



Understand to Prevent

Practical guidance on the military contribution
to the prevention of violent conflict

MCDC April 2017




Understand to Prevent

Practical guidance on the military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict

A Multinational Capability Development Campaign project

Project Team:

GBR, CAN, DEN, FRA, NLD, NOR, SWE



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Distribution statement

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About this handbook

Purpose

1. This handbook is designed primarily to support **strategic** and **operational** military planning for the prevention of violent conflict, especially violent intrastate and transnational conflict.¹ However, it is also relevant to thinking and planning at the **policy** and **tactical** levels and so can be used across the range of military activity.
2. This handbook has been developed in response to the changing nature of contemporary armed conflict, which is prompting Western forces and their allies to adapt to a range of challenges that lie outside their traditional roles. Against this shifting background, Understand to Prevent (U2P) argues for a new focus – a reorientation of military effort away from crisis response and towards persistent, modulated engagement that seeks to positively manage conflict, prevent violence and build peace.
3. U2P is therefore relevant to all points in the conflict cycle,² not only to the so-called ‘upstream’ phase or in response to an emerging crisis.

Audience

4. Today’s conflict-affected environment is crowded and complex, inhabited by a diverse variety of actors. For the U2P approach to be effective, the military has to build trust with many other actors in the field, some of whom will not be the military’s traditional partners. Therefore, while the handbook’s primary audience is military, it should also be of interest to – and help communication with – a wide range of non-military actors including policy makers, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, police and judiciary.

Structure

5. The handbook is in five parts.

Part 1 – Introduction explains in practical and conceptual terms how U2P complements current mainstream thinking on prevention.

- **Chapter 1 – Understanding Understand to Prevent** explains the basics of the U2P process and how it can complement the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) to support a comprehensive approach to the prevention, resolution or transformation of violent conflict.

¹ The terms ‘conflict’, ‘violence’ and ‘prevention’ have specific meanings in the U2P process. See pages 28-30.

² The conflict cycle (or curve) is a key model for reference in the U2P process. For more detail see pages 14 and 34-37.

- **Chapter 2 – Understanding conflict and violence** offers a brief summary of some of the key ideas discussed in the U2P concept note and can be read as a background to the content that follows.

Part 2 – The Understand to Prevent process takes the reader step-by-step through the four stages of the U2P process: understand, engage, act, endure.

- **Chapter 3 – Understand** is focused on how military and non-military actors can develop the best possible understanding of the conflict they are facing, their relationship to it and which intervention options might be appropriate.
- **Chapter 4 – Engage** explains the practicalities of how to build relationships and structures with the key actors ('stakeholders') relevant to the conflict being considered, with the aim of preventing violence, promoting dialogue and supporting conflict resolution and transformation.
- **Chapter 5 – Act** introduces a grid of possible preventive military actions – alongside complementary non-military actions – that can be taken at each point in the conflict cycle.
- **Chapter 6 – Endure** discusses the elements necessary to planning for the transformation of violent conflict through to a sustainable conclusion of self-governance, including the disciplined monitoring and evaluation of prevention efforts and an understanding of the power of reconciliation.

Part 3 – Pillars of Understand to Prevent explores, through the U2P lens, a number of key issues planners have to consider when designing a comprehensive approach. These are grouped under four major headings.

- **Chapter 7 – Protection of civilians** offers a scenario-based approach to the protection of civilians from direct violence and also looks at complex emergencies, early warning, unarmed civilian protection, health and cultural property protection.
- **Chapter 8 – Gender perspectives** explores prevention from a gender viewpoint and includes discussions on children and conflict-related sexual violence.
- **Chapter 9 – Rule of law** explains how the military can enhance its role in prevention through support for the rule of law, policing and public order, and improved interoperability with policing.
- **Chapter 10 – Security sector reform** consists of four short discussions – security sector reform as a core element in prevention strategy; good governance in security; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) from a prevention perspective; and children in DDR.

Part 4 – Other U2P themes continues to explore, beyond the key themes outlined in Part 3, various issues relevant to prevention planning.

