

Annual Review - Summary Sheet

PROGRAMME TITLE: Somaliland (Somalia) Programme	
Country/Region:	Somaliland (Somalia)
HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); Metropolitan Police; Ministry of Defence (MOD); Department for International Development (DFID)
Total Budget:	ODA: £4.05m Non-ODA: £0.95m
Start Date: April 2016	End Date: March 2019
Outputs	Score
1: Institutional capacity and security of Somaliland justice institutions is strengthened	A
2: Institutional capacity of Somaliland Police (SLP) is strengthened	B
3: Institutional capacity of Somaliland defence institutions (Ministry of Defence, Army, Coastguard) is strengthened	A
4: Somaliland's electoral authorities have increased technical capacity to deliver a free and fair presidential election in 2017 and civil society have increased capacity to hold them to account	A
5: Institutions and systems to promote government and media accountability established	A
Outcome: Somaliland 's formal and security, justice and electoral institutions provide more effective, accountable and human rights compliant services	
Outcome Score: B	Risk: Medium

Summary of Programme Performance

Year	2016/2017								
Programme Score	B								
Risk Rating	Medium								

What support is the UK providing?

The programme is designed to deliver the following outcome: Somaliland's security, justice and electoral institutions provide more effective, secure, transparent and HR compliant services, and are held to account by a free media. The programme comprises of the following two components:

1. Security and justice sector reform:

- Defence: increasing civilian oversight and professionalization of the Somaliland Army and Coastguard.
- Criminal Justice: increasing the effectiveness and accountability of the judiciary and prosecutors through development of the Somaliland High Judicial Council, and improving court security and administration.
- Policing: increasing the capacity of the Somaliland Police to provide security in an effective and human rights compliant manner, and improving human resource and financial management.
- Prisons (provisional): maintaining the human rights compliance and security of Hargeisa prison.

2. Political stability and accountability:

- Media and communications: increasing proactive communication between government, the public and the media, and increasing the professionalism and effectiveness of media.
- Democratisation: supporting democratisation, civil society and the electoral cycle in Somaliland.

Summary of progress and lessons learnt/actions taken since last review

Security and justice (S&J) activity built on the programme of institutional reform initiated in the seven months of implementation in financial year 2015/2016, and delivered a varied level of capacity improvements to S&J institutions. Most progress was achieved in the judiciary, enabled by the progressive leadership of the Chief Justice. Improved case management systems were in pilot which, when combined with better trained judges and an effective High Judicial Council to provide oversight of the system, will in time improve the accountability and reliability of justice outcomes. Less was achieved across the defence and policing sectors due to a lack of political will, but there was an evidenced increase in communication and coordination between the Somaliland Ministry of Defence and the Army

as a step towards increased civilian oversight. The capability of the Public Order Unit created within the police, in using appropriate non-lethal tactics was improved (seen when it was deployed to quell football riots). The programme improved intelligence gathering, human resources and financial management at the Coastguard, but the latter lacks the resources to give this operational effect; An opportunity to gain these lies in the Berbera Port deal with the United Arab Emirates (said to include support for the Somaliland coastguard).

The political stability component supported the National Electoral Commission to deliver a robust and inclusive voter registration process in a sensitive way that has so far avoided conflict. This enabled all Somalilanders of eligible age to register to vote, and included the eastern and disputed regions Sool and Sanaag for the first time. Support to the wider electoral cycle was channelled through un-earmarked funding to a larger third party programme, which broadly delivered as expected, but with mixed results on our priority areas; procurement support was successful while voter education was assessed by civil society monitors to have been weak. Fora for government and media communications were established as part of work designed to increase the capacity of both the media and the government to disseminate accurate information and analysis to citizens in a timely and responsible manner. This was successful in increasing public facing communications through press releases, and through new websites for the Ministry of Justice and the National Election Commission. However, freedom of expression and assembly deteriorated, measured by a spike in journalist arrests in the first calendar quarter of 2017.

Key lessons:

The context for reform:

- Experience in the justice sector illustrates that leadership is essential to progress with reform in Somaliland. But gains could be reversed with a change of leadership so need to be consolidated by identifying reformers in middle management and fostering a change in organisational culture through recruitment and induction. The upcoming election presents risks (both opportunities and threats) across S&J and more widely through changes in political and organisational leadership; upstream engagement by HMG and the International Community should articulate the advantages in reform.
- Where there is an absence of political will, alternative approaches should be explored including: 1) a transactional/ results based approach where support provided in exchange for increased commitment and action to drive reform; 2) a bottom up approach through the intake and training of young and more progressive recruits into each institution; 3) development of civil society accountability mechanisms to hold government to account and drive progress; 4) widening government stakeholders and identifying champions for illustrative reforms in middle management.
- The programme team and implementers understanding of how to navigate the political realities in Somaliland could be improved through: better use of analysis; formalised engagement between implementers and NGOs; and using local staff with more understanding of the political context.

