INTENTIONALLY BLANK
1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.22, Edition A, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR STABILITY POLICING, which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2616.

2. AJP-3.22, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt.

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member or partner nations, or NATO commands and bodies.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Edvardas MAŽEIKIS
Major General, LTUAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office
Allied Joint Publication-3.22

Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing

Edition A Version 1

Allied Joint Publication-3.22 (AJP-3.22), dated August 2016, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff.

Director Concepts and Doctrine
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
# RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
## RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[nation]</th>
<th>[detail of reservation]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Military police and gendarmerie forces are different entities, depending on the participating nations. Despite their disparity they conduct the same tasks in missions, especially when providing security force assistance. That is why the term &quot;military police including gendarmerie-type forces&quot; brings together both entities. Separating them from each other would limit the commander's opportunities and would produce an unintended separation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>The deployment, by France, of units or staff to conduct stability policing missions cannot be considered unless expressly and explicitly authorized by the force's mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>The Slovak Republic reserves the right to implement operational capabilities established in this STANAG up to the level of a SVK Military Police company deployed in a stability policing operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| SVN      | According to Annex A to AJP-3.22:  
- Negotiation and mediation: SAF MP has trained police negotiators. Mediation does not fall within the tasks assigned to the SAF MP.  
- Support to judicial and correction institutions: Support to judicial and correction institutions do not fall within the tasks assigned to the SAF MP.  
- Counter-organized crime: SAF MP can assist and support Counter-organized crime activities IAW national legislation. It possesses limited capability to perform such activities.  
- Counter-smuggling: SAF MP can assist and support Counter-smuggling operations IAW national legislation. It possesses limited capability to perform such activities.  
- Counter drug: SAF MP can assist and support Counter-drug crime operations IAW national legislation. It possesses limited capability to perform such activities.  
- Counter human trafficking: SAF MP can assist and support Counter human trafficking operations IAW national legislation. It possesses limited capability to perform such activities.  
- War crime investigations and assistance to international courts: SAF MP can assist and support war crime investigations and assistance to international courts. It possesses limited capability to perform such activities.  
According to Annex B to AJP-3.22: |
For tasks as:
- Prosecutions,
- Jail,
- Supply / Logistics,
- Budgeting,
- Human Resource Management,
- Police Administration,
- Oversight / Accountability,
- Community Programs and
- Ethics
SAF MP does not possess such capability.

SAF MP can assist and support Interagency Planning, but it does not possess capability to perform such activity.

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
PREFACE

1. The NATO Strategic Concept (Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the NATO, adopted by heads of state and government at the NATO summit in Lisbon, 19-20 Nov 2010) describes the requirement for the Allies to “develop the capability to train and develop local forces [police forces included] in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance.” This requirement is also mentioned in Serial 1.7 of the Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (CAAP) and the Lisbon Summit decisions on the Comprehensive Approach (MCM 0034-2014 SFA Concept, 28 March 2014).

2. The requirement to substitute, if necessary, and support local police forces as part of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach, has been underscored in recent operations in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Although NATO has experience in providing assistance to local forces in crisis zones, there is no dedicated Allied Doctrine for Stability Policing (SP). While the Military Committee (MC) has undertaken effort to develop a Security Force Assistance concept (SFA Concept) to address the need to train and develop indigenous military security forces, the need to address local police forces remains unfilled. The MC recognized this void in the SFA Concept by stating that “there may be a requirement to fully support the security sector reform by training and mentoring police forces and advising local government officials in the areas of law and order and rule of law when other actors are hampered and unable to do so”. Furthermore, the SFA Concept indicated that “the doctrinal work taken forward with Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing is to address part of this matter.” As well, in the ongoing development of Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction (AJP 3.4.5) the requirement for SP doctrine is recognized.

3. In accordance with AJP 3.2 Allied Land Operations, military forces in any campaign will undertake a range of tactical activities. These will include stability activities which seek to create and maintain civil security, to support civil authorities and to build security force capabilities as appropriate. Doctrine for these stability activities is given in ATP 3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks. Although all military forces may be involved in variety of stability activities, the unique capabilities of Military Police are well suited for building civil police capabilities and capacity in maintaining security and control.

---

1 MCM 0034-2014 NATO Security Force Assistance Concept
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Chapter 1 - Introduction and Framework**  
Introduction 1-1  
Stability Policing 1-1  
Comprehensive Approach 1-2  
NATO Strategic Concept 1-2  
Doctrinal framework 1-3  
Stability Policing and Crisis Response 1-3  
Stabilization and Reconstruction Missions 1-4  
Stability Policing support to Stability Activities 1-5  

**Chapter 2 – Planning Considerations**  
Introduction 2-1  
Understanding the Operational Environment 2-1  
The Culture 2-1  
The Threats 2-2  
The States at Risk 2-2  
Partnership with Local Authorities and Population 2-3  
Identifying and Planning for the Policing “Gap” 2-4  
The Indigenous Policing Gap 2-4  
The Actors 2-5  
Stability Policing Mandate 2-6  
Stability Policing Missions 2-6  
Replacement 2-7  
Reinforcing 2-9  
Interaction with Relevant Actors 2-12  
End State and the Transitional Process 2-12  

**Chapter 3 – Conduct of Stability Policing Activities**  
Introduction 3-1  
Stability Policing in Security and Control 3-1  
Stability Policing in Security Sector Reform 3-2  
Stability Policing in Support to Initial Restoration of Services 3-3  
Stability Policing in Support to Initial Governance Tasks 3-4  

**Annex A – Stability Policing Tasks**  

**Annex B – Training and Skills**  
The Structure of Training  
Policing Skills Development  

**Lexicon**  
Part I – Acronyms and Abbreviations  
Part II – Terms and Definitions Stability Policing  

IX  
Edition A Version 1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK

Introduction

0101. NATO missions address complex problems in fragile states during and post crisis. These efforts contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and to coherence and coordination of the international community’s efforts towards security, development, and governance. Specifically, Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) activities include support to establishing long-term stability and strengthened governance, local capacity building, and the promotion of ownership by the relevant national authorities. Additional important S&R activities include the encouragement of the rule of law and establishing the basis for economic, human, and social development. The ultimate goal of such efforts is to maintain or return to a stable, self-sustaining peace.