- **Chapter 11 – Conflict sensitivity** explains the vital importance of understanding the impact of one's own role in any conflict to ensure that intervening actors 'do no harm'.
- **Chapter 12 – Religious leader engagement** introduces the role that military 'chaplains' of different faiths can play in furthering prevention and conflict transformation, and illustrates this with case studies from Kosovo and Afghanistan.
- **Chapter 13 – The military and the environment** discusses minimising the negative impact of military operations on the environment, the role of the military in environmental peacebuilding, and how it might respond to the challenges of climate change.

Part 5 – Supporting material offers a range of practical and reference material to be used to support the U2P process; for example analytical tools, case studies and a glossary of terms commonly used in the prevention field.

6. Military planners – and ideally the non-military actors with whom they are working at any level – should familiarise themselves with the contents of the handbook, in particular Chapters 1-6, and draw on it as appropriate when considering how best to respond to a (potentially) violent conflict. U2P does not have to be adopted in its entirety, so picking relevant discrete elements to use as part of prevention planning can also be of benefit.

It is essential to note that everything in this handbook should be treated as guidance. Every conflict is unique and it is crucial that planners always respond, and adapt the suggestions offered here, to local circumstances.

Part 1

Introduction



Chapter 1 – Understanding U2P

1.1 This handbook is designed primarily to support strategic and operational military planning for the prevention of violent conflict, especially violent intrastate and transnational conflict.

Specifically, it supplements the current *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD)¹ – used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its member states and partner nations – by focusing on the **non-kinetic military actions and complementary non-military actions** that have been identified as essential elements of a ‘comprehensive approach’. The complex, interlinked nature of a society demands a comprehensive approach to conflicts because the military alone cannot address all aspects. The military contribution is just one part of a comprehensive approach.

1.2 Key to the Understand to Prevent (U2P) process is therefore the need for military actors to develop a **common understanding** of the conflict with other actors working towards the same ends and, wherever possible, to ‘co-design’ effective and **complementary preventive actions and structures**. Military action, kinetic or non-kinetic, should only be undertaken if it clearly adds **sustainable** value to the commonly agreed objectives.² The need to develop greater interoperability with other key actors (for example, the police) is also coming to the fore.

1.3 To further support the development of mutual understanding, the U2P process stresses the need for military actors to pursue, **as far as possible**, multi-stakeholder engagement (MuSE) with all those who are relevant to the conflict.³ This includes with non-military actors in the home nation(s), and with both military and non-military actors in the host nation.

1.4 The U2P process thus offers detailed and practical support to a comprehensive approach, which calls for:⁴

- the need for proactive engagement between all actors, before and during a crisis;
- the importance of shared understanding stimulated through cooperative working, liaison, education and a common language;
- the value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate – institutional familiarity and information sharing are key; and
- thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal (or outcome), and ideally mutually agreed objectives, underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by unity of purpose.

1 Interim V2.0, 04 October 2013.

2 See Chapter 6 – Endure, pages 65-72.

3 See Chapter 4 – Engage, pages 49-60.

4 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01 (D), *Allied Joint Doctrine*.

Key assumptions

1.5 The guidance in this handbook is offered on the basis of the following key assumptions:

- political will exists to take the necessary action;
- ‘prevention’ refers to any action at any point in the conflict cycle that is taken to prevent, limit or end violence, promote dialogue and resolve or transform conflict;
- human (‘soft’) security and national (‘hard’) security are both important and – based on the rule of law – should be mutually reinforcing;⁵ and
- to be meaningful, peace, security and the management of conflict must be experienced at the local level.

Key features of the Understand to Prevent process

1.6 The U2P process has been developed in response to the multifaceted nature of contemporary armed conflict, in which military forces are increasingly being challenged by the varied demands of a comprehensive approach. While war fighting remains the foundation of military capability, there is therefore a need to supplement the current spectrum of prevention efforts practised by most Western nations (shape-persuade-deter-coerce-intervene) with a new, human-centred model – the iterative U2P process of ‘understand-engage-act-endure’ as illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1 – Understand to Prevent: an iterative process

⁵ See pages 15-16.

