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Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

Portfolio Review

Principal authors,
Greg Austin and Malcolm Chalmers

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Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC

& Associated Consultants

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Principal Authors: Greg Austin and Malcolm Chalmers

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PREFACE

P1. The purpose of the Portfolio Review is to describe the programmes and associated activities that are being evaluated. Since its main purpose is descriptive, it draws heavily on existing official documents as appropriate. It should be noted that Her Majesty's Government (HMG) has not previously commissioned a comprehensive overview of the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) from the perspective required for the Evaluation. Though various forms of overview of each of the two CPPs have been prepared, the purposes and therefore the content of these have been different from the purpose at hand.

P2. This brief 'analytical history' of the Conflict Pools will provide an account of how and why the CPP's have developed in the way that they have. The Portfolio Review does not aim to provide the analytical framework for meeting the key objectives of the evaluation, as set out in the Terms of Reference (ToRs). This has been done in the Inception Report, and this Portfolio Review should not be read in isolation from the Inception Report.

P3. The Portfolio Review provides a description of the CPPs, their funding, their projects, and their administrative processes to a level of detail appropriate to the purposes of the Evaluation and the agreed length of the document. For a document of this length (a planned 20 pages plus annexes) to address a program of more than 600 million operating in some 100 countries, and involving the interests of five separate departments of state in the UK, not to mention significant other stakeholders outside the UK, difficult choices about the scope and detail of material to be included had to be made. As we crystallize our priorities for what to include in the final version of the Portfolio Review, given the constraints of length, we would invite comments as to further material that could be included.

P4. The Portfolio Review has involved London-based research, including interviews with officials as well as review of documentary sources. This work has included collection of preliminary information on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of current programming effectiveness and administration. In respect of existing CPP activities, it supplements the Inception Report as a guide to the authors of the case studies. For the Portfolio Review, we interviewed some 25 officials across five departments. The main purpose of interviews in the Portfolio Review stage was to support the effort of getting down on paper, for the first time, a comprehensive description, with an appropriate level of consistency, of all of the purposes, all of the key processes, and all of the activities of the CPPs.

P5. Work for the Portfolio Review was completed in August and a draft presented at that time. This version was finalised in March 2004 along with other Evaluation reports, as agreed by the Evaluation Management Committee (EMC).

Michael Hammond
Head of Evaluation Department
2 April 2004

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CoE	Council of Europe
CPPs	Conflict Prevention Pools
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAT	Defence Advisory Team
DEL	Departmental Expediture Limit
DFID	Department for International Development
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff
DOP	Defence and Overseas Policy Committee
DOP (A)	Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (Sub-Committee for Sub-Saharan Africa)
DOP (OA)	Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (Sub-Committee for Outside Sub-Saharan Africa)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EMC	Evaluation Management Committee
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GOF	Global Opportunities Fund
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HMT	Her Majesty's Treasury
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
oda	Official Development Assistance
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
ODM	Ministry of Overseas Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PSO	Peace Support Operations

QIP	Quality Improvement Programme
SALW	Small Arms/Light Weapons
SDA	Service Delivery Agreement
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Security Sector Reform
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VMT	Verification Monitoring Team
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. ORIGIN OF THE POOLS

1. In 1999, a cross-cutting review on conflict prevention in Africa was established, in response to concerns (especially in the Department for International Development (DFID)) at the lack of appropriate policy instruments for funding conflict prevention activities in Africa. A particular and immediate concern (arising from experience in Sierra Leone, where military support was funded from the Treasury reserve) was that, under existing arrangements, it could be difficult to reach agreement on and fund emergency security related interventions except where special financing arrangements were already in place (such as for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)).

2. The resultant review, chaired by the International Development Secretary, reported in 2000 and proposed the establishment of a pooled budget for conflict prevention in sub-Saharan Africa, including a programme budget made up of £30 million of current departmental conflict prevention programmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) £5m, DFID £24m, Ministry of Defence (MOD) £1m), plus a contingency element funded by new Treasury money. This budget was to be allocated on the basis of joint strategy and priority setting between the three ministries concerned.

3. During the Africa review, it was agreed that a review for the rest of the world would follow on immediately, to be chaired by the Foreign Secretary. The draft report of this review was agreed in May 2000, and recommended the creation of a Global Conflict Prevention Pool, covering the rest of the world outside sub-Saharan Africa. The FCO had previously bid for increased resources for conflict prevention in SR2000. The two Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) were subsequently established in the 2000 Spending Review, and became operational in April 2001. The two Pools were financed by transfers of existing budgets and activities from the three participating Ministries. Additional programme funds were also provided by the Treasury.

4. From the outset, the CPP budgets had two elements: programme spending[1] and peacekeeping costs.[2] Her Majesty's Government (HMG) decided that the CPPs should include spending on peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, excluding only those operations whose scale and volatility would seriously impact on the funds available for other Pool activities. The allocations for the CPPs in SR2000 and actual allocations for subsequent years can be seen in Table 1. Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) peacekeeping costs include a number of training-related activities that are reported under programme costs in the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP).

[1] The programme budget is used to fund a range of different activities with national governments, international organisations, regional and sub-regional organisations, and NGOs. Apart from a caveat that the programme budget would not be used to cover administrative costs of HMG personnel, the funds are used flexibly, with decisions being taken on a case-by-case basis whether to fund a proposal.

[2] The peacekeeping budget is used to pay UK contributions to peace support operations mandated by multinational or intergovernmental organisations of which the UK is a member (principally the UN, EU or OSCE). It also covers the costs of deploying UK personnel in both UN and non-UN peace support operations and the UK contribution to international criminal courts. The budget has two elements—'assessed' and 'non-assessed' or 'voluntary' contributions. The assessed contributions element is used to fund UK contributions over which it has no discretion—they are a consequence of its membership of the organisation. The non-assessed element funds activities that the UK has otherwise 'voluntarily' decided to support financially.

Table 1: SR2000 Estimates and Subsequent Allocations

	2001/2		2002/3		2003/4	
	SR2000 Estimate	Allocation (Feb 01)	SR2000 Estimate	Allocation (Feb 02)	SR2000 Estimate	Allocation (Feb 03)
ACPP[3]						
Peacekeeping[4] (or minor operations)	65	52	60	99	60	86
Programmes	50	45	50	50	50	50
Sub-total ACPP	**115**	**97**	**110**	**149**	**110**	**136**
GCPP[5]						
Peacekeeping (or minor operations)[6]	340	450	380	407	380	378
Programmes	60	55	68	111	78	105
Sub-total GCPP	**400**	**505**	**448**	**518**	**458**	**483**
TOTAL (GCPP +ACPP)	**515**	**602**	**558**	**661**	**568**	**619**

5. Both the ACPP and GCPP include in their programme costs a reserve fund for contingencies. In 2002/03, these reserve funds were £7 million and £10 million respectively. The GCPP also includes in its programme allocations a Quick Response Fund, set at £5 million in 2002/3.

6. Three main considerations appear to have been important in the decision to create the two Pools in 2000: the changing external environment; the increased priority given to poverty reduction, and the associated creation of DFID; and the belief that conflict prevention was less costly than the sorts of interventions needed once large scale deadly violence had broken out.

1.1 Changing External Environment

7. The increasing involvement of the UK in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations during the late 1990s, notably in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq (the no-fly zones) and East Timor, had a powerful effect on government approaches to bureaucratic management of financing for these commitments. This development was subsequently

[3] The source for SR2000 estimates are 'Cross-cutting Review: Conflict Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa', 2000. The sources for other data are various *Africa Pool Quarterly Financial Reports,* 2001–04.

[4] This figure includes both assessed and non-assessed costs.

[5] The sources for SR2000 estimates is the 'Cross-cutting Review: Conflict Prevention beyond Sub-Saharan Africa', 2000. The source for GCPP allocations (peacekeeping and programme) and outturns (programmes) for 2001/2 is FCO, 'GCPP Outturn as at 31 March 2002, Updated 12 June 2002'. The source for allocations for 2002/3 is FCO, 'GCPP 02-03 Outturn as at 31 March 2003' (undated). The source for allocations for 2003/4 is GCO, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool 2003-04: Outturn/Forecast', (undated).

