

# Operational Plan 2011-2015

## DFID Sudan

July 2011

<b>Contents:</b>		
	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
Section 1:	<b>Context</b>	<b>1</b>
Section 2:	<b>Vision</b>	<b>2</b>
Section 3:	<b>Results</b>	<b>4-5</b>
Section 4:	<b>Delivery and Resources</b>	<b>6-10</b>
Section 5:	<b>Delivering Value for Money</b>	<b>11</b>
Section 6:	<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<b>12</b>
Section 7:	<b>Transparency</b>	<b>13</b>

# Introduction

The UK Government is determined to help reduce the inequalities of opportunity we see around the world today. We believe that promoting global prosperity is both a moral duty and in the UK's national interest. Aid is only ever a means to an end, never an end in itself. It is wealth creation and sustainable growth that will help people to lift themselves out of poverty.

In May 2010, the International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, commissioned the Bilateral Aid Review (BAR) to take a comprehensive and ambitious look at the countries in which the Department for International Development (DFID) works through our direct country and regional programmes. The review focussed on the best ways for the UK to tackle extreme poverty, ensuring that we make the greatest impact with every pound we spend. In parallel, through the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR), DFID assessed how effective the international organisations we fund are at tackling poverty.

On the 1st March 2011, the key outcomes of the reviews were announced, including the results that UK aid will deliver for the world's poorest people over the next four years. The Bilateral Aid Review has refocused the aid programme in fewer countries so that we can target our support where it will make the biggest difference and where the need is greatest. The Multilateral Aid Review findings enable us to put more money behind effective international organisations which are critical to delivering the UK's development priorities. In addition the independent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review looked at how the UK can build on its strengths in responding impartially to humanitarian needs and help ensure future disaster responses can be better prepared and coordinated.

DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency. In the current financial climate, we have a particular duty to show that we are achieving value for every pound of UK taxpayers' money that we spend on development. Results, transparency and accountability are our watchwords and guide everything we do. DFID regards transparency as fundamental to improving its accountability to UK citizens and to improving accountability to citizens in the countries in which it works. Transparency will also help us achieve more value for money in the programmes we deliver and will improve the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty.

The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee commits DFID to making our aid fully transparent to citizens in both the UK and developing countries. As part of this commitment we are publishing Operational Plans for country programmes. The Operational Plans set out the vision, priorities and results that will be delivered in each of our country programmes.

We will concentrate our efforts on supporting achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), creating wealth in poor countries, improving their governance and security and tackling climate change. The prize, in doing so, is huge: a better life for millions of people, and a safer, more prosperous world.

# 1) Context

Sudan is a highly complex political and development environment. More than fifty years of independence have been characterised by deep social and political divisions; a military dominated government in Khartoum which undermines democratic and accountable governance; variable government capacity and continued conflict. Following the January 2011 referendum on self-determination for the South, Sudan is undergoing a historic transition from one country to two. The new Sudan will be a more homogenously, but not uniformly Arab and Muslim state. The long-term prosperity of Sudan depends on achieving an inclusive peace with justice in Darfur, and successful resolution of outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). There is a significant risk of Sudan becoming increasingly isolated due to ongoing violence and fighting in the border areas and Darfur. Sudan is also facing economic and political instability in large part due to the inequality of resources and access to services between the centre and periphery regions, including the East which is still highly underdeveloped despite a peace agreement in 2006.

Sudan is a highly-centralised economy, heavily dependent on oil. Global increases in food and fuel prices, cuts in subsidies and bans on numerous imports have led to rapidly increasing inflation. Combined with a growing budget deficit and foreign currency shortages, economic pressure is building and could threaten political stability. While overall per capita incomes have tripled since the discovery of oil in the 1980s, government expenditure is heavily skewed towards the centre while the periphery states are characterised by poor performance on some or all of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In comparison with countries with similar per capita income Sudan is off-track on the MDGs on gender equity in education, and under-five and maternal mortality rates. Data on progress to the other MDGs is very weak or unavailable.

Sudan is dominated politically and economically by Khartoum. The ruling National Congress Party (NCP), strongly supported by the military, continues to hold tightly to power. Darfur remains insecure with higher levels of violence reflected in more Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 2010 than in recent years. Insecurity and other obstacles (some imposed by the Government) are shrinking the space for humanitarian and development action.

