Country Policy and Information Note
Algeria: Fear of Islamic terrorist groups

Version 1.0

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Preface

This note provides country of origin information (COI) and policy guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the policy guidance contained with this note; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Country information

COI in this note has been researched in accordance with principles set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI) and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, namely taking into account its relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability.

All information is carefully selected from generally reliable, publicly accessible sources or is information that can be made publicly available. Full publication details of supporting documentation are provided in footnotes. Multiple sourcing is normally used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, and that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided. Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of views and opinions. The inclusion of a source is not an endorsement of it or any views expressed.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.

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The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/
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1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of claim

1.1.1 Fear of persecution or serious harm by members of Islamic terrorist groups because of a person’s actual or perceived political or religious opposition to the groups. This may include those who fear such a group having had a previous association with it.

1.2 Points to note

1.2.1 This note does not deal with the state treatment of current or former Islamist terrorists.

1.2.2 In this note the word ‘Daesh’ is used to describe the Islamic terrorist group, often referred to as Islamic State and abbreviated to ISIS, ISIL or IS. Quoted material may use any of these or other terms.

2. Consideration of issues

2.1 Credibility

2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

2.2 Exclusion

2.2.1 Some persons may claim to fear Islamic terrorist groups because of a previous association with such a group. These groups have committed human rights violations and abuses (see Non-state armed groups).

2.2.2 If there are serious grounds for considering that a person was involved in or associated with such acts, or with the groups concerned, decision makers must consider whether one of the exclusion clauses is applicable, seeking advice from a Senior Caseworker if necessary.

2.2.3 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.

2.2.4 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instructions on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Restricted Leave.
2.3 Assessment of risk

2.3.1 Islamic terrorist groups operating in Algeria are generally affiliated to Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb (AQIM) or Daesh. These groups advocate a strict interpretation of Islamic Law and their aim is to create an Islamic state in the region, using all necessary means, including violence (see Armed groups).

2.3.2 Sources report that Islamic terrorist groups operate in the north eastern Kabylie region and along Algeria’s borders but as a result of the government’s counter-terrorism measures they do not control any territory and do not have the capacity to undertake an attack in a major city (see Spheres of influence, capacity and targets).

2.3.3 Islamic terrorist groups mostly target the security forces and local government in rural areas, particularly government vehicles, using improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and ambushes (see Spheres of influence, capacity and targets). AQIM is also reported to have a base outside of Algeria, possibly in Mali or south west Libya, from which it may seek to attack western interests, such as energy facilities in the desert. Islamic terrorist groups also use the kidnapping of foreign nationals, often working in these areas, to raise funds. There have been no reports of kidnappings by terrorist groups since 2014. None of the terrorist incidents since 2015 have deviated from the usual AQIM modus operandi of roadside IEDs or assassinations of security forces in rural areas (see Spheres of influence, capacity and targets).

2.3.4 Civilians generally are not targeted by terrorist groups. Available data indicated that in 2016 there were 10 incidents of violence against civilians, causing the deaths of four civilians in one incident. As of August 2017, there were no credible reports of attacks on civilians during the year (see Terrorist incidents in 2016/17 and Spheres of influence, capacity and targets).

2.3.5 It is therefore unlikely that an ordinary civilian returning to Algeria will be at real risk of persecution or serious harm because of Islamic terrorist activity.

2.3.6 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.4 Protection

2.4.1 The government pursues an aggressive campaign to eliminate terrorist activity and has a large, robust security apparatus to thwart terrorism threats. It has been largely successful in limiting the reach and impact of terrorist groups, and has severely impeded the terrorists’ ability to operate (see Government counter-terrorism operations).

2.4.2 The government has virtually eradicated one Daesh affiliated group and claimed in 2016 that there was no Daesh presence in Algeria (see Government counter-terrorism operations).

