1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.16, Edition A, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE (SFA), which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 6512.

2. AJP-3.16, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt.

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4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

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Director, NATO Standardization Office
Allied Joint Publication-3.16

Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA)
Edition A Version 1

Allied Joint Publication-3.16 (AJP-3.16), dated May 2016, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Director Concepts and Doctrine
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
### RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

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| USA    | The US ratifies AJP-3.16 with following reservation:  
        (1) The US does not support the acronym "GOTEAM" as described in this AJP. All references to "GOTEAM" need to be harmonized throughout this publication. In addition, the "GOTEAM" model presented is inconsistent with AJP-3.4.4 and with the NATO SFA Concept. The US will lift this reservation when the term is consistently applied throughout the AJP and properly harmonized across the AJP-3 series and with the NATO SFA Concept.  
        (2) Numerous terms and definitions introduced in the AJP have not been vetted with approved NATO terminology guidance and directives. The US recognizes only those terms approved in AAP-6 and AAP-15. This reservation will be lifted upon use of NATO approved terms. Terms not recognized include assessment, effect, infrastructure, operations assessment, special operations forces, and stability policing. |

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Preface

1. **AJP-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance** is intended for use by NATO and NATO-led forces. However, this doctrine can be used as a reference by other military or civilian actors. The requirement to train and develop local forces\(^1\) capabilities, as part of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach,\(^2\) is integral to the success of a broader strategy aimed at reinforcing the capacity of non-NATO nations within the broader framework of defence and related security capacity-building.

2. This doctrine outlines direction and guidance on how NATO provides security force assistance (SFA). SFA activities are applicable at all levels of operations: military strategic; operational; and tactical.\(^3\) NATO SFA activities require North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval and should contribute towards a strategic end-state.

Conceptual linkages

3. SFA relates to, and its implementation will impact upon, other NATO concepts and policies and operations, including the areas described below.

   a. **Security sector reform.** Security sector reform (SSR) is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation (HN) provides safety, security and justice. SSR is a long-term effort conducted by the HN government requiring extensive resources and participation of many security sector actors. NATO contributes to the HN’s SSR through security sector assistance, which refers to the activities of NATO members and forces to engage with foreign partners to help shape their policies and actions and build and sustain HN capacity and effectiveness in the security sector. SSR requires stabilization and reconstruction to provide a stable environment.

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\(^1\) Local forces are indigenous, non-NATO, military security forces.

\(^2\) For more on NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach, see Allied Joint Publication (AJP-01) Allied Joint Doctrine, Chapter 2. See also: PO(2011)0045, Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach, 04 March 2011.

\(^3\) As described in AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine.
SFA may form, or be part of, NATO's contribution to SSR, which is led by the HN with the support of the international community. To ensure comparative advantages are levered, SFA activities must be planned and coordinated at all levels with the other SSR-involved actors. SFA directly contributes to Defence Reform which is the: transformation or development of defence organizations and institutions, including the appropriate oversight and management bodies, so that they play an effective, legitimate and legally accountable role within the security sector. SFA is a key subset Defence Reform.

b. **Stabilization and reconstruction.** Stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts aim to address complex problems in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states. Such efforts contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis management through the international community's efforts towards security, development and governance.

c. **Military assistance.** Military assistance (MA) is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through organizing, training, advising, mentoring or conducting combined operations. The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional and national leadership organizations and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. Special Operation Forces (SOF) conduct MA within their field of expertise. More specifically, MA activities may include the following.

(1) **Training.** These are activities that train designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment and integration of land, air and maritime skills; provide assistance to designated leaders; and provide training on tactics,

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4 Working definition: MC 0578 (Military Decision) MC Concept for Military Support to Defence Reform, 23 February 2009.
5 See AJP 3.4.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction (currently in ratification).
6 PO(2010) 0140, Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction, 06 October 2010.
7 Military assistance is one of the Special Operation Forces' three main tasks. See AJP 3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, Edition A Version, 1 December 2013.)
techniques and procedures thus enabling a nation to develop individual, leader and organizational skills.

(2) **Advising.** These are activities that improve the performance of designated actors by providing active participation and expertise to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

(3) **Mentoring/partnering.** These are activities conducted by small teams of subject matter experts who are tasked to work closely with designated personnel and provide direction and guidance which may concern the conduct of military or security operations.

d. **Counter-insurgency.** Counter-insurgency (COIN)\(^8\) is defined as: *the comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.*\(^9\) SFA can form part of the military contribution to COIN.

e. **Stability policing.** Stability policing (SP)\(^10\) is a set of police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights, in order to enable the development of a sustainable peace, through reinforcing and/or temporary replacing of the indigenous police. SP and SFA are the two aspects of contribution to the development of security forces. SP focuses its activities on the police forces whereas SFA activities will address the development of military forces.

f. **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.** Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a process that contributes to S&R by disarming combatants, removing them from military structure and integrating them into society. Indeed, DDR programmes are part of other efforts to demilitarize and consolidate stability and are tightly linked with the

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\(^8\) See AJP 3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN).*

\(^9\) Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*

SFA process in supporting the SSR. Planning for a successful DDR program requires an understanding of both the situation on the ground and the goals, political will and resources of actors and other organizations. Effective DDR planning relies on analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics and local society. Assessments have to be conducted in close consultation with the local populace and with personnel from participating agencies who understand and know about the HN.

Related documents

4. AJP-316, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance* (SFA) is topically related to and should be read in concert with:

a. AJP-01(D), *Allied Joint Doctrine*;

b. AJP-3(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*; and

c. AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning*.

Structure

5. AJP-3.16 comprises three chapters.

a. Chapter 1 defines SFA, its applicability and the principles upon which successful SFA action must be built.

b. Chapter 2 outlines SFA activities and introduces the ‘generate, organize, train, enable, advise and mentor’ (GOTEAM) activities.

c. Chapter 3 provides a methodical approach to provide SFA, which includes planning, training and legal considerations.
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Chapter 1 – Concept and imperatives

Section I – Security force assistance applicability

0101. Security force assistance (SFA) includes all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones. Local forces comprise indigenous, non-NATO military security forces and will be defined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).\(^\text{11}\)

0102. While training non-military indigenous forces should be considered as the primary responsibility of other relevant national or international organizations, there may be circumstances that preclude those organizations from immediately undertaking that responsibility. In such circumstances, NATO may be required (as determined by the NAC) to fill that gap until the conditions allow for the transfer of that responsibility to the appropriate actor. NATO may be required to establish a minimum standard of security in an initial phase of an operation in order to allow other non-military organizations to begin operating.

0103. SFA assists a host nation (HN)\(^\text{12}\) in developing a sustainable capability that should enable its defence against threats to stability and security.

   a. SFA activities can be provided during any phase of an operation and across the full range of military operations.

   b. SFA activities require a political, financial and long-term commitment to develop and improve the HN’s capacity and capabilities through generate, organize, train, enable, advise and mentor (GOTEAM) activities.

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\(^\text{11}\) See MCM-0034-2014, NATO Security Force Assistance Concept, 28 March 2014 (NAC approved 6 June 2014). For military forces, the associated institution is the Ministry of Defence or the nation’s equivalent institution.

\(^\text{12}\) Allied Administrative Publication (AAP-06), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, defines a host nation (HN) as: a Nation which, by agreement (HN support arrangements like memorandum of understanding, status of forces agreement etc.): 1. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; 2. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or 3. provides support for these purposes.
c. Transition of security responsibilities to local forces – to be understood as a progressive transfer of security functions – is an essential part of SFA.

0104. This Allied Joint Publication (AJP) outlines the doctrinal guidance and principles required to plan, conduct and assess SFA within a joint and multinational framework. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept\(^{13}\) outlines the need for Allies to develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones,\(^{14}\) so that legitimate local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance.

0105. SFA can be a key enabler in NATO operations by generating, employing and sustaining local forces in support of a legitimate authority. NATO may not be the only organization providing assistance to develop local forces or otherwise contributing to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) in the region. Therefore, commanders must ensure that coordination measures are in place to synchronize activities, mitigate gaps and reduce redundancies.