The UK is the second largest Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development bilateral donor in Sudan after the USA. This may change as donors realign following the secession of South Sudan. The main oil investors are China, Malaysia and India, while some Gulf States also invest in real estate, infrastructure and services. Trade with the UK has increased in recent years but remains relatively insignificant, owing in part to the risks linked to US sanctions, but also to the poor business enabling environment. Sudan is not a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement and as such is unable to access funding from the European Development Fund. It also currently has international debts of around \$37bn. For some creditors, including the UK, debt relief remains contingent on progress on Darfur. The Government of Sudan, supported by donors at a technical level, is pressing hard to accelerate progress through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country process. However it is unlikely to be able to access concessional loans from the major development banks for another two years.

We work closely with other donors. We aim to follow best practice aid effectiveness principles for working in fragile states, and the international humanitarian donor principles. Thus far, the bulk of our programmes use multi-donor trust funds and other pooled mechanisms. We work in close partnership with the European Union and the International Financial Institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank in particular). We collaborate closely with the other Troika members (USA and Norway) on a range of policy issues. We have signed a bilateral development agreement with USAID (the US development agency), and seek to engage more with important non-traditional donors such as China and Egypt.

## 2) Vision

### Overview

This four year Plan is launched in a period of political transition. This is likely to last for at least the first two years of this Plan as the separation of Sudan and South Sudan concludes, and the longer-term tasks of state-building and nation-building begin to be addressed, if conditions allow. Based on past and current levels of oil revenue, the Government of Sudan has the resources it requires to eliminate poverty. However, the challenge is to build the capacity and the political will of the government to reallocate funding from military expenditure to more productive, social sectors and to allocate resources more equitably between the more privileged groups and people in the marginalised peripheral states. Tackling corruption at all levels will also remain a priority.

### Alignment to DFID and wider UK Government priorities

DFID will contribute to the achievement of UK Government objectives over the next four years for Sudan: supporting the peaceful completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), including the transition to two countries; working towards an inclusive peace with justice in Darfur; supporting national and regional stability; promoting human rights; and encouraging the development of democratic and accountable government. The Operational Plan aligns closely with UK Government's Building Stability Overseas Strategy, the UK Government's Country Business Plan for Sudan, and DFID's Structural Reform Plan, Business Plan and state-building framework. It will also draw closely on the outcomes of the Multilateral Aid Review and the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review to shape its programming and delivery. DFID will focus on helping Sudan develop in four principal ways which will allow poor people, particularly girls and women, to benefit from:

- A gradual transition from humanitarian programmes to support for more durable and sustainable livelihoods in conflict-affected areas; this will not preclude continuing life-saving humanitarian support to those displaced through violence and conflict in Darfur and the border states;
- Peace-building between Sudan and South Sudan in the East and in Darfur; and between Sudan and its neighbours, including through support to community-level development programmes which reduce conflict and improve access to services and a say in decisions for currently excluded groups;
- Increased democratic and accountable governance, operational and fiscal decentralisation, and a reduction in the incidences of corruption;
- More equitable and sustainable development through a better use of the national budget, including a shift from military expenditure to more productive use of resources; the extension of basic services, safety and access to justice to the underserved states; and a focus on economic diversification and employment.

DFID is determined to ensure that UK aid reaches the people who need it the most. Sudan remains an expensive and high risk environment for development programming, but the potential return on investments is very high. It does not and will not for the foreseeable future channel any money through the Government of Sudan, but will continue to channel funds through non-governmental organisations, private sector firms, and multilateral agencies which have robust financial management systems. However, DFID will prioritise work with state-level institutions, aligning UK funding with their priorities, and building their capacity and systems so that they can manage and administer the delivery of services to their own citizens. This plan will integrate targets on gender, anti-corruption, and English Language teaching across the DFID Sudan programme. We will continue to work closely with other donors, including through joint programming and shared advisory/technical resources.

### What we will stop doing

DFID Sudan has focused on improving its programme portfolio by dropping a number of peripheral and poorly performing projects, by suspending outstanding payments to them and reallocating the funds to better-performing projects. DFID is focused on achieving optimum Value for Money in programme design and implementation. We will focus on building a stronger evidence base on levels of poverty and need in order to target our funding to those that need it most and find innovative ways to monitor and evaluate projects in areas which we cannot easily access. We will continue to close projects or reallocate funding from those which are performing poorly.