2.4.3 The government has significantly increased border security measures, including working jointly with the Tunisian government, in an attempt to prevent terrorist incursions. These operations have had some success, although due to the length of the borders in the desert, plus the instability in
Libya, they have not been able to prevent all infiltration, particularly in the south east of the country (see Security forces and Government counter-terrorism operations).

2.4.4 Civilians living in the main urban areas in the populated north of the country would be able to seek government protection against a terrorist threat and the government is in general able and willing to provide it. The onus will be on the person to show that their circumstances are such that they would be unable to seek and obtain effective state protection.

2.4.5 Those civilians working in the southern desert areas could be at real risk of a targeted attack at an energy installation, although those employed are mainly not Algerian (see Government counter-terrorism operations).

2.4.6 For more guidance and information on protection see the country policy and information note on Algeria: Background information including actors of protection and internal relocation.

2.4.7 For further guidance on assessing the availability of state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.5 Internal relocation

2.5.1 Apart from some restrictions on travel in areas close to energy installations in the southern desert, freedom of movement is unimpeded, particularly in the heavily populated north of the country (see Freedom of movement).

2.5.2 Urban areas are heavily policed and generally safe so internal relocation should be a reasonable option to escape any localised risk. Each case must however be considered on its individual facts. The onus will be on the person to show that internal relocation is not a reasonable option for them.

2.5.3 For more information and guidance on internal relocation within Algeria see the country policy and information note on Algeria: Background information including actors of protection and internal relocation.

2.5.4 For further guidance on internal relocation and the factors to be considered, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.6 Certification

2.6.1 Where a claim is refused, it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

2.6.2 This is because civilians are not targeted by Islamic groups and the real risk of persecution/serious harm is negligible. Effective state protection is available and it is possible to relocate from areas where there may be a risk.

2.6.3 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
3. **Policy summary**

3.1.1 Although Islamic terrorist groups operate in Algeria they are limited in size and capacity by the government and ordinary civilians living in the northern populated part of Algeria are not generally targeted.

3.1.2 There have been occasional attacks aimed at the security forces in rural areas which have resulted in civilian casualties. However considering the size of the general population against the capabilities of terrorist groups and the relatively low number of reported attacks, the risk of civilians being subject to serious harm by terrorist groups is statistically very low.

3.1.3 The government has a robust security apparatus and is able and willing to provide effective protection.

3.1.4 People working for the security services could be targeted by Islamic terrorist groups employing IEDs and ambushes and those working at energy installations in the desert could be subject to attack or kidnapping although there have been no reports of kidnapping since 2014.

3.1.5 In most cases internal relocation is likely to be a reasonable option, although each case must be considered on its individual circumstances.

3.1.6 Where a claim is refused, it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Country information

Updated 16 August 2017

4. Note on naming of Islamic groups

4.1.1 In this note the term Daesh is used to describe the Islamic terrorist group also known as ISIS, ISIL, IS or Islamic State. Quoted material may use any of these or other terms.

4.1.2 Although Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Daesh are separate groups much of the following quoted material does not necessarily differentiate between the groups referring to them generically as jihadist or terrorist groups. This is partly because there are several groups under each umbrella and groups splinter and change their names and allegiances frequently.

5. Non-state armed groups

5.1 Overview


‘Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AQIM-allied groups, and ISIS elements including the Algerian branch known as Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria (JAK-A, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria), were active terrorist organizations within Algeria and along its borders. These groups aspired to establish their interpretations of Islamic law in the region and to attack Algerian security services, local government targets, and Western interests.’

5.1.2 The report considered the impact of the lack of stability in the region, ‘Regional political and security instability contributed to Algeria’s terrorist threat. Terrorist groups and criminal networks in the Sahel attempted to operate around Algeria’s nearly 4,000 miles of borders. Continuing instability in Libya, terrorist groups operating in Tunisia, fragile peace accord implementation in Mali, as well as human and narcotics trafficking, were significant external threats.’

