Joint Doctrine Publication 0-20

UK Land Power

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Signature

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Foreword

We live in an inherently multipolar world, marked by a strategic context that is complex, dynamic and unstable. The UK and our allies face a diverse range of threats. Land power is an indispensable component of military and national power, offering policy makers scalable and responsive options to protect the UK, fight our enemies, prevent conflict and deal with disaster. Since it is on the land that people live and where decisions are made, land power is unique in providing the ability to exert decisive control and influence on actors and the course of events.

Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-20, UK Land Power, for the first time in joint doctrine, describes the context, utility and application of land power in the context of joint and multinational operations. It recognises that the nature of war remains constant: it is visceral, violent, characterised by friction that makes the simplest things difficult, and its outcomes are more often determined by the effects on people’s minds than by physical effects, and it is always about politics. But we now live in an age where information is pervasive and driving a rapidly evolving character of conflict, opening new ways for state and non-state adversaries to exploit ambiguity, blurring the boundaries of peace and war. This makes for an era of constant competition. The battlefield is increasingly decentralised with a premium placed on the talent of junior leaders within land forces, and their ability to understand the strategic context. There are also no boundaries between what happens abroad and what happens at home. And expectations of military restraint, as well as the complexity of the legal framework, constrain commanders as never before.

In this context, strategic success is more likely to be achieved through non-military or non-lethal means, and invariably it is the triumph of the narrative that is decisive and not necessarily the facts on the ground. The two central ideas in UK land doctrine endure. Mission command, based on mutual trust between leaders and those whom they lead, empowers commanders at all levels, generating agility and tempo, and enabling us to overcome enemies in the most chaotic and demanding circumstances. The manoeuvrism approach is our fighting doctrine, focused on the enemy – but the pervasiveness of information demands that manoeuvre has to take account of a broader audience than simply the ‘enemy’. This requires a new idea – called integrated action. This is a unifying doctrine that requires commanders first to identify the desired outcome, to consider all the audiences relevant to attaining the outcome, to analyse the effects required on the relevant audience and then to determine the best mix of capabilities, from soft through to hard power, to achieve the outcome.
As doctrine, *UK Land Power* captures a set of beliefs that underpin how land forces practice their profession. It has been written primarily for joint staffs, officials, allies and partners in industry. I encourage you to read it as a framework for understanding how land forces perform their vital role in protecting our nation.

**Chief of the General Staff**
Abstract

Purpose

1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-20, *UK Land Power* is the UK’s keystone land environment doctrine. Whilst JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* provides the broad philosophy and principles underpinning the use of our Armed Forces as a whole, JDP 0-20 is focussed specifically on UK land power. It provides an understanding of land power, placing it in its appropriate context, while recognising its strengths and limitations. JDP 0-20 also explores land power’s interdependence with the other elements of national and military power, as well as multinational and private sector partners. Finally, JDP 0-20 also considers, in broad terms, those factors that enable the effective employment of land power.

Context

2. JDP 0-20, *UK Land Power* describes the nature and application of UK land power. The land environment is distinguished by the fact that it is where people predominantly live. As a result, it is in the land environment that the roots of conflict are most usually found, and tends to be where conflicts and disputes are finally decided. In a globalised and connected operating environment, however, a military solution alone will rarely translate into desirable political outcomes. Instead, success may often require the ability to create and sustain a positive consensus amongst multiple audiences – local, regional and global. This, in turn, depends upon a nuanced understanding of the ways we can achieve influence, supported by the intelligent integration of lethal and non-lethal capabilities, as well as the need for joint, cross-government, multi-agency and multinational cooperation. Underpinned by this approach, the employment of UK land power remains indispensable to national security and prosperity.

Audience

3. We commend JDP 0-20, *UK Land Power* to all our partners as a simple and concise explanation of UK land power. JDP 0-20 should be of particular value to joint commanders and staffs, single-Service warfare branches, other government departments, partners and allies.
Structure

4. JDP 0-20 is divided into four chapters.

   a. **Chapter 1 – An introduction to UK land power.** Chapter 1 defines and explains land power, describing how UK land power is adapted to provide wide-ranging strategic utility.

   b. **Chapter 2 – Land power in context.** Chapter 2 provides an overview of the context in which UK land power is employed. This chapter outlines the factors that shape the land environment, as well as explaining the concept of the enduring nature and changing character of conflict. It also describes the key aspects that shape the contemporary operating environment.

   c. **Chapter 3 – The foundations of land power.** Chapter 3 outlines the enduring attributes and required qualities of land forces. It also explains the concept of fighting power.

   d. **Chapter 4 – Employing UK land power.** Chapter 4 examines the functions of UK land power, its application in the contemporary operating environment, as well as its integration with joint, cross-government, multi-agency and multinational partners.

Linkages

5. JDP 0-20, *UK Land Power* provides keystone land environment doctrine within the joint doctrine architecture, sitting below the capstone JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* and alongside other joint environmental doctrine, JDP 0-10, *UK Maritime Power* and JDP 0-30, *UK Air and Space Power*. JDP 0-20 is coherent with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) capstone doctrine – Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* and AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*. While reflecting the joint context, JDP 0-20 remains consistent with the British Army’s single-Service capstone doctrine, Army Doctrine Publication, *Land Operations*. It is also founded upon current policy, in particular the *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*. 
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Chapter 1 provides an overview of UK land power, outlining its enduring utility in a complex and uncertain operating environment.

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…sound strategy [is produced] through continuous reconciliation of what is desired and what is possible.

Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*
Chapter 1 – An introduction to UK land power

Section 1 – Land power

1.1. Land power is defined as: the ability of land forces to exert decisive control and influence on actors and the course of events.¹ At the heart of UK land power is the capacity of UK land forces to fight and succeed in combat against our adversaries. Our land forces can take physical possession of terrain, or physically defend and secure it, delivering the enduring physical presence necessary to influence political decisions. The forward presence of land forces can also deter aggression by altering an adversary’s cost-benefit analysis of aggressive action, and can bolster an ally’s will and capability to resist coercion.

1.2. The UK’s national strategy coordinates the instruments of national power.² UK land power, along with maritime, air and space power, form the interdependent levers of the military instrument of national power. The absence of any one of these levers creates potential vulnerabilities that our enemies may exploit. The military instrument’s unique contribution is to threaten, or apply, legitimate force in pursuit of national policy objectives.

1.3. Land power is generated and applied by our land forces.³ UK land forces protect the UK, fight our enemies, prevent future conflict and deal with disaster, both at home and overseas. Driven by the proliferation and speed of information flows, the strategic context within which our land forces operate is increasingly unstable and complex. It is characterised by a state of constant competition that blurs traditional distinctions between war and peace. We increasingly use and contest

¹ This is a new definition of land power and it will be added to the UK’s terminology glossary Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1, UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database, on promulgation.
² The three instruments of national power are: diplomatic, economic and military – all underpinned by information. See JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine for a full explanation of national power, national security, the national interest and national strategy.
³ The term land forces refers to all those elements of UK Armed Forces that operate primarily within the land environment. This largely encompasses the British Army, but also embraces elements of the other Services, for example, the Royal Marines and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment.
the virtual domain through digital media and cyber. Foreign and homeland threats have also merged. Future conflict will likely mean attacks on UK sovereign territory, including sabotage, terrorism and civil disturbances. War, therefore, no longer remains confined to fixed battlefields.

1.4. Within this context, land power continues to offer scalable and responsive options to our Government in shaping the international security environment. Our land forces undertake a wide variety of tasks, ranging from war fighting through to delivering security, peace support and Defence engagement. Within these tasks sit a broad range of activities, including combat and stability operations (such as counter-irregular activity such as counter-insurgency, counterterrorism and counter-criminality), as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and the provision of military aid to the civil authorities. To fulfil these tasks, our land forces are held at the appropriate readiness so that they can be properly prepared and applied at the right time and place, overseas and at home. The functions of UK land power underpin its broad utility in support of national strategy, and are described in Figure 1.1.

- **Fight.** The core capability of land forces is the ability to fight and succeed in combat against our adversaries in the most demanding circumstances.

- **Engage.** Early and persistent engagement overseas by land forces helps to shape the international security environment through its contribution to understanding, influence and improved security.

- **Secure.** Land forces provide durable security and protection to both people and places, and may be required to contribute to wider stabilisation activities.

- **Support.** Land forces support and assist state and non-state institutions, both at home and overseas.

**Figure 1.1 – The functions of UK land power**

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4 JDP 0-01.1, *UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database* describes three domains in which activity occurs. Note that this description is not common across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (1) **The physical domain.** The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated are upon capability.

(2) **The virtual domain.** The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information. The principal effects generated are upon understanding.