# 3) Results

Headline results			
Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Expected Results (including year)
Health	Number of women with improved access or quality of obstetric care supported by DFID in Sudan	0 (2011)	2 million (2015) (End of year snapshot)
Education	Number of children supported by DFID in primary education in Sudan	0	25 000 (2015) (End of year snapshot)
Water and Sanitation	Number of people with sustainable access to clean drinking water and/or an improved sanitation facility as a result of DFID support in Sudan	0 (2011)	800 000 (2015) (End of year snapshot)
Governance and Security	Number of people who have choice and control over their own development supported by DFID in Sudan	0 (2011)	1.5 million (2015) (End of year snapshot)
Governance and Security	Number of people who vote in elections supported by DFID in Sudan	10 million (2010)	10 million (2014) (End of year snapshot)
Governance and Security	Number of women with improved access to Justice Services through DFID support in Sudan	0 (2011)	125 000 (2014) (End of year snapshot)
Humanitarian*	Number of people reached by nutrition-related programmes through DFID support in Sudan	3 million (2011)*	3 million (2012)* (End of year snapshot)
Humanitarian*	Number of people provided with food security and livelihoods assistance through DFID support in Sudan	2.7 million (2011)*	2.7 million (2012)* (End of year snapshot)

\*DFID humanitarian assistance is based on an annual needs-based call for proposals. This operational plan will ensure assistance is delivered to those who need it. But it will also help build peace and stability so that people can look after themselves. Success might therefore be reflected in a reduction of the number of people assisted by our humanitarian spend.

### 3) Results (continued)

#### Evidence supporting results

DFID Sudan's programmes are based on strong evidence that building peaceful societies requires work to i) address conflict and fragility, ii) build inclusive political settlements and iii) develop core state functions that meets people's expectations. However the evidence base in Sudan itself is very poor. Data availability and quality is extremely low in some areas of our work across Sudan. We intend to address this during the design of new programmes, but further changes to the results offered and the framework may be required as more evidence becomes available.

Our work on governance and security is based on strong evidence that a more inclusive and equitable political settlement, as well as access to justice, aids state- building and reduces conflict. Data collection in Sudan has been hindered by the ongoing conflict and closed nature of the security services. Whilst the UN does collect a broad range of evidence on a regular basis, this is not project specific, is difficult to verify, and has poor attribution to UK work. The situation has begun to improve in recent years, and we will rely heavily on defence and security diplomacy and analysis to strengthen our baselines and impact monitoring.

New water and sanitation, health and education projects are only just being designed, but results are based on reliable data from other projects. Previous surveys on health and education needs from 2011 are being updated and we expect 2011 versions to be agreed with the government shortly.

DFID Sudan's humanitarian programmes are informed by strong data on need. The UN produces regular analysis, including annual food security assessments in South Sudan and Darfur, as well as a range of reports on the humanitarian situation. The main weaknesses include: sporadic and non-comparable nutrition surveys lacking a gender split; and incomplete coverage due to poor access caused by insecurity, particularly in Darfur. The Common Humanitarian Fund's (CHF) results reporting is improving, but monitoring and evaluation needs to be improved. Work is ongoing on this.

#### Value for Money (VfM) rationale

The primary VfM rationale for investing in Sudan derives from the risks and costs associated with renewed conflict. The war between North and South lasted 20 years and cost two million lives. Frontier Economics estimates that a return to war would cost US\$50bn to Sudan in lost GDP, US\$25bn to neighbouring countries, and US\$30bn in peacekeeping and humanitarian costs to the international community. We believe that alongside the rest of the UK Government's activities in Sudan, success in the programme areas outlined on slide 2, will also deliver substantial savings to the UK government, representing good VfM.

Many parts of Sudan are starting from an extremely low base in terms of development indicators. In this context, even small interventions can make a big difference. For example, in the eastern states of Kassala and Gederaf, the proportion of the population with access to safe drinking water is around 38%, compared with an average of 58% for sub-Saharan Africa

Finally, Sudan is amongst DFID's largest and most expensive humanitarian assistance programmes in the world. Whilst we will continue to provide urgent and life-saving support where it is needed, DFID Sudan's Operational Plan also focuses on moving people from non-life-saving interventions supported by humanitarian funds onto more durable and sustainable livelihoods through its new programmes on Water and Sanitation, Education and Health.

