Joint Doctrine Note 1/17

Joint Theatre Entry

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Abstract

Purpose

1. Joint doctrine notes are developed to stimulate dialogue and debate on subjects that have operational significance, in order to inform subsequent doctrine. The purpose of Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/17, Joint Theatre Entry is to reinforce existing doctrine and provide a potential framework for the UK to conduct joint theatre entry (JTE) at the operational level. The intention is for this publication to be reviewed after it has been used in support of the Joint Force Command exercise programme. It is authoritative, but not ratified, UK doctrine.

Context

2. The UK possesses highly capable military forces held at varying levels of readiness, with the ability to deploy within the UK or globally. When faced with threats, military power is sequenced to complement diplomatic and economic activities by other government departments, and possibly alliance partners, seeking to influence an outcome in-line with the UK’s strategic objectives. Employing these forces will be part of a full spectrum approach.

3. The purpose of JTE is to project forces from the air, land or sea into foreign and/or contested airspace, territorial waters and territory to conduct operations. It helps Defence achieve its strategic objectives by shaping the environment, contributing to the rules-based international order and preventing regional instability.

4. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, (NSS/SDSR 15) articulates Defence policy and lists our Defence missions, some of which could require theatre entry. As such, JTE comprises a range of scalable operations from deployments alongside key allies and partners, (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization enacting Article 5) in an opposed environment, through to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, with other government departments and non-governmental organisations, in an unopposed environment. Moreover, by 2025, the NSS/SDSR 15 envisages the
rapid deployment of a larger UK force (up to 50,000), for longer periods and as part of a coalition.

5. This JDN complies with Defence Strategic Direction 2016 and is harmonised with Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00, Campaign Execution (3rd Edition, Change 1).

**Audience**

6. JDN 1/17, Joint Theatre Entry is primarily aimed at the operational-level Joint Task Force Headquarters commander and staffs, and should inform and be used by respective component commands. It also provides other government departments, key allies and partners, and non-governmental organisations with an understanding of how the UK's Armed Forces conduct JTE as part of integrated/multinational approach.

**Structure**

7. JDN 1/17 is divided into five chapters and two annexes.

a. Chapter 1 defines and states the purpose of JTE against the backdrop of the contemporary and future operating environments, along with the UK’s approach to intervention operations.

b. Chapter 2 describes the force generation process, preparation, training and deployment of a force assigned a JTE mission.

c. Chapter 3 provides guidance on the conduct of manoeuvre activities for an entry operation.

d. Chapter 4 provides guidance on establishing a lodgement and protecting it.

e. Chapter 5 considers command and control, its functions and the inform requirements for a JTE operation.

g. Annex B presents the four models which the Joint Force Headquarters use to exercise command and control.

**Linkages**

8. This JDN should be read alongside a number of publications to provide wider context. These include:

- AJP-3.2(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*;
- AJP-3.3(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations*;
- AJP-3.13(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Deployment and Redeployment of Forces*;
- Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-08, Volume 1, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*;
- Army Field Manual (AFM), Volume 1, Part 12, *Air Manoeuvre*;
- *Defence Strategic Direction 2016*;
- *Future Operating Environment 2035*;
- *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045*;
- JDN 1/16, *Air Manoeuvre*;
- JDP 0-30, *UK Air and Space Doctrine*;
- JDP 4-00, *Logistics for Joint Operations*; and
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"The SDSR 15 narrative is already emphasising the requirement to respond quickly and effectively to crisis... intervening militarily where that is necessary."

The Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, 22 September 2015
Chapter 1 – Joint theatre entry fundamentals

Section 1 – Strategic context

1.1. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS/SDSR 15) outlines the contributions our Armed Forces should make in crises. We must be prepared to:

- support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and conduct rescue missions;
- conduct strike operations;
- carry out operations to restore peace and stability; and
- conduct major combat operations as required, including under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5.¹

1.2. The NSS/SDSR 15 introduces the concept of Joint Force 2025² of which power projection is a key tenet. Carrier Enabled Power Projection will greatly enhance the UK’s ability to deploy forces. This joint doctrine note (JDN) supports power projection by focusing on joint theatre entry (JTE) at the operational level.

1.3. Our ability to project power depends on the capability and credibility of our Armed Forces and if we are to retain our ‘preferred partner of choice’

² ‘We will ensure that the Armed Forces are able to tackle a wider range of more sophisticated potential adversaries. They will project power, be able to deploy more quickly and for longer periods, and make best use of new technology’ and ‘we will develop a new Joint Force 2025 to do this, building on Future Force 2020.’ Ibid; page 29, paragraph 4.38.
Joint theatre entry fundamentals

status, we must maintain and be ready to use highly-effective and lethal combat power. Joint Force 2025 is at the heart of this approach and must have the necessary capability to project forces, otherwise our ability to deter or coerce potential aggressors may be compromised. Entry operations are not new. From a UK Armed Forces’ perspective they are conducted to support and complement the UK Government’s National Security Strategy objectives. This means that if we are to intervene anywhere in the world, a theatre entry may be required at the beginning of the operation to ensure we do not lose strategic and operational choices and initiative from the start. Entry operations may be required to:

- defeat threats to global trade that impact the UK’s security and prosperity, including sea and air lines of communication;
- conduct limited duration operations, such as non-combatant evacuation operations;
- support Defence Engagement to prevent conflict;
- provide humanitarian assistance in support of non-governmental organisations; and
- enable subsequent operations by providing a secure lodgement.

1.4. In the contemporary operating environment, the challenge is compounded further by the proliferation of emerging technologies. Our Armed Forces must use developing techniques and strategies to reduce the associated risk.

Royal Navy sailors and Royal Marines carry out a non-combatant evacuation operation during an exercise

3 Strategies against the proliferation of emerging technologies, anti-access and area denial (A2AD) threats, cyber and electromagnetic threats, hybrid warfare and others.
1.5. A theatre of operations is defined as: a geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a joint force commander (termed the joint operations area), within which they conduct operations. A theatre of operations can consist of several joint operations areas, span vast distances and be affected by the adversary before the joint force deploys.

1.6. A joint theatre entry operation can vary widely in context. This JDN proposes the definition of joint theatre entry as: the generation and projection of joint forces into a new or emergent theatre of operations to conduct operations in response to an emerging crisis.

1.7. Power projection is likely to be used when entering a contested, degraded and operationally limited environment. The greatest challenge is to project and sustain a joint force when facing armed opposition using anti-access and area denial (A2AD) strategies. These A2AD strategies comprise two parts:

- anti-access – actions and capabilities, usually at longer-ranges, designed to prevent or limit a force from entering an operational area; and

- area denial – actions and capabilities, usually at shorter ranges, designed to limit a force’s freedom of action in an operational area.

1.8. When conducting power projection operations, a joint force will have to gain and maintain access to an operational area to achieve a degree of freedom of manoeuvre/action to conduct and accomplish missions. Therefore the entry force may have to secure a lodgement. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines lodgment as: a designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore which, when seized and held, facilitates the continuous landing of troops and materiel to enable

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4 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.
Joint theatre entry fundamentals

manoeuvre for subsequent projected operations ashore. Once a lodgement has been achieved, the threat to a joint force does not dissipate; rather an adversary will likely switch from anti-access measures to shorter-range area denial.

1.9. While the need for entry operations is not new, some of the conditions in which a joint force may have to operate are. When considering JTE operations, it is essential that joint commanders and their staff consider key factors that are likely to influence the outcome of any operation. These operational-level factors include:

- the operational environment (hostile, permissive or non-permissive);
- geographic and infrastructure challenges;
- the culture and society they will be operating in;
- entry capacity;
- evolving threats;
- the legal basis for the operation;
- working within a full spectrum approach;
- multinational cooperation; and
- the level of host-nation and international support.

1.10. Purpose. JTE operations are undertaken to deter or defeat an adversary from achieving their objectives. There are four main reasons why the joint commander will contemplate conducting theatre entry operations.

a. To eliminate, reduce or mitigate the threat from surface, sub-surface or air forces to sea, land or air lines of communication and/or commercial hubs. An example of this threat would be the piracy that threatens important sea lanes off the Horn of Africa through to near-peer A2AD capabilities.

b. To conduct short-duration operations for the purposes of deception, denying/destroying key facilities, counter-terrorism and/or gathering information about an adversary. Such operations may not require establishing a lodgement and may include:

5 Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-08, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations - Volume 1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses lodgment while the Ministry of Defence uses lodgement.
Section 3 – Operating environment

1.11. The joint operating environment consists of a number of domains of military activity (maritime, land, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic) under the command and control of the joint commander that could occur within a number of contextual environments. Entry operations can be conducted in three types of environment: hostile; non-permissive; and permissive.

a. **Hostile environment.** A hostile environment is defined as: an environment in which an adversary has the capability and intent to oppose or disrupt operations of friendly forces.\(^\text{6}\) Entry operations into a hostile environment are likely to be contested. Offensive threats will range from insurgency war fighting to the use of weapons of mass effect. Adversaries will use active opposition to prevent or disrupt a joint force from establishing a lodgement. In a hostile environment, we may choose to use stand-off and precision capabilities (long-range fires, cyber, air) to degrade, deter and disrupt to enable JTE. Operations

\(^{6}\) NATO Term.
may be delayed and tactical patience required across the force. These actions may include:

- denying the use of sea, land, littoral, cyberspace and air space;
- strikes against our home base, ports of embarkation, and sea and air lines of communication; and
- using physical barriers, including sea/land mines, and enhancing natural obstacles (flooding/scorched earth).

b. Non-permissive environment. A non-permissive environment is defined as: an environment in which friendly forces anticipate obstructions to, or interference with, operations.\(^7\) Non-permissive entry into the theatre is undertaken without approval of the host nation and/or it attracts regional animosity. Diplomatic, legal and economic pressure may be brought to bear by regional or other actors (potentially including the host nation) contesting the legitimacy of the operation. The local security situation will be volatile and unstable within lodgement areas. A joint force’s freedom of action could be degraded by popular resistance, widespread local disorder and/or the inability of the host nation to impose law and order. It is likely the joint force will place more emphasis on establishing and maintaining campaign legitimacy, rapid manoeuvre to achieve surprise and early security sector reform in support of the host nation.

c. Permissive environment. A permissive environment is defined as: an environment in which friendly forces anticipate no obstructions to, or interference with, operations. Note: a permissive environment does not necessarily imply absence of threat.\(^8\) Entry into a permissive environment is characterised by host nation invitation or tacit agreement, with access basing, navigation and overflight granted. Where available, the host nation provides facilities including rail, road, air and sea ports. Regional actors may support the entry or, at the least, not contest it. Figure 1.1 illustrates these three environments.

\(^7\) NATO Term.

\(^8\) Ibid.
1.12. Geography and infrastructure. The geography and infrastructure of the area into which a joint force is conducting an entry operation could prove challenging. These challenges could include: lines of communication (air, sea and land), basing, logistical support, and communication networks. All of these challenges will be compounded by physical factors, such as the:

- physical distance between the UK and the forward mounting base in theatre;
- distance from the sea or air points of disembarkation to the objective area;
- nature of the climate and terrain;
- capacity and condition of in-theatre infrastructure; and
- extent of urbanisation and population density.
1.13. **Culture and society.** When planning entry operations, joint commanders and their staff need a comprehensive understanding of the cultural and societal landscape. Without this high level of understanding, military actions have the potential to cause unforeseen effects that have a negative impact on the local/regional population, including the local ecosystem. Such misguided actions, may cause a permissive environment to degenerate into a non-permissive or, at worst, hostile environment. To compound the situation, adversaries will use information and social media to rapidly capitalise on any misguided actions our Armed Forces take.
1.14. **Entry capacity.** The key requirement for JTE forces is to at least establish temporary or localised control of the domains of operation (maritime, land, air, cyber and electromagnetic) so they can seize, establish and protect a lodgement. The effort used achieving this may impact on the ability of the entry force to conduct subsequent operations in support of follow-on forces. UK Armed Forces possess a limited number of combat forces trained and equipped for joint theatre entry operations. Non-specialist entry forces would need in-theatre reception, staging, onward movement and integration, at the lodgement prior to conducting operations, however this can vary depending on the mission or terrain. Our ability to project power into potential crisis areas may also be limited by the capacity of air and sea ports of disembarkation in theatre to handle the volume of forces and materiel. This reinforces the requirement for effective logistic intelligence preparation of the battlespace as early in the planning process as possible.

1.15. **Evolving threats.** An increase in the adversary’s ability and the proliferation of A2AD capabilities can threaten and exploit space, cyberspace and command, control, communications and computers intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. Future entry operations will be even more challenging with potentially greater risk involved. The force needs to overcome anti-access threats and, specifically, it will have to deal with area denial threats through the whole operation. For example, the global nature of cyberspace makes the home base a critical part of the operational cyber terrain targeted by an adversary.

1.16. **Legal basis for the entry operation.** The Charter of the United Nations requires all member states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state. Notwithstanding that restriction, JTE operations may be conducted with the consent of a host nation. If consent is not given, then it will only be lawful to use offensive force in an adversary’s territory in one of the following circumstances:

- under the inherent right to take action in self-defence in response to an armed attack;

- under a Chapter VII United Nations Security Council Resolution; or
• to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.

All military operations must be conducted within a legal framework. The laws that apply will vary depending on the nature of the operation. The applicable law may be a combination of international and domestic (national) laws and will include human rights law. Commanders at all levels should be aware of the precise legal basis for the operation as this will determine the use of force permissible under the rules of engagement. Commanders should be aware of any legal constraints and in all circumstances should seek advice from legal staff. Failing to comply with the applicable laws, or even perceived failures, can significantly undermine campaign authority, public support and legitimacy.