Partners:

- Build the capacity of local implementing partners to be the direct implementers of future CSSF programmes; providing increased value for money and supporting locally driven solutions.
- Ensure the political leverage of programmes is maximised by clear messaging to Somaliland ministers about UK (rather than implementer) funding and implementation of programmes.

Actions were taken to address recommendations from the previous review relating to:

- **Improving monitoring and evaluation:** A programme level results framework (RF) was developed, and an implementer's RF was reviewed to ensure realistic targets. Implementer reporting was improved by using standard templates, and review meetings with implementers were recorded, and agreed actions were tracked.

- **Building the evidence base:** A political mapping exercise was undertaken to inform UK engagement on elections. Initial research into the risk of violent extremism was conducted in-house with further more conclusive research recommended. The theory of change and other programme documentation will be reviewed and improved by a team of technical experts from the CSSF in July.
- **Adopting a multiyear programming approach;** implementers will be issued a two year contract for 2017/2018 - 2018/2019 to allow sustained and uninterrupted delivery.
- **Increasing HMG coordination and integrating expertise into the programme board:** with UK government stakeholders split between London, Addis, Nairobi and Mogadishu this remained a challenge. DFID joined strategic review meetings on S&J and CSSF contractors will provide more expertise on monitoring and evaluation and gender in future.
- **Ensuring sufficient staffing cover:** interim programme management capacity has been provided, but difficulties in recruiting and retaining locally staff risks future staffing gaps.

Summary of recommendations for the next year

Security and Justice

- 1) **Justice:** Capitalise on reform in judiciary to institutionalise and drive progress ahead of election, identifying additional areas to support. Identify and build the capacity of a local partner to improve women's access to justice, and provide technical assistance to the Chief.
- 2) **Police:** Begin construction of a police academy only when there is confidence that this will underpin police reform. Look for opportunity to incentivise and publically signal reform and in the interim be prepared to respond to 'tactical' opportunities to demonstrate the benefits of training.
- 3) **Coastguard:** Assess operational needs of the Coastguard and provide technical assistance to help them bid for, secure and use financial investment from the Berbera Port Deal to build an operational capability to use the intelligence systems now set up. Encourage voluntary and routine information sharing with Djibouti and Puntland.
- 4) **Defence:** If will is limited, pursue tactical opportunities to maintain the relationship, including improved training capability on gender and human rights. If there is political will on reform, provide expert technical assistance to facilitate decisions on a pension plan, and associated update of army headcount. Foster linkages to the ongoing World Bank work on civil service pensions. Continue to support the Defence Development Committee for Ministry of Defence and Army engagement in a way that builds local ownership and buy-in; and review the relative priority and value of English language training

Political Stability

- 5) **Elections:** Improve international coordination, via the election working group, coordinated visits and messaging from international partners. Contract for independent electoral monitoring to verify the fairness of the election. Earmark contingency funding to mitigate the risk of any emerging financial restraints delaying the election. Ensure sustainability of voter registration by linking to local government on both the process for updating the voter registration and plans for completion of the ID card / civil register. Address recommendations from civil society to improve quality of voter registration. Assess conflict risks around release of further voter registration data ahead of elections.
- 6) **Media:** Focus on the elections code of conduct, ensuring agreement among a wide set of stakeholders and training in the regions. Encourage the new government to use the media to disseminate messages, and scale up internal communications and press releases, particular on S&J. Work with drivers of change and focal points within ministries. Build links with DFID's cabinet effectiveness support.

Cross Cutting

- 7) Monitoring, evaluation and learning:** Commission more conclusive research into the risk of violent extremism in Somaliland to inform policy and programming. Support a perception survey of target institutions to establish a baseline and end point for the project. Share results widely with civil society to push for accountability and reform. Improve political economy understanding among programme team and implementers by using analysis and through more regular engagement with civil society.
- 8) Staffing:** Increase institutional knowledge and capacity on Somaliland in the CSSF programme team, so that programmes continue to be run effectively and responsibly even when temporary staffing is unavoidable.
- 9) HMG coordination:** Increase coherence between programming and policy across the UK government by: merging Somaliland policy and programming boards, with a new formalised role for DFID and MOD on the board; using the refresh of the Somalia National Security Council Strategy to renew agreement on priorities.
- 10) Civil society and partners:** Explore ways to increase civil society monitoring of key institutions. Conduct due diligence of key local partners and work to build their capacity to receive direct funding in future, offering increased value for money while building local capacity.