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Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations

Briefing Paper H: Risk Management

Context

While the DAC Principles do not explicitly address risk management, it was recognised in the National Audit Office (NAO) report on DFID's work in insecure environments¹ (October 2008) to be a critical challenge. Risks are inherently higher in situations of conflict and fragility. DFID needs to improve its risk management if it is to meet its performance targets as it scales up in fragile states.

Weak partner capacity, insecurity, political and reputational risks are all heightened in fragile situations. Responses to risks can be categorised as tolerate, transfer, terminate or treat. The level of risk DFID can tolerate is in part a function of the development benefits it intends to achieve. Diversifying programme delivery and scenario planning are both useful approaches to risk management. Monitoring of risk is critical, and requires resources (particularly staff time) to do well.

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine how risks for DFID are different in situations of conflict and fragility, and to give a range of practical examples demonstrating how they can be managed. The paper looks at:

- the importance of risk management in conflict-affected and fragile situations;
- types of risk;
- approaches to risk assessment and management;
- risk monitoring;
- barriers to risk management; and
- links between risk management and conflict-sensitive development.

The focus is on risks that threaten DFID's ability to operate and implement policies and programmes in a given country. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive guide to risk assessment and management in situations of conflict and fragility, but to supplement the advice set out in the *Guidance on Risk Management for DFID Programmes* (available on DFID Insight).²

¹ See: www.nao.org.uk/publications/0708/operating_in_insecure_environm.aspx

² See: <http://dfidinsight/Other/Departments/FinanceCorporatePerformanceDivision/ProgrammeGuidanceRiskAssuranceGroup/PGRAGguidancenotes/Riskmanagement/index.htm>

The importance of risk management

Risks to DFID programmes are generally higher in countries affected by conflict and fragility. They are more unpredictable, with greater potential for significant short-term changes in the political and security environment. Partner capacities, especially in government, are likely to be weaker, and domestic political agendas may differ sharply from our own. Risks of physical insecurity may also be a factor. The impact of risks can also be much greater, threatening not just the failure of individual projects or programmes, but death or injury to DFID staff members, partners or beneficiaries, and the possible withdrawal and closure of an entire operation.

DFID is scaling up both the volume and share of its expenditure in fragile states, where the MDGs are most likely to be off track.³ At the same time, DFID programming in these countries is increasingly moving away from project-based and humanitarian work with short delivery chains, quick impacts and more easily managed risks. Instead, DFID is focusing on more complex peace-building and state-building processes, with greater potential to transform the long-term prospects of these countries, but with much higher levels of risk.

DFID's commitment to working more in fragile states is a clear indication that it is willing to take risks, where the potential benefits and impacts are high. But DFID also has an obligation to use its resources efficiently and carefully, and must be able to demonstrate this through clear development results. The only way to achieve this is if the organisation significantly improves its ability to assess and manage risk.

DFID offices and departments already take risk seriously, have considerable experience of managing risk successfully and have developed a range of innovative tools for doing so. But practice is uneven, and good ideas developed in one situation are not necessarily being shared elsewhere.

Types of risk

Sound analysis of the context, along the lines described in *Briefing Paper A: Analysing Conflict and Fragility*, is critical to the effective identification and management of risks. The principles of risk *management* and the process for risk *assessment* are no different in situations of conflict and fragility, although some types of risk will be different (e.g. threats to staff security) and the impacts may be higher. Otherwise, all the risks encountered in more stable situations need to be considered.

There are multiple risks that can affect programmes.⁴ A Programme Risk Assessment Matrix (PRAM) developed by DFID's Middle East and North Africa Department (MENAD) identifies three broad categories which are particularly relevant to conflict and fragility:

- **Country risks:** these affect the broader environment in which DFID is operating, including the internal and external political context, levels of security and violence, and events and processes (e.g. peace talks or elections) that may

³ DFID White Paper, *Making Governance Work for the Poor* (2006).

⁴ For a summary of risk types and definitions, see Mokoro/CIPFA, 'Stocktake on Donor Approaches to Risk Management when Using Country Systems' (May 2008). Available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/51/41086713.pdf.

impact DFID's operations at a strategic level. Country risks are often beyond the scope of donors to impact significantly, although they may be the subject of diplomatic engagement. Scenario and contingency planning has been found to be an effective way of assessing and managing country risks.