5.1.3 A report of 2 June 2016 by Critical Treats, ‘AQIM and ISIS in Algeria: Competing Campaigns’ stated that ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are competing to be the dominant Salafi-jihadi group in Algeria.’


5.2 Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

5.2.1 AQIM was listed by the UK government as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) (GSPC) and was proscribed as an international terrorist group in March 2001. The List also noted, ‘Its aim is to create an Islamic state in Algeria using all necessary means, including violence.’

a. Origins/names/leadership

5.2.2 Stanford University’s ‘Mapping Militant Organisations’ gave the following details about AQIM:

- sometimes referred to as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)
- Prior to January 2007, called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
- GSPC formed in 1998 by a splinter group from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), who were broken up by the Algerian government following the civil war
- Led by Abdelmalek Droukdel (since June 2004) also known as Abou Mossab Abdelwadoud

b. Ideology/goals

5.2.3 Although AQIM remains largely a regionally-focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-Western rhetoric and ideology, and has aspirations of overthrowing ‘apostate’ African regimes and creating an Islamic state. Although undoubtedly hostile to the US, AQIM views France and Spain as the ‘far enemy,’ as opposed to the secular governments of the Maghreb, which it deems the ‘near enemy.’

5.2.4 An article on the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue 9, published 5 May 2017, ‘Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects’, stated:

‘Ten years on, AQIM is a very different organization from what it was in early 2007. Although its leadership remains Algerian, Algeria no longer represents AQIM’s main focus.

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4 Stanford University, Mapping militant organizations, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, 1 July 2016 http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65 Accessed 27 June 2017
6 Stanford University, Mapping militant organizations, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, 1 July 2016 http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65 Accessed 27 June 2017
8 Stanford University, Mapping militant organizations, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, 1 July 2016 http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65 Accessed 27 June 2017
‘While this does not mean that the organization will not mount attacks in Algeria, it is no longer the systemic threat that the GIA represented in the 1990s and AQIM itself posed in the first months after its rebranding.

‘The group is now more of a regional franchise. It is the center of gravity for a number of local groups, and itself part of the wider al-Qaeda global project. Moreover, it represents a regional counterbalance to IS, and the rivalry between the two organizations has been a significant feature of the regional geostrategic environment.

‘However, as IS declines, it is possible that many IS fighters will move closer to al-Qaeda-linked groups once again. In addition, as IS weakens, AQIM is likely to return to many regional theatres, among them Libya.

‘...AQIM does not appear to have the capacity to establish a salafi-jihadist state in the region, it will continue to represent a significant asymmetrical and hybrid threat, mixing minor jihadist operations with criminal activities to bolster its finances and further its ultimate goals of fighting near enemies such as regional governments and actors such as Libya’s General Haftar, and its traditional far enemies in the West.’

5.2.5 Strength

Statfor’s 2017 report ‘Al Qaeda in 2017: Slow and Steady Wins the Race’, looked at AQIM, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda’s Algeria-based franchise, splintered in 2013 and suffered additional losses in 2014 when some of its members defected to the Islamic State. However, the group was reinvigorated in 2016 when Mokhtar Belmokhtar returned to the al Qaeda fold with his al-Mourabitoun group.’

5.2.6 Estimates vary from several hundred operating in Algeria and the Sahel to 1000 members in Algeria alone.

5.2.7 The USSD 2016 Terrorism report noted, ‘Since the French intervention in northern Mali, AQIM’s safe haven in northern Mali is less tenable for the organization and elements have moved to remote regions of northern Mali or to southwestern Libya. AQIM is attempting to reorganize in the wake of setbacks inflicted upon it by the combined French and African forces.’


d. Funding

5.2.8 Stanford University’s research stated that AQIM has often been called ‘Al Qaeda’s wealthiest affiliate’ and that it is ‘a key trafficker of drugs, cigarettes, arms, and humans both within North Africa and between South America and Europe via Africa.’

