

EVALUATION OF DFID COUNTRY PROGRAMMES:

COUNTRY STUDY RWANDA 2000 – 2005

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PREFACE

This evaluation of DFID's Rwanda country programme is one of a series of regular Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) commissioned by DFID's Evaluation Department. The studies are intended to improve performance, contribute to lesson learning and inform the development of future strategy at country level.

The evaluation was carried out by a team of independent UK, Dutch and local consultants led by ITAD. The process was managed by Iain Murray, Lynn Quinn and Shona Wynd of Evaluation Department (EvD). This study is part of a wider, rolling programme of evaluations of DFID's work in Asia and Africa.

The study period focused on DFID's programme during the period 2000-2005. The evaluation was carried out between March and June 2005. This included a one week inception visit carried out by EvD and a two week field visit carried out by the consultancy team. The field visit included interviews with DFID staff, local stakeholders and key partners.

In accordance with EvD policy, considerable emphasis was placed on involving the country office staff during the process and on communicating findings. They were invited to discuss findings at a workshop during the evaluation, offered written comments on the draft reports and participated in a seminar discussing the findings previous to the final draft.

The Rwandan situation is and was unique. DFID played a key role in supporting the Rwandan government to take forward its reconstruction and reconciliation process and to move forward on the development of their Poverty Reduction Strategy. The gains achieved were truly remarkable. However, if the momentum of this progress is to be maintained we must continue to meet the challenges of an evolving context. The purpose of this evaluation is to support the on-going role that DFID plays in carrying forward the pro-poor agenda in Rwanda.

Key study conclusions include:

- Rwanda has made remarkable progress since the terrible events of 1994. Despite the negative impact of the genocide and civil war, the pro-poor policies have achieved impressive results.
- The UK government's strong political commitment to Rwanda underpins the DFID programme. The decision to work with government and through government's systems for budget support is highly regarded. DFID is regarded as an influential and trusted partner.
- The programme has some clear strengths: a stable political commitment enshrined in a ten-year memorandum of understanding between the two countries; the commitment to budget support that has helped bring predictability to government finances; flexibility in response especially during development of the poverty reduction strategy and in the area of public financial management; and a commitment to core government processes.

- The narrow focus means some areas have received less attention. The programme is strongly oriented at central government but it is distant from implementation realities at the service delivery level. Within the area of public financial management, more attention could have been given earlier to budget execution and expenditure tracking.

This has been an important lesson learning opportunity for DFID. The usefulness of the study findings has resulted from the efforts of many people. EvD would like to acknowledge the contribution made by the evaluation team itself, but also the active and positive co-operation of DFID staff and development partners in Kigali.

Nick York
Head of Evaluation Department

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Glossary

ADAR	Agency for Agricultural and Rural Development (USAID supported)
ADDP	Africa Director's Delivery Plan
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGHD	Africa Great Lakes and Horn Department
APDP	Annual Performance and Development Plan
APPR	Annual Portfolio Performance Review
AU	African Union
BS	Budget Support
BTC	Belgian Technical Cooperation
CAP	Country Assistance Plan
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CC	Coordinating consultant
CDC	Community Development Council
CDF	Common Development Fund
CEPEX	Central Public Investments and External Finance Bureau (MINECOFIN)
C/BT	Centre for British Teachers (Managing Consultant for RESSP)
CIDA	Canada International Development Agency
CITT	Centre for Innovations and Technology Transfer
CLADHO	Human rights associations' platform
CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire
DBS	Direct Budget Support
DDP	Directors' Delivery Plan
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DTP	Distant Training Programme
EICV	Enquete Intg rale sur les Conditions de Vie (Household Living Conditions Survey)
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (IMF)
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan (MINEDUC)
ETO	Ecole Technique Officielle (Upper secondary technical school)
EU	European Union
EvD	Evaluation Department (DFID)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FAR	Forces Armes Rw andaises (Rwanda Armed Forces)
FARAP	Financial Accountability Review and Action Plan

FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK
FO	Farmer Organisation
FRSP	Rwanda Private Sector Federation
FRW	Rwanda Francs
FSRP	Food Security Research Project
GBS	General Budget Support
GoR	Government of Rwanda
GoU	Government of Uganda
GPAP	Gender Policy to Action Programme
GPAR	Gender Policy to Action Review
GTP	Gender Training Project
GTT	Gender Training Team
GTZ	Gesellschaft fŸr Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HLCS	Household Living Conditions Survey (cf. EICV)
HRDP	Human Resources Development Project (World Bank)
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ISAE	Institute for Agriculture and Livestock Research
ISAR	Rwanda Institute for Agricultural Research
JRES	Joint Review Education Sector
KIE	Kigali Institute of Education
KIST	Kigali Institute for Science and Technology
LIRPW	Labour Intensive Rural Public Works (aka : HIMO)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MIFOTRA	Ministry of Public Service, Skills Development, Vocational Training and Labour
MIGEPROF	Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MINEDUC	Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research
MINICOM	Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Investment Promotion, Tourism and Cooperatives
MININFRA	Ministry of Infrastructure
MINISANTE	Ministry of Health

MINITERE	Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Mines
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSU	Michigan State University
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTPRIF	Medium Term Planning, Resource and Implementation Framework
NAP	National Agricultural Policy
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPPA	National Participatory Poverty Assessment
NPRP	National Poverty Reduction Program
NRI	Natural Resources Institute
NUFFIC	Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education
PADBL	Dairy Cattle Development Support Project (ADB)
PASAR	Rwanda Food Security Support Project
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PIP	Public Investment Programme
PIU	Project Implementation Unit (World Bank HRDP)
PLWHA	People Living With HIV/AIDS
PMIS	Poverty Monitoring and Information System
PMS	Poverty Monitoring System
PPA	Participatory Poverty Analysis
PRBS	Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSA / SDA	Public Service Agreement / Service Delivery Agreement
PSI	Population Services International
RAAQC	Rwanda Agency for Agricultural Quality Control
RADA	Rwanda Agricultural Development Agency
RARDA	Rwanda Animal Resources Development Agency
REMA	Rwanda Environment Management Agency
RES	Rural Economy Strategy
RESSP	Rwanda Education Sector Support Programme
RIEPA	Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
ROPARWA	Rwanda Network of Farmer Organisations
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RRA	Rwanda Revenue Authority

RSSP	Rural Sector Support Project (MINAGRI-WB)
RTTP	Rural Technology Transfer Project
SER	Sector Expenditure Review
SFAR	Student Financing Agency for Rwanda
SG	Secretary General
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SNEC	Secrta riat National de l'Enseignement Catholique
SPTA	Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance or Technical Assistant
TCO	Technical Cooperation Officer
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund for Women
UPE	Universal Primary Education
VSO	Voluntary Services Overseas
VVOB	Flemish Development Cooperation
WB	World Bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S1 This is the report of an evaluation of the Department for International Development (DFID) country programme in Rwanda from 2000 to 2005. Bilateral expenditure over this period, when DFID has been the largest bilateral donor amounted to around £168 million, some 5 percent of all British aid to Africa.

S2 The evaluation had two main objectives: to provide an account of the performance of the programme over this period; and to derive lessons for DFID in Rwanda and elsewhere.

Context

S3 The civil war and the genocide totally devastated Rwanda. Within three months, the genocide left Rwanda with an unprecedented death toll of close to one million people and hundreds of thousands of widows, orphans and disabled people. There is a general consensus that the results obtained during the decade after the genocide have been remarkable. Rwanda has achieved impressive progress and has put in place crucial policies for pro-poor-growth. Perhaps more than any other country programme of recent years, DFID's involvement in Rwanda was driven by a strong political commitment.

Findings

S4 This evaluation has used two main criteria for assessing the performance of the Rwanda programme: internal quality (strategy; relationships; portfolio); and external effectiveness (project results; influence; contribution to outcomes). The methodological framework for the evaluation is set out in a table in Annex D.

S5 The **internal quality** of the programme has been quite good. Two thirds of funds were allocated to budget support. The main thrust of other programmes was based on a rationale that government's constraints to implementing the poverty reduction strategy were with central government processes: the MTEF, sector strategies and budget management. Neither the 1999 CSP nor 2004 CAP contained clear programme objectives, and performance indicators were only adopted with the Change Impact Monitoring Tables, but the office remedied this with a logframe planning exercise in 2004. The programme would have benefited from an analysis of the complementarity of the non-budget support activities to budget support

S6 Programmes were developed to improve public financial management, develop the Rwanda Revenue Authority, contribute to civil service reform and provide sectoral support to education (at the request of government). A number of smaller projects were developed linked to national statistics, demobilisation, HIV/AIDS and gender. Support to land policy followed later and will lead into a land reform programme. The aim was a few large programmes and several smaller projects with more intensive management requirements. The programmes were coherent and followed the CAP. The focus on sector strategy and expenditure management led to a programme that was state-centred and with the exception of education, had few linkages with the challenges of implementing service delivery towards poverty reduction.

S7 Britain's strong political commitment to Rwanda underpins the programme. The decision to work with government and through government's systems for budget support is highly regarded. Relationships have been very good, though concentrated on a thin layer of top management in government. DFID has had good access to decision-makers and is regarded as an influential and trusted partner. Contacts and relationships with civil society and the private sector are much less well developed and present a major challenge to DFID Rwanda if government proceeds with its policy of decentralised service delivery.

S8 DFID has played a leading role in donor harmonisation, working through the government-led cluster system and supporting an aid coordination unit. A series of initiatives, supported by some secondment of staff to other development partners has brought significant influence in the areas of budget support, financial management and agriculture strategy.

S9 The programme displays a number of clear strengths: a stable political commitment enshrined in a ten-year memorandum of understanding between the two countries; the commitment to budget support that has helped bring predictability to government finances; flexibility in response especially during development of the poverty reduction strategy and in the area of public financial management; and a commitment to core government processes.

S10 Inevitably, a narrow focus means some areas have received less attention. The programme is very strongly oriented at central government but it is distant from and insufficiently informed about implementation realities on the ground. Within the area of public financial management, more attention should have been given earlier to budget execution and expenditure tracking. This would have fostered greater accountability and contributed directly to ambitions for good governance.

S11 The arrangements for disbursement of budget support worked well until 2004 when disbursement was delayed twice, once linked to the macroeconomic situation, the other to a threatened deterioration in regional security. Both disruptions were short-lived and have had little lasting effect on predictability of funding.

S12 Not much independent evaluation has taken place. Despite DFID's concern for participatory and evidence-based policy making, the programme has not matched its support for a poverty observatory and establishment of a National Institute of Statistics with evaluation capacity development.

S13 A low prioritisation of language as a communication issue and poor language skills amongst advisers and TA have contributed to the distancing of DFID from middle management and rural settings. This is partly mitigated by a focus on national frameworks. But in the absence of the networks that exist in neighbouring Anglophone countries in the region, this strategic choice has left DFID less well informed.

S14 Very little quantitative or independently verified data are available about **external effectiveness** and outcomes. Such evidence as there is suggests broadly positive outcomes in a number of areas. Taking budget support first: budget allocation appears to be aligned with PRS priorities; joint reviews of the poverty reduction strategy have little hard evidence

but are positive in their findings; macroeconomic performance is mixed, partly owing to exogenous factors, but the country is considered to be on track by the IMF since 2004.

S15 The MTEF was well supported by DFID as part of a wider programme of public financial management and is in operation, but progress has been slow in linking to sector strategies and PRS spending priorities. Support to the Rwanda Revenue Authority has been very effective with revenue as a percentage of GDP, and costs of collection both exceeding targets. Assistance to civil service reform has been slower and less well coordinated with other programmes. Good progress has been made in the education sector, especially with development of a sector plan, and DFID has played a major role in developing a new land policy.

Lessons and recommendations for DFID

Strong and interactive political support was the foundation of a successful development programme

S16 The clarity of political support made the technical work of the programme easier and accelerated the pace at which government grew confident at working with DFID. The MOU and the monitoring arrangement brought security to the commitment and transparency to the process. Recommendation: for DFID Palace Street (PS), to make wider use of independent monitoring of MOUs. Programmes built around budget support need a strategy for the non-budget support components

S17 Neither the CSP nor the CAP provided much strategic thinking about how the non-budget support part of the programme should be structured and managed. An analysis of the interactions between these components would have helped the programme develop objectives and indicators. Recommendations: for DFID Rwanda to develop the intervention logic to support a non-budget support strategy in the next CAP; and for DFID PS to develop improved guidelines about strategy to support linkages between budget support and service delivery.

Effective support for poverty reduction requires an understanding of constraints and opportunities facing national implementation, including service delivery

S18 Government faces substantial challenges to meet poverty reduction targets, many of which hinge on the ability of the state and other actors to deliver services. Development organisations need to engage at operational and decentralised levels to understand how central government processes are being transformed into effective programmes. DFID can meet this challenge by bringing in advisers and programme staff with language skills to communicate effectively at middle management levels and in rural areas. Recommendations: DFID Rwanda to use future recruitment to appoint some advisors who are fluent in French; DFID PS to create an incentive policy for language skills and permit selective recruitment to language sensitive posts.

Core processes of government include responding to demand and monitoring effectiveness of aid programmes (not just MTEF, PFM and sector strategies)

S19 The CAP strategy focuses on financial and planning processes at the centre. Empowerment of the demand side of government services has not received the attention

it deserves. Good governance requires downward oriented accountability systems and needs the empowerment of citizens, who are the clients of government services. Recommendations: DFID Rwanda to work with other donors to plan for support to evaluation capacity development; DFID PS to provide policy support to M&E initiatives in country programmes.

Joint sector reviews provide a powerful tool to empower government leadership, and have the potential to foster accountability and transparency, but must follow expenditure management all the way to service delivery

S20 Joint sector reviews, such as those introduced in the education sector have high potential. But they should complement work on budget management and sector strategy. A critical element is for reviews to take place in the field and to trace both the flow of resources and the corresponding educational performance. A start has been made, but lessons can be learned from DFID programmes in other countries, such as India, where government-led reviews are structured in this way. Recommendation: for DFID Rwanda to lead in education, with other donors, to consolidate joint sector reviews, PETS and sector PERs into a coherent process; DFID PS to draw lessons from country experience and disseminate widely throughout DFID.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This report is an evaluation of DFID's country programme in Rwanda. The main analysis deals with the period from 1999 to 2005, but events prior to that period are also taken into account in order to understand the context and factors influencing DFID's approach. The broad objectives are first, to assess DFID processes, using evaluation criteria of appropriateness, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness, and second to examine evidence of impact and sustainability.

1.2 This study is the first in a round of five country programme evaluations (CPE) commissioned in 2005/06. The structure of the evaluation was developed through five earlier CPE, in which an increasingly rapid and light approach was tested. The structure consisted of a preliminary country visit by staff of EvD, in order to brief country staff and collect background documents. The main team of four international and one national consultant, visited the country for up to two weeks. The report is a synthesis of their findings.

1.3 The rapid and light approach constrains the study methodology in several ways. Evidence was collected from three sources: interviews with past and present DFID staff; interviews with officials in government, with partners in other development agencies and from representatives of NGOs and civil society organisations (Annex B); and reviews of file correspondence and programme documents from DFID (Annex C). The limited number of performance reviews and evaluation reports available means this study is not a meta-evaluation. No projects or programmes were visited in the field, no primary data collection took place, and no additional analytical studies were commissioned. The limited extent to which the team has been able independently to verify the evidence needs to be borne in mind when reading the report.

1.4 The study asks two main questions: what was the quality of DFID's programme and processes; and what has the programme achieved? The first is concerned primarily with internal processes within DFID's control. The second examines the development results to which DFID has contributed. An evaluation matrix setting out a checklist of questions that were asked is included at Annex D.

1.5 The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 sets out the context within which the programme was developed. Chapters 3 and 4 tackle the two principal questions, dealing with programme quality and programme effectiveness. Chapter 5 assesses Rwanda's development progress. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions, lessons and issues from the evaluation.

2. CONTEXT:

Political, social and economic country context

2.1 The political, social and economic context over the period 1999 to 2005 is defined by the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Four issues summarise the Rwandan context: reconstruction and reconciliation; governance and capacity; regional peace and stability; and language.

2.2 The civil war and the genocide totally devastated the country. Within three months, the genocide left Rwanda with an unprecedented death toll of close to one million people (Tutsis and moderate Hutus) and hundreds of thousands of widows, orphans and disabled people. The productive sector had to restart from scratch: almost half the population fled and had to re-establish themselves, 80 percent of domestic animals were killed; planting material was lost, economic infrastructure was largely destroyed. Agricultural production collapsed. Large numbers of professionals, including doctors and teachers fled or were killed. In one decade all human development indicators collapsed. The prevalence of absolute poverty mounted from around 50 percent in the mid-eighties to over 80 percent in 1994.

2.3 After the genocide, 3 to 3.5 million people returned to their 'colline', many other Rwandan (0.7 million people) had to be reintegrated in society after years of exile abroad. Indirectly, the genocide severely affected production capacities: elimination of qualified staff that still affects all professional organisations in the country;¹ around one third of all rural households female- or orphan-headed; more than 100,000 prisoners in detention; and a stark rise in HIV-AIDS prevalence as a result of widespread rape.

2.4 This is the context that the new Government of National Unity, formed according to the Arusha Accord, had to face for national reconstruction and reconciliation through an intense period lasting from mid-1994 through to 1997. From 1995-97 government set a long term goal of moving away from state-centred economic development to a market-centred economy in which the state played the role of regulator. In 1997 government turned its attention away from recovery and started a macroeconomic stabilisation programme and implemented significant structural measures, particularly to prioritise and control spending.

