

# Results in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Situations

## *HOW TO NOTE*

The note is for use by country offices in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and situations and is intended to bring together relevant materials and share good practice on measuring and managing for results in these contexts. The document is relevant to DFID programming in every sector. It supplements general DFID guidance including on business cases, results, value for money, evaluation and logframes. This is a constantly evolving area and this Note is intended to be **living, regularly updated, guidance**.

This note is a joint product between the Fragile States Team of Policy Division, CHASE, the Improving Aid Impact team of FCPD, RED and the Evaluation Department. It builds on an stock take of DFID practice in six countries which includes further examples and lessons [Managing results in conflict-affected and fragile states: A stock-take of lessons, experience and practice](#)

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## Abbreviations

**FCAS:** Fragile and Conflict-affected States. The definition also covers situations in which part of a country or region is fragile (including local and regional multi-state dimensions)

## 1. Overview

- 1.1 This How To Note sets out the rationale, the challenges and some of the practical options and ideas for measuring and managing development results in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and situations (FCAS). It is intended as a readable resource for DFID Country Offices operating in these contexts, a reference point with useful links and to complement other advice written by DFID's Finance and Corporate Performance Division on results management.
- 1.2 The paper begins with basic definitions and classification ([section 2](#)) and outlines what is distinctive about results management in FCAS ([section 3](#)). It then introduces peacebuilding and statebuilding frameworks and goals, originally set out in the DFID Practice Paper [Building Peaceful States and Societies](#) and now reflected across UK Government through the [Building Stability Overseas Strategy](#) and internationally through the [Monrovia Roadmap](#). This Note emphasises that a core objective in all FCAS country programmes and interventions across every sector is to support peacebuilding and statebuilding; an explicit theory of change is also underscored as critical ([section 4](#)).

### Measuring and Managing for Results in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Situations

- 1.3 The core business of results management in FCAS is largely the same as in other places where DFID works but this paper brings out specific issues for FCAS, including: measuring results at country ([section 5](#)) and intervention ([section 6](#)) levels, defining appropriate indicators ([section 7](#)), assessing VFM ([section 8](#)), and ensuring there are robust processes to carry out and learn from evaluations ([section 9](#)).

### Practical Issues and Challenges

- 1.4 Measuring and managing results in FCAS raises specific practical challenges and some opportunities beyond those normally encountered in more effective states ([section 10](#)). These include issues of managing risks ([section 11](#)) and potential harm ([section 12](#)), data reliability and collection ([section 13](#)), and opportunities to engage beneficiaries ([section 14](#)). The paper finishes with further ideas on the importance of innovation ([section 15](#)) and a summary of where to find further information within DFID ([section 16](#)).

[Annexes](#) A through L contain further detail, references and worked examples.

## *Introduction*

### **2. Defining & Classifying Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Situations**

- 2.1 The methods for defining and classifying fragile countries are contested<sup>1</sup>. DFID's approach is to use a combination of the three most widely accepted assessment frameworks<sup>2</sup>. These are the [World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment \(CPIA\)](#) indicators, the [Fund for Peace's Failed States Index \(FSI\)](#) and the [Uppsala Conflict Database](#).
- 2.2 **This paper uses the acronym FCAS to refer to both states that fit within the state-focused definition above, and fragile and conflict-affected situations more generally. A fragile and conflict-affected situation can exist within an otherwise stable state or regionally - affecting one or more states.**
- 2.3 Fragile and conflict-affected states, although often difficult environments in which to operate, may provide the opportunity to achieve excellent results rapidly. Although risks are often higher than in more stable environments, potential rewards can be exceedingly high. Evaluations conducted on FCAS interventions can thus yield critical information for the improvement of future interventions.

### **3. What is Distinctive about Results in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Situations?**

- 3.1 **We need dual objectives to ensure we are addressing conflict and fragility as well as poverty if we are to achieve the MDGs** (see 4.2). There is a serious risk of negative results if every intervention does not consider conflict and fragility objectives. This is commonly referred to by the rubric "Do No Harm" ([s12, Annex I](#)).
- 3.2 **International experience shows that:**
- **Delivering both short- term and long-term results is critical.** FCAS, particularly post-conflict or deteriorating states, need results quickly to build the confidence of the population.<sup>3</sup> The specific intervention will depend on the context. However, **sustainable change can take at least 15-30 years (and donor planning cycles are 2-5 years)**. Countries do not exit from conflict and fragility in a single leap. During the twentieth century, even the fastest performing countries took 15-30 years to bring their institutional performance from the level of a fragile state like Haiti to the level of a functioning state like Ghana<sup>4</sup>. This means we should think carefully about the discount rates applied in business cases – some changes which will take a long time are nevertheless extremely valuable.
  - **Risk management is essential.** Working in these situations is inherently risky but high rates of return are possible through transformational results and there

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<sup>1</sup> The OECD usefully defines it as a situation where, "governments lack the political will and/or capacity to fulfil the basic conditions for poverty reduction, development, security and human rights" OECD (2007), [Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States](#), Paris

<sup>2</sup> DFID's approach is to use a combination of three credible, widely used and publicly available methods to classify countries every two years. Currently this means FCAS represent 21 of DFID's 28 bilateral programmes.

<sup>3</sup> See for example, World Bank [World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development](#), Chapter 4 *Restoring Confidence: Moving away from the brink* (pages 119-128).


<sup>4</sup> See WDR 2011 p.11; & Pritchett & de Weijer, [Fragile States Stuck in a Capability Trap?](#) WDR Background

[Annex F](#)). International studies indicate that donors may be too risk averse and that they need to review their approaches to risk management. See [section 11](#).

## 4. Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Frameworks and Goals

- 4.1 DFID published its [peacebuilding and statebuilding \(PBSB\) framework](#) in 2009. This should frame DFID's overall strategy and objectives at country (and regional) level in FCAS and help to identify and prioritise interventions that address conflict and fragility. These interventions should start with a specific context analysis and consider all aspects of the framework holistically. Core state functions identified by DFID include citizen security, justice and financial and economic management. This approach is echoed in the OECD-DAC's guidance [Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance](#)

### DFID's approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding



- 4.2 FCAS are the furthest behind in terms of meeting the MDGs, and there is now wide recognition that poverty reduction can only be achieved if we address conflict and fragility through a peacebuilding and statebuilding approach. The [2011 World Development Report](#), the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the DAC strongly reinforce this.<sup>5</sup> According to the WDR, no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has achieved a single MDG (although some on DFID's list are on target).<sup>6</sup> People in FCAS are more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school and twice as likely to see their children die before age five.<sup>7</sup> Girls and women are more subject to sexual and gender-based violence.<sup>8</sup> On average a country that experienced major violence from 1981 to 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points higher than a country that saw no violence.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See [DAC Page on Peacebuilding, statebuilding and security](#).

<sup>6</sup> [WDR 2011](#), page 5 (World Bank: 2011). Compiled for 2010 MDG Summit in 2010. For more see '[MDG Goals Report 2010](#)' (United Nations, NY, 2010) & World Development Indicators 2010

<sup>7</sup> [WDR 2011](#), page 62. based on World Development Indicators 2010 and WDR calculations and Scott Gates et al. '[Consequences of Civil Conflict](#)', (WDR 2011 Background Paper, World Bank October 2010).

<sup>8</sup> A global review of 50 countries finds significant increases in gender-based violence following a major war. See Megan Bastick, Karin Grimm and Rachel Kunz, '[Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector](#)', (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> [WDR 2011](#), page 60, based on WDR calculations and Shaoshua Chen, Martin Ravallion and Prem Sangraula, (2009) '[Dollar a Day Revisited](#)', World Bank Economic Review 23 (2); 163-84.

- 4.3 **A peacebuilding and statebuilding approach to tackling these challenges requires that country offices set out – through country plans – a planned contribution to addressing conflict and fragility.** This will entail a theory of change ([s5.2](#)).
- 4.4 **There is a broadening consensus across Whitehall that all UK government efforts in FCAS, including development, diplomatic and security engagements, must be coordinated to support peacebuilding and statebuilding. This was agreed in the [Building Stability Overseas Strategy \(BSOS\)](#) published in July 2011.** BSOS emphasises conflict prevention including upstream capacity building to develop strong institutions in partner countries, so reducing fragility. Early warnings of conflict and fast response to emergent conflicts to limit the spread of violence are also flagged (see [s5.4](#)).
- 4.5 Taking a peacebuilding and statebuilding approach to the 30% of ODA spent in fragile states is a key part of **DFID’s implementation of BSOS**. Wider implementation is also underway, including new processes to address early warning and action, and the development of a cross-HMG strategic conflict assessment methodology to provide shared analysis. Concurrently, the Conflict Pool, the main instrument for implementing cross-HMG strategies, is developing its own results guidance.
- 4.6 **There is also greater international consensus on a framework.** The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding of some FCAS governments (the g7+ group of 17 fragile states) and international partners has agreed five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals as a foundation for fragile states to enable progress towards the MDGs, endorsed at Busan in November 2011 as part of a New Deal for Fragile States. These are currently known as the **Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals** (see [Annex D](#)):
- i. ***Legitimate politics*** – Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
  - ii. ***Security*** – Establish and strengthen people’s security
  - iii. ***Justice*** – Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice
  - iv. ***Economic foundations*** – Generate employment and improve livelihoods
  - v. ***Revenues and services*** – Manage revenues and build capacity for accountable and fair social service delivery

The International Dialogue will develop indicators for these in 2012.

## *Measuring and managing for results in fragile and conflict –affected states and situations*

### **5. Measuring and Managing for Results at Country Level**

- 5.1 **Country office results frameworks should outline how the country programme will contribute to reducing conflict and fragility and provide information about the general direction of travel for the country.** Where there is sufficient host government will and capacity, these frameworks should be owned and led by locally based institutions and should include an assessment of donor performance e.g. the Government of Rwanda uses Paris indicators; Fragile States principles (10.1) could also be useful.
- 5.2 **Country offices need to develop and articulate a ‘theory of change’** which will explicitly link country level indicators that assess the transformation from conflict and fragility to intervention level impact indicators, measuring how DFID’s interventions are supporting this transformation. **The aim is to give an analytical explanation of the logic that underpins the results chain.**
- 5.3 The DFID peacebuilding and statebuilding approach provides the framework to use at sector and country level. Wherever possible, draw on nationally-owned objectives and frameworks, so that DFID’s theories of change do not undermine national ownership.<sup>10</sup> DFID’s Quality Assurance Unit, which is responsible for formally quality assuring DFID’s business cases, outlines that the theory of change should be very explicit. Attention should be paid to the links between inputs and outputs, and each step tested with evidence particularly to support assumed behavioural changes; political economy analysis should also be deep and explicit. DFID’s Evidence and Evaluation Department highly recommend that to best communicate theories of change we must provide:
- i. A one line snapshot of the programme – highlighting the key causal links
  - ii. A diagram to give a visual summary – ideally showing all causal links and assumptions
  - iii. Narrative text which gives more detail on each of the causal links, the assumptions and evidence (or lack of it) for each causal link
- 5.4 It is important that the ToC is used as a tool to drive programme design and provoke critical reflection and, if appropriate, a re-think. **The ‘theory of change’ will itself change and need adapting over time in response to new circumstances, analysis and understanding;** we are unlikely to know with complete confidence at the outset how cause and effect will work, and how the politics will play out, in a particular context. Indicators will help us test the validity of the theory of change. **Set realistic targets and milestones:** While it is critical in many fragile (and particularly in post-conflict) state contexts to deliver some results quickly, it is also important to recognise that lasting change takes time. Sustainable, complete institutional reform takes 15-30 years,<sup>4</sup> well beyond our short country planning and project cycle timeframes.
- 5.5 **Once goals are defined, we need to identify indicators that can measure how effective our overall country programme is at tackling conflict and fragility by tracking overall progress through country-level indicators.** DFID is currently considering some standard corporate indicators in this area. The Building Stability

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<sup>10</sup> See Annex A of DFID’s [Building Peaceful States and Societies](#) paper: “Practical Ways of Addressing Causes and Effects of Conflict and Fragility”.

Overseas Strategy provides a cross-Government framework to assess DFID's contribution to addressing conflict and fragility at country level. While, there is currently no unified cross-UK Government results strategy, there is often one unified country plan.

5.6 **We then need to identify indicators at all stages of the results framework based on the theory of change and incorporate them logically into results chains that link overall country level objectives to intervention level objectives and outcomes.** This is useful because:

- It allows us to aggregate intervention level monitoring results to report on peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes at country level; and
- Disaggregating existing development indicators (e.g. on provision of basic services) in different ways can help us to monitor trends in fragility and conflict – e.g. to monitor regional, ethnic or other forms of exclusion.

(For more work on Indicators see [section 7](#) below)

## ***6. Measuring and Managing for Results at Intervention Level***

*Note: This paper does not cover general guidance on measuring and managing for results. For details on setting clear objectives, reviewing existing research and evidence, finding available data and identifying gaps, see DFID's general Business Case guidance.*

- 6.1 **All interventions in all sectors in FCAS should contribute to tackling conflict and fragility, as a primary or secondary set of objectives.** It is important to factor into planning that it may take longer in FCAS than in other contexts to design interventions, get them operational and observe results. Consideration should also be given to whether conflict could manifest itself as exported violence in the form of terrorism. In these circumstances, the [CONTEST/PREVENT](#) strategy requires teams to consider interventions to address this and to report back on results to the wider UK Government counter-terrorism community. Contact DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department for more information.
- 6.2 **Contextual analysis at sector level is a crucial initial stage of programme design.** DFID is developing approaches to sector level conflict assessment in service delivery sectors (health, education, water, sanitation) and the implications for results and indicators. Links to these resources will be added to this paper when complete – Contact DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department for more information.
- 6.3 **It is worth identifying whether a Post-Conflict Needs Assessment has been undertaken by the UN or World Bank.** Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) are multilateral exercises undertaken by the UN Development Group (UNDG), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank (WB) and Regional Development Banks in collaboration with the national government and with the cooperation of donor countries. PCNAs are increasingly used by national and international actors as an entry point for conceptualizing, negotiating and financing a common shared strategy for recovery and development in fragile, post-conflict settings. The PCNA includes both the assessment of needs and the national prioritization and costing of needs in an accompanying transitional results matrix. As of July 2010, PCNAs have been undertaken or remain ongoing in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan (both not formally PCNAs), Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan (North/South), Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Pakistan, Georgia, Zimbabwe (only preparation) and Yemen.