**Security force assistance applicability**

0106. SFA activities support the overall mission and objectives as detailed by the NAC.

a. SFA requires NAC approval and should be conducted at all levels of operations (military strategic, operational and tactical).\(^{15}\)

b. SFA applies only where a HN requests assistance to train and develop local forces.

c. SFA activities can be provided across the entire spectrum of crisis response scenarios and threat levels. SFA could range from


\(^{14}\) ‘Crisis zones’ will cover the geographical area where a NAC-approved NATO operation/mission is executed.

\(^{15}\) See AAP-06 – an operation is defined as: a sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose. Note 1: NATO operations are military. Note 2: operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military.
improving the local forces of a HN that is facing a threat, to advising against an immediate threat.

Section II – Security force assistance imperatives

0107. NATO has a broad history of delivering SFA. As well as the principles of NATO operations, the SFA imperatives listed below are derived from NATO’s collective experience and subsequent analysis. The list is not exhaustive, but captures the key SFA imperatives that a commander, planning staffs and those delivering SFA should consider. To be successful, SFA must be based on solid, continuing assessment and include generating, organizing, training and educating, enabling, advising and mentoring the forces involved. Commanders need to understand that the development of the institutional infrastructure to sustain SFA gains must be coordinated.

Political primacy

0108. Committing to security transition and allocating sufficient resources to conduct SFA activities are both political decisions. Political primacy underpins cooperation between the HN and NATO. This is fundamental to effective and sustainable security transition.

Comprehensive approach

0109. SFA must be planned, executed and assessed in the context of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach (CA). A CA comprises the integrated activities from an appropriate range of civil and military actors to achieve common objectives, enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-confliction of NATO’s military and political instruments with the other instruments of power. SFA will be one part of NATO’s contribution to a CA by the international community. Therefore, those involved in providing SFA must consider and understand all aspects of the local forces’ capacity and capability

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16 See AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine.  
development, including their relationship with other institutions and processes. A CA should:

a. seek to stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while facilitating a shared understanding of the situation;

b. invigorate existing processes and strengthen relationships at the joint, inter-agency and multinational levels; and

c. consider the activities of all actors who may have an impact on the end state.

0110. Capability and capacity building typically involve long-term and complex processes necessitating the development of local forces and infrastructure. While understanding its limits, commanders providing SFA should contribute to a CA that considers how the local forces complement the HN’s instruments of national power.

Understanding

0111. An in-depth understanding of the environment, and in particular the political, social and organizational cultures of the HN, is critical to the planning and conduct of SFA. Identifying key factors influencing the environment will help define the goals and methods for developing local forces and HN institutions. To prioritize and focus the SFA effort, an understanding of the regional players and transnational actors who may influence the security environment is vital. Further guidance on understanding is described in Section III.

Trust

0112. The successful delivery of SFA requires trust between all parties involved. Developing and maintaining trust assists all actors, and any break of trust may affect the success of the entire operation. All actors involved in SFA activities must behave in a credible, reliable and genuine manner, and work to develop and maintain mutual trust.
Leadership

0113. Leadership, a critical aspect of the conduct of military activities, is especially important in the dynamic and complex environments associated with SFA. SFA requires the personal interaction of trainers, advisers and trainees, military and civilians, from the tactical level to the strategic level, so a high premium is placed on effective leadership at all levels.

0114. Leadership on both sides, NATO and HN, must fully comprehend the operational environment and be prepared, engaged and supportive for SFA activities to succeed. Productively engaging the leadership on both sides requires extensive effort throughout the campaign.

Legitimacy

0115. Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality or rightness of a set of actions, and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them. This audience may be the HN population, the populations in the operational area, or the participating forces. If SFA activities are perceived as legitimate, the audience has a strong impulse to support them. Strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government in the eyes of the HN population is essential to SFA efforts; SFA activities conducted by NATO forces must maintain this focus. NATO and local forces must be viewed as legitimate by the HN, troop-contributing nations and the international community. Without legitimacy, SFA activities will be undermined. Legitimacy comprises legal, cultural, historical, religious, social, gender, moral and political aspects and may be contested. Authority is dependent upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of four factors.

a. **Mandate:** The perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes the SFA activities and even the mandate that establishes the state authority of the HN, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, or a recognized and accepted caste/tribal model.
b. **Manner:** The perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively.

c. **Consent:** The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, may range from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given support.

d. **Expectations:** The extent to which the beliefs and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or are met by those exercising the mandate.

**Rule of law**

0116. A country's security policies and practices must be founded upon the rule of law and linked to the broader justice sector. SFA activities should promote the rule of law, including applicable human rights laws and the gender perspective.\(^{18}\) The police, in particular, should operate as an integral part of the justice system and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and corrections institutions. Assistance to the police and other state security providers may need to be complemented with other efforts to strengthen these institutions, to avoid unintended consequences, and to ensure that the local forces operate according to the law.

**Strategic communications**

0117. Strategic communications considerations should be integral to mission planning and execution. This will contribute towards a shared understanding of SFA activities. The information strategy should align with the stated intent and agreed policies between the HN and other agencies. SFA objectives should be supported by the strategic communications’ strategies of both NATO and the HN. NATO’s information strategy should promote visible and credible results with

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\(^{18}\) NATO policy, action and implementation plans as well as directives articulate that the full implementation of UNSCR 1325, *Women and Peace and Security* and related resolutions is to be integrated in all operations.
the aim of building trust and transparency. Commanders should consider the following factors.

a. An effective information strategy, articulated through a strategic communications framework will promote legitimacy and credibility and will help to create a positive perception of the SFA mission within the local, regional and the international community.

b. The importance of building and maintaining a cohesive narrative should not be underestimated. The ability to manage and employ information underpins activities in diplomatic, military, economic and other areas of activity, thus maintaining Allied freedom of action.

c. Effective strategic communications will both enable, and underpin, assistance activities in the information-dominated environment.19

Transparency

0118. SFA activities should be transparent and accountable; they should foster awareness of reform efforts among HN officials and the population, neighbouring countries, troop-contributing nations, and other stakeholders contributing to the end state. SFA activities should encourage open, accountable and transparent consultation with local and international actors.

Host nation commitment

0119. Planning and successfully providing SFA requires the long-term commitment of the HN and all other actors involved. Commitment is built upon personal relationships and mutual trust, underpinned by strong leadership. Nurturing and developing the commitment of actors at all levels (for example, a HN’s political, military and other government organizations) will be a two-way endeavour. To achieve common goals that benefit all, relationships should be built upon cooperation.

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19 See AJP 3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations and AD 95-2, ACO Strategic Communications.
0120. In the early stages of a SFA mission, commanders cannot expect to have commitment ‘in place’. It is likely, therefore, that it will have to be developed and maintained. To engender strong relations (which are pivotal to securing commitment), troop rotations, particularly those in key leadership positions, must be carefully managed. Once committed, all actors need to be consistent and dependable. Involving the HN from the very beginning of the planning process will facilitate their commitment to accomplish the mission.

Support host nation ownership

0121. The HN’s history, religion, culture, legal framework and institutions must drive the principles, policies, laws and structures that form SFA activities. As a result, the needs, priorities and circumstances shaping SFA will differ substantially from one country to another. Addressing the basic security concerns of the HN population is essential in attaining support and delivering SFA. To ensure the sustainability of reforms, assistance should be designed to meet the needs of the HN population and support HN agencies, processes and priorities. To accomplish this, SFA generally should be developed to serve longer-term goals. In addition to the appropriate competencies and skills, SFA requires a specific mind-set focusing on supporting local forces to:

a. make their own decisions;

b. learn from their successes and failures; and

c. take ownership for their own organization, preparation, planning and execution of operations to ensure sustainability.

Commanders delivering SFA must understand that they are tasked with developing local forces that fit with the HN government’s wider political, economic and societal needs.
Sustainability

0122. The effects of SFA must be sustainable beyond NATO forces (and other contributing actors) departing the HN. Planning for SFA activities must consider HN capabilities in the long-term.

