1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.4.2 Edition A Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, has been approved by the nations in the MCJSB, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2514.

2. AJP-3.4.2 Edition A Version 1 is effective upon receipt. It supersedes AJP-3.4.2 which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for destruction of documents.

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Dr. Cihangir Aksit, TUR Civ
Director NATO Standardization Agency
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Allied Joint Publication-3.4.2

Allied Joint Doctrine for
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

Allied Joint Publication-3.4.2 (AJP-3.4.2), dated May 2013, is promulgated in the United Kingdom in accordance with the UK national comment.

As directed by the Joint Force Commander and Chiefs of Staff

[Signature]

Director Concepts and Doctrine
UK national comment

1. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.2 (Edition A, Version 1) *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations* provides Allied joint doctrine for planning and conducting non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) throughout the range of military operations.

2. Non-combatant evacuation operations are non-discretionary operations often requiring a national response. Differing interests and risk thresholds often result in countries responding to crisis in different ways. Although evacuations are likely to be conducted in a multinational setting, the interaction between nations will probably be limited to coordinating separate national plans rather than a unified multinational endeavour. However, commanders and their staff should read this publication along with our Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3.51, *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations* (UK national doctrine) to understand the challenges of operating as part of a coalition when conducting a multinational evacuation.

3. We (UK) will use JDP 3.51 for non-combatant evacuation operations. This complies with AJP-3.4.2.
### RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

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Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
**RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS**

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<td>GBR</td>
<td>GBR will use national doctrine for NEO (JDP 3.51), which is compliant with AJP-3.4.2. JDP 3.51 refers to AJP-3.4.2 for alliance-led NEO activities, but provides essential, amplification for national NEO activities.</td>
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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR
NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

PREFACE

0001. The purpose of Allied Joint Publication-3.4.2, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, is to provide Allied joint doctrine for planning and conducting non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) throughout the range of military operations.

0002. As with other non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO), participation in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led NEO will be decided by each Allied nation on a case-by-case basis, depending on each unique situation. A NATO-led NEO would be directed by the North Atlantic Council through an initiating directive, with Military Committee guidance, and transmitted to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe for implementation. It should be noted that, in rare instances, a NATO-led NEO could also be conducted in conjunction with Article 5 operations.

0003. The nature of the operating environment (OE), in terms of the potential opposition to the operation and the risk both to the evacuees and to the joint force conducting the NEO, will determine the scope of the operation and how it is conducted. The OE for the conduct of a NEO is generally identified as permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

0004. The successful conduct of a NEO requires that diplomatic and military elements work as a team. The safe and orderly evacuation of non-combatants largely depends on the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) ability to coordinate the operation with the heads of missions and supporting NATO military commands. An appropriate command and control (C2) structure will be established in accordance with NATO standards. While this publication uses the term “JFC” to identify the responsible NATO commander, a NEO might also be coordinated by a joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ) or a component command. In addition, if more than one NATO country is involved, command relationships may also be regulated by bilateral agreements, defining the lead nation and the nation with a supporting role.

0005. NEOs are usually limited, rapid, small scale operations. The main characteristic of a NEO is urgency, which results in hasty planning and execution with limited opportunity to establish or modify memorandum of understanding (MOU) or Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).

0006. Within the architecture of AJPs, AJP-3.4.2 is directly subordinate to AJP-3.4 (A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, which describes
the fundamental principles and highlights considerations relevant to the conduct of NA5CRO. It is also related to the following:

a. AJP-3.4.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*, which develops and describes the NATO doctrine for peace support.

b. AJP-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Support to Civil Authorities*, which describes the overarching guidelines and principles to assist joint force commanders in planning for and providing support to civil authorities.

c. AJP-3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*, which provides guidance to commanders and staffs for planning and conducting COIN.
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CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW OF NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

0101. Introduction

a. NATO activities falling outside the scope of Article 5 are referred to collectively as NA5CRO. For more information on NA5CRO, see AJP-3.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*.

b. NEO is ultimately a national responsibility; options include unilateral, multinational, or NATO-led. NATO could be asked to support an evacuation operation during a crisis when NATO troops are already operating in the affected environment. With this in mind, AJP-3.4.2 has been developed for a NATO-led operation, though historically, there are no examples of a NATO-led NEO. However, this publication also provides guidance to NATO nations on how to plan and execute a NEO.

c. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* defines a NEO as, “An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety.” This relocation may be temporary or permanent and a place of safety may be within the same country. NEOs have political, humanitarian, and military implications and usually involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation and holding of key locations, such as an evacuation control centre (ECC), assembly points, and embarkation sites, and withdrawal upon completion of the evacuation. Legal issues associated with the law of armed conflict will not normally arise in the context of a NEO, however, the protections afforded civilians, the sick, and the wounded under human rights aspects of international law are designed to promote and protect human rights at the international, regional, and domestic levels despite the absence of international armed conflict.

d. It is important to note that NEOs are national diplomatic initiatives with Alliance forces participating in a supporting role. Generally a joint force committed to a NEO should have, as a minimum, the capability to provide security, crowd control, temporary shelter, food and water, reception and control, movement, and emergency medical support for the personnel to be evacuated. NATO forces, conducting a NEO will remain under NATO command.

e. For the purpose of simplification, the term “head of mission” (HOM) has been used throughout the publication. A HOM is a national diplomatic agent of the highest rank in the affected territory. Variations of the title HOM or other
titles referring to the senior national diplomatic agent or chief of mission, such as ambassador, chargé d'affaires, consul general, or high commissioner, at a particular diplomatic post could be interchanged throughout the publication and not change its relevancy.

f. Likewise, the term “diplomatic mission” has been used. A diplomatic mission is a group of people from one state or an international inter-governmental organization (such as the United Nations) present in another state to represent the sending state/organization in the receiving state. In practice, a diplomatic mission usually denotes the official permanent mission, namely the office of a country's diplomatic representatives in the capital city of another country. Variations of the title diplomatic mission or other titles referring to the national diplomatic mission, such as embassy, consulate, mission, or high commission, at a particular diplomatic post could be interchanged throughout the publication and not change its relevancy.

g. Finally, NEO is an excellent example of an operation where a comprehensive approach is essential to achieve an integrated response. Interaction between civilian and military actors is necessary at all stages to optimize the military support to a civilian-led plan. Emphasis should be placed on this integrated dynamic at all stages of the NEO process, especially during the initial planning stage. It is important to understand that in the overall evacuation process, the military plays a key supporting role in planning and conducting the operation. The JFC and staff should understand this role when preparing a plan for the evacuation. It might be quite natural, but it is also incorrect, to assume that the evacuation is a unilateral military operation. Planning should be inclusive and consider the diplomatic missions’ requirements and perspectives for the NEO.

0102. Characteristics of Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

a. A fundamental characteristic of a NEO is the degree of diplomatic/military interrelationship. Diplomatic missions are responsible for preparing evacuation contingency plans for evacuating their nationals abroad and for ensuring the protection of evacuees. NATO commanders may advise and assist the diplomatic missions in preparing and implementing plans for an evacuation but are only responsible for the military aspects of a NEO in the framework of a NATO-led operation. Notwithstanding, commanders must keep in mind that the diplomatic missions will have significant impact on the planning and conduct of any evacuation.

¹ For more on a comprehensive approach, see AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
b. The diplomatic mission, whose purpose is to promote national interests, will wish to remain diplomatically engaged for as long as possible and avoid inadvertent political signals. NATO, whose concern is Allied force security and operational efficiency, will have a preference for timely military planning, early deployment, particularly of reconnaissance and liaison elements, and preventive action. This can create a dynamic tension between diplomatic and military requirements and may also exacerbate military operations security efforts. The military option is invariably viewed as the last resort and thus any diplomatic request to deploy a joint force may not, from a military perspective, have the best timing.

c. Another fundamental characteristic of a NEO is time-sensitivity. NEOs can evolve with little warning and often need to be executed quickly to be effective.

d. Due to the politically sensitive nature of NEOs, C2 normally remains at the highest level possible. The diplomatic mission will, in all probability, be actively involved in the NEO and may retain some form of national evacuation control. Therefore, establishing face-to-face contact between each HOM and joint force liaison elements is extremely important.

e. NATO rules of engagement (ROE) during a NEO will normally be limited to the force necessary to protect personnel being evacuated and those supporting the evacuation. ROE may be different among the participating nations.

f. The use of force is normally a measure of last resort. Consideration should be given to the establishment of ROE that allows, when time and circumstances permit, forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent to be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. Employment of psychological operations (PSYOPS) assets and capabilities should be considered toward this end.

g. In the modern information environment, local and global audiences, stakeholders, and key leaders receive information through a complex combination of information channels. All actions and communication of the Alliance have an impact on the perception of all these audiences and NEOs usually generate significant media interest. Information Operations (Info Ops) and public affairs (PA) play a vital role in coordinating and synchronizing activities designed to achieve desired effects in the information environment and to prevent misunderstanding and to foster support for Alliance mission objectives. Additionally, a military media handling organization should be tailored to address what both the local and homeland media may consider to be a major event.
h. Frequently, NEOs are conducted within countries where international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are present. During a NEO, the JFC should consider establishing a mission-tailored civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) centre to interface with these and other civil actors.²

0103. Operating Environment. The nature of the OE, defined in terms of the potential opposition to the operation, and the risk both to the evacuees and to the joint force conducting the NEO, will determine the NEO’s scope and how it is conducted. The key factors in NEO planning are situational awareness, an accurate appraisal and understanding of the changing political and military environment in which the joint force will operate, and preparation of the evacuation force for a situation that could rapidly move from permissive to uncertain or hostile. Therefore, commanders and operational planners must always consider the higher level environment in addition to the one being assessed for the mission.

a. Permissive. A permissive environment is characterised by no resistance or hostile action that would interfere with the evacuation. A NEO conducted in a permissive environment would most commonly occur following a natural disaster or civil unrest. Under these conditions no resistance to evacuation is expected. In such circumstances there will be host nation (HN) consent and possibly host-nation support (HNS) for the evacuation of those wishing to leave. In most cases, scheduled or chartered civil aircraft and shipping would be used if possible. Although military resources are unlikely to be required to provide security, they may be needed for logistics support functions such as movement, transportation, and medical and health service support. Military staffs should monitor and evaluate the situation closely and plan for a range of contingencies, including a deteriorating situation and transition into a less permissive environment.

b. Uncertain. An uncertain environment is an OE in which host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to the NEO, do not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area or country of operations, or where the ability of host government forces to provide a secure environment is in doubt. A NEO conducted in an uncertain environment would most commonly occur following an insurrection. Often, there are elements, armed or unarmed, organised or disorganised, that create a climate of insecurity and a threat to potential evacuees. Under these circumstances, the HN government has effective control of the majority of its security forces and is not expected to interfere with the conduct of a NEO. However, HNS is less likely to be available or reliable.

² For more on CIMIC, see AJP-9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Cooperation.
Planning for a NEO conducted in an uncertain environment must anticipate the possibility of escalation to a hostile environment.

c. **Hostile.** Personnel may be evacuated under conditions ranging from civil disorder or terrorist action to full-scale combat. A NEO conducted in a hostile environment would most commonly occur when the HN civil and military authorities have lost control or have ceased to function altogether and there is general breakdown in law and order. Potential evacuees may be directly targeted and their lives increasingly threatened. The HN security forces cannot be expected to support, and may even obstruct, a NEO. In such an environment, the JFC must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. The JFC may elect to deploy a sizable security element with the evacuation force, or position a large reaction force, either with the evacuation force or at a forward mounting base (FMB). In addition to normal functions associated with personnel evacuations (embarkation, transportation, medical, and other services), the joint force may be required to conduct a forced entry, establish defensive perimeters, escort convoys, provide security of embassies and reception centres (RCs), and perform the screening of evacuees normally accomplished by diplomatic mission officials. Additionally, planners should be aware that in a hostile environment there may be some planning distinctions between inland and littoral evacuations. NEOs conducted from an inland location are more likely to require the force to secure civil or military airfields and use intra-theatre assets to move evacuees to a temporary safe location and out of the hostile area. Littoral NEOs will more than likely involve moving evacuees by helicopter to off-coast ships or conducting armed convoy movements to secure seaports for ship movement to a temporary safe location before movement to a safe haven.

0104. **Military Planning and Forces**

a. In-depth military planning should commence as soon as possible. Planning timelines, diplomatic consideration, and the issuing of directives can vary from hours to weeks which usually will require a NEO to start soon after the political decision to commit forces, and as quickly as militarily practicable. On these occasions the operations planning process (OPP) may have to be abbreviated. The use of the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) in this case can assist in achieving preparedness while the planning process unfolds. See Annex A for NEO planning considerations.

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3 For more on the OPP, refer to AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning, or the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.
b. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) can only conduct a NEO after the relevant OPP has been accomplished and upon receipt of an execution directive. The HOMs are not in the NATO military chain of command, but as the senior national representatives on scene, are responsible for the evacuation and for identifying those entitled persons (EPs) who have been designated for evacuation. It is imperative that the HOMs' evacuation plans and the JFC's plan for the NEO be supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated.

c. Force options to conduct a NEO may first and foremost depend on the OE in which it will be conducted. Many forward presence forces, such as those deployed for NATO/Partnership for Peace exercises, could conduct a NEO in a permissive environment. However, a NEO in an uncertain or hostile environment may require formation and deployment of a specifically tailored joint force. In addition to the OE, the HNS capabilities may play a major role in determining courses of action for conducting NEOs. SACEUR may consider flexible force options that provide both early response to a developing situation and a capability to quickly expand should the OE become hostile.

d. NATO NEO forces entering a foreign territory should be kept to the minimum number and type required for the conduct of the NEO to avoid misperception of NATO intent.

e. Following the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision to employ a NATO force to conduct a NEO, SACEUR would likely establish a joint force to exercise overall control of military operations. The JFC is responsible for operational-level planning, deploying to an FMB (if required), conducting all military aspects of the NEO and operations at a place of safety (if this mission is assigned), as well as redeployment.

0105. **Keys to Success**

a. Successfully conducting a NEO requires that the diplomatic missions and military forces work collaboratively and in coordination. The successful, safe, and orderly evacuation of EPs largely depends on the JFC’s ability to synchronize the operation with the HOMs and supporting NATO military commands. This is because, during NEOs, the HOMs are the senior authorities for the evacuation and are ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the evacuation and the safety of the evacuees. At all levels, Alliance military forces and diplomatic missions need to cooperate to successfully execute the evacuation. This is most important at the diplomatic mission and joint force level and includes their staffs and all other
personnel. Additionally, establishing liaison with on-scene IOs and NGOs may facilitate the evacuation process.

b. While the protection of EPs remains paramount, NEOs will probably be conducted in an environment where political concerns and constraints are also key considerations. In most cases, NATO may not be actively engaged militarily against the forces posing a threat to the non-combatants. Military action may, therefore, be limited by the situation. Political constraints may also be imposed on the introduction of military personnel and capabilities into a country prior to and during an evacuation operation, thus hampering planning and preparation.

c. The goal is for the JFC to support the HOM’s plans and cooperate with the diplomatic missions without compromising military mission requirements. The diplomatic missions should keep the joint force appraised of the on-scene conditions and maybe influential coordinating actions affecting the NEO. These actions may include political constraints on the joint force, legal issues, agreements, rights, privileges, and immunities (if any) within the HN, an FMB, and a temporary safe location, if established.

d. Finally, the JFC should be cautioned that EPs and others cannot be forced to, or may decide not to, leave in accordance with the NEO plan. Many may not wish to leave when directed or, after refusing to leave, may request assistance later. They may also enter the NEO chain at any point, such as the airport; therefore, the NEO force must exercise patience and flexibility while executing the NEO.
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CHAPTER 2 – NATO AND NATIONAL ROLES, COORDINATION, AND INTERACTION

0201. Introduction. Evacuations are diplomatic initiatives with Alliance military forces conducting a NEO in a supporting role. This chapter outlines the responsibilities of the military and diplomatic participants in a NATO-led NEO.

0202. North Atlantic Council

a. If NATO agrees to support an evacuation, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) will provide the direction and authority for the deployment of NATO forces. Should the NAC decide on a requirement for a NEO, it would issue a NAC Initiating Directive (NID) to enable detailed operations planning to commence. The Military Committee (MC) is responsible for translating political guidance into strategic military direction for SACEUR.

b. The NID establishes the authority and parameters for the NEO and provides a clear political end state. A NID normally includes the following elements:

(1) **Situation.** This first element describes the political/military situation that generated the requirement to develop a NEO operation plan (OPLAN).

(2) **NATO end state.** This should include the definition of a desired political end state and identification of political direction and guidance.

   (a) **Political guidance.** Articulates political direction for consideration by NATO military authorities when developing the OPLAN.

   (b) **Political limitations.** Usually categorized as constraints and restraints.

      1. **Constraints.** Specifies political obligations that must be met or accomplished.

      2. **Restraints.** Specifies political prohibitions on military actions that cannot be carried out or capabilities that cannot be used.

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4 See MC 133/4, NATO’s Operations Planning, for further information on a NID.
(c) Political assumptions. Lists the political assumptions that were considered in formulating the NEO mission.

(d) Further guidance.

(3) Mission. This defines the NEO mission.

(a) Roles.

(b) Military objectives.

(c) Non-military objectives.

(d) Supporting objectives.

(4) Resources.

(5) Participation of non-NATO Nations. If appropriate, authorises the participation of non-NATO nations in the NEO.

(6) Interaction with non-NATO actors.

(7) Strategic communications. The strategic communications (StratCom) paragraph should include the overarching StratCom approach including the core message and StratCom objectives. Detailed StratCom guidance will be promulgated in a StratCom Framework and be supported by individual communication / information annexes by PA, Info Ops and PSYOPS.

(8) Any other Coordinating Instructions. This may include timing. It also establishes the deadline by which the NAC wishes to be presented with an MC-endorsed NEO concept of operations, or when the NAC decides that NATO will use the fast track decision making process, with an MC-endorsed OPLAN based on the appropriate contingency plan.

0203. Diplomatic Representatives

a. The National Foreign Ministries carry political responsibility for a NEO. NATO military operations take place within this overall political responsibility. When considering a NEO, the national foreign ministry is generally responsible for:
(1) Initiating a request for NATO military assistance and obtaining political approval (drawing on the experience/advice of the Defence Attachés where necessary).