- 6.4 **Service delivery is substantially undermined by fragility and conflict. And basic service provision can impact significantly – positively or negatively - on state-society relations.** The OECD-DAC has outlined the mutual influence of state fragility and service delivery and offers useful guidance. [Service Delivery in Fragile States: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons](#) (2009). More recently the OECD has produced a [Handbook on Contracting Out Government Functions and Services in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations](#).
- 6.5 The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies ([INEE](#)) [Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery](#) provides tools for design and implementation of education programmes in situations of conflict and fragility. They include contextual analysis, appropriate curriculum development, inclusive recruitment and non-violent classroom management.
- 6.6 **Robust reporting and oversight is particularly important** in FCAS, where delivering complex interventions may require more flexibility, with elements of trial and error. Country offices may need to employ tools and approaches for managing results at intervention level in a more innovative and intensive way, often with a higher level of expenditure, than in other contexts. Reporting should be partner-led, assessing both partner country and development partners – but also transparent, using for example existing web-based platforms.
- 6.7 **Quality, real-time monitoring (and where possible evaluation) of the delivery of activities and early results is needed alongside robust management** to ensure that lessons are learned and corrections made. This can be particularly challenging in FCAS where partner M&E systems are often notably weaker and can become activity-focused losing sight of the strategic issues. **Feedback from beneficiaries** ([s14](#)) can be a useful way to get factual monitoring information especially through mobile phones, when other information sources are hard to get. And it can ensure that marginalised groups are fully included.
- 6.8 **Close engagement with implementing partners to support, facilitate and oversee operations is required.** When working with multilateral partners, for instance, DFID’s Memorandums of Understanding should have a robust performance framework attached. When entering into a programme relationship with a multilateral organisation, DFID country staff should liaise with the International Relations Division, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department or International Finance Division and refer to the [MAR assessment](#). Staff should consult the institutional lead on the institutional leads list for the latest advice on specific policy objectives for that organisation and lessons learned. Staff should also refer to guidance from the International Directors Office on completing a Business Case for programmes delivered through multilaterals.
- 6.9 **Monitoring should be jointly and regularly conducted by both partner countries and implementing partners.** One option is engaging a different partner for the monitoring role to provide an independent data source and to challenge the implementing partner more effectively and flag when changes are required. This requires hands-on oversight by DFID staff (or a joint donor committee).

### **Box 1 Monitoring with partners in Somalia**

In Somalia, the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery is funded by DFID and other donors and delivered by the UN. DFID staff and consultants have little or no access to the areas where the programme is being implemented and the UN system works mainly remotely or via local partners. Several monitoring approaches have been combined to overcome these constraints. The programme funds local development initiatives through a participatory planning process. Financial and 'contract' monitoring is done by project staff on a monthly basis, with dispersal of funds for community initiatives tracked through a dedicated financial and information management system. Disbursements are conditional on delivery of the outputs linked to the previous disbursement, and require joint sign-off by UN staff, local government officials (engineers in the case of construction projects) and community representatives. Contractors must produce photographs of construction sites in their monthly reports. Implementation data is aggregated on a central database by the programme management team, against logframe indicators. Where the data reveals a problem with implementation, the management team seeks clarification to ensure that timetables and budgets are respected. This aggregated data is used for progress reports to quarterly donor steering committee meetings.

## ***7. Defining Indicators to Monitor Conflict and Fragility<sup>11</sup>***

**7.1 In using chapters 7 and 9 of this guidance it is important to keep clear the difference between (a) performance and outcome monitoring for tracking results in all programmes, over a short to medium timescale; and (b) impact evaluation, which uses a counterfactual comparison to measure impact rigorously for selected programmes, over a longer time period.**

**7.2 Impact evaluation including attribution of impact to DFID programmes:** Attribution of impact to an intervention (funded partly or wholly by a DFID programme) is only possible using impact evaluation with a counterfactual. There is no short cut to this. It allows use of methods to measure the impact of the intervention rigorously, and DFID's contribution to that impact is then assessed pro rata to the resource input or using some other appropriate rule that can be defended. DFID is expanding its investment in impact evaluation of programmes, particularly in fragile states, and impact evaluation is important in a wider range of programmes than has been used up to now. However, realistically not all programmes will be looked at in this way because of the technical challenges and measurement costs of impact evaluation. The effects produced by a development intervention (particularly at the higher end of the results chain) invariably take time to manifest, so data generated to support impact evaluations will usually be collected on a longer timescale (likely to be at least 18 months). However real-time impact evaluation is now being developed in the World Bank and some other agencies.

**7.3 Performance monitoring and use of outcome indicators to track progress on DFID programmes:** The monitoring framework will include a log frame, annual reviews, indicators of progress and outcomes, and clear baselines. The indicators should be selected to focus on the outcomes that we are trying to achieve, recognising that these will include factors beyond our control. On their own these indicators will support an analysis of what actually happened (the *factual*) rather than what would have happened in the absence of the intervention (the *counterfactual*). There is often a tendency to use the language of outcomes and impact interchangeably in external communications - this is confusing and should be avoided.

<sup>11</sup> Refer to DFID's guidance on [Using Logframes](#) for what makes a good indicator

- 7.4 **All DFID programmes are subject to monitoring. Monitoring frameworks are required because they generate timely data for management decision-making to track progress and correct direction of travel.** These performance data are essential in assessing overall results within a 6 month time frame and reporting that progress. If accompanied by qualitative analysis which sets out what is assumed about the counterfactual, they can also be used in explaining progress towards programme indicators. But it cannot establish the effect of the intervention compared to what it would have been in the absence of the intervention (i.e. *impact*), or attribute changes to DFID programmes. The following definitions should be kept in mind:

Results: The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention. **Results include a programme's:**

- Outputs: **The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention**
- Outcomes: **The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. These might be changes in behaviour, relationships, activities, or actions of people, groups and organisations**
- Impact: **Positive and negative, long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended**

(See forthcoming handbook on evaluation – contact DFID's Evaluation Department for more information.)

- 7.5 **Many of our programmes will in future be subject to both evaluation and monitoring. So it may be sensible to develop the monitoring and evaluation components together, but to keep clarity about what each element is doing and not doing.** This is efficient use of analytical resources and ensures the M&E components are consistent with each other. The baseline survey can be shared between the two components, although some of the questions and coverage will not be identical. The log frame used for performance monitoring should be consistent with the theory of change, developed as part of the business case, which drives the impact evaluation design. The evaluation questions developed in the design of the impact evaluation will be useful in informing selection of monitoring indicators.

- 7.6 **DFID is considering standard corporate level indicators of progress on conflict and fragility for aggregate reporting.**

- 7.7 **There is a range of existing possible sources of data that may be useful to monitor trends in addressing conflict and fragility and to establish baseline information.** (See Annex E for examples). **Indicators should be based on the theory of change linking interventions and programmes to a specific outcome on the drivers of conflict and fragility and hence delivering on peacebuilding and statebuilding.** Indicators can then be designed to monitor this outcome, and to continually test the validity of the theory of change.

- 7.8 **Peacebuilding and statebuilding indicators should be complementary to indicators which may be monitoring key sector objectives.** For example, an education programme may aim principally to increase the number of children in primary school. However, it could also be designed to improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of a marginalised group. Indicators could include changes in attitudes towards the state among the target population. It would also be important to disaggregate the indicator measuring the number of children going to primary school to show the proportion coming from the marginalised group.

- 7.9 **Selecting appropriate indicators in a particular context will depend on the dynamics of conflict and fragility identified through country analysis, including political analysis.** We may use top level indicators where change is not attributable to DFID activity (see Box 3), as well as indicators at intervention and country level that measure the outcomes we are seeking from DFID programmes on conflict and fragility directly. Where rigorous impact evaluation is also being used (not in every case), it is possible to go further and indicators/estimates of DFID's impact can be generated. [Annex B](#) illustrates some of the categories of indicators that can be used to monitor different objectives in relation to fragility and conflict at country level. And we may need to cover unexpected consequences beyond normal linear results chain thinking, to monitor broader information.

#### **Box 2 DRC - Country level indicators to monitor conflict and fragility**

This box sets out some areas with examples of indicators that have been used to measure progress on peacebuilding and statebuilding goals and to monitor changes in the operating environment. These (and all) indicators can be used effectively where a serious counterfactual analysis has been undertaken at inception and updated appropriately over time.

- **Reducing conflict and improving security:** activities of armed groups; numbers of displaced people and voluntary returns; command and control arrangements for defence forces; implementation of peace agreements; regional security and border incidents;
- **Improving respect for human rights:** reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence; reports from UN and reputable human rights NGOs on justice and human rights;
- **Reducing corruption:** transparency of natural resource revenues; WB 'Doing Business' survey; expected vs. actual government revenue from natural resources; compliance by executive with control institution recommendations;
- **Respect for democracy and the political settlement:** functioning of national and provincial parliaments; % of women in elected positions; media freedom;
- **Providing basic services:** primary roads developed and maintained; primary enrolment; primary health care; access to clean water; budget allocations and spending for education and health;
- **Effectiveness of public financial management:** integrity of budget; budget execution data; reduced leakage of public funds; % increase in budget revenues from natural resources and other sources.

Monitoring uses a combination of qualitative information from external sources (e.g. news media, press statements by NGOs), any available quantitative data (e.g. business climate surveys indicating perceptions of corruption) and subjective assessments by DFID staff of political and institutional developments.

- 7.10 **It may be possible to use the same indicators at country and intervention level.** For example, opinion polls measuring an increase in the perception that the political settlement is inclusive could be both an indicator for an intervention to support empowerment and accountability, as well as an indicator to measure overall national progress towards an inclusive political settlement. Similarly, the criminal conviction rate could monitor a project to support justice sector reform at the same time as measuring the restoration of core state functions.
- 7.11 **The identification of indicators will be informed by the data available *but should not be dictated by it.*** we need to measure what is important not what is easy to measure. To address data gaps, a variety of official and non-official sources will need

to be used and specific measures can be put in place to support capacity-building or the commissioning of new data collection. As far as possible we should use triangulated national sources of data. Developing indicators is not simply a technical exercise to meet DFID's needs – engaging with country partners in indicator development can help build their capacity to monitor and improve accountability, service delivery and state-society relations

**7.12 We can use a basket of indicators to measure a particular outcome, rather than relying on a single measure.** This is particularly useful where confidence in the underlying data is limited, or where the theory of change lends itself better to qualitative measures. In such cases, two or three complementary indicators, quantitative and qualitative, could be used.

**Box 3 Developing a basket of indicators - DRC Community-Driven Reconstruction Programme (Tuungane – Let's Unite)**

Many areas of the DRC have been devastated by war, and the Tuungane programme was designed to help rebuild access to basic services. However, the programme design went beyond service delivery to address one of the key drivers of fragility in DRC - the exclusion of communities from decision making, and consequently poor state-society relationships of trust and accountability.

Tuungane helps villages set up community decision-making forums in cooperation with the local government, which are then provided with the resources to choose and implement projects rebuilding basic services and infrastructure. The peacebuilding theory of change is that greater community engagement in decision making alongside state actors will improve state-society relations, develop a system of accountability, and help develop the ability to manage future crises without resorting to violence.

The Tuungane programme has several indicators monitoring its contribution to basic service provision, including: # of classrooms built, # of clinics rehabilitated, # of people using each clinic, and # women giving birth in rehabilitated birthing centres.

However, based on the peacebuilding theory of change, indicators were also developed to monitor the potential outcomes in terms of democratic decision-making, community engagement and state-society relations:

- % of community members who believe that the local committee is representative of the population,
- % of community members who participated in elections to local committees;
- % of community members who believe that the public should decide on the allocation of public funds, or question the actions of national political leaders;
- % of women elected onto village committees

**7.13 Monitoring peacebuilding and statebuilding results often involves finding ways to measure complex concepts like state legitimacy, confidence levels, trust in institutions and social cohesion.** Proxy indicators should be carefully tailored to the political, social and cultural context. One way to do this is by involving the intended beneficiaries in indicator selection through a participatory design process as they may be able to identify simple measures of progress that would not be apparent to outsiders (see [s14](#) on beneficiary engagement below). This may also enable an 'active indicator' to be developed which improves outcomes as well as monitoring (see Box 4). Qualitative methods are also likely to be critical to ensure monitoring captures a full and accurate picture. For information on the use of perception surveys see section [13.8](#) below

#### **Box 4 An active approach to security and justice indicators – Harvard University**

With support from DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, Harvard University has been working on developing indicators in security and justice that can help improve outcomes, not just monitor them. They define an 'active indicator' as one which 'is designed specifically for use by an official with formal authority over the people expected to produce the outcome being measured.'