- **Partner risks:** these most commonly relate to capacity and political will, but also include fiduciary risks and corruption. The scale of the risks in fragile contexts is likely to be significant. Weak government capacity is a critical challenge in some countries, and can be addressed through capacity-building interventions. Weak capacity on the ground may also extend to the donor community and to multilaterals, including the UN and the World Bank.
- **Programme/project risks:** these affect the implementation of individual programmes and projects, but may not have wider significance. As well as the security environment, these may include risks associated with infrastructure, supplies or elements dependent on other actors.

MENAD Programme Risk Assessment Matrix

The PRAM presents a broad picture of portfolio risk and performance across the three country programmes (Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Yemen) and the regional programme. Initially this was done each month, and is now updated every six months. It includes the following elements:

- a summary of portfolio performance and trends, and the numbers and percentage of programmes judged high risk across the portfolio;
- one-page risk summaries for each country and the region, which review the key changes to risks at country, partner and programme levels;
- a table showing monthly performance scores for all live programmes; and
- detailed individual risk reports for all programmes scoring 3–5, setting out the reasons for poor performance, remedial action, risks and rewards.

The regular assessment obliges both country offices and the MENAD to keep levels of risk and impact on operations under constant review. If the same risks and responses are recurring, managers should take remedial action. By pulling together risks across MENAD, it enables management to form an overall picture of the risk situation and identify regional trends. It also promotes cross-programme learning.

Although the PRAM is viewed positively by programme staff, there is a risk that the exercise will become a box-ticking exercise if it is seen as just another piece of corporate reporting. A key challenge is how to keep risk reporting light enough to be manageable, but still treated with the seriousness it requires.

There are other types of risk worth noting separately:

- **Reputational risks:** these include potential opposition from certain groups, particularly civil society or religious groups, to DFID programmes and decisions, as well as criticism from UK and international sources, such as NGOs, the media and Parliament. Overall, reputational risks are also likely to be higher in situations of conflict and fragility, given the often contested and polarised nature of political space and potentially higher levels of international media and NGO attention. Reputational risks in Ethiopia were partly responsible for the suspension of budget support in 2005–2006 (see *Briefing Paper B: Do No Harm*).

Reputational risk: Nepal Rural Access Programme

Political changes in Nepal and the poor performance of this rural road-building programme forced the DFID country office to consider a significant scaling down of plans. Despite implementation delays, the programme was providing income opportunities to tens of thousands of the poorest in a number of heavily conflict-affected districts. A quick field review to assess the impact of closure highlighted significant reputational risks for DFID Nepal with government, communities and Maoist insurgents. Withdrawing this programme risked undermining the relationship between communities and development staff. As donor programmes depended for their security on the goodwill local communities, there was concern that closure would have a significant impact on DFID's ability to implement *other* programmes in Maoist-dominated areas, and could even threaten the safety of field staff.

DFID Nepal successfully managed the risk through active communication with stakeholders, ensuring that local offices and partner staff were kept informed about the review process and could address rumours. Following the review, it was decided the risks arising from closure were too high, and that additional funding should be found to continue the programme.

- **Political risk:** this is a subset of country risk, and refers to uncertainty and instability resulting from political conditions, particularly changes to government, regime or policy. Guidance on managing political risk is available.⁵ Good political and conflict analysis (including Drivers of Change, Strategic Conflict Assessment, Countries at Risk of Instability studies) is the basis for identifying political risk. The guidance sets three principles for political risk assessment:
 - identify both long-term structural and short-term temporal indicators;
 - ascribe (subjective) probabilities to possible situations; and
 - allow comparison across countries and across time.

Political risk analysis in DFID Pakistan

DFID Pakistan developed a sophisticated political risk analysis as part of the preparations for its new country strategy in 2008. This drew on business models for political risk, and defined detailed categories covering politics and society, economic growth/policy, governance and security, each broken down into a range of sub-indicators. Questions were developed to allow each risk to be assessed and assigned a numerical value. The results were tabulated and weighted, with security risks emerging as the highest concern and economic risks the lowest.

The analysis identified a number of short-term potential triggers that could dramatically change the political risk situation. These included elections, power supplies, shortages of basic goods, fuel price rises and natural disasters. It identified 19 structural risks, including patronage-based politics, military involvement in politics, the poor policymaking environment, lack of transparency, terrorism and territorial disintegration, together with the 39 triggers with the potential to influence these risks.

