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Evaluation of Teachers' Pay Reform

Final Report

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Social Science in Government

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Executive summary

Introduction

The Government has introduced substantial reforms to the pay of teachers in the English local authority (LA) maintained sector, to give schools greater freedom to decide how much they pay teachers and how quickly their pay progresses.

The new system was introduced in September 2013 and affected pay decisions in LA maintained schools from September 2014 (changes were voluntary in academies). A central feature was the abolition of automatic progression for all classroom teachers, and the introduction of performance-related pay (PRP). Schools also now have more flexibility to decide starting salaries when recruiting teachers, and are no longer required to match teachers' previous salaries. In September 2014 further reforms were implemented, extending the same principle of greater autonomy at school level to the pay of school leaders (headteachers, deputy headteachers and assistant headteachers)¹. Academies are not required to follow the national pay terms and conditions and were, therefore, not required to implement the pay reforms, though they may choose to do so. The effect of the reforms to teachers' and leaders' pay must be considered carefully alongside the public sector pay freeze, which affected pay in 2011 and 2012, and recommendations made by the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) for the adjustments made to pay ranges for classroom teachers and leaders that coincided with the reforms. The recommendations were for all teachers in post on or after 1 September 2013 in LA maintained schools to be awarded a 1% pay uplift, and the statutory minima and maxima of the main and upper pay ranges for classroom teachers were increased by 1% from September 2014. Teachers within the minima and maxima of the pay ranges in September 2014 and 2015 were not obliged to receive a 1% increase in pay.

A review of the international research literature on the use of PRP in schools found a mix of positive (Winters *et al.*, 2008) and neutral results on student outcomes (see Fryer, 2013; Glazerman and Seifullah, 2010; Goldhaber and Walch, 2012; Goodman and Turner, 2010; Springer *et al.*, 2010 and 2012). Features of effective PRP systems include: involving teachers in the design (Murnane and Cohen, 1986); individual, clear goals (Inwood, 2014); attainable targets (Armstrong, 1993); for the system to be perceived as fair (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001; Levy and Williams, 2004; Murnane and Cohen, 1986; Neal 2011); and sufficient funds to be available to reward good practice (Marsden, 2015).

¹ These reforms were mandatory for LA maintained schools and voluntary for academies.

Research objectives

The study set out to identify what reforms schools were making, what influenced their decisions, and the perceived implications for staff and schools.

Terminology

The term 'pay award' is used to describe any uplift to the statutory minima and maxima of all pay ranges in the national pay framework, including allowances. The term 'pay progression' is used to describe increases in the salaries of individual teachers based on performance.

Methodology

The study comprised five strands of activity.

1. A literature review

The research included a rapid review of the research literature on PRP between 1985 and 2016 in England and other countries.

2. A headteacher survey

A computer assisted telephone interview (CATI) survey was completed by 900 headteachers in spring 2015. The sample included respondents from both primary and secondary schools within the LA maintained schools and academy sectors. This was followed by a short online survey of headteachers in spring 2016 to the same sample of responding schools.

3. A teacher survey

An online teacher survey was undertaken in spring 2015. This was sent to teachers in the same schools as the headteacher survey sample and 1,020 teachers responded. Further information about the sampling approach to both the headteacher and teacher surveys can be found in Appendix 1.

4. Case studies in eight schools

In order to gather a more in-depth understanding of the reform implementation process, a series of school case studies were undertaken between October and November 2015, focussing on the experiences of eight schools. The visits were followed up by telephone interviews with seven of the eight headteachers in April 2016 to explore whether the reforms had become embedded. The case studies consisted of qualitative interviews with headteachers and other senior school leaders (such as deputy and assistant headteachers), teachers and governors. In total, 50 interviews were undertaken: eight with headteachers; eight with senior leaders; 28 with teachers; and six with governors.

5. Analysis of administrative data from the School Workforce Census (SWC).

Secondary analysis of School Workforce Census (SWC) data looked at changes to pay for the school workforce in the period 2010 to 2015. The findings are summarised in this report. A full technical report has been published separately (Burgess *et al.*, 2017).

Key findings

Adoption of pay reforms

- The surveys with headteachers undertaken in spring 2015 revealed that almost all (99%) of LA maintained primary and secondary schools and a majority (62%) of academies had implemented pay reforms.
- The most common reforms to classroom teachers' pay were: to relate all progression to performance; to enable teachers to progress at different rates; and to abolish automatic pay progression on the main pay range.
- The most common reforms to school leaders' pay were: to base pay on school size, context and/or challenge; and that the changes would apply to future leadership appointments.
- The interviews with staff in case-study schools revealed that a number of changes had been introduced to schools' performance management processes. The main changes related to objective setting, evidence use, and progression pathways. Performance management processes were reported to be more transparent, robust and rigorous as a result.
- Most headteachers (84%) reported that their policies were similar to, or the same as, other schools in their local area. Case-study headteachers in this position said that they had adopted their LAs' policies primarily because they wanted their school's pay policy to be in line with other local schools.

Implementation of pay reforms

- The research literature (MET, 2013; Rockoff and Speroni, 2010) suggests that a combination of objective measures (such as test scores) and subjective measures (such as classroom observations) can be informative in identifying teacher effectiveness.
- The surveys with headteachers undertaken in spring 2015 as part of this research revealed that the most common types of evidence used by schools to assess teacher effectiveness were: pupil progress; classroom observation; teacher standards; measures linked to the school improvement plan; and pupil attainment. Most schools were using these measures prior to the introduction of the pay reforms.

- By contrast, fewer schools reported using the following three types of evidence to help assess teacher effectiveness: feedback from parents/carers; feedback from colleagues; or teachers' additional responsibilities.
- Most headteachers who had not revised their pay policies were in academies (who were not required to implement the reforms). The reasons given by headteachers who had not revised their pay policies, irrespective of whether they were in LA maintained schools or academies, were: satisfaction with their current policies; concerns that revisions would lead to unfairness or have an adverse effect on recruitment; and a desire to keep their policies similar to those in neighbouring schools.
- The main challenges associated with the pay reforms, as reported by case-study interviewees, were: the additional staff time involved in collecting and reviewing evidence for performance reviews; the pressure on teachers to meet pupil outcome targets; and the challenge of applying a school's pay policy fairly in certain situations, such as job shares.

Teachers' views of pay reforms

- Research conducted before or soon after the introduction of pay reforms (Policy Exchange, 2013; O'Beirne and Pyle, 2014; Marsden, 2015) indicated that teachers in England had mixed views on the desirability of pay reforms.
- The teacher survey, conducted in spring 2015 as part of this study, provides further insights. It found that two thirds (66%) of teachers felt they understood their school's pay policy and about half (52%) felt they had received adequate training on the policy. However, less than a quarter (23%) felt they had had a meaningful opportunity to contribute to their school's pay policy before it was introduced.
- A majority of teachers had positive attitudes towards the implementation of their school's pay policy. Over half of respondents agreed that: it treated all staff equally without favouritism (60%); was clear and easy to understand (57%); and was applied consistently across all teachers (52%).
- Fewer teachers were convinced of the motivational nature of their school's pay policy. Just over a quarter (27%) agreed that it helped motivate underperforming teachers and 38% agreed that it helped their school to further motivate teachers who were already performing well. Only 34% agreed that it resulted in a fair allocation of pay for staff in the school.
- A majority of teachers (66%) thought that their school's current pay policy had added to their workload and 58% thought that it had made no difference to the way they worked.

Impact on recruitment and retention

Most headteachers felt that the pay reforms had not had an immediate impact on teacher recruitment and retention.

- At the time of the survey (spring 2015) a minority of headteachers (7%) said that the pay reforms had had an impact on teacher recruitment.
- A third of headteachers (33%) said that pay reforms had already had a positive impact on their ability to keep their existing teachers.
- Headteachers interviewed as part of the case-study visits to schools in 2016 felt it was too soon to tell whether the pay reforms would impact on teacher recruitment and retention.

National trends in pay of teachers and school leaders

Analysis of national data from the SWC investigated changes between 2010 and 2015.

- The average nominal base pay of teachers increased very slightly between 2010 and 2015. Once adjusted for inflation, this equates to a real terms decrease in base pay for teachers of around 2%. Over the same period the average base pay for leaders rose slightly, which equates to a real terms decrease of around 1%.
- The very small increase in nominal base pay for teachers across the period has been partly offset by a small decline in the prevalence of additional payments², from around 38% receiving an additional payment in 2013, to around 36% in 2015. The average nominal value for those who received an additional payment remained similar (although slightly lower than the nominal value before the reforms).
- Many schools, when they did increase teacher pay, were still awarding annual increases in line with the previous (now reference) spine points, though this practice varied across LA areas. The increased variation in annual pay awards around reference spine points suggests that at least some schools had moved away from using this benchmark.
- Teachers' salaries upon starting at a new school appear to have been affected by the removal of 'pay portability' as a statutory requirement³. There was an increase in the proportion of teachers moving schools to equivalent positions who received

² Total additional pay is defined as the sum of four components of additional pay: Special Educational Needs (SEN) allowances, recruitment and retention allowances, teaching and learning responsibilities, and other. See Burgess *et al.* (2017) for further details.

³ The term 'pay portability' refers to the requirement for schools to match the spine point received at their previous school.

a lower nominal salary (from 5.5% between 2012 and 2013, to 8.9% between 2013 and 2014, and 7.4% between 2014 and 2015), although this only affected a small proportion of teachers.

- There was some evidence of increased flexibility in progression from the main to the upper pay range, with a greater proportion of those below the top of the main pay range progressing to the upper pay range following the reforms (2.7% between 2010 and 2011, compared with 7.8% between 2014 and 2015).
- There was no evidence from this analysis to support concerns that females or members of black and minority ethnic groups were disadvantaged by the pay reforms. However, more in-depth research would be needed to conclusively state if this was the case.

Conclusion

Almost all LA maintained schools and a majority of academies have adopted PRP. The introduction of pay reforms appears to have gone smoothly, although many teachers report that the process of gathering and reviewing evidence has added to their workload. It appears that most schools have adopted similar reforms and there is some evidence of increased variance in annual teacher pay awards, in particular a move away from annual pay increases in line with reference spine points. This is likely to be affected by the period of pay restraint, which coincided with the pay reforms, as well as a desire by headteachers to adopt similar policies to those of neighbouring schools.

1. Introduction

The Government has introduced substantial reforms to the pay of teachers in the local authority (LA) maintained sector, to give schools greater freedom to decide how much they pay teachers and how quickly their pay progresses.

In 2012, the Secretary of State for Education asked the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) to review current provisions for teachers' pay, aiming to raise the status of the profession and improve the quality of teaching in schools. The case for change was presented in the context of research evidence showing that teacher effectiveness is a key determinant of pupil progress, particularly for disadvantaged pupils (DfE, 2012).

The STRB (DfE, 2012) recommended a broad national pay framework, establishing minima and maxima for teacher and leadership pay ranges and the main additional responsibility allowances. This framework defined the areas within which schools were free to make their own decisions, such as setting recruitment and retention allowances, and making individual pay decisions. Key recommendations focused on replacing increments based on length of service with progression linked to annual appraisal.

The main changes (DfE, 2013a) were as follows:

- all pay progression was linked to performance and not length of service
- schools can increase individual teachers' pay at different rates based on their performance
- new criteria for progression from the main to the upper pay range instead of a threshold test
- a pay range was introduced for leading practitioners: a qualified teacher in a post where their primary purpose is to model and lead improvement of teaching skills
- more freedom for schools to set the starting salaries of teachers new to the school and schools no longer had to match a teacher's existing salary when recruiting staff (relaxing 'pay portability').

The reforms to teachers' pay came into force in September 2013 and first affected teachers' pay awards from September 2014. In September 2014 further reforms were implemented, extending the same principle of greater autonomy at school level to the pay of school leaders (headteachers, deputy headteachers and assistant headteachers)⁴.

One of the features of these reforms is the deliberately non-prescriptive way in which they were introduced. The Department for Education (DfE) issued general advice to schools (DfE, 2013b) in which the definition of 'performance' was left for schools to specify in their appraisal policies.

⁴ These reforms were mandatory for LA maintained schools and voluntary for academies.

The effect of the reforms to teachers' and leaders' pay must be considered carefully alongside the public sector pay freeze, which affected pay in 2011 and 2012, and recommendations made by the STRB for the adjustments made to pay ranges for classroom teachers and leaders that coincided with the reforms. In contrast to 2011 and 2012, all teachers in post on or after 1 September 2013 were awarded a 1% pay uplift, and the statutory minima and maxima of the main and upper pay ranges for classroom teachers were increased by 1% from September 2014. Teachers within the minima and maxima of the pay ranges in September 2014 and 2015 were not obliged to receive a 1% uplift in pay. From 2014, the discretionary national reference points (known as spine points) were removed from departmental advice, with the aim of moving pay awards away from the typical level of pay progression in operation before the reforms to teachers' and senior leaders' pay.

1.1 About this report

This report provides findings from an evaluation designed to gain a clear understanding of schools' responses to teachers' pay reforms. The project was commissioned by the Department for Education and was undertaken by a team from the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER), the University of Bristol, the University of Texas at Austin, and the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).

Drawing on the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document (DfE, 2016), the term 'pay award' has been used in this report to describe any uplift to the statutory minima and maxima of all pay ranges in the national pay framework, including allowances. The term 'pay progression' has been used to describe increases in the salaries of individual teachers based on performance.

This report presents the findings from surveys with a nationally representative sample of headteachers and teachers in both primary and secondary schools (comprising both academies and LA maintained schools). It also provides a summary of an analysis of national trends in school teachers' pay over time. This was undertaken using administrative data; a full technical report has been published separately (Burgess *et al.*, 2017). To help set the findings in the context of a wider evidence-base, the report draws on evidence from a rapid review of international research relating to schools' implementation of pay reforms.

1.2 Aims of the evaluation

The aims of the evaluation were to:

- track schools' progress with implementing pay reforms and identify areas of best practice


- understand resulting changes in schools' behaviour as a result of policy changes relating to pay award and progression
- explore perceptions of the reforms amongst teachers and school leaders
- explore whether the reforms are influencing behaviour in relation to pay award and progression amongst academies and free schools
- seek to understand the reasons underlying schools' decisions to implement pay freedoms or, if they choose not to do so, the reasons why
- identify examples of innovative practice and establish their perceived benefits and challenges
- explore national trends in teachers' pay awards over time.

1.3 The evaluation design

This study was a process evaluation designed to help answer key policy questions, namely: what reforms were schools making, what influenced their decisions, and what were the perceived implications for staff and schools?

The study comprised five strands of activity as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Evaluation design



Strand 1 was a rapid review, which documented existing evidence relating to schools' implementation of pay reforms. Its purpose was to inform the design of the headteacher and teacher surveys (Strands 2 and 3) and help to ensure that the research team was able to draw on the evidence base in the final analysis.

Strand 2 involved a headteacher survey, which took place in spring 2015. To encourage headteacher participation and accuracy of responses, the initial sweep involved a

computer assisted telephone interview (CATI) survey⁵. This was followed by a short online survey in spring 2016 to the same sample of responding schools.

Strand 3 comprised an online teacher survey, which took place in spring 2015. This was sent to teachers in the same schools as the headteacher survey sample. Further information about the sampling approach can be found in Appendix 1.

Strand 4 involved visits to eight case-study schools in autumn 2015 and follow-up phone calls to the same schools in spring 2016. Further information on the characteristics of the eight case-study schools can be found in Appendix 1.