(3) **The cognitive domain.** The sphere in which human decision-making occurs as a result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The principal effects generated are upon will and understanding.
1.5. Land power, however, is not employed in isolation. Instead, a joint approach to applying military power (whereby a combination of scalable maritime, land, air, space, cyber or special forces operate together within a single military force) can integrate capabilities and provide powerful synergies. The land, maritime, air and space environments, as well as cyberspace, are clearly connected to one another, and the force elements associated with each can, and do, routinely create effects in other environments. The wealth of information in the virtual domain must also be exploited; generating understanding depends heavily upon our ability to access and make sense of the rapidly increasing volumes and variety of data available. Cyberspace therefore presents significant opportunities and threats as information technologies continue to transform how land forces operate with, among and against other actors. Strong alliances and partnerships worldwide are also more important than ever because the complex nature of the threats we face increasingly require a multi-faceted response. Furthermore, effective crisis management requires active cross-government and multi-agency cooperation to develop and sustain a comprehensive and successful response.
1.6. Within a dynamic strategic context, the distinguishing characteristic of the land environment is the presence of humans in large numbers. Land forces are able to engage directly with friendly, neutral and adversary actors, potentially seizing and holding terrain for extended periods to create the conditions in which a favourable political outcome can be reached.

1.7. Taken together, our soldiers, presence, persistence and versatility form the attributes of land forces. These attributes are explored in further detail in Chapter 3. In an operating environment shaped by human dynamics, our soldiers remain at the heart of land forces. Land forces depend on the abilities of professional, innovative, adaptable individuals, moulded by training, education and discipline into cohesive teams, who can react quickly to changing conditions. They accomplish missions face to face, providing essential human interaction in the midst of societal, environmental, religious and political upheaval. It is their presence amongst local populations that enables this success. Land forces not only seize, occupy and defend areas of land, they also have the persistence and durability to remain in a region until long-term strategic objectives have been achieved. Land forces are a highly versatile element of the joint force, fulfilling multiple functions across the breadth of strategic requirements. Even when optimised for war fighting, land forces can conduct a wide range of engagement, security and support tasks.

The attributes of land forces are:
- soldiers;
- presence;
- persistence; and
- versatility

5 The term soldier refers specifically to personnel serving in an army. It is acknowledged that those elements of our UK Armed Forces that operate primarily within the land environment, but belong to the other Services, use different terminology to describe their Service personnel. For example, the marines and airmen of the Royal Marines and Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment respectively.

6 An operating environment is defined as: a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. NATO Term.
Section 3 – The enduring utility of land power

Influence

Influence is successfully achieved when we change (or reinforce) the behaviour of the target audience in ways that meet our objectives. It is not just about messages or media, but about how the combination of word and deed are communicated, portrayed, interpreted and understood by audiences when viewed through a lens of their own culture, history, religion and tradition.

1.8. Land forces are uniquely postured to influence human activity. Across the broad range of activities they undertake, our land forces can carry a message of reassurance, deterrence or potentially coercion, depending on the mission context. Adaptable land forces can transition rapidly between tasks, offering a nuanced, tailored response to evolving circumstances.

1.9. Credible and capable land forces, as part of a cross-government approach (usually framed within a wider multinational and multi-agency response), can deter potential adversaries from aggression. Persistent engagement overseas also:

- demonstrates a tangible level of political commitment;
- contributes further to conflict prevention by fostering mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts; and
- helps partners to build the capacity to operate more effectively.

Such activities strengthen alliances and partnerships and provide the security and stability that benefits UK prosperity. Persistent engagement overseas also provides our land forces with the insight and understanding that enable them to operate with agility and precision in a context of uncertainty. It also facilitates regional access and enables the contextual understanding necessary for the success of potential subsequent operations.
1.10. Our land forces also support and assist both domestic and international communities as they recover from natural and humanitarian disasters. This usually occurs as part of a wider military response that provides the speed, personnel, equipment and experience required to respond effectively to a given crisis.

1.11. Certain situations, including threats to our national security may require a response that calls for the physical control of territory. The unique ability of land forces to seize and hold ground affords the potential to fulfil this requirement, and signifies the highest levels of political commitment. Control brings responsibility that must be planned for at all levels. The manner in which control is asserted, through image, word and deed, and by addressing a broad range of audiences, ensures control constitutes a positive element of strategy. The exercise of control can:

- remove or weaken an enemy’s power base;
- directly impose our will upon our adversaries;
- provide a secure environment in which wider objectives can be achieved;
- send a deterrent message to our adversaries; and
- reassure our allies.

1.12. Because of its significance, the physical capture and control of territory, or the credible threat to do so, has often been regarded as decisive. But, the ultimate decision is political; people have to decide whether or not to accept the facts on the ground. Land forces, through their presence among, and proximity to, the people, provide an important contribution to achieving these political outcomes.

1.13. Underpinning all that our land forces do is the ability to fight, and to succeed in combat against our adversaries. Since the nature of land operations most closely aligns with the human dynamic that lies at the heart of all war, the ability to prevail in ground combat can be decisive in breaking the enemy’s will. Thinking, adaptive enemies cannot be defeated at range. Soldiers possessing the unique capability to find, fix, close with and defeat our enemies are therefore required to achieve sustainable strategic outcomes. Perceptions of our combat capabilities also reinforce our capacity to influence other actors, including the credibility of efforts to deter adversaries, as well as the ability to reassure allies and partners.

7 The United Nations Charter requires that all member states refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state. However, this does not restrict the inherent right of a state to take action in self-defence in response to an armed attack. Further, it may also be lawful to use offensive force in another state’s territory (without its consent) in certain circumstances – under a Chapter VII United Nations Security Council Resolution, or if some states propose direct humanitarian intervention – in response to a humanitarian catastrophe.
1.14. At all levels of war (tactical, operational and strategic), the successful employment of land power requires force elements that are able to adapt to meet the requirements of a specific context. That context has changed significantly over the past three decades, and continues to do so. In an interconnected world, success is contingent on achieving favourable consensus among multiple local, regional and global audiences. Tactical military success can only be translated into desirable political outcomes as part of an effective political strategy that draws on the full spectrum of levers available to achieve objectives.

1.15. The successful employment of UK land power must therefore be predicated upon sound strategic thinking. Within this complex operating environment, a flexible and agile approach to strategy and warfare allows the development of a campaign based on achievable objectives, but which can respond to unexpected events and crises. Such an approach, which focuses on closing out our opponent’s courses of action, whilst preserving and creating our own options, will be more flexible and ultimately underpins the effective employment of land power. Directed at affecting and influencing the perceptions of a wide range of audiences, this approach must also be based on intimate knowledge and understanding of the tasks at hand, including:

- what is required to attain those tasks;
- any impediments and obstacles;
- the alternatives;
- the resources required; and
- the consequences of various courses of action.

Within a cross-government information strategy, a common strategic narrative must also underpin the employment of UK land power, outlining why the UK is engaged and its objectives.

8 Strategic narrative is described as the compelling storylines designed to resonate in the mind of its audiences that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan. JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.
1.16. Integrated action is the unifying doctrine which guides how our land forces orchestrate and execute operations in an interconnected world, where the range of threats we face is diverse. It recognises that success in the contemporary operating environment requires more than physical and cognitive effect on the enemy – it also requires the concurrent (and deliberate) ability to influence much wider audiences, including local political actors, the local population, indigenous partners, as well as broader allies. It is outcome-focused and requires sophisticated understanding and the integration of all capabilities available. These themes are explored further in Chapter 4.
Key points

- Land power is defined as: the ability of land forces to exert decisive control and influence on actors and the course of events.

- UK land power, along with maritime, air and space power, form the interdependent levers of the military instrument of national power.

- Land power is generated and applied by our land forces to protect the UK, fight our enemies, prevent future conflict and deal with disaster, both at home and overseas.

- To fulfil these tasks, our land forces are held at the appropriate readiness so that they can be prepared appropriately and applied at the right time and place.

- Land power is underpinned by joint, cross-government, multinational and private sector partnerships. These relationships integrate capabilities and provide powerful synergies.

- Land forces are uniquely postured to influence human activity in the environment where humans live, and can carry a message of reassurance, deterrence or potentially coercion.

- The ability of land forces to seize and hold ground enables the physical control of territory and signifies the highest levels of political commitment.

- Underpinning all that our land forces do is the ability to fight and succeed in combat against our adversaries.

- Persistent engagement overseas provides our land forces with the insight and understanding that enable them to operate with agility and precision.

- The successful employment of land power is predicated upon sound strategic thinking.
Land power in context

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the context in which UK land power is employed. It outlines the factors that shape the land environment, describing the enduring nature of war and the changing character of conflict, as well as the principal factors that shape contemporary operations.

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No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed.

