

# Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

## Strengthening the United Nations

*Principal author,  
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with input from Andrew Mack*



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office



CABINET  
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



HM TREASURY

# **Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools**

**Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC**

**& Associated Consultants**

**Thematic Case Study 2**

## **Strengthening the United Nations**

**Principal Author: Pierre Robert with input from Andrew Mack**

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### **DISCLAIMER**

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author/s and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development nor of the other government departments who have assisted in managing this evaluation (Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, HM Treasury).

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## PREFACE

P1. The Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) are a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID) mechanism for funding and managing the UK's contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) covers sub-Saharan Africa while the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) covers the rest of the world. The CPPs were established by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) in April 2001, following a government-wide review of UK conflict prevention work in 2000. The rationale behind the CPPs is that by bringing together the interests, resources and expertise of FCO, MOD and DFID, greater effectiveness can be achieved. To this end, the CPPs share a joint Public Service Agreement (PSA) target, expressed as follows:

Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution.

P2. HMG commissioned the first evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools to inform the Spending Review 2004 (SR04). DFID has managed this evaluation through Evaluation Department in collaboration with an Evaluation Management Committee (EMC) that also included the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat (Chair), the FCO's United Nations Department, MOD's Directorate of Policy and Planning, DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and DFID's Africa Conflict Team (now the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit), situated in the Africa and Greater Horn Department (AGHD).

P3. The establishment of a cross-Whitehall Evaluation Management Committee was an innovative approach to managing an evaluation in DFID, and followed the ethos of the joint working of the CPPs. It allowed for extensive consultation between the various departments and conflict prevention teams. Many thanks are due to the various EMC members who contributed to the management of this evaluation. These include: Chris Chalmers, Benjamin Saoul and Anthea Dolman (Cabinet Office), Clare Barras and Stephen Evans (HMT), Joan Link, Euan Wallace and Karen Wolstenholme (FCO), Bernard Harborne and Malcolm Hood (AGHD), Tom Owen-Edmunds, Catherine Masterman and Ben le Roith (CHAD), Alicia Forsyth, Charlotte Brown, Campbell McCafferty (MOD).

P4. The study was managed by Mary Thompson, Iain Murray and Dale Poad (DFID Evaluation Department) in collaboration with the EMC. It was edited by Caryn Maclean.

P5. The evaluation was undertaken by Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, the PARC & Associated Consultants. The United Nations (UN) Case study was carried out by Mr Pierre Robert with Professor Andrew Mack. The study was carried out through documentary review and interviews with members of the UN GCPP Steering Committee, other London-based officials, UK officials and other stakeholders in other case study countries, staff from the UK's UN Mission in New York (UKMIS) and with senior staff at the UN and at other relevant institutions involved in managing projects funded under the Strategy.<sup>1</sup> The main evaluator also drew on experience from having evaluated a specific GCPP UN Strategy project, the Early Warning and Preventative Measures (EWPM) training, implemented by the UN System Staff College, early in 2003.

P6. The aim of the evaluation of the CPPs is to assess current government approaches to Conflict Prevention through the GCPP and the ACPP, and to provide an overview of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward. The purpose of evaluation generally is to examine the design, implementation and impact of selected programmes in order to learn lessons from them so that these can be applied to current and future work, and also to help strengthen HMG's accountability. It should be borne in mind that any programmes or projects examined are the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed have often changed in the light of HMG's developing knowledge.

P7. The UN Case Study is one of six studies undertaken within the framework of the evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the Inception Report, the Evaluation placed maximum emphasis on the macro level: the policy processes in Whitehall by which decisions on allocations are made and implemented by the CPPs. Considerable attention has also been placed on the meso level: the degree to which CPP policies and activities in a given conflict form part of a coherent package of direct interventions by the international community and local actors to the problems of particular large scale deadly conflicts or potential conflicts. The micro-level of analysis (review of specific projects) confines itself largely to the way in which projects impact on the meso and macro levels. The Evaluation has not analysed systematically whether specific projects funded by the CPPs have been well managed and whether they have achieved their specific project goals. Single projects have been analysed to the extent that they reflect on the macro and meso levels.

P8. The main findings of the evaluation, reflected in this Synthesis Report, are that the CPPs are doing significant work funding worthwhile activities that make positive contributions to effective conflict prevention, although it is far too early in the day to assess impact. The progress achieved through the CPP mechanisms is significant enough to justify their continuation. Overall, the consultants believe that worthwhile improvements could be achieved through:

- a. more consistent approaches to joint assessment and priority setting;
- b. more determined pursuit of coordinated international responses;
- c. and by allocation of more administrative resources and staff trained appropriately in the associated processes.

P9. The 'Strengthening the UN Strategy' under the GCPP is an important strategy of the CPP system. Currently funded at just under £11 million in 2003/4, it supports a portfolio of projects of a size and scope that makes the UK one of the major supporters of reform of UN conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities outside normal UN budget processes. The UN Case Study notes that that a considerable amount of UK effort related to UN conflict prevention activity is conducted completely outside the framework of the CPPs. Therefore, where useful, this report also considers the interface between the UN Strategy and other activities.

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<sup>1</sup> One evaluator visited a Civilian Police training workshop in Bramshill near London, where police trainers from about 20 countries contributing (or interested in contributing in future) civilian police forces to UN peace-keeping operations were trained in interactive training methods covering human rights and policing standards.

P10. Overall the consultant's main findings are as follows:

- a. UN Strategy-funded activities have been highly relevant to elements of the reform agenda in the UN as it affects conflict prevention, though it has not paid as much attention to directly influencing key UN institutions or to the high-level politics of conflict prevention within the system as it has to indirect influences and middle-level mechanisms. The UN Strategy is now looking at new initiatives in this area. Indirect effects from GCPP activities, crucial to advancing reform of UN systems for conflict prevention, include the fact that the UN Secretariat regularly turns to the UK for expertise and advice.
- b. Whilst the UN Strategy has paid relatively little attention to how it might be used to directly mobilise other UN members to assist in pushing for reform of the UN conflict prevention system, this issue has been addressed by UK policy outside the GCPP. Meanwhile, the UN Strategy itself has progressively moved to find funding partners in a number of areas.
- c. The UN Strategy is currently in transition. The recent internal review of the UN strategy appears to have enhanced the quality of the management of the projects funded under the strategy through pooled efforts from the three departments involved. The Evaluation found regular, intense and effective consultation between FCO and DFID, whilst MOD has participated but not as vigorously as the trilateral system of the CPPs might have implied. There is potential for more effective inter-departmental collaboration, which would be assisted by clearer procedures, guidelines and staff training.
- d. Whilst projects implemented under the UN Strategy are managed tightly, any judgement on the overall cost effectiveness of the UN Strategy would depend on a much more detailed analysis of what alternative uses the money could have been put to than has been undertaken so far.

P11. The evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools is comprised of the following reports which can be found on the corresponding web-site links:

Synthesis Report	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647synthesis.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647synthesis.pdf</a>
Security Sector Reform, Nicole Ball	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf</a>
United Nations, Pierre Robert & Andrew Mack	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.un.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.un.pdf</a>
Sudan, Emery Brusset	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.sudan.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.sudan.pdf</a>
Sierra Leone, Jeremy Ginifer & Kaye Oliver	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.sleone.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.sleone.pdf</a>
Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand & Paul Bergne	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.afghanistan.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.afghanistan.pdf</a>
Russia and the FSU, Greg Austin & Paul Bergne	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf</a>
Portfolio Review, Greg Austin & Malcolm Chalmers	<a href="http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.portfolio.pdf">www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647.portfolio.pdf</a>

Evaluation reports can be found at the DFID website:

<http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/>

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2 April 2004





## **EVALUATION TEAM ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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The Evaluation Team has been supported effectively by Ms Janet Wilson, the Programme Officer at Bradford University's Centre for International Cooperation and Security. Research assistance has been provided by Mr Todd Krannock, Mr David Newton, Mr Rob Lawton, Mr Nick Robson and Mr Thom Oommen. Mr Ken Berry has provided review assistance for the synthesis report and some case study reports, as well as having drafted some background material.

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Channel Research Ltd  
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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

AU	Africa Union
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
BPU	Best Practices Unit (DPKO)
CAAC	Children Affected by Armed Conflict
CIC	Center on International Cooperation
CPPF	Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum
CPPs	Conflict Prevention Pools
DDA	Department for Disarmament Affairs
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DFID	Department for International Development
DOP (OA)	Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (Sub-Committee for Outside Sub-Saharan Africa)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPS	Executive Committee on Peace and Security
EISAS	ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat
EMC	Evaluation Management Committee
EU	European Union
EWPM	Early Warning and Preventive Measures
FALD	Field Administration and Logistics Division
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FT	Framework Team
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HMT	Her Majesty's Treasury
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMTFs	Integrated Mission Task Forces
IPA	International Peace Academy

IT	Information Technology
ITSD	Information Technology Services Division
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
OHCHR	Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSRSG-CAAC	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children Affected by Armed Conflict
P5	Five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
PBU	Peacebuilding Unit
POE	Peace Operations Extranet
PSA	Public Service Agreement
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDA	Service Delivery Agreement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TES	Training and Evaluation Service
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UKMIS	UK's UN Mission in New York
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Teams
UND	United Nations Department (FCO)
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

S1. The 'Strengthening the United Nations (UN) Strategy' under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) is an important strategy of the Conflict Pools system. It has received between 12 and 15 per cent of GCPP funds since its inception so that the UK can gain the added leverage in its conflict prevention efforts around the world that the UN system offers. Currently funded at just under £11 million in 2003/4, it supports a portfolio of projects of a size and scope that makes the UK one of the major supporters of reform of UN conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities outside normal UN budget processes.

### **Effect on Preventing New Conflicts and Containing Existing Ones**

S2. The Strategy-funded activities have been highly relevant to elements of the reform agenda in the UN as it affects conflict prevention. This agenda has been laid out in reports by the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and by the former Under-Secretary-General, Lakdar Brahimi. The GCPP UN Strategy has been directed to securing improvements against the benchmarks provided by these reports, though of the two, the UN Strategy has so far concentrated most explicitly on the Brahimi report. Thus, support for peacekeeping and international policing has been among its main priorities. This has included funding of peacekeeping exercises, support to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana—in cooperation with the Africa Conflict Prevention Pools (ACPP)—and support for peacekeeping training in countries such as Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Thailand and Vietnam. The UN strategy has also been active in support of the UN Development Program (UNDP) strategic planning and the special needs of women and children, issues canvassed in Annan's report.

S3. The UN Strategy has not paid as much attention to directly influencing key UN institutions or to the high-level politics of conflict prevention within the system (the issues identified mainly in the Annan report) as it has to indirect influences and middle-level mechanisms. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), one of the key institutions identified by Annan in his report, will be an important target in this regard and the UN Strategy is now looking at new initiatives in this area (having previously given strong support to the peacebuilding programme within DPA). The GCPP UN Strategy has concentrated its efforts on international arrangements and processes in the UN Headquarters and UNDP in New York. Outside New York, most of the UN Strategy's efforts have been targeted at support for peacekeeping-related activities. It has not directly targeted a number of programmes and agencies outside New York that have important roles in conflict prevention, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Geneva or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.

S4. There are important indirect effects from the GCPP activities that are crucial to advancing reform of UN systems for conflict prevention. This is the degree to which the GCPP spending offers the UK an influential position as part of the deliberation on substantive organisational or conflict-specific issues. Officials are correct to note that the UN Secretariat regularly turns to the UK for expertise and advice, and probably just as correct to assert that this access flows in part from the GCPP activities.

S5. The UN Strategy is one of the few Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) strategies to have explicitly accepted an externally derived set of benchmarks. The projects under the strategy appear to have been effective, in general, in reaching the objectives set out for them. This can be ascribed to skilled selection of projects, good timing and good choices by implementing staff. The UN Strategy has been reviewed critically by its Steering Group in connection with bids for 2002/3 and in 2003/4. These reviews, though brief, reveal a thoughtful and innovative approach to improving the reach and effect of the Strategy. Further innovation in the Strategy is severely constrained by pre-existing commitments, political realities of supporting reform in the UN system and, as discussed later, by availability of staff resources.

### **Effect on International Arrangements**

S6. The Terms of Reference (ToRs) required the Evaluation to address the effect of the CPPs on international arrangements. This question may appear more appropriately directed at the country case studies: did the CPP-funded measures help to mobilise more effective efforts by international partners of the UK for the specific conflicts in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan or the former Soviet Union? For a case study like the UN Strategy, which is directed entirely at enhancing the capacities of a major international partner of the UK, in this case the UN, this question seems somewhat artificial in that it overlaps with the first question addressed above. Nevertheless, there is room for some additional analysis of how the UN Strategy might address its potential to mobilise key international actors behind its aims and activities. Two issues arise.

S7. First, is the issue of co-funding by the GCPP and other donors, such as Canada, France or Japan, of certain initiatives. Officials have rightly identified the political sensitivities in any effort to work on these fronts. Before the UN Strategy was established, Her Majesty's Government (HMG) deliberately avoided these partnerships for the most part within its UN reform projects. Since its creation however, the UN Strategy has progressively moved to find funding partners in a number of areas. At the same time, the issue of how the UN Strategy might engage other donors does not appear to have been canvassed in a comprehensive way. The Strategy has paid relatively little attention to how it might be used to directly mobilise other UN members to assist in pushing for reform of the UN conflict prevention system (this has of course been a plank of UK policy toward the UN outside the GCPP).

S8. Second is the question of how to link up the country-specific conflict prevention priorities in the GCPP and ACPP with the UN reform agenda in ways that maximise potential for economies and better outcomes through collaboration with partners. Three issues identified in the Annan report are particularly apt: the need to increase the use of UN fact-finding missions, the need to rely more on special envoys, and the need to develop regional prevention strategies with other states in conjunction with UN agencies. Some of these issues are on the agenda of the UN Strategy Steering Group, but probably cannot be taken up by the UN Strategy Steering Group acting alone (there may need to be a wider GCPP-ACPP joint deliberation, in which strategy managers from the high priority conflicts can participate).

## **Effect on Inter-Departmental Processes**

S9. The existence of the GCPP appears to have brought added value to UK support for UN reform in the area of conflict prevention by bringing the three ministries together to develop a joint UN Strategy. The pooling of knowledge that the strategy review process has involved appears to have enhanced the quality of the management of the projects funded under the Strategy. The Evaluation found regular, intense and effective consultation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UN Strategy. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has participated but not as vigorously as the trilateral system of the CPPs might have implied. Until a recent reorganisation of the MOD's defence diplomacy directorates, there was not a dedicated counterpart in MOD for the FCO and DFID officers involved in the UN Strategy. This has now changed, and all departments now expect a more systematic buy-in from MOD.

S10. Like its counterparts in other parts of the CPPs, the UN Strategy is in transition—from a collection of existing projects brought under the Pools in 2001 by the participating ministries to a more integrated, better planned and therefore more strategic programme. As suggested above, a review of the UN Strategy in connection with bids for GCPP allocations in 2003/4 mapped out a well-conceived and wide-ranging set of initiatives. But the Strategy has not been developed on the basis of a well-developed set of intermediate objectives, risk assessments, or timelines for achieving its objectives. The Strategy has not been the object of a wide discussion, review and adjustment across the three ministries nor across the Pools system. Input from posts and officials with specialist knowledge of UN agencies based outside New York seems to have been limited. The UN Strategy, like its CPP counterparts, has also been affected by unclear procedures and by the absence of proper training or guidelines for staff on the CPP's objectives and project management processes. There is room to conclude that successes to date of the UN Strategy might as readily have been achieved had the projects been implemented outside a GCPP framework. There is however considerable potential within the CPP systems for more effective inter-departmental collaboration.