(2) Assisting in burden-sharing negotiations with Alliance nations and any other friendly countries involved.

(3) Providing political advice to NATO on aircraft routing and negotiating requests for diplomatic clearances for overflight and staging.

(4) Assisting in obtaining visas.

(5) Providing and arranging for consular processing teams if the reinforcement of staff in the threatened area is necessary.

(6) If designated a lead diplomatic mission, coordinating the NEO efforts among Alliance, coalition, and diplomatic missions included in the evacuation

b. **The Role of the Diplomatic Mission in NEOs**

(1) In the HN, a diplomatic mission is normally responsible for:

   (a) Giving the executive order to evacuate in consultation with its national foreign ministry.

   (b) Maintaining an evacuation contingency plan and establishing a system to provide for an orderly evacuation.

   (c) Maintaining a current register of all nationals likely to be evacuated.

   (d) Establishing and running an ECC\(^5\).

   (e) Arranging reception and onward movement of EPs.

   (f) Assisting in arranging for HNS and local resources as required for the support of the joint force at an FMB, if established.

   (g) Advising on the numbers and disembarkation points of EPs that may arrive in a nation accepting evacuees but not authorising them to remain in that nation.

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\(^5\)For a description of an ECC, see Annex F, paragraph F02 of this AJP.
(h) Maintaining a system for disseminating information to its nationals.

1 Some diplomatic missions use a “warden system” to maintain contact with nationals in their designated area, pass on advice from the diplomatic mission, organise the assembly of evacuees at RCs where necessary, and oversee their movement to evacuation locations when asked to do so. Wardens allow the diplomatic mission to convey information/advice to resident nationals easily and quickly particularly in the early stages of a developing crisis situation.

2 Apart from using wardens, diplomatic missions may use other means to contact their nationals in a crisis. Some set up a staff roster and contact nationals directly; others make use of modern technology where possible by posting advice by E-mail and fax modem, and on the diplomatic mission’s website, or answering machine. In countries where communication and information systems (CIS) are limited, the national foreign ministry may equip some nationals with cellular telephones or radios.

3 Diplomatic missions should also consider means to disseminate threat information relative to the event. Whereas news coverage, audio and video feeds are limited to local means, there should be consideration for sharing data to NATO and partner nations to complete the situational awareness update to responders or JTF members as appropriate to the event.

(i) Collating accurate data of the number, location, condition, and identity of EPs. The accuracy of the numbers of EPs can vary and should be used as a rough planning guide only.

(j) Gathering EPs at the RCs.

(k) Transferring the EPs from the RCs to the evacuation points.

(l) Providing political links with the HN.
(m) Liaising with the joint force when a military operation is required to evacuate EPs. The timing and procedures must be agreed between the joint force and the diplomatic missions before a NEO starts.

(n) Liaising and, where necessary, coordinating the evacuation with other nations’ representatives whose nationals may be involved.

(o) Arranging the screening of applicants for evacuation.

(p) Coordinating local resources including transportation, accommodation, equipment, fuel, water, food, and medical facilities for the military and EPs where necessary.

(2) Diplomatic missions may also use global communications, such as the German Deutsche Welle, American Voice of America, or British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, to alert nationals to any emergency.

0204. NATO Military Commands and Forces

a. **Strategic Command.** Allied Command Operations (ACO) is responsible for developing an OPLAN outlining the mission, command, and C2 responsibilities. The Commander of ACO, SACEUR, issues strategic planning guidance to the JFC, providing initial guidance for operational-level planning.

b. **NATO Forces and Commands.** As part of the command arrangement, ACO would designate appropriate military forces and HQ to conduct the NEO. These forces might consist of an existing Alliance force conducting exercises or on operations in the vicinity of the crisis area, the NATO response force (NRF), a deployable NATO force command headquarters, or a JTF established for the mission. NATO’s OPP, including force activation and deployment procedures, is utilised for activating a joint force and its associated components. This process can be either supplemented or, in the event time is limited, superseded by using force readiness measures contained within the NCRS.6

c. Depending on the HN government’s degree of control, it may be necessary for the JFC to establish direct liaison, in coordination with appropriate HOMs,

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6 For further information on NATO Operations Planning, see MC 133/4 and ACO’s Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive.
with separate areas of government, including the local security forces, the agency responsible for national airspace, and port authorities, as well as with commercial agencies and other organizations. This will require recognition and a clear articulation of mutual aims to ensure cooperation wherever possible. In order to reach this goal the JFC takes advantage of all components at his disposal, including the specialized assets operating within the local population and civilian environments / structures.

0205. **International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations**

a. IOs and NGOs may be operating in a country providing humanitarian assistance or other forms of relief when a NEO occurs. A large number of these organizations operating within the potential area of operations may be able to provide valuable up-to-date information to enhance situational awareness, including the location of entitled personnel. The joint force should be aware that personnel working for these organizations may not support Alliance goals and therefore will not necessarily share information with military personnel. An early determination of their position in relation to NATO policy is recommended. IOs and NGOs may provide assistance to refugees during a NEO and, in fact, may be among the evacuees. Joint force coordination and liaison will probably be complex, frequently involving a number of other organizations; therefore, the JFC may desire to establish one or more CIMIC centres in order to achieve better cooperation with local authorities, IOs, and NGOs operating in the joint operational area. The JFC should attempt to identify and utilize any in-place civilian coordination organizations that could assist in this task, such as the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

b. There will inevitably be a number of UN entities in addition to other IOs and NGOs in a country where a NEO is conducted. The IOs and larger NGOs will generally have their own evacuation plans that they practise and coordinate among each other. However, there may also be a number of smaller independent NGOs unaware of the threat and with no contingency plans for evacuation. In an uncertain or hostile environment, the UN will normally deploy a security officer who will attempt to develop and coordinate the various evacuation plans for the humanitarian community at large.

c. Deconfliction is essential to avoid numerous civil organizations competing for resources and evacuation routes and duplicating efforts with Alliance plans. Collaboration is highly desirable to achieve mutual benefit from pooling and sharing resources and plans. Planners must be aware of any political, cultural, professional, and commercial sensitivities which need resolution to avoid international or inter-organization friction. To achieve this, liaison should be established as soon as possible. The diplomatic missions are
responsible for overseeing local liaison within potential operational areas while the NAC may assume the liaison lead with IO HQ.

0206. **Host Nation**

a. **Political and Legal Considerations.** Coordination and interaction with the HN and en route HN governments will be required to determine, among other things, overflight rights, ROE constraints due to HN laws, international agreements (e.g., SOFAs, MOUs), and the legal status of evacuation force personnel. The outcome of this effort will influence the level of freedom and ease with which the evacuation force may execute its mission.

b. **Support.** The response and activities of the HN during a NEO will be determined by the existing OE, which could be permissive, uncertain, or hostile. In a permissive environment, the HN may assist the NEO by providing security outside the diplomatic mission property, around evacuation sites, and along evacuation routes. The HN may also be capable and willing to provide interpreters, logistic, and communications support, and airspace control thus relieving the burden on the evacuation force. The NEO force commander should however be prepared to conduct the NEO with limited or no HN support.

c. Commanders should be aware of applicable basing rights and the status of NATO forces within the country when planning and executing a NEO. Advance coordination should be made to ensure necessary landing, embarkation, and transit rights are in place to support a given operation. Additionally, the changing political and military situation should be taken into account prior to relying on previously negotiated HNS agreements. Liaison with officials responsible for the particular NEO site should be accomplished in a timely manner.
CHAPTER 3 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

0301. **Introduction.** Normally, the HOM, with the approval of the national foreign ministry, can order the evacuation of official diplomatic mission personnel and dependents. However, the HOM can only advise visitors, the resident community, and other nationals covered by the evacuation plan to leave and may be able to offer assistance, depending on the circumstances at the time. Time permitting; an evacuation starts with the diplomatic mission’s evacuation plan, using commercial scheduled airlines, chartered flights, or surface transportation. However, if hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or appear imminent, the HOM may invoke such elements of the emergency evacuation plan as the situation warrants.

0302. **Command Relationships**

   a. Once authorized by the national foreign ministry, the HOM can implement the preparatory measures of an evacuation plan. On receipt of a NAC execution directive, an actual NATO-led NEO may be initiated.

   b. Since the military is in a supporting role during a NEO, it is important to note that within the HN, the applicable HOMs as the senior national government representatives, are the overall responsible authorities for the evacuation. The JFC retains responsibility for the conduct of all military operations in support of an evacuation, and for the security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the operational area in consultation and coordination with the HOMs. While the HOMs are the responsible national authorities, they do not exercise command over the joint force. During a NATO-led NEO, the joint force conducts operations in response to a NAC tasking through SACEUR. The chain of command from the JFC to SACEUR remains within the NCS throughout. For more on the NCS, refer to the MC 324 series, *The NATO Military Command Structure*.

   c. Due to time constraints and the requirement for intensive civil-military interactions at all levels with respect to NEOs, operations planning and decision-making must be based on a foundation of common understanding of perspectives (diplomatic and military) concerning the situation, mission, objectives, procedures, and free exchange of information. In those cases when significant differences between the JFC and HOM become obstacles to the success of the operation, they are referred to their respective superiors for resolution.

   d. The JFC will offer military advice and assistance to the HOM in planning and executing a NEO. This in no way limits the HOM's overall responsibility for
the NEO. Likewise, while planning a NEO, the JFC should also acknowledge and consider the opinions and concerns of the HOM.

e. **Liaison Officers**

1. In a deteriorating situation and with the likelihood that military assistance may be required, a joint force liaison officer (LO) should be deployed to act as a link between the joint force and diplomatic missions in order to facilitate a seamless transition from an evacuation based on commercial means to one which requires military assets. Additionally, organizations such as the JFC’s operational liaison and reconnaissance teams (OLRTs) may be deployed for increased coordination, information gathering, and situational awareness.8

2. The JFC may also recommend the deployment of a Civil-Military Assessment and Liaison Team (CMALT) in the early phase of the mission. The aim of a CMALT is to conduct an initial assessment of the environment and report back to the Council to inform their decision-making and establish liaison with all relevant civil actors.9 If deployed, this team will at some point transition to liaison/execution.

3. The deployed LOs should possess a robust secure CIS in order to provide a direct link between the diplomatic missions and the joint force.

4. In addition to information gathering, the early deployment of LOs to the subject country should be considered to:

   a. Brief the HOMs on NEO procedures, the likely forces involved, and other military considerations.

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7 Nations may decide to support their HOMs with military personnel during a potential evacuation situation, in accordance with individual national policies. The JFC does not command these military personnel; however, some LO functions might be accomplished by these individuals.

8 The OLRT is a discrete team formed by the JFC HQ to gain early first-hand situational awareness and facilitate the establishment of liaison and conduct reconnaissance. The composition of the team is mission dependent and can range from a few personnel with a satellite phone, to a robust team of 12 with a complete deployable CIS package capable of covering all major staff functions. For more on OLRT see MCM 0083, *NATO Response Force Minimum Military Requirement for Common Funded Deployable CIS and HQ CSS Equipment*.

9 CMALT is a co-led civil-military team with a flexible composition based on the civilian Advisory Support Team and the military Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) concept.
(b) Liaise with the military attachés and staffs, the diplomatic mission staffs, HN military, and the military personnel or forces of non-NATO nations deployed in the operational area.

(c) Review and coordinate the evacuation plans with military plans.

(d) Assist in the initial development of the estimate and provide enduring support to the NEO planning process.

(e) Compile local information not otherwise available. LOs should seek to extract information from local experts to provide the JFC and the NEO force commanders increased situational awareness.

f. All orders from either the HOM or JFC to corresponding personnel are issued through the appropriate diplomatic or military chain of command. In the event CIS cannot be established with higher authority or if the situation deteriorates to one of combat operations rather than a NEO and Allied lives are at risk, the JFC may take appropriate measures to defend NATO forces and personnel from attack or imminent attack, subject to each contributing nations caveat and ROE. ROE should be as precise as practical; however, ROE must never deny the use of appropriate self-defence measures.

g. **Coordinated Lead Diplomatic Mission.** Depending on the magnitude and anticipated duration of a NEO, the Alliance should request designation of a NATO coordinated lead diplomatic mission within the HN. Such a request would need to be discussed and agreed within the national foreign ministries. A designated coordinated lead diplomatic mission would have sufficient personnel and C2 assets to serve as a focal point for coordinating NEO efforts among the Alliance and other diplomatic missions included for evacuation. The intent of creating a coordinated lead diplomatic mission is to foster a degree of unity of effort within the Alliance diplomatic community and lessen the liaison burden on the joint force.

0303. **Joint Force/Diplomatic Mission Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations Coordination Centre.** The JFC might consider establishing a NATO NEO coordination centre within the joint force headquarters, or utilize existing mechanisms initiated by the NEO Coordination Group (NCG). The purpose would

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10 The NEO coordination centre (NEOCC) concept was initiated by the NCG, a group comprising several member nations, independent of NATO and EU. The principle role of the NEOCC is to act as a non-executive multinational liaison cell operating to each nation’s own chain of command, to coordinate both effort and assets to where they are most needed during an evacuation. A UK-led NEOCC, activated in Malta, was a major success. The NEOCC coordinated the evacuation of over 4500 people of 78 different nationalities over a period of 13 days, utilizing ships and aircraft from a variety of different countries, and did this by conducting 54 sorties to 13 different locations across Libya. (Extract from an unclassified Post Operational Report from the NEOCC.)
be to create a centralised focal point providing a conduit for information exchanges between the various diplomatic missions and the joint force—through the joint force LOs.

0304. **Joint Task Force Organization for Support to Evacuation Operations.** The Allied joint force will likely be a task-tailored force, i.e. the NRF, constituted particularly for a specific NEO. The composition of the joint force is determined in great part by the needs of the entry/withdrawal and supporting operations within the overall NEO and delineated in the NID. A JTF and corresponding HQ could be created by incorporating elements and capabilities from standing land, air, maritime, and special operations forces. Accordingly, the JTF for a NEO may consist of some or all of the following component commands: a joint force land component command (JFLCC), a joint force air component command (JFACC), a joint force maritime component command (JFMCC) and a special operations component command (SOCC).

   a. **Headquarters.** A JTF HQ is a deployable, multi-national, multi-Service HQ of variable size, tailored to the mission and utilised by the JFC to exercise C2 over the entire JTF. A JTF headquarters has an appropriate support capacity and the requisite CIS capability necessary for a NEO.

   b. **Joint Force Land Component Command.** The JFLCC uses land power in support of the JFC’s objectives. Forming a functional land component is a key organizational decision, which will have significant importance when conducting a NEO. In a NEO, the JFLCC would most likely coordinate ground transportation requirements and provide security at evacuation sites and along evacuation routes.

   c. **Joint Force Air Component Command.** In the context of a NEO, combined joint air operations may be conducted to support the activities of land, maritime, and special operations forces (SOF) components either by contributing assets, or by providing other support to sustain and enhance operations. The most likely contribution of air operations in a NEO would be in coordinating air transport requirements with other missions in support as required.

   d. **Joint Force Maritime Component Command.** Maritime operations are conducted in the maritime environment, which includes the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces above and under the sea to gain or exploit command of the sea, sea control or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea. Particularly throughout the littorals, the maritime component is capable of conducting or supporting a NEO with maritime and amphibious forces (including maritime
air assets), logistic sea basing, and providing secure EP handling facilities afloat.

e. **Special Operations Component Command.** SOF are commanded through a Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) under an operational-level headquarters alongside land, air, or maritime forces. A SOCC is a multi-national or national command that must be generated for every operation involving SOF and is generally formed around a SOF Framework Nation. As with other operations, it would be specifically structured for a NEO according to the number of special operations task groups or units assigned and the degree of C2 required. The SOCC is comprised of a combination of command and liaison elements, and force elements that provides the NEO force commander with a flexible, versatile, and unique capability. The SOCC commander employs and controls SOF and can act as a supported or supporting commander as directed by the JFC. See MC 437/2 Military Committee Special Operations Policy and AJP-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, for additional information on special operations.

0305. **Communication and Information Systems**

a. In NEO, it is extremely important to consider the complex linkage between land, maritime, and air assets, and direct efforts to create a unique network. If properly used and protected, modern network-enabled CIS offer the JFC a significant advantage over any potential adversaries. Secure communications and data transfer capabilities are to be considered wherever NEOs are planned or executed. CIS services and support, including automated decision aids, assist in the planning, execution, and monitoring of operations. The joint nature of the force requires consideration of the characteristics, doctrine, procedures, and equipment of each component.

b. In considering communications requirements, the application of CIS principles throughout all phases of a NEO is extremely important. This will ensure a proper and effective working of the systems within a wide range of conditions. These principles are described in AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems. Additionally, see STANAG 5048, Edition 5, The Minimum Scale of Connectivity for Communications and Information Systems for NATO Land Forces. This STANAG is currently being revised as an MC document.

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For a detailed description and discussion of the communication principles, refer to AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems.
c. Since NEOs are conducted in support of HOMs and could also involve a large number of disparate organizations, the exchange of timely and accurate information could potentially be a major challenge. Steps should be taken to create effective communications with HN governmental and military organizations, the embassies involved in the NEO, and other international, non-governmental or commercial organizations who may be able to assist in the NEO.

0306. **Automated Tracking System.** The JFC may have access to a number of automated tracking systems to simplify the tracking of evacuees, units, material, and supplies during a NEO; these should be applied with respect to HOM’s national data protection legislation. If available, these should be employed to the maximum extent practicable to more efficiently execute the operation.

   a. The NEO Tracking System is a United States of America system that can assist JFCs in maintaining visibility and accountability of evacuees as they proceed through the evacuation pipeline. The system collects data from “smart cards”, barcoded passports, and other electronic data sources and is capable of exchanging data with other systems such as a global transportation network and the Automated Repatriation and Recording System. Evacuees entered into the system are issued barcoded bracelets, similar to hospital bracelets, which allow for rapid scanning of persons in transit to track their whereabouts. NEO Tracking System terminals should be employed at the ECC, transit points, and any temporary safe location to maintain awareness of the movement of evacuees through the stages of evacuation. The system also provides the ECC the capability to generate passenger manifests for groups departing to any form of transportation.

   b. The NATO Asset Tracking System is being implemented under CP 9C0103. The Asset Tracking System will provide NATO and nations with information on the identity, quantity, location and movement of units, personnel, equipment and items of supply moving through the logistics chain network on a NATO operation. A sub-set of the Asset Tracking System, the Consignment Tracking System has been implemented in support of current operations.
CHAPTER 4 – CONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

0401. **Introduction.** Most NEOs will be contingency operations with responses developed through the crisis response planning process. Planning must confirm that the operating environment matches the nature of the proposed mission. Diplomatic Mission Planning normally focuses on the evacuation of its own national citizens, employees, and their families. Depending on the content of the NID, the JFC mission planning may require accounting for the evacuation of other nationals, such as those employed by commercial firms, NGOs, IOs, other resident nationals and tourists, as well as asylum seekers. This chapter outlines the planning considerations, both diplomatic and military, that warrant consideration when conducting a NEO.
Figure 4-1. Planning Considerations

0402. Diplomatic Mission Planning

a. Responsibilities for the diplomatic mission could normally include:

(1) Promulgating an evacuation contingency plan.

