

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

The Security Sector Reform Strategy

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HM TREASURY

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools
Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC
& Associated Consultants

Thematic Case Study 1
The Security Sector Reform Strategy

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DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author/s and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development nor of the other government departments who have assisted in managing this evaluation (Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, HM Treasury).

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PREFACE

P1. The Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) are a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID) mechanism for funding and managing the UK's contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) covers sub-Saharan Africa while the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) covers the rest of the world. The CPPs were established by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) in April 2001, following a government-wide review of UK conflict prevention work in 2000. The rationale behind the CPPs is that by bringing together the interests, resources and expertise of FCO, MOD and DFID, greater effectiveness can be achieved. To this end, the CPPs share a joint Public Service Agreement (PSA) target, expressed as follows:

Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution.

P2. HMG commissioned the first evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools to inform the Spending Review 2004 (SR04). DFID has managed this evaluation through Evaluation Department in collaboration with an Evaluation Management Committee (EMC) that also included the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat (Chair), the FCO's United Nations Department, MOD's Directorate of Policy and Planning, DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and DFID's Africa Conflict Team (now the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit), situated in the Africa and Greater Horn Department (AGHD).

P3. The establishment of a cross-Whitehall Evaluation Management Committee was an innovative approach to managing an evaluation in DFID, and followed the ethos of the joint working of the CPPs. It allowed for extensive consultation between the various departments and conflict prevention teams. Many thanks are due to the various EMC members who contributed to the management of this evaluation. These include: Chris Chalmers, Benjamin Saoul and Anthea Dolman (Cabinet Office), Clare Barras and Stephen Evans (HMT), Joan Link, Euan Wallace and Karen Wolstenholme (FCO), Bernard Harborne and Malcolm Hood (AGHD), Tom Owen-Edmunds, Catherine Masterman and Ben le Roith (CHAD), Alicia Forsyth, Charlotte Brown, Campbell McCafferty (MOD).

P4. The study was managed by Mary Thompson, Iain Murray and Dale Poad (DFID Evaluation Department) in collaboration with the EMC. It was edited by Caryn Maclean

P5. The evaluation was undertaken by Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, the PARC & Associated Consultants. The GCPP Security Sector Reform (SSR) case study was carried out by Ms Nicole Ball who has conducted extensive fieldwork on SSR in a number of countries. This study was carried out through review of relevant documents, including the reports of geographic case studies undertaken for the evaluation, and interview of UK-based officials involved in SSR work. The UK-based interviews focused on several categories of stakeholders: members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group; members of

the SSR Policy Committee; representatives of three main SSR Strategy instruments (DAT, GFN, Defence Diplomacy); representatives of the GCPP and ACPP; and officials currently working on or recently working on key geographic desks (Balkans, Indonesia, Uganda).

P6. The aim of the evaluation of the CPPs is to assess current government approaches to Conflict Prevention through the GCPP and the ACPP, and to provide an overview of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward. The purpose of evaluation generally is to examine the design, implementation and impact of selected programmes in order to learn lessons from them so that these can be applied to current and future work, and also to help strengthen HMG's accountability. It should be borne in mind that any programmes or projects examined are the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed have often changed in the light of HMG's developing knowledge.

P7. The GCPP SSR Case Study is one of six studies undertaken within the framework of the evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the Inception Report, the Evaluation placed maximum emphasis on the macro level: the policy processes in Whitehall by which decisions on allocations are made and implemented by the CPPs. Considerable attention has also been placed on the meso level: the degree to which CPP policies and activities in a given conflict, or given sector of conflict prevention policy such as SSR, form part of a coherent package of direct interventions by the international community and local actors to the problems of preventing large scale deadly conflicts. The micro-level of analysis (review of specific projects) confines itself largely to the way in which projects impact on the meso and macro levels. The Evaluation has not analysed systematically whether specific projects funded by the CPPs have been well managed and whether they have achieved their specific project goals. Single projects have been analysed to the extent that they reflect on the macro and meso levels.

P8. The main findings of the evaluation, reflected in this Synthesis Report, are that the CPPs are doing significant work funding worthwhile activities that make positive contributions to effective conflict prevention, although it is far too early in the day to assess impact. The progress achieved through the CPP mechanisms is significant enough to justify their continuation. Overall, the consultants believe that worthwhile improvements could be achieved through:

- a. more consistent approaches to joint assessment and priority setting;
- b. more determined pursuit of coordinated international responses;
- c. and by allocation of more administrative resources and staff trained appropriately in the associated processes.

P9. This case study notes that the SSR Strategy is relatively new and has set itself the goal of enhancing the capacities of local actors. The SSR Strategy is well-positioned to achieve significant gains in this area, and all of its funded activities are relevant to SSR. In Uganda and Sierra Leone, the SSR Strategy was clearly making an important contribution

to conflict prevention. In Afghanistan, the portfolio of SSR projects, and the support offered by the SSR Strategy, have the potential to meet a range of short to medium term needs within the security sector that can support the process of peace consolidation.

P10. Overall the consultant's main findings are as follows:

- a. Potential synergies between various individual projects were not explored as often as they might be. Similarly, more clarity is required on how funding decisions taken at the political level conform to SSR Strategy requirements.
- b. There has been a significant inter-play between the UK and the international community concerning the development of the SSR concept, the principles underpinning that concept, and the practices flowing from it. As a result, UK thinking and practice on SSR has helped to shape the emerging international consensus on SSR, and consequently reflects that consensus to a large degree.
- c. As a result of the SSR Strategy, there is now a better idea of what a joined-up approach to SSR might be and a growing recognition that a joined up approach can add value to UK SSR work. Progress is reflected in the development of an SSR Policy Brief (MOD, FCO and DFID) which sets out the Government's policy on SSR.
- d. A major challenge facing the SSR Strategy is to clarify SSR principles and good practice for HMG personnel developing and implementing policy for conflict-affected countries and regions.
- e. In common with other strategies, the SSR Strategy has experienced considerable pressure to ensure that spend is on target and has, thus far, performed very well in this regard.

P11. The evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools is comprised of the following reports which can be found on the corresponding web-site links:

Synthesis Report	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647synthesis.pdf
Security Sector Reform, Nicole Ball	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf
United Nations, Pierre Robert & Andrew Mack	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647un.pdf
Sudan, Emery Brusset	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sudan.pdf
Sierra Leone, Jeremy Ginifer & Kaye Oliver	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf
Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647afghanistan.pdf
Russia and the FSU, Greg Austin & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf
Portfolio Review, Greg Austin & Malcolm Chalmers	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647portfolio.pdf

Evaluation reports can be found at the DFID website:

<http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/>

Michael Hammond
 Head of Evaluation Department
 2 April 2004

EVALUATION TEAM ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
ACSC	Advanced Command and Staff Course
AGHD	Africa and Greater Horn Department
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAT	Defence Advisory Team
DCAF	Democratic Control of the Military
DFID	Department for International Development
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EC	European Commission
EMC	Evaluation Management Committee
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
GFN	Global Facilitation Network
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HMT	Her Majesty's Treasury
IOT	Initial Officer Training
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OGDs	Other Government Departments
OSCE	Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
RCDS	Royal College of Defence Studies
SALW	Small Arms/Light Weapons
SDA	Service Delivery Agreement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

S1. In June 2002, Ministers approved a security sector reform (SSR) Strategy,¹ and it became operational at that time based on development work undertaken in the previous year (the Strategy was therefore launched just 13 months before the start of this evaluation). The objective of the SSR Strategy is 'to help governments of developing and transition countries fulfil their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict'. This objective promotes conflict prevention because security bodies that adhere to professional standards and the norms of democratic accountability and are effective in fulfilling their security roles will:

- help provide adequate protection to people and states;
- contribute effectively to regional peace support operations;
- ensure that the security bodies do not themselves become a source of insecurity.

S2. The SSR Strategy relies on three outputs to achieve its objective: policy development and analysis, technical assistance, and capacity building. As a thematic strategy within the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), the SSR Strategy is designed to support regional or country specific conflict prevention programmes under either the GCPP or Africa CPP (ACPP). It does so by providing coherent guidance on SSR policy and by acting as a central base for resources that would otherwise be duplicated between strategies.

S3. The main instruments of the SSR Strategy are:

- courses funded under defence diplomacy;
- military education courses;
- the Defence Advisory Team (DAT), established to provide defence management assistance in partner countries for defence policy reviews, financial management support and advice on civil-military relations;
- the Global Facilitation Network (GFN), a research, advisory and mobilisation tool for the UK Government and international partners facilitating policy development and capacity building for SSR.

Together these accounted for 84.5 per cent of the £5,050,000 allocated to the SSR Strategy in fiscal year 2003/4. The lion's share of resources in the SSR Strategy (some 58 per cent) go to military diplomacy education courses or other military courses.

S4. Security sector reform is a relatively new and evolving concept. Donor support to SSR in partner countries can be highly political and may involve altering power balances among local stakeholders, significant institutional restructuring and cultural change in those institutions. The path followed must be developed locally and be contextually appropriate.

¹ Joint FCO, DFID, MOD Paper, 'Strategy for Security Sector Reform', 12 June 2002.

Therefore, the benchmark for SSR good practice should describe general principles for donor engagement, rather than provide a template for SSR in support of conflict prevention. Eight internationally recognised principles for effective donor support to security-sector reform are:

- adopt a broad definition of the security sector;
- situate SSR in the context of providing a secure environment for people;
- recognise that all countries can benefit to varying degrees from SSR;
- foster local ownership of reform processes;
- develop comprehensive frameworks for promoting SSR and assist reforming countries to develop their own frameworks;
- build capacity to undertake SSR in reforming countries;
- adopt a long-term approach;
- adopt a regional/sub-regional perspective.²

Effect on Preventing New Conflicts and Containing Existing Ones

S5. The SSR Strategy is relatively new and has set itself the goal of enhancing the capacities of local actors. The SSR Strategy is well-positioned to achieve significant gains in this area, and all of its funded activities are relevant to SSR. In Uganda and Sierra Leone, the SSR Strategy was clearly making an important contribution to conflict prevention. In Afghanistan, the portfolio of SSR projects, and the support offered by the SSR Strategy, have the potential to meet a range of short to medium term needs within the security sector that can support the process of peace consolidation. As noted in respect of Afghanistan, the gigantic size of the conflict problems which the SSR work is supposed to alleviate is a challenge that is not matched by the combined resources of the Afghanistan Strategy and the SSR Strategy.

² These principles have been culled from a variety of sources, including: Dylan Hendrickson, *A Review of Security-Sector Reform*, CSDG Working Paper No 1, 1999; Bonn International Center for Conversion, *Security Sector Reform*, Brief 15, June 2000; Clingendael Institute, International Alert and Saferworld, *Towards a Better Practice Framework for Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate* (London/The Hague, 2001); Tim Edmunds, 'Defining Security Sector Reform,' *Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Network Newsletter*, No 3 (October 2001), pp 3–6, http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/CMR%20Network/cmrn3.htm#New_Agenda; OECD, *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, Paris, 2001; 'Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Policy Coherence', *The DAC Journal*, Volume 2, No 3, 2001; UNDP, 'Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace,' *Human Development Report*, 2002 (New York, 2002) Chapter 4, pp 85–100; UNDP, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, *Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR's Programmatic Approach* (New York, November 2002) www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/jssrprogrammaticapproach.pdf; Hans Born, P. Fluri and A. B. Johnsson, *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices*, Handbook for Parliamentarians No 5 (Geneva/Belgrade: DCAF/Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2003); and Clingendael Institute, *Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework*, prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague, 2003).

S6. Through the country/region case studies, the Evaluation found that the potential synergies between various individual projects were not explored as often as they might be. The Evaluation did not find a consistent set of ideas on the ways in which the SSR Strategy can be used to have the maximum effects for the lowest cost on preventing particular types of conflicts. More than a few officials believed the approach to what measures work best in certain circumstances was either lacking transparency, inadequately articulated or simply ad hoc. In some cases, according to certain officials, the decision to fund certain measures was often made at a high political level with only minimal articulation of how they conformed to an agreed SSR Strategy.

S7. The SSR Strategy has as yet not penetrated the work of the country/regional strategies on the sort of sustained and wide-ranging basis that would be necessary for all of its activities to pass the test of highest relevance to priority conflict prevention needs (in 2002/3, the DAT undertook policy advice activities in some seventeen countries while the GCPP and ACPP are active in SSR to some degree in a much bigger number of countries). The linkage between the highest priority conflict prevention needs within these countries and the specific type of support has not always been articulated or obvious. The SSR Strategy is beginning to address the question of prioritisation, but the Steering Group and Policy Committee can go only so far on their own. Determining and communicating overall priorities is the responsibility of the GCPP and the ACPP. At the time interviews for this Evaluation were conducted, the ACPP was undergoing a process of reviewing its priorities and anticipated being able to identify SSR-related priorities in early 2004. Within the GCPP as a whole, the lack of clear procedures for identifying in-country priorities and mechanisms to implement priorities has created problems for many GCPP strategies, the SSR Strategy included.

S8. Many officials interviewed for this Evaluation identified mainstreaming SSR within the departments as a high priority. Buy-in at senior levels and a deeper understanding of the benefits of a holistic approach to SSR among officials in London and overseas posts is a clear necessity. Achieving this should be a high priority for the SSR Strategy Steering Group. While the SSR Strategy has already set in motion several activities that will help with mainstreaming, a clear description of the baseline principles and associated practice would complement these activities, as would clarification of what the three departments agree is, and is not, SSR for those UK officials not working on SSR on a daily basis.