Strand 5 involved secondary analysis of School Workforce Census (SWC) data, looking at changes to pay for the school workforce in the period 2010 to 2015. The findings are summarised in this report. A full technical report has been published separately (Burgess *et al.*, 2017).

1.4 Survey responses

Much of this report focuses on findings from Strands 2 and 3 (i.e. the headteacher and teacher surveys). These were based on a nationally representative sample of primary and secondary schools; both LA maintained and academies. Table 1 details the responses (set against targets for a representative sample) for both the headteacher and teacher surveys in spring 2015.

Table 1 Survey responses

	Schools sampled	Headteacher survey			Teacher survey		
		Target (N)	Achieved (N)	% of target	Target (N)	Achieved (N)	% of target
Primary academy	1,000	200	238	119	208	122	59
Primary LA maintained	1,375	275	303	110	210	124	59
Secondary academy	1,000	200	166	83	300	474	158
Secondary LA maintained	1,281	275	193	70	300	350	116
	4,656	950	900	95	1,018	1,070	105

Source: NFER surveys of headteachers and teachers, 2015.

⁵ A telephone survey in which the interviewer follows a script supported by a software application. The questionnaire was developed by the research team in consultation with the DfE, and administered by Qa Research.

The table shows that secondary schools were under-represented in the achieved sample of headteachers, whereas primary schools were under-represented in the achieved sample of teachers.

Due to the CATI survey method, the headteacher survey returned a full set of responses (i.e. each respondent answered every question). However, there was considerable attrition during the teacher survey, with only 739 of the 1,070 teachers who responded to the online survey completing all of the questions.

As the research team was interested in drawing comparisons between different types of schools, where necessary, weights have been applied in the analysis to ensure the achieved samples are more representative of the overall population of schools nationally (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed explanation of the weighting process). Table 2 shows the margins of error associated with different comparisons made in the report.

Table 2 Margins of error for analyses of headteacher and teacher surveys, 2015

Presentation of findings	Margin of error	
	Headteacher survey	Teacher survey
All schools combined*	-/+ 4.1%	-/+ 5.9%
Difference between primary and secondary *	-/+ 6.4%	-/+ 9.2%
Difference between LA maintained and academy *	-/+ 6.3%	-/+ 8.6%
Difference between primary LA maintained and primary academy *	-/+ 8.2%	-/+ 15.1%
Difference between secondary LA maintained and secondary academy *	-/+ 9.7%	-/+ 10.8%
4-way split: Primary LA maintained	-/+ 5.6%	-/+ 10.7%
Primary academy	-/+ 6.0%	-/+ 10.6%
Secondary LA maintained	-/+ 6.5%	-/+ 8.1%
Secondary academy	-/+ 7.2%	-/+ 7.1%

*denotes sample has been weighted

It is important to note that there is a degree of uncertainty around the representativeness of the findings, and that this varies depending on how the findings are presented. For example, one of the findings indicates that 62% of headteachers from academy schools reported they had implemented reforms to the pay of classroom teachers and/or school leaders. However, given the margins of error reported above, this could fall within the range of -/+ 6.3%, meaning it could be 55.7% or 68.3%, relative to the equivalent finding for LA maintained schools.

The margins of error for the teacher survey are based on the 739 teachers from 244 schools that responded to all questions, rather than the 1,070 teachers from 275 schools that responded to at least one question. They, therefore, represent a conservative estimate of the margin of error and for some questions the margin of error will be smaller, because more teachers answered that particular question.

2. Rapid review of the literature

The research included a rapid review of the research literature on performance-related pay (PRP) between 1985 and 2016 in England and other countries. Recent economic research on PRP programmes in the USA has found a mix of positive (Winters *et al.*, 2008) and neutral results on student outcomes (see Fryer, 2013; Glazerman and Seifullah, 2010; Goldhaber and Walch, 2012; Goodman and Turner, 2010; Springer *et al.*, 2010 and 2012). Using evidence from international comparisons, Woessman (2010) reported an association between the use of salary adjustments for outstanding performance and higher levels of student achievement.

It is clear that not all PRP programmes are equally effective (Storey, 2000) and that PRP forms merely one part of a wider set of factors in a reward system for teachers. There is also a risk of unintended consequences, such as teachers' focusing less attention on non-measured activities due to prioritising activities which will affect their pay (Neal, 2010 and 2011; Jacob, 2005).

For PRP systems to work well, much of the literature on the subject has highlighted the need for them to have the following features:

1. Teachers to be involved in the design of the system (Murnane and Cohen, 1986).
2. The goals to be individually and clearly set (Inwood, 2014).
3. Teachers' actions to impact on the chance of being rewarded, and for the targets to be attainable (Armstrong, 1993).
4. Teachers to perceive the system and measurement to be fair (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001; Levy and Williams, 2004; Murnane and Cohen, 1986; Neal 2011).
5. Sufficient funds to reward good practice (Marsden, 2015).

Given the time and financial constraints in many English schools today, it may be difficult to achieve all of these goals. However, for the current policy to have a positive impact on teachers and students, it is clear that much thought needs to be put into how appraisals and rewards are implemented.

Further findings from the literature review are included throughout the report.

3. Adoption of pay reforms and support and guidance used by schools

3.1 Summary of key points

- In spring 2015, almost all LA maintained schools (99%) were reported to have revised their pay policies following the introduction of pay reforms. Academies are not required to follow the national pay terms and conditions and were therefore not required to implement the pay reforms. However, a majority (62%) of academies had used their academy freedoms to make changes to their staff pay policy for classroom teachers and/or senior leaders.
- The most common reforms to teachers' pay (made by both LA maintained schools and academies) were: to relate all progression to performance; to enable teachers to progress at different rates; and to abolish automatic pay progression on the main pay range.
- The most common changes to school leaders' pay were made by both types of school: to base pay on school size, context and/or challenge; and the changes would apply to future leadership appointments (rather than existing ones).
- Most headteachers from both types of school (84%) reported that their policies were similar to or the same as other schools in their local area.
- Headteachers from both types of school reported that they drew on a range of sources of support and guidance when changing their pay policies, consulting four sources, on average. The most common were: the school teachers' pay and conditions document (DfE, 2013a); their LA; and the DfE advisory document (DfE, 2013b).

Chapters 3 – 6 present findings from the headteacher and teacher surveys and the case-study visits to schools. A copy of the survey questions, together with the responses to each question, can be found in Appendix 2.

3.2 Adoption of pay reforms

The 2015 survey asked headteachers whether they had revised their pay policies for classroom teachers and headteachers (following reforms for the LA maintained sector, or using their academy freedoms, as relevant).

The reforms came into force in September 2013 for classroom teachers and September 2014 for school leaders in LA maintained schools. No timeline was specified for academies. The survey questions for academies, therefore, sought to capture whether they had revised their pay policies for classroom teachers and school leaders since gaining their 'academy freedoms'. If the respondent was from a sponsored academy, this

would apply from the first day the school opened. If the respondent was from a converter academy, this would apply from the first day the school reopened as an academy.

The findings suggest that almost all LA maintained schools (99%) had implemented some aspects of the reforms to the pay of classroom teachers and/or school leaders since the reforms were introduced. By contrast, only 62% of academies, which are not required to follow the national pay terms and conditions and were, therefore, not required to implement the pay reforms, had used their academy freedoms to make changes to their staff pay policy for classroom teachers and/or senior leaders.

It is possible that some LA maintained schools introduced reforms to the pay of teachers and/or senior leaders prior to converting to academy status. These schools might, therefore, report that they had not made any changes, potentially giving a misleading impression of the state of pay reform in the academy sample. In order to explore the extent of this, the team carried out some additional analysis, which revealed that only 60 of the 411 academy schools in the sample converted to academy status after 12th September 2013 (i.e. after the reforms for classroom teachers in the LA maintained sector were introduced). This suggests that, even if all of these schools had adopted reforms prior to becoming an academy, it would not substantially affect the difference between academy and LA maintained schools reported above.

The findings from the eight case studies shed some light on the rationale for change. The three most common reasons given by school leaders in both LA-maintained schools and academies for introducing changes to their schools' pay policies were to:

- build a fairer, more transparent and equitable system
- better recognise individual staff members' strengths
- motivate good teachers and, conversely, to reveal under-performance.

In doing so, they hoped that staff morale and performance would improve, and that teachers who were underperforming would improve their performance or leave. In addition, headteachers reported that they hoped that their school pay policies would: fulfil their statutory duties to promote standards for children; support their school improvement plans; and build greater rigour and consistency into performance management processes. Most interviewees were broadly positive about the changes, as illustrated by the following quotation from a headteacher from a secondary academy:

It [the pay reforms] will contribute to increasing the quality of teaching and learning in the classroom. Of that there is no doubt. We have now the most highly trained, highly qualified teachers than I have ever known and this system has contributed significantly to that.

Individual case-study schools reported they had considered, but decided not to take advantage of, a number of additional changes to pay policies. The reforms considered, together with reasons for not implementing them are given below.

- Introducing a points system, which attempted to place a value on people's effort. The reason for not adopting this was that staff thought it would be difficult for different appraisers to score this consistently.
- Awarding additional payments for additional responsibilities, such as through time-limited Teaching and Learning payments (TLR3s), as it was felt these would be better captured by moving teachers onto the Excellent Teacher or Leading Practitioner pay range.

The findings reported above suggest that case-study schools were making their own decisions about the changes to their pay policies, and that these decisions were influenced by local needs and priorities, as well as their own assessment of what would work best within their own settings.

Of the eight case-study schools, five reported that they had adopted, or had made minor adaptations to, the policy being used by other schools in their area. Three schools reported they had developed their own pay policies (one primary and one secondary academy and one secondary LA maintained school). While most of the case-study schools said they were happy with the policy being used by other schools in their area (with minor revisions in some cases), the headteachers of two schools reported that they would have liked to have made further changes. However, they had not done so, because they felt this left them open to challenge, as illustrated by the following quotation:

As a community school we have to do what we're told to do. If we change it, we invalidate the [pay] policy and if we get into discussions with unions as a result, then on our head be it. It's not in our interests to change the policy, even if we don't necessarily agree with it.


The limitations reported above encapsulated the view, held by some case-study interviewees, that they had no choice but to follow the policy being used by other schools in their area. Even if they wanted to make changes, they thought the work involved in consulting with unions and others would be too onerous. In contrast, the three case-study schools that had developed their own pay policies reported doing so without encountering any major challenges (see below).

The two academies that developed their own pay policies followed a similar process. They consulted with a range of stakeholders, including school staff and governors, the teacher unions, the LA, and legal specialists. The secondary LA-maintained school that developed its own pay policy, primarily engaged with internal stakeholders, including a mixed team of 12 teachers, ranging from NQTs to those on the Upper Pay Range, and including two school union representatives. In all three cases, interviewees reported that the process worked well and that they did not encounter any major challenges.

The pay reforms gave schools greater freedom to decide how much they pay teachers and how quickly pay progresses, but not all of the reforms were statutory. In their

submission to the 26th STRB, the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT, 2015) emphasised that its ‘members have largely chosen to continue to use the existing pay scales and points that existed in the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD) 2013’. Therefore, along with other teaching unions, the NAHT continued to publish and use uplifted pay points. The survey findings on the specific reforms that have been adopted are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Specific reforms to pay of classroom teachers, by phase and type of school




Note: these responses are filtered by those that had implemented reforms to classroom teacher pay.
 Source: NFER survey of headteachers, 2015. Based on answers from 720 headteachers.

Figure 2 shows that virtually all headteachers surveyed in 2015 reported that ‘all progression is now related to performance’. However, a slightly smaller proportion, approximately 90%, reported that their schools had abolished automatic pay progression on the main pay range. These findings appear slightly contradictory; if headteachers have ensured that all progression is performance-related, then it should follow that they have also abolished automatic pay progression. A likely explanation is that a small number of heads may not have considered progression under the previous system as “automatic”.

Of those schools that implemented reforms to *school leader pay*, more than 80% set leadership pay based on ‘school size, context and/or challenge’. A similar proportion of headteachers reported that any changes to the pay of leaders would apply to future leadership appointments (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3 Specific reforms to pay of school leaders, by phase and type of school




Note: these responses are filtered by those that have implemented reforms to school leader pay. Source: NFER survey of headteachers, 2015. Based on answers from 601 headteachers.

Evidence from the 2015 headteachers' survey suggested that schools were relatively cautious overall in implementing the pay reforms. For example, additional analysis reveals that that 90% of schools had not changed the number of increments on the Main Pay Range from six. Similarly, 94% had kept the number of increments on the Upper Pay Range at three.

In response to a separate question, headteachers reported that their pay policy was similar to that of neighbouring schools (see Figure 4).

Figure 4 Headteachers' perceptions of the difference between their schools' pay policy and those of other schools in their local area



Source: NFER survey of headteachers, 2015. Based on answers from 900 headteachers.

Figure 4 shows that the majority of headteachers thought their policies were either similar to (52%) or the same as (32%) those used by other schools in their local area. Few headteachers reported that their school's pay policy was 'a bit different' (5%) or 'completely different' (2%) to other schools in their local area.

3.3 Support and guidance used by schools

Headteachers reported drawing on a range of different sources of support and/or guidance in relation to their school's pay policy. These included:

- the 'School teachers' pay and conditions document' (DfE, 2013a) (85%)
- their LA (84%)⁶
- the DfE guidance document (DfE, 2013b) (78%)
- the teaching unions (64%)
- local schools/networks (61%).

⁶ This comprises 91% of LA maintained schools and 55% of academies.

4. Practice in implementing pay reforms

4.1 Summary of key points

- The research literature suggests that a combination of objective measures (such as test scores) and subjective measures (such as classroom observations) can be informative in identifying teacher effectiveness.
- The survey found that the most common types of evidence used by both LA maintained schools and academies were: pupil progress; classroom observation; teacher standards; measures linked to the school improvement plan; and pupil attainment. Most schools were using these measures prior to the introduction of the pay reforms.
- Few schools used the following three types of evidence: feedback from parents/carers; feedback from colleagues; or information about teachers' additional responsibilities. There were no notable differences between the types of evidence used by LA maintained schools and academies.
- Respondents from the case-study schools reported that they had introduced changes to objective setting, evidence use, and progression pathways. Performance management processes were reported to be more transparent, robust and rigorous as a result.
- Most (97%) of the 180 headteachers responding to the survey who had not revised their pay policies were in academies. Their reasons for not revising their pay policies included: satisfaction with their current policies; concerns that revisions would lead to unfairness or have an adverse effect on recruitment; and a desire to keep their policies similar to those in neighbouring schools.
- Findings from the case studies suggested that the main challenges associated with the pay reforms were: the additional time involved in collecting and reviewing evidence for performance reviews; the additional pressures on teachers to meet pupil outcome targets; and the challenge of applying a school's pay policy fairly in certain situations, such as job shares.

4.2 Previous research into PRP

This chapter presents evidence from the headteacher survey regarding schools' practices in implementing pay reforms.

The research literature suggests that both objective measures (such as test scores) and more subjective measures (such as classroom observations) can be informative in identifying effective teachers, with each type of evidence providing some information that the other does not (MET, 2013; Rockoff and Speroni, 2010). However, as reported earlier, there are some potential dangers in systems which rely on 'high stakes' test

scores, including teaching to the test (Koretz, 2002; Vigdor 2008) and even cheating by artificially inflating student grades (Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Martins, 2009). The Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project highlighted three measures as important: gains in future test scores; pupils' higher order thinking; and reliability⁷. Systems identified as the most effective relied on these measures for between 33 and 50% of the outcome, with the remainder equally split between more stable subjective measures such as student surveys (feedback) and classroom observations of teaching.

