In both embassies, for example, it was the DFID officer who was tasked with 'scoring' the various tenders for the Consortium Initiative. In Baku's case, he even received instruction from London not to discuss this work with the embassy.

105. As far as SSR work is concerned, the current DA has had considerable experience in peace-keeping and conflict prevention, and runs a comprehensive programme for each of the S. Caucasus countries including courses in democratisation of the armed forces (including training for trainers), diplomas in SSR, and, in cooperation with the British Council, teaching in 'peace-keeping English'. Although many of the functions organised by the DA involve officers from all three South Caucasus countries and therefore bring together representatives from both Armenia and Azerbaijan, current sensitivities prevent him

arranging anything with a specific reference to Nagornyi Karabagh. He goes back every year to the UK for a regional coordination conference and to make suggestions about the focus of training. Although he runs his programmes quite separately from the embassies, he takes care to keep the ambassadors informed of progress.

106. Relatively few of the GCPP projects currently under way were initiated by either of the two embassies. The Economy and Conflict Project in Erevan originates from a proposal put to the previous ambassador who gave it his backing. In Baku, the ambassador was also responsible for recommending a more coordinated approach to CP work in Nagornyi Karabagh—a recommendation which led to the Public Policy Institute proposal being put to Eurasia chief Ed Zarubin in New York. But these are exceptions.

5.4 Kyrgyzstan

107. The embassy in Almaty suffers from the same lack of coordination between the GCPP different players. Although HMA himself has had experience of the London end of CP work (having worked in FCO Security Policy Department on the transfer of 'Assist' programmes to the GCPP) neither of the other two embassy members with GCPP responsibilities received any special training. HMA has tried to stage regular consultations between Chancery, DFID and the DA but without great success. The DA's office runs the SSR programme quite separately from the embassy which is not consulted about projects or their management. There appears to be considerable Kazakh interest in taking part in the various MOD courses and exercises on offer, but there must be some doubt as to the extent to which such activities qualify as CP projects. Many, if not most of them are legacy projects dating from long before the GCPP. The locally engaged DFID officer in the embassy is mainly involved in environmental projects approved by DFID in London. She does not have to consult the rest of the Embassy about these.

108. The embassy was not consulted on recent and ongoing GCPP projects like the International Watercourse Law, the Police Training or the Management of Ethnic Relations projects, which were inspired from outside the region, either by the OSCE or by London. This was a pity as, apart from the question of their usefulness, each of these projects has proved controversial politically. The only project to be initiated by the embassy has been the Adil Soz one which seems to be highly successful although the monitoring of its finances leaves a good deal to be desired.

109. One apparent result (or perhaps a cause) of the dis-connect between the FCO staff of the Almaty embassy and the GCPP, has been that the former are getting increasingly involved in the administration of other funds, of which there has been a significant proliferation recently. Apart from the GCPP, and traditional funds like Chevening and the Ambassador's personal fund, the embassy manages the Human Rights Fund, the Global Opportunities Fund, the Public Diplomacy Challenge Fund, the Quality of Life fund, and the small grants system (SGS). FCO staff seem to find these sources of finance easier and more flexible to manage and both Almaty and Baku have successfully applied for additional personnel to help run them. HMA Almaty contrasted the relevance of the small scale Chui waters scheme financed from the Quality of Life fund with the controversial extravagance of the GCPP's International Watercourse Law scheme.

6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

110. The financial management processes of the Global GCPP are the subject of an independent review which is due to report early next year. Officials have launched this review in recognition that there is some disorder in the GCPP on this front. The Evaluation team has found such disorder to be the norm in the Russia and FSU Strategy, with the main weakness being the poor direct relationship (where one exists at all), between the formulation of an over-arching Strategy and the spending of money under the GCPP. Several officials responsible for managing the Russia and FSU projects expressed dissatisfaction with their lack of ability to supervise spending in a genuinely strategic way.

111. What is the cause of this? Some officials cited the lack of provision for administrative staff resources under the operating procedures of the GCPP, and compared this unfavourably with the regime for the Global Opportunities Fund, which allows for 10 per cent of the funds to be spent on administrative staff costs. This does appear to be a major constraint on effective operation of the GCPPs. At the same time, the more fundamental problem is that financial disbursements cannot be managed for maximum effect where the implementers are poorly trained in fundamentals of the mission being executed. Several officials testified to the very negative effect on the financial management of the Russia and FSU Strategy of the low levels of training of GCPP officials for the tasks they are charged to implement.

112. Even here though, there was regular testimony from officials that they simply don't have time for the training (not that much training dedicated to the GCPP exists in any department). The biggest cause of mismanagement of the resource (misallocation of priorities) may be that HMG is simply not funding the FCO to anywhere near the level it needs to in support of all of the current missions, of which the GCPP is one that has been particularly demanding. One presumption that informed the establishment of the GCPP is that 'prevention is cheaper than cure'. That is true on a number of levels, but active conflict prevention of the sort to which the UK committed itself in establishing the GCPP is much more expensive than doing what the UK had been doing previously. In all sorts of ways, HMG has imposed new demands on its officials by setting up the GCPP but may not have not funded them adequately. This is an inevitable conclusion from a review of the work of the Russia and FSU Strategy.

7. SUMMARY COMMENTS ON RELEVANCE, EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

113. Many activities funded under the GCPP in Russia and the FSU appear to represent best practice in addressing the sources of conflict in the region (see Annex 2 for a brief overview of the conflict dynamics for selected conflicts). This success is most visible in Georgia, where the GCPP funds a suite of conflict prevention activities in ways that are having positive effects on important dimensions of the conflicts there. Many of the activities funded by the GCPP in Georgia provide a useful complement to other UK policies in support of conflict prevention, and to the policies of other actors, both internal and external, in support of the same aims. In some cases, the UK is ahead of other donors in support of conflict prevention in Georgia, and some GCPP-funded activities are held up as useful directions for future policy by other actors, both external and internal.

114. The work of the GCPP in Russia and the FSU has been evolving steadily, and quite effectively considering a number of the constraints. The Steering Group responsible for managing the Russia and FSU Strategy is attempting to move toward a more strategic approach. Nevertheless, as many officials observed, GCPP work there is still not strategic enough and is not yet 'trilateral' enough in terms of the working relationships between the FCO, MOD and DFID. It is the authors' view that the achievements of the GCPP in Georgia have so far been built largely on ideas of best practice and on bureaucratic structures and activities that would have existed had the GCPP not been created. Most activities do not demonstrate the trilateral quality which the GCPP was in part established: to exploit the opportunities for more effective conflict prevention that the combined efforts of the FCO, MOD and DFID could produce compared with the efforts of the three departments acting relatively independently (in fact, in the pre-GCPP period, the three departments were not operating in such isolation from each other as the new interest in 'joined up-ness' presumed and this has been confirmed by the work for this Case Study).

115. The GCPP has a potentially excellent system of prioritising between conflicts in terms of its dedicated strategies: for example, to have a Middle East Strategy and not a Latin America Strategy. The elements of this prioritisation are:

- how important is the conflict in terms of UK or other significant international interests?
- will UK involvement make a significant contribution to preventing or containing deadly violence?²⁵
- would a combined effort by three government departments (FCO, MOD, DFID) work better than activities by single departments?

116. This system of prioritisation might usefully be applied more explicitly within the Russia and FSU Strategy. The dominance within the GCPP programmes for Russia and the FSU of activities that were in place prior to the creation of the GCPP, many of which have been funded at higher levels, is one indication that such prioritisation has not been pursued as

²⁵ The official documents use 'preventing or resolving the conflict' and not 'preventing or containing deadly violence'. But the former term is what was at issue when the GCPP was established. It was not the goal of the GCPP to resolve conflicts which are to all intents and purposes frozen.

effectively as it might have. The main obstacle here appears to be the persistence of legacy projects and the lack of effective challenge by the GCPP as a system to the majority of these legacy projects. A number of officials across three departments attested to the view that one working principle of the GCPP process for Russia and the FSU was to 'ring-fence' (that is, not test for relevance), most of the pre-existing programmes.

117. Given the rather low level of comprehensive strategising in the Russia and FSU Strategy, the mismatch between its stated aims and the projects it funds, and the very small levels of penetration of its projects into the centre of conflict dynamics in the region (Georgia excepted), it would be relatively fruitless to spend much time discussing efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. Even in Georgia, where there has been a reasonably high level of effectiveness in projects funded by the GCPP in several quite different and complementary dimensions, a number of interlocutors commented that they saw little evidence of the monitoring in some important projects that would be able to provide a reliable assessment of their efficiency. Several interlocutors noted the lack of consideration of sustainability and lack of appropriate engagement of local stakeholders.