2.5 Between 1998 and 2001, the legal framework was put in place for decentralised governance.² In 2003 the new Constitution was adopted and general elections were held, which were overwhelmingly won by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The extensive legislative programme and other reform initiatives are listed in a time line in Annex E.

¹ For instance, out of a staff of 80 before the genocide, only 5 scientists returned to the Rwandan Agricultural Research Institute (ISAR) after the war.

² Many African countries are involved in decentralisation processes; it is therefore not unique for Rwanda. The speed of the process and the progress with fiscal decentralisation and budget allocation to Districts distinguishes Rwanda from other countries. The Rwandan decentralisation process is also of specific political importance: it may turn out as an instrument for controlling the national territory or it may turn out as a successful attempt to institutionalise participatory governance and to deepen democracy.

2.6 There is general consensus that the results obtained during the first decade after genocide, have been remarkable. All the MDG indicators were dramatically reversed during the genocide and fell below 1990 levels. This reversal was compounded by the already existing structural constraints of a landlocked country, a low natural resource base, high transport costs, limited land availability and a high population growth rate. Despite these impediments, Rwanda has achieved impressive progress and has put in place crucial policies for pro-poor growth. After high growth in the initial rebound between 1995 and 2001, Rwanda managed to achieve real GDP growth of 6% to 10% in the three years up to 2003. There has been some diversification of exports and privatisation is being pursued energetically. The Government³ and the President of the Republic have a legitimate power base with widespread popular support and the anti-segregation ('Barwanda') policy⁴ is generally applauded.

2.7 The Great Lakes Region is characterised by multiple sources of conflict: interstate, civil and regional (where states oppose regionally-based armed groups). In the aftermath of the genocide, the ex-FAR, interahamwe and civilian refugees drifted into exile in Eastern Congo. The failure of the international community to disarm and separate armed groups from the population and the connivance of the Mobutu government led to a shift in the centre of this conflict into the DRC. Despite a series of negotiated agreements (Lusaka, 1998; Pretoria; Sun City, 2003) the government of DRC has been unable to exert effective control over its territory and the dual existence of groups opposed to the government of Uganda has further exacerbated the situation.

2.8 Rwanda's concern is a situation where its border areas are controlled by hostile forces aligned to the interahamwe. Tensions between Uganda and Rwanda have largely been dealt with by joint verification made up of British, Ugandan and Rwanda security teams. Rwanda continues to support initiatives geared towards engendering peace and stability in the region. But the DRC has been unable to effectively disarm the hostile forces and has rebuffed proposals by Rwanda for practical and joint military actions.⁵

2.9 In this complex setting, good intelligence is hard to obtain, and as a result analysis is subject to claim and counter claim. Rwanda's threat to mount a 'surgical strike' across its borders, together with allegations that its forces were active in eastern DRC led to the UK and other donors withholding disbursement of aid in 2004. The continuing regional crisis has been a significant factor in the sometimes uneasy political relationships between Rwanda and her development partners.

2.10 Language too, has become a sensitive and highly politicised issue. The government is making strenuous efforts to make the whole population trilingual in Kinyarwanda, French and English, in order to overcome historical language divides, related to power and ethnicity. This has significant ramifications for conducting business with government and for education.

³ The new Constitution states that one single party cannot hold more than 50% of the Government posts.

⁴ The GoR never speaks of Hutu and Tutsi, but invests in national reconciliation efforts (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, participatory policy development, gacaca, sport and cultural events).

⁵ Killick et al (2005)

The appointment of many former exiles to the highest levels of government has created a situation whereby English is the *lingua franca* for a small and powerful stratum, but at the levels of middle management and outside Kigali, French is the preferred foreign language, although Kinyarwanda dominates. Effective communication calls for a recognition of this reality.

Development assistance

2.11 Rwanda prepared an overarching development framework providing a twenty-year perspective from the new millennium. The Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda 2000) identifies six priority pillars and three crosscutting areas that need to move in tandem. It calls for an annual growth rate of 7-8% over the 20-year period, for which the agricultural sector, especially in the first decade, would have to provide the lion's share.

2.12 Vision 2020 laid the foundation for Rwanda's planning process: (i) translation of the Vision into medium-term Poverty Reduction Strategy and National Investment Strategy; (ii) operationalisation of PRS in sector strategies, as well as in provincial and district development plans, to be implemented through the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Public Investment Programmes (PIP); translation of MTEF and PIP into concrete action plans and annual budgets.

2.13 The elaboration of the PRSP took 2 years. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) was produced in November 2000. Intensive consultations at the ministry, local government and community level followed and the final version of the PRSP was published in June 2002.

2.14 The PRSP process led to the identification of six broad areas where action is to be taken on a priority basis.⁶ Ranked by importance, these are: (i) rural economic development and agricultural transformation; (ii) human development; (iii) economic infrastructure; (iv) governance; (v) private sector development and (vi) institutional capacity strengthening. For all these areas, 9 crosscutting issues were underlined: technology, gender, environment, imidugudu (grouped settlements), HIV-AIDS, employment, capacity building, inequality and sectoral policies.

2.15 Donors have responded well to this framework. Currently there are active programmes from the World Bank and African Development Bank. IFAD is supporting the agriculture sector strategy. UNDP is active in aid coordination and governance. And there are programmes from a wide range of bilateral donors including Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Canada and the United States. The history and scale of aid support to Rwanda is apparent from Table 1.

⁶ During the National Poverty Assessment (NPA), communities identified small or insufficient plots and lack of work/employment as their priority problems. Other problems related to rural economic activities also feature high on the list of priorities. The agricultural sector was identified as the priority sector (Government of Rwanda 2002: 115).

Table 1 Net ODA flows to Rwanda

Net ODA (\$ Million – current prices)	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
DAC Countries, Total	178.67	208.99	180.52	175.38	148.89	199.09	213.38
Multilateral,	50.4	140.96	192.58	146.47	149.5	155.81	118.07
G7, Total	89.38	115.01	107.12	107.73	97.44	123.34	128.86
EU Members, Total	113.53	149.27	114.67	133.06	104.46	136.66	134.37
Non-DAC Bilateral Donors, Total	0.53	0.13	0.09	0.17	0.13	0.14	0.11
ALL Donors, Total	229.6	350.08	373.19	322.02	298.52	355.04	331.56

Source: OECD-DAC International Development Statistics on line: Database on annual aggregates. Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Disbursements (Table 2a)

2.16 Total volume has increased over the period shown, but with significant fluctuation over the years. Figures for the early years include humanitarian aid following the civil war. The trend since 2000 is rising. IDA and EC are the largest donors with 30 percent over the years 2001 to 2003. Twenty four bilateral donors have supported Rwanda, but the largest concentration has been from six countries. In 2001 to 2003, the UK and USA together contributed one quarter of net ODA; The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Germany contributed a further 20 percent.

2.17 Aid has been vital to Rwanda's success in rebuilding the country. Table 2 shows the budgetary impact since 1999, with a rising trend in the most recent years, to 57 percent of the budget, a high level of aid dependency.

Table 2 External financing of the domestic budget

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
External financing %	49.93	56.09	-	45.84	46.47	55.19	57.10

Source: Finance Laws of 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005

DFID

2.18 DFID's programme has been stable as a proportion of DFID's rising bilateral spend, with a steady increase in financial terms since the ten year commitment was given in 1999 (Table 3). Year on year variations reflect timings of disbursements rather than changes in allocations.⁷ The overall size of the programme has been in excess of the recommendations under DFID's aid allocation model, and is now planned to remain constant at around £46 million through to 2007/08.

Table 3: DFID bilateral aid to Rwanda, Africa and all countries (£ million)

Country/ Regional Programmes	Rwanda	Africa	Africa %	Total
2000/01	32.7	583.3	5.6	1,095.9
2001/02	26.8	496.8	5.4	1,141.3
2002/03	35.2	663.2	5.3	1,340.6
2003/04	28.1	638.9	4.4	1,623.3
2004/05	45.7	833.0	5.5	1,760.8
Total 2000-2005	168.5	3,215.2	5.2	6,961.9

Source: DFID Departmental Report 2005. Annex 1, Table 4

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- Rwanda still faces major challenges in reconstruction and reconciliation.
- The regional security situation is a continuing threat to stability and a constraint to economic growth.
- Rwanda is working within a structured development framework towards a long-term vision via a poverty reduction strategy.
- There is active donor engagement, with the main support provided by IDA, the EU and six bilateral donors.

⁷ Annual commitments and expenditure are shown in detail in Annex H

3. Programme Content and Process

3.1 This chapter examines the quality of DFID's programme in terms of strategy, relationships and the composition of the portfolio. It starts with an exploration of how strategy developed from a strong political commitment and how that responded to the context described above. Next, relationships with government and development partners are examined, followed by an assessment of the portfolio of programmes and projects.

Political commitment

3.2 Perhaps more than any other country programme of recent years, DFID's involvement in Rwanda was driven by a strong political commitment. The UK had contributed to humanitarian assistance after the genocide, but without a historical relationship in this francophone country there was no experience to build on. That changed with a visit to Rwanda by the Secretary of State in 1998. Deeply moved by the conflict that had been fostered by a divisive colonial history and the enormous challenge of re-building that faced the country, she embarked on a programme to win the trust of government and foster support amongst other donors.⁸

3.3 That support had three key features. First, there was a long-term partnership arrangement set out for ten years and governed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Rwanda governments. Second, the commitment was made in the knowledge that human rights needed to improve and that the regional security situation was destabilising, so arrangements were made for an independent arbiter to conduct an annual monitoring review and assess the performance of both parties to the MOU. And third, DFID's programme responded directly to the new direction set out in the 1997 White Paper by working through large scale transfers and strengthening institutions, financial-management systems and competence through government-led programmes, rather than by a proliferation of projects.

Strategy

3.4 Within that framework, DFID developed a strategy for engagement. Strategy evolution can be considered in four stages, as set out in Table 4.

⁸ Clare Short (2004) *An Honourable Deception?: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power*. Free Press. pp 85-88

Table 4: Strategy evolution

Dates	Strategy	Purpose	Main features
Up to September 1999	Initial political commitment	To build confidence and initiate a ten-year programme	Humanitarian assistance, leading to an initial commitment to a one-off budget support in 1999 and development of the CSP
1999 - 2002	CSP 1999	To enable Rwanda to meet the international development targets within a sustainable economic and social framework which facilitates peace and security, reconciliation, economic growth and inclusive government	Budget support conditional on reduced military spending by GoR; actions to improve effectiveness and efficiency of government institutions and expenditure; and an expanded programme in education. Joint commitments set down in UK/Rwanda MOU. Assessment of UK comparative advantage and limitations.
2003 - 2004	CAP 2004	Support the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy	Two thirds of programme to be delivered as direct budgetary support; small number of large long-term projects; and number of small, management intensive interventions on policy and harmonisation
2004 - 2005	CAP logframe 2003-2006	Increased capacity and means of GoR and other partners to fulfil their commitments to reducing all aspects of poverty	5 outputs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Core PRS cycle is improved • Capacity for pro-poor macro-economic and financial management, including MTEF process, improved • Policy, planning and delivery improved in selected sectors/ targeted programme areas • Accountable, effective and democratic governance enhanced • Donor coordination, alignment and harmonisation improved

3.5 The 1999 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) set out the new commitment and relationship; acknowledged the challenge facing Rwanda; and prescribed the UK development strategy. In common with CSPs of that era, there are no clearly stated objectives and no monitorable indicators. Three elements make the strategy distinctive. First, a short and realistic appraisal of DFID's strengths and limitations working in Rwanda is given. Second, the text of the MOU is included in full, giving prominence to the commitments on the part of the GoR. Third, a central plank of the strategy was to programme general budget support as two-thirds of the overall programme. The CSP was shared with government at an early stage and some consultation took place with civil society and NGOs. Copies of the draft CSP were circulated in English, French and Kinyarwanda for that meeting. In view of the 'fragility of the Great Lakes Region' the programme was to be managed from London.

3.6 A Country Assistance Plan (CAP) followed the CSP. Publication is dated February 2004, but drafting started in March 2002, a twenty three month process. The CAP is essentially DFID's response to the Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy rather than a change of direction from the CSP. In view of the long gestation period, the evaluation team has taken the view that the CAP embodies the predominant strategy for most of the period under review.

3.7 Development of the CAP coincided with the last eighteen months of programme management from London, before the office was devolved to Kigali in December 2003. Despite a relatively high level of continuity of advisers and programme staff,⁹ by August 2004 there was a consensus in the Kigali office that the plan lacked a practical, operational focus. A new exercise was started to develop a logical framework out of the CAP, which resulted in a clear statement of purpose and the development of strategic outputs and indicators of performance.

Strategy assessment

3.8 Budget support is, by definition, aligned with government spending plans (to the extent that the national budget is comprehensive). That said, given that the objective of the programme was poverty reduction the question then arises about what strategy should be followed in the make up of the remaining one-third of resources to maximise the development effectiveness of the programme as a whole? Neither the CSP nor the CAP present a rationale. Indeed the text reads little differently from a CAP in a country without budget support. Programme analysis provided by DFID Rwanda for FY 2005/06 indicates 36 project or programme expenditure lines. One is for £31 million of budget support; the other 35 are for the balance of £15 million. For much of the period the causal logic underpinning budget support was implicit. An evaluability study for budget support was produced in 2003, after the CAP was drafted, and that sets out a conceptual framework and logical model that links budget support to poverty reduction.¹⁰ That could provide a basis for analysis of

⁹ A new head of office took over soon after the devolution, but the two deputy programme managers and two of the four advisers remained in post.

¹⁰ Lawson *et al* (2003:28 *et seq*). The framework was updated in the inception report for the GBS evaluation, see Lister (2005).

constraints to government processes, but it is still limited in scope and short of detail about management of public spending for service delivery by line departments.

3.9 The Africa Director's Delivery Plan (ADDP, DFID 2005) explicitly states that Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) should be linked to national Poverty Reduction Strategies, which, in turn, should relate to MDGs. Table 5 presents the PRS priority areas and the cross-cutting issues and indicates in which areas: (i) DFID has made a major technical and/or financial contribution additional to PRBS (in bold); (ii) DFID has been moderately involved (in normal font); and, (iii) DFID has been hardly involved (in italic).

3.10 This overview is quite revealing in the sense that DFID has mainly focused on governance, institutional capacity building and human development (education and to a much lesser extent health). DFID has hardly played a role in the economic areas (priority areas no. 1, 3 and 5 of PRSP: rural economic development, economic infrastructure and private sector development). As far as the crosscutting issues are concerned, DFID was only a major player for gender. To a lesser extent, it contributed to technology (KIST-CITT), environment and Imidugudu (land policy), HIV/AIDS (some very recent projects), capacity building (concentrated in selected areas) and inequality (gender, but not for inequalities between urban and rural populations and between socio-economic groups).

Table 5: DFID's involvement in PRS priority areas and cross-cutting issues

PRS: Priority areas		PRS: Cross-cutting issues
1	<i>Rural development and agricultural transformation</i>	Technology Gender
2	Human development	Environment
3	<i>Economic infrastructure</i>	Imidugudu (grouped settlements)
4	Governance	HIV-AIDS <i>Employment</i>
5	<i>Private sector development</i>	Capacity building
6	Institutional capacity building	Inequality

Key: **High**, moderate, *low* involvement

3.11 The strategic choices were largely set under the CSP and the emergence of the PRS does not appear to have influenced those directions in the CAP. An issue raised in both the CSP and CAP is the question of DFID's comparative advantage to give support that is complementary to PRBS. This has clearly been an issue in the Rwanda office and the Economics Adviser produced a note to stimulate discussion and develop a common approach. But despite frequent mention, the reasoning behind the strategic choices is never explained.¹¹

¹¹ Comparative advantage is frequently cited as a basis for choice in country programmes, but the term is used casually, without any supporting analysis. See, *inter alia*, Africa Director's delivery Plan 2002, part C; Africa DDP Review 2003, Section 3. The 2004 Poverty Reduction Budget Support states that country programme documents should make explicit the reasoning and analysis underlying the choice of aid instruments (para 3.13).

3.12 A clearer insight comes from the statement in paragraph 2.26 of the CAP where the implementation of the PRS is said to be *'dependent on the sector strategy process, the budget process and in particular the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, and the National Investment Strategy'*. To a large extent that defines DFID's planned programme, with the addition of regional peace and stability, social and economic policy and some specific references to gender, and strategic sectoral work in education, rural development and agriculture.

3.13 The narrow focus on central government processes and absence of any reference to analysis of delivery of pro-poor public services, or constraints to development in the PRS priority areas undermines DFID's claim to be responsive to country needs. Nowhere is the claim of DFID's comparative advantage being to work only at central government level clearly reasoned and justified against other approaches.

3.14 There was little consultation until late in the CAP development process. Early drafts were shared with government, but consultation with development partners, and NGOs and civil society, only occurred after fifteen and seventeen months. Representatives of both groups were pleased to have been consulted, but it was too late to influence strategy at such a late stage. A focus on the PRS led the CAP to identify the planned government PRS Review Cycle and annual sector reviews as the means to monitor budget support and the programme more generally.