Professor Sir Michael Howard
*Future Character of Conflict*
Chapter 2 – Land power in context

2.1. The effectiveness of land power varies according to how well we tailor its employment to a particular context. The land environment itself, with all its enduring challenges and opportunities, as well as the unchanging political, adversarial and human nature of war, must be understood. But the character of every conflict also varies – political objectives differ between conflicts, the capacity and capabilities of adversaries relative to our own will never be the same and the audiences we seek to influence through our actions will change. Land power must be adapted to successfully meet the requirements of every context, balancing a readiness for those elements that remain constant, with an ability to react rapidly to changing circumstances. An effective political strategy must underpin this approach, founded upon an adaptable land force able to integrate the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

Section 1 – The land environment

2.2. The land environment is inherently complex, and is shaped primarily by human, information and physical aspects. Unlike the air or maritime environments, it is distinguished by the fact that it is where people predominantly live. It is in the land environment that the roots of conflict are usually found, since conflict on land involves those things that people tend to value most: their lives, values, property and resources.

Human aspects

2.3. Land has immense practical and symbolic significance for human beings. Within the land environment, people inhabit towns, cities and villages, whilst even apparently unpopulated space often contains resources that support humans in some way. Control over land is consequently of fundamental political, cultural and psychological importance, and has often been regarded as decisive in conflict. Control of territory alone, however, is rarely sufficient – our actions must be supported by a broad range of audiences if they are to contribute to the successful achievement of desired outcomes.

9 An environment is defined as: the surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelations. NATOTerm. The use of the term ‘environment’ is currently under review as part of a possible re-categorisation of UK joint operations taxonomy.
2.4. People exist in linguistic, cultural, social and political groups with specific identities, usually associated with particular territories. Individually or collectively they form the audiences whose perception and interpretation of events, and subsequent behaviour and decisions, determine how conflict is conducted and resolved. These audiences may include those deployed, as well as broader international audiences, including those in the conflict region. They may be hostile, friendly or neutral to the actions of land forces, although the boundaries between these groups are not fixed.

Information aspects

2.5. The land environment is shaped by the way that these populations interact; it is the exchange of information between individuals, tribes, ethnic and interest groups, and countries that lie at the heart of human dynamics. This communication can be verbal, written or visual and it can be conducted directly between people or through radio, television or online. Human interaction is expanding and accelerating as information flows in the virtual domain increase, linking individuals, groups and societies globally, unconfined by traditional state boundaries. The proximity of land forces to local populations allows them to distinguish between different people and groups, adjusting their interaction accordingly. Land forces therefore require a unique set of ‘people skills’, including empathy, emotional intelligence, an understanding of culture and history, and an ability to communicate in the local language.

2.6. It is through this exchange of information that individuals come to understand their environment, to articulate purposes and to frame processes of conflict and cooperation. As a means of influence, land forces must therefore understand what information is relevant, to whom, how it is received, and how it might influence people’s decision-making and behaviours. We must also understand how land forces and other actors compete for influence by using information, in both the physical and virtual domains.

Physical aspects

2.7. The land environment is varied and complex. It includes open grassland, cultivated land, forests, mountains, deserts, jungles, rivers, swamps, urban and littoral areas. Each creates constraints and freedoms, placing different demands on the people and equipment that operate within them. Terrain can block or enable communication, provide cover from detection or attack, and obstruct or enable movement. Variations in elevation and vegetation limit visibility and the effects of weapons, whilst movement on land is impeded and channelled by obstacles that land forces must overcome. Climate accentuates the demands of terrain, and may affect
visibility, movement and communication. Extremes of heat and cold can create hostile physical and psychological conditions for land forces. Night operations can provide cover and the element of surprise, but challenge the ability to retain effective command and control. Changes in climate can bring danger and threaten our very survival, but also potentially bring opportunities that sustain life and provide protection.

2.8. The land itself can be altered by human activity. Obstacles can be cleared and roads built to enable access. Ground can be fortified or provided with physical defences, whilst certain types of pollution can amplify survival challenges. Globally, the phenomenon of urbanisation has created physically, culturally and institutionally complex cities that are challenging for military forces operating in them, not least due to the force ratios traditionally required for success in urban operations on this scale. Where cities are located on the littoral – a complex operating environment in its own right – these complexities are amplified and even more dynamic. Land forces have to be highly adaptable and resilient to operate successfully in these different conditions.

Operation TYPHOON

Operation TYPHOON began on 2nd October 1941 as the final stage of Nazi Germany’s advance towards Moscow across the open steppes of western Russia. The progress of Panzer Groups during this operation was hindered as first rain, and then snow, severely limited mobility, delaying both their rate of advance and the ability to resupply forward troops. An extreme Russian winter presented new challenges; deep snow neutralised the impact of hand grenades and mortar shells, while meteorological conditions altered the path of artillery fire. These difficulties ultimately contributed to the delay of the German arrival outside Moscow and gave time for a Soviet counter-offensive. By late December 1941, the Germans had lost the Battle for Moscow, and the invasion had cost the German army over 830,000 casualties killed, wounded, captured or missing in action. Soviet writer and journalist Vasily Grossman’s war diaries suggested German soldiers with their inadequate equipment ‘were not killed by us; they were killed by frost’.10

Section 2 – The nature of war and the character of conflict

2.10. The nature of war does not change. Armed conflict remains an inherently chaotic, visceral and violent contest, whose underlying nature is human, adversarial and political.

2.11. The character of conflict, however, shaped by the age in which it is fought, continues to evolve. Human developments (such as technology, laws, social attitudes, philosophy, religion and international relationships) will all change the way that conflicts are prosecuted. The character of contemporary conflict is shaped by an increasingly uncertain and complex operating environment. In a strategic context characterised by constant confrontation, traditional interpretations of peace and war can be increasingly difficult to distinguish.

2.12. The distinctions that we can make between the nature of war and the character of conflict inform our approach to force development and design, doctrine, education and training. Deductions regarding the nature of war inform enduring principles and ideas, whilst deductions related to the character of conflict allow us to prepare appropriately for the more detailed requirements of contemporary operations. It is essential to draw on both in the right balance.

The nature of war

2.13. War has certain intrinsic attributes that transcend individual clashes and disputes. The nature of war will continue to be influenced by, and representative of, the entire spectrum of human behaviour, emotion and capability.\textsuperscript{11} Human emotions such as fear and anger can shape why we fight and what we fight for. Combat against an armed adversary is an intense, lethal human activity. War is marked by violence, danger, stress, fear, exhaustion, isolation and privation that can adversely affect the

\textsuperscript{11} Developments in automated systems will potentially affect the human aspect of conflict. The proliferation of automated systems, and their use by a variety of actors, will spawn a diverse range of applications across all environments by 2035. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), \textit{Future Operating Environment 2035}.
will of all those involved. The battlefield often teems with non-combatants and is crowded with infrastructure. No matter how great the quantity of information available, a ‘fog of war’ caused by limitations in our ability to understand the dynamics of a situation will lead to uncertainty and chaos.

‘If I had time and anything like your ability to study war, I think that I should concentrate almost entirely on the “actualities of war” – the effects of tiredness, hunger, fear, lack of sleep, weather …: it is the actualities of war that make war so complicated and so difficult.’

Field Marshal Lord Wavell, in a letter to Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart

2.14. Human attributes also determine how we fight. Our physiology, challenged by the arduous nature of the land environment, defines what we can do physically. Land forces must be able to endure in the most hostile conditions, requiring high levels of resilience in individuals, as well as command and support structures and equipment. Human cognitive limitations also mean that our decisions and behaviour are often matters of perception – it is therefore particularly important for land forces to understand how to influence and assess human behaviour, and how the audience is likely to perceive our actions. Our soldiers respond to effective leadership. Amongst other qualities, commanders must be flexible, decisive, resilient in the face of adversity, judicious and able to inspire others.

2.15. For land forces operating in a context of friction, uncertainty and chaos, a decentralised command system is necessary, empowering subordinate commanders and promoting initiative, freedom and speed of action. For UK land forces this is incorporated into the command philosophy of mission command. It empowers leaders down to the lowest level, enabling subordinate commanders to rapidly identify and exploit opportunities to achieve their commander’s intent.

2.16. War remains adversarial. It is a reciprocal contest of wills against opponents that think, react and adapt. As the contemporary strategist Colin Gray notes, the adversarial nature of war means ‘that every cunning plan has to succeed against, not blind nature, but rather an adversary with whom you conduct a permanent tactical, operational, strategic, and political-moral dialogue.’ UK land forces embrace a fighting doctrine known as the manoeuvrist approach. It is an indirect approach which advocates the application of strength against enemy vulnerabilities. It blends lethal and non-lethal actions to achieve objectives which shape the enemy’s understanding, undermine their will and break their cohesion.