0102. Security forces are the most visible manifestation of government authority responsible for public security, and will enhance the legitimacy of the State in being responsive to public needs.

Stability Policing

0103. Stability policing activities are conducted with the aim of establishing a safe and secure environment (SASE), restoring public order and security, and establishing the conditions for meeting longer term needs with respect to governance and development (in particular through security sector reform). This can include both the re-establishment of law and order and reinforcing the Rule of Law (police, courts, corrections, etc.). Under a comprehensive approach, a combination of military and non-military actors, such as indigenous and international police forces, could be employed to achieve this goal.

0104. Stability policing should be conducted by specialised assets, which are police trained and equipped. Stability policing assets are specialized in the field of maintaining public order, public safety, and law enforcement. This may be accomplished by the replacement or reinforcing of indigenous police forces through the performance of the tasks identified in Annex A.

0105. Stability policing fills a void in establishing and maintaining a SASE post conflict. Stability policing assets perform police activities in the mission area aimed to tackle possible threat sources and provide security to the local population by replacing and/or reinforcing indigenous police forces.

---

2 The relevant national authorities are the governing authorities of the nation, which is the recipient of the international community's assistance in S&R. They may include authorities at the national, regional, and local level, as appropriate.
0106. Stability policing conducted throughout the full spectrum of conflict requires a specific police approach and set of capabilities which significantly differs from the support and training of other types of security forces. While stability policing benefits greatly from a comprehensive approach, given its specialized nature, it must rely on police expertise and as such it should be directed by police forces from within the NATO force.³ It may be necessary for conventional forces to conduct policing functions in the initial stages, however, the transition to police forces should occur as soon as possible.

**Comprehensive Approach**

0107. NATO has learned from its operational experience that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to the Alliance’s security. Both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian, and military crisis management instruments. To this end, NATO has introduced the NATO Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (CAAP).

0108. The CAAP seeks unity of effort with other members of the international community, in particular the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). NATO support to S&R will normally be a part of a wider international response and should be conducted in close cooperation with other relevant actors and national authorities. NATO commanders could be called upon to support the activities of other actors in protecting, strengthening and restoring civil society, governance, rule of law, and the local economy. All these stability activities should contribute to setting the conditions for a stable host nation governance.

**NATO Strategic Concept**

0109. The Strategic Concept⁴ is written to “guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners.” It says that NATO will actively employ an appropriate combination of capabilities “to help manage developing crises before they escalate into conflicts, to stop on-going conflicts and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security”.

0110. NATO Allies will be engaged “in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation” as well as doctrine development, adapted capabilities, and competencies. New concepts and doctrine are already under development such as SFA and AJP 3.4.5. Military Support to S&R. The development of Stability Policing doctrine

---
³ Such as Military Police including Gendarmerie type forces.
⁴ Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the NATO, adopted by heads of state and government at the NATO summit in Lisbon, 19-20 Nov 2010
will allow NATO to better assist local authorities to restore and maintain security without international assistance.

**Doctrinal Framework**

0111. In accordance with contemporary operational doctrine, NATO forces may be called upon to conduct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. The spectrum of conflict reflects the prevalence, scale, and intensity of violence ranging from stable peace to high-intensity conflict. Overlying the spectrum of conflict are four predominant campaign themes: Peacetime Military Engagement, Peace Support Operations, Security Operations, and Combat Operations. The spectrum of conflict can vary among, and within the campaign themes and can evolve over time. Stability policing adapts to the above mentioned campaign themes and to the mission mandates. Throughout the spectrum of conflict the initial goal of stability policing is to re-establish and maintain sufficient security for the local populace. Secondly stability policing re-establishes law and order and strengthens the rule of law through reinforcing local security institutions. In this view, lasting stability can be achieved, under the policing perspective, by preventing violence, protecting borders/personnel/key institutions, tackling organised crime, countering terrorism, etc. Overall stability may only be achieved through a broad range of initiatives extending beyond policing activities.

0112. Stability policing assets are specialised resources, available to the commander to support safety and public order needs. The deployment of stability policing assets could complement NATO forces and indigenous security forces in their mission to provide security to the local population as well as refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Stability policing assets are capable of deploying into a crisis area from the beginning of the intervention and stay as long as authorised by the NATO mandate until the transfer of responsibility to national or international law enforcement agencies.

**Stability Policing and Crisis Response**

0113. The AJP 3 series of publications address the full range of crisis response operations which require cooperation and support of military and civilian actors. These full ranges of actors contribute to a Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental and Multinational response to the resolution of the complex challenges of a crisis. Among them, NATO police forces (Military Police and Gendarmerie type forces) are ideally suited to interact, cooperate, and support both the military and civilian players. Stability policing doctrine is linked with a number of AJP 3 series publications.