0123. Any sustainable SFA solution may be part of a larger security sector reform process (where this exists) taking into account the whole security sector\(^{20}\) and based on political, social and economic structures and processes. Commanders planning and delivering SFA should consider and review:

a. the supporting diplomatic/economic structures and processes;

b. the procurement of the appropriate equipment;

c. the sequencing of withdrawing enablers as the HN transitions towards self-sufficiency;

d. continuing to build HN capacity in specialist areas that will continue to require time and investment, for example, aviation training; and

e. any ongoing external defence requirements of the HN, brokered by either a treaty or agreement (within a formal legal framework).

0124. Long-term success will depend on developing sustainable security frameworks and organizations, which must deliver effective day-to-day operations, management and oversight. These functions should include:

a. strategic resource and personnel planning;

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\(^{20}\) Security sector actors include all institutions, groups, organizations and individuals (both state and non-state) that have a stake/vested interest in providing security. They include: core security actors, security management and oversight bodies, judicial and law enforcement institutions, and security-focused civil society groups. Core security actors include: Armed Forces, police, military police, including gendarmerie-type forces, paramilitary forces, intelligence organizations, security services, coastguards, customs authorities and non-statutory security forces. (working definition in MC 0578 (Military Decision), MC Concept For Military Support To Defence Reform, 23 February 2009).
b. financial responsibility;

c. building integrity;

d. legal accountability; and

e. the understanding to analyze and modify the organization’s aims, policies and doctrines.

0125. A state’s institutions may take years to develop in societies where they have been absent. This is at odds with the common political desire for rapid progress. In security transitions, four aspects of sustainability are central to success.

a. Any sustainable solution must be based on an effective political settlement. Security transitions should be designed and carried out with this in mind and should neither undermine nor unduly empower any political party, nor undermine the potential for future political progress.

b. Sustainable security institutions need to develop with a balance between combat and combat support elements, logistical support, administrative and legal foundation.

c. Processes must be able to be sustained by the HN and will be impacted by elements including ownership, societal relevancy and effective resourcing.

d. As security transitions are frequently resource-intensive periods for the HN, resources may need to be sustained post-transition, including the provision of financial support.

Transition

0126. Effective security transition strategies must contribute to sustaining security in the post-transition environment. Effective security transitions enable the HN to assume responsibility for its own security once NATO activities have come to an end. The transition process is
part of a longer-term reform and transformation process that will be managed by other actors.\textsuperscript{21}

Section III – Security force assistance understanding

0127. An in-depth understanding of the operational environment is critical to planning and conducting SFA activities. Understanding does not equate to knowledge, or amassing information.\textsuperscript{22} Understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation to provide the context, insight (knowing why something has happened) and foresight (being able to identify and anticipate what is likely to happen) required for effective decision-making. Developing an understanding of ourselves is as important as understanding those NATO are assisting. Gaining a developed understanding will enable commanders to:

a. evaluate the context, leading to improved decision-making;

b. support developing policy, strategy and plans;

c. assist in developing alliances or agreements;

d. achieve influence;

e. focus on the critical facets of the operating environment;

f. develop an appreciation of the actors within an environment;

g. identify the causal relationship and interplay of factors;

h. address causes as well as symptoms; and

i. anticipate future operational environmental conditions.

\textsuperscript{21} For more on transitions see Chapter 2, Section II – Security force assistance transitions.
\textsuperscript{22} Information activities ensure that the information available to friendly decision-makers is safeguarded and assured. In this way, shared understanding between Allies will be possible (provided the mechanisms are in place), thus improving NATO decision-making and effectiveness. In addition, NATO may seek to provide factual information to other approved parties to seek their support or to undermine efforts of an adversary attempting to gain support from them. See AJP 3.10, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations}. 

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0128. As contexts are dynamic, understanding needs to be constantly refreshed as NATO provides SFA. Commanders should understand that their actions will have intended and unintended effects and these must be continuously analyzed and understood. Investing in attaining an understanding may involve forgoing speed of action in the initial stages, but such investment will enable progress later.

0129. To achieve unity of effort and purpose within a CA, SFA activities should be coordinated across all stakeholders with a common understanding, or at least similar intentions/goals. Planning and resourcing the re-building, reorganization or reconstruction of local forces’ capability require a joint, inter-agency approach with the HN’s full cooperation and commitment. Commanders must cooperate with the HN to jointly identify what the local requirement is, and recognise (and be prepared to accept) that a local solution may be different to theirs.

0130. By gathering information and speaking to subject matter experts and local partners, commanders must develop and, where possible, share an understanding of all actors that may influence the operational environment. They also have to be aware of all changes which may impact SFA operations. This includes:

a. the factors that will contribute to transforming the HN into a stable and secure state;

b. how to gain and exploit influence;\(^{23}\)

c. the military contribution within the overall strategy and how it links with a sustainable political solution;

d. interoperability issues;

e. capabilities and support of other actors in the area to increase the unity of effort;

\(^{23}\) Influence aims to convince other actors to change their behaviour. Not all means of exerting power are equal in all environments.
f. national caveats;

g. how to match the construct of the newly-created local forces to the requirements of the HN to meet the challenges that they face; and

h. the need to build self-reliance and not dependency.

Understanding the local forces

0131. Effective SFA demands that commanders understand local forces as fully as possible. Amassing the information required to gain this understanding demands a sensitive approach: fact-finding enquiries also need to be conducted with both tact and balance. Developing an understanding of all key aspects of the local forces will assist both NATO and NATO-led forces to identify critical problem areas and priorities for further action.\(^24\)

0132. Commanders need to understand what frameworks, processes and structures work well within the local context. SFA activities that work within these frameworks, processes and structures are more likely to be both accepted by local forces and sustainable. Understanding requires divergent thinking and commanders must remain aware of the smallest nuances of culture and norms that may be levered to achieve objectives.

0133. An understanding of local forces should include, but is not limited to:

a. organizational structures, hierarchy, processes, accountability, policies and doctrine;\(^25\)

b. history, roles, tradition and morale;

c. identified security threats;

\(^{24}\) For more on operational analysis see AJP-5, Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning.

\(^{25}\) Commanders should note that organizational charts and structures may not fully reflect where power lies.
d. how they are perceived by the general population and local forces;

e. links to the HN’s laws and economy;

f. ethnicity and religion (and any tensions);

g. gender balance and the organizational structures and culture as well as women’s and men’s roles in society;

h. relationships to other-government institutions, organizations; and

i. the scale, drivers and form of any corruption.

Culture

0134. Culture consists of the customs, ideas and social behaviour of particular people or a group.26 Moreover, shared concepts guide what people believe and how they behave. Cultural understanding is vital to the conduct of SFA, and within a CA, NATO must cooperate with allies, partners, civilian agencies and local communities. Understanding different cultures demands knowing:

a. how people and their societies are organized;

b. what their beliefs and values are; and

c. the ways in which they interact with each other and outsiders.

NATO will need to interact with different cultures (including those within NATO) and work with those who may have different beliefs, political structures and approaches to operations. Although these differences often present challenges, when diverse actors are united by a common purpose or objectives, their differences may contribute to a wider range of options for SFA activities. NATO must show cultural respect towards their partners. This is paramount to create mutual trust.

26 To be analyzed from a gender perspective. See PO(2013)0491.
0135. NATO forces must understand those it cooperates with, and the context within which they, and non-combatants, operate. This demands understanding their institutions, culture, fears, perceptions, motivations and history. A principle of full understanding is appreciating the role of people, both locally and globally, as:

a. state actors, including governments, government agencies, state-controlled industries;

b. populations;

c. non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations; and

d. groups or individuals.