4.3 Evidence used to assess teacher performance

Headteachers responding to the 2015 survey reported that their schools used different activities and sources of evidence to support the assessment of teacher performance, including pupil assessment and classroom observation. The following were used most frequently (as indicated by combining survey response categories of 'to a great extent' and 'to some extent'):

- pupil progress (98%)
- classroom observation (95%)
- exceeding teacher standards (95%)
- measures linked to school self-improvement plan (95%)
- pupil attainment (93%)
- pupil attainment at a department level (78%)⁸
- feedback from pupils (64%).

The vast majority of headteachers reported that these different forms of evidence were already being used to support teacher assessment prior to the reforms for classroom teachers coming into force in September 2013. Of the minority who reported that these measures had been introduced since September 2013, headteachers who had been in their current schools for a short period of time (two years or less) were more likely to report that their schools had made recent changes than their counterparts who had been in post for longer.

⁷ The report concluded that measures of teacher effectiveness should have a balance between these factors. Measures with high weightings of teachers' previous value-added measures were the best at predicting future gains, but were also the least 'reliable' in that they had the most year on year variation, in comparison to pupil surveys or classroom observations. Teacher assessment should also include aspects of pupils' higher order thinking (such as analysis, evaluation and creativity), as these skills can support a broader range of learning objectives than skills measured by a single test.

⁸ 'Pupil attainment' refers to the proportion of pupils reaching an expected level of achievement, whether measured through teacher assessment or external assessments (e.g. national Key Stage tests). 'Pupil attainment at a department level' captures whether schools were using evidence measures at the departmental level rather than at individual teacher level. These two items were not intended to differentiate between internal and external assessment, although may have been interpreted differently by respondents.

The three forms of evidence which were most frequently reported never to have been used to support the assessment of teacher performance were as follows (percentages given are for those reporting 'not at all'):

- feedback from parents/carers (21%)
- feedback from other colleagues (16%)
- information about teachers' additional responsibilities (such as running after-school clubs) (16%).

The case-study schools used a variety of different sources of evidence to assess whether performance objectives had been met. Some headteachers said they had become more specific about the type and nature of evidence that they required, as a result of pay reforms. Sources of evidence used by one or more of the case-study schools to inform whether objectives were met and subsequent pay decisions included the following:

- pupil performance data
- classroom observation/learning walks
- review of pupils' work
- marking assessment
- pupil feedback
- TLR activities
- CPD points
- contribution to wider school activities
- research activity
- teacher attendance data
- assessors' judgements.

The follow-up interviews with headteachers, conducted in spring 2016, suggested that some refinements had been made to the types of evidence or the way evidence was used. For example, one headteacher had been asked to clarify the system for the awarding of points for CPD activities. The school had moved to a system whereby staff received two points for activities they led, and one for activities in which they participated. In another school, the headteacher was considering whether their school could lessen the amount of evidence that teachers who were consistently judged as outstanding, had to produce. At the time of interview, this was still work in progress, but the headteacher was keen to 'take the burden away from them (outstanding teachers) and utilise them to help those who need support'.

The boxed example below describes the process adopted by a school, which introduced a new system of performance management.

Creating a more transparent performance management process

When the headteacher of a LA maintained secondary school joined the staff, they thought the staff included several under-performing teachers. There was no formal performance management process in operation so the head set up a new review system on appointment, which 'was honed in line with the pay policy'.

The new system used a range of evidence to assess teachers' performance, including lesson observations, a review of pupils' work, marking assessment and pupil feedback (gathered through questionnaires and informal feedback sessions).

More formal target setting was introduced, differentiated by seniority so that it provided: 'targets that are commensurate with the level of the teacher.' Teachers were able to apply to the upper pay range at any time, irrespective of their level of experience, providing they applied one year in advance to ensure it became one of the teacher's targets. If a teacher failed to progress, they would not receive a pay award (the head reported that a number of teachers had left due to 'poor performance').

Teachers interviewed said the system was 'transparent' and 'open' and they felt confident that it was 'implemented fairly'. They liked the fact that the new performance review process focussed on teachers doing their job well, rather than on pupil outcomes alone, which, in their view, did not take into account other external factors beyond the teacher's control. The process placed responsibility on teachers to provide evidence they were meeting targets – teacher interviewees had mixed views as to whether or not this was an onerous task.

While in most schools the onus appeared to be on individual staff to collect the necessary evidence, one school had moved this responsibility to the senior leadership team in order to minimise the burden on staff. The headteacher of this school reported that they were careful to include staff in agreeing this, as they were aware that there was a danger that staff could feel excluded from decisions that affected their performance.

One school had introduced standardised templates to help staff gather evidence and three schools reported they were using specialist software to help track and support the performance management process. This was said to have helped introduce a more systematic approach to the collation of information, while also providing senior and middle leaders and governors with a more comprehensive overview of a school's performance management.

Across the schools, there had been a move towards more regular review and appraisal of teachers' performance throughout the year, rather than leaving it to the annual performance review meeting at the start of the school year.

4.4 Changes to objectives and progression pathways

In addition to the changes described above, findings from the case studies showed how schools had also made changes to objective setting and progression pathways.

Performance objectives were now reported to be more closely aligned to school improvement targets, and adapted to the role and experience of the teacher. This had been approached in different ways and resulted in a range of objectives focused on different themes. For example, in one school, staff worked towards two targets, one of a personal nature, and another linked to departmental targets, which in turn were based on whole-school priorities. In another school, staff were set three targets: one linked to pupil attainment; one linked to a research-related target; and one linked to a personal objective (see boxed example below). A third school reported that staff could choose their objectives from a 'menu of targets' that fitted with the schools' development plan and departmental plans. Case-study schools reported variations in the number and focus of performance objectives, but the general response from case-study interviewees was that performance management processes were now more transparent, robust and rigorous as a result of these changes. The following example describes how this worked in one school.

Setting innovative targets for staff

In a primary academy, the headteacher had 'sharpened up' the performance management process at the time of pay reforms, which included introducing three types of target for all staff. These were: one linked to student attainment; one personal target (for example, continuing professional development (CPD)); and a research-related target. For the research target, all staff were asked to explore an education-related issue, the findings from which were disseminated internally and sometimes externally (both nationally and internationally, via blogs, social media, and networks). Staff were asked to present the findings from their research during an INSET day.

The senior leader discussed the broader impact of the research-based targets: 'There is more reflective practice and research... children get a richer breadth of experience. It's what's current, what's new... big impact comes from a tiny seed'.

Some headteachers reported that they were sympathetic to the fact that targets focused on pupil performance would not always be met. They recognised that 'good quality teaching doesn't always correlate with good outcomes'. As one headteacher explained, teachers who missed their pupil targets could still receive pay progression as long as they provided appropriate evidence:

Of course there will be children who won't achieve their targets, because we set aspirational targets. [In that case, I want to see]...what that teacher put in place to try and encourage that child to achieve and get them to where we want them to be.

However, some of the classroom teachers interviewed reported that their targets were not realistic. As one said: 'Our targets are set higher than a lot of other schools, when most of our children are significantly below. They're already setting us a target which [it's] unlikely we're going to achieve'. There were some reports that teachers who did not receive pay progression were opting to leave a school or had changed their working pattern as a direct result of being denied a pay increase. For example, in one school, two teachers were leaving, while a third had opted for reduced hours and now worked part time.

In terms of **progression pathways**, most case-study schools appeared to continue to link pay progression to (now reference) spine points. However, in keeping with the findings from the analysis of the School Workforce Census (see Chapter 7 and the supporting technical report) at least some schools appeared to have moved away from using reference spine points. Some schools enabled staff to put themselves forward for two- or three-point increments, whereas others allowed staff to apply to join the Upper Pay Range at any time, regardless of their experience or length of service. However, the majority of eligible staff in these schools were reported to be receiving an annual pay increase, though they had to provide the necessary evidence to justify receiving it.

Some schools had changed their processes for identifying which staff were responsible for appraisals. For example, headteachers in two schools felt it was better if this was undertaken by someone who was not the individual's line manager, to avoid concerns about bias. One headteacher explained:

We had friendships getting in the way, so we deliberately mixed staff up. Staff are now appraised by colleagues who are not necessarily working in their area, or where friendships exist. This means appraisers can focus on the criteria and not on any prior information they have about that person. Some [staff] were wary and said 'well they don't know me', but in fact I think that's crucial to this process.

This view was not held consistently across the case-study schools. For example, one senior leader argued that it was important to speak to teachers' line managers because they were in the best position to comment on their performance, adding that this was important because 'teachers generally don't sell themselves very well'.

Several headteachers reported that operating a good performance review system was time consuming, and that appraisals were now being undertaken on a continuing basis, which made the annual review meeting less important than it had been previously. As a result, staff from one school reported that they were informed mid-year if they were at risk of failing to meet their targets.

4.5 Schools' reasons for not revising their pay policies

The minority of headteachers (from 174 academies and six LA maintained schools) who reported that their schools had not revised their pay policies were asked why not. In response to an open question, which included some pre-defined response options, some reported 'Our pay policy was already in place and did not need updating' (N=41). Only a minority agreed with the statement: 'We haven't got around to it, but plan to in the future' (N=5). A total of 106 'other' responses were also received, which included the following themes:

- satisfaction with existing pay policies
- perceptions that revising their pay policies would be unfair to staff
- perceptions of an adverse effect on teacher recruitment
- not revising their pay policies because they wanted their schools to be similar to or on a level playing field with other schools in the area.

Eleven headteachers of academies stated that the decision not to change their pay policies was taken centrally at Trust level rather than at individual headteacher/school level.

Findings from the case-study visits to schools, provided some additional insights, albeit from two schools that had introduced a small number of changes to their pay policies, as distinct from none at all. One school had deliberately wanted to 'start small', while the other had concerns about the school budget, and the feasibility of being able to deliver pay increases.

4.6 Challenges associated with pay reform

In addition to the reasons reported above, the case-study interviews with teachers and senior leaders revealed a number of challenges associated with the introduction of the pay reforms, including:

- Time commitments: appraisal (and gathering evidence) added to teachers' and appraisers' workload.
- Pressure on teachers: particularly from meeting pupil outcome targets, and justifying the results.
- Applying the policy in certain situations: such as dealing with job shares when pupil performance targets were set at class level.

The workload issue was the most frequently reported and applied equally to appraisers and to those being appraised. For example, one teacher reported feeling 'snowed under' with the evidence gathering required for the performance review, and was said to be 'logging everything and printing every email'. This interviewee argued that time spent on gathering evidence was at the expense of time spent with students.

Additional time commitments associated with gathering and reviewing evidence were interwoven with interviewees' desire to do the job properly. For example, appraisers were conscious of the need for appraisals to be fair and for judgements to be consistently applied, and felt that they needed time to gather sufficient evidence, as illustrated by this quotation from one senior leader:

You're talking about your colleagues' financial well-being and you have a duty of care that these decisions need to be right and you have to have all your evidence to be reassured that if it came to an appeal, you are able to answer the right queries.

The follow-up telephone interviews conducted with headteachers in spring 2016 suggested that these time pressures were still affecting schools. There was, however, a general feeling amongst case-study interviewees that although operating a good performance review system was time consuming, it was ultimately worthwhile.

Some interviewees gave examples of certain situations which were challenging to manage, such as when teachers were in a job-share arrangement, or where staff joined the school part way through the year and did not have the time to collect the requisite evidence. LA-maintained schools had consulted with their LAs to help find a solution, all of which appeared to have been amicably resolved.

In addition to the main challenges discussed above, a number of challenges were reported by fewer interviewees. For example, interviewees in three schools reported that there were practical challenges to the type and nature of the pay reforms they could adopt. One headteacher reported that the school could not afford to introduce changes to leaders' pay, while the headteachers of two schools reported that they would have liked to have made further changes to their schools' pay policies, but felt this was not feasible due to the amount of work involved.

In one school, a teacher described the new pay policy as being imposed without consultation with teaching staff: 'We are told what is going on. It is not a dialogue. Things are delivered to us'. In another school, a teacher reported being given conflicting advice from the headteacher and union about the evidence that would be needed to receive a pay award. While decisions had been based on the headteacher's interpretation of the policy, the teacher in question felt the guidance within the school's pay policy was not clear.

There was some evidence to suggest that the pay reforms had more limited impact on those staff at the top of their pay range. This appeared to be the case particularly for senior leaders, who were reported to be more frequently at the top of their pay range, and thus less likely to be eligible for a pay award. The effect was summarised by one headteacher, who explained: 'As a motivator, [the pay reforms] have a more limited impact on senior leaders'. However, some schools reported that they now offered alternative incentives to those staff ineligible for financial rewards. For example, two

schools reported that they offered an extra day's holiday to relevant staff at a time convenient with the individual and the school.

5. Teachers' attitudes to pay reforms

5.1 Summary of key points

- Previous research has indicated that teachers in England had mixed views on pay reforms, prior to or soon after their introduction.
- The NFER teacher survey took place after the introduction of the reforms. It found that a majority of teachers (66%) felt they understood their school's pay policy and about half (52%) felt they had received adequate training on their school's appraisal and performance management system. Less than a quarter (23%) felt they had had a meaningful opportunity to contribute to their school's pay policy before it was introduced.
- Most teachers had positive attitudes towards the implementation of their school's pay policy, with a majority agreeing that: it treated all staff equally without favouritism (60%); was clear and easy to understand (57%); and was applied consistently across all teachers (52%).
- A majority of teachers agreed that their school's pay policy helped to achieve school priorities and made objectives easy to measure.
- Fewer teachers were convinced of the motivational nature of their school's pay policy. Just over a quarter (27%) agreed that it helped motivate underperforming teachers. Only 38% agreed that it helped their school to further motivate teachers who were already performing well, and 42% felt it heightened the risk of teachers feeling aggrieved. Only 34% agreed that it resulted in a fair allocation of pay for all staff in the school.
- Most teachers (80%) felt that the pay reforms would lead to some good teachers leaving the profession and 56% disagreed that the reforms will strengthen the quality of teaching for the profession as a whole.
- A majority of teachers (66%) thought that their school's current pay policy had added to their workload.
- Most teachers (58%) thought that their school's current pay policy had made no difference to the way they worked.
- Teachers tended to neither agree nor disagree that their school's pay policy had encouraged them to seek promotion or stay at their current school.

5.2 Previous research into teachers' attitudes to pay reforms

This chapter explores teachers' attitudes to pay reforms. The literature review indicated that teachers held a variety of views on the principle of PRP, prior to its introduction. For example, research reported by Policy Exchange (2013) found that 89% of the primary

and secondary teachers surveyed agreed that the quality of their teaching should be driving teachers' pay and progression.

O'Beirne and Pyle (2014) surveyed teachers and leaders within a few months of the reforms coming into effect, but before any school had made their first pay decisions under the new pay framework. At that time, the majority of teachers had had their performance assessed against the Teachers' Standards and objectives set by the school. Respondents were equally divided in their opinions of the usefulness of the Teachers' Standards to provide a fair basis for recommendations for their pay. However, there was a large difference between senior leaders and classroom teachers, with 66% of senior leaders saying that the standards were an appropriate basis for making decisions about pay compared to 36% of classroom teachers. A divergence of opinions was also present in teachers' views on PRP in general. Whilst the majority of teachers felt that they understood the new arrangements, and more teachers agreed than not that the pay of individual teachers should be on the basis of their performance rather than length of service (48% compared to 38%), nearly half of teachers thought that the new pay arrangements would not reward them appropriately for the quality of their teaching.