118. There must be big doubts that the GCPP process has brought much practical value to the activities it funds in Russia and the FSU. At the same time, there probably have been benefits in the prominence the GCPP processes give to certain ideas, issues and targets of UK diplomatic effort.

119. At the same time, the enormous potential of the GCPP in Russia and the FSU and the improvements gradually being made in its management need to be exploited. This will not be done without a radical re-think by HMG of priorities and costs. This re-think will need to be informed by expert advice and careful planning, relying in the first instance on the knowledge and experience of serving (and possibly retired) officials. Much damage has been done to the GCPP process in Russia and the FSU by over-reliance on poorly determined arrangements for the use of external consultants or other external service providers. If HMG wants conflict prevention to work better in Russia and the FSU, it will need to make a much bigger commitment to getting the ideas right, communicating them, finding the best partners, and then funding measure at an appropriate level. By any yardstick, given what is at stake in Russia today, the GCPP must either do a whole lot more there or drop it completely from its purview. If the former course is chosen, then more staff resources and more effective policy settings for the GCPP need to be found.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS I: SHOULD THE GCPP WORK IN RUSSIA AND THE FSU BE CONTINUED AND HOW COULD IT BE IMPROVED

120. Given Russia's power and strategic importance, the Russia and FSU Strategy of the Global GCPP probably cannot be meaningfully implemented without the funding of a new regional conflict policy post in the UK embassy in Moscow dedicated exclusively to the aims of the GCPP (which should include coordination with Russian on peacekeeping and implementation of the Brahimi report). This new embassy post would need to be a senior diplomat with considerable experience of international security and Russia's strategic policy and decision-making, and considerable knowledge of conflict prevention and peacekeeping.

121. Unless much more GCPP activity is undertaken in respect of Chechnya, then Russia should be dropped from the GCPP Strategy. Otherwise the disconnect between the aims of the GCPP and practice on the ground will remain too marked.

122. The active or potential role of Russia in conflicts in the FSU suggests the need for the Russia and FSU Strategy to continue as an organisational unit. It may be more practical however to have a separate Russia Strategy and a separate Caucasus Strategy. The UK should not have a Central Asia Strategy as such independently of an Afghanistan Strategy (see the Afghanistan Case Study). In promoting conflict prevention in Kyrgyzstan, and other countries of Central Asia, the UK should put its eggs in the EU and OSCE baskets, since both have been far more effective collectively in the region than the GCPP. Even without a formal Central Asia Strategy, the GCPP could consider funding the appointment of a UK Special Representative for the region.

123. The GCPP process might be mobilised to undertake a careful review of what it could bring to defence diplomacy in Russia and of the future evolution of the RRP.

124. There should be a standardised and simplified approach to strategic conflict assessments that involves much heavier direct involvement of HMG officials and embassies, local stakeholders and other external actors.

125. There should be significantly more review by each embassy of the projects funded under the programme side of the GCPP, based on more consistent consultation with local stakeholders about GCPP priorities.

126. There should be more GCPP-funded work with 'power ministries' (e.g. ministries of internal affairs) which fall outside the normal purview of defence staffs.

127. Communication systems should be enhanced significantly, to overcome confusion about what the GCPP is meant to achieve and how it can best be done. The appointment of a regional conflict adviser for Russia and the FSU, possibly based in Moscow, might add more coherence to GCPP programmes and help to mobilise and apply the necessary specialist conflict prevention advice that a number of officials believe is lacking.

128. There is a requirement for more consistent and transparent dialogue between the GCPP committee in London and the posts in the decision making process.

129. The current system of a 'Strategy' has been applied very unevenly and has worked poorly. It does not sit well with other mechanisms of UK decision-making and policy implementation. The Strategy could be replaced with a standing inter-departmental unit or task force in Whitehall, which appears to suit much better and which may achieve more genuinely trilateral decision-making. This may be an urgent need in the case of Russia.

130. Training should be offered to officials about to take up duties which include GCPP management. Within the FCO itself, Strategy Managers' GCP responsibilities are often only a small part of their duties and do not loom large in the list of their priorities.

131. If conflict prevention in a certain case needs a British face, then this must be promoted more vigorously. Where a British face is not necessary, the UK has to be much more willing to promote a greater leading role for the EU, OSCE or other regional organisations as appropriate.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS II: BENCHMARKS, TARGETS AND INDICATORS

132. Any GCPP work should test itself regularly for relevance against an externally recommended set of external conflict prevention priorities for a specific conflict.

133. At the country level, the first test has to be whether a set of policies can be shaped that will make the key provocateurs of conflict abandon their preference for use of force.

134. A second key test has to be whether the UK needs to work with other international actors or whether it can bring about the final aims by working alone.

135. At the project level, the first test for any project is to identify explicitly what changes were the GCPP initiatives trying to bring about or promote in the behaviour of named targets (individuals, groups or institutions) that were likely to affect the prospects for conflict prevention or management.

136. The second test is how close are these named targets, in terms of influence, to the key provocateurs of conflict?

137. The third test is to ask what other circumstances are needed to make the identified measures work.

ANNEX 1: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS AND OTHER WRITTEN MATERIALS CONSULTED

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British Embassy Baku, 'CPF Proposal re Scientific-Practical Conference on "The Ways of Solution of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict"', 23 March 2000

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- FCO, 'Conflict Prevention Pool: FCO Project Proposal—Peacemaking and Pluralism in Schools of Tajikistan', June 2002
- FCO, 'GCPP—Moldova—Moldovan Constitutional Initiative', 5 August 2002
- FCO, 'GCPP—South Caucasus—Economy and Conflict: Engaging the Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Transformation', 31 July 2002
- FCO, 'GCPP—South Caucasus—Facilitating Political and Civil Society Contacts', 8 May 2002
- FCO, 'Georgia—Conflict Assessment and Peace Building Framework', 9 April 2002
- FCO, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool Existing Commitments', 3 May 2001
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ANNEX 2: BRIEF NOTES ON SELECTED CONFLICTS IN RUSSIA AND THE FSU

Russia and its Periphery

Russia inherited about 75 per cent of the territory of the former Soviet Union. While this makes it bigger than any other European state, most of the territory ruled from Moscow is in Asia (about 75 per cent), a source of considerable insecurity to Russia in the minds of many of its leaders given the number of potential threats on its Southern borders and in neighbouring regions. Russia occupies about one eighth of the land territory on the planet but does not have sufficient military or paramilitary forces to secure its territory against existing threats. Russia shares land borders with fourteen states,²⁶ along 20,139 km, and has a coastline of 37,653 km. Russia shares maritime borders with some of its land neighbours but also has maritime borders with the USA and Japan. In population size, Russia is the fifth biggest country in the world, after China, India, the USA and Indonesia. Russia retained about 50 per cent of the population of the former USSR and much of the community diversity.

Since 1991, Russia has consistently pursued a policy of integration into the international community and observance of its norms. There have been important exceptions, as in Chechnya, but these have been dictated in large part by emergency circumstances associated with the collapse of the USSR. There have certainly been important lapses, as in Chechnya, in the attentiveness of the leadership to the principles Russia espouses. But the trend in strategic policy has been a firm and consistent one of cooperative internationalism, even as it has been tinged with shades of great power chauvinism.

The national economic base does not provide Russia with the range of diplomatic tools it would like to implement its great power aspirations or even secure its interests. Russia is one of the richest-resourced and self-sufficient countries in the world in terms of natural resources, with the largest reserves of natural gas (45 per cent of world share), the third largest reserves of coal (23 per cent of world share), and one of the largest reserves of oil outside the Middle East. It is in the top five producers for iron ore, gold, zinc, copper, lead, mercury, nickel and hydropower. This underlying wealth and Russia's past as a great industrial power might have provided fairly solid foundations for economic prosperity of the new Russian state. But this was not to be the case.

The country's conventional military forces will remain small and will in all probability continue to shrink. Yet Russia remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear superpower, with more than enough weapons to end life on the planet as we know it. After 1991, the daily peacetime regime for control of these nuclear weapons deteriorated and the risks of inadvertent launch or diversion of nuclear weapons material to other states rose correspondingly. As for war, the armed forces, with the full endorsement of the political leadership, shifted to military doctrines that give more emphasis to use of nuclear weapons to compensate for weaknesses in conventional force posture. While this doctrinal shift

²⁶ Azerbaijan—284 km; Belarus—959 km; China (two sectors)—3,645 km; Estonia—290 km; Finland—1,313 km; Georgia—723 km; Kazakhstan—6,846 km; North Korea—19 km; Latvia—217 km; Lithuania—227 km; Mongolia—3,441 km; Norway—167 km; Poland—432 km; Ukraine—1,576 km.

does not represent a substantial change from what was almost certainly the situation in practice in the Cold War, the sharply reduced capacities of the armed forces and their low morale provide dangerous pressures for fundamentally different strategic calculations compared with those made in Moscow during the Cold War.