5.2.9 The USSD 2016 Terrorism report noted, ‘AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and criminal activities to finance their operations. AQIM also successfully fundraises globally, including limited financial and logistical assistance from supporters residing in Western Europe.’

5.3 Groups allied to AQIM

a. Al Murabitun and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

5.3.1 Al Murabitun was proscribed by the UK government as an international terrorist group in April 2014. The List of Proscribed Terrorists Organisations also noted:

‘Al Murabitun resulted from a merger of two Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb (AQ-M) splinter groups that are active in Mali and Algeria, the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group, the Al Mulathamine Battalion which included the commando element ‘Those Who Sign in Blood’. The merger was announced in a public statement in August 2013.

‘Al Murabitun aspires to unite Muslims from “the Nile to the Atlantic” and has affirmed its loyalty to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the emir of the Afghan Taleban, Mullah Omar.’

5.3.2 Stratfor noted in a 2017 report that, ‘[AQIM] was reinvigorated in 2016 when Mokhtar Belmokhtar returned to the al Qaeda fold with his al-Mouribitoun group. Al-Mouribitoun has operated across the region, not only conducting attacks but becoming embroiled in the kidnapping of a number of foreigners. Their ransom demands will help boost the finances of the organization as they have done for many years now.’
5.4 Daesh and allied groups

5.4.1 The Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations List noted that ‘ISIL was previously proscribed as part of Al Qa’ida (AQ). However on 2 February 2014, AQ senior leadership issued a statement officially severing ties with ISIL. This prompted consideration of the case to proscribe ISIL in its own right.’  

5.4.2 The List also noted that, ‘The group adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. ISIL aims to establish an Islamic State governed by Sharia law in the region and impose their rule on people using violence and extortion.’

5.4.3 Aranews reported on 9 October 2016 that Daesh had formally announced ‘the start of operations in Algeria’:

‘In a statement published by the jihadi Amaq Agency [on 8 October 2016], ISIS claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a People’s National Army (PNA) convoy in Skikda Province…

‘The ISIS leadership has vowed to continue their attacks in Algeria and pledged to extend their operations against PNA forces. According to reports, at least 200 ISIS militants are currently active in Algeria.

‘In September 2014, a group of militants deserted al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in a communiqué released on 13 September 2014.’

See Government counter-terrorism operations for information about the eradication of Daesh.

5.4.4 Jund al Khalifa-Algeria (JaK-A) was proscribed by the UK government as an international terrorist group in January 2015. The List also noted, ‘JaK-A is an Islamist militant group believed to be made up of members of dormant Al Qa’ida (AQ) cells. JaK-A announced its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in a communiqué released on 13 September 2014.’

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18 Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, ISIL, 3 March 2017

19 Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, ISIL, 3 March 2017

20 Aranews, Islamic State launches first operation in Algeria, 9 October 2016,
http://aranews.net/2016/10/islamic-state-launches-first-operation-algeria/ Accessed 28 June 2017

21 Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, Jund al Khalifa-Algeria (JaK-A), 3 March 2017
5.4.5 The USSD Report on Terrorism 2015 reported that the Algerian government appeared to have significantly limited JaK-A’s ability to operate in 2015\textsuperscript{22} and the 2016 report stated that government efforts continued to restrict the group’s ability to operate.\textsuperscript{23} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment of Algeria of November 2016 stated that the group had been dismantled by the Algerian security forces.\textsuperscript{24}

b. Others

5.4.6 The successes of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East have also prompted the emergence of a number of small IS affiliated groups in Algeria, most of which have not carried out attacks thus far.\textsuperscript{25}

5.4.7 The USSD OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council) Algeria 2017, Crime and Safety Report, published 25 April 2017, noted:

‘Three other [in addition to JaK-A] Algerian groups have issued statements claiming allegiance to ISIS, but there is little indication that these groups contain more than a small number of fighters.