This means it should be built using available, easily collected data in such a way that it presents officials in, for example, a prison service with a tool they can use to improve performance on a day-to-day basis. To do this, indicators need to be composites, capturing the changing relationship between activities that officials can manipulate (the independent variable) and the resulting changes in performance that they want to measure (the dependent variable). For example, indicators developed with police services in Jamaica and Sierra Leone included, the proportion of police searches that yielded arrests and the number of days elapsed between key stages in investigations of sexual assault. Both of these offer a tangible entry point for officials to alter practice and monitor the results of this change. For more information, contact DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department.

- 7.14 **We recommend a participatory approach to identifying conflict issues and then designing appropriate indicators to measure them.** The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) working group on Education and Fragility has facilitated a number of [consultative workshops](#) on education and fragility including in Ethiopia and South Sudan. These focus on identifying educational factors which promote or mitigate against peace. There is scope to develop these into indicators that promote peacebuilding and statebuilding and target state fragility (see INEE link above).

#### **Box 5 Sources of sample conflict and fragility related indicators for use at intervention level:**

**Conflict, Security and Justice:** [Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators](#) (Scheye, E and Chigas. D, 2009). This also includes indicators useful for measuring progress towards some key statebuilding objectives. And [Measuring and Monitoring Armed Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators](#) (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2010).

**Governance and conflict:** (DFID *Forthcoming - GFSD*)

**Voice and accountability:** [Measuring change and results in voice and accountability work](#) (DFID Working Paper 34).

**Peacebuilding:** [Fragile states and peacebuilding programs: practical tools for improving program performance and results](#) (Social Impact, 2006). And, [Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs](#) (Church, C and Rogers, M, Search For Common Ground, 2006)

**Rule of law:** [Developing indicators to measure the rule of law: a global approach](#) (Vera Institute of Justice, 2008).

- 7.15 **Establishing clear baselines is critical.** In FCAS, baselines are often absent, and where they are present changes in the security situation may mean that accessing the same population for repeated monitoring is impossible. So we may need to establish a baseline as part of the early intervention stages. Pragmatic, 'good enough' monitoring may be unavoidable. We should be aware of any resulting limitations to the data and take them into account when analysing and communicating the results. See the section on [innovation \(s13\)](#) below for an example of an approach to developing a baseline.

- 7.16 **Most indicators should be disaggregated by sex.** And if horizontal inequality<sup>12</sup> within the target population (e.g. by ethnic group, religion or caste) is an actual or potential driver of conflict, disaggregating data can provide important information on conflict dynamics and the extent to which an intervention is reducing causes of conflict. If political sensitivities make it inappropriate to collect this data directly, we may be able to use proxies for group membership (e.g. place of residence) with care. Avoid drawing too many conclusions from groups too small to be statistically significant (particularly for surveys). This may entail expanding the size of surveys, or groups within surveys, to ensure that potentially disadvantaged groups are adequately represented.
- 7.17 DFID is developing arrangements with a number of NGOs on improving our approaches to monitoring and indicators of conflict, crime and violence. This will include a call-down system for direct support to country offices. Information is available from DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department.

## 8. Value for Money

*This guidance is not intended to deal with the issue of value for money (VFM) in FCAS exhaustively. But a few relevant points are outlined below.*

- 8.1 **Many of our innovative interventions in FCAS are simultaneously high risk and potentially transformative with high returns.** VFM analysis needs to incorporate both risk and returns. The appraisal section in the business case is the main vehicle for addressing value for money (VFM).<sup>13</sup> Programmes to support peace or statebuilding processes can be strategically very significant, but politically risky and outside our control.
- 8.2 **While unit cost measures are a key analytical tool for assessing VFM because of the unique nature of the FCAS operating environment, the choice of benchmarks is more complex.** Comparisons should only be made with programmes in similar challenging situations and contexts. Unit costs may also vary significantly within one fragile state, and they may vary substantially between large and small projects.<sup>14</sup> Data may be unreliable. It is especially important in FCAS to explicitly highlight the judgements made in coming to VFM decisions and to justify the data being used.
- 8.3 **The benefits are in relative not absolute terms.** One intended outcome is to stabilise or reduce risks in a difficult and complex environment. As a result the counterfactual or do nothing comparison is vital as it may be that without the programme, instability will worsen. An intervention could be value for money even where outcome measures show no change or if the alternative is a rapid deterioration in the situation.

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<sup>12</sup> 'Horizontal inequalities' refers to inequalities between groups defined by identity, such as ethnicity, religion, caste or region.. For further information see Frances Stewart (ed) Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and the [CRISE website](#).

<sup>13</sup> DFID's Approach to Value for Money (July 2011). See [http://mande.co.uk/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/pub\\_031035.pdf](http://mande.co.uk/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/pub_031035.pdf).

<sup>14</sup> DFID's Secretary of State said : " If it costs twice as much to educate a child in a conflict country as it does in a stable one, it's still good value. We will be guided by what we can achieve not just by how much it costs to achieve it." See <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-articles/2011/andrew-mitchell-on-results-for-change/>

- 8.4 Impact evaluation provides one source of data on rates of return for assessing likely VFM (see [s9](#)) where the rate of return is the ratio of social and other benefits gained from an investment relative to the investment. However, there are relatively few studies in this area. There is also a risk of using over-optimistic assumptions on rates of return (the positive outputs and outcomes to be achieved) so optimism bias should be explicitly considered. As with other types of DFID programmes, attribution of impact to DFID should be proportionate, realistic and only claimed where this can be justified.
- 8.5 **Benefits may accrue over relatively long time periods** (15-30 years) compared with other types of DFID programmes. This means both (a) acknowledging the full range of benefits, including security, stability and counterfactual, and (b) using an appropriately long appraisal and evaluation period and sensible discounting assumptions are crucial parts of the analysis (see DFID's How to Note on '[A Strengthened Approach to Economic Appraisals](#)', [HMG's Green Book](#) and/or seek advice from DFID economists on discounting).
- 8.6 **Risk analysis and management is critical. However, the potential to diversify risk is more limited** as alternative interventions to achieve the same outcomes in FCAS may be more difficult to identify and deliver. Scenario analysis of alternative interventions together with a risk analysis against each will be helpful. Ultimately, though, because of the difficulty of diversifying risk and given the implementation challenges of operating in fragile states, the key drivers of VFM may well be procurement and management aspects for the preferred option, including well-developed risk management strategies. This may be more important than the first stage appraisal issue of choosing between options.
- 8.7 **VFM metrics must clarify the reward-risk trade off, and not create incentives to focus solely on low risk activities** (see [s11](#)). Advisers should be aware of the tension between the flexibility required to operate effectively in FCAS and demands created by strict financial management.
- 8.8 **Take the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) assessment into account when considering funding mechanisms.** The full MAR report, *Taking Forward the Findings of the MAR* paper, individual assessment summaries, and responses from the multilaterals assessed can all be found [here](#). The MAR assessed value for money of our partners, scoring them accordingly. For those multilaterals which scored poorly, DFID has ceased funding or identified 'special measures'. There may be good reason for working with a poor performing multilateral but a clear justification should be provided in the Business Case. These Business Cases must be submitted to the DFID Quality Assurance Unit (QAU) regardless of funding level.

## ***9. Evaluation***

- 9.1 **Rigorous evaluation is integral to managing for results in FCAS, as it is in all contexts.** It allows us to know more about what worked, what didn't and why and from that allows us to improve performance and to be held accountable to beneficiaries, host governments and to the UK taxpayer. An honest management culture is essential where failures as well as successes are flagged and investigated openly to improve performance and enable more strategic and effective targeting of aid.
- 9.2 **However, there is currently relatively little evidence of the effect and impact of DFID's engagement in FCAS.** [Annex K](#) provides a summary of DFID commissioned



research and systematic reviews that are beginning to address this gap. More details will be available on the new [Evidence & Resources](#) page on Insight.

**9.3 There are usually a number of constraints to evaluation in fragile contexts, including:**

- Complex, highly dynamic and unpredictable lines of causation **between variables of interest make it hard to develop theories of change, articulate objectives and understand attribution;**
- Little or unreliable access<sup>15</sup> to data **from which to adequately draw baselines, monitor progress and develop counterfactuals;**
- Long term results horizon **(typically between 15 to 30 years) limiting the efficacy of mid-term and immediate ex-post evaluations;**
- Coupled with unpredictable causation, multiple actors (including across HMG) pursuing similar results makes it difficult to attribute effects of interventions; **and**
- The political nature of engagement **in fragile and conflict-affected states can undermine incentives to evaluate and the lesson learning objectives of evaluation.**

However, this is not always the case. There are examples where conflict situations can provide unique opportunities for evaluating impact. For example, work on the management of illness undertaken during the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan is considered of exceptional quality as measured by high impact publications. The reasons for this include a high and concentrated burden of need (which significantly reduces the numbers you need to see an effect), often a more static population (as travel is difficult), less fragmentation of services, and good enumeration by international agencies.

**9.4 These unique challenges demand that we invest more systematically in evaluation of interventions in FCAS.** They also demand that the planning, design and delivery of evaluation in fragile and conflict-affected states be uniquely tailored to the context. The OECD DAC Evalnet ‘Evaluating Donor Engagement in Situations of Conflict and Fragility’ (2011) outlines some basic evaluation principles ([Annex H.](#))

**9.5 A strategic approach to evaluation of DFID’s work in fragile and conflict-affected states will ensure we:**

- generate data that is comparable across development contexts and from which we may be able to generalise;
- consider sustainability beyond the project end by building impact evaluation into the longer-term;
- answer questions that are relevant to our work, and not academia-led;
- avoid going to scale on pilot initiatives too early

## **Theory of change and available evidence**

**9.6 The theory of change ([s5.2](#)) is a vital tool for identifying the evaluation questions from which evaluation design will emerge.** As Chris Blattman ([non-resident DFID fellow, Centre for Global Development](#)) notes, “the first thing many evaluations do is to highlight that no one has seriously thought through the theory of change.” Getting the

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<sup>15</sup> Including insecure access to intervention areas

causal links right in a theory of change will enable DFID to tackle the question of attribution.<sup>16</sup>

- 9.7 **For conflict interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states we recommend a *theory of conflict or a conflict analysis* is undertaken to inform the theory of change.** This is not just a section on conflict within a situation or governance analysis but a thorough analysis of the drivers of conflict and how the intervention will aim to address them. The initial understanding of conflict will likely be flawed but it can be revised throughout the intervention and reflected in a modified theory of change and intervention log frame.
- 9.8 **Once the theory of change is established, the next step is to examine the available evidence underpinning the theory and assumptions.** If the evidence supporting the theory is strong, then an evaluation may not be necessary. Sometimes the evidence is strong for some parts, but not for others. Once the evidence is established, we can use the theory of change to ask whether there is interest in examining the micro-components and disaggregated aspects of the theory of change; or whether it would be more useful to evaluate the overall programme hypothesis and higher level goals. Only then can you begin to identify evaluation questions (including identifying outcome indicators for impact analysis and specifying sub-groups), but more fundamentally decide whether or not evaluate.

## Evaluation Planning

- 9.9 **We should not try to evaluate everything;** this is unnecessary, resource-intensive and distracting for staff, partners and beneficiaries. Project evaluations need to contribute to knowledge at a meta-level and demonstrate results in FCAS. We need to avoid commissioning uncoordinated and opportunistic evaluations or evaluating interventions that are not generalisable beyond the specific context in which they were delivered.
- 9.10 **We should use impact evaluation strategically to enable us to experiment and test a type of programme intervention or approach;** and to answer strategic high-level questions related to working in FCAS that have relevance beyond any specific context. Relevant heads of profession will help identify evidence and knowledge gaps and the big evaluation questions relating to working in FCAS.
- 9.11 **Once a decision has been made to undertake an evaluation, details should be reflected in the business case which needs to be clear about whether or not an evaluation is planned.** If one is planned then the 10 bullet points in the business case guidance on evaluation need to be addressed. It is essential to ensure coherence between the theory of change, log frame and the evaluation questions.<sup>17</sup>
- 9.12 **The business case will also identify the likely evaluation budget.** Management Board guidance suggests that in addition to any costs for routine monitoring and reporting, 3% to 5% of overall programme costs should be allocated to evaluation. Evaluation in FCAS is likely to be more expensive than in stable environments, and could be up to 10% of overall programme costs. Yet it is important not to be formulaic in evaluation budgeting, comparing the evaluation cost against the programme cost, but rather considering the value of the knowledge it will yield.

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<sup>16</sup> For more on theory of change see also *Integrated Planning and M&E in Stabilisation Contexts*- Stabilisation Unit October 2011

<sup>17</sup> Advice is available from EvD in developing business cases.

- 9.13 **The timing of an evaluation is particularly important in FCAS where interventions may have outcome or impact level targets (or both) that cannot be assessed within the lifetime of the intervention.** “The weaker or more fragile a state, the longer the time lag will be in showing program results and allowances must be made for this lag in evaluations.”<sup>18</sup> When an evaluation takes place will depend in part on when you expect to see results.<sup>19</sup>
- 9.14 **In line with DFID’s Paris Declaration commitments in fragile states, consideration should be given in FCAS to building partner country capacity for evaluation with a view to host governments eventually monitoring and evaluating interventions themselves.** Those commissioning evaluations in FCAS should, whenever possible, seek to ensure involvement of local partners in the design, management and analysis (i.e. beyond just data collection).

## Evaluation Design

- 9.15 **Evaluation design and approach are determined by the specific evaluation questions being asked.** In that sense *methodological appropriateness* and mixed methods are generally considered best practice in evaluation design. Randomised controlled trials will be an appropriate method to use with some interventions. However, rigorous methods can include both experimental and non-experimental quantitative and qualitative methods. It is important to identify the right methods for the question, not to start from the choice of preferred methods. (Source: DFID's forthcoming evaluation handbook).