## **Implications for Financial Management**

S11. Projects implemented under the UN Strategy are managed tightly and are resulting in good value for money in terms of project-specific outcomes. Any judgement on the overall cost effectiveness of the UN Strategy would, however, depend on a much more detailed analysis of what alternative uses the money could have been put to than has been undertaken so far. More careful financial management of the UN Strategy's £11 million could probably be achieved if the key strategy document itself was improved by being much more explicit in terms of intermediate objectives, incremental steps and timelines for achieving outcomes.

## **Recommendations**

S12. The key recommendation in this report concerns strategy development and the staffing resource issues that go with it. The UN Strategy should more explicitly identify (in brief) the full range of reforms needed and rank them according to priority. It should then canvas

the opportunities for the UK to make a meaningful contribution to the highest priority issues. In this regard, consideration should be given to the balance in UN Strategy projects between those supporting the Annan report and those supporting the Brahimi report. There may be considerable room to shift the balance more toward the Annan recommendations. There may be some value in a careful reappraisal of the share of GCPP money allocated in support of peacebuilding compared with the share going toward preventive action, the focus of Annan's report.

S13. The broader UN system outside New York should be taken into account in refining the Strategy. As a corollary, consultations on the strategy within HMG should involve more posts than is currently the case. Geographic strategy managers should be consulted in shaping and implementing the UN Strategy. HMG could rely more on the UN training systems it funds for UN staff to address the training deficit a number of officials have identified for HMG staff working on the CPPs. While an evaluation of the overall UK strategy towards the UN is outside the scope of the present study, it is strongly suggested that the GCPP Strategy should be reviewed in light of the overall aims of the UK in relation to the UN.

S14. Such ambitious strategy development for an £11 million annual programme active in many parts of the world, with important potential synergies with other parts of the GCPP and ACPP, probably demands a different allocation of staff resources and a different set of structures and processes than those in place at present. It may be unreasonable to expect the three Steering Group staff members based in London and committing only a fraction of their time to the UN Strategy, to be able to deliver the analysis, monitoring and review functions implied by the above findings and recommendations.



## 1. BACKGROUND

1. After a report on United Nations (UN) peace operations by a panel of experts chaired by UN Under-Secretary-General Lakdar Brahimi,<sup>2</sup> the Security Council affirmed its intention, to strengthen international efforts at conflict prevention and called on the appropriate action by Member States. The Brahimi Report called, *inter alia*, for enhanced integration of the activities of UN agencies involved in peacekeeping operations, and for increased capacity at the UN Secretariat for mission support, from operational guidelines to strategic analysis. In a further major report on conflict prevention delivered to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General affirmed the need for a shift to a culture of conflict prevention.<sup>3</sup> The UN, the prevention report argued, had for too long simply reacted to conflicts, it was now time to be more proactive in preventing them. The report advocated a series of wide-ranging reforms and changes in the attitudes of member states.

2. Following this and several related resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on conflict prevention, the General Assembly in July 2003 passed its own resolution (57/337) on Prevention of Armed Conflict, with an annex of conclusions and recommendations on the subject.<sup>4</sup> It emphasised the importance of a 'comprehensive and coherent strategy comprising short-term operational and long-term structural measures for the prevention of armed conflict'. It called on Member States to strengthen the capacity of the UN 'in order to carry out more effectively its responsibilities for the prevention of armed conflict'.

3. The General Assembly resolution on conflict prevention passed with little opposition, in part as a consequence of an intensive consultation process. Previous concerns about prevention leading to intelligence gathering, infringements of sovereignty and intervention remained muted. While the original draft resolution was watered down at the insistence of some key G77 states the fact that *any* resolution supporting enhanced conflict prevention capacities in the UN system was approved by the General Assembly was a sign of the changing times.

4. As a Permanent Member of the UNSC, the UK has a special responsibility to work with other members of the Council to maintain international peace and security. This obligation can only be fulfilled if the UN organs and agencies charged with supporting the UNSC in this mission, either directly or indirectly, are effective and efficient. In setting up the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) in 2001, Her Majesty's Government (HMG) was motivated not just by the decade of review in the UN of its failures to perform effectively and efficiently in the area of conflict prevention, but also by its potential for reform. The Spending Review (SR) 2000 cross-cutting review establishing the Global CPP (GCPP) noted: 'Our permanent seat on the Security Council, and our membership of NATO,<sup>5</sup> the OSCE,<sup>6</sup> the EU, G7 and Commonwealth give us leverage and opportunities, as well as

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations' (Brahimi Report), 21 August 2000. A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the UN Secretary-General, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict', A/55/985-S/001/574, 7 June 2001, p 17.

<sup>4</sup> UN General Assembly, Resolution, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict', A/RES/57/337, 18 July 2003.

<sup>5</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

<sup>6</sup> Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

responsibilities'.<sup>7</sup> In August 2001, the UK supported a UNSC Resolution endorsing the report of the UN Secretary-General and calling on Member States to strengthen the capacity of the UN through provision of the 'necessary human, material and financial resources for timely and preventive measures including early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, practical disarmament measures and peace-building as appropriate in each case'.<sup>8</sup> The UK has historically been one of the main voluntary contributors to the UN Secretariat and its specialised agencies.<sup>9</sup>

5. The establishment of a 'Strengthening the United Nations' thematic strategy within the GCPP (alongside EU and OSCE strategies) was regarded by Ministers as one of the most important tasks of the GCPP and funded accordingly: £8 million out of £55 million for the GCPP programmes.<sup>10</sup> Of some note though, all but £1 million of the programme money for the UN Strategy was for activities in place before the formal establishment of the CPPs. The aim of the thematic strategy as approved by Ministers in 2001 was to 'make a significant contribution to help the UN's global capacity and performance to reduce and prevent conflict by addressing weaknesses in current systems and mechanisms for building peace'.<sup>11</sup> The UN Strategy's share of GCPP funding has remained at about 14-15 per cent in 2003-04 and is the third biggest GCPP Strategy in terms of money spent.

6. The UN Strategy is a key strategy for the GCPP and the ACP because, as noted in its main working document: 'The Strategy's outcome is central to achievement of the PSA target. É The UK has very limited capacity for unilateral action in the areas of conflict prevention and management, and collaboration with the UN in these areas provides the greatest potential for leveraging national efforts'. The UN Strategy is seen as a 'contribution multiplier' for the UK.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> FCO, DFID, MOD, 'Cross-Cutting Review: Conflict Prevention beyond Sub-Saharan Africa', May 2000.

<sup>8</sup> UN Security Council, Resolution 1366, 30 August 2001, S/RES/1366 (2001).

<sup>9</sup> Statement in the Security Council by Sir Jeremy Greenstock KCMG, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, 14 April 2000. For text, see [http://www.ukun.org/xq/asp/SarticleType.17/Article\\_ID.119/qx/articles\\_show.htm](http://www.ukun.org/xq/asp/SarticleType.17/Article_ID.119/qx/articles_show.htm).

<sup>10</sup> GCPP 02-03 Outturn as at 31 March 2002, updated 12 June 2002.

<sup>11</sup> The December 2002 UN GCPP Strategy bid reformulated this aim as follows (source: see Note 10): 'The "Strengthening the United Nations" strategy seeks to achieve the following main outcome: to build on the Brahimi peacekeeping/peacebuilding reform process, by enhancing the ability of the UN and UN troop-contributing countries to prevent conflict, launch and sustain peace support operations and promote effective peacebuilding'.

<sup>12</sup> FCO (UND), '2003-05 bid synthesis document: "Strengthening the United Nations"', December 2002.

## **2. BENCHMARKS FOR A UN THEMATIC STRATEGY IN THE GCPP**

7. The departure point for any benchmark to assess work on enhancing UN capacities for conflict prevention should be a test of relevance: does the program/project address identified weaknesses in the UN Secretariat, programmes and agencies? This section therefore briefly describes the weaknesses identified by others as those most urgently requiring attention in the UN system in order to enhance its capacities in conflict prevention. This agenda has been laid out in the reports by the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and by the former Under-Secretary-General, Lakdar Brahimi, that are mentioned above.

8. The primary organisations, entities or agencies of the UN involved, directly or indirectly, in conflict prevention—and hence the organisations most likely to be target by an institutional reform strategy—are:

- Security Council
- Office of the Secretary-General (Secretariat)
  - Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
  - Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
  - Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
  - Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA)
- International Court of Justice
- United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
- High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

9. In his report on prevention to the UNSC, Kofi Annan made 29 recommendations (see Annex 1). Of these, the key recommendations urging action by or within UN agencies are listed in Box 1 (next page). These recommendations are wide ranging, and many of them (especially those addressed to the Security Council and the General Assembly, address areas of high politics that are beyond the reach of a fund like the GCPP UN Strategy.

10. Those recommendations of Annan which are more obviously susceptible to support from a fund like the GCPP UN Strategy included the following:

- information and analysis;
- capacity and resource base of the Secretariat;
- development of regional conflict prevention strategies;
- funding of more special envoys and confidence-building measures;
- mobilisation by member states of opinion within the UN system and among Member States to build support for conflict prevention policies;
- more consideration in framing support policies of the impact of conflict on children;
- the need to take gender more fully into account in humanitarian and prevention policies.

**Box 1: Key Recommendations for UN Reform for Conflict Prevention—Kofi Annan’s June 2001 Report**

**Security Council**

- to consider innovative mechanisms, such as establishing a subsidiary organ, an ad hoc informal working group or other informal technical arrangement to discuss prevention cases on a continuing basis, as well as other early warning or prevention cases brought to its attention by Members States;
- to make more active use of preventive deployments before the onset of conflict, as appropriate;
- to support peace-building components within peacekeeping operations, as relevant, and to strengthen Secretariat capacity in this regard, *inter alia*, through the measures outlined in my report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi report on UN Peace Operations;
- to include, as appropriate, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building operations;
- to make full use of information and analyses emanating from United Nations human rights mechanisms and bodies in its efforts to prevent armed conflicts.

**Secretary-General**

- enhance the traditional preventive role of the Secretary-General in four ways:
  - by increasing the use of United Nations interdisciplinary fact-finding and confidence building missions to volatile regions;
  - by developing regional prevention strategies with our regional partners and appropriate United Nations organs and agencies;
  - by establishing an informal network of eminent persons for conflict prevention;
  - by improving the capacity and resource base for preventive action in the Secretariat.

**General Assembly**

- consider a more active use of its powers, in accordance with Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter of the United Nations, in the prevention of armed conflicts;
- consider ways of enhancing its interaction with the Security Council on conflict prevention, particularly in developing long-term conflict prevention and peace-building strategies;
- authorize the Secretary-General and other United Nations organs to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court, and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such authorization resort to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions;
- strengthen existing disarmament-related early warning and transparency mechanisms, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons;
- provide the Department of Political Affairs, in its capacity as focal point for conflict prevention, with adequate resources to carry out its responsibilities for conflict prevention and peace-building in the United Nations system;
- provide additional resources for United Nations direct and mission-based broadcasts to counter hate messages and to promote media development in conflict-prone situations. I intend to reflect this priority in future budgetary submissions, as appropriate.

11. Other areas of policy attracting particular attention from Secretary-General Annan may appear, at least on the surface, to be less susceptible first appearances at least. These included recommendations on the Security Council and on the attitude of Member States to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's principal dispute resolution body.

12. The recommendations of the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations also provide a useful benchmark. Its recommendations are listed in Annex 2. Of 20 heads of recommendations, all but two ('preventive action' and 'peacebuilding') are addressed specifically and exclusively to UN peace support operations.

- Preventive action.
- Peace-building strategy.
- Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy.
- Clear, credible and achievable mandates.
- Information and strategic analysis.
- Transitional civil administration.
- Determining deployment timelines.
- Mission leadership.
- Military personnel.
- Civilian police personnel.
- Civilian specialists.
- Rapidly deployable capacity for public information.
- Logistics support and expenditure management.
- Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations.
- Integrated mission planning and support.
- Other structural adjustments in DPKO.
- Operational support for public information.
- Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs.
- Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- Peace operations and the information age.

13. It needs to be emphasised that Annan’s prevention report and subsequent Security Council and General Assembly resolutions referenced above, spell out a much broader agenda of reform of UN capacities for conflict prevention than the Brahimi report, which focuses on UN capacities and responsiveness for peace support operations. As discussed later, this distinction is an important reference point for the findings of the Evaluation.

14. Both the Secretary-General’s report and the Brahimi report are ‘political’ documents in that each is constrained by assumptions about what is politically possible within the existing system. In this sense they are more ‘realistic’ than many externally produced reports that advocate reforms that, while arguably desirable, have no change of being implemented. The recommendations of both the Secretary-General’s prevention report and the Brahimi report ‘push the envelope’ of reform—but without recommending proposals that have zero chance of being adopted in practice, no matter how attractive in theory. In fact even one of Brahimi’s apparently modest proposals—on strengthening the Secretariat’s analytic capacity for example—was not acceptable to many Member States. The realistic, politically sensitive nature of the recommendations in these two reports means that they very much represent the limits of the possible in the short to medium term.

### 3. GCPP's UN STRATEGY: RELATION TO THE BENCHMARKS

15. In the Inception Report, it was proposed and agreed by the Evaluation Management Committee (EMC), that each case study would contrast the CPP strategy it was reviewing with a set of policy proposals for conflict prevention goals in the named country/region or thematic activity that had been devised outside HMG. This independently-derived set of policy proposals would be used as a benchmark for consideration of whether HMG had selected an optimum portfolio of activities and whether the components selected were making (or were likely to make) a significant impact on the conflict prevention goals of HMG. Each case study would then compare the CPP-funded portfolio of activities and associated strategy documents against this external or independently derived benchmark.

16. A comparison of the activities and priorities within the UN Strategy with the benchmarks (Annan and Brahimi) shows a good spread across a number of the main activities identified. The GCPP UN Strategy focuses on several Secretariat departments, programmes and agencies. It also supports a number of non-governmental organisation (NGO) initiatives with the same aims (an overview of projects funded by the UN Strategy can be found in Annexes 3 and 4, and are summarised in Table 1 below). The GCPP UN Strategy has been explicitly directed to securing improvements against the benchmarks set out Brahimi, and it is often called the Brahimi strategy (it is one of the few CPP strategies to have explicitly accepted an externally derived set of benchmarks). The GCPP UN Strategy has however not been so specifically built on Annan's much broader program for reform,<sup>13</sup> though several UN Strategy documents have used the Annan report as a reference point.<sup>14</sup> The UN Strategy, in its December 2002 version, has the following overall objective:

'to build on the Brahimi peacekeeping/peacebuilding reform process, by enhancing the ability of the UN and UN troop-contributing countries to prevent conflict, launch and sustain peace support operations and promote effective peacebuilding'.<sup>15</sup>

17. In 2001, the UN Strategy originally proposed to pursue nine objectives under two discrete heads, the first managed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the second managed by the Department for International Development (DFID):

#### **Peacekeeping (Brahimi Implementation)**

- Improving mission planning for peace support operations;
- enhance the capacity of troop-contributing countries to take part in UN peace operations and to encourage more countries to contribute;
- enhance international civilian policing capability.