Effect on International Arrangements

S9. There has been a significant inter-play between the UK and the international community concerning the development of the SSR concept, the principles underpinning that concept, and the practices flowing from it. In consequence, UK thinking and practice on SSR both strongly reflect the emerging international consensus on security-sector reform and are in many respects shaping that consensus. The UK is seen to be a leader in the international community on SSR issues. Without the support of the UK Government, SSR would have a much lower profile internationally than it currently does. The SSR Strategy, through the GFN, is taking a leading role in promoting capacity building through networking in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Defence Diplomacy and military education courses also contribute to building capacity, as does much of the DAT's work. In addition to developing capacity to address SSR in these regions, the regional networks supported by the UK

could provide a mechanism for identifying and disseminating lessons learned in the conduct of SSR as well as articulating SSR requirements and concerns from the regional perspective.

Effect on Inter-Departmental Processes

S10. During the first 18 months of its existence, the SSR Strategy has sought to promote a joined-up approach to SSR within Whitehall. In consequence, there is now a better idea of what a joined-up approach to SSR might be and a growing recognition that a joined-up approach can add value to UK SSR work. There also seems to be a growing recognition that there is considerable overlap between democratic civil-military relations (Ministry of Defence's (MOD's) Defence Diplomacy work) and SSR (Department for International Development (DFID)), as well as DFID's work on safety, security and access to justice.

S11. A concrete indication of the progress made by the three departments to date is the development of an SSR Policy Brief, signed by three Ministers, which sets out the Government's policy on SSR and describes some of the work undertaken thus far. All of the officials on the SSR Strategy's Steering Group and the Whitehall SSR Policy Committee interviewed for this Evaluation agreed that the Policy Brief constitutes an important step forward. It is the product of lengthy consultations among the three departments, and as such provides a useful platform for carrying forward SSR work. Additionally, the work of the Strategy's main instruments is increasingly incorporating the international benchmarks. A major challenge facing the SSR Strategy is to clarify SSR principles and good practice for Her Majesty's Government (HMG) personnel developing and implementing policy for conflict-affected countries and regions.

S12. At the same time, not-inconsiderable impediments to joined-up work remain. While the three departments will always address SSR from somewhat different perspectives, there is a view among some officials that the way in which the SSR Strategy has been managed to date has not maximised opportunities to bridge the gulf between the three departments. There is room to consider whether the growing demands on the SSR Strategy can be satisfied by current bureaucratic arrangements.

S13. Although some of these factors are beyond the control of the strategy management team, interviews conducted for this evaluation reported a culture of inadequate consultation and transparency within the SSR Strategy. Transforming this culture would go a long way toward resolving the concerns raised by many of those interviewed about the management of the SSR Strategy and would promote a stronger shared vision of the objectives of SSR throughout HMG.

Implications for Financial Management

S14. The impact of any strategy on financial management should be to increase the effectiveness and efficiency with which resources are employed in support of an agreed objective. In common with other strategies, the SSR Strategy has felt considerable pressure to ensure that spend is on target. The SSR Strategy has thus far performed very well in this regard.

S15. Although to date the decision on precisely how to use resources more often than not

has resided primarily with the departments in charge of implementing those activities, there now appears to be a trend toward somewhat greater transparency and participation within the SSR Strategy on such decisions. This opens up opportunities for engaging in joint discussion of the priority that any particular activity should have within the strategy as well as how a particular activity fits in with the priorities of the country/region in which the activity is to be implemented. There already is some good practice within the SSR Strategy on these points and they should be extended to all Strategy activities.

Recommendations

S16. *The SSR Strategy should be continued* (this and other recommendations are elaborated at length in the body of the report). Demand for SSR will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. It is likely that there will be a growing market for SSR assistance. The UK has already invested a fair amount of resources in developing SSR-related expertise, and is looked to by many abroad as a source of innovation and good practice. SSR is an area where joint action by relevant ministries will definitely add value. SSR is also an area where joint action by groups of external actors will add value. It would be helpful if the SSR Strategy identified explicitly how its work can contribute to coordination among other donors.

S17. Timely attention to prioritisation, mainstreaming, and mechanisms to promote a joined up approach will greatly enhance the capacity of the SSR Strategy to deliver on its main objective in a manner supportive of the joint Public Service Agreement (PSA). *It is recommended that the SSR Strategy Steering Group consider how best to generate a more detailed framework for promoting the SSR priorities of the GCPP and ACPP for specific conflicts.* In particular, the SSR Strategy should consider how best to communicate to both UK-based and in-country staff the mechanisms they can use:

- to develop a joint analysis of the SSR needs in a country or region that is consistent with HMG conflict prevention priorities and the stated needs of local governments;
- to prioritise these needs; and
- to translate priorities into coherent programmes of support.

The review should also clarify the principles on which SSR work should be based and how these relate to the variety of activities funded by the CPPs in the area of SSR. A high priority should be attached to developing mechanisms for incorporating lessons learned into ongoing SSR work.

S18. While it is not the remit of the SSR Strategy to determine how the geographic strategies apply SSR principles and good practice, we believe that it is very much the remit of the SSR Strategy to clarify for the geographic strategies what SSR principles and good practice are. In order to achieve this objective, the SSR Strategy and all of its instruments need to serve the joined-up conflict prevention requirements of the geographic departments. This was explicitly recognised by the SSR Strategy Steering Group in September 2003. *The SSR Strategy Steering Group needs to monitor and evaluate the intensity and quality of service to (and sustained dialogue) with the country desks or country/conflict steering groups.*

1. BACKGROUND

1. In March 2001, Ministers agreed to establish the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Strategy within the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP). A Whitehall Security Sector Reform Policy Committee was established, chaired by a member of the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of the Department for International Development (DFID), and with representation from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD). In June 2002, Ministers approved an SSR Strategy,³ and the Strategy became operational (this was just 13 months before the start of this evaluation). The objective of the SSR Strategy is to 'help governments of developing and transition countries fulfil their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict'.

2. The decision to establish the SSR Strategy reflected the belief of the UK Government that appropriate, accountable, and affordable security bodies in countries at risk of violent conflict are a potentially important adjunct to prevention or management of such conflicts and that the UK Government can more effectively deliver on its conflict prevention objectives by working in a joined up manner to promote those outcomes. According to the SSR Strategy: 'The responsible and legal conduct of security is a prerequisite for building a secure environment in which a country can develop without violent conflict and in which people can go about their business without fear or threat'.⁴ In order to achieve such 'responsible and legal conduct', it is often necessary for a country to make significant changes in the governance and management of its security sector. This process, known as SSR, is defined by the SSR Strategy as encompassing 'the behaviour, conduct and performance of security sector actors, relationships between the security sector and civil society, and the processes of managing security within democratic societies. SSR is an essential part of the wider governance reform that will contribute to an indigenous capacity to build sustainable security and peace'.⁵

3. Security-sector reform is one component of creating a safe and secure environment, and preventing conflict is one of the potential benefits of security-sector reform. SSR intersects with two other critical components of creating security: enhancing the operational effectiveness of security bodies (domestically and regionally) and overcoming the legacies of violent conflict. The precise nature and scope of these intersections, which are shown graphically in Annex 1, will vary according to the environment in which SSR is undertaken.

4. Democratic control of responsible security bodies, acting only in the most professional manner according to international law, and with high levels of effectiveness and efficiency, is the desired end-state of SSR (both in donor and recipient countries).⁶ As those we interviewed generally recognised, the transition to this end-state is a long, difficult and unpredictable path that may often only be subject to external influences at the margins. In a paper prepared for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the principal

³ Joint FCO, DFID, MOD Paper, 'Strategy for Security Sector Reform', 12 June 2002.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

author of this report noted that 'External actors must accept that every country has a unique history and mode of operations. They must also accept that there are different ways to achieve the end states of transparency, accountability and civil management and oversight of the security bodies'.⁷ What is more, the defence forces, public security and intelligence services and judicial processes of a state can be the most difficult to reform, even for a democratic government in the developed world. The agencies possess the coercive powers of the state. They are the most powerful institutions in any country, and when a government seeks 'root and branch' changes, such reform can take many years.

5. As noted in the report for UNDP, the 'principles of good governance in the security sector describe an ideal-type and do not provide a roadmap for change'. It is therefore likely that there will need to be an iterative process of policy development and implementation which will progressively bring principles, policies and practice closer together. Where targeted short-term activities are used in SSR, the objective should be to identify a series of practical steps that are achievable and contribute to long-term progress.

6. The challenge for a country like the UK of adapting the new agenda linking SSR in other countries to conflict prevention was complicated by decades of a different sort of involvement in the security sector during the Cold War. In those years, security assistance from the major providers in both East and West almost always took the form of training and equipment designed to enhance operational capacity, with the primary aims either of buying influence or of opposing each others' client states, with little or no concern for democratic governance or rule of law considerations. The development assistance agencies of major donors avoided interaction with the security sector, and democratic governance and rule of law considerations were also largely absent from their support which tended to concentrate on economic and social development. The result was tolerance of politicised security bodies, their frequent disregard for the rule of law, all too regular abuse of human rights, and unnecessarily high (or inappropriately allocated) security sector budgets to the neglect of social and economic development.⁸

7. The growing interest of external actors in SSR through the 1990s was some indication that the old ideas had lost their appeal. The UK adoption in 2002 of the SSR Strategy to support the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) is certainly confirmation that UK assistance to security sectors abroad is now set on a very different path from that of several decades ago.

⁷ Nicole Ball, 'Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP', 9 October 2002, <http://www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/nicoleballpaper.htm>. This work was done under DFID funding—part of a broader effort by it to get SSR, SALW and conflict prevention issues into what was then the emergency response division of UNDP.

⁸ See Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), especially chapter 7 'Capital, Growth and Security Assistance,' pp 237–94 and Nicole Ball, 'Pressing for Peace: Can Aid Induce Reform?', Policy Essay no. 6 (Washington DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992).

2. SSR AND CONFLICT PREVENTION: WHAT BENCHMARK FOR BEST PRACTICE?

8. In the Inception Report, it was proposed and agreed by the Evaluation Management Committee, that each case study would contrast the CPP strategy it was reviewing with a set of policy proposals for conflict prevention goals in the named country/region or thematic activity that had been devised outside Her Majesty's Government (HMG). This independently-derived set of policy proposals would be used as a benchmark for consideration of whether HMG had selected an optimum portfolio of activities and whether the components selected were making (or were likely to make) a significant impact on the conflict prevention goals of HMG. Each case study would then compare the CPP-funded portfolio of activities and associated strategy documents against this external or independently derived benchmark.

9. In the case of the SSR Strategy, it has not proven so simple to identify a set of benchmarks for best practice in SSR that are instantly distinguishable from the work of HMG. The UK was the first government of an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member country to have established a discrete sub-programme on SSR within an overarching programme of conflict prevention linking the three main departments involved. It is pioneering an holistic approach to SSR that is based on an awareness of the highly political nature of the processes necessary to achieve democratic security-sector governance. The components of this approach have been evolving since the early 1990s within the governments and multilateral organisations that provide both development and security assistance.⁹ European Union (EU) governments and the United States have, for example, supported the development of democratic civil-military relations in the context of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and EU accession of countries in East and Central Europe and the Baltic countries.¹⁰ Similarly, OECD countries, the EU and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have supported police and justice reform programmes in many parts of the world. Virtually all donors have supported efforts to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate (DDR) ex-combatants.¹¹

10. There have historically tended to be quite different perspectives on SSR and its relationship to conflict prevention according to the different primary missions of a foreign ministry, a defence ministry and a development ministry. Foreign and defence ministries have been particularly interested in promoting the capacity of a country's security bodies to provide security, both domestically and regionally/internationally to peace support operations, thus contributing to conflict prevention in-country or in other countries. The development community has focused

⁹ It is important to recognise that non-OECD countries have also chosen to undertake SSR-related activities without external support. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum has decided to promote publication of defence white papers and associated reform of military doctrine as a means of establishing more transparency in national security policy. The post-1994 government of South Africa has undertaken a major, indigenously developed and implemented, security-sector transformation, affecting defence, safety and security, justice and intelligence.

¹⁰ See, for example, publications of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, www.dcaf.ch and information on the Stability Pact created by the EU, <http://www.stabilitypact.org/>.

¹¹ While many SALW and DDR programmes are intended first and foremost to build trust among excombatants and to reduce personal insecurity, they also open the door for SSR-related work.

on creating a secure environment for maximising human development of the poor. Development actors are only slowly coming to terms with the need to incorporate into their SSR concept a number of broader, and sometimes morally troubling, political objectives, including the need to improve the operational capacity of security bodies in order to contribute to conflict prevention, even if those bodies are not yet fully democratically accountable.¹² They need to make this adjustment in order to increase buy-in from the defence and foreign policy communities, just as the defence and foreign policy actors need to accept that not all security-related assistance can be classified as SSR.

11. The challenge is not only to develop a comprehensive approach to SSR, but importantly to specify and strengthen the linkages between that SSR approach and conflict prevention. In an international environment in which the conflict prevention agenda and the SSR agenda are both new and rapidly developing, it is difficult to find highly developed views in general about best practice in SSR as it relates to conflict prevention. In general terms, there are three basic reasons why SSR along the lines described above can promote conflict prevention. Security bodies that adhere to professional standards and the norms of democratic accountability and are effective and efficient in fulfilling their security roles will help to:

- provide adequate protection to people and states;
- contribute effectively to regional peace support operations;
- ensure that the security bodies do not themselves become a source of insecurity.