The biggest change has been the shift in geographic focus of Russian military strategy from its orientation to major conventional wars in the west and east (NATO and China), to low intensity war, often involving guerrilla operations, on its southern borders. Countries to Russia's south are seen in the Russian mind as representing a threatening 'Muslim Asia'. Most of the more notable operations by Russian military forces since 1991 have been in this region and included South Ossetia in Georgia for eighteen months in 1991–92; Azerbaijan in 1992; Abkhazia in Georgia from 1992–94; and Tajikistan since 1992. Inside the country, Russia military forces have conducted preventive deployments in North Ossetia in 1992 and Dagestan beginning in May 1998;²⁷ and has conducted two wars in Chechnya (from December 1994 to August 1996, and the continuing Second Chechen War which began in 1999).

Russia had few choices. In some Union republics, one of the biggest problems for Russia was simply to keep the peace as the states made the transition from Soviet republic to full independence. Russia's efforts in this regard should be recognised as contributing to some degree to strategic stability among the newly independent states. Three examples stand out.

In 1991–92, political groups in South Ossetia, an administrative unit of the newly independent state of Georgia, had been seeking unification with their fellow Ossetians on the Russian side of the border in the region of North Ossetia. The two parts of Ossetia had been divided by the Soviet government between the Union Republic of Georgia and the RSFSR. After three years of intermittent fighting beginning in 1989 and involving relatively small forces numbering in the hundred, a ceasefire was achieved in 1992 with the intervention of a Russian force of about 1,000 personnel. By 1994, this force (a battalion from the Leningrad²⁸ Military District) had been reduced to about 500 and it remained at that level as of 2003.

Unlike operations in South Ossetia, the military operations of Russian forces in Moldova in 1991 and 1992 were not sanctioned or planned by the Russian government. By 1990, as a number of Union Republics of the USSR were declaring their sovereignty, two new states had declared their existence on the territory of the Union Republic of Moldova. In the subsequent civil disturbances and military clashes between the rival states, the USSR's 14th Army based there became both the potential peace-maker and a serious cause of further conflict. In fact the 14th Army had fractured, with some elements supporting the rival sides. After the formal break up of the USSR in 1991, the conflict in Moldova was caught

²⁷ In May 1998, an airborne division based in Stavropol Territory was deployed to Dagestan, a national republic of the Russian Federation, to assist in disarming rebel groups after large riots in Makachkala on 20–21 May. The 136th Infantry Brigade stationed there had been put on full alert in response to the riots on 21 May but it remained in its barracks at the time. Checkpoints along the border between Dagestan and Chechnya were reinforced at that time.

²⁸ The Leningrad Military District did not change its name after the city's name reverted to St Petersburg.

up in the contest between political groups in the Russian Federation as well as in the interests of neighbouring states—in this case, Romania and Ukraine. By June 1992, Russian forces became more decisively involved in support of one of the warring factions and participated in an operation resulting in several hundred killed. This incident prompted the despatch by Moscow of General Lebed²⁹ to take control of the situation. It appears that Lebed may over-stepped his authority, or at least interpreted it creatively, and brought a standstill to clashes after taking operational command of some of the forces and engineering a brief and decisive military clash with the armed units opposing the 14th Army³⁰ and relying on support of airborne units already in Moldova or deployed there at Lebed's request. In spite of several agreements implying eventual withdrawal of Russian forces, in 2003, the force comprised 2,500 personnel in a variety of formations subordinated to the Moscow Military District.

In Azerbaijan in February 1992, a small Russian force of regimental size, 336th Motorised Infantry Regiment, joined forces in combat operations with separatists in the Nagornyi Karabagh autonomous locality who were fighting to be separated from the newly independent state of Azerbaijan. The people in Nagornyi Karabagh identified more closely with Armenia, another newly independent state on Azerbaijan's south-west border, and wanted their autonomous locality to be merged with Armenia. The 336th Regiment comprised large numbers of Armenian nationality personnel. In March 1992, Russia despatched airborne and special forces based in Azerbaijan to arrest the 336th (or at least its leaders). The involvement of Russian forces in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and in earlier repressions in Azerbaijan in 1986 made their position there untenable and by September 1992, the former Soviet 4th Army in Azerbaijan was disbanded and by May 1993, the 104th Airborne Division was withdrawn.

In Georgia in July 1992, after three years of separatist tension in the national Republic of Abkhazia within the newly independent state, Abkhazia declared its independence. In the ensuing conflict, leaders of Russian military units which had been stationed in Georgia since before the collapse of the USSR sided with the Abkhaz rebels, and were encouraged in this by leaders of the Supreme Soviet (the holdover parliament)³¹ of the Russian Federation and quite probably by the military leadership in Moscow—while the Russian civilian government could not decide on a clear course of action. In February 1993, Russian military aircraft bombed Georgian forces which had taken over in the Abkhaz capital, and in March Russian Ground Forces and Cossack volunteers joined an Abkhazian attack on Sukhumi. In July 1993, a cease-fire was signed but clashes broke out again in September, and Abkhazian rebels succeeded in driving all Georgian forces from the territory. The Abkhazian success was the direct result of Russian military support and the opening of its border with Abkhazia to allow free flow of military equipment and mercenaries. By October 1993, Georgia had agreed to join the CIS and from a position of weakness accepted in

²⁹ Aleksandr Lebed was the commander of a group of airborne personnel involved in the planning for the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev but as the events unfolded he refused to obey the orders of the coup leaders and changed sides. His decision was one of the influential turning points in the attempted coup, and he rose to political prominence in subsequent years for this and because of his successful settlement of the fighting in Moldova in 1992.

³⁰ After that operation, Lebed was formally appointed commander of the 14th Army.

³¹ This was not the national parliament of the USSR, but the parliament of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The parliament had been elected before the collapse of the USSR.

May 1994 a Russian peacekeeping force of three battalions (3,000 troops) to be deployed along its internal border of Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia.

The troubles in Tajikistan, which had begun in early 1990, had erupted into a civil war by May 1992 with Russian forces based in Tajikistan backing the incumbent government against opposition forces, but not on clear orders from the Russian government. The personnel of the units in the country were frustrating Russian government policy for a number of reasons. Some were backers of the Communist Party in the as yet unresolved constitutional battles in Russia as a whole, and some were free traders in the military supplies over which they had control. A number of important decisions on military actions were being made by lower level Russian officers in Tajikistan, not the government in Moscow. The situation was further complicated by the intrusion of other parties, notably the Russian population of Tajikistan and the government of Uzbekistan, which had intervened in the conflict with its own military forces. By May 1993, Russian official policy was to side with the government of Tajikistan, but only after its forces had already been actively engaged in doing just that, including in use of force against military and civilian targets alike. The two governments signed a Friendship Treaty in May. Sporadic military operations continued after that. More than 100,000 people may have been killed in this civil war.

Russian ground forces and border units stationed in Tajikistan were based in large part on those that were stationed there at the time of the break-up of the USSR. Subsequent governments of Tajikistan did not take-over the former Soviet units, as happened in many other former Union republics. Tajikistan signed an agreement with Russia formalising the presence of the Russian forces until 1999 for common defence. These forces were the 201st Motorised Infantry Division, with about 5,000 personnel, which had been established in Tajikistan since 1943, and the border guards detachments. In August 1993, one month after 25 Russian border troops were killed on duty on the border with Afghanistan, Russia sent 10,000 reinforcements for the 201st, since it had been at low levels of manning and low levels of readiness. Two months later, in October, Russia organised a CIS-sponsored peace-keeping force, which was manned mostly by Russian personnel. The size of this force may have reached 35,000. The mission of the Russian forces was to shore up a pro-Russian government under pressure from an Islamist political group and to protect the Tajikistan border from incursions from Afghanistan.

By the end of 1998, there was active deliberation of withdrawal of the 201st MID and a scaling down of Russian-supported border operations (by 1998, total Russian personnel levels had shrunk to about 8,000). Such consideration became possible after the brokering of a peace agreement in Tajikistan in 1997, and a marked reduction in cross-border incursions from Afghanistan. The reductions in Russian presence were also dictated by cost pressures, by recognition that the use of the ground forces for residual mission of combating drugs was not appropriate, and by the failure to develop an appropriate, durable regime for the interoperability of Russian and Tajikistan personnel in mixed units.