#### **Peacebuilding**

- improve information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning capacities;
- enhance the conflict prevention skills and competence of UN staff and partners;

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<sup>13</sup> FCO memo, 'Comments from UN group on UN Evaluation', 3 November 2003.

<sup>14</sup> See UND, 'GCPP Bidding Form for FY2003/4 and 2004/5', 24 December 2002.

<sup>15</sup> FCO (UND), '2003-05 bid synthesis document: "Strengthening the United Nations"', December 2002.

- develop peacebuilding strategies on a UN system-wide basis;
- reduce the impact of armed conflict on children;
- integrate gender perspectives into conflict prevention, peace support and peacebuilding operations;
- support the implementation of further UN Secretary-General and 'Brahimi' recommendations.

18. In 2002, the strategy was reviewed and the objectives were grouped under 4 main sub-goals or themes, without a suggestion that one Ministry would take sole responsibility for the follow-up of any given goal. These themes (or goals) were expressed as the goals to be pursued by each partner in the CGPP, irrespective of which projects they were implementing. All the projects currently funded are highly relevant to the four sub-goals of the strategy. These four goals were the organising categories for the bids for 2003/4, as shown in Table 1:

- to support peacebuilding strategy development at the UN;
- to encourage further UN reform and follow-up to the Brahimi Report's recommendations;
- to enhance the protection of civilians in armed conflict;
- to increase the analytic capacity available to the UN Secretariat.

19. To encourage further UN reform and follow-up to the Brahimi Report's recommendations, the UN Strategy has included support to DPKO in four main areas: enhancement of rapid deployment capabilities; support to code of conduct training for peacekeepers; strengthening DPKO's Best Practices Unit; and support for the Civilian Police Division. One new project under the UN Strategy has been the commissioning of four comprehensive studies on the UN peace operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and Kosovo.<sup>16</sup> These studies provide recommendations for improving UN peace operations. DPKO has agreed to engage with UK officials to discuss implementation of the recommendations and has invited the UK to contribute to a workshop which the UN's Training and Evaluation Service (TES). The Strategy has also funded:

- a series of civil/military peacekeeping exercises in Buenos Aires, Bangkok and Dakar;
- separate UK bilateral discussions with India and Pakistan on peacekeeping issues;
- peacekeeping website ([www.peacekeeping.co.uk](http://www.peacekeeping.co.uk)) ;
- preparation of a UN handbook on multi-dimensional operations and projects, designed to raise awareness of issues affecting women when UN operations are deployed;
- design of a logistics project for an improved warehouse management system at the DPKO logistics base in Brindisi.

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<sup>16</sup> International Policy Institute, King's College London, *A Review of Peace Operations: A case for change*, <http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/peaceoperationsreview>.

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Table 1: UN STRATEGY BID, 2003/4

<b>HIGH PRIORITY</b>	<b>£</b>
<b>I. Peacebuilding Strategy Development</b>	
DPA—Peacebuilding Unit	500,000
BCPR—Strategic Planning Unit	500,000
BCPR—Transition Recovery Unit	1,500,000
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>2,500,000</b>
<b>II. Further UN Reform &amp; Brahimi Follow-on</b>	
Support to DPKO	1,000,000
Peacekeeping exercises	1,200,000
Pre-deployment (mil)	200,000
Website development	50,000
Latin America PK capacity	170,000
South East Asia PK capacity	52,000
Civilian Police Rapid Deployment	40,000
Civilian Police Train the Trainer	82,000
Civilian Police Train the Trainer	100,000
Pre-deployment training (internat)	100,000
Pre-deployment training (UK)	93,000
UK CIMIC training	48,000
Workshop Civilian Police	300,000
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>3,435,000</b>
<b>Medium Priority</b>	
<b>III. Protection of Civilians</b>	
OSRSG—Children Affected by Armed Conflict	500,000
UNICEF	1,000,000
UNIFEM	1,000,000
Gender	300,000
PK Code of Conduct	100,000
HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping	200,000
Human Security Report	250,000
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>3,350,000</b>
<b>Low Priority</b>	
<b>IV. Information Analysis and Capacity Building</b>	
CPPF	300,000
CPI	150,000
International Peace Academy	350,000
UNITAR Fellowship	200,000
UNSSC EWPM	400,000
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>1,400,000</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>£10,685,000</b>

20. The UN Strategy pursues support of peacebuilding strategies within the UN system mainly through supporting the capacity of UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the DPA. The GCPP provides funds for the work of the Strategic Planning and Transition Recovery Units of BCPR, which involves the assessment of UNDP crisis and conflict strategies, conflict assessments, some justice and Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives, and inter-agency liaison on these issues. Of some considerable note, BCPR has increasingly assumed the role of an operational arm of UNDP on these issues. In recent years, UNDP has given conflict prevention considerable attention and UNDP is now among the international innovators in this field, in support of research, programs and activities in the field, and appointment of conflict advisers.<sup>17</sup>

21. In support of the protection of civilians in conflict situations, the GCPP continues to actively support UNICEF and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children Affected by Armed Conflict. In conjunction with the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and others, the GCPP is promoting an understanding of gender in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore funding is being directed toward encouraging accountability and professionalism in peacekeeping operations. HIV/AIDS is a sensitive yet growing issue for peacekeeping operations especially in Africa where public health is at risk from transmission by and from peacekeeping troops. To challenge this trend, support and awareness programmes are being developed with DFID, UNAIDS and DPKO. Funding has been provided for the production of an accessible Human Security Report, to provide for the conflict policy filed a document similar to the *Human Development Report*, to bridge the information gap between policymakers and academics in what still remains an area of considerable policy debate but rapid policy evolution.

22. Of the four themes above, one of the most important areas of activity from the point of view of conflict prevention may those addressed to the UN's need for better analysis in support of conflict prevention and a broader knowledge base. Some effort was made, including through support from the UK, to establish a new analytical unit of the sort recommended by Brahimi, but this was rejected by a number of member states. The UN Strategy has supported a number of alternative sources of analysis and information: the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) based in New York, the Center on International Cooperation (CIC, based at Columbia University) and the International Peace Academy (IPA). Key UN staffers work very closely with these outside organisations and ensure that their views are heard in the policy making process. All interlocutors of the Evaluation in the UN system expressed strong support for the value of input from these institutions. CPPF, funded under the Strategy, is the external partner of the so-called 'Knowledge Project' that links researchers outside the UN with policy planning units in DPA, DPKO and OCHA. These units have had a recent infusion of highly capable, but relatively young staff whose influence within the system is disproportionate to their relatively junior status. The Knowledge Project is predicated on the assumption that the benefit to the UN from outside information, analysis and scholarship will be limited unless and until there exists a more rational and systematic policy planning process within the Secretariat. The project also assumes that for the foreseeable future the Secretariat will continue to face severe human resource constraints, particularly with respect to research and that this will make continued reliance on outside expertise vital.

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<sup>17</sup> See the Crisis Prevention and Recovery section of UNDP's web-site at [www.undp.org/erd](http://www.undp.org/erd).

23. Notwithstanding the fact that the GCPP UN Strategy funds a wide range of activities of high relevance to the reform agenda of UN conflict prevention structures, institutions or practices, it pursues a much narrower agenda than that laid out by the benchmark documents. The UN Strategy has not paid as much attention to direct influence on key UN institutions or to the high-level politics of conflict prevention within the system (the issues identified mainly in the Annan report) as it has to indirect influences and middle-level mechanisms. The DPA, one of the key institutions identified by Annan in his report, will be an important target on this regard and the UN Strategy is now looking at new initiatives in this area (having previously given strong support to the peacebuilding programme within DPA). The GCPP UN Strategy has concentrated its efforts on international arrangements and processes in the UN Headquarters and UNDP in New York. Outside New York, most of the UN Strategy's effort has been targeted on support for peacekeeping-related activities. It has not directly targeted a number of programs and agencies outside New York that have important roles in conflict prevention, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Geneva or the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

24. A 2002 document foreshadowed some possible change in priorities over the next two to three years 'as some objectives near achievement and new areas for development present themselves'.<sup>18</sup> The document cited as an example the likely further 'success' of UK work with DPKO that would allow a shift of focus onto DPA and the peacebuilding agenda.

25. The UN Strategy is but one element in a broader UK policy package directed towards the UN, the main elements of which can be summarised as follows:

- to support the UN as the locus of international legitimacy with respect to global security;
- to maintain the UK's global standing by demonstrating its commitment to the UN as a 'good international citizen';
- to contribute to overall UN reform, making the organisation more effective, responsive and proactive;
- to support greater coordination between the Secretariat and the rest of the UN system, and between the UN and other international organisations.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> DFID, FCO, MOD, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool Bidding Form for FY2003/4 and 2004/5'.

<sup>19</sup> Interviews with officials.

#### **4. EFFECT ON PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONTAINING EXISTING ONES**

26. The projects funded by the GCPP have been highly rated by their users (UN personnel) and appear to be meeting the objectives set for them in their respective project proposals. The existence of a wide portfolio of GCPP projects is also affording the UK (through project management and supervision processes, as well as through access to meetings and reports) insights into emerging thinking on prevention within the policy research community (e.g. the IPA) and an opportunity to influence that thinking.

27. The UN Strategy works effectively as a tool to support UN reform in the realm of peace and security. One of the effects of the research-related projects has been to enhance communications among policy staff in key Secretariat departments. Other projects have helped raise awareness of conflict prevention methodologies across UN agencies. The cumulative impact of the GCPP projects has probably made the UN more responsive to the political environment in specific conflict-related situations, and better able to respond to related challenges. As mentioned above, the CPPF is playing an increasingly valuable role in helping link Secretariat staff with outside expertise. Projects such as the Early Warning and Preventative Measures (EWPM) training and the training of media officers for peacekeeping operations respond to very specific UN on-the-ground security needs that the organisation simply doesn't have the resources to fund itself. UN Strategy projects for DPKO (e.g. logistics, training) compensate for the loss of technical expertise that followed the withdrawal of so-called 'gratis personnel' from the organisation.

28. Our review of the various projects funded under the Strategy and of the effectiveness of each of them (based on interviews with UN staff familiar with them) paints a relatively happy picture. While some projects have started too recently to make a visible impact, the consensus from those interviewed was that projects such as the EWPM Training, the funding to IPA, the CPPF, as well as funding for DPKO projects, are making an important difference contribution to enhancing UN capacities in the broad field of conflict prevention. To illustrate:

- EWPM has resulted in the training of over 1600 UN staff in conflict early-warning methodologies, no comparable training program exists;
- IPA and the CPPF are provide high-quality policy research, always relevant to the specific needs of the UN Secretariat. IPA's seminars and policy briefs provide an efficient way of disseminating its findings to Secretariat staff and to delegations. Both IPA and CPPF respond to requests for policy research from the Secretariat, with CPPF having a particularly close relationship with DPA;
- comments from Secretariat staff on the projects associated with DPKO were generally supportive. The fact that the Best Practices Unit is now under dynamic new leadership, new staff and high-level support, bodes well for the gender project that the UK is supporting.

29. While some projects have suffered delays, there are clear signs that overall, the 'micro' level of the Strategy is being delivered satisfactorily, and is relevant to the 'meso' level—as expressed by the four sub-goals of the Strategy.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> The ToRs use the terms 'macro', 'meso' and 'micro' to refer to three levels of analysis. Respectively, these are the Whitehall decision-making level (including embassies), the country, conflict or thematic area being targeted, and the projects that make up the full suite of UK conflict prevention activities within that country or conflict.

30. GCPP activities are relevant to the broader agenda of UN reform beyond issues of conflict prevention in a number of ways: The GCPP-funded CIC is playing an advisory role for a new commission appointed by the Secretary General to determine how the UN can respond more effectively to the new peace and security challenges of the twenty first century. The director of the critically important secretariat of this commission was previously involved with a major IPA project post-conflict peacebuilding and is relying to a considerable degree on key actors involved with the CPPF-supported Knowledge Project. As always in the UN informal networks can play a critically important role. Thus, the UN Strategy has, both directly and indirectly, helped support one of the most important of these inside/outside networks associated with the UN.

31. The effectiveness of the UN's conflict prevention reform, and therefore of the contribution of the GCPP's UN Strategy to it, are almost impossible to assess given the problem of attribution. There is growing evidence (to be detailed in the forthcoming *Human Security Report*) that the dramatic increase in UN interventions—preventive diplomacy and peacemaking missions, peace operations, capacity-building for conflict management, electoral assistance, disarmament programmes—have been major factors driving the marked decrease in the incidence of armed conflict over the past decade. Ninety conflicts ended between 1989 and 2002 and the average combat-related death toll from armed conflict fell from a 1990s level of about 200,000 per year to around 25,000 in 2002.

32. It has sometimes been difficult for the UN Strategy to assist with building capacity within the UN system itself. CPPF was established in response to reluctance by Member States to follow the Brahimi Report's recommendations. In-house capacity is being enhanced through projects such as CPPF, but only indirectly. There may be some parts of the UN system that may lend themselves better to external support for capacity-building. These include the UN Country Teams (UNCT), where some support already exists through such GCPP-funded activities as the EWPM training course and the development of training material on gender. Further engagement with UNCT should be based on a needs assessment, which would also involve evaluations by Resident Coordinators. Support to the Framework Team,<sup>21</sup> an interdepartmental coordinating mechanism within the UN system, is also relevant there—however the constraints on the operational reach of the Team are quite substantial. The Framework Team (FT) can and does identify countries at risk of conflict, but its ability to implement preventive action is limited by the fact that the Team is a consultation mechanism, which has no authority to act and no specific action budget. However, the UN Strategy does not regard the FT as an important target.

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<sup>21</sup> The Framework for Co-ordination (Framework Team or FT) was created in 1995 to co-ordinate planning and operational activities among the humanitarian, peacekeeping and political sectors of the UN Secretariat in connection with peacekeeping missions. The FT has since evolved to a mechanism for early warning and preventive action among 18 UN agencies, departments, offices and programmes. It now includes DDA, DESA, DPA, DPKO, FAO, ILO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNIFEM, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO, the World Bank, and IMF. DPI and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General participate as observers. Drawing on the strengths and perspectives of the individual members, the FT addresses situations with a potential to develop into a complex emergency or conflict where there is a prima facie case for UN preventive action. The FT typically tackles situations where a broad based, multi-sectoral response is warranted and where there is not already a strong UN involvement, for example in the form of a task force. The FT hence acts as a catalyst to draw attention to and initiate action with regards to a potentially violent situation.

33. The GCPP UN Strategy has faced three major challenges that are beyond the remit of its steering group. First, there has been a lack of agreement within HMG about what does—and should—constitute effective conflict prevention. Second, there appears to have been relatively weak guidance of what might be expected of a thematic strategy within the GCPP and ACPP framework. Third, there is considerable lack of agreement within the UN system about what constitutes an appropriate division of labour and resources among various departments and agencies that play a prevention role.<sup>22</sup> This lack of clarity in the UN system has been compounded by classic turf protection reflexes, hampering communication and cross-fertilisation amongst agencies and departments. While the GCPP UN Strategy works within a clearer analytical framework than does the UN, it is to be noted that the benchmark documents (Annan and Brahimi) have not, according to the documents reviewed for this Evaluation, been analysed from the point of view of constructing a genuinely strategic approach for the GCPP UN Strategy.