1.7 **Understand** means developing as deep an insight as possible of the target conflict (or conflicts, as several overlapping disputes can be involved), and ensuring that this understanding is regularly challenged and refreshed. It also means developing a clear and honest self-awareness – that is, how and why this conflict matters to oneself and one’s partner actors – and an understanding of the effects of different types of intervention.

1.8 **Engage** means building trust with key actors relevant to the target conflict, including with potential partners (at home and in the host nation) who might have been operating in the conflict-affected space for a considerable period (for example, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations) and who have related but different agendas. It also means working together with different actors at various levels of interaction, from simply sharing information to fully-integrated design, planning, preparation and action.

1.9 **Act** means undertaking the best actions that military and non-military actors have identified – based on the understanding and engagement generated in the first two stages – to prevent violence, promote dialogue, enhance security and support conflict resolution/transformation. It means deciding who will take the necessary actions and calculating their second- and third-order effects (and beyond if possible). Crucially, it also means ensuring that these actions ‘do no harm’,⁶ however unintentionally, and that the alternative options to violence are fully explored.

1.10 **Endure** means ensuring that any actions taken to prevent violence, promote dialogue, enhance security and support conflict resolution/transformation are sustained long enough to be/remain effective, through to a sustainable conclusion of self-governance. This necessarily involves early planning for sustainability and establishing upfront a meaningful framework for monitoring and evaluating those actions, which should regularly be adjusted, as necessary.

1.11 **It is essential that U2P is seen as an iterative process.** While progress is made by working through the four stages in turn, ultimately everything is based on understanding and feeds back into it (as shown in Figure 1). The **Understand** and **Engage** stages in particular must be viewed as running together in tandem rather than in sequence. Understanding informs greater engagement, which informs deeper understanding, and so on.

The Understand to Prevent process and the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*

1.12 Figure 2 shows the conflict curve (or cycle), which is an abstract depiction of the escalation of conflict to all-out violence and its de-escalation to peace and reconciliation. Currently, the COPD is activated – by NATO collectively or by one or more of its member states – in response to a crisis, and relates broadly to points 4-8 in the curve (between the red lines).

⁶ See Chapter 11 – Conflict sensitivity, pages 175-178.




Figure 2 – The conflict curve – escalation and de-escalation

1.13 By contrast, the U2P process advocates engagement or intervention at *any* point 1-9 in the curve – by invitation or with a United Nations (UN) mandate – with the intention to prevent violent conflict. In other words, the U2P process seeks to **extend** the thinking that informs the COPD to include points 1-3 + 9 of the conflict curve and to **add** U2P elements to points 4-8.

1.14 The U2P process aligns with, and can inform, the COPD at all levels. Figure 3 shows broadly how it maps onto the COPD phases.




Figure 3 – U2P and COPD crisis management

1.15 The green arrows running beyond Phases 1-6 indicate that the U2P process also seeks to understand/engage (and influence) **before** the COPD is activated and to contribute to sustainable post-violent conflict activities **after** it is suspended. At the **strategic** and **operational** level, the U2P process can support every phase of the COPD by:

- contributing to the development of a common understanding of the conflict and its wider context;
- aiding engagement with, and cooperation between, a broader range of relevant actors;
- identifying possible non-kinetic military actions and complementary non-military actions; and
- helping to facilitate and support an enduring local prevention solution.

Specifically, U2P can support and bring deeper knowledge of understanding and analysis to Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning*, especially to the discussion on ‘operational art, analysis and thinking’ in Chapter 2.

1.16 U2P offers an advanced ‘toolbox’ for enhanced analysis to both AJP-5, which gives doctrinal guidance, and the COPD, which provides the process. Planning teams at strategic or operational level can choose which U2P tools best support analysis in a given situation.⁷

1.17 The U2P process can also inform and help to bridge **political** and **strategic** thinking. Exactly how this can be achieved will be explained in the following pages. Additionally, NATO members and partner states may choose to adapt aspects of the U2P process to the needs of their own forces at the **tactical** level.

Human security and national security

1.18 A central feature of the U2P model is its focus on the need to establish human security as well as national or state-centric (‘hard’) security in host nations. Human security is people-centred and seeks the well-being of individuals and communities, their ability to live free from fear, want and indignity, and the protection of their supporting environments. National security seeks to protect the territorial, economic and political interests of the state and the safety of its citizens – using key state resources such as military and internal security forces – within the context of the rule of law and international conventions of justice and human rights. The contrasting approaches are summarised in Table 1.