(2) Administering the evacuation effort.

(3) Requesting military support through the national foreign ministry.

(4) Providing an estimate of EPs to be evacuated.

(5) Delivering evacuees to the RCs and evacuation points.

(6) Identifying and providing administrative support for evacuation facilities within the HN and embarkation site until the EPs are transported to a place of safety.

b. In an event (or crisis) that results in a NATO-led NEO, the planning process should flow seamlessly from the sequential stages outlined in the evacuation contingency plans into the generic phases of the military plan. Normally it is in the final stage of the diplomatic mission plan that a NEO is initiated. Evacuation contingency plans are not tactical OPLANs in the sense that military planners think of, but they are the reference materials that support the formulation of an OPLAN.

c. Evacuation Contingency Planning. Diplomatic missions should have an evacuation contingency plan and a list of all EPs as a starting point. In fact, most diplomatic missions have some form of an evacuation contingency plan for the area under their cognisance, one section of which may address the military evacuation options of its citizens and designated other nationals. See Annex D for the likely contents of an evacuation contingency plan. The objectives of an evacuation contingency plan are:

(1) To protect EPs.

(2) To provide the links between the HOM and the EPs and the national community for passing information in a time of crisis.

(3) Depending on the level of threat, to provide a procedure for conducting an orderly evacuation of EPs by commercial means.
(4) Outline procedures for conducting evacuation of EPs in the event that commercial means are no longer available

d. Notification and Implementation. Diplomatic missions normally have an established notification system network throughout the HN to facilitate communications between the diplomatic mission and resident nationals in the event of a local crisis. For more on the subject, see paragraph 0203 b. (1) (h). Diplomatic missions are the authorities for declaring the various stages of the evacuation contingency plan as a situation deteriorates. Evacuation contingency plans are normally implemented in stages, the number of which will vary between Alliance members. Diplomatic mission evacuation contingency plan notification procedures might resemble the following:

(1) Advice to national community and others.

(a) **Stage I: Stand Fast.** When the political or security environment has deteriorated and it is perceived that national citizens are threatened, but an evacuation is either not required or is temporarily impossible, all national citizens are requested to “stand fast” and are given preliminary instructions for preparing to evacuate the country.

(b) **Stage II: Leave While Commercial Means are Available.** Due to the gravity of the situation, nonessential national citizens may be requested to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible. Additionally, the national foreign ministry might reinforce the diplomatic mission’s internal security force and the HOM might request the deployment of NATO LO teams to the diplomatic missions to assist in evacuation planning and in anticipation of a requirement for military assistance to conduct an evacuation.

(c) **Stage III: Leave Now by Commercial Means or by Official Evacuation.** The political or security environment is believed to have deteriorated to the point that the safety of national citizens is threatened. Normally, with national foreign ministry approval, the HOM orders the departure of designated diplomatic personnel, keeping only a minimum essential staff. The diplomatic mission would assemble, document, and begin assisting in the movement of national citizens and other EPs to designated place of safety sites. A mix of commercial charter, private, or military transport might be necessary, depending on the availability of scheduled commercial transportation.
(2) **Communication.** When feasible, notification of potential national evacuees involves communicating through an established system. As a rule, written messages are more reliable than oral messages and should be used whenever possible. There may be several notification phases for an evacuation.

(3) **Drawdown.** The basic options for drawdown are authorized departure and ordered departure. Departure may be authorized or ordered when it is of national interest to require the departure of some or all employees and their eligible family members, or if there is imminent danger to the life of the employee or the lives of the immediate family of the employee. The diplomatic mission prepares lists of personnel to remain at the mission in an emergency situation. The list of employees to remain will include those needed to manage an eventual evacuation of national citizens.

(a) **Authorised Departure.** The HOM normally requests authorized departure status from the national foreign ministry. Employees and family members who wish to leave the diplomatic mission must obtain approval from the HOM. When the authorized departure status is terminated, the official evacuees must return to the mission.

(b) **Ordered Departure.** The HOM may determine that a situation has deteriorated to a point that family members and certain employees should leave the diplomatic mission for their safety. Ordered departure is not optional; family members and employees will be issued orders to leave. When the ordered departure status is terminated, official evacuees normally return to the mission.

(4) **Diplomatic Mission Closing.** The situation has deteriorated to the point that the diplomatic mission must close and all remaining national citizens and mission employees are evacuated. This does not normally include private national citizens and their dependants who desire to remain in the country. Military assistance might not be required on the ground until this phase of the evacuation.

0403. **Evacuee Assignments and Identification.** Most diplomatic missions have an established system to designate who is to be evacuated and how they are to be identified. These personnel may be called “entitled,” “designated,” “sponsored,” “authorised,” or other similar terms. The system allows diplomatic missions to
organise the evacuation based on available assets. Additionally, some EPs may be eligible for evacuation through other international arrangements.

0404. **Military Planning.** The OPP enables commanders to translate Alliance strategy and objectives into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations will be used to achieve success within a given space and time. NATO operations planning is conducted through two separate but related processes: advance planning and crisis response planning. See Annex A for NEO planning considerations and the ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) for the estimate format.

a. **Advance Planning.** Advance planning is conducted with the intention of preparing the Alliance to deal with possible future security risks, both Article 5 and non-Article 5. It entails a comprehensive iterative coordination and approval process, which is outlined in AJP-5 and the COPD. The result of advance planning is a contingency plan (CONPLAN) or standing defence plan.

b. **Crisis Response Planning.** Crisis response planning involves the development of OPLANs. OPLANs are the commander’s means of relaying a vision of the sequence of operations and supporting functions needed to attain objectives. Where a suitable CONPLAN has already been developed, it is normally used as the initial basis for developing an OPLAN.

0405. **End State.** The end state is defined in AAP-6 as, “The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates the objective has been achieved.” The end state should be established prior to execution. NEO success will generally be related to the achievement of pre-determined strategic objectives that are derived from the political end state as defined in the overall political mandate and the NID.

0406. **Diplomatic Mission – Joint Force Cooperation**

a. The joint force should establish and maintain close liaison with the applicable diplomatic missions, and especially with their defence attachés if present. The defence attachés should be able to assist in the coordination of joint force activities with the diplomatic missions and to assist the JFC in obtaining the HOMs’ evaluation of the situation. Additionally, the defence attachés are able to provide information on the general scope of in-country activities for all NATO non-combatant command elements, including missions, locations, organizations, and unique security requirements.

b. The HOMs should summarize the political objectives and limitations relevant to the joint force’s assistance and the nuances involved that might be
appropriate. While these may be obvious to those intimately involved with the situation, the JFC will be better prepared to comply effectively with a request for help if the reasons have been clearly explained.

0407. **Diplomatic Mission Security and Operations**

a. Security outside the diplomatic mission is the responsibility of the HN, but may not be effective in an uncertain or hostile operating environment and will need to be addressed by the JFC. Security of the HOM and diplomatic mission is the responsibility of the individual nations. In many cases, diplomatic missions do not have security forces or personnel. If a mission does have security provided during the evacuation, the security personnel receive their orders from the diplomatic mission, while joint force personnel receive their orders from the JFC. Joint force personnel do not receive orders from the diplomatic mission. These two chains of command can potentially cause problems, which may come to the forefront when diplomatic mission security personnel and joint force personnel work together during the evacuation operation. It is vital that all joint force personnel understand the relationships between the separate chains of command before the operation commences. The JFC must understand the HOM’s security plans and integrate the joint forces as smoothly as possible. The diplomatic mission evacuation contingency plans may not provide for the diplomatic mission itself to be a primary RC or evacuation point. However, past experience shows that during times of crisis large numbers of national citizens, citizens of the host country, and other nationals will often go to the diplomatic missions. These people will be frightened and may want to leave the country but may not have been included in the notification plan or could not reach the designated RC or evacuation point. Separate plans may have to be developed to handle these crowds, both as a threat to the diplomatic missions and as EPs.

b. In some cases, local contract guards control the perimeter of each diplomatic mission. These personnel are HN citizens who may or may not be armed. The quality of the local guard force varies by country. Some local guards are professional and staffed with personnel who have proven their loyalty to the diplomatic mission’s staff. These local guards can be very useful in assisting Allied forces assigned to perimeter security duty during a NEO.

c. Diplomatic mission personnel control access into critical facilities where national classified material is processed and stored. The diplomatic mission should have reaction plans to defend these facilities and destroy or evacuate sensitive material or equipment, if necessary.
0408. **National and Organizational Terminology.** As discussed earlier, the conduct of a NEO has the potential to include many disparate organizations, both civil and military. Many will not be familiar with NATO NEO terminology, such as entitled person or place of safety, or will use their own terminology. Therefore, NEO planners should make every attempt to pre-coordinate and discuss terminology issues with other military and civil actors to allow for a better understanding of like terms.
CHAPTER 5 – EMPLOYMENT AND EVACUATION
OPERATION PROCEDURES

0501. Implementing the Non-Combatant Evacuation Plan. At the operational level, a NEO will normally be conducted in four phases: preparatory operations, preliminary operations, evacuation operations, and withdrawal and recovery. These phases are usually sequential, but may have significant overlap.

a. Preparatory Operations. This phase covers gathering military information, researching prior lessons learned databases, reassessing available and prevailing diplomatic missions and military contingency planning, generating the joint force, training, establishing a lessons learned process, deployment, logistic build-up, acclimatisation, and other administrative preparations. In the early stages of a crisis, there will be a significant demand for detailed, current information. Initially, this will be for strategic information on the overall political and military situation in country. As a NEO becomes more likely and the need for additional military planning and preparation develops, there will be increased pressure for timely and accurate information on the location and numbers of EPs and advice on the best options for their movement. This important information should be shared with all nations likely to be involved in the NEO. Preparatory NEO measures at the joint force level may include:

(1) Identifying key stakeholders to aid integration at all levels of planning.

(2) Conducting intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and updating IPB overlays and other intelligence products, including the anticipated numbers and locations of EPs. See Annex C for more detailed information.

(3) Arranging tentative diplomatic clearances with the diplomatic missions for the deployment and evacuation air routes.

(4) Identifying air, land, and sea deployment, evacuation, and withdrawal routes.

(5) Assisting in arranging for chartering civil commercial aircraft and sealift.

(6) Confirming the availability of strategic lift.

(7) Making tentative arrangements for en route staging airfields and selected FMBs.
(8) Reviewing FMB and in-country mapping requirements.

(9) Considering legal and ROE issues.\textsuperscript{12}

(10) Identifying potential HNS/Allied logistic coordination.

(11) Arranging strategic CIS and identifying local HN CIS infrastructure.

(12) Ascertaining from the national foreign ministries the likely location of the ECC.

(13) Ascertaining from the national foreign ministries the likely location of the place of safety.

b. **Preliminary Operations.** The military objective during the preliminary operations phase of a NEO is to identify and secure FMBs and evacuation points and assist in the establishment of the ECC as required. Additionally, further reconnaissance of these locations could be accomplished. If the NEO is conducted in a hostile environment, this phase may include forcible entry operations or operations to shape the OE. Entering the operational area may involve amphibious or air manoeuvre operations. Tasks normally include:

(1) **Deployment**

(a) A FMB may be established to provide a stepping stone from which a NEO could be launched.\textsuperscript{13} The selection of the FMB constitutes a key first step in the execution of the JFC’s concept of operations for the deployment, sustainment, and recovery of the force. For smaller scale NEOs conducted in the littorals, establishing a sea base in international waters free from HN and other constraints may be preferable to establishing an FMB. See Annex E for information on FMBs and temporary places of safety.

(b) Establishing a joint force HQ early, with separate component HQs where appropriate, is normally required to provide the C2 infrastructure to command the force deployment and build-up. The joint force HQ may be located, as required, in country, at

\textsuperscript{12} See MC 362/1, *NATO Rules of Engagement*, for further guidance on ROE.

\textsuperscript{13} Establishing a forward operating base (FOB) in the operational area might be considered when an FMB is located in an HN outside the operational area.
the FMB, ECC, or afloat. It is likely that an advance HQ would
form the activation element of the joint force HQ. Establishing
a CIS infrastructure will be required with all appropriate links to
NATO, diplomatic missions, and Allies.

(c) The initial arrival of forces in the operational area must be
balanced to provide an early and viable capability, with the
necessary command functions and combat service support, to
meet the JFC’s mission requirements. Those elements that
contribute to the reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration of the joint force will be high in the arrival sequence.
The joint force main body may then be deployed to an FMB if
required.

(d) Time permitting, once in the operational area, Allied forces
should be able to conduct reconnaissance and rehearsals and
possibly complete a period of preparation and training prior to
conducting the NEO. If possible, rehearsals should be
conducted with HOMs covering all anticipated contingencies.
This will assist with the acclimatisation and familiarisation of
Allied forces with new equipment and ROE, enhancing joint
force techniques and procedures. The most important goal is
to test the evacuation C2 structure.

(2) **Assist in Establishing Evacuation Points.** Identify and secure
evacuation points close to the threatened community, through which
the evacuees can be moved by military transport to the ECC. The
diplomatic missions, preferably with military advice, select these
points.

(3) **Assist in Establishing an Evacuation Control Centre.** Provide
assistance to the diplomatic missions in establishing and protecting
the ECC. See Figure 5-1 for a notional ECC flow chart.

(4) **Assist in Establishing Embarkation Sites.** Provide assistance to
the diplomatic missions in determining and protecting places where
EPs will be embarking on transportation to a place of safety.

(5) **Assist in Establishing Entitled Persons (EP) Identity Operations.**
Provide assistance to diplomatic missions in identification and
enrolment of those EPs who have been designated for evacuation
using technical exploitation operation (TEO) capabilities.
c. **Evacuation Operations.** The main effort of this phase of a NEO is the safe and swift evacuation of EPs enabled by a rapid insertion and withdrawal of the Allied military forces. The forces should:

![Notional Evacuation Control Centre Flow Chart](image)

**Figure 5-1. Notional Evacuation Control Centre Flow Chart**

1. **Secure Vital Points and Key Terrain.** The uncertain or hostile nature of the environment may necessitate additional forces being deployed to help secure evacuation points. This may include forces to control approaches to the evacuation points and secure the routes from them to the ECC.

2. **Support Reception Centres.** In an uncertain or hostile environment, the EPs should not be gathered before the RCs are secured. If required, the joint force may deploy security element assets to the

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14 A detailed description of Figure 5-1 is at Annex E.
RCs and assist in moving EPs from the RCs to the ECC by providing escorts and close protection.

(3) **Evacuate Entitled Persons.** Take responsibility for EPs at the evacuation points. EPs should be screened as necessary and moved by military transportation to the ECC.

(4) **Assist the Evacuation Control Centre.** Provide assistance to the diplomatic missions both in running the ECC and in facilitating onward movement of EPs to a place of safety. See Annex F for information on evacuee processing.

(5) **Assist the Embarkation Sites.** Coordinate the EP transit with scheduled transportation departures.

(6) **Provide Force Protection.** The IPB process will assist in identifying the threats both to Allied forces and to the EPs. Maintaining an agile and adaptable plan will enable the joint force to continue the evacuation in deteriorating security situations.

d. **Withdrawal and Recovery.** The end state for a NEO is the safe evacuation of all EPs to a place of safety and the withdrawal of the joint force, followed by its recovery or redeployment to other tasks as soon as possible. A debriefing and “lessons learned” process should be initiated before the operation is officially ended. The HOMs of those nations involved have authority to declare when NEO of their respective EPs is complete.

0502. **Joint Force Organization and Missions.** Depending on the magnitude and anticipated duration of the NEO, the joint force may remain at home station, deploy to an FMB, or deploy into the HN as the situation warrants. If the NEO is significant, an advance HQ may deploy as early in the NEO preparation phases as possible, and may deploy simultaneously with a joint force component forward command element (FCE).

a. **Advance Headquarters.** The advance HQ coordinates with the HOMs and diplomatic mission staffs for information and assistance. The advance HQ submits situation reports to the JFC. When the main body enters the country, the joint force HQ rejoins the advance HQ and continues operations.

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(1) **Advance Headquarters Composition.** The JFC, in coordination with the HOMs, determines the size and composition of the advance HQ. The skills presented reflect potential coordination requirements between the joint force and civilian agencies involved in the NEO. The advance HQ may include all or a portion of the following skill sets: intelligence, operations (land/maritime/air/SOF), logistics, C2 and CIS, medical, fire support, PA, information operations (Info Ops), PSYOPS, CIMIC, legal, military police, stability police such as multinational specialized unit, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), military engineering, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence.

(2) **Advance Headquarters Tasks**

(a) Initiate liaison with the diplomatic missions and establish a forward command post that can prepare for the reception of the joint force HQ.

(b) Provide a continuing presence for planning and ensure a complementary role with diplomatic mission personnel.

(c) Confirm whether the OE is permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

(d) Advise the JFC regarding the size and composition of forces required.

(e) Advise the JFC regarding the time, place, and method for the arrival of the evacuation forces.

(f) Determine existing political and sociological considerations.

(g) Assess the attitude of the local population.

(h) Establish CIS between the advance HQ and the JFC.

(i) Assess the efforts of ongoing NEO initiatives with other diplomatic missions.

b. **Main Body.** Depending on the situation, a joint force “main body” may deploy to an FMB or the HN to affect the on-scene evacuation process. After insertion of the main body, each joint force component prepares for its part in the operation.
(1) **Joint Force Headquarters.** The joint force “main body” HQ joins the advance HQ as operations continue. The joint force HQ coordinates and directs the joint force components during the NEO.