34. In other words, whereas the overall objective of the UN Strategy is to deliver on the UN aspect of the CPPs' Public Service Agreement (PSA) and Service Delivery Agreement (SDA), there is no clear and agreed framework among the three departments of what this link should be. The four objectives of the UN Strategy (and associated project documentation) go some way towards adapting the PSA to the specific context of the UN, but they are no substitute for an explicit UN GCPP strategic goal and genuinely strategic plan that are broader than just peacekeeping and more sharply focused than simply 'building on' the reform process.

35. Thus, the gap between the benchmarks laid out in the strategic goals of the Annan and Brahimi reports on the one hand, and on the other the strong concentration of the UN Strategy on peacekeeping and peacebuilding through capacity-building projects (as opposed to an articulated influencing strategy) is an area worth of further investigation. There appears to have been little prioritisation of areas in the GCPP UN Strategy according to the UN's competitive advantage—which, at the level of the UN Secretariat clearly lies in the realm of short-term prevention.<sup>23</sup> (There are exceptions, most notably the UN Strategy's support for annual lesson-learning conferences of the all of the Secretary General's Special Representatives.) The Annan report is in many ways more central to a broader range of UN preventive capacities than the Brahimi Report.

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<sup>22</sup> The Secretary-General's Executive Office tends to focus on crises, leaving almost no time for the SG to focus on longer term prevention policy. Moreover crisis management in the SG's office—much of which is preventive in intent—tends to be influenced by the interests of key Member States. Preventing international terrorism, for example, is now at the top on the Council's security agenda, and hence that of the Secretary-General's Executive Office and DPA. Yet international terrorism kills relatively few people—less than a thousand a year on average over the past 30 years, this is small a fraction of one per cent of the average civil war death toll over the same period. In addition, international terrorist attacks have, according the US State Department data, been declining since the mid-1980s. In 2002 there were 200 such incidents, down from more than 600 in 1986. Yet stopping terrorism is a higher priority goal in the UN than stopping civil war, as evidenced by the preoccupations of the Security Council in the last two years. Second, UN Departments have different views of what constitutes prevention, in terms of timeline (from years to a few weeks) and in terms of approach. DPA focuses on diplomacy; UNDP on development, and so on. This situation constitutes a challenge for the UN Strategy, and explains in part the difficulty the Strategy is experiencing to move from being a collection of project (however individually relevant some projects may be) to a fully-fledged strategy.

<sup>23</sup> The UN has no such comparative advantage in so-called 'structural prevention'—in addressing the 'root causes' of conflict. These causes lie in the realm of development and governance policy and the UN (including UNDP) is simply too small a development actor to be able to play much of a role here. The key actors on the development/prevention front are the World Bank and the major donor states—not least the UK.

36. Although the current formulation of the UN Strategy's main objective covers conflict prevention, its focus is on peace support operations and peacebuilding. Peace operations and peacebuilding play an important role in preventing past conflicts from re-occurring, but they are not directed at preventing new conflicts from erupting in areas where there UN peace operations are not in place or are not likely to be in place. Even though some projects funded under the Strategy cover a much broader agenda than that encompassed by the Brahimi report (such as research on zones of conflict or prevention training for UN staff), it may be preferable to have an overall objective that more explicitly provides (and sets a strategic framework) for the broader Annan agenda, including aspects related to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

37. The UN Strategy as it now exists appears to be written around a collection of projects that do support the overall aim, as described above, but for which the linkages to each other and to the overall strategic objective aim are not clearly articulated in terms of relative importance. The GCPP UN Strategy appears to remain, to a large extent, a composite of an FCO/MOD programme (Brahimi and peacekeeping) and a DFID programme (peacebuilding), little different from what they may have looked like before the GCPP was established. Because of the inadequacy of the link between the headings and the overall aim, there is not a clear picture in the UN Strategy as to what, precisely, it seeks to change and how (beyond making a 'contribution' to capacity). As a result, there are few indications of what incremental steps should be taking place to indicate progress towards a strategic influencing objective. There is little evidence of setting of intermediate objectives. Targets and means, differentiated for each objective, are not defined as explicitly as they might be. Though timelines exist for project implementation, a time frame for implementation and likely achievement of clear sub-objectives (apart from making a contribution) has not been identified.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> As one document noted: 'Each project has defined objectives against which progress is monitored and an agreed timescale. Many of the activities currently ongoing under these objectives have come to the end of their initial phase and next steps are being considered. Therefore, a number of our projects are only beginning to deliver tangible results in support of the objective in question. The reviews to be carried out during 2003 will enable the steering committee to examine the combined impact of these projects against the objectives and make amendments to the strategy as necessary.' See DFID, FCO, MOD, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool Bidding Form for FY2003/4 and 2004/5'.

## **5. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

38. As a funder of UN conflict prevention activities, the UK is in 'good company', to use the words of one interviewee in New York. Other countries with a long-standing commitment to prevention include Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Of these, the UK is the only heavyweight player at the UN, the only P5 member, and the one with the broadest portfolio of projects. France finances training for peacekeeping troops and civilian police, but the evaluators were unable to identify portfolios of projects of similar size to that of the UK among any of the other Permanent Five (P5) countries.

39. The UK has expended time, intellectual resources and significant amounts of money on UN-related projects in recent years. This has enhanced its image and reputation within the Secretariat and agencies. UK views on policy formation and institutional reform are welcomed and listened to. The GCPP's UN Strategy has not only enhanced the UK's reputation at the UN it has also helped place it in a unique position to influence future developments at the UN, both in terms of the development of policy and in terms of institutional reform. France, by contrast commits little funding to the UN outside its assessed contributions, nor does Russia or China. All three lack the policy leverage within the UN system that comes with funding that promotes policy relevant research. Japan makes major financial commitments outside its assessed contributions, such as its Human Security Fund established with \$150 million,<sup>25</sup> but it has little active involvement in policy debate/formation and lacks the influence that comes with P5 membership.

40. The Terms of Reference (ToRs) required the Evaluation to address the effect of the CPPs on international arrangements. This question may appear more appropriately directed at the country case studies: did the CPP-funded measures help to mobilise more effective efforts by international partners of the UK for the specific conflicts in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan or the former Soviet Union? For a case study like the UN Strategy, which is directed entirely at enhancing the capacities of a major international partner of the UK, in this case the UN, this question seems somewhat artificial in that it overlaps with the first question addressed above. Nevertheless, there is room for some additional analysis of how the UN Strategy might address its potential to mobilise key international actors behind its aims and activities. Two issues arise.

41. First, is the issue of co-funding by the GCPP and other donors, such as Canada, France or Japan, of certain initiatives. Officials have rightly identified the political sensitivities in any effort to work on these fronts. Before the UN Strategy was established, HMG deliberately avoided these partnerships for the most part within its UN reform projects. Since its creation however, the UN Strategy has progressively moved to find funding partners in a number of areas.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, the issue of how the UN Strategy might engage

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<sup>25</sup> See [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human\\_secu/t\\_fund21/fund.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/fund.html).

<sup>26</sup> As one Review document noted: 'For example, the Beyond Brahimi project is co-sponsored by Canada, Germany, Norway and Sweden. We are collaborating with Canada, Norway and Liechtenstein to steer the Secretariat towards an acceptable approach on peacebuilding. Wherever possible we seek to collaborate with international partners to share ideas, responsibility and costs. Through its Institutional Strategy Papers DFID works to reform a number of international institutions engaged in various facets of peacebuilding. In a number of cases (CPI, CPPF, BCPR), initial UK trail-blazing has encouraged subsequent engagement by other donors, leading to greater integration in the international system and increased chances for sustainability. We are proposing a meeting of various of the UK's initiatives (IPA, CPI, CPPF etc.) early in 2003 to bring together project officials, donors and the UN to review the spectrum of support provided by the various initiatives—and related initiatives which the UK does not currently fund. This meeting will also offer opportunities for further collaboration and identify possible areas or gaps which are not currently being addressed.' See DFID, FCO, MOD, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool Bidding Form for FY2003/4 and 2004/5'.



other donors does not appear to have been canvassed in a comprehensive way beyond their potential role as co-funders. The Strategy has paid relatively little attention to how it might be used to directly mobilise other UN members to assist in pushing for reform of the UN conflict prevention system (this has of course been a plank of UK policy toward the UN outside the GCPP).

42. Second is the question of how to link up the country-specific conflict prevention priorities in the GCPP and ACP with the UN reform agenda in ways that maximise potential for economies and better outcomes through collaboration with partners. Three issues identified in the Annan report are particularly apt: the need to increase the use of UN fact-finding missions, the need to rely more on special envoys, and the need to develop regional prevention strategies with other states in conjunction with UN agencies. Some of these issues are on the agenda of the UN Strategy Steering Group, but probably cannot be taken up by the UN Strategy steering group acting alone (there may need to be a wider GCPP–ACPP joint deliberation, in which strategy managers from the high priority conflicts participated).

43. The UN Strategy steering group has shown a keen awareness of the political sensitivities that can constrain progress in advancing the conflict prevention agenda. It has deliberately opted for the implementation of projects which, while meeting UK policy objectives, had little obvious UK identity stamped across them. For example, the Conflict Prevention and Peace Foundation in New York, and the EWPM training course run by the UN System Staff College (UNSSC), were both given substantial initial funding by the UK under the GCPP—a fact of which managers of these projects, and other senior UN people were aware and for which they were grateful—but the projects are managed independently, in accordance with user needs.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Interviews with UN Strategy Team, CPPF and EWPM managers, and with UNSSC Director and DPA Regional Directors.

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## **6. EFFECT ON INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES**

44. Key officials in FCO and DFID, and those posted in New York, attested to very effective and close collaboration on the UN Strategy's activities.<sup>28</sup> The framing of the UN Strategy appears however to have had little strategic input from MOD on any regular or consistent basis (although MOD does contribute its resources to UN Strategy peacekeeping-related projects). All three UK departments in the GCPP have a history of project or programme links with the UN and its agencies: MOD as a contributor of troops and as one of the driving forces behind the development of DPKO as it now stands; DFID (earlier Overseas Development Administration (ODA)) as a long-standing donor to UN agencies; and FCO as the coordinator for UN peacekeeping policy.

45. At its inception, the UN Strategy was very much an instrument to coordinate existing projects brought into the GCPP framework by each of the three ministries. The original division of responsibility between DFID and FCO for the two discrete heads of the Strategy (Brahimi peacekeeping and peacebuilding) was a reflection of the pre-CPP situation, in which both Ministries had existing UN-related programmes which could be grouped under those headings. As the CPPs developed and joint management of the Strategy got underway, it was sensible to rework that distinction, particularly in the interest of efficiency. The Year Two review of the Strategy noted the intent to develop new complementarities between what had been the work of separate departments.<sup>29</sup> The shift from nine to four objectives was indicative of a transition towards greater integration and a more holistic approach.

46. Within departments, it is notable that the UN Strategy in its entirety seems to have been the subject of relatively little critical review at the strategic level. The three departments have routinely approved the bids and jointly scrutinised new projects, as well as approving the appropriate strategy documents that summarise existing projects. This process has however been limited largely to activities already in the portfolio at the time of review. There has not been any root and branch review of the UN Strategy.

47. While DFID and FCO appear to have consulted among themselves in London, and with the UKMIS in New York, little discussion has taken place with UK representatives in Geneva and in other UN headquarters locations such as Rome and Vienna. This is evidenced, by the absence of any mention in the UN Strategy of leading UN agencies involved in conflict prevention outside New York, such as the ICJ or the IAEA, the latter organisation now being at the forefront of very high-risk conflict prevention strategies. For these reasons, the term 'UN Strategy' may be a misnomer. In order for effective inter-departmental dialogue on the utility of the strategy to take place, the strategy itself has first to be more clearly articulated.

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<sup>28</sup> As one document noted: 'The steering group is in regular contact (formal and informal) and each department is kept fully updated on the progress of projects managed by other members of the group. This level of coordination in turn ensures that departmental objectives are not pursued in exclusion of each other; rather, the steering group works together to develop a comprehensive and complementary programme. The Steering Group meets on approximately a monthly basis to discuss progress and, where necessary, new proposals for activity. Approval of new activities is given after mutual agreement by all partners.' See DFID, FCO, MOD, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool Bidding Form for FY2003/4 and 2004/5'.

<sup>29</sup> DFID, FCO, MOD, 'Global Conflict Prevention through Strengthening the United Nations', 21 March 2002.

48. One challenge to the UN Strategy in this regard is that it reflects a double transition. One transition is that of moving from three Ministries pursuing their policies separately to a more coordinated and 'joined-up' approach. The other is the shifting strategic outlook within each Ministry. Thus, the UN Strategy has not only faced immense external constraints, but a fluid institutional environment at home.

49. The management of the UN-funded GCPP activities suffers from some of the same shortcomings as the rest of the GCPP: the UK staff administering the project do not have access to a single, holistic overview of GCPP aims and methodologies. The paper 'The Global Conflict Pool: A UK Government Approach to Reducing Conflict'<sup>30</sup> is a useful statement of the general objectives of the CPPs and of their overall approach, but it says little about the processes under which country and thematic strategies are developed, projects worked out, and the project management cycle is supervised and evaluated. Prioritisation frameworks developed in the early years of the CPPs have since been neglected and do not seem to have been specifically adapted for use in relation to UN activities. The project funding request and approval process seems to be ad hoc: there is no specific calendar or standard application mechanism. While HMG staff acting as counterparts to project implementers have been praised for their helpfulness and flexibility, some of the interlocutors sensed a lack of clarity as to the nature and extent of the supervisory or review functions of HMG officials.

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<sup>30</sup> DFID, FCO, MOD, 'The Global Conflict Prevention Pool—A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict', August 2003, [www.fco.gov.uk](http://www.fco.gov.uk).

## **7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT**

50. There seems to be little question that the projects implemented under the UN Strategy are well managed and evaluated by the responsible DFID and FCO teams and are resulting in good value for money (see for example the evaluation of the EWPM training carried out in early 2003). All the projects examined have strict reporting procedures, including six-monthly narrative and financial reports. The largest projects in the UN Strategy are those related to peacekeeping, which are managed under UN rules. These rules are widely found to be cumbersome but it is obviously beyond the scope of the UN Strategy steering group to modify them. In some cases, such as support to the Best Practices Unit of DPKO, projects were delayed (and therefore funds immobilised) for longer than expected at the outset. This has been ascribed to problems with UN internal management—issues over which the UK has little leverage. There seems little reason, if any, to question the allocation of resources to individual projects. However, two points need to be made.

51. First, there are concerns about the sustainability of projects beyond the end of UK funding. Several of the UN GCPP projects are dependent on UK funding under the strategy, and this leads repeatedly to concern from project managers about the long term viability of their project, if and when GCPP funding ends. While this is not a concern specific to the GCPP (many other donor-funded projects are in the same situation), it is nevertheless important in future for the GCPP to develop a policy on project sustainability for projects that are not specifically designed to be a one-off.