Russia has not been interested in keeping the peace merely for the sake of peace itself. Russia has used the peacekeeping efforts in the former Union republics to pursue its own geopolitical interests, especially a desire to reassert influence. The idea of reviving some sort of union involving former Soviet republics under Russian leadership has remained a

prominent theme in Russian politics since 1991³² and Russia has used a variety of means to do this. It may have little expectation of reasserting its pre-eminence in traditional imperialist fashion by force, but it was not averse to using what in the language of one writer must be called 'quasi-imperialist' methods when the opportunity arose. One good example of this was in Georgia, a new state that had initially refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. Another example has been in Tajikistan, where the government in power has been a more willing partner.

As the Tajikistan experience shows, Russia's use of force in the newly independent states was not a sustainable policy in the light of the economic weakness of Russia and the policy preferences of its government. The 'quasi-imperialism' has been inconsistent in its implementation for most of the time since 1991 but it remains an active cause of conflict in Russia's southern border regions.

Chechnya

Between mid-1990 and August 1991, separatist Chechens succeeded in manoeuvring themselves into a position of strength and formal power in much of the Chechen-Ingush Republic sufficient to displace Russian authority in that part occupied predominantly by Chechens. In October 1991, Chechnya declared its independence in part of the Chechen-Ingush Republic and after that refused to recognise Russian authority. By November, when President Yeltsin decreed a state of emergency and sent Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) troops to restore Russian sovereignty, they were easily and painlessly rebuffed—and the Russian Government was humiliated. By June 1992, Russian military forces had withdrawn leaving large amounts of their equipment and heavy arms. By November 1994, the Russian government was pushed into firmer action and as part of a wider strategy of regaining Chechnya, sided with anti-separatist groups, at first politically but eventually through the supply of Russian military equipment and personnel. The opposition groups used this equipment and the personnel for a tank assault on Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and this military operation was a complete failure. On 29 November, Russia decided to send formed units to Chechnya. On 31 December, a new battle for control of the Chechen capital of Grozny began and lasted for several weeks. On 26 January, the Russian armed forces turned the city over to troops of the MVD. But while the Russian forces had been victorious in the battle for Grozny, they could not win the war since they had no strategy and, in the end, no political will to defeat rebel forces in the mountainous countryside. After a violent terrorist attack by Chechens in Budennovsk in southern Russia in 1995, pressure from within the armed forces and in many parts of Russian society led the political leaders to agree to enter negotiations on a ceasefire.

Russia's resort to military force in Chechnya had been part of a pattern followed both by the Soviet leadership in the dying days of its regime in a number of locations such as

³² As unlikely as any reunification of Russia and its former republics may seem, the issue is not a dead one. Russia and Belarus are negotiating, without success, on the details of a constitutional act for a new union. On 23 May 1997, Russia and Belarus signed a charter of union, seen by some as a charter of reunification, which accepts a 'common responsibility' for social security, creation of a common economic space, and the coordination of military and foreign policies. The charter set up a Supreme Council, comprising the Presidents of each state, and Executive Committee, and a Parliamentary assembly, all to be based in Moscow. The Union, which is open to other CIS states, does not envisage creation of a single super-state.

Vilnius, Baku and Tbilisi, and by the Russian Federation government after 1991, both inside Russia and in other newly independent states of the former USSR. For example, in 1991 inside Russia, Russian forces successfully extinguished a revolt in the Ingush rump of the Chechen-Ingush Republic that followed Chechnya's declaration of independence. This dispute involved a military campaign by Ingush insurgents to detach a region of the neighbouring North Ossetia by force after the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush administration. On 31 October 1991, 8,000 troops from the Pskov airborne division, and special forces and police units, deployed to the region with a team of high level military officers with a clear mission of pre-emption of further troubles and pacification by deterrence. The troops subsequently placed themselves on the border between the insurgents home territory (Ingushetia or South Ossetia in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia) and the targeted region in North Ossetia called Prigorodny. The success in this type of operation has underpinned a continuing determination on the part of the Russian government to use force where it believes necessary to extinguish conflicts.

In 1996, the Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov warned that unless this process of Balkanisation of Russia stopped, 'we shall lose the single state'. On another occasion, Primakov said 'we lost the USSR, we shall never lose Russia'. The military option, though now seriously discredited because of the defeat in Chechnya, remained on the table for Russia's leaders and Russia continued to make military preparations for a possible re-opening of the Chechen war. By 1998, according to a Russian official source, the armed forces had more conventional military forces in the North Caucasus Military District (MD) than in any other MD and more units on higher levels of readiness than other MDs. The deployments in this region exceeded the limits set by the CFE Treaty for this area, but Russia was relying on its right under the treaty to hold higher levels in the region on a temporary basis. According to the IISS, the forces in the MD in 1998 comprised 54,500 personnel in two infantry divisions and one airborne division, three independent infantry brigade, one special forces brigade, one naval infantry regiment, and other air force and ground formations. There were about 300 fixed wing ground attack aircraft, and about 350 fixed wing fighter aircraft. The independent infantry brigades serve as garrison units in the major towns, like the 205th in Budennovsk. The Russian military posture in the southern regions at the time also included forces involved in peacekeeping in Georgia and Armenia, where in 1998 there were about 15,000 Russian military personnel.

The largest single group deployed close to Chechnya was a force of more than 10,000 but this was comprised primarily of MVD troops (five independent special forces divisions) and militia units. Similarly, the air forces assembled there (Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters) included units of the Russian Federation Airforce (RFAF) as well as MVD. In the first half of 1999, the 58th Army based in the North Caucasus MD was in a high state of readiness.

It was inevitable then, that were offensive operations to resume against the Chechen forces (which are not large), the most likely form of attack was going to be aerial bombardment and special operations. The ground forces simply did not have enough high precision weapons to support any more sophisticated campaign. Their most accurate artillery pieces only have a range of 20 km. According to Russian specialists at the time, the special force units most appropriate to operations against the Chechen armed groups were in the MVD and the Federal Security Bureau, not the armed forces proper.

In August 1999, Chechen combatants, led by a fundamentalist radical, Shamil Basayev, conducted a military operation in Dagestan, a neighbouring 'national republic', which has a large non-Russian, Muslim population. In subsequent months, unidentified assailants undertook a series of bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and another Russian city (Volgodonsk). The Russian government wrongly but wantonly attributed the attacks to Chechen guerrillas, and used the brutality of the attacks and the large death toll as justifications for breaking its peace agreement with Chechnya and re-opening the war.

As the American Committee for Chechnya has noted, the Russian military 'offensive and subsequent occupation was brutal' even though the government claimed a limited objective of neutralising Basayev's force. The testimony of Grozny's residents and TV news footage provided graphic and incontrovertible evidence of the deliberate targeting of civilian targets, and the commission of war crimes on a massive and sustained scale. Whole apartment houses and even whole city blocks were flattened in several areas of the city as the result of bombardment by bomber aircraft, missiles and artillery. According to the Ministry of Defence, Russian military losses were 4,750 killed and 13,040 wounded. Other sources estimate Russian losses to be more than twice the official figure.

Georgia

Compared with Chechnya, the so-called 'frozen conflicts' of Georgia appear to pale into insignificance. But the idea that these conflicts are 'frozen' or that they have little to do with war in Chechnya can be dangerously misleading. It is probably correct to assume that there is only a low likelihood of a return to deadly violence of sort we are now seeing in Chechnya. Nevertheless the risk does exist and the strategic interests of Russia are at play in addition to those commonly seen in ethnically divided small states. There is a large number of small arms in Georgia, and a variety of heavier weapons could be made available to combatants by military personnel sympathetic to their cause.

The prospects for a return to large-scale violent conflict in Georgia depend on three possible developments:

- 1) Military operations between Russian forces and Chechen separatists may unsettle the emerging 'solidity' of the Georgia/South Ossetia 'peace' (since Chechen Guerillas have evacuated to areas to the north of South Ossetia; Chechnya borders northern Georgia and Russia bombed and occupied two villages in northern Georgia just several years ago).
- 2) Deteriorating social and economic conditions in the Russian Caucasus (Dagestan, North Ossetia, Ingushetia) may combine with Russian military excesses in Chechnya and the region to force an anti-Russian response. (Russia was forced to deploy an airborne brigade to Dagestan in May 1998 to restore order and disarm rebel groups). Anti-Russian sentiment is not likely to take the form of separatism, but be channelled into a narrowly-focused anti-government terrorism, perhaps with Muslim fundamentalist inspiration. Bombings occur on a regular basis in North Ossetia.
- 3) Russian strategic pressure on Georgia over gas supplies and military bases may unsettle the internal political balance of Georgia and may re-ignite the relatively stable Abkhazia separatism into open warfare.