(2) **Liaison Teams.** The liaison activities continue with the diplomatic missions and other agencies as required.

**0503. Evacuation Force Organization and Tasks.** In most instances, the actual NEO evacuation force is established from a designated joint force component, with other joint force components in support missions. Depending on the particular OE and mode of transportation required to conduct the NEO, any one of the component commands could be designated to execute the NEO. There is also a need for a ready reaction force to be part of the NEO force. Because the OE can change quickly, a reaction force capable of protecting the NEO force elements and non-combatants from adversary advances is imperative. This force should be on short-notice alert and positioned close to the operating area. See Annex F for detailed information on the evacuation force composition and missions.

**0504. Other Considerations**

a. **Medical**

   (1) During evacuation operations, it may be difficult or impossible to insert and establish the medical support function for the joint force because of time and operational constraints. Comprehensive and detailed casualty and medical support planning should be implemented to cover immediate medical and surgical treatment points. Special units organized for this purpose may save lives and permit a more expeditious evacuation. Depending on the size and scope of the evacuation operation, there may be the potential for large numbers of both military and civilian casualties. The JFC’s staff should identify tailored medical packages to treat disease and non-battle injuries, and to identify and mitigate potential environmental health threats.

   (2) While the main task of military health services is to provide medical support for NATO forces, medical plans must also provide for care of EPs. The unique composition of EP populations, such as infants, pregnant women, and the elderly, must be considered and when practical, medical planning and execution should be done in cooperation with HN and other civilian health service organizations. Stress trauma management should also be included within the medical plan. Medical services may include any or all of the following functions:
(a) Determining if an EP requires emergency medical treatment.

(b) Performing emergency treatment as required or coordinating with local hospitals to perform the treatment.

(c) Advising the JFC on a temporary safe location on hygiene and preventive medicine including epizootic disease prophylaxis.

(d) Inspecting food and water obtained from local sources.

(e) Evaluating the general health of the EPs, particularly in regard to pregnancies and the possibility of communicable diseases.

b. **Personnel Recovery**

(1) A NEO has the potential to involve a large number of disparate organizations, which can pose significant personnel recovery (PR) challenges to NATO forces conducting the NEO. Therefore, as with other operations, NATO must ensure that its PR organization can perform, or establish agreements with other organizations to execute, PR tasks. Additionally, in accordance with NATO policy and doctrine, NEOs are not considered to be a subset of PR although they could entail small to large groups of isolated personnel. However, PR capabilities and tactics, techniques and procedures may be used to conduct NEO operations as applicable/appropriate.

(2) PR involves a balance of activity in two areas. First, a recovery force that has the equipment, manpower resources and expertise to plan, exercise and execute PR missions. Second, military personnel who are likely to be at risk should be identified, trained and equipped for the specific type of recovery method. Support to isolated personnel extends to reintegration. The nature of the recovery force required varies in line with the demands of the task. However, while the broad types of capabilities are closely linked, they are separated by distinct changes in situation.\(^{16}\)

c. **Repatriation.** Repatriation, which is not part of, but subsequent to a NEO, is the procedure whereby citizens are officially processed back into their respective countries following evacuation from overseas. NATO responsibility for NEO normally ends with the arrival of evacuees at the

\(^{16}\) For additional information, see Bi-SC Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) for Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) dated 22 Feb, 2011.
designated place of safety. Nations are responsible for the welfare of their citizens at the place of safety and for any repatriation including funding for safe haven expenses for their respective evacuees. There should be a positive process for handing over evacuees and their documentation to representatives of the appropriate nations at the place of safety.

d. **Strategic Communications.** PO (2009)0141, NATO Strategic Communications Policy, defines strategic communications as “the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, PA, Military Public Affairs, Info Ops, and PSYOPS, as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.” StratCom is a political-military process and a political-military StratCom approach to a NEO will be established. The military contribution in the information and communications mission areas (PA, Info Ops, and PSYOPS as appropriate) must support and be coherent with the political-military context. As with all NATO operations, StratCom should be integrated with the political and diplomatic organizations and incorporated into all aspects of operations planning. It may play a more important role in NEO if the environment becomes uncertain or hostile.

(1) **Public Affairs.** The JFC should anticipate and be prepared to support news media coverage of almost every aspect of the NEO as well as implement measures to manage the excessive demand for information from those governments / HOMs whose citizens are part of the evacuation. To ensure that the media does not provide intelligence to persons hostile to the operation, the public affairs officer (PAO) working with diplomatic mission personnel needs to manage PA through accurate and timely releases concerning the NEO. All PA products must be coordinated with the appropriate HOMs prior to release. Depending on the magnitude of the NEO, the JFC may consider establishing a Press Information Centre to facilitate media coverage. For more on PA and the responsibilities of the PAO, see AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*, and MC 457, *NATO Military Policy on Public Information*.

(2) **Info Ops.** Info Ops is a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities. In support of a NEO, Info Ops will evaluate the information environment with a focus on actors, issues of concern, information systems, and media. Additionally, Info Ops staff will coordinate capabilities and activities which have the potential to effect the information environment in order to achieve coherence of words and deeds. They should also coordinate with PA, CIMIC, and other staffs to ensure that messaging
to target audiences in the joint operations area (JOA) is focused on enabling the operation and neutralizing parties that may attempt to disrupt NATO activities.¹⁷

(3) **Psychological Operations.** PSYOPS can facilitate NEOs, especially in uncertain or hostile environments. Principally, PSYOPS efforts may facilitate passing pertinent information to EPs, and PSYOPS efforts and assets can execute programs and disseminate products that induce an attitude or behaviour of non-interference toward the NEO among people in the NEO area. Prudent employment of PSYOPS may also prevent a permissive or uncertain environment from becoming a hostile environment. See AJP-3.10.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*, for additional information on PSYOPS.

e. A mechanism for capturing observations and lessons learned should be initiated from the very outset of an operation.

f. Coordination between all the national foreign ministries and Defence Ministries and military headquarters of those nations involved.

g. A mechanism for the in-country HOMs of those nations involved to coordinate and reach an agreement on the timing of any evacuation. It should be noted that some nations’ national foreign ministries might retain responsibility for ordering a NEO while others will delegate this to their HOM. Many diplomatic missions have in-place agreements and coordinated plans to address emergency situations within a given HN.

h. The formation of an effective military command system and infrastructure including a compatible CIS plan, an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture which can draw and share data from NATO and national sources, and a logistic system which acknowledges the need for national support, but also caters to international needs.

i. The need to deploy and coordinate additional NATO assets such as transportation and the shared use of logistic facilities.

j. The selection of senior officers for staff and liaison functions to coordinate plans with diplomatic missions, HNs, and other civilian agencies.

k. **Recommended Guidelines.** Some recommended guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows:

1. Evacuees are not detainees. However, evacuees who interfere with or obstruct the NEO may be restrained *with the minimum force required* and detained by proper authorities, if necessary, for the minimum period required.

2. Evacuation can be an unsettling experience, especially for children and families who have become separated. As a rule, presenting a patient, courteous, and professional attitude will do much to calm the situation and all evacuees.

3. Depending on the situation, personal baggage may be limited.

4. EPs should not be separated from their baggage for any prolonged period of time during the evacuation process.

5. Baggage will be searched for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or items declared to be restricted items.

6. If medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is necessary for a member of a family, the entire family should be evacuated medically (dependant on time constraints and space availability). Need to have established liaison with local airport security and ambulance services.

7. Medical personnel and religious support personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid in identification.

I. **Request for Political Asylum or Temporary Refuge.** International law and customs have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger. However, commanders may not grant political asylum to any foreign national. They may grant temporary refuge under emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any person. Commanders must understand that if temporary refuge is granted, SACEUR approval is necessary to release the individual. No information shall be released to the media concerning requests for political asylum until cleared by the HOM and SACEUR. Any requests by foreign governments for the return of an individual must be reported to SACEUR and the HOM. Until final determination is made by appropriate authorities, safeguard those who have requested political asylum or temporary refuge. Do not release personnel against their will to a third party force. Additionally,
the safety of NATO personnel and the security of the unit must be taken into consideration along with the following:

1. Grant temporary refuge in cases where the requesting individual is in imminent danger, irrespective of whether political asylum or temporary refuge is requested.

2. Let HOM representatives handle political asylum requests through the appropriate channels.

3. Establish procedures to notify SACEUR of actions taken in cases of requests for political asylum.

m. **Migrants at Sea.** If the NEO force is utilizing sealift, it is likely that the force may encounter migrants at sea. Since the joint force must abide by international law at sea to render assistance, planning should provide clear guidance on how the force will handle such a situation. Additionally, the joint force should establish information channels to alert nearby relevant search and rescue organisations and plan to assist migrants in close coordination with cluster leading UN organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration.

n. **Pets.** Although the evacuation of pets is not normally authorized, past experience has shown that evacuees will bring their pets; therefore, there should be a policy concerning pets. If pets arrive for evacuation, a pet control facility will need to be established. Although authorities have gone to great effort to make plans to evacuate pets, this may not be feasible in all evacuations, particularly in a hostile environment, and families must make plans for their pets to stay behind or be transported out commercially. The costs of any commercial transport of pets must be borne by the family. If the NATO force can accommodate the transportation of pets through a military or chartered aircraft, families must bring the following with their pets to the assembly area.

1. Separate airline-approved pet containers for each animal except those with nursing litters. NOTE: Crates with watering bowls and limited towels and blankets are preferred. Do not include rawhide chew toys. Repatriation centres and staging/processing locations should be prepared to take care of pets if the evacuation of pets has been approved by NATO. Dog and cat food should be available at these locations as well as veterinary assistance; however any boarding of pets at a local kennel or quarantine costs at repatriation sites will be the responsibility of the pet owner.
(2) Movement orders and health and vaccination certificates should be attached in a waterproof bag to the outside of the crate. Written medication or special care instructions should be provided to personnel at the assembly point.

(3) Dog and cats should wear collars with owner identification.

(4) Pets other than dogs or cats also must be in airline-approved crates. Families should secure all permits required to import the pet to the safe haven. A copy of the permit plus any health or vaccination certificates should be attached to the crate in a waterproof bag. Additionally, special food requirements sufficient to cover the duration of the evacuation process must accompany the pet.
CHAPTER 6 – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

0601. **Introduction.** NEOs, by their very nature, normally occur in regions where there are seldom agreements between NATO and the supporting nation or nations. Therefore, the only guarantee of sufficient combat service support is if the Alliance force deploys with it. A logistics estimate will always be conducted to ascertain required support. HNS, including the country where the evacuation originates or in which any part of the NEO chain exists, and in-country resources would be available under ideal conditions to provide additional support, but cannot be relied upon when planning a NEO. Although not an exhaustive list, some of the support arrangements that could be arranged are as follows:

a. The first and preferred method is the establishment of a HNS agreement. If a legitimate government exists, and there is sufficient time to negotiate an agreement, the implementation of HNS under an umbrella MOU would be required. In this case, SACEUR would, in conjunction with the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), prepare an HNS agreement on behalf of all NATO and any non-NATO forces that are part of the NEO force package.

b. In cases where formal HNS agreements are not practical, support may still be obtained locally through contracts with individual civilian providers.

c. In practice, there are many similarities between HNS and local contracting. Most significantly, resources are usually obtained in both methods through contracting, under the coordination of a NATO contracting coordination activity. For NEOs, a logistic planner can expect to use local contracting at least until an HNS agreement can be established.

d. Depending upon the magnitude of the NEO, additional logistics and CIS support may be needed to deploy and operate separately from the Alliance infrastructure. In an extensive NEO, the JFC may also assume responsibility for rear area security, a task normally undertaken by the HN. However, it might be appropriate due to geographical considerations to link these functions with logistic functions and to establish a joint force rear area command.

0602. **Responsibilities.** Except when NATO provides maintenance and limited NATO-purchased resources, TCNs provide all their personnel and equipment required to conduct a NEO. These resources are dedicated, either through planned allocation of forces through the force planning process, or through requirements identified in the contingency OPP. Under NATO procedures, nations will transfer some level of authority (TOA) over their national force contributions to NATO at an agreed time. This TOA includes combat service support forces that nations nominate through the force generation process coordinated by SACEUR. The type and amount of logistic
forces will dramatically affect the actual logistic concept for a NATO operation, and the TOA limitations imposed on contributed forces. This is especially applicable to NEOs where nations significantly influence the logistic concept through their contributions in the force generation process.

0603. **Combat Service Support Considerations**

a. **Forward Mounting Base.** An FMB should:

1. Be capable of handling the aircraft or ships used in the evacuation to include air traffic control and movement control.
2. Have adequate facilities for billeting, messing, and sanitation for the evacuation force and EPs, especially if used as a temporary safe location.
3. Possess aircraft servicing and maintenance capabilities, if required.
4. Have storage facilities and ensure safety and security for perishables, petroleum, oils, and lubricants, medical supplies, and ammunition.
5. Be close to major medical facilities, if possible with suitable HN medical infrastructure.
6. Provide role 1 and role 2 medical support if necessary.
7. Be close enough to the embarkation sites that aircraft or ships used in the evacuation can transit without refuelling.
8. Establish liaison with the HN diplomatic mission and civilian agencies (police, military, and others as required).
9. Have interpreters, if required.
10. Establish contracts for local services and supplies.
11. Have adequate local security.
12. Have sufficient services to support deployed units.

b. **Forward Operating Base.** An FOB is a locality within the operational area from which subsequent operations are projected. Its selection and use is an operational matter for the JFC and component commanders.
c. **Evacuation Control Centre Movement.** The following transportation functions should be considered to ensure an orderly movement at the ECC:

1. Coordinate land, sea, or air transportation for the movement of EPs to a place of safety.
2. Coordinate movement flow of EPs with the reception teams.
3. Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard aircraft, ships, or other vehicles.
4. Maintain a record of all embarked personnel showing destination and identifying information.
5. Expedite the departure of all EPs who are sick, injured, or wounded.

d. **Temporary Safe location.** A temporary safe location should have airfield or port capacities suitable for the aircraft or ships being used, both for the evacuation and later onward movement for the EPs with consideration given to the following factors:

1. Be capable of 24 hour operations at the airfield or seaport.
2. Have HN controllers available to control airfields. Upon HN consent, be prepared to support with additional controllers from the joint force.
3. Be capable of balancing airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing of anticipated airflow.
4. Be capable of handling the total numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation.
5. Have adequate aircraft parking areas.
6. Have adequate length, width, and condition of runways and taxiways.
7. Be capable of airfield SAR, security, aircraft rescue and fire fighting, and logistic support.
8. Have adequate airfield maintenance support.
9. Have sufficient channel and harbour depth.
(10) Have adequate berthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages.

(11) Have the right types and capabilities of tugboats.

(12) Have the capability to load and offload ships, if required.

(13) Have adequate billeting, rations, and potable water for EPs and the temporary safe location force.

0604. **Other Considerations.** Force levels and sustainability criteria will be established during NEO crisis response planning. In many cases, combat service support will have to be deployed by air, placing a premium on available airlift and HNS. A logistic estimate will always be required. Effective logistic support for NEOs relies upon:

a. **Optimal Use of Air Movement Assets.** Payloads must be maximised and strictly prioritised. Especially in a small-scale operation, each flight will have an increased impact on the airflow. Depending on the scale of the NEO, the JFC should consider establishing an Allied movement coordination centre.

b. **Host-Nation Support Availability.** Various intelligence and planning guides may provide an indication of what HNS may be available, if any, from individual nations. However, confirmation of the current level of HNS available will be required during the planning phase. In addition, SACEUR would be able to confirm what HNS arrangements were already in place. Before deploying, or staging the evacuation force into another nation, especially if establishing an FMB, clearances would be required from the HN concerned. Once permission has been granted, detailed coordination of a SOFA, which details the general conditions under which the joint force will operate within the particular nation, plus an MOU, or implementing arrangements, that establishes HNS to the joint force, can begin. The provisions of mutual logistic support with coalition partners and others involve bilateral or multinational arrangements at national foreign ministries, NAC, or SACEUR level.

c. **Contracting Provisions.** An Allied contracting or purchasing officer should be assigned to coordinate services with the HN. Some considerations are as follows:

(1) Billeting would ideally be located within facilities or hotels provided by or contracted from the temporary safe location country. However, the joint force may be required to establish a tented camp. In this event, the temporary safe location force should arrive early enough to
accomplish this before EPs begin arriving. The JFC may consider contracting locally for the labour and sanitation facilities.

(2) Because EPs will normally leave the HN with little or no food, combat rations could be used as a temporary solution. However, the temporary safe location commander should be prepared to establish a food service section to provide meals to Alliance and other nationals involved in the evacuation. Culturally sensitive (i.e., Vegetarian or Halal) rations should be procured if available.

(3) If the climate of the country is substantially different from the EP’s former residence, they may need to be provided adequate clothing and other protection from the elements.