0136. Cultural misunderstandings can occur when one group interprets another group’s behaviour against an inappropriate context or their own cultural norms, or fail to consider sensitivities. Behaviour that appears irrational to one group, may be completely rational to another. Cultural misunderstandings can result in friction, potentially leading into mistrust and tension. Even at the tactical level, a lack of cultural understanding can have strategic implications, especially when an alleged incident is broadcasted by the media which are capable of influencing opinions worldwide. Cultural misunderstanding may:

a. damage the legitimacy, credibility and public support of both NATO and the HN;

b. unsettle the political narrative;

c. fuel retaliation;

d. create barriers to interaction with the HN;

e. lead to alienation; and

f. turn benign actors against the mission.
Risks of cultural misunderstanding

0137. An understanding of culture during the planning and execution of SFA activities will decrease the risks to the mission and NATO forces delivering SFA. However, a lack of cultural understanding could have an impact at all levels. Assessing the risks from cultural misunderstanding comprises a likelihood and impact analysis and employing measures to mitigate them. Commanders must ensure that the SFA plan includes measures to address risks of cultural misunderstanding.

0138. Mistakes made due to a poor understanding of culture (even if unintentional) can be very difficult to correct. Cultural awareness is the ability to understand culture and to apply this knowledge to effectively engage in the environments in which NATO operates. Cultural awareness must be employed at all levels.

a. At the strategic level, it supports decision-making and the development of the best strategy to effectively address the situation.

b. At the operational level, it supports the adoption of the most suitable ways of communicating with the various actors.

c. At the tactical level, it supports the development of awareness and understanding to help mitigate risks (to include those posed by insider attacks) and build relationships.

0139. In assessing the risks that cultural misunderstanding may expose, commanders should consider that:

a. cultural norms and values that are ‘taken for granted’ in certain nations may be different elsewhere;

b. while some (perceived) cultural similarities may be ignored or considered irreconcilably different, there will often be areas of common ground;
c. the interpretation of concepts such as honesty, fairness, respect, and ownership can mean fundamentally different things to different cultures;

d. superficial assessments, resulting in generalizations, are more likely when time is limited; and

e. over-immersion can occur when individuals or groups become overly sympathetic within a different culture.

When possible, personnel with local force cultural experience or subject matter experts (for example, anthropologists or cultural specialists) should be integrated into SFA forces to help prevent cultural misunderstandings.
Chapter 2 – The security force assistance framework

Section I – Security force assistance activities

0201. The security force assistance (SFA) framework is the non-linear, collective application of SFA planning, SFA activities, SFA assessment and SFA transition by NATO forces in order to assist with the development of competent, capable and sustainable, committed, confident and accountable local forces. NATO forces conducting SFA may be required to develop local forces along a single line of operation, multiple lines of effort, or across a combination of SFA activities. SFA activities can be summarized using the acronym ‘GOTEAM’:

- generate;
- organize;
- train;
- enable;
- advise; and
- mentor.

An initial assessment of the local situation and forces should be conducted to determine which activities are most appropriate to the situation and are essential to achieving NATO and host nation (HN) objectives. An initial assessment will also inform commanders of the HN’s capability and readiness to absorb SFA activities. SFA activities should be provided as best suits the context and may be delivered concurrently. Commanders should ensure that each SFA activity is tailored to the situation, local conditions and requirements.

0202. While providing SFA, the following factors need to be considered.

a. **Assessment and evaluation.** All SFA activities must be assessed and evaluated. Assessment ensures that:

   (1) progress can be monitored;

   (2) a starting baseline of ability is captured;
resources are correctly prioritized to meet the end state;

(4) the HN meets the prescribed standards; and

(5) transition phases start with an agreed standard.\(^{27}\)

b. **Transitional arrangements.** Planning for the eventual transition of ownership from NATO personnel to the HN must be planned and considered from the earliest stages of any SFA activities. Regardless of how much SFA is delivered, there will have to be a transitional phase. See Section III – Transitions. Transition and assessment should not be regarded as discrete: both play an integral part of all SFA activities (see Figure 2.1).

\[\text{Figure 2.1 – Security force assistance framework}\]

**Generate**

0203. Generate activities assist a HN to develop the systems, structures and manpower that will be required to build a sustainable local force capability. Generate activities require identification, resourcing and

\(^{27}\) See Chapter 1, Section III – Security force assistance assessment.
resolution of capability gaps. To ensure that both NATO and HN requirements are addressed, generate activities should be planned and carried out by close coordination with the HN. Generate activities could range from standing up a whole institution to a discreet function or capability and may include recruiting, selecting and vetting local force personnel. Generate activities will stretch across the political and military spectrum and may include assisting with developing budgets, timelines and sharing agreements. Generate activities may have to endure throughout the entirety of SFA activities.

0204. Generate activities should ensure that the correct balance of personnel, with a commensurate range of skill-sets (for example, linguistic, literacy and numeracy skills) and competencies is achieved. Generate activities will require supporting infrastructure, including but not limited to: recruitment centres; supporting administrative processes (including information technology (IT) systems, if feasible); and assisting in designing terms and conditions of service. Commanders should note that:

a. NATO may not lead the generation process;

b. not all levels of command may need to be generated; and

c. generate should be a planning consideration.

Organize

0205. Organize activities assist a HN to shape its local forces. Considerations should include measures taken to develop, implement and sustain command and control structures, functional areas (for example, manpower and personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning and policy, communications, force development), supporting institutions and infrastructure.

0206. Organizing a HN’s personnel, structures and processes into a capable, sustainable force demands a thorough understanding of the initial conditions and the end state. The initial conditions will be framed by the extant cultural, societal, structural, procedural and systemic norms
that are already in place (or missing). The SFA objectives, derived from the end state established by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), must be agreed at the outset in conjunction with the HN. Commanders should articulate clear phases as this will help to frame the start and end of activity as it progresses. HN organizations and units should reflect their own unique requirements, interests and capabilities – they should not simply replicate NATO or troop-contributing nations’ external institutions.

**Train and educate**

0207. Training is typically the most visible and recognized SFA activities. The aim of training and education is to teach a person (or organization) a skill, or type of behaviour, through regular practice and instruction. Training may include the development and execution of programs of instruction and training events. NATO may train and educate the local forces and may also contribute towards establishing a sustainable HN training capability. Therefore, training activities that are provided by NATO forces should be planned and structured to enable NATO to transition these activities to the HN. Some specialized training may continue beyond transition by arrangement with the HN.

0208. Training and education involve developing leadership and management skills, as well as building confidence, ethos and professional pride. NATO trainers work with the HN leadership to set and evaluate training standards. NATO trainers typically coach future HN trainers to facilitate eventual transition of responsibility to the HN. The main responsibilities of the training activity staff can be summarized as train, guide, coach, observe and evaluate. For more on training, see Chapter 3.

**Enable**

0209. Enable activities include providing services (and potentially contributing toward developing the associated institutions) that underpin and facilitate other SFA activities, particularly during transition activities. The HN must not depend on protracted NATO
support. Enable activities should contribute towards empowering the HN and building a sustainable capability. In addition, enable activities must be coordinated across the full spectrum of actors – this will ensure that activities are coherent and resources are prioritized. Enable activities may include, but are not limited to:

a. developing policy, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures;

b. providing services linked to joint functions\textsuperscript{28} such as explosive and ordnance disposal, air or sea lift, basic medical treatment, route clearance, air support and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR);

c. building or rebuilding facilities and infrastructure directly contributing to local forces, such as training facilities and headquarters;

d. managing equipment and material delivery;

e. managing financial matters;

f. sharing information on threats; and

g. maintaining facilities, infrastructure and equipment.

0210. Enable activities are likely to change over time. In the initial stages of an assistance programme, the local forces may be heavily reliant on external support. NATO (and/or contributing organizations as part of a comprehensive approach) must assist the HN to develop its local forces in order to be self-reliant in all but niche capabilities that they may never own themselves. These capabilities may continue to be provided until the local forces obtain their own capabilities and may, on request, be provided post transition (for example, intelligence and special operations forces’ assistance).

\textsuperscript{28} For more on joint functions see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine}. 