3.15 The country team argue that DFID chose to complement the work of other donors, especially in the decision to work primarily at central government level. To some extent this is understandable, as the ability to conduct a large proportion of business in English mitigated some of the language and culture pressures faced by the office. But no evidence has been seen to support the reasoning with analysis. The specific point is argued that the programme chose not to become engaged in the rural sector owing to donor overcrowding. Yet by 2003, just seven donors working through twenty nine projects accounted for 85 percent of externally funded interventions in agriculture. It is true the remainder was made up of a further nine donors (mostly FAO and NGOs) with 43 small projects.¹² But given the scale of the challenge to stimulate growth and DFID's policy to align the CAP with the PRSP, a more convincing rationale might have been forthcoming. For example, a strong case could be made that the poor performance of budget execution in agriculture makes that sector a candidate for support for financial management that would directly complement DFID's core activities with MINECOFIN.¹³

3.16 The current strategy is narrowly 'statist'. Yet many pro-poor services fall outside the realm of the state or, after public sector and civil service reform, can no longer be delivered by governmental bodies.¹⁴ Understanding the roles of non-state actors in service delivery and exploring how capacity building efforts might benefit and could be extended to non-

¹² MINECOFIN/CEPEX: Registry of External Aid to Rwanda Vol. I: Distribution of Interventions by Sector, April 2004

¹³ Weak engagement of line ministries with the MTEF process has been cited as a constraint to continuing PFM reform in the July 2004 PRSC Appraisal Mission (Lawson 2004)

¹⁴ See for instance Carney 1998.

governmental actors was a missed opportunity during the past 5 years and is a challenge for the coming years.¹⁵

3.17 Last is the issue of language. Despite evident sensitivity in Rwandan society, it is not recognised in DFID's strategy. Opinions amongst country staff, development partners, NGOs and civil society organisations are mixed. But on balance there is consensus that DFID would be more effective with a positive language policy: to have at least some advisors who are fluent in French, and to prepare and distribute some material in all three languages. File correspondence in the office shows that staff have in the past called for executive summaries, at least, to be prepared in both French and English, and this suggestion needs to be developed further.

Relationships

3.18 In general, DFID maintains very good and pro-active relations with top government officials, especially in MINECOFIN, MINEDUC, MIGEPROF, MIFOTRA, the President's Office, the RRA and the Lands Unit of MINITERE. Relations are good, but rather passive with MINAGRI and MINALOC.¹⁶ The high level of government trust (notably in MINECOFIN) is a major asset for friendly but critical dialogue.

3.19 The programme has been less attentive to relations between central government and local authorities. The strategy seems to have led to an over-optimistic view that local service delivery will take place once national procedures are in place and there has been a relative neglect of processes at meso and local level.¹⁷ The causal path by which budget support and other reforms at the centre will lead to improvements in service delivery is poorly articulated. The issue is recognised in DFID's policy paper on PRBS and in the evaluability analysis for budget support. It is central to developing a strategy for the non-budget support programme.¹⁸

3.20 Relations with civil society are even less well developed. The office is not well informed about the potential role of NGOs, FBOs, CBOs, FOs and the private sector. Contacts with civil society organisations and field visits are quite rare. Language barriers limit interaction between advisers and civil society or lower ranking government officials, which could be overcome by recruitment of more local advisors or a stronger involvement of existing local programme staff.

3.21 The team's assessment of DFID's influence amongst other development partners is limited by the range of people who could be interviewed during the country visit. Amongst

¹⁵ For example, there is no discussion about the role of the Catholic education society in the RESSP.

¹⁶ Acronyms in common use for the government ministries are explained in the Abbreviations: MINECOFIN – Economics and Finance; MINEDUC – Education; MIGEPROF – Gender; MIFOTRA – Civil Service; MINITERE – Lands; MINAGRI – Agriculture; MINALOC – Local Government.

¹⁷ Cf. World Development Report 2004, Making services work for the poor (World Bank Group 2003)

¹⁸ DFID (2004) Poverty Reduction Budget Support. A DFID Policy Paper; GBS Evaluation: Final Inception Report. Box 4.1 Strengthening of pro-poor policies at output level and service delivery are essentially seen as primarily linked to resource flows. The evaluation recognises that public sector reform and decentralisation are necessary elements of the service delivery strategy, together with mechanisms to enhance local accountability.

development partners, views are largely positive. Two areas were frequently singled out for positive comment. That DFID advisers have time for policy dialogue – something lacking in other organisations where country-based staff have a large portfolio of projects to oversee. Also, the strategic appointments of secondees in the EC Delegation, World Bank and UNAIDS was felt to be constructive.

3.22 On the negative side, a number of instances of TA in MINECOFIN, MINEDUC, MIGEPROF and MIFOTRA were felt to have tended to “run the show” too efficiently, leading to a lack of ownership by national staff.

3.23 One of the main areas of influence by DFID has been to promote the use of budget support and this has taken place in a variety of ways:

- **promoting the concept of PRBS:** the DFID economic adviser is seconded for 25 percent of his time to the Dutch bilateral co-operation, who indicated that his presence had significantly increased their understanding for the rationale behind BS. DFID is also financing the economic advisor within the European Delegation, who has been in charge of putting in place and managing the current EC budget support line.
- **building confidence:** DFID involvement encourages other donors to move away from project support. With SIDA a ‘silent partnership’ has been agreed which means that SIDA will fund part of the education sector and rely on DFID’s reports. Bilateral donors each have their own constraints. DFID’s future involvement in the education SWAp, while seeming a step back from unconditional, unearmarked direct budget support, in fact encouraged other donors (SIDA, Netherlands, Belgium and France) to participate and thus move away from project support.
- **promoting donor harmonisation around PRBS and PFM analysis:** the donor coordination framework actively promoted by DFID and now signed by EC, SIDA and AfDB, with WB and IMF intending to sign. DFID has also championed the Financial Accountability Review and Action Plan (FARAP), now recognised as the common reference document and action plan for fiduciary analysis.

Portfolio of activities

3.24 A summary of past and forthcoming programmes is given in Table 6.¹⁹ The table analyses programmes by PRS area and according to the programme size groupings described in the CAP, as interpreted by the CPE team. Details of expenditure on the smaller programmes can be found in Annex H.

¹⁹ Activities listed here and in Annex H include all those for which data were made available by DFID Rwanda or by EvD. It is not necessarily a comprehensive list for the whole period.

Table 6: Programme activities other than budget support, by PRS area

PRS Areas	Large long-term	Small, management intensive	Other
1. Rural Development and Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land Reform* (£3m) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CITT (£1.1m) 	
2. Human Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RESSP (£13m) • National Children Cluster* (£11m) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PSI Bednets
3. Economic Infrastructure			
4. Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil Service Reform* (£4.5m phase 3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fiscal Decentralisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP/NEPAD
5. Private Sector Development			
6. Institutional Capacity Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rwanda Revenue Authority (£7.8m phases 4 & 5) • National Institute of Statistics (£1.5m) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRS • MTEF • Debt Management • Adviser to Minister of Finance 	
Cross-cutting		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIGEPROF Capacity Building (£2.6m) • Gender Policy • Gender Audit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SURF/PACFA (£4.2m) • ICTR• SIPAA (£2.9m) • PSI Condoms
Other			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demobilisation (£5.5m) • Small arms • Support to Rwanda 10 Commission • Support to Gacaca • WB Rural sector Specialist • EC Economic Adviser • UNAIDS HIV/AIDS Adviser • UNDP Alignment, Coordination & Harmonisation

Note: Programmes marked * started or are due to start in 2005

3.25 The composition of the portfolio has three characteristics. First, with the exception of the RESSP, it has been concentrated on capacity within central agencies, although that will start to change with the land reform process and support to the national children cluster. Second, the implementation modalities have differed markedly between the programmes. RESSP was contracted to CfBT who managed a large programme of separate studies and TA support. By contrast support to MINECOFIN was handled as discrete individual projects, in rather a fragmented fashion, in part to be responsive to the ministry's requests. The RRA started as a series of individual contracts but was then let under a single management contract. Third, a small, but significant number of the smaller projects were initiated through political lobbying and do not fit with the strategy as a whole.

Table 7:

Overview of planned budget support to Rwanda since 1999 (main programmes), £ million

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
DFID		9.0	26.0	17.0	20.8	27.3	30.3
SIDA				4.9	5.3	4.2	3.6
EC (including 10.5 SAF1, SAF2, PPARP)		18.9	13.2	19.8	16.5	8.7	13.4
WB (including ERC, IRC, PRSC1)	25.3	23.2	10.7	29.4	24.1	8.3	28.1
Total	44	45	57	68	59	53	72
Total aid	191	219	215	167			
Share BS in aid	23%	21%	26%	41%			

Source: DFID, 2004. Evaluation of General Budget Support, Rwanda Country Report, Inception Phase. The data are based on CEPEX (MINECOFIN).

3.26 The major item in the programme was the General, later, Poverty Reduction, Budget Support. BS took place in three phases: a one-off transfer in 1999, a first three-year programme of £63 million between 2000 and 2003, and the current programme of £82 million running from 2003 to 2006. While the first 3-year programme had a window conditioned to targets in the education sector, the current programme does not contain disbursement triggers.

3.27 Table 7 illustrates the fact that DFID is a major donor of budget support to Rwanda, and comparable in size to the World Bank. Budget support represents an important share of total aid flows to Rwanda, up to 41 percent in 2002. Total budget support flows stepped up in 2001 from about \$57 million per year to over \$100 million per year, and even \$133 million in 2005. In 2003, reported disbursed aid – a significant share of which is off-budget – was equivalent to 18 percent of GDP and to 55 percent of actual (current and development) budget expenditure. Budget support thus represented a roughly estimated 30 percent of budget expenditure and rising.

Portfolio assessment

3.28 In general, the portfolio follows the strategy of the CAP. However, that is a weak test of relevance as the strategy is so permissive. The concentration of support on central government functions follows the analysis by DFID that successful PRS implementation was dependent on development of sector strategies and efficient expenditure management. It has resulted in a programme that is state-centred and only loosely aligned with the development programmes of the poverty reduction strategy.

3.29 The effectiveness of the programmes is considered in the next chapter. This section asks:

- Was the portfolio of projects sufficiently focused and coherent?
- Were poverty, rights, gender, environment and HIV/AIDS adequately mainstreamed?
- Was the balance between government and civil society right?
- Has monitoring and evaluation been effective?

3.30 The cluster of activities related to public sector management are all coherent. But especially within MINECOFIN there is an issue of fragmentation and a lack of focus. The programme was reactive, responding to GoR/ MINECOFIN demands, which can be good, or pressure, which is less good. A particular problem was the difficulty experienced trying to get a strategy developed for MINECOFIN. A consultants' draft was developed in 2003 but not adopted and work is currently underway again. The absence of a strategy for what in effect was DFID's core partner ministry made it harder for DFID to help clarify roles and functions, and relations between different levels and functions. The limited engagement with line ministries meant DFID was not well placed to understand the 'reform fatigue' being experienced and respond with appropriate support.²⁰

3.31 The choice of education as a social sector to support, at the request of government, was responsive to a major national issue.²¹ Set alongside the programmes listed above, focussing on a single sector was appropriate at the time. In parallel with the programme in education has been a steady rise in support to HIV/AIDS. The new programme with SURF/PACFA will double previous commitments and take the total to over £9 million. Support for SURF/PACFA arose after political lobbying. It does not fit with the CAP and will place significant demands on the current office in the absence of a health adviser.

²⁰ See Lawson (2004)

²¹ Consideration was given to working in health, but the combination of the government request for education and the presence of other donors in the health sector tipped the decision towards education.

3.32 DFID's corporate goal is poverty reduction. Throughout most of the period under review, the major activity other than budget support was the RESSP. In all DFID's internal documents as well as the MINEDUC policies and plans produced with DFID's technical support it is assumed that education will contribute to poverty reduction. DFID has been engaged in protracted policy dialogue to divert more funding to primary education from tertiary education, which government has been keen to support to address skill shortages arising from the genocide. Education is pro-development, but not necessarily pro-poor and the RESSP was designed as an inclusive approach to sector development, in which poor people will benefit from wider sector improvements. There was for example, no target relating to number of children from poor families completing primary or secondary education.

3.33 It can be argued that by including universal primary education as a short term priority in the MoU, DFID Rwanda implicitly also focused on reaching the poor with basic schooling, since around 60-70 percent of the population was living under the international poverty line of \$1 (PPP) a day. The situation has changed now. Net enrolment is high but retention is weak and that puts an emphasis on education quality as a high priority. Reaching the last 10-20 percent of children not enrolled will warrant more deliberate efforts in the future. Through the new work on children DFID is looking towards removing constraints to children accessing services including education. In the preparations for DFID's future support to the education sector, more attention is given to reaching poor and disadvantaged children with quality education. One of the objectives mentioned in the PCN is to increase capacity for pro-poor management in MINEDUC. In 2005, DFID commissioned a comprehensive report on planning a systematic education response to the needs of orphans and vulnerable children.

3.34 During most of its years of operation in Rwanda, DFID has had a passive attitude towards rural development, despite being identified for action in the CAP.²² The involvement in land policy and reform was reportedly the result of the proactive attitude of Secretary General of the new Ministry of Lands (MINTERE). The Rural Technology Transfer Project (RTTP) resulted from a commitment of the Secretary of State after having visited the Kigali Institute for Science and Technology (KIST) in 2002. For more than two years, these two activities stood as stand-alone projects for which there was not much office capacity.

3.35 With the arrival of the first Kigali-based rural livelihoods advisor, several new initiatives have been taken: support to the elaboration of the strategic plan of MINAGRI (collaboration with IFAD and RNE); secondment of a rural sector specialist to the World Bank; support to the preparation of an MTEF for MINAGRI; Implementation of Land Reform; and institutional strengthening of MINAGRI (in collaboration with IFAD and RNE).

3.36 The treatment of **gender** within the programme has been varied. Few of the features of a gender mainstreaming approach, as defined in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action and Strengthened by the 1997 White Paper and Millennium Goals have been in place. Since 1997, DFID has directly supported the Ministry of Gender and Women in

²² Weaknesses in MINAGRI and donor overcrowding (noted above) are cited by DFID Rwanda as having held back involvement, plus the slow pace of recruitment once the decision was made to have a rural adviser based in Kigali.

Development.²³ DFID support gradually evolved from gender training to gender mainstreaming and policy formulation. Since the elaboration of MIGEPROF's strategic plan (2003-2007), the focus is on 'Gender Policy to Action'. Now, with the arrival of the new social development policy advisor, several new initiatives have recently been taken in the area of gender, social inclusion, children's rights and measures for disabled people.

3.37 Attention for HIV/AIDS has been scattered. Such programmes as are being supported have been prompted by political lobbying outside the office, rather than as part of a strategy. There is no HIV/AIDS policy in the workplace in DFID Rwanda. Inclusion of HIV/AIDS in the education sector has not been very successful. The recent secondment of an adviser to UNAIDS may help to improve the situation.

3.38 Attention for environmental management, a key issue in densely populated and severely eroded Rwanda, has been minimal.

3.39 Staff capacity, more than policy intentions, determines whether or not a country office will develop a pro-active approach and invest in influencing and donor harmonisation. The contributions of the new social development and rural livelihoods advisors have intensified communication (especially bilateral talks with other donors) and led to harmonisation of efforts with like-minded bilateral and multilateral donors. The secondment of a rural sector specialist to the World Bank has provided further impetus. DFID is leading the new Children Cluster and more active in the Rural Development Cluster.

3.40 Arrangement for monitoring and evaluation have been very light and as a result there is little hard evidence to support assessments of programme outcomes. Information is available at three levels: OPRs and PCRs of projects and programmes; reviews of the country programme; and the independent monitoring of the MOU.

3.41 Few OPRs and PCRs were available to the mission. In the main this reflects the limiting criteria for performance reporting in DFID.²⁴ Those that are available are listed in Annex G, Table 1. The most comprehensive reporting has been for the education sector, where joint reviews have been held annually since 2003. DFID's policy is to move towards joint or government-led review mechanisms.

3.42 Monitoring the management of the PRBS has been reliant on a baseline assessment through the FARAP, quarterly flash reports, the annual budget and IMF PRGF reviews. These have been effective. But arrangements for monitoring development outcomes arising from PRBS have been unsatisfactory and leaves the programme without any clear evidence to support future policy. The project memorandum for the 2003-2006 tranche includes a logical framework. The statements of purpose, outputs and OVIs are weak, fail to distinguish between DFID's contribution and changes in the wider economy and make no attempt to decompose the intervention logic between budget support and progress against PRS

²³ The name of the Ministry frequently changed, since the transfer of responsibilities for family promotion from MINALOCm it is now called Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion; MIGEPROF

²⁴ A comprehensive analysis of limitations in reporting can be found in DFID Evaluation Report EV645.

targets.²⁵ As a result, monitoring stops at the stage of budget allocation. Inadequate attention has been paid to the need for reporting of budget execution and for periodic public expenditure tracking although this is now improving with a sectoral programme of public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS).

3.43 In pursuit of a more effective PRS cycle and monitoring of poverty reduction, DFID has supported development of national statistics, in particular the conduct of household surveys. This is a good long-term strategy to develop capacity and it will provide data for policy analysis. But statistics alone are only a small part of evaluation capacity development. The PRS focuses on outcomes and the MTEF on outputs, and both are monitored separately. Little work appears to have been done to identify development pathways to link budget support or sectoral programmes to PRS outcomes. Evaluation needs to ask not only what has been achieved, but why. Under present arrangements few of the DFID programmes will generate evaluative evidence that can be used by government to make policy decisions about effective transformation of resources into development outcomes.