(4) Due to the situation, EPs may have not had the opportunity to pack sufficient personal, comfort, or hygiene items prior to arriving at the embarkation site. NEO forces should be prepared to provide a range of personal hygiene and support items for EP males, females, children and babies such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baby food and juice</th>
<th>Soap and shampoo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baby formula</td>
<td>Toilet paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diapers</td>
<td>Toothpaste and toothbrushes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminine hygiene supplies</td>
<td>Towels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razors</td>
<td>Trash bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheets and blankets</td>
<td>Washing buckets and powder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. **Liaison with other Forces and Organizations.** Liaison should be established with HN, IOs, and NGOs to coordinate logistics issues to the extent practicable.

e. **Multinational Logistics.** In multinational operations, close liaison with the other non-NATO Nations' logistic organizations is required to prevent conflicts of interest and to enable sharing supplies. Agreements between participating nations could offer economies of scale, coverage, and alternative sources of supply not otherwise available. Multinational logistics helps to eliminate competition for scarce resources. NATO resources required must be endorsed by the appropriate committee. For more on logistics, see MC 526, *Logistic Support Concept for NATO Response Force Operations*, and AJP-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*.

f. **Seabasing.** Land, air, or maritime joint force assets may conduct the NEO. The latter has the advantage of being self-contained and not reliant on HNS, which is likely to be in short supply during a NEO. Seabasing has the major
advantages of timely response, a secure environment, operational freedom, and robust CIS.

g. **Environmental Health.** The national situation leading to a NEO is frequently compounded by a breakdown in civil infrastructure, which could pose an environmental health risk to EPs as well as NATO deployed forces. In particular:

1. Obtaining potable water, which may be in short supply, should be evaluated early in the planning process.

2. The communicable disease profile of the country may require specific health protection measures to be taken or advised.

h. **Deceased Evacuees.** Even in a permissive NEO environment, the death of vulnerable EPs such as the elderly, infirm, or infants may be encountered. The decision to evacuate the deceased is dependent on, but not limited to, the specifics of the situation, to include the tactical environment, religions, HN laws, local customs, the wishes of any relatives, weather, health related risk, and capacity of receiving ships and aircraft. Under no circumstances should remains be transferred until all EPs have been safely evacuated.

i. **Finance.** Once a concept of operations is established, the ACO financial controller, in conjunction with the other relevant staff elements, will develop cost estimates and determine the scope and structure of financial management support required for a NEO based on the direction provided at Bi-SC Functional Planning Guide - Financial Management and Contracting Support for Contingency Operations.

j. **Military Engineering (MILENG) support to Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.** The MILENG contribution to the success of a NEO requires involvement of the appropriate capability components during the planning, reconnaissance, execution of, and recovery from such operations. MILENG capabilities that can support a NEO are described in AJP-3.12, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineer Support to Joint Operations*. In particular, MILENG can conduct reconnaissance and advise on evacuation routes, infrastructure in support of evacuation, real-life support functions such as tented camps and water supply, explosive ordnance awareness, environmental considerations including historical and cultural heritage, and geomatics support. MILENG can also assist the evacuation force through support to force protection, as described in AJP-3.14, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection*. MILENG personnel can provide engineering liaison with NGOs, IOs, and national authorities.
ANNEX A

NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area</th>
<th>Political/Diplomatic</th>
<th>Strategic Command</th>
<th>Joint Force&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Evacuation Force (Component)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Will this be a permissive, uncertain, or hostile NEO?</td>
<td>What is the current situation in the country? In the diplomatic mission? Near the EPs?</td>
<td>Who are the key personnel of the various HNs and what are their attitudes toward the NEO?</td>
<td>Will the HN be providing any security for the NEO?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there any sensitive equipment or material that will need to be evacuated or destroyed?</td>
<td></td>
<td>What is the potential threat? Strength? Composition? Disposition? Probable tactics? Weapons available?</td>
<td>What are the security forces': Locations? Unit types and identities? Strengths and capabilities? Liaison arrangements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will NATO personnel with requisite clearances be required to assist in evacuating or destroying sensitive equipment or material?</td>
<td></td>
<td>What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the joint force to avoid confrontation?</td>
<td>What are the HN military forces': Location?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>18</sup>The individual questions may not always be suitable under the functional area identified, but will nonetheless be conducted by the joint force staff.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence (cont)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Who provides country studies for the joint force with information such as concentration of EPs, airfields, helicopter landing sites, port facilities, and landing beaches?</td>
<td>Availability? Capability, discipline, and effectiveness? Loyalty to the HN? Attitude to the NEO?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How will this information be transmitted to the joint force?</td>
<td>What are the HN police forces': Location? Availability? Capability, discipline, and effectiveness? Loyalty to the HN? Attitude to the NEO?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are there any members of the joint force, or anyone else reasonably available, who have been in country recently?</td>
<td>Is factional infighting present?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are map products of the area, including the diplomatic missions available? What are the sources?</td>
<td>What are the HN fire and rescue services': Location? Availability? Capability and effectiveness?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are the characteristics of the country and region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Area</td>
<td>Political/Diplomatic</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>Joint Force&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>What other nations’ forces will be operating in the area and what are their plans?</td>
<td>What is the chain of command for NATO forces?</td>
<td>Have the RCs, evacuation points, ECC, and routes between them been verified and surveyed?</td>
<td>Is there any information needed immediately from the EPs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations (cont)</td>
<td>What steps are being taken by the diplomatic missions to get the EPs ready for evacuation?</td>
<td>What are the appropriate C2 arrangements if the NEO is conducted as a multinational operation?</td>
<td>What is the status of the national communications infrastructure and does NATO have access to it?</td>
<td>When does the evacuation need to begin, how long will it take, and when must it be completed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will interpreter support be available from diplomatic missions or the HN?</td>
<td>Are multinational forces integrated into the NATO NEO plan? How are operations synchronized and harmonized with national and alliance information activities; who takes responsibility for an information strategy?</td>
<td>What is the guidance on the use of PSYOPS?</td>
<td>How will the baggage and personal property of EPs be screened?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will the diplomatic missions close and all staff leave? If not, who will remain?</td>
<td></td>
<td>What is the role of CIMIC?</td>
<td>What is the maximum flow-rate of EPs that can be generated to a place of safety?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Will joint force teams be sent to search for missing EPs? Where are the places of safety, FMBs, and FOBs?</td>
<td>Who will be available to search females and children if required?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Are trained EOD</td>
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A-3
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area</th>
<th>Political/Diplomatic</th>
<th>Strategic Command</th>
<th>Joint Force (Component)</th>
<th>Evacuation Force (Component)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How are national plans being deconflicted if the NEOs are separate?</td>
<td>Will other national plans be executed sequentially or simultaneously with the NATO NEO?</td>
<td>Who will give the JFC permission to terminate the NEO and to withdraw?</td>
<td>What is the role of Strategic Communication and Information Operations?</td>
<td>personnel available?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>What are the arrangements for EP housing, security, and transfer?</td>
<td>Enable availability of non-military resources.</td>
<td>What support is available from other participating nations?</td>
<td>Will transportation assets be available from the diplomatic mission or the HN?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will food, water, protective clothing, or money be required for</td>
<td></td>
<td>What support is required by other participating nations?</td>
<td>Type?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>What is the best means to</td>
<td>Location?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Condition?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional Area</td>
<td>Political/Diplomatic</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>Joint Force&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Evacuation Force (Component)</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics (cont)</td>
<td>them? Type? Quantity? Location?</td>
<td></td>
<td>transport EPs? Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying Allied military assets? Have air requirements for units and equipment been quantified, including special needs such as possible MEDEVAC assets? If appropriate, are maritime assets available? Have all requirements for strategic transportation been requested? What support is available from other Alliance sources? What support is required by other NATO agencies?</td>
<td>Operators required? If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance party?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Area</td>
<td>Political/Diplomatic</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>Joint Force&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Evacuation Force (Component)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will NATO assume medical responsibility for EPs?</td>
<td>At what stage will medical aid be provided to EPs (for example, will the joint force collect ill EPs from their homes with MEDEVAC assets and at what stages of the NEO)? Where will ill EPs be handed over for follow on treatment (direct transport to home countries with military/civilian MEDEVAC assets or the nearest possible treatment facility)? Who will coordinate the necessary follow-on treatment? Who has the authority to hire civilian MEDEVAC assets?</td>
<td>Which EPs have special medical needs or health care problems such as pregnancy, infectious diseases, injuries, disabilities, or paediatric requirements? What is their evacuation priority? What is the general medical and physical condition of all EPs? Who will assess the fitness of EPs for transport by land/sea/air? Will medical support be available from diplomatic missions or</td>
</tr>
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A-6

EDITION A, VERSION 1
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area</th>
<th>Political/Diplomatic</th>
<th>Strategic Command</th>
<th>Joint Force&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Evacuation Force (Component)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical (cont)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans &amp; Policy</td>
<td>What is the total number of EPs to be evacuated?</td>
<td>What ROE are required?</td>
<td>What are the NATO requirements for EP screening?</td>
<td>Have the screening and processing areas of the ECC been verified?</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>What will be the composition of the</td>
<td>Are there any other strategic resources required for the operation?</td>
<td>What ROE are required?</td>
<td>Who will screen the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>operation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional Area</td>
<td>Political/Diplomatic</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>Joint Force&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Evacuation Force (Component)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans &amp; Policy (cont)</td>
<td>EPs? Number of special categories?&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt; Identification? Are there any changes to the categories used to identify EP requirements? Will diplomatic mission representative be able to assign evacuation priorities? What proof of EP citizenship is acceptable? What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of EPs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EPs? Are there diplomatic mission consular staff assigned to screen? Are there any EPs, such as wardens, who will be able to help with processing and screening?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>19</sup> Such as non-ambulatory patients, pregnant women, etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area</th>
<th>Political/Diplomatic</th>
<th>Strategic Command</th>
<th>Joint Force&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Evacuation Force (Component)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Who decides when all EPs have been accounted for prior to terminating the NEO?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication Systems</td>
<td>What CIS support will be available from the diplomatic missions and how will the communication architecture be set up to support the NEO (networks, frequencies, secure equipment availability, relays, etc.)?</td>
<td>Can portable CIS equipment be sent to the diplomatic missions to facilitate improved and secure communication?</td>
<td>Determine what type CIS is required to complete the mission (i.e., email, voice, VTC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>What are the sovereignty aspects of ingress, egress, and staging?</td>
<td>Do SOFAs, MOUs, or other international agreements exist?</td>
<td>What is the legal status of deployed military personnel?</td>
<td>What discipline problems are expected from the EPs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal (cont)</td>
<td>What will be the policy on the use of force?</td>
<td>Have territorial boundaries been identified?</td>
<td>What is the legal position on the use of force?</td>
<td>What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Area</td>
<td>Political/Diplomatic</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>Joint Force 18</td>
<td>Evacuation Force (Component)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is the legal categorisation of the situation in the country?</td>
<td>Are overflight rights required? What are the differences as between TCNs on the use of force? What constraints are imposed by differences in national laws and ROE; SOFAs, and MOUs? Are sea rights of passage required?</td>
<td>How will seized or abandoned EP private property be disposed? What are the national caveats of the TCNs? Is detention authorized?</td>
<td>among EPs? What action is authorised against non-entitled EP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>What are the target audiences, themes, and information objectives for the operation? What Strategic Communications guidance has been issued by NATO HQ?&quot; How will co-ordination</td>
<td>Is there any additional PA guidance from SACEUR? What are the target audiences, themes, and information objectives for the operation?</td>
<td>What are the characteristics of the information systems to include the media system and landscape? Who are the relevant actors and groups and how are they related? What coordination has been made between NATO and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Area</td>
<td>Political/Diplomatic</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>Joint Force</td>
<td>Evacuation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Affairs (cont)</td>
<td>and synchronization of PA and InfoOps be assured?</td>
<td></td>
<td>the international media to support the NEO or the PA plan?</td>
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<td>Will the local media provide support for the NEO or the PA plan?</td>
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<td>Who will prepare the PA plan?</td>
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<td>How often will it be updated?</td>
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<td>Will media representatives be evacuated?</td>
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<td>Are there areas from which the media are restricted access?</td>
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<td>Is there a media support plan?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Considerations</td>
<td>Who is the senior Alliance official in charge of the NEO?</td>
<td>What is the relationship between the NATO force and senior Alliance</td>
<td>Are the diplomatic mission’s evacuation contingency plans available? Are they up</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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EDITION A, VERSION 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area</th>
<th>Political/Diplomatic Considerations (cont)</th>
<th>Strategic Command</th>
<th>Joint Force</th>
<th>Evacuation Force (Component)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who is the primary point of contact within the diplomatic mission to work with NATO on details of the NEO?</td>
<td>official?</td>
<td>to date?</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>What action should be taken if someone asks for political asylum?</td>
<td>What is the legal authority to conduct the NEO in the HN or deploy military forces in the temporary safe location? Is there a SOFA or a Diplomatic note establishing the legal status of the JTF in the HN or in the temporary safe location?</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

A-12
Possible Dilemmas
Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. NATO personnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with the following:
Questions concerning use of weapon systems in a given situation.
Interpretation of the ROE.
Potential chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards, including Toxic Industrial Material (TIM).
Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by NATO.
Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence.
The employment of crowd control techniques including the use of non-lethal weapons.
Terrorism/bomb threats/snipers.
Disabled evacuees.
Language problems.
Socio-cultural problems.
Potential EP’s name not on list provided by the diplomatic mission but appearing to be a bona fide EP.
Deaths of EPs.
Listed EPs or unlisted potential EPs with unknown means of identification.
EPs carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband.
Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to RCs or evacuation points to request evacuation.
Listed EP refusing evacuation.
EP attempting to give bribes to gain favour.
Inaccurate evacuation lists.
Large numbers of international journalists converging on the area.
A potential discrepancy exists between the need to liaise with many agencies involved and the likely requirement to keep military evacuation classified during planning and initial deployment.
ANNEX B

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE CONSIDERATIONS

B01. **General.** The procedures for conducting IPB described in AJP-2.1, *Intelligence Procedures*, may be adapted to support the planning process for NEO. This Annex provides guidelines for conducting IPB in connection with NEO. While this annex only addresses the IPB process, MC 133/4, and the COPD both recognize that intelligence is only one part of the knowledge development process. This process also includes a Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE) which provides a more holistic view of the entire OE.  

B02. **Step 1: Battlespace Area Evaluation.** This step in the IPB process may include the following actions:

a. **Evaluating areas outside the immediate area of operations.**
   
   (1) Determine which countries might shelter EPs or assist the operation.
   
   (2) Determine which countries might hinder the operation.

b. **Evaluating demographic, social, and societal factors.**
   
   (1) Evaluate the demographic situation that has prompted the evacuation.
   
   (2) Evaluate the political, social, economic, legal, and religious situation.
   
   (3) Analyse the population in general.
   
   (4) Analyse the government, armed forces, and security forces in the operational area.
   
   (5) Identify the location of groups that might influence the NEO (focus should be on areas where anti-evacuation sentiment is strongest as well as areas where sympathy for the evacuation is strongest).
   
   (6) Identify languages spoken in the operational area.

---

20 Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE) is a coordinated analytical process to develop an integrated understanding of the main characteristics of the operational environment including its land, air/space, maritime dimensions, as well as the fundamental systems of adversaries, friends, and neutral actors that may influence joint operations. For more on CPOE, see the COPD.
c. **Evaluating legal and political factors.**
   (1) Identify legal issues that may affect the evacuation.
   (2) Identify political factors or issues that may shape own courses of action (COAs).

d. **Identifying and mapping protected, hazardous, and key facilities.**
   (1) Locate and map protected buildings such as hospitals and other medical facilities, buildings and monuments of cultural, religious, or historical importance.
   (2) Locate and map areas that may pose environmental hazards to the operation such as toxic waste dumps, storage sites for hazardous materials, nuclear power plants, and chemical factories.
   (3) Locate and map key facilities such as military installations, police stations, and government buildings.

e. **Evaluating the infrastructure.**
   (1) Identify logistics infrastructure that might support the evacuation.
   (2) Locate suitable sites for reception centres, evacuation points, evacuation control centres, and embarkation sites.
   (3) Identify and evaluate HN fire and rescue services.
   (4) Identify and evaluate CIS systems that can support evacuation operations.
   (5) Identify and evaluate routes that ensure evacuation.
   (6) Identify and evaluate means of transportation for EPs.
   (7) Assess the availability of food and drinking water for EPs.

f. **Terrain analysis.**
   (1) Identify likely locations for ambushes of evacuation vehicles.
(2) Identify infiltration routes and assembly areas for potential attacks on EP assembly and holding points.

(3) Identify areas suited for demonstrations against the NEO.

g. **Weather analysis.**

(1) Analysis of the effects of weather on operations by hostile forces or groups. (For example, insurgents and terrorists may prefer poor weather conditions while casual demonstrators probably would not.).

(2) Analysis of the effect of weather on the NEO.

h. **Map overlays.**

(1) Develop relevant demographic overlays of the HN population.

(2) Develop overlays showing lines of communication (LOC), key facilities and targets, protected areas, hazardous areas and other relevant infrastructure.

(3) Develop weather overlays showing how weather conditions impact on operations in connection with the NEO.

B03. **Step 2: Threat Evaluation.** This step in the IPB process may include the following actions:

a. **General considerations.**

(1) Determine if the NEO is expected to be permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

(2) Determine the operational time constraints and restraints.

b. **Evaluating possible adversary groupings.**

(1) Identify all groups who might intentionally interfere with the evacuation. (These may include: HN law enforcement agencies, military forces, political groups, religious factions, and the general population. Focus should be on hostile groups such as insurgents, terrorists, and radical extremists.)

(2) Identify all groups that might put up spontaneous or unstructured resistance to the evacuation. (These may include groups such as
students, labour unions, demonstrators, rioters, host nation forces, and criminal elements.)

(3) Analyze the order-of-battle for each potentially hostile group.

(a) Identify their goals and objectives as well as how these goals and objectives may impact on the NEO.

(b) Identify areas where hostile groups live and gather in relation to evacuation objectives. Focus should be on neighbourhoods near the embassies of nations participating in the NEO, areas where evacuees live and work, including businesses owned or operated by evacuees.

(c) Determine the size, organization, equipment, and armaments of these groupings.

(4) Evaluation of tactics for each potentially hostile group.

(a) Determine resistance methods and techniques that these groups could employ against the evacuation (These may include attacks, raids, ambushes, sniping, bombings, hijackings, hostage taking, kidnappings, and demonstrations. Focus should be on how these groups could interfere with the evacuation.)

(b) Determine desired effects in the information environment and likely information activities (Focus should be on the coordinated use of media operations, PSYOPS and other capabilities aimed at local and international audiences.)

(c) Identify and evaluating support functions for groups that would interfere with the evacuation such as planning, weapons, ammunition, food, water, shelter, training, or command and control.

(d) Evaluate threat control of the local infrastructure such as control of workers or labour groups.

c. Threat evaluation tools.

(1) Create a coordinated register to record possible hostile and adverse activities around key routes, evacuation sites, and installations used by forces and nations participating in the NEO.
(2) Develop an intelligence workbook and order-of-battle database to record information about potentially hostile and adverse groups.

(3) Create a link analysis (activities and association matrices) to identify which individuals are actively interfering with the NEO, to include when and where.

(4) Create map overlays of LOC, key facilities and targets to determine where interference might occur.

B04 Step 3: Determine Threat Courses of Action. This step in the IPB process may include the following actions:

a. Development of threat COA.