0114. Stability policing activities should be undertaken by actors and organizations that have the relevant expertise and competencies. These activities need to be assigned to NATO police forces and must be considered from the initial stages of planning.

---

5 STANAG 2490 - AJP 3.0(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
Stabilization and Reconstruction Missions

0115. S&R is normally led by civilians and takes place during or after a crisis, in unstable states. S&R should be undertaken by actors and organizations with relevant expertise, mandate, and competence required to foster stability. Consequently, the primary military contribution usually focuses on establishing a SASE for the HN authorities, population, and other actors to facilitate S&R efforts and lay the foundation for long-term stability.

0116. While many aspects of S&R are to be undertaken by civilian actors, there may be situations where military support, other than security, will be necessary. When civilian actors are unable or unwilling to provide support, NATO-led military forces may be obliged to temporarily assume the operational lead for other S&R missions and activities. However, these activities should be coordinated with the activities of other actors involved in the overall S&R effort as part of a Comprehensive Approach. The long-term goal of S&R is to create conditions which the local population will regard as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions include a manageable level of violence; functioning governmental, economic, and societal institutions; and the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behaviour. Therefore, S&R focuses on identifying and mitigating the root causes of instability and building the capacity of the HN institutions.

0117. The military can play a crucial role in S&R because they possess unique capabilities and capacities. Based on the situation, military support to S&R may be conducted in the following areas:

a. Establish a SASE and freedom of movement
b. Help to restore public order and security
c. Help to restore basic utilities and infrastructure
d. Facilitate humanitarian assistance
e. Help in establishing the conditions for meeting long term governance and development.

0118. A Safe and Secure environment is critical because it allows other S&R activities to proceed. Establishing a safe and stable environment for the local population is the key to obtaining their cooperation and support for the overall S&R effort. Military forces require this cooperation in order to control crime and subversive behaviour, defeat insurgents, and limit the effects of adversary actions. Such an environment facilitates introducing civilian agencies and organizations whose efforts ensure long-term success by addressing the root causes of the instability.
0119. Perceived inequalities in the administration of the law, and real or apparent injustices, are triggers for instability. It is of paramount importance that all actions taken by a government and its agents in attempting to restore stability are legal and perceived as legitimate. The prospect of long-term stable governance only occurs when influence is exercised over a population and territory by methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the majority of the governed. The rule of law, based on three pillars (law enforcement, judicial, and correctional) must be addressed concurrently, is fundamental to legitimate governance, and may be institutionalized in varying forms dependent upon the social, cultural, and political characteristics of the particular society. Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by the externally imposed criteria.

0120. Integral to establishing rule of law is the support that military forces can provide to law enforcement and policing activities. Local law enforcement agencies and organisations should provide this capability if the security environment permits; however, in a fragile state, these institutions may have become corrupted or failed altogether. While indigenous police forces are established, NATO may provide security to them while they are conducting their regular policing activities... Stability policing assets contribute to this effort.

**Stability Policing support to Stability Activities**

0121. Stability activities seek to stabilize the situation and reduce the level of violence. The four types of stability activities include Security and Control, Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), Support to Restoration of Services, and Support to Governance Tasks. All stability activities are closely related. Stability policing activities impose security and control over an area while employing capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies, set the conditions for governance, and assist in ensuring law and order. This will set the conditions for mitigating/minimizing the activities of criminal organisations, insurgent and/or reactionary movements.

---

*AJP 3.2 Allied Land Operations and ATP 3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks.*
CHAPTER 2

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

0201. General. NATO campaigns normally involve a shifting balance between major combat operations to remove threats, and security operations to enable and support the process of stabilization and enduring peace. NATO planners must pay special attention in addressing the policing aspects of stability operations and in selecting the most appropriate forces to be deployed. Such policing activities are generally performed across the full spectrum of operations, and could start when the environment is still unstable. This chapter aims at providing planning factors for the commander and staff's considerations for stability operations.

0202. Of utmost importance is to have a complete understanding of the special mandates associated with stability policing. The commander and his staff are responsible for defining policing rules of engagement (ROE), specific executive powers (e.g. search, arrest, use of force), rules for the escalation of force and clear lines of accountability to ensure transparency throughout all phases of the operation.

Understanding the Operational Environment

0203. In a stable environment, indigenous police forces are normally in a position to interact with all aspects of society, to include faith-based institutions, schools, civil society, social services, and other community cornerstones. This daily contact allows the police to be pro-active in the community they serve. These community cornerstones constitute the major focus for NATO stability operations to include stability policing.

The Culture

0204. Understanding the local cultural norms will be paramount when it comes to choosing Stability Policing methods. Not only does one have to consider the environment, but also the customs and traditions that which can affect the outcome of Stability Policing activities. An example of questions to ask would include the following:

- What are the accepted means of conflict resolution among individuals/groups/tribes/factions?
- Where does the society derive legitimacy for its leaders and public services?
- Who are the influencers in society?
• How does the society expect security and police forces to interact with citizens?
• How have security and police forces violated those expectations in the past?