1.17. Full spectrum approach. Setting the operational conditions to enable theatre entry will require a full spectrum approach. This would see the Ministry of Defence working with other government departments, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DfID). These government departments can assist with Defence Engagement leverage such as overflight rights, access to ports and airports, temporary basing solutions, host-nation support and cooperation with non-governmental organisations.

1.18. Multinational cooperation. The UK will most likely conduct entry operations alongside multinational partners with the UK joint force expected to make use of partner capabilities. Understanding individual national caveats and interoperability demands will be an essential part of UK joint force preparation.

1.19. Host nation support. Whilst an entry force is likely to be self-contained, they may require a degree of host-nation support. This could include facilitating cross-border movement, frequency deconfliction, Internet provision, port of entry assistance or providing a forward mounting base. This support can be provided through either government or commercial sector actors.

9 These may include: national rules of engagement; command and control limitations; restrictions/constraints on areas of operation; and limitations on types of task.
1.20. **Adversary capability threats.** Traditional Western advantages could be reduced by new threats, such as:

- increased quantity and sophistication of cyberspace threats; and
- air threats including hypersonic weapons, low observable cruise missiles, and sophisticated conventional ballistic missile systems.

How, when and where these capabilities will emerge is less clear, but operations within the air domain already have to take many of these threats into account.

‘Over the last two decades, countries like China and Russia have successfully leveraged the kind of precision-guided systems once solely possessed by the West and its allies to develop A2AD capabilities, by way of precision-guided anti-ship, anti-aircraft, land-attack, anti-satellite cruise and ballistic missiles as well as cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. The application of precision-guided systems to rockets, artillery rounds, mortars, missiles, anti-tank munitions or shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, it can significantly augment the military potential of unsophisticated militaries and terrorist groups. A2AD capabilities are also (slowly) finding their way into Europe’s extended southern neighbourhood, a geographic space running from the Gulf of Guinea, through the Sahel, the Mediterranean and Red Sea into the Western Indian Ocean, as far as the Persian Gulf.’

*Small Wars Journal*¹⁰
1.21. **Modern adversaries, defence and deterrence.** A modern adversary developing and proliferating A2AD capabilities in, and around, Europe poses a significant challenge for UK forces deploying on a global task. Also, developments in precision-guided, network centric warfare could significantly improve A2AD capabilities. Examples may include:

- overlapping air and missile defences;
- dense concentrations of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles;
- land-, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles;
- layered anti-submarine warfare capabilities;
- offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; and
- electromagnetic capabilities.

1.22. **Anti-access and area denial capability.** Credible A2AD capability allows an adversary to disrupt an entry force by limiting or even prohibiting freedom of movement and action. Adversaries may have integrated air-defence systems and short-range land-attack missiles that can cover the key ground, or countries in their entirety. As an example, long-range/multi-engagement surface-to-air missile systems are able to create A2AD ‘bubbles’ in the Baltic Sea or Eastern Mediterranean.

1.23. **Reaction to adversarial projection.** To eliminate, reduce or mitigate the threat posed by credible A2AD capabilities, an entry force may need to use a combination of:

- low observable/stealth;
- cyber capability;
- dispersal of forces;
- suitable levels of air platform protection;
- long-range air delivered strike capability;
- air-to-air refuelling;
- over-the-horizon helicopter reach;
• amphibious forces capable of ship to objective manoeuvre;

• deep-strike land capability;

• command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;

• enhanced satellite communications; and

• mission data: planning, programming and testing.

A mixture will help an entry force penetrate layered defences in depth.

Key points

• Theatre entry may be required at the beginning of an operation or during an operation to open up a new front.

• We need theatre entry capabilities to ensure we do not lose strategic and operational choices and initiative from the start.

• This joint doctrine note proposes the definition of joint theatre entry as: the generation and projection of joint forces into a new or emergent theatre of operations to conduct operations in response to an emerging crisis.

• The definition of a lodgment is: a defined area in a hostile or semi-permissive operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous flow of forces and material possible for current and subsequent operations.

• The UK will most likely conduct joint theatre entry operations alongside multinational partners, but will act alone, if necessary.

• Traditional Western advantages could be reduced by new and emerging threats.
Prepare and project

Chapter 2 identifies prepare and project requirements for a joint theatre entry operation.

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A **good plan** violently executed **now** is better than a **perfect plan** executed **next week**.

General George S. Patton
Chapter 2 – Prepare and project

Section 1 – Theatre entry forces

2.1. The joint force is a pool of contingent force elements that provides an integrated, scalable, adaptable and resourced high readiness intervention capability. Elements provide credible options to respond to overseas crises requiring a military contribution. These joint task forces are able to be tailored to the mission, operating environment and threat.

2.2. Drawing on the joint force pool allows the creation of flexible and tailored force packages, best suited to an emerging crisis. First response will be conducted by very high readiness force elements, who will provide an initial rapid response. If required, this lead element can be reinforced, adjusted or relieved by other force elements from the Defence main intervention capability or other committed, responsive, engaged and adaptive forces, in addition to contributions from partner nations. As a result, the joint force can be configured over time to provide an appropriate response force for all situations.

2.3. The joint force will most likely be multinational. The UK will provide a core contribution to combined operations alongside willing partners either through bilateral agreements or as part of an existing alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

2.4. The joint force comprises a number of different structural components. The UK is able to offer several flexible command and control solutions for a joint force deployment. These options are scalable and will be adjusted to suit the operation. For small and niche operations, command and control may be provided at officer 4 or officer 5 (OF4/OF5) level.

   a. **Lead element.** These force elements need to be capable of rapid deployment and the lead element is therefore comprised of lighter and more agile forces. Maintained at extremely high readiness and very high readiness, lead element forces are often aligned to multiple tasks.
Once deployed the lead element may be backfilled from the main intervention capability to ensure the UK maintains an extremely high readiness/very high readiness contingent capability. Partner nation contributions may be added to any lead element deployment.

b. Main intervention capability. The main intervention capability is largely held at high readiness and comprises heavier force elements with higher projection and sustainment demands. The main intervention capability is optimised to reinforce the lead element or execute other contingent operations that require a heavier footprint. They are not routinely nominated to backfill the main intervention capability, though this may change depending on the strategic environment. Partner nation contributions may be added to any main intervention capability deployment. The size, shape and scale of partner nation contributions would be determined as part of the force generation process for a specific operation.

c. Partner nations. A key strength will be the potential to integrate multinational capability. However, the UK recognises that the specific circumstances of a crisis may prevent a partner nation from committing force elements to an operation. As such, the joint force must retain its framework nation core, but the preferred position will always be to operate with partner nations.
Section 2 – Force readiness

2.5. The preparation of forces is divided into routine preparation and crisis response. Routine preparation is a continuous process involving a series of tiered training, providing force capability to the high readiness pool. Preparation includes assurance (validation/testing, deployability and sustainability) across distinct elements of the physical components of fighting power – manpower, equipment, sustainment and training. Crisis response employs readily available forces, some of which may not sit in the high readiness pool and therefore need compressed mission-specific preparation.

2.6. Crisis response includes UK force elements, along with elements from partner nations. Extremely high readiness and very high readiness forces can improve readiness during pre-tasking by gaining an awareness of, and involvement in, the development of joint contingency plans, tracking indicators and warnings across regions in, or tending to, crisis. This is in addition to regional assessment visits and maintaining a network of diplomatic, military, commercial, host nation and intelligence agency contacts. The force mix will be tailored to the statement of requirement.

a. UK force elements. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation provides direction for generating force elements in response to a crisis. This is supported by Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Standard Operating Procedure 3690: Operational Mounting and Deployment Process (Planning and Execution). The process is managed by the Operations Directorate, coordinated with the single-Service force generation organisations and directed when an activation order is issued from the Ministry of Defence.

b. Partner nation force elements. There is no single prescribed activation mechanism for partner nation force elements. Any mechanism for the activation must accommodate the broad range of potential military responses and the need for multinational integration. The Joint Expeditionary Force Activation Handbook offers guidance on how some partner nations may link and integrate their processes. NATO
has a framework for assurance of high readiness forces, covering many of the potential partner nations for a coalition joint operation.

c. **Statement of requirement.** In response to a crisis, a statement of requirement is generated as part of a Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS’) Planning and Operations Directive. The resultant package may contain force elements drawn from the lead element, main intervention capability and partner nations. It provides a flexible pool of forces and a range of command options allowing for a scalable response to crises. Figure 2.1 gives an indicative force generation example.

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**Figure 2.1 – The force generation process**

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2.7. **Mission-specific training.** Additional training will be laid down by PJHQ or the force generation command in-line with any appropriate theatre entry standards. For early entry forces this might only consist of the mission briefing and a rehearsal, whilst for those at lower readiness there may be time to develop a more comprehensive package, this will be influenced by the political imperative.

**Section 3 – Force generation**

2.8. Force generation is the preparation, testing and, on orders, activation of forces. Force generation of military elements is the responsibility of the front line commands. Joint Force Command conducts force generation for the Joint Force Headquarters and the joint force logistics support element.

2.9. Force elements at readiness should be included in cross-domainal and joint contingency planning and responses to indicators and warnings. This enables them to anticipate future tasks, develop their own understanding, situational awareness and initiate concurrent force preparation activities.

2.10. The deploying force element should be prepared, tested and activated by its superior headquarters which will assume responsibility for generating and coordinating deployment activity with joint force enablers and Defence agencies. Force elements should be generated in groupings based on existing formations which are capable of subsequent task organisation. They should be resourced, trained and equipped to theatre entry standard and should be capable of integrating with any joint force.

2.11. Where partner nations contribute force elements, there should be a coherent UK contribution. This should run through the command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, fires and sustainment functions to reduce interoperability frictions.
2.12. Forces must be allocated sufficient logistic support and resources to sustain the operation. They should be able to meet the expected demand, distance, duration, disposition and destination of their mission.

2.13. All forces are held at a particular notice to move. This includes the ability of the unit to receive any augmentation of manpower or equipment required to bring it up to operating strength and a high level of equipment serviceability. With sufficient credible indicators and warnings and supporting activation orders, the notice to move can be reduced so forces are held at high or extremely high notice to move.

2.14. **Notice to effect.** Notice to effect refers to the time required before a unit is ready to start its mission in the joint operations area. This can be a more important indication of readiness for crisis response as it indicates when forces can be employed and helps synchronise the arrival of force elements in theatre. To determine notice to effect, planners have to understand and, if necessary, adjust the:

- readiness of the required forces;
• readiness of any other force elements within the joint operations area required to deliver or support them;

• travel times from starting locations to the joint operations area; and

• time and resources required to bring joint forces up to directed theatre entry standards before they can be committed.

2.15. Integration and staging. Integration involves matching manpower with equipment and materiel, while staging will include specific mission, or theatre-related training. Advance and early entry forces will normally complete the majority of their integration before deploying and will deploy with only the essential theatre and mission-specific training. This limits their scale, and the complexity and duration of their missions. Their effectiveness can be improved if they link up with committed or engaged forces already in-theatre who can provide local knowledge, acclimatised troops and/or in theatre transport. Main intervention forces should ideally complete reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) on arrival in the theatre of operations.

2.16. Reducing preparation time. A reduction in the readiness of very high readiness force elements should be directed by PJHQ, driven by indicators and warnings. There are several options in which a force’s preparation and notice to effect can be reduced. These options include force integration, preparing priming equipment packs and forward basing forces.

a. Force integration. Standardising orders of battle and conducting training will reduce the time required for mission rehearsal. Conversely, creating bespoke force elements beyond normal task organisation immediately prior to deployment, will add to the training requirement.

b. Equipment packs. Priming equipment packs\(^\text{11}\) are the spares and consumable resources required by land forces to operate and maintain vehicles, equipment and personnel in the immediate period after deployment until the Defence Support Chain is established. Priming equipment packs are land resources, aviation logistic support to the Royal Navy is termed afloat support packs or deployed spares packs. See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine for more details.

\(^{11}\) Priming equipment packs are land resources, aviation logistic support to the Royal Navy is termed afloat support packs or deployed spares packs. See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine for more details.
equipment packs, and their equivalents, must be assembled and held at the same readiness as the joint force’s requirement.

c. **Forward basing.** It is possible to reduce the notice to effect by using temporary or permanent forward basing, including sea basing and holding first line scales of equipment and supplies in regions of the world where the UK retains strategic interests. Forward basing also offers the opportunity to signal intent and capability to adversaries, allies and partners.  

2.17. **Managing risk.** Commanders may judge it desirable to take risks to achieve tempo (breaking notice to move times, or accepting that theatre entry standards will not be fully achieved before forces are committed to operations). However, there may be significant legal, policy and political considerations in balancing the operational risks and opportunities.

12 The ability to forward base at tempo would be optimised by pre-set logistics/information infrastructure statement of requirement options.
Section 4 – Force projection

2.18. Projecting force elements in response to a crisis will, in most cases, require mounting support from a strategic base and deployment via strategic maritime, land or air transport. Security must be considered throughout force preparation as threats to the force may be present in the homebase. Physical and information security will be essential and consideration must be given to activity on social media, as messaging will shape and contribute to future force activity. Some force elements will be capable of self-deployment (maritime and air) but when considered as a Whole Force, some support elements will still require additional lift support.