Some observers have identified the Javakheti region as the most likely area for new deadly conflict in Georgia, 'given the relatively high tensions in the area' and 'its isolation from the rest of Georgia'.³³

The stakes are somewhat higher in Georgia than in Central Asia. Two major powers (Russia and Turkey) are in direct and uneasy rivalry over a new geopolitical order. With the USA and European countries taking a stronger interest in Georgia than Central Asia, the prospects for Russian misjudgement of Western policy and interests is high. Russian strategic policy is quite unstable at present, even as appearances of close US-Russia and EU-Russia relations suggest otherwise. Russia is deeply insecure about its southern borders. While many commentators look for the impact of Russian Caucasus policy on Western interests, the biggest negative impact is likely to be in the Caucasus itself and inside southern Russia.

Nagorny Karabagh (Armenia and Azerbaijan)

Karabagh (Azeri: Black Garden) is a region within what is now Azerbaijan, the mountainous (Russian: Nagorny) part of which was made into an autonomous oblast (province) in the 1920s when the new Soviet government divided up the former Russian empire into administrative districts based on ethnic principles. The Armenian name for the region is Artsakh and for its chief administrative centre, Stepanakert (Azeri: Khankendi). Like the rest of Azerbaijan, Karabagh has for centuries been inhabited by a mixture of peoples speaking various languages, Armenian, Azeri (a branch of the Western Turkic group of languages), Kurdish and others. By the 1920s the majority of the population was Armenian, although there was a considerable Azeri population notably in the towns of Shusha and Aghdam. After some hesitation the Soviet government eventually decided to place Nagorny Karabagh as an Armenian enclave within the Azerbaijan SSR. Some observers have attributed this decision to a desire on the part of the then commissar for nationalities Josef Stalin to build into the region a permanent source of instability which would perpetuate the need for Russian control.

By 1988, with the loosening of Soviet and CP control throughout the USSR, a perception had taken root amongst the Armenian population of Karabagh that they had been neglected by the Azerbaijani Soviet government in Baku. The Supreme Soviet of Nagorny Karabagh submitted a petition to Moscow asking to be transferred to the Armenian SSR. Baku objected to this proposal which was also rejected by Moscow. Atrocities against the minority populations in both republics were followed by more widespread hostilities and the flight of refugees from the minorities in both republics. In 1991 more intense fighting broke out, involving attempts by Soviet forces to control the situation. However, when the Soviet Union disintegrated in August of that year, the conflict, fuelled by the sudden availability of large quantities of armaments and the participation of numbers of soldiers from the Soviet armed forces, spiralled still further out of control. By 1993, the Karabagh Armenians had gained complete control not only over Karabagh, but of some fifteen per cent of Azerbaijani territory beyond the frontiers of the enclave. About fifteen thousand had died on both sides. The entire Azeri population had been driven out, resulting in the flight of more than

³³ Cornell Caspian Consulting, 'The South Caucasus: A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment, Summary and Recommendations', 2002, http://www.cornellcaspiian.com/sida/sida_sum-rec.html.

half a million refugees who are still languishing in camps. Eventually a cease-fire was signed in May 1994. Barring small scale violations, this has held until now. That this has been achieved without the help of external peace-keeping forces is a source of some pride to both sides.

Since the signing of the cease-fire, continuous attempts have been made by the international community to broker a peace agreement between the two sides. The main focus of these attempts has been the so-called Minsk group, set up by the OSCE with Russia, France and the US as co-chairman. This and other attempts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict are complicated by various factors:

- The Armenian insistence that Nagorny Karabagh has been fighting alone for its independence from Azerbaijan and must be a party to any peace negotiations. The ample evidence for military support provided by Erevan to Karabagh has shown this to be a fiction. However, some substance was given to the fiction by Stepanakert's declaration of Nagorny Karabagh independence in early 1992.
- Azerbaijani insistence that Nagorny Karabagh remains part of its territory and its consequent refusal to include representatives of the Stepanakert regime in any negotiations. The two sides address the problem from two opposing sides of the UN charter with the Azerbaijanis invoking the principle of territorial inviolability and the Armenians that of national self-determination.
- Armenian suspicion of the OSCE's objectivity following the decision of the OSCE's Lisbon in December 1996 summit that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity must be respected.
- Azerbaijani suspicion of the Minsk Group's objectivity on the grounds that all three co-chairmen are basically pro-Armenian: France for reasons of historic support for the Armenian side following World War 1; Russia for similar reasons and because of suspicions that Moscow helped the Armenian side during the conflict—a claim which received some vindication in 1996 when the Russian Defence Ministry was found to have been supplying large quantities of sophisticated weaponry to the Karabaghis; Russia has also prejudiced her position on the group by occasionally floating her own proposals without consultation; the US, because of the strong influence of the Armenian lobby in Congress, one of the results of which was the passage of Article 907 of the Freedom Support Act prohibiting US aid to Azerbaijan.
- The existence on both sides of strong and potentially violent constituencies opposed to any concessions. In the case of Armenia these manifested themselves in late 1997 when the then president Ter Petrossian accepted a proposal of the Minsk Group that the Armenians should withdraw from the seven provinces of Azerbaijan being occupied by Armenian troops, leaving the status of Nagorny Karabagh to be negotiated later. This ran counter to Stepanakert's line and opposition to Ter Petrossian's position grew so strong that he was forced to resign. His successor, elected after a much disputed election, was the current president Robert Kocharian, himself a former prime minister of Nagorny Karabagh (so much for the fiction that the two countries are quite separate).

In a later attempt to bring the two sides together, the US brokered a series of direct talks between 2000 and 2001 between Presidents Aliev and Kocharian and their representatives. After an encouraging start, both sides seem to have realized at the last meeting in Key West, Florida that they would not be able to bring these to a successful conclusion and the contacts petered out. Perhaps Kocharian realized that he could not deliver Armenian popular or parliamentary support while Aliev realized that his declining health no longer allowed him time to impose a solution before his son Ilhom had to face the complications of the dynastic succession he wished to ensure for him.

By 2001 when the GCPP was set up the material and human cost of the war was formidable. Between 15,000 and 25,000 people had been killed and a further 50,000 wounded. By 1998 some 345,000 Armenians had fled from Azerbaijan, and about 185,000 Azerbaijanis had left Armenia proper. A further 45,000 Azeris had had to leave Nagorny Karabagh, while more than half a million had been driven out of their homes in the seven other provinces occupied by Armenian troops. The bulk of Azeri refugees were, and are, still living in camps.

The indirect consequences of the war have been almost as damaging. Some on the Armenian side may feel that they have gained a military victory and can simply wait until the Azeris are ready to make the concessions they want. On the other hand the economic and social cost to Armenia has been colossal, mainly thanks to the boycott imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Armenian economy has collapsed and approximately half the population has been forced to emigrate in order to seek work. Inevitably, those who have left tend to be the more active and employable. The political arena however remains strongly influenced by extreme nationalist groups whose activities have eroded the fledgling post-Soviet democracy which at one stage promised to develop. The elections of both presidents Ter Petrossian and Robert Kocharian were sharply criticized by international monitors. Meanwhile the threat of violence is never far away, witness the murder of eight members of parliament, including the then Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsian and former first communist party secretary presidential candidate Karen Demirchian, in the parliament building on 27 October 1999, and the prosecution of Samvel Babayan, the former defence minister of Nagorny Karabagh, for attempting to assassinate the local president Arkady Gukasian.

In Azerbaijan, the war would also have brought political instability had it not been for Heidar Aliev's 1993 accession to power and imposition of a sophisticated authoritarian personal rule. There too democratic norms are routinely flouted and human rights violations are frequent, while political and economic power are concentrated in the hands of the president, his family and close supporters. Azerbaijan's oil wealth provides the potential too make the country prosperous but the corruption of the system allows precious little to filter down to the mass of the population large numbers of whom continue live in conditions of extreme poverty.

As long as Haidar Aliev's position was unassailable, he had sufficient self-confidence to authorise the direct negotiations described above. However, by 2001 he seems to have decided that he could not carry the country with him and since then his deteriorating health has precluded any resumption of the process. In October 2003, he withdrew from the imminent presidential elections in favour of his son Ilhom who enjoys nothing like his

father's political skill or authority and whose position is unlikely to become strong enough to embark on potentially unpopular negotiations with the Armenians for years to come (in the words of HMA Baku 'probably for a generation').

A further consequence of the war has been the widespread demonisation of the other side. The long years of peaceful coexistence are forgotten in favour of the often artificial and manipulated resurrection of perceived ancient Armenian/Turkish enmity. The longer the situation continues, the harder it will become to erase these extreme attitudes. This phenomenon is further aggravated in Azerbaijan by the feelings of shame at defeat. Recent opinion polls show that Karabagh remains an issue of major importance for large numbers of the population. This in turn has contributed to an atmosphere of unreality in local politics. All the government's failures are ascribed to the war. The defeat and failure to find a settlement are attributed (with some justification) to Russian help for the Armenian side. On the other hand, many Azerbaijanis, including senior politicians, dream of using the country's considerable oil wealth to rearm and reconquer the lost territories. In reality, given Armenia's defence treaty with Russia a military solution is not a viable option.