2.17. The ends towards which all conflict is fought are dictated by **policy**. War is therefore a means to an end, not an end in itself. These ends may be clearly defined or they may be ambiguous, and their legitimacy and utility may be challenged within our democratic society. But the fact remains that, as Clausewitz notes, war ‘is controlled by a political objective’, and this objective ‘will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.”¹⁴ Political contexts tend to alter over time: events may create new realities; new domestic political dynamics can emerge; and balances of power can change. In consequence, the purpose of a conflict; its value; the costs and benefits; and the military and political constraints and imperatives, may all change in quite fundamental ways as a conflict develops. These changes necessarily shape the manner in which operations must be conducted by land forces.

The character of conflict

‘Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life ... To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met.’

Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart\textsuperscript{15}

2.18. Unlike the nature of war, the character of conflict is subject to change. Whilst predicting the precise character of future conflict is impossible, the character of a particular conflict will be shaped by factors such as its geography, participants and the type of tactics and technology that adversaries employ.

2.19. The pervasive nature of information has changed the character of contemporary conflict. The increased availability and flow of information enables messages and ideas to be rapidly communicated across physical boundaries. In this interconnected operating environment, military activity is often immediately visible to local, regional and global audiences. The local and regional audience includes enemies, adversaries and a range of actors, from allies and partners to the local population. The global audience is unbounded, blurring previous operational and non-operational distinctions; even relatively minor armed conflicts have potentially global consequences. Each of these groups interprets our activity through their own lens, and each is influenced by others. Critically, it is the perceptions of these audiences that determine the success of military action.

2.20. Comparatively open access to the virtual domain allows our adversaries to:

- communicate ideas;
- develop and exploit recruitment opportunities;
- influence audiences;
- mobilise resources; and
- identify targets.

Many actors are adept at presenting military activity to the audience, magnifying, mitigating or altering it to influence observers’ understanding of what actually happened. Information and propaganda campaigns using ‘facts’ – even if they are wrong or invented – to appeal to emotions more than logic, are hard to rebut. Indeed, now more than ever, no conflict has a purely military solution. Instead, a

compelling strategic narrative, reinforced at operational and tactical levels, and with enduring coherence between actions and words, has the potential to be decisive in developing favourable consensus.

2.21. The increased visibility of our actions, and the manner in which we conduct operations, has led to greater political, public and international scrutiny and accountability. Recent operational experience has demonstrated that this dynamic can potentially lead to policy constraints on the use of force, over and above the requirements of domestic law, the Law of Armed Conflict and general international law. This, in turn, creates potential advantages, or perceptions of advantage, for our adversaries who may not choose to be bound in the same way.

2.22. Potential adversaries, both state and non-state, are increasingly demonstrating the will and capability to undermine Western operational capability, resolve and legitimacy by blending conventional and unconventional forms of conflict, using both attributable and non-attributable methods. Our opponents’ methods, which can be applied in ways that remain below well-established military response thresholds, include posturing, provocation and persuasion in the physical and virtual domains, subversion, economic and cyber warfare, with or without employing conventional military forces. This ‘hybrid’ threat to the international rules-based order can blur our interpretation of the thresholds between peace and armed conflict.

2.23. Battlefields are no longer fixed. Threats that manifest overseas are also often blurred with those at home as our adversaries seek to exploit our vulnerabilities. High impact terrorist attacks are designed to seize the initiative and shape the political agenda, whilst both state and non-state adversaries seek to influence the perceptions of our domestic population. We can no longer expect most potential adversaries to mass for major engagements, rather, they will disperse to mitigate the West’s advantages in air power and long-range stand-off fires. This complexity places even greater requirements on leadership at junior levels by demanding that they operate with autonomy and lead dispersed, agile units that can rapidly concentrate.
2.24. The proliferation of commercially available technology also increases the potential capability and effectiveness of our adversaries, both state and non-state. Secure communications, cyber capabilities and surveillance systems, including unmanned air systems, are affordable and can be easily acquired or improvised. Chemical weapons have been used, whilst biological, nuclear and radiological weapons remain a threat. In particular, cyber and electromagnetic activities present significant opportunities and threats.\textsuperscript{16} From the use of digital communication systems through to global positioning systems (GPS) and weapon guidance systems, cyberspace and the electromagnetic environment routinely provide the medium through which operations are planned by land forces, and make an increasingly important contribution to their execution. Hostile actors constantly probe our systems to seek vulnerabilities, intelligence and advantage, and yet these actions are often difficult to attribute to any state or group, creating unique challenges when formulating an appropriate response.

2.25. The outcomes of a cyber attack may be physical, but the majority are created through the virtual and cognitive domains. Effects may be unpredictable, and will vary depending upon the attacker’s intent and nature of the payload.\textsuperscript{17} Land forces must therefore protect against cyber attacks, while remaining capable of planning and executing operations with reduced or denied access to cyberspace and the electromagnetic environment.

\textsuperscript{16} Cyber is defined as: to operate and project power in and from cyberspace to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events. DCDC, Cyber Primer (2nd Edition). Electromagnetic activities include electromagnetic spectrum operations and electromagnetic warfare. DCDC, Cyber Primer (2nd Edition).

\textsuperscript{17} Cyber attacks can be simple criminal activity on a large or small scale or the use of force equivalent to a kinetic attack. They can appear in many guises, without necessarily inflicting visible or tangible material damage and are more easily deniable by the perpetrator. DCDC, Cyber Primer (2nd Edition)
Key points

- The successful employment of land power requires force elements that are able to adapt to meet the requirements of a specific context.
- The land environment is shaped primarily by human, information and physical aspects.
- The land environment is varied and complex, creating constraints and freedoms for the people and equipment that operate within it.
- War has certain intrinsic attributes that transcend individual clashes and disputes. In particular, the nature of war remains human, adversarial and political.
- The character of conflict is shaped by the age in which it is fought and continues to evolve.
- The distinctions that we can make between the nature of war and the character of conflict inform our approach to force development and design, doctrine, education and training.
- The pervasive nature of information has changed the character of contemporary conflict.
- In an interconnected operating environment, military activity is often immediately visible to local, regional and global audiences.
- Many actors are adept at presenting military activity to the audience, magnifying, mitigating or altering it to influence observers’ understanding of what actually happened.
- Our opponents’ methods, which can be applied in ways that remain below formal Western military response thresholds, complicate our ability to differentiate between peace and armed conflict.
- Battlefields are no longer fixed. Threats that are manifest overseas are also often blurred with those at home as our adversaries seek to exploit our vulnerabilities.
- The proliferation of commercially available technology increases the potential capability and effectiveness of our adversaries, both state and non-state.
Chapter 3 outlines the enduring attributes and required qualities of land forces. It also explains the concept of fighting power.

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Section 3 – Fighting power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Annex 3A – Organisation of land forces . . . . . . . . . . 39
"You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

T. R. Fehrenbach
This Kind of War
Chapter 3 – The foundations of land power

3.1. Every land force has inherent attributes which underpin their relative strengths and limitations. As discussed in Chapter 1, the four attributes of land forces are: soldiers, presence, persistence and versatility. Building on these attributes, a land force also needs to demonstrate certain qualities if it is to be able to exercise land power effectively, in particular the quality of adaptability. The overall operational effectiveness of a force is captured by the concept of fighting power. Fighting power consists of three components: the conceptual, the moral and the physical.

Section 1 – The attributes of land forces

3.2. The enduring attributes of land forces are shaped by the distinct characteristics of the land environment, as well as the enduring nature of war. These attributes create advantages and opportunities which enable the broad utility of land power, although the employment of land forces must also acknowledge the potential challenges they may generate.

Soldiers

3.3. The primary attribute of any land force is its soldiers. Land conflict is a fundamentally human activity and, as such, it cannot be reduced to scientific templates and principles, but rather it relies on human initiative, enterprise and intelligence. Land forces are therefore complex organisations, requiring moral and structural cohesion. This complexity can make land forces difficult to direct, so decentralised command systems tend to work best. Drills and standardised practices can also help achieve common understanding and unity of effort. In a land force the fighting soldier will always be the fundamental constituent of capability, be it moving among, interacting with and reassuring a population under stress, or applying extreme physical violence. Our leaders and soldiers are moulded by training, education and discipline into cohesive teams with high morale and the will to win. A reliance on its people, however, also means that the effectiveness of a land force is dependent upon its ability to recruit and effectively train the necessary number of personnel.
3.4. UK land forces also embrace the Whole Force approach advocated across Defence, which ensures unity of effort across outputs delivered by the right mix of capable and motivated people – regular and reserve Service personnel, MOD civil servants, contractors and other civilians. This means that the land force will consist of a diverse range of people, all of whom must integrate to deliver required outcomes.