- In May 2015, Katibat Ansar El Khilafa (Caliphate Supporters) in Skikda announced its support of ISIS through an audio clip posted on Twitter
- Also in May 2015, Katibat Sahara announced its allegiance to ISIS through an online statement. This group is believed to be a split from al-Murabitun
- Seriat El Ghoraba, based in the Wilaya of Constantine, announced in July 2015 via Twitter its split from AQIM to join ISIS\textsuperscript{26}

6. Spheres of influence, capacity and targets

6.1.1 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment of Algeria noted in November 2016:

‘Counter-terrorism and military operations have restricted the operational reach of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State affiliates based in the northeastern Kabylie region. These groups probably lack the


\textsuperscript{24} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Algeria, Security – Terrorism hotspots, Updated 9 November 2016. Subscription only. Accessed 20 June 2017


capability to undertake an attack in a major city, and instead focus on localised attacks targeting the security forces, and kidnap for ransom and small-scale extortion of locals. In the southern desert, jihadist groups based in the border areas of Mali, Tunisia, and Libya retain the capability to penetrate deep into Algeria to carry out attacks, primarily against energy facilities.  

6.1.2 The assessment looked at Algeria’s vulnerability at its borders:

‘Despite additional army deployments to the border and the construction of physical defences following the January 2013 jihadist assault and siege of the In Amenas gas facility, seizures of weapons caches including RPGs, MANPADS, and ammunition in Illizi and Tamanrasset have continued to occur. It is likely that these are most often shipments intended for Libya rather than for use in Algeria, but this vulnerability nevertheless highlights the porous nature of Algeria’s borders. Energy facilities closest to Algeria’s southern border with Mali and eastern border with Libya, for instance in the areas of Ghardaïa, Illizi, Ouargla, and Tamanrasset provinces, are at greatest risk of cross-border attacks.

‘This risk also extends into the deep interior of the country, as illustrated by the attack in March 2016 against the Krechba gas facility near In Salah. Attacks this far inside Algeria’s security perimeter are likely to be relatively low capability against fixed positions, or less likely, targets of opportunity, rather than a concerted assault…'

‘None of the terrorist incidents in 2015-16 deviate from the usual AQIM modus operandi of roadside IEDs or assassinations of security forces in rural areas.’

6.1.3 Jane’s also looked at the risks posed:

‘Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and ambushes by jihadist militants remain an elevated risk in Algeria’s northeastern provinces, primarily targeting security forces and government vehicles. There is a persistent jihadist presence in Boumerdès, Bouïra, Béjaïa, Skikda, Tébessa, and Tizi Ouzou [provinces]. In the northwest, the highest-risk areas are [in the] Aïn Defla, Chlef, and Tipaza [provinces].’


6.1.5 The USSD OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council) Algeria 2017 Crime and Safety Report, published 25 April 2017, noted, ‘These groups [AQIM,
MUJAO and al-Murabitun]…attack Algerian security services, local government targets, and Western interests. Most attacks are directed toward Algerian military/police… AQIM attacks have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, and ambushes.31

6.1.6 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment of Algeria of November 2016 stated, ‘The success of the Algerian security forces in suppressing jihadist groups limits the latter’s ability to launch attacks in northern centres. AQIM cells and the Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Jazair remain active in the Kabylie and around Constantine. These groups probably aspire to attacks in major urban areas, targeting Western nationals and assets as well as government and security forces. However, they probably lack the capability to do so.’32

6.1.7 The US Department of State in its June 2017 Algeria Travel warning (for US citizens) stated: ‘While violence has reduced significantly in recent years, terrorist groups remain active in some parts of the country. Although major cities are heavily policed, the possibility of terrorist acts in urban areas cannot be excluded. Extremists have conducted attacks in the following areas:

- ‘mountainous region south and east of Algiers (provinces of Blida, Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou, Bouira, and Bejaia)
- ‘further east outside the city of Constantine
- ‘southern and eastern border regions, including Tebessa and the Chaambi mountains area, south of Souk Ahras, near the Tunisian border’33