⁷ See Annexes A-G.

	National security paradigm	Human security paradigm
Goal	Securing the territorial, economic and political interests of the nation, such as access to key markets and resources, promoting favoured political and economic beliefs, and safeguarding the physical safety of its citizens	Protecting the well-being of all individuals and communities (and their environments) so that they can live free from want and fear, and with dignity
Actors	Primarily state elites, at times employing a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, with military and police/internal security to the fore	Multi-track efforts at top, mid and community levels; a ‘whole-of-society’ approach that stresses rights and includes government, civil society, business, academic, religious and grassroots organisations, amongst others
Analysis	Threats assessments tend to focus on the risk of direct violence (for example, terrorism and foreign attack) and perceived challenges to national interests, status, rule of law and various (often elite) citizen groups	Threat assessments include the risk of direct violence from a wide range of actors (for example, internal and external, state and non-state), plus the harm caused by various structural, cultural and environmental factors (for example, poverty, inequality, discrimination and climate change)
Budget	Focused primarily on military, police and internal security force capacity	More widely dispersed, to bolster political, economic and social development, and preventive capacities
Global ties	State-centric alliances, partnerships and trade deals	Human-centric (but often weaker) relationships that stress interdependence across state borders

Table 1 – Contrasting security paradigms⁸

1.19 These two security approaches are often seen as being in competition but both have a strategic link to justice and rule of law considerations, as it is the absence of these that often leads to increased human **and** state insecurity, which in turn can lead to violent conflict. The U2P process seeks to achieve a mutually supporting balance.

1.20 The balance is made more difficult to achieve the more a state can be described as ‘elite-captured’ rather than ‘citizen-centred’. ‘Elite-captured’ states serve the interests of a small group of elite members in society and actively discriminate against other groups. ‘Citizen-centred states’ – which tend to be democracies – serve the interests of a state’s entire population and enjoy widespread public legitimacy. In elite-captured states, the security sector supports the elite, while in citizen-centred states it serves the population as a whole, impartially.

⁸ Based on (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli, 2015).

‘Local first’

1.21 Closely related to the concept of human security is another key feature of the U2P process – the emphasis it puts on ‘local first’, the local leadership of conflict management and peace processes. ‘Groups of people will always organise, even under the most anarchic circumstances’⁹ and the ‘local first’ approach stresses that prime consideration be given to local individuals and their knowledge, expertise and leadership. Any external engagement must seek to support local actors and facilitate local initiatives – for example, through a ‘co-design’ approach¹⁰ – and not dominate processes or impose outcomes.

1.22 ‘Local first’ is a concept that embraces a spectrum of different models. In **locally led** initiatives, local actors design and implement a strategy, with external actors providing technical and financial support. This contrasts with **locally owned** initiatives, where locals are consulted on the detailed design and implementation of programmes that are initiated and funded by external actors; and **locally implemented** initiatives, which external actors design and fund for local actors to deliver.

1.23 It is important to remember in this context that ‘local’ is a relative and not an absolute concept. From a:

- global perspective a continent might be local;
- continental perspective a region might be local;
- regional perspective a nation might be local;
- national perspective a province might be local;
- provincial perspective a city might be local;
- city perspective a village might be local; and
- local perspective anyone not from that locality might be viewed as an ‘outsider’; those regarded as ‘insiders’ will vary according to context.

1.24 Military planners therefore need to consider at what ‘local’ level preventive action could be most effective and is actually possible, given political and other constraints. As part of a comprehensive and ‘whole of government approach’ planners should also seek to build local inputs into their planning process at the earliest opportunity.

9 (Mandrup, 2010).

10 See pages 23-25.

1.25 In this regard, it is essential to recognise that the prevention, resolution and transformation of conflict are *internal political processes*. Effective support must therefore be carefully attuned to the political context, both locally and more broadly. It must not be regarded simply as a technical activity. For example, local civil society actors are not necessarily representative of all societal groups and might themselves consist of elites with particular interests. Additionally, the complex relationships between external actors and state/local elites can lead to what has been called ‘cooperative’, ‘compromised’, ‘captured’ or ‘confrontational’ peacebuilding. These terms are explained as follows.