### Box 6

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| <b>Impact Evaluation:</b>  | Estimates the effect of an intervention by comparing observed outcomes or outputs with a counterfactual. Can also be designed to answer the why and how questions             |
| <b>Process Evaluation:</b> | Seeks to understand whether, how and under what conditions an intervention works. Important for assessing the effective implementation and delivery of policies or programmes |

- 9.16 **Impact is defined as the outcome of an intervention compared to what it would have been in the absence of the intervention.** At the heart of impact evaluation is the idea of attribution and a counterfactual which estimates what would have happened in the absence of intervention.<sup>20</sup> Baselines are prerequisites for impact evaluations.
- 9.17 **Whether an impact or a process evaluation is necessary will depend on the questions being asked and purpose of the evaluation.** Process evaluations are useful to assess what has been achieved and whether plans have been implemented. They answer questions of efficiency and effectiveness and allow for re-direction of the intervention and for results to be demonstrated during the course of the intervention. Evidence produced will inform the results agenda at the intervention and country level.

<sup>18</sup> Natsios, A (2010) [The clash of the counter-bureaucracy and development](#), CGD, p71.

<sup>19</sup> DFID is now encouraging ex-post impact evaluations, e.g. five years after project completion, to examine the full impact of interventions. The possibility of embedding this as standard DFID practice is being considered through the new approach to project scoring which will be introduced in January 2012.

<sup>20</sup> By contrast, outcome monitoring is more about factual analysis, and doesn't tell us as much about effectiveness.

9.18 **In deciding whether to conduct an impact evaluation for an intervention in FCAS, potential gains have to be measured against the risks. Impact evaluations** would probably be appropriate:

- **where the intervention is innovative, experimental or a pilot, with plans to scale up or repeat it;**
- **where there is significant potential for impact;**
- where the evaluation findings are likely to change DFID or others' practice
- **to understand attribution; and,**
- **where the counterfactual can be constructed**

#### **Box 7 Afghanistan- innovative approaches to M&E**

In response to the Afghanistan Country Programme Evaluation, DFID Afghanistan has been developing innovative ways to monitor and evaluate programmes – for example in obtaining qualitative data from implementing partners, using military patrols for site monitoring, utilising independent reviews, and feedback or narrative from reliable sources such as donors, UN agencies and NGOs. They plan to produce guidance to improve their ability to gather data and make judgements on programme success, including how to measure the impact of new statebuilding and peace building work. It will take time for the results to filter through, but DFID is committed to addressing weakness in this area. (ICD Note on evaluation and fragility).

9.19 **Evaluations in fragile and conflict-affected states may well involve a degree of compromise, with 'good enough' monitoring and evaluation likely to prevail.** Resulting limitations to the evidence produced should however be flagged and taken into account when analysing and communicating the results.<sup>21</sup>

### **Closing the Circle – Learning from Evaluation**

9.20 **It is essential to have systems in place to respond to the results of M&E through changes in ongoing programmes and new programme design.** We need to learn lessons from the aspects of interventions that didn't work as well as aspects that have been successful. Often evaluations are used to make partially successful interventions more successful, rather than learning from outright successes or failures. It is particularly critical in FCAS to manage and provide the evidence for much of our programming, given its high risks, innovative nature and potential to save enormous cost and deliver transformational results.

9.21 Evidence uptake in FCAS can be facilitated in a number of ways:

- Specific, prioritised, constructive, relevant and feasible evaluation recommendations
- Present evidence and results in short, succinct reports and ensure constructive **not critical presentation. Make results and evidence more accessible through the use of abstracts, synthesis and meta-evaluations.**
- Use creative means of communicating evidence **including new media (e.g. social media) in addition to written reports.**
- Exploit established fragile states and other networks to disseminate and promote the uptake of evidence **instead of traditional methods. Engage multiple senior managers in setting results and evaluation agendas**

<sup>21</sup> Bamberger, Michael (2005), '[Designing quality impact evaluations under budget, time and data constraints](#)', World Bank.

- Identify stakeholders early and link with them **to ensure that the evidence serves their needs and dovetails into known business processes**
- Ensure budgets are adequate **to both capture and disseminate evidence effectively. Provide guidance to partners on suitable evaluation budgets and promote a flexible budget for quick evaluation and research to support evidence production and uptake**
- Be honest about and learn from failure **by understanding what went wrong. Distinguish between implementation failure and theory failure**
- Ask for and demonstrate evidence-based decision-making. **Ensure formal management response to evaluation evidence and use senior management to advocate for evidence uptake. Ensure transparent monitoring and reporting of the response. Showcase evaluation evidence utilisation and spotlight good examples of humanitarian evidence uptake in the same way DFID showcases success stories.**

## *Practical implementation issues*

### **10. Lesson Learning & Overall Guidance**

- 10.1 As members of the OECD-DAC [INCAF network](#), DFID and most development partners are signed up to operate through [ten Fragile State principles](#). However, it is clear from recent monitoring that implementation is patchy (see [INCAF's 'Monitoring the Fragile States Principles' page](#)).<sup>22</sup>
- 10.2 **DFID's synthesis of evaluations conducted in fragile states brings together findings from nine Country Programme Evaluations.** Key lessons include:
- **Nature of success:** Outcomes and impact are often unpredictable, intangible and hard to attribute. Progress is rarely linear, often reversible, but equally likely to accelerate after sudden breakthroughs. Conventional logic models on which standard evaluation approaches are based may not be appropriate and have to be supplemented by others.
  - **Alignment of interests:** Success often depends on the alignment of interests and incentives between DFID and its stakeholders.
  - **Internal shortcomings:** The National Audit Office 2008 report (Operating in Insecure Environments) states: "Learning has been hindered by incomplete project reporting. Quicker and fuller dissemination of the lessons from frontline experience will help DFID to improve the effectiveness of its aid". Click [here](#) to see the full report.
- 10.3 **Country offices should ensure they have sufficient resources and focus on effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E).** DFID Afghanistan has 3 full time equivalent staff members working on results. However, a focus on results and monitoring and evaluation is also critical for all advisers, especially where there are staff shortages.

#### **Box 8 DRC: Reflecting the results agenda in the staff team**

DFID DRC has dedicated one full time equivalent staff member to results, increased monitoring and evaluation capacity in programme teams and allocates approximately 10% of programme budgets to monitoring and evaluation. The Results Team integrates two functions: managing development results, which relates to the content of programmes, and managing for development results, which relates to systems and organisational management. All new programmes have to be 'passed' by the Results Team, which gives it the authority to ensure that sound monitoring and evaluation frameworks are in place from the start. During programme design phases, a member of the Results Team joins lead advisers to discuss monitoring and evaluation plans with partners. The Team also has a role in ensuring on-going programme quality through review processes. The team therefore provides a quality assurance function for all programmes. DFID-DRC has recently recruited a second Deputy Head who will lead the results agenda.

### **11. Risk Management in FCAS**

<sup>22</sup> INCAF has recently launched [transition financing policy and guidance](#) which DFID is also signed up to.

## **DFID's Approach**

- 11.1 **DFID's risk appetite is reviewed annually by the Management Board. It states that in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations, DFID is willing to take considered programme risks to increase potential effectiveness and secure potentially transformative long-term results.** Risks and rewards must thus be explicitly linked and traded off. The appetite statement highlights the issue of 'managing downside or negative risks, but grasping opportunities that are likely to yield high returns'.
- 11.2 **Risk is managed in DFID at four levels – corporate, divisional, country and project. DFID has recently reviewed its corporate risk register and management tools. The risk appetite for programmes in fragile states is medium-high.** DFID acknowledges a medium-high risk of unforeseen or rapid rises in instability and deterioration in the political governance context which would impact on operational delivery. DFID can tolerate a relatively high probability of a project not achieving its objectives, especially where the project is innovative or likely to produce high returns if successful. However, appetite for some specific types of risk, particularly fiduciary risk and security risk for staff, is very low. Corruption or fraud is considered to be one of the most serious risks, causing tension with the benefits of using country systems.
- 11.3 **Risk is also covered in DFID's business case guidance.** Country programmes must be designed with a heavy emphasis on understanding the risk context and assessing the evidence base in support of interventions. The strategic case section of the business case provides the opportunity to do this and to consider the counterfactual (the risk of non-engagement).
- 11.4 **The counterfactual costs and risks of inaction and non-engagement in FCAS are likely to be very high.** DFID must consider the trade-off between the high value of helping to prevent conflict against the risks. Some recent work on the costs of conflict can be found in [Annex F](#).
- 11.5 DFID's risk categories are illustrated in [Annex G](#).
- 11.6 **Risk analysis is particularly important in FCAS.** The risks will include more complex and difficult to assess risks, such as political instability, exchange rate risks, and the potentially higher risks of not engaging. Developing risk matrices, identifying risk triggers and working through scenarios with careful sensitivity analysis will be useful tools. Detailed knowledge of the political and security context will be required to feed into scenarios and as there will be inherent uncertainty or complexity here it will require more time and analysis to get this stage right than for other programmes.
- 11.7 **Risk management should be a continuous part of monitoring,** providing us with a means of operating in a volatile environment and making timely adjustments to activities, modalities and partnerships. If the level of risk is considered to be too high or not cost-effective to manage, it can be 'transferred' by commissioning an external agent to undertake activities. Alternatively risk can be shared through a mechanism such as a transition compact (see below).
- 11.8 **Detailed conflict analysis and the development of a robust theory of change allow country offices to develop appropriate risk registers** for their programme in general and for particular interventions. **Country offices may want to balance their portfolio across high risk and lower risk interventions.**

## Tools for Managing Risk

11.9 As well as the suggestions in the various international studies below, a **range of tools and techniques for managing risk are available, including risk registers and scenario planning. A portfolio approach to assessing risks and returns across a country or sector programme will allow some balancing of high and lower risk programmes.** Scenario planning may also enable us to develop alternative programmes so we can change course if necessary. See guidance on scenario planning: [Government Office for Science \(2009\), 'Scenario Planning Guidance Note'](#).

### Box 9 Scenario Planning in Bangladesh

In 2006, DFID Bangladesh carried out a scenario planning exercise that looked towards 2020, assessing the key risks associated with support of the Government of Bangladesh's Poverty Reduction Strategy, and how DFID country planning could best manage these risks.

Twenty challenges were initially identified, from rising energy prices to the growing influence of conservative Islam. Through workshops and interviews, these were prioritised and given "importance" and "uncertainty" scores. Two clusters emerged as both important and uncertain, and were therefore used as the two axes of a scenario planning matrix. Firstly, the nature of socio-economic development, along a spectrum from growth-first to equity-first. And secondly, political and cultural attitudes and values, ranging from conservative to change-oriented.

These two axes produced four scenarios, each with positive and negative features that had implications for DFID's programming. Based on the detailed development of the scenarios themselves, the workshop identified (i) the actions DFID could take to manage the risks inherent in each scenario, and (ii) critical 'must-do' issues for DFID to address which are common across the various scenarios. The latter included support to improved governance and promotion of equitable access and availability of public services. These key actions were then used to inform DFID's country planning<sup>23</sup>.

### 11.10 Risk monitoring must be accompanied by an active management response.

Where a heightened risk to successful project delivery or to the security of staff, partners or beneficiaries is identified, work through the implications for each activity affected.

### Box 10 Nepal Risk Management Office: an example of an approach to risk management

In Nepal, DFID jointly established a Risk Management Office with GTZ. This Office undertakes continuous monitoring of security risks in conflict-affected areas, to provide implementing partners with the confidence to operate in a difficult environment. Key activities include:

- Establishing and supporting systems for managing security risks, including contingency planning, emergency response and crisis management, reporting and information flows;
- Providing training for staff and partners on staying safe in conflict zones, basic first aid and dealing with difficult security situations;
- Providing advice and intelligence on the operational environment to staff, partners and consultants, including daily travel advice and how to deal with the government


<sup>23</sup> Example drawn from [Government Office for Science \(2009\), 'Scenario Planning Guidance Note'](#).



- and Maoist security forces;
- Training partners on conflict-sensitive approaches to development and how to comply with the 'Do No Harm' principle

## International Approaches and Recommendations on Risk

11.11 The OECD's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) produced a **summary of issues and recommendations** in a full report on Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts<sup>24</sup> summarised in [Policy Briefs](#). It used the following conceptual framework:



11.12 The INCAF study concluded that:

- Achieving long-term transformational results demands appropriate risk taking with political backing and appropriate institutional processes;
- The risks and costs of not engaging far outweigh the risks and costs of engaging;
- Donors are too risk averse in their engagement in fragile states. Pressure to demonstrate results and meet accountability requirements may be contributing;
- Devices for transferring and sharing risk, particularly pooled funding have potential that is not yet being realised; and,
- Recommendations include collective approaches to managing risk, a better balance of high and low-risk forms of engagement and more realistic mutual expectations between donors and implementing partners (Ibid).

11.13 The 2011 WDR also flags a need to change donor approaches to risk urgently.

Existing approaches are slowing progress on the ground and donors need to achieve a better balance between the risks of action and inaction and to adapt oversight and delivery mechanisms to the particular challenges of working in FCAS. The report highlights challenges presented by domestic political dynamics in donor countries and proposes options for more effective risk management.<sup>25</sup>

11.14 The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding suggests that **fragile states can generate the highest rates of return**. But donors fail to engage

<sup>24</sup> See [Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of Success?](#)

<sup>25</sup> See [WDR 2011](#), pages 31-2.

with long-run risks, overemphasising short-term engagement on safe issues. The participants recommend:

- **Better management of risk through aid instruments, multilateral reform and national accountability:** stricter accountability from national partners and prioritising efforts to decrease risks; joint donor risk assessments shared with partner countries and more joint risk management. This should be built into aid instruments and multilateral procedural reform to enable more collective and calculated risk-taking and management; Procurement procedures should use more national procedures and systems. And mutual or independent accountability mechanisms and safeguards can be strengthened.
- **Piloting new procedures:** For example adopting emergency (humanitarian) or fast-track procedures for use in FCAS countries. This experiment could then be used to adapt general rules.