The Pakistan Risk Analysis was one of the most detailed ever used in DFID. The methodology was robust and tested in nine countries, and was based on best practice from the private sector. By ascribing numerical values across a wide range of indicators, it provided a precise and monitorable assessment, superior to DFID's usual categorisation of high, medium and low risk. The exercise was intended to provide benchmarks that would enable trends to be measured over time and support informed decision making in risk mitigation.

⁵ 'Political Risk in Partner Countries: An update on DFID Policy and Procedure' [[link](#)]

While the Pakistan example shows how DFID has improved its ability to conduct sophisticated risk analysis, this is only one factor among the many that influence programming choices. In the case of Pakistan, the risk analysis was balanced against other factors, such as the numbers of poor people and the policy environment (both of which indicated the country to be under-aided), the DAC Principle emphasising the importance of preventive action in the face of risks of instability, and broader political considerations.

There is however a general issue about the degree to which DFID's increasingly sophisticated analysis influences programming decisions. This is particularly true when negative conclusions of analysis challenge the logic of ongoing and planned interventions, which may be driven by strong organisational and political incentives for greater financial engagement.

This highlights an important tension: on the one hand, there is recognition of the need for 'warts and all' analysis and risk assessment; on the other hand, there are imperatives around programmes and programme spend, which negative assessments may undermine. It also highlights the critical importance of senior management ownership of risk assessment processes.

- **Security risks:** these are often the most visible risks associated with working in fragile environments, and the greatest concern to senior management, particularly where there is open conflict. A key distinction can be made between situations in which there is a direct threat to DFID staff (partners or beneficiaries) – typically, but not exclusively, where the UK is either a party to the conflict or closely allied to one – and situations where there is generalised insecurity, with no direct threat. In situations where UK staff and interests are perceived to be under direct threat, DFID is required to follow HMG security procedures as laid down by the Embassy or High Commission.

Field security risks are a function of many factors: who you are, who you work for, the nature of the work, who you travel with and how you travel. Risks may be mitigated by good local information, discussions with local communities and leaders, and a low-profile approach. Local staff and consultants may be at lower risk, but not necessarily. It is essential that DFID understands these factors before making decisions about field visits.

Following the 2007 security review, DFID has issued a revised Security Policy (available on DFID Insight).⁶ DFID's web-based Security Manual has been revised with new sections on Overseas Security Management and guidance for Overseas Security Advisers Reviews. A security incident tracker has been established to ensure senior management is kept fully informed, and guidance has also been recently updated on duty of care (see Duty of Care Factsheet and Q&A).⁷ There are nine types of security training and briefing available, including Hostile Environment Training. Regional cabinets can advise which are

⁶ http://dfidinsight/Other/Departments/HumanResourcesDivision/Security/Policy/PUB_008922

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http://dfidinsight/Other/Departments/HumanResourcesDivision/Security/Policy/StaffSecurity/PUB_010528

recommended or mandatory for each country. For further information on any of the above, contact the DFID Security Section.

In situations of indirect threat, and particularly where insecurity is unpredictable, there is much greater variation across offices in planning and preparing for possible security problems. For examples of good practice in managing these risks, see the section below on Risk Monitoring and the example of the Risk Management Office in Nepal.

- **Fiduciary risks:** like other risks, these are likely to be higher due to the weak capacity of many fragile contexts. The tools for assessing fiduciary risk are well developed, and equally apply in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.⁸

Discounting risk?

A recent mapping of DFID's engagement in fragile states⁹ noted that overall programme risk levels are recorded on PRISM as no higher in fragile states than in other countries, with just 18% of expenditure rated as high risk. This seems surprising, and may indicate that risks are not always fully recorded. As one programme manager put it: "Given the nature of the country, everything we do is high risk. Should we rate all our programmes as such? How then could we distinguish between programmes which may be lower risk in *some* respects, and those which are high risk in *all* respects?"

While this is an understandable reaction from the country perspective, it is nevertheless essential that risk analysis is carried out systematically for all programmes and portfolios. This will enable DFID to gauge whether risks are increasing or decreasing, and the degree to which they are being actively managed across the whole of our operations.