**Presence**

3.5. Land forces’ presence on the ground means that they operate in close proximity to people and terrain. First hand interaction with diverse people, places and cultures, as well as exposure to developing problems and threats, provides land forces with the potential to develop a detailed understanding of the human, information and physical aspects of the environment. They can get close enough to distinguish between different people and groups and communicate directly with them, adjusting their approach accordingly.

3.6. Land forces present a particular kind of threat to adversaries, whilst their presence also has the unique capacity to reassure neutral and friendly individuals and groups. Land forces can manoeuvre over ground, or via air or water, to take physical possession of terrain, or they can physically defend or secure it. The forward presence of credible and capable land forces also forms an important aspect of our ability to both deter adversary aggression, and to reassure our allies and partners. In addition, it may be necessary for an intervening force to stand between two or more hostile forces to stabilise the situation before peace can become a possibility. The presence of land forces can therefore be decisive.

**Persistence**

3.7. The attribute of persistence – the capacity of land forces to extend their presence and endure in an area for long periods of time – gives land forces the potential to broaden and deepen their understanding of the local context. The sustained presence of land forces before, during and after a conflict also allows them to engage with, influence and assist local populations and civil authorities, varying their actions according to the situation to make permanent the otherwise temporary gains achieved through combat. Together, the presence and persistence of land forces may be necessary to achieve and sustain a political outcome. Furthermore, persistent overseas engagement by land forces not only builds up vital multinational partnerships, but also ensures access to regional bases should land forces have to deploy to a particular region. Forces deployed for extended periods also require sustainment and protection commensurate with the threats and distance from the home base.
Versatility

3.8. Versatility underpins the ability of a land force to perform many functions; it lies at the heart of land power’s broad strategic utility. Land forces have inherent versatility because they consist largely of organised groups with the ability to conduct a wide range of military and non-military tasks. So, even when optimised for war fighting, land forces retain broad utility. Land forces can perform a wide range of engagement, security and support tasks. Such versatility requires balanced capabilities, organised appropriately for specific tasks. Physical (our equipment) and structural (the way we are organised) versatility is enhanced by cognitive versatility (the ability of our people, backed by effective education, training, common doctrine and mutual understanding, to switch effectively between tasks). However, no land force is infinitely versatile. Factors such as the size of a land force and its objectives, equipment, structure and training will place practical limits on its ability to meet particular contingencies.
The Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in 2014 was of an unprecedented scale. Much of our Armed Force’s value came from being able to generate forces in a timely manner, deploy, and then, critically, sustain them at reach. As part of the joint force, the UK’s land contribution was centred on Headquarters 104 Logistic Support Brigade (the Vanguard Enabling Group), which included a range of capabilities (including command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, engineering, medical and logistics). By November 2014, 800 soldiers had arrived in Sierra Leone as part of Operation GRITROCK to combat Ebola. The initial warning time for deployment was 48 hours, bringing the need for readiness, especially manpower, equipment, training and sustainability, into sharp focus.

The experience and mind-set of working as part of a full spectrum approach, in this case with the Department for International Development in particular, but also with other nations such as Canada, was key in forging the Joint Interagency Task Force (JITF). The success of this inter-agency working was a feature throughout the deployment.

In November 2015, Sierra Leone was declared free of Ebola by the World Health Organization after 42 days without a new reported case. This success demonstrated the broad utility of land power, enabled by versatile land forces who were able to operate in a complex, non-war fighting role in conjunction with non-traditional partners. At the heart of this versatility remained our people; that same soldier who was at risk dealing with Ebola was also called upon to protect people at the Olympic Games or to assist civil authorities in response to flooding in the UK.
Section 2 – Adaptability of land forces

3.9. Although all land forces display the four attributes to a greater or lesser extent, it does not follow that they will succeed on operations. As a relative concept, land power must be adjusted appropriately to the context in which it is employed if it is to achieve desired outcomes. The adaptability of our land forces is the pre-eminent quality which ensures that land power remains relevant in new and changing situations.

3.10. Although land forces are inherently versatile, they require adaptability to deal with new and changing situations, embracing the need to learn quickly and to change plans accordingly. The character of future conflict cannot be predicted accurately, so land forces must prepare for the most complex and demanding operations but also maintain the agility to adapt rapidly to specific operational requirements. Adaptable land forces are able to recognise and understand new challenges, experiment with solutions and implement effective responses at a higher tempo than the enemy. This allows them to seize and maintain the initiative and exploit opportunities. Our land forces’ command philosophy, mission command, embraces decentralised execution, providing the freedom of action to adapt to circumstances within the commander’s intent. Adaptability is further enabled by a number of factors, including education, creativity and common doctrine.
The failure to adapt: Monongahela, 9 July 1755

The French and Indian War (1754–1763) pitted the colonies of British America against those of New France, with both sides supported by military units from their parent countries of Great Britain and France, as well as by Native American allies.

The major British defeat at the battle of Monongahela river reflected the unpreparedness of British forces, who were used to the requirements of conventional warfare against symmetrical European opponents, for the demands of frontier warfare in America. A British column led by General Edward Braddock was dispatched in 1755 with the intention of securing the Ohio river basin through occupation of the French fort Duquesne. Braddock’s force comprised of over 2000 men, including two British regiments and provincial militia. The British Army was well regarded for its tactical ability on the conventional battlefields of Europe. However, Braddock’s expedition was required to traverse and fight in difficult and heavily forested terrain against French, Canadian, but especially Native American opponents who were skilled in irregular warfare.

The key problem with the British approach was the assumption that troops trained in a conventional fashion would be equally effective in an unconventional context. One solution would have been to acquire the skills of local Delaware Indian allies; Braddock, however, was dismissive of the Native Americans seeing them as ‘an unnecessary complication’.18

Frustrated at the slowness of the advance of his forces, Braddock led forward a ‘flying column’ of 1,300 British and provincial troops. Braddock’s forces were confronted by a French force that was far smaller (some 800 men) but which included 600 allied Indians. As the two forces ran into one another, a meeting engagement ensued. In this, the Indian forces proved far superior, combining fluid skirmishing with sudden hand-to-hand attacks from unexpected quarters. Whilst some of the provincial forces were able to fight in a looser fashion, the British troops attempted to fight a regular battle, in European order, with volley fire. Unprepared tactically for the fight and having no effective answer to the methods of their adversary, the British troops were also unprepared psychologically for a mode of warfare in which the enemy often could not be seen, and who seemed to dominate the terrain. After a fight of more than three hours, Braddock’s column was defeated, suffering 800 casualties including Braddock himself.

Before he died, Braddock said ‘We shall better know how to deal with them another time.’ The disaster provided important impetus for the expansion in the British Army of specialist ranger and light infantry capabilities.

Fighting power is a concept that describes the operational effectiveness of armed forces, or any element of them. Fighting power recognises the fact that forces do not simply consist of such tangibles as people and equipment, they also have intangible conceptual and moral properties that can play a decisive role in shaping their effective employment. The drive to achieve the right balance of fighting power guides force development and preparation, with each component adjusted as necessary to meet the needs of a specific context. Fighting power is therefore intrinsically linked to the required quality of adaptability. It consists of three components.

a. The conceptual component. The conceptual component of fighting power rests on the development and application of doctrine, a set of fundamental principles by which land forces guide their actions in support of objectives. Agile, not dogmatic, doctrine takes past experience and extracts guidance for dealing with future challenges, providing a foundation from which initiative can be applied with confidence. An understanding of relevant doctrine, as well as the dynamics of any given situation, provides the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making. The flexibility to adapt to deal with complex, dynamic challenges is another essential element of the conceptual component. Realistic and demanding training to develop core skills, along with organisational and technological flexibility, based on doctrine and supported by effective lessons processes, underpin the ability to adapt successfully.

b. The moral component. The moral component concerns the human aspect of fighting power. It supplies and sustains our land forces’ will to fight. It has three mutually dependent elements.

- High morale enables the land force to fight and overcome the privations of conflict. Moral cohesion contributes to this success, providing a sense of shared identity and purpose that binds individuals into teams, and teams into effective fighting forces. Moral cohesion is sustained by shared values and standards which guide the actions of every soldier.

\[\text{Fighting power is a common concept across Defence and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations and Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine (5th Edition).}\]

\[\text{A detailed breakdown of each component can be found in Chapter 2 of JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine.}\]
Land forces rely on the strength of their leaders at all levels to establish and sustain motivation, morale, moral cohesion and trust. Their vision, intellect, communication and unceasing motivation pave the path through chaos and confusion.