Kyrgyzstan

In 1924 the commissar for nationalities of the young Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, decided to divide up the territory of the former Governorates General of the Steppe and Turkestan on ethnic principles. One of the ethnic groups judged sufficiently numerous to merit an administrative region of their own were the Kyrgyz (or Kara-Kyrgyz as they had been known up to then). The authorities responsible for this delimitation exercise encountered problems in the area of Osh, where the majority of the rural population surrounding the town was Uzbek. Eventually the province was allotted to the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In 1936 this autonomous region was upgraded to full union republic status. It was this status which qualified Kyrgyzstan for independence when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991.

The allocation of Osh to Kyrgyzstan became something of a bone of contention between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities but, under the rigorous discipline of the Soviet regime, these tensions remained beneath the surface. However, disputes over limited land and water resources kept the hostility alive and, when Gorbachev's glasnost' and perestroika policies led to a relaxation of control, these tensions began to manifest themselves. In 1991, there were serious clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz which resulted in several hundred deaths and injuries. Calm was only restored with the intervention of the Soviet army.

Since independence, new dimensions have been added to problems of the South of Kyrgyzstan. Some of these are functions of internal tensions within the republic while others have arisen in the context of Kyrgyzstan's relations with its neighbours and the world in general. Some are affected by both. To take the predominantly internal sources of tension first:

The post-Soviet government in Bishkek is dominated by Northerners, led by President Akaev and his supporters. This dominance, accompanied by growing corruption and

arbitrary government, has increasingly alienated the Southerners in the provinces of Osh and Jalalabad. This alienation took a serious turn in 2001 at the village of Aksy, when ill-disciplined police fired into a crowd, killing a number of demonstrators. Since then there have been demonstrations and marches, and although the situation is now calm, discontent rumbles on. One of the reasons for the 'froideur' in relations between the North and the South of the country is explained by the much greater level of religiosity in the South where, unlike their secular compatriots in the North, the population has traditionally been influenced by the strong Islamic traditions of the Ferghana Valley.

Soon after independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan gained the reputation of being an 'island of democracy' in a sea of Central Asian dictatorships. In comparison with the autocratic regimes of some of its neighbours, the government of President Akaev was and indeed continues to be relatively benign and tolerant. However all things are relative and over the past five years Akaev has increasingly resorted to arbitrary authoritarian methods to secure his position of power. At the same time, the economic decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been more severe than in most other FSU countries. Extreme poverty is widespread and the polarization of society has to some extent been aggravated by the speedy introduction of a market economy as recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and intensified by Kyrgyzstan's membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Regrettably these measures have not been mitigated, as intended, by social protection measures unadulterated by corruption and inefficiency. The serious levels of social deprivation have the potential to lead to tensions in society, perhaps aggravated by the North/South divide mentioned above, and conceivably to aggressive feelings against the government.

Other potential sources of tension have their roots in events outside the country over which Bishkek has little control. In 1999 and the two following years armed groups of guerrillas from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan entered Kyrgyz territory, partly it would seem to raise money by kidnapping foreigners but mainly to use the region as a spring-board to infiltrate Uzbekistan and carry out terrorist attacks against government offices and officials there. Irritated at the perceived inability of the Kyrgyz authorities to control these attacks, the Uzbek government in Tashkent has installed barriers along the frontier and from time to time mounted armed seek-and-destroy incursions into Kyrgyz territory. These may have some limited effect in keeping out Islamic guerrillas, but cause considerable disruption to the locals who, in the Soviet past, were free to carry on trade and social exchanges without regard to frontiers.

Again on the international regional level, yet another source of tension has arisen since independence over the allocation of water originating in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan, to the water-hungry republics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan whose agriculture relies on the free flow of water down Syr Darya river system. Under the Soviet system, Uzbekistan would supply virtually free natural gas to satisfy Kyrgyz energy requirements in winter, so that the latter could allow the Toktagul hydro-electric complex to accumulate water. This would be released through the turbines in spring and summer to generate power for Kyrgyz requirements and supply water for downstream irrigation. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in particular have been plagued by a succession of disputes over the price of gas supplied by the Uzbeks. Faced with higher

charges, the Kyrgyz have on occasion released water from the Toktagul reservoir to supply energy in winter. The result has been a lack of water for downstream irrigation in summer and Uzbek threats to occupy the Toktagul hydro-electric complex.

Finally, there is the danger to social and economic stability caused by the illegal trade in opium and heroin originating in Afghanistan where poppy cultivation has increased exponentially since the collapse of the Taliban regime. The smuggling route across the Pyandzh river and Northwards through the Pamirs of Tajikistan and Osh in Kyrgyzstan is one of the favourites for those involved in this trade.

ANNEX 3: INDEPENDENT BENCHMARKS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN RUSSIA AND THE FSU

Each table in this Annex compares a set of recommendations for conflict prevention and management in selected conflicts (Column 1) with UK responses. Column 2 provides an indication (Yes or No) whether the UK has been active in advancing the listed recommendations outside the GCPP framework. Column 3 provides an indication (Yes or No) whether the GCPP has funded activities in support of similar recommendations for other conflicts. Column 4 provides an indication (Yes or No) whether the GCPP has been funding any activities that align closely to the recommendations for the specific conflict. The use of Question marks (??) indicates some uncertainty about making even some indication of Yes or No.

The judgements made in this Annex about the objective of existing GCPP projects relative to the recommendations from other organisations is of necessity subjective. Moreover, the relationship between each recommendation and the judgement about the purpose of GCPP activities is for broad indicative purposes only. There may be GCPP projects which touch marginally on the topic of a recommendation but for which the indication given about its link to the recommendation is a 'No'.

Table 1: OSCE Assembly Recommendations on Chechnya and UK Responses

RECOMMENDATIONS	Other UK CP Efforts	Similar GCPP actions elsewhere	GCPP measures in place
All contending parties to seek a political solution to the conflict in accordance with international law and the will of all peoples concerned.	Y	Y	NO
The government of the Russian Federation to ensure that its military command enforces the basic tenets of humanitarian law during armed conflict and international agreements to which the Russian government is signatory.	Y	Y	NO
Welcomes ... the consultative expert assistance of three Council of Europe experts working in the Office of Mr Kalmanov, and in setting up of a joint working group of the Council of Europe Assembly and the Russian State Duma to monitor the implementation of recommendations by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly on Chechnya and to present regular progress reports.	Y	Y	NO
Participating States to take effective measures to prevent any assistance to terrorist and extremist forces in Chechnya and to strengthen their cooperation in fighting international terrorism.	Y	Y	NO
Reiterates its belief, as expressed in the Concluding Document of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE, that a political solution to the conflict is essential, and that the assistance of the OSCE would contribute to achieving that goal.	Y	Y	??
Welcomes the return of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya and expresses its expectation that the Assistance Group—on the basis of its 1995 mandate—will be able expectation that the Assistance Group—on the basis of its 1995 mandate—will be able to promote the peaceful settlement of the crisis and stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic.	Y	Y	??
Commends the efforts of the ... OSCE observer mission on the Georgian-Russian border.	Y	Y	??
Continues to call upon all parties in the conflict to observe assiduously and conscientiously the territorial integrity of all sovereign states in the region and to refrain from any actions that might contravene that territorial integrity or undermine regional security.	Y	N	NO
Welcomes the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the OSCE on 13 June 2001 and the return of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya.	Y	Y	N
Reiterates its belief, as expressed in the Concluding Document of the 1999 Istanbul Summit, that a political solution to the conflict is essential and that the Assistance Group can contribute to achieving this goal on the basis of the April 1995 mandate.	Y	Y	Y

Table 2: Cornell Caspian Consulting Recommendations on the Southern Caucasus and UK Responses