Risk management

The 4Ts

DFID guidance describes four basic responses to risk: tolerate, transfer, terminate or treat. The same options are available in fragile situations. DFID has a relatively high risk appetite, and is often willing to **tolerate** high levels of risk *where there are substantial potential benefits*. DFID has a developing track record of providing Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) in fragile situations, where fiduciary risk is high (but improving) and capacity low. The potential benefits – strengthened policy dialogue, reduced transaction costs etc. – are perceived to outweigh the risks. Alternative courses of action may also be recognised as carrying equally serious risks, but without the potential benefits.¹⁰ Where a decision is taken to tolerate high levels of risk, effective risk monitoring is essential (see below).

The **transfer** of risks remains a common response in situations of insecurity, in particular by channelling funding through UN humanitarian agencies, the ICRC and

⁸ See DFID 'How to Note: Managing Fiduciary Risk in DFID Bilateral Aid Programmes' (January 2008).

⁹ Agulhas, 'DFID Engagement in Fragile States (2000–2006) – A portfolio review. Analysis of funding and activities' (2008).

¹⁰ Agulhas *op. cit.* found that PRBS in fragile states generally performed no worse or better than other aid instruments.

NGOs. These organisations have a track record of working in highly insecure areas, with experienced staff and strong systems and procedures to ensure delivery. They may also be somewhat protected, or at least at lower risk, by perceptions of their impartiality/neutrality.

The **termination** of risk may involve persuading another actor to take on responsibility for delivering the same (or similar) benefits. Risk may also be terminated through ending or not proceeding with an intervention. This is the option of last resort, when other alternatives have been rejected and the potential benefits do not justify continuation. However, this course of action must also be weighed against the risks of not proceeding, and the importance of DAC Principle 9 – *Act fast ... but stay engaged*.

The most common response is to **treat** the risk – that is, to seek either to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence or reduce its impact. Policy dialogue, performance assessment frameworks and targeted capacity development – all approaches that are familiar to DFID offices – are usually built into programme design precisely to address risk. Other approaches to treating risk are set out below.

Managing risk by diversifying

At the country level, DFID sometimes responds to high levels of risk by diversifying the programme across sectors, partners and aid instruments (up to and including budget support).¹¹ By spreading risk, donors can reduce their exposure to individual programmes, so that the impact of any single failure is reduced. In 4T terms, this can be described as *transferring* some of the risk, while tolerating/treating the rest.

While this is a sound response to situations with multiple high risks, and can allow resources to be relatively quickly reallocated from one programme to another, the approach may not be sufficient if the key risks and triggers are the same across programmes. At the same time, multiple programmes and partners, and working through parallel systems, bring their own well-known risks: potential loss of aid effectiveness, dispersed focus and increased transaction costs.

DFID Yemen: Social Fund for Development

As one of the few organisations capable of delivering substantial benefits to poor communities across the country, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) has become a major channel for DFID's assistance to Yemen. It operates in parallel with line ministries and has the advantage of excellent staff and strong leadership. It is responsive to local demands and is largely free of restrictive bureaucracy. SFD is an autonomous agency and operates according to its own policies and systems. However, it is perceived to be a government body by many, is headed by a deputy Prime Minister and it is likely to be affected by the same risks if the political situation in the country should take a significant turn for the worse. (See *Briefing Paper E: Aligning with Local Priorities* for more detail on the SFD.)

¹¹ Agulhas *op. cit.*

Managing risk by scenario and contingency planning

Scenario and contingency planning can make a significant contribution to risk management.¹² By thinking through plausible futures for a country, and identifying specific drivers (or triggers) that may bring these about, a number of DFID offices in fragile contexts have been able to develop a more proactive approach to risk management. Good scenario and contingency planning, involving cross-Whitehall working with FCO and MOD, has enabled these offices to identify areas for programming which can support more positive futures, while preparing for a variety of alternative scenarios.

This approach can help position programmes to take advantage of positive developments and develop options to ensure some continuity of assistance if negative scenarios occur. DFID Bangladesh and DFID Ethiopia are among the many offices that have found this approach helpful. Scenario planning enables country offices to design programmes and interventions that can continue to operate whether levels of conflict rise or fall, even rapidly.

Case studies of scenario planning

In 2006, **DFID Bangladesh** worked with consultants to develop scenarios running to 2020 with a list of 20 drivers (reduced from 60) and polarities. Each driver was given an 'importance' score and an 'uncertainty score'. The most important and uncertain drivers were then clustered into two groups, revealing two key uncertainties: **social, cultural and political attitudes and values** (including drivers such as access to media and information technology and the regional economic and political environment); and **the nature of social and economic development** (including drivers such as changes in the rural economy, increasing inequality and urbanisation).