[6] These budget allocations and estimates are provided by the FCO UN Department. By contrast, the MOD publicly reports 'MOD peacekeeping costs under the UK's cross-cutting initiative on Conflict Prevention' for 2002/03 (estimated outturn), at 1,636 million. 'Estimates of MOD Peacekeeping Costs 2002-03', Table 1.17, Defence Statistics 2003, http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/stats/ukds/2003/chapter1/tab117.html accessed 11 February 2004. There are two main explanations for these apparently incompatible figures. First, the MOD figures include spending on Afghanistan and Operations in Iraq, both of which were excluded from the CPPs because of their status as 'major operations'. Second, the MOD figures only include five operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, Gulf, Afghanistan and Operations in Iraq), and thus exclude the large number of smaller operations (assessed and non-assessed) to which the UK makes a contribution.

reinforced by involvement in operations in Afghanistan, Macedonia and Iraq during 2000-03. With the exception of the USA, the UK's commitment to such operations has been greater than that of any other country. The character of these interventions has in turn increased demand for a range of non-military interventions—humanitarian response, security sector reform (SSR), post-conflict reconstruction—that could be undertaken with a view to reducing suffering and helping to prevent future conflict.

8. As wider international involvement in peacekeeping and peace support operations grew after the end of the Cold War, there has also been growing interest in the possibilities for conflict prevention at an international level. The timeline of the new prominence of this international conflict prevention agenda can be traced over the last decade, with prominent milestones including:

- 1992: *Agenda for Peace* by UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali.
- 1997: Carnegie Commission on Large Scale Deadly Violence.
- 1999: Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Preventing Violent Conflict—A Swedish Action Plan.*[7]
- 2000: UN 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations' (Brahimi Report).
- 2000: G8 Action Plan on Conflict Prevention.
- 2001: EU Action Plan on Conflict Prevention.
- 2001: Report of the UN Secretary General on 'Prevention of Armed Conflict'.[8]
- 2002: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

9. HMG interest in the new conflict prevention agenda reveals a similar pattern of quickening pace since 1997, when a new White Paper on international development committed the UK to advance its cause: 'Understanding the causes of conflict, and helping build the will and capacity of state and civil society to resolve disputes non-violently will be central to our international policy'.[9] In 1999, in a speech to the UN, Secretary of State for the FCO, Robin Cook, committed the UK to a new agenda of conflict prevention.[10] By 2000, the UK had decided to set up a new inter-departmental funding mechanism to promote these purposes, and this evolved quickly into the CPPs.

10. In contrast to the Cold War emphasis on military deterrence as the primary element in conflict prevention, therefore, the UK Government increasingly recognised the need for a joined-up, and inter-departmental, approach to preventing the re-emergence of conflict in violence-prone countries and regions. In terms of budgetary management, it was also

[7] Government Printing Office, Stockholm, 1999.
[8] UN Document A/55/985-S/001/574, 7 June 2001.
[9] 'Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century', 1997.
[10] 'Conflict Prevention in the Modern World', 21 September 1999.

argued that reduced flexibility for trade-offs within departmental allocations would be outweighed by the potential to trade off different means of achieving the same conflict prevention objectives.

1.2 Poverty Reduction and the Creation of DFID

11. The second major impetus for creation of the CPPs was the increased priority given by the Government to global poverty reduction, and the associated establishment of the new DFID in 1997. The Government supported the new Department with significant budget increases. Over the period 1997–2006, its increased commitment to global poverty reduction led to the UK planning on a 93% real increase in official development assistance (oda) (from 0.23 per cent of GNI in 1997 to 0.40 per cent of GNI by 2005/6): the sharpest increase of any Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) state.

12. Yet this commitment has been accompanied by a heightened realisation that increased oda must be accompanied by other policy measures if ambitious poverty reduction objectives are to be met. DFID has sought to focus resources more effectively on poverty reduction, for example by untying aid and increasing the proportion of oda spent in low-income countries. At the same time, DFID's remit was extended beyond the administration of development assistance to include a broader role in coordinating development policies across Government. This led to DFID playing an active role, for example, in shaping UK policy in trade negotiations and IFI meetings. It also led to an increased appreciation of the links between conflict prevention and poverty alleviation.

13. This was especially evident in sub-Saharan Africa, the world's poorest region and the location of a growing proportion of its civil conflicts. Because of its widespread poverty, Africa was a priority region (arguably the highest priority region) for DFID. Without a reduction in the incidence of warfare on the continent, however, the prospects for achievement of poverty reduction goals on the continent were bleak. If the UK could make a contribution to conflict prevention on the continent, on the other hand, it would also help in the achievement of poverty reduction.

14. While Africa was a priority region for DFID, it continued to be seen to be a relatively low priority by the FCO and MOD. UK national economic and strategic interests were seen to be concentrated elsewhere, especially in Europe and the wider Middle East.[11] This tendency for departments to develop separate objectives was, of course, one of the reasons for the creation of DFID in the first place. When the instruments for delivery of a particular policy objective lie in the hands of another Ministry, however, it creates new problems. For example, DFID was seen as inhibited about funding military personnel deployed for conflict prevention activities in Africa from the aid budget.

15. The creation of the Africa Pool was seen by DFID as a means of overcoming this problem, allowing the development of a 'joined up' approach to conflict prevention (and thus poverty reduction) using all the instruments at HMG's disposal. A similar argument could also be made in relation to low-income countries with substantial DFID involvement outside Africa (such as Nepal and Sri Lanka). Development agencies had often tended to

[11] For example, see the 1998 Strategic Defence Review

underplay the extent to which conflict was a fundamental barrier to development, treating it as best as an exogenous variable on which external actors could have no influence. The new UK approach, exemplified in the Pools, sought to make conflict prevention an integral part of development policies.

16. Yet DFID's focus on the poorest countries was seen by the FCO as having led to a neglect of conflict prevention opportunities elsewhere. The FCO therefore made a bid in SR2000 for £126 million over 3 years for increased conflict prevention resources outside sub-Saharan Africa:

> 'we should not be shy of including programmes in areas such as governance or even economic support which might normally be DFID-funded: our case is built on the need to make good the gaps left by DFID's lack of interest in middle-income countries, and we envisage that funds would probably be spent jointly with DFID and MOD through a shared budget'.[12]

17. The FCO memorandum cited went on to suggest a number of countries where there was a high risk that the international community would become involved in responding to new or escalated conflict: Afghanistan, PNG/Bougainville, East Timor, Western Sahara, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Israel/Syria, Iraq/Kuwait, Balkans, Albania, Georgia, Tajikistan, Armenia/ Azerbaijan. A majority of these countries are now the focus of programmes within the Global CPP.

1.3 Prevention Is Cheaper than Cure?

18. Third, it was hoped that more effective conflict prevention efforts could help to reduce the costs of 'remedial' military interventions in future. Attention was drawn, for example, to total UK Global Conflict Prevention spending (excluding sub-Saharan Africa) of £585 million in 1998/99, of which £484 million was for peace enforcement (mainly in Kosovo and Bosnia) and £82 million for peacekeeping (and only £19m for other purposes). While it was acknowledged that the bulk of spending on peace enforcement and peacekeeping was pre-committed, the review of the Global Pool suggested that the inclusion of these costs in a pooled conflict prevention budget could create an increased incentive to spend on 'preventing conflict breaking out in the first place', using funds that had previously only been available for peacekeeping. One FCO memorandum asked 'what if anything we might realistically have done over the last two years to forestall the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo (and the heavy costs we are now faced with) had serious programme money been available'.[13]

19. In the medium and long term, such effects could potentially become significant. The largest Pool activities are currently in countries (Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, the Balkans) to which the UK has also deployed significant armed forces in the recent past, and to which there remains some expectation of future operational deployments should the situation worsen. In these cases, effective measures to strengthen local security forces (for example) can reasonably be seen as directly helping to reduce the necessity and/or

[12] Memorandum from UND, 18 April 2000.
[13] Ibid.

size of expensive UK military operations in the future. In cases where the current likelihood of UK military involvement is much lower, by contrast, more effective conflict prevention activities are more likely to have a neutral effect on the anticipated peacekeeping/peace enforcement spend. Indeed increased conflict prevention programme activities by the UK might sometimes increase (at the margins) the expectation of UK peacekeeping/peace enforcement involvement should such efforts fail.

2. UK APPROACHES TO THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT

20. In a number of recent publications issued by HMG, the causes of conflict in Africa have been identified as including:

- Weakening or collapsed state institutions, themselves frequently caused by abuse of political power, corruption, and the misuse of state sovereignty to serve narrow leadership, class or ethnic interests;
- A complementary but separate aspect of the above is the weakening, or absence, of state infrastructures—either physical (roads, trade) or social (services, judiciary), or the abuse of such infrastructures, such as the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. This leads to the formal government structure losing effective control of its territory (becoming a 'failed state');
- Economic collapse related to violence itself (destruction of crops, disruption to trade) and feeding the continuation of violence (where joining an armed force becomes a key means of livelihood). Violence also distorts economic patterns (abuse of natural resources, looting), and economic gain then becomes a motive for continued and widening conflict;
- Historical (including colonial) factors have left a legacy of conflict in many countries, which may have reasserted themselves as an indirect effect of post-Cold-War disengagement by major powers.