6.1.8 Jane’s further noted, ‘In the Kabylie and in southern and central provinces such as Illizi, Ouargla, and Tamanrasset, close to the Libyan or Malian borders, unguarded foreigners in transit overland are at severe risk of kidnapping for ransom or, potentially, execution.’34

6.1.9 However, the USSD Country Report on Terrorism 2015 report noted that there had been no reports of kidnappings by terrorist groups in 2015.35 The last reported kidnapping by a terrorist group was of a French tourist in September 2014 who was subsequently beheaded.36 The Algerian

34 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Algeria, Security – Ground risks, Updated 9 November 2016. Subscription only. Accessed 28 June 2017
government maintained a strict ‘no concessions’ policy with regard to individuals or groups holding its citizens hostage.\(^{37}\)

6.1.10 See also Terrorist incidents in 2016/17 (below).

6.2 Terrorist incidents in 2016/17

6.2.1 According to the OASC, the press reported more than 36 terrorist acts between January-November 2016.\(^{38}\)

6.2.2 Information produced by ACCORD from data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) noted that in 2016 there were 48 incidents of battle which produced 122 fatalities and there were 10 incidents of violence against civilians which produced 4 fatalities.\(^{39}\)

6.2.3 The United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights, published 3 March 2017 and covering 2016 (USSD report 2016), noted, ‘On April 15, terrorists killed four soldiers in Constantine Province. On August 6, an improvised explosive device killed four civilians in Khenchela Province. Da’esh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) took credit for the October 28 killing of a police officer in Constantine. Terrorists reportedly killed two police officers and a civilian in a November 13 attack in Ain Defla.’\(^{40}\) These incidents were also reflected in the USSD Report on Terrorism 2016.\(^{41}\)

6.2.4 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in its Foreign Travel Advice, updated 24 May 2017, noted that on 26 February 2017, 2 police officers were injured during an attempted suicide attack on a police station in central Constantine.\(^{42}\)

6.2.5 Morocco World News reported on 3 June 2017 that two Algerian soldiers and four other civilians were wounded in a terrorist attack on an army convoy in Bir El-Ater in the state of Tebessa, close to the Tunisian border.\(^{43}\)

6.2.6 The USSD Report on Terrorism 2016 stated, ‘Although there was one reported kidnapping by terrorists as a tactic to compel provision of supplies

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of food, there were no reports of kidnappings for ransom by terrorist groups in Algeria in 2016.\textsuperscript{44}

6.2.7 As of July 2017 CPIT was unable to find reports of further reported terrorist attacks in 2017.

7. Security forces

7.1 Counter-terrorism forces

7.1.1 The USSD Report on Terrorism 2016 stated:

‘Military forces and multiple law enforcement, intelligence, and security services addressed counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, investigations, border security, and crisis response. These included the various branches of the Joint Staff; the army; the 140,000 members of the National Gendarmerie; and the Border Guards under the Ministry of National Defense (MND); and approximately 210,000 national police, or General Directorate of National Security, under the Ministry of Interior. Military forces and security services conducted regular search operations for terrorists, especially in eastern Algeria and in the expansive desert regions in the south. Public information announcements from the MND provided timely reporting on incidents during which MND forces captured or eliminated terrorists and seized equipment, arms, ammunition caches, and drugs.

‘Border security remained a top priority to guard against infiltration of terrorists from neighboring countries. Official and private media outlets reported on measures to increase border security, including closed military border areas, new observer posts in the east, reinforced protection of energy installations, additional permanent facilities for border control management, new aerial-based surveillance technologies and upgrades to communication systems. The Algerian government reported it had established a regularly updated database regarding foreign terrorist fighters, which is deployed at all border posts and Algerian diplomatic missions overseas.’\textsuperscript{45}

7.1.2 The 2015 report also noted that Algerian officials reported that they have provided training and equipment to border security officials in Tunisia to ensure effective cross-border communication.\textsuperscript{46}

7.1.3 For more information on the capability of the security forces and the availability of protection see the country policy and information note on Algeria: Background information including actors of protection and internal relocation.