(1) Determine threat COAs that may interfere with the NEO at each likely interference site based on the key facilities and target overlays used to identify the most likely points of interference with the evacuation. (Examples include terrorist actions, ambushes, delays at checkpoints, demonstrations, sniping, and raids on evacuation sites) (Alternate routes or COAs at these points should also be identified.)

(2) Determine possible threat activities against the logistics infrastructure, such as sabotage, disruption of services by workers and labour groups.

(3) Determine possible unstructured or unplanned interferences, such as riots, criminal activity, or arson.

(4) Determine possible support activities for threat groups that could indicate intent to interfere with the evacuation.

b. Overlays and other tools.

(1) Situation overlays or “concepts of operation” should be produced for each possible COA available to hostile groups that could interfere with the operation.

(2) An event overlay or “indications and warning board” should be produced to support the production of the intelligence collection plan and assist in identifying the intended threat COA.
(3) A decision support overlay or matrix should be developed and updated in close cooperation with the operations staff.

c. **Wargaming.** The entire staff participates in the wargaming process. When possible, the intelligence staff should play the part of all groupings, the intentionally hostile or adverse groups as well as the spontaneous or non-political groups, which could possibly interfere with the NEO.
NOTIONAL DIPLOMATIC MISSION EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLAN CONTENTS

C01. Most diplomatic missions maintain an evacuation contingency plan in some form or another. Information that may be included within these plans is highlighted in this annex.

C02. General

   a. The diplomatic mission officials in charge of the evacuation.
   b. Diplomatic mission officials remaining behind—to include names and means of contacting.
   c. Diplomatic mission officials available to process and evacuate EPs.
   d. The number of stations conducting screening of EPs and who is available to assist the forces.
   e. Whether the NEO environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
   f. Potential security requirements at the reception centres, evacuation points, and embarkation sites.
   g. Security the host government or controlling authority may provide.
   h. The location of alternate reception, evacuation, or embarkation sites, if required.
   i. The likelihood of unauthorized persons forcibly attempting to join the evacuation.
   j. What actions may be required if someone asks for political asylum.
   l. Who conducts searches of women?
   m. The number of meals required.
n. The potable water available and the quantity of bottled water required.

o. If the diplomatic missions anticipate that any nationals will decline evacuation. See Annex H for a sample waiver of evacuation.

p. The policy on EPs taking pets.

q. If joint force personnel will be needed to assist in searching for missing EPs.

r. Whether or not a search operation is likely to meet armed resistance.

s. Any assistance that may be required in destroying sensitive materials or equipment.

t. Whether portable communication devices are available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of EPs.

u. Who will prepare EP manifests?

v. Other items that may affect the NEO such as:

   (1) Travel restrictions, curfews, and roadblocks.

   (2) Local military activities.

   (3) Political or security factors affecting evacuation.

   (4) PA considerations.

w. The ability to provide interpreters, if required.

x. The estimated number of EPs who are wounded, injured, ill, or pregnant.

y. Medical assistance (to include special equipment) that may be required.

z. A breakdown of EPs by age and sex:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0-7 yrs</th>
<th>8-16 yrs</th>
<th>17-59 yrs</th>
<th>60+ yrs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

aa. Known doctor(s) and nurse(s) among the EPs.
bb. Any influential religious or community leaders among the EPs.

c. The weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation.

dd. An intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status.

C03. **Reception Centre**

a. Location.

b. Grid coordinates.

c. Reference points.

d. Size and estimated capacity.

e. Shelter available/required.

f. Cooking facilities and water available.

g. Food stocks available.

h. Lavatories and showers available.

i. Security requirements.

j. Control points.

k. Telephone numbers and radio call signs.

l. Potential access choke points.

m. Nearest police station.

n. Nearest medical facility to include its capability and capacity.

o. Emergency power supplies.

p. Distance to the ECC.

q. Any LZs/assault strips identified.
C04. Helicopter Landing Zones. Should be in accordance with the Helicopter Landing Site Report format prescribed in ATP-49, Volume II, *Use of Helicopters In Land Operations – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Annex A to chapter 3. The Remarks section should include additional information specific to the NEO such as the distance(s) to the reception centre(s).

C05. Airfield Surveys.

a. Name of airfield.
b. Location (map coordinates).
c. Fuel (type and availability).
d. Material handling equipment.
e. Elevation.
f. Runway length.
g. Runway width.
h. Taxiway/manoeuvring area dimensions.
i. Surface composition and estimated single wheel load factor.
j. Available parking areas.
k. Largest aircraft accommodated.
l. Instrument approach facilities; navigation aids.
m. Aircraft obstacles.
n. Airfield lighting (approach, runway, taxiway, apron, obstacles).
o. Communications (frequencies, call signs used).
p. Physical security.
q. Whether the airfield is under civilian or military control.
r. The status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue.
s. If the airfields meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for signs, markings, and other applicable requirements.

t. The availability of certified air traffic controllers.

u. Availability of aeronautical information service and weather support.

v. Key contacts.

w. Distance from ECC to airport.

x. Condition of roads leading to airport.

y. Conditions, weight limits, and other characteristics of bridges and tunnels leading to airports.

z. ECC capacity.

aa. Lavatories and shower facilities.

bb. Feeding facilities and capacities.

cc. Aircraft rescue and fire fighting.

dd. Capability for continuous operations.

ee. ICAO identifier.


gg. Location of nearest medical facility.

hh. Facilities for safe and secure storage of ammunition of armed aircraft.

C06. **Seaport Surveys.**

a. Name of seaport.

b. Location (map coordinates).

c. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage.

d. Channel depth, depending on season.
e. Tides, depending on season.
f. Pilots required or available.
g. Navigational aids.
h. Port or beach obstacles.
i. Wharves (description and capabilities).
j. Material handling equipment.
k. Fuel (type and availability).
l. Physical security available and in use.
m. Distance from ECC to seaport.
n. Conditions of roads leading to the seaport.
o. Condition and weight limit of bridges leading to seaport.
p. On-site embarkation sites and capacities.
q. Dining facilities and capacity.
r. Lavatories and shower facilities.
s. Location of nearest medical facility to include its capability and capacity.
t. Key contacts, key personnel.
ANNEX D

FORWARD MOUNTING BASES
AND TEMPORARY SAFE LOCATIONS

D01. **Introduction.** Depending on the distances involved, an FMB may be established to provide a stepping stone from which the joint force could launch a NEO. Additionally, adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from the embarkation sites to their final destination. If this is the case, a temporary safe location may need to be established to facilitate the onward movement of EPs. The JFC is responsible for all military phases of a NEO to include operations at the FMB and temporary safe location (if located within the area of operations or JOA). An FMB or temporary safe location outside the operational area normally falls under the responsibility of SACEUR. The joint force is responsible for support and transportation of the evacuees to places of safety outside the operational area. The JFC may organize elements of assigned and attached forces as necessary to accomplish the missions inherent in the evacuation operation. Under ideal conditions, FMBs and places of safety would be located within an Alliance Nation.

D02. **Forward Mounting Base**

a. Utilising an FMB during deployment provides the joint force many advantages over deploying directly from the home station. The FMB may be located in another country close to where the NEO is taking place or may be aboard a ship under Allied control. The FMB becomes more important as the distance from the home station and the likelihood of hostilities increase. When an FMB is located in a country outside the Alliance, the NAC is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country. If the FMB is an established NATO base, using the FMB as a staging point for launching Alliance forces into a non-Alliance country may pose political problems. Since FMBs are typically located at airfields or seaports, SACEUR needs to be made aware of timely information related to facilities and sites being considered as likely FMBs.

b. Ideally, the FMB could also function as a temporary safe location, if one is required. The FMB may also serve as an airfield for support forces, such as additional airlift for unforeseen movement requirements, a medical treatment facility, or combat forces in the event that a forced entry becomes necessary.

c. Advantages of utilizing an FMB:

(1) The joint force staff can gather further intelligence.
(2) The evacuation force component can conduct rehearsals and briefings.

(3) Units have the opportunity to redistribute and finalize loads.

(4) Personnel can recuperate after a long trip from their deploying base.

(5) A reaction force or additional security personnel can pre-stage for contingency operations.

(6) It can function as the temporary safe location for the NEO.

d. An FMB should meet the following criteria:

(1) Possess effective CIS with the evacuation force component, SACEUR, the joint force advance HQ, the ECC, the temporary safe location, and the diplomatic missions at the FMB and NEO HN.

(2) Be located to provide maximum possible operational security.

(3) Have adequate local and area security forces to protect Allied personnel and equipment. This protection could be accomplished either by the HN or by security forces from the deployed FMB support element.

e. An FMB should be selected in a timely manner.

f. The composition of an FMB force depends on what support is required and what is already on site at the FMB. An FMB at an established, modern facility requires substantially less than one at a lesser-developed location.

g. Force sequencing is the phased introduction of Allied forces into and out of the operational area. Force sequencing provides the JFC with the option to provide a flexible and rapid response to a NEO through employment of forward-deployed NEO evacuation forces, which may form the nucleus for a larger tailored force to be deployed from an FMB. Effective force sequencing requires detailed knowledge of available Allied military and multinational capabilities.

D03. **Temporary Safe Location.** If a temporary safe location is required, the national foreign ministries coordinate with the government where it will be located.
a. A temporary safe location, designated by the national foreign ministries and controlled by the joint force, is a location in an area or country to which EPs may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe location would be in an Alliance nation. On occasion, an intermediate safe location, such as a NATO ship or seasead element, may be used for a limited period of time. In such a case, EPs should be removed from the ship to land-based places of safety as quickly as possible. Facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting must be coordinated. A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security and may consist of command groups, reception teams, processing teams, comfort teams, scheduling teams, and security teams. Although the temporary safe location operates under the authority of the host government, it may not have the goodwill of the local population and may be vulnerable to terrorism and riots. The JFC should plan for such situations and posture the forces to protect the EPs and Alliance personnel. The following factors should be considered when selecting a site:

1. Operational security before and during the NEO to enhance the likelihood of mission success and prevent undue pressure against the temporary safe location government.

2. The capability to communicate with the ECC, joint force HQ, evacuation force, and local diplomatic missions.

3. Climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic considerations.

4. The proximity to major transportation hubs.

b. **Organization and Functions.** The temporary safe location force, organized similarly to the ECC processing section, operates under the control of the joint force. It should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, combat service support requirements to support a large number of EPs may require that it deploy earlier. A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may consist of the following elements:

1. **Command Group.** The command group coordinates the overall operation and may consist of a commander, executive officer, staff non-commissioned officers, CIS officer, LOs, religious ministry teams, and interpreters. The LOs and interpreters maintain contact with the diplomatic missions and the host government. The command group is responsible for the following:
(a) Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the temporary safe location.

(b) Maintains liaison with local representatives of the national foreign ministries and other agencies that may be involved with the NEO.

(c) Advises the JFC on the progress of the temporary safe location operations.

(d) Establishes procedures for government officials and other evacuees if not previously established by the joint force.

(e) If required, establishes special provisions for searching women and children as well as disabled and injured persons.

(2) **Reception Team.** This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section.

(a) **Briefing Section.** This section should brief the EPs upon their arrival concerning the following:

1. Current political situation in the HN.
2. Description and operation of the temporary safe location.
3. Further travelling options and arrangements.
4. Customs requirements in the temporary safe location, if any.
5. Projected departure times for flights to their final destination.

(b) **Public Affairs Section.** The PAO, working with the HN diplomatic mission personnel, releases information to the media. However, release of information on the NEO or temporary safe location operations within each country is the responsibility of the Alliance HOMs. The temporary safe location PAO has the same responsibilities as the joint force PAO. Temporary safe location PAO responsibilities are as follows:
1 Advise the temporary safe location commander on all aspects of PA.

2 Coordinate and supervise all PA and command information functions, to include planning and production of bulletins, newsletters, and other information media.

3 Keep the joint force PAO advised on all aspects of PA.

4 Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe location and its operations to the news media in accordance with joint force policies.

5 Escort civilian and military news media representatives.

6 Ensure that the news media are restricted from EP billeting areas.

7 Ensure that interviews of joint force personnel and EPs are held only with the permission of the JFC and the individuals concerned.

8 Determine and disseminate joint force guidance on the release of information to the public.

(3) **Processing Team.** This team consists of an administrative section, transportation section, intelligence section, and medical section. The processing team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC, but should verify that all information obtained from the EPs is complete and correct.

(a) **Administrative Section.** This section documents and accounts for all EPs and ensures that all information required by the national foreign ministries or the joint force has been collected. The administrative section should have legal personnel available to advise EPs on claims procedures and assist in relations between EPs, safe location personnel, and HN nationals. The following should be accomplished:

1 Receive and document incoming EPs in conjunction with national foreign ministry representatives.

2 Maintain a record of each EP who passes through the temporary safe location. It should list the nationality,
date of birth, profession, destination, and name, address, or phone number of a family representative at their final destination for notification.

3 Provide escorts for groups of personnel. Very important persons (VIPs) and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides if available.

4 Provide for safekeeping and security of valuables while EPs wait for onward transportation to their final destination.

5 Provide assistance in locating separated family members, as needed.

(b) **Transportation Section.** The transportation section is responsible to assist in the onward movement of EPs to their final destination. Specific tasks include coordinating land, sea, and air transportation of EPs out of the HN, coordinating the movement flow of EPs with the ECC and RCs, and providing loading control persons to supervise the loading of EPs aboard vehicles, ships, or aircraft.

(c) **Intelligence Section.** This section may debrief EPs that were not debriefed at the ECC, if necessary. If the temporary safe location is also acting as an FMB, intelligence personnel should arrange to pass information gained from EPs to those Alliance forces that are returning to a threat area for follow-on operations. Information should also be reported to the joint force intelligence centre.

(d) **Medical Section.** The medical section provides support to the temporary safe location force. Additionally, this section may conduct EP medical screening if this was not accomplished at the ECC.

(4) **Comfort Team.** This team provides logistic support for the temporary safe location. It is responsible for supplies, billeting, sanitation facilities, food, water, general welfare, religious support, and local transportation. See para 0604 c, for additional details.

(5) **Scheduling Team.** This team coordinates and plans the departure of EPs from the temporary safe location. The scheduling team should accomplish the following:
(a) Coordinate with the transportation section for arrangements made for leaving the temporary safe location.

(b) Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the points of embarkation.

(c) Manifest authorized passengers aboard military or commercial flights.

(6) **Security Team.** This team provides, or arranges for, adequate security at the temporary safe location site.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
ANNEX E

EVACUEE PROCESSING

E01. Introduction. The national foreign ministries establish an ECC, which conducts processing, screening, and selected logistic functions associated with an emergency evacuation of non-combatants. However, the joint force should be prepared to perform functions that are national foreign ministry responsibilities, if required. The number of EPs, the evacuation environment, and the evacuation area location will determine the size and composition of the ECC. The nature of the emergency causing the evacuation is of primary importance; it may be a natural, political, or military.

E02. Reception Centres

a. Characteristics. RCs should be accessible, recognisable, secure, and close to EP communities. They should be familiar to EPs and easy for civilians to find at night and under difficult circumstances. The location and significant aspects of each RC are normally specified in the diplomatic mission’s evacuation contingency plans. Under ideal conditions, RCs should be capable of accommodating EPs for a few days if necessary.

b. Responsibilities. The diplomatic missions are responsible for selecting RCs, normally after considering NATO military advice. The HOMs are responsible for ensuring their EPs know where the nearest RC is and how long it will remain open.

c. Activities. When called forward by the HOMs, EPs make their own way to their allocated RC where national representatives gather them, assisted by diplomatic personnel. The national representatives should have a nominal record of those members of their national community that are expected to report to the RC. At a pre-arranged time, or on call, the national representatives will close the RCs and escort the EPs to the nearest evacuation point, using the EPs own transport or transport arranged by the diplomatic missions. Depending on the situation, (although not a military responsibility) it may be necessary for Allied forces to escort the EPs from RCs to the evacuation points to ensure safe passage.

E03. Evacuation Points

a. Characteristics. Evacuation points should be defendable and offer road access, parking, an airstrip or helipad (if aircraft are to be used), a
beach/slipway /jetty (if boats are to be used), shelter, and security. They should also be situated as close to the RCs as possible.

b. **Responsibilities.** The diplomatic missions are responsible for selecting the evacuation points, normally after considering military advice. The joint force is responsible for evacuation point security and for EP security from their arrival at the evacuation points until their delivery at the ECC, where responsibility for their onward movement reverts to the national foreign ministries. While it is likely that an RC could be collocated with each evacuation point, this might alter the functional division of responsibilities.

c. **Activities.** Under the security of the joint force, EPs are transported from the evacuation points to the ECC. Once all EPs have been safely re-located, operations at the evacuation points are terminated and the evacuation point parties assist the registration station at the ECC.

E04. **Evacuation Control Centre**

a. **Characteristics.** The primary purpose of the ECC is to organise the onward movement of the EPs to a place of safety. It also provides a screening facility to ensure that only entitled evacuees are moved and will have the administrative arrangements needed for providing adequate medical and logistic support. It must be of sufficient size to handle the expected number of EPs, offer shelter and basic sanitation facilities, and enable conducting the functions described below.

b. **Location.** The location of the ECC will be determined by the specific circumstances of the NEO. However, it is most likely to be located at a secure port or airport in an area where the urgency of the evacuation will not be compromised by the screening process. The ECC could be collocated with an FMB and could be located in the country being evacuated or situated in another country. Some advantages and disadvantages of each of these options are:

1. **In Another Country.** The main advantages of situating the ECC in another country are security, greater chance of receiving HNS, and ease of administration, especially for the national foreign ministries. The main disadvantage is the danger of inadvertently evacuating non-entitled persons into a country that subsequently refuses to accept them.

2. **In the Country Being Evacuated.** The main advantages of situating the ECC in the HN are that the inadvertent evacuation of non-entitled personnel can be largely avoided and logistics are potentially easier.
(3) **Afloat.** Many of the functions of the ECC could be accomplished at a sea base. However, if processed at sea, EPs would probably need to be sent ashore before further onward movement as arranged by the national foreign ministries. Sea basing may be necessary where there is no suitable land location for an ECC or in a NEO with small numbers of EPs. Increased force protection and easier administration are other advantages when the ECC is sea based.