## 4) Delivery and Resources

### **Business Operating Model**

DFID Sudan, located in Khartoum, is currently split into three teams: Policy, Programme and Corporate. The Corporate Team provides support in liaison with the British Embassy in Khartoum, which provides many of the services required for this office including transport, technical works and estates management. DFID's development programme is divided into two 'workstreams': Power and Resources, and Humanitarian and Livelihoods. As of July 2011, DFID Sudan has just completed its separation from DFID South Sudan which is now established as an independent country office. However, we envisage that a limited level of support and flexibility will continue to be required from DFID Sudan until DFID South Sudan is fully up to strength. Close cooperation with DFID South Sudan will also be required on a number of programmes operating both sides of the border in support of continued peace between the two countries.

### **Staffing**

DFID's focus on improving the design of programmes and portfolio quality over the next four years, indicates the need for more in-country technical capacity, some of which can be achieved through shared resources with other partners. However, in the immediate term, in order to deliver on the OP, we will require additional expertise in Infrastructure and Conflict. Depending on how our potential programmes on Basic Services evolve, additional expertise in Health or Education may be required. Stronger corporate systems and a greater focus on developing skills and careers will also be essential. The need for sufficient staff in DFID Sudan is strongly supported by results of the office's People Survey.

### **Programme Delivery**

DFID Sudan's current programme delivery is primarily through large multi-donor pooled funds managed by multilateral agencies and we will continue to use effective mechanisms such as the Common Humanitarian Fund managed by the UN's Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). However, the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) has found a wide variation in the relevance and effectiveness of multilaterals operating internationally and in Sudan. We will consider directly the MAR findings in appraising new project documentation and mitigate risk by linking funding more closely to performance. Where mechanisms are performing poorly we will reallocate funding to other delivery partners including the private sector and NGOs.

The government in Sudan does not currently meet the UK's three partnership commitments (commitment to poverty reduction, human rights and international obligations, and strengthening financial management and accountability) for using government systems for budget support. Whilst no funds will therefore be routed through the government in Sudan, we will continue to align our assistance closely behind government priorities and consider greater use of counterpart funding where appropriate. Evidence from the DFID State-building/Peace-building framework and the agreed principles on international engagement in fragile states suggests that such approaches are essential in enhancing state capacity and avoiding long term aid-dependency.

Non-delivery partners will be crucial in achieving the Operational Plan. Since many of the challenges will be political and conflict-related, we will work closely with our colleagues in the Sudan Unit, the Embassy, the Ministry of Defence, Stabilisation Unit, and British Council, as well as our Missions and Delegations to the UN, the European Union, the World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank.

## 4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

### Programme Spend

Pillar/Strategic priority	2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15		TOTAL	
	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000
Wealth Creation										
Climate Change										
Governance and Security	16,000	0	16,000	0	17,000	0	17,000	0	66,000	0
Education	2,000	0	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	8,000	6,000
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health	5,000	0	5,000	0	4,000	1,000	4,000	1,000	18,000	2,000
Malaria										
HIV/AIDS										
Other Health										
Water and Sanitation	3,000	4,000	2,000	4,000	2,000	4,000	2,000	4,000	9,000	16,000
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability										
Humanitarian	21,000	0	18,000	0	12,000	0	9,000	0	60,000	0
Other MDG's										
Global Partnerships										
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>47,000</b>	<b>4,000</b>	<b>43,000</b>	<b>6,000</b>	<b>37,000</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>34,000</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>161,000</b>	<b>24,000</b>

2010/11 Baseline: Sudan and South Sudan shared a combined budget of £140 million.



## 4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

### Operating Costs

	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	Total
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Frontline staff costs - Pay	800	918	940	968	997	4,623
Frontline staff costs - Non Pay	1,596	1,650	1,650	1,650	1,650	8,196
Administrative Costs - Pay	140	144	148	100	100	632
Administrative Costs - Non Pay	1,060	1,100	1,100	1,100	1,100	5,460
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,596</b>	<b>3,812</b>	<b>3,838</b>	<b>3,818</b>	<b>3,847</b>	<b>18,911</b>

We will meet our target reduction of 33% administration costs in Khartoum by consolidating our housing units and dropping one post in FY13/14. There may also be savings to be gained from the potential co-location with the Embassy at the end of DFID's current office lease in 2013.

## 4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

### Efficiency savings

#### Delivering Programme Efficiencies

Category	Details	Residual cost in the SR period £'000
Strategic Reprioritisation	See note below	
Further examples of Programme efficiency		

DFID Sudan has already streamlined its programme portfolio – decreasing the overall number of projects (covering will now be Sudan and South Sudan) from 60 to 35 at the end of 2010. We have done this through **taking** decisions not to allow extensions on programmes that were small or not performing strongly, and/or to reallocate resources from some poorly performing projects. Following the expulsion of International NGOs from Darfur in 2009, we rationalised our bilateral humanitarian portfolio to channel support through a smaller number of partners able to deliver more results. Whilst DFID does not believe any further reduction in the number of programmes would increase efficiency, we will ensure that these savings are retained by continuing to focus on fewer, larger and more effective programmes.