21. Other more secondary causes of conflict have been identified as being those related to poverty, ethnicity, arms proliferation and lack of conflict mediation/arbitration processes.

22. Analyses such as these serve to mobilise support for and give direction to the CPPs. But the UK Government is primarily interested in the causes of conflict in terms of how to develop appropriate responses. In the words of three ministers: 'The challenge is to increase our understanding [of causes of conflict] and to translate this into more effective action to prevent and reduce conflict'.[14] Most governments in the developed world, including the UK, have now recognised their weaknesses, not in understanding the causes of conflict, but in shaping appropriate responses to it.[15]

23. Two recent exercises by the UK Government have helped to bridge this gap: a 'Review of UK Government Approaches to Peacebuilding' (2003); and 'Compiling Lessons about Conflict Prevention and Peace Building' (2003). But it is the persistence of this gap between recognition of the problem and effective response that has forced actors such as DFID to develop processes of strategic conflict assessment and analysis of the causes of conflict

[14] DFID, FCO and MOD, 'The Causes of Conflict in Africa', September 2001. Foreword by Clare Short, Jack Straw and Geoff Hoon.

[15] The lessons of conflict prevention have yet to be fully learned by states and by international organisations. Where lessons have been exposed, these have yet to be significantly recognised, boiled down and utilised to inform decision-making', and 'reconnected to the actual routines and established processes of decision-making and implementation'. See Michael Lund, 'Operationalising Lessons from Recent Experience in Conflict Prevention' in *Lessons learned on Peacebuilding,* Working Document, International Conference on Prevention and Management of Violent Conflict and Building Peace, Gripsholm, 1–4 May 2001.

that sit somewhat outside of and independent from the main conflict assessment processes of HMG that reside in the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and its participating agencies.

24. For this reason, as indicated in the Inception Report, the Evaluation's interest in the causes of conflict is not in giving yet another summary of the issues, but in how the CPPs utilize existing work on the causes of conflict and frame policy actions to address them. In this effort, two distinct operational cultures are visible. They are more mutually reinforcing, at least potentially, than some practitioners credit, but these two cultures are clearly visible. And the balance between the two cultures has not yet stabilised. The policy challenge now is to get the best from each of these two approaches: one deriving from a 'classic threat-driven foreign and security policy' and the other deriving from a 'security and development' approach.

25. The first operational culture is what might be termed 'classic foreign and security policy', and has traditionally been the remit of the FCO, the armed forces, the MOD, and other intelligence and security services. In the traditional diplomacy of a state, the goal of preventing—and if necessary winning—war against itself was a key plank of policy. Preventing deadly conflicts involving other states in strategic locations, where the state's vital national interests of a geopolitical and economic kind were perceived to be involved, also occupied a central position in the traditional diplomacy of a state.[16] This threat-driven approach constitutes the classic foreign and security policy approach to the causes of conflict and appropriate policy responses. In the UK's case, in the period since 1945, this area of policy has played itself out in many conspicuous ways, including involvement in the foundation and operations of the UN and its Security Council, involvement in the formation of defensive military alliances (NATO, SEATO), joining of the EC and support of its subsequent transformation into the EU, with its common foreign and security policy, and the shaping of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreement and its subsequent transformation into the OSCE.

26. Contrary to a commonly stated belief in much of the conflict prevention literature, the classic diplomacy of states like the UK not only addressed inter-state war, but it also involved internal war. In the UK's case in the period since 1945, this has been evident in UK involvement in violent conflicts arising as part of the decolonisation process, its participation in anti-communist counter-insurgency conflicts, and its experiences in the Northern Ireland anti-terrorist conflict.

27. The classic diplomacy of the UK addressed issues of economic and social development on a global basis, not least because of strategic necessity associated with decolonisation and counter-insurgency. Humanitarian motives for pursuing international development were also evident in the UK's classic diplomacy, as can be seen from the prominent role the UK played in the formation of the UN and its development and welfare agencies (UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO), the formation and operations of international development banks (World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)), and in the UK's active program of international development cooperation over

[16] In cases where national interests as classically defined are served by preventing war, as it was for the USA in the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation until 1989 or as it is for Japan and the USA in the China-Taiwan confrontation, then the goals of conflict prevention impinge much more on policy and the practices of conflict prevention begin to resemble those of classic foreign policy.

many years, including multi-donor coordination through such agencies as the OECD's Development Assistance Committee.

28. The importance attached by the UK to addressing the economic and social causes of conflict in 'classic foreign and security policy' is evident in the close institutional relationship between the FCO and the arm of the UK Government involved in international development, sometimes as a sister department of state, such as the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) and (since 1997) DFID, and sometimes as a separate wing within the FCO (as with the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), in 1979–97). The role of this sister organisation was, however, seen as administering development assistance in pursuit of poverty reduction objectives. Characteristically, it did not involve itself in issues of conflict and security policy, except insofar as the aid budget was sometimes used to support strategically important bilateral relationships.

29. In conducting its classic foreign and security policy, the UK developed a comprehensive and for the most part effective mechanism for analysing the causes of conflict and appropriate policy responses: the process that the conflict prevention community now would call conflict impact assessment or Strategic Conflict Assessment. The agencies principally involved in this process include the JIC, the FCO (including embassies), the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), intelligence arms of the single military services (such as Naval Intelligence), MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. In the work of these agencies on strategic conflict assessments, the UK Government has relied on numerous other agencies and organisations, including allied intelligence agencies, other cooperating governments, academic specialists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and even private citizens.

30. This work on the causes of conflict in the service of classic foreign and security policy has had three characteristics relevant to our understanding of the place of similar work in support of the CPPs. First, the work has rarely been undertaken by reference to a single manual on the general causes of conflict or best practice in addressing those causes. Rather, the government has relied heavily on the education, training and experience of thousands of committed staff operating in a time-tested system of competitive analysis, contested ideas, and critical review of assessments. In this work, the full diversity of possible causes of conflict identified by social scientists (especially economists), historians, psychologists, psychiatrists and philosophers was given considerable play. Few governments in the developed world have felt it either desirable or possible to write manuals on the causes of conflict for the purpose of providing in one book guidance for officials on understanding those possible causes. From time to time, attempts at generalisations of this sort have been made in order to crystallise common threads between particular conflicts or forms of violence. But explicit assessments at a general level on the causes of conflict have classically been regarded as the work of political philosophers or social historians, and good ones at that, and not the operating domain of officials or consultants. This reliance on unstated generalisations may have tended to reinforce conservatism amongst analysts.

31. Second, the strategic conflict assessment work has for the most part been specific to a country or specific to a locality inside a country. From time to time, transnational issues did arise because of cross-border problems. With less frequency, regionally oriented conflict assessments might have appeared in response to a problem common to several countries.

With even less frequency, strategic conflict assessments have addressed transcontinental or global phenomena. When this has occurred, there has usually been a very specific single reference point, such as Soviet military assistance, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or the impact of HIV/AIDS. One very clear implication of the time-honoured UK system of conflict assessment in support of classic foreign and security policy is that it has for the most part addressed the causes of conflict from a specific issue perspective: a locality, a country, an actor, or a threat.

32. Third, the UK's conflict assessment in support of classic foreign and security has always accorded politics a clear position of supremacy over the structural underpinnings of conflict, be they economic, social or military. It is for this reason that the Cabinet Office and the FCO have traditionally played the central role in coordination of strategic assessments before the emergence of the new conflict prevention agenda.

33. Fourth, the UK Government has long recognised strategic conflict assessment to be an immensely difficult, highly complex and resource intensive process which itself demanded deployment of enormous assets and a fairly vigorous system of prioritisation. The UK considerably narrowed its priorities in this sort of conflict assessment work as its strategic priorities narrowed after the collapse of the USSR. Now, in response to the threat of terrorism arising especially from Islamist extremists, and the increased concerns over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, the UK is again in the process of altering its conflict assessment priorities and expanding its coverage, both in terms of geographic scope and the causes of conflict to which it is being forced to respond.

34. It is this system of strategic conflict assessment, and this system of analysing the causes of conflict, which underpins the bulk of spending by the CPPs. As discussed below, the lion's share of spending by the CPPs is taken by peacekeeping, an activity that engages the MOD and the FCO much more than DFID, and one that relies heavily on the classic modes of UK conflict assessment that reside in the UK intelligence community broadly defined, and which are not for the most part revealed in the public domain in much detail.