3.44 For the country programme as a whole, the absence of well-specified objectives and indicators should have been apparent at an early stage. But the period under review has seen a swiftly-changing set of arrangements for programme monitoring by DFID. Documents made available to the CPE include the APPR 2001, CAP Annual Review 2003 and the PSA Annual Review 2004. All have used different formats and combinations of narrative and rating assessments. None are directly comparable.²⁶

3.45 The MOU is the third area of performance assessment. It is an agreement between the governments of UK and Rwanda, and goes beyond DFID's programme. The provision to have the MOU reviewed by independent arbiters has been a success. In 2004 DFID withheld disbursements of budget support. This was judged by the independent reviewers to have been contrary to the procedures set out in the MOU. The disruption to aid is held to have damaged DFID's standing as a development partner, but the transparency of the review is a testament to the benefits from open government and may prove to have a longer-lasting influence. The growth in level of detail of the MOU is criticised by the independent reviewers. The inclusion of indicators related to public financial management mixes technical, policy and process issues in an uneven way. Plans are in hand for DFID to have the MOU revised in the light of this criticism.

²⁵ A draft of the logical framework for the next round of PRBS has benefited from the GBS Evaluability Study. Further conceptualisation of the development pathway has taken place during the inception phase of the GBS evaluation. But still, the link to pro-poor service delivery remains under-developed and arguably is needed by country offices who wish to prepare a strategy for their non-budget support programme.

²⁶ See Annex G Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5

Summary of findings

- DFID's programme was founded on a strong political commitment and ten year time-frame, enshrined in a memorandum of understanding between the two governments.
- The Country Assistance Plan defined a programme structured around two-thirds budget support and a set of other projects and programmes.
- There is no clear strategy for the non-budget support, nor explanation of how DFID's comparative advantage oriented the alignment of programmes to Rwanda's poverty reduction strategy. Relationships have been good between DFID and top layers of government, and with other donors, but there are few links to non-state actors and little contact with lower and decentralised levels of government, in part owing to language constraints among DFID advisors.
- The country programme is centred on core processes of central government with a single large programme in education and a variety of scattered, rather fragmented smaller programmes across public financial management, governance, gender, health, land reform and demobilisation.
- Activities in gender and social inclusion, and in rural economic development have started to gain impetus following appointments of new advisors.
- Arrangements for monitoring and evaluation have been light, with support to monitoring the PRS largely focused on long-term national surveys; and little exploration of the intervention logic between budget support and pro-poor service delivery.
- The provision to have the MOU reviewed by independent arbiters has been a success.

4. Programme Effectiveness

4.1 This chapter examines the extent to which programmes and projects have delivered their objectives at output and purpose level. Issues of influence and harmonisation are discussed in the context of each sectoral intervention. Assessing the achievements is difficult for three reasons. First, the bulk of the programme has been budget support for which it is inherently difficult to attribute the contribution by DFID to development outcomes. An evaluation of general budget support was underway in parallel with this country programme evaluation, but findings are not available to be summarised here. Second, a major focus of the country programme has been support to core processes of central government, with uncertain linkages to subsequent improvements in service delivery and poverty reduction. Third, there is little evaluation material for DFID's other projects and none for recent activities and those costing less than £1m. The assessment therefore, is strongly influenced by external informants in government and amongst other donors, and by the judgements of DFID staff.

Results

Budget support

4.2 DFID is one of a number of budget support donors and in view of the difficulty of attributing results to any one party the main overview of achievements is given in Chapter 5. Comments here are restricted to objectives set out in DFID's logframe and the core issue of predictability of funding. Although generally successful in meeting the disbursement schedule, DFID's programme was delayed twice during 2004. The first time was because the PRGF was off track and led to a delay of three months but with no knock-on effect to later tranches. The second arose from political conditionality linked to a threatened military incursion by Rwanda into the DRC, but again returned to normal within three months.²⁷

4.3 As far as specific indicators in the budget support logframe is concerned, quantified independent data are not available, but the following broadly positive assessments have been made:

- Sustained budgetary allocations for PRS priorities appear to be increasing over recent years.
- Evidence from joint PRS reviews remain positive and emphasizes progress being made against targets.
- The performance by MINECOFIN in terms of disbursement for financing MTEF programmes is mixed with no real evidence of improvement.
- Macroeconomic performance against PRGF targets also shows mixed performance partly due to exogenous factors, which has led to a large number of waivers. Rwanda was off track in 2003, but recovered in 2004 and achieved HIPC Completion Point in March 2005.

²⁷ Killick, T., M. Karumanga and L.-H. Piron, 2005. The implementation of the memorandum of understanding between the governments of Rwanda and the United Kingdom: report of independent monitors.

Other programmes

4.4 Formal reporting covers a small proportion of the portfolio. Six of the non-budget support projects and programmes listed in Annex G have ratings from Output to Purpose Reviews or Snapshot or Completion Reviews. The purpose was likely to be partially achieved for five of the six and largely achieved for the sixth. Output scores are rather better, with three of the six rated as likely to be largely achieved, two partially but one, Gender Mainstreaming, rated as only likely to be achieved to a limited extent.

Support to core processes of government

4.5 A central plank of DFID's programme was to support core government processes: the MTEF, the poverty reduction strategy, and wide range of financial management actions with Minecofin. These have been largely successful. The joint review of support to MINECOFIN carried out in 2004 concluded that:

- donor support had been successful in supporting the basic functioning of the Ministry; but
- had been focusing on inputs and outputs of the individual parts of the Ministry rather than on the process linking the different functions;
- had been provided in an ad hoc way with low efficiency and doubtful sustainability; and
- potentially set a bad example to the Ministry, through poor co-ordination.

4.6 Reforms to PFM have still to translate into more predictable resource flows to line ministries against agreed priorities. To support this, accounting for public finance still needs to be strengthened and this is now receiving attention. The 2004 PRSC Appraisal Mission noted that in 2003 eight government ministries, including MINISANTE, had recurrent expenditure rates of less than 85 percent. This together with an overall shortfall in capital spending effectively served to finance over-expenditure on Defence, Police and Education and originally unbudgeted expenditure for election expenses.²⁸

4.7 Throughout the two-year PRSP elaboration process, DFID provided participatory development advisors, training and financial support. A comparative study of PRSP processes in 7 African countries found that Rwanda had directed and owned the PRS elaboration processes to a greater extent than was found in the other countries (Booth 2003).

4.8 The efforts to establish a Poverty Observatory in the Department of Statistics of MINECOFIN, the database and coordination of donor projects and investments (CEPEX) and budgetary processes and discipline (MTEF) have been commended as examples of above-average performance. This is a remarkable achievement for a post-conflict country. With hindsight, DFID made a good political assessment of the government's motivation. A PRS Implementation and Review Cycle is in place. Preparations for PRSI evaluation and PRSII elaboration have recently started.

²⁸ Lawson 2004

4.9 Other programmes targeted domestic revenue collection and the civil service. Key achievements of the Rwanda Revenue Authority have been to draft new tax and customs laws. The former has been approved by parliament and the latter is scheduled for approval in July 2005. Overall performance has exceeded targets for Phase V with tax revenue now 14 percent of GDP and the cost of collection at 2.6 percent, better than the 3 percent target.

4.10 Government has demonstrated a willingness to undertake civil service reform that is unusual in the region, and perhaps across Africa. In 1998 some 7,000 ghost workers and 3,000 unqualified workers were removed from the payroll. Subsequent retrenchment has reduced numbers by a further 1,000, about 10 percent of the total non-defence civil service. DFID's actions include the support for a MINECOFIN strategic plan, work on fiscal decentralisation, support for the National Electoral Commission, support for the Auditor General's Office and to the NEPAD Secretariat in the President's Office. The most sustained work was to promote civil service reform, though phases 1 and 2 were both relatively small and not contiguous. The main achievements were in seven areas:

- Integrated Human Resources and Payroll Management System
- Design and implementation of a job classification and grading system
- Defining a Medium Term Remuneration Policy
- Drafting legislation on issues related to the new public service law of 2002
- Design and implementation of a new website for MIFOTRA
- Design and implementation of a performance evaluation system
- Establishment of a Public Service Commission

4.11 Progress was made in all areas but none are complete. A third phase of support is due to start in 2005. Progress has been difficult and some very serious challenges remain. The biggest is an immediate problem: salary policy has not yet been satisfactorily resolved and top civil servants in MINECOFIN and other central ministries report 'a haemorrhaging' of competent staff. The current interim support for salaries by DFID and other donors is due to end in July 2005.

Support to policy development and service delivery in targeted sectors

4.12 The primary sector of involvement was education. Four key results were targeted by DFID: the operationalisation of an education sector plan process; development of capacity for a SWAp; enhancement of mechanisms to improve the quality, access and equity of education; and, HIV/AIDS and conflict resolution promoted across the curriculum.

- The ESSP 2003-2008 has been produced and updated.
- The SWAp, based on the (revised) ESSP 2005-2010, aligned with the PRSP and with its financial needs reflected in the MTEF seems to be well on track.
- All major policies and plans that were developed by or with the support of the RESSP (Education Policy, Education Sector Strategy Plan, EFA, Curriculum Policy) elaborate on the major issues surrounding quality of education, access by girls, poor and vulnerable children. The RESSP was not well geared to put mechanisms in place for improving these issues, but all the same some important steps have been taken. Positive achievements include: the replacement of school fees by capitation grants directly to schools; the Student Financing Agency for Rwanda (SFAR); and the Distant Training Programme (DTP) of the Kigali Institute of Education

- Less success has been achieved with the setting up of monitoring systems and an EMIS, and in setting up of a HIV/AIDS unit in MINEDUC. Textbooks have been bought and distributed, but owing to lack of teacher training in how to use them, many lie idle in schools. The JRES of 2003 (page 12) concludes that massive textbook investment (not only by DFID as many other donors also provided textbooks) has been a “huge waste of resources”.

4.13 Work on a much smaller scale has led to drafting of a new land policy and land law in MINITERE and, via a largely silent partnership with IFAD, to a strategic plan for MINAGRIC.

Cross-cutting issues - gender and social inclusion

4.14 Rwanda strongly owns gender policies and has made significant progress in engendering policies (PRSP, sector policies) and laws (constitution, land law, etc.).²⁹ It is however hard to attribute DFID’s contribution to these achievements. Considering the weak human resource capacities within the Ministry, it is nevertheless evident that the Gender Analyst and short-term consultants have played an important role in the preparation of documents and in initiatives for gender mainstreaming and donor coordination.

Influence, harmonisation and alignment

4.15 Several examples emerge to demonstrate DFID’s success at influencing. The head of Planning MINEDUC said: “Where we are now in education can be attributed to DFID support and to the priority the GoR gives to education. Teachers are paid out of the budget support, and the TA helped us to meet certain conditionalities, such as the sector strategy, for the budget support money flow to continue.”

4.16 The DFID rural livelihoods expert, seconded to the World Bank to act as ‘Rural Development Cluster Anchor’, played a subtle and decisive role in helping the Bank accept the PSTA framework and not insist on the elaboration of a Multi-Sector Rural Development Strategy. Such a plan was called for under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit (PRSC) policy matrix and there was a danger that World Bank disbursements would be stalled until elaboration of the MRDS.

4.17 Less success was experienced trying to influence line ministries to mainstream gender and in harmonising support for civil service reform through MIFOTRA. There is no public sector management cluster and a related good governance cluster was disbanded in 2005.

Effectiveness of different instruments

4.18 Three main instruments have been used during the period under review: financial aid, which is subdivided into project or sector support and programme aid, which includes budget support; technical cooperation; and grants.

²⁹ Rwanda has the world’s highest proportion of female parliamentarians. Also the proportion of women in decision-making and leadership posts has sharply increased since 1996. Very good progress has been achieved in gender parity in primary school enrolment and literacy rates.

4.19 The evidence has demonstrated that budget aid has been an efficient mechanism. Although DFID failed to maintain predictability of disbursements in 2004 the mechanism for independent review of the MOU governing the process has been used conscientiously. Experience from the current round has led to proposals for more front-end loading in the next phase.

4.20 Effectiveness of budget support is less clear, because the evidence base for development outcomes under the PRS is still very weak. A major shortcoming of the programme has been the low attention to monitoring budget execution (outturn) compared with the MTEF and budget allocation. The programme has also lacked a clear strategy that demonstrates complementarity between the budget support and non-BS parts of DFID's portfolio. The programme has been strategic and flexible in supporting the planned education sector SWAp alongside PRBS.

4.21 During the period, Development Grants were trialled as a new mechanism for smaller scale expenditure (less than £1 million) to pass the management responsibility to government and replace imprest accounts, managed by DFID. During 2003 and 2004 DFID closed down all imprest accounts and moved to Development Grant Accounts, requiring all procurement, contracting and accounting to be undertaken with ministries' own systems. The experience in Rwanda is considered by DFID Rwanda to have been mostly successful, although one case of fraud did occur in the period before the office was devolved to Kigali. Development grants have since been suspended by DFID London and current guidance is that future arrangements will be treated as financial aid under an MOU.

Sustainability

4.22 Budget support avoids the sustainability problems that project support always encounters (sometimes technical and almost always financial). Because budget support is accompanied by demands on PFM improvements it contributes, in time and in the long term, to an improved, more democratic, more transparent national system of resource allocation and usage.

4.23 The main concerns for sustainability in the DFID portfolio as a whole, over and above specific issues noted in the previous sections, hinge on problems of ownership, most evident in the areas of sector strategy and planning. Much effort has been put into capacity building from a technical perspective, but capacity includes capacity for ownership. The positive outcome from the land reform TA in MINITERE illustrates the way forward for DFID, in contrast to the work with MIGEPROF.

Outcomes

4.24 Assessment of achievements against outcomes is hampered by the absence of a results structure in either the 1999 CSP or 2004 CAP. Table 8 presents the purpose and five strategic outputs defined in the 2004 CAP logframe. Each of these objectives is accompanied by a set of indicators in the draft logframe. These outputs are to be used as change areas for the CIMT in the 2005 PSA Country Report. The CPE team have made an assessment against these in support of the overall assessment shown in the table. However, the indicators require further work by DFID Rwanda and are not shown here.

4.25 At the time of the CPE country visit, DFID Rwanda had not categorised its programmes against the logframe objectives. To facilitate this exercise the CPE team has made an allocation which is presented in Annex G. The ratings given are derived from the evidence presented to the team and summarised in this report and probably err on the generous side. As noted elsewhere, there is very little objective evidence to support the judgment.

Table 8: Assessment of impact and DFID contribution by change impact areas

	DFID CAP Logframe Objectives April 2003 – March 2006 Purpose	Impact	DFID Contribution
	Increased capacity and means of GoR and other partners to fulfil their commitments to reducing all aspects of poverty	Medium	High
	Change areas		
1	Core PRS cycle is improved	High -	High
2	Capacity for pro-poor macro-economic and financial management including MTEF process is improved	Medium	Medium
3	Policy, planning and delivery improved in selected sectors/ targeted programme areas	Medium	Medium
4	Accountable, effective and democratic governance enhanced	Medium +	Medium
5	Donor coordination, alignment and harmonisation improved	Medium	High

Note: Simple four point scale: high, medium, low, and nil

4.26 Notwithstanding the limitations of this approach, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- Good progress has been made to develop the PRS cycle and government has instituted an annual calendar. Less progress has been made in developing indicators and sector plans are, with some exceptions, at a fledgling stage. DFID has concentrated efforts here and been effective at influence.
- Good progress has been made in the planning and budgeting of government finance and in the enhancement of the revenue basis. DFID has been highly influential in some areas, but the relatively low levels of performance in monitoring budget execution and sectoral public expenditure reviews has left an imbalance of progress on planning rather than implementation.

- Good progress has been made in policy and planning in some sectors, with notable contributions from DFID in education. The evidence base about delivery is weak and incorporation of cross-cutting issues such as gender and HIV/AIDS has lagged.
- Governance has been enhanced, with the development of accountability mechanisms, fiduciary analysis and development of oversight bodies. Weaknesses still exist in government's relations with civil society and the private sector.
- Donor alignment has been fostered by the use of budget support and sector strategies; harmonisation initiatives have built on the government-led cluster system and the new coordination secretariat is operational. DFID has taken a number of key initiatives and is widely recognised for its role by government and donors.

Progress towards CAP logframe purpose and goal

CAP purpose: increased capacity and means of GoR and other partners to fulfil their commitments to reducing all aspects of poverty.

4.27 Gradual progress has been made towards the CAP purpose. Improvements in public financial management capacity are recorded in all relevant reviews by IMF, WB, EC, DFID and the budget support donor group. DFID contributed to this mainly through a) substantial budget support which helps financing the operation of the GoR; b) policy influence through both TA and policy dialogue and c) influence on other donors to draw them towards basket funding in the education sector. Progress towards sector strategy and management is clearest in education. DFID has come late to the rural sector, but there are signs of scope for positive engagement, building on the PSTA.

CAP goal: poverty reduction for all the people of Rwanda to live together peacefully and safely within a secure region.

4.28 There has been some progress against this objective but the link between aid and poverty reduction remains unverified. Moreover, much of the initial improvements after 1994 are due to a rebound effect after the destruction of the civil war and genocide. The GBS evaluation³⁰ considers the year 2000 as a reasonable baseline for measuring the effectiveness of public policies, but this leaves only a very short period over which to assess progress.