52. Second, the overall financial management of the UN Strategy could be improved if the strategy itself was improved by being much more explicit in terms of purpose, strategic objectives and incremental steps.

## 8. OVERVIEW COMMENTS

53. The GCPP UN Strategy is a paradox: few other countries support similarly relevant and valuable prevention-related projects at the UN outside of their normal assessed contributions. Yet, as a statement of application of available means on a priority basis to objectives linked to concrete achievable outcomes, the use of the term ‘strategy’ may be a misnomer. Its particular objectives are worthwhile in themselves but the relationships between the different activities and the overall outcomes are not elaborated in strategic terms that are meaningful in either management or accountability terms. For example, there is no articulation of why £1.2 million has been bid in 2002/3 for peacekeeping exercises, while \$3.35 million was bid for protection of civilians in conflict. While the latter activity is a good cause and is one issue identified by Kofi Annan in his report, there are some aspects of the programming of this money that suggest it may be quite out of place in a conflict prevention budget jointly administered by three departments. Much of that spending seems more appropriate to a humanitarian or relief budget administered exclusively by DFID. Why was the balance not made the other way: \$3.35 million for peacekeeping support and £1.2 million for protection of civilians. There may be good reasons, but the record available to the Evaluation does not reveal how choices are made between the various priorities in the UN Strategy or why certain activities are ruled out altogether.<sup>31</sup>

54. The effectiveness of the UN Strategy, largely a function of the efficient management of the individual projects, has been remarkable (thanks to the dedication of the project managers) and the few difficulties can by and large be ascribed to the difficulties of working with the UN’s cumbersome bureaucracy. However the unsystematic character of the strategy development and implementation is probably contributing to inefficiencies. Staff involved with the CPPs told evaluators that they did not really know what they were supposed to achieve in relation to the strategies, and many had been in post for surprisingly short periods at the time they were interviewed. Further, there seem to be no relevant and systematic documents outlining the CPP, its strategy-making and project management processes (although there are documents outlining such policies in individual ministries). There is also little training on the aims, contents and processes of the CPP and little in the way of institutional memory.

55. Sustainability is a key issue. This, to some extent, is the result of a historical element. Until about 2 years ago, managers of projects funded by DFID told the evaluators that DFID had preferred to be the sole funder of such projects, thus leading to more dependency than necessary. The emphasis is now on more collaborative funding, but more could probably be done in that respect by ensuring that ‘exit strategies’ that build financial, institutional and policy sustainability are demanded of all projects—except those clearly designed as one-offs (in which case there should be a strict timeline and no extension). In many cases, however, it is unrealistic to expect projects to continue without ongoing funding. Private charitable foundations—a traditional funding source for organisations like IPA—are spending less and less on security issues—and the UK is too big a funding source for alternatives to be easily found.

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<sup>31</sup> The Evaluation did not have access to classified information that might have addressed these issues.

56. The strategy managers have stated that the diplomatic sensitivities relating to the role of the UN and to its status as a western power require the UN Strategy to be implemented with a significant degree of distance from the UK's political work at the UN. This assumption may be correct, but it is striking that it is not dealt with at length as a specific subject in the strategy documents seen by the evaluation team. It may reasonably be argued that the risks related to linking the UK's diplomatic agenda at the UN to the CPP strategy are smaller than asserted, and that benefits may flow from such a linkage, in terms of ensuring more consistency between the UN GCPP Strategy and the overall HMG policy at the UN.

## **9. RECOMMENDATIONS I: SHOULD THE STRATEGY BE CONTINUED AND HOW CAN IT BE IMPROVED?**

57. The three departments need to clarify the management structure of the CPPs, including the relationship between CPP activities and others, and whether the CPP is primarily a funding mechanism or a policy development and coordination mechanism. A set of CPP management documents should be prepared.

58. The UN Strategy should be more explicitly formulated in terms of the UK's overall UN policy (connection to UN reform/conflict prevention/development). The UK should hold a regular high level consultation with the UN on reform of its conflict prevention capacities and dispositions and how the range of its GCPP-funded activities can contribute on a strategic basis, especially on the basis of a UN-wide view. Piecemeal contributions can be very effective individually, but a strategically conceived set of objectives, coordinated with major allies of the UK, should be able to do better.

59. The UK should more systematically liaise on GCPP support to UN reform with a range of like-minded countries that also fund prevention-related activities (Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, etc). According to officials, the IPA has suggested such a conference of donors and project partners and the UK has expressed an interest in participating as this can also have an impact on our future priorities and development of the existing programme

60. The GCPP should consider funding critical evaluations of UN prevention-related policies—something the UN either doesn't do or does badly. An evaluation of the effectiveness of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) in relation to conflict prevention and management has yet to be undertaken—though a valuable project which examines the role of SRSGs and the problems they confront has been carried out by UNITAR. Similarly, more detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of peace operations building on earlier work by IPA would help the UN plan future operations more effectively. The forthcoming Human Security Report will provide powerful—and for many surprising—statistical evidence for the overall effectiveness of UN security policies, but this research cannot determine which particular policies have had most impact. All such evaluations could be carried out in association with other donors. The Brahimi Report approach—a small secretariat with an independent lead analyst, wide consultation and competent in-house support, may be a useful model. It provides independent assessment tempered by reality testing of recommendations which only insiders familiar with UN 'turf' politics understand.

61. The CPP should consider ways to encourage links between the UN and international financial institutions—particularly the World Bank which has now embraced conflict prevention with enthusiasm. There are good communications between individuals in the Bank, the Secretariat and UNDP, but virtually nothing in the way of systematic institutional collaboration on prevention-related issues.

62. The CPP should, in a manner coordinated and consistent with the UN CPP strategy, consider funding prevention-related projects associated with regional organisations such

as OSCE, Organisation of American States (OAS), Africa Union (AU)—particularly where such projects involve improving collaboration with the UN.

63. UKMIS should engage with DPKO in a review of some aspects of its work, NOT CLEAR with a view to possibly using the CPP to carry out a pilot project, supporting staff exchanges between DPKO and regional organisations involved in peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations (ECOWAS, NATO, OSCE, etc).

64. ***Bring a strategic perspective to defining conflict prevention.*** In the UN environment, there is little consensus about what is meant by conflict prevention, partly because different agencies conceive of prevention differently. DPA's strategic approach, for example, focuses on short-term, political, 'instrumental' means of prevention. UNDP, like the World Bank, naturally enough, takes a more development-oriented or 'structural' approach. The two approaches, while radically different, are—or should be—complementary. The GCPP UN Strategy needs to bear both the differences in mind—and the 'turf' conflicts that they sometimes cause. DPA is the 'focal point' for peacebuilding/prevention within the UN system, but, as noted above, DPA's conception of prevention is a fairly narrow one.

65. ***Develop a comprehensive overview of stakeholders.*** Within the UN, conflict prevention has been accepted as a cross-cutting issue across a wide range of agencies with stakeholders in the Secretariat, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the specialised agencies. While the IFIs are technically part of the UN system they are not usually considered as such. As noted earlier the World Bank, by sheer weight of its expertise and resources is a more important 'structural' prevention actor than the UN can ever be. It is therefore critically important that the UN and the Bank collaborate far more closely and effectively than is the case at the moment. GCPP strategy could play an important role in encouraging such collaboration.



## **10. RECOMMENDATIONS II: TARGETS AND INDICATORS**

66. The UN Strategy needs to set intermediate objectives before performance indicators can be identified. The UN Strategy Steering Group should develop a consultative process to define the goal of the UN Strategy—presumably by adapting the CPP-related PSA or SDA to the specific circumstances of work with the UN. The consultation should involve appropriate staff working on UN issues in London, as well as all the UK missions involved in following the work of UN agencies and other relevant multilateral institutions.

67. The Steering Group should develop formal strategies for each of the objectives stemming from the overall goal of the UN Strategy (currently four objectives). A logical framework (or other planning tool) should be developed for each objective, under which the individual projects can be placed.

68. In addition to the current monitoring and evaluation of individual projects, a process should be developed to carry out a regular (presumably yearly) review of the overall strategy—for example by preparing and circulating a document setting out the activities implemented in the previous period and revising the strategy planning tool.

**ANNEX 1: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM REPORT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT, 2001**

1. I recommend that the General Assembly consider a more active use of its powers, in accordance with Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter of the United Nations, in the prevention of armed conflicts.
2. I urge the General Assembly to consider ways of enhancing its interaction with the Security Council on conflict prevention, particularly in developing long-term conflict prevention and peace-building strategies.
3. I encourage the Security Council to consider innovative mechanisms, such as establishing a subsidiary organ, an ad hoc informal working group or other informal technical arrangement to discuss prevention cases on a continuing basis, particularly with regard to periodic regional or sub-regional reports that I intend to submit to the Council, as well as other early warning or prevention cases brought to its attention by Members States.
4. I suggest that a future high-level segment of the annual substantive session of the Economic and Social Council be devoted to the question of addressing the root causes of conflict and the role of development in promoting long-term conflict prevention.
5. I urge Member States to resort to the International Court of Justice earlier and more often to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner and to promote the rule of law in international relations.
6. I urge Member States to accept the general jurisdiction of the Court. When domestic structures prevent this, States should agree bilaterally or multilaterally to a comprehensive list of matters they are willing to present to the Court.
7. I urge Member States, when adopting multilateral treaties under United Nations auspices, to adopt clauses providing for disputes to be referred to the Court.
8. I recommend that the General Assembly authorize the Secretary-General and other United Nations organs to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court, and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such authorization resort to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions.
9. With the support of Member States, I intend to enhance the traditional preventive role of the Secretary-General in four ways: first, by increasing the use of United Nations interdisciplinary fact-finding and confidence building missions to volatile regions; second, by developing regional prevention strategies with our regional partners and appropriate United Nations organs and agencies; third, by establishing an informal network of eminent persons for conflict prevention; and fourth, by improving the capacity and resource base for preventive action in the Secretariat.

10. I encourage the governing bodies and other intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations funds and programmes and specialized agencies to consider how they could best integrate a conflict prevention perspective into their different mandated activities.
11. I urge the General Assembly to provide the Department of Political Affairs, in its capacity as focal point for conflict prevention, with adequate resources to carry out its responsibilities for conflict prevention and peace-building in the United Nations system.
12. I encourage Member States and the Security Council to make more active use of preventive deployments before the onset of conflict, as appropriate.
13. I urge the Security Council to support peace-building components within peacekeeping operations, as relevant, and to strengthen Secretariat capacity in this regard, inter alia, through the measures outlined in my report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
14. I encourage greater transparency by Member States on military matters, including broader participation in the United Nations instruments relating to arms transparency and military expenditure. I also call on the General Assembly and other United Nations disarmament bodies to strengthen existing disarmament-related early warning and transparency mechanisms, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons.
15. In order to prevent the recurrence of conflict, I encourage the Security Council to include, as appropriate, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building operations.
16. I call on the Security Council and the General Assembly to make full use of information and analyses emanating from United Nations human rights mechanisms and bodies in its efforts to prevent armed conflicts.
17. I urge Member States to ratify or accede to human rights treaties and the statute of the International Criminal Court, if they have not already done so.
18. I urge Member States to avail themselves of the advisory services and technical assistance offered by UNDP and other United Nations development actors that aim to strengthen national capacities for addressing structural risk factors.
19. I call on donor countries to provide additional resources to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations Development Group to respond effectively to requests for assistance by Member States, to strengthen structural conflict prevention capacities and to facilitate South-South cooperation in this field.
20. I call on the Security Council to invite the Office of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator to brief its members regularly on situations where there is a substantial risk of a humanitarian emergency. I also urge the Council to call for and support the implementation of preventive protection and assistance activities by United

Nations agencies in situations where there is a risk of a humanitarian crisis. I request United Nations humanitarian agencies to integrate such preventive activities increasingly into their work in pre-crisis situations. In this regard, I call on Member States to provide increased resources for the work of these agencies in this field.

21. I urge the General Assembly at its forthcoming special session on HIV/AIDS to examine how strategies for the prevention of HIV/AIDS can be broadened to take into account the important contribution that they can make to conflict prevention, particularly in seriously affected regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa.
22. I urge Member States to support policies and resources that target the needs of children and adolescents in situations of potential conflict, since this is an important aspect of long-term conflict prevention strategy.
23. I urge the General Assembly to provide additional resources for United Nations direct and mission-based broadcasts to counter hate messages and to promote media development in conflict-prone situations. I intend to reflect this priority in future budgetary submissions, as appropriate.
24. I encourage the Security Council, in accordance with its resolution 1325 (2000), to give greater attention to gender perspectives in its conflict prevention and peace-building efforts.
25. I call on the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other relevant United Nations bodies to provide increased resources for the activities of the Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, particularly in the prevention of transnational crime, drug trafficking and illicit trade in small arms.
26. I call on Member States to support the follow-up processes launched by the Third and Fourth High-level United Nations-Regional Organisations Meetings in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building, and to provide increased resources for the development of regional capacities in these fields.
27. I urge NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to organize an international conference of local, national and international NGOs on their role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the United Nations in this field.
28. I encourage Member States and the private sector to support the Global Compact in the context of United Nations conflict prevention efforts. In particular, I encourage the business community to adopt socially responsible practices that foster a climate of peace in conflict prone societies, help prevent and mitigate crisis situations, and contribute to reconstruction and reconciliation.
29. In the context of the long-term prevention efforts of the United Nations, I renew my appeal to the international donor community to increase the flow of development assistance to developing countries. I particularly urge Member States to give serious consideration to the recommendations of the High-level Panel on Financing for Development.

## **ANNEX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM BRAHIMI REPORT ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS**

### 1. Preventive action:

(a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council's second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to 'all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development—the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organisations—[to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion';

(b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General's more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States' obligations, under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give 'every assistance' to such activities of the United Nations.

### 2. Peacebuilding strategy:

(a) A small percentage of a mission's first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team's resident coordinator;

(b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;

(c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict;

(d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.

### 3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy:

Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.

#### 4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates:

(a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines;

(b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peace-building elements, from Member States;

(c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;

(d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission's use of force.

#### 5. Information and strategic analysis:

The Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

#### 6. Transitional civil administration:

The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity.

#### 7. Determining deployment timelines:

The United Nations should define 'rapid and effective deployment capacities' as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.

8. Mission leadership:

(a) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States;

(b) The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership;

(c) The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation, and whenever possible should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership.

9. Military personnel:

(a) Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations;

(b) The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be reached;

(c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy;

(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving 'on-call list' of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation.

10. Civilian police personnel:

(a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the UNSAS;

(b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;

(c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations;

(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;

(e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial 'rule of law' teams.

#### 11. Civilian specialists:

(a) The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat;

(b) The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid- to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas;

(c) Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects;

(d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission start-up, and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy.

#### 12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public information:

Additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation's message out and build effective internal communications links.



13. Logistics support and expenditure management:

(a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of DPKO;

(b) The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. These start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them;

(c) The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US\$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution;

(d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines;

(e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets;

(f) The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from \$200,000 to as high as \$1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts.

14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations:

(a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full;

(b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for this purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organisation;

(c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO.

15. Integrated mission planning and support:

Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies.