The Threats

0205. During any conflict, threats will arise that will affect the success of the mission. In addition to the conventional threats that affect military forces, other threats to the population must also be considered which may consist of: rampant lawlessness, revenge killings, religious and ethnic based tensions, threats to vulnerable groups, major crimes, civil disturbances and riots, acts of terror, looting, armed resistance, war crimes, drugs, smuggling, counterfeiting, human trafficking, etc. All these occurrences must be considered before, during, and after a conflict.

a. Before the Conflict. The previous list of threats will likely deteriorate the rule of law; consequently, local judiciary powers and law enforcement structures could progressively lose their effectiveness. The cause, if left unaddressed, may lead to civil war or other conflict.

b. During the Conflict. Although military forces will manage the conflict and secure the environment, stability policing partners must concurrently address the above mentioned threats to ensure a continued contribution to S&R efforts.

c. After the Conflict. Stability policing has to continue to address the above mentioned threats that may hamper the recovering rule of law, with an immediate focus on the transfer of responsibility to local authorities.

The States at Risk

0206. To properly plan for the employment of stability policing assets and the conduct of stability policing, it is critical to understand the operational environment. This section will briefly describe the different operational environments that stability policing could and should be employed in.

0207. Unstable states are likely to become a more persistent and pervasive threat to global security, since they can acquire strategic importance as a potential destabilising element in a region. An unstable state is a state with weak capacity to carry out the basic state functions of governing a population and its territory and that lacks the ability or political will to develop mutual constructive and reinforcing relations with society.7 The term “unstable states” describes a range of failing, failed, and recovering states. The stability of these states depends on the commitment of their institutions to promote an acceptable standard of governance.

---

7 Oxford English Concise Dictionary (OECD)
When NATO forces commence an operation, the starting conditions may span from a failing to a recovering state. At the onset of operations, military forces and civilian agencies will attempt to move the state towards stability. The transition between failing and recovering states does not have to be linear; the conditions can decline and improve in separate iterations.

a. **Failing State.** The failing state is still viable, but is characterised by a reduced capability and capacity to protect and govern the population. Based on the situation, a failing state may transition to a recovering or a failed state.

b. **Failed State.** A failed state may only have remnants of a government due to collapse or a regime change or it may have a government that exerts weak governance in all or large portions of its territory. It cannot maintain the use of force on a large scale. A failed state is unable to effectively protect and govern the population. A failed state may not have any government with which to work and, consequently, conducting S&R activities is difficult, especially with respect to establishing legitimacy of the government and governmental security forces. Under these extreme circumstances, the intervening authority may be granted, in accordance with international law, the legal responsibility to install a transitional authority. Even with a national government, a failed state may include large ungoverned areas.

c. **Recovering State.** The recovering state is moving toward normalcy but may have an imperfect level of viability. This state is able to protect and govern its population to some degree. A key consideration is whether the population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable, normal, and legitimate.

**Partnership with Local Authorities and Population**

0208. Stability policing encompasses the replacement or reinforcement of indigenous police forces. Within fragile states, police forces are most likely the bodies of the government with the largest impact on the day-to-day lives of the population. The development of a professional police force, trusted by and responsive to the needs of society, is critical to maintaining ROL (Rule of Law), providing public safety, fostering an environment in which governance can flourish, and providing situational awareness and criminal intelligence. The historical and cultural context of the populace need to be considered together with the role of the police in that particular society, in order to gain an indication of how the institutions should be rebuilt or strengthened. Knowledge about or consideration of indigenous plans and development strategies is essential in finding common acceptance for alliance involvement. Respect and support for existing national plans must not depend upon the standards of development and democratic institutions of NATO member nations. A more resilient stability can be achieved in
the short term, even if introducing modern principles and goals is not achievable within the timeframe of the alliance’s mission.

0209. Stability policing is based on the principle of working in partnership with the local, regional, and national communities and authorities. Population focused policing, through its partnership and interagency approach, aims at ensuring that security needs of all groups in a particular community are properly addressed. In this way, the police can facilitate all people’s access to justice, regardless of their social or economic status. Addressing local needs, while combating crimes, improve overall security and allow the conditions for development to take place. Stability policing efforts must be synchronised at all levels of intervention (local, regional, and national) and must be coordinated with all S&R efforts in order to avoid jeopardising the efforts of all the actors involved.

**Identifying and Planning for the Policing “Gap”**

**The Indigenous Policing Gap**

0210. Once an understanding of the operational environment has been garnered, planners must identify the security gap that they will be facing. The “Brahimi Report” of 21 August 2000 revealed the concept of the “security gap” and expressed the requirement for a new peacekeeping structure. The necessity to move forward from the “single police officer” monitoring missions, to active roles in reforming, training and restructuring of indigenous police forces was highlighted. The need for competencies in managing civil disturbance operations along with the requirement to provide police assets possessing self protection capacity became more evident. Furthermore the report concluded that the lack of qualified and rapidly deployable police capacities resulted in a serious deficiency in several international peacekeeping and peace building missions. The policing gap illustrates the lack of indigenous police capability to provide a SASE, public security and the ROL. (Figure 2-2). Stability policing is intended to close the policing gap.

---

0211. Stability policing normally starts at the onset of the intervention where an adherent, robust management of public order and the re-establishment of the rule of law are required. These activities are carried out in the joint operational area and among the local population, and fall between the combat role and the inner requirement of police capacities. Stability Policing provides the combat bridging function between these areas. These activities are intended as an enabling function with special reference to the security requirements of an environment transitioning from pure combat to S&R. They should always be considered throughout the spectrum of military operations.

0212. It is therefore important to ascertain who will lead the stability policing effort (NATO Military Police/Gendarmerie type forces or Indigenous Police) throughout all phases of operations. The ultimate objective is to transfer the primacy to the indigenous police. In order to help guide the development of tactical doctrine, Annex A provides a list of potential capabilities/tasks that could be seen during the conduct of stability policing activities.