Savings Initiative	2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15	
	PAY	Non Pay £'000	PAY	Non Pay £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	PAY	Non Pay £'000
Reduction in Consultancy				5		5		5
Reduction in Admin staff					70	30		
Reduction in Travel				5		5		5
Reduction in Training						5		
Accommodation				74				
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>

## 5) Delivering Value for Money (VfM)

DFID Sudan has attached high importance over the last year to demonstrating VfM in our current and future programming, and in all our procurement. Additionally, we have prioritised the enhancement of our unit's procurement capacity through training, and placed renewed emphasis on the VfM agenda in our management of pooled/multi-donor funds in Sudan. Given the challenging operating environment, financial forecasting is a particular challenge – with unexpected eventualities frequently holding back project delivery and expenditure. We mitigate this risk by putting in place robust contingency plans and closely scrutinising forecasts.

Particular challenges are presented by the context in Sudan, such as poor infrastructure and high security costs. For instance in the highly insecure operating environment of Darfur, security costs account for 20% of programme costs. Also much of the Sudan programme will continue to be focussed on areas such as governance, state- and peace-building and security where it is particularly difficult to demonstrate VfM. Finally Sudan's debt arrears to the main multilaterals limits their ability to work here until the arrears are cleared. This reduces the choice of implementing partners through which DFID could work. We will be working closely with Central Departments to strengthen our understanding of how to address these challenges.

Within this context, DFID Sudan has worked hard to identify the most cost effective options available for achieving results.

### **Specific actions being taken to address economy, efficiency and effectiveness**

We will be:

- Testing VfM of different delivery models. DFID Sudan is using a range of delivery models. We are also delegating management to donors with relative strengths in different areas, for instance channelling support to oil sector reform through Norway. We are in discussions to consider using other models such as consortia of NGOs to deliver basic services. We are comparing VfM performance to see which works best.
- Pressing UN and other partners on management fees, particularly in cases where agencies act as managers of funds and then sub-contract to other partners. We will minimise the money spent on management to increase the share spent on delivering results.
- Looking to learn from the reviews of the Common Humanitarian Fund in the DRC, Sudan and CAR and see how Sudan's fund could be made more cost-effective. This mechanism currently represents around 45% of DFID Sudan's programme. We intend to reduce the footprint of our humanitarian spend over the four years, subject to conditions on the ground, as well as seek greater cost-effectiveness: both improvements will yield significant returns.
- Developing programmes of longer duration (e.g. more than four years) because of high front loaded start-up costs in Sudan. This will help to maximise opportunities for transformational impact and increase value for money by minimising start-up costs.

### **Stepping up VfM in 2011**

- A stronger approach to improving VfM will be developed in the second quarter of the year. A number of issues around VfM such as future security costs and ways of working in South Sudan will become clearer as the shape and politics of the post-CPA transition firms up.
- Plans include establishing a set of benchmarks for unit costs. These should take account of the costly environment but also measure performance and challenge partners to find ways to work more cost-effectively. We will also increase understanding of VfM among our implementing partners and ensure that they maximise it through their management of DFID-supported programmes.
- We will look more at cost-determination so that cost-effectiveness can be better addressed in our programmes. A clearer understanding of how costs are broken down will allow us to identify factors largely outside of our control, such as the cost of private delivery of utilities and additional security in Sudan, and areas where we can most improve and press partners to do so.
- We will harness Corporate and Divisional financial improvement strategies and tools to ensure we have the correct systems, procedures and practice in place to drive continued improvement in financial management. We will further strengthen financial forecasting by implementing a monthly three-step quality assurance process including peer review by the Programme Team and sign-off by the Senior Management Team.
- We will improve our portfolio performance by taking emergency measures or closing down poor performing projects and by establishing an enhanced portfolio review process.