16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO:

(a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser;

(b) The Military Adviser's Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured;

(c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in the United Nations peace operations;

(d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period;

(e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations;

(f) Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the 'Principal Assistant Secretary-General' and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.

17. Operational support for public information:

A unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information (DPI) reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information.

18. Peacebuilding support in the Department of Political Affairs:

(a) The Panel supports the Secretariat's effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA, in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for this unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. This programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has

provided in paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General within the context of the Panel's recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above;

(b) The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions;

(c) To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peace-building field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

19. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:

The Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets.

20. Peace operations and the information age:

(a) Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to the responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of the special representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy;

(b) EISAS, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD), should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE);

(c) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction;

(d) The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation;

(e) The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy.

## **ANNEX 3: UN STRATEGY REVIEW 2002/3**

### **GLOBAL CONFLICT PREVENTION THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS**

A joint strategy from DFID/FCO/MOD for  
improving the UN's Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Capacity

#### **Developing the Strategy in Year Two**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

1. In November 2000, DOP (OA) agreed to give priority under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool to work on the United Nations covering peacekeeping, conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives, including the implementation of the Brahimi Report. The overall aim of the Strengthening the UN strategy is to build on the Brahimi peacekeeping/peacebuilding reform process, by enhancing the ability of the UN and UN troop-contributing countries to prevent conflict, launch and sustain peace support operations and promote effective peacebuilding.

2. In Year One, the strategy was divided into two parts: Brahimi Implementation: Peacebuilding, led by DFID; Brahimi Implementation: Peacekeeping, led by FCO. In Year Two we propose to concentrate the efforts of the individual departments by improved targeting and enhanced complementarity and coordination of activities.

3. This report evaluates progress achieved in implementing the strategy during Year One and proposes steps to ensure efficient and effective implementation in Year Two. The Annexes provide details of projects undertaken in Year One, those planned for Year Two and a breakdown of expenditure. The report further proposes that an additional £1 million is made available to improve our capacity to build on the achievements so far and exploit further opportunities in Year Two.

4. On the UK Government side, Year One has highlighted synergies between DFID, FCO and MOD and confirmed the value of the Pool for eliminating duplication and improving strategic coherence in the work of the three departments. Regular meetings of the Steering Group have facilitated information-sharing and revealed areas of mutual concern and interest.

#### **HAS THE STRATEGY BEEN EFFECTIVE?**

5. During the first year of the joint Strategy, the three Departments have worked closely together on a number of inter-related activities. DFID activities have sought to address systemic constraints preventing the UN from effectively carrying out its role in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. These activities, though implemented through different organisations both inside and outside the UN, have had the shared, overarching goal to improve the way in which the UN supports and strengthens country-level conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives. FCO/MOD have concentrated on strengthening the military and

civilian policing aspects of peacekeeping through programmes to increase the capacity among existing and new troop-contributing countries to deliver effective and well-trained troops and police for UN missions. Activities have included troop pre-deployment training, a peacekeeping map exercise, training of police trainer courses and the design of a peacekeeping website.

6. Our ability to evaluate the efficacy of activities carried out in Year One varies according to the project. In some cases, success has been evident immediately; in others, judgements of progress are affected by the incremental nature of the project, and/or the challenge of dealing with the UN, a large bureaucracy influenced by deeply embedded and often cumbersome procedures, with little experience of critical self-evaluation.

## **ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN YEAR ONE**

7. All three departments agree that the Strategy has enhanced cooperation with the UN and certain countries engaged in, or interested in, peace support operations.

### **Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding**

#### *Improve information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning capacities*

8. Good progress has been made in this area. Key parts of the UN are now using web-based technology tools to collect, summarise and disseminate relevant information on conflict prevention for UN staff. Two large web-based conferences on conflict prevention initiatives (Nepal and Indonesia) have been held which facilitated structured dialogue between analysts and policy makers from governments, political parties, social movements, and civil society groups. Several workshops have been held with members of the Security Council and a number of studies of specific conflict prevention cases are being developed. A newly established network for independent experts on conflict analysis and prevention is up and running, and is a demand-driven mechanism that assists the UN Secretariat to consult with outside expertise on country, regional and thematic issues. Consultations have already been held, for example, on Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Balkans, Colombia and the Andean region, and the feedback from the UN has been positive. We are encouraging more focus on Africa in future. In addition we are supporting the development of a Human Security Report to map trends leading to increased human insecurity, document ongoing and new policies designed to increase human security—and thus provide a useful global resource for decision makers. The feasibility study has been produced and the Global Pool will continue to support the production of the first issue of the report under year 2.

#### *Enhance the conflict prevention skills and competence of UN staff and partners*

9. To date over 700 UN staff have been trained in early warning and conflict prevention skills and later this year we will support an independent evaluation of the training to look specifically at the impact, and for evidence of tangible benefits derived from it. We are also seeking ways to integrate the training with relevant planning frameworks (e.g. the Common Country Assessment and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)). The first ever seminar of all SRSGs coming together with Kofi Annan and his senior team was held in March 2001. This was considered extremely useful and will now be an annual event.

*Develop peacebuilding strategies on a UN system-wide basis*

10. Through the strategy, significant support has been provided to build the UN's capacity in peacebuilding, both at headquarters and field level, working closely with both DPA and UNDP, which are both central to developing comprehensive peacebuilding strategies. Support has been provided to the BCPR in UNDP to enable it to fulfil its mandate in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and recovery. We have continued to support DPA and its peacemaking efforts, although the Peacebuilding Unit for which assistance was provided in year 1 is still not up and running, primarily because of uncertainties created by the debate around implementing Brahimi recommendations. Indications are that this will shortly be resolved.

11. The strategy intended to provide support under year 1 to discussions on an independent mechanism to overcome the 'relief-development gap', but progress on this was held up due to events in Afghanistan. The proposed mechanism would enable stronger inter-agency co-operation (especially involving the IFIs and UNDP) to provide technical assistance and 'jump start' planning and financing in the *immediate* aftermath of a cessation of hostilities—so that fragile peace building opportunities are not lost. A joint UK Norwegian meeting on the issues with key donors and the UN will now be held in New York in April 2002.

*Reduce the impact of armed conflict on children*

12. The issue of children affected by armed conflict is much wider than simply that of child soldiers. The strategy has therefore targeted both specialised and general UN bodies to seek to address this. Support has been provided to the Office of the Special Representative on Children Affected by Armed Conflict (OSRSG-CAAC) to ensure effective advocacy of the issue. To complement this work, we are also supporting UNICEF's work in the field.

*Integrate gender perspectives into conflict prevention and peace support and peacebuilding operations*

13. The need to integrate gender perspectives into peace operations has been identified in a number of reviews and reinforced in the recent Security Council Resolution on 'Women and Peace and Security'. This remains a major challenge for the UN. Support through the strategy is provided on two fronts: Through a multiyear Women's Peace and Security Programme with UNIFEM which seeks both to strengthen approaches to protection and assistance of women affected by conflict and to support women's roles in conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding; and through the development of a strategy with DPKO to mainstream gender throughout peacekeeping operations, including through integration of gender issues in training of peacekeepers.

*Support the implementation of further UN Secretary General and Brahimi recommendations*

14. All three Departments have worked consistently over the past year to ensure implementation of the Brahimi Report and follow-up recommendations. A key aspect of this has been in developing closer links with the UN Secretariat (DPKO and DPA—see Future Strategy below). In response to particular concerns during the process raised by certain G77 members, it was decided to hold a series of regional seminars building on the DFID regional Brahimi seminars of last year, but targeted at parliamentarians. Seminars in

year 1 of the strategy were held in Egypt, Ghana and India, and an informal meeting with the Security Council will be held in New York in May 2002.

## **Peacekeeping**

### *Peacekeeping exercises*

15. The regional mapping exercise 'Blue Elephant' was held in Bangkok from 18 to 22 February 2002. The overall aim of the exercise was to enhance understanding of complex peace support operations, focusing on interoperability between forces and on civilian-military cooperation. The UN provided expert speakers on Military Planning and Civilian Police. It was a high profile event which helped to reinforce with Thailand the profile and importance of its peacekeeping involvement. It also provided the participants (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, East Timor, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Ukraine), who represented Civilian, Military and NGOs, with the opportunity to exchange experience and know-how and to build their capacity for deployment into complex PSOs worldwide.

### *Website/Virtual Learning Resource Centre*

16. The UK peacekeeping website is scheduled to go on-line in April 2002. It will, amongst other items, incorporate materials for use in Mapexes facilitating their use in national training programmes and enabling UK training expertise to be shared with a wide audience. IT hardware and software will be supplied to peacekeeping centres of countries participating in Mapexes when the country in question has no existing capacity to use the online materials.

### *PSO Conference*

17. A UK-Argentine Peace Support Operations Conference was held in January 2002. The aim of the event was to produce common guidelines and procedures, promote understanding, increase respective operational effectiveness and strengthen an integrated approach to PSO and complex emergencies. The themes explored in this initial event will be further developed in the Latin American map exercise planned for Year Two (to be held in Buenos Aires) and will also set the framework for further practical assistance to the Argentine Peacekeeping Training Centre (which will be funded from the Latin American GCPP strategy).

### *Civilian Police Training*

18. Three regional training of trainers courses have been held in Beijing, Amman and Buenos Aires. Demand for international civilian police is growing. But the UN is hampered by a shortage of appropriately trained CivPol contingents. Brahimi highlighted the importance of Member States cooperating on regional training initiatives which go some way to addressing these difficulties. The training of trainer courses are the UK's contribution to this effort. Initial feedback is positive.

### *CivPol Pre-Deployment & English Training*

19. Following peacekeeping bilateral discussions with the Chinese, we have agreed to provide £45,000 to assist in establishing their new civilian policing training centre, primarily to be used for English language training.

20. Consultations with DPKO on where key inputs are required for improving UN police training have highlighted the need to reprint the 1994 edition of English Language Course for UN Civilian Police. We have allocated £50,000 towards the reprint and towards the purchase of books and cassettes for training courses.

### **EXPENDITURE TO DATE**

21. Details are provided in Annex A. There has been an underspend which can partly be explained by the challenge of working with the UN but which is mainly due to the fact that this was the first year of the strategy, projects take time to plan (particularly in military structures) and only now are they coming to fruition.

### **ONGOING COMMITMENTS IN YEAR TWO**

22. Details are provided in Annex B.

### **FUTURE STRATEGY**

23. It has become clear over the past year that the activities of FCO, MOD and DFID with DPA and DPKO in particular are closely inter-related. Through discussions of the Global Pool Steering Group there is scope for improved targeting of activities through a systematic concentration of effort on a limited number of key areas. Notwithstanding the continuation of agreed activities which are ongoing, in taking the Global Pool Strategy forward, new activities will also be designed which complement the existing strategy, and which build on the experience accumulated over the past year, taking advantage of the progress which has been made at UN HQ in New York and the existing impetus to now push the benefits of this progress to field level.

### **PROPOSED NEW ACTIVITIES AND EXPECTED EXPENDITURE**

#### **Regional**

24. Additional resources requested: None—it is proposed to redirect existing resources and unallocated funding from Year 1.

25. The regional dimensions of conflicts cannot be forgotten and more needs to be done to strengthen the capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations. However, this is tempered by the realisation that regional organisations have very weak capacity and can themselves be part of the problem. The Report of the Secretary General on Prevention of Armed Conflict (May 2001) puts emphasis on the role of regional organisations and actors in conflict prevention and calls for increased resources for the development of regional capacity in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Similarly the UN Peacebuilding Plan of Action calls for improved UN coordination at country level, paying particular attention to inter-linkages between UN HQ and UN operations on the ground.

26. In addition to the HQ level activities, there is therefore greater scope to look at location-specific engagement with the UN, particularly with DPKO and DPA. Experience from the



field level would also provide specific evidence to advocate more strongly on concrete issues centrally and push through continued reform.

27. It is proposed to identify 2 or 3 countries/regions and design a programme of activities to directly strengthen and support UN peace operations there. The criteria for selecting the countries/regions will include identifiable elements of the UN operations where UK support will add significant value; a reasonable expectation that such support will result in sustainable improvements in the UN operation (and ideally to the early completion of its mandate); and an assessment that UK support will not replicate activities by other donors. The assistance will conform with UK Government policy on preventing/reducing conflict and will thus promote UK national interests. The approach would be a mix of ongoing activities such as broad based training (early warning, analysis and strategic planning, conflict prevention skills training), peacekeeping exercises, targeted provision of resources/equipment, building local and regional capacity to contribute to UN peace operations, and working directly with the UN, primarily DPA and DPKO, at HQ and in the field to improve linkages and lesson learning.

28. By strengthening the UN's ability to interact at a regional and/or country level the strategy would help address the 'disconnect' between HQ progress and field level performance. For example, looking at ways to improve the information flow between HQ and field and vice versa; ensuring use of UN training materials developed are used in regional training centres; putting into practise the UN objective to strengthen links with civil society; and complementing field efforts to strengthen regional organisations. A specific programme of activities will be worked out for each of the 2 or 3 countries/regions identified and agreed by the Global Pool Steering Group and departmental regional or country desks. We are already committed to a certain amount of baseline expenditure, as indicated in Annex 2. We will use these activities to develop further the synergies which have evolved in Year One.

## **DPKO**

### **Additional resources required: £500,000**

29. DPKO's capacity for mounting and sustaining peace support operations has been significantly strengthened through implementation of the Brahimi report and subsequent Comprehensive Review of DPKO. Changes at UNHQ are beginning to bear fruit, but a number of weak points remain, especially in the areas of best practices/lessons learned, the Civpol division, and the Situation Centre. Moreover, the process of extending some activities to the field is only just getting under way.

30. In the past three months, the momentum of our efforts to assist DPKO has increased, as difficulties in implementation of the Brahimi report have become apparent and possible entry points for UK assistance have been identified. DFID is providing capacity-building support to DPKO in five priority areas identified by Under-Secretary-General Guehenno:

- Strengthening the capacity of DPKO's Civilian Police Division.

- Upgrading the Situation Centre.
- Institutional support on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) issues.
- Capacity-building in the Best Practices Unit.
- Strengthening selected aspects of field operations.

31. Detailed discussions with DPKO staff have now resulted in a number of possible UK approaches for providing assistance. These range from providing a consultant to assist the Civilian Police Division with developing its strategic planning capacities to helping enhance DPKO's IT/knowledge management capacity.

32. DPKO is deeply appreciative of the UK's work to date and is fully committed to the process of developing and implementing a strategy of support. This process will continue, and expand, in Year Two.

## **DPA**

### **Additional resources required: £500,000**

33. Once the process of strengthening DPKO is under way, we propose to build on that model in order to help enhance capacity of the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Initial consultations have been held with DPA and we expect to build on them in the coming months. In Year One we have supported DPA's efforts aimed at setting up a Peacebuilding Unit. We are advised that this will shortly be established. DPA has drafted a Peacebuilding Plan of Action, whose finalization and implementation we will monitor. Similarly, we will soon be devoting attention to helping enhance the efficacy of several peacebuilding offices managed by DPA.