The Actors

0213. The natural providers of resources devoted to stability policing activities are Military Police inclusive of Gendarmerie type forces when operating in a non-permissive environment. These forces are well suited to perform stability policing activities due to their inherent policing skills and their experience to operate in high threat environments. Furthermore, due to the police and military nature of these forces, they share the general mindset and operational procedures of the military force they are part of and can easily be integrated in the military missions.
0214. Gendarmerie type forces possess full police jurisdiction in their nations, and as such, they possess all the skills required to cover the full spectrum of police tasks in mission areas according to the assigned mandate. This enables their employment within both military and civilian missions, thus granting the flexibility to address and perform policing functions in the mission area, throughout all phases, specifically during the transition phase from a NATO mission to a non-NATO mission.

0215. Other military forces that may be involved in SP include combat and support component of coalition forces. In addition, under the comprehensive approach, non-military actors may collaborate in stability policing activities such as: police forces with civil status, IOs, NGOs, and contractors (on the basis of the mandate and the environment being permissive).

0216. Clear, specific ROE and mechanisms of coordination must be established in order to maximize the benefits of broad collaboration among all police players.

**Stability Policing Mandate**

0217. Stability Policing can be employed throughout the wide spectrum of any intervention, from the conflict to the reconstruction. This implies that either military or civilian authorities might be in the lead during specific phases of the multinational operations, or for precise tasks.

0218. Circumstances arise where stability policing assets and military components must work in mutual support with a NATO operation and their mutual support must be planned in advance (and if possible rehearsed, since coordination is a key issue and the definition of the respective area of responsibilities for specific tasks is crucial). In this regard, command and control must be carefully defined, to ensure the appropriate level of initiative and freedom of movement are granted, despite their respective roles, responsibilities and functions. Specific military and police guidelines should be prepared in advance and taken into consideration during the different phases of the planning process.

**Stability Policing Missions**

0219. Broad stability tasks reflect a number of interrelated activities conducted across the stabilization and reconstruction processes. Under the police perspective, stability policing is conducted under two main mission types; the replacement or reinforcement of indigenous police forces:

Replacement is essential when the indigenous police or a recognised government is non-existent. In this situation, all police tasks must be assumed by stability policing assets, such as enforcement of the law, area patrolling and control, forensic, border and sensitive structures control, criminal investigations and
intelligence, and civil disturbance operations. NATO stability policing assets must be entitled with executive police powers, encompassing the use of force, as well as the power of search and arrest. Appropriate mechanisms of coordination with the local judicial and correction systems, will be necessary. In light of the local ownership principle, according to which all state functions shall be expressed by indigenous structures, entities and forces, a new local police force shall be built. Therefore, next to the replacement, an additional police reform operation would be necessary.

0220. Reinforcement is required when the indigenous police are existing and reliable but their effectiveness is limited and training, monitoring, advising, mentoring and sustainment are required. NATO stability policing assets will not be entitled to executive police powers, as these are retained by the indigenous police, and their tasks will consist of providing assistance. The ultimate goal is to enhance the indigenous police self-sufficiency and effectiveness in performing the assigned tasks as identified in Annex A.

Figure 2-3. The Spectrum of Conflict and Stability Policing Themes

0221. The two themes for NATO stability policing are described in detail below.

Replacement

0222. Replacement may be characterized by one or more of the following operational and environmental factors, but is not limited to:

a. A conflict in the Area of Operations (AOO) led to a significant breakdown of the central administration. In particular the ROL system is not functioning properly and the central state institutions are not able to provide a secure environment;
b. Some former military, paramilitary and/or terrorist groups, as well as rampant organized crime, remain active in the AOO, putting in danger efforts of the international community to stabilize the country;

c. Human rights violations have significantly increased, especially against vulnerable groups and ethnic minorities;

d. The corruption in the AOO became endemic and spread within the whole administration;

e. The insecure and volatile environment is leading to an economic collapse;

f. The development of an election process to provide the country with democratic institutions;

g. The situation requires a broad international involvement, including a strong military component, to help national authorities to restore a SASE;

h. High levels of insecurity and criminality due to the lack of a functioning ROL system. In particular the preponderance of organized crime constitutes an obstacle to the efforts of re-establishing a secure environment; and

i. Serious natural or manmade disasters that affect governance.

0223. Policing Considerations for Replacement (Indigenous Police Assessment). The following items must be considered in part or in whole for a replacement intervention. This list is not exclusive:

a. Indigenous police not existing;

b. Insufficient or absence of capacities;

c. Insufficient personnel to be effective;

d. Indigenous police not willing or unable to conduct its functions;

e. The protection of the population not assured or endangered;

f. Credibility in question (corruption);

g. Human rights violated; and

h. Impartiality not respected.
0224. In accordance with the above mentioned factors, the following situations can be envisioned for replacement:

a. **Comprehensive (Full) Police Replacement Mission.** This is the most demanding stability policing scenario. This will require the deployment of a significant amount of resources to be effective. Interventions could cover the territorial control, general policing, performance of specialised police functions, and the possible running of coexistent strengthening activities. The total strength and the structure of the deployed force depend on the current situation in the conflict area and shall be adjusted in a timely manner. This scenario should be for the shortest time possible and planning for transition as quickly as possible must be a campaign priority.

b. **Partial Replacement Mission.** If indigenous police forces are able to accomplish some of their tasks, stability policing functions would be limited to cover those remaining areas not enforced by them. Such employments can be characterized by a higher level of specialisation, to fill capacity gaps in specific fields.