12. Lack of democratic accountability can lead to corrupt behaviour on the part of security force personnel, government officials, politicians, and other key actors that prevents security bodies from being professionally trained, adequately equipped and appropriately financed. Inadequate adherence to professional standards can mean that security bodies do not have the capacity to plan, manage their resources effectively and efficiently, ensure clear lines of responsibility, or develop sound human resource management and procurement systems. Lack of operationally effective security forces (often a result, *inter alia*, of a lack of professionalism and democratic accountability) allows criminality and armed opposition to flourish, undermining the conditions for development and making large-scale armed conflict more likely. All of this will affect their ability to protect people and states and to contribute effectively to regional peace support operations.¹³

¹² Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, 'The Challenges of Security Sector Reform', pp 175–202, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2002). This chapter examines a range of issues affecting the viability of SSR efforts in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Some of the implications of SSR for transition countries are discussed in Timothy Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation', Report for Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Security Sector Reform: Conceptual Framework and Practical Implications (Workshop 20-22 November 2001), http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/E-Packages/ws_criteria%20221101/DCAF%20SSR%20Report1.pdf, and Timothy Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Criteria for Success and Failure' (Workshop 22-23 November 2001), http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/E-Packages/ws_criteria%20221101/DCAF%20SSR%20Report1.pdf.

¹³ While democratic accountability and adherence to professional standards will not automatically produce more effective and efficient security bodies, there is a strong correlation between the absence of these factors and ineffective and inefficient security bodies. For example, see Günther Bächler, 'Security Sector Reform', pp. 20-21 in *Conflict Transformation through State Reform* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001).

13. By the same token, a poorly-managed, unprofessional and unaccountable security sector can be a major source of insecurity, both domestically and regionally. Countries where the security sector does not operate within the framework of democratic accountability are more likely to experience internal and external violent conflict. This arises from:

- a disregard for the rule of law, including the ability of the security bodies to act with impunity and engage in serious human-rights violations;
- the tendency to settle disputes with neighbours through the use of force, rather than develop mechanisms to mediate conflict;
- support for highly centralised political systems that exclude the majority of the population and undermine the ability of poor people to improve their lives and livelihoods.¹⁴

14. Annex 2 demonstrates that activities undertaken to promote SSR can be short-, medium- and long-term in nature. They can occur at all stages of the conflict cycle. In post-conflict environments, it is likely that most short-term security-related activities will be focused more on creating security than on SSR *per se*, but the linkages to SSR should not be ignored, nor should activities such as taking steps to create a reform friendly environment be neglected.

15. It is within this extremely complex context that any consideration of benchmarks for good practice in SSR as a thematic 'Strategy' in support of conflict prevention should be situated. There can probably be no concrete international benchmark at a thematic level for this rather specialised form of bureaucratic organisation. The test of effectiveness must be its contribution to reducing the risk of, or mitigating the effects of, large scale conflict in specific cases. There is, however, growing agreement that donors need to follow a number of basic principles (as guidelines for engagement, rather than a template for policy or programme development):

- adopt a broad definition of the security sector;
- situate SSR in the context of providing a secure environment for people;
- recognise that all countries can benefit to varying degrees from SSR;
- foster local ownership of reform processes;
- develop comprehensive frameworks for promoting SSR and assist reforming countries to develop their own frameworks;
- build capacity to undertake SSR in reforming countries;
- adopt a long-term approach;

¹⁴ Bächler, 'Security Sector Reform', pp 20–21.

- adopt a regional/sub-regional perspective.¹⁵
16. In applying these principles, it is important to keep the following points in mind:
- SSR is highly political and involves altering power balances: between civilians and security body personnel, between the executive and legislative branches of government, within the executive branch, and between government and civil society. Altering these power balances involves significant institutional restructuring and cultural change. Thus, the motivations of key actors have to be understood to the extent possible.¹⁶
 - The dilemmas and policy tensions implicit in this area of activity must be specified, and practical advice offered for addressing both generic problems and country specific problems in ways that are finely tuned to the political, social, economic and security circumstances of countries concerned.
 - These problems and practical solutions must be discussed widely, especially in ways that are likely to influence and shape the views, behaviours and approaches of key local actors.
 - The practical ideas and possible solutions should be delivered not just for long-term impact but also in support of short-term preventive actions to the extent feasible.
 - In cases where partner governments are not receptive to external influence on the most important issues, efforts need to be made to develop a constituency for reform, for example by cultivating reform-minded officials and helping to mobilize local civil society.¹⁷

¹⁵ These principles have been culled from a variety of sources, including: Dylan Hendrickson, *A Review of Security-Sector Reform*, CSDG Working Paper No 1, 1999; Bonn International Center for Conversion, *Security Sector Reform*, Brief 15, June 2000; Clingendael Institute, International Alert and Saferworld, *Towards a Better Practice Framework for Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate* (London/The Hague, 2001); Tim Edmunds, 'Defining Security Sector Reform,' *Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Network Newsletter*, No 3 (October 2001), pp 3–6, http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/CMR%20Network/cmnrn3.htm#New_Agenda; OECD, *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris, 2001); 'Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Policy Coherence', *The DAC Journal*, Volume 2, No 3, 2001; UNDP, 'Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace,' *Human Development Report, 2002* (New York, 2002), Chapter 4, pp 85–100; UNDP, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, *Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR's Programmatic Approach* (New York, November 2002), www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/jssrprogrammaticapproach.pdf; Hans Born, P. Fluri and A.B. Johnsson, *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices*, Handbook for Parliamentarians No 5, (Geneva/Belgrade: DCAF/Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2003); and Clingendael Institute, *Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework*, prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague, 2003)

¹⁶ External actors need to be realistic about the difficulties they face in understanding the motivations of key players or institutional dynamics, in part because motivations often shift during a conflict.

¹⁷ These modes of operation are relevant for both local stakeholders and external actors such as the UK. For a methodology that incorporates them that is intended for use by developing and transitional countries, see Clingendael Institute, *Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework*, prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague, 2003), http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/pdf/2003_occasional_papers/SSGAF_publicatie.pdf. The objective of this framework is to help partner countries to prioritise their SSR needs by analysing a series of entry points. Although aimed in the first instance at partner countries, this framework could also assist external actors to understand the political context in which they are operating.

17. Thus, the SSR Strategy within the GCPP should be evaluated both against the positive aspirations and characteristics of international SSR work at the thematic level and, at the country level, against the consideration that donors may have few entry points for supporting SSR because it is such a highly contested and politically complex field. The work of the CPPs in SSR will always be sharply limited by the openness of the partner government to the specific programmes. The external actor can only offer inspiration, support and ideas for other people's SSR.

18. The above discussion of politics and priorities exposes the need to be able to identify with some degree of reliability the most appropriate entry point for using SSR support as a conflict prevention tool. Analysis of the potential of SSR to support conflict prevention should therefore, at least in the first instance, situate narrowly technical descriptions of evolving institutional capacities within a much broader analysis of the entry points for changing the calculation of key players about resort to violence and about appropriate norms for governance of the armed forces, security services or judicial institutions.

3. RELATION OF SSR STRATEGY TO THE BENCHMARK

19. As noted above, there has been a significant inter-play between the UK and the international community concerning the development of the SSR concept, the principles underpinning that concept, and the practices flowing from it. In consequence, UK thinking and practice within the SSR thematic strategy of the GCPP strongly reflect the emerging international consensus on security-sector reform benchmarks or ‘guiding principles’ (as they also continue to shape that consensus). Each of the Strategy’s main instruments, discussed below, is increasingly reflecting the international benchmarks for the SSR principles. The additional major challenge facing the SSR Strategy is to translate SSR principles into feasible solutions for HMG personnel required to prevent or mitigate conflict in specific countries and regions.¹⁸ The following discussion addresses both the thematic level and the conflict-specific or country-specific work of the SSR Strategy. The discussion is intended to highlight the areas of commonality between the international benchmarks, as un-formed as they may be, and UK concepts and practices and to identify how relevant the work of the SSR Strategy has been to the purposes of conflict prevention, both at a thematic level and for specific conflicts.

20. The objective of the SSR Strategy is ‘to help governments of developing and transition countries fulfil their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict’.¹⁹ Although the SSR Strategy is established within the GCPP, it also supports the work of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). Moreover, a significant amount of resources allocated to the geographic strategies in both the GCPP and the ACPP have been used for SSR-related activities.

21. The SSR Strategy proposes to assist these governments to:

- improve their policy making—including through engagement with wider civil society;
- establish mechanisms which will strengthen security sector accountability and transparency;
- enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the development and employment of security sector capacity.²⁰

22. The SSR Strategy identifies three main outputs to achieve these purposes:

- Policy development and analysis: ‘The development of generic and region-specific Whitehall policy and strategy papers on request from FCO/MOD/DFID,’ aimed at creating a ‘better understanding of security problems,’ thereby helping to develop ‘more appropriate policy responses’.

¹⁸ Some tools already exist, for example, Department for International Development, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*, February 28, 2002, www.dfid.gov.uk. As discussed below, others are in development. What does not seem to exist as yet is an articulated strategy for mainstreaming. See also section 4.

¹⁹ ‘Strategy for Security Sector Reform: Joint Conflict Prevention Pools’, para 8.

²⁰ *Ibid*, para 7.

- Technical assistance: 'Providing effective SSR assistance is a priority theme for conflict reduction.' Technical assistance can 'involve government-to-government work É support for non-state actors and provision of education and training opportunities for military and other security sector personnel'.
- Capacity building: 'Work with bilateral donors, multilateral organisations, NGOs and academic institutions to create a global climate conducive to SSR by influencing agendas and developing local capacity for reform'.²¹

23. The Strategy is designed to 'support regional or country specific conflict prevention programmes that include SSR activities, whether developed under the GCPP or ACPP, by providing coherent guidance on SSR policy and a central base for resources which would otherwise be duplicated between strategies (e.g. non-country specific Defence Diplomacy capacity). The SSR Strategy is not intended to 'duplicate, replace, or fund specific security sector reform activities that have been developed under existing regional strategies'.

24. Thus at a general level of mission statement and objectives, the SSR Strategy can be judged to be operating close to the international benchmarks in terms of relevance. The same pattern can be seen in closer examination of the specific instruments funded by the SSR Strategy, as they operate at country-level. Though, at that level, it may be impossible to judge the degree to which alternative priorities or choices are shaped by the likes and dislikes of the partner governments, rather than by the preferred positions of HMG.

25. The SSR Strategy funds four main instruments through which SSR in support of conflict prevention can be provided:

- Defence Advisory Team.
- Global Facilitation Network (GFN) for SSR.
- Defence Diplomacy courses.
- Military education courses.

The Strategy also funds a number of stand-alone projects. Together these programmes accounted for 84.5 per cent of the £5,050,000 allocated to the SSR Strategy in fiscal year 2003/4. Additional detail on expenditure is found in Table 1 and Annex 4.

²¹ 'Strategy for Security Sector Reform', para 19. Additional detail on the types of activities that fall under these categories is found in Annex 3.

Table 1: SSR Strategy Allocation 2003/4

Expenditure item	Allocation	% total allocation
Defence Diplomacy education	£959,205	19.0
Military education	£1,955,5190	38.8
Defence Advisory Team	£791,400	15.7
GFN SSR	£561,653	11.1
Projects	£491,712	9.7
Other	£290,520	5.7
Total	£5,050,000	100.0

26. Annex 3 provides descriptions of delivery on three main outputs of the SSR Strategy in 2002/3. It is extracted from the SSR Bid to the GCPP, FY 2003/4 and 2004/5. As such it does not fully reflect the activities actually undertaken during 2003 or the evolution of SSR Strategy instruments such as the GFN and Defence Advisory Team (DAT). It does, however, reflect the range of activities that the SSR Strategy has been involved in and the general orientation of key instruments. The material in Annex 3 demonstrates a strong overlap between the work of the SSR Strategy and the international benchmarks at both thematic and country level. Some examples of this are highlighted below.

27. *Defence Advisory Team:* the DAT was established to provide defence management assistance in partner countries in three core areas: defence policy reviews, financial management and civil-military relations. It was set up by the Secretary of State for Defence in February 2001, two months in advance of the formal creation of the GCPP, though after the completion of the cross-cutting review that recommended the establishment of the GCPP. The cross-cutting review had identified SSR as one of 22 tools of conflict prevention. The review also identified links with the armed forces of partner countries as a useful entry point for conflict prevention in general.

28. In 2002/3, the DAT had a staff of ten, including both civilian and military personnel, among them a member of DFID. The operating costs (£500,000 in 2002/3) are provided by the SSR Strategy, and programme/project costs for significant DAT work-streams are met from individual country or thematic strategies in the GCPP or ACPP. The GCPP SSR Strategy funds the attachment to DAT of advisers in various fields (governance, police/justice, and intelligence/security reform).²² In 2002/03, the DAT undertook policy advice activities in 17 countries:

- Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda
- Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

²² See <http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/dat/index.htm>, and N.A. Fuller, 'Defence Advisory Team. Annual Report, 2002/03', April 2003. The police/justice and intelligence/security reform advisers will join the Team in 2004.

29. *Global Facilitation Network*: created with core funding from the SSR Strategy in November 2002, and fully operational in May 2003, the GFN is centred around an independent team of specialists (academics and practitioners) located at Cranfield University. The team is a resource and mobilisation tool for the UK Government and international partners facilitating policy development and capacity building for SSR. The aim of the GFN is to support SSR in societies in transition. The GFN has three core objectives:

- supporting policy development by providing assessments, scoping studies, country analyses, concept and briefing papers, and presentations for a range of stakeholders;
- assisting capacity-building through support to new academic institutions, designing accredited flexible learning and educational materials, and participating SSR management training programmes;
- developing an information repository containing SSR events, news, contacts, documents and information, accessible via the GFN website.