## **RESOURCES/BID FROM GLOBAL POOL**

34. The Strategy proposes initially to redirect remaining funds from year 1 activities and consider in development of year 2 programmes whether any can be refocused to contribute to the specific objectives as outlined above. In addition, it is estimated that a programme of new activities with the UN Secretariat will require additional resources of £1 million per annum for 3 years. This is in addition to already agreed ongoing activities in the Strategy which play an important role in supporting the UN Secretariat, as summarised in Annex B.

## **MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS**

35. The Joint Steering Group of DFID (Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department), FCO, MOD, will implement the strategy, advised by UKMis New York and UKMis Geneva. The Strategy Manager is Susan Speller, UND, FCO.

*21 March 2002*

## Annex A

### YEAR ONE ACTIVITY: PEACEKEEPING

#### Enhancing National Troop Contributing Capacity:

- Regional peacekeeping map exercise (involving military and civilian elements) held in Bangkok in February 2002.
- Creative design and development of UK peacekeeping website (to support peacekeeping exercises)—due to launch in April 2002.
- Pre-deployment training —Kenya.
- UK-Argentine PSO conference.
- Planning for regional pre-deployment training of trainers—Uruguay.

#### Improving Civilian Policing Capability:

- Regional training of trainer course held in Beijing (December 2001), Amman (January 2002, Buenos Aires (February 2002).
- Provision of English language training manuals and cassettes to UN DPKO.
- Allocation of £45,000 to Embassy in Beijing for assistance to Chinese CivPol training projects.

### YEAR ONE EXPENDITURE: PEACEKEEPING

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Spend</u>	<u>Carry over</u>
<b>Enhancing National TC Capacity</b>			
Equipment—Resource Pool	2,050,000	1,000,000	1,050,000
Equipment—Strategic Lift	1,000,000	0	1,000,000
Peacekeeping Exercises	500,000	231,000	269,000
Website/Virtual Learning	100,000	44,000	56,000
Military Staff Training	295,000	25,000	270,000
Troop Pre-deployment Training	100,000	100,000	0
<b>Improving Intl CivPol Capacity</b>			
CivPol Training	350,000	71,100	278,900
CivPol Pre-deployment Tng	80,000	6,000	74,000
Rapid Deployment Tng	75,000	0	75,000
<b>Total Carry Over:</b>			<b>3,072,900</b>
<b>Amount of Carry Over Committed:</b>	<b>2,022,900</b>		
<b>Amount Uncommitted:</b>	<b>1,050,000(Equipment Resource Pool)</b>		

## YEAR ONE ACTIVITY: PEACEBUILDING

### Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Initiatives

(£ million)

**2001/2**

*Objective 1:*

a) Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum	0.500
b) Conflict Prevention Website	0.250

*Objective 2:*

a) UN Staff College	0.350
b) UNITAR	0.250
c) UNDP	0.500
d) IPA	0.350

*Objective 3:*

a) DPA's Peacebuilding Unit	1.000
b) UNITAR's SRSG project	0.250
c) UN Transition Recovery Teams	0.750

*Objective 4:*

a) UNICEF	1.000
b) OSRSG/CAC	0.500

*Objective 5:*

a) UNIFEM	1.000
b) Gender Training	0.500

**TOTAL**

**7.200**

### New Conflict Prevention Initiatives

(£ million)

**2001/2**

*Objective 1:*

c) Human Security Report	0.250
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*Objective 3:*

d) Strategic Recovery Facility	0.250
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*Objective 6:*

a) Support to Brahimi Implementation and further UNSG recommendations	0.500
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**TOTALS**

**1.000**

## **Annex B**

### **YEAR TWO COMMITMENTS**

Existing commitments for Year Two are as follows:

#### **Peacekeeping:**

- Support for DPKO—Peacekeeping Logistics and Planning.
- South Asia regional peacekeeping map exercise—Bangladesh.
- South America peacekeeping map exercise—Buenos Aires.
- (West) African peacekeeping map exercise—Location to be confirmed.
- Awarding of contract to run map exercises.
- Donation of IT equipment to regional PK centres/targeted countries.
- Regional training of civpol trainers—courses planned in Poland, Hungary and further location to be confirmed).
- Pre-deployment training in Uruguay, Bangladesh.
- Pre-Deployment training of civpol—commissioning video of UK civpol.
- Rapid Deployment training of civpol—course under development—first scheduled for May 2002. Further three planned for Year Two.

**COMMITTED EXPENDITURE: £2,022,900**

**EXTRA RESOURCES BID FOR UNDER YEAR TWO: £1,000,000**

(see paras 23 and 29 above)

## Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Initiatives

(£ million)

**2002/3**

*Objective 1:*

a) Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum	0.375
b) Conflict Prevention Website	0.250

*Objective 2:*

a) UN Staff College	0.350
b) UNITAR	0.300
c) UNDP	0.566
d) IPA	0.350

*Objective 3:*

a) DPA's Peacebuilding Unit	2.000
b) UNITAR's SRSG project	0.250
c) UN Transition Recovery Teams	0.500

*Objective 4:*

a) UNICEF	1.000
b) OSRSG/CAC	0.500

*Objective 5:*

a) UNIFEM	1.000
b) Gender Training	0.500

**TOTAL**

**7.941**

## New Conflict Prevention Initiatives

(£ million)

**2002/3**

*Objective 1:*

c) Human Security Report	0.381
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*Objective 3:*

d) Strategic Recovery Facility	1.225
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*Objective 6:*

a) Support to Brahimi Implementation and further UNSG recommendations	0.500
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**TOTALS**

**2.106**

**ANNEX 4: UN STRATEGY PLANS FOR 2003/4 AND 2004/5<sup>32</sup>**

**1. Peacebuilding Strategy Development**

Over the next year we plan to focus on developing peacebuilding strategy and capacity within the UN. The peacebuilding aspects of the Brahimi Report were less developed than the peacekeeping parts. There are suggestions that this was because thinking was less developed and also because peacebuilding was thought to be a more politically sensitive area. Some progress has been made on peacebuilding in that many parts of the UN appear to be carrying out peacebuilding activities, but these activities appear to lack adequate coordination and a strategic approach. The lack of an agreed strategy for peacebuilding is unhelpful.

**DPA and BCPR**

We, together with other donors of the Peacebuilding Unit (PBU), have requested DPA to carry out a stock take of the current situation, including a review of peacebuilding activities both in the field and HQ, and an assessment of (bottom up) need and demand for DPA's services leading to a clear definition of DPA's niche role in peacebuilding, what support it should provide and in what situations. Once we have this, we will be in a better position to determine how the UK can support this process.

BCPR has been working with DPA on an ad hoc basis to develop peacebuilding strategies, most recently with the DPA Peacebuilding Office in Guinea. This coordination is to be welcomed and we will encourage BCPR to input into the development of any strategy for peacebuilding. Our continued support to the BCPR (the Strategic Planning Unit and Recovery Unit) will be essential in enabling BCPR's operational involvement.

Budgets

	2003/4	2004/5
Support to DPA on peacebuilding:	500,000	500,000
BCPR SPU	500,000	500,000
BCPR Recovery Unit	1,500,000	1,500,000
<b>Total:</b>	<b>2,500,000</b>	<b>2,500,000</b>

Risks

Unless peacebuilding is prioritised and has top UN political backing, the agenda is likely to continue to flounder and be tackled in an ad hoc, uncoordinated way. We aim to work with DPA, other relevant parts of the UN system, and other donors to develop a strategic approach, which will result in a coordinated programme of activities.

<sup>32</sup> Part C of DFID/FCO/MOD, Global Conflict Prevention Pool Bidding Form for FY2003-4 and 2004-5'.

## 2. Further UN reforms and Beyond Brahimi follow-on

In this past year, we have made significant strides in developing a partnership with DPKO. The package of support being funded from this year's strategy is envisaged as a first tranche, and we have already indicated a willingness to support the strengthening of the Civilian Police Division and gender-related activities. A recent interdepartmental brainstorming on follow-on to the Brahimi reforms identified a number of activities which will be explored with the UN and other donors. These would be in such areas as rapid deployment, pre-deployment training for key mission staff, strengthening the Secretariat's capacity in the areas of SSR and DDR. To retain momentum in the peacekeeping reform process will require that these projects are developed and launched in the coming year. However, determining the nature and scope of these projects, and the extent of UK financial commitment to them, will require detailed negotiations with the Secretariat, troop contributing countries and other donors.

As noted above, the Beyond Brahimi project is approaching completion, and we are waiting for the findings in order to develop detailed proposals for follow-up. The recommendations are likely to include improved training of civilian personnel and enhanced management capacity both at Headquarters and field levels. Projects are likely to emerge from the recommendations which would benefit from Global Pool funding.

The Strategy will continue and build on its efforts to enhance national troop contributing capacity and to improve international civilian policing capability. Two new projects are planned: UK CIMIC training for senior military/police officers and NGOs; and a workshop for international CivPol, possibly co-hosted with the Dutch, focusing on the link between police reform and criminal justice sector reform.

Projects will be linked to our ongoing GCPP work to strengthen the UN. They will maintain the process of building relationships with key parts of the UN system, and will contribute to advancing the conditions of security and stability which are indispensable for long-term development.

Funding from the GCPP will permit the continued maximisation of synergies between DFID, the FCO, and MOD, with each contributing input in areas of particular expertise.

### Budget

	2003-4	2004-5
Further UN reforms and follow-on to Beyond Brahimi	1,000,000	1,000,000
Enhancing troop contributing capacity and improving international civilian policing capability	2,435,000	2,103,000



## Risks

The primary risk associated with these activities is the same as that encountered by our ongoing work with the UN, namely bureaucratic delays or obstacles. However, DPKO is becoming more efficient and, perhaps because of our regular interaction, attempts to be as prompt as possible in its dealings with us. As at present, we will monitor the situation and attempt to pre-empt or minimise such difficulties by collaborating with the Secretariat to find solutions.

### **3. Protection of Civilians in Conflict Situations**

The issue of protection of civilians is now firmly on the agenda of the Security Council, with adoption of two Security Council Resolutions, 1265 in 1999 and SCR 1296 in 2000, and an Aide-Memoire agreed in March 2002. However, there is a widespread feeling that the focus now needs to shift from analysis to implementation. The UK has consistently called for protection of civilians work to be an integrated and cross-cutting issue in terms of UN handling. Given our reach across all aspects of the UN system (political, developmental, humanitarian), we are well placed to provide targeted support where it is needed in order to move implementation of this issue forward.

#### **3.1 Children Affected by Armed Conflict**

In the coming year we propose building on the work on Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) and the work on gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations. The former will concentrate on supporting implementation of the mandate for CAAC. We are currently re-examining our support to the OSRSG-CAAC, who leads on advocacy and awareness raising aspects of the mandate. Following a review scheduled for February 2003, we may need to refocus our assistance to provide better support to implementation of the mandate. Our successful support to UNICEF to enable them to carry out activities linked to the mandate will continue.

## Risks

The issue of protection of civilians is high on the agenda of the Security Council and at face value enjoys high political support. The main difficulty is enforcement of penalties for abuses, which is politically extremely sensitive.

One area of concern is our support for the OSRSG – we are reviewing this in early February, engaging with other donors and UN senior management in discussing how to take this forward.

#### **3.2 Gender**

Further work to mainstream gender in peacekeeping operations will build on our support to DPKO and the outcome of the review currently being carried out by BPU/DPKO. This, together with the recent review on Women, Peace and Security carried out by UNIFEM and the Office of the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, will provide a basis on which to develop a plan of action to enable DPKO to deliver on its obligations under SCR 1325.

### **3.3. Code of Conduct**

The recent OCHA report on protection of civilians emphasised core principles for minimum standards of conduct for UN personnel. Both civilians and peacekeepers must be held accountable for violations. Recent events in West Africa and Nepal seriously undermine the credibility of the UN's protection mandate. The UK has previously provided support for the Training and Evaluation Service and PBU of DPKO and has funded development of a film on the code of conduct for peacekeepers. We propose to continue support to DPKO on this important issue.

### **3.4 HIV/AIDS and Peacekeeping**

The problem of HIV/AIDS and peacekeepers is a growing problem, which many countries are unsure how to deal with. The official HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for the South African National Defence force, which regularly participates in peacekeeping operations, is estimated as between 17–22 %, close to the national average, though actual rates are difficult to determine without comprehensive testing. However the Centre for Defence Studies estimates that over 50 % of in-service deaths can be attributed directly to AIDS.

There is growing concern that the peacekeeping capacity of many troop-contributing countries, particularly in Africa, will be increasingly hampered by growing rates of HIV/AIDS among the military. Onward transmission of the virus by deployed troops to the host community is another major factor, linking back to the issue of protecting civilians from the impact of conflict.

It is proposed to work with DFID's Health and Population Department, UNAIDS and DPKO to develop a programme of support, targeting the military forces of UN troop contributing countries, building on existing wider HIV/AIDS programmes.

#### Risks

HIV is politically an extremely sensitive issue and any programme would need to be handled very carefully and build on wider HIV/AIDS awareness and mitigation programmes. The Strategy will work with DFID's HPD (who have been consulted and agree with this approach), UNAIDS and DPKO to ensure that any support is appropriately targeted and politically acceptable.

### **Human Security Report**

The Human Security Report will be modelled on the Human Development Report and will map the incidence, intensity, causes and consequences of global violence and policy responses to it. It will include data collected and collated from a wide variety of sources. Each year the University of Uppsala and its partner the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo will collect new data on armed conflict specifically for publication in the *Report*. The Ipsos-Reid polling organisation has been commissioned to undertake a global survey of peoples' experiences of, and fears about, violence.

The case for such a report is as compelling as it is timely. First, effective policymaking requires reliable data and informed analysis. Few policymakers would dispute this. Despite this, there are no official data sources for armed conflict data.

The conflict research community has created extensive armed conflict databases and produced compelling analyses of key human security issues, but this research has had little impact on the policy community. This constitutes a major communication failure. Academic researchers generally write, often obscurely, for scholarly publications—and do not target busy policymakers. The *Report* will ‘translate’ this often-abstruse research material, thus making it more accessible to the policy community, media, educators and the interested public.

Second, there is now general acceptance among policymakers dealing with conflict prevention that poverty, bad governance and armed conflict are mutually reinforcing and that successful prevention strategies must focus on linkages between them. Such strategies, however, are too often hindered by bureaucratic ‘turf’ concerns in the policy community and lack of communication across disciplinary boundaries within the research community. By focusing on the security, development and governance nexus, the *Report* will seek to bridge disciplinary and departmental fault lines.

Third, the *Report* will provide a valuable complement to the official annual UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) progress reports. The MDG reports focus on poverty, health, educational and environmental trends, but ignore security issues completely—even though policymakers now recognize that development and security are interdependent.

### Risks

Aside from the GCPP, this initiative is funded by the United Nations University, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Simons Foundation. Provided full funding from these donors can be secured, there are relatively few risks related to the production of this report. To safeguard against errors, particularly with respect to statistical data, a consultant will be employed to review the data. The reports content will also be peer-reviewed by the International Editorial Advisory Board and sent to the Donors Board for members input.