0225. Due to a likely non-permissive environment and the role to be performed in a replacement scenario, especially during the initial phases when combat operations may take place, stability policing forces must be robust, flexible, interoperable, and rapidly deployable and provided with adequate logistic capacity. This means that Stability Policing Units (whose structure will be defined in a future tactical publication) will be most suitable to be deployed in these circumstances.

0226. The transition to the reinforcing function could evolve from a replacement (initial phase) mission. Replacement to reinforcing will require a progressive hand over of responsibilities to the indigenous police, therefore the demands on stability policing have to be adapted to the new operating environment for reinforcing.

**Reinforcing**

0227. Reinforcing may be characterized by one or more of the following operational and environmental factors, but is not limited to:

a. A conflict in the AOO has weakened the governmental and administrative structures of the state, including the ROL system;

b. The economy of the area is being affected by a lack of a secure environment;

c. Human rights violations are increasing;

d. Indigenous police require confidence building measures;
e. Natural or manmade disasters that affect governance;

f. Transition from replacement; and

g. Considerable level of insecurity and criminality due to the lack of a proper ROL system.

0228. Policing Considerations for Reinforcing (Indigenous Police Assessment). The following items must be considered in part or in whole for a reinforcing intervention. This list is not limited:

a. Transition from replacement;

b. Indigenous police are existing, but not fully efficient;

c. Insufficient policing capabilities;

d. Insufficient or inexperienced personnel;

e. Public safety threatened;

f. Lack of integrity;

g. Lack of credibility;

h. Human rights violated;

i. Impartiality not respected;

j. Improper interference;

k. Presence of organized crime jeopardizing the security environment;

l. Request or need to restructure the indigenous police; and

m. Request for training and capability development.

0229. Implementation of reinforcing. Reinforcing interventions could be composed of different functions, such as:

a. Monitoring. Consists of observing, assessing and reporting (to the competent authority) on the performance of indigenous police forces, in order to ensure compliance with the human rights and best international police practices;
b. **Mentoring.** Activities assisting the Host Nation by providing continuous guidance and counsel to specific individuals, teams or units until they are capable to function independently. Mentoring is normally focused on developing personnel in leadership and command positions;

c. **Advising.** Activities assisting the Host nation by providing subject matter expertise and advice to local forces. Advising activities are applicable from the tactical to the strategic level and in support of individuals or groups;

d. **Reforming.** Consists of driving, supporting and favoring a strategic transformation process aimed at enhancing capacities and integrity at both institutional and individual levels. Such activity can consist in:

   (1) **Restructuring.** Internal reorganization of the concerned indigenous police, management, internal processes and administrative system for the purpose of making it more efficient and able to fulfill its mandated functions;

   (2) **Rebuilding.** Establishment or re-establishment of indigenous police; and

   (3) **Inspecting.** Examining closely the performance of a task, as well as an asset, checking the compliance with a pre-determined set of standards;

e. **Training.** This includes all initiatives that contribute to education and training of the local force, both at the individual and collective level. A comprehensive training program should align with all stakeholders to ensure a coordinated approach. Annex B provides further information on training and skills.

f. **Partnering.** Consists of activities/involvement from different contributors, in terms of resources or practices.

0230. In addition to the aforementioned functions, infrastructure development and sustainment projects could be established to support strengthening missions. When planning infrastructure development and sustainment projects, one must tailor the effort in such a way that it is sustainable (fiscally and institutionally) once the transition to a fully capable indigenous police force is complete.

0231. In reinforcing missions, the tailored force objectives can range from a reduced targeted operation for reinforcing specific capabilities, to a comprehensive operation in accordance with the mission mandate. In this particular scenario, the intervention of single (military) police officers or specialised teams is expected. The organization and structure of the operation will be task tailored to those fields of expertise to be strengthened.
0232. If the operating environment is such that it requires structured units, they may be deployed to provide security to individuals or teams performing reinforcing operations.

**Interaction with Relevant Actors**

0233. NATO planners including civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)/J9 staff must have a clear picture of the differing actors operating in the mission area and have a complete understanding of their roles and responsibilities. The following relevant actors need to be considered for close cooperation and coordination:

a. Indigenous security and conventional forces including police forces;

b. Local/Regional/National governmental officials;

c. Judicial officials (Judges and Prosecutors);

d. Penal officials;

e. Non-Governmental Organizations;

f. IOs, such as UN, EU9, African Union (AU), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), etc.

g. and, Private security companies.

**End State and the Transitional Process**

0234. The success of stability policing operations depends on the involvement of the national authorities and their willingness to achieve the identified objectives. This is conditional upon the principle of local ownership and thus must take into consideration indigenous customs and culture. This includes their commitment to actions on the ground, including their active support of the implementation of the mission mandate. As the final aim of peace process is the restoration of local authority in a peaceful environment, indigenous actors should be integrated in the phases of the peace process in order to ease the transition from international to local responsibility.