To be effective, a force’s actions must reflect a sound and appropriate ethical, moral and legal foundation. These actions are guided by their obligations as soldiers and an ethical foundation shared with that of UK society. The Values and Standards of the British Army are the practical code that fulfils this foundation. The values of courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity, loyalty and selfless commitment together guide our actions. They demand that the actions of our land forces are lawful, appropriate and totally professional.21

c. The physical component. The physical component of fighting power provides the means to fight. Our ability to attract, recruit and retain the right people, with the right skills, in the right quantity and at the right time is critical to its fighting power. Manpower and equipment are converted into ready, deployable and resilient forces by education and training. Training must be realistic, providing the forcing function for wider innovation and adaptation, as well as creating the conditions in which our Army’s fighting spirit can be developed. Training must therefore become ‘surrogate warfare’ – it needs to replicate the challenge of combat so that it inculcates the confidence and

21 Values and Standards of the British Army and The Army Leadership Code – An Introductory Guide provides a detailed and authoritative explanation.
tactical innovation necessary to prevail in war. Sustainability is also essential; even if the force is fully manned and has all the necessary equipment, if it cannot be sustained, it cannot be employed as intended. The physical component is also reliant on wider resources; manning, equipping, training and sustaining armed forces costs money. The physical component of land forces can be broken down into units and formations, or by the function that they fulfil. These constituent parts are detailed at Annex 3A.

3.12. Fighting power can only be applied if it is held at the appropriate readiness, can be deployed in time, and then recovered for the next operation. Readiness applies to all components of fighting power. The deployment and recovery of land forces also requires organic and non-organic, including joint, enablers. For example, the joint force may enable the deployment of a land force to a point of disembarkation from which it may need to project itself overland for long distances. Fighting power also varies depending on the level of interoperability which the force can achieve with other military formations and with other actors. These factors must be accounted for when considering the employment of land forces in a wider context based on their readiness state and overall military utility in a given situation.
Key points

- Every land force has inherent attributes (soldiers, presence, persistence and versatility) which underpin their relative strengths and limitations.

- The primary attribute of any land force is its soldiers. Land forces rely on human initiative, enterprise and intelligence.

- Land forces’ presence on the ground means that they operate in close proximity to people and terrain, enabling them to physically defend or secure objectives.

- The presence and persistence of land forces may be necessary to achieve and sustain a political outcome.

- Versatility underpins the ability of a land force to perform many functions; it lies at the heart of land power’s broad strategic utility.

- Land forces must be adaptable to deal with new and changing situations, embracing the need to learn quickly and to change plans accordingly.

- Fighting power is a concept that describes the operational effectiveness of armed forces, or any element of them. It consists of three components – the conceptual, the moral and the physical.

- Fighting power can only be applied if it is held at the appropriate readiness, can be deployed in time, and then recovered for the next operation.
Annex 3A – Organisation of land forces

3A.1. Land forces are generally structured hierarchically into formations, units and sub-units and categorised by function and type. They are organised on operations by combining arms to form a cohesive and versatile whole.

3A.2. Table 3A.1 shows the typical hierarchy that flows down from corps, division, brigade, unit and sub-unit. Formations and units are designed to be modular and scalable, so that elements can be easily added or taken away, and they can be expanded or contracted.

| Corps | A corps commands a number of divisions, functional brigades and task forces, comprising all types of force elements. It is the link between the operational and tactical levels of conflict. It can command at the operational level (as a JTFHQ for a land-centric operation or as a Land Component HQ) or as a corps at the higher tactical level. In the British Army, the corps is the highest level of deployable headquarters and is assigned to NATO as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, but can also deploy on national, EU or multinational missions. It is resourced and structured to orchestrate Integrated Action in a joint, interagency and multinational context and can execute large-scale complex operations simultaneously. |
| Division | A division is a combined arms tactical formation that commands brigades within a corps, joint task force (JTF) or theatre framework. It is the lowest level formation that routinely commands all types of force element, capable of planning and executing simultaneously, but can also command at the operational level as a land component headquarters. The division is the lowest level capable of orchestrating integrated action and routinely interacting with joint, inter-agency and multinational actors. |
| Brigade | A brigade is a combined arms tactical formation with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), combat support and combat service support force elements. Its primary focus is achieving tactical effects. |
| Unit | A unit is the smallest grouping capable of independent operations with organic capability over long periods. It contains integral combat service support and limited combat support elements. |
| Sub-unit | A unit contains a number of sub-units, usually three to five. Sub-units are usually grouped into battlegroups or task forces. |

**Table 3A.1 – Land force formations, units and sub-units**

22 A division is defined as: a major administrative and tactical unit/formation which combines in itself the necessary arms and services required for sustained combat, larger than a regiment/brigade and smaller than a corps. NATOTerm.

23 Units of the British Army are called regiments or battalions. A Royal Marine unit is called a commando.

24 British Army sub-units are called squadrons, companies or batteries.
3A.3. Land forces are categorised functionally as combat, combat support or combat service support force elements (see table 3A.2). In addition, the UK also has specialist forces trained for: capacity building tasks; air and amphibious manoeuvre; force protection tasks; and intelligence and reconnaissance tasks.

Table 3A.2 – Functional categorisation of land forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Combat force elements are those that engage the enemy directly. They manoeuvre and fight, typically employing direct fire weapons, to gain ground, find and defeat the enemy, or acquire information. They include armoured, reconnaissance, infantry, and attack and reconnaissance aviation units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat support</td>
<td>Combat support force elements provide operational assistance, including fire and manoeuvre support to combat force elements. They include support helicopters, artillery, combat engineers, intelligence, communications, command support and information activity specialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat service support</td>
<td>Combat service support is the organisational support provided to the whole force, primarily administration and logistics. It includes logistic, health service and equipment support, personnel, welfare and administration force elements. Certain combat service support functions are also provided by combat engineers, such as providing water and electrical power supply or infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3A.4. Complementary to functional categorisation, land forces are also distinguished by their force type, commonly described in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as heavy, medium or light depending on the vehicles and equipment they use. These force types are brought together (task organised) for specific roles or tasks – with force design having to make trade-offs between protection, firepower, operational and tactical mobility, and logistic demand.

3A.5. The combination of capabilities provided by different force elements and types, when they have sufficiently high levels of interoperability, produces extremely powerful combined arms forces. A battle group is a combined arms force commanded by a combat unit headquarters made up of a combination of sub-units drawn from across the functional areas. A task force refers to a combined arms force

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25 Traditionally the major combat and combat support functional branches of the British Army were known as arms (leading to the expression ‘combined arms’) and the combat service support branches were known as services.

26 There are three levels of interoperability. Integrated means that forces are able to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable. Compatible means that forces can interact with each other in the same geographical battlespace in pursuit of a common goal. De-conflicted means that forces can co-exist but not interact with each other.
created for a specific purpose. It is based on the headquarters of any type of force, at unit and formation level, and is not limited to a combat arm.\footnote{An example would be an engineer unit allocated an infantry sub-unit for local protection.}

3A.6. **Task organisation** is the process by which combined arms forces are formed. Task organisation during operations increases flexibility. Task organisation may take place at any level within UK land forces and can, with some limitations, occur within a multinational context. It is enabled by clearly defined command relationships between formations, units and sub-units.
Chapter 4

Employing UK land power

Chapter 4 examines how UK land power is employed. It explores its functions in support of national strategy, its application in the contemporary operating environment, as well as its essential integration with joint, cross-government, multi-agency and multinational partners.

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“All planning, particularly strategic planning, must pay attention to the character of contemporary warfare.”

Carl Von Clausewitz

On War
Chapter 4 – Employing UK land power

4.1. Land power encompasses the employment of UK land forces – in conjunction with joint, multi-agency, multinational and private sector partners – to achieve a broad range of political objectives. In an operating environment defined by complexity and uncertainty, our land forces are capable of exerting land power for strategic effect across a range of tasks, whether deterring adversaries, defeating our enemies, building partnerships or improving stability. This broad utility is encapsulated by the four functions of UK land power – fight, engage, secure and support. But, they are underpinned by the manner in which our land forces orchestrate and execute operations. At the heart of this is integrated action – our ability to intelligently harness lethal and non-lethal capabilities to achieve desired outcomes.

Section 1 – The functions of UK land power

4.2. The functions of UK land power cohere with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations themes of war fighting, security, peace support and peacetime military engagement. The effective exercise of each function is enabled by joint, cross-government, multi-agency and multinational partners. Conversely, each of the functions of UK land power frequently create the conditions for our partners to engage, allowing them to operate where they would otherwise be unable.

4.3. Each function can be exercised independently, but most operations are likely to involve some combination of the four functions, either sequentially or in parallel. For example, while one element of the force is fighting our enemies, others may be engaged in humanitarian relief or capacity building. This versatility is an inherent requirement for success in complex land operations, usually conducted in the midst of non-combatants. Figure 4.1 illustrates the functions of UK land power.

28 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine.
4.4. Although land power’s contribution to deterrence and coercion is significant, it is not considered as an individual function. Instead, deterrence and coercion, underpinned by credible and capable land forces, run as a thread throughout each function. Forward deployed, actively engaged land forces have proven essential to conflict prevention by reassuring our allies and deterring our adversaries. This includes all training activity conducted by UK land forces. Training not only underpins fighting power, but can also reassure allies and simultaneously communicate our determination and credibility to potential adversaries.