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS	Other UK CP Efforts	Similar GCPP actions elsewhere	GCPP measures in place
Any effort at long-term development assistance and conflict prevention in the South Caucasus needs to be of a regional character.	Y	Y	Y
The improvement of regional trade is crucial to durable peace and prosperity in the region but is frustrated by the deadlock in ethno-political conflicts. The economic dimension needs to be further and more concretely incorporated into the process of conflict resolution and the work of negotiators.	Y	Y	N
Efforts to solve these conflicts must focus on altering the images of the 'other' that parties to conflicts have.	Y	Y	Y
Promote solutions that address the actual issues in these conflicts: security, symbolic politics, and national pride.	Y	Y	N
New assistance to the Caucasus should be better coordinated with existing programmes and projects of international organisations or individual countries' aid agencies. A more detailed survey of ongoing programmes and their results could provide a good picture of worthwhile projects.	Y	Y	N
Involve experts and beneficiaries in the decision-making process.	Y	Y	Y
Long-term partnerships need to be developed with state and non-state institutions in the region.	Y	Y	N
Ethnic nationalism can only be effectively counteracted if the national identities of the three states develop away from ethnic- and blood-based identities in the direction of civic- and citizenship-based criteria for membership in the national community.	Y	Y	N
The trans-national crime scene in the South Caucasus is poorly understood. Assistance needs to be geared toward containing and combating trans-national crime, and for that purpose its patterns need to be studied in more detail.	Y	N	N
Until national statehood has been consolidated, strengthening of local self-rule, especially in ethnic minority areas, is likely to have a divisive and fragmenting effect on the region. In its place, integration of minorities in the national polity and economy should be encouraged.	Y	Y	N
Efforts to improve the socio-economic conditions in minority areas are crucial to attenuating perceptions of discrimination among minorities. Planning of development assistance must hence ensure that minority areas are not marginalized.	Y	Y	N
Encouraging various forms of dialogue among communities For this purpose, working with graduate students, NGOs, and the media may be the best way of having an impact throughout society. Another opportunity is to organize the reunion or meeting of mixed families that were divided as a result of conflict, something that has not been done so far.	Y	Y	Y
There a number of areas in the field of environment protection that are suitable for regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. They are trans-boundary water and air pollution. Despite the fact that there are a number of projects that address trans-boundary water issues, there are numerous gaps and issues that need to be timely addressed to avoid conflict situations between the countries. The capacity of institutions dealing with the issue is weak, legislation is underdeveloped.	Y	Y	N
Ethnic tensions in Javakheti need to be reduced, and the most feasible way of achieving that is through the integration of Javakheti with the rest of Georgia economically. A concrete way of promoting this is through the restoration of the Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki road. The reconstruction and expansion of communications would immediately change the economic conditions of Javakheti, enabling its integration with the rest of Georgia, and thereby both the improvement of the economic situation in the region and the lessening of mutual suspicion and fear between Georgians and Armenians.	Y	Y	N
The Pankisi gorge, with the presence of transnational crime networks, Islamic radicals, and Chechen fighters is an explosive region, and the primary possible justification for a Russian intervention. Any attempt to 'root out' terrorism and crime in Pankisi must be done extremely cautiously, and without alienating the groups of Kists, Georgians and Chechen refugees—all of which need to be enticed into establishing.	N	Y	N

Table 3: SCA Recommendations on Nagornyi-Karabagh and UK Responses

RECOMMENDATIONS	Other UK CP Efforts	Similar GCPP actions elsewhere	GCPP measures in place
Work collectively to achieve a shift in the balance of strategy from short-term security interests to developing long-term structural stability within the region. Specifically they should:			
Shift from a policy of strategic containment in relation to Afghanistan to a more proactive engagement that involves providing carrots (reconstruction aid alternatives to the drug economy) as well as stick (sanctions and international isolation);			
Recognise that the issues of regional security are not just drugs terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism but poor governance and growing inequalities that fuel greed and grievance dynamics;			
Recognise that China and India share similar concerns about security in the region and should be included in the development of a strategic responses .			
Recognise that support for good governance is essential if emerging 'greed' and 'grievance' dynamics are to be addressed;			
Take the initiative perhaps through a conference on the region to develop medium and long-term strategies and consider their relationship to the current short term strategies (market economics ad security containment); and			
Include the IFIs in this process and ensure that their strategies reflect the risk of conflict.			
Monitor and jointly analyse events that might constitute triggers for conflict. Specifically, they should:			
Monitor border incursions, both from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan;			
Offer assistance for the demarcation of borders;			
Seek ways to reduce tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan over resource issues perhaps by international mediation;			
Monitor land sales following the lifting of the moratorium;			
Monitor ethnic tensions and develop contingency plans with government to clamp down on any outbursts of violence;			
Make contingency plans for 'trigger' events.			
Adopt a more conflict-sensitive approach to their market reform model. Specifically they should:			
Recognise that slavishly following a market economics model can exacerbate conflict dynamics in the region which may ultimately undermine their economic reform objectives; Recognise that WTO membership has created tensions that could lead to conflict if not addressed;			
Give more attention to the sequencing and overall balance of reform processes. For instance build institutions before lifting controls. Develop the capacity of the state to provide services to citizens;			
Expand aid programmes in conflict sensitive areas;			
Strengthen support for activities that promote good governance;			
Link political and economic support to progress on governance issues including those relating to poverty reduction such as market cartels;			
Consider the application of political conditionalities in relation to economic aid;			
Support the OSCE politically and financially to take a stronger role in monitoring political processes and the status of minorities. (Britain should press the EU to take a more active role in this process);			

Insist on the separation of the judiciary from political influences, and the freedom of the press.			
Increase support for poverty reduction as a means to promote good governance and the development of a civil society. Specifically they should:			
Actively engage the World Bank comprehensive development framework (CDF) in order to remove governance obstacles to poverty reduction targets;			
Address the governance obstacles that prevent poor people from achieving sustainable livelihoods notably through marketing arrangements and developing small and medium enterprises;			
Engage more deeply with civil society by developing their analysis of civic groups in the region and providing strategic and long term support;			
Examine the potential welfare support and peace-building role of grass-roots Islamic groups in the region;			
Provide core support to NGOs in addition to grants for projects;			
Support the development of community-based organisations through the UNDO and other channels;			
Encourage more International NGOs to work in support of NGOs and CBOs; Support NGOs in developing public awareness and advocacy strategies especially in relation to governance issues.			
Improve contextual analysis and monitoring and evaluation of programmes from a conflict perspective. Specifically they should:			
Apply 'do no harm' tests in project design monitoring and evaluation processes, specifically in relation to social exclusion ethnicity and opportunities for 'greed' by elites;			
Develop security procedures and policies that enable them to work effectively in unstable areas;			
Consolidate the process of gathering information and analysis through for example the ICG, OSCE, SDC and UNDP;			
Monitor the effects of lifting the moratorium on land sales in the Ferghana valley;			
Monitor the effects of incursions and refugees flows in the South;			
Monitor ethnicity in employment and in the distribution of profits in aid programmes;			
Initiate further research on 'greed' (emergence of warlords, drugs etc) and 'grievance' (poverty, social exclusion etc) dynamic and the synergies between the two.			

Table 4: Selected International Crisis Group Recommendations on Central Asia

RECOMMENDATIONS	Other UK CP Efforts	Similar GCPP actions elsewhere	GCPP measures in place
Kyrgyzstan (August 2001 and August 2002)			
Develop a common platform among the US, the EU and the OSCE to push for political reform.	Y	Y	N
Provide financial and technical assistance to underpin these reforms, if it is clear that there is real political will behind them.	N	Y	N
Major donor countries—in particular the United States, the members of the European Union and Japan—should make it clear that any rescheduling of Kyrgyzstan's debt and continued aid will be contingent on further economic reforms and an immediate improvement in the treatment of opposition groups, journalists and the other components of a civil society.	N	Y	N
Donors should work closely with the Kyrgyz authorities, local NGOs, the media and the domestic/international business community to reduce corruption, and make clear that future cooperation will hinge on major improvements in the rule of law. Encourage parliament to pass laws governing lobbying and outlawing bribery. Step up assistance for legal training.	N	Y	N
Donors should assist the Kyrgyz authorities to improve training for journalists and provide financial support to the independent media to reduce its technical dependence on the state, by funding, for example, an independent publishing and printing house.	Y	Y	N
These countries should help the Kyrgyz authorities in their current efforts to restructure government administration through training of public officials and by aiding the introduction of new standards of personnel management.	Y	Y	N
Provide assistance to widen the scope and ownership of the media and to reform the state media so that it offers broader, independent news coverage, and train journalists in both the independent and state sectors.	Y	Y	N
Link further financial assistance, including assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs), to effective implementation of changes in the political system, without which economic development is unlikely.	N	Y	N
Offer a substantial increase in resources for the OSCE office in Kyrgyzstan, including personnel, to assist in a wider programme of political and economic reform.	N	Y	N
Central Asia and Islam (2003)			
Consistently press Central Asian governments to respect freedom of belief for members of all faiths and promote observance of international conventions regarding freedom of belief and religion.	Y	Y	N
Take a firmly critical line against governments that practice torture and other abuses of religious prisoners.	Y	Y	N
Consider widening exchange programmes to include more religious figures, with the aim of improving religious education and demonstrating freedoms of belief.	N	Y	N
Engage where possible with Islamic institutions to promote greater awareness of the international community among their students and provide appropriate assistance, for example with literature, computer technology and language classes.	Y	Y	N

ANNEX 4: BASELINE ELEMENTS

The Russian and FSU Strategy, which does not manage the peacekeeping expenditure referred to above, does manage two components of spending. These are described as 'programme elements' and 'baseline commitments'. The programme elements include projects in place when the GCPP was established and whose funding was transferred to the GCPP budget. These have been called 'legacy' projects. Programme elements also include new projects, which are assumed to be more sharply aligned to the goals of the GCPP than a number of legacy projects might have been. Apart from programme elements, the Russia and FSU Strategy includes 'baseline commitments'. These were activities whose funding base was transferred to the GCPP but which were not identified separately as projects. The reasons for this distinction are not clear and reporting practice seems a little inconsistent. For example, the Russian Resettlement Programme (RRP) has been included in the baseline expenses, while new activities under the RRP were reported in programme elements for 2002/3.