(4) **At a Forward Mounting Base.** The main advantage of collocating the ECC with an FMB is economy of effort. Clear divisions of responsibility and functions must be established. The disadvantage is that while an HN government may be willing to support an ECC controlled by civilian officials on humanitarian grounds it may be more reluctant to support a base from which NATO military operations are being launched into neighbouring countries.

c. **Procedures During Processing.** Should the situation on land preclude the use of an in-country ECC, evacuees may be processed aboard ship. If it is an Alliance ship, responsibility for processing EPs may rest with the ship’s commanding officer. At an air terminal, port, or beach, EP processing should be located within a building, tent, or other appropriate place to provide shelter and safety to the evacuees. The area should be staffed with security, interpreters, diplomatic mission personnel, support liaison, and medical personnel. The following procedures should be considered:

1. Use military police when available.

2. Use easily recognizable, such as NATO, markings on Alliance personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

3. Assist in disarming EPs prior to evacuation processing.

4. In coordination with the HOMs, establish a policy concerning the joint force responsibility to secure EP valuables during processing, if any.

5. Assist in providing interpreters for bilingual communications.

6. Upon initial screen, use tags for visual identification. Assist in identification and enrolment of EP,s with SOF Units (TEO teams) when available.

7. Assist in establishing provisions for searching women, children, and the disabled or injured. To conduct searches, use national foreign ministry personnel of the same sex as EPs.
(8) Have medical personnel on hand to assist the diplomatic missions.

(9) Assist in establishing procedures for VIPs.

(10) Assist in organizing EPs to ensure the following:

(a) Establishing a single point of contact between the EP groups and the joint force.

(b) Contacting civil officials to increase control and response for the evacuation.

(11) Request additional diplomatic license plates for use by joint force personnel during the NEO.

(12) Determine if EOD personnel are required.

(13) Determine if CBRN screening and decontamination teams are required.

d. **Minimum Processing Requirements.** Minimum processing requirements are used in those time-sensitive instances when there is also a concern for the protection and safety of EPs and the joint force. The procedures used normally meet the following guidelines:

(1) Prior to implementing the NEO, the HOMs and the JFC should agree on procedures for minimum evacuee processing.

(2) Security of joint force personnel and equipment will not be compromised to expedite processing.

(3) Processing persons with life threatening medical problems is expedited.

(4) All evacuees are screened with identity and documentation verified.

e. **Responsibilities.** The national foreign ministries are responsible for establishing and running the ECC, which may impact the location of an FMB. The national foreign ministries are also responsible for screening potential EPs and establishing an order of evacuation, if necessary. Coordinating the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation and billeting is normally a national foreign ministry responsibility. The national foreign ministries may ask the joint force to provide security, administrative, and
logistic support to the ECC. The primary duties of the joint force include controlling military transportation arriving from the evacuation points with EPs, disembarking EPs, assisting in maintaining order in the ECC, and supporting national foreign ministry’s efforts to care for evacuees. The JFC may allocate responsibility for the military aspects of the ECC to the evacuation force commander or to another joint force component as conditions warrant. Should the ECC be located aboard an Alliance ship, responsibility for processing evacuees may rest with the ship’s commanding officer.

f. Factors. When the national foreign ministries establish an ECC, a number of factors are normally considered:

1. Has a lead diplomatic mission or missions been arranged? If a lead diplomatic mission has not been arranged, the decision as to whether or not to do so must be made early in the planning process.

2. The origin and numbers of the national foreign ministries staff to perform the ECC functions.

3. Any requirements for multinational coordination at the ECC.

4. When situated in another country, the willingness of the HN to host the EPs.

5. Logistics support available, including accommodations and airline availability.


7. Military advice on the ECC location, if required.

g. Processing Operations. The three guiding principles for any ECC are accuracy — everyone who should be accounted for is accounted for; security — EPs and the joint force are safeguarded from all threats; and speed — processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently. As the marshalling teams bring the EPs to the ECC, the processing centre assumes control of the evacuees. The purpose is to prepare the EPs for eventual movement to a temporary safe location. All evacuees should be screened to certify identification and to ensure that documentation is accurate and all information provided is current. Representatives from the diplomatic mission’s consular offices should be in the ECC to determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees. If evacuees arrive without an escort, processing personnel should verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation prior to
allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. The processing centre performs
the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions
to ensure an orderly evacuation. Joint force processing centre support
usually consists of the following:

(1) **Headquarters Section.** The HQ section responsibilities are as follows:

(a) Plans, organizes, and supervises military support for the ECC.

(b) Maintains liaison with local representatives of the national
foreign ministries and other agencies involved in the evacuation.

(c) Advises the JFC and evacuation force commander on the
progress of the evacuation.

(d) Maintains CIS with all elements of the evacuation force to
include ships, control aircraft, remote sites, evacuation
vehicles, diplomatic mission personnel, HN security forces, and
the ECC.

(2) **Reception and Search Station.** The reception station personnel
assist in collecting all available information from the marshalling
teams who escort the evacuees. Information from the marshalling
team’s logbook may be valuable because it could reduce the
processing time. The evacuees should be moved into a holding area
where the following should be accomplished:

(a) Assist diplomatic mission representatives in receiving,
searching, segregating, and briefing incoming evacuees.
Senior officials should give the initial briefing to ease any fears
about the evacuation process. This briefing may include:

1. A summary of the reasons for the evacuation.
2. Stations through which the evacuees will process.
3. The reason for inspecting personnel and baggage.
4. What support to expect at the temporary safe location.
5. What to expect upon arrival at their final destination.
6 An amnesty opportunity for any restricted items.

(b) Assist in organizing evacuees into groups (maintaining family integrity where possible). Assist in maintaining a record of each EP, with nationality, date of birth, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a point of contact at the final destination.

(c) Assist in providing escorts for groups of personnel going through the processing centre. VIPs and emergency medical cases should be individually escorted, as required.

(d) Assist in inspecting for restricted items. Each EP and all baggage should be inspected at the conclusion of the briefing. Areas used for individual inspections should also be screened. Hand-held metal detectors can expedite these inspections. All restricted items should be confiscated.

1 All weapons, excluding those of official Allied personnel, should be impounded and receipts issued to the owners. Diplomatic mission officials should be consulted about the disposition of these weapons.

2 The persons, property, papers, and families of HOMs are exempt from search under any circumstances without specific direction from the NAC. However, personal baggage may be screened in accordance with standard airport security measures.

3 The persons, baggage, and papers of other accredited diplomats (other than HOMs) are also exempt from search. Personal baggage may be screened in accordance with standard airport security measures. All searches should be conducted in the presence of the diplomats or their authorized agents.

4 Diplomatic pouches are not searched.

5 Based on reasonable belief, the evacuation force commander may refuse to evacuate any baggage suspected of containing weapons or explosives on military aircraft.
(e) Evacuees suspected of being adversary agents or criminals should be separated and escorted to the screening station. This screening should be a prerequisite to evacuation. This process should remain, when feasible, a national responsibility. At the conclusion of the screening, the evacuees will be allowed to continue the processing, released, or placed in a holding area, if possible under the responsibility of the HN. The joint force may be requested to provide assistance in maintaining and providing security of the holding area.

(f) Female military members should be part of the reception and search station to assist in searching female EPs, as required.

3 Registration Station. Personnel should complete all administrative paperwork prior to leaving the country. Nationals, other than EPs, must either be on the list of potential evacuees provided by the diplomatic missions, or obtain approval from the appropriate HOMs before they can continue processing. The HOM or designated national foreign ministry representative will be the final authority on acceptability of evacuee identification. If there are doubts about a person's identity, the matter should be turned over to the national foreign ministry. Registration station personnel should ensure that other nationals are supervised until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the ECC. Military police should be available to react to any incidents. (See Annex H for an example of a registration form)

Each evacuee should be able to accomplish the following:

(a) Prove identity by using passports, identification cards, seaman's papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes citizenship.

(b) Provide information to the registration clerks concerning background and personal history. Provide points of contact and addresses at the final destination nation. All critical information should be documented on forms, to include personal data, health, and citizenship status. The original document remains at the ECC while copies may be used as boarding passes for evacuation transportation and for in processing at the temporary safe location.

(c) The names of all registered EPs should be continually shared with all nations involved in the NEO to assist each diplomatic mission in accounting for its citizens.
(4) **Debriefing Station.** This station is optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the evacuation. Evacuees may be debriefed, on a voluntary basis, to obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, its mission, the EPs, or other Allied activities in the country. Preferably the debriefers should include personnel from both the national foreign ministries and the joint force. Areas of interest might include the following:

(a) Locations of other potential EPs.

(b) Changes in the political situation.

(c) Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties that might oppose the evacuation.

(d) The true intent of a threatening third party. Consider the following:

1. Capability and likelihood of carrying out a threat.
2. Can the third party be influenced?
3. Can the potential threat be stopped or countered?
4. Any other information that would improve the situational awareness of the joint force.

(5) **Medical Station.** The medical station assists in providing emergency medical treatment and any immunizations that may be required by the temporary safe location country. As required, injured or ill EPs may proceed through the medical station for first aid and to identify medical conditions that may affect the evacuation process. Serious medical cases should receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer should ensure that any seriously ill, injured, or wounded persons complete processing. Medical personnel should:

(a) Assist in screening to determine if an EP requires emergency medical treatment or evacuation.

(b) Perform emergency treatment as required, including the capability to treat infants, pregnant women, and the elderly.

(c) Assist in isolating persons infected with contagious diseases.
(6) **Transportation Station.** Transportation personnel help prepare each group of EPs for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles. Some considerations are as follows:

(a) Coordinate surface or air transportation to include movement of personnel to the embarkation area, transportation of EPs to designated aircraft or landing craft, and internal embarkation site requirements.

(b) Provide loading control personnel to assist in supervising personnel if boarding military vehicles, aircraft, or landing craft.

(c) Help maintain a record of all embarked personnel showing destination and other identifying information.

(d) Assist in organizing EPs into transportation groups, issuing boarding passes for aircraft, and verifying baggage tags.

(e) Helping to ensure that information on the passenger manifest agrees with information provided on the EP list.

(f) Helping to ensure sufficient transportation assets to transport evacuees and their baggage to the point of embarkation.

(7) **Comfort Station.** The comfort station is a temporary waiting area for EPs until they board evacuation transportation. Comfort station personnel should make the EPs stay as untroubled as possible and provide some degree of privacy. Some considerations are as follows:

(a) Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies.

(b) Sufficient sanitation facilities.

(c) Senior personnel and medical personnel and assistants available to council evacuees, especially families with young children.

(d) Male and female personal items.

(e) If at all possible, a means of communication (telephone, e-mail, TELEFAX, Red Cross/Crescent Diamond) should be included in the comfort station.
(f) Provide sufficient protection for women and children, especially for those families where only mothers are present during the evacuation operation.

E05. **Embarkation Sites.** An embarkation site may be a seaport or airport or other site where EPs embark onto transport to depart the HN.

a. Embarkation is the final movement of the EPs from the threatened area to a temporary safe location. From the point of view of the embarkation site, EPs are passengers.

b. The main responsibilities of the embarkation site personnel are as follows:

1. Assist in movement planning and management, including producing passenger manifests.


3. Assist in coordinating and integrating the embarkation sites with terminal operations, both those operated external to the joint force (such as an HN civil airport) and those conducted by the joint force (such as an expedient beach terminal operated by the maritime component).

4. Assist in providing passenger services, such as ticketing, baggage services, and coordinating special provisions and arrangements.

c. The embarkation site, with its associated terminal activities, has many additional considerations. It is vital that planners arrive at a sound estimate of the throughput rate of each facility, such as the number of trips that could be made from the embarkation site to the temporary safe location in a given period by a single transportation platform. Factors include:

1. The embarkation time for each EP manifest.

2. The distance and transit time from the embarkation site to the temporary safe location.

3. The turnaround time at the temporary safe location (based on disembarkation of passengers and baggage, refuelling and replenishment, maintenance, and crew changes, etc.).

4. The distance and transit time from the temporary safe location back to the embarkation site.
ANNEX F

EVACUATION FORCE ORGANIZATION AND MISSIONS

F01. The evacuation force that physically executes a NEO is normally drawn from a component command. The evacuation force normally consists of a FCE, an administrative element, a marshalling element, a security element, a combat service support element, and a communications element.

F02. **Forward Command Element.** As early as possible in the planning, the designated component evacuation force forms a FCE and requests permission to send it to the site of the operation. Deployment of the FCE depends on the mission, potential adversaries, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and political considerations. The least conspicuous method is for the FCE to arrive in the HN in civilian clothes on commercial aircraft (Subject to international law and national policies). This may be accomplished only if the necessary passport and visa arrangements can be made and the environment is permissive. An uncertain or hostile environment may require forced entry.

a. The FCE may consist of two elements: a small command section and an evacuation point party. In a permissive or uncertain environment, the FCE should be inserted before any evacuation point parties. In a hostile environment, the HOM’s decision will probably be to insert the entire NEO force to immediately commence the operation. The FCE coordinates with in-country diplomatic mission personnel and HN authorities and, if not already established by the joint force advance HQ, establishes a communication link between the joint force and SACEUR. The evacuation point party conducts reconnaissance to determine and establish evacuation points and assist in establishing RCs.

b. During NEO planning, the following FCE tasks should be addressed:

   (1) Ensure permission for the FCE to enter the country has been arranged through the national foreign ministries. Recommend the number of FCE members authorised and propose the insertion method.

   (2) Deploy as soon as possible, and in advance of the evacuation force, to allow maximum time for coordination and determining external support requirements.

   (3) Develop a CIS plan for the FCE.
(4) Acquire and review appropriate maps.

(5) Review the diplomatic mission’s evacuation contingency plans.

(6) Assemble and inspect required equipment.

(7) Develop and brief an escape and evasion plan for the FCE.

(8) Obtain visas for all members of the FCE.

(9) Determine whether the FCE should deploy in civilian clothes.

(10) Consider weapon and ammunition requirements based on the threat assessment.

(11) Examine the need for specialized equipment such as ordnance to assist diplomatic mission officials in destroying classified equipment and documents or satellite CIS systems to establish requisite CIS.

(12) Determine the medical requirements.

(13) Identify translator and linguistic requirements.

(14) Request overflight and landing rights for appropriate countries.

F03. **Evacuation Point Party.** The evacuation point party identifies and, where possible, establishes the evacuation points and assists the diplomatic missions in establishing RCs, the ECC site, and embarkation sites. When the evacuation force enters the country and the evacuation commences, the evacuation point party becomes the military operations centre or section of the ECC.

a. **Evacuation Point Party Composition.** The evacuation force determines the composition of the evacuation point party; however, the HOMs may desire to minimize its size. Figure F-1 shows a notional evacuation point party.

**NOTIONAL EVACUATION POINT PARTY**
Figure F-1. Notional Evacuation Point Party

b. Evacuation Point Party Tasks

(1) Assist the diplomatic missions in planning, organizing, and establishing the ECC in preparation for the main evacuation body.

(2) Provide direct liaison with the diplomatic mission consular offices.

(3) Maintain liaison with civilian and HN government agencies involved in the evacuation.

(4) Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed RCs, evacuation points, beaches, helicopter landing zones (HLZs), and drop zones (DZs), airports, and ports; obtaining photographs, where possible. Ensure that aircraft configurations are considered, and that the air officer is aware of the requirements of potential pickup and delivery sites.

(5) Recommend or confirm RCs, evacuation points, HLZs and DZs, and embarkation sites. If an RC must be relocated, coordinate and obtain concurrence of the HOM.

(6) Prepare initial evacuation point defensive plan and evacuation security requirements.

(7) Plan and coordinate emergency MEDEVAC operations for evacuees with serious medical problems.

(8) Coordinate operations of the RCs and evacuation points with diplomatic mission representatives.

(9) Conduct initial preparation of evacuation points to clear minor obstacles. Assist the diplomatic missions in planning and organizing RCs, and plan for the possibility of providing initial terminal guidance at beaches and HLZs and DZs.

(10) Collect essential planning information including assessing potential hostage threats, determining the number, categories, and medical status of evacuees, and any known political constraints.

(11) Assist diplomatic mission personnel with handling news media.

(12) Establish and maintain CIS with the joint force advance HQ, if deployed, and diplomatic missions.
(13) Coordinate any additional security requirements the HN police may be able to provide.

(14) During permissive NEOs, assist in coordinating overflight rights. In uncertain or hostile environments, consider the need for operations security and airspace coordination prior to coordinating overflight rights.

(15) Conduct ground reconnaissance on explosive ordnance, environmental hazards, and environmental protection issues.

F04. **Administrative Element.** The administrative team joins the evacuation point party within the ECC. The administrative team assists in ensuring a smooth operation of the ECC processing centre.

F05. **Marshalling Element.** The marshalling element moves to the RCs designated by the diplomatic missions, assists in bringing evacuees to the RCs if required, and may escort them to the evacuation points if necessary. The size of the marshalling element depends on the number of sites and EPs.

a. **Marshalling Team.** One marshalling team assists an RC and helps evacuate the citizens in that area. The marshalling team should be large enough to organize into two sections that consist of search squads and security squads. Search squads may not be needed if the diplomatic mission’s evacuation contingency plan has been successfully implemented and all evacuees have been notified. If it has been determined that all evacuees have been informed, search squads should remain at the RC.

(1) The search squads assist in locating evacuees and escorting them to the RCs. Each search squad should have an interpreter and, if possible, a guide. The interpreters may be required to assist the search squads in moving from the RCs and locating evacuees who are not at home or whose addresses are incorrect.

(2) A security squad provides security to the team during movement and at the RC.

(3) Consideration should be given to attaching small PSYOPS teams, with their organic loudspeakers, to the marshalling teams. The organic loudspeakers can facilitate communication with the local populace and EPs. Additionally, depending on the location, PSYOPS personnel may be able to provide interpreters.
b. **Marshalling Team Operations.** The marshalling teams assist in locating EPs and moving them to RCs and evacuation points, and eventually to the ECC. The marshalling team may have several search squads under the control and direction of the team’s officer in charge. The following should be considered during marshalling operations:

1. Sufficient transportation for the search and security squads and evacuees. All EPs should be prepared to evacuate by helicopter, small boat or craft, and tracked or wheeled vehicles. Other considerations include:
   - The use of local drivers, if available, because of their experience and familiarity with the local road network.
   - Availability of sufficient mechanics for emergency repairs.
   - Briefing military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.