11.15 **Transition Compacts may be an appropriate mechanism for sharing risk, developing shared concepts and locally appropriate accountability.**<sup>26</sup> These are “light and flexible mutual agreements between national and international partners, linking key priorities with an explicit strategy that combines funding sources and instruments in support of transition objectives.”<sup>27</sup> Risk is thus defined and shared between partners. These compacts should be reviewed annually.

## ***12. Do No Harm***

12.1 **All interventions in FCAS are potentially harmful.** Our interventions may bolster an illegitimate government or undermine state-society relations. This means that as well as assessing the risks of not intervening, we must be aware of the potential for interventions to do more harm than good. We should understand these risks and monitor programme delivery to ensure we minimise any (inadvertent) harm. This will include monitoring for unexpected impacts (positive or negative) that of a project. The DFID Practice Paper [Building Peaceful States and Societies](#) also sets out some examples of possible harm in specific sector programmes. See [Annex I](#) for more detail, and also the [Do No Harm INCAF](#) paper.

## ***13. Data Sources***

13.1 **We can address data gaps by using a variety of official and non-official sources and through specific measures to support capacity-building or the commissioning of new data collection.** Just as in effective states, where possible we should use or develop existing official statistical systems rather than create parallel structures.

13.2 **Reliable data can be obtained even in difficult environments.** In FCAS we probably need to invest heavily in data generation. This may include reviewing the robustness of existing data, commissioning new data, and supporting national or other bodies in generating good data, while building their capacity. Triangulation of different types of data, e.g. surveys, administrative data and focus groups, is a useful strategy to make results measurement more robust.

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<sup>26</sup> OECD-DAC (2011) Transition Compacts in a Nutshell.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, page 1

- 13.3 **It is critical to collect and use data with political sensitivity.** Data can be very powerful and we must take care not to exacerbate or create tensions or conflict or put particular groups at risk through insensitive handling of data.
- 13.4 Data generation can be designed purely by donors to provide evidence for results frameworks. However, it can be more productive and sustainable to develop it in partnership with the recipient country. We should use local data sources as much as possible, invest in their development, and supplement these with other sources. Building national ownership of data generation and indicators enables the instrumental use of the data by national institutions to improve their performance and hold authorities to account. DFID will shortly be publishing a report on this more transformative approach to collecting conflict, crime and violence data – contact DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department for more information.

#### **Box 11 Zimbabwe - Shadow alignment with the HIV/AIDS monitoring system**

In Zimbabwe, where direct assistance to the Government is limited, DFID has sought ways to engage constructively with public institutions in areas where a credible technical dialogue is possible. The Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS (ESP) is a pooled funding mechanism for HIV-AIDS, implemented by UN agencies and NGOs. The first challenge was to establish an effective working relationship with the national authorities. One strategy for building this relationship was to develop a joint M&E process. Donors and Government have agreed to an annual independent review, which provides the ESP Working Group and the Government with an independent assessment of policy consistency, coordination, budgeting and management across the sector, creating a basis for dialogue. Regular monitoring of ESP is done through the national HIV and AIDS M&E system, with additional support from UNAIDS to improve data quality.

This aligned approach has limitations in terms of the accuracy of monitoring. The first annual review found a range of problems with the national M&E system, including missing baselines and weak compliance with data requirements by national authorities. In the short term, this makes it more difficult for donors to track the overall achievements of the ESP. Nonetheless, the programme has the flexibility to identify and gradually address these weaknesses over its lifespan. The aligned approach is helping to build mutual understanding and cooperation between the national authorities and donors, creating the basis for a more programmatic engagement in the sector.

#### **Box 12 Afghanistan- Investing in statistical data**

After three decades of conflict, quality data is sorely lacking in Afghanistan, and is urgently required for stabilisation and development efforts. DFID has initiated several investments to improve the pool of quantitative data available for informing strategies and measuring progress, including a joint programme with the World Bank and the EU to support the Central Statistics Organisation (CSO) and improve the quality and availability of official data. This has included updating the Afghanistan National Statistics Plan, and prioritising surveys, and the Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (see box on Helmand below).

DFID has also carried out a thorough investigation into the reliability of the most frequently used data on social, economic and governance progress in Afghanistan, using a detailed examination of methodologies, internal validity tests on micro-data and triangulation with other sources. Given the paucity of documentation and the difficulty of access to micro-data, the exercise involved developing relationships of trust with data providers to secure their support. Findings confirm that data is least reliable in insecure areas and where fewer

resources are available. There are particular concerns over opinion polls, where differences in local and Western concepts call for very cautious interpretation of results. Nonetheless, the investigation revealed that reliable information is available despite the difficult environment, and that even where the accuracy of data is in question it may still be useful for broad purposes such as tracking trends over time.

- 13.5 Working with local partners (companies and NGOs) is important especially (but not only) where it is hard for donors and others to operate in the target area.** Where appropriate we may need to invest in their capacity. Even in a collapsed state like Somalia, there are tertiary institutions offering relevant qualifications in monitoring methods and a range of companies competing for business.
- 13.6 Large international companies often invest considerable resources in risk monitoring and management** and might be able to provide data that is not available elsewhere.
- 13.7 In stabilisation contexts, there are many sources of data collected routinely by the military that may be useful for country office staff to draw on.** In Afghanistan, such sources include daily patrolling information, minutes from *shuras* with local farmers and tribal leaders, and after-action reports from civil affairs officers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.<sup>28</sup>

## Using perception surveys

- 13.8 Monitoring progress towards peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives will often require us to measure changes in community knowledge, attitudes or perceptions.** Opinion polls can be a useful means of gauging public perceptions of progress towards complex goals (e.g. state legitimacy). They are likely to be especially important as milestones where it may take a long time to see tangible change but where we need to be able to monitor the direction of travel. However, conducting good quality surveys in FCAS is notoriously difficult. DFID will shortly publish a consultant report on the use of survey data, and will be developing a call down arrangement with several NGOs to provide expertise and quality assurance on survey use (contact DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department for more information). Some key challenges for perception surveys in FCAS are outlined in [Annex J](#).
- 13.9 To counteract methodological shortcomings, surveys are often combined with other approaches,** such as focus groups, which offer an opportunity to explore results with the target population in a more open-ended way, providing qualitative data that can be useful in interpreting survey results and other analysis such as conflict assessments. These should be commissioned during the baseline research, and then be repeated at project completion. As research-based studies produced by experts, using key informant interviews and other techniques, they allow a more nuanced investigation of the levels and drivers of conflict, including exogenous influences on the target population not anticipated in the design of the intervention.
- 13.10 Consider non-perception data that can be generated from surveys.** This can include information on specific events, such as the frequency of violent incidents in a particular area. It can also include behavioural information, such as data on mobility along major transport highways, which can act as a useful proxy for the level of security in an area.

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<sup>28</sup> Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme 2010 Q3 Monitoring report.

13.11 **It is important to triangulate across multiple sources to produce data that is good enough for practical management purposes.** For example, if official statistics on school enrolment are suspect, it may be possible to cross-check them through site visits to a sample of schools and data from household surveys. It may be that official statistics will be found to be accurate in some respects and biased in others, enabling us to make some use of the data.

## ***14. Beneficiary Engagement***

14.1 **Involving beneficiaries in indicator design, monitoring and analysis can be both good practice from a participation perspective and a practical way of generating data in FCAS.** Beneficiaries should have an interest in seeing projects successfully delivered. One way to do this is through committees to monitor outputs and outcomes. Providing monitoring committees with digital cameras and mobile phones can be a low cost way of obtaining additional data to verify the reports of implementing partners. Engaging beneficiaries presents real practical challenges, especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations where people may be unable or unwilling to engage with external actors. The boxes below from DRC and Afghanistan offer some examples of how these sensitivities can be navigated.

14.2 Ushahidi ('testimony' in Swahili) is an NGO-run web platform originally developed to map the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya by 'crowd sourcing'. It allows data to be gathered direct from the public via SMS, email or the web, and be put onto maps and timelines. Allowing data entry by the public at large has the potential to distort the picture through bias, but also enables the quick gathering of data from a broad base of people. Such innovative approaches to data generation can complement more traditional approaches.<sup>29</sup>

### **Box 13 DRC- monitoring using mobile 'phone technology**

The DFID-funded 'Healthy Village' sanitation programme in DRC, implemented by UNICEF, is testing the use of mobile phone technology for monitoring. The system aims to collect and validate real-time programme data for monitoring and planning, using text messaging and the internet. The system is easy to use and cost-effective. The first tests, carried out with programme partners from the Ministry of Health, have confirmed the feasibility of the method. Larger scale tests are now taking place in the provinces of Bas Congo and Kinshasa. If successful, the scheme will be extended to all provinces in late 2010 and early 2011.

### **Box 14 Afghanistan - Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme**

The Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (HMEP) is designed to collect, collate and analyse unclassified quantitative and qualitative data to assess the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Team's and DFID's interventions in Helmand. It is an ambitious attempt to apply an integrated M&E framework to all development and stabilisation interventions in Helmand to assess whether the international community is successfully boosting the capability and legitimacy of the Afghanistan Government and undermining insurgents.

To do this, the HMEP monitors progress on a quarterly basis to help determine 'what works' and whether the causal models underpinning stabilisation activity are valid. It covers

<sup>29</sup> See <http://www.usshahidi.com>.

governance, population engagement, policing, justice, growth and livelihoods, agriculture, social services, infrastructure and counter-narcotics, and combines quantitative and qualitative research, official reporting & GIS products. The HMEP draws its data from a wide range of sources including, for example:

- HMEP Head of Household survey
- Qualitative research with women and men
- ISAF's Theatre Integrated Nationwide Survey (TINS) – now known as ANQAR
- PRT strand and DST reporting;
- RC (SW) reporting
- International Community and Afghan ministerial reporting (including ISAF for ANP data; UNODC for CN data; BRAC and MoPH for health data; MoE for education data)
- Secondary sources of public opinion data and atmospherics, including from The Asia Foundation, Human Terrain System, Glevum Associates, ABC News Poll and Integrity Watch Afghanistan; and
- Other qualitative research such as FCO/CPAU Human Security Research

See also: [Stabilisation Issues Note: Monitoring and Evaluation](#)

## ***15. Innovation***

**15.1 Where an intervention is innovative, DFID may start small and should build in robust mechanisms to learn whether the new approach works before scaling up.**<sup>30</sup> Country offices are encouraged to be innovative in their approaches to measuring results in FCAS and to draw on methods not frequently used by DFID. This may be particularly useful for measuring results that are complex or hard to measure, and where it is difficult to define a linear input-output based results chain. However, in undertaking evaluations, the unit of evaluation must be big enough for the thing being evaluated. There are some things that can only have impact and thus be evaluated fairly on a large scale. Evaluation at a smaller scale would cause a misleading result.

15.2 In DFID's Media for Democracy and Accountability Project in DRC one of the monitoring tools is a panel of media professionals and analysts in five locations around the country who convene periodically to assess progress and trends over the life of the intervention. The Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme in Afghanistan is exploring methods to understand how interventions influence complex systems, and using perceptions data to test log-frame assumptions (see boxes 14 and 15).

### **Box 15 DRC- Setting the baseline for a media project**

The Media for Democracy and Accountability Project in DRC (jointly funded with the Swedish and the French Governments) is an innovative approach to building democracy through media. An independent baseline study was commissioned during the inception phase. It assessed the current state of the media sector, including estimated audience sizes, the perception and needs of media managers and the quality of content.

Among the techniques used was to convene a panel of media professionals and analysts in several locations around the country, and ask them to rate the status of a number of issues (e.g. press freedom, fairness of licensing laws, plurality of news sources, respect for ethical rules etc.). They also carried out an analysis of content from a representative sample of media outlets, and commissioned additional studies on issues such as the professionalism of journalists. This has led to an innovative monitoring mechanism involving panels of five media professionals and analysts in ten locations (rural and urban) convened periodically to assess progress and trends.

<sup>30</sup> ICD Note on evaluation and fragility (Need a link to this – can't find it online though)

### **Box 16 Pakistan – Measuring innovative results in a high risk area**

Al-Mubarak Welfare Society International comprises Deobandi religious scholars who are committed to disseminating interpretations of Islam which are more accurate in relation to treatment of women. The society is implementing two sub-projects, funded by GJP in tehsil Shabqadar of District Charsadda, in KP province. The first project has three core areas;

1. Inclusion of text books on religious injunctions against violence against women (VAW) in the curricula of the Madrassahs (religious seminary). So far these text books have been incorporated in the syllabi of 14 Madrassahs (that covers all religious schools in tehsil Shabqadar).
2. Working with the Religious scholars for redemption for victims of Swara (transfer of women to settle blood feuds) and their rehabilitation with their parents. Forty two such cases have been resolved
3. Working with religious scholars for securing inheritance rights of women by issuing religious edicts in their favour. Thirty eight women have received inheritance rights through the intervention of the project.

The second project of Al-Mubarak Welfare Society is a research project, in which they are conducting a KAP (knowledge, attitude, practice) survey of tribal elders, religious scholars, police and lawyers on VAW (particularly Swara and inheritance rights) in the district. The full report is currently being written.