2-5
Advise

0211. Advising activities comprise improving the performance of designated actors by providing active participation and expertise to achieve strategic or operational objectives. An adviser can recommend a course of action, offer advice, or inform another party about a fact or situation. SFA advisers will carry out a number of functions.

a. Support formations, units and individuals that have reached an agreed standard of capability, competence and self-sufficiency, jointly decided by NATO and the HN.

b. SFA advisers must have the capability of operating with external coalition forces.

c. Provide advice on joint operations, how to improve their operating procedures, or how to obtain additional niche assets, such as air support, to accomplish their mission. Advisers may be empowered to request support.

d. Make recommendations through their chain of command; however, they cannot enforce them. Advisers can, for example, recommend courses of action, or inform about a fact or situation, but the final decision must be with the local forces and their chain of command.

e. Provide a liaison function between NATO and the HN. Advising should be a two-way relationship and the adviser is the pivotal link in the exchange of information.

f. They may be required to influence a target audience among local forces through personal appeal, close collaboration, rational persuasion, and team building.

0212. A key aspect of advise activities is to establish a relationship based on trust with HN counterparts. Culture, the mission, and the operational environment largely define the conditions under which advisers must develop relationships necessary to achieve mission success. Advisers
need to use their influence, developed through trust and teamwork, to explain to those that they are advising that their advice could be a viable alternative and is worthy of consideration. Once a course of action has been selected, advisers fulfil the functions of an observer, provider of capability support and official representative of their own chain of command. Advisers should have the required skill-sets and experience and should be selected carefully. The responsibilities of an adviser are summarized as inform, recommend, liaise, observe, represent and support.

**Mentor**

0213. Mentoring is about leadership and relationships. A mentor should focus on developing and enabling personnel in leadership and command positions in order to achieve a sustainable capability. A mentor is an experienced and trusted individual who provides counsel and leadership to another person, or organization, by agreement. Mentors need to develop relationships with individuals and teams that they are mentoring and these relationships must be based on mutual respect and trust. Such relationships should be goal oriented, enable a common understanding between both parties and empower through knowledge and confidence.

0214. Commanders providing SFA must choose and empower mentors carefully, and ensure that mentors fully understand their operating boundaries, responsibilities and function. Mentoring activities are summarized as teaching, guiding, influencing and supporting.

0215. During operations, the differences between mentoring and advising may be blurred and a clear distinction is not always possible. Though advising may follow mentoring, it may also be conducted by itself. This depends on the capabilities and skills of the individual member of the local forces’ organisational elements. Advising is only feasible if local forces have a solid understanding of how the individual performs the given tasks, and which goes beyond the required basic knowledge

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29 Mentors may be given authority to take the initiative in a critical situation for a less experienced local force individual or group in a face-saving manner. Authority must be specifically given by higher command, and should not be assumed.
level. If mentoring is followed by advising, the point of transition will always be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Section II – Security force assistance transitions

0216. SFA transition activities comprise the progressive transfer of functions, supporting institutions, infrastructures and responsibilities between actors to reach an enduring level of capability for the HN so that it is not dependent on a significant operational NATO military contribution. Transition activities must be planned from the outset and regarded an integral component of all SFA activities. In order to succeed, transition activities are to be conducted from the beginning of the operation and include assessment. As a result, initial transition terms may be re-evaluated.

0217. Transitions are often a period of high risk and uncertainty. If transition activities are poorly managed, gains achieved can be reversed. There are common approaches, principles and risks applicable to planning or implementing transition activities that may contribute to a lasting capability.

0218. Transitions are negotiated processes, most importantly, with the HN. This makes them non-linear and dependent on HN political processes and interests, which will change over time. Any long-term transition plan is therefore unlikely to proceed as expected. Flexibility is vital, requiring those planning transition activities to identify the range and limits of acceptable outcomes and to work within those limits to develop potential options and courses of action.

0219. It is rare for transition activities to be a bilateral process and is more likely to take place in a multilateral, multi-agency setting, with NATO being one of several actors involved. Hence, the ability of any single actor to manage transition activities as a whole, or to define its outcomes, will be limited. There are three key aspects that must shape any approach to transition activities.

a. **Transitions are a multinational and inter-agency process.**
   Transitions typically occur within multinational and inter-agency
environments, with multiple actors and agencies working within a HN on security, governance and rule of law. This environment creates dependencies between actors. Therefore, no one actor will have the freedom to plan and execute transition activities alone. In particular, NATO must cooperate with those agencies involved in activities that will outlast any significant military presence.

b. Transitions are a negotiated process. All actors, including the wider population, will have a view on the shape of any post-transition security environment – and such views may conflict. Negotiating the shape of this future security environment is more important than solely focusing on technical capability building. Commanders must work towards a flexible, sustainable, technically-sound and politically-sensitive transition approach in a dynamic political environment that they cannot control. Simple, flexible plans will allow greater resilience to occasional shocks or setbacks and commanders should aim not for a single, fixed end state, but for an acceptable range of outcomes. Understanding what defines this acceptable range is a key element of any transition activities planning.

c. Transitions are informed by operation assessments. Monitoring the progress of SFA transition activities (including perceptions, relationships and behaviours) is vital to enable commanders to identify whether they have achieved their SFA objectives and adjust their activities to meet their objectives.

Assessing transition activities

0220. An approach to assessing transition activities that emphasizes continuous learning and analysis is required to adapt planning to the transition environment. Assessment frameworks should allow progress to be tracked with risks and issues being recognized and addressed early. Security transition assessment should comprehensively consider related HN systems in order to promote and facilitate synchronization, coordination and integration. Moreover, identifying decisive points and conditions will assist in setting
assessment and transition activities. Without a holistic approach to assessment, elements of transition activities may become uncoordinated, especially if multiple actors are involved.

0221. Engaging with multinational and inter-agency actors, as well as those within the HN, provides effective means for building shared ownership and understanding of transition activities. Commanders must consider (and review) if the transition activities and the way in which NATO engages in it accords with the key aspects of a successful transition outlined at paragraph 0219.

Effective transition activities

0222. Transitions planning should facilitate commanders to both track specific progress against transitions plans and monitor the way in which partners are behaving and engaging with one another. Specifically, commanders should consider the following.

a. **Political primacy and focus.** Those involved in transition activities must be politically astute, maintaining a political focus responsive to the internal politics of the HN while being embedded within the international environment and wider political context.

   (1) **Flexibility.** Transition plans must accommodate uncertainty and be capable of flexible adaptation to a changing political context. Commanders should be prepared to react to change and remain flexible so that NATO can respond to opportunities or threats as they arise. Regardless of any changes to the plan, a clearly articulated end state must always be maintained.

   (2) **Identifying and understanding what motivates actors.** Transition initiatives must be considered in the context of its impact on the motivations and interests of these different actors. Understanding the diversity of perspective across HN
and non-state actors, including religious and tribal affiliations, genders, age groups and geographic areas provides a richer basis for planning and decision-making.

(3) **Balancing international and indigenous knowledge.** International experts can offer specific capability and technical knowledge while HN actors will have a more nuanced understanding of social structures, situational understanding and appropriate local solutions. Locally-influenced solutions, especially when founded on local cultural, political and social foundations are likely to be more durable than those designed solely by international actors.

b. **Legitimacy.** When considering legitimacy, it is important to specify what legitimacy entails and in the eyes of whom; developing domestic legitimacy provides long-term stability. Without legitimacy, transition activities will:

(1) lack popular support and the broader political process could be undermined; and

(2) be less likely to endure.

c. **Building comprehensive capacity.** Capacity to support transition activities goes beyond recruiting, training and equipping security personnel and forces. It requires creating a comprehensive capacity to plan, manage, oversee and sustain an acceptable level of security on a cross-government level.

d. **Sustainability.** Longer-term success will rely on developing sustainable models and organizations that can provide effective day-to-day security. Sustainability should therefore be examined with regards to politics, organizations, processes and resources.

e. **Communication strategy.** Effective transition activities must be supported by a communication strategy that creates an accurate understanding of NATO’s actions and intentions among audiences in support of NATO’s interests and objectives.
Transition risks

0223. Transition activities are inherently risky endeavours with impact beyond the tactical and operational levels. Commanders at all levels should consider the following risks when planning and assessing transition activities.

a. **Timing.** Transitions may occur before actors feel fully confident and capable. The time required for capability and legitimacy to develop will need to be balanced with the risks that emerge from not achieving key security tasks. Transitioning too soon can lead to deterioration in security and, ultimately, strategic mission failure. Premature transition activities may lead to the need to re-engage. Delayed transition activities may result in increased dependency.