0235. The end state of a stability policing mission is the handover of full responsibility to an effective indigenous police force or to an international police mission. Building comprehensive capability and capacity is normally a long term

---

9 NATO will further establish working relationships with national and international entities.
and complex process which will require the participation of many partners. Stability policing missions will most likely require further efforts, beyond those of the military mission, as they are focused on rebuilding, reinforcing, and restructuring police capacities which require longer term commitments. In this view, during mission planning, markers should be identified to detect and assess the progressive level of development attained by the indigenous police. As such, the responsibility for functions or branches of relevant policing activities will be handed over to local authorities as soon as possible, once the minimum or required level of development has been reached. All these specific steps shall be designed, organized, conducted and controlled by qualified military police personnel or appropriate police subject matter experts, in order to allow an adherent reading and analysis throughout the process.
CHAPTER 3

CONDUCT OF STABILITY POLICING ACTIVITIES

Introduction

0301. General. Chapters 1 and 2 of this publication have laid out the doctrinal foundations and planning considerations for stability policing at the strategic and operational level. This chapter aims at introducing the conduct of stability policing activities that need to be considered throughout the spectrum of conflict. Although not intended to be tactical doctrine, it will introduce tactical level activities that may require the production of follow-on publications which may be subordinate to this document.

0302. In order to be relevant to NATO, the conduct of stability policing activities must be linked to existing NATO doctrine. As such, NATO has already established four main stability activities.\(^\text{10}\)

   a. Security and Control;
   b. Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR);
   c. Support to Restoration of Services; and
   d. Support to Governance tasks.

0303. Although it is understood that a wide variety of agencies will actively influence or take part in stability operations, the conduct of stability policing activities must be planned and directed by police experts within the force, as they hold the expertise and knowledge to replace or reinforce the indigenous police. Only with the use of police subject matter experts can a credible and stable police force, be achieved. In order to guide the development of subsequent tactical doctrine, Annex A provides a list of potential tasks and skills that could be executed during the conduct of stability policing activities.

Stability Policing in Security and Control

0304. The provision of general security and control allows the civilian populace, and other elements within a comprehensive approach, the freedom and safety to conduct normal civic activities and to build institutions that support a lasting stability. Security and control should be the first consideration following the

\(^{10}\) STANAG 2606 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks (ATP 3.2.1.1)
completion of major offensive activities, particularly in the populated areas. When it becomes apparent that the continuance of offensive actions may have to be postponed in order to secure populations, decrease suffering and protect civil sites of significant importance, it should be recommended to the Joint Forces Commander to implement Stability Policing Operations. Failure to do so may threaten the longer term success of the campaign and its legitimacy in the eyes of the local, national and international audiences.

0305. An acceptable level of security is required prior to starting the reconstruction of a country or region in a crisis area. Generally, in the aftermath of a disaster, the indigenous police forces are responsible for the provision of internal security, and the military may only be required to support with humanitarian aid and/or ensure territorial integrity. This is where indigenous police must have primacy. However, there may be cases where indigenous police do not provide sufficient internal security and as such NATO stability policing assets and/or conventional forces may be required. This will occur if the indigenous police are not present, or fail to gain control and provide minimal security to the population. During security and control activities, the goal is to deploy forces that can respond swiftly and adequately to any threat. In general terms, security control activities are resource heavy and may require the initial employment of NATO forces. This could include the employment of large and robust stability policing assets.

0306. Indigenous Police Primacy. Where police primacy rests with the Host Nation and NATO is required to provide forces as a result of a conflict or crisis, stability policing will normally limit itself to strengthen existing indigenous police forces. NATO could be providing police capabilities to re-enforce or support existing ones or provide specialist police capabilities that are lacking. In all instances, indigenous police maintain executive police powers.

0307. Police Primacy other than Indigenous Police. In the case that indigenous police are absent or incapable of maintaining basic law and order, police primacy may be exercised by NATO forces. Stability policing in this instance would be the immediate replacement of indigenous police forces. NATO stability policing will seek to re-establish security and control while at the same time conduct police capacity building to ensure that indigenous police forces can assume full responsibility.

**Stability Policing in Security Sector Reform**

0308. A key aspect to the long term stability and development of a nation may be the reform of the various elements of a nation’s security sector. The police and military will have a key role in developing the nation’s policing and military capabilities. SSR may be preceded by a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. This may in turn involve specific security tasks such as securing and protecting belligerent groups that have been disarmed.
0309. All SSR activities require a comprehensive approach. SSR is the comprehensive set of programmes and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. Stability policing assets will have a key role throughout, focusing on Police Capacity Building (PCB).

0310. **Police Capacity Building.** PCB will seek the development of police capabilities in fragile states. Planning and execution of PCB must be conducted by professional police organizations. Military forces may initially be the only force in place to initiate such development, but they must handover the responsibility to police leadership as soon as possible. As such, it is important for MP and Gendarmerie type forces to be involved at the onset of PCB planning. Only then can a credible police organisation be developed for a fragile state. To be successful, PCB must be conducted at all levels, from the appropriate central authority down to the policeman who will interface with the population.

0311. The following PCB activities can be executed as a whole or individually as may be required:

a. Force Design and Management;

b. Individual and Collective Training;

c. Advising and Mentoring; and

d. Partnering.

0312. **Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR).** This activity involves the standing down of former military or police forces and their reintegration to civil society or a newly structured military or police force. It may also include the disbanding of irregular or informal armed groups. Disarmament often also encompasses the civil population and the development of responsible weapons management programmes. Stability policing will endeavour to ensure a transition between police forces and will require the involvement of a range of agencies. It should include enforceable programmes to avoid the creation of a large mass of unemployed, possibly embittered, former police officers. Stability policing will have a key role in assisting and securing the process from a police perspective. Whenever possible this must be done in strict coordination and control of the local governance.