15.3 Outcome Mapping offers another way to capture results that are less easily monitored in log frames. It may be particularly appropriate where the key indicators of success will be in changed behaviours by target groups and in wider society. It uses regular participatory workshops with programme implementers and partners to list observed and expected behaviour changes, and examine the extent to which these are related to programme activities. Further information about Outcome Mapping can be found through the [Outcome Mapping Learning Community](#) and at the [International Development Research Centre](#). An example from Liberia is [on the website](#).

## ***16. Further Information***

16.1 This Note is a joint product between the DFID's Fragile States Team of Policy Division, DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, the Improving Aid Impact team of Finance and Corporate Performance Division, Research, Research and Evidence Division and the Evaluation Department.

Please contact DFID's Fragile States Team for further information.

## Annex A: Tools for analysing conflict and fragility

The primary tools for country analysis are in widespread use across DFID, and each have their associated guidance:

- DFID's [Country Governance Analysis](#) How to Note (2008): a mandatory tool used to assess the state of institutions against a normative standard (the Capacity-Accountability-Responsiveness framework), prepared with a historical perspective to capture the trajectory of change;
- DFID's [Political Economy Analysis](#) How To Note (2009): a flexible investigative tool into the nature of the political settlement, the interplay between formal and informal institutions and the interaction between economic and political power;
- [Strategic Conflict Assessments](#): used to assess drivers of conflict at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels, covering political and socio-economic grievances, natural resource disputes, political culture and conflict resolution mechanisms. SCAs provide a means of assessing the interaction between our interventions and conflict dynamics; The SCA methodology is currently being overhauled by DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department.
- DFID's [Gender and Social Exclusion Analysis](#) How To Note (2009): used to assess patterns of horizontal or group-based inequality that may feed conflict, and which development assistance may inadvertently reinforce.

Other tools include:

- the **Countries at Risk of Instability (CRI) Framework**, a tool developed for cross-Whitehall analysis that draws together political, social and economic analysis from restricted and open sources, and is designed to facilitate comparative analysis of risk levels between countries or across regions;<sup>31</sup>
- the **Critical Path method**, which is an analytical process focused on immediate planning needs, designed to expose the steps or processes required to achieve stability;
- **Conflict Audits** are used to assess whether country programmes are addressing the causes of conflict and being delivered in a conflict-sensitive manner. Contact the Conflict Policy Team in CHASE for further information.

For further guidance, see the DFID Briefing Paper [‘Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations – Briefing Paper A: Analysing Conflict and Fragility’](#)

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<sup>31</sup> Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, "Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response", 2005. <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1684>



## Annex B: Country-level indicators of trends in conflict and fragility

Note that this table contains examples, intended to help generate ideas and should not be considered a prescriptive or comprehensive list. Indicators used should always reflect analysis of the context and capture context-specific features (for example, indicators capturing the opium trade in Helmand or the drugs trade in West Africa). These indicators may be suitable for use at country or intervention level.

| High-level objective                                | Possible indicators   | Possible data sources   |
|---|---|---|
| <b>Causes and effects of conflict and fragility</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # deaths from armed conflict</li> <li>• # displaced as % of population</li> <li>• # violent clashes reported</li> <li>• intentional homicide per 100,000</li> <li>• Growth rates of primary incomes of marginalised groups</li> <li>• Freedom of movement (e.g. traffic along particular routes)</li> <li>• % minority groups and women in political or public office</li> <li>• Existing development indicators (for example, service provision, literacy, maternal and child health, household income) disaggregated by religion, ethnic group, region, caste, gender etc. as relevant.</li> <li>• # land rights disputes successfully resolved</li> <li>• % constitutional changes suggested in peace agreement actually implemented</li> <li>• Inequality measures</li> <li>• % perceptions that conflict is likely</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uppsala Conflict Data project (updated annually)</li> <li>• UNHCR data</li> <li>• Media monitoring</li> <li>• Official data, where available, UNODC data.</li> <li>• Official data, programme data</li> <li>• Official data, programme data</li> <li>• Official data, Minorities at Risk (updated 3-yearly)</li> <li>• Existing development data, including MDG indicators</li> <li>• Official data, programme monitoring</li> <li>• Monitoring of legislation</li> <li>• Gini coefficient</li> <li>• Opinion polls</li> </ul> |
| <b>Inclusive political settlement</b>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of factional/exclusive language used by elites</li> <li>• Inclusion of minority groups in political settlement</li> <li>• % of minority group members/population of marginalised areas voting in elections</li> <li>• Interaction amongst hostile groups, e.g. % targeted groups who say they would meet socially with members of 'opposing' groups.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failed States Index – measures elite factionalisation (updated annually)</li> <li>• State Fragility Index (updated annually)</li> <li>• Official statistics, survey data.</li> <li>• Programme/Survey Data, Afrobarometer in some countries.</li> <li>• Freedom in the World</li> </ul>  |

|  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of civil and political rights among minority groups</li> <li>• % population confident in honesty of elections/political process</li> <li>• Constitution amended to increase inclusiveness of political settlement</li> <li>• % perception that political settlement is inclusive</li> <li>• membership of excluded groups (against national statistics) in national/district level political parties disaggregated by gender and ethnicity.</li> </ul>   | <p>(updated annually)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survey data, e.g. Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer where available</li> <li>• Monitoring of legislation</li> <li>• Opinion polls</li> <li>• Party membership data</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Core state functions</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective state control of territory, e.g. # major internal security incidents</li> <li>• # instances of security services acting outside of civilian oversight</li> <li>• % population who perceive improving security situation, disaggregated as appropriate</li> <li>• % improvement in population with confidence in the police</li> <li>• Criminal conviction rate (% of prosecutions)</li> <li>• % population who regard the justice system as fair and effective</li> <li>• Effective financial and macro-economic management</li> <li>• GDP per capita</li> <li>• Tax collection as a % of GDP, disaggregated by region.</li> <li>• % of revenue from natural resources included in budget</li> <li>• % of public sector workers receiving regular salaries</li> <li>• % increase in perception that government is effective</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official data, media monitoring</li> <li>• Failed States Index (includes measures of impunity etc.)</li> <li>• Survey data, Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer, Opinion polls</li> <li>• Opinion polls</li> <li>• Official data, UNODC.</li> <li>• Survey data, Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer, Opinion polls</li> <li>• PEFA, CPIA scores</li> <li>• World Bank</li> <li>• Official statistics</li> <li>• Official statistics</li> <li>• Official statistics, survey data</li> <li>• Opinion polls</li> </ul> |
| <b>Response to public expectations</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing indicators for basic service provision, disaggregated by religion, ethnic group, region, caste, gender etc. as relevant.</li> <li>• % of citizens who believe public institutions serve their interests</li> <li>• % perceptions of access to finance (disaggregated)</li> <li>• Growth rates of primary incomes of marginalised groups</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing development data, including MDG indicators</li> <li>• Survey data e.g. Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer, Opinion polls</li> <li>• Survey data, Programme data</li> </ul>  |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perception of corruption</li> <li>• Legitimacy of government. E.g. % increase in perception that government is legitimate and serving the population</li> <li>• % increase in budget transparency</li> <li>• Rehabilitation or extension of infrastructure, e.g. irrigation, electricity</li> <li>• % pro-poor allocation in the national budget;</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Household survey data</li> <li>• Corruption Perceptions Index</li> <li>• Opinion polls. Also delegitimisation score in Bertelsmann Transformation Index (updated biannually), Failed States Index.</li> <li>• Open Budget Index</li> <li>• Local data</li> <li>• Budget data</li> </ul> |
|---|--|

#### Additional sources of trend indicators

DIE/UNDP [A Users' Guide to Measuring Fragility](#)  
CDA (Eric Scheye and Diana Chigas) Development of a basket of conflict, security and justice indicators

**Afrobarometer.** Provides public opinion data tracked over time for 20 sub-Saharan Africa countries. <http://afrobarometer.org/>. Arab (<http://arabbarometer.org/>) and Asia (<https://www.asiabarometer.org/>) opinion data is also available.

**Geneva Declaration**, April 2010, Measuring and monitoring armed violence. A comprehensive paper setting out a framework to more effectively measure and monitor armed violence  
[http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Indicators/Metrics\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Indicators/Metrics_Paper.pdf)

**Indices of Social Development.** Provides indicators and data sources for 5 areas: [civic activism](#), measuring use of media and protest behaviour; [clubs and associations](#), defined as membership in local voluntary associations; [Intergroup Cohesion](#), which measures ethnic and sectarian tensions, and discrimination; [interpersonal safety and trust](#), focusing on perceptions and incidences of crime and personal transgressions and [gender equality](#).  
<http://www.indsocdev.org/>

**World Bank**, Worldwide Governance Indicators. A global dataset (including the views over time of different groups – citizens, business, experts) on different aspects of governance, including political stability and absence of violence, rule of law, voice and accountability and control of corruption.  
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>

## **Annex C: Outcome indicators for conflict and fragility**

As described in [section 7](#), programme level indicators of outcomes in conflict and fragility will need to be developed based on the specific theory of change for a given programme. Below are some examples of how this can be done, and some resources that provide lists of potential indicators. These are intended as a starting point, not as standard indicators that can be copied straight into specific programme plans.

### **Examples**

A **programme in Burma to promote local democratic change** (Pyoe Pin) is using an issue-based approach to engage community-based organisations and CSO coalitions in decision making on local government. Measuring advocacy work by beneficiary organisations (especially from a very low base) is proving a challenge. The programme has identified quantitative indicators such as:

- number of policy issues that supported CSO coalitions are working on;
- number of beneficiary organisations that have developed strategies to influence policy and debate;
- number of networks and coalitions able to identify way in which they are managing conflict more effectively.

However, the country team notes that qualitative assessments may ultimately be more meaningful, even if difficult to summarise in log frame format.

**DFID Nepal's Enabling State Programme** is using a range of indicators to measure the emergence of a more responsive and inclusive state, including:

- # of Constituent Assembly members who benefited from the program;
- # of women-related policies promulgated, reviewed and tabled through pressure by Inter Party Women's Alliance;
- # of cases filed challenging the fairness/legitimacy of election;
- # of debate issues raised by media through the program
- # of disputes resolved by programme supported informal mechanisms (disaggregated);
- # of cases referred by formal justice system to programme supported informal mechanisms

### **Example indicators – Service delivery contribution to peacebuilding and statebuilding**

Indicators around how service delivery fits with a broader statebuilding peacebuilding agenda will be highly context specific, and will be developed based on a theory of change. However, they may relate to some of the following areas:

#### **Equity and Inclusion**

These indicators would measure the usual sector indicators (access and quality) with equity/inclusion dimensions including marginalised groups, caste, gender, regional, rural/urban, age or other disaggregation suited to the context: who is being reached and is there disparity in quality? They could also address improvements in pro-poor and inclusive nature of wider policy or legislative frameworks, legislative and statutory rights, incorporation of citizens into governance and regulatory frameworks, etc.

- Strengthened pro-poor/equitable focus of budget allocations
- % children who say they feel safe going to school etc (disaggregated).
- Number of curriculum and textbooks agreed to be outdated, biased, or harmful that are revised. However, a high degree of caution is needed to avoid entrenching positions.
- % of rural population with access to sanitation

### **Community Voice, Empowerment and Accountability**

There is ongoing work in DFID's Policy Division to offer practical advice on setting indicators and to provide examples of indicators used to measure different dimensions of community voice empowerment and accountability. For example, indicators could address greater community participation in decision-making processes on service-delivery – including transparency around budgets and budgetary allocation processes as well as through PTAs etc. They could also measure the number of citizens able to hold officials to account and increased social, economic and political empowerment, particularly of women and marginalised groups.

- % citizens aware of how to access and use information on services (disaggregated)
- % citizens accurately aware of constraints faced by service provider and prepared to discuss mutual accountability (egg reduction in deliberate damage to pipelines)

### **Capacity and Sustainability**

Despite tensions and trade-offs between speed of outcome achievement and longer term capacity building, there is clear compatibility in overall service **sustainability** and statebuilding goals. Indicators could therefore focus on the sustainability aspect over time of both (i) sector outcomes and (ii) continuance of any social accountability mechanisms, community groups, etc.

- % service (e.g. water point) maintained and functional after X years
- % expected budget transferred from central government
- # and % of unfilled posts (vacancy rate)
- % government staff trained/with qualification to do their job

### **State society interaction**

- perceptions of improvement in service (disaggregated).
- progression by communities of CSOs from success/ engagement in specific sector issues (such as sanitation) into success/ engagement in wider developmental issues (disaggregated).

### **Example indicators – natural resource management contribution to peacebuilding and statebuilding**

The management of natural resources, including non-renewable (e.g. oil and diamonds) and renewable (e.g. land, water, forests) can be a potential driver of conflict in many countries. Transparent, equitable governance of these can contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding. Several organisations have developed potential indicators to measure the peacebuilding contribution of programmes in this area (see further resources), including the following examples:

- % citizens in forest area able to access information on sale of logging concessions.
- % of revenues from mineral extraction invested in local infrastructure and services
- # of dispute resolution mechanisms set up, and # and % of cases successfully dealt with.