35. The second operational environment might be termed the 'security and development approach', which in the UK has developed recently largely as a result of initiatives by DFID. The main feature of this operational environment is realisation that the best efforts of donor governments and international organisations to promote development in poorer countries were all too open to reversal if violent conflicts could not be prevented. Another prominent feature of this operating environment is the importance it attaches to grass-roots politics, to civil society and to the structural causes of violence. There has been a high degree of bureaucratic determinism at play because development agencies, such as DFID, have been the main advocates of the need to address the causes of conflict where the UK's classic (geopolitical and economic) foreign and security interests were not seen to be in play.

36. Within HMG, to some appearances, the initiative for the harmonisation of the two approaches has remained with DFID, which in a number of steps set about articulating a UK conflict prevention policy framework, including through such things as development of its Strategic Conflict Assessment process and the publication of its 2001 paper on the

Causes of Conflict in Africa. However, as suggested above, the lack of published documents from either the FCO or MOD that resemble the DFID research and analysis effort should not give the impression that these two departments had no interest in or no appreciation of the causes of conflict or appropriate responses. It was more the case that the FCO and MOD were the beneficiaries of a pre-existing system attuned to UK policy responses in areas of perceived high strategic priority to the UK's foreign and security policy. As indicated above, however, the geographical scope of these priority areas has widened considerably in recent years (with the Balkans and Afghanistan, for example, graduating from being areas of primarily humanitarian interest a decade ago to being seen as areas of vital strategic concern).

37. In order to apply common understandings of the causes of conflict from both operational environments, there will need to be a sharper sense of prioritization in the work of the CPPs, and a significant narrowing of their focus, if the best capacities of the classic conflict assessment processes are to be turned to the advantage of the expanded agenda of security and development. The alternative is that the CPP strategies continue to develop policy in conflicts of lower perceived strategic and economic priority to the UK relatively free of the burden of knowledge of the latest twists and turns of the political dynamics and therefore relatively free of any obligation for timely responses to emerging signs of tension. The CPP's were intended to be not simply funding mechanisms for projects that were related to conflict prevention, but also to be 'a mechanism to improve policy and share information on all conflict prevention activities to deliver better policy outcomes'.[17]

[17] DFID, 'Analysis of Resources ACPP in SR 2002', 4 March 2002, p 7.

3. ORIGINS OF THE PSA AND INDICATORS

38. The first objective of this Evaluation is to assess the extent to which the CPP Public Service Agreement (PSA) and Service Delivery Agreement (SDA) objectives are being met. As the Inception Report has already made clear, however, there is considerable disquiet within HMG as to the value of these objectives as currently formulated.

39. The draft cross-cutting review on the GCPP did not envisage a specific PSA or SDA 'for this or any other cross-cutting review', since the contributions envisaged by government departments were already set out in their PSA's.[18] For convenience, the review set out suggested targets for joint action in PSA/SDA form. As a result of subsequent discussions, however, a joint PSA was agreed in July 2000 that was based largely on these targets. It reads as follows:

> 'To improve the effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management, as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and by a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution'.

40. Further discussions subsequent to the establishment of the CPP's resulted in a Technical Note (23 November 2000) which established two types of measures of progress towards the PSA target:

- at a high level, using data from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and UNHCR on the incidence of conflicts, conflict-related displacement and war-related casualties in all countries and regions where activities are funded by the Pools. Change in the risk of future conflict will also be assessed;

- At an intermediate level, against the objectives for programmes funded from the Pools.

41. A further Technical Note was issued on 31 March 2003 that elaborated these indicators. In particular it was agreed that:

- targets for 2000–06 changes in fatalities and refugees would only apply to selected countries (presumably chosen because of substantial Pool programme involvement, but more information is required on this). These are: Afghanistan, Nepal, Macedonia, Georgia, Israel/Occupied Territories, Sri Lanka for the GCPP; Sierra Leone, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Angola, Nigeria for the ACPP; and

- these numerical targets would contribute 50 per cent to PSA targets. The other 50 per cent would be 'Conflict Level Assessment Tool sub-targets'. This is a new product measuring variations in potential sources of future conflict, and was due to become available in April 2003.

[18] ACCP: 'Cross-cutting Review: Conflict Prevention beyond sub-Saharan Africa', draft report, May 2000, p 27.

42. The Technical Note states that the use of this data makes it difficult to isolate the UK's distinct contribution from other international—or for that matter domestic—actors, especially as the UK cannot control the policies of other actors. In almost every one of the 14 cases cited (with the *possible* exception of Sierra Leone), the UK is not the most influential external actor, as measured either by funds disbursed or military personnel deployed. Nor can the success or otherwise of conflict prevention efforts be adduced simply to the role of external governments in any case. The Government also recognises the problems of data quality that are involved, given the difficulty involved in collecting accurate information on conflict-related deaths. In addition, the risks that the aggregate figures used as targets may be unduly dominated by the outbreak of conflict (or peace) in a single country. Although the current PSA relates to 2003–06, baseline data relates to 2000. A final assessment will not be made until 2007.

43. In the light of these problems, a number of interviewees have suggested that the Evaluation should consider whether an alternative PSA might be proposed. In seeking such an alternative, one possibility would be to review whether the PSA might be amended to become more similar in character to some of those already in existence for the MOD, DFID and FCO. In particular, when their activities are designed to influence external environments over which the UK has only partial control, and where it is usually only one actor amongst many, the MOD and FCO have been given planning objectives that relate to improving the UK's ability to provide the assets necessary to respond to new operational and diplomatic requirements as they emerge. Thus, for example, the MOD's first (and most important) PSA objective is to provide armed forces able to undertake successfully an operation the size of the Gulf War, or two simultaneous medium-size operations, while meeting long standing commitments and retain the ability to rebuild a bigger force should a major threat to Europe re-emerge. Other MOD-only PSA's are essentially derivatives of this first objective, concerned for example with generating the personnel necessary to support such a capability.

44. The main problem with the current joint conflict PSA, by contrast, is that it seeks to target a variable—namely the level of conflict—over which the UK Government has only partial influence. Neither the MOD nor the FCO provide a comparable target for changes in the external environment (such as reduced numbers of terrorist incidents). Rather, their numerical targets focus on variables over which they have (or should have) substantial control—for example, the processing rate for visas or the level of recruitment for the armed forces.

45. At this early stage of our evaluation, therefore, we would like to investigate what the reaction would be were the PSA to be simplified as follows:

> 'To improve the effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management'.

46. A similar form of language might also apply to the three SDA's.[19] For example, the aim should not be 'to resolve conflicts' but 'to provide capacities or inducements which increase the incentives for the parties to resolve their conflicts'.

[19] Currently these are as follows:

'By 2006, DFID, FCO and MOD, together and with others, will work to:

i. resolve existing violent conflicts and prevent new conflicts in priority countries and regions, e.g. Afghanistan, Balkans, former Soviet Union, Middle and near East, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Great Lakes, Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria;
ii. address the national and regional causes of conflict by:
    - strengthening local conflict management, e.g. though improved governance and security sector reform in priority countries and regions
    - improving local peace support capacity in cooperation with international partners e.g. the development of a G-8-Africa Peace Support Operations plan by 2003.
iii. improve the international community's response to conflict by:
    - strengthening the UN Conflict Management capacity, e.g. improving peacekeeping deployments
    - mobilising and supporting coherent bilateral and international action at UN, EU, Commonwealth, and other forums including NEPAD
    - implementing agreements to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, e.g. international and national action plans
    - tackling the Economic and Financial Causes of Conflict (sic in capitals) e.g. by mobilising national and international agreement to increase oil revenue transparency and corporate social responsibility

(Assessment of progress will be based on the implementation of conflict prevention and peace support strategies in target regions and countries. Successful delivery depends on the cooperation of other state and non-state actors, international organisations and non-government bodies as well as the UK Government.)'

4. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE POOLS

47. The development of the CPPs since their inception can be analysed by reference to a number of issues:

- eligibility (what the CPP's can fund);
- priorities;
- spending patterns;
- management arrangements;
- how the CPPs relate to other UK conflict-related policies;
- emergence of the Global Opportunities Fund (GOF).