The work of the GFN is supported by an international advisory group.²³

30. The GFN is currently engaged in or developing a range of capacity building activities such as supporting regional networks, developing distance learning and other training/educational materials for both SSR practitioners and civil society, and disseminating information through their website. It is precisely in these areas that the vast majority of those interviewed for this Evaluation indicated that the GFN's capacity to contribute to the work of the SSR Strategy and conflict prevention lies.

31. The GFN's recent experiences in developing regional networks and building capacity illustrate the importance of a number of the baseline principles discussed above: building local capacity, fostering local ownership, and adopting a long-term approach. The Africa SSR Network is currently being formed under the guidance of African members of the GFN Advisory Group, and has considerable potential to build capacity in a sustained and context-appropriate manner. Work is also underway on preparing the ground for a future Asia network, and GFN are exploring opportunities for a similar venture in Latin America. In each of these cases it is clear that network development is a long-term process that proceeds most effectively when locally owned. In principle, attention to capacity building will also provide opportunities to inject a regional or sub-regional perspective into work undertaken through the SSR Strategy, although since no regional network was in operation at the time of this Evaluation, it was impossible to assess the extent to which this will occur.

32. Two GFN activities that will get off the ground in 2004 with the collaboration of DAT are of particular interest in terms of supporting a conflict prevention approach to SSR within HMG: a short-course on SSR and a repository of good practice in SSR. Again, as these are not yet operational, it was impossible to determine how well they will fulfil this objective, although the outline of the short-course available to us suggests that it has the potential to provide a solid introduction to the subject for UK officials.

²³ See the GFN website <http://www.gfn-ssr.org/> for additional details.

33. *Defence Diplomacy Educational Activities:* these activities comprise educational courses and a fellowship programme. Since 2000, Cranfield University has offered seven-week courses in the UK and two-week courses abroad on the subject of 'Managing Defence in a Democratic, Market-based Society'. The objective is to promote democratic accountability and effectiveness and efficiency in the conduct of defence. A fellowship of up to three years, managed by MOD and the host institution, helps develop capacity outside the defence sector in priority countries to engage in and inform the national debate about the conduct of defence. Cranfield University also runs a Global Security MSc course, which aims to generate in-depth knowledge and understanding of what constitutes security in the twentyfirst century and the place, relevance and limitations of military forces in helping to solve multi-dimensional security problems.²⁴

34. While the Defence Diplomacy activities were in existence prior to the creation of the SSR Strategy, the three departments assessed and prioritised these activities for inclusion in the Strategy. The curriculum of the MOD courses has been progressively modified to enhance their ability to contribute to the change in attitudes or capacities identified as the benchmark for SSR in section 2. Until recently there was no mechanism for ensuring either that the export courses are the highest priority tasks for SSR in the target countries or that they are targeted on the highest priority countries. In October 2003, agreement was reached that decisions on where export courses will take place in the future will be broadened to include representatives of DAT, DFID and FCO, along with MOD. Course participants are both military and civilian and are selected from priority countries and regions that are agreed by the Steering Committees of both Pools (based on UK Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Objectives) but are not covered by separate Pools strategies.²⁵ At the same time, since the UK-based courses can only accommodate a small number of participants from each country per year, the resulting gains for conflict prevention may be fairly small and gradual.

35. *Military education:* the objective of military education funded under the SSR Strategy is to influence military behaviour in ways consistent with democratic accountability and the promotion of military effectiveness and efficiency. It consists of three programmes which, in common with the Defence Diplomacy education activities, were created prior to the establishment of the SSR Strategy budget line:

- Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) course for senior officers and non-military officials from the UK and abroad aimed at developing their analytical powers, understanding of defence in a democracy, and international security and strategic vision;
- Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) course for military officers and civilians ranked lieutenant colonel or equivalent from abroad to international relations, law, ethics, human security and defence management;

²⁴ MOD, 'Security Sector Reform Strategy—Activities undertaken by the MOD,' undated, pp 4–6, MOD, 'Security Sector Reform—A MOD Position Paper,' Director Approved Draft 17 July 2003, para 19), Dr Laura Cleary, 'Managing Defence in a Democratic, Market-based Society', description of 7-week certificate course. Cranfield University, Global Security MSc, <http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/prospectus/shrivenham/gs.cfm>.

²⁵ Course participants from countries that are not GCPP and ACP priorities are funded through the Defence Assistance Fund.

- Initial Officer Training (IOT) to develop basic professional military skills and the qualities of leadership, intellect and ethical behaviour demanded of a junior leader working in a democratic context.²⁶

36. As with the Defence Diplomacy courses, many of these activities may contribute to the change in attitudes or capacities identified as the benchmark for SSR in section 2. They seek to influence the behaviour of attendees in a manner that is consistent with democratic accountability, as well as to promote military effectiveness and efficiency, and are targeted on countries and regions that are agreed by HMG to be conflict-prevention priorities.²⁷ However, as with the UK-based Defence Diplomacy courses, the military education courses are not in a position to educate large numbers of officers from any individual country, nor necessarily the most influential officers, and thus resulting gains will only accrue rather slowly.

37. Questions were raised by a number of officials interviewed for this Evaluation about the relevance to SSR and conflict-prevention of the three military education courses and the various Defence Diplomacy activities funded under the SSR Strategy. Many of these activities may contribute to the change in attitudes or capacities identified as the benchmark for SSR in section 2, but are a long way from being the highest priority tasks for SSR in some of the target countries. The SSR Strategy funds activities in some countries that are not even the subject of country conflict strategies under the GCPP or ACPP. The selection of target countries for SSR Strategy activities shows a mix between high priority countries from the point of view of conflict prevention or reduction (Iraq and Afghanistan) and those that seem to be of quite low priority (Ukraine and Bulgaria). Important countries like Russia have not been included, even though there is no SSR program within the country strategy under GCPP.

38. In defence of the activities, it was asserted that they have the potential to support both SSR and conflict prevention, albeit at a relatively slow pace. There can be no doubt that the ability to offer a place in one of the UK-based courses or holding an export course in a particular country or region can be a crucial component of an SSR programme. Additionally, an effort is made to include the most significant politico-military policy makers and decision takers in the senior-level courses. What is more, building democratically accountable controlled and effective armed forces increases the pool of potential donors for regional and international peace support tasks. Senior officials made plain to the Evaluation that HMG placed high priority on a number of these military education courses for their contribution to UK positioning in international affairs and security policy in general. This view held that the UK needed a wide-ranging set of defence relationships in countries that may not now be high priority for conflict prevention so that the UK was positioned strategically in the event that circumstances changed.

39. The counter-argument was made more in terms of process. Some officials questioned how decisions had been made within the SSR Strategy to allocate funds to these courses in the context of maximising the benefits of the limited resources at the disposal of the Strategy.

²⁶ MOD, 'Security Sector Reform Strategy—Activities undertaken by the MOD,' undated, pp 4–6, MOD, 'Security Sector Reform—A MOD Position Paper,' Director Approved Draft 17 July 2003, para 19.

²⁷ Here, too, course participants from countries that are not GCPP and ACPP priorities are funded through the Defence Assistance Fund.

First, in view of the large share of SSR Strategy resources allocated to the Defence Diplomacy and military education courses (nearly 58 per cent in 2003/4), is this the optimal use of Strategy resources? While continuing to fund some amount of Defence Diplomacy and military education activities, could these resources more effectively support SSR and conflict prevention objectives if some of them were targeted on other SSR activities? Second, what is the most effective means of targeting the Defence Diplomacy export courses? Could one or more of the courses conducted each year be embedded in major, ongoing UK SSR programmes?²⁸ There is clearly an argument for using export courses as an entry point for SSR work, but in most individual cases there has been no articulated link between defence export courses and specific conflict prevention activities in the target country.

40. *Small projects:* the SSR Strategy has supported a number of small, stand-alone projects providing primarily police and military training/reform and primarily financed by FCO in areas where there is no country or regional strategy. In 2003/4, such projects were being carried out in Argentina, Bahamas, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Uruguay, and in the EU Council Secretariat.²⁹ As with the Defence Diplomacy and military education courses, these activities may contribute to the change in attitudes or capacities identified as the benchmark for SSR in section 2, but do not appear to be targeted on the highest priority countries. It has been recognised that these activities need to be better integrated into strategic priorities for the CPPs and the geographic strategies, but it does not appear that a mechanism for doing so has yet been agreed.³⁰

41. This brief review of the main instruments of the SSR Strategy within the context of the international benchmarks discussed in section 2 suggests that all of the activities are relevant to SSR, but the linkage between the highest priority conflict prevention needs within these countries and the specific type of support has not always been articulated or obvious. The SSR Strategy is beginning to address the question of prioritisation, but the Steering Group and Policy Committee are dependent on the GCPP and ACPP Steering Groups and country steering groups or country desks for this. The SSR Strategy has taken a number of steps that will facilitate prioritisation, and these should be both deepened and adequately supported by the officials managing country processes within the CPPs.

42. The SSR Strategy Steering Group and Policy Committee have developed an SSR Policy Brief, signed by three Ministers, which sets out the Government's policy on SSR and describes some of the work undertaken thus far. All of the officials on the SSR Strategy's Steering Group and the Whitehall SSR Policy Committee interviewed for this Evaluation agreed that the Policy Brief constitutes an important step forward. It is the product of lengthy consultations among the three departments, and as such provides a useful platform for carrying forward SSR work.³¹

²⁸ Export courses were held in Argentina and Croatia during 2003. A third course planned for Nigeria had to be cancelled due to political instability. In none of these countries was a major UK programme of work on SSR underway.

²⁹ Global Conflict Prevention Pool 2002/3: Outturn/Forecast.

³⁰ Author/s interviews with FCO officials, September–October 2003. In this regard, it may be useful to examine the Indonesia Strategy where some effort has been made to fund small projects that support the overall Indonesia SSR Strategy priorities.

³¹ Department for International Development, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and Ministry of Defence, *Security Sector Reform Policy Brief* (London: November 2003), http://www.gfn-ssr.org/edocs/gfn027_ssr_policy_brief.pdf.

43. The Policy Brief demonstrates that the three departments are very close to agreement on the definition of SSR, which is critical for prioritisation. Interviews conducted for this Evaluation suggest that there remain some outstanding issues which relate in particular to the military education courses that need to be resolved.³² It will also be important to reinforce the message that the SSR Strategy was clearly intended to apply to developing and transition countries, as both categories of countries can require conflict prevention assistance. In the past, SSR work in countries that did not reflect poverty-reduction priorities has often been opposed by DFID, creating tensions with the other departments.³³ Equally important, as is discussed in section 4, both the GCPP and the ACPP need to give the SSR Strategy a much clearer steer on their priorities for SSR-related work.

44. The development of the SSR Policy Brief, the planned good practice repository, the move toward more integrated UK SSR strategies for individual countries, a trend toward joint scoping missions, the development of the strategic security assessment for use by partner countries, and the development of training courses for UK practitioners all indicate that the GCPP SSR Strategy is operating close to an independent benchmark for relevance as far as basic intentions are concerned. But it will be important to test delivery: to ensure that the principles underlying SSR and the elements of good practice reach the broadest possible audience and that mechanisms are developed to increase the likelihood that lessons are truly learned and implemented, not merely observed.

45. The SSR Strategy is relatively new and has set itself the goal of enhancing the capacities of local actors. The SRR Strategy is well-positioned to achieve significant gains in this area, but has as yet not penetrated the work of the country/regional strategies on the sort of sustained and wide-ranging basis that would be necessary to for all of its activities to pass the test of highest relevance to priority conflict prevention needs. The SSR Strategy has not funded any significant projects related to gender or children.

46. The Evaluation has examined the SSR activities in three country/region case studies (the fourth case study, on Sudan, did not have a significant SSR component). In Uganda and Sierra Leone, the SSR Strategy was clearly making an important contribution. As noted in respect of Afghanistan, the gigantic size of the conflict problems which the SSR work is supposed to alleviate is a challenge that is not matched by the combined resources of the Afghanistan Strategy and the SSR Strategy. But in these case studies, the Evaluation found that the potential synergies between various individual projects were not explored as often as they might be. The Evaluation did not find a consistent set of ideas on the ways in which the SSR Strategy can be used to have the maximum effects for the lowest cost on preventing particular types of conflicts. More than a few officials believed the approach to what measures work best in certain circumstances was either lacking transparency, inadequately articulated or simply ad hoc. In some cases, according to certain officials, the decision to fund certain measures was often made at a high political level with only minimal articulation of how they conformed to an agreed conflict prevention strategy.

³² Annex 5 describes the emerging UK consensus on SSR.

³³ The SSR Policy Brief states that SSR 'is equally relevant for the good governance of middle income and developing countries and a key issue for poverty reduction' (p 16), but it may be desirable to find ways to underscore this important point within the broader Whitehall environment.

4. EFFECT ON PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONTAINING EXISTING ONES

47. In order to ensure that the SSR Strategy has the maximum impact on conflict prevention, it is necessary that:

- all SSR Strategy instruments and projects support GCPP and ACPD priorities; and
- SSR is mainstreamed within all relevant departments as a precondition for a joined up approach.