A workshop was held to identify actions to manage the risks inherent in each scenario, along with actions to support the emergence of positive scenarios. The resulting outputs were fed into the country planning process, and provided reassurance that the risks associated with the scaling-up agenda were manageable. DFID Bangladesh has since built on this work by undertaking a horizon scanning exercise and holding a series of stakeholder focus group discussions.

DFID Ethiopia undertook a scenario planning exercise to 2012, identifying eight clusters of drivers. The axes of the scenario matrix were selected as high/low growth and political inclusion/polarisation. A mixed DFID/FCO team developed the scenarios further, with inputs from Ethiopian experts. The scenarios were used to develop contingency plans, strengthen risk management and test the robustness of current plans and programmes.

The process identified critical risks (including climate change, tension arising from urban poverty, and internal and external conflict) and implications for programmes arising from these. It also recommended specific actions to be undertaken immediately in order improve understanding and management of these risks. The scenarios challenged DFID/FCO thinking and demonstrated the uncertainties facing Ethiopia, suggesting a need for further strategic risk management and mitigation. The exercise may be undertaken annually or if there is a significant change in the interim.

¹² Guidance is available at <http://teamsite/sites/policydivision/Scenario%20Planning/default.aspx>. Scenario and contingency planning is now a mandatory part of the country planning process for fragile states in DFID.

Risk monitoring

Effective risk management is a dynamic process. Risks must be monitored over time and mitigating actions regularly reviewed. There is a risk that offices put considerable effort into a one-off risk assessment but fail to instigate good monitoring practices. Failure to monitor can lead to the 'frog-in-the-pot' syndrome, where staff become accustomed to slowly increasing levels of risk and fail to act decisively, even as a crisis is approaching. The risk monitoring system established in MENAD (see above) is one example of good practice.

Barriers to effective risk management

There are a number of potential barriers to effective risk management:

- In stable contexts, risk management is often seen as a mechanistic, box-ticking exercise – or a hoop that has to be jumped through. It is possible that some of these attitudes are carried over into situations of conflict and fragility.
- There can be a tendency among DFID staff to look for optimistic signs and to emphasise positive trends. Without this it would be almost impossible to work in some situations. However, it also means there may be a tendency not to acknowledge fully the scale of the risks facing them.
- Good risk management requires resources – particularly staff time. Based on sound analysis, it should be a senior programmatic responsibility rather than a technical administrative task. With staff resources under pressure – even in situations of conflict and fragility – it may be an area that is not given enough attention.
- As strategic risk assessments are often decided at the top-level of a DFID office, they often do not adequately involve junior, and particularly national, staff, whose perceptions may be different. It is difficult for these staff to contribute to or challenge assessments made at a higher level.

There are also occasions when HMG objectives require DFID to carry a high level of risk. Under these circumstances it is critical that DFID works closely with HMG colleagues, including FCO and MOD/UK military to actively monitor risk, and ensure that directors are kept apprised of any changes. At all times in high-profile politically sensitive situations it is vital that ministers have the opportunity to make decisions on the basis of a clear understanding of all risks. It is the responsibility of country offices to ensure that all relevant information is put before ministers.

Risk management and conflict-sensitive development

Over the past ten years, DFID has built up considerable experience of working in insecure situations, including places where there is a level of direct threat against the staff and programmes (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen), as well as places with generalised violence but little direct threat (DRC, Kenya, Nepal, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Zimbabwe).

Responses to these situations should be based on detailed contextual analysis of threats and vulnerabilities.¹³ Effective risk management requires sharing information from a broad cross-section of sources. DFID should – as a matter of course – be sharing risk information with other Whitehall departments, as well as other donors, multilaterals and partners, and be developing joint assessments where feasible and useful.

A consultant's report for DFID argues that security management should be treated as an aspect of conflict-sensitive development practice.¹⁴ The report warns against seeing security risk management as a set of rules, divorced from the business of development. Managing security risks is an aspect of programme delivery, and should be treated as such. This was the approach adopted in Nepal, with the establishment of the Risk Management Office and the Safe and Effective Development model.