4.1 Eligibility

48. The 2000 crosscutting reviews envisaged that the Pools would cover all direct conflict prevention work where a joint approach would add value. It specifically excluded humanitarian and governance related conflict prevention work. In practice, there have been continuing debates as to what new activities can be funded from the CPP's, with particular controversies over the supply of military helicopters to the Nepalese armed forces and the inclusion of minor military operations (in Afghanistan and in Iraq). Several meetings of the relevant sub-committees of Cabinet were held in 2003 with the objective of agreeing on eligibility criteria. The position as of May 2003 was as follows:

- The supply of military equipment will only be funded if essential to the success of strategies. Weapons and ammunition will only be provided on an exceptional basis, subject to Ministerial agreement.
- Major military operations will not be funded from the Pools.
- Only peace-support-type minor military operations will be considered for Pool funding. Until SR2004, Peace Support Operations (PSO's) will be assessed for Pool funding by Ministers. A decision will be made at the time of the Spending Review on whether borderline operations should be funded by the MOD or by the Treasury DEL reserve.
- There will be no counter-terrorism strategy under the Global or Africa Pools. Similarly, activities driven by the War on Terrorism will not be eligible for Pool funding. Certain 'counter-terrorism' activities may be permitted under other strategies if incidental to conflict reduction, and focused on country concerned (not 'defence of the realm').[20]

49. There will clearly be continuing questions about how to interpret these guidelines. For example, there will often not be a clear dividing line between 'defence of the realm' (defined elsewhere as 'defence of the UK and UK national interests') and conflict prevention.[21]

[20] Briefing by CHAD, May 2003.
[21] Note by officials, DOP(OA)(02) 2nd meeting, 18 June 2002.

50. The recent decision to use the Afghanistan GCPP to fund counter-narcotics work, up to a value of £10 million, also raises questions about future limitations on eligibility. The funding decision appears to have originated with the separate FCO PSA that requires it to aim to reduce Afghanistan's poppy cultivation by 70 per cent over five years and to eliminate it within 10 years. This GCPP investment is part of a larger £70 million UK allocation over three years to a broad-ranging Afghan National Drug Control Strategy covering law enforcement, capacity building, alternative livelihoods and demand reduction. The GCPP share of this strategy appears to focus primarily on the law enforcement element.

4.2 Priorities for Use of Pool Resources

51. The criteria used to decide on the relative priority of strategies, the creation of new ones, and the closing down of old ones, have developed significantly since the establishment of the CPP's. Both Pools inherited significant number of 'legacy' commitments, and it is a continuing challenge to determine the criteria by which to decide whether these should continue (not least because departments may be highly supportive of some of the programmes because of their contribution to non-CPP objectives).

52. The GCPP has developed a 'scoring table' for assisting in the allocation of resources between geographical and thematic strategies. This allocated points on the basis of 14 questions, relating to the importance of the conflict (UK and international interest, numbers affected, public concern), international efforts (activity of other donors, potential for UK contribution, value-added of Pool funding), existence of joint analysis, shared objectives, sound management and clear focus. As a consequence, the GCPP was able to determine which strategies were 'high priority' (Afghanistan, Balkans, SSR, small arms and light weapons (SALW)), and which medium and low priority.[22] A similar scorecard approach was also used in the early days of the Africa Pool, but was rejected on the grounds that it was too schematic and inflexible. Prioritisation in the Africa Pool is now loosely based on a comprehensive and regularly updated analysis of the regional conflict environment.

4.3 Spending Patterns

53. In the final version of the Portfolio review, the authors intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of spending patterns over the life of the CPPs using consistent data sets. It has not been possible in the time available to reconcile a number of different sources that report different aspects of financial management. In the meantime, the data provided in this section for selected years should be regarded as indicative only.

54. There are two main elements to the spending allocations under the CPPs: costs for international peacekeeping and peace support; and costs for programmes. For FY 2002/3, the opening allocation for these cost elements was as follows:

[22] GCPP Bids 2003/4, undated unsourced document, Box 24.

Table 2: CPP's 2002/3 Allocations (£ million)

	Global Pool	Africa Pool
Peacekeeping (discretionary)	319	3
Peacekeeping (assessed)	88	96
Programmes	111[23]	43
Totals	**518**	**142**

55. As Table 2 indicates, costs for peacekeeping are divided into two categories: assessed and discretionary. The assessed costs are those that relate to activities undertaken by the UN, the EU or OSCE, where the UK monetary contribution is based on a standard formula. Discretionary costs are those borne by the UK, either as a contribution to an international organisation (e.g. NATO), as part of a coalition of the willing, or as a UK-only operation, and where the UK monetary contribution is decided *de novo* by the UK Government.

56. Within the programme spending of the CPPs, MOD and FCO are committed to 'baseline activities', which in mid-2002 were being undertaken in over 35 countries not directly involved in formal CPP 'strategies'. These baseline activities comprise largely bilateral military training, other security sector related projects (such as human rights training for police), disaster management, and national reconciliation programmes. These activities are seen as supporting two broad objectives:

- Support UK foreign and security policy in its aim for international security and stability.

- Sustain bilateral defence and security relations, especially options for future basing rights for military operations.

57. When the CPPs were established, FCO committed all of its security-related training and assistance funding (the former ASSIST programme) to the CPP, and MOD committed most of its funding for bilateral military assistance and defence diplomacy to the CPP. In June 2002, the value of these base-line commitments for 2002/3 were 7.511 million (FCO 4.07m and MOD 3.441m). DFID has small baseline commitments in the area of support to research and analysis. In 2002/03, this was only 650,000. Thus, at the outset of 2002/3, the CPPs involved an estimated expenditure of some £660 million over many hundreds of separate projects in more than 100 countries on four continents.

58. Under the GCPP in 2003/4, ministers approved 15 'strategies' for programme spending (see Table 3). For 2003/4, for ACPP programmes, ministers approved areas and themes on a priority basis (see Table 4). These are Sierra Leone, Nigeria, DRC and the Great Lakes region, Sudan, Angola, Building African Peace-keeping Capacity and tackling the economic causes of conflict.[24] The bulk of ACPP programme funds is spent on SSR, though the CPP does try to keep a focus on addressing the economic and social causes of conflict and on the need for pan-African institution-building. The programme budget spending is

[23] This amount varies from document to document depending on the phase of the budget cycle. The £ value cited here is drawn from the GCPP 2002/3 Outturn as at 31 March 2003.
[24] UND Minute, FCO, 1 November 2002, Box 24.

undertaken with a range of partners (states or regional and sub-regional organisations). Aside from an agreement that the programme budget would not be used to cover administrative costs of UK personnel working for the UK, the funds are used flexibly with decisions being taken on whether to fund a proposal on a case-by-case basis. Under the Africa Pool, as for the GCPP, the peacekeeping budget covers the costs of UK personnel deployed in both UN and non-UN peace support operations and the UK contribution to international criminal courts.

Table 3: GCPP Programme Spending Allocations 2003/4[25]

Country/Region	
Afghanistan	15,100,000
Afghanistan: Counter-Narcotics	10,200,000
Balkans	11,500,000
Russia & FSU	11,500,000
Iraq	7,500,000
MENA	5,000,000
Nepal	6,000,000
Indon/ET	1,480,000
India/Pakistan	2,000,000
Sri Lanka	1,100,000
CEE	4,800,000
Belize/Guat	1,790,000
Thematic	
SSR	5,050,000
SALW	9,450,000
UN	10,690,000
EU	0
OSCE/CoE	1,000,000
SUB-TOTAL	**104,160,000**
QIP + Eval'n	1,150,000
Reserve	10,000,000
Quick Response Fund	5,000,000
TOTAL	**115,310,000**

[25] FCO, 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool 2003/4: Outturn/Forecast', undated.

Table 4: ACPP Programme Spending Allocations 2003/4

Geographical priorities	
Sierra Leone (DFID)	10,135,000
Sierra Leone (MOD)	13,135,000
Sierra Leone (FCO)	85,000
DRC (DFID)	2,980,000
Rwanda (DFID)	255,000
Burundi (DFID)	425,000
Uganda (DFID)	1,030,000
Uganda (MOD)	75,000
Nigeria (MOD)	255,000
Nigeria (DFID)	298,000
Nigeria (FCO)	662,500
South Africa (MOD)	765,000
South Africa (FCO)	425,000
Angola (DFID)	596,000
Somalia (DFID)	255,000
Sudan (FCO/DFID)	4,685,000
Kenya (DFID)	340,000
Kenya (MOD)	210,000
Ethiopia (DFID)	850,000
Ethiopia (MOD)	115,000
Functional/Thematic priorities	
Peace Support East Africa (MOD)	2,460,000
Peace Support West Africa (FCO)	2,267,500
Peace Support West Africa (MOD)	170,000
Pan-Africa Regional (DFID)	511,000
Total	**43,000,000**

Table 5: GCPP Discretionary Peacekeeping & Peace Support Operations: 2003/4 First Quarter Estimates