**Stability Policing in Support to Restoration of Services**

0313. Restoring infrastructure and public utilities is crucial to achieving stability and is an essential condition for reconstruction. In addition it makes an important contribution to gaining the support of the local population. It also offers benefits for
NATO forces. Cooperation with the civilian authorities is also very important, particularly with respect to identifying quick impact projects.

0314. Stability policing must be limited itself to providing police capabilities. Furthermore, police capabilities and resources are usually limited in nature and must be employed in a manner that maximises their effectiveness. As such, stability policing could be used in the following areas when dealing with the initial restoration of services:

a. Support to protection of infrastructure;
b. Re-establishing of indigenous police services;
c. Support to judiciary services; and
d. Support to corrections.

**Stability Policing in Support to Governance Tasks**

0315. Stability policing has a role in the provision and maintenance of a safe and secure environment to ensure governance can be developed. Stability policing can provide their expertise by assisting the initial governance through mentoring and advising on the ROL and policing related issues.
ANNEX A

STABILITY POLICING TASKS

Most of the Stability Policing tasks can also be conducted by conventional forces in the initial stage, but should transition to police forces as soon as possible. During the transition there may be a combination of conventional and police forces conducting these tasks.

Stability Policing include but are not limited to:

- Crowd and riot control
- Border control
- Restoration of public security and public order
- Election security
- Close Protection
- Searches and seizures
- Criminal investigations
- High risk arrest
- Critical site security
- Negotiation and mediation
- Protect people (especially vulnerable groups) and property
- Rapport building (Population and authorities)
- Support to judicial and correction institutions
- Support to military EOD/IED and civilian UXO activities
- Conduct forensic activities
- Biometric
- Support weapon intelligence teams (WIT)
- Police Intelligence
- Contribution to situational awareness
- Counter terrorism
- Counter-organized crime
- Hostage rescue
- Crime scene management
- Traffic circulation
- Community based policing (Patrolling)
- Surveillance
- Counter-smuggling
- Counter drug
- Counter human trafficking
- War crime investigations and assistance to international courts
ANNEX B

TRAINING AND SKILLS

The Structure of Training

1. **General Training.** General training normally encompasses three different categories:

   a. **Basic Level.** Is addressed to basic agents of the indigenous police and is aimed at developing basic police skills such as: police code of ethics, basic legal notions, use of weapons, general policing, physical training, police officers survival, and police patrol duties;

   b. **Mid-Level.** Is directed at the indigenous executive cadres focusing on providing trainees with more detailed notions about legal procedures, laws, disciplinary matters, and the police code of ethics based on professionalism and integrity. As police station commanders, they will also receive basic notions about the management of the personnel assigned to their command; and

   c. **High Level.** Is aimed at providing superior officers and HQ staff officers with strategic notions about how to use the assets available in a more effective way, the importance of information gathering, the management of personnel, and the development of policing strategic police planning to counter any form of crime inside the country.

2. **Specialised Training.** This type of training aims at deepening knowledge in specific areas such as: criminal investigations, intelligence, traffic control, border control, crowd and riot control techniques, etc.

3. **On the Job Training.** This is aimed at making the trainees quickly familiarized with the working procedures under a professional supervision before their direct involvement in the operational activities. The duration of this phase has to be considered flexible and related to the mission requirements.

4. **Training of Trainers.** This type of training is aimed at educating trainers who should eventually be capable to train their own force.
Policing Skills Development

5. This list is not limiting (all inclusive) and can be adjusted based on the mission mandate and operational environment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Police Skills</th>
<th>Advanced Police Skills</th>
<th>Management / Command Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Use of Force</td>
<td>- Forensics</td>
<td>- Supply/Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- First Aid</td>
<td>- Internal Affairs</td>
<td>- Budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Powers of Arrest</td>
<td>- Complex</td>
<td>- Human Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Custody</td>
<td>- Investigations / Major Crimes</td>
<td>- Police Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Constitution and Law</td>
<td>- Criminal Intelligence</td>
<td>- Oversight/Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community Policing</td>
<td>- Advanced Crowd and Riot Control</td>
<td>- Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Basic investigations</td>
<td>- Biometrics</td>
<td>- Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Evidence handling</td>
<td>- Tactical Ops</td>
<td>- Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Police Structure / Organization</td>
<td>- Prosecutions</td>
<td>- Interagency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Interpersonal Communication</td>
<td>- Interagency Cooperation</td>
<td>- Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Court Procedures</td>
<td>- Incident Command</td>
<td>- Supervision and Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Police Patrolling</td>
<td>- Police Station Operations</td>
<td>- Police Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Human Rights</td>
<td>- Close Protection</td>
<td>- Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ethics</td>
<td>- Negotiation</td>
<td>- Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Driver Training</td>
<td>- Snipers</td>
<td>- Police Intelligence Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Traffic Control</td>
<td>- Advanced Counter-Terrorism Tactics</td>
<td>- Communication Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Operate Checkpoints/Vehicle Inspections</td>
<td>- Jail</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Basic Anti-Terrorism Tactics</td>
<td>- Firearms/Marksmanship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Crowd and Riot Control</td>
<td>- Survival Skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- COIN awareness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- CBRN awareness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LEXICON

## Part I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAP</td>
<td>Comprehensive approach action plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROGENDFOR</td>
<td>European gendarmerie force (also EGF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International committee of the red cross/red crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International criminal police organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for security and cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Police capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security force assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Stability policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Very important person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIT</td>
<td>Weapons intelligence team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Stability Policing

Police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.