2. Movement control includes:
   - Identifying primary and alternate routes and check points.
   - Having local road maps available for each driver.
   - Planning for convoy control and security.
   - Identifying safe houses or areas if vehicles break down or become separated or lost.
   - Ensuring that adequate CIS equipment is available for convoys.

3. RC assistance operations may include:
   - Establishing perimeter security.
   - Ensuring sufficient transportation is available to move evacuees. Vehicles belonging to the EPs may be used to transport personnel.

4. Search squad operations may include:
   - Obtaining a list of potential EPs from the consular officers.
(b) Obtaining copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee.

(c) Having copies of a “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” readily available for EPs who refuse to leave (See Annex H).

(d) Briefing each EP on the baggage limitations set by the diplomatic missions, positive identification requirements, and restricted items that may not be transported.

(e) Documenting the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee.

(f) Escorting EPs from the vehicle parking area to the evacuation points (EPs may drive their vehicles and search personnel should note the individual’s name and intent).

(g) Identifying evacuees not on the list previously provided by the diplomatic missions.

F06. **Security Element.** Security forces are used as necessary at the RCs, evacuation points, ECC perimeters, LZs, aircraft staging and parking areas, landing sites for landing craft, and embarkation sites. From a security perspective, the most critical evacuation facilities are the ECC and embarkation sites, for they hold the largest numbers of EPs for the longest periods of time. Security forces can also provide a reaction force if a marshalling team or other unit encounters difficulty or requires assistance. To determine the size of the security force, consider the following:

a. The adversary threat to evacuation operations.

b. The anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly forces in and around the evacuation objective area.

c. Crowd control requirements at each location.

d. The number of EPs.

e. The number of marshalling and search teams required to search for EPs.

f. The number of evacuation points.

g. The size of the ECC.

h. Transportation available to cover the assigned areas.
i. The personal security of the Alliance HOMs, if required.

j. The types of resources used to evacuate personnel.

F07. **Combat Service Support Element**. This element contains two sub-elements – logistic and medical. The combat service support provided should be limited to the minimum essential support required for the evacuation. Consideration should be given to the following factors in determining requirements for combat service support of the evacuation force:

a. The characteristics of the evacuation area.

b. The resources available:

(1) Existing and potential facilities for support to the evacuation force, such as facilities for the storage and distribution of supplies to include ammunition, transportation means, airfields, fuel points, and other facilities.

(2) Food, water, fuel, and consumables.

c. The climate, weather, and terrain.

d. The number of EPs and their needs (including medical or special diets).

e. Any potential threats to the evacuation.

f. Adversary and potential adversary strength and activity, disposition and locations.

g. The strength and composition of the evacuation force.

h. The total troop strength.

i. The composition of the evacuation force in terms of land, air, and maritime combat forces, combat support, and combat service support units.

j. The logistic support capabilities of each component and separate units.

k. The time constraints and duration of operation.

l. Any additional logistic support required by the diplomatic missions and EPs.
m. The availability and suitability of HNS as an alternative to deploying NATO military logistic support.

n. Prearranged HNS agreements as appropriate.

o. The medical support capabilities, dependencies and restrictions within and between own troops, HN, and civil IOs/GOs/NGOs locally available (e.g. medical treatment facilities, medical supplies, MEDEVAC assets).

p. Existing arrangements and agreements concerning medical support.

q. The HN CIS infrastructure.

r. Requirements for epizootic disease prophylaxis.

F08. **CIS Element.** The CIS element:

a. Sets up and operates necessary CIS equipment.

b. Determines areas of compatibility between military and diplomatic mission on-site CIS equipment.

c. Resolves any frequency problems that may occur.

d. Determines if HN CIS equipment is similar to, or compatible with, Alliance equipment.

e. Ensures that required CIS equipment is planned for and deployed.

f. Develops an understanding of the operation of the HN's phone system.

g. Establishes positive CIS between the diplomatic missions, the joint force, and SACEUR
APPENDIX G

OPERATIONAL RISK AND SAFETY

G01. **Risk Management.** Risk management (RM) is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. There are five steps to the RM process: identify the hazards, assess the hazards, develop controls, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate. NATO doctrine for RM is contained in AJP-3.14, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection*. Factors that are particular to a NEO include accelerated deployment with short planning and preparation time, interaction with HOMs, and handling of large numbers of civilians.21

a. **Operating Environment.** The conditions that prompt a NEO present the joint force with difficult choices during execution. The force mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support depends upon the evaluation of the threat. Further, the OE likely will be highly volatile and may change rapidly from permissive to hostile.

b. **Potential Hazards.** Hazards may be identified by brainstorming the possibilities within the categories of mission, adversary or enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available. The following list contains typical hazards (not an exhaustive list) that should be considered when planning a NEO.

1. Accelerated deployment with short planning and preparation time.
2. Urban terrain -- congestion, unfamiliar local customs/laws.
3. Temperature/humidity extremes.
4. Underdeveloped infrastructure -- roads, ports, aircraft facilities, communications.
5. Water availability/contamination.
6. Disease vectors.
7. Fatigue due to jet lag or 24/7 operations.

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21 For more on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, see AJP-3.14, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection*, and the COPD.
(8) HQ/command post facilities and location.

(9) Chain of command ambiguity.

(10) Local populace interference.

(11) Spontaneous terrorism/insurgency activity.

(12) Night operations.

(13) Rotary-wing operating area characteristics -- wires, LZ conditions, density altitude, forward arming and refuelling points.

(14) Vehicle operations -- speed, loading and unloading non-combatants, overloading, bridge capacities, and escorts.

(15) Weapons/ordnance handling.

(16) Disabled vehicles/aircraft recovery.

(17) PR.

(18) Ship/landing craft operations -- slippery spots, tiedowns, flight deck operations, hearing, and head protection.

(19) Evacuation route characteristics -- roadblock potential, trafficability, and threat exposure.

(20) Fratricide potential.

(21) Chemical, biological, or radiological contamination.

c. **Reaction Force.** Because the OE can change quickly, a reaction force capable of protecting the NEO force elements and non-combatants from adversary advances is highly desirable. This force should be on short-notice alert and positioned close to the operating area.

d. **Hazard Awareness.** While joint force members will be informed of the hazards and mitigating controls associated with the military operation, non-combatants likely will be unaware. Further, the general alertness of the non-combatants will be impaired (to some degree) by stress and fatigue resulting from their sudden departure.
e. **Host Nation Support.** HNS may not be available as previously agreed; therefore, contingency plans should address this possibility.

G02. **Safety Considerations**

a. **Command Evaluation.** All commanders involved in a NEO are responsible for the safety of their personnel. The JFC and subordinate and supporting commanders share responsibility for the safety of non-combatants with the HOM, since the non-combatants will be in the physical custody of the joint force for hours or days and sometimes weeks. This unique situation requires that the commanders carefully evaluate the associated risks discussed below considering the general unfamiliarity of joint force personnel with the operation area and non-combatants unfamiliarity with military procedures and equipment. Thereafter, specific safety precautions should be briefed and implemented to mitigate the operational risks.

b. **Protecting the Force.** Before beginning any NEO, certain standard safety procedures should be implemented as follows:

1. Brief joint force personnel on the safety aspects and necessary precautions that must be considered for safe operations. When more than one operation takes place in parallel, personnel should be assured that the hazards of any one operation will not inadvertently affect any of the other operations.

2. Conduct an inspection to determine the physical condition of equipment.

3. Ensure that personnel who have been instructed and given written instructions do, in fact, understand these instructions; ensure that certifications for all operations requiring certified operators are current.

4. Ensure that personnel are medically fit for deployment and have executed the appropriate measures of force health protection (e.g. vaccination).

5. Exercise all equipment.

6. Ensure that appropriate safety devices are used and worn and that safety procedures are followed.
(7) Brief all personnel on the special safety procedures to be taken when working near non-combatants.

(8) NEOs that involve operations on or near water can be particularly dangerous because of adverse weather, operational task hazards, and adversary action. The efficiency of an operation may also be seriously curtailed by carelessness of personnel who permit dangerous conditions to exist or fail to repair faulty equipment.

c. Protecting Non-combatants. Although the respective HOMs are ultimately responsible for the safety of their nation’s citizens, the JFC shares that responsibility since the evacuees will be in the custody and direct control of the joint force during the military operation. The following considerations are provided to enhance the protection and safety of non-combatants.

(1) Safety Briefing. Evacuees may not be familiar with military organizations, activities, and procedures. An information program and safety briefings, tailored to the specifics of the evacuation (air or sea), should be delivered at the earliest opportunity and repeated as necessary.

(2) Manning and Expertise. Adequate manning of the various NEO force elements and stations is key to help evacuees avoid hazardous situations. An adequate presence of diplomatic mission and joint force personnel in a supervisory role, accompanied by interpreters, aids communication with the evacuees, thus enhancing their awareness of hazardous conditions and overall safety of the various movement and loading evolutions.

d. Accident Reporting. Procedures must be developed to inform HOMs of injury to or death of EPs due to accidents.
ANNEX H

SAMPLE FORMS

SAMPLE WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY

1. I, ____________________________________________________, acknowledge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has offered to evacuate me and my following dependents:

   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

2. I have declined that offer, with the understanding that the offer will not be formally repeated, although I retain the option to utilize the evacuation capability while resources are still in country.

3. Evacuee Signature_________________________________________________

4. Witness Signature_________________________________________________

Figure H-1. Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity
**SAMPLE REGISTRATION FORM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGISTRATION FORM</th>
<th>CATEGORY:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**NATIONALITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORENAME</th>
<th>SEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surname</td>
<td>AGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport Number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EMPLOYER**

**DEPENDANTS PRESENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**DEPENDANTS MISSING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**CONTACT NAME (S)/NUMBER (S)**

**ACCOMMODATIONS**

| ISSUED WITH | |
|-------------| |

*Figure H-2. Sample Registration Form*
LEXICON

PART I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAP    Allied administrative publication
ACO    Allied Command Operations
AJP    Allied joint publication

Bi-SC   Bi Strategic Command

C2      command and control
CBRN   chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CIMIC  civil-military cooperation
CIS    communication and information systems
CMALT Civil-Military Assessment and Liaison Team
COA    course of action
CONPLAN      contingency plan
COPD   Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
CPOE   Comprehensive preparation of the operational environment

DZ     drop zone

ECC    evacuation control centre
EOD    explosive ordnance disposal
EP     entitled person / entitled personnel

FCE    forward command element
FMB    forward mounting base
FOB    forward operating base

HLZ    helicopter landing zone
HN     host nation
HNS    host-nation support
HOM    head of mission
HQ     headquarters

ICAO   International Civil Aviation Organization
Info Ops information operations
IO     international organization
IPB    intelligence preparation of the battlespace

JFACC  joint force air component command
JFC    joint force commander
JFLCC  joint force land component command
JLSG   joint logistics support group
JFMCC  joint force maritime component command
JOA    joint operations area
JTF    joint task force

LO     liaison officer
LOC    lines of communications
LZ     landing zone

MC     Military Committee
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MILENG military engineering
MOU    memorandum of understanding
MSU    multinational specialized unit

NA5CRO non-Article 5 crisis response operations
NAC    North Atlantic Council
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCG    NEO Coordination Group
NCRS   NATO Crisis Response System
NCS    NATO Command Structure
NEO    non-combatant evacuation operation
NEOCC  NEO coordination centre
NGO    non-governmental organization
NID    NAC Initiating Directive
NRF    NATO response force
NSA    NATO Standardization Agency

OE     operating environment
OLRT   operational liaison and reconnaissance team
OPLAN  operation plan
OPP    operations planning process

PA     public affairs
PAO    public affairs officer
PR     personnel recovery
PSYOPS psychological operations

RC     reception centre
ROE    rules of engagement
RM     risk management

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAR  search and rescue
SOCC  special operations component command
SOF  special operations force
SOFA  Status of Forces Agreement
STANAG  standardization agreement
StratCom  strategic communications

TCN  troop-contributing nation
TOA  transfer of authority

UN  United Nations
VIP  very important person
PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative element
The section within an evacuation point party that commences initial entitled person administrative processing and assists the evacuation control centre registration station. (Definition for the use within this publication)

authorized departure
A procedure, short of ordered departure, by which mission employees or dependents or both, are permitted to leave post in advance of normal rotation when the national interests or imminent threat to life require it. (Definition for the use within this publication)

comfort station
A temporary waiting area within an evacuation control centre where entitled persons are sheltered until they board evacuation transportation. (Definition for the use within this publication)

communications element
The section within an evacuation point party that sets up and operates required communications equipment during an evacuation. (Definition for the use within this publication)

debriefing station
An area within an evacuation control centre where entitled persons are questioned, on a voluntary basis, to obtain information that may affect the operation. (Definition for the use within this publication)

embarkation site
A seaport, airport, or other site where entitled persons embark onto transport to depart to the place of safety. (Definition for the use within this publication)

entitled person
Government employees, dependents, and other personnel who have been designated by the HOM as individuals authorized to be evacuated. (Definition for the use within this publication)

evacuation contingency plan
A diplomatic mission plan for the area under its cognisance that addresses the military evacuation options of its citizens and designated other foreign nationals. (Definition for the use within this publication)

evacuation control centre
An organization, under the authority of the national foreign ministries, that is responsible for coordinating the onward movement of entitled persons from a threatened area to a place of safety. It also provides a screening facility to ensure that only entitled evacuees are moved and has the administrative arrangements needed for providing adequate medical and logistic support. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication.)

**evacuation force**
That portion of a joint force, normally a designated joint force component with other components in support, which actually conducts a non-combatant evacuation operation. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication.)

**evacuation point**
The site where entitled persons are collected from the reception centres for onward movement to an evacuation control centre. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**evacuation point party**
The section of a forward command element that identifies evacuation points and assists the diplomatic missions in establishing reception centres, the evacuation control centre site, and embarkation sites. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**force sequencing**
The phased introduction of forces into and out of the operational area. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**forward command element**
The advance party of the Allied joint force component assigned the mission of conducting a NEO. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**forward mounting base**
A temporary location used to stage evacuation forces prior to inserting the forces into a host-nation. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication.)

**host nation**
A nation which, by agreement:
- receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
- allows materiel and NATO organizations to be located on its territory; or
- provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6)

**host-nation support**
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory. (AAP-6)

**logistic element**
The section within an evacuation point party that provides temporary logistic support to the evacuation. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**marshalling element**
The section within an evacuation point party that assists in bringing entitled persons to the reception centres. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**medical element**
The section within an evacuation point party that provides temporary medical support to the evacuation in co-operation with the ECC medical station. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**medical station**
An area within an evacuation control centre where entitled persons are provided medical screening and emergency medical treatment. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**military engineering**
Engineer activity, comprising both force support engineering and combat support engineering, undertaken regardless of component or service to shape the physical operating environment. (AAP-6)

**national foreign ministry**
The senior diplomatic organization of an Alliance nation. The national foreign ministries carry political responsibility for a NEO. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**NATO response force**
A high readiness, joint and combined force, capable of performing certain missions on its own, as well as participating in an operation as part of a larger force, or serving as an initial entry force that prepares the theatre for follow-on forces. (MC 477)

**non-Article 5 crisis response operations**
Multifunctional operations, falling outside the scope of Article 5, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives. (AJP-3.4)

**non-combatant evacuation coordination centre**
An optional centre within an Allied joint force headquarters that establishes a centralised focal point providing a conduit for information exchanges between the various diplomatic
missions and the Allied joint force through liaison officers. (This entry will be processed for inclusion in AAP-6 upon ratification of this publication.)

**non-combatant evacuation operation**  
An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (AAP-6,)

**ordered departure**  
A procedure by which the number of government employees, their dependents, or both are reduced at a foreign service post. Departure is directed by National authority (often initiated by the head of mission) to designated safe havens with implementation of a NATO non-combatant evacuation operation plan. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**public affairs**  
NATO military PA is the function responsible to promote NATO’s military aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the Alliance. This includes planning and conducting media relations, internal communication, and community relations (AJP-3.10 and MC 457/1)

**reception centre**  
A location where entitled persons are assembled prior to moving to an evacuation point. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**reception and search station**  
An area where entitled persons are initially received at an evacuation control centre. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**refugee**  
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (AAP 6)

**registration station**  
An area within an evacuation control centre where entitled persons complete administrative papers. (Definition for the use within this publication)

**security element**  
The section within an evacuation point party that assists providing security to the evacuation. (Definition for the use within this publication)
temporary safe location
A location, in an area or country designated by the national foreign ministries and controlled by the Allied joint force, to which entitled persons may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe location would be within an Alliance Nation. (Definition for the use within this publication)

transportation station
An area within an evacuation control centre where entitled persons are assisted for embarkation. (Definition for the use within this publication)
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

MC 133/4  NATO’s Operations Planning
MC 319/2  NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
MC 324/2  The NATO Military Command Structure
MC 326/2  NATO Principles and Policies of Operational Medical Support
MC 327/2  NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
MC 348  NATO Command and Control Warfare Policy
MC 362/1  NATO Rules of Engagement
MC 402/1  NATO Psychological Operations Policy
MC 411/1  NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Policy
MC 422/3  NATO Military Policy on Information Operations
MC 437/2  NATO Special Operations Policy
MC 526  Logistic Support Concept for NATO Response Force Operations
MC 560  MC Policy for Military Engineering
MC 586  MC Policy for Allied Forces and Their Use for Operations

PO(2009)0141  NATO Strategic Communications Policy
MCM-0085-2010  Military Concept for NATO Strategic Communications

AAP-6  NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
AAP-15  NATO Glossary of Abbreviations
AJP-01  Allied Joint Doctrine
AJP-2.1  Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures
AJP-3  Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
AJP-3.4  Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
AJP-3.4.1  Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations
AJP-3.4.3  Allied Joint Doctrine for Support to Civil Authorities
AJP-3.5  Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations
AJP-3.10  Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
AJP-3.10.1  Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations
AJP-3.12  Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineer Support to Joint Operations
AJP-4  Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
AJP-4.10  Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
AJP-6  Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems
AJP-9  NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine

NCRSM 2010  NATO Crisis Response System Manual
Bi-SC Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) for Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR)
Bi-SC Information Operations Reference Book
The NATO Handbook
AJP-3.4.2(A)(1)