COUNTRY/REGION	**PROGRAMME/ACTIVITY**	
ALBANIA (FCO)	ECPAPA	0
ALBANIA (FCO)	OSCE	219,000
BOSNIA (FCO)	UNMIBH/ITPF	0
BOSNIA (FCO)	OSCE	982,000
BOSNIA (MOD)	PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	81,667,000
BOSNIA (FCO)	EUPM	4,347,113
CROATIA (FCO)	OSCE	416,000
CYPRUS (FCO)	UNFICYP (MOD)	17,355,000
CYPRUS (FCO)	UNFICYP (CIVPOL)	393,630
EAST TIMOR (FCO)	UNMISET (MOD)	0
EAST TIMOR (FCO)	UNMISET (CIVPOL)	449,500
GULF (MOD)	PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	0
GEORGIA (FCO)	UNOMIG (MOD)	636,000
GEORGIA (FCO)	OSCE	818,000
IRAQ (FCO/MOD)	UNMOVIC (FCO/MOD)	270,000
IRAQ/KUWAIT (FCO)	UNIKOM (MOD)	998,000
KOSOVO (FCO)	UNMIK (CIVPOL)	5,350,740
KOSOVO (FCO)	OSCE	2,392,000
KOSOVO (MOD)	PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	59,145,000
MIDDLE EAST (FCO)	JERICHO MONITORING MISSION (MENA)	1,200,000
MIDDLE EAST (FCO)	EU MONITORING GROUP (MENA)	700,000
MIDDLE EAST (FCO)	UNMEPP	0
MIDDLE EAST (FCO)	QUARTET VERIFICATION MISSION (MENA)	3,400,000
NAGORNO-KARABAKH (FCO)	OSCE	55,000
WESTERN SAHARA (FCO)	MINURSO (MOD)	0
YUGOSLAVIA (FCO)	EUMM (OTHER)	442,800
MACEDONIA	EUPOL Proxima	0
IPU	CivPol mission costs	0
Sub-total		**181,236,783**
OSCE (Former Programme Activity)		
MACEDONIA (FCO)	OSCE	1,204,000
KAZAKHSTAN (FCO)	OSCE	0
KYRGYSTAN (FCO)	OSCE	99,000
UZBEKISTAN (FCO)	OSCE	0
TAJIKISTAN (FCO)	OSCE	99,000
MOLDOVA (FCO)	OSCE	55,000
BELARUS (FCO)	OSCE	0
AZERBAIJAN (FCO)	OSCE	55,000
ARMENIA (FCO)	OSCE	65,000
MONTENEGRO (FCO)	OSCE	0
FRY includes Montenegro (FCO)	OSCE	361,000
OSCE SECRETARIAT (FCO)	OSCE	391,000
Sub-total		2,329,000
FUNCTIONAL/THEMATIC		
KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL (FCO)	KRT	500,000
TOTAL—DISCRETIONARY		**184,065,783**

Table 6: GCPP Assessed Peacekeeping & Peace Support Operations: 2003/4 First Quarter Estimates

COUNTRY/REGION	**PROGRAMME/ACTIVITY**	
ALBANIA (FCO)	OSCE	260,683
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (FCO)	OSCE	1,363,194
BOSNIA (FCO)	EUPM	2,375,000
BOSNIA (FCO)	EUPM	2,375,000
BOSNIA (FCO)	UNMIBH/ITPF	793,418
CROATIA (FCO)	OSCE	657,322
CYPRUS (FCO)	UNFICYP	985,909
EAST TIMOR (FCO)	UNMISET	7,816,952
GEORGIA (FCO)	UNOMIG	1,355,829
GEORGIA (FCO)	OSCE	1,409,069
GOLAN HEIGHTS (FCO)	UNDOF	1,743,055
IRAQ/KUWAIT (FCO)	UNIKOM	2,385,984
KOSOVO (FCO)	UNMIK	13,826,360
KOSOVO (FCO)	OSCE	3,739,455
LEBANON (FCO)	UNIFIL	4,204,855
NAGORNO-KARABAKH (FCO)	OSCE	137,261
WESTERN SAHARA (FCO)	MINURSO	1,658,651
FRY (FCO)	EUMM (includes carry over from 2001/02)	653,195
MACEDONIA	OP CONCORDIA	786,419
Sub-total		**46,152,611**
OSCE (Former Programme Activity)		
MACEDONIA (FCO)	OSCE	1,098,674
KAZAKHSTAN (FCO)	OSCE	69,859
TURKMENISTAN (FCO)	OSCE	57,912
KYRGYSTAN (FCO)	OSCE	93,028
UZBEKISTAN (FCO)	OSCE	64,175
TAJIKISTAN (FCO)	OSCE	181,710
CHECHNYA (FCO)	OSCE	28,500
ESTONIA (FCO)	OSCE	0
LATVIA (FCO)	OSCE	0
MOLDOVA (FCO)	OSCE	73,510
BELARUS (FCO)	OSCE	57,701
ESTONIA MIL PENSIONS (FCO)	OSCE	8,374
UKRAINE (FCO)	OSCE	64,032
AZERBAIJAN (FCO)	OSCE	81,584
ARMENIA (FCO)	OSCE	69,584
FRY includes Montenegro (FCO)	OSCE	642,676
Sub-total		**2,591,319**
FUNCTIONAL/THEMATIC		
YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL (FCO)	ICTY	5,181,495
ICC (FCO)	CRIMINAL COURT	2,863,676
Sub-total		**8,045,171**
TOTAL - ASSESSED		**56,789,101**

Table 7: ACPP Discretionary Peacekeeping & Peace Support Operations: February 2003/4 Estimates

COUNTRY/REGION	**PROGRAMME/ACTIVITY**	
SIERRA LEONE	UNAMSIL MOD COSTS	2,144,000
SIERRA LEONE	UNAMSIL CIVPOL COSTS	466,630
DRC (UN)	MONUC MOD COSTS	665,000
DRC (UN)	MONUC CIVPOL COSTS	296,578
SUDAN	NUBA MOUNTAIN MONITORS + VMT	555,960
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA	UNMEE MOD COSTS	112,000
COTE D'IVOIRE	UN PKO MOD COSTS	138,803
DRC (EU)	OP ARTEMIS	0
LIBERIA	UNMIL MOD COSTS	0
Sub-total		**4,378,971**
FUNCTIONAL/THEMATIC		
SIERRA LEONE	SPECIAL COURT	2,000,000
BRINDISI	STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT STOCKS	0
Sub-total		**2,000,000**
TOTAL—DISCRETIONARY		**6,378,971**

Table 8: ACPP Assessed Peacekeeping & Peace Support Operations: February 2003/4 Estimates

COUNTRY/REGION	**PROGRAMME/ACTIVITY**	
SIERRA LEONE	UNAMSIL	23,197,063
BURUNDI	UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION	4,200,000
SUDAN	UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION	1,000,000
COTE D'IVOIRE	MINUCI	7,754,481
DRC (UN)	MONUC	31,189,225
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA	UNMEE	8,836,976
DRC (EU)	OP ARTEMIS	0
LIBERIA	UNMIL	0
Sub-total		**76,177,745**
FUNCTIONAL/THEMATIC		
RWANDA TRIBUNAL	ICTR	4,070,077
Sub-total		**4,070,077**
TOTAL—ASSESSED		**80,247,822**

59. Based on the spending information available above and that available in more detailed summary documents of programme spending, a crude preliminary analysis suggests that the UK dedicates most of its CPP funding not to 'conflict prevention' before the event, as the name of the Pools suggest it might, but to 'conflict management' or post-conflict activities in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Cyprus and Sierra Leone.[26] Even though the Pools were initially established on the premise that 'prevention is cheaper than cure', therefore, the bulk of their resources continue to be spent in societies in the aftermath of the outbreak of large-scale deadly violence.

60. The priority accorded to conflict management in the CPP spending is evident not just in peacekeeping and peace support commitments but also from the amounts allocated in programme spending under the country or region strategies and thematic strategies to security-related activities. Within the GCPP, for example, more than half is spent on military security, police matters or SSR, as indicated in Table 9:

Table 9: Global CPP Sector Share 2002/3 Allocations

	million	% share
Sub-Total for Security Sector	48.568	51
Sub-Total for Preventive Action	25.507	27
Sub-Total for Law and Justice	7.050	7
Sub-Total for Governance	5.816	6
Other	7.692	9
TOTAL	**94.633**	**100**

61. Where the Pools do fund Conflict Prevention activities, the bulk of those funds appear to go to long term structural prevention, which is of necessity *indirect* in its effect, rather than to short term preventive diplomacy or preventive deployment. It will be important to test this crude preliminary calculation during the course of the Evaluation, but the importance of such distinctions has been borne out by early interviews of UK stakeholders by the evaluators. Such an imbalance between expenditure on conflict management to the relative neglect of conflict prevention, the political sphere and direct measures was noted in at least one department's 2000 'Cross Cutting Review: Conflict Prevention outside Sub-Saharan Africa' (para. 2.9 of unsourced, undated document). But there are other imbalances as well. The CPPs were initially intended to 'pursue policies and activities that *directly* contribute to conflict prevention, reduction and management', and excluded 'activities that *indirectly* contribute to conflict prevention, such as human rights work, election monitoring, humanitarian and governance work'. Yet much of the CPP activities on the Programme side are indirect measures. Another notable imbalance is that between the security sector, which receives the bulk of the funding, and the political sector, even though many direct conflict prevention measures require intervention in political affairs of a target country.