48. During 2002/3, the DAT provided advice and assistance in: SSR; governance and civil military relations; defence reviews; organisation; force structures; financial management; procurement and logistics; human resources management and development; and change management. In 2002/3, the DAT supported activities in 17 countries:

- Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda
- Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

49. An illustration of the scope of DAT work can be seen from the following summary information for two countries:

- *Afghanistan*: delivery of framework of study on SSR for G8; Acceptance by HMG of National Security Council (NSC) Project proposal, including agreement of project management framework; delivery of temporary accommodation; approval of plans for permanent accommodation; recruitment of resident project manager; delivery of NSC team workshop to establish organisation, priorities, objectives;
- *Uganda*: delivery of 3 Workshops: facilitation of threat assessment paper; development of security policy paper; formulation of defence policy paper (approved by president Museveni); increased dialogue between Ugandan central departments on security issues; enhanced openness on security issues with civil society (press conferences/ radio interviews/TV coverage of UPDF); facilitation of links Makerere University and GFN-SSR to facilitate capacity building. Support for one inward Ministerial visit.³⁴

50. In Uganda, there appears to have been careful attention paid to the need for a comprehensive approach, addressing not only government institutions but also civil society and encouraging the government of Uganda to begin its defence review process by undertaking a Strategic Security Assessment. Such an assessment involves analysing the full range of security threats of both a military and non-military nature that Uganda could expect to face in the future and only then moving on to the defence review stage. By developing a new integrated and wide-ranging concept of security for Uganda as well as an institutional mechanism to implement it, the Strategic Security Assessment also provided scope for addressing the roles and missions of other security bodies. At the same time, the decision to focus reform efforts on the defence sector did have limitations in terms of addressing wider security sector governance and personal security concerns.

³⁴ DAT Annual Report for 2002/3. Not all of these activities have been fully delivered. The linkage with Makerere University and the GFN capacity building have been delayed.

51. In Uganda, the UK is the major donor and wields considerable influence over the government and can have more influence on its SSR agenda. By contrast, in Afghanistan, the US is the major actor in the security area and the UK and others engaging in security-related work have, to date, had less opportunity to undertake innovative work. The portfolio of projects within the GCPP have the potential to meet a range of short to medium term needs within the security sector that could support the process of peace consolidation. However, the potential for synergies between individual projects has not been exploited and to an extent this means that the GCPP remains a collection of disparate activities that are 'less than the sum of their parts'. The Afghanistan case highlights very well the limitations of the SSR Strategy and the DAT that are not of their making, but which flow from the gigantic size of the conflict problems confronted in Afghanistan which the SSR is supposed to alleviate. As reported in the Afghanistan case study, there has been a major mismatch between the ambitions of the international community and their willingness to commit the requisite military, political and financial resources. However, an international consensus has emerged over the need to address the sources of insecurity and this is reflected in a growing focus on SSR. Whilst there is a level of consensus about the long-term goal and the centrality of SSR, there are still disagreements about how to proceed in the medium term.

52. The SSR Strategy is beginning to address the question of prioritisation, but the Steering Group and Policy Committee can only go so far on their own. Determining and communicating overall priorities is the responsibility of the officials administering country or region programmes in the GCPP and the ACPP. At the time interviews for this Evaluation were conducted, the ACPP was undergoing a process of reviewing its priorities and anticipated being able to identify SSR-related priorities in early 2004. Within the GCPP as a whole, the lack of clear procedures for identifying in-country priorities and mechanisms to implement priorities has created problems for many GCPP strategies, the SSR Strategy included.

53. In developing priorities, the SSR Strategy's activities should ideally focus on countries that are independently regarded as the ones with security sectors that are a potential source of improper use of force, that increase the potential for large scale deadly violence, and/or where reforms to the security sector can contribute to its role as a potential contributor to conflict prevention. Within these countries, there needs to be careful prioritisation of the institutional and personal targets according to the unique circumstances of each country.

54. All of the main instruments of the SSR Strategy would benefit from better prioritisation by the CPPs. The Annual Report of the DAT for 2002/3, a considered self-assessment, illustrates the pressures the DAT in particular faces in the absence of agreed conflict-prevention priorities:

' As awareness of the Team grows in Whitehall and elsewhere, there is potential for the volume of tasks to increase to the point where careful prioritisation is needed. At the outset the Team was established to support only three major tasks at any one time. The Defence Relations Strategy may provide some means of helping the MOD to prioritise tasks, but to get all three partner Departments to agree on prioritisation is still a challenge and a complication to planning.

Much tasking remains ad hoc and reliant on decisions made by the DAT itself, rather than directed by a more strategic and joined up approach amongst those with the potential to commission the Team's activities, both within the UK and from its representatives abroad. Clear prioritisation of countries and/or regions from an HMG perspective would be highly beneficial'.³⁵

55. Many officials interviewed for this Evaluation identified mainstreaming SSR within the departments as a high priority.³⁶ Notwithstanding the participation of three ministers in the SSR Forum, buy-in at senior levels appears to be limited and scepticism about the benefits of a joined up, holistic approach to SSR among officials in London and overseas posts remains a significant concern.³⁷ Officials such as the Africa Regional Conflict Advisers who are tasked with coordinating SSR work in their regions have indicated a strong need for more information on SSR.³⁸ Mainstreaming is essential for joined up work.

56. Mainstreaming involves building awareness within all relevant departments of what SSR is and how it can be promoted. The objective is not only to produce solid and effective SSR programmes that will promote conflict prevention, but also importantly to develop an awareness of SSR so that all departmental programmes can reflect SSR thinking.

57. As a relatively new enterprise, the SSR Strategy and has set itself the goal of enhancing the capacities of local actors. The SSR Strategy is well-positioned to achieve significant gains in this area, and all of its funded activities are relevant to SSR. In Uganda and Sierra Leone, the SSR Strategy was clearly making an important contribution to conflict prevention. In Afghanistan, the portfolio of SSR projects, and the support offered by the SSR Strategy, have the potential to meet a range of short to medium term needs within the security sector that can support the process of peace consolidation. As noted in respect of Afghanistan, the gigantic size of the conflict problems which the SSR work is supposed to alleviate is a challenge that is not matched by the combined resources of the Afghanistan Strategy and the SSR Strategy.

58. Through the country/region case studies, the Evaluation found that the potential synergies between various individual projects were not explored as often as they might be. The Evaluation did not find a consistent set of ideas on the ways in which the SSR Strategy can be used to have the maximum effects for the lowest cost on preventing particular types of conflicts. More than a few officials believed the approach to what

³⁵ N.A. Fuller, 'Defence Advisory Team. Annual Report, 2002/3', para 9. By late 2003, the DAT were engaged in 18 countries. With a core staff of only ten, soon to be augmented by police/justice and intelligence/security reform advisers, the DAT is clearly not resourced sufficiently to respond to the considerable demands which the key role of SSR (in both the SSR Strategy and the two CPP's) places upon it. This should be a focus of further review when determining priorities within the SSR Strategy, and within the GCPP more generally.

³⁶ Among others, a number of participants at the September 2003 Whitehall SSR Policy Seminar highlighted the importance of mainstreaming. Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, *Whitehall Policy Seminar on Security Sector Reform*, GFN Paper No 29, 31 September 2003, www.gfn-ssr.org, and interviews with seminar participants.

³⁷ Among the comments on this point, one official interviewed for this evaluation noted that there were only a handful of officials of director rank who participated in the September 2003 Whitehall SSR Policy Seminar.

³⁸ The Africa Regional Conflict Advisers will be among the first to take part in the GFN short course on SSR early in 2004.

measures work best in certain circumstances was either lacking transparency, inadequately articulated or simply ad hoc. In some cases, according to certain officials, the decision to fund certain measures was often made at a high political level with only minimal articulation of how they conformed to an agreed SSR Strategy.

59. The SSR Strategy has as yet not penetrated the work of the country/regional strategies on the sort of sustained and wide-ranging basis that would be necessary for all of its activities to pass the test of highest relevance to priority conflict prevention needs. The linkage between the highest priority conflict prevention needs within these countries and the specific type of support has not always been articulated or obvious.

5. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

60. DFID's CHAD manages the SSR Strategy together with a Steering Group drawn from the FCO, MOD and DFID. The Steering Group meets monthly. DFID is responsible for chairing these meetings. Strategic direction for the SSR Strategy and Steering Group is provided by the Whitehall SSR Policy Committee, whose interests extend well beyond conflict prevention. The Policy Committee includes representatives of all departments with an interest in security-sector issues across Whitehall, including FCO, DFID, MOD, Home Office, Cabinet Office, HM Treasury, Vauxhall Cross and lead Africa Pool officials. The Policy Committee meets quarterly and is normally chaired by DFID.³⁹

61. DFID is recognised as a leader within the development community in the area of SSR. In early 1999, DFID was the first development agency to produce a policy statement on SSR. The UK Government is also considered a leader in working to develop a government-wide approach to SSR, especially by integrating the MOD's support for democratic civil-military relations with DFID's SSR work through the GCPP and the DAT.

62. DFID's strong support for SSR internationally helped push the subject onto the agenda of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and promoted the further development of the concept.⁴⁰ Interestingly, however, just at the time that the SSR Strategy was being developed in the UK, DFID observed that their strong efforts to place SSR on the development agenda internationally, particularly in the context of the World Bank and the DAC, were finding very little resonance among other development assistance agencies. In some cases, their efforts appeared to be counterproductive, as some donor agencies felt that the UK was exerting too much pressure. DFID thus concluded that they should allocate their scarce resources to other tasks and significantly reduced their efforts to consciously drive the SSR agenda forward internationally.⁴¹

63. Nonetheless, SSR-related activities undertaken through the CPPs in general and the SSR Strategy in particular are being noted internationally and have the potential to move the international community forward in concrete terms. *The significant inter-play between the UK and the international community concerning the development of the SSR concept, the principles underpinning that concept, and the practices flowing from it has put the UK in a lead position in shaping international community approaches. This engagement brings the SSR Strategy and its instruments into direct operational contact with other actors and provides opportunities for influencing behaviour.*

64. Because resources devoted to the SSR Strategy are clearly stretched, it seems advisable for the SSR Strategy to develop a strategic approach to international engagement. To this end, the Policy Committee could direct the Steering Group to survey the full range of options that currently exist for international engagement and, in conjunction with the

³⁹ Chairmanship of both the Steering Group and the Policy Committee rotates from time to time on an informal basis.

⁴⁰ The DAC has been working since 1999 to develop a common concept of SSR among its members, as well as to identify elements of a common approach and good practice. OECD, *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris, 2001). A DAC Policy Paper on SSR will be brought before the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2004 for consideration and endorsement.

⁴¹ Author's interviews with UK officials, 2002, 2003.

three departments, develop a plan for international engagement that would be reviewed and revised as necessary every 6 to 12 months. One question that the SSR Strategy would need to answer is whether to devote resources to developing a constituency for SSR in countries such as France and the United States. Both of these countries were flagged as important targets during the September 2003 Whitehall SSR Policy Seminar.⁴² Both are important players in the security arena and neither has incorporated the concept of SSR into their approach. In fact, US activities have worked to varying degrees at cross purposes to efforts to promote SSR in countries such as Afghanistan, Indonesia and Iraq. While the UK might not be able to devote a significant amount of resources in absolute terms to influencing these two governments, HMG might be able to put together a coalition of like-minded governments and multilateral bodies, including the World Bank and the United Nations, to begin to exert pressure on one or both of these countries. This would clearly constitute an area where the UK can make a significant contribution, since few other OECD countries are likely to take the initiative or have as holistic a view of SSR as the UK.

65. *The SSR Strategy, through the GFN, is taking a leading role in promoting capacity building through networking in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Defence Diplomacy and military education courses also contribute to building capacity, as does the DAT's work.* In addition to developing capacity to address SSR in these regions, the regional networks could provide a mechanism for identifying and disseminating lessons learned in the conduct of SSR as well as articulating SSR requirements and concerns from the regional perspective. In this way they could feed into the Defence Diplomacy and military education courses where relevant, as well as into work carried out through the geographic strategies and by the DAT. While the value of developing local capacity in these areas is widely recognised within the development community, support thus far has tended to be *ad hoc*. The UK, through the SSR Strategy, could help to provide a focus for international support in this area, thereby adding value beyond its own monetary contribution.⁴³

⁴² Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, *Whitehall Policy Seminar on Security Sector Reform*.

⁴³ Canada and the UN Foundation have reportedly expressed interest in GFN efforts at network development in Latin America. Author's interviews, September–October 2003.

6. EFFECT ON INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES

66. SSR-related policy development, technical assistance, and multilateral collaboration began during the 1990s, particularly in MOD and DFID.⁴⁴ The legacy of previous SSR activities has both provided a basis on which SSR-related work carried out under the CPPs can build inter-departmental collaboration and created challenges for achieving a joined up approach. Unlike the SALW Strategy, which was able to begin operations, in the words of one UK official, 'enviably with a clean sheet', officials in the three departments establishing the SSR Strategy had clear and not entirely compatible ideas about what should and should not be considered security-sector reform. Although there had been some efforts to harmonise SSR-related activities prior to the creation of the GCPP, notably in Indonesia and Sierra Leone,⁴⁵ there was no formal mechanism designed to promote coordination of SSR-related activities among the departments until the advent of the CPPs. In consequence, SSR-related work in the three departments proceeded more or less independently prior to mid-2002.

67. While there has been a desire across Whitehall to promote democratically accountable security sectors for a variety of reasons, one of which was conflict prevention, the concept 'security-sector reform' entered the UK Government lexicon through DFID, specifically DFID's CHAD. This reflects the fact that new approaches to SSR have emerged internationally as an element of the development assistance agenda and that the development assistance agencies have tended to see SSR as a key component of their conflict prevention efforts, aimed at promoting poverty reduction. In consequence, CHAD has taken the lead on developing DFID policy and guidance on SSR⁴⁶ and has played a central role in developing and managing the SSR Strategy.