2.19. Understanding the environment and carrying out initial shaping activity, for example, information gathering, liaison with Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials, identifying points of entry, assessing security requirements, siting headquarters and logistic locations, is critical. In permissive environments, the early deployment of an operational liaison and reconnaissance team, potentially followed by an early entry headquarters is a key step in this activity. It is also likely that political influence to create secure access, basing and overflight permissions will be required.

2.20. Mounting force elements may be conducted through a strategic base. A combination of contracted and military support elements will be used to ensure the timely deployment of equipment, personnel and stores. Strategic lift assets held at readiness, as well as those reapportioned from routine tasks, will be used for deployment. However, an established strategic base may come under threat and this risk needs to be considered.

2.21. **Deployment.** The deployment from the home base follows three broad options. These options are:

- deploy directly into the joint operations area and conduct RSOI on arrival;
- deploy via a forward mounting base; or
• conduct RSOI before entering the main theatre.

a. **Direct deployment.** Direct deployment to theatre, followed by RSOI is the default setting for most deployments into a semi-permissive/permissive environment. It minimises the time to arrive in theatre, which can be important if deterrence is the main effect to be created, or if there is time to conduct a steady build up and incremental use of forces. Further, in areas of extreme or unfamiliar climate it permits acclimatisation of the force. Figure 2.2 illustrates an example of direct deployment.

![Diagram of mounting and deployment](image)

**Figure 2.2 – Example of mounting and deployment directly into theatre**
b. **Using a forward mounting base.** When forces are required to conduct operations immediately on arrival, RSOI should be completed before they enter the theatre. This can be done before departing, on a ship or by using a forward mounting base. This allows the early dispatch of a force into the joint operations area where they are not yet engaged on operations. It can also have a deterring or pre-emptive effect on the enemy. Manpower and equipment can be dispatched by different methods. The forward mounting base provides a more secure staging area for the build-up of supplies outside the threat of enemy action. Figure 2.3 depicts deployment from a forward mounting base.

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**Figure 2.3 – Example of a deployment via a forward mounting base**
Prepare and project

c. **Reception, staging, onward movement and integration in the home base.** There are certain times when the RSOI of a force has to be conducted within the home base. When troops are deployed directly into theatre and expected to act immediately there will be little or no time for RSOI in theatre. This is especially true for lead element forces held at very high readiness, used to affect an entry, seize an objective or conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation at very short notice. For a hostile or non-permissive environment, achieving acclimatisation in a proximal forward mounting base or adjacent friendly force territory would be the optimal solution. In these cases, RSOI is conducted within the home base or on a permanent joint operating base (for example, Cyprus) and the deploying troops are dispatched directly to theatre, conducting operations immediately on arrival.

d. **Building a force in transit.** For non-discretionary crises, there is likely to be an imperative to create early effect, either to demonstrate intent, resolve, deter or to seize an opportunity. The increasingly rear based and dispersed nature posture of UK forces, driven by centralisation (for example, the Queen Elizabeth Class carrier), regional threats (such as UK operating across the Eastern Mediterranean, Gulf and South Asia) and the light land forward footprint focussed Defence Engagement means early effect can only be achieved by task organising around forward positioned standing or committed land forces supported by, or enabling, air and cyber. The joint task force commander needs to be able to consider what early effect and opportunities exists to shape the operating environment using this light and disparate force mix, as very high readiness intervention forces are projected forward.
Key points

• A key strength of the joint force will be the potential to integrate multinational capability.

• Forces should be allocated sufficient logistic support and resources to meet the expected demand, distance, duration, disposition and destination of their mission.

• Projecting force elements in response to a crisis will, in most cases, require mounting support from a strategic base and deployment via strategic maritime, land or air transport.

• A combination of contracted and military support elements will be used to ensure the timely deployment of equipment, personnel and stores.

• When forces are required to conduct operations immediately on arrival, reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) should be completed before they enter the theatre.

• When troops are deployed directly into theatre and expected to act immediately there will be little or no time for RSOI in theatre.
Chapter 3 provides guidance on how to conduct the core military manoeuvring activities in an entry operation, from active shaping activities to securing a lodgement. This chapter also focuses on the critical phases that characterise an entry operation.

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Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy…

Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson
Chapter 3 – Operate

Section 1 – Preparations for entry operations

3.1. Entry operations need a comprehensive preparation of the operational environment. It is vital that this covers all domains, including cyber and space, to explore all possible single and combined avenues of entry. The comprehensive preparation of the operational environment must explore not only the domains but also the effects dimensions; physical, virtual and cognitive to maximise the cumulative effects at the moment of entry.

3.2. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance must aim to find possible gaps in the adversary’s defences, as well as exploring the possibilities of creating gaps. The joint force should identify a number of points of entry across all domains, or even create them covertly or by force. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is vitally important for enabling an entry operation, as the information and analysis provided allows the commander and staff to make informed decisions on how to avoid, destroy, suppress or neutralise an adversary’s area denial systems. If needed, the joint force may also have to penetrate area denial systems, after which, they may have to create pockets or corridors of local superiority. Any corridors and pockets will need to be carefully prepared in advance.

3.3. Area denial systems comprise active and passive defensive measures designed to impede an entry force’s freedom of action and manoeuvre. We may, for example, need to conduct hydrographical reconnaissance before an entry operation to detect area denial systems and physical hindrances. This may be difficult to conduct without drawing attention from an adversary. We will also need to map the terrain and its defences by employing advanced ISR systems; these include synthetic aperture radar and satellite radar/photography.
3.4. The joint force should consider the use of deception across all domains to minimise casualties and create space for manoeuvre. Deception and other ruses of war are perfectly lawful. However, commanders, planners and their legal advisers must be aware that deception operations which amount to perfidy are unlawful. Perfidy is an act ‘inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence’. Such acts are unlawful when they are carried out to ‘kill, injure or capture an adversary’.

13 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). Adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977, Additional Protocol I (AP I), Article 37(2): ‘Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law and are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under the law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.’
14 AP I, Article 37(1).
15 Ibid. Article 37(1) gives the following examples of perfidy: ‘(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender; (b) the feigning of incapacitation by wounds or sickness; (c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and (d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.’ See also Joint Service Publications (JSP) 383, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, paragraph 5.9.
3.5. Deception may result in the adversary exposing previously concealed capabilities, opening them up for engagement. Likewise, it is important to plan the entry in a way that divides the adversary across the domains, thereby denying them the opportunity to create a joint effect. As an example, this could be achieved by luring an adversary’s maritime assets out of reach of their air strike capability, leaving them vulnerable. It is important to note that dividing the enemy’s attention and forces through multiple viable entry points/vectors is likely to create a disproportionate requirement for scarce, theatre enabling resources.

3.6. The joint force may seek to overwhelm an adversary’s ISR capability by generating too much information for them to collect and process. For example, this may include:

- creating false electromagnetic system signatures, which simulate and present an operational picture that encourages the adversary to make inappropriate decisions; and

- using various decoys, massing techniques and unmanned or automated systems.

3.7. The joint force will consider employing a range of diversionary activities designed to disrupt and deceive an adversary. Skilfully conducted, deception may influence an adversary’s decision-making to such an extent that it degrades their cohesion. Examples include:

- using ISR missions against decoy targets;

- Special Forces conducting raids and other activities, to generate confusion; and

- positioning our own forces in such a way that an adversary makes an incorrect deduction as to our intended entry point(s).\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} Operation FORTITUDE, in 1944, is one of the best examples of deception ahead of a theatre entry operation. It had two elements; north to deceive the Germans into believing the Allied invasion was into Norway; and south for the Calais area. These were both part of the much larger Operation BODYGUARD which saw deception used from Norway all the way down to the Mediterranean to confuse the Germans as to where the main Allied invasion of Western Europe would take place.
3.8. There may also be possibilities to isolate the adversary. This can be done in all domains, especially in cyber and electromagnetic. Combined with information operations at all levels, the adversary can be denied accurate situational awareness. It may even be possible to persuade the population to move away from certain areas to reduce the risk of collateral damage. Isolation may also be physical and result from denying the adversary access to goods and supplies. This may also include economic means, which would be managed by other government departments.

3.9. There is also the potential to erode the adversary’s support both locally, regionally and strategically – effective information operations as part of our strategic communication approach are vital to this. Erosion can also take the form of electronic warfare directed on both the adversary’s internal communications and between the adversary and its population.

**Operation NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH**

‘After the first Gulf War in 1991 the coalition established two no-fly zones in Iraq, Northern Watch and Southern Watch. This allowed the coalition to closely monitor the re-building of the Iraqi Air Force which grew back to some 300 aircraft, 850 surface-to-air missiles, some 3,000 anti-aircraft guns and 20,000 servicemen up to the Iraqi war of 2003. Between June 2001 and up to the start of the war on 19 March 2003, the coalition flew about 21,700 missions and destroyed 349 ground targets belonging to the Iraqi air defence system. When the war began the attrition and degradation of the Iraqi air defence and air force alongside the established intelligence picture allowed the coalition to immediately establish complete air superiority. The entry operations into Iraqi territory never had to face a serious area denial threat from the Iraqi Air Force or air defence.’

_The Iraqi War_  
Swedish Defence University
3.10. The joint force will be subject to a rules of engagement profile governing the use of force that may restrict some of the activities mentioned in this section. Rules of engagement, for instance, may not allow the joint force to engage in certain activities until the adversary initiates hostile action or clearly demonstrates hostile intent. In such cases the joint force must locate and track as many threats and approaches as possible and be prepared to engage, with both lethal and non-lethal force as soon as the rules of engagement allow. This may be sequenced into different areas and types of targets.

Section 2 – Integrating the force across multiple environments

3.11. A joint theatre entry (JTE) operation is more likely to succeed if the joint force can act in all domains and in depth. This cooperative approach may make it possible for a small force to gain entry against the odds.

3.12. When simultaneously manoeuvring and acting across several domains, it is possible to create multiple dilemmas for an adversary at a rate and tempo that becomes irreversible. Coordinated shifts in action across different domains may cause confusion for the adversary who is then too slow to respond when they realise their purpose.

3.13. If an adversary is particularly strong in one domain, the joint force should seek to focus actions in other domains, thus making the adversary’s strength irrelevant. Being agile and flexible across all domains and having the ability to improvise during execution is a key element to success. For example, if the adversary is defending a beach, the joint force may use a vertical manoeuvre, seizing undefended terrain behind the enemy defences and striking from the rear. If the adversary has good air defences, the joint force can attack from the sea or through the littoral.
3.14. By exploiting all domains as manoeuvre space, the joint force will be able to threaten a greater number of the adversary’s critical assets, as well as increasing the unpredictability of the force. Manoeuvring through all available domains to multiple entry points and surprising the adversary enhances the potential for the joint force to avoid direct conflict against the adversary’s areas of strength and gain advantage in their areas of weakness. Our actions will eventually become obvious to the adversary, but, too late for them to react effectively. However, repeating the same manoeuvre more than once may increase the risk.

3.15. **Approach.** Joint forces should begin shaping operations once sufficient understanding has been developed. Shaping activities will employ the four component part of joint action, namely:

- manoeuvre;
- fires;
- information activities; and
- outreach.

**Section 3 – Shaping operations**
These actions must be integrated to create effects that provide freedom of action for the joint force commander to gain the initiative.

3.16. **Maintaining permissions.** The Joint Task Force Headquarters and component commanders should ensure the necessary permissions to position and operate forces within the joint operations area are established and maintained. Examples include; securing of basing rights and the rights of transit or passage. For discretionary operations in support of an ally, partner or host nation, it will often be necessary for commanders to understand and give direction on acceptable cultural norms for behaviour before introducing forces.

3.17. **Establishing control of the sea.** Maritime assets may be employed to threaten the use of force, demonstrate intent as part of a narrative, or employ fires and electronic attack to disrupt, deter or destroy adversaries ashore as part of shaping operations. Warships can gain access to the littoral from where they can conduct surveillance, provide fire support and manoeuvre in support of forces operating ashore. These operations can involve detailed sea lane clearance, or destroying coastal forces, and must be sequenced with the forward movement of land forces through forward mounting bases, staging areas and entry points. Where access to the littoral can be achieved across land borders, land forces may offer close support to maritime forces operating near the coast. Conversely, the reach and persistence of warships can enable land force commanders to find and understand threats on land, control the movement of forces, and sustain and support them from secure operating bases afloat.

![A Type 45 destroyer, part of establishing control of the sea](image)
3.18. **Establishing control of airspace.** Counter-land and counter-air operations are primarily conducted by fixed-wing fast attack aircraft to deny adversaries control over ground and air space that is vital to the success of the JTE operation. This will include supressing enemy air defences, destroying command and control facilities and denying essential supplies. In unfavourable air situations, counter-air operations may be enabled by preliminary ground Special Forces’ operations aimed at deterring or disrupting an adversary’s littoral or ground-based air defence systems. Maritime task groups (with combat air and guided missile destroyers) also provide the ability to establish/contribute to establishing control of airspace. Counter-air operations can also protect land and maritime forces from attack or target acquisition by enemy aircraft, helicopters and armed or unmanned aerial systems. This will be an important task until ground-based air defence systems can be established ashore. Air interdiction operations may be employed in depth to degrade enemy forces and prevent them impacting early entry forces operating at reach. It is likely control of air space will be limited and not constant.

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**Section 4 – The complexity of anti-access and area denial threats**

3.19. The UK will face a series of challenges from state or non-state actors that will either be mature or immature in approach. They will deliver a layered or series of complex actions/effects that may challenge any assumed military-technical advantage.