Contribution to DFID's Public Service Agreement

4.29 The changing corporate objectives against which the programme has had to report have already been noted above in para. 3.53. In the period under review the country programme has been assessed against two different PSA constructs and a new structure has now been adopted for 2005-08. The PSA for the period 2003-06 most closely corresponds to the 2004 CAP and so that is taken as the defining agreement for this evaluation (Table 9).

³⁰ DFID, 2004. Evaluation of General Budget Support, Rwanda country report, inception phase (Draft), November 2004.

Table 9: Assessment of DFID Rwanda’s contribution to the 2003-2006 PSA

DFID PSA 2003-2006 Objective I: Reduce poverty in Sub Saharan Africa	
Target 1: Progress towards the MDGs in 16 key countries demonstrated by:	DFID Rwanda programme contribution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● a sustainable reduction in the proportion of people living in poverty from 48% across the entire region; 	<p>Two-thirds of DFID’s contribution to Rwanda is through poverty reduction budget support. There is no direct evidence for reduction in poverty or hunger. Data suggest that agricultural production has mostly been variable, with livestock faring better than crops. [Low]</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● an increase in primary school enrolment from 58% to 72% and an increase in the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary school from 89% to 96%; ● a reduction in under-5 mortality rates for girls and boys from 158 per 1000 live births to 139 per 1000; and an increase in the proportion of births assisted by skilled birth attendants from 49% to 67%; a reduction in the proportion of 15- 24 year old pregnant women with HIV from 16%; ● improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution. (Joint Target with FCO and MOD); and ● effective implementation of the G8 Action Plan for Africa in support of enhanced partnership at the regional and country level. 	<p>Support through PRBS and directly through the education sector have been effective with positive improvements in policy and some aspects of service delivery. [High]</p> <p>Health outcomes are very poor, especially for under 5 mortality. No progress towards reducing this rate or maternal mortality is evident. DFID has supported the national strategy for HIV/AIDS and is now contributing TA to UNAIDS. [Low]</p> <p>Direct support for demobilisation and reconstruction has reduced in the past year, but there is a continued effort towards stability in the region, not least through the MOU. [High]</p> <p>Good progress with a high level of influence by DFID: adoption of PRS review cycle for monitoring budget support; support for government-led sector/theme clusters; progress towards World Bank-led adoption of FARAP as a diagnostic tool for financial management; joint government and development partners review of education sector feeding into PRS.[High]</p>

Note: ratings High, Medium, Low are estimates by the CPE team

4.30 The programme has made a strong contribution to DFID's PSA targets, with three of the five targets rated (subjectively) as 'high'. The most problematic area is in poverty reduction where recent growth has been low and the link to PRBS is less well articulated than for the social sectors and those with high levels of recurrent spending. Poverty reduction is discussed in Chapter 5 in the context of the MDGs.

Unanticipated outcomes

4.31 The main area of concern at the time of the CPE is the staffing situation in MINECOFIN. This key ministry appears to be going through a period of change, with many people leaving and reported diminishing motivation. The salary support which is due to end in July has not yet been replaced by an attractive national salary scheme. Middle level capacity is very low across government. The enthusiasm by DFID to support salaries in the short run has not been accompanied by a clear exit strategy and harmonisation with the civil service reform programme for a sustainable solution.

Summary of findings

- Experience with budget support considered largely positive: some disruption to predictability of funding occurred in 2004 but of short duration; government has made sustained budget allocations in line with PRS priorities; but achieved mixed performance against PRGF targets and in financing MTEF programmes
- Support to core processes successful but rather ad hoc in structure, with low efficiency and doubtful sustainability; greater attention is needed to monitor budget execution
- RRA has exceeded targets in domestic tax revenue
- Slow progress with civil service reform after initial strong commitment by government
- Good results in the education sector: development of strategy; a new SWAp aligned with the PRS; new policies on quality of education and access
- New land policy and land law, and a strategic plan for MINAGRIC
- Support to gender was overambitious and beyond capacity of MIGEPROF
- Outcomes are rated as high or medium against the five objectives in the 2004 CAP logframe
- Gradual progress has been made towards the CAP logframe Purpose; uncertain progress towards CAP Goal of poverty reduction
- Programme is rated as high in contribution towards 3 of the 5 Africa PSA targets

5. Development Progress

Development progress

5.1 The most recent assessment of progress in Rwanda is contained in the July 2005 first draft of the 2005 Annual Progress Report of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. Trends in major indicators improved over 2003, with an increase in GDP growth from 0.9 percent, to 4.2 percent, driven by a buoyant construction sector and rapidly developing tourism. But another year of bad rains resulted in a poor harvest and an inflationary push from rising food prices.

5.2 A nuanced and balanced assessment of development progress made by the GoR in recent years is included in the review on the implementation of the MoU between GoR and UK of May 2005. One of its principal conclusions is that the GoR has introduced major reforms to strengthen the management of public finances, although large weaknesses remain. In the context of the country's recent history much progress has been achieved. DFID's latest fiduciary assessment of January 2005, notes that most progress made so far amounts to providing for and strengthening the legal/ institutional framework for public financial management. The key challenge in 2005 is to make this framework deliver the desired results.

5.3 Table 10 sets out the progress towards the MDGs, assembled from a variety of sources.

Table 10: Progress against Millennium Development Goals³¹

MDG	Rwanda Progress to 2005
<p>One Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</p>	<p>No reliable data since the 2000 estimate of 52% of the population below \$1 per day³² – little improvement expected owing to poor growth in agricultural production in 2004 and a reduction in total food production. Performance of the crops sub-sector has been largely stagnant but the livestock sub-sector has shown growth in milk, meat and some products. New survey results expected in 2005. Domestic food production is highly dependent on good rainfall. Children's nutrition has not yet shown signs of improvement and there are large urban-rural and provincial disparities. UNDP assessment: <i>potentially</i> able to meet goal</p>

³¹ Sources: UNDP (2004); Government of Rwanda 2005; UN Statistics Division Millennium Indicators; DFID PSA Country Annual Review Rwanda 2004

³² Rwanda has adopted a national poverty line that differs from the international standard. Against this line a survey in 2000 established that 60% of the adult equivalent population live in poverty and 42% in extreme poverty.

MDG	Rwanda Progress to 2005
<p>Two Achieve universal primary education</p>	<p>The education sector is perhaps the best organized in terms of sector strategy and arrangements for performance reviews. Strong commitment by government has produced improvements in resources (expenditure, qualified teachers and pupil:teacher ratio at primary) and in outcomes (enrolment and transition from primary to secondary). The policy on Fee-Free Primary Education has stimulated increased enrolment: NER up from 73.3% in 2001/02 to 93% in 2003/04, though completion rate is only 44.9% and transition to secondary 47%. Repetition rate is 20% and drop out 15.2%. UNDP assessment: <i>probably</i> able to meet goal</p>
<p>Three Promote gender equality and empower women</p>	<p>The Government of Rwanda has given a high priority to gender equality. Gender equality is high at entry to primary education but declines at secondary and tertiary. Girls perform less well. Gender mainstreaming has been slow to be adopted across government ministries, especially at decision-making levels, but female literacy is high at over 75% and the country has the highest proportion of female parliamentarians in the world. UNDP assessment: <i>probably</i> able to meet goal</p>
<p>Four Reduce child mortality</p>	<p>Statistics in 2000 were 203 deaths of children under five per 1,000 live births (15th worst in world); and infant mortality rate of 118 per 1,000 live births. There is some evidence of a decline in recent years. Immunization rates have been increased to over 70%. UNDP assessment: <i>unlikely</i> to meet goal</p>
<p>Five Improve maternal health</p>	<p>Maternal mortality was 1,071 per 100,000 live births in 2000, still much higher than fifteen years ago. The use of assisted birth services is low for the region and much lower than developing countries as whole. Levels of contraceptive use are very low. Both child and maternal health efforts are adversely affected by diversion of staff to HIV/AIDS programmes. UNDP assessment: <i>potentially</i> able to meet goal</p>
<p>Six Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</p>	<p>HIV/AIDS programmes are being developed to integrate approaches across sectors. A new strategic framework for 2005-2009 is under development. Overall prevalence was estimated by UNAIDS at 5.1% in 2004; much lower than the previous estimates of 13%. The next authoritative estimate is due from a Demographic and Health Survey in 2006. The TB prevalence rate is very high at 628 per 100,000 populations; as also is malaria, which is the principal cause of morbidity and mortality in every province. UNDP assessment: <i>potentially</i> able to meet goal</p>
<p>Seven Ensure environmental sustainability</p>	<p>There is a NEAP, and the concept of sustainable development is gaining ground. Good progress has been made on land policy with help from DFID for a new law drafted and adopted by Cabinet. Efforts are underway to integrate environment in government policies. But the sector has a record of low budget execution, 6% of the development budget in 2004. About 41% of the population has access to safe water, much lower than averages for SSA or LDCs as a whole. UNDP assessment: <i>unlikely</i> to meet goal</p>

5.4 The fact that Rwanda is assessed for two of the seven as probably able to reach the goals, and potentially able for another three is a positive achievement, given the enormous challenges facing the country.

5.5 DFID's involvement in the education sector has a clear link to the progress that has been achieved. These figures forebode well on Rwanda's capacity to achieve the MDGs for education, but some qualifications have to be made. Contrary to the net enrolment ratio, the completion ratio in primary education is very low, owing to high drop-out rates, and academic achievements are poor because of lack of qualified teachers, textbooks, instruction of general subjects in a foreign language,³³ high pupil to teacher ratios, etc. Above primary education, gender equality is less positive but improving in secondary schools (64 male to 36 female) and in higher education (female rate moving from 25% to 29% in the past three years).

Aid effectiveness

5.6 Total aid flows, based on OECD/DAC statistics, amounted to some \$40 per head of population during the period 2001 to 2003, and close to \$100 per head for the 42 percent in extreme poverty. Some 35 to 40 percent of that aid was delivered as direct budget support. The most direct effect of budget support is to enable the national budget to make ends meet. The views of government and budget support donors in interviews with this evaluation mission are that the primary effect has been to get the machinery of the state back on track.³⁴ Specific effects are seen in:

- Empowerment of government as the lead partner in dialogue and policy formulation;
- A focus on recurrent spending with direct effects on maintenance of infrastructure and support for sectors with high public expenditure, such as education and health;³⁵
- Bringing a greater proportion of external funds within the budget process; and,
- Developing a more professional competency in public financial management.

5.7 The contribution in progress towards impact is less clear. Sector policies have been slow to develop, and policy dialogue and budget allocation is primarily driven through the PRGF. Financial reporting and accountability of service delivery has been a harder challenge

³³ In primary schools instruction during the first 3 years is in Kinyarwanda with English and French as a subject. In grade 4-6 the language of instruction changes to French in >95% of schools with English as a subject (exceptions are some schools in Kigali, and private schools where the language of instruction is English and French is taught as a subject). In most secondary schools classes are taught in French with English as a subject. In higher education teaching occurs in both languages. There are concerns among educationalist that the heavy focus on foreign language skills compromises the teaching of other basic subjects and skills. It is also said to be the main cause of the high drop-out rate that Rwandan schools experience (some 30-40%), because many pupils drop out in 4th grade, when a foreign language becomes the language of instruction. Another widely acknowledged concern about the trilingual policy is that the teachers who have to teach (in) the foreign languages do not have a good command of the language themselves, impacting negatively on both the quality of the language teaching as well as of that of other subjects taught.

³⁴ An independent evaluation of budget support is due to report later in 2005.

³⁵ Unlike other countries in the region, Rwanda applies budget support to the recurrent budget and not to development expenditure.

than development of the MTEF and reforms to the budget process. These may explain in part why some donors are still attracted to sector budget support or other direct funding, with a perceived higher effectiveness in policy dialogue. There is still a greater need to understand and evaluate the link to expanded service delivery and a greater pro-poor focus.³⁶

5.8 Overall contribution of aid towards MDGs is hard to isolate from other factors, but certainly the focus of budget support on the PRS process strengthened the latter. For example, education is the sector that has received the most direct support from DFID. A key condition in the April 1999 MoU between the GoR and GoUK, was for an increase in social sector spending and decrease in defense spending. Figures quoted on percentage of GDP spent on defense/security and basic social services show that between 1997 and 2002 spending on defense had gone down by 1.1% while expenditures for social services had risen by 3.4% (Table 11). The recurrent budget for the education sector has increased by 18% between 2003 and 2004 and by 14% between 2004 and 2005 with the largest share being attributable to the introduction of the capitation grant.³⁷

Table 11: Fiscal expenditure (as % of GDP)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Defense/Security	4.1	4.3	4.1	3.7	3.3	3.0
Social Services	2.1	2.3	3.4	3.4	4.7	5.5

5.9 A key feature affecting effectiveness has been the adoption of a coherent approach to dialogue between government and donors. An overarching Development Partners Consultation Group (DPCG) has two cross-cutting groups, dealing separately with projects/programmes, and budget support. Sector or thematic clusters bring together interested donors with the relevant government organization. A lead donor takes a facilitating role (e.g. DFID for education, Belgium for health, USAID for private sector, and HIV/AIDS, Netherlands for decentralization). Minecofin has the overall lead with support from a new External Finance Unit and a Trust-fund financed Aid Coordination Unit, supported by UNDP.

³⁶ The need for a clear poverty focus in the PRS priority funding areas is noted by UNDP: UNDP (2004:15 *et seq*)

³⁷ Initially RwF300 in 2002/03, increasing to RwF1000 in 2003/04. See Suzy Ndaruhutse. Analysis of 2005 Education Sector Budget. DFID Rwanda, April 2005 (page 3 and 5).

Summary of findings

- Two of the seven MDGs are assessed by UNDP as probably and three as potentially able to be achieved
- Budget support has empowered government as lead partner in policy formulation; strengthened recurrent expenditure, especially in sectors such as education, health and infrastructure; brought more external funds within the budget; and fostered more professional public financial management
- The budget support contribution is less obvious in funding for growth-related sectors such as agriculture.
- Financial reporting and accountability of service delivery remains a challenge
- Aid effectiveness has been helped by donor harmonisation through the government-led cluster system and a new Aid Coordination Unit

6. Conclusions and Lessons

DFID contribution & value added

6.1 DFID Rwanda has made a major contribution to the country's development. The strategy and programme is bold, constructive, predictable, flexible, efficient and clear. It is in line with DFID corporate views and complementary to other donors' approaches, who are often still working mainly through projects. DFID's support is often path-breaking and oriented at non-conventional or sensitive issues.³⁸ During the past five years, DFID has been very effective and influential in Rwanda.

6.2 The main thrust of the programme has been poverty reduction budget support. But in other areas DFID has adopted a process-oriented approach (Rwanda Revenue Authority, civil service reform, land policy and land reform, gender mainstreaming). Although the level of success in these domains varied, this gradual process is very commendable in order to put the right policies in place, to ensure ownership and to move at an acceptable pace according to national priorities and available human and financial resources. This learning by doing approach was crucial alongside PRBS.

6.3 Even within a PRBS strategy, DFID has been sufficiently flexible to join a sector-wide approach with joint basket funding for the education sector. Such a decision opens the office to criticism of making a backwards step. But it is an imaginative decision, in part to help encourage other donors into the sector. This could also be adopted for other key sectors, such as agriculture and natural resource management. A sector-wide approach encourages a strong focus on operational service delivery issues and helps to establish a closer link between resources and results. Finding a balance between GBS, sector basket funding and project approaches is a process of trial and error and the office has shown itself able to be flexible and responsive.

6.4 In the Rwandan context of 1997-2000, the relative neglect of the productive sector was probably a right choice, because basic governance systems had to be put in place first. The strong focus on the education sector was also justifiable, and responsive to government requests. But opportunities to scale up experiences in this sector and use the closer involvement to track expenditure flows and feedback lessons to the MTEF and expenditure management were missed.

6.5 DFID's early work and focus on public finance management gained the trust of government, especially in the finance ministry. It also built confidence for multilateral and bilateral donors to move away from humanitarian assistance to a full development programme. DFID's subsequent efforts at harmonisation by working through the government-led cluster system and promoting aid coordination reinforced that confidence.

6.6 At the same time, the quality of advisers, TA and secondees brought positive influence to government on issues such as the MTEF, public financial management, tax and customs

³⁸ Examples include support to the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), MTEF and land reform.

law, land reform, and education policy. Development partners also credit DFID with influence over their approaches to budget support and agricultural strategy.

Strengths & weaknesses of DFID's programme

Strengths

6.7 Good foundations are the key to a stable construction. The strong political commitment that launched the programme was bold and visionary. It established a new relationship where none had existed before. The close political interaction between the UK Secretary of State and the President of Rwanda enabled the programme to develop at a time when governance was weak and regional security uncertain. The arrangement was farsighted, formalised in a memorandum of understanding and contained the astute provision for annual independent reviews.

6.8 The decision to commit two thirds of programme funding through budget support was also bold, especially given DFID's limited familiarity with national systems. It responded to policy thinking in DFID at the time and has been a positive experience.³⁹ It gave a clear signal that DFID wanted to work with government and through government systems.

6.9 The political commitment was for ten years and the resulting country strategy and assistant plan have experienced no major shifts in programme priorities. But the programme has not been rigid, and DFID has responded to government requests, especially during development of the poverty reduction strategy and in the area of public financial management.