68. *During the first 18 months of its existence, the SSR Strategy has sought to promote a joined up approach to SSR within Whitehall. In consequence, there is now a better idea of what a joined up approach to SSR might be and a growing recognition that a joined up approach can add value to UK SSR work.* There also seems to be a growing recognition that there is considerable overlap between democratic civil-military relations (MOD's Defence Diplomacy work) and SSR (DFID), as well as DFID's work on safety, security and access to justice. While the appreciation of the benefits of a joined up approach are strongest within the SSR Strategy Steering Group and Policy Committee, inter-departmental conversations that would not have occurred two years ago are now being held. As one

⁴⁴ With the demise of the USSR and communist governments in Eastern Europe, the UK Ministry of Defence has progressively reoriented key assistance programmes to support democratic civil-military objectives. Shortly after its creation in 1997, DFID began to play a leading role within the international development community on issues relating to SSR.

⁴⁵ Sierra Leone was the first country in which SSR-related collaboration with undertaken by DFID and MOD. This experience reportedly gave rise to former Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short's decision to develop a policy statement on SSR in 1999. (DFID, *Poverty and the Security Sector*, February 1, 1999.) Both of these early efforts at inter-departmental collaboration faced challenges but both have also generated interesting lessons. See Roderick Evans, David Jones, and Graham Thompson, 'Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II. Output to Purpose Review', Defence Advisory Team, 25 June–5 July 2002, and Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 'External Review of UK Government's Security-Sector Reform Strategy in Indonesia', submitted to UK Embassy Jakarta, 2 July 2002.

⁴⁶ DFID, *Poverty and the Security Sector* and DFID, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*. Both are available at www.dfid.gov.uk.

senior UK Government official observed, 'There is now a different way of looking at the issue within Whitehall'.⁴⁷

69. Some highlights of this higher level of inter-departmental cooperation include:

- The publication of the SSR Policy Brief indicates that the three departments are beginning to understand each others' security-related objectives. This is the first step toward developing a more joined up approach.
- The 'Managing Defence in a Democratic, Market-based Society' course has clearly expanded its focus on governance-related issues over the last year or two. Additionally, agreement has been reached on a joined up mechanism for determining where the MOD export courses will take place. The DAT will soon have police/justice and intelligence/security reform advisers on staff, which will enhance their capacity to assess security-sector requirements in a holistic manner.
- Joint scoping missions are occurring more frequently.
- The GFN, in collaboration with DAT, are developing a course on SSR for practitioners and a repository of good practice, both of which should help promote more joined up work. There are frequent informal contacts and exchanges of ideas between DAT and GFN (there may be a requirement to formally clarify the boundaries and possible overlaps between their respective activities).

70. As another example, the UK Embassy in Jakarta spent more than a year developing a joint assessment of security-sector reform needs in Indonesia. It then established an Embassy Steering Committee to oversee the resultant programme of work, which was approved in 2001. All three departments have helped to implement this programme of work. A good deal of time, particularly in the first year or so of the SSR Strategy's life, was devoted to promoting the concept of reform. This required the active participation of the Ambassador, the Defence Attaché, and the First Secretary (Governance). In order to help coordinate the Embassy's SSR work and reduce the administrative burden on key officials, the FCO engaged a consultant in 2002. Although virtually impossible to measure quantitatively, there is no doubt that this joined up effort helped to strengthen the climate for dialogue and debate on the nature of and need for SSR in Indonesia.⁴⁸

71. Another concrete indication of the progress made by the three departments to date is the development of an SSR Policy Brief, signed by three Ministers, which sets out the Government's policy on SSR and describes some of the work undertaken thus far. All of the officials on the SSR Strategy's Steering Group and the Whitehall SSR Policy Committee interviewed for this Evaluation agreed that the Policy Brief constitutes an important step forward. It is the product of lengthy consultations among the three departments, and as such provides a useful platform for carrying forward SSR work. Additionally, the work of the Strategy's main instruments is increasingly incorporating the international benchmarks. A major challenge facing the SSR Strategy is to clarify SSR principles and good practice for HMG personnel developing and implementing policy for conflict-affected countries and regions.

⁴⁷ Author's interviews with UK officials, September–October 2003.

⁴⁸ Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 'External Review of UK Government's Security-Sector Reform Strategy in Indonesia'.

72. *Despite this clear progress, impediments to joined up work continue to exist.*⁴⁹ While DFID has tried to build a Whitehall consensus on SSR, it has also sought to retain control over that consensus. In contrast to the SALW Strategy, where DFID also holds the lead, there is a view among some officials that the DFID lead in the SSR Strategy has been less able to bridge the gulf between the three departments. While the three departments will always address SSR from somewhat different perspectives, there is a view among some officials that the way in which the SSR Strategy has been managed to date has not maximised opportunities to bridge the gulf between the three departments. There is room to consider whether the growing demands on the SSR Strategy can be satisfied by current bureaucratic arrangements.⁵⁰ Some officials reported a lack of buy-in to the SSR Strategy among senior officials, particularly in MOD and FCO, as well as senior military officers. Uncertainty about the longevity of the Pools may have created a disincentive to collaborate, at least among some members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group.

73. In addition to somewhat different bureaucratic arrangements for SSR Strategy management, other means of promoting joined up work within the remit of the SSR Strategy include:

- **Developing guidance on methods of inter-departmental engagement.** While there are well-known limitations on the effectiveness of written guidance, the SSR Strategy Steering Group might want to consider exploring the possibility of producing guidance on principles and methods of inter-departmental engagement. Such guidance might be particularly useful to officials participating in inter-departmental scoping missions.
- **Establishing working methods within the Strategy that ensure adequate time** for a full contribution on the part of all Strategy members. For example, some Steering Group members recommended providing opportunities for full consultation at the earliest stage of document drafting and allowing adequate time for intra-departmental consultation on materials prepared by the Strategy.
- **Conducting lessons learning studies of recent joint scoping missions.** The objective would be to examine recent missions—for example those to Ethiopia and Guyana—to identify what has worked and not worked and how lessons might be applied to future scoping missions. In the course of interviews for this evaluation, several concerns were raised that suggest that such attention would be merited: a) the need to ensure that the appropriate mix of skills and experience are represented

⁴⁹ Author's interviews September–November 2003; Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, *Whitehall Policy Seminar on Security Sector Reform*; N.A. Fuller, 'Defence Advisory Team. Annual Report, 2002/3', para 11.

⁵⁰ Author's interviews September–October 2003. Possible alterations to current bureaucratic arrangements might include the secondment of additional personnel (from all involved departments) to the management of the strategy, the appointment of a senior official as Strategy manager, and a review of the best departmental location for the Strategy's secretariat. These issues are further considered in the Evaluation Synthesis Report. At the same time, it is important to note that there was broad agreement among those members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group and Policy Committee interviewed that only DFID would be able to allocate a significant amount of resources toward managing the SSR Strategy. The concern was thus not to change the departmental location of the SSR Strategy lead but to increase collaboration at all stages of the SSR Strategy's work. Breaking down the current culture of inadequate consultation and transparency within the SSR Strategy would go a long way toward resolving the concerns raised by many of those interviewed about the management of the SSR Strategy.

on scoping teams and b) the need to develop joint working procedures that will enable reporting to occur in a timely fashion in order to enable windows of opportunity to be exploited.⁵¹

74. A common theme running through the interviews conducted for this evaluation is the amount of time that some members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group and most others working on SSR through geographic strategies are able to devote to Pools work. Many estimated that they spend perhaps 10 percent of their time on Pool activities. As indicated earlier, DFID members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group are able to devote between 40–50 and 80 per cent of their time to SSR Strategy-related work, but MOD and FCO colleagues have far less time at their disposal for this purpose.

75. This is a problem faced by all strategies within the GCPP and ACPP. A variety of possible solutions have been proposed, including allowing some or all of the administrative costs associated with running the strategies to be covered by the pools, creating a dedicated London-based unit to guide conflict-prevention work, and increase the amount of time departments allow officials to devote to Pools-related work.⁵² Each of these proposals can be seen to have positive and negative aspects that are beyond the terms of reference of this case study to assess. However, it is our view that, however HMG choose to resolve the problem, they need to resolve it and to do so rapidly.

76. An additional problem facing both ACPP and GCPP strategies is the relatively rapid turnover of staff in all three departments. As it is well-established government policy for staff to remain in a particular post for a maximum of between 18 months and two years, this report can only draw attention to the added burden this places on the effective and efficient use of SSR Strategy resources. As SSR is a relatively new and as yet not-mainstreamed issue within HMG, officials at ‘the sharp end’ of implementing SSR find that they need to spend considerable time bringing colleagues up to speed on the concept, key principles and good practice. Almost as soon as that occurs, the colleagues are replaced by someone with little or no knowledge of SSR and the entire practice begins again. In some cases, this is reported to have delayed implementation of SSR-related activities, including in Sierra Leone.⁵³ More attention to mainstreaming SSR should eventually help alleviate this problem. The ACPP and GCPP should consider if there are other, more short-term remedies as well.

⁵¹ Author’s interviews with UK officials, September–October 2003.

⁵² Author’s interviews with UK officials, September–November 2003.

⁵³ Author’s interviews with UK officials, September–October 2003.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

77. The impact of any strategy on financial management should be to increase the effectiveness and efficiency with which resources are employed to support an agreed objective. In interviews with HMG officials in the course of this evaluation, finances were spoken of primarily in terms whether or not spend is on target and if not, whether strategy managers can explain why not.⁵⁴ As far as the SSR Strategy is concerned, it underspent by £200,000 on a £2.85 million allocation in fiscal year 2002/3 and spending on the £5.05 million allocation for fiscal year 2003/4 is more or less on target.⁵⁵ *The SSR Strategy has thus far performed very well in managing its financial resources according to its activity plan.*

78. The crucial issue as far as the SSR Strategy is concerned revolves around how the spending objectives within the SSR Strategy are agreed and whether they reflect the Pools' highest priorities, as discussed above in section 4.

79. *It is clear from discussions with relevant officials that within both the SSR Strategy and some of the geographic SSR Strategies the decision on precisely how to use resources more often than not has resided primarily with the departments in charge of implementing those activities.⁵⁶ There appears to be a trend toward greater transparency and participation within the SSR Strategy on such decisions, although concerns were raised in interviews about the unevenness of the degree of scrutiny to which the requests from different departments have been subjected. Opinions varied markedly on exactly where the problem lay. Therefore it is only possible for us to conclude that discussions on funding particular pieces of work through the SSR Strategy would benefit from clearer, more transparent procedures applied across-the-board.*

80. As the process of agreeing activities funded by the SSR Strategy becomes more transparent and participatory, it opens up opportunities for engaging in joint discussion of the priority that any particular activity should have within the strategy. It was noted earlier, for example, that questions have been raised about the value of MOD's military education courses to the Pools and how the training provided contributes to conflict prevention.

⁵⁴ Although the GCPP's financial managers report that they understand the difficulty in predicting precisely when and how much money a particular activity will require, they continue to press for concrete spend plans and the timely fulfillment of such plans. Of course this reflects pressure on the Pool managers from HM Treasury, but there was also a feeling among some members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group interviewed for this evaluation that the GCPP financial managers have not had adequate experience abroad to understand the essentially contingent nature of much project and programme funding. This is particularly true in countries of high political interest to the UK Government, where decisions to proceed with a programme or to suspend programming are made for political reasons, and in countries emerging from conflict where the political situation is highly volatile and governments have inadequate human resources to address the multitude of priority needs facing the country. At the same time, the GCPP are seeking to provide strategy managers with assistance through the Quality Improvement Programme to develop plans with options to assist in financial planning. Managers are increasingly aware that having clear plans and alternative options if certain projects are not able to move ahead does assist with financial planning.

⁵⁵ Author's interview with UK officials, September 2003. Details of the 2003/4 allocation are found in Annex 4.

⁵⁶ This practice can be contrasted with that of the SALW Strategy where the representatives of the three departments appear to be jointly involved in determining priorities and shaping projects/programmes so that they meet the SALW priorities. See, for example, Global Pool, Small Arms Steering Group, Minutes of meetings held on 30 April 2002, 9 September 2002, 9 October 2002, 12 June 2003 and 6 August 2003.

81. It is also important to ask whether a particular activity fits in with the priorities of the country/region in which the activity is to be implemented. It is not clear to what extent this is discussed in the SSR Strategy Steering Group or Policy Committee. It appears to be left to the individual implementing body to determine, if it is so inclined. There are a number of examples of good practice in this area. The DAT have adopted as a central operating principle the need to tailor advice to meet the customer's needs and basing all activities on a detailed in-country analysis.⁵⁷ Similarly, African members of the GFN Advisory Group with considerable experience in SSR are involved in the GFN's network development effort in Africa. While it is important that this principle of tailoring assistance to local needs be replicated throughout the SSR Strategy, indeed throughout all of HMG's SSR work, it is by no means clear that this is the case.

82. The SSR Strategy is viewed by many in Whitehall as a relatively successful GCPP strategy. The perception of success is reportedly based on two factors: a) the resources allocated to the SSR Strategy are spent in a timely fashion and more or less on target and b) SSR is quite tangible compared with other strategies as the DAT, the GFN, defence education have all produced concrete outcomes.⁵⁸ For the most part, the SSR Strategy finds it easier to estimate expenditure requirements because it is making block grants to its main instruments (DAT, defence/military education and training courses, and the GFN). In contrast, the Foreign Office and the Defence Diplomacy export courses face significant unpredictability in attempting to run a series of stand-alone projects.