3.20. Anti-access challenges prevent or degrade the ability to enter an operational area. These challenges can be geographic, military or diplomatic. For example, an operational area could be some distance inland and a great distance from ports and/or usable airfields, which would be a geographic challenge. In other cases, diplomatic or political issues can pose an anti-access challenge when one, or more, nations in a region prohibit or limit the ability for forces to deploy onto their sovereign territory or to fly through their airspace.
3.21. Area denial refers to threats faced by forces within the operational area. They are characterised by the opponent’s ability to obstruct the actions of deployed forces. Importantly, there are far more potential opponents that could pose significant area denial challenges than there are opponents with major anti-access capabilities.

3.22. The anti-access and area denial (A2AD) threats that could be encountered in future operations will vary considerably. At the low end of the conflict spectrum, there could be guerrilla-type forces with very limited anti-access capabilities and a small number of modern weapons. These forces could still pose a considerable area denial challenge due to their ability to operate amongst the local population and employ irregular tactics to strike coalition forces at times and places of their choosing. At the high end of the threat spectrum are the armed forces of nation states that tend to employ conventional tactics and weapons. Even at this end of the spectrum, the level of A2AD capability can vary considerably. As with the hybrid threat, this challenge is not new. In the case of World War II, Germany employed long-range anti-access capabilities in its U-Boat force, which threatened Allied shipping routes across the Atlantic Ocean.

3.23. In most situations forces will have to employ a full spectrum of capabilities to overcome A2AD challenges, including cross-government economic and diplomatic levers. Pre-crisis activities and the presence of UK military personnel can be beneficial in overcoming anti-access challenges, but the response must be multilayered.

3.24. A collective approach by allies and partners will address A2AD issues. Supporting nations can fill capability gaps or provide the required niche capabilities. Countering the threat posed by A2AD is as much, if not more, about changing our conventional mind-set as it is about defeating capabilities. It is not just about capability overmatch, or demonstrating a credible capability, but a cross-governmental approach must be used to support this by adopting a full spectrum approach.
3.25. It is also important to be ready to stop and/or destroy the adversary’s reserves to prevent them counter-attacking. The joint force must be prepared to protect its pockets and corridors of entry. Ideally, a joint force will complete this activity before and during the entry operation. It is likely to include different infiltration techniques and forms of envelopment, such as air manoeuvre.

Section 5 – Overcoming advanced military threats

3.26. This section outlines the principles on the handling of kinetic A2AD threats. It is written from a joint perspective to offer the single-Services some alternative thinking.

3.27. Anti-access and area denial threat. When the A2AD kinetic threat is high in major combat operations, theatre entry operations may be very difficult. The most advanced A2AD systems are ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range surface to air missiles and surface to surface missiles. The intention of first shaping the theatre by gaining control over the sea and the air by suppressing the adversary’s A2AD system may take such a long
time that the operational objective may be lost. Additionally, the cost in terms of materiel and personnel may be prohibitive.

3.28. **Strategic manoeuvre.** The battlespace should be seen as a whole, both in time and space. Threatening and attacking from different strategic angles at the same time may disperse the adversary’s A2AD systems and thereby weaken them, exposing gaps. Our ability to mass on weak points must exceed the adversary’s ability to close them in time.

3.29. **Depth.** The joint force must be able to both attack and penetrate A2AD systems in all domains. Independent and resilient ‘strike forces’ will be needed to disrupt the adversary’s A2AD systems and defences in depth.

3.30. **Direct defence against anti-access and area denial systems.** Different types of missiles are likely to be launched in salvo and concentrated on the prime targets. The bigger, more threatening, concentrated or valuable a target is, the more likely it is to come under attack. Modern air defence systems are capable of engaging multiple targets and must be concentrated where they are most likely to be needed. Dispersing them will lead to overwhelming and defeat.

*Sea Wolf air defence missiles are capable of destroying incoming missiles*
3.31. **Enhanced forward presence.** Deploying forces in advance of a potential crisis is one way of avoiding anti-access threats. The deployment can be to a host nation to defend it, or to intervene from its waters, air or land. The size and capability of these forces must be such that they can conduct the initial combat themselves without immediate reinforcement. Enhanced forward presence can create deterrence for the use of A2AD threats, as well as help shape the host nation environment for the optimised and effective receipt of larger intervention forces.

3.32. **Enhanced resilience.** Forces at enhanced forward presence and those that face A2AD threats must raise their level of resilience. On heightened threat level or direct engagement, forces can reduce the threat by active dispersion, concealment and ongoing movement. Deployed forces will face a period where the Defence Support Network will be broken or disrupted and must plan accordingly. Preparations for technical support, repairs of military equipment, communications equipment and critical infrastructure (for example, airstrips) must be pre-planned.

3.33. **Attacking anti-access and area denial systems.** An attack on A2AD systems will have best effect if it targets the system itself rather than individual platforms. All systems are different with different critical vulnerabilities. If these can be identified and destroyed, at least temporarily, it may cause a collapse in the system. The joint force should mass their attacks on weak spots creating gaps for the entry forces to exploit. Simultaneity and surprise are key, so is the coordination between air and surface. If long-range weapons are used this lessens the risk to our own platforms and systems and exploits our adversary’s weaknesses. For example, a long-range surface-to-air missile system can be targeted by attack helicopters at treetop level. It may, of course, be defended by other air defence systems but these can be overwhelmed by mass and surprise.

3.34. **Land strike on anti-access and area denial systems.** Forces at enhanced forward presence and/or strike forces, local forces and special forces may be able to attack A2AD systems from land – before the entry. These forces can mass against those systems posing the greatest threat to the movement into theatre and help provide local control of the air. They have to be able to manoeuvre long distances with high resilience and may operate separately from the entry force itself.
3.35. **Sub-surface attack.** Submarines can penetrate an adversary’s waters and contribute to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance soaks. They can attack the adversary’s seaborne surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles systems, supporting our advances on the surface and in the air. They may even create gaps in the adversary’s A2AD system through the ability to launch precision guided land attack missiles from within an adversary’s surface and air A2AD coverage. Submarines can also insert unmanned underwater vehicles and special forces into the adversary’s littoral or mainland to conduct special missions on critical systems.

3.36. **Alternative thinking.** New ways of thinking should always be considered when attacking A2AD systems. Some examples could include:

- enhanced forward presence;
- enhanced resilience;
- land strike;
- sub-surface; and
- infiltration by helicopter attacks.
Section 6 – Entry approaches

3.37. Regardless of Service, this joint doctrine note considers three generic approaches to theatre entry. They are to be seen as ‘think pieces’ before being developed into more enduring solutions that link actions with specific capabilities. The approaches that can be conducted in all domains are:

- envelopment;
- infiltration; and
- penetration.

3.38. **Envelopment.** Envelopment is defined as: *an offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear.*\(^{17}\) Envelopment is based on non-linear thinking. It is often a preferred entry approach which can be conducted within a single (or multiple) domain(s). By using the advantages of each domain, the joint force can optimise its mobility through the operating environment to envelop the enemy, seize undefended terrain or surface and strike unexpectedly, creating great physical and cognitive advantage. Envelopment may also allow the joint force to move towards the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, or even directly on the object itself. Envelopment offers speed, tempo and surprise.

3.39. **Infiltration.** Infiltration is defined as: *a technique and process in which a force moves as individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection.*\(^{18}\) Infiltration can be conducted through all domains, especially cyber and electromagnetic. It often has to be dispersed, covert or conducted over time to avoid detection and defeat from area denial systems. An infiltrated force can be used to disrupt critical systems, capture key objectives, cause uncertainty and occupy vast enemy resources.

\(^{17}\) NATO*Term.*

3.40. **Penetration.** Penetration is defined as: *a form of offensive which seeks to break through the enemy’s defence and disrupt the defensive system.*\(^{19}\) Although penetration can be seen as close to linear thinking, it does not look for enemy strengths. Penetration of the adversary’s defences concentrates on weak points of entry that can be shaped to our advantage and finally overwhelmed, at least temporarily. Penetration calls for a concentration of force and effort from all domains on specific targets. The adversary, knowing the possibility of this threat, will be forced to make decisions that impact their overall fighting power.

3.41. **Combined approach.** When combined, envelopment, infiltration and penetration operate to surprise and fix the adversary’s resources, creating numerous dilemmas and causing them to make mistakes. Weaknesses are then revealed that the joint force can exploit when deciding where, when and how the entry should be conducted.

\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*
Section 7 – Movement versus manoeuvre

3.42. Movement should be understood as the phase when the joint force approaches the theatre of entry and is mainly affected by the adversary’s anti-access countermeasures. Movement can also, in a late stage, be affected by the adversary’s area denial countermeasures and the two can overlap. Manoeuvre should be understood as the phase when the adversary’s area denial measures gradually cause the entry force to start manoeuvring to avoid and/or degrade the adversary’s area denial threats in order to proceed. There is no sharp line between movement and manoeuvre. The entry force will gradually start manoeuvring according to the threat.

3.43. Movement is the most effective and fastest way into a theatre as it does not consume much fighting power and can cover large distances. However, movement is more vulnerable, the force is concentrated and not really ready to ‘fight’. Direct hits by the enemy may cause severe harm and even jeopardise the whole operation.

Ivor Matanle, World War II, Chapter 4, 1989.
3.44. Manoeuvre consumes fighting power and tends to be slower in its advance to the objective. To start manoeuvring too early may lead to a culmination even before the object is reached with a need for an operational pause, giving the adversary time to reorganise. Manoeuvring is safer as the force can act dispersed and avoid threats and also manoeuvre to a position of advantage to defeat a threat. Generally, the deeper into the objective, the greater the need for manoeuvre. However, we should not let the adversary force us to manoeuvre too early, especially not with our critical capabilities.

3.45. The joint force should consider long lasting elements of movement when planning an entry; although this may not be applicable to the force as a whole. However, some of our own forces with short endurance in manoeuvring are dependent on saving their fighting power until it is really needed.

3.46. The possibility of prolonging movement can be shaped by an array of actions. These actions include:

- the suppression of enemy air defences;
- minesweeping/clearing;
- seizing key terrain to extend movement through, or over, it;
- finding alternative entry avenues;
- envelopment; and
- unconventional transportation alternatives, such as sub-surface landing and parachute gliding.
3.47. Balancing movement and manoeuvre is also about balancing risk and determining priorities. When planning movement and manoeuvre it is also important to identify the abort criteria for the operation and flexibly shift between movement and manoeuvre – critical decisions for the commander.

Section 8 – Manoeuvre to object

3.48. **Early entry operations.** Early entry operations are employed to seize and hold key terrain, in particular entry points, \(^{21}\) ports of disembarkation or defiles through which main intervention forces may subsequently manoeuvre. Theatre entry requires land and amphibious forces capable of forcible entry onto the land with sufficient firepower and protection to hold ground. Joint forces should always seek to execute early entry operations into uncontested battlespace using deception, fires in depth and simultaneity of actions to deceive or overwhelm. Entry points must offer access to preselected ports of entry. In most cases airborne or amphibious forces supported by air, aviation and naval fires will be most suitable for the operation. However, in heavily contested battlespaces, where adversaries are able to to manoeuvre in force or apply concentrated fires, or where manoeuvre is possible from a neighbouring state, armoured or mechanised land forces may be more suitable.

3.49. **Amphibious operations.** An amphibious operation is defined as: a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal aim of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile. \(^{22}\) The UK’s amphibious forces have the capability to deploy early to demonstrate will and project intent by poising in international waters without commitment. Alternatively, it can be despatched without overt demonstration if political understatement and diplomatic sensitivity dictate. In common with all naval forces, whilst poised offshore it offers presence without occupation and deterrence without commitment. Operational reach of this nature enables the landing force to expand the land battlefield by posing an unpredictable, credible and dynamic threat to the adversary’s maritime flanks.

\(^{21}\) The term ‘entry point’ is used to describe a point at which initial access onto land is achievable, for example, a beach, landing zone or border crossing.
\(^{22}\) NATO Term.
3.50. **Ship to objective manoeuvre.** Ship to objective manoeuvre is an operational technique used by the landing force to project ashore. It seeks to create a decisive effect by using the agility of amphibious forces to strike at the points of greatest opportunity. This is achieved using a combination of surface manoeuvre landing craft, and air manoeuvre. Air manoeuvre is fundamental to ship to objective manoeuvre, as it gives the ability to reach beyond the shore and strike directly on the objective or to secure key terrain. Air assault is the primary type of air manoeuvre used. Ship to objective manoeuvre avoids the delay of a classic amphibious assault where there is a requirement to build up combat power in a beachhead before moving to the objective. Figure 3.1 compares a traditional amphibious assault with a ship to objective manoeuvre.

3.51. **Air manoeuvre operations.** Envelopment through the air offers speed and reach in depth. Air assault and airborne operations may employ a combination of air manoeuvre insertion techniques both on land and in a littoral environment.

a. **Air assault operations.** An air assault operation is defined as: an operation in which assault forces, using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of helicopter assets, manoeuvre on the battlefield under the control of the commander to engage and destroy adversary forces or to seize and hold key terrain.  

24  **NATO Term.**
b. **Airborne operation.** An airborne operation is defined as: an operation involving movement of forces and capabilities into an area by air.²⁵

i. **Air land.** These operations generate a rapid concentration of force elements on a target, assuming access is available to a functioning landing strip.

ii. **Airdrop.** Parachute insertions provide the ability to enter a theatre, where the integrity of an air strip is not initially assured or the threat denies an air land option. Airdrop can also continuously sustain forces.

Inserting into the lodgement, the intent is to seize key terrain, link up with special forces or local forces and disrupt adversaries. Air assault and airborne operations are likely to be supported by the air component for control of the air (which may pose a great challenge) and to suppress enemy air defences and sustain assault forces once on the ground. If necessary, air assault forces are usually responsible for the seizure, clearance and protection of the air port of disembarkation.