**Fight**

4.5. The core capability of land forces is the ability to fight and succeed in combat against our adversaries. Whilst the frequency and scale of combat may vary, the ability to fight effectively remains essential. The ability to prevail in ground combat can be a decisive factor in breaking the enemy’s will; our soldiers possess the unique capability to find, fix, close with, and defeat adversaries. This requires the skilled use of combined arms and the ability to fight using all available combat power in complementary ways. The ability to fight underpins all functions of land power and is essential for intervention and territorial defence, as well as our ability to deter adversaries.

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29 ‘Deterrence aims to dissuade a course of action, whilst coercion aims to encourage a course of action.’ Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*, 5th Edition.
4.6. Early and persistent engagement overseas by our land forces develops regional insight and understanding, and helps to shape international security. Such engagement not only improves the capacity of host nations to handle their own internal security challenges and establishes enduring relationships with regional military and political leaders, but also represents a commitment that demonstrates the UK’s resolve. Soldiers are particularly important in this effort, since all nations have land security elements, even if they lack credible air and naval forces.30

4.7. Overseas engagement by our land forces takes several forms. Capacity building is aimed at reinforcing local stability, developing good governance and enhancing partner nation resilience. Security cooperation deals, including the maintenance of close bilateral relationships with specified partner nations, help to foster exchanges and grow capabilities. Finally, improved compatibility in capabilities and procedures enables the UK to work alongside allies and partners. All of these activities provide our land forces with the insight and understanding which enable them to operate with agility and precision in a context of uncertainty. In turn, this facilitates regional access, leaving us better prepared in the event of a need to intervene.

30 Nearly three quarters of the world’s full-time military personnel, almost 15 million out of some 20 million, are in their nations’ respective armies. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2015.
4.8. Engagement is most effective when initiated in peacetime, since it may help to avert instability and prevent conflict, although it will continue if necessary through conflict and into post-conflict stabilisation operations. Engagement overseas also contributes to national prosperity, with UK training and equipment held in high regard by many nations, enabling sales on behalf of UK industry.

Secure

4.9. Our land forces are able to provide persistent security and protection to both people and places. Indeed, the most commonly employed component of peacekeeping and stabilisation missions are land forces because, as in war fighting, the objective is to compel a change in behaviour by government and people. In non-permissive circumstances, in addition to establishing a robust security framework (which for some force elements may entail more or less continuous combat), land forces may be required to contribute to wider stabilisation activities. When pursuing the gradual transition towards stability, commanders are likely to support the activities of other actors in protecting, strengthening and restoring civil society, governance, rule of law and the economy.
Support

4.10. Land forces can support and assist state and non-state institutions, both at home and overseas. They provide a unique contribution in terms of personnel, command and control, equipment, experience, logistic capacity and access to isolated populations. As well as protecting the integrity of the UK’s coastal waters and airspace, there is a responsibility to assure the physical security of the homeland, on land. In certain circumstances, military aid to the civil authorities may be required beyond the deployment of very small numbers of highly-trained special forces. In an interconnected operating environment, where information is pervasive, threats overseas can rapidly migrate to the home base, requiring increased focus by our land forces in support of civil authorities on homeland resilience and security tasks. Away from home, typical activities include:

- peacekeeping;
- protection;
- providing essential services; and
- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
The decisions and behaviour of local, regional and global audiences determine how conflict is conducted and resolved

31 This is a new definition, based on Army Doctrine Publication, Land Operations and it will be added to the UK’s terminology glossary JDP 0-01.1, UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database, on promulgation.
4.13. Integrated action requires commanders and staff to be clear about the outcome they are seeking and to analyse the audience relevant for them to achieve their objectives. They then identify the effects that they wish to impart on that audience to achieve the outcome, and what capabilities and actions are available. These lethal and non-lethal capabilities may belong to the land force itself, or to external actors involved in the operation. It is important for commanders and staff to determine how to synchronise and orchestrate all the relevant levers to impart effects onto the audience to achieve the desired outcome.

4.14. Integrated action has the audience as its major consideration. It requires sophisticated understanding, integration of all capabilities available, and is outcome-focused. These are the four fundamentals of the doctrine.

   a. People are at the heart of conflict; it is their decisions and behaviours that determine how conflict is conducted and resolved. Integrated action requires consideration of the diverse audience that is relevant for us to achieve our objectives, globally, nationally and within theatres of operations, and includes friendly, neutral and enemy actors. The range of these audiences is illustrated at Figure 4.2.

   b. Integrated action is founded on the land force’s understanding of its task, as well as the human, information and physical aspects of the environment in which they operate. They must also understand the context of a situation or conflict – including its historical, political, economic, cultural and social background – which shapes the resources and missions allocated to land
forces, as well as their freedoms, constraints and relationships with other actors. Understanding is never complete. Rather, it evolves in response to our engagement with changing situations and improved knowledge. It is therefore essential for the force to learn throughout an operation, continually assessing its actions and those of others to generate dynamic and continuous understanding.

c. Land forces create desired effects by integrating lethal and non-lethal capabilities. Effective integration is, in turn, contingent on the cooperation and interoperability of the land force with multinational partners, and effective interaction with host nation, cross-government, non-governmental and inter-agency actors, as well as of tactical combined arms formations and units.

d. Integrated action needs commanders to think about how their actions contribute to the desired outcomes, in a broad and evolving context. Integrated action is planned from the desired outcome back to actions, through objectives and effects, and the execution is adjusted in response to what has been learned and the changing situation. This approach encourages a wider and longer-term view of a situation, relative to the task and role of the land force.

4.15. Integrated action applies at all levels to land forces, from the land component of joint operations to tactical formations, units and sub-units. There is, however, an important delineation between responsibilities for its orchestration and execution.

a. Integrated action can only be fully orchestrated and aligned with joint, inter-agency and multinational activity at the divisional level or above.

b. Brigades and units at the tactical level plan and execute a single tactical activity at a time, routinely integrating their own capabilities to contribute to an integrated action campaign orchestrated at the divisional level or above.

32 A desired outcome is defined as: a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. JDP-01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.
4.16. The two central ideas of land doctrine remain constant: the **manoeuvrist approach** and **mission command**. Together with integrated action, these form the intellectual foundation of UK land forces’ doctrine.

a. The **manoeuvrist approach** is the fighting doctrine of UK land forces. It determines the way we fight enemies across different types of operations, and because fighting can have extremely significant consequences, it is set in the broader context of the audience and integrated action. The manoeuvrist approach requires an attitude of mind that seeks indirect solutions, pits our strengths against enemy vulnerabilities to break the enemy’s will to fight and to undermine their cohesion. We must therefore understand an enemy’s vulnerabilities, both before contact and as they appear and evolve during battle. This indirect approach emphasises the need to act in original ways unexpected by the enemy and a relentless determination to retain the initiative and exploit success. Seizing and holding the initiative allows our own forces to dictate the course of events, to decide and act before our opponents do and so gain advantage. The manoeuvrist approach also seeks to manipulate an enemy’s understanding to produce outcomes favourable to the friendly force. The perception of failure is the best mechanism by which to promote actual failure, convincing the enemy of the futility of their actions. The shock induced by surprise and an enemy’s loss of initiative all contribute to this perception of failure.

b. The exercise of command is the process by which commanders make decisions, impress their will on, and transmit their intentions to, subordinates. Common across Defence, our land forces adhere to the command philosophy of **mission command**. This is an approach which empowers subordinate commanders and promotes initiative as well as freedom and speed of action. It is based on mutual trust between leaders and those they lead. Leaders have a duty to provide the guidance, including a clearly defined intent, as well as the resources and constraints that allow subordinates to use their initiative and judgment. In return subordinates have a duty to act with loyalty and discipline to achieve that intent. Critically, it focuses on achieving the higher intent through mission-type orders. It empowers leaders at every level and is intended to generate agility and tempo. This enables us to overcome an enemy in the most chaotic and demanding circumstances and unlocks everyone’s potential to seize winning opportunities, however fleeting. Supporting integrated action, mission command focuses on outcomes,

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33 Further detail on the application of integrated action, the manoeuvrist approach and mission command, as well as the conduct of operations is covered in detail in the British Army’s capstone doctrine publication, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Land Operations, 2016.

34 JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine.

35 A mission-type order is defined as: **an order issued to a subordinate unit that indicates the mission to be accomplished without specifying how it is to be done.** NATO Term.
Employing UK land power

objectives and effects, rather than specifying the detailed ways in which these are to be achieved.