6.10 The combination of budget support, financial management and sector strategies has kept DFID close to top decision-makers. Access has been good and DFID is seen as a trusted interlocutor.

6.11 The flexibility to harness the combined efforts of advisers and TA, and to appoint secondees with development partners has been the key factor behind successful influencing, as noted above.

Weaknesses

6.12 Inevitably, within such a broadly-cast approach, where instruments were untested and there was no historical relationship to fall back on, some assumptions have proved wrong and some opportunities have been missed. Unsurprisingly, some of the weaknesses identified in the report are the obverse of the strengths; others highlight issues of detail.

6.13 A results focus was not developed until the 2004 logframe exercise that built on the programming in the CAP. Areas of interest and programmes were defined in the CSP and CAP. But even after the poverty reduction strategy was prepared, the CAP failed to set clear objectives or indicators for DFID.

³⁹ An unrelated evaluation of budget support that includes the Rwanda experience is due to report at a similar time to this study.

6.14 Part of the problem seems to have arisen from an incomplete understanding of the causal logic from budget support through to poverty reduction outcomes. It left the programme with a top-down approach to public sector management based on trickle down assumptions. The DFID Rwanda programme is very strongly oriented at central agencies; it is distant from other important players in line ministries and local government and insufficiently informed about implementation realities on the ground. There has been little attention to pro-poor service delivery mechanisms and throughput processes that transform resources into tangible outputs. The country office argue that this role was left to other donors acting in a complementary manner.

6.15 The DFID programme was slow to respond to the priorities expressed in the PRS, especially for rural transformation. Although the programme was consequent on focussing on public sector management, governance and institutional development, it could have been more pro-active in its support to economic development.

6.16 Within the area of public financial management, more attention should have been given earlier to budget execution and expenditure tracking, which is now starting to be addressed. This would have fostered greater accountability and contributed directly to support for parliamentary institutions and ambitions for good governance.

6.17 The arrangements for disbursement of budget support worked well until 2004 when disbursement was delayed twice, the second time owing to security concerns. The independent monitors argue that in the second instance the UK government failed to follow the procedures set out in the MOU and harmed the UK's reputation as a development partner. The UK government's view is that the situation was clearly in breach of the clause to promote peace and stability in the region and warranted swift and decisive action. In any event, the delay in disbursement was short lived and of little long-term consequence to the flow of funds.

6.18 The use of OPRs and PCRs has followed departmental guidelines, but the programme should have made more use of independent evaluations. One of the five principles in DFID's new policy paper on aid conditionality is for participatory and evidence-based policy making.⁴⁰ Yet DFID has given little support to government either directly or through evaluation capacity development. DFID has neglected the establishment of a coherent national poverty reduction monitoring and evaluation system, investing only in national statistics. There is a need to join monitoring under the MTEF, which is currently geared towards outputs, with monitoring under the PRS, which has outcome targets. With government's planned move towards decentralised structures, it is important to develop a bottom-up data collection system that also feeds into local planning, monitoring and evaluation, as well as through the line ministries.

6.19 The programme has forged few links to civil society and the private sector – some respondents perceive DFID as being a 'close friend of government that does not like civil society'.

⁴⁰ DFID, FCO and HMT (2005) Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality. HMSO, London

6.20 A low prioritisation of language as a communication issue and poor language skills amongst advisers and TA have distanced DFID from middle management and rural settings.

Explanatory factors

6.21 It is worth trying to disentangle why things developed in the way they did, in the hope of providing a better understanding for future policy. A number of factors have been identified in this evaluation, which appear to explain key elements in the strengths and weaknesses.

6.22 An intensive focus on public financial management kept the attention of the programme on MINECOFIN and the role of central agencies in tackling constraints to PRS implementation through the MTEF, sector strategy and budget processes. Limited involvement with line departments left DFID less informed about the challenges and limitations to service delivery, other than in education. In the absence of a portfolio of small projects which provide a natural entry point, advisors need a strategy for engagement with sectoral institutions.

6.23 Close support to government in developing the poverty reduction strategy and a consequent close association with the strategy itself, seems to have left DFID advisers convinced that the CAP was responsive to the PRS. Earlier consultation might have opened it to greater challenge by development partners and civil society, but the consultations came when the strategy was largely set. The fact that the livelihoods adviser was London-based during CAP development, when the education, social development and governance advisers were all in Kigali, may have contributed.

6.24 If programme staff had been more closely engaged at lower and decentralised levels of government, other voices would have been heard. In other countries in the region, longstanding social, economic, educational and personal links with the UK create formal and informal networks of communication and interaction that do not exist for DFID in Rwanda. The 1999 CSP correctly identified concerns about DFID's low knowledge base and unfamiliarity with francophone bureaucracy and systems. The draft CSP was circulated in all three languages, but thereafter, DFID never responded to this analysis with mitigating actions such as promoting a strong multi-lingual policy. As a result the programme has been distant from rural poverty and the challenges of service delivery.

6.25 The non-budget support part of the programme has been centred on a few major interventions. But without a clear strategy a combination of responsiveness to government and political direction did lead to probably too many smaller projects that were marginal to the programme (such as CITT) or that took the programme in unplanned directions (ICTR, SURF-PACFA, Rwanda 10 Commission). This weakness has been recognised by the current team but it will take time to restructure the portfolio.

6.26 Last, both the civil service reform and public financial management initiatives could have been more closely integrated with each other and with gender and HIV/AIDS cross

cutting issues. The short-term gains from salary support were not fully thought through and are now a major problem.

Lessons and recommendations

6.27 The main findings from the evaluation have been summarised in text boxes at the end of each chapter.

Strong and interactive political support was the foundation of a successful development programme

6.28 The clarity of political support made the technical work of the programme easier and accelerated the pace at which government grew confident at working with DFID. A political relationship brings uncertainties about what will happen when individuals change. The MOU and the monitoring arrangement was the answer to that uncertainty. It brought security to the commitment and transparency to the process. The scope and content of the MOU has probably moved too far towards technical and economic performance in the 2004 revision. Future versions should follow the recommendations of the 2005 independent monitors and contain fewer detailed provisions and more focus on process.

6.29 Recommendation for DFID PS.⁴¹ The use of independent monitors has been a strength of the MOU and should be reviewed and compared with experience in other countries with a view to extending their use.

Programmes built around budget support need a strategy for the non-budget support components

6.30 Neither the CSP nor the CAP provided much strategic thinking about how the non-budget support part of the programme should be structured and managed. As a result, complementary work on public financial management was at first poorly harmonised with other donors; not closely integrated with civil service reform; and focused on the MTEF and budget management to the exclusion of expenditure management and service delivery through line ministries. Sector support to education was an exception. An analysis of the interactions between these components would have helped the programme develop objectives and indicators.

6.31 Recommendation for DFID Rwanda: In the next CAP, attention should be given to a more explicit analysis of the intervention logic between budget support and service delivery, in order to target specific interventions on constraints facing government. An objective review of the roles and contributions of other donors should be used to identify gaps and complementarity.

6.32 Recommendation for DFID PS: Useful contributions to understanding the impact of budget support come from the GBS evaluability study and the inception report of the OECD/DAC GBS evaluation. Neither explore in much detail the linkages between improved

⁴¹ The shorthand DFID PS is used to refer to DFID Headquarters, at Palace Street, London

budgeting and flows of funds with access and quality of service provision. In view of current policy to expand budget support, these links need to be better understood. Improved guidelines would help DFID country programmes develop strategy and set more informative objectives and indicators of performance.

Effective support for poverty reduction requires an understanding of constraints and opportunities facing national implementation

6.33 Government faces substantial challenges to meet poverty reduction targets, many of which hinge on the ability of the state and other actors to deliver services. Development organisations need to engage at operational and decentralised levels to understand how central government processes are being transformed into effective programmes. Development partners need to be able to analyse these processes. DFID can meet this challenge by bringing in advisers and programme staff with language skills to communicate effectively at middle management levels and in rural areas. Broader historical and cultural sensitivity might be fostered by exploring relationships with non-Anglo Saxon knowledge centres.⁴²

6.34 Recommendation to DFID Rwanda: Future recruitment should aim to appoint some advisors who are fluent in French and have working experience of Francophone administrative systems.

6.35 Recommendation to DFID PS: Language policy should be re-examined to provide incentives for competency in relevant foreign languages. The practice of FCO might be a guide here. Recruitment policy would be more effective if it allows selective recruitment of suitably qualified staff to language sensitive posts such as Rwanda.

Core processes of government include responding to demand and monitoring effectiveness of aid programmes (not just MTEF, PFM and sector strategies)

6.36 The CAP strategy focuses on financial and planning processes at the centre. Bottom-up reasoning and interest for real-life situations on the ground is relatively weak outside formal consultations associated with the PRS and some sector strategy development. Empowerment of the demand side of government services has not received the attention it deserves. Good governance requires downward oriented accountability systems and needs the empowerment of citizens, who are the clients of government services, with initiatives such as citizen report cards. Sector programmes of monitoring and evaluation can be used as a vehicle to survey demand and promote accountability in delivery of services.

6.37 Recommendation to DFID Rwanda: The effectiveness of poverty reduction budget support would be better understood, and probably better managed, with a more structured flow of information about performance on the ground. DFID, in collaboration with other

⁴² For instance the Centre d'Etudes de la Region des Grands Lacs d'Afrique (Belgium) or the Centre for International Studies Clingendael (Netherlands).

donors, should examine the scope to support evaluation capacity development that would foster engagement by civil society and link to other initiatives to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny.

6.38 Recommendation to DFID PS: Monitoring and evaluation is a neglected area outside of EvD. Yet moves towards budget support and funding through multilateral agencies place a premium on better flows of information to understand the effectiveness of donor support. Good M&E is a necessary adjunct to capacity building in public financial management. Consideration should be given to creating an M&E policy support facility to develop methods and harness experience. An early priority would be to examine practical approaches to sector-wide evaluation.

Joint sector reviews provide a powerful tool to empower government leadership, and have the potential to foster accountability and transparency, but must follow expenditure management all the way to service delivery

6.39 In a strategy where budget support or sector wide approaches with basket funding are the main instruments for finance, tools are needed to provide policy dialogue and interaction with government. Joint sector reviews, such as those introduced in the education sector have high potential. But they should complement work on budget management and sector strategy. A critical element is for reviews such as these to take place in the field and to trace both the flow of resources and the corresponding educational performance at classroom level. A start has been made in Rwanda. Lessons can be learned from DFID programmes in other countries, such as India, where well-established government-led reviews are structured in this way.

6.40 Recommendation to DFID Rwanda: Many of the building blocks to improve sector review are in place but they need to be joined together. There is scope for DFID to lead in the education sector and foster a consolidated approach to joint sector reviews, with public expenditure tracking surveys and public expenditure review at sector level. Anchoring reviews more clearly in the field and with a sector-wide participation will require the language skills noted above and will contribute to other recommendations dealing with monitoring and evaluation.

6.41 Recommendation to DFID PS: There is growing interest in government-led processes to monitor and evaluate sector performance. Lessons should be drawn from country experience and disseminated widely throughout DFID.

EVALUATION OF DFID COUNTRY PROGRAMMES – COUNTRY STUDIES PROGRAMME 2005-6

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONSULTANCY ASSISTANCE

1. Introduction

- 1.1 DFID's Performance management system is supported by periodic independent evaluations at project, programme, sector and thematic level. A recent NAO report suggested that performance management could be strengthened by periodic evaluation of DFID's country programmes (CPEs).
- 1.2 DFID's Evaluation Department (EvD) has recently undertaken independent pilot studies in four countries during which an evaluation framework evolved. This framework (Annex A) will form the basis of future evaluation studies.
- 1.3 These terms of reference (ToRs) are for the next stage in a rolling programme of CPEs covering EvD's requirements for the next 12 months, with a possible extension of up to 12 months. As each CPE finalised, the ToRs maybe refined to reflect country context.
- 1.4 Countries proposed for evaluation in 2005/6 are Rwanda, Ghana, Mozambique and Bangladesh. The timing of these may require some studies to run concurrently.
- 1.5 The evaluation will examine the countries' most recent Country Strategy Paper (CSP), or related policy documents. The lessons learned will contribute to DFID policy, including Country Assistance Plans (CAPs).

2. Background

- 2.1 DFID has increasingly targeted development assistance at the county level and become a highly decentralised organisation. Country offices have replaced regional development offices and decision-making and financial authority have been delegated to country programme heads. The purpose of this shift is to improve the relevance and coherence of development assistance programmes while at the same time maximising opportunities for partnership, influencing and donor harmonisation around a nationally owned programme for poverty reduction. The way in which country programmes (e.g. as described in a CSP) translate DFID's corporate objectives into operational plans for delivering development assistance is therefore a logical object for evaluation.

3. Overarching objectives

3.1 The main objective of the CPE is to assess the country programme in terms of:

DFID Processes

- The **appropriateness** of country programme objectives and the logic behind them given domestic policy objectives for poverty reduction, as well as DFID's own corporate level objectives;
- The **relevance** of programme interventions given overall objectives (i.e. the cause and effect link between interventions and objectives), the governance and institutional setting, and DFID's comparative advantage and human resource availability;
- The **efficiency** with which programme plans are translated into activities, including human resource and office management, collaboration and harmonisation with other stakeholders, policy dialogue and influencing, the use of financial instruments, and the quality of DFID as a development partner;
- The **effectiveness** of the overall programme in achieving intermediate poverty reduction outcomes and the systems for measuring and monitoring success;
- The success with which the programmed had mainstreamed the cross-cutting issues of **poverty, gender, HIV/AIDS and environment** into all of its activities. What were the variables influencing the process of inclusion? What was the impact on the achievement of wider programme objectives?

Outcomes and Impacts

- What can be said about **impact and sustainability** and at what level this occurs. What changes intended or unintended can be attributed to the interventions.

3.2 The evaluation seeks to draw the cause and effect links between:

- **Programme direction and the poverty outcomes to which they are linked** - Does the programme have clear direction? How does this relate to DFID's corporate objectives on the one hand and the country-specific environment on the other? What development theory and evidence underpins the programme direction? Why were certain investment decisions made over others? What are the results/outcomes of these linkages?
- **Choice of instruments and objectives** – What are the “development instruments” in use? What are the factors/variables that impact upon efficiency? Are the choices being made the best

possible choices, given those factors/variables?

- **DFID as a development partner** – What is the nature and quality of DFID’s partnerships with the country government and other development stakeholders? How do these different stakeholders perceive DFID as a development partner? What are the factors/variables that impact/influence those relationships?

Outputs & Timing

The consultants will produce one study report and executive summary for each country. The report shall be approximately 30-40 pages long (excluding annexes).

EvD will carry out the initial data collection, with support from the consultant, which will produce a programme history. DFID will produce an initial context summary which will provide additional background information and outline issues identified by key stakeholders, other donors and DFID country staff. The consultants will work to the evaluation framework for the study (Annex A) as well as addressing country-specific issues raised by the EvD team in the context summary.

The consultant will:

- identify key issues for the evaluation, including understanding the development environment and history of DFID’s recent programme
- identify key stakeholders, internal and external to DFID, who they will interview
- set up and plan the main field visit (lasting 2 weeks) including consulting with local DFID staff and getting their support
- identify and engage a consultant locally as part of the evaluation team

The consultants will work to strict deadlines, to be agreed by the Evaluation Manager, however, the First Draft report will be required to be delivered to EvD within 2 weeks of the Field Visit.

Following a dissemination seminar in which the consultant will present the findings of the report, the consultant will produce the Final Report, incorporating any resulting comments from the seminar, within 6 weeks of the Field Visit.

On completion of the final report, the consultants will produce an evaluation summary (EvSum), of approximately 4-6 pages, which will include the response from the relevant DFID office/Department.

The Rwanda CPE is the first in the programme, with field visit dates set

for 6 –17 June. The Bangladesh CPE is planned for the end of August and the Mozambique CPE is planned for late in 2005. The Ghana CPE will take place in early 2006.

5. Competence and Expertise Requirements

- 5.1 One consultancy organisation will be appointed to deliver the outputs described above. The team should be balanced in terms of gender and must include a strong national/regional component.
- 5.2 A full-time managing consultant with extensive evaluation experience, and a record of managing country/strategic level evaluations will be required to manage the planning and delivery this study. The individual will also be expected to have strong written and oral communications skills as he/she will play a major role in communicating lessons learned both to country programme personnel and to a wider DFID audience.
- 5.3 Each country team will need to be familiar with country programme evaluation, monitoring and performance management issues. The team will be made up of a combined skill set covering economics, social and institutional development and human resource management.
- 5.4 The consultancy team will have responsibility for:
 - maintaining ethical standards in implementing the evaluation
 - the timely production of evidence based conclusions and recommendations
 - managing logistics in country

5. Reporting

- 5.1 The consultants will report to the Evaluation Manager/Senior Economist (Nick York) or the Deputy Programme Manager (Lynn Quinn) in DFID Evaluation Department.

6. Timing

- 6.1 The consultancy should start around April 2005 and outputs will be produced to firm timetable. Consultants must specify the level of inputs of each component of the evaluation work as well as provide CVs of the proposed country evaluation team.