Marsden (2015) surveyed over 4,000 teachers and 200 school leaders between January and April 2014. The survey found that only 24% of teachers agreed that linking pay progression to performance is good in principle. Teachers' gave three main reasons for why the new PRP programme would not work: the difficulty of linking work done to individual teacher performance (87%); schools not having sufficient funds to reward good performance (73%); and the perception that leaders would reward their favourites (70%).

Surveys conducted by teachers' unions amongst their members following the implementation of PRP identified some concerns, including: a negative impact on workload (ATL and NUT, 2017); a negative impact on morale (NUT, 2016); and a fear of discrimination based on gender and ethnicity (ATL, 2015; ATL and NUT, 2017; NASUWT, 2015).

5.3 Findings from the teacher survey

This section presents findings from the teacher survey, which took place in spring 2015 following the first pay decisions for teachers being made under the new framework the previous September. The teacher survey covered similar themes to those explored with headteachers, but focused on capturing teachers' personal experiences and views of the reforms.


A small number of similar attitudinal questions featured in the headteacher and teacher surveys. This chapter identifies where this is the case, and highlights any differences of interest between the two surveys⁹.

The survey asked teachers about the introduction of their school’s latest pay policy. Respondents were asked the following questions:

- To what extent do you feel you understand your school’s pay policy?
- To what extent do you feel you had a meaningful opportunity to feed into your school’s pay policy, prior to it being introduced?
- To what extent do you feel you have had adequate training on your school’s appraisal and performance management system?

The findings are presented in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5 Teachers’ views on their school’s current pay policy



Source: NFER Teacher Survey 2015. Based on answers from 1,020 teachers. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing responses.

As the figure shows, the majority of teachers (66%) reported that they understood their school’s pay policy ‘to a great extent’ or ‘to some extent’. In addition, over half (52%) reported that they had received adequate training on their school’s appraisal and

⁹ Note that reported differences between the views of headteachers and teachers are indicative as they have not been subjected to a test of statistical significance.

performance management system. However, only a minority of respondents (23%) agreed 'to a great extent' or 'to some extent' that they had had a meaningful opportunity to contribute to their school's policy before it was introduced. Moreover, 42% reported that they had no such opportunity.

Additional analysis¹⁰ of teacher characteristics revealed statistically significant differences in the responses of teachers on different pay ranges. Teachers on a higher pay range were more likely to report that they understood their school's pay policy 'to a great extent'. This applied to 46% of those on the 'leadership' pay range, 20% on the 'upper', and 8% on the 'main' and 'unqualified' pay ranges. Indeed, staff on the leadership pay range generally reported being more positive and knowledgeable about their school's pay policy, relative to staff on the other pay ranges. This extended to their views on: opportunities to feed into their school's pay policy, prior to it being introduced; how clear and easy to understand their school's pay policy was; and to their feelings on the adequacy of the training they had received on their school's appraisal and performance management system.

The headteacher survey included some similar questions about teachers' involvement in the process of revising their school's pay policies, and the extent to which they felt their school's pay policies ensured training on appraisal/performance management¹¹. (Headteachers were not asked about teachers' understanding of their school's pay policies.)


There was a small difference between the perceptions of teachers and headteachers relating to the extent to which they felt teachers were involved in the process of revising the school's pay policy. Headteachers tended to perceive that teachers in their school had been involved in revising the pay policy (63%) to a greater extent than teachers themselves (45%). There was little difference in answers to a question on training: similar proportions of headteachers (79%) and teachers (83%) agreed that the pay policy had ensured training on the school's appraisal/performance management system.

The teacher survey included a number of additional questions asking for respondents' views on their school's pay policy. Some of these are shown in Figure 6 (see Appendix 2 for a full breakdown of all the survey items). Note that not all of the teachers completed all of the questions in the survey, so this analysis is based on the 820 teachers who completed this section.

¹⁰ Using Chi Square tests and a significance level of $p < 0.05$.

¹¹ Because these questions were worded slightly differently in the teacher and headteacher survey, responses to them are not directly comparable. These comparisons are reported for interest only.

Figure 6 Teachers' views on their school's pay policy



Source: NFER Teacher Survey 2015. Based on answers from 820 teachers. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing responses.

Most teachers had positive attitudes towards their school's pay policy, with a majority agreeing – 'to a great extent' or 'to some extent' – that their school's policy: treated all staff equally without favouritism (60%), was clear and easy to understand (57%) and was applied consistently across all teachers (52%).

A minority of teachers gave negative answers to these questions. By grouping together those who answered that they agreed 'to a very small extent' or 'not at all', it can be seen that 14% of teachers did not agree that their school's pay policy treated staff equally, 16% did not find their school's pay policy easy to understand and 17% did not agree that their school's pay policy was applied consistently. This may be considered to be a higher proportion than desirable, especially given the importance of teachers' perceptions of fairness identified in the literature (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001; Neal 2010, 2011).

Teachers who had been in their current schools for a longer period of time, were more likely to say that their school's pay system was accurate and reliable¹² than their counterparts who had been in post for a shorter period of time. For example, 57% of teachers who had taught at their current schools for more than ten years agreed 'to a great extent' or 'to some extent' that their schools' appraisal processes provided an accurate and reliable basis for recommendations for teacher pay. This compares to 39% of teachers who had been in post for two years or less and was a statistically significant difference. Similarly, teachers who had worked at their current schools for ten years or more were significantly more likely to perceive that their school's pay policy treated all


¹²Based on additional analysis using Chi Square tests and a significance level of $p = < 0.05$.

teachers equally and without favouritism (74%) than teachers who had worked at the school for under two years (47%).

Overall, 19% of teachers indicated that they did not know whether the policy was applied consistently. A possible explanation for this is that some changes had been implemented recently and therefore teachers may have been reserving judgement until the changes had had more time to bed in.

Figure 7 shows teachers' views on the contribution of their school's pay policy to fulfilling school objectives.

Figure 7 Teachers' views on the extent to which their school's pay policy fulfils school objectives



Source: NFER Teacher Survey 2015. Based on answers from 796 teachers. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing responses.

The survey responses showed that the majority of teachers 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that their school's pay policy helped to achieve school priorities and made objectives easy to measure. However, fewer teachers were convinced of the motivational nature of their school's pay policy. Just over a quarter (27%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that it helped motivate underperforming teachers, whereas 41% 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with this statement. Only 38% 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that it helped their school to further motivate teachers who were performing well (although this is a larger proportion than the 34% of teachers who 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with this statement).

In addition, while 45% of teachers thought their pay policy gave teachers an incentive to focus on pupil performance, 42% 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that it heightened the risk of teachers feeling aggrieved.


Opinions were almost equally split on whether school pay policies resulted in a fair allocation of pay for staff in their school, with 34% indicating they 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed', 31% indicating they were 'neutral' and 32% indicating they 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with this statement. This statement produced a less positive response than the similar statement presented above: 'My school's pay policy treats staff equally without favouritism', to which 60% of teachers agreed or strongly agreed. It is not clear why the majority of teachers felt their school's pay policy treated staff equally, but only 31% felt this resulted in a fair allocation of pay, although it is possible that teachers were distinguishing between the intention of the policy and its outcomes.

Teachers in schools which had used their academy freedoms to make changes to their staff pay policies were asked whether the changes to their schools' pay policies had affected their total pay (as an individual) for this academic year. There was a statistically significant difference between teachers' responses to this question and the duration of their employment at their current school. Just 9% of teachers who had worked at the school for ten or more years stated that the changes to their schools' pay policies had affected their total pay, whereas around 20% of teachers who had worked at the school for a shorter length of time did so. This could be because teachers who were employed by schools for longer were more likely to be at the top of the upper pay range. As these teachers were not receiving annual pay increments, they were, therefore, not affected by the removal of automatic pay progression.

The survey also asked teachers whether they agreed with three statements about the impact of national pay reforms affecting LA maintained schools, as can be seen in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8 Teachers' views on the impacts of pay reforms on the teaching workforce

The reforms to teachers' pay in maintained schools will...




Source: NFER Teacher Survey 2015. Based on answers from 764 teachers
Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing responses.

The figure shows that many teachers (80%) agreed with the statement ‘the reforms to teachers’ pay in the maintained sector will lead to some good teachers leaving the profession’¹³ and 56% disagreed with the statement that the reforms ‘will strengthen the quality of teaching for the profession as a whole’.

The survey asked teachers about the impact of their school’s pay policy on their own experiences and behaviours – see Figure 9. These questions were designed to identify teachers’ perceptions of how the policy was affecting them and pick up on any evidence in relation to the policy aim of enabling schools to attract and retain the best teachers.

¹³ Note that it is possible that teachers interpreted ‘the maintained sector’ as having one of two meanings: either publicly funded schools as opposed to independent schools (the intended meaning) or schools maintained by the local authority as opposed to academies and free schools.

Figure 9 Teachers' views on the extent to which their school's pay policy affects them



Source: NFER Teacher Survey 2015. Based on answers from 752 teachers. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding and missing responses.

Responses to questions about the impact of the pay reforms are important, as research into the previous Threshold Assessment scheme (Mahony *et al.*, 2004) reported that most teachers felt it had not resulted in an increase in effort or retention, only more work involved in collecting evidence and less risk taking.

The results show that a majority of teachers (66%) agreed/strongly agreed that their school's pay policy: 'adds to my workload'. On the other hand, the majority of teachers (58%) agreed/strongly agreed that their school's pay policy made no difference to the way they worked. It seems likely that these two statements are picking up on different aspects of teaching: teachers thought that their school's pay policy had increased their workload, but it had not changed the nature of their day-to-day teaching practice.

There were mixed views on the impact of school pay policies on teachers' motivation. Just under half (49%) disagreed/strongly disagreed that the pay policy encouraged them to achieve better academic results for their pupils, whereas 25% agreed/strongly agreed with this statement.

A similar proportion (48%) disagreed/strongly disagreed that their school's pay policy 'encourages me to try out new ideas in the classroom'.

Just under half (47%) disagreed/strongly disagreed that the pay policy discouraged them from taking part in activities that do not directly impact on pupil attainment. In addition to paperwork, these activities could include activities related to the development of a pupil's character or participation in extra-curricular activities.

The questions about promotion and retention tended to elicit neutral responses, although 43% of teachers disagreed/strongly disagreed with the statement that their school's pay policy 'encourages me to seek opportunities for promotion'.

Teachers' responses to the statement that their school's pay policy 'encourages me to stay teaching in the LA maintained sector¹⁴' were almost equally divided between neutral (42%) and disagree/strongly disagree (41%). One possible interpretation of these findings is that pay policies appear to be having little effect on movement within the LA maintained sector, but could encourage teachers to consider moving outside the LA maintained sector.

There were three statistically significant differences in respondents' answers to this question according to their highest level of qualification (bachelor's degree or lower, PGCE, masters or doctorate):

- Compared to teachers with a bachelors degree/lower qualification, a higher proportion of teachers with a masters/doctorate said they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: 'My school's pay policy discourages me from taking part in activities that do not directly impact on pupil attainment' (38% of teachers with a masters agreed/strongly agreed with this statement compared with 30% of teachers with a bachelors degree or lower qualification).
- Compared to teachers with a PGCE or masters/doctorate, a lower proportion of respondents with a bachelors degree or lower qualification indicated disagree/strongly disagree with the statement 'My school's pay policy encourages me to try out new ideas in the classroom' (36% of teachers with a bachelor's degree compared with 53% of other respondents).
- Teachers with a bachelors degree or lower qualification were least likely to indicate strongly disagree/disagree with the statement: 'My school's pay policy encourages me to stay in teaching in the LA maintained sector' (33% of teachers with a bachelors degree or lower qualification compared with 43% of teachers with a PGCE and 52% of teachers with a masters/doctorate).

Interestingly, teachers' duration of service was statistically significantly associated with the extent to which they felt that their schools' pay policy encouraged them to achieve

¹⁴ Note that it is possible that teachers interpreted 'the LA maintained sector' as having one of two meanings: either publicly funded schools as opposed to independent schools (our intended meaning) or schools LA maintained by the local authority as opposed to academies and free schools.

better academic results for their pupils. One third (33%) of teachers who had worked at their current schools for under two years agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, compared to just 18% of teachers who had worked at their school for ten years or more. This could be because teachers on the upper pay range were not receiving annual pay increments and, therefore, were not affected by the removal of automatic progression.

Teachers' duration of service at their current school was also statistically significantly related to their views on the impact of pay reform on schools' ability to recruit and retain teachers. Just 8% of the 152 teachers who had been employed at their current schools for up to two years felt that the reforms had not impacted on retention, compared to 36% of the 198 teachers who had worked at the school for ten years or more.

6. Headteachers' perceptions of the influence of pay reforms on recruitment and retention

6.1 Summary of key points

- At the time of the survey (spring 2015) a minority of headteachers (7%) said that the pay reforms had had an impact on teacher recruitment.
- A third of headteachers (33%) said that pay reforms had already had a positive impact on their ability to keep their existing teachers.
- A small minority (6%) of headteachers reported that teachers had appealed the outcomes of their appraisal in 2014/15.
- Most of the headteachers interviewed as part of the case-study visits thought it was too early to say whether the reforms had led to positive impacts on teacher recruitment and retention.

This part of the report draws on the evidence from the headteacher survey and case studies, to consider the perceived effects of the pay reforms.

6.2 Findings from previous research into PRP effects

As noted in Chapter 5, one of the desired outcomes of relating pay to performance is to retain the most effective teachers through higher rewards, whilst also making the occupation more attractive to potential teachers who consider themselves to be highly capable. This is reflected by a statement by Dame Patricia Hodgson, a former chair of the STRB (reported in Coryton, 2012): 'We believe our recommendations will help schools to recruit, retain and reward the best teachers. It will give heads freedom to manage teachers' pay according to pupil needs and local circumstances, within a fair national framework'.

Previous research (Armstrong, 1993) has identified a potential danger in having very detailed student attainment targets that are dependent on factors outside of the control of the employee. This may result in perverse outcomes, such as worsening teacher recruitment and retention.

6.3 Findings from the headteacher survey on recruitment and retention

The 2015 survey asked headteachers about any early and emerging impacts resulting from the reforms. Less than one in ten (7%) reported that pay reform had already had a positive impact on *teacher recruitment*, with 52% reporting it had not, and 31% reporting

this was not applicable (presumably because they had not recruited any new staff since implementing the reforms). In addition, 11% reported they did not know. Those who reported that the reforms had already had a positive impact on teacher recruitment were invited to give further details. They said that it had helped them to recruit teachers with the following characteristics: those who had the expertise/experience for hard-to-fill vacancies; those who had a more varied set of skills; and for priority subject areas.

In contrast to their perceived impact on teacher recruitment, a larger proportion of headteachers (33%) reported that the pay reforms had already had a positive impact on their *ability to keep their existing teachers*. Of the remainder, 43% reported it had not, 16% reported it was not applicable, and 8% did not know. Of those who responded 'yes', many said that pay reform had helped them to retain: their 'best teachers'; their 'most ambitious teachers'; and/or teachers who were middle leaders. A much smaller proportion of those who said yes reported that pay reform had helped them retain teachers in shortage subject areas.