- a. **Cooperative** – local elites accept and fully cooperate with the external actors’ peacebuilding programme.
- b. **Compromised** – local elites and external actors negotiate a programme that reflects the desire of external actors for stability and the legitimacy of peacebuilding, and the desire of local elites to ensure that reforms do not threaten their power base.
- c. **Captured** – state and other local elites are able to redirect the distribution of assistance so that it is fully consistent with their interests.
- d. **Confrontational** – external and/or local actors threaten or use coercion to achieve their goals.

In short, it is important to recognise that any preventive action in a contested political space is itself likely to be contested by someone, including (potential) partner actors who are operating to different agendas.

‘Local first’ and the security sector

1.26 The ‘local first’ approach to the security sector supports UN Security Council Resolution 2151, passed in 2014, which ‘reiterates the centrality of national ownership for security sector reform processes, and further reiterates the responsibility of the country concerned in the determination of security sector reform assistance, where appropriate’.¹¹

1.27 There are six distinct approaches to the security sector relationship with society.¹² Figure 4 illustrates these approaches to support an analysis of why civil society-military-police coordination and local ownership of security is possible in some contexts but not others.

¹¹ The maintenance of international peace and security: Security sector reform: challenges and opportunities, UNHCR, (2014).

¹² (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli, 2015).



Figure 4 – Security sector approaches to society¹³

1.28 The U2P process stresses the importance of military forces developing the capacity to engage with two of these approaches – protection of civilians and coordination for human security. Protecting civilians is one of the pillars of the U2P approach and is explored in depth in Chapter 7. The coordination approach involves security forces and an empowered and independent civil society seeking to build mutual understanding to address the root causes of insecurity, and to coordinate, co-design, co-implement and co-monitor efforts in support of human security. In this approach, prevention and peacebuilding skills, values and processes foster relationships across the different sectors that are key to cooperative problem-solving.

1.29 It is important to note that a human security approach does not seek to use elements of civil society as security assets. Rather, it seeks the empowerment of civil society as partners in identifying security challenges, designing and implementing human security programmes, and overseeing the security sector's performance.

The challenge of commonality – a tiered approach

1.30 The persistent challenge of a comprehensive approach is how to achieve commonality of purpose and effort among a range of actors who do not acknowledge a commonly agreed authority, let alone a single chain of command. On the military side, most Western forces and their allies share joint processes that are alien to most civilian actors, while civilian actors can also often find it hard to coordinate with other civilians, even in the same field. Table 2 highlights some of the similarities and differences between military and non-military actors.

¹³ (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli, 2015).

Similarities	Differences
<p>Military actors and civilian actors working in conflict-affected areas share:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • affiliation to their mission; • commitment to peace and stability; • hard-working attitude; • international experience; • life with hardship and danger; • personal risk of injury; • decision-making under pressure; and • frustration with political decisions that can make their work less effective. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most international organisations and NGOs work with a ‘code of conduct’ based on the four humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and operational independence. • They regard the alleviation of human suffering as the highest priority and can see the involvement of armed forces as unhelpful rather than part of a real solution to any humanitarian problem. • The organisational composition of international organisations, governmental organisations and NGOs can differ widely with regard to gender, age and ethnicity of the members. • The organisational structure and procedures of international organisations, governmental organisations and NGOs are primarily determined by de-centralised (<i>versus</i> hierarchical in the military domain) decision-making and donor-driven tasking and execution. • The normally short-fix approach of the military contrasts with the long-term development and peacebuilding approaches of the international organisation and NGO community.

Table 2 – military and non-military actors: similarities and differences¹⁴

1.31 The actions of various non-military actors can be determined by internal mandates that set strict limits on the degree to which they can interact with other organisations, especially the military. Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding NGOs also operate according to different cultures. Figure 5 shows the varying levels of interaction that military forces can expect from non-military actors.

¹⁴ Based on *Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) Civil-Military (CIMIC) Field Handbook* (3rd Edition).