### **Example indicators – governance and conflict prevention contribution to peacebuilding and statebuilding**

Some programmes will directly address peacebuilding and statebuilding, whilst for others this will be a secondary objective. Indicators will be developed based on a theory of change, but may look at some of the following areas:

### **Effective and accountable government, able to peacefully manage grievances**

- |   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
| • # parliamentarians/parliamentary committees | • Training records, post |
|---|--------------------------|

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>(disagg) trained (in what their role is, how to be effective, budget procedures, including scrutiny &amp; monitoring) and can demonstrate use of new skills/knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of all local/national govt. staff (disaggregated) completing skill training courses who can demonstrate that they are using their new skills on the job</li> <li>• % target ministries implementing budgeted sector-wide plans, % implementation on-budget, % implemented on-time, # of conflict sensitive development plans</li> <li>• # and % of political parties with budgeted annual plans</li> <li>• # or % of citizens (disaggregated) who make use of, or are served by, programmes, benefits, services of local councils</li> <li>• # youth &amp; other risk groups receiving vocational training (disaggregated)</li> <li>• New constitution finalised, publicised and implemented</li> </ul> | <p>training follow up interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Post training/mentoring follow up questionnaires/reports</li> <li>• Ministry records, progress reports , process/content review</li> <li>• Records, media reports</li> <li>• Government records, ILO/WB/UNDP reports</li> <li>• Government records, NGO/media reports</li> </ul> |
|---|--|

### **Inclusive political systems**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # lobby groups/CSOs/media/political parties who know how to access voting records/debate, parliamentary information, including assets</li> <li>• % of target local governments opinion polling/holding more than x town meetings/live call-in radio shows, other) with more than y people attending.</li> <li>• # joint round tables held by political parties, NGOs, CSOs, businesses etc</li> <li>• # groups (disaggregated) that develop advocacy strategies as a result of training, # advocacy strategies carried out by targeted CSO/business/other coalitions</li> <li>• % of targeted CSOs undertaking budget tracking</li> <li>• % of government expenditure online/in public libraries</li> <li>• # awareness raising sessions held, # targeted groups/individuals attending, # of participants (disaggregated) who can cite 3 civil/political rights</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Surveys, small group interviews</li> <li>• Government records, media reports, attendance records</li> <li>• Official records, media reports</li> <li>• Group records, media reports</li> <li>• Survey</li> <li>• Official records, special visits</li> <li>• Training records, post training follow up</li> </ul> |
|---|--|

### **Free and Fair Elections**

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Independent supervisory body in place, % electoral body staff trained to fulfil specific role and responsibilities (disaggregated)</li> <li>• % target citizen awareness of electoral principles and procedures (disaggregated)</li> <li>• % population aware how to vote (disaggregated)</li> <li>• Gender profile of polling officials</li> <li>• National election plan completion rate</li> <li>• Ratio national/international observers</li> <li>• # hours/days to communicate election result to majority of population (disagg)</li> <li>• Pre-election risk analysis completed and appropriate</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official records, training reports</li> <li>• Survey, focus group interviews</li> <li>• Official records</li> <li>• Official records</li> <li>• Media reports</li> <li>• Government reports, observer/NGO reports</li> </ul> |
|--|---|

|   |  |
|---|--|
| resources targeted at areas identified at most risk of violence |  |
|---|--|

### Reducing levels and perceptions of corruption

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # laws stating that corruption is a criminal offence, # anti-corruption manuals produced, % read by target audience (disaggregated)</li> <li>• Appointments to anti corruption body based on competency based recruitment procedure</li> <li>• Development, publication and tracking of specific indicators to monitor misuse of public funds</li> <li>• # examples from target audience (disaggregated) of how anti-corruption training/materials have been used</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government, NGO, donor records, target audience surveys</li> <li>• Personnel policies, interviews</li> <li>• Government, donor reports, media reports</li> <li>• Post training follow up reports, surveys, interviews</li> </ul> |
|---|---|

### Independent and professional media

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of code of conduct, # media organisations signing up to Code,</li> <li>• # editors/journalists trained in investigative, conflict sensitive etc. reporting and provide examples of how it has been used</li> <li>• # media programmes (TV, radio, other) produced on conflict issues, % (target) population reached</li> <li>• # hits on radio station website, # people (disaggregated) listening to independent radio, # people (disaggregated) signing up to independent news text messaging service</li> <li>• Evidence-based research completed in x conflict issue (access to land for example)</li> <li>• # meetings of editors/journalists from cross-divide media</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survey of media organisations</li> <li>• Training reports, post training follow up interviews/surveys</li> <li>• Media reports, audience survey</li> <li>• Research reports</li> <li>• Survey, small group interviews</li> </ul> |
|--|---|

### Human rights and civil liberties

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation of a functioning human rights commission, human rights courts, or Ombudsmen/laws support freedom of association and speech</li> <li>• # CSOs per 100,000 involved in promotion/protection of right to x, # human rights community defenders</li> <li>• Development of voluntary principles on security and human rights, # targeted organisations adopting these principles</li> <li>• # of anti-discriminatory laws passed/policies developed</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official records, media reports</li> <li>• NGO/CSO records</li> <li>• NGO/media reports, surveys</li> <li>• Official records</li> </ul> |
|---|--|

### Additional sources of outcome indicators

|                                    |   |
|------------------------------------|---|
| DIE/UNDP                           | <a href="#">A Users' Guide to Measuring Fragility</a>   |
| CDA (Eric Scheye and Diana Chigas) | Development of a basket of conflict, security and justice indicators  |
| DFID                               | Empowerment and Accountability online resource (includes information on indicators that can be measured on the basis of Demographic and Health Surveys). For more information please contact DFID's Politics, State and |

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
|               | Society Team (PSST).   |
| Conflict Pool | Conflict Pool results guidance and indicators database (2011). For more information please contact DFID's CHASE. |

**ITAD, Jan 2011**, Governance and Conflict Indicators Report. *Provides details of DFID governance and conflict indicators as well as provides a useful framework for how to assess the quality of indicators.*

[http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/Mis\\_SPC/60797\\_ITAD-Gov-Conflict-Indicator-Rpt-Jan11.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/Mis_SPC/60797_ITAD-Gov-Conflict-Indicator-Rpt-Jan11.pdf)

**Peacebuilding Fund Results Framework.** *Provides details of Peacebuilding Fund outcomes and example indicators.*

[www.unpbf.org/docs/PBF\\_Results\\_Framework.doc](http://www.unpbf.org/docs/PBF_Results_Framework.doc)

**USAID**, Aug 1998, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Programme Indicators, *An extensive list of possible indicators for Rule of Law, Elections and Political Processes, Civil Society and Governance programming.*

[http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/democracy\\_and\\_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacc390.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacc390.pdf)

**Vera Institute of Justice**, November 2003, Measuring Progress toward Safety and Justice: A Global Guide to the Design of Performance Indicators across the Justice Sector. *Provides comprehensive basket indicator sets for justice reform projects and includes datasets not included in model indicator list (judiciary, courts, prosecution, prisons, non-state justice institutions).*

[www.vera.org/indicators](http://www.vera.org/indicators)

**UN Rule of Law Indicators Project** *presents a set of indicators alongside a range of other tools to support implementation*

<http://www.unrol.org/Default.aspx>

**UNDP.** Seven Steps for DDR Programme Planners for Integrating M&E into Programme Design. *Outlines the results chain in DDR programmes, providing examples at each stage*

[http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/ddr/posters\\_ddr.pdf](http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/ddr/posters_ddr.pdf)

**UNDP**, 2007, Governance Indicators, A Users Guide. *A useful introduction to governance indicators, what they are, how they can be developed, and a detailed explanation of different data sources.*

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/UNDPslocenter.pdf>



## **Annex D: The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals**

See [here](#) for the complete New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

### **OBJECTIVE 1: LEGITIMATE POLITICS - Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution**

In fragile situations, trust in state institutions and among people tends to be weak. Peacefully resolving and managing conflict and (re) building the state require an increasingly inclusive political settlement, and committed and able leadership. It also requires political institutions that ensure accountability and provide opportunities for participation of all key groups in society, including the most vulnerable and marginalized. An engaged public and civil society which constructively monitors decision-making is important to ensuring accountability. Conflict legacies and the risk of future tensions make it critical to build capacities for reconciliation and conflict resolution at all levels.

### **OBJECTIVE 2: SECURITY - Establish and strengthen people's security**

Without security for the people there can be little development. The challenge is to improve the behaviour, effectiveness and accountability of the broad range of security actors, whether formal or informal, in response to people's rights and needs. Particular attention needs to be paid to vulnerable groups, especially women and children. The participation of communities and civil society groups can make security provision more effective and more accountable.

### **OBJECTIVE 3: JUSTICE – Address injustices and increase people's access to justice**

Addressing grievances and deeply-felt injustice is essential. Formal justice mechanisms must be accessible, affordable and seen as fair by citizens. Where feasible, traditional non-state and informal means for dispute resolution and adjudication should be strengthened and gradually aligned with international human rights standards.

### **OBJECTIVE 4: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS – Generate employment and improve livelihoods**

Employment gives people a sense of self-worth and the means to start shaping their future. Employment can reduce participation in violence and conflict. The challenge is to generate meaningful income opportunities fast enough, including for groups previously marginalized, and youth. Within fragile states, priority needs to be given to labour-intensive public and community works, increased agricultural productivity and domestic private sector development.

### **OBJECTIVE 5: REVENUES & SERVICES: Manage revenues and build capacity for accountable and fair social service delivery**

The ability to raise, prioritise and manage resources to finance and develop capacity for more equitable delivery of basic social services is critical in fragile countries. The state must gradually ensure fair access to these services to all key groups in society, including the most vulnerable and marginalized. It is important for the state to lead in setting the framework and coordinating the delivery of services, including by non-state providers. Gradually building a sound and transparent system of public financial management will be essential to instil confidence in citizens to pay their taxes, in donors to contribute aid and in businesses to invest. Of equal importance is donor transparency about their financial contributions. In countries where natural resource management is a particular challenge, it is critical that resource revenues do not (re)fuel conflict, are managed transparently and significantly benefit society.

## Annex E: Existing possible data sources

These may be useful for monitoring trends in addressing conflict and fragility and for establishing baseline information.

- [Afrobarometer](#): perception survey data from several African states;
- [Bertelsmann Transformation Index](#): political legitimacy, democratic transitions, etc.;
- [Corruption Perceptions Index](#): TI's global perception survey of corruption;
- [Failed States Index](#): social, political and economic pressures, and state legitimacy;
- [Freedom in the World](#): assessments of global political rights and civil liberties;
- [Gallup World Poll](#): perception surveys from a range of countries on political and social issues
- [Ibrahim Index of African Governance](#): includes indicators on Safety; Rule of Law; Participation; Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity; Human Development;
- [Minorities at Risk](#): analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups;
- [Open Budget Index](#): measures budget transparency and accountability;
- [State Fragility Index](#); includes measures of state effectiveness and legitimacy;
- [UN Security Council Resolution 1325](#): tracks the participation of women and integration of gender issues into peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery (in development);
- [UN Statistics Division](#): wide range of data including MDGs, economic, social, and environmental indicators;
- [Uppsala Conflict Data](#); rigorous data on numbers of conflict deaths;
- [World Bank/IMF DSA](#); debt sustainability assessments for low-income countries;
- [World Development Indicators](#); over 400 indicators that (in some cases) can be disaggregated for conflict and fragility monitoring purposes.

## Annex F: The costs of conflict and fragility

It is clear that conflict and fragility can impose enormous costs on the population of the country affected, as well as on neighbouring states and the international community. Attempts to quantify these costs, however, are strongly disputed – both methodology and underlying data are subject to weaknesses. However, the following statistics from respected publications give a current best estimate of some of the costs:

### The costs of conflict and fragility

- A civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly **30 years of GDP growth**, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty.<sup>32</sup>
- A child in a conflict-affected state is **twice as likely to be undernourished as a child in another developing country – and nearly three times as likely to be out of school.**<sup>33</sup>
- Countries with weak government effectiveness and weak rule of law and control of corruption have up to **45 percent higher risk of civil war**, and significantly higher risk of extreme criminal violence than other developing countries.<sup>34</sup>
- **Trade levels** after major episodes of violence take 20 years to recover to pre conflict levels.<sup>35</sup>
- Total cost of **Somalia 20 years of civil war** to international comm. = **\$55bn**
- A country making development advances (e.g. Tanzania) loses an estimated 0.7% of GDP for each neighbour in conflict.<sup>36</sup>
- The annual cost of one new conflict to the country and its neighbours is over \$64 billion and civil war reduces the affected country's growth by 2.3% per year.<sup>37</sup> A negative growth shock of 5% increases the likelihood of conflict by one-half the following year.<sup>38</sup>
- Maritime piracy is estimated to have direct economic costs of between \$5.7bn and \$11.2bn, including ransoms, insurance and re-routing.<sup>39</sup>
- The total cost of a single country falling into the fragile state category for itself and its neighbours may reach \$85 billion – equivalent to 70% worldwide ODA in 2009.<sup>40</sup>

### The cost effectiveness of addressing conflict – spending to save

- It is more cost effective to prevent states falling into conflict or major collapse than to respond once they have failed.<sup>41</sup> It is estimated that **investing £1 in early/pre-**

<sup>32</sup> Zoellick, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development*, World Bank.

<sup>33</sup> World Development Report 2011: Facts and Figures, World Bank.

<sup>34</sup> *World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development*, World Bank, 3-page summary.

<sup>35</sup> *World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development*, World Bank.

<sup>36</sup> *World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development*, World Bank.

<sup>37</sup> Collier, 2006. *The Bottom Billion*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

<sup>38</sup> Miguel, E. *Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: an instrumental variables approach* Journal of Political Economy (2004).

<sup>39</sup> World Development Report 2011: Facts and Figures, World Bank.

<sup>40</sup> Stewart Patrick (citing data by Collier and Chauvet), 'The Brutal Truth', *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2011.