Headteachers were also asked if any teachers had appealed the outcomes of their appraisal in the performance management cycle 2014/15. Only 6% of headteachers overall reported that any teachers had done so. There were differences between school phases, with a much higher instance of appeals in secondary schools (as might be expected due to the larger number of staff involved). However, responses were similar by school type, with 4% of primary LA maintained, 3% of primary academies, 19% of secondary LA maintained and 20% of secondary LA maintained schools reporting that they had received an appeal from one or more teachers¹⁵.

6.4 Findings from the case studies

Most of the headteachers interviewed as part of the case-study visits thought it was too early to say whether the reforms had led to positive impacts on teacher recruitment and retention. However, other reported benefits included:

- More opportunities for staff progression: for example, staff on the main pay range could progress more swiftly to the upper pay range (see Chapter 7 for evidence of changes in the prevalence of this practice).
- Better use of data: staff appraisals were now based on a range of evidence, with an emphasis on pupil progress data. This was said to promote a culture in which staff were more regularly reflecting on their performance, and on the performance of their pupils.

¹⁵ Information was not collected on the number of appeals that were upheld.

Most of the headteachers said that their staff had responded positively to the pay reforms. Only one of the eight schools had had an appeal. This was reported to have been satisfactorily resolved and the headteacher felt this provided confirmation that the pay policy was working.

Headteachers argued that the reforms had resulted in staff objectives becoming more closely aligned to whole school priorities and were resulting in improvements to the quality of teaching and learning. This gave senior leaders hope that with time, the reforms would result in improvements to pupil outcomes. However, for most, it was too early to say whether the reforms had led to positive impacts on teacher recruitment and retention.

The interviewees also argued that the pay reforms, while a useful tool, would not, by themselves, address schools' recruitment needs. For example, one headteacher reported that the school had struggled to fill an internal leadership post. Even with the enhanced flexibility that came with the school's revised pay policy, staff said they did not want the extra work, stress or responsibility of a leadership post.

7. Analysis of trends over time

7.1 Summary of key points

- A follow-up survey to headteachers in early 2016 showed that most schools had made changes to teachers' and leaders' pay before 2015. Only 14% had made further changes between spring 2015 and January/February 2016.
- The majority (60%) of academies had introduced pay policies that implemented some aspects of PRP by early 2016, even though this change was not required of them.
- Analysis of national data from the SWC showed that the average nominal pay of teachers increased very slightly between 2010 and 2015. Once adjusted for inflation, this equates to a real terms decrease in base pay for teachers of around 2%. Over the same period the average nominal base pay for leaders rose slightly, which equates to a real terms decrease of around 1% over the period.
- The very small increase in nominal base pay for teachers has been partly offset by a small decline in the prevalence of additional payments (comprising SEN allowances, recruitment and retention allowances, teaching and learning responsibilities, and other additional payments), from around 38% receiving an additional payment in 2013, to around 36% in 2015. The average nominal value for those who received an additional payment remained similar (although slightly lower than the nominal value before the reforms).
- The decline in the use of additional payments means that teachers who no longer received an additional payment will have experienced a larger decrease in total pay than the average decrease in base pay reported above.
- Many schools had moved away from awarding annual pay awards in line with the previous (reference) spine points, though this practice varied across LA areas. This suggests more flexibility in pay awards following the reforms.
- Teachers' salaries upon starting at a new school appear to have been affected by the removal of 'pay portability' as a statutory requirement. There was an increase in the proportion of teachers moving schools to equivalent positions who received a lower nominal salary (from 5.5% between 2012 and 2013, to 8.9% between 2013 and 2014, and 7.4% between 2014 and 2015).
- There was some evidence of increased flexibility in progression from the main to the upper pay range, with a greater proportion of those below the top of the main pay range progressing to the upper pay range following the reforms (2.7% between 2010 and 2011 compared with 7.8% between 2014 and 2015).
- There was no evidence from this analysis to support concerns that females or members of black and minority ethnic groups were disadvantaged by the pay

reforms. However, it is beyond the scope of this analysis to conclusively state if this was the case.

This chapter contains findings from two sources: a follow-up survey of headteachers in 2016; and an analysis of national trends between 2010 and 2015, using data from the Schools Workforce Census (SWC).

In the summer of 2016 the DfE commissioned the NFER to survey a representative sample of teachers as part of the Teacher Voice Omnibus Survey (Smith *et al.*, 2017). As part of this survey, respondents were asked what had been the outcome of their last annual performance review in terms of pay progression. Overall, over a third of teachers (37%) were ineligible for pay progression and just under half (46%) reported their pay progression had been recommended and awarded. Only 8% of respondents said that their pay progression had been recommended but not awarded, with a further 5% who had not been recommended for pay progression.

7.2 Findings from a follow-up survey of headteachers in 2016

In January and February 2016, NFER administered a short online survey to the same 900 headteachers who had responded to the CATI survey in spring 2015. The survey sought to identify whether schools had made further changes to their pay policies since spring 2015. Responses were received from 418 headteachers (46% of the original sample), as shown in Table 3.

Table 3 Survey responses

School Type	Number sampled	Achieved (N)	% response rate
Primary LA maintained	303	174	57
Primary academy	238	96	40
Secondary LA maintained	193	76	39
Secondary academy	166	72	43
Total	900	418	46

Source: NFER follow-up survey of headteachers, 2016

The responses were then weighted to provide results that were representative of the proportions of each type of school in the national population (see Appendix 1). This particularly affects primary LA maintained schools, which were under-represented in this sample. The information from the two surveys was combined, to give a fuller picture of the changes taking place after the reforms in 2013 and 2014, up to early 2016, based on the sample of 418 headteachers who responded to both surveys.

7.2.1 Changes affecting teachers

The types of reforms affecting teachers implemented between 2013 and early 2016 are shown in Table 4. (The 'not implemented' category was inferred from respondents who did not indicate that they had made the change in question.) Note that the change 'ensure progress is related to performance' was asked of academies only (168 respondents), because this change was required of LA maintained schools.

Table 4 Changes to pay policies affecting classroom teachers

	Not implemented	Have implemented	% who made the change in the past year
Teachers progress at different rates according to performance	18	82	1
Flexibilities on salary when recruiting teachers	32	68	2
Removed pay portability	39	61	2
Ensure progress is related to performance (academies only)	40	60	5
Introduced time-limited TLR3s	63	37	3
Paid teachers on leading practitioners pay range	81	19	2

Source: NFER follow-up survey of headteachers, 2016.

Based on answers from 418 headteachers.

Multiple response question - items will not sum to 100.

Overall, the answers to this question showed that most change had taken place before spring 2015: only 75 schools (14% when weighted) had made any of the listed changes between spring 2015 and early 2016.

The majority of schools reported that their pay policies enabled teachers to progress at different rates, were flexible on salary when recruiting teachers, and had removed pay portability. The table shows that the majority (60%) of academies had implemented PRP by early 2016 even though this was not required of them. A small minority (5%) had implemented this change within the last year. The least popular reforms were to introduce time-limited Teaching and Learning Responsibility payments (TLR3s) and to pay teachers on the leading practitioners pay range.

There were a few differences in relation to school type. As might be expected, given that pay reform was mandatory in LA maintained schools, LA maintained schools were more likely than academies to implement each of the listed reforms.

In relation to sector, primary schools were more likely to introduce flexibilities relating to recruitment. For example, 71% of primary schools compared with 53% of secondary schools had introduced pay policies that enabled flexibility on salary when recruiting teachers; and 64% of primary schools compared with 43% of secondary schools had removed pay portability.

Secondary schools were more likely to introduce TLR3s (52% of secondary schools compared with 35% of primary schools) or to pay teachers on the leading practitioner pay range (30% of secondary schools compared with 17% of primary schools).

7.2.2 Changes affecting school leaders

The type of reforms affecting school leaders implemented between 2014 and early 2016 are shown in Table 5.

Table 5 Changes to pay policies affecting school leaders

	Not implemented	Have implemented	% who made the change in the past year
Leadership pay is now based on school size, context and/or challenge	35	65	1
Set the top of the pay range to 25% above the relevant head teacher group range	68	32	2
Removed fixed differentials between pay of different grades	76	24	0

Based on answers from 418 headteachers.
Source: NFER follow-up survey of headteachers, 2016.

The table shows that by spring 2016, a majority of schools had introduced leadership pay based on school size, context and/or challenge. About one third (32%) had set the top of the pay range to 25% above the relevant group range and about one quarter (24%) had removed fixed differentials between different pay grades. Very few schools were reported to have made changes to leaders' pay between spring 2015 and early 2016.

LA maintained schools were more likely than academies to base the pay of leaders on size, context and/or level of challenge (71% of LA maintained schools compared with 46% of academies).

Primary schools were more likely to have based leadership pay on school size, context and/or challenge (67% of primary schools compared with 56% of secondary schools), or to set the top of the pay range for leaders 25% above the relevant group range (34% of primary schools compared with 19% of secondary schools). Similar proportions of

primary and secondary schools had removed fixed differentials between the pay of different grades.

7.3 Findings from the School Workforce Census

This strand of work comprised analysis of teacher pay and mobility using administrative data from the annual School Workforce Census (SWC). The SWC consists of individual-role level data on all staff from all LAs and state-funded schools in England (including academy and LA maintained schools). The census is co-ordinated by the DfE. It is a statutory requirement on schools and LAs to submit the SWC return, with data being supplied from either schools or LAs, or a combination of the two. The data used spanned the period immediately before and after the reforms (November 2010 to November 2015). Further detail of this analysis is presented in a separate technical report (Burgess *et al.*, 2017).

The analysis set out to investigate the hypothesis that pay reforms increased the variance in teacher pay and annual teacher pay awards, on average. Hypotheses relating to teacher mobility following the abolition of ‘pay portability’ were also explored.

The analysis considered the following indicators.

- Variance and average of teachers’ and leaders’ full-time equivalent nominal base pay across school type and individual characteristics
- Changes in the growth of teachers’ full-time equivalent nominal base pay by age and across school type and individual characteristics.
- The within- and between-school variance in teachers’ and leaders’ full-time equivalent nominal base pay.
- Changes in the mobility of teachers across school type and individual characteristics.


It is important to note that the analysis was descriptive and therefore any changes should not be causally attributed to the reforms. Also, any impacts of the reforms that occurred after the latest available data (November 2015) are not reflected in this report.

7.3.1 Changes in the level of teachers’ and leaders’ pay

The level of pay for teachers increased very slightly in nominal terms and declined slightly in real terms (accounting for inflation) between 2010 and 2015.

Figure 10 compares the base pay for teachers in 2012 and 2015. The distribution is shown according to teachers’ age, which is used as a proxy for years of teaching as this information is not collected in the SWC. The dashed horizontal lines indicate the bottom of the main pay range, top of the main pay range, and top of the upper pay range in 2015 for reference.

Figure 10 Average base pay (full-time equivalent base pay) for teachers in England in 2012 and 2015 (£1,000s)




Source: Longitudinal SWC.

The general pattern across both years is a steep earnings gradient for younger teachers, followed by a shallower earnings gradient.

The average nominal pay for teachers remained very similar across the period, although the figure shows that there was an increase in base pay across the middle and upper part of the age distribution. For example, average base pay for teachers aged 40 in 2015 was around £35,700, compared to around £34,600 for teachers aged 40 in 2012. Once inflation is taken into account, the average pay for teachers decreased by around 2% in real terms between 2012 and 2015.

Figure 11 gives the equivalent picture for the pay of school leaders. Note that this analysis excludes leaders aged 27 or below as there were fewer than 500 observations per age group.

Figure 11 Average base pay (full-time equivalent base pay) for leaders in England in 2012 and 2015 (£1,000s)



Source: Longitudinal SWC.

The figure shows a linear relationship between pay and age for school leaders. The average pay for leaders was slightly higher in nominal terms in 2015 than in 2012, by around £1,200. After taking account of inflation, this equates to a decrease of around 1% in real terms.

The analysis presented so far has focused on base pay, without considering potential changes in additional payments for teachers. Small nominal increases in base pay across the period have been partly offset by a small decline in the prevalence of additional payments for teachers, from around 38% receiving an additional payment in 2013, to around 36% in 2015. The average nominal value for those that receive an additional payment remained similar (although slightly lower than the nominal value before the reforms). The decline in use of additional payments means that teachers who no longer received an additional payment will have experienced a larger decrease in *total pay* than the decrease in base pay reported above.

7.3.2 Changes in the variation of annual pay awards

The evidence shows only small changes in the variation of teachers' and leaders' pay after the reforms. The variation of teachers' and leaders' pay has changed over time, but these changes were small (in the case of teachers) and not clearly related to the timing of the reforms (for leaders).

The variation in the annual pay awards for teachers increased following the reforms, although not universally. However, this period coincided with recommendations from the STRB to increase the maxima and/or minima of the teacher pay ranges and consequent changes in the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document (DfE, 2013a) so any increase in variation is likely to reflect these changes, in addition to the introduction of PRP.

Many schools were still awarding annual increases in line with the reference spine points provided by the teacher unions, suggesting that the existing pay ranges and points in operation before the reforms were still being used. However, the increase in variation around these reference spine points suggests that at least some schools had moved away from using them. For example, the percentage of teachers on the upper pay range awarded a pay increase in line with these spine point increases (between 3 and 4%) declined from 27% for pay awards between 2010 and 2011 to 12% for pay awards between 2014 and 2015. The percentage of teachers on the main pay range awarded a pay increase in line with these spine point increases (between 7 and 8%) declined from 50% for pay awards between 2010 and 2011 to 22% for pay awards between 2014 and 2015.

There was considerable variation in the continued adherence to (now reference) spine points across the country. Some LAs had around 60% of teachers with changes in pay consistent with movement up the reference spine points, compared to other LAs with less than 10%.

The combination of increased variation in teachers' annual pay awards and a largely flat average level of teachers' pay suggests that some teachers were experiencing lower pay awards than before the reform, while others were experiencing higher pay awards.

7.3.3 Changes in relation to teacher mobility

Teachers' salaries on moving to a new school appear to have been affected by the removal of 'pay portability'. Some schools seemed to be using their flexibility to offer lower salaries to new teachers in equivalent positions.

There was an increase in the proportion of teachers moving schools to equivalent positions who received a lower nominal salary (from 5.5% between 2012 and 2013, to 8.9 % between 2013 and 2014, and 7.4% between 2014 and 2015), although this only affected a small proportion of teachers.

There was a larger increase in the proportion of teachers that moved schools to an equivalent position and received a nominal base pay equivalent to a lower reference spine point. This is because reference spine points increased between years, while nominal base pay could remain constant.

There were increases in the percentage of teachers that left their school each year between 2010 and 2015. This was reflected in increases in the percentage of teachers that moved between state-funded schools in England each year from 2010 to 2015. However, these patterns are more consistent with a general time trend than any effect of the reforms on the size and composition of the teacher workforce.

7.3.4 Changes in progression across pay ranges

There was some evidence of increased flexibility in progression across pay ranges. Progression from the main to upper pay range for teachers has stayed relatively constant over time, between roughly 12% and 13% each year. As expected, those at the top of the main pay range were more likely to receive progression to the upper pay range than those below the top. For example, between 2010 and 2011, 35.5% of those at the top of the main pay range progressed to the upper pay range, compared to 2.7% of those below the top of the main pay range.