3.5 Unanticipated Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were there any unintended consequences (positive or negative) from DFID's activities? Were any missed opportunities identified? 	•	
4. DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS: <i>what development progress has been achieved in country?</i>			
4.1 Development progress 2000-2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What overall progress has been made towards the MDGs etc.? What has been the contribution of the development assistance? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic and development progress Contribution of development assistance? 	•
5. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND ISSUES			
5.1 DFID contribution and value added	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What has been DFID's overall value added/contribution? 		
5.2 Strengths and weaknesses of DFID programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What have been the strengths of the DFID programme? What have been its weaknesses? 		
5.3 Explanatory factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> what explains DFID's contribution and the strengths/weaknesses of the programme? 		
5.4 Issues and lessons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> what lessons can be learned for the [country] programme, Regional Office, DFID and donors? what issues of wider interest are raised by the [country office] experience? 		

- The report will include the following:**
- Financial analysis
 - Persons met
 - Documents consulted
 - List of acronyms
 - Terms of Reference
 - Timeline(s)
 - Outcome matrices

Annex B:**Country Programme Review Timeframe**

Activity	Timeframe
Letter/ToRs sent to Country Office	2 months +
EvD Scoping/Documentation Collection	1 week
Inception/Hand-over to Consultants	3 – 5 weeks
Field Visit	2 weeks
Draft paper	3 weeks
Seminar	2 weeks
Final Report/EvSum	2 weeks

List of People Met

DFID Rwanda

Colin Kirk	Head of Office
Matt Maguire	Deputy Head (Programmes)
Alan Penney	Senior Education Adviser (Acting)
Renwick Irvine	Assistant Education Adviser
Rodney Dyer	Rural Livelihoods Adviser
Arif Ghauri	Governance Adviser
Doreen Muzirankoni	Assistant Governance Adviser
Simon Stevens	Economic Adviser
Judy Walker	Social Development Adviser
Cormac Quinn	Deputy Programme Manager
Jim McCredie	Deputy Programme Manager
Jean Gakwaya	Programme Officer
Netty Butera	Programme Officer
Innocent Mutuyimana	Assistant Programme Officer
Cyriaque Harelimana	Assistant Programme Officer
Denzil Castelino	Management Officer
Reuben Muvunyi	Estates Management Officer
Boniface Twahira	Assistant Estates Management Officer
Katie Bigmore	HIV/AIDS Adviser attached to UNAIDS Rwanda
Liz Drake	Rural Livelihoods Adviser attached to World Bank Rwanda

DFID and FCO

Jeremy Macadie	British Ambassador, Rwanda
Caroline Phillips	DFID Bangkok (ex-Rwanda) <i>by email</i>
Mark James	DFID Caribbean (ex-Rwanda) <i>by telephone</i>

TA and Consultants

Dr Harvey Smith	Consultant Coordinator, CfBT, RESSP
Alison Mead Richardson	Distance Teacher Educ. Adviser, CfBT / RESSP
Ann Louise Grinsted	ODI Fellow, MINELOC
Kieran Holmes	RRA Project Manager
Tom Leeming	Economist, attached to Delegation of the European Commission in Rwanda
Ben Cropper	ODI Fellow, MINECOFIN
Robert Cook	ODI Fellow, MINECOFIN
Susy Ndaruhutse	Education Finance Specialist, CfBT

Government of Rwanda

Eng. Eugene Rurangwa	Director of Lands and Chief Registrar of Deeds, Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Mines
Vincent Karega	Secretary General, Ministry of Public Service, Skills Development, Vocational Training and Labour
George Katureebe	Director General, Central Public Investments and External Finance Bureau (CEPEX), Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Leonard Rugwabiza	Economist, SPU, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

Claver Yisa	Director of Studies and Planning, Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research
M Wenceslas	Chef de Division, Studies and Planning, Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research
John Rutayisire	Director Nat. Curr. Dev. Centre, MINEDUC
Paul Masterjerb	Director Distance Training Prog, KIE
Emmanuel Muvunyi	Director , SFAR
Innocent Nkurikyinka	Information Officer, SFAR
Anne Gahongayire	Secretary General , MIGEPROF
Camille Karamaga	Director Budget, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Claver Gatete	Secretary General and Secretary to the Treasury, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Philippe Gafishi Ngango	Director, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Ernest Rwamucyo	Director, SPU, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Henry Gaperi	Commissioner General, Rwanda Revenue Authority
Elias Baingana	Director for Planning and Research, Rwanda Revenue Authority
Dr Evariste Namahungu	Secretary General, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
Ernest Ruzindaza	Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
David Bukacara	Agricultural extension unit, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
Stephen Bashaija	Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator, Rural Sector Support Project (MINAGRI)
Prof Silas Lwakabamba	Rector, KIST
Dr N K M Mushule	Director of CITT, KIST
Emmanuel Kanigwa	Co-Director CITT, KIST
C P Agarwal	Ag. Director, ICT Centre, KIST
Innocent Nkurunziza	Assistant Director, ICT Centre, KIST
Lawrence Nabwana	Head, Planning Department, KIST
Development Partners & IFIs	
Eugene Nkubito	Programme Specialist, Governance, UNDP
Jean Barbe	Head of Section, Economics and Governance, Delegation of the European Commission in Rwanda
Gianluca Rampolla	Head of Unit, Aid Coordination Unit, UN Resident Coordinator's Office/Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Lambert Grijns	Head of Development Cooperation, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Gaspard Ndagijimana	Adviser, Rural Economic Transformation, Royal Netherlands Embassy

Dirk Brems Arne Ström	Belgian Cooperation Counsellor Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden
Paul Lambers	Co-director SPPMD (Institutional Strengthening of the Strategic Planning Process Project), MINECOFIN, BTC/CTB
Nancy Fitch	HIV/AIDS Technical Advisor, USAID Rwanda
NGOs & Civil Society	
Emmanuel Ndahimana	Retired Parliamentarian; ex Minister of State in MINECOFIN; previous Ambassador to Tanzania; currently in private business, Chair of the Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency, and member of the NEPAD National Commission
Phil Hudson Francois Nsengiyumva	Programme Director, VSO, Rwanda Executive Secretary ROPARWA (Rwandan Network of Farmer Organisations)
Alexis Ruzibukira	Deputy Director General for Investment Promotion, Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency
Daniel C. Clay	Director Institute of International Agriculture, Michigan State University (WB consultant for Agricultural policy paper)
Henk Breman	International Center for Soil Fertility and Agricultural Development (consultant for soil fertility management and input demand and supply analysis)
Aloys Guillaume	Director, SNEC
Julia Sobrevilla	Country Representative, PSI Rwanda

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ANNEX D: RWANDA COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION MATRIX

CRITERIA	MAIN QUESTIONS	SUB QUESTIONS / TASKS
1. CONTEXT: what were the significant features of the context in which the programme was designed and implemented?		
1.1 Rwanda 2000-2004	Drivers for change over this period	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timeline and significant features.
1.2 DFID 2000-2004	Major changes & events within DFID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timeline and significant features
1.3 Donor scene 2000- 2004	Major changes in donor community and approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timeline and significant features
2. PROGRAMME QUALITY: what was the quality of DFID's programme and process?		
2.1. Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was DFID's strategy(s) in Rwanda appropriate? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summarise evolution & content Appropriately harmonised with and communicated to, other donors? Clear, results-focused and monitorable? Relevant, appropriate and aligned to context/PRS process ? Consistent with DFID policy? reflecting DBS path, PRS led, harmonization, upstream shift, globalization, PSA agenda Adequate consultation with and communication to govt, CS and Private sector ?
2.2 Relationships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How was DFID viewed by other development partners? How effectively did DFID pursue the 'influencing' objectives regarding strategy and policy? What were the risks and unintended consequences? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identification of key partners and change over time General approach to influencing DFID – government DFID – civil society DFID - bilaterals DFID - multilaterals DFID – FCO
2.3 Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> what portfolio of activities and instruments did DFID implement? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and staff inputs by CP outcome and instrument Justification for activities and instruments by outcome

CRITERIA	MAIN QUESTIONS	SUB QUESTIONS / TASKS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How did DFID appropriately balance its support for government and civil society? How did it implement the cross-cutting issues of gender, poverty, HIV/AIDS and environment? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainstream gender? Mainstream environment? Mainstream poverty? Mainstream HIV/AIDS Harmonised with other donors? Cross-cutting rights-based approach? Government ownership? Civil society ownership? Balance between govt. and CS? M & E of initiatives and instruments?
3. PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS: what has the programme achieved?		
3.1 Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have project level objectives been achieved/ are on track at project output and purpose level? What influence has been achieved? Has DFID advanced harmonisation? How effective have different aid instruments been as development instruments? Are these results sustainable? Equity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none">
3.2 CP outcomes:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What progress has been made towards each (CP) strategic outcome? Is this progress sustainable? What has been DFID's contribution? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none">
3.3 CP purpose and goal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What progress has been made towards the CP purpose and goal? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support implementation of PRS State and society work together to achieve sustainable poverty reduction

CRITERIA	MAIN QUESTIONS	SUB QUESTIONS / TASKS
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transformation within public service
3.4 DFID corporate objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What contribution has the programme made to the PSA and DDP? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribution to PSA, SDA and DDP (general)
4. DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS: <i>what development progress has been achieved in Rwanda?</i>		
4.1 Development progress 2000 – 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What overall progress has been made towards the MDG's etc.? What has been the contribution of the development assistance? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic and development progress Contribution of development assistance?
5. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND ISSUES		
5.1 DFID contribution and value added	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What has been DFIDs overall value added/contribution? 	
5.2 Strengths and weaknesses of DFID programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What have been the strengths of the DFID programme? What have been its weaknesses? 	
5.3 Explanatory factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What explains DFIDs contribution and the strengths/weaknesses of the programme? 	
5.4 Issues and lessons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What lessons can be learned for the Regional Programme (Strategy ?), DFID and donors? What issues of wider interest (PRS & BS) are raised by the Rwanda experience? 	

Rwanda Timeline

Year	Key national events in Rwanda and the region
1999 & before	<p>Process of down-sizing military from 1997</p> <p>Establishment of the Law on privatisation on 11th March 1996 and the creation of the Privatisation Secretariat in October 1997</p> <p>The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) programme signed with the IMF/WB on 24th June 1998 for the period 1998 – 2001, to improve economic management and structural reforms. This was transformed into PRGF in 1999, to take into account the Poverty reduction and Growth aspects</p> <p>Establishment of the Auditor General's Office by Law No. 05/98 of 4th June 1998</p> <p>Establishment of the Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency (RIPA) on 18th Dec. 1998. This however became operational in June 2000.</p> <p>RRA created in 1998</p> <p>National Unity and Reconciliation Commission set up 1999</p> <p>Creation of the Rwanda Debt Trust Fund following the Stockholm Conference of 2-3/June 1998</p> <p>Begin of the work of the National Human Rights Commission in 1999</p> <p>Begin of Public Service Reform with support of UNDP in April 1999</p> <p>Establishment of Insurance System for Civil Servants through SUREMED in Jan. 1999</p> <p>First free elections at grassroots community administrative levels at Cells and Secteurs in March 1999 in the Democratization and Decentralised process</p> <p>Establishment of the Auditor General's Office for Auditing of all Govt. accounts</p> <p>8th August 1999: Official Launching of the Fund for Assistance to Survivors of Genocide (FARG)</p>
2000	<p>~Introduction of MTEF in May 2000 for the 2001-2003 Budget</p> <p>~1st June 2000: Official Launching of the PRSP by H.E. The President of the Republic in the Parliament</p> <p>~Dec. 2000: Approval of the I-PRSP (Decision Point) by the WB/IMF Boards, after its finalisation in Nov. 2000. This enabled considerations for the Debt Relief in the HIPC Programme</p> <p>~Establishment of the Rwanda Bureau of Standards (RBS) in June 2000</p> <p>~Creation of the Rwanda Private Sector Federation replacing the former Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which was a public Institution</p> <p>~Creation of the Rwanda-Tanzanian Joint Commission for better utilisation of the Central Corridor and examination of the possibility of construction of the Railway ISAKA-KIGALI</p> <p>~Establishment of the Constitutional Commission and the National Electoral Commission in 2000</p> <p>~4th October 2000: Signature of the AGOA Agreement with the USA to improve access of Rwandan export products to the US market</p> <p>~19/12/2000: Modification of the Law of 15/04/1964, on the administrative organisation of the territory of the Republic of Rwanda. The modification established the current Provinces and Districts</p> <p>~29/12/2000: Law No. 43/2000 on organisation and functioning of the Province</p> <p>~Nov. 2000: National validation workshop on Land tenure and documents for the preparation of the Land bill</p> <p>~Establishment of the National Examination Council in 2000</p>

Year	Key national events in Rwanda and the region
	<p>~28/11/2000: Law on the creation of the National Electoral Commission</p>
2001	<p>Jan. 2001: Replacement of the Tax on Turnover (ICHA) by VAT</p> <p>Law on Discrimination and Sectarianism passed in 2001</p> <p>26/01/2001: Organic Law establishing <i>Gacaca</i> Jurisdiction</p> <p>Jan. 2001: Laws governing the organisation and functioning of the District, the Town and the City of Kigali passed</p> <p>March 2001: The Public Servants Health Insurance Scheme (RAMA) established by law</p> <p>6th March 2001: Organisation of elections of Mayors and Executive and Advisory Committees of Districts and Towns throughout the country</p> <p>Creation of 12 Women Promotion Funds (one per Province) for economic empowerment of women</p> <p>Establishment of the National Committee for the Follow-up of Implementation of the Recommendations of the Beijing Conference.</p> <p>Signature with European Union for the Financing Agreement for the Support Programme to ESAF II as Direct Budget Support for 58.42 Million Euro to cover Budget deficit for 2001 and 2002</p> <p>December 2001: Final PRSP presented to and approved by Development Partners in Kigali.</p> <p>5th Nov. 2001: Meeting between H.E. The Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda in UK under facilitation of the Gvt. Of UK (SoS Clare Short)</p>
2002	<p>Feb. 2002: Decree of the Prime Minister establishing the restructured CEPEX, for better planning and coordination of Public Investments and Resource Mobilisation</p> <p>May 2002: Conclusion of new PRGF negotiations with IMF and related agreement signed allowing financing with 330,37 Million USD</p> <p>1st June 2002: Official launching of <i>Gacaca</i> to start on experimental basis in 12 Secteurs</p> <p>November 2002: Introduction of "Clusters" by GOR in the aid coordination mechanism – DFID asked to facilitate the social cluster, but opted for education</p> <p>Nov. 2002: Introduction of the National Investment Strategy (NIS) to the Government Development Partners, a document of prioritisation of Public Investments to improve impact on poverty reduction and achievement of objectives of the PRS and Vision 2020</p> <p>July 2002: Commemoration for 20 years twinning partnership with the German Land of Rhananie-Palatinat</p> <p>March 2002: Elections of local leaders at Cell and Secteurs</p> <p>New press law November</p> <p>GoR acceded to Convention of Rights of Child (CRC) optional protocols</p> <p>Common Development Fund (CDF) started October 2002</p> <p>Rwanda completed military withdrawal from DRC</p> <p>August 2002: 3rd National General Census of Population and Habitat. Results have been analysed and published on the Gvt. Website</p>
2003	<p>1st Jan. 2003: Presidential Directive for the release of different categories of detainees from prisons (elderly, sick and those without dossiers)</p> <p><i>Gacaca</i> courts are functional in one Secteur in each of 106 Districts in the country</p>

Year	Key national events in Rwanda and the region
	<p>7th Sept 2003: First Meeting of the General Assembly of the National Women Council for establishment of the functioning of the Women Council Committees</p> <p>Draft Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Review Commission approved by referendum on 26th May 2003.</p> <p>Report of the Constitution Commission of 08/06/2003 shows approval of constitution by 93% of the voting population</p> <p>Presidential elections on 25th August and Legislative elections on 29th August 2003.</p> <p>12th Sept 2003: Inauguration of H.E. Paul KAGAME, as first democratically elected President of the Republic</p> <p>07/11/2003: Prime Minister's Speech presenting the development Plan of the 1st mandate of the President of the Republic of 2003 - 2010</p>
2004	<p>Jan. 2004: Rwanda joined the Free Trade Area of COMESA</p> <p>Ombudsman operational January</p> <p>Revised Gacaca law adopted June</p> <p>Report on Parliamentary Commission into the Ideology of Genocide published</p> <p>23rd March 2004: Ministerial decree on Elections of the Women Council Committees at all levels, Cell to National level.</p> <p>12th to 16th July 2004: Elections of the Executive Committees of the Women Councils at all levels</p> <p>13th July 2004: Election of "Abunzi" (Disputes Mediators), a total of 18,540 (12 in each of all 1545 Sectors of the country).</p> <p>11/02/2004: Policy on Land Management and utilisation approved by Cabinet of Ministers</p> <p>17/06/2004: The Chamber of Deputies approved the Organic Law on Environment and sent it to the Senate for approval</p> <p>02/09/2004: New Press Policy in Rwanda approved by Cabinet of Ministers, allowing , <i>inter alia</i>, private Radio Broadcasting Stations</p> <p>23rd Sept. 2004: Official Launching of the Public Labour Intensive Works (HIMO) Programme by H.E. The President of the Republic (in Kanyonyomba Marshland and subsequent establishment of Focal Points in technical Ministries for "HIMO Mainstreaming"</p> <p>10th Dec.2004: Presidential Decree modifying the law on the "Public Interest Works" (TIG) to bring it into conformity with the Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/06/2004 on <i>Gacaca</i>.</p> <p>8th – 10th Dec. 2004: GoR/Partners Conference in Kigali, with particular attention to the financing of the Energy and Water sectors and in the context of Public/Private Partnerships</p> <p>Dec. 2004: Seven (7) Ministries out of 15 have Sector Strategies in place</p> <p>Dec. 2004: Draft Law for establishment of the National Research Commission and the National Research Fund</p> <p>NGOs develop a Platform</p>
2005	<p>Nationwide Gacaca implementation started January</p> <p>HIPC Completion Point reached after approval by the Boards of IMF/WB on 12th/13th April</p> <p>May 2005: The Land law approved by the Senate, the final stage before its signature by H.E. The President of the Republic</p>