4.17. Together, integrated action, the manoeuvrist approach and mission command form the fundamental ideas of UK land forces’ doctrine, providing the conceptual framework for applying UK land power. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), *Land Operations* is the primary source of doctrine for UK land operations, and should be consulted by those seeking a more detailed explanation of the British Army’s practices and procedures.

Section 3 – Working together

4.18. The ability of our land forces to integrate with other organisations (military and non-military, within and external to Defence, and at home and overseas), underpins both joint and multinational operations. Military integration is referred to as **interoperability**. Our land forces face distinct challenges to achieving interoperability, including differing objectives, cultures, structures, equipment, laws and languages, as well as variations in doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and sustainment. Achieving high levels of interoperability takes time and resources to develop and maintain, and must be honed through training and by lessons identified during operations. Shared understanding improves interoperability, fusing information from a diverse range of organisations into a coherent whole.

**Full spectrum approach**

4.19. A **full spectrum approach** to national power formalises an approach for dealing with the widest variety of challenges by creating and managing strategies to address complex problems. A full spectrum approach draws on a range of levers available to a state actor in a coordinated way to achieve (geo)political and strategic objectives. This can include overt and covert activities and military and non-military levers. It is designed to ensure that all possible ways and means (including those outside of direct Government control) that could be used to change or influence the behaviour of an opponent or competitor are considered before generating options and creating

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36 Interoperability is defined as: the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. NATO Term.

37 For more details on the full spectrum approach, see Joint Doctrine Note 1/17, Full Spectrum Approach, which will be promulgated in Autumn 2017.
multinational and multi-agency operations

4.20. A national approach will usually be framed within a broader multinational and multi-agency response, involving many actors including allies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. Alliances and coalitions provide a range of options that most nations could not generate independently, including unique capabilities or particular skills, as well as potentially providing the required mass for favourable force ratios. Participation in multinational operations can also enhance perceptions of legitimacy and increase influence across the international community. Maintaining cohesion across the international community is therefore a strategic priority in any multinational operation.

Joint operations

4.21. The term joint describes an operation or organisation in which elements of at least two Services participate. Joint task forces (JTFs) are created for specific operations, and usually exercise command through subordinate land, air, maritime, special forces and logistic components. The relationship between these components is synergistic; they each have unique strengths which combine to enhance the ability of the joint force to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations provide vital sustainment, projection and support, as well as intelligence gathering and the delivery of both lethal and non-lethal fires. Joint operations also significantly enhance options for freedom of manoeuvre and sustainment at speed and reach. A joint approach is therefore one of the foundations of UK Defence policy.

Joint action

4.22. Joint action is a framework for considering the integration, coordination and synchronisation of all military activity within the battlespace. The UK military contribution to a full spectrum approach is delivered through joint action, defined as: the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to create...

38 A full spectrum approach builds on the comprehensive approach (advocated in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine) and the associated enhanced relationships and cultural awareness to apply it to more than just immediate pre- and post-conflict situations and to achieve more than simply shared understanding and aligned planning. A full spectrum approach also develops the integrated approach (described in JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, 5th Edition) by widening it to definitively include all parts of our Government.

39 Multi-agency planning and crisis management is covered in detail in JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.
specific physical and/or psychological effects to influence a range of actors, including allies, civilian partners, regional and global audiences, as well as any adversary. Integrated action provides a doctrine for land forces that is completely compatible with joint action, yet adjusted for the characteristics of tactical land operations. Integrated action is effectively the land component’s contribution to joint action. The relationship between joint action and a full spectrum approach, within the context of an effective political strategy, is visualised at Figure 4.3. Joint action coordinates and synchronises:

- fires (lethal and non-lethal, including through cyber and electromagnetic activities);
- information activities (including regional and key leader engagement);
- manoeuvre (used to gain advantage in time and space); and
- outreach (including stabilisation, support to governance and capacity building).

Figure 4.3 – The relationship between joint action and the full spectrum approach

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40 JDP 3-00, Campaign Execution, 3rd Edition.
4.23. **Land forces’ contribution to joint operations.** Land forces execute a wide variety of missions, ranging from security tasks in support of stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts to major combat operations. Simultaneously, they conduct various types of tactical activities, using fires and manoeuvre to apply overwhelming combat power, achieving decisive results, protecting the force, minimising civilian casualties, and facilitating future operations. Rarely will land, air, naval or special forces alone be capable of achieving the desired outcomes. Only effective mutual support in joint operations will achieve operational success. Land forces do, however, usually remain the decisive instrument by which an alliance or coalition can ultimately impose its will forcibly on any adversary. Depending upon the context, UK land forces are able to:

- integrate the effects of national instruments of power in the land environment;
- defeat enemy land forces;
- secure and hold terrain objectives, including access to areas of operations;
- directly influence the behaviours of conflict actors, in conjunction with other instruments of power;
- enable other Services, instruments of power, partners and agencies to operate, including through providing security, tactical understanding and interpersonal relationships;
- represent strong political commitment in support of national, alliance, coalition or bilateral objectives, complementary to other instruments of power;
- deter hostile and potentially hostile actors from aggression, as part of a credible and capable joint force;
- support the civil authorities in the provision of homeland resilience and security; and
- support conflict prevention and security improvement through persistent engagement and capacity building.
Key points

• The broad utility of land forces is encapsulated by the four functions of UK land power – fight, engage, secure and support.

• Each function can be exercised independently, but most operations are likely to involve some combination of the four functions, either sequentially or in parallel.

• Deterrence and coercion, underpinned by credible and capable land forces, run as a thread throughout each function.

• The core capability of land forces is the ability to fight and succeed in combat against our adversaries.

• Early and persistent engagement overseas by our land forces develops regional insight and understanding, and helps to shape international security.

• Land forces provide persistent security and protection to both people and places.

• Land forces provide support to state and non-state institutions, both at home and overseas.

• Integrated action is the unifying doctrine which guides how land forces orchestrate and execute operations in an interconnected world.

• The manoeuvrist approach is UK land forces’ fighting doctrine. It requires an attitude of mind that seeks indirect solutions, pits our strengths against enemy vulnerabilities to break the enemy’s will to fight and to undermine their cohesion.

• UK land forces adhere to the command philosophy of mission command. This is an approach which empowers subordinate commanders and promotes initiative.

• The ability of our land forces to integrate with other organisations (military and non-military, within and external to Defence, and at home and overseas), underpins both joint and multinational operations. At the national level this is formalised in a full spectrum approach. Across Defence, joint action provides the framework for considering the integration, coordination and synchronisation of all military activity.
### Lexicon

#### Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied administrative publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>full spectrum approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JDP</td>
<td>joint doctrine publication</td>
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<td>Joint Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>JITF</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Task Force</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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Part 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into two parts. First, we list new definitions that will be added to the UK endorsed terminology. Secondly, we list endorsed terms and their definitions which may be helpful to the reader.

New definitions

**integrated action**
The application of the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to change and maintain the understanding and behaviour of audiences in order to achieve a successful outcome. (JDP 0-20)

**land power**
The ability of land forces to exert decisive control and influence on actors and the course of events. (JDP 0-20)

Endorsed definitions

**campaign**
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective. (NATOTerm)

**cognitive domain**
The sphere in which human decision-making occurs as a result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The principal effects generated are upon will and understanding. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)

**command**
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. (NATOTerm)

**common understanding**
The ability to comprehend perceptions of groups other than our own and to establish a common baseline for communication, interpretation and action. (JDP 04, 2nd Edition)
components
Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JDP 01)

control
The authority exercise by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. (NATOTerm)

cyber
To operate and project power in and from cyberspace to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events. (Cyber Primer, 2nd Edition)

Defence Engagement
The means by which we use our Defence assets and activities, short of combat operations, to achieve influence. (JDP 04, 2nd Edition)

desired outcome
A favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. (JDP 01)

environment
The surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelations. (NATOTerm)

intelligence
The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers. (NATOTerm)

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
The activities that synchronises and integrates the planning and operation of collection capabilities, including the processing and dissemination of the resulting product. (JDP 2-00, 3rd Edition)

interoperability
The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives. (NATOTerm)
**joint**
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. (NATOTerm)

**joint action**
The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to create specific physical and/or psychological effects to influence a range of actors, including allies, civilian partners, regional and global audiences, as well as any adversary. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)

**joint force**
A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 01)

**manoeuvrist approach**
An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 01)

**mission command**
A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 01)

**mission-type order**
An order issued to a subordinate unit that indicates the mission to be accomplished without specifying how it is to be done. (NATOTerm)

**multi-agency**
Activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation. (JDP 01)

**multinational**
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. (NATOTerm)
operating environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (NATOTerm)

physical domain
The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated are upon capability. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)

understanding
In the context of decision-making, understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making. (JDP 04, 2nd Edition)

virtual domain
The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information. The principal effects generated are upon understanding. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)