Increased flexibility in progression is evident, as those below the top of the main pay range had the largest growth in progression to the upper pay range across the period (2.7% between 2010 and 2011 compared to 7.8% between 2014 and 2015). This possibly reflects more flexibility in teachers' pay and progression as a result of the reforms, as teachers are less rigidly paid according to typical (now reference) spine point progression.

7.3.5 Evidence of changes in pay equality

As noted previously, the introduction of PRP for teachers was accompanied by concerns by teachers' unions that the progression of female teachers relative to male teachers, and ethnic minority teachers relative to White British teachers, would be unfairly disadvantaged (ATL, 2015 and [ATL and NUT, 2017](#); NASUWT, 2015).

The analysis explored the patterns in the level and variation of teachers' pay and the level and variation in annual pay awards for female and minority ethnic teachers. In general, there was little evidence that particular groups have been disadvantaged as a result of the reforms to teachers' pay. However, more in-depth research, which would take account of the distribution of teachers across teacher pay regions and school types, would be needed to state this conclusively.

8. Discussion and conclusions

This section discusses the evidence in relation to the evaluation's main aims.

8.1 Tracking schools' progress in implementing pay reforms

The findings suggest that, as expected, almost all LA maintained schools had implemented pay reforms by spring 2015. More surprising perhaps, is the finding that most academies had also implemented pay reforms. The most commonly-adopted reforms were to adopt PRP, enable different rates of progression and abolish automatic progression on the main pay range. Fewer (though still a majority) had introduced more flexibility in deciding starting salaries for newly recruited teachers and/or had removed pay portability.

Although it might have been expected that schools would adopt different pay structures from their neighbours, this does not appear to have been the case. The findings reveal some reluctance among schools to 'stand out' from their neighbours, as demonstrated by the finding that 84% of headteachers reported that their pay policies were similar to or the same as other schools in their local area. The case studies provided some insights into the reasons for this. Headteachers found it convenient to adopt the same (LA) policy; they were concerned about the additional work involved in devising and negotiating a different policy; and/or they wanted to avoid the risks involved in 'going it alone'.

8.2 Changes to schools' behaviour

Most schools reported minimal changes in their behaviour. Findings from both the surveys and the case studies revealed that the most common types of evidence used for performance management included both objective measures (such as pupil progress and attainment) and subjective measures (such as classroom observation). However, the majority of headteachers said they were using these evidence sources before the pay reforms. Nevertheless, this is in line with the research evidence on good PRP systems (MET, 2013; Rockoff and Speroni, 2010), which suggests that both objective and subjective evidence can be informative in identifying teacher effectiveness.

Evidence from the case-study visits to eight schools suggested that teachers' performance objectives were now more closely aligned to school improvement targets, and that, as a result of the pay reforms, some schools had become more specific about the type and nature of evidence that they required. Across the case-study sample, there had been a move towards more regular review and appraisal of teachers' performance throughout the year, rather than leaving it to the annual performance review meeting at the start of the school year. However, most case-study interviewees thought it was too early to say whether the reforms had led to positive impacts on teacher recruitment and retention.

The evidence shows only small changes in the variation of teachers' and leaders' pay following the pay reforms. The average base pay received by teachers and leaders was very similar in 2012 and 2015, although slightly higher in nominal terms for leaders. However, there was evidence that annual pay awards had changed as a result of the pay reforms, with noticeably more variation around previously-used reference levels for pay awards. There was also a decrease in the use of additional payments for teachers, which might suggest some movement of monetary compensation from additional payments to base pay. There was an increase in the proportion of teachers moving schools who received a lower rate of pay, and an increase in the proportion of teachers below the top of the main pay range moving to the upper pay range in 2015 than in 2012; both of these practices were enabled by the pay reforms.

8.3 Perceptions of reform amongst teachers and school leaders

This research confirmed findings from previous research (Policy Exchange, 2013; O'Beirne and Pyle, 2014; Marsden, 2015), indicating that teachers had mixed views on the desirability and impact of the pay reforms.

The findings from this research reveal that most teachers felt their schools had implemented the pay reforms well, in terms of clarity and consistency of application. Most teachers felt that they understood their school's pay policy, objectives were easy to measure and it helped to achieve school priorities. Over half agreed that it had made 'no difference' to the way they worked. However, a majority felt the reforms had added to their workload, and only a minority felt the reforms encouraged them to achieve better results for their pupils.

Headteachers' views on the implementation and impact of their schools' pay reforms were largely similar to the views of teachers. However, a greater proportion of headteachers (63%) reported that teachers had been involved in revising their pay policy than the proportion of teachers (23%) who felt they had had a meaningful opportunity to contribute to their school's policy before it was introduced.

Teachers' unions (ATL, 2015; NASUWT, 2015) have raised equality concerns about the potential for the pay reforms to result in unfair treatment of females and people from black and minority ethnic groups. The analysis of national trends in pay between 2010/11 and 2014/15 found little evidence for this, although there is scope for further investigation of equality issues in relation to pay awards.

8.4 Influence of the reforms among academies

As noted above, the 2015 survey found that the majority (62%) of academies (including free schools) had used their academy freedoms to make changes to their staff pay

policies for classroom teachers and/or leaders even though they did not have to do so (compared to 99% of LA maintained schools, which had done so in response to the pay reforms). The main reasons given by the headteachers of academy schools for not implementing pay reforms were that their pay policies did not need updating. A few headteachers of academies stated that the decision not to change their pay policy was taken by their Trust. The extent of appeals about the outcomes of appraisal was similar in academies and LA maintained schools.

8.5 Conclusion

This research has shown that almost all LA maintained schools and a majority of academies have adopted PRP. The introduction of these reforms appears to have gone smoothly, although many teachers report that the process of gathering and reviewing evidence has added to their workload. It appears that most schools have adopted similar reforms and there is limited evidence of an increased variance in teacher pay, although some evidence of increased variance in teachers' annual pay awards. This is likely to be affected by the period of pay restraint, which coincided with the pay reforms, as well as a desire by headteachers to adopt similar policies to those of neighbouring schools.

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Appendix 1 Sampling and analyses undertaken

A1.1 Sampling strategy

Surveys

The survey sampling strategy is described below. In devising this strategy, the following requirements were considered:

- obtaining a response from a sufficient number of schools to achieve a nationally representative sample of LA maintained schools
- obtaining a response from a sufficient number of schools of different types and phases (i.e. primary LA maintained schools, primary academies, secondary LA maintained schools, secondary academies and Free Schools) to achieve a representative sample for each group
- having a sufficient number of schools in the sample to approach over the life of the project
- avoiding approaching schools unnecessarily (i.e. if the benefit to the research in achieving an additional response is outweighed by the burden on schools)
- assuming a realistic response rate
- achieving a suitable level of precision.

Due to the substantial difference in the number of primary LA maintained schools compared to secondary LA maintained schools (as of September 2014, there was approximately a 10:1 ratio), the team drew independent samples of primary and secondary schools¹⁶. This was done for both primary and secondary LA maintained schools and for secondary academies/free schools. This enabled the research to achieve an acceptable level of precision for the analysis of outcomes at group level. The resulting aggregate sample can be described as a disproportionate stratified sample, with the main strata being defined by the school's phase and type (LA maintained or Academy/Free School). The individual sub-samples of primary and secondary schools were then further stratified by geographical location (three regions: north, midlands and south) and level of deprivation of the pupil population (four groups in relation to the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals (FSM) in the school).

The teacher survey was targeted at schools in which the headteacher had completed the CATI survey. Headteachers were asked to make the survey available to all teaching

¹⁶ The samples were drawn from the SWC and matched to NFER's Register of Schools. The Register is NFER's extensive database of educational establishments in the UK and overseas. The information on the Register is updated through daily interaction with schools and through annual school census updates. The Register is an important tool which facilitates the selection of randomly stratified samples of schools, and the management of communications with schools.

staff. The research team assumed that they would receive responses from teachers in about half of the schools, with a larger number of responses from teachers in secondary than primary schools because secondary schools employ more teaching staff.

The plan was to achieve a total of 1,018 responses from teachers, from 239 different schools, comprising responses from 510 teachers from LA maintained schools and 508 teachers from academies and free schools¹⁷. Following the same approach used for the headteacher survey, the sample of schools involved can be described as a disproportionate stratified sample, with the main strata being defined by the school's phase and type.

Case studies

In order to gather a more in-depth understanding of the reform implementation process, a series of school case studies were undertaken between October and November 2015, focussing on the experiences of eight schools. The visits were followed up by telephone interviews with seven of the eight headteachers in April 2016 to explore whether the reforms had become embedded.

Schools were selected to:

- provide examples of where a number of different reforms had been introduced
- explore barriers or challenges to implementation
- include both academies and LA maintained schools.

Selected school-level characteristics of the schools are presented in Table 6.

The case studies consisted of qualitative interviews with headteachers and other senior school leaders (such as deputy and assistant headteachers), teachers and governors. In total, 50 interviews were undertaken: eight with headteachers; eight with senior leaders; 28 with teachers; and six with governors.

¹⁷ To estimate the required sample size, it was assumed that teachers' perceptions and attitudes are more likely to differ across schools than within the same school. This assumed a positive correlation between responses from teachers within the same school of +0.2.

Table 6 Selected characteristics of the eight case-study schools

	School type	Age range	Number on roll	GOR	Pupils with a statement of SEN or education, health and care (EHC) plan	Pupils eligible for free school meals at any time during the past 6 years	Pupils whose first language is not English	Performance**
1.	Secondary LA maintained	11-16	570	South East	1%	18%	5%	51%
2.	Secondary academy	11-18	1650	South East	1%	14%	2%	64%
3.	Secondary academy	11-16	1050	North West	<1%	26%	4%	64%
4.	Primary academy	5-11	400	South East	1%	34%	2%	41%
5.	Secondary LA maintained	11-16	870	South East	1%	54%	1%	38%
6.	Primary LA maintained (infant)	4-7	250	North West	3%	38%	10%	N/A (infants only)
7.	Primary LA maintained	4-11	210	North West	1%	3%	1%	87%
8.	Secondary LA maintained	11-16	1470	South East	1%	19%	17%	59%

**For secondary schools this relates to percentage of students achieving 5+ A*-C GCSEs (or equivalent) including English and maths GCSEs in 2015; for primary schools this relates to the percentage of pupils meeting the expected standard in reading, writing and maths at key stage 2

Note that frequencies and percentages have been rounded to protect anonymity.

A1.2 Analyses undertaken

The following analyses have been undertaken on the headteacher and teacher survey data:

1. Analysis of the sample representativeness of the headteacher CATI survey and teacher survey. The analysis compared the schools that responded to each survey with all schools in the register of schools, according to the variables that were used to stratify the four phase-type samples (FSM quintile, region) and other variables of interest (school size). Sample weights have been applied (see section A1.2 below) to the different phases and types because they have been disproportionately sampled: this means that our analysis of both surveys is nationally representative.
2. Basic descriptive analysis of responses to survey questions for both the headteacher and teacher surveys.
3. Comparison of how responses differ between phase and type to explore how practice and changes differ in academies and LA maintained primary and secondary schools. The team carried out significance testing (such as Chi Square or ANOVA) in order to identify statistically valid statements about the differences between groups in relation to their observed characteristics. Statistically significant differences are reported in the body of the report.
4. Explored how teachers' attitudes towards pay reform are related to their characteristics, such as pay range, experience and age, using cross-tabulations and Chi Square tests. Statistically significant differences are reported in the body of the report.

A1.3 Weighting and margins of error

Responses were received from four separate samples of headteachers that were drawn at the outset. These were designed to be fairly evenly matched in size to improve the precision with which the averages of samples could be compared with one another. Comparing these sub-groups (e.g. primary LA maintained versus primary academy) can be done without weights because the frequency percentages are representative of the sub-population (leaving aside stratifier variables, FSM band, region and school size).

However, the samples are not representative of the overall population of schools when they are combined. For example, primary LA maintained schools comprise 34% of headteacher responses but make up 74% of schools; conversely, secondary LA maintained schools comprise 21% of headteacher responses but only make up 7% of all schools (see Table 7). Therefore, in order to calculate frequencies that are representative of all schools nationally, weights were applied to the responses according to the sample

they were drawn from. The weight applied to primary LA maintained responses is 2.18 (74% ÷ 34%) and the weight applied to secondary LA maintained responses is 0.31 (7% ÷ 21%). The total weighted N is the same as the un-weighted total N (900).

To compare all primary schools with all secondary schools, slightly different weights were applied. It is important for tests of statistical significance that the weighted Ns of the samples being compared are the same as the un-weighted Ns: otherwise, some confidence intervals would be too wide and others too narrow. Primary LA maintained schools comprise 56% of responses from primary schools but make up 87% of primary schools. Therefore a weight of 1.55 is applied to primary LA maintained schools when comparing primary and secondary schools.

Table 7 Weighting applied to the headteacher survey

	Responses		Population		Weights		
	Number	%	Number	%	Over all	By phase	By type
Primary LA maintained	303	34	14,362	74	2.18	1.55	1.50
Secondary LA maintained	193	21	1,288	7	0.31	0.80	0.21
Primary academy	238	26	2,200	11	0.43	0.30	0.96
Secondary academy	166	18	1,690	9	0.47	1.23	1.06
Total	900	100	19,540	100			

The teacher survey was weighted using the same principle, but a different population (see Table 8). The population is the number (headcount) of teachers in each phase and type of school from the SWC, rather than the number of schools. Continuing the example above, teachers at primary LA maintained schools comprised 12% of responses but make up 45% of all teachers; conversely, teachers at secondary LA maintained schools comprised 33% of responses but only make up 19% of all teachers (see table). The weight applied to primary LA maintained teacher responses is 3.89 (45% ÷ 12%) and the weight applied to secondary LA maintained teacher responses is 0.59 (19% ÷ 33%). Again, to compare all primary schools with all secondary schools, and to compare all academies with all LA maintained schools, slightly different weights were applied, respectively.

Table 8 Weighting applied to the teacher survey

	Responses		Population		Weight		
	Number	%	Number	%	Overall	By phase	By type
Primary LA maintained	124	12	199,343	45	3.89	1.69	2.67
Secondary LA maintained	350	33	85,663	19	0.59	0.97	0.41
Primary academy	122	11	34,036	8	0.68	0.29	1.06
Secondary academy	474	44	122,672	28	0.63	1.02	0.98
Total	1070	100	441,714	100			

The margin of error of a sample is the 95% confidence interval around the sample statistic. Therefore, it is possible to be 95% confident that the sample result reflects the actual population result to within the margin of error. These figures are based on a 50% sample statistic, which is where the margin of error is at its maximum. For example, if 90% of respondents give a particular response, then the margin of error will be smaller than if 50% of respondents give a particular response. However, reporting the margin of error at 50% is a conservative estimate of the margin of error for all questions.

Table 9 shows the margins of error for the 2015 headteacher survey and Table 10 shows the margins of error for the 2015 teacher survey. The margins of error for the teacher survey are based on the 739 teachers from 244 schools that responded to all questions, rather than the 1,070 teachers from 275 schools that responded to at least one question. They therefore represent a conservative estimate of the margin of error for all questions: for some questions the margin of error will be smaller because more teachers answered that particular question.