\textsuperscript{44} The United States Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2016, Middle East and North Africa Overview: Algeria, 19 July 2017

\textsuperscript{45} The United States Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2016, Middle East and North Africa Overview: Algeria, 19 July 2017

7.2 Government counter-terrorism operations

7.2.1 The USSD Report on Terrorism 2016 noted, ‘Algeria is not a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS; however, Algeria actively supported the effort to defeat ISIS in other ways, such as counter-messaging, capacity-building programs with neighboring states, and co-chairing the Sahel Region Capacity-Building Working Group (SWG) of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).’ 47

7.2.2 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment of Algeria looked at the effectiveness of the government’s military operations against terrorism since 2013:

‘Military operations in areas of jihadist activity are likely to remain a frequent occurrence in the one-year outlook, constraining the ability of militant groups to re-establish themselves in northern Algeria. In September 2014, a French national was executed by the Islamic State-aligned Jund al-Khilafah (JaK) in Tizi Ouzou. The ensuing military campaign in the area led to the death of the group’s leader and the disbandment of the group’s operations. Similarly, a localised insurgency that emerged in Aïn Defla in mid-2015 was effectively broken up by the military, leading to the near-cessation of attacks there by end-2015. Operations in the north are most likely to focus on rural areas in the Kabylie provinces of Béjaïa, Boumerdès, Bouïra, and Tizi Ouzou. Security forces have driven Islamist militants out of major cities, and public opinion generally supports military operations against Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State, and their affiliates.

‘Algeria has deployed thousands of additional troops to the eastern borders with Tunisia and Libya to attempt to prevent jihadist incursions; given the distances involved, this is insufficient to prevent all infiltration. Algeria is working jointly with Tunisian forces to build their capacity, but is more wary of co-operation with Libyan border forces since these comprise tribal and local militias over whom the central government has little or no authority. It is from southern Libya that the main external threat originates, given the presence of AQIM and the Islamic State-affiliated groups.

‘The January 2013 In Amenas incident [a siege at a gas plant following an AQIM attack where 40 people, mostly foreign nationals and 29 terrorists were killed] 48 demonstrates that the Algerian military and government is likely to use any means necessary to neutralise militant attacks and preserve strategic assets even at the cost of civilian lives. It will continue to respond to any future threats near the border with search-and-destroy operations, supported by special forces and helicopters.’ 49

47 The United States Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2016, Middle East and North Africa Overview: Algeria, 19 July 2017
48 BBC News, In Amenas inquest: British victims of Algeria attack, 28 November 2017,
49 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Algeria, Security – Terrorism hotspots, Updated 9 November 2016. Subscription only. Accessed 20 June 2017
7.2.3 The Cipher Brief (digital, security-based conversation platform) in a report of 1 September 2016 considered whether Daesh had a foothold in Algeria:

"As the fight to push ISIS out of Libya intensifies, one country where ISIS has failed to gain a foothold is neighboring Algeria due to a firm stance by the Algerian military against jihadist cells in the country and a relatively strong central government."

"There is no ISIS in Algeria," said Madjid Bougerra, Algeria's Ambassador to the United States. "They have tried, but we have succeeded in countering all their efforts. Our security forces have, for the last two or three years, mobilized to secure our borders – be it on the east with Libya or in the southern part of the Sahel region. And believe me, ISIS does not exist in Algeria," he continued.\(^{50}\)

7.2.4 Reuters, on 24 August 2016, quoted senior security sources in Algeria who said that their forces have cleared out Islamic State affiliated militants from mountains east of Algiers:

"The group has been dismantled; most of its commanders were killed or arrested. It is over," one senior security source told Reuters, asking his name not be used because he was not authorized to speak to media.