b. **State instability.** The political settlement and elements of the state may remain vulnerable for some time both during and after transition activities.

c. **Human rights abuses.** Where warring parties have been responsible for human rights abuse, the risks of retributive violence must be carefully assessed and mitigated. Abuse within the security and justice system can further undermine the functions of governance and hamper the transition and recovery from conflict and crises. The risks are highest where integration of former combatants into the security apparatus is taking place or where state institutions, as well as conflicting parties, behave in a predatory manner towards the civilian population.

d. **Conflict of interests.** Tensions may emerge regarding the scope and vision for transition among HN parties, neighbouring countries and those international actors engaged in the transition. These must be carefully negotiated to avoid undermining competing objectives.

e. **Legitimacy.** If transition activities are not seen as legitimate, it is unlikely to endure. Those engaged in transition activities should
therefore consider the implications of any choices they make on the legitimacy of their HN counterparts and support developing their legitimacy wherever possible.

f. **Political capture.** Powerful actors within the HN may seek to use the transition to further their own or their group’s political purposes. This will undermine the legitimacy of the HN government and the transition process, and may ultimately lead to a return to violence or, in extreme cases, security sector collapse.

**Section III – Security force assistance assessment**

0224. Assessment comprises measuring the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel, systems and processes. The purpose of assessment is to provide an evaluation of activities and progress toward creating effects, achieving objectives and attaining the end state. Comprehensive SFA assessment should encompass the strategic, operational and tactical assessment. Assessment of all SFA activities will be of particular relevance as local forces assume responsibility for their own security. This will ensure a measurement of HN capacity and capability development toward the defined end state.

0225. To determine capability gaps, assessment of the local forces and their functional components should precede any SFA activities. Commanders should complete this assessment in coordination with the HN and the other major stakeholders. This will assist in identifying any gaps in capability or capacity that need to be addressed within the context of NATO and regional interests, objectives and goals. Each echelon providing SFA should establish a baseline assessment and subject matter experts should assess the local forces’ capability against the agreed end state. From this baseline assessment, ongoing assessments must measure the effectiveness of SFA efforts to date and determine the scope, level and focus of subsequent, ongoing activities. Commanders must consider what assessment criterion should be implemented that will ensure that processes can be measured and assessed.
0226. Assessments should be appropriate to those organizations that fulfil executive direction, generating forces, or operating force roles and functions.

a. The operating forces should communicate their requirements back to the executive direction and the generating forces. This feedback facilitates comprehensive SFA assessment.

b. Commanders should select assessment metrics carefully. Assessment metrics must be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely (SMART) and must align with the level of assistance that NATO is providing.

c. Among the key assessment criterion that must be developed by those charged with providing SFA are measures of effectiveness to measure how well the operating forces perform their assigned tasks against agreed performance standards.

0227. Assessment is difficult to achieve when there is a lack of fixed, stationary or constant elements: without a baseline, it is more difficult to assess progress. A number of reoccurring challenges exist that are relevant to assessing SFA activities. These challenges are a product of the interaction between the HN population and other actors that are not under the command of a joint forces commander. Challenges include:

a. ensuring that NATO standards are not mapped onto the local forces;

b. the complex and unpredictable nature of the operation;

c. dealing with multiple actors with different priorities/timescales;

d. the risk of being misled by competing subjective and measurable sources of information;

e. understanding that progress is often non-linear and may reverse; and
f. the difficulty, at times, to appreciate political imperatives.

0228. A well-executed assessment strategy assists commanders to prioritize or redirect resources. Based on changing conditions, assessment facilitates opportunities for flexible responses via customization of SFA activities. These assessment-based modifications to such activities are most visible in changes to the assistance method (for example, from embedded advisory teams to mobile training/advisory teams).
Chapter 3 – Providing security force assistance

Section I – Planning

0301. Security force assistance (SFA) should be planned in accordance with the guidance and principles outlined in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning* and the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD), which describe in detail the operational-level planning process and its relationship with strategic-level planning.

0302. To promote common understanding, cooperation and unity of purpose among stakeholders, commanders should adopt a comprehensive approach (CA) to SFA planning. Planning should include the host nation (HN) and multinational stakeholders. Comprehensive planning processes facilitate:

a. a common end state and objectives to be agreed;

b. the delineation of NATO, multinational actors and HN roles/responsibilities;

c. identifying the required resources;

d. common understanding;

e. shared assessment and transition strategies; and

f. the sequencing and prioritizing of activities.

0303. There is no SFA planning blueprint. Each SFA plan must be contextual, specific to the HN's requirements and security situation and should reflect an effective balance between NATO’s established best practices, other international support, and the HN’s needs, capabilities and traditions. A common understanding should be built through sharing information and conducting planning with all partners. Commanders should analyze lessons identified from NATO’s previous experiences of providing SFA.
Security force assistance planning

0304. When planning to integrate SFA into wider strategies and plans, commanders should consider the following.

a. **Maintaining host nation primacy and build legitimacy.** SFA activities cannot undermine, or be perceived to undermine, the primacy or legitimacy of the HN government.

b. **Understand strategic, long-term implications and sustainability of SFA before delivering action.** This is especially important in building HN development and defence self-sufficiency, both of which may require large investments of time and materiel. Planning considerations include, but are not limited to, the:

   (1) understanding of NATO and the HN’s required end state;

   (2) transitions and assessment strategies;

   (3) sustainability of local forces and HN supporting institutions;

   (4) acceptability of SFA outcomes by the HN’s society;

   (5) impact of SFA on the distribution of resources within the HN;

   (6) likely relationship between improved military forces and existing civilian, regional, ethnic and religious divisions in society;

   (7) security situation within the HN and the risk to NATO and HN forces;

   (8) impact of SFA activities on wider security sector reform (SSR) programmes and on the regional and local balance of power; and
(9) management of local forces who receive/may require extra training.

c. **Tailoring security force assistance provision within the operational environment and the specific needs of the host nation.** Choices in equipment and training conducted during SFA activities may affect future interoperability capabilities and impact sustainability. This requires that local forces are equipped and sized in ways that suit their infrastructure and which are not reliant on systems that may not be available to the HN in the long run.

d. **Ensuring unity of effort/unity of purpose.** Commanders must consider international, governmental and non-governmental organizations’ programmes and objectives. Commanders should also, where possible, aim to integrate and coordinate NATO and HN capabilities.

**Section II – Security force assistance as an operational activity**

0305. Providing SFA necessitates a methodical approach to create the desired effects within a given timeframe. It is not intended that SFA doctrine should supplant extant doctrine that outlines how maritime, land, air and special operations forces operate. Key to successful SFA is harnessing the relative advantage that each element (operating within their own environment) can bring as well as understanding their limitations. In order to achieve sustainable local forces, the implementation of a functional-based SFA framework, may be required. Functions may span across all levels (from tactical to strategic) and integrate HN systems and processes which have to be influenced by SFA activities. This allows NATO forces to enable the HN to solve problems within their own domain and become self-sufficient.

0306. Following NAC mission approval, SFA can be a supporting effort within a wider NATO operational design. Therefore, SFA will be considered throughout the strategic and operational concept of operations (CONOPS) development processes.
0307. The overarching aim of SFA activities is to develop legitimate local forces while contributing to regional stability. Such activities should assist local forces to be:

a. **competent** – across all functions and levels, from the ministerial level to the individual soldier performing security functions;

b. **capable and sustainable** – resourced within HN capabilities, appropriately sized and effective enough to accomplish missions and be sustainable over time;

c. **committed** – to protecting institutions and the security of its people;

d. **confident** – in both NATO’s ability to assist, and in themselves to increase their ability to secure their own country; and

e. **accountable** – within a framework of the rule of law and international human rights.

**Force protection**

0308. AJP-3.14, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection* describes force protection as ‘measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success’.