Table 9 Margins of error for analyses of headteacher survey 2015

Presentation of findings	Margin of error
All schools combined*	-/+ 4.1%
Difference between primary and secondary*	-/+ 6.4%
Difference between LA maintained and academy*	-/+ 6.3%
Difference between primary LA maintained and primary academy*	-/+ 8.2%
Difference between secondary LA maintained and secondary academy*	-/+ 9.7%
4-way split: Primary LA maintained;	-/+ 5.6%
Primary academy;	-/+ 6.0%
Secondary LA maintained;	-/+ 6.5%
Secondary academy.	-/+ 7.2%

*denotes sample has been weighted

Table 10 Margins of error for analyses of teacher survey 2015

Presentation of findings	Margin of error
All schools combined*	-/+ 5.9%
Difference between primary and secondary*	-/+ 9.2%
Difference between LA maintained and academy*	-/+ 8.6%
Difference between primary LA maintained and primary academy*	-/+ 15.1%
Difference between secondary LA maintained and secondary academy*	-/+ 10.8%
4-way split: Primary LA maintained;	-/+ 10.7%
Primary academy;	-/+ 10.6%
Secondary LA maintained;	-/+ 8.1%
Secondary academy.	-/+ 7.1%

*denotes sample has been weighted.

Assumes that responses from teachers within the same school are more strongly correlated than responses between teachers in different schools, which reduces the precision of analysis relative to all responding teachers being from the same school. The ('intra-school') correlation is assumed to be 0.2.

Appendix 2 Survey instruments

This appendix presents the 2015 NFER surveys together with the responses to each question. Note that all the percentages reported in this section are weighted to be representative of the population the sample was drawn from (see Appendix 1 for more details). In some cases where there are small numbers of responses, these are presented as un-weighted N's, and are referred to as such.

A2: Headteacher survey



Evidence for
Excellence in
Education



Department
for Education

Evaluation of Teachers' Pay Reform

Headteacher Questionnaire

You should have received a letter from NFER, informing you that they are undertaking an evaluation of schools' responses to teachers' pay reform for the Department for Education. This survey forms part of a three-year evaluation of the pay reforms being carried out from 2014 to 2017. We hope to speak to many of the same schools in the autumn and in 2016. This evaluation will track schools' progress with implementing the reforms and explore the perceptions of the reforms amongst teachers and school leaders. The study will also explore whether the reforms are influencing behaviour in relation to pay award and progression amongst academies and free schools. NFER will send schools feedback on the results.

As the headteacher, I would like to ask you to take part in a brief telephone interview for the evaluation.

The interview will provide you with an opportunity to reflect on your views on and responses to the reforms and to capture any issues, achievements and impacts to date.

The interview should only take about 20 minutes to complete and your answers will be treated confidentially. Your responses may be linked to other statistical datasets such as the National Pupil Database and the School Workforce Census. This linking is solely for statistical purposes – anonymity will be guaranteed. Is it convenient to interview you now?

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this research.

Part A. Confirming school information

1. Can you confirm that your school is a <maintained/academy> school?

	% (weighted)
Maintained school	79
Academy school	21

N=900

2a. Has your school revised its pay policy as a result of the pay reforms for the maintained sector which came into force in (maintained schools only):

	Yes %	No %
September 2013 affecting classroom teachers	99	1
September 2014 affecting school leaders	83	17

N=488

2b. Has your school used its Academy freedoms to make changes to your staff pay policy? (academy schools only)

	Yes %	No %
For classroom teachers	58	42
For school leaders	47	53

N=412

3. What is the main reason why your school has not implemented pay reforms for classroom teachers?

	N (un-weighted)
The reforms are too difficult to implement in general	1
The reforms are too difficult to implement in a fair way	2
We haven't got around to it yet but plan to in the future	5
The reforms would create tensions between teachers	1
The reforms would undermine the ethos of our school	1
The reforms would undermine teachers' morale/motivation	4
The reforms would impact negatively on teachers' performance	1
Our pay policy was already in place and did not need updating	41
We did not need to adopt pay reform to recruit or motivate teachers	5
Other reason	106
Total	167

N=167

4. Have you sought support or guidance from any of the following sources in relation to your school's current pay policy

	Yes %	No %
The teaching unions	64	36
Your local authority	84	16
School teachers' pay and conditions document (STPCD)	85	15
DfE guidance document: 'Implementing your school's approach to pay'	78	22
Academy chain	8	92
Employed a consultant	12	88
Local schools/networks	61	39
No – I haven't sought advice or guidance from elsewhere	1	99
Other	15	85

N=900

5. Which, if any of the following features have you implemented in your current pay policy?

Affecting classroom teachers

	Yes %	No %
Abolished automatic pay progression on the main pay range	90	10
All progression is now related to performance	98	2
Enable teachers to progress at different rates according to their performance	92	8
Introduced more flexibility to decide starting salaries when recruiting teachers	74	26
Removed the requirement to match teachers' previous salaries (i.e. removed principle of "pay portability")	65	35
Other	7	93

N=720

Affecting school leaders

	Yes %	No %
Set leadership pay based on school size, context and/or challenge	87	13
Changes to the pay of school leaders will apply to existing leadership posts	64	36
Changes to the pay of school leaders will apply to future leadership appointments	88	12
Introduced time-limited Teaching and Learning Allowances (TLR3s)	52	48
Paid teachers on the Leading Practitioner pay range	25	75
Removed the fixed differentials between the pay of different leadership grades	35	65
Set the top of pay range up to 25% above the relevant headteacher group range	40	60
Other	3	97

N.B. The items 'Introduce time-limited Teaching and Learning Allowances (TLR3s)' and 'Paid teachers on the Leading Practitioner pay range' should have been explored with headteachers who reported introducing reforms for classroom teachers and not leaders, as those are the groups they relate to. As a result, they are not reported in the main body of the report.

N=601

6a. Have you changed the number of increments on the Main Pay Range from six?

	%
Yes	10
No	90

N=900

6b. If yes, how many increments do you now use?

	%
3	<1
4	4
5	<1
7	6
8	8
9	16
10	1
11	28
12	30
13	3
14 or more	4

N=94

7a. Have you changed the number of increments on the Upper Pay Range from three?

	%
Yes	7
No	94

N=900

7b. If yes, how many increments do you now use?

	%
0	2
1	2
2	2
4	8
5	40
6	37
7 or more	8

N=70

8. How different would you say your school's pay policy is to those used by other schools in your local area?

	%
Completely different	2
A bit different	5
Similar	52
The same	32
Don't know	9

N=900

9. We are interested in the role played by the governing body. Please confirm to what extent the following statements are true. The governors with responsibility for teachers' pay...

	To a great extent	To some extent	To a small extent	To a very small extent	Not at all
Have played a key role in helping to establish the school's current pay policy	47	36	12	4	2
Have established processes to review the policy on an annual or more frequent basis	68	23	4	2	3
Have taken decisions regarding the pay of deputy and assistant headteachers	62	18	4	2	15
Have been involved in moderating and/or approving the pay decisions for individual teachers	55	24	10	2	10
Have taken decisions on appeals	14	4	2	1	79
Have the relevant skills and training to be effective in their role in relation to pay decisions	44	42	9	3	3
Have the relevant skills and training to be effective in their role in relation to appeals	33	37	14	5	11

N=900

10. How far was affordability a factor when you decided your pay policy?

	%
To a great extent	17
To some extent	23
To a small extent	11
To a very small extent	9
Not at all	39

N=900

11a. To what extent does your school use the following to support the assessment of teacher performance?

	To a great extent %	To some extent %	To a small extent %	To a very small extent %	Not at all %
Pupil attainment or the proportion of pupils reaching the expected national level	69	24	4	1	2
The progress made by pupils as measured by assessment results (taking account of prior attainment)	77	21	1	<1	<1
Pupil assessment results at a group/departmental level	42	35	8	3	12
Classroom observation	58	38	4	1	1
Feedback from pupils	16	48	20	7	10
Feedback from parents/carers	5	36	26	12	21
Teachers' additional responsibilities (such as running after-school clubs)	25	42	12	5	16
Contribution to teamwork from other colleagues	31	52	10	3	5
Feedback from other colleagues	10	42	23	9	16
Participation in Continuing Professional Development	36	49	9	2	3
Evidence of exceeding Teachers' Standards	65	31	3	<1	1
Other measures linked directly to the School Improvement Plan/ self-evaluation process	55	40	2	1	2
Other	16	6	<1	1	77

N=900

11b. Which forms of evidence carry the most weight?

	%
Pupil attainment or the proportion of pupils reaching the expected national level	55
The progress made by pupils as measured by assessment results (taking account of prior attainment)	85
Pupil assessment results at a group/departmental level	19
Classroom observation	49
Feedback from pupils	10
Feedback from parents/carers	7
Teachers' additional responsibilities (such as running after-school clubs)	13
Contribution to teamwork from other colleagues	17
Feedback from other colleagues	11
Participation in Continuing Professional Development	18
Evidence of exceeding Teachers' Standards	28
Other measures linked directly to the School Improvement Plan/ self-evaluation process	23
Other	13

N=900

12a. Were any of these introduced to your school since September 2013?

	Yes %	No %
Pupil attainment or the proportion of pupils reaching the expected national level	6	94
The progress made by pupils as measured by assessment results	9	91
Pupil assessment results at a group/departmental level	5	95
Classroom observation	6	94
Feedback from pupils	7	93
Feedback from parents/carers	5	95
Teachers' additional responsibilities	4	96
Contribution to teamwork	7	94
Feedback from other colleagues	5	95
Participation in Continuing Professional Development	7	93
Evidence of exceeding Teachers' Standards	10	90
Other measures linked directly to the School Improvement Plan/ self-evaluation process	7	93
Other	4	96
None	80	20

N=488

12b. Were any of these introduced to your school since it gained Academy status?

	Yes %	No %
Pupil attainment or the proportion of pupils reaching the expected national level	12	88
The progress made by pupils as measured by assessment results	12	88
Pupil assessment results at a group/departmental level	7	93
Classroom observation	9	91
Feedback from pupils	6	94
Feedback from parents/carers	6	94
Teachers' additional responsibilities	5	95
Contribution to teamwork	6	94
Feedback from other colleagues	5	95
Participation in Continuing Professional Development	10	90
Evidence of exceeding Teachers' Standards	12	88
Other measures linked directly to the School Improvement Plan/ self-evaluation process	9	91
Other	5	95
None	77	23

N=412

13a. In the last performance management cycle (i.e. October 2013-October 2014), approximately how many hours have you spent on activities related to your own appraisal? We are interested in the time spent on all activities that feed into this, including the appraisal itself and time spent gathering information and evidence.

	Hours
25 th percentile	5
Median (50 th percentile)	8
75 th percentile	15

N=900

13b. Compared with the previous performance management cycle (i.e. October 2012-October 2013), has the amount of time you have spent on activities related to your own appraisal decreased, stayed the same, or increased, and to what extent?

	%
Decreased a lot	1
Decreased a little bit	1
Stayed the same	60
Increase a little bit	16
Increased a lot	13
Don't know	2
n/a not in headship role during last performance management cycle	8

14a. In the last performance management cycle (October 2013-October 2014), approximately how many hours have you spent on activities related to appraising other teachers?

	Hours
25 th percentile	20
Median (50 th percentile)	40
75 th percentile	80

N=900

14b. Compared with the previous performance management cycle (October 2012-October 2013), has the amount of time you have spent on activities related to appraising other teachers decreased, stayed the same, or increased, and to what extent?

	%
Decreased a lot	1
Decreased a little bit	1
Stayed the same	40
Increase a little bit	20
Increased a lot	31
n/a not in headship role during last performance management cycle	8

N=900

15a. Did any teachers appeal the outcomes of their appraisal this year?

	%
Yes	6
No	94

N=900

15b. If yes, how many?

	%
1	62
2	20
3	11
4	3
5	<1
6	2
8	1

N=87

16. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

My school's pay policy...	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Neither agree nor disagree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %
Ensures that objectives are easy to measure	1	4	7	45	43
Ensures the appraisal process is consistent for all teachers	1	2	2	28	68
Ensures training on appraisal/performance management	2	6	13	47	32
Helps my school to recruit the best teachers	9	17	32	26	16
Helps my school to retain the best teachers	5	11	21	38	25
Helps my school to recognise and reward high performance	1	5	10	43	41
Helps my school address particular recruitment needs e.g. shortage subjects	9	18	32	30	12
Helps my school to motivate teachers that are underperforming	8	17	22	38	15
Helps my school to further motivate teachers that are performing well	4	8	14	47	27
Supports the achievement of my school's priorities	3	4	10	52	31
Results in a fair allocation of pay for staff in my school	1	4	10	49	35
Strengthens the basis for sound financial planning	3	12	17	43	25
Strengthens the basis for sound personnel planning	4	10	19	47	21
Heightens the risk of teachers feeling aggrieved/discriminated against	15	28	15	29	14
Gives teachers in my school greater incentive to focus on pupil attainment and/or progress	7	13	13	45	22
Makes teachers in my school take the appraisal process more seriously	3	7	9	46	35

N=900

17. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

The reforms to teachers' pay in the maintained sector will...	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Neither agree nor disagree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %
Increase competition between schools for the best staff	7	17	24	40	13
Strengthen the quality of teaching for the profession as a whole	7	22	21	39	10
Lead to some good teachers leaving the profession	7	28	20	34	12

N=900

18. We are interested in your experience of revising your school's pay policy. Using the same scale, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Neither agree nor disagree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %
Teachers in my school were involved in the process of revising the school's pay policy	9	16	12	43	20
Most of my teachers are against linking pay progression to performance appraisal	6	36	28	20	10
Teachers in my school feel that the appraisal system is fair	1	2	16	63	18
Most of the teachers in my school have reacted positively to the revisions made to the school's pay policy	1	5	26	50	18

N=720

19a. Is there anything that the pay reforms you have introduced will enable the school to achieve that it otherwise wouldn't be able to?

	%
Yes	47
No	51
Not sure	3

N=720

19b. If yes, what?

	%
Focus on getting higher standards	11
More control over finances	7
Enables to identify or reward good or bad practice	28
Enabled to create new roles	1
Created a clearer understanding of what is required of teachers	3
A higher standard of teachers apply or can be recruited	10
Improved accountability	7
Helps us to retain good staff	11
TLR or TLR3 payments are very beneficial	7
Other	10
No Answer	<1
No Relevant Answer	5

N=344

20a. Have the changes to your school's pay policy affected your total pay (as an individual) for this academic year?

	%
Yes	17
No	82
Don't know	1

N=601

20b. If yes, has your pay...

	%
Increased more than expected?	28
Increased as much as expected?	55
Increased less than expected?	17

N=139

21. To what extent are you satisfied with the following?

	Very satisfied %	Quite satisfied %	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied %	Quite dissatisfied %	Very dissatisfied %
The way your own most recent appraisal was conducted?	59	28	7	3	3
The decision, resulting from your own most recent appraisal, on your own pay?	54	28	13	3	3

N=900

Part E. Reported impacts/improvements

22a. Has the introduction of pay reform in your school had a positive impact on teacher recruitment so far?

	%
Yes	7
No	52
Not applicable	31
Don't know	11

N=900

22b. If yes, has pay reform enabled you to recruit:

	Yes %	No %
More teachers?	37	63
Teachers who have the expertise/experience for hard-to-fill vacancies?	68	32
Teachers who have a more varied set of skills?	56	44
Teachers for priority subject areas?	42	58

N=68

23a. Has pay reform in your school had a positive impact on your ability to keep your existing teachers?