'Mopping up Islamic State in the north will allow Algeria's army to focus on southern borders with Libya, Mali and Niger where fleeing militants may try to slip across its frontiers, the source familiar with the operations said.

'A second security source said Jund al-Khilafa has been militarily defeated over the past few months in regions including Bouira, Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou, all the east of the capital.

'Most of its commanders had been killed or arrested and its structure has been dismantled, the source said."\(^{51}\)

7.2.5 The USSD OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council) Algeria 2017 Crime and Safety Report, published 25 April 2017, noted:

'The government continues an aggressive campaign to eliminate all terrorist activity and has a large, robust security apparatus to thwart terrorism threats. In 2016, military and security services conducted regular operations nationwide including in the Kabylie area and in the expansive desert regions in the southeast...Public information announcements from the Defense Ministry provided reporting on incidents during which Algerian forces killed 125 terrorists, captured 225 others, and seized equipment, arms, ammunition caches, and drugs as a result of operations in 2016."\(^{52}\)

7.2.6 The Maghreb Times reported on 6 April 2017, that in the first quarter of 2017, according to El-Djeich magazine (published by the Algerian military),


Army forces eliminated 35 terrorists, arrested 18 others and neutralized 59 individuals supporting terrorist groups. As part of counterterrorism, the same source stated the Army forces recovered “272 pieces of weapons and calibres, 15897 types of ammunitions and 242 vehicles and trucks of various types.”53

7.2.7 In July 2017 the International Crisis Group reported that:

‘Generally speaking, Algeria has put into practice a three-part strategy: massive force deployment against militant groups; pervasive security presence (the ranks of the police, in particular, have expanded considerably over the last decade); and, notably through the Civil Concord, a policy of national reconciliation that provided an amnesty to Islamist insurgents and, in exchange for leaving politics, allowed them to engage in conservative social activism. ISIS’ emergence led to the addition of a fourth dimension, a focus on cybersecurity and online jihadist recruitment.’

‘Overall, the feeling among officials and many analysts is that this strategy – however imperfect and often-criticised for its eschewing of accountability for the killings and kidnappings committed by militants and security forces in the 1990s – has worked. The small number of Algerian foreign fighters and low level of in-country ISIS activity comforts this view. That said, the high costs of maintaining such an imposing security posture – in particular the deployment of thousands of troops at the borders with Libya, Niger and Mali – could prove prohibitive, especially given falling oil prices. Another concern revolves around a potential battle to succeed President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who has been seriously ill for many years. This in turn could provoke infighting within the security establishment, although many analysts believe that any turmoil will be temporary and the army will remain firmly in charge.’54

7.3 Prosecution of terrorists

7.3.1 The USSD Report on Terrorism 2016 noted, ‘On June 19 [2016], the President signed a new law adding articles to the Algerian penal code and expanding criminal liability in the areas of foreign terrorist fighters, those who support or finance foreign terrorist fighters, the use of information technology in terrorist recruiting and support; and internet service providers who fail to comply with legal obligations to store information for a certain period or to prevent access to criminal material.’55

Accessed 10 July 2017


7.3.2 The USSD report 2016 noted that if authorities require time beyond the authorized 48-hour period for gathering additional evidence, they may extend a suspect’s authorised time in police detention with the prosecutor’s authorisation to a maximum of twelve days for charges related to terrorism. The court appearance of suspects in terrorism cases is public.  

7.3.3 For information on the judiciary see the country policy and information note on Algeria: Background information including actors of protection and internal relocation.

8. Freedom of movement

8.1.1 Algeria has a population of just over 40.2 million with the vast majority living in the extreme northern part of the country along the Mediterranean Coast. It is the largest country in Africa and the tenth largest in the world.

8.1.2 For information on freedom of movement, see the country policy and information note on Algeria: Background information including actors of protection and internal relocation.


Version control and contacts

Contacts
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