0309. With implications that extend well beyond the military mission and into issues such as public support and political cohesion, force protection in support of any NATO forces is a principal consideration in planning, decision-making and executing the mission on all levels of command. Providing SFA may expose NATO forces to a broad spectrum of security risks and threats, specifically when conducting combined activities (for example, insider threats) and may require NATO forces

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30 Hazards include mission-related hazards such as road traffic accidents and fire and exposure to environmental hazards such as disease and toxic industrial hazards.
to work closely with local forces across the whole spectrum of threats. Force protection issues must be addressed during all SFA activities.

0310. Commanders must understand their force protection responsibilities and ensure that risks are identified, analyzed and assessed. If a risk is deemed unacceptable by the commander, mitigation measures will be required.\footnote{See Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.16.1, \textit{Allied Doctrine for Countering Insider Threats} outlines direction and guidance on countering insider threats on SFA operations.}

**Security force assistance coordination**

0311. It is likely that NATO will not be the only organization providing assistance to develop local forces. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that coordination measures are in place, such as liaison officers. Such measures will promote visibility, de-confliction and cooperation among the different organizations.

0312. Information sharing is of great importance as one organization's good intentions may have unintended consequences on another. Information sharing manifests in integrated planning and common understanding. NATO must also develop working relationships with other local and international organizations in shared areas of interest to help fill shortfalls. This may help make the operation more efficient by avoiding duplication of effort. Commanders must understand who holds primacy in any SFA effort and aim to coordinate their activities with other stakeholders.

**Organization**

0313. Within the existing means and capabilities, a network of subject matter experts to provide SFA advice during the implementation, execution and transition process, may be established at the strategic command level. At the operational and tactical levels, subject matter experts’ advice may be required and commanders should dedicate staff positions to plan and coordinate SFA activities. While the NATO command and control structure remains independent, the NATO SFA
functional organization should reflect and complement the local forces command framework.

Section III – Legal considerations

Legal framework for the mission

0314. As part of an ongoing NATO operation or mission, any assistance provided to local forces must be consistent with the applicable NAC approved mission and operation order. In addition, the legal status of NATO forces and/or their civilian component must be determined in a legally-binding written agreement with the HN (for example, a status of forces agreement). Specifically, civil or criminal jurisdiction pertaining to NATO personnel must be validated or established well-before NATO personnel enter the HN territory. Commanders must consider that contributing nations may be operating within national caveats.

Legal consistency of the training

0315. The assistance provided to local forces must promote the knowledge and respect of international law, especially the Law of War/Armed Conflict,\(^{32}\) as part of military skills. This must include basic information on the:

a. authorized means of warfare, in compliance with the Hague Treaties;

b. main principles of international law as laid down in the Geneva Conventions (humanity, distinction (including protected persons materials and facilities), proportionality and military necessity); and

c. criminal and disciplinary consequences of breaches of this law (war crimes, genocides, crimes against humanity) before national or international courts that have jurisdiction over local forces.

\(^{32}\) The US DoD refers to the Law of Armed Conflict as the Law of War.
Children and Armed Conflict – Resolution 2225(2015) and related resolutions

0316. When invited to train local forces, NATO should, as appropriate and in accordance with its mandate, raise the awareness of local forces on violations against children in armed conflict and the need to implement Resolution 2225 and related resolutions. Resolution 2225 formally established a framework for the monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) to strengthen the practice of reporting on violations committed against children in armed conflict, especially on six practices identified by the UN Secretary General as ‘grave violations against children in armed conflict’. NATO forces should provide the education and training tools on Children and Armed Conflict available for local forces in order to synchronize the efforts so as to prevent or reduce recruitment of children as part of the conflict.

Section IV – Training

Training for local forces

0317. Training consists of activities to teach a person or organization a skill, or type of behaviour, through regular practice and instruction. Training local forces is a key component in developing a self-sustainable capability. History demonstrates that training local forces requires determination, cultural awareness, empathy and, above all, patience. Successful SFA is underpinned by carefully selecting and training those personnel chosen to provide training activities. Training must be an enduring function that is able to persist within the HN’s own capabilities once NATO forces have left.

0318. Training can be delivered in, or out of, the HN and comprises all activities that develop, improve and integrate leader-development and education at individual, leader, collective and staff levels. In order to mitigate identified capability gaps in local forces, and accelerate their

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34. These are the killing or maiming of children; recruitment or using child soldiers; attacks against schools or hospitals; rape or other grave sexual violence against children; abduction of children; denial of humanitarian access for children.
independence from NATO forces, training activity should focus on the commander’s priorities. This may include:

a. task analysis;

b. developing and delivering programmes of instruction;

c. implementing training events and assessment strategies; and

d. leader-development activities.

0319. Training programmes should coordinate all aspects of multinational and national action and contribute towards, and connect with, a wider framework. This requires that commanders and those delivering training, have an understanding of the wider comprehensive training programme and how they contribute within it. While each commander will prioritize action based on the situation and training assessment, two enduring focuses should be:

a. activities conducted to train and educate the local forces to fulfil their role; and

b. activities conducted to train and educate HN instructors and educators help to ensure that capability is sustainable.

0320. In partnership with the HN, commanders should design, establish and deliver training programmes for the local forces. This activity may need to be underpinned by developing training infrastructure. NATO forces can also conduct individual, leader and collective training programs for specific local forces. NATO forces can provide training and advisory assistance in two ways:

a. teams may provide training or give advice/assistance to local forces; and

b. individual personnel may be assigned or attached to perform training and advisory assistance duties on a temporary or enduring basis.
The commander’s initial assessment should develop a training plan based on a full mission analysis.\textsuperscript{36}

0321. Training activities should be coordinated across the local forces, or at the very least be sympathetic to other training being delivered elsewhere. Inadvertently training differing techniques, procedures and processes that cannot be shared and integrated should be guarded against. Commanders responsible for designing training frameworks should consider:

a. listing NATO and HN agreed training objectives at each echelon of local forces;

b. identifying units, commands and leadership personnel requiring training across each echelon;

c. identifying resources required and how they will be provided; and

d. providing written agreements between NATO and the HN identifying what will be provided by each party.

\textbf{Security force assistance training for NATO personnel}

0322. Mentors, advisers and trainers are crucial to achieving sustainable success in SFA activities. They usually live and work with their counterparts, sharing common hardship, risks and experiences. Accomplishments are closely related to their level of preparation and competency. Therefore, NATO forces must be trained to provide SFA prior to deploying regardless of whether it is in training, advising or mentoring role.\textsuperscript{37} Training emphasis will vary according to the HN’s requirements, force composition and NATO/HN agreements.\textsuperscript{38} To determine requirements, in terms of knowledge and capabilities, personnel and units carrying out SFA activities should develop selection, education and training processes before deploying. In all

\textsuperscript{36} AJP 5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning outlines the 8-step process.

\textsuperscript{37} MC 458/2, NATO’s Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy, acknowledges this similar requirement.

\textsuperscript{38} Military skills, concepts and procedures taught to NATO forces may be transferrable to local forces for their own internal defence and development.
events, the training to be conducted will depend on the situation and the commander’s estimate.

0323. Pre-deployment, advanced and follow-on training for SFA personnel should consider the following principles.

a. For NATO personnel providing SFA, an important part of training is imparting knowledge on NATO and national doctrines, concepts and requirements for cooperation in a partnership. Likewise, they need to understand national and multinational procedures.

b. All training activities must contribute to the end state.

c. Pre-deployment, advanced and follow-on training with a special focus on HN orientation is indispensable. During that training, NATO personnel should be provided with the information to allow them to develop an understanding of the theatre, political and cultural particularities, customs and traditions.

d. Training activities should consider lessons learned by previous contingents to learn from operations and be able to react to ongoing developments.

e. Standardized procedures must be developed and imparted to ensure consistency of training, and hence credibility, irrespective of force rotations.

f. Leaders and specialists must understand the structures and processes of local forces as well as HN laws in order to prepare themselves accordingly for common planning and consultations.

g. NATO forces must know how to build trust-based relationships, influence, and advise partners. They must be familiar with the theoretical bases, for example, the sociological and psychological background.
h. NATO forces providing SFA may work in environments that expose them to isolation, capture and/or exploitation of personnel and they must be familiar with force protection measures.\textsuperscript{39}

i. Not everyone is suited to perform SFA functions.