### Budgets

	2003/4	2004/5
Children affected by armed conflict:		
OSRSG	500,000	500,000
UNICEF	1,000,000	1,000,000
Gender mainstreaming:		
UNIFEM	1,000,000	1,000,000
DPKO	300,000	300,000
Code of Conduct:		
DPKO	100,000	100,000
HIV/AIDS and UN peacekeepers:		
UNAIDS/DPKO	200,000	200,000
Human Security report	250,000	250,000
Total:	3,350,000	3,350,000

## **4. Information and Analysis Capacity-Building**

### **4.1 Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum**

This will build on progress made under phase I of Global Pool funding. Firstly, it will expand its geographical base to include a large Africa-based programme as well as smaller interventions in the Caucasus and Nepal, at the request of UN system partners. It will also develop existing and successful operations, for example those in Central Asia and the Andes. Secondly, positive relationships with DPA and UNDP-BCPR will be further developed in addition to new partnerships with other relevant organisations, such as DPKO, UNICEF and others. Outside of the UN system, CPPF will increase its engagement with other donors, in order to attract more sustainable funding, and will increase its linkages with similar organisations (IPA, CPI, the Centre for International Co-operation) in order to provide a more programmatic approach to their support for the UN system.

The information and assistance provided by CPPF plays an important role in providing accurate and timely information to the UN, on a demand-driven basis, thus addressing UN partners' most immediate needs. By facilitating the improvement of UN field operations we can contribute to the UK's political and defence partnerships with UN peacekeeping missions, country offices and headquarters operations.

CPPF has a valuable contribution to make to the work carried out by FCO and MOD. By providing this support as part of the Pool, we can ensure that it is both implemented and perceived as a wider programme of UK support to the UN.

#### Risks

There are two main risks concerning our work with CPPF. First is the risk that it may not be able to cope with demand; however, it is working hard to strengthen its resources. The second risk is that CPPF will become too reliant on GCPP funding which will affect both its sustainability and its valuable status as an independent organisation. GCPP funding has decreased this financial year and will continue to do so in 2003/4. However, CPPF, with our encouragement, is steadily attracting funding from other donors and organisations. Promises of core, multi-year funding need to be realised in the near future if CPPF's current success is to continued in future.

### **4.2 Conflict Prevention Initiative**

CPI's main objective from 2003 onwards will be to clarify its niche within a wide 'community' of organisations providing information to the United Nations. It will establish a steering committee to set out and monitor the objectives of those other organisations. At the more operational level, it will take steps to ensure that potential users in the field are able to access portals and contribute to e-conferences and online discussions. CPI has good relationships with the UN system and has attracted the attention of some other donors, but these relationships need to be developed. CPI will be working closely with UN OCHA, ReliefWeb and the Framework Team on the development an Internet Forum on Conflict Prevention Cases, which should heighten CPI's profile within the System whilst also allowing them to have a more direct connection to UN information channels. At the same time, CPI

will be developing its communications and fundraising strategy, in order to communicate its aims clearly to its potential partners and also to attract the attention of donors. Existing portals will be maintained and developed, and a new portal for the Executive Office of the Secretary General will be designed and launched.

As with CPPF, CPI offers valuable information to its UN partners, although in a different format. The provision of web-based discussion fora has wide-reaching potential as it potentially allows participants from across the system to participate in discussion and to feed their expertise back into the UN: participants to date have ranged from desk officers to country office personnel, and from representatives of other donors and academia to people directly affected by conflict. As CPI is a virtual resource, information can be fed into it and collected by people working and living in crisis situations and employed immediately. Again, initiatives supported by FCO and MOD can benefit from CPI's service.

### Risks

CPI is, by its nature, heavily reliant on its users. It must ensure that it can respond appropriately to user demand. As a web-based platform, it is also dependent on technology to relay information to its user base. Recent user feedback has highlighted the problem of user access in remote parts of the world that may or may not have reliable Internet connections. In addition to this, it appears that UN participation has been mixed in the past. It is important that UN partners not only receive information from CPI, but also feel able to be involved in ongoing discussions. Positive steps are being taken to ensure that this happens, but lack of UN participation remains a risk. One of CPI's major challenges came from the UN itself, when it decided to establish the Internet Forum on Conflict Prevention Cases, which threatened to replicate, from within the UN system, some of CPI's service. CPI has managed to alleviate this risk, at least in part, by involving themselves in the establishment of IFCP.

### **4.3 International Peace Academy**

The current phase of Global Pool assistance to the IPA (which covers two projects: From Reaction to Prevention and African Peacebuilding) will come to an end in mid-2003. In the period leading up to that IPA will take stock of its ongoing activities in order to take their programmes forward in 2003/4. The 'From Reaction to Prevention' programme will identify and focus on issues that are of major interest to the UN, such as DDR and failed states and tailor this into a body of policy fora that is of direct relevance to the UN agenda, whilst also involving and encouraging the participation of the wider donor community and civil society.

The Africa Peacebuilding programme will build on its successful relationship with ECOWAS and the New Partnership for African Development in order to take forward agendas relating to both organisations. In phase II, IPA will aim to strengthen its relationship with Southern African Development Community (SADC) and will work to bring all of the African regional organisations together in order to set out and take forward common agendas. In addition to this, IPA will encourage more proactive involvement in its work from the UN system and will continue to feed results from the Africa programme into the "From Reaction to Prevention" project.

## Risks

The International Peace Academy is an established organisation, with a long-standing reputation for effective working with the UN, and so has a natural advantage over newer initiatives such as CPPF and CPI. Although there is always a risk that the UN will not engage with a given organisation or project, IPA's standing makes this almost negligible. It does, however, have more of a challenge when it comes to working with the African Regional Organisations. Despite positive relationships with ECOWAS, IPA has not been able to gain the support of all the major regional organisations—in particular SADC. Although IPA has made clear progress with ECOWAS in the first phase of its Africa programme, it will need to develop wider partnerships if it is to see sustainable systems in place for the reduction of conflict in Africa. IPA's reputation, its ability to demonstrate success with ECOWAS, and its standing with the UN should, however, enable it to make clear progress in the next phase of activity.

### **4.4 UNITAR**

The activities envisaged in partnership with UNITAR (their **Fellowship Programme** and work with **Special Representatives of the Secretary-General**) will replicate activities carried out under phase one. The Fellowship programme is expected to continue in the same way that it has over the past two years of support from the GCPP. UNITAR have now finalised their SRSG's handbook, and so there is expected to be less activity in this area over the next two years. Main activities are expected to cover updates, as required, of the handbook and organisation of the annual SRSG's workshop. The project documents for the next two years are currently being prepared by UNITAR and will be submitted early in the New Year. A team from DFID will visit UNITAR in January and discuss our continued partnership, after which we will have a clearer idea of these programmes' future direction.

## Risks

The main risk associated with training programmes is that intended participants will not want to take part in the course, or will not have the time to do so. To date, this has not been an issue for UNITAR: feedback from the Fellowship programme has been positive and the SRSG workshop appears to be filling a useful gap, in terms of providing new SRSGs with the information required by them in taking up a new posting, and also providing a useful forum within which new and outgoing SRSGs can exchange experience and ideas. More specific risks will be identified following the DFID visit to UNITAR in January.

### **4.5 UNSSC Early Warning and Preventive Measures**

This training is also expected to follow much the same format in 2003/4. UNSSC and DFID have commissioned an evaluation of the course that will be completed early in the next financial year. The recommendations of this study will then be used to refine the course, if that is deemed to be necessary. Our current phase of support to UNSSC will come to an end in mid-2003 and the objectives of the proposed next phase will be developed in line with the outcomes of the evaluation.

Risks

The UNSSC course runs the risk of being too advanced or not advanced enough for its participants. However, this risk has not manifested itself to date, and UNSSC are confident that they can provide training to suit all tastes. The current evaluation of EWPM will examine this risk and make recommendations for its mitigation, which will then be taken forward in phase two of our support.

In terms of this strategy, the training and information and analysis projects have a similar benefit. By supporting UNITAR and UNSSC training activities, we can ensure that UN personnel have the relevant procedural knowledge to manage crisis response programmes, and make effective use of the information provided by CPPF, CPI and IPA. By uniting these projects into one strategy, we can ensure that they complement and are complemented by those more operational programmes managed by DFID as well as FCO and MOD.

Budgets:

	2003/4	2004/5
CPPF	£300,000	£200,000
CPI	£150,000	£110,000
IPA	£350,000	£350,000
UNITAR Fellowship	£200,000	£200,000
UNITAR SRSG	£200,000	£200,000
UNSSC EWPM	£400,000	£400,000
TOTAL	£1,600,000	£1,460,000

## **ANNEX 5: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS AND OTHER WRITTEN MATERIALS CONSULTED<sup>33</sup>**

Army Headquarters Training Support Command (Land) 'FCO UN Training Strategy' 23 November 2001

British Embassy Cairo, 'Strengthening UN Peacekeeping' 5 March 2002

Cabinet Office, 'Conflict Prevention Global Pool', 19 December 2001

Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, 'Report on the Grant for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF)', 19 June 2003

DFID, 'A joint strategy from DFID/FCO/MOD for improving the UN's Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Capacity' 21 March 2002

DFID, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool, Financial Allocations for FY 2002/3', 28 May 2002

DFID, 'Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre' 13 March 2002

DFID CHAD, 'GCPP Update', December 2002

DFID CHAD, 'Record of UN Strategy Steering Group Meeting', 10 September 2002

DFID CHAD, 'Record of UN Strategy Steering Group Meeting', 23 September 2002

DFID, FCO, MOD, 'The Global Conflict Prevention Pool—A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict', August 2003, [www.fco.gov.uk](http://www.fco.gov.uk)

FCO, 'GCPP: Strengthening the UN Strategy: Mid Year Review', 4 October 2002

FCO, 'Strengthening the UN: Brahimi Implementation' 22 November 2001

FCO, DFID, MOD, 'Cross-Cutting Review: Conflict Prevention beyond Sub-Saharan Africa', May 2000

FCO memo, 'Comments from UN group on UN Evaluation', 3 November 2003

FCO (UND), '2003-05 bid synthesis document: "Strengthening the United Nations"', December 2002

FCO (UND), 'GCPP—PK bids for FY's 2003/2004 and 2004/05', undated

FCO (UND), 'Strengthening the UN Strategy: Quarter 3', 4 December 2002

Ferguson, Chris, 'UNDP: Conference on Justice and Security Sector Reform—Coherence, Cooperation and Comparative Strengths', GFN Paper No 16, 8 May 2003

Greenstock, Sir Jeremy, KCMG, 'Statement in the Security Council', 14 April 2000. For text see: [http://www.ukun.org/xq/asp/SarticleType.17/Article\\_ID.119/qx/articles\\_show.htm](http://www.ukun.org/xq/asp/SarticleType.17/Article_ID.119/qx/articles_show.htm)

International Policy Institute, King's College London, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*, 2003. For full text see: <http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/peaceoperationsreview>

Sriram, Chandra Lekha and Wermester, Karen, *From Promise to Practice—Strengthening UN capacities for the prevention of violent conflict* (New York and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003)

UND, 'GCPP Bidding Form for FY2003/4 and FY2004/5', 24 December 2002

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<sup>33</sup> More than 100 documents on project selection or management under the UN Strategy were reviewed as part of this exercise and not included in this list.



- UND, 'GCPP, Strengthening the UN Strategy: 2002–2003', 30 August 2002
- UND, 'GCPP, Reallocation of non-strategy baselines', 9 July 2002
- UND, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool—Settlement Letter for FY 2002/03 and 04—United Nations Strategy', 15 April 2003
- UNDP, 'Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace', *Human Development Report 2002* (New York) Chapter 4, pp 85–100
- UNDP, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, 'Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR's Programmatic Approach' (New York, November 2002)
- United Nations, 'Children and Armed Conflict—Report of the Secretary General', A/58/546-S/2003/1053, 10 November 2003
- United Nations, 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding—UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (Final Draft)', date n/s
- United Nations, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations' (Brahimi Report), 21 August 2000
- United Nations, 'Report of the UN Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict', A/55/985-S/001/574, 7 June 2001
- United Nations, 'An Agenda for Peace—Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping' A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992
- United Nations, 'Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Rwanda' A/55/269, 4 August 2000
- United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35—The fall of Srebrenica', A/54/549, 15 November 1999
- United Nations, 'Security Council Resolution 1366 on the Prevention of Armed Conflict', 30 August 2001
- United Nations, 'Interim report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict', A/58/365–S/2003/888, 12 September 2003
- United Nations, 'General Assembly Resolution—Prevention of Armed Conflict', A/RES/57/337, 18 July 2003
- UN General Assembly, Resolution, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict', A/RES/57/337, 18 July 2003
- UN Secretary-General, Report of the, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict', A/55/985-S/001/574, 7 June 2001
- UN Security Council, Resolution 1366, 30 August 2001, S/RES/1366 (2001)

## **ANNEX 6: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED**

Andreyeva, Ruth: Team Manager Global Issues and Institutions, CHAD, DFID  
Ballentine, Karen: IPA, New York  
Benomar, Jamal: UNDP, New York  
Bowden, Mark: OCHA, UN New York  
Branch, Nick: Desk Officer, FCO, Conflict Prevention Unit.  
Briscoe, Neil: UN Programme Manager, CHAD, DFID  
Cousens, Elizabeth: CPP Foundation, New York  
Evans, Phil: UKMIS, New York  
Forman, Shepard: Centre for International Cooperation, New York  
Jones, Bruce: Centre for International Cooperation, New York  
Kanninen, Tapio: DPA, UN, New York  
Kerley, Max: DPKO, UN, New York  
Khundker, Sheba: FCO  
Korth, Svenja: EWPM Training Project, UN Staff College  
Le Roith, Ben: DFID, Programme Officer GCPP  
Link, Joan: UND, Senior Conflict Advisor, FCO  
Loupforest, Christelle: OCHA, UN, New York  
Lowe, Sunaina: DPKO / Best Practices Unit, UN  
Magazzini, Gianni: OHCHR, Geneva  
Malone, David: IPA, New York  
Manuel, Susan: DPI, UN, New York  
Meacock-Bashir, Danae: United Nations Department, FCO  
Menkerios, Haile: DPKO, UN, New York  
Moir, Jo: UKMIS New York  
Moon, Richard: UKMIS, New York  
Naidoo, Sebastian: OCHA, UN, New York  
Owen-Edmunds, Tom: DFID  
Palmer, Timothy: DFID  
Plummer, Andrew: UND FCO, Regular Peace-Keeping Representative  
Renninger, John: DPA, UN  
Rosenblum-Kumar, Gay: DESA, UN, New York  
Ruffle, Stephen: Centrex Police Training Centre, Bramshill  
Ryland-Jones, Philip: DFID  
Seliankin, Mikhail: DPI, UN, New York  
Sexton, Toby: DFID  
Seymour, Colonel Nick: DPKO, New York  
Speller, Susan: UUND FCO, UN Senior Strategy Officer  
Susan Manuel, UN Dept of Public Information, New York  
Taylor, Robert: Centrex Police Training Centre, Bramshill  
Thant Myint-U, DPA, UN, New York  
Thompson, Adam: UKMIS, New York  
Vaitla, Vasu: Initiative for Chang, New York  
Whitfield, Teresa: Centre on International Cooperation  
Wimhurst, David: DPKO, UN, New York  
Ziai, Fatemeh: DPKO, UN, New York

## DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

DFID's assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

DFID works in partnership with governments committed to the Millennium Development Goals, with civil society, the private sector and the research community. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID has headquarters in London and East Kilbride, offices in many developing countries, and staff based in British embassies and high commissions around the world.

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