[26] *Conflict prevention* is understood as actions taken to prevent large scale deadly violence from breaking out or, if it has ceased, to prevent its recurrence. *Conflict management* is understood as actions taken to respond to a crisis that has crossed the threshold into large scale deadly violence, to prevent that violence from escalating and to bring it to a conclusion.

Where money is spent on governance, this is directed largely to institutional and structural aspects, and only negligible amounts of CPP funds find their way into programs that target the attitudes and policies of key political actors at the highest level.

62. If one looks at departmental shares of programme spending, it is FCO who administers the bulk of those funds in the GCPP, yet some officials interviewed regard the FCO as less well resourced than DFID or MOD to implement and monitor project spending. This may be an especially important consideration when the project cost is taken into account. FCO managed some 35 projects in the GCPP that cost less than 20,000.

Table 10: Global CPP Departmental Share 2002/3 Allocations

	million	% share
FCO	42.076	51
MOD	26.555	32
DFID	11.679	14
DFID/FCO	1.425	2
FCO/MOD/OGD	0.500	
FCO/OGD	0.125	
Total	81.909	99

4.4 Management Arrangements

63. As section 4.2 above noted, there are two main elements to the spending allocations under the CPPs: costs for international peacekeeping and peace support; and costs for programmes. The arrangements for managing the two different types of spending are quite different, as are the arrangements for initiating new projects in each area, adjusting existing projects, or eliminating them altogether.

64. The central unifying element in the CPPs is at Cabinet level, where a sub-committee on Conflict Prevention sets broad priorities, approves all spending in gross amounts, and bears responsibility for the appropriate use of the funds against the PSA objectives. The sub-committee is responsible to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of Cabinet (DOP). For matters to do with the GCPP, the Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention is chaired by the Secretary for State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. For matters to do with the ACPP, the Sub-Committee is chaired by the Secretary for State for International Development. The Sub-Committee is referred to by other names in official documents, sometimes being referred to as either the Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa, and its associated acronym DOP (A), or the Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention outside Africa, and its associated acronym DOP (OA).

65. Other members of the Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention include Ministers or junior Ministers from the portfolios concerned: FCO, MOD, DFID and HMT. Though all meetings are chaired by a Minister, the other portfolios are not always represented at Minister level.

66. The Cabinet Office has an important coordinating role in the operation of the CPPs at a strategic level. This role is performed by the Secretariat of the DOP Committee, which has a staff of about 30, several of whom are engaged regularly with CPP matters. As of early August 2003, the DOP Secretariat was divided into three sections with responsibilities as shown in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Organogram DOP Secretariat



67. While the main DOP involvement with CPP programmes has been from the section dealing with Foreign Policy outside Europe, other sections have also been involved as appropriate. The section responsible for Foreign Policy outside Europe is small, and in early August 2003 comprised only three people. For the most part, at least in terms of the majority of the more than 100 countries targeted by CPP spending, the activities of the CPPs are somewhat disengaged from the UK's major foreign policy initiatives. For the most part, the DOP Secretariat is not engaged in day to day oversight of specific programmes or strategies. One exception to this is that a member of the DOP Secretariat chairs one of the GCPP strategies (Balkans), but the exception can be explained by the importance to UK strategic interests of conflict in Europe relative to most other parts of the world. In the work of the Secretariat and of the Sub-Committee itself, a certain de-coupling between classic UK foreign and security policy and the work of the CPPs is visible, though clear exceptions exist, most notably in the case of the Balkans and Afghanistan.

68. The DOP Secretariat forms the primary link between the broad decisions of the Cabinet Sub-Committee, and sometimes of the full Cabinet (as in the case of spending in Afghanistan and Iraq), and the CPPs. But another important link is that between Ministers or senior officials attending the Sub-Committee and the officials in their own departments who are charged with implementing the sub-committee decisions.

69. One example of the role of the DOP Secretariat in giving strategic direction to the work of the CPPs can be found in the review in December 2002 of CPP bids for 2003. The Secretariat sought to induce additional critical thinking from CPP officials on prioritisation of projects and consideration of where the UK could add significant value, relative to other international actors, such as the USA or the UN. The DOP Secretariat also played an important coordinating role in the Sub-Committee's review over more than a year of eligibility of certain types of projects for funding within the CPPs. One view in the DOP Secretariat is that there could be better explicit linkage between the principle UK foreign policy interests and CPP activities.

70. One fundamental principle of conflict prevention that the DOP Secretariat seems to grasp very well is that the potential of a country like the UK (or indeed even the USA) to intervene in the domestic politics of other countries in ways that materially reduce the prospect of conflict is quite limited. One challenge for the DOP Secretariat has been to translate that strategic reality into the work of the CPPs as they strive to find a balance between a little bit of good work in lots of places and more concentrated effort in places where, by concentrating its effort, the UK might make a bigger difference on the political choices of key actors.

71. The DOP Secretariat is joined in the role of strategic policy setting by HMT, whose representatives, including the Chief Secretary, are committed to the enhancement of the CPPs' work and who have consistently pressed for greater accountability and greater adherence to strategic objectives of the CPPs, especially the PSA and SDA objectives.

72. Apart from the participation of the Chief Secretary to the Treasury in the Cabinet Sub-Committee, HMT officials sit in the steering groups of the GCPP and the ACPP. These steering groups provide the main strategic direction to the work of the CPPs in their entirety.

73. For programme spending, the Steering group for the GCPP operates through a highly developed process of country, regional or thematic strategies. The strategy document identifies conflict prevention priorities in the country. As the GCPP has evolved, the purpose of the 'strategy' has shifted from justifying pre-existing programs from a conflict prevention perspective to recommending new projects that might better meet the conflict prevention needs of the particular country. But the initiative still lies principally with single departments, who might develop ideas in coordination with posts, NGOs and/or consultants. When sufficiently mature, they go both through Departments' own mechanisms for the approval of public expenditure, and then a formal approval process by the Steering Group, normally as part of the Spending Review process. Though there is significant provision in some strategies for approval of new projects as they arise throughout the financial year.

74. The effectiveness of this process appears to vary between strategies, depending on the commitment of the departments involved, the depth and range of other UK involvement, and the experience levels of the officials involved. The Balkans strategy, for example, appears to be relatively developed in its approach. This may be a result of the relatively long-standing (10 years) UK peacekeeping/peace enforcement involvement in the region, together with the central role played by the Cabinet Office. In some other strategies, the lead role in priority setting may be set in-country. It is of some note that vigorous and well-informed attempts to set new priorities do not always receive the recognition they deserve because of the normal practice of incrementalism in year on year spending for what are in most cases treated as medium to low priority issues for the FCO.

75. Unlike the GCPP, in which both the peacekeeping and programme elements are managed by one department (FCO), in the ACPP the two elements are managed by separate departments, with DFID (Africa Division) being responsible for the programme side and FCO (United Nations Department) responsible for the peacekeeping side.

76. The steering group for the ACPP meets informally on a monthly basis, and every 2-3 months on a more formal basis with representation from HMT and the Cabinet Office.

For programme funding, at the beginning of each year, the Steering group calls for country and thematic bids, according to priorities set by Ministers. Once these bids are approved, country desks within DFID then have responsibility for implementation. This contrasts with the situation in the GCPP where there are standing interdepartmental 'strategy' groups which draft a planning document specific to the work of the CPP. The conflict prevention strategy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa under the CPP sits as a section of a broader Country Engagement Paper. There are no such papers for countries with which the UK does not have a bilateral development relationship. These papers are developed on the basis of short FCO–originated papers on UK objectives in the particular country.

77. According to officials, the bids for projects in the ACPP can be quite variegated in style and approach. Often there is little reference to a clear set of priorities for conflict prevention work in the particular country. And the content of bids will also be influenced by the scale and type of HMG representation in the country. In some cases, such as Sierra Leone, the decision-making on projects can be far removed from the ACPP steering group, and emerge from other processes at Cabinet level. There has been recognition by the Secretary of State for International Development that the conflict assessment process by which the ACPP might more rigorously set its priorities is a very costly and demanding process. As a result, the ACPP has been prepared to engage in some high-risk strategies which are judged prima facie to be in UK interests and therefore worthy of pursuing, even if there is not a high chance of success.