0324. Troop-contributing nations must properly select personnel to ensure each individual possesses the required knowledge, skills, and temperament required to work closely with local forces. Experience suggests that the following characteristics significantly enhance the ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture.

a. Rank, age and technical expertise.

b. Empathy, flexibility and perceptiveness.

c. Open-mindedness and tolerance for ambiguity; ability to withhold judgment and set realistic goals and tasks.

d. Ability to motivate oneself and others, and a strong sense of self-reliance.

e. Ability to accept and learn from failure, and a tolerance of frustration helps to overcome setbacks and failures.

f. The ability to work in a transactional environment.

g. Patience and knowing when it is right to step away.

h. Cultural and religious affiliation and understanding.

Training assistance

0325. The agreement reached between NATO and HN officials (most likely outlined in a memorandum of understanding (MoU)) provides the framework for the who, what, when, where, how and why of military training assistance. NATO’s extant training processes should be

\textsuperscript{39} AJP-3.7, \textit{Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment}
modified to fit the requirements of the local forces being trained, and assessed to ensure that styles and techniques are appropriate for HN consumption. Procedures may vary, but fundamental training principles and processes still apply.\textsuperscript{40} Training assistance should consider the materiel, financial and logistical realities of the HN. The training philosophy should be to deliver the prescribed standard: that is, no more and no less than required. This will enable the efficient use of resources and reduce the time taken to create credible local forces. Training beyond the agreed standards should be guarded against.

0326. Local forces who are identified as trainers must operate very closely with NATO forces. The long-term goal of SFA training must be for local forces to eventually conduct all instruction and training without assistance from NATO forces. Initially, NATO forces may present all, or most, of the instruction with as much HN assistance as is feasible. The ‘train-the-trainer’ concept should be integrated throughout all training programmes.

0327. Training assistance comprises all formal training conducted by NATO forces. All NATO forces engaged in training assistance must be prepared and conditioned for the level of scrutiny that their actions may be subjected to by HN government personnel, military, media and civilians. Part of preparing personnel for providing training assistance is making them aware that their actions can have a lasting impact. Their words and actions must underpin NATO’s commitment, legitimacy and professionalism.

0328. Training local forces may have unintended effects, for example, shifts in power. Commanders must be aware of this, and plan to include indicators of any unintended outcomes in their assessment strategies.

\textsuperscript{40} Bi-SC Directive 75-2 \textit{Education and Training Directive} provides strategic guidance on responsibilities, programming, planning and standard procedures for execution of E&T to ensure a coordinated approach throughout NATO in order to provide trained and ready forces for current and future operations.
SFA training considerations

0329. When providing SFA, there are a number of considerations that must be addressed.

a. What type of forces are required and what are their primary purpose?

b. Who is receiving NATO training and what are their motivation, morale, ethnicity, gender, education (for example, literacy) and culture?

c. What should be taught?

d. What is the appropriate level of assistance?

e. What information is required to enable NATO to understand the operational training environment and required training activities?

f. What cultural expertise does NATO have that will help training the local forces?

g. What enablers will have to be provided by NATO forces?

h. What consideration is given to sustaining the training effort once NATO forces have left?

i. What will be the assessment and evaluation strategies?

j. How will training activities integrate with broader strategic communications strategies?

k. What are the assumptions and limitations?

l. What are the legal requirements?
Training plans

0330. Developing the HN training plan may require a site survey to identify gaps between capabilities and needs. Those developing training plans should consider as a minimum:

a. HN doctrine and training literature, including differences from NATO/contributing nations’ doctrine;

b. constraints in HN resources and funding;

c. societal, religious and military culture;

d. current level of HN proficiency;

e. relationship between civilian security/police forces and military forces;

f. HN’s ability (or inability) to field systems or equipment;

g. human rights and the weight of gender in society;

h. potential training facilities and areas based on projected training (for example, urban terrain training sites);

i. proficiency of HN’s trainers;

j. equipment availability (for example, radios, weapons, aircraft and vehicles);

k. systems and procedures;

l. logistics systems and procedures;

m. existing cooperation levels with NATO, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and other agencies; and

n. force protection.
Lexicon

Part I – Acronyms and abbreviations

The lexicon contains abbreviations relevant to Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.16, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection* and is not meant to be exhaustive. The definitive and more comprehensive list of abbreviations is in AAP-15, *NATO Glossary of Abbreviations* used in NATO Documents and Publications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied Administrative Publication</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bi-SC</td>
<td>of the two Strategic Commands</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>comprehensive approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counter-insurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOTEAM</td>
<td>generate, organize, train, enable, advise and mentor</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>military assistance</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<td>MRM</td>
<td>monitoring and reporting mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>security and reconstruction</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>strategic commander</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>stability policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>troop-contributing nation</td>
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Part II – Terms and definitions

assessment
A considered process of appraisal to support decision making.
(New definition harmonized in accordance with the two Strategic Commands (Bi-SC) letter, CPPSPL/7740-73/10-271642; 5000 FEF 0070/TT 6518/Ser: NU0008 dated 31.01.2011. Will be processed for inclusion in the NATO Terminology Management System (NTMS) and AAP-06 in accordance with the procedures defined in C-M(2007)0023-AS 1, 23 April 2007, Guidance for the Development and Publication of NATO Terminology.

command
1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual.
4. To dominate an area or situation.
5. To exercise command. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

counter-insurgency (COIN)
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.
(NTMS – NATO Agreed)

course of action (COA)
In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

doctree
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.
(NTMS – NATO Agreed)

effect
A change in the state of a system (or system element) that results from one or more actions, or other causes.
(New definition harmonized in accordance with Bi-SC letter, CPPSPL/7740-73/10-271642; 5000 FEF 0070/TT 6518/Ser: NU0008 dated 31.01.2011. Will be processed for inclusion in the NATO Terminology Management System
end state
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

force protection (FP)
All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

host nation (HN)
A nation which, by agreement:
- receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
- allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
- provides support for these purposes. (NTMS— NATO Agreed)

infrastructure
In NATO, the static buildings, facilities and other permanent installations required to support military capabilities. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

measurement of effectiveness
The assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (New definition proposed by AJP-1(D), will be processed for inclusion in the NTMS in accordance with the procedures defined in C-M(2007)0023-AS 1, 23 April 2007, Guidance for the Development and Publication of NATO Terminology). Not NATO Agreed.

military assistance (MA)
A broad range of activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring or the conduct of combined operations. Note: The range of military assistance is considerable and includes, but is not limited to: capability building of friendly security forces; engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations; and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)
mission (Msn)
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

non-governmental organization (NGO)
A private, not for profit, voluntary organization with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organized at local, national, regional or international level.

Notes:
1. A non-governmental organization does not necessarily have an official status or mandate for its existence or activities.
2. NATO may or may not support or cooperate with a given nongovernmental organization. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

objective (Obj)
A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

operation (Op) ((OP) (admitted))
A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.

Notes:
1. NATO operations are military.
2. NATO operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

operational level
The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

operations assessment
The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making.

(New definition harmonized in accordance with Bi-SC letter, CPPSPL/7740-73/10-271642; 5000 FEF 0070/TT 6518/Ser: NU0008 dated 31.01.2011. Will be processed for inclusion in the NATO Terminology Management System (NTMS) and AAP-06 in accordance with the procedures defined in CM (2007)0023-AS 1, 23 April 2007, Guidance for the Development and Publication of NATO Terminology)
operations planning
The planning of military operations at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Designated active or reserve component forces of national military services specifically organised, trained, and equipped for special operations. (New definition contained in MC 0437/2, Special Operations Policy, 2011. Not NATO Agreed)

Stability policing (SP)
A set of police related activities intended to reinforce, or temporarily replace, indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights, in order to enable the development of a sustainable peace, through reinforcing and/or temporary replacing of the indigenous police.

strategic level
The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

supporting commander
A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

sustainability
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

tactical level
The level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)
AJP-3.16(A)(1)