	%
Yes	33
No	43
Not applicable	16
Don't know	8

N=900

23b. If yes, has pay reform enabled you to retain:

	Yes %	No %
Your best teachers?	88	12
Your most ambitious teachers?	81	19
Teachers in shortage subject areas?	23	77
Teachers who are middle leaders (e.g. head of department, head of year)	68	32
Teachers who are senior leaders (e.g. assistant or deputy head)	64	37
Better qualified teachers?	39	61
More experienced teachers?	46	54

N=301

Part F. Questions about you

This section asks some questions about you. The information will be used to help us understand how different groups of teachers have responded to the reforms.

24. Are you:

	%
Male	37
Female	64

N=900

25. What is your age range?

	%
Under 30	<1
30-40	13
41-50	42
51-60	40
61-65	4
Over 65	<1
Prefer not to say	1

N=900

26. How long have you been a Headteacher?

	%
Less than a year	6
1-2 years	11
3-5 years	19
6-10 years	30
11-15 years	17
16-20 years	9
More than 20 years	8

N=900

27. How long have you been a Headteacher of this school?

	%
Less than a year	10
1-2 years	17
3-5 years	25
6-10 years	31
11-15 years	10
16-20 years	4
More than 20 years	3

N=900

A2.2 The teacher survey



Evidence for
Excellence in
Education



Department
for Education

Evaluation of Teachers' Pay Reform

Teacher Questionnaire

The National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) has been asked by the Department for Education (DfE) to carry out an evaluation into teacher pay reform. This questionnaire forms part of a three-year evaluation of the pay reforms being carried out from 2014 to 2017. We plan to survey teachers in many of the same schools in spring 2016. The evaluation will explore teachers' experiences and views as schools implement the reforms. The study will also explore whether the reforms are influencing behaviour in relation to pay award and progression amongst academies and free schools.

The questionnaire will provide you with an opportunity to reflect on the reforms and how they are affecting you and your school.

The questionnaire should only take about **15 minutes** to complete and your answers will be treated confidentially. Your responses may be linked to other statistical datasets such as the National Pupil Database and the School Workforce Census. This linking is solely for statistical purposes – anonymity will be guaranteed. If returning as a paper copy, we would be grateful if you could complete the questionnaire in **BLACK INK**.

If you have any queries about the completion of this survey, or would like further information about the evaluation exercise, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Thank you in advance for your help with this important research.

Part A. Implementation of pay reform

This section contains questions about what, if any, pay reforms your school has implemented.

1a. Has your school revised its pay policy as a result of the pay reforms for the maintained sector which came into force in:

Please select one answer in each row

	Yes %	No %	Don't know %	Missing %
September 2013 affecting classroom teachers?				
September 2014 affecting school leaders?				

N=474

1b. Has your school used its Academy freedoms to make changes to its staff pay policy for:

Please select one answer in each row

	Yes %	No %	Don't know %	Missing %
Classroom teachers?	40	23	34	4
School leaders?	21	11	57	12

N=596

2. To what extent...

Please select one answer in each row

	To a great extent %	To some extent %	To a small extent %	To a very small extent %	Not at all %	Don't know / not sure %	N/A %
Do you feel you understand your school's pay policy?	18	48	15	10	5	3	1
Do you feel you had a meaningful opportunity to feed into your school's pay policy, prior to it being introduced?	9	14	11	11	42	6	8
Do you feel you have had adequate training on your school's appraisal and performance mgt system?	18	34	17	14	14	1	2

N=1020

3. In the following table, please indicate the extent to which your school does the following activities to support the assessment of teacher performance.
Please select one answer in each row

	To a great extent	To some extent	To a small extent	To a very small extent	Not at all	Don't know / not sure	N/A	Missing
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Use pupil assessment results to evidence individual teachers' performance	54	31	6	2	1	4	<1	2
Use pupil assessment results to evidence teachers' performance at a group/departmental level	36	31	9	4	6	10	2	3
Use classroom observation to evidence performance	58	30	5	1	2	2	<1	2
Use examples of lesson plans	11	27	20	14	18	8	<1	3
Use feedback from pupils	12	30	13	14	18	11	<1	2
Use feedback from parents/carers	5	24	13	12	25	16	1	3
Use teachers' additional responsibilities (such as running after-school clubs)	12	26	15	12	24	9	1	2
Use contribution to teamwork from other colleagues	13	25	17	10	20	13	<1	2
Use feedback from other colleagues	7	21	16	11	22	19	1	3
Use participation in Continuing Professional Development	20	32	15	10	11	11	<1	2
Use evidence of exceeding Teachers' Standards	31	29	12	6	7	11	<1	3
Other measures linked directly to the School Improvement Plan/ self-evaluation process	28	31	11	4	4	17	1	2
Other	1	1	<1	<1	1	10	25	61

N=952

- 4a. (Maintained schools) For the options you selected in Question 3, please indicate
a) whether the activities were introduced to your school since September 2013;
and b) which forms of evidence carry the most weight.

	Part a): introduced since September 2013? <i>Please select one for each row</i>				Part b): carries most weight? <i>Please select as many as required</i>
	Yes %	No %	Don't know %	Missing %	Yes %
Use pupil assessment results to evidence individual teachers' performance	52	30	16	2	87
Use pupil assessment results to evidence teachers' performance at a group/departmental level	46	30	22	2	30
Use classroom observation to evidence performance	56	32	12	2	82
Use examples of lesson plans	33	48	17	2	6
Use feedback from pupils	38	39	21	2	16
Use feedback from parents/carers	28	43	27	3	3
Use teachers' additional responsibilities (such as running after-school clubs)	31	41	26	2	21
Use contribution to teamwork from other colleagues	32	42	24	2	17
Use feedback from other colleagues	29	44	25	3	12
Use participation in Continuing Professional Development	42	37	19	3	30
Use evidence of exceeding Teachers' Standards	49	29	20	2	44
Other measures linked directly to the School Improvement Plan/ self- evaluation process	50	27	20	3	35

N=363

- 4b. (Academy Schools) For the same set of options, please indicate a) whether the activities selected were introduced to your school since it gained Academy status; and b) which forms of evidence carry the most weight.

	Part a): introduced since Academy status? <i>Please select one for each row</i>				Part b): carries most weight? <i>Please select as many as required</i>
	Yes %	No %	Don't know %	Missing %	Yes %
Use pupil assessment results to evidence individual teachers' performance	47	35	17	1	78
Use pupil assessment results to evidence teachers' performance at a group/departmental level	41	36	22	1	37
Use classroom observation to evidence performance	40	40	18	1	73
Use examples of lesson plans	21	53	25	1	4
Use feedback from pupils	28	45	25	2	12
Use feedback from parents/carers	18	52	29	1	4
Use teachers' additional responsibilities (such as running after-school clubs)	25	47	27	1	11
Use contribution to teamwork from other colleagues	23	51	25	1	9
Use feedback from other colleagues	25	50	23	2	8
Use participation in Continuing Professional Development	35	41	22	2	25
Use evidence of exceeding Teachers' Standards	37	38	23	1	30
Other measures linked directly to the School Improvement Plan/ self-evaluation process	35	34	29	2	18

N=394

5. In your view, to what extent does the school's appraisal process provide an accurate and reliable basis for recommendations for teacher pay?

Please select one

To a great extent %	To some extent %	To a small extent %	To a very small extent %	Not at all %	Don't know / not sure %	Missing %
17	35	18	13	8	7	2

N=842

- 6a) In the last performance management cycle (i.e. October 2013-October 2014), approximately how many hours have you spent on activities related to your own appraisal?

We are interested in the time spent on all activities that feed into this, including the appraisal itself and time spent gathering information and evidence.

Please enter the hours in the box

	Hours
25 th percentile	2
Median (50 th percentile)	6
75 th percentile	15

N=824

- 6b) Compared with the previous performance management cycle (i.e. October 2012-October 2013), has the amount of time you have spent on activities related to your own appraisal a) changed; and b) to what extent?

Part a) (Please select one)	
	%
Decreased?	3
Stayed the same?	43
Increased?	49
Missing	6

	Part b) (Please select one)			
	A lot %	A little %	Don't know %	Missing %
Decreased?	40	49	11	0
Stayed the same?	46	34	18	2
Increased?	62	33	4	1

N=816

- 7a) In the last performance management cycle (i.e. October 2013-October 2014), approximately how many hours have you spent on activities related to appraising other teachers?

We are interested in the time spent on all activities that feed into this, including the appraisal itself and time spent gathering information and evidence.

Please enter the hours in the box

	Hours
25 th percentile	0
Median (50 th percentile)	0
75 th percentile	6

Note: 49% of teachers reported at least one hour spent on activities related to appraising other teachers.

N=807

7b) Compared with the previous performance management cycle (i.e. October 2012-October 2013), has the amount of time you have spent on activities related to appraising other teachers a) changed; and b) to what extent?

Part a) (Please select one)	
	%
Decreased?	3
Stayed the same?	64
Increased?	25
Missing	8

Part b) (Please select one)				
	A lot %	A little %	Don't know %	Missing %
Decreased?	25	53	22	0
Stayed the same?	38	25	35	2
Increased?	59	34	6	1

N=802

8. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Please select one answer in each row

The pay policy in my school ...	To a great extent %	To some extent %	To a small extent %	To a very small extent %	Not at all %	Don't know / not sure %	Missing %
Treats all teachers equally without favouritism	36	24	10	6	8	13	2
Is clear and easy to understand	22	35	17	8	8	8	2
Is <u>applied</u> consistently across all teachers	31	21	11	7	10	19	2

N=796

9a) Did you appeal the outcome of your appraisal this year? (Please select one answer)

	%
Yes	2
No	95
Missing	3

N=795

9b) If yes, was your appeal successful? (Please select one answer)

	%
Yes	21
No	34
Do not yet know	45

N=24

Part B. Attitudes to school's pay policies and to the national teacher pay reforms

This section asks for your views on your school's pay policy and on the national teacher pay reforms affecting maintained schools

10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Please select one answer in each row

My school's pay policy...	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Missing
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ensures that objectives are easy to measure	5	13	21	48	11	3
Ensures training on appraisal/performance management	7	20	22	40	8	4
Helps my school to motivate teachers that are underperforming	14	27	29	22	5	4
Helps my school to further motivate teachers that are performing well	14	21	25	31	7	3
Supports the achievement of my school's priorities	7	10	23	46	12	3
Results in a fair allocation of pay for staff in my school	10	22	31	27	7	4
Heightens the risk of teachers feeling aggrieved/discriminated against	6	20	28	30	12	4
Gives teachers in my school greater incentive to focus on pupil attainment and/or progress	10	19	23	37	8	4
Makes teachers in my school take the appraisal process more seriously	6	18	24	35	15	3

N=768

11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Please select one answer in each row

The reforms to teachers' pay in maintained schools will...	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Missing
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Increase competition between schools for the best staff	12	23	33	24	6	3
Strengthen the quality of teaching for the profession as a whole	23	33	19	20	4	3
Lead to some good teachers leaving the profession	1	7	10	37	43	2

N=764

- 12a) *[Only answer this question if your school has revised its pay policy as a result of the pay reforms for the maintained sector – see Question 1]
Or [Only answer this question if your school has used its Academy freedoms to make changes to its staff pay policy – see your answer to question 1]*

Have the changes to your school's pay policy affected your total pay (as an individual) for this academic year?

Please select one answer

	%
Yes	30
No	63
Do not yet know	7
Missing	<1
Total	100

N=403

- 12b) **If yes, has your pay...**

Please select one answer

	%
Increased more than expected?	12
Increased as much as expected?	34
Increased less than expected?	21
Remained the same?	31
Missing	1
Total	100

N=122

13. **To what extent are you satisfied with...**

Please select one answer for each row

	Very satisfied	Quite satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Quite dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Missing
	%	%	%	%	%	%
The way your own most recent appraisal was conducted?	32	32	21	8	3	3
The decision, resulting from your own most recent appraisal, on your own pay?	33	23	28	8	6	3

N=759

Part C. Reported impacts/improvements

This section asks questions about the impacts resulting from your school's pay policy, and your views on the early or emerging impacts that have resulted from the national reforms.

14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Please select one answer for each row

My school's pay policy...	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Neither agree nor disagree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %	Missing %
Makes no difference to the way I work	6	20	14	34	24	2
Encourages me to achieve better academic results for my pupils	21	28	24	20	5	2
Discourages me from taking part in activities that do not directly impact on pupil attainment	15	32	20	20	12	2
Encourages me to try out new ideas in the classroom	16	32	31	17	2	2
Adds to my workload	4	10	18	36	30	2
Makes my relationship with other teachers more competitive rather than collaborative	11	30	25	20	13	2
Encourages me to seek opportunities for promotion	14	29	32	17	5	3
Encourages me to stay in my current school	11	20	43	15	8	3
Encourages me to stay in teaching in the maintained sector	18	23	42	11	4	2
Discourages me from applying for the same post in a different school	7	15	47	18	11	2

N=752

15a. To date, to what extent has the introduction of pay reform impacted on your school's ability to... Please select one answer for each row

	To a great extent %	To some extent %	To a small extent %	To a very small extent %	Not at all %	Don't know / not sure %	Missing %
Retain its existing teachers?	6	14	9	9	29	31	2
Recruit new teachers?	3	13	10	6	25	42	2
Recognise and reward individual teachers' high performance?	7	14	10	12	30	26	2

N=335

15b. To date, to what extent have the Academy freedoms governing teachers' pay impacted on your school's ability to... Please select one answer for each row

	To a great extent %	To some extent %	To a small extent %	To a very small extent %	Not at all %	Don't know / not sure %	Missing %
Retain its existing teachers?	4	14	12	9	31	30	2
Recruit new teachers?	3	14	11	7	27	36	2
Recognise and reward individual teachers' high performance?	3	15	11	12	32	27	2

N=230

Part D. Questions about you

This section asks some questions about you. The information will be used to help us understand how different groups of teachers have responded to the reforms.

16. Are you: (Please select one)

	%
Male	27
Female	71
Missing	2

N=743

17. Which pay range are you on? (Please select one)

	%
Main	35
Upper	49
Leading practitioner	2
Unqualified teacher	1
Leadership	12
Missing	2

N=743

18. What point are you at on your pay range (if relevant)?

	%
0	47
1	8
2	9
3	15
4	3
5	4
6	9
Other response	6

N=743

19a) Do you receive any additional teaching and learning responsibility payments (TLRs)?
(Please select one answer)

	%
Yes	37
No	62
Missing	1

N=741

19b) If yes, how many? (Please enter in the box)

	%
0	8
1	48
2	20
3	3
4	1
Other response	20

N=356

20. What is your age range? *(Please select one answer)*

	%
Under 30	20
30-40	35
41-50	24
51-60	15
61-65	2
Over 65	0
Prefer not to say	3
Missing	1

N=740

21. How long have you been a teacher? *(Please select one answer)*

	%
Less than a year	1
1-2 years	8
3-5 years	16
6-10 years	25
11-15 years	17
16-20 years	10
More than 20 years	21
Missing	3

N=739

22. How long have you been a teacher at this school? *(Please select one answer)*

	%
Less than a year	6
1-2 years	15
3-5 years	24
6-10 years	25
11-15 years	16
16-20 years	5
More than 20 years	6
Missing	3

N=739

23. What is your highest level of qualification? *(Please select one answer)*

	%
Doctorate/PhD (e.g. Level 8)	1
Masters degree/post-Graduate diploma or equivalent (e.g. Level 7)	19
Postgraduate Certificate in Education (PGCE)	48
Bachelors/Honours degree or equivalent (e.g. Level 6)	30
A level or equivalent (e.g. Level 3)	<1
GCSE higher grade pass (e.g. Level 2) or equivalent	<1
Missing	1

N=739



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