In the Russia and FSU Strategy, the overwhelming proportion of baseline commitments has been managed by MOD. In 2002/3, of £8.326 million allocated for the Russia and FSU Strategy, less than half (£3.447m) was directed to the four headline goals or thematic areas and the remainder was allocated to baseline commitments. There were two main elements in the baseline spending: the MOD Outreach Programme (£3.3m) and FCO commitments (£0.6m).

Most of the MOD Outreach Programme (£2.06m) was allocated to the RRP which aims to provide assistance for redundant Russian military officers. The Outreach Programme also includes most of the 'defence diplomacy' activity of HMG in Russia and the FSU, as well as a number of operational requirements (especially training) related either to the UK's interest in promoting UN peacekeeping or to more basic requirements for some interoperability stemming from the demands of the UK military posture (either for combined combat operations or for development purposes under arrangements like Partnership for Peace). These activities included training for peace support operations, training in counter-terrorism and seminars promoting democratic reform of the armed forces.

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Abbott-Watt, Thorda: HMA Armenia
Abdullaeva, Arezu: Helsinki Citizens' Assembly
Aliev, Arif: Yeni Nesil
Alieva, Leila: Centre for National and International Studies
Aptsiauri, Dr David: First Deputy Minister, MFA Georgia
Atajanov, Sabir Sadykovich: Deputy Head, Osh Regional Administration
Bakradze, Dr David: Director, Centre for International Security and Conflict Management
Balm, Lt Col Steve: Royal Marines, SO1 Outreach Programme Coordinator for Central and Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, MOD
Barnes-Jones, HMA Deborah: British Embassy, Georgia
Batiashvili, Irakli: Committee for Defence and Security, Parliament of Georgia
Betrand, Catherine: Representative, UNHCR, Georgia
Bilikava, Natalia: Don Women's Union
Blair, Dennis: Deputy Regional Representative, UNHCR
Bremner, David: International Alert
Brocking, Elisabeth: Counsellor for Political and Economic Affairs, US Embassy, Tbilisi
Byrne, Jack: Catholic Relief Services, Baku
Champain, Phil: International Alert
Cherkassov, Dr Igor: Senior Researcher, Institute for State and Law
Clark, Lance: Resident Representative, UNDP
Clogg, Rachel: Associate Manager, Caucasus Programme, Conciliation Resources
Cohen, Jonathon: Conciliation Resources
Darchiashvili, Dr David: Board Member, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
Darbo, Igor: Project Manager, EU Mission, Georgia
Dardanov, Colonel Kemalbek Directorate for International Frontier Cooperation.
Dinsley, Andrew: First Secretary, British Embassy, Almaty
Donnelly, Matthew: FCO
Dyarchenko, Oleg: RRP Project Moscow
Egemberdiev, Chingiz: Kyrgyzstan, MFA, CIS Directorate.
Eryomin, Viktor D: Vice-Rector, Rostov State Civil Engineering University
Fall, Sir Brian: UK Special Representative for Georgia and the Southern Caucasus
Fedorova, Tatiana: Head of the Department for Economic Reform Eurasia Foundation Moscow Office
Gatsinski, Valentin: Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA Moscow
Gegishidze, Ambassador Archil, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies
Gevorgian, Victoria: DFID officer, British Embassy, Erevan
Ghazaryan, Ara: EC HR compliance, Project Trainer, Erevan
Gogia, Giorgi: Analyst, International Crisis Group, Georgia
Goncharov, Alexandr: Russian Resettlement Project, Moscow
Hamalian, Sona: Eurasia Foundation Erevan
Hayes, Tim: Country Director Eurasia Foundation Baku
Helly, Dr Damien: Georgia Project, International Crisis Group
Hinchon, David: Third Secretary, British Embassy, Almaty
Idil, Aydin: Director, OSCE, Bishkek

Jakypova, Chinara: IWPR Bishkek
Japaridze, Ambassador Tedo: National Security Adviser to the President of Georgia
Jardim, Squadron Leader Max: Project Officer, Russian Resettlement Programme
Kakabadze, Malkhaz: Minister of Special Situations, Georgia
Kaliyeva, Tamara: Adil Soz, Almaty
Kanunikov, Anatoly Vassilevich: Director of RRP, Rostov
Karakhanian, Aghavni: Institute for Civil Society and Regional Development
Kasprczyk, Andrzej: Personal representative of the OSCE chairman in office
Kasybekov, Erkinbek: Counterpart Consortium
Katzsch-Egli, Ute DHM: German Embassy, Bishkek
Khimshiashvili, Kakha: Development Officer, DFID Georgia
Knust, Christian: OSCE, Bishkek.
Kolbaia, Vakhtang: Deputy Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia
Kortunov, Dr Andrei Vadimovich: Vice President, Eurasia Foundation Moscow Office
Krasnogorskaia, Irina: Don Women's Union
Kyrgyz Office for Water Management.
Leach, Kathy: First Secretary, British Embassy
Lyne, HMA Sir Roderic: British Embassy, Moscow
Mackenna, Rod: Third Secretary, British Embassy, Tbilisi
Mackintosh, Kenny: Assistant DA, British Embassy, Almaty
McLaren, Stuart: Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy, Georgia
Melbourne, Sean: Second Secretary, British Embassy
Melikian, Ashot: Yerevan Press Club
Meskhi, Lali: Head of Development Section, UK Embassy, Georgia
Metcalf, Air Commodore Wilson: Defence Attache, British Embassy
Mkrtchian, Artyush: Gyumri Development Association
Molenaar, H.E. Ambassador Harry: Netherlands Embassy, Tbilisi
Murrell, Sarah: Third Secretary: British Embassy, Erevan
Navarsadian, Boris: Yerevan Press Club
Navoyan, Arayik: Dept for External Relations of the French University of Armenia.
Novruzov, Syavush: Yeni Azerbaijan Party.
Nunn, Lt Col Chris: Defence Attache, South Caucasus
O'Connor, Faye: Second Secretary, British Embassy
Ohanjanian, Karen: Helsinki Citizens' Association, Erevan
Oliphant, Craig: Research Department, FCO
Orestis, Cecilie: Political and Human Dimension Officer, OSCE. Osh
Perrotta, Louise: DFID
Pikaev, Dr Alexander: Senior Researcher, Carnegie Centre Moscow
Pye, Cate: Policy and Defence Relations Directorate, MOD
Poghosian, Gevorg: Armenian Sociological Association.
Quliev, Kazim: Eurasia Foundation, formerly the DFID officer in the British Embassy
Ramishvili, Levan: Liberty Institute, Georgia
Ray, Kakoli: IOM, Bishkek.
Reeve, Roy: Ambassador, OSCE
Revzanov, Dr: Deputy Minister of Education, Rostov Oblast Administration
Rzaev, Shahin: IWPR
Sandukchyan, David: Internews Erevan

Sasykbaeva, Asiya Interbilim (NGO)
Schmid, Steven: Regional Director, Eurasia Foundation Moscow Office
Schroeder, Dominic: Deputy Head, Eastern Department, FCO
Shakhverdiev, Jamal: Eurasia, formerly of Mercy Corps
Sharp, James: HMA Kazakhstan
Shengelia, Zourab: Institute of Georgian-Abkhaz Relations
Shepelenko, Liudmila: Don Women's Union
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Torosian, Tigran: Deputy Speaker, Armenian Parliament
Tucker, HMA Andrew: British Ambassador, Baku
Vantomme, M. Jacques: First Counsellor, EU Mission to Georgia
Wygant, Michael: OSCE Erevan
Yunusova, Leila: Institute for Peace and Democracy.
Zadoyan, Karen: Armenian Young Lawyers' Association
Zeynalov, Eldar: Human Rights Centre of Azerbaijan

Two Groups of beneficiaries of the RRP, each of 10, one group in Moscow at the British Council and one in Rostov at the RRP Centre in Rostov State Civil Engineering University.

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

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- Reduce child mortality
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- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

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ISBN: 1 86192 616 2