**conflict prevention saves the international community £4 in post-conflict response.**<sup>42</sup>

- International support to peacebuilding and statebuilding helps countries transition to durable peace. From 2000-05 only 10% of negotiated peace agreements broke down, compared to over 40% in the 1990s. This is because peace settlements are today receiving far more support from the international community than in the past. This equates to a **saving of around \$256 billion p.a.**<sup>43</sup>
- Failure to get it right after conflict significantly increases the risk of a return to conflict. E.g., conflict prevention in Macedonia cost the international community £0.3 billion, **saving an estimated £14.7 billion if a conflict had broken out, and saving an estimated £143.9 billion if the conflict had spread beyond Macedonia's borders.** This is the equivalent of **between £50 and £500 saved for every £1 spent.**<sup>44</sup>
- UN Peacekeeping is not cheap (\$7.87bn in 09/10) but it works, reducing the risk of wars reoccurring by as much as 85%.<sup>45</sup> Given the cost of a typical civil war, **successful peacekeeping missions<sup>46</sup> can yield a cost-benefit ratio of around 1:7.**<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> 'Spending to Save: Is conflict prevention cost effective? Malcolm Chalmers/University of Bradford, Centre for International Cooperation and Security Working Paper 1, 2005.

<sup>42</sup> 'Spending to Save: Is conflict prevention cost effective? Malcolm Chalmers/University of Bradford, Centre for International Cooperation and Security Working Paper 1, 2005.

<sup>43</sup> I.e. the cost of approximately 4 conflicts restarting at \$64 billion a year. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme/Human Security Report Project Dataset, 2007.


<sup>44</sup> Brown and Rosecrance, 1999. 'The Case for Conflict Prevention'.

<sup>45</sup> Fortna, 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work?*

<sup>46</sup> In the form of international military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

<sup>47</sup> Collier, 2006. 'The Security Challenge in Poor Countries'.

## Annex G: DFID Risk categories diagram



**Annex H: Principles for evaluation in fragile and conflict-affected states from the OECD DAC Evalnet 'Evaluating Donor Engagement in Situations of Conflict and Fragility' (2011)**

- **Take context as a starting point** – the need for conflict analysis. Conflict analysis is central to the evaluation of donor engagement in fragile and conflict-affected contexts
- **Combine evaluation approaches** - There is not one correct or blueprint approach for undertaking evaluations of donor engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations
- **Conflict sensitivity** - Doing harm in a situation of conflict and fragility means having impacts (intended or not, direct or indirect) that aggravate grievances, increase tension or vulnerabilities, or perpetuate conflict and fragility in some way
- **Gender awareness and equality** - Field experiences and research show that the way women and men experience, engage in and are affected by violent conflict and situations of fragility differs according to their sex.
- **Manage expectations** - set realistic goals and be flexible. Donors need to be realistic about what they can achieve in limited timeframes and evaluation managers need to be realistic about what can be covered by an evaluation – both in terms of timelines and in terms of scope and content
- **Protection and ethical responsibilities** - Evaluation managers need to be aware of the fact that conducting evaluations in zones of conflict and fragility may put evaluation teams and stakeholders at risk
- **Other principles** - Fundamental principles of established evaluation practice should be applied (including the 2010 OECD DAC Evaluation Quality Standards for Development Evaluations). Independence of an evaluation team, participation of relevant stakeholders, transparency and inclusiveness are particularly important evaluation principles when working in this field

## **Annex I: Do no harm**

The need to ensure that we do no harm in our interventions is a key issue for the design stage. Monitoring during implementation is also essential, because we may not have got the design right and/or other factors may change, particularly in volatile political environments or contexts affected by violent conflict. Data disaggregation in monitoring can help detect inadvertent harm – e.g. the risk of our activities reinforcing existing patterns of inequality and exclusion, or creating new ones.

Monitoring to ensure on-going conflict sensitivity is critical. But minimising harm is broader. Some key issues to consider are the impact is the programme having on the:

- combination of consultation, coercion and persuasion that characterises state-society relations
- ways in which state-society relations are mediated – including the relative position and power of political parties, clans, traditional networks and others
- balance of power between groups competing for control of the state
- inclusion or exclusion of particular elites or social groups in decision-making structures of the state
- relative importance of the formal and informal rules that govern how the state and society work
- capacity of the state to respond to society
- capacity of society to put demands on the state
- extent of co-operation or polarisation between state and society
- legitimacy of the state among elites
- legitimacy of the state among diverse social groups
- relative importance of competing sources of legitimacy
- the level and expression of expectations on the state – putting enough or too much pressure on the state to deliver
- creation of capacity in state organisations
- creation of parallel structures outside the state
- promotion of state or non-state structures as sites of decision-making on public sector goods.

See the [OECD-DAC \(2010\) 'Do No Harm: international support for statebuilding'](#) for further information.

## Annex J: Key challenges in using perception surveys in FCAS

- **Political and security constraints:** Surveys may raise politically sensitive questions, and often cannot be conducted without the consent of local authorities. This should be taken into account in questions selection. In conflict-affected communities, care should be taken to avoid asking questions that may increase tension or endanger researchers ('do no harm'). In insecure environments, a risk assessment should be conducted
- **Cultural and linguistic problems:** Survey instruments with inappropriate cultural assumptions and/or poor translation can produce misleading results. Suitably qualified professionals working with local partners familiar with the cultural context should be engaged to develop survey instruments. Where surveys are drafted in English and translated, a useful precaution is to have them re-translated back into English by a second translator, to pick up translation errors. Survey instruments should also be piloted in the area in which they will be used
- **Management challenges:** Poorly managed surveys are prone to receiving fraudulent returns, particularly in insecure environments where access is limited. Implementing partners should be selected with care, based on demonstrated ability to deliver. There are statistical techniques (internal validity tests) for identifying obvious cases of fraud. Data entry should record the identity of enumerators. Significantly different results between enumerators can indicate a problem. Questioners can also be given GPS units and asked to record the coordinates at each survey site. This is useful both for oversight purposes and for analysis, as the location of villages may be difficult to identify on maps.
- **Qualitative vs. quantitative questions:** In conflict-affected environments, public opinion may be volatile and surveys can pick up transient influences. To provide a more accurate picture, there should be a balance of qualitative and quantitative questions. For example, to gauge security levels in the community, it is appropriate to ask for both general perceptions of security and the actual number of incidents of crime or violence experienced by the respondent's household in, for example, the past month or year. Questions on trust in institutions should be balanced with questions on utilisation of services, and so on.
- **Sampling:** Most survey methodologies rely on some degree of randomisation in their sampling (the individuals from the population who are chosen to respond). However, in most FCAS, accurate census information is not available. This means that the data needed to generate randomised samples is not in place, undermining the validity of the survey.
- **Repeated vs. one-off surveys:** Many surveys currently used in results frameworks are one-off events, which are not repeated, or are repeated at erratic intervals with slightly different questions. This makes their use for ongoing results monitoring extremely challenging, not least because slight variations to the question can yield substantially different results. In addition, because of the other challenges listed above in data reliability, it is generally more robust to use the direction of travel in responses to a particular question (e.g. *increase* in % who trust the police) rather than the absolute values (% who trust the police), which are unlikely to be accurate.



## **Annex K: Research and Evidence Division's support to building the evidence base on conflict and fragility**

This Annex provides a short summary of specific RED outputs of particular relevance to conflict and fragility.

### **Systematic Reviews on conflict and fragility**

RED has commissioned a series of systematic reviews on conflict and fragility that are designed to critically assess the research and evaluation evidence on specific interventions. The six questions are listed below:

- (i) Are approaches to reducing risk and incidence of sexual and gender-based violence effective, including in conflict, post conflict and fragile states (particularly where they are integrated into humanitarian responses)?
- (ii) [What is the evidence of the impact of employment creation on \(a\) stability and \(b\) poverty reduction in fragile states?](#)
- (iii) [Working with non-state providers in post-conflict and fragile states in primary healthcare service delivery](#)
- (iv) [What is the evidence of impact of civil service reform on service delivery in fragile states and other low income countries?](#)
- (v) What are the impacts of interventions to reduce violent crime in developing countries?
- (vi) How can low cost private schools be sustainably scaled up in South and West Asia, in particular in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

The protocols for these reviews and final reports (when completed) can be found on the Evidence & Resources page on Insight. RED plans to commission a new round of systematic reviews in early 2012.

### **Grading the evidence underpinning the DFID Practice Paper on Building Peaceful States and Societies**

To assess the quality of the evidence underpinning DFID's statebuilding and peacebuilding approach, the Fragile States Team has commissioned a RED Evidence Broker to conduct an evidential review. This involves:

- a) Identifying the sources of evidence used for the practice paper;
- b) Outlining the peer review process used for the practice paper; and
- c) Grading the quality of the evidence used in the practice paper.

### **DFID-commissioned research on conflict-affected situations**

Table 1 below provides a summary of research commissioned by DFID's Research and Evidence Division (RED) that is relevant to fragile and conflict-affected situations and has implications for the prevention and response to disasters, including natural

disasters. It is grouped by thematic team (Governance, Conflict and Social Development, Human Development, Agriculture, Growth and Climate Change).

Over the next 12 months, we will be launching a number of major new research initiatives on conflict and fragility which will be seeking to answer the **how** and the **what** of programming and interventions in this area. For example,

On **governance and fragility** – RED is commissioning two new major research programmes to inform policy in conflict situations – where the existing evidence base remains thin and uneven. The first is focused on livelihoods, social protection and basic services. It will ask ‘What works in terms of promoting more secure livelihoods and growth in fragile states?’ The second will be looking at how people really access security and justice in conflict-affected environments – often relying on non-state actors, as well as state actors. It will ask ‘How do we respond to this to develop ‘good enough’ security and justice’?

A major emphasis of both programmes will be to understand the perspective of citizens living in fragile states, and what their experience is of national and international policy. Both programmes will also have a strong focus on impact and outcomes, including the development of new tools to measure impact. We will continue to invest in primary data that decision-makers can use to track trends. Countries will likely include: Sudan, DRC, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka among others.

A third programme will look at governance in more stable environments, and will also include a component on **security and justice**.

We are also funding a new initiative to promote innovation in **humanitarian practice**. Developed in collaboration with CHASE, we are the founder contributor to a multi-donor fund that will promote more systematic design and testing of new approaches to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

On **health** a new research programme on health systems (REBUILD led by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine) will focus on fragile states. The five other new health research programmes are working in a range of conflict-affected countries, including Afghanistan, Sudan and Pakistan.

On **agriculture** – our support for the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) has a specific focus on forest management in conflict-affected states. The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), which we fund, has a programme on pastoralist livelihoods and farmer conflict in the horn of Africa and West Africa.

A number of our programmes have implications **for prevention and response to disasters**. This includes seven programmes looking at various aspects of climate change and World Institute for Development Economics Research on the triple crisis (food, finance and climate).

**Table 1 Summary of RED conflict relevant research by Research Team**

| RED Research Team and Programmes                       |
|--|
| <b>Governance Conflict and Social Development Team</b> |

- Governance, Security and Justice in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations. 7-year programme under a consortia led by LSE. Country coverage: Sudan, DRC, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Nigeria [tbc]
- Livelihoods, Social Protection and Basic Services in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations. 7-year programme under a consortia led by ODI. Country coverage: Sudan, DRC, Somalia Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka [tbc]

### **Agriculture Team**

- The Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) has a specific focus on forest management in conflict-affected states.
- The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), which DFID funds, has a programme on pastoralist livelihoods and farmer conflict in the horn of Africa and West Africa.
- Worldfish work on fisheries management under weak governance regimes.
- Other indirectly relevant research includes: advanced research on resistance to abiotic and biotic stress and on animal disease (the [Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council](#), Gates and Government of India partnership), the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research work on crop and livestock varieties and farming systems that are less vulnerable to a range of shocks and work on crops which are fall-back options in times of stress whether climate or conflict driven
- Specific research on Afghanistan and Pakistan includes the work on durable wheat rust resistance in South Asia, International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics research in South and Central Asia.

### **Human Development Team**

- The new research programme on health systems (REBUILD led by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine) will focus on fragile states.
- The five other new health research programmes are working in a range of conflict-affected countries, including Afghanistan, Sudan and Pakistan
- Two clinical trials looking at delivery of antiretroviral therapy for adults and children are working in Zimbabwe.
- The drugs for neglected diseases initiative (DNDi) is involved in developing new drugs for sleeping sickness, leishmaniasis and Chagas disease. Fragile states are countries with high burden of disease and DNDi is doing research in a number of these.
- The WHO-based research organisations (Tropical Disease Resesarch, Human Reproduction Programme and the Alliance for health policy and systems research) are all doing work in or that is of relevance to fragile contexts.
- The Global Health Trials Scheme - will be funding a range of clinical trials, some of which may take part in fragile states.

### **Climate Change Team**

- Currently scoping a possible contribution to a Dutch led call for further research on resource scarcity and conflict - probably focused on climate change.
- Environmental Services for Poverty Alleviation: especially: managing shared water resources

- Climate Change Adaptation in Africa: operates in environments that are commonly found in fragile states, especially: semi-arid regions
- Global Climate Change Adaptation Research Programme (under design - will operate in environments that are commonly found in fragile states, especially: semi-arid regions
- Research-inspired Policy and Practice Learning in Ethiopia and the Nile region (RIPPLE): water and sanitation supply
- Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security - CGIAR Mega Programme – 7

#### **Growth Team**

- A new *International Tax Centre* based at IDS will be helping to identify new approaches to taxation that will help to raise revenue and to support more responsive, accountable and peaceful states. It may include research in Pakistan. Support for the *Africa Economic Research Consortia* includes support for economic research capacity building in fragile and post-conflict contexts.