DFID Rwanda Timeline

	1999 & before	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
DFID				January. CAP to replace CSP and be updated annually so replace APPR and PARPS			
DFID Rwanda Strategy Statements	1998 UK Commitment to 10 year development plan including BS September 1999 CSP 1999 First MOU		Feb MOU 2000-2001 Update	Feb 2002 MOU Update		Feb 2004 CAP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Peace and stability ▪ Economic & social policy ▪ Aid co-ordination, harmonisation & alignment ▪ Government processes ▪ PRS priorities: education; gender; rural dev and agric transformation; HIV/AIDS ▪ Rights CAP Logframe produced. 5 outputs: 1 Core PRS cycle is improved 2 Capacity for pro-poor economic and financial management including MTEF process, improved 3 Policy, planning and delivery improved in selected sectors/targeted programme areas 4 Accountable, effective and democratic	

	1999 & before	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
						governance enhanced 5 Donor coordination, alignment and harmonisation improved New MOU	
Major programme activities and projects							
<i>Budget Support</i>				Dec.: DFID brings forward a £ 3 m disbursement to help GOR finance withdrawing troops from DRC	Nov.: DFID agrees new BS programme and disburses 2 tranches, leaving one that hinges on agreement of new PRGF programme targets	March: DFID withholds £ 6.25 m due to continued delay in agreeing new PRGF targets. May: despite agreement of new PRGF targets, DFID withholds £ 6.25 m due to increased fighting in Eastern DRC and accusations of Rwandan complicity June: DFID disburses delayed £ 6.25 m tranche and £7m second quarter tranche Sep.: DFID withholds £7m third tranche due to Cabinet Office assessment of situation Eastern DRC. Tranche eventually released in October. Nov/ Dec: final quarter £7m delayed due to	Dec.: DFID brings forward a £ 3 m disbursement to help GOR finance withdrawing troops from DRC

	1999 & before	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
						announcement Rwanda is going to send troops into DRC. Delay persists beyond end of year despite assurances by GOR that it did not send troops and decided not to do so. Sweden also withholds \$7m tranche. WB \$65m PRSC arrives 31-12 allowing GOT to meet a number of its PRGF targets.	
<i>IMF Programmes</i>	1997: Post Conflict Emergency Assistance 1998: 40% quota first year ESAF 1999: 40% quota second year ESAF	July: Mid-term Review completed with waivers for 6 missed targets Dec: PRGF, HIPC DP and I-PRSP approved	First PRGF review delayed and then approved. Waivers and programme extension to April 2002.	July: new 3-year PRGF agreed	June: first review of new PRGF endorsed. Waivers and warnings on mixed performance and involvement in DRC conflict. Sept.-nov.: failure to negotiate new targets	Feb.: new targets agreed June: second and third review combined, waivers for 6 quantitative and 3 structural missed criteria	
<i>Education</i>	CSP Regular short term consultancy inputs into MINEDUC and MIGEPROF	First (Assistant) Educ Adviser in country	APPR RESSP starts	TA support DFID becomes facilitating donor	TA support	TA support CAP Start planning RESSP Phase II	TA support RESSP ends
				Education Sector Policy Education For All Plan	SFAR established (temp) Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) NCDC 6-year plan Textbook Policy & Plan Higher Education Bill passed Capitation grants replace school fees	Draft HIV/AIDS policy Draft policy on teacher management and development	Revised ESSP Draft response to needs of OVC
<i>Governance</i>			Support to Civil Service Reform				Fiscal decentralization issues paper due

	1999 & before	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>Gender</i>				TCO in Ministry of Gender	TCO in Ministry of Gender	TCO in Ministry of Gender	
<i>Livelihoods</i>				TA to Ministry of Land	TA to Ministry of Land	TA to Ministry of Land	
<i>Other donors</i>						World Bank PRSC	
<i>Major Reviews and Evaluations</i>			Oct Internal Audit Report No. 312/10/01 Nov APPR MOU 2 nd Independent Monitors	WB: PETS Health/Education DFID/SIDA MoU	CAP Annual Review Joint DFID WB UNICEF Prog Review 1 st Annual Joint Review of Education Sector	PSA Country Annual Review 2004 2 nd Annual Joint Review of Education Sector	3 rd Annual Joint Review of Education Sector
<i>In-country office</i>					Office devolved to Kigali		

DFID Rwanda Programme Performance

Annex G

Programme/ Project	Budget £'000	Output Score	Purpose Score	Overall Rating	DFID Contribution	Notes
Poverty Reduction Budget Support						
GBS Snapshot Annual 15 May 2003	£63,000	2	2	nr	GOR devoting increasing resources to poverty-reducing programmes; allocation to education significant and shift in financing from tertiary to primary.	GOR on track with IMF PRGF fiscal and monetary targets; tracking of budget execution weak; output indicators still being developed
GBS PCR 5 February 2004	£63,000	2	2	nr	DFID provides between one quarter and one third of budget support. Real level of public spending on poverty-reducing action has risen. There is no evidence of increased effectiveness.	Same {Purpose} text as 2003 report above
PRBS Support 2003-2005	£82,000					
1. Core PRS cycle is improved						
Support to PRS	£2,660					
Poverty Reduction Strategy PRS – Phase II Dev Grant	£425					
National Institute of Statistics for Rwanda	£1,500					
2. Capacity for pro-poor macro-economic and financial management including MTEF process is improved						
Support to MTEF Phase IOPR July 2001	£850	2,1,3,1	nr	nr		Strong links noted between PRSP and MTEF but linking of sector polices to resources not yet in place
MTEF Phase II	£240					
Support to SPPMD	£1,300					
Interim support to	£41					

DFID Rwanda Programme Performance

Annex G

Programme/ Project	Budget £'000	Output Score	Purpose Score	Overall Rating	DFID Contribution	Notes
MINECOFIN						
Debt Relief International	£186					
Forensic Audit BCR and BACAR	£45					
RRA Phase IV OPR 11/10/02	£3,565	2	1	nr		
RRA Phase IV PCR 16/12/03	£3,565	2	2	2	DFID is sole donor giving support to RRA, therefore progress largely attributable	
RRA Phase V	£4,330					
Support to Fiscal Decentralisation	£65					
3. Policy, planning and delivery improved in selected sectors/ targeted programme areas						
Support to the integrated framework	£66.5					
RESSP Annual Review 6 Nov 2003	£13,000	3	3	nr		Absence of M&E framework; indicators related to PRS; limited skills to manage whole sector development
RESSP Annual Review 23 Sep 2004	£13,000	3	3	nr		SWAp adopted and ESSP being rolled out to decentralised levels
RESSP OPR – BS/SWAP November 2004	£13,000	2	3		DFID direct contribution to fee-free primary education; significant contribution to Education Sector Strategic Plan	Not clear how this relates to the Annual Review of Sep 2004
Support to CITT OPR Dec 2004	£1,146	3	3	nr		A large part of the project was for building of capacity of staff and infrastructure, which were the main interests of CITT. Competitive

DFID Rwanda Programme Performance

Annex G

Programme/ Project	Budget £'000	Output Score	Purpose Score	Overall Rating	DFID Contribution	Notes
						fund was not fully understood and owned by CITT, which was more interested in support for its own research.
Joint support to the Education Sector	£4,000					
HIVA/AIDS SIPAA	£2,950					
Gender Mainstreaming OPR June 2002	£1,334	4	3	nr		
Interim support to Gender Policy	£211					
Gender Audit	£50					
Support to National Children cluster	£11,000					
Capacity building with MIGEPROF	£2,624					
Civil Service Reform Phase III	£4,500					
Development grant to MINITERRE	£83.5					
Support to Land Reform Process Phase I	£3,000					
Social Protection	£60					
PSI Condom Social Marketing PCR for Rwanda January 2005	£896	3	3	nr	No evidence to show purpose is achieved other than anecdotal information from some sexually active youth and CSW	Reviewed jointly with OPR for Burundi programme
PSI Malaria Prevention Bednets	£800					
ICTR	£200					
SURF-PACFA Care and treatment for survivors	£4,250					
4. Accountable, effective and democratic governance enhanced						
Support to the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme PCR January 2005	£5,500	2	3	nr	No logframe for the programme or for wider DFID support to WB MDRP. Joint Supervision mission in Oct 2004 reported this project had helped relocate expenditure from defence to social	Concerns over a lack of an exit strategy despite extension by 2 years to 1/6/05

DFID Rwanda Programme Performance

Annex G

Programme/ Project	Budget £'000	Output Score	Purpose Score	Overall Rating	DFID Contribution	Notes
					sectors.	
Support to UNDP support to NEPAD	£300					
Support to the Rwanda 10 Commission	£636					
Penal reform international GACACA	£715					
5. Donor coordination, alignment and harmonisation improved						
UNDP support to alignment, coordination and harmonisation project, joint support to MINECOFIN	£300					
UNAIDS HIV/AIDS Adviser	£330					
EC Economic Adviser	£390					
WB Rural Sector Specialist	£500					
WB RSSP Mid-year review	£70					

Note: nr – not rated

DFID Rwanda Programme Performance

Annex G

APPR November 2001			
Impact areas:	1. Poverty reduction and reconciliation		
	2. Other donors support to Rwanda		
	3. Capacity building to carry out reforms		
	4. Strategic sector interventions improving quality of public expenditure		
	5. Statistical capacity		

CAP Annual review 2003			
Performance assessments			
Milestones:	PRSP, Aid instruments (SDA I & PSA 1a)		
	Governance & conflict (SDA IIc & IIe)		
	Education, Health (PSA 1a, 1b & SDA IIa, IIb)		
Harmonisation (Annex 8, Africa DDP)	Policy harmonisation and common conditionality		
	Common reporting, monitoring, procurement and accounting systems		
	Sharing professional skills		
	Joint representation		

Change Impact Monitoring Tables

PSA Country Annual Review 2004

Change area	Annual indicator of country progress	Assessment of progress 1 – Fully met 2 – Partially met 3 – Not met	Assessment of DFID intervention (same scale)
1 Effective implementation of PRS	<u>Milestone 1</u> Sector strategies including indicators for MDGs agreed by Government by Dec 2003	2	2
	<u>Milestone 2</u> PRS implementation and review cycle established, providing sound MIS for June 2004 PRS Review	2	2
	Ministries and districts submit expenditure plans for 2004 consistent with PRS and MTEF	2	2
	<u>Milestone 3</u>	1	1

DFID Rwanda Programme Performance

Annex G

Change area	Annual indicator of country progress	Assessment of progress 1 – Fully met 2 – Partially met 3 – Not met	Assessment of DFID intervention (same scale)
	Government develops vision for CSR and designates a credible agency to develop and implement by July 2004		
	All sector clusters active and holding quarterly meetings by July 2004	1	1
2 Increased democracy and government accountability	<u>Milestone 4</u> Electoral irregularities investigated and findings published by March 2004	1	1
	Media strategy developed; broadcast licenses issued; legal framework	2	2
	HRC develops 4 year plan	1	n.a.
	<u>Milestone 5</u> Reports of disappearances investigated and findings published by March 2004	3	2
	FARAP operationalised by March 2004	2	2
	All districts to have prepared budgets for CDF by June 2004	Not known	
	Development plans for decentralised structures developed by feb 2004	2	2
3 Improving quality of HR at all levels	Joint review of education sector Apr 2004	1	1
	Consistency between ESSP and MTEF on a) allocation and b) expenditure	a)1 b)2/3	1
	Progress on PRS education KPI	2	1
	Progress on annual sector development process indicators	2	2
	Agreement on priorities for capacity building at central and decentralised levels	2	1/2
	National literacy programme designed	3	2
	Expansion of ICT at KIE and KIST	1	1
	CITT Operational	1	2
	Education Development Partners Group operationalise framework for coordination	2	2
	Lessons from education sector feed into broader consultation	2/3	
	Overall assessment	GOOD	GOOD

Change areas	2004	2005
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DFID Rwanda Programme Performance

Annex G

1	Effective implementation of PRS	Core PRS cycle is improved
2	Increased democracy and government accountability	Capacity for pro-poor macro-economic and financial management including MTEF process is improved
3	Improving quality of HR at all levels	Policy, planning and delivery improved in selected sectors/ targeted programme areas
4		Accountable, effective and democratic governance enhanced

DFID Rwanda Expenditure

Annex H

Financial year	1998/9	1999/00	2000/1	2001/2	2002/3	2003/4	2004/5	2005/6
CSP 1999¹								
Total		15.5	14.6	14.3				
RNR, Rural & Social		0.8	0.4	0.4				
Economic policies and enterprise		0.5	0.3	0.1				
Good governance		1.9	2.5	2.4				
Education		0.7	0.5	0.5				
Emergency		1.2	0.5	0.5				
Other		0.4	0.4	0.4				
Budget support		10.0	10.0	10.0				
Increase to High case²			30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0		
CAP 2004³								
Total						37.8	41.4	45
Budget support						25.0	28.0	31.0
PRS implementation						1.6	2.0	2.0
Education						3.8	4.5	4.0
Rural transformation						0.2	1.5	4.0
Governance						1.0	2.0	2.0
Social stability						3.0	0.5	0.0
RRA						1.6	1.0	0.5
HIV/AIDS						1.0	0.4	0.0
Gender equity						0.3	1.2	1.2
Other						0.3	0.3	0.3
Expenditure⁴								
Total	13,642	14,295	32,708	27,027	32,345	26,934	42,430	
Financial aid:								
• Project or sector	-	-	1,052	1,488	2,348	779	1,640	
• Programme (DBS)	15,600	10,000	25,400	18,586	22,032	19,218	28,000	
Technical cooperation	1,356	2,341	5,419	6,212	6,542	5,543	10,435	
Grants and other aid in kind	1,281	784	837	741	1,423	1,375	2,355	
Humanitarian	1,005	1,170	-	-	-	19	-	

¹ CSP 1999, Annex 2, figures for Probable Total Disbursement for 1999/0 to 2001/2

² Commitment reported in APPR November 2001, para 4.7, for 2000/1 to 2003/4

³ CAP 2004, Annex 2, figures for Total Budget for 2003/4 to 2005/6

⁴ Statistics on International Development – 2004 Edition

Rwanda annex I.htm

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

A World Free of Poverty

Rwanda Data Profile

Click on the indicator to view a definition	1999	2002	2003
People			
Population, total	7.5 million	8.2 million	8.4 million
Population growth (annual %)	2.8	2.9	2.8
National poverty rate (% of population)
Life expectancy (years)	40.0	39.8	39.8
Fertility rate (births per woman)	..	5.7	5.7
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	118.0
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 children)	203.0
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)
Child malnutrition, weight for age (% of under 5)
Child immunization, measles (% of under 12 mos)	78.0	69.0	90.0
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population aged 15-49)	5.1
Literacy rate, adult male (% of males ages 15 and above)	72.6	75.3	..
Literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and above)	58.8	63.4	..
Primary completion rate, total (% age group)	22.0	37.0	..
Primary completion rate, female (% age group)	20.0	36.0	..
Net primary enrollment (% relevant age group)	..	86.7	..
Net secondary enrollment (% relevant age group)
Environment			
Surface area (sq. km)	26,340.0	26,340.0	26,340.0
Forests (1,000 sq. km)
Deforestation (average annual % 1990-2000)
Internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters)	595.6
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	0.1
Access to improved water source (% of total pop.)	..	73.0	..
Access to improved sanitation (% of urban pop.)	..	56.0	..
Economy			
GNI, Atlas method (current US\$)	2.0 billion	1.9 billion	1.8 billion
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	270.0	230.0	220.0
GDP (current \$)	1.9 billion	1.7 billion	1.6 billion
GDP growth (annual %)	7.6	9.4	3.2
GDP implicit price deflator (annual % growth)	-3.5	-1.1	4.6
Value added in agriculture (% of GDP)	41.9	41.9	41.6
Value added in industry (% of GDP)	19.4	21.6	21.9
Value added in services (% of GDP)	38.7	36.6	36.5
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	5.9	7.7	8.6
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	22.9	25.4	27.7
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	17.2	19.0	20.2
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP)
Technology and infrastructure			
Fixed lines and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)	3.3	16.4	..
Telephone average cost of local call (US\$ per three minutes)	0.1	0.1	..
Internet users (per 1,000 people)	0.7	3.1	..
Paved roads (% of total)	8.3
Aircraft departures
Trade and finance			
Trade in goods as a share of GDP (%)	16.2	15.1	18.3
Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP (%)	26.4	23.8	28.9
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)	0.6	1.4	25.4
Net barter terms of trade (1995=100)	93.0	69.0	..
Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting country (current US\$)	1.7 million	2.6 million	4.7 million
Present value of debt (current US\$)	..	688.5 million	972.1 million
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)	26.2	11.5	14.4
Short-term debt outstanding (current US\$)	54.0 million	45.5 million	30.0 million
Aid per capita (current US\$)	49.8	43.5	39.5

Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2005