Figure 5 – From coexistence to integration¹⁵

1.32 When taken together, these factors mean that there is no one-size-fits-all model that will deliver a truly comprehensive approach to prevention. Even so, to maximise their effectiveness it is imperative that military and non-military actors seek to develop a *common understanding* of the conflict they are considering and, on this basis, *forge complementary* approaches to prevention.

1.33 While these might be achieved through *ad hoc* or informal arrangements (which could be all that is possible in certain circumstances) the U2P process proposes a more structured, ‘tiered’ approach that seeks to balance inclusiveness, flexibility and effectiveness (Figure 6). It simplifies the different degrees of interaction shown in Figure 5, grouping them into three broad tiers of engagement between military and non-military actors, both within and beyond the conflict-affected space; namely integration, cooperation and sharing.




Figure 6 – Three tiers of interaction

¹⁵ CCOE CIMIC Field Handbook (3rd Edition).

1.34 These three tiers are part of a spectrum, so the exact boundary between them is less important than the key characteristic of each tier. The intention in suggesting these three tiers is to establish a flexible and creative approach to interaction that supports developing a common understanding of a conflict, and complementary approaches towards it.

- a. **Tier 1: Integration** is for those actors who are willing to plan and operate as part of an integrated effort under a commonly recognised authority.
- b. **Tier 2: Cooperation**, based on the two levels of cooperation and coherence in Figure 5, is for those actors who wish to negotiate some complementarity in their actions. This can range from developing common goals to some degree of co-planning and action. The actors retain full autonomy, however.
- c. **Tier 3: Sharing** is based on the first two levels shown in Figure 5, awareness and de-confliction. The aim at this level of interaction is simply, as far as possible, for everyone to know what everyone else is doing, through sharing information.

1.35 A trusted high-profile institution that is concerned about the possibility of violent conflict in a particular country or region could convene Tier 2 – 3 discussions between military and willing non-military actors who have experience, knowledge and skills relevant to the conflict; for example, international organisations, NGOs, academics, diaspora groups, journalists, think-tanks, conflict management experts and peacebuilding practitioners. Together, their input will inform the development of a national or international prevention response. Some of those non-military actors might then become more closely involved at Tier 1, if specific plans are formulated.

1.36 Crucially, the U2P process suggests that these tiers be established both ‘at home’ – to include the various actors who are (or could be) operating in the conflict space – and also, if possible, in the host nation/conflict space itself. This latter point adheres to the principle of ‘local first’ and calls for local actors or institutions to take a leading role.

1.37 The ‘engage’ phase of the U2P model seeks to develop the ‘entry-points’ – i.e. the relationships, based on trust – which will make possible this tiered approach and also enhance its effectiveness. The U2P model therefore calls for the ‘engage’ phase to be initiated if possible with other actors – both at home and in the host nation – **long before any crisis develops**.

1.38 What precise form these three tiers could take will be decided by the participants. Possibilities include consultative forums, advisory groups and contact teams. More important is that the different functions of the tiers are understood.

1.39 The military contribution to these three tiers will vary. At Tiers 2 – 3, which are civilian-led, military actors will ‘have a seat at the table’, sharing information, analysis and possible courses of action. At Tier 1 they will be more central to the political and strategic analysis, and they will obviously lead in the military planning arena.

1.40 In short, the U2P tiered approach is a key mechanism through which military and non-military actors can interact to share knowledge, forge common understanding and co-design complementary approaches to the conflict(s) with which they are dealing.

Co-design

1.41 Central to the sharing, collaboration and integration envisaged in the tiered approach is the concept of co-design. In a general sense, this is a process where technical experts empower, encourage and guide users to develop solutions for themselves. It is used in a number of fields, including prevention and peacebuilding. In this context, external and local actors (and/or military and non-military actors) come together, in defined spheres of expertise and a defined process, to design complementary approaches that aim to resolve or manage a specific conflict, according to its degree of escalation.

1.42 Co-design recognises that local actors can offer insight into the specifics of their physical and social environment and history. They can also bring leadership, initiative, enduring commitment and a genuine desire to seek a lasting solution.

1.