78. Almost all officials interviewed by the Consultants to date have registered strong satisfaction with the enhancement in interdepartmental consultation achieved through the CPP mechanisms, both at the steering Group level and at 'strategy' levels. Numerous examples of this can seen across the CPPs, but two which stand out and which cut across both the Global and ACPPs are those associated with SSR. These are the Defence Advisory Team (DAT)[27] and the SSR Strategy, nominally under the GCPPP, but projecting important outcomes and impetus to similar work in the ACPP. In the case of the DAT, it has an institutional life of its own within what might be termed a 'classic' MOD mission, but since it relies on CPP funding its working processes have involved closer inter-departmental coordination than might have been the case otherwise.

79. At the same time, officials interviewed by the Consultants have identified four organisational problems in CPP management. The first is that the two CPPs are organised differently and have different organisational cultures. The second is that there is a significant gulf between decision-making for the programme side of CPP spending and the peacekeeping side of CPP spending. The third is that for the bulk of CPP expenditure, the CPPs represent little more than a new accounting mechanism (a new budget line) for pre-existing programs of involved departments rather than a way of enhancing UK efforts in conflict prevention as rapidly as they might. The fourth concerns that part of CPP funding

[27] As described in the Annual Report of the DAT: 'The Secretary of State for Defence approved the creation of the DAT in February 2001. The purpose of the Team is to formalise the delivery of short-term (2/3 month) in country defence management assistance programmes with core activities in: Defence Reviews, Financial Management and Civil-military Relations. The Team is 10 strong, with a mix of civilian and military personnel and includes a representative from DFID. Its operating costs of £500K are drawn from the pooled Conflict Prevention Fund, which also meets its deployment costs from individual country or thematic strategies.'

where significant new effort has been made to apply UK resources to conflict prevention and management, and the main issue here is how to set priorities within strategies and who sets them. One related question is the balance between top-down selection of projects (either from Whitehall or posts) or bottom-up selection (from governments or NGOs in affected countries or areas of thematic activity).

80. A number of officials observed the CPPs to operate more according to bureaucratic interests somewhat removed from the identified PSA and SDA objectives, rather than to those objectives. One official observed that the Pools are limited by what the three principal departments (FCO, MOD and DFID) can agree, even though differences can be and are on occasion resolved at Ministerial level.

81. CPP programme expenditures are now undertaken for at least 100 discrete sets of spending, and are linked either to a country, a region, a thematic issue (such as SSR or small arms), to peacekeeping or to peace support. Only a small number of these are formally called strategies. In fact, the lion's share of CPP expenditure is administered by structures that were in existence prior to the creation of the CPPs and which co-exist quite painlessly with the CPPs since the unique administrative structures of the Pools have almost no impact on them. This is visible in the documentary sources, which show peacekeeping and peace support to constitute the bulk of CPP spending, but most officials involved in deliberations of conflict prevention 'strategies' (country or thematic) do not have much influence on the peacekeeping decision-making. But it is also evident in the testimony of a number of officials interviewed by the Consultants.

82. The CPPs are engaged in a process of self-review and development. The GCPP for example has initiated a Quality Improvement Programme (QIP) which is currently reviewing the Middle East and North Africa Strategy. A number of officials have expressed the view that this review and improvement process is still in its early stages.

83. Issues identified by officials as worthy of investigation in the Evaluation's review of management processes included:

- A need to train officials involved in CPPs in conflict prevention.
- A need to post conflict advisers to posts, either on a regional basis or a country basis.
- New mechanisms for bringing conflict prevention expertise to bear on the work of CPPs and other policy processes (mainstreaming).
- Ways of reducing the size of under-spends.
- Recognition of the lack of an automatic link between higher amounts of money and greater impact.
- Need to penetrate high levels of policy making on strategic issues, like the Israel/ Palestine issue or Persian Gulf issues.
- Need for a re-focussing of the PSA targets and performance assessment of the CPPs at the level of conflict or thematic activity.
- Need to deliver more effective management through better resourcing of staff in Whitehall and in posts from CPP money.

4.5 CPPs and other UK Conflict-Related Policies

84. Where the CPP is the main form that UK Government engagement takes, the CPP strategy may effectively be the UK's conflict prevention strategy. In other cases, where departments are engaged directly in non-CPP activities with a conflict prevention dimension, our initial impression is that the Pools are not generally seen as a mechanism for improving the effectiveness of all UK contributions to conflict prevention.

85. This observation has relevance for activities of all three CPP-participating Ministries. Most if not all military deployments, for both preventive and combat purposes, have significant conflict prevention implications. Much of DFID development assistance across a wide range of activity should be informed (e.g. on relation to impact on horizontal equity) by conflict impact assessment, and significant elements in the DFID budget (e.g. related to good governance) may have a more direct conflict prevention dimension. Conflict prevention and management is also a central part of the FCO's diplomatic work. These other activities with a conflict prevention dimension are pursued in parallel with, rather than subordinate to, CPP strategies.

86. The issue of multiple objectives is also important in understanding how the CPP's work as funding mechanisms. We have been told that the joint Conflict PSA has often been seen to be subordinate to other departmental PSA's, with departments tending (at least initially) to engage with the Pools on the basis of whether conflict prevention could serve their 'primary' goals. Thus DFID was seen to be interested in Pool activities primarily because of their potential contribution to poverty reduction, and was consequently seen to be relatively indifferent to conflict prevention in middle-income countries. By contrast, the FCO and MOD were seen to be primarily interested in supporting Pool activities as a means to pursuing perceived UK economic/strategic interests and in securing alliances that could be of value for future military deployments. One consequence of this phenomenon is that some Pool strategies are managed without the active participation of one, and sometimes two, of the key departments.

87. This difference in departmental objectives helps to explain why it was felt necessary to establish two separate Pools for sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. Yet the premise on which this linkage has been made—that the UK's policy in sub-Saharan Africa is primarily driven by moral/humanitarian interests, while its policy elsewhere is driven by economic/strategic interests –may itself be an obstacle to the development of a more pro-active approach to conflict prevention. A decade ago, UK interests in Afghanistan and the Balkans were seen primarily in humanitarian terms, just as conflict in Africa is seen mainly as a moral challenge today. Yet the very same factors that led to Afghanistan and the Balkans becoming regions of strategic importance in recent years—such as refugee movements and support for terrorism & organised crime—are also increasingly relevant for Africa.

4.6 Emergence of the GOF

88. The decision to create this Fund was made as part of SR 2002, and the Fund began operation in 2003/4 with a programme allocation of £20 million, rising to £30 million in 2004/2005 and £40 million in 2005/6.[28] Instituted as a result of a Downing Street initiative, the GOF is an FCO-managed Fund that seeks to promote action on global issues in areas of strategic importance to the UK. Middle income and transitional countries are the key partners, including countries in line for EU membership. The Fund is organised around five thematic programmes: reuniting Europe, engaging with the Islamic World, strengthening our relationship with emerging markets, climate change and energy, and counter-terrorism. Priorities include human rights and legal reform, good governance, and energy and environment. FCO posts will help develop and screen proposals within this framework, including from NGO's and other partners. GOF assistance must 'add value to ... existing support for poverty reduction, conflict prevention and combating transnational crime'.[29] These funds will be integrated with some existing FCO programme budgets, including the Human Rights Project Fund, the Environment Fund and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.[30] The FCO has been allowed up to 10% of the cost of the GOF to be used for running costs. DFID and FCO have argued that such an allowance should also be made for the CPP's.

[28] Interview in FCO. The three-year GOF allocation totals £120 million, of which £30 million are allocated for the FCO reserve, international subscriptions and administration of GOF.
[29] GOF, FCO website, August 2003.
[30] FCO, Annual Report 2003.

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

DFID's assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

DFID works in partnership with governments committed to the Millennium Development Goals, with civil society, the private sector and the research community. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID has headquarters in London and East Kilbride, offices in many developing countries, and staff based in British embassies and high commissions around the world.

DFID's headquarters are located at:
1 Palace St
London SW1E 5HE
UK

and at:

DFID
Abercrombie House
Eaglesham Rd
East Kilbride
Glasgow G75 8EA
UK

Switchboard: 020 7023 0000 Fax: 020 7023 0016
Website: www.dfid.gov.uk
Email: enquiry@dfid.gov.uk
Public Enquiry Point: 0845 3004100
From overseas: +44 1355 84 3132
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