⁵⁷ Fuller, Defence Advisory Team, Annual Report 2002/3, para 13.

⁵⁸ Author's interviews with UK officials, September 2003.

8. Recommendations I: Should the Strategy be Continued and How Can It be Improved?

83. There is no doubt that *the SSR Strategy should be continued*. Demand for SSR will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. It is likely that there will be a growing market for SSR assistance. The UK has already invested a fair amount of resources in developing SSR-related expertise, and is seen by many abroad as a leading, and perhaps the leading, source of cutting-edge innovation and good practice. SSR is an area where joint action by relevant ministries will definitely add value. Because of its multi-dimensional nature, no one department can provide the full complement of assistance required to support SSR effectively, while inadequate collaboration can produce assistance that is less than the sum of the parts. The SSR Strategy has already provided a solid base on which to build by demonstrating that joined up activity is feasible and by generating useful lessons for future work in this area.

84. SSR is also an area where collaboration by groups of external actors will all add value. It would be helpful if the SSR Strategy could act as a focal point to help define and implement coordination among external actors.

85. We believe that the current status of the SSR Strategy is within the bounds of what can be expected after one to two years of operation. We also believe that timely attention to prioritisation, mainstreaming, and mechanisms to promote a joined up approach will greatly enhance the capacity of the SSR Strategy to deliver on its main objective in a manner supportive of the joint Public Service Agreement (PSA). *It is recommended that the SSR Strategy Steering Group consider how best to generate a more detailed framework for promoting the SSR priorities of the GCPP and ACPP for specific conflicts*. In particular, the SSR Strategy should consider how best to communicate to both UK-based and in-country staff the mechanisms they can use:

- to develop a joint analysis of the SSR needs in a country or region that is consistent with HMG conflict prevention priorities and the stated needs of local governments,
- to prioritise these needs, and
- to translate priorities into coherent programmes of support.

The review should also clarify the principles on which SSR work should be based and how these relate to the variety of activities funded by the CPPs in the area of SSR. A high priority should be attached to developing mechanisms for incorporating lessons learned into ongoing SSR work.

86. While it is not the remit of the SSR Strategy to determine how the geographic strategies apply SSR principles and good practice, we believe that it is very much the remit of the SSR Strategy to clarify for the geographic strategies what SSR principles and good practice are. In order to achieve this objective, the SSR Strategy and all of its instruments need to serve the joined-up conflict prevention requirements of the geographic departments. This was explicitly recognised by the SSR Strategy Steering Group in September 2003. *The SSR Strategy Steering Group needs to monitor and evaluate the intensity and quality of service to (and sustained dialogue) with the country desks or country/conflict steering groups.*

87. Just as an effective UK approach to SSR requires collaboration among a range of actors within HMG, supporting SSR in any country requires collaboration with other external actors and with local stakeholders. In order for the UK contribution to SSR in any country to add value, it needs to ensure the participation of key local stakeholders and be coordinated with similar activities by other external actors. *As part of the analysis underpinning SSR activities, the SSR Strategy needs to ensure that it identifies the full range of local stakeholders who should ideally be involved in particular joint endeavours and attempt to determine who are likely to be effective change agents and who have the potential to become spoilers.* Strategies for neutralising spoilers are just as important as strategies for working effectively with change agents. The same sort of analysis needs to be carried out for external actors. External actors will have their own niche areas which should be taken into account when UK support is developed. There will also be actors whose objectives will complicate providing support to SSR. These need to be identified and strategies devised for addressing the challenges they pose.

88. Both the SSR Strategy and the SSR Policy Brief contain descriptions of the roles envisioned for the main instruments of the SSR Strategy—policy development and analysis: GFN; technical assistance—DAT, complemented by defence attachés and MOD civilian and special defence advisers; capacity building—GFN, defence diplomacy and military education courses. *The current responsibilities of different parts of HMG for various SSR activities should be reviewed for several reasons.* For one thing, the category ‘technical assistance’, used to describe the DAT’s tasking, is not consistent with the principles that underlie SSR. It would be more helpful to think in terms of providing advice on process and frameworks to help partner governments address their problems. Additionally, there is a need to review and clarify the responsibilities of as many of the key players as possible, including the new DFID conflict advisers, the four joint Africa regional conflict advisers, the SSR Policy Committee, the SSR Strategy Steering Group as well as the three departments. For example, the FCO is responsible for the conduct of diplomacy in-country, which provides a range of opportunities that ambassadors, deputy heads of missions and other FCO officials can take in support of SSR. Similarly, the in-country representative of the MOD, the defence attaché, has an important role to play in supporting SSR, as do heads of DFID in-country missions or embassy-based advisers. It is important to clarify how each of these actors can support SSR work most effectively. In this context, it will be important to ensure that the tasking of the main SSR instruments is consistent with decisions made about the roles of members of the broader HMG community undertaking SSR work.

89. A high priority should also be attached to developing mechanisms for incorporating lessons learned into ongoing SSR work.

9. Recommendations II: Baselines, Targets and Indicators

90. As discussed in throughout this report, it is important that the SSR Strategy identify those principles on which its work and SSR-related work undertaken by the geographic strategies will be based. Most of the baseline principles identified in section 2 already form the basis of the work carried out through the SSR Strategy. The DAT have identified other complementary principles. It is recommended that the SSR Strategy Policy Committee and Steering Group determine how to present these principles in practical terms and to demonstrate how they can be woven together to produce a viable approach to SSR that is easily operationalised.

91. There seems to be agreement that the PSA target is acceptable as a general statement but that it is very difficult actually to measure a reduction in the number of people's lives affected by violent conflict and how many potential sources of conflict are removed as a result of SSR work. Some officials interviewed for this evaluation feel that the Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) are easier to measure: a) to resolve existing violent conflicts and prevent new conflicts in priority countries and regions; b) to address national and regional causes of conflict by strengthening local conflict management; c) to improve the international community's response to conflict by strengthening UN conflict management and mobilising and supporting coherent bilateral and international action.

92. The linkage between the PSA target and SSR—that is, between conflict prevention and SSR—is not straightforward. The path that the SSR Strategy has chosen to follow seems broadly appropriate: if a democratically accountable, effective and efficient security sector contributes to conflict prevention, and thereby to achieving the joint PSA target, and if SSR is intended to create a democratically accountable, effective and efficient security sector, SSR is, by definition, conflict prevention. The question then becomes one of determining which types of security-related activities can be considered SSR and which have other, equally valid, but non-conflict prevention objectives. *It is recommended that the SSR Strategy Policy Committee and Steering Group clarify these relationships.*


93. The SSR Strategy Group indicated a sincere interest in developing more appropriate indicators of success. They have found few sources of assistance within HMG to develop such indicators, however. The 2003/4 and 2004/5 SSR Strategy bid document lists the following indicators of success against which it proposes to measure both strategic activities and target countries and regions and which offer a reasonable starting point for the development of indicators:

- The number of countries engaged in major security sector reviews and reforms supported by HMG that will lead to appropriate, accountable and affordable security sectors;
- Increase in SSR-related capacity within developing and transitional countries;
- Level of provision of security sector assistance to developing and transitional countries through the GFN;
- Provision of training and education opportunities to military, police and other security sector actors, and tracking of alumni of such training courses;

- Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged with the SSR GFN and the involvement of other donors in supporting NGOs/academic institutions;
- UK influence on positive progress by the multi-lateral organisations in developing their SSR policy, and implications for a better coordinated international approach;
- UK influence on the level and quality of governmental and public debate on security issues in countries receiving assistance, national transparency on security issues, including published white papers.

94. In principle, the indicators that are used to determine whether the work of the SSR Strategy is contributing to greater democratic accountability in the security sector and more effective and efficient provision of security should focus both on end states (production of a White Paper on Safety and Security; provision of training and education to security sector actors) and process (implementation of the White Paper on Safety and Security; determining if training to security actors has changed the beliefs and attitudes of the security personnel). The indicators proposed by the SSR Strategy Steering Group are a good beginning as they identify a number of useful end states. *It is recommended that the SSR Strategy Policy Committee and Steering Group establish a process for developing both end-state and process indicators for SSR. In developing process indicators, it will be helpful to disaggregate the different processes in question and to develop a series of indicators describing desirable outcomes at each stage of the process.*

ANNEX 1: SSR BASELINE: PROMOTING SECURITY FOR PEOPLE AND STATES



Note: Areas of overlap between the three components of security sectors reform can be greater or less than indicated in this diagram.

ANNEX 2: TAILORING SUPPORT TO COUNTRY CONTEXT

Contextual categories	Possible forms of assistance
<p>Political Context</p> <p>1) The capacity of the civil authorities to exercise oversight and control over one or more of the security bodies is weak.</p> <p>2) Democratic accountability of security bodies to civil authorities is inadequate or deteriorating.</p> <p>3) Power is centralized; attempts to increase participation are opposed; public officials exhibit disregard for rule of law.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist legislature as a whole and relevant legislative committees to develop capacity to evaluate security sector policies and budgets. • Assist finance ministry, ministry of defense, office of national security adviser and other relevant executive branch bodies to improve capacity to formulate, implement and monitor security policy and budgets. • Help strengthen/create oversight bodies such as auditor general’s office, police commission, human rights commission. • Support national dialogues on issues relating to security sector governance. • Encourage participatory national security assessments. • Provide professional training for security bodies consistent with norms and principles of democratic accountability, such as the role of the military in a democracy, democratic policing, human rights training. • Encourage national dialogues on security sector governance, leading to development of national strategies for strengthening security sector governance. • Support civil society in its efforts to, for example, train civilians in security affairs, defense economics, democratic policing; monitor security-related activities; offer constructive advice to policy makers. • Where feasible, support civil society in efforts to encourage dialogue within society and between civil society and government on rule of law, human rights protection, democratic governance. • Assist civil society to build capacity on security-related issues. • Work to develop an appreciation for democratic accountability of civil authorities to population. • Identify and support potential reformers in government, security bodies.

Contextual categories	Possible forms of assistance
<p>Political context (cont'd)</p> <p>4) There is a tendency to resolve disputes domestically and with other countries through the use of force, but the country is not at war.</p> <p>5) The country is engaged in war.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce access to weapons by all parties, for example through arms sale moratoria. • Strengthen democratic accountability of civil authorities to population. • Support the development of a capacity to defuse conflicts, thereby reducing the likelihood of a resort to violence. • Encourage parties to conflict to discuss security sector governance in the course of peace negotiations. • Support post-conflict demilitarization efforts such as demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, disarming ex-combatants, irregular forces, population-at-large. • To the extent possible, train civilians in areas relevant to capacity to manage and oversee the security sector.
<p>Psychosocial context</p> <p>1) Civilians experience difficulty in interacting with members of the security bodies.</p> <p>2) Unaccountable security bodies create a sense of insecurity, within the country as a whole, among certain communities and groups.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote confidence-building measures, such as facilitating dialogue between civilians and security body personnel in a neutral setting and arranging for local stakeholders to observe constructive civilian-security body interactions among international and regional stakeholders. • Arrange for security body personnel to learn behavior appropriate to democratic societies when interacting with civilians from other security bodies, either in the region or a trusted international partner. • Train civilians in security-related issues in order to increase their confidence on substantive issues when dealing with members of the security body. • Encourage greater accountability through, for example, requiring security body personnel to wear identification badges, requiring security body vehicles to be easily identified, supporting unofficial citizen monitoring activities where feasible. • Encourage human rights, gender sensitivity training. • Encourage dialogue between civilians and security body personnel in a politically safe space if conditions permit, i.e. reprisals against civilian participants seem unlikely. • Support the creation of police councils and other civilian bodies to monitor behavior of the security bodies. • Identify underlying causes of unaccountability and devise strategy to address these.

Contextual categories	Possible forms of assistance
<p>Normative context</p> <p>1) The legal basis for democratic accountability of security bodies to civil authorities is not well developed.</p> <p>2) The legal basis for democratic accountability of security bodies to population is not well developed.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support revisions of legal framework consistent with democratic principles and norms such as civil supremacy, appropriateness of means in the use of force, rule of law. • Support regional efforts to codify democratic principles such as non-recognition to governments coming to power through coups d'états. • Support reviews of national legal framework for consistency with international law and democratic norms, especially protection of human rights and laws of war; support for revisions as needed.
<p>Institutional context</p> <p>Fundamental institutions are poorly developed or do not function adequately. For example:</p> <p>1) Criminal justice system</p> <p>2) Financial management system.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist in development and implementation of criminal justice policy. • Support democratic policing, judicial strengthening, legal training. • Support efforts to demilitarize police, for example by separating them from armed forces and promoting democratic policing. • Support efforts to depoliticize the judiciary. • Support civil society's ability to monitor the activities of the criminal justice system and to provide training for members of the criminal justice system. • Support the development of regional policing capacity to address cross-border problems and to strengthen commitment to democratic principles and practices. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist national stakeholders to develop mechanisms to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) identify the needs and key objectives of the security sector as a whole and the specific missions that the different security bodies will be asked to undertake. b) determine what is affordable. c) allocate scarce resources according to priorities both within and between the different security sectors. d) ensure the efficient and effective use of resources.