Nepal – Risk Management Office and Basic Operating Guidelines

In 2002, DFID Nepal and GTZ established a joint Risk Management Office (RMO). The role of the RMO was to:

- establish and support systems and procedures for security risk management in DFID and GTZ, including emergency responses and contingency planning, evacuation procedures, crisis management, reporting and information flows;
- provide training for staff and partners, including on staying safe in conflict situations, basic first aid and dealing with difficult security situations;
- provide advice on security issues, including daily travel advice, to staff, partners and consultants, and operational advice to programmes/partners on managing field security risks, including office location, employment and working practices, and dealing with insurgents and security forces; and
- provide regular field-based analysis to the heads of DFID and GTZ, including through risk assessments, mission reports and field security monitoring.

*Basic Operating Guidelines*¹⁵

A key risk to staff security identified by the RMO was the perception of poor standards in aid and the behaviour of some development personnel. At the same time, the behaviour of both insurgents and the security forces were threatening the viability of development activities. In response, the RMO developed Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs), to set out the case for development and set standards for all parties to uphold. The 14 points of the BOGs aimed to:

- explain the reasons for donor involvement in Nepal (reducing poverty);
- outline the values and standards that aid programmes should achieve (provision on the basis of need, guided by wishes of the community, against discrimination and exclusion, free from political interference and corruption); and
- set the minimum conditions required from conflict parties (no theft or diversion of resources, staff able to work without threat of physical violence, observation of humanitarian law and human rights obligations).

¹³ There are excellent resources available to provide guidance. See Van Brabant, K. *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments*, ODI (2000). See also RedR website for details of training and publications: www.redr.org.uk.

¹⁴ DFID, 'Security Risk Management – Recommendations for Improvement' (June 2008).

¹⁵ For the BOGs in full: http://www.un.org.np/pressreleases/BOGs-Revised/2007/Basic_Operating_Guidelines-English_Revised_11_Oct_07.pdf

Ten donors immediately signed up to the BOGs – including all the major bilaterals except USAID. The international financial institutions (IFIs) felt they could not sign without government approval; the UN initially issued its own, parallel version¹⁶. The BOGs were printed and issued to all development staff, widely displayed in development offices across rural areas and publicised through local radio and newspapers.

The BOGs were an effective tool in helping to establish space for development. The standards set by the BOGs were hard to disagree with, and provided the basis for legitimate dialogue between development staff and combatants. They also provided a vehicle for a harmonised response to security threats. The BOGs donor group – to which the IFIs and USAID belonged as observers – became the key meeting point on security issues.

Safe and Effective Development

During the course of RMO operations, it became clear that issues of conflict sensitivity, particularly understanding how development related to on-going conflict, were critical factors in effective security risk management. From 2004, the RMO started to develop Safe and Effective Development, a training tool which combined operational security management¹⁷ with conflict-sensitive approaches ('do no harm').¹⁸ This was used by development programmes in Nepal, helping to improve aid practices and ensure that activities could continue throughout the conflict.

Key lessons

- Risk management is an **integral component** of effective programming in situations of conflict and fragility, and can be used to improve the quality of our work.
- **Analysis of context** is the foundation of risk assessment and management. Analysis should involve other departments and stakeholders where possible.
- Risk assessment and analysis must be **owned at senior levels** within an office, but must also draw on knowledge and perceptions at junior levels.
- Effective risk monitoring systems should bring together **risk, impact on performance and mitigating actions**. They should allow comparison over time to determine the direction of travel and be light touch.
- DFID offices should avoid becoming so used to risk that they begin to discount its seriousness or fail to register deteriorating situations. We must **recognise our tendency to play down risk levels**, given political and spending pressures.
- **Diversification** may be an effective way of managing risks, but it may not be the whole answer if risks are common across programmes.

¹⁶ The revised BOG includes donors, the UN and the Association of International NGOs

¹⁷ Van Brabant, K., *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments*, ODI (2000).

¹⁸ A pdf version of the training guide 'Safe and Effective Development' is available from DFID Nepal or the Conflict Policy Team in CHASE.

- **Scenario planning** is a very useful technique for identifying actions that can be taken immediately to reduce the risk of negative scenarios eventuating, and for planning in advance in case they do.
- Effective risk management is likely to require **resources** – particularly time from senior programme staff within an office. This needs to be recognised and resourced.