²⁵ NATO Term.
3.52. **Ground manoeuvre.** Combined armed forces may be used to secure the lodgement over land. Typical missions will include seizing and securing key terrain, linking up with, and reinforcing, amphibious or air assault forces, opening land combat service support routes, or blocking, delaying or distracting enemy forces. When operating with joint and land intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, ground forces can manoeuvre rapidly over several tactical bounds. Ground forces can operate continuously and penetrate an adversary’s defences by manoeuvre and mass. In fact, land forces may be able to manoeuvre to objectives and create dilemmas for the adversary with their direct presence. Their reach, firepower and logistic resilience are enhanced when they are integrated, and supported by, close air support, air and aviation. Similarly, ground forces can enable aviation and air assault forces to manoeuvre and can reinforce them with firepower and additional combat service support.

3.53. **Purpose.** The purposes for an entry force to seize objectives can vary from enabling humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations to inserting a large force conducting major combat operations after the theatre entry itself. In various ways the follow-on force, whatever task they have been given, is dependent on what objective the entry force has seized. Maintaining momentum will be critical for success.

3.54. **Objectives.** The objectives we are most likely to want to seize are sea ports of disembarkation, air ports of disembarkation and rail ports of disembarkation. The selection of ports of disembarkation will be determined by factors including the ability of the enemy to concentrate force and the availability of suitable ground. The great advantage of using multiple entry points is to achieve a faster flow of forces and expand assets into the lodgement. The disadvantages are the dispersal of forces at a vulnerable moment in the plan, as well as the requirement for more enablers such as port task groups.
3.55. **Multiple ports of disembarkation.** Disembarkation may be conducted from a single domain, but the best operational effect will be created if the disembarkation points are cross-domain, creating synergy. As an example, a sea port of disembarkation can receive large and heavy equipment whilst an air port of disembarkation offers speed of human transport and medical evacuation. It is therefore vital that the entry force can seize multiple ports of disembarkation. Seizing the objectives for the follow-on forces is often more important than seizing all the terrain within the lodgement. Figure 3.2 depicts an example of the geographical layout in a lodgement.

![Image of geographical layout](image.png)

**Figure 3.2 – Seizing ports of disembarkation is vital for receiving follow on forces and expanding the operation**
Section 10 – Consolidation of lodgement

3.56. A lodgement will contain one or more ports of disembarkation, be of sufficient size to accommodate main intervention forces, and offer an acceptable level of physical security. Operations to secure the lodgement should flow seamlessly from early entry operations. Early entry forces in particular must be balanced and ready to seize opportunities to secure sea, land and airports of entry. They will need to consider options for the arrival of the main intervention forces.

3.57. The lodgement ideally offers good access to the land via the sea and air corridors, as well as a secure perimeter through which civilian access can be monitored and controlled. It must also have enough capacity and size to accommodate main intervention forces and enable them to organise and transit for subsequent operations. Access to a civilian labour force, machinery, tooling, workshop space and materials is also beneficial, particularly for armoured and mechanised land forces.

3.58. The lodgement must be sited to enable land forces to manoeuvre from it. Consideration should therefore be given for access to graded road surfaces and bridges capable of supporting the appropriate military load class (MLC) of vehicle within the main intervention force (up to MLC 80 for armoured forces and MLC 40 for mechanised forces). Real estate may also be needed for forward arming and refuelling points for helicopters, and artillery manoeuvre areas. Any high ground which surrounds the lodgement, or which if held by an adversary could prevent egress from it, is key terrain and must be secured or denied.
Key points

- Entry operations need a comprehensive preparation of the operational environment.

- The joint force should identify a number of points of entry across all environments.

- The joint force should try to deceive the adversary in multiple ways with this deception having the best effect across all environments.

- It is important to plan the entry in a way that divides the adversary across the environments, thereby denying them the opportunity to create a joint effect.

- If an adversary is particularly strong in one environment, the joint force should seek to focus actions in other environments, thus making the adversary’s strength irrelevant.

- Coordinated shifts in action across different environments may cause confusion for the adversary.

- The joint force must address the anti-access and area denial systems complete kill chain.

- An attack on anti-access and area denial systems will have best effect if it targets the system itself rather than individual platforms.

- To start manoeuvring too early may lead to a culmination even before the object is reached.

- Ship to objective manoeuvre avoids the delay of a classic amphibious assault where there is a requirement to build up combat power in a beachhead.
Chapter 4 identifies considerations and factors for how the joint force is sustained and protected.

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“"Maintenance and resupply are the backbone of any military."

Robert Ferrigno,
*Sins of the Assassin*

“"During the last war, eighty percent of our problems were of a logistical nature."

Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery
Chapter 4 – Sustain and protect

4.1. The ability of the follow-on force to quickly deploy and manoeuvre onto the initial objectives to provide additional firepower, protection and mobility is key for the entry force. There are certain capabilities needed to ensure the survival of the entry force and ultimately lead to mission success.

Section 1 – Sustainment

4.2. This section only covers sustainment for the joint theatre entry (JTE) force; there will be an additional support requirement for the follow-on forces. The entry force task can be complicated if the operation is against a near-peer adversary. This section outlines the key sustainment enablers and capabilities that should be considered when conducting entry operations.

4.3. Opening the lodgement. Theatre opening describes those activities that set the conditions for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of the main intervention force. It requires the early deployment of a theatre logistic headquarters and specialised enablers capable of activating air and sea ports, establishing a Defence Support Chain along with movement control systems and procedures. These activities should occur concurrently with establishing an adequate level of medical support and evacuation capability, and the communication and information systems architecture. For a hostile or non-permissive environment joint theatre entry, initial theatre opening activities may begin at a forward mounting base until the lodgement is sufficiently secure. Theatre opening tasks include:

- establishing the air port of disembarkation or sea port of disembarkation;
- identifying and establishing a joint logistic support area;
- establishing the RSOI infrastructure;
- establish communications links;
- establishing a movement control framework;
• establishing force protection;
• preparing to open the Defence Support Chain; and
• identifying and establishing main and alternative supply routes.

4.4. Medical support. Theatre entry forces are likely to have limited or no access to host-nation support during opposed operations, when entering failed states and during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. In these circumstances it is imperative that the task group has sufficient maritime medical capability to support the expected patient load as directed by the medical planning estimate. This is designed to support land and littoral operations and provide a route for casualty evacuations to air ports of departure in secure locations. Once a lodgement has been secured, the strategic air bridge must be established to enable timely strategic evacuations of any casualties sustained. Medical planners should consider using appropriate host nation role 3 and 4 facilities following a comprehensive medical recce. A UK role 3 deployed hospital care facility should be established to meet North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) medical planning guidelines where no host nation or allied/partner facility is deemed suitable.26

4.5. Initial operation from the lodgement. An initial operation from the lodgement describes the tasks that joint forces must complete to:

• understand the situation within, and forward of, the lodgement;
• shape adversaries; and
• prepare to protect and sustain future operations.

These tasks are the responsibility of the entry force, but will be executed by a theatre logistic headquarters, until the lead component with its organic combat service support is fully established in the lodgement.

26 See Allied Joint Doctrine Publication (AJP)-4.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support for an explanation of medical treatment facilities.
4.6. **Receiving the main intervention force.** The bulk of heavy equipment (armoured/mechanised vehicles) normally deploy by sea or land with personnel and some equipment deploying by air. Planning for this should be completed in reverse ensuring that the entry plan for the joint force is completed first and that the supporting movement activities deliver the joint forces in the correct order in which they are required once in place. This is known as the reverse planning process and demonstrated in Figure 4.1.

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**The Mulberry harbours**

Mulberry harbours were temporary portable harbours developed by the British during World War II to facilitate the rapid offloading of cargo onto beaches during the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944. After successfully holding beachheads following D-Day, two prefabricated harbours were taken in sections across the English Channel from the UK with the invading army and assembled off Omaha (Mulberry ‘A’) and Gold Beach (Mulberry ‘B’).

The Mulberry harbours were to be used until the Allies could capture a French port, initially thought to be around three months. However, it was not until six months after D-Day that the Belgian port of Antwerp was captured that use of the harbour at Gold Beach lessened. It was used for 10 months after D-Day and over two and a half million men, 500,000 vehicles, and four million tonnes of supplies were landed using it before it was fully decommissioned.

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D-Day Museum Arromanches

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**Figure 4.1 – The reverse planning process**
a. **The ground tactical plan.** The commander must work out what their scheme of manoeuvre and objectives will be to help inform the logistic planners. This will allow them to work backwards from the plan to ensure the operation is successful.

b. **The landing plan.** The landing plan must take into account the desired order of arrival in theatre of the troops and equipment that will form the main intervention force. Ideally this will have been decided before the main intervention force deploys but, if this is not possible, the force could use a forward mounting base to reload ships, landing craft or aircraft.

c. **The movement plan.** The movement plan supports the landing plan by directing the order in which ships and their troops and equipment arrive in the joint operations area and the order in which they are to be used.

d. **The loading plan.** The loading plan should direct the order in which the joint forces are arranged on ships or aircraft. They should be loaded in reverse order to that which they will be used for disembarkation. The joint force should spend no longer on board their transport than necessary. Any additional time risks the transport becoming vulnerable to enemy action and prevents their effective and efficient use. In addition, any loading plan should ensure that the equipment required for the landing be available to the troops.

e. **The staging plan.** The staging plan should facilitate the loading plan, in particular ensuring that troops are called forward in the right sequence and at the correct time to board their transport.

4.7. **Establishing the main intervention force.** The process that enables main intervention forces to attain full operating capability as quickly as possible is RSOI. It is normally a national responsibility, however, in a coalition operation a lead nation may be tasked to conduct RSOI for all or selected force elements. There are times when a formal RSOI process is not required or is conducted in the home base before deployment, or while travelling to the operation. The RSOI process can be brief or take some time depending on the situation.
a. **Reception.** Reception begins with the arrival of forces and equipment in theatre. This phase includes receiving, offloading, marshalling, recording and transporting personnel, equipment and materiel from strategic/operational lift at the ports of disembarkation. It involves the activation and operation of the ports of disembarkation and movement control and transport within and from them. Reception ends when the main intervention forces, equipment and materiel are moved onwards from the ports of disembarkation.

b. **Staging.** Staging is the process of assembling, temporarily holding, organising, acclimatising and training arriving personnel, equipment and materiel, prior to their onward movement and further activities. Staging may involve either formed units or individuals and, at its simplest, encompasses providing food and accommodation in a benign or protected environment. Staging is complete when force elements have been fully briefed, orientated, equipped, trained and acclimatised.

c. **Onward movement.** Onward movement is the process of moving units, personnel, equipment and materiel (reception area or staging areas) to their operational deployment location. It requires coordinated movement control and an effective transportation network. Onward movement is considered complete when force elements have consolidated in their final operational deployment location (namely, concentration areas or forward assembly areas).

d. **Integration.** This is the synchronised transfer of mission ready force elements into the coalition in accordance with the operational plan. Before integration, the deploying commander reports that the levels of readiness prescribed by the coalition commander have been achieved and that integration may begin. Integration may be conducted outside the area of operations or at any stage of the RSOI process. In particular, integration includes:

   - establishing transfer of authority procedures;
   - enabling a seamless flow of personnel, equipment and materiel;
Sustain and protect

- reconnaissance of the area of operational responsibility and area familiarisation;
- dividing responsibilities between the previous command, gaining command and the integration unit;
- establishing status reporting procedures;
- transferring logistic support from RSOI supporting organisations to the gaining command; and
- handing over equipment and materiel, including stock-takes (if the integration is part of a relief).

Integration is complete when force elements are capable of performing their assigned mission and the receiving commander establishes command and control over the force elements.

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**The lodgement in Inchon**

‘The daring amphibious assault at Inchon, Korea on 15 September 1950, proved a critical turning point in the Korean War. It functioned as a turning movement by establishing a lodgement deep in the operational level rear areas of the north Korean Peoples’ Army, severing their logistic lifeline and reducing the pressure on the United Nations (UN) Forces in the Pusan Perimeter. It demonstrated the use of manoeuver [sic] to achieve surprise and avoid enemy strengths by landing where he was weak. It took advantage of the UN Forces’ strengths, control of the sea and air, to achieve decisive advantage over the enemy’s strengths on land by building forces rapidly in his operational rear and then using those friendly ground forces to encircle and destroy enemy forces. Operational success relied on an effective initial entry force supported by joint assets and by rapidly inserting reinforcing entry forces to establish a lodgement. This lodgement then brought in sufficient follow-on forces and capabilities to re-take Seoul, control the ground lines of communications on the Korean Peninsula, and to begin the counter-offensive toward the Yalu River.’

Roy Appleman

*South to the Naktong, north to the Yalu*
4.8. **Sustainment considerations.** There are specific capability considerations that enable quickly accessible, properly configured, prepositioned equipment and relief supplies in support of entry operations.

a. The joint force should be able to rapidly access classes of supply that support entry operations, port opening and theatre opening or activation. They should also improve selective offload capabilities for relief supplies and port or theatre opening support equipment. The ability to rapidly access and redistribute prepositioned or sea-based assets in theatre is key.

b. The ability of the joint force to conduct selective offload of forces, equipment and all classes of supply from sea-based assets.