# 7) Monitoring and Evaluation

## Monitoring

**How** – DFID Sudan will work closely with partner institutions to ensure that all new programmes have a strong monitoring strategy, including metadata for programme monitoring, plans for data collection, reporting, programme evaluation and risk management (capturing changes in the political and security situation which impinge on data collection and potentially programme performance). These will include partnerships with third parties if necessary to ensure independent data to ensure optimum results management. Data for monitoring will come from a variety of sources, including national representative surveys, government information management systems, participant perception surveys and programme specific information systems. We will work to improve the evidence base of our programmes as set out in slide 5 – with a particular emphasis on gathering and monitoring data by sex and geographic location. We will ensure that the programmes have either staff time or financial resources to do this work. The Development Assistance Committee recommends that when working in difficult environments up to 10% of funding should be allocated for both monitoring and evaluation, and we will work towards achieving this target. Particular attention will be paid to programmes which are innovative or pilots and we will include clear review points at which decisions over continued investment will be made.

**Who** – Implementing partners will be responsible for day to day programme monitoring, and DFID lead advisers and programme managers will provide oversight. The DFID Sudan Policy Team will provide a quality assurance role, developing concepts, feeding into design work, and commenting on and contributing to Annual Reviews and Project Completion Reviews. The new Results Adviser will be responsible for advising on and providing quality control of results.

**When** – DFID-Sudan will maintain continuous dialogue with implementing partners about programme performance, and we will formally agree with partners a results reporting schedule, at least every six months, which will include results, narrative and financial reporting. We will aim to carry out up to two field visits per programme per year – bearing in mind the principle of proportionality. Programme performance and results will be reviewed annually and at completion in line with blue book requirements. DFID Sudan will also review its results framework every 6 months, and formally refresh its overall operational plan annually.

**What** – the information will be used to inform programming decisions and review value for money. The policy team with relevant programme managers will determine how to use the results to improve the programme portfolio. We will design a Performance Improvement Action Plan (PIAP) for poor performing programmes to ensure closer monitoring. If milestones are not being met in year the programme manager and lead adviser will advise whether a PIAP is needed. We will set-out what minimum results a programme must achieve to continue receiving DFID support, and consider terminating programmes that fall-short.

## Evaluation

For each new programme we will consider whether an independent evaluation is required depending on its size, strategic importance, degree of novelty and the strength of pre-existing evidence. For existing programmes, we will consider whether an evaluation is appropriate; where we know that there is a low evidence base e.g. on maternal mortality in Sudan, we will work to improve this through evaluation. We propose to earmark a minimum of 1% and up to 7% of programme funds to evaluation depending on the programme and whether primary data collection is needed. The outcome of the evaluations will be shared with partners and stakeholders. DFID Sudan will share a new Results Adviser with DFID South Sudan and evaluation skills will be required for this post. DFID Sudan will also identify a staff member to be trained and accredited to the evaluation cadre to provide advice and support to the office.

## Building capacity of partners

Our priority is to support national partners and help build their capacity. Where possible we will work with government to improve national systems and the quality, relevance and timeliness of the data.

## 8) Transparency

**Transparency is one of the top priorities for the UK Government. DFID Sudan will meet our commitments under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee: we will publish detailed information about DFID projects, including programme documents and all spend above £500. Information will be accessible, comparable, accurate, timely and in a common standard with other donors. We will also provide opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback.**

DFID Sudan will work hard to promote accessibility to information in Sudan. This will include continuing to contribute to the Embassy-led 'UK in Sudan' website and issuing local press releases on our work through the Embassy communications team. We will also begin to produce an information sheet detailing our work in Sudan, highlighting our impact and results. The UKaid logo will be used appropriately on buildings, commodities and other materials for DFID-funded programmes so it is clear what UKaid is supporting.

DFID Sudan does not presently provide information directly in the main local language - Arabic. With the Embassy, we will explore the option of more proactively working with radio broadcasters working in local languages across Sudan to publicise our support and also to increase the demand side for accountability of public resources in across Sudan. We will ensure that from January 2011 all local publications we produce, including project summaries for newly approved programmes are published in Arabic. Many of our implementing partners do already provide project information in local languages, such as through leaflets explaining the work they are doing.

We will meet the standards set out in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), and encourage our partners in civil society, multilateral organisations and other donors to do the same. Through our relationships with the Government we will encourage greater transparency to their citizens about their budgets and the aid which they receive.

We will increase opportunities for feedback by those benefiting from DFID programmes. DFID Sudan is currently designing a number of large new programmes, including in education, health and social safety nets. We will explore what will be the most effective ways for the voices of the beneficiaries to be heard during the design process as well as during the operation and appraisal of the programmes. We will look at easy, innovative and cost effective ways of gathering the views of beneficiaries, including through traditional means such as field visit and interviews as well as through technology such as mobile communications.