Contextual categories	Possible forms of assistance
<p>Societal context</p> <p>1) Civil society is prevented from monitoring the activities of the security sector and working to promote change.</p> <p>2) Civil society lacks substantive knowledge of security-related issues.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work with the members of the security sector to enhance public transparency, for example by ensuring that expenditure in the security sector is subject to the same public expenditure management principles and practices as apply to other parts of the public sector and that the principle of confidentiality is not abused. • Encourage regional confidence building measures aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability of the security bodies. • Provide training in democratic policing principles and practices and human rights protection for the security bodies. • Where feasible, seek ways of empowering civil society, for example, by encouraging changes in legislation that limit civil society activities, inviting CSOs and local security experts to participate in meetings, or soliciting civil society opinion. • Support efforts to develop indigenous training capacity. • Provide scholarships in security studies, defense management, law and other relevant subjects.
<p>Economic context</p> <p>1) One of more of the security bodies has privileged access to state resources.</p> <p>2) The security bodies receive inadequate financial resources to fulfill their missions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support incorporation of security sector into government-wide fiscal accountability and transparency processes. • Support anti-corruption activities. • Assist civil society to develop the capacity to monitor security budgets. • Strengthen the capacity of legislators and economic managers to assess security budgets, carry out oversight functions. • Encourage participatory national security assessment which would have as a major objective developing missions within a realistic resource framework.

Contextual categories	Possible forms of assistance
<p>Geopolitical context</p> <p>1) Trans-border crime is a major problem.</p> <p>2) Regional tensions create arms races, provide justification for greater resource allocation to security bodies.</p> <p>3) Neighbouring countries seek to destabilize government, for example by arming dissidents.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the development of regional policing capacity. • Encourage development/strengthening of regional security mechanisms. • Encourage regional dialogues on security issues. • Encourage development/strengthening of regional security mechanisms. • Encourage regional dialogues on security issues. • Work to reduce access to arms.

ANNEX 3: DELIVERY ON THREE MAIN OUTPUTS FY 2002/3

Source: This description of delivery on the three main outputs of the SSR Strategy is extracted from the SSR Bid to the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, FY 2003/4 and 2004/5, final version. As such it does not fully reflect the activities actually undertaken during 2003 or the evolution of SSR Strategy instruments such as the GFN and DAT. It does, however, reflect the range of activities that the SSR Strategy has been involved in and the general orientation of key instruments.

FY 2002/3

Objective A: Analysis and Policy Development: the strategy has benefited from the development of a coherent understanding of SSR issues across Whitehall. Policy development has also been enhanced by the establishment of a call down arrangement comprised of an information repository and resource centre under the GFN. The network provider is Cranfield University and the contract began on 1 November 2002. GFN has already established a far-reaching advisory group, which held a workshop in December 2002 to identify the key priorities and activities and added value of the GFN. The work programme for Year 1 includes intensive development of website (www.gfnessr.org), establishing a database of all HMG SSR efforts overseas and launching a campaign to raise visibility and awareness of the GFN. The GFN will facilitate and prepare concept papers for the Whitehall SSR Policy seminar in January 2003. Outputs from the policy seminar will guide the development of a Whitehall SSR policy that will be in place by the end of the current financial year, and will lay the foundation for progress to be made in 2003. The Annual International SSR Forum in March 2003, which Cranfield University will facilitate, will also enhance policy development.

Having an overarching SSR Strategy has significantly strengthened efforts to further define regional or bilateral programmes. Recent examples include a review of the Sierra Leone security work, with a view to identifying transferable experiences for other post-conflict SSR, and a scoping study to identify possible areas of engagement in civil-military relations and building security policy capacity amongst non-state actors in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), in order to enhance the on-going work of the DAT with military institutions in the FRY. Both pieces of work were requested by country desks in DFID.

Objective B: Effective technical assistance: the main inputs to this objective are DAT assistance; Defence Diplomacy education; and Military education. These inputs support Objective B by seeking to influence the management and conduct of Defence, and the wider security sector in ways that promote democratic accountability, and effectiveness and efficiency, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict. *The DAT* supports the development and implementation of SSR by providing bespoke advice to non-UK partner governments on reform strategies. The team consists of military and civilian advisors from MOD and a DFID Senior Governance Advisor. The Team aims to conduct three major assistance projects at any one time.

Defence Diplomacy Educational activities consist of scholarships on a range of UK-based courses and short in-country courses, which are delivered by Cranfield University. These

courses support SSR by providing Defence officials military officers and members of Other Government Departments (OGDs) who work with Defence (e.g. Finance and Foreign Affairs) with education in the management of Defence and Security in a Democracy.

Military education is provided to partner countries through attendance in the UK at Royal College of Defence Studies, the Advanced Command and Staff Course, and Initial Officer Training. These activities support SSR by influencing the behaviour of attendees in ways which are consistent with democratic accountability and which promote military effectiveness and efficiency.

SSR assistance is being provided in 15 countries including Uganda, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Peru. In future the need for efforts to prevent, reduce and manage conflicts, together with post-conflict reconstruction and SSR are likely increase substantially. Two examples demonstrate how countries can benefit from the three inputs previously mentioned:

Uganda is undertaking major reform of its security sector, central to which is its Strategic Defence Review. The DAT has provided advice and assistance with the review, which seeks to improve oversight, transparency and accountability and to assist in the effective integration of the MOD and Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces HQ. The review process has included other Ugandan government departments, Parliament, academics from Makerere University and the media.

SSR is an important strand within the Global Pool Balkans strategy, to which SSR Strategy inputs make a significant contribution. A Defence Diplomacy export course in Macedonia in 2002 was attended by representatives of all of the countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania. The DAT has since conducted scoping visits to Belgrade. A further export course is to be run in the Balkans in 2003. These courses, together with defence and military education courses in the UK, develop capacity amongst local officials and the military to undertake their own SSR programmes. In addition to assisting regional SSR, these activities visibly demonstrate UK commitment to a region which is undergoing post-conflict recovery.

In addition to defence education, the Strategy also supports police reform and training. Currently, there are two projects running in Colombia that focus on training the police to improve security/policing in local communities, and working with representatives of the government and civil society in internal conflict resolution.

Objective C: Influencing and Capacity Building: work aims to create a conducive environment to support SSR through wider donor involvement and local capacity building. This wider approach is vital in order to influence the international agenda and to spread the load. The demand on the UK is likely to exceed our capacity to respond; one possible means to alleviate this pressure would be to establish indigenous regional counter parts to the UK DAT, led by countries with sufficient experience. Contacts with other donors and with academic institutions worldwide will be achieved through the development of the database under the GFN, which will be set up before the end of this financial year, and the establishment of regional SSR networks engaging the full range of SSR actors. The GFN will play a key role in generating local demand for reform, by supporting the exchange of

information and ideas between local and sub-regional NGOs and academic institutions through the development of regional SSR networks. The GFN will conduct needs analysis surveys with regional partners in order to assist in identifying the most appropriate and effective entry points for HMG supported SSR work. HMG is currently a leading actor within the international community on SSR issues so it is important to engage with others in order to push forward better understanding and coherence of SSR at the policy and programme levels. An important element in the GFN work programme will be to facilitate an international SSR Forum for SSR practitioners, which will take place in London in March 2003. Other activities supported under the Strategy also contribute towards this output – for instance, the DAT liaises closely with contacts in Canada, the US, and the UN, and is engaged with the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Military (DCAF) and with OSCE and NATO regarding potential SSR assistance to FRY.

The foundations for the SSR Strategy were developed over two years. This has contributed to the success of the Strategy as there is now a common understanding in Whitehall of the SSR issues and the deliverable outcomes. The added value is the coherence which has been achieved through bringing together the different Governments Departments through the strategy. SSR is a cross-cutting issue, and the GCPP strategy has been able to link its work with those of other country and regional strategies under both the Global and Africa CPPs, by providing advice and assistance on SSR to country strategies such as Indonesia, Afghanistan, the FRY and Ghana. This helps to ensure that all SSR work undertaken by HMG aims to meet the overall PSA objectives and targets. The Strategy offers an overarching guide on SSR work and offers a mechanism through which all SSR work undertaken as part of other country and regional strategies in both the Global and Africa CPPs can be synthesised.

ANNEX 4: SSR STRATEGY ALLOCATION 2003/4

Expenditure Item	Allocation [£]	Percentage
1. Defence Diplomacy Education		
Defence Diplomacy Scholarships	657,987	
Defence Diplomacy Export Courses	271,218	
Defence Diplomacy Fellowship	30,000	
<i>Subtotal Defence Diplomacy Education</i>	<i>959,205</i>	19.0
2. Military Education		
ACSC/RCDS/IOT	1,649,815	
Ireland—RCDS	67,403	
Malta—RCDS	31,650	
Turkey—RCDS	32,000	
Syria—RCDS	32,000	
Yemen—IOT	32,650	
Guyana—IOT	26,992	
Slovenia—IOT	33,000	
Peru—RCDS	50,000	
<i>Subtotal Military Education</i>	<i>1,955,510</i>	38.8
3. Defence Advisory Team		
DAT—Running Costs/Scoping Missions	596,000	
Snr Governance Adviser to DAT	100,000	
Police & Justice Adviser to DAT	50,200	
Intelligence & Security Reform Adviser to DAT	45,200	
<i>Subtotal DAT</i>	<i>791,400</i>	15.7
4. Global Facilitation Network SSR		
GFN Core Costs	356,182	
GFN Advisory Group	15,000	
Whitehall Policy Seminar	12,471	
Dev of Best Practice Documents	10,000	
Distance Learning	50,000	
SSR Practitioners Courses x2	45,000	
Latin America & Caribbean Forum	73,000	
<i>Subtotal GFN</i>	<i>561,653</i>	11.1
5. Projects		
Peru—Corruption & Police Reform	32,000	
Colombia—Police & Military Training	99,130	
Colombia—Police Legislature	99,082	
El Salvador—Police & Military Training	28,000	
Argentina—Police & Military Training	105,000	
Bahamas—Police & Military Training	4,000	
Trinidad —Police & Military Training	25,000	


Expenditure Item	Allocation [£]	Percentage
Mexico—Police & Military Training	40,000	
Honduras—Police Training	11,000	
Uruguay—Community Policing	8,500	
EU Council Secretariat	40,000	
<i>Subtotal Projects</i>	<i>491,712</i>	9.7
6. Other		
Police Reform Training	40,000	0.8
Dev of Intelligence Legislation	20,000	0.4
SSR Policy Brief	15,000	0.3
Capacity Building	40,000	0.8
EEZ Activities	100,000	2.0
Unallocated	75,520	1.4
TOTAL	5,050,000	100.0

Source: Global Conflict Prevention Pool 2003/4: Outturn/Forecast.

ANNEX 5: EMERGING UK CONSENSUS ON SSR

The emerging UK consensus on SSR is shown in the figure below. It is essentially the same as SSR baseline shown in Annex 1. As with the baseline definition, the precise areas of overlap among the three components of creating a safe and secure environment for people and states through conflict prevention will vary based on the situation in each reforming country.

While there is widespread agreement on this definition among those who are engaged at what one UK official termed ‘the sharp end’ of SSR and the work of those ‘at the sharp end’ can be seen to promote the holistic view of SSR,⁵⁹ interviews carried out in the course of this evaluation clearly indicate the need to give more attention to mainstreaming the SSR concept within Whitehall.



Note: Areas of overlap between the three components of security sector reform can be greater or less than indicated in this diagram.

Source: Based on interviews conducted September-November 2003

In this context, it will be important to provide some guidance on security-related activities that promote conflict prevention but do not promote SSR and therefore are more appropriately funded through the geographic strategies. Conversations with the members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group and SSR Policy Committee suggest that the areas of overlap include:

- Activities designed to promote good governance.
- Activities designed to promote efficiency and effectiveness with a governance component—financial management, accountability mechanisms, clear lines of responsibility, job descriptions, procurement processes and the like.

Where there is a lack of clarity is activities designed to promote professionalism of military forces. Professionalism has both technical and normative components. The normative components describe the appropriate roles and behaviour of military forces of all ranks in a democratic society. The technical aspects relate to the capacity of military personnel to fulfil their military functions. In reality, there is considerable overlap between the two, which is why MOD has included a range of military education courses in their contribution to the SSR

⁵⁹ For example, through the Whitehall SSR Policy Seminars, through the DAT and GFN, and through policy advice provided by members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group and Policy Committee.

Strategy. Table 1 showed that these courses account for nearly 40 per cent of all allocations to the SSR Strategy in fiscal year 2003/4 and therefore, within the context of receiving value for money, the SSR Policy Committee may wish to clarify the contribution of the military education courses to SSR and to conflict prevention.

As far the activities in the lower right-hand circle are concerned, discussions are underway on how to link SALW work more closely to SSR.⁶⁰ Similar discussions need to take place among those groups responsible for PSOs and DDR. Based on the discussion of DDR in the policy brief, for example, there is a lack of clarity on the distinctions between carrying out DDR in order to promote security and build confidence and carrying out DDR in order to advance SSR. The linkages between SSR and DDR are not easy to make, both because of sequencing issues and because capacity to carry out SSR is generally particularly weak in the immediate post-conflict period. While the linkages with PSOs may be clearer—since PSOs often have responsibility for helping to create or train new security bodies—there is considerable scope for specifying linkages and thinking in more detail how they might be operationalised.

⁶⁰ For example, members of the Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy have met with the DAT, members of the SSR Strategy Steering Group, and MOD's Joint Arms Control Implementation Group to consider how to work more closely.

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Stegmann, Graham: Director, Africa Division, DFID
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Willie, Liz: Security Sector Reform Programme Manager, Security Policy Team, Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

DFID's assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

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