4.9. **Planning.** Planners must be able to assess, plan, prioritise, sequence and disperse sustainment requirements needed by follow-on forces. They will need to carry out the following functions.

a. Provide sustainment directly to the point of need, even in a denied domain and deep into entry locations.

b. Prioritise and sequence sustainment into multiple, different logistic nodes.

c. Match strategic movement of forces with theatre capabilities to receive them. Host nation/destinations require the infrastructure capacity for onward movement, for example, road/bridge load capacity.

d. Prioritise, synchronise and protect logistic operations in a degraded or denied communications environment.

e. Ensure cargo moves quickly from all ports of disembarkation enroute to the end user with minimal staging and/or cross-decking.

f. Plan and deliver an integrated health care system that supports multiple entry locations in the littoral and deep inland, using medical planning guidelines to minimise medical risk.
g. Plan for joint personnel recovery, which is an integral part of force protection policy, should be part of the operational commander’s force protection estimate/operational risk assessment.

h. Escort and protect key sustainment assets in advanced area denial environments.

i. Access a database listing multinational partners’ logistic and classes of supply capabilities and resources.

j. Provide sufficient materiel handling capability to support the entry force.

k. Provide asset tracking and visibility.

l. Provide a scalable and early entry logistic support, bulk fuel or liquid delivery system at multiple points of entry.

m. Using civilian contractor support services to enable and sustain joint operations is now a routine function.

n. Captured persons must form part of the initial planning and execution of an operation. Finding and freeing captured persons is a resource heavy activity which may occupy large forces.

Section 2 – Protection

4.10. Force protection. Force protection tasks are intended to preserve the combat power of the joint forces within a hostile environment. The precise protection measures implemented will depend on an analysis of the threat and the appetite for risk and are, therefore, specific to each JTE operation. However, controlling emissions, hardening vulnerable capabilities and employing deception will be common to any approach in a hostile JTE operation.
4.11. **A layered approach.** Protecting our own forces will require a layered approach based on understanding the capabilities, tactics and intentions of the adversary. The latter will seek to detect a range of signatures emitted by joint forces within the electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace and physical environment. Where our own forces are identified, they may then be subject to targeting and subsequent attack. Therefore, using counter-surveillance and operations security procedures form the first lines of defence against target acquisition. Physical means of protection should be considered where the probability of hostile target acquisition remains high. Personal security is critical and protection of personal identifiable information on high value individuals or in sufficient quantities across the force should be considered. Maritime, land and air forces can be organised to provide a layered air defence. Persistent surveillance, geo-data and ground signal analysis can be used to predict points where forces may be vulnerable to enemy engagements. Building systematic layers of protection can be described like the layers of an onion and must be integrated.

4.12. **Cyber.** Cyber attacks are commonplace within the business and commercial environment and therefore joint forces should assume that they will be similarly attacked. Protection measures should focus on controlling emissions from antennae, aircraft, ships, power sources and servers, as well as dispersing or moving a land-based headquarters frequently. This may include measures to deceive an adversary, for example:

- creating false or dummy emitter concentrations;
- concealing or screening emitters; or
- situating emitters in stand-off locations.

Plans should also be prepared to isolate elements of the communication and information systems architecture that are subject to cyber or electronic attack. As a minimum, orders for handling protectively marked data, using social media and unclassified private communications, personal electronic devices and information management must be prepared, issued and enforced.
4.13. **Visual signature reduction.** Visual signatures include key equipment, personnel or emblems that indicate the type of forces observed. A concentration of antennae close to, or within a lodgement, transmitting at high power is an obvious signature for a headquarters or capital ship. They can indicate a command and control hierarchy, force dispositions and even future intentions. Once identified, adversaries can make deductions on the capabilities, strengths, locations and future intentions of forces and use them to their advantage. Counter-reconnaissance tasks include dispersing signature equipment, operating at night and employing camouflage, concealment and dispersal to good effect.

4.14. **Physical protection.** Headquarters and logistic bases should be physically protected where possible and prepared to switch back to non-digital processes and means of communication. Planning for worst case scenarios may include losing control of the air, indirect fire, ballistic missile attack, electronic or cyber attack and suicide attacks. In a non-permissive environment, force protection and facilities protection tasks may be given to early entry or partner forces until other suitable forces become available. Physical protection tasks should be anticipated before early entry forces deploy so they can be quickly reinforced with search teams, explosive ordnance disposal and electronic countermeasures, should they be required.
4.15. **Force health protection.** Force health protection is described as the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it is healthy, fully combat effective and can be applied at the decisive time and place. It consists of actions taken to counter the debilitating effects of environment, disease and selected special weapon systems through preventive measures for personnel, systems and operational formations. It considers force preparation measures, environmental health advice, in-theatre preventive measures, post-exposure measures and rehabilitating the force. Force health protection must include competent medical advice in force health protection for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. Force health protection incorporates medical intelligence.

4.16. **Facilities protection.** Consideration should be made to use host nation forces and assets when appropriate to the type of operation. These may include the sea port of disembarkation and air port of disembarkation, main arterial routes, transport hubs, power and telecommunications networks as well as sources of food and water. Threat assessments should consider both conventional threats but also any irregular and asymmetric threats such as demonstrations and riots, sabotage and localised chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

4.17. **Protecting lines of supply and communication.** Strategic sea, air and ground lines of supply and communication can be subject to friction and interference, not just from adversaries, but also other regional actors through whose territory they may pass. Potential threats and vulnerabilities to lines of supply and communication will be considered during initial campaign planning, but situations and allegiances can change, not least as a result of the initial deployment of joint forces or the start of hostilities. Whilst full physical security of a line of supply is unlikely, Permanent Joint Headquarters need to understand where their vulnerable points lie, and how threats to these might be mitigated, for example, by using diplomatic means, local proxies or reservists. They should also develop contingency plans to switch to alternate routes should a failure occur.
4.18. **Movement.** The ability to keep friendly forces freedom of manoeuvre into, and within, the entry area is vital. This will aid the points listed below.

a. The ability to land, via air and/or surface means, in a timely manner to support the early entry force.

b. The ability to provide enhanced lethality and force protection during entry operations without creating a force that becomes too heavy to move rapidly or requires RSOI activities.

c. The ability to tailor the follow-on forces for operations by expanding the use of small units of currently available medium/heavy forces trained to deploy rapidly on strategic lift.

d. The ability to employ low signature capabilities to insert and support the follow-on force.

4.19. **Protecting information.** In the information age, adversaries will be aware of our intentions to deploy main intervention forces. Operations security must therefore focus on protecting information concerning when
and where joint forces will concentrate to achieve entry. Planning may need to be compartmentalised, decisions on where and when to strike should be retained as long as practicable and contingency plans prepared in case initial entry options are compromised. Information management procedures should be rigorously applied.

4.20. **Protecting the civilian population.** It is a fundamental principle of international humanitarian law that when conducting military operations, constant care should be taken to spare the civilian population and civilian objects from attack. The civilian population shall be distinguished from combatants and civilian objects shall be distinguished from military objectives at all times. Operations should only be directed against military objectives. Adversaries will seek to deny access to joint forces by operating from population centres, cultural buildings or areas of critical national infrastructure to force errors and deny the joint force's freedom of action. Populations may look on early entry forces with a mix of fear, suspicion and anticipation. Early tasks upon entering a lodgement will therefore include:

- operations to identify, engage with and protect populations from hostilities;
- reassure the population; and
- manage the local security environment in which they live.

Applying dynamic battlespace management, recalibrating fire control procedures, messaging and providing outreach, framework security and emergency life support should be considered once the lodgement has been secured.

4.21. **Protecting the narrative.** Care must be taken to protect the narrative by using information activities to project our actions and defend against any enemy counter-narrative or propaganda actions. This will be important to retain the public support of our own population as well as the regional actors and general world opinion. Anticipation and risk mitigation should be planned to support each tactical action.
**Key points**

- For a hostile or non-permissive environment joint theatre entry, initial theatre opening activities may begin at a forward mounting base until the lodgement is sufficiently secure.

- Planning for theatre entry should be completed in reverse ensuring that the entry plan for the joint force is completed first and that the supporting movement activities deliver the joint forces in the correct order.

- The landing plan must take into account the desired order of arrival in theatre of the troops and equipment that will form the main intervention force.

- The commander must work out what their scheme of manoeuvre and objectives will be to help inform the logistic planners.

- The load plan should direct the order in which the joint forces are arranged on ships or aircrafts. They should be loaded in reverse order to that which they will be used for disembarkation.

- The ability to continuously keep movement of forces into and within the entry area is vital.

- Operations security must focus on protecting information concerning when and where joint forces will concentrate to achieve entry.

- Populations may look on early entry forces with a mix of fear, suspicion and anticipation.
Command and control

Chapter 5 identifies command and control and inform requirements for a joint theatre entry operation.

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Passive inactivity, because you have not been given specific instructions to do this or to do that, is a serious deficiency.

George C. Marshall
Former United States Secretary of State
Chapter 5 – Command and control

Section 1 – Command considerations

5.1. A critical part of conducting a successful theatre entry is effective command and control of our forces. Effective command is about sound decision-making, which begins by building sufficient understanding.27

5.2. Mission command. Mission command remains the command philosophy for UK Armed Forces and is even more important in the chaos and friction that joint theatre entry (JTE) forces face in a degraded or denied operating environment. Command and control systems will likely be disrupted as adversaries seek to deny or limit friendly force use of the space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Joint entry will therefore rely on well integrated and interoperable teams established through habitual relationships well before conflict arises; with mutual trust at all levels of command. It is therefore essential that JTE forces train and exercise together, using mutually agreed operating procedures and endorsed tactics and techniques.

5.3. Seizing the initiative. On the battlefield there is a constant shift in unforeseen obstacles and opportunities. New pockets and corridors of entry may be exposed in battle and must be immediately exploited to gain temporary, localised control of the operating environment. Small points of successful entry must be rapidly expanded on whilst planned and blocked ones should be abandoned if they are unsatisfactory. Mission command will be key to seizing the initiative. Commanders must therefore set objectives in depth, trust their sub-commanders and allow a high degree of decentralisation and flexibility in the execution. Reserves and follow-on forces will be inserted to exploit success rather than mitigate failure. The speed and agility of entry, supported by mission command, signifies theatre entry operations.

27 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04, Understanding and Decision-making (2nd Edition).
5.4. Considerations. To ensure early entry forces succeed, they must look beyond those tools and techniques available to them and not limit themselves to augmenting the organisation, process or capability. If opposed, being bold and agile in command may allow the entry forces to make significant gains over an adversary who is less adaptable and risk adverse. However, the command structure must be configured and trained to enable effective command. The ability to quickly form command and control relationships with staff and attachments that understand the intricacies of entry operations is critical and requires flexible commanders and staff. Sufficient command and control authority is needed to execute entry operations effectively allowing the commander to integrate and synchronise joint and multinational forces. This authority must extend to all joint functions and include the ability to globally integrate and employ assigned forces.
5.5. **Control nodes.** For non-combatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, at niche and small scale, the requirement for a component headquarters to exercise command and control is unlikely to exist at the tactical level. Where joint force entries are taken under command at the operational level, a 1* Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) may integrate command and control nodes to exercise tactical control of those force elements and act as a conduit between the operational and tactical levels. A national early entry headquarters acts as the principal building block of the JTFHQ. Rapid and agile forward capability enables a network of committed and deployed forces, allies and other government departments to deliver an integrated and coordinated response.

5.6. The level of command required for an operation will be outlined in a command and communications plan produced by the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). The level of command will depend on the location of the joint operations area, the complexity and size of the force, and whether it is part of a coalition or alliance. The early entry force must have the flexibility to scale up or down depending on how the operation is going and what the political will is. The force will also have to consider the communication and information systems (CIS) implications for working between different levels (tactical and operational) as well as the challenges posed by working in a coalition. Interoperability is a vital aspect that must be discussed during the planning phases and as the operation grows and there may be a requirement to generate mass, or to re-subordinate the early entry forces.

5.7. **A scalable approach.** The design of the operational command and control architecture must allow for delivering early entry command and control, liaison and reconnaissance for immediate crisis response. This must scale up to a 1* JTFHQ capable of commanding a national or multinational joint task force for niche and small-scale operations including non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and early entry operations. These may be in support of another government department or in advance of a larger joint expeditionary force.
commanded by a 1* JTFHQ. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters Group (SJFHQ), comprises the 1* Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), 1* Standing Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters (SJJFHQ), and 2* SJFHQ. It provides Defence with an assured, joint, tactical to operational level, deployable command and control capability; offering scalable and adaptable multinational and inter-agency command options in support of UK interests worldwide. Annex A explores these JFHQ crisis response procedures in further detail.

5.8. **Command transition.** The main command transition will take place between the early entry force 1* command and the 2* JTFHQ, or it could be from the 2* UK national command to a 2* coalition command. Each of these transitions must have the ability to conduct a reverse change of command should an operation reduce in size. The nature of the environment, threat and complexity dictates that the JTFHQ will need to maintain a full range of operational activities throughout the campaign, such as, information operations, outreach and full spectrum targeting. Consideration must therefore be given to augmentation to bolster staff resilience, where specialist personnel with greater expertise of joint tactics, techniques and procedures will allow a seamless transition to the follow-on SJFHQ. JFHQ have established four models that they use to exercise command and control which can be found in Annex B.

5.9. **Command and control factors.** The JTFHQ must possess the following characteristics to deliver JTE:

- unity of command of assigned force elements;
- the capacity to integrate sovereign and multinational partner capabilities;
- the ability to command and control in denied and degraded domains;

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28 The Standing Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters (SJJFHQ) provides joint logistic componency at the tactical level, as either the joint force logistic component for the joint expeditionary force, or the core of a combined joint support group for the combined joint expeditionary force (CJEF).
29 This is generally the standard UK command and control arrangement.
• the ability to integrate and synchronise activities across all domains; and

• the ability to use, establish and sustain existing and new liaison networks.

5.10. **Battlespace coordination.** A particular characteristic of the shaping phase of a JTE operation will be the concentration of maritime, land and air forces in close proximity to each other. The issue is amplified in archipelago regions, complex coastlines or where urban areas border the sea. Careful coordination of the battlespace and targeting procedures will require fire support coordination measures, including combat identification, and clear command and control arrangements between joint task force staff and components. In some circumstances, for example, where the JTFHQ manages a broad span of operational-level activities across a dispersed theatre, it may be preferable to designate component headquarters.

5.11. There are various means of delivering command and control across tactical and operational levels. Each system should be interchangeable and supportive of the other. In a contested and degraded domain an agile CIS will be vital. The size, weight and power of the CIS with their associated resiliency levels need to be balanced against speed of deployment and operational risk. A scalable headquarters must be able to connect with other headquarters to facilitate unified command. The headquarters must establish the joint force communication and information systems (JFCIS), which is an effective mission configurable CIS architecture that governs the scale and pace of the deployment and the subsequent entry of joint forces into theatre.

5.12. The demand for bandwidth, frequencies, connectivity and power will require careful management and prioritisation by PJHQ and the JTFHQ. Establishing an end-to-end tactical to operational mission configurable network will take time, resources and a clear explanation by commanders of
their communication needs. Where possible, steps should be taken before the deployment to validate and authorise the CIS of allies wishing to join the network. This capability is provided by either the 1st Signal Brigade from the British Army or Royal Air Force tactical communications units acting as the JFCIS group. A similar capability is provided in the maritime domain by Naval Command Headquarters Information Warfare Force Generation. Their JFCIS architecture should include the following items.

a. A mission configurable theatre communications architecture including wide area trunk and satellite-enabled reachback capability.

b. A suite of command and control applications and services that enable the planning and control of joint and component operations to be integrated, including joint battlespace management, targeting and the fusion of intelligence and data.

c. An integrated common operating picture that enables shared situational awareness across the joint force.

d. A logistic asset tracking and control system that enables the creation of the recognised theatre logistics picture to facilitate demand forecasting.

The JFCIS architecture will have to incorporate and overcome tension points throughout its creation and adaptation. Joint battlespace management, cloud-based services, predictive logistics and airspace management are all elements to consider.
5.13. **Establishing a regional and coalition liaison network.** The UK will often conduct joint theatre entry operations within a coalition. In these circumstances, commanders must always be aware of, and coordinate their actions with allies, the host nation, other agencies and regional partners. Long-standing liaison structures exist with allies and partners which can be accessed through PJHQ. During theatre entry, such coordination will need to be dynamic and highly responsive to events. This is done by well-informed and empowered liaison officers, using appropriately secure CIS suites and working alongside the joint task force and component headquarters. The core of this network might be existing personnel who are already responsible for Defence Engagement activities; in which case, a regional joint force liaison network could be quickly established. In areas where we have little or no presence the early use of operational liaison and reconnaissance teams (OLRTs) may be needed while a network is generated. To ensure efficient tasking and that a single, clear and corroborated assessment of events is maintained this network must report to the joint force commander.

5.14. **Mission configurable network.** Future CIS capability must be mission configurable both in terms of classification and membership to allow information flow between different commands. The construction and rehearsal of a mission configurable joint force and tactical/operational CIS network can enable joint force communicators to understand the scope and scale of the information services and applications required by the joint force and component headquarters. Rehearsals also enable the permissions and security protocols of allies, agencies and partners who may wish to ‘plug into’ the CIS network to be validated and assured beforehand, saving time and process when orders to deploy are given.

5.15. **Fusion.** Early entry forces need the ability to generate and share a dynamic common operating picture across all domains. They should have the tools and processes to integrate electromagnetic activities into operational-level planning and control in the battlespace.

5.16. **Distributed command.** The early entry force will need to have workable method of reachback into various facilities to access large volumes of data. This could include the Joint Information Activities Group, Joint Force Cyber Group, the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit, Single Intelligence Environment, and more. As a result there will be a requirement for suitably qualified and
experienced personnel. Targeteers are needed to prosecute kinetic targets by air, land or sea to enable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Nominated reserves may have specific skillsets making them uniquely suited to an early entry operation due to location, culture and language.

Section 4 – Understand/inform

5.17. Understanding provides the context for effective decision-making. Information can be turned into intelligence but not understanding, which is derived from a deep comprehension of the political, cultural and societal drivers that shape the operating environment. Establishing understanding is assisted by the forward engagement of forces able to collect information, or support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Through intelligence and engagement, commanders at all levels are better able to observe the situation, familiarise themselves with threats and opportunities, decide on a course of action and enact it. The information collected will change according to the situation and phase of a JTE operation.

5.18. Introducing early entry forces to a joint operations area will have an effect on the responses of other actors, particularly adversaries operating in close proximity to the lodgement. This may switch from coastal or perimeter defence to offensive action, while others may seek local alliances to reinforce their own power base or secure resources for protection. Regional actors may demonstrate increased disquiet at the start of operations and seek to offer distractions or become less cooperative to joint forces operating in their sphere of influence. Joint forces should be ready to adapt their own tactics in response.

5.19. Situational awareness. The early entry force must maintain a shared situational awareness of countries and regions of the world that are tending towards crisis and where the UK has a national interest. They should develop and share conflict assessments with:

• PJHQ;
• secret intelligence agencies; and

• other government departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DfID), the Government Communications Headquarters, the Stabilisation Unit and the UK Border Force.

This allows them to understand and maintain a working relationship with UK partners, allies, non-governmental organisations and other agencies across government.

5.20. **Understanding in the information age.** Arguably the most significant and difficult change to the character of conflict is the rapid proliferation of mass media and data, or the information environment. The speed and reach of this data, twinned with its unregulated nature leads to challenges in maintaining our narrative and countering our adversaries. This environment connects people across borders and boundaries in near real-time thereby enabling them to directly, or indirectly, affect the conduct of the operation.

5.21. **Strategic communications.** When fully integrated in the planning process, strategic communications provide a coherent framework that harnesses all means of communication, to affect attitudes and behaviours in support of objectives. It is more fundamental than simply media relations as all activities, political, diplomatic and military, will communicate something. Where there is an absence of strategy or operational direction, or where what is said and what is done do not align with the strategy, it will fail. Therefore, it is important that there is a clear link between UK operational activity, the communicative effect of that activity and the intended strategic effect. At the operational and tactical levels, the integration of activities requires a whole-of-staff effort to plan and execute targeted cognitive and physical effects. This is best achieved by developing

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30 A full description of the Defence contribution to strategic communication is contained in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/12, *Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution*. Further detail on the development of strategic communication planning in the Ministry of Defence is contained in 2016 DIN 03-017: *Defence Strategic Communication (StratCom) and the Role of Military Strategic Effects (MSE)*.
a clear narrative\textsuperscript{31} supported by a strategic communication framework\textsuperscript{32} which enables decentralised execution of activity that is coherent with the intended effects. A 1* headquarters has the ability to carry out this function before transferring to a higher command.

5.22. **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** Early entry air ISR capabilities will need to be protected if they are to operate in any form of threat environment. This may require the early deployment of capabilities and command and control platforms. The early entry force should have the ability to manage and coordinate significantly increased quantities of unmanned and automated systems throughout the operational area in support of any entry operation. The joint task force joint fires team creates a surveillance and target acquisition plan for the lodgement. Maritime-, air- and land-based ISR systems should be networked, layered and organised to provide a high degree of persistent surveillance. There will also be a requirement to conduct collection requirement management processes to enable greater understanding and analysis.

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\textsuperscript{31} Narratives are compelling storylines which explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn. This assists individuals or teams to discard actions or proposed courses of action that do not conform to the narrative and, by extension, strategy.

\textsuperscript{32} Strategic communication planning guidance will be included in Chief of the Defence Staff Planning Directives to enable the development of strategic communication frameworks, and the supporting communications or information operations’ plans, at the operational and tactical levels.
5.23. **Remote and stand-off surveillance and reconnaissance.** The extent to which reconnaissance and surveillance can be achieved by direct access on the ground and in the lower airspace will be determined by the nature of the mission, threat and balance of risk and opportunity. Those assets conducting stand-off missions will require protection. For discretionary operations the bar of protection may be set quite high, in which case emphasis should be placed on stand-off capabilities such as airborne signals intelligence, maritime and cross-border land-based electronic warfare and surveillance capabilities. Remote collection by national agencies, cyber activities and engagement through proxies should also be considered.

5.24. **Defence Engagement.** The UK’s approach to fragile and failing states is focussed on cross-government post-conflict prevention, liaison with the FCO, DfID, Department for International Trade and other government departments. These can be supported by the early entry forces:

- identifying and deterring threats;
- being able to shape responses to the crisis; and
- developing understanding.

Joint forces offer persistence in priority regions and countries by conducting capacity building tasks to develop indigenous institutional and security force capability. These tasks allow them to contribute information and insights which enable situational awareness to be maintained and understanding of culture, terrain and threats to be developed.

5.25. **Exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum.** Exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum has long been regarded as a key enabler for command and control. The electromagnetic spectrum underpins the full range of military activity. Using technology or man-made interference from the electromagnetic spectrum is now possible. Over the past two decades, significant global powers have rapidly improved the sophistication and range of their own capabilities which may disrupt our:

- communications;

33 JDN 1/15, *Defence Engagement.*
Command and control

- navigation and timings;
- ability to create lethal and non-lethal effects; and
- ability to gain and develop situational awareness and understanding.

5.26. **Operations security.** Adherence to operations security procedures when applying counter-surveillance control measures is important. Deception operations must be visible and sufficiently well-resourced to be credible. Ideally they will also conform to what an adversary expects and should be consistent with existing practices and doctrine. Examples for JTE include:

- releasing misinformation to proxies or social media;
- moving and unmasking signature equipment, communications and personnel to false concentration areas; and
- masking force preparation activities by routine administrative, training or resupply tasks.

5.27. **Providing intelligence.** The primary source of intelligence for joint forces preparing for JTE operations is through PJHQ and the JFHQ’s joint intelligence, along with the Joint Force Intelligence Group, and particularly the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre and the Joint Intelligence Operations Centre for specialised Defence intelligence support to operations. A JTE operation could have limited intelligence and will require reachback to ascertain key information. This could be limited pending cyber and electromagnetic domain threats and capabilities of the joint forces. The Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre ensures command intelligence requirements are represented alongside cross-government departments. This is shown in Figure 5.1.
5.28. **Early entry requirements.** The early entry force will require support from subject matter experts on a mission-tailored call-down basis at pre-arranged readiness. Small command and control nodes are capable of integrating into a 1* headquarters to provide tactical control of units, ships or aircrafts as the joint task force forms. Command and control nodes will collocate with the 1* headquarters and primarily operate across tactical communications. The 1* headquarters with the control nodes will then transfer command, if required to a JTFHQ.
Key points

• Mission command is key to seizing the initiative. Commanders should set objectives in depth, trust their sub-commanders and allow a high degree of decentralisation and flexibility in the execution.

• The ability to quickly form command and control relationships with staff and attachments that understand the intricacies of entry operations is critical and requires flexible commanders and staff.

• The Joint Task Force Headquarters needs the following characteristics:
  - unity of command of assigned force elements;
  - the capacity to integrate sovereign and multinational capabilities
  - the ability to command and control in potentially denied or degraded environments;
  - the ability to integrate and synchronise across all domains; and
  - the ability to use, establish and sustain existing and new networks.

• Establishing an end-to-end tactical to operational mission configurable network will take time, resources and a clear explanation by commanders of their communication needs.

• The early entry force will need to have workable method of reachback into various facilities to access large volumes of data.

• Establishing understanding is assisted by the forward engagement of forces able to collect information, or support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

• The early entry force must maintain a shared situational awareness of countries and regions of the world that are tending towards crisis and where the UK has a national interest.
Annex A – Joint Force Headquarters crisis response procedures

A.1. The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) sets out a series of procedures to follow depending on the crisis and the level of response required. The JFHQ approach is scalable and adaptable, ranging from niche and small-scale operations to multinational and inter agency command options. The procedures are described below.

A.2. The initial phase is the pre-crisis situation. When in a pre-crisis situation, JFHQ will undertake the procedures below.

   a. Maintain a shared situational awareness of countries and regions of the world tending towards crisis and those where the UK has national interests.

   b. Develop and share conflict assessments with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J2/J5 (operations intelligence/crisis and deliberate planning), the wider Defence community and other government departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Crisis Management Department, the Department for International Development (DfID), the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) team, the Government Communications Headquarters, Stabilisation Unit and the UK Border Force.

   c. Understand and maintain a working relationship with a crisis network of partners, allies and agencies in the UK and at risk countries.

   d. Conduct initial joint contingency planning with PJHQ and other government departments.

   e. Carry out individual and collective staff training to maintain appropriate theatre entry standards and the ability to conduct liaison and reconnaissance in medium and high threat environments.\(^\text{34}\)

\(^{34}\) Theatre entry standards, medium and high threat environments are defined and monitored by Permanent Joint Headquarters J3 (current operations).
 Joint Force Headquarters crisis response procedures

f. Carry out individual and collective staff training appropriate for executing joint operational command and control.

g. Regularly validate and assure the ability to activate and deploy mission-tailored command and control, from operational liaison and reconnaissance teams (OLRTs) to Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), within mandated readiness, highlighting risks and gaps in capability where these arise.

A.3. On receiving a warning order\textsuperscript{35} the JFHQ will activate a mission-tailored OLRT, early entry headquarters (EEHQ) or JTFHQ. This will see the actions listed below being taken.

a. Activate the JFHQ component of the cross-Whitehall crisis network with JFHQ liaison officers deploying to the FCO Crisis Management Department and DFID CHASE as may be deemed operationally appropriate.

b. If sanctioned by the Standing Joint Force Commander/Chief of Joint Operations, an OLRT or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) liaison officer will be deployed with the DfID ‘No Regrets Team’, ahead of any formal Ministry of Defence tasking to understand, inform and provide early and immediate situational awareness.

c. Conduct an estimate to understand the mission, tasks, freedoms, constraints, forces and capabilities that are required to achieve the assigned mission.

d. Confirm the command and control authorities and permissions afforded to the mission commander.

e. Call for and integrate augmentee staff and ensure that they are ‘fit to deploy’.

\textsuperscript{35} A warning order can be a verbal or written indication of intent to task by a higher commander or superior headquarters, most probably PJHQ J3, the Ministry of Defence Operations Directorate or the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The Chief of Joint Force Operations may issue a warning order to the Joint Force Headquarters in anticipation of a tasking.
f. Confirm the procedures required for reporting and integrating the battle rhythm.

g. Confirm the information exchange requirements and the deployable communications and information systems necessary to enable them.

h. Initiate crisis response planning with PJHQ J5, other government departments and lead force elements.

A.4. An activation order is issued by the Ministry of Defence. On receiving an activation order the JFHQ will take the actions below.

a. Assume command and control of assigned force elements and coordinate their arrival in the joint operations area.

b. Assess, understand and report on the political, social, environmental, information and threat environments in the deployed theatre of operations.

c. Plan and execute the operational consultancy and liaison tasks for operations.

d. Plan and execute non-combatant evacuation operations.

e. Plan and execute military support to HADR.

f. Plan and execute small-scale joint force interventions as directed.

g. Assess and confirm proposed/alternate enabling infrastructure and theatre entry points.  

h. Plan and execute shaping operations in support of decisive operations at the joint medium scale or above.

36 Such as sea/air ports of disembarkation and forward mounting bases. This task will invariably require Standing Joint Force Logistics Component (SJFLogC) expertise which may initially deploy as a preliminary theatre opening group under command of an early entry headquarters or joint task force headquarters during early entry or preliminary operations before reverting to the SJFLogC as it stands up.
Joint Force Headquarters crisis response procedures

i. Be prepared to form the core of a joint inter-agency task force headquarters to coordinate multifaceted military assistance to the civilian population.

j. Be prepared to provide an alternate or forward headquarters to a 2* joint task force commander.

Joint Force Headquarters crisis response procedures are depicted further in Table A.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enable understanding</th>
<th>Integrate with partners</th>
<th>Command and control</th>
<th>Sustain operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational liaison and reconnaissance teams</td>
<td>Conduct liaison</td>
<td>Coordination with established embassy, country offices and liaison officers</td>
<td>Apply tactical control on behalf of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct recce</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct the intelligence estimate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Provide situational reporting to the joint commander</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop an intelligence collection plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early entry headquarters</td>
<td>Conduct simple intelligence collection, analysis and assessment</td>
<td>Establish an inter-agency command and control node</td>
<td>Apply operational control on behalf of the CJO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
<td>Coordinate with UK/coalition commanders and staff</td>
<td>Refine a non-combatant evacuation operations/humanitarian assistance and disaster relief early entry plan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate analysis and assessment</td>
<td>Integrate very high readiness maritime, land, air, special forces and logistics command and control elements</td>
<td>Execute the plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide campaign assessment</td>
<td>Establish reachback to specialist cells such as 77 Brigade, Permanent Joint Headquarters, Targets Cell, Joint Force Cyber Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable understanding</td>
<td>Integrate with partners</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Sustain operations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task multi agency intelligence collection, analysis and assessment</td>
<td>Integrate maritime, land, air, special forces and logistics components</td>
<td>Apply operational control on behalf of CJO or tactical control on behalf of the joint force commander</td>
<td>Sustain 24/7 headquarters manning for up to 90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate national and multinational intelligence collection, analysis and assessment</td>
<td>Form core of a Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force</td>
<td>Control shaping operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st joint task force headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td>Enable theatre entry and activation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan and refine a campaign plan up to medium-scale intervention commanding a joint entry force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Command small-to-medium-scale intervention, including having expertise to develop kinetic targets via reachback to PJHQ and subsequent prosecution by an organic qualified controller</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table A.1 – Scalable command and control functions

37 Via augmentee supervisor forward air controller or joint tactical air control.
Joint Force Headquarters crisis response procedures

Notes
Annex B – Command and control models

B.1. Below are the four models which the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) use to exercise command and control. These models were introduced in Chapter 5, Section 3.

B.2. Model 1. This model provides liaison, reconnaissance, consultancy and command and control capability in support of other government departments. This is enabled by rapidly deploying extremely high readiness, niche forces forward into a theatre.

a. Structure. This response would typically be tasked via the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and assured via the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) or the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). It would be routinely framed around one or more operational liaison and reconnaissance teams (OLRTs) operating in either a military or civilian role.

b. Context. The OLRT provides situationally-aware operational-level reports and assessments. They may be required to operate in medium- to high-threat environments and be capable of deploying at extremely high readiness in response to an urgent demand as an initial element of an early entry force. When operating in direct support of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the OLRT may offer a consultancy service to assist consular planning and immediate responses to crisis, including security assessments, liaison, coordination and secure communications. Figure B.1 illustrates a deployment using this model.
B.3. **Model 2.** This model provides a regional crisis response network. The network is enabled by augmenting embassies and high commissions with niche command and control force elements from both the UK and multinational partners.

a. **Structure.** This model centres on up to ten points of presence linking regional actors together and joining them into an existing PJHQ architecture. A core command and control node of an enhanced OLRT or early entry headquarters may be deployed to manage and optimise this network, potentially drawing in other already deployed military force elements. An example of these force elements could be small task training teams or loan service personnel who have a clear mission-specific command and control agreed between Defence Engagement and operations.

b. **Context.** This model is used in situations when a regional crisis occurs that requires a coordinated military, other government department or inter-agency response from UK military force
elements based in a number of countries or locations. The OLRT (enhanced)\textsuperscript{38}/early entry headquarters will deploy resources into the PJHQ operational architecture, acting as a conduit into an evolving crisis response connecting liaison officers, Defence sections, special forces network, FCO posts and other government departments, multinational crisis response partners and indigenous forces. The early entry headquarters may deploy into a preconfigured facility held at readiness in anticipation of the crisis. Figure B.2 depicts a regional crisis deployment.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure_B.2.png}
\caption{A deployment using Model 2}
\end{figure}

B.4. Model 3. This model comprises niche command and control forces for a military response in support of other government departments. This will enable an integrated approach.

\textsuperscript{38} Additional assets added to the operational liaison and reconnaissance teams; for example, manpower, network collaboration and technical capability.
a. **Structure.** Forming a 1* joint task force headquarters (JTFHQ) capable of commanding force elements, coordinating a limited liaison officer network and working closely with other government departments. Rapidly deployed OLRTs and the early entry headquarters held at extremely high readiness are the likely building blocks, being light, agile and modular of command and control.

b. **Context.** An operation such as a non-combatant evacuation operation or a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation conducted as part of a coordinated cross-government response. The 1* JTFHQ will command and control the assigned military force elements. These may support another government department that has primacy (for example, FCO or the Department for International Development (DfID)), or lead a primarily military response into complex and contested environments. The 1* JTFHQ will operate under the operational command of PJHQ, but also inform decision-making with other government departments. This model allows the JTFHQ to act as a host for a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force or other government department elements should it be required. Figure B.3 depicts such a deployment.

![Figure B.3 – A deployment using Model 3](image-url)
B.5. **Model 4.** This model provides command and control for military intervention operations. This covers small-scale UK-led intervention operations through to a medium-scale UK-led intervention.

a. **Structure.** The scale is modular, dependent on the nature and genesis of the intervention operation. It is likely the principal building block will remain an early entry headquarters at extremely high readiness providing rapid command functions forward. This will then transfer to a 1* JTFHQ (framed on JFHQ core staff) to either command a small-scale intervention or conduct preliminary operations to understand, inform, shape and enable and set the operational architecture for the 2* JTFHQ for a joint, medium-scale intervention.

b. **Context.** This model centres on command and control capability for intervention operations in a national, combined joint expeditionary force (CJEF), joint expeditionary force, or a broader coalition environment. This model delivers the JFHQ-centric provision of a full 1* JTFHQ for the command of a small-scale intervention. It also provides a JFHQ early entry headquarters/1* JTFHQ as a component of SJFHQ Group command and control capability, should the mission be deemed to be joint, medium-scale. During the preliminary stages of this larger operation, whilst the 2* SJFHQ is designing the campaign and supporting the generation of the joint force, this JFHQ early entry headquarters/1* JTFHQ is deployed forward. This allows the joint commander and the joint task force commander the ability to better understand, inform, shape and enable as well as establish the operational architecture. It can then create full spectrum activity to shape the future battlespace and take lead elements under command for shaping activity. Once the SJFHQ has deployed, the forward JFHQ may return to the UK and reconstitute at readiness for crisis response, or it may be re-roled in theatre as a distinct command and control node for supporting activity to the joint task force commander. Figure B.4 depicts command and control for military intervention operations.
Joint Force Headquarters crisis response procedures

Figure B.4 – A deployment using Model 4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2AD</td>
<td>anti-access and area denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied administrative publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHASE</td>
<td>Conflict, Humanitarian and Security department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>communication and information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJEF</td>
<td>combined joint expeditionary force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPOE</td>
<td>comprehensive preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>full spectrum approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance and disaster relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDN</td>
<td>joint doctrine note</td>
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<td>JDP</td>
<td>joint doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEF</td>
<td>Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFCIS</td>
<td>Joint Force Communication and Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTE</td>
<td>joint theatre entry</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Service Publication</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MOD Ministry of Defence
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO non-combatant evacuation operation
OLRT operational liaison and reconnaissance team
PAG partners across government
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters
SJFLogC Standing Joint Force Logistic Component
UN United Nations
Part 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into two parts. First, we list new definitions introduced in this publication. Secondly, we list endorsed terms and their definitions which may be helpful to the reader.

New definitions proposed by this publication

**Joint theatre entry**
The generation and projection of joint forces into a new or emergent theatre of operations to conduct operations in response to an emerging crisis. (JDN 1/17)

Endorsed definitions

**Air assault operation**
An operation in which air assault forces, using firepower, mobility, and total integration of helicopter assets, manoeuvre on the battlefield under the control of the commander to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (NATOTerm)

**Airborne operation**
An operation involving the movement of forces and capabilities into an area by air. (NATOTerm)

**Airdrop**
Delivery of personnel or cargo from aircraft in flight. (NATOTerm)

**Air landed**
Moved by air and disembarked, or unloaded, after the aircraft has landed or while a helicopter is hovering. (NATOTerm)

**Amphibious assault**
The principal type of amphibious operation which involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (NATOTerm)
amphibious operation
A military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile. (NATOTerm)

battlespace
The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to apply combat power, protect a force or complete a mission successfully. Note: It includes the land, maritime, air and space environments; the enemy and friendly forces present therein; facilities; terrestrial and space weather; health hazards; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment in the joint operations area and other areas of interest. (NATOTerm)

beachhead
A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore which, seized and held, provides for the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides manoeuvring space required for subsequent projected operations ashore. (NATOTerm)

envelopment
An offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear. (NATOTerm)

Defence Support Chain
The Defence Support Chain encompasses the end-to-end process of the entire logistic support system, including stakeholders beyond MOD and UK. (JDP 4-00, 4th Edition)

infiltration
A technique and process in which a force moves as individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection. (NATOTerm)
hostile environment
An environment in which an adversary has the capability and intent to oppose or disrupt operations of friendly forces. (NATOTerm)

lead nation
Forces generated under a ‘lead nation’ are commanded by an officer from that nation, from his own Joint Force Headquarters (augmented with Liaison Officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute National Contingents and National Contingent Commanders. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)

lodgement
A defined area in a hostile or semi-permissive operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous flow of forces and material possible. It also creates manoeuvre corridors for subsequent operations. (Allied Tactical Publication-08, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations - Volume 1. NATO use the spelling ‘lodgment’.)

non-permissive environment
An environment in which friendly forces anticipate obstructions to, or interference with, operations. (NATOTerm)

operations security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (NATOTerm)

penetration
In land operations, a form of offensive which seeks to break through the enemy’s defence and disrupt the defensive system. (NATOTerm)

permissive environment
An environment in which friendly forces anticipate no obstructions to, or interference with, operations.
Note: a permissive environment does not necessarily imply absence of threat. (NATOTerm)
port of disembarkation
A seaport, airport or railhead where personnel, equipment and/or stocks are unloaded from a means of transport. (NATOTerm)

reception, staging, onward movement and integration
The series of activities that enable force elements, on arrival in theatre, to attain full operating capability as part of a joint force. Integration is the synchronised transfer of operationally-ready units and contracted capabilities into the joint force. Note: The integration process will be J3-led and conducted within components; the deployed logistic headquarters becomes the supporting headquarters. (JDP 4-00, 4th Edition)

theatre of operations
A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the joint operations area), within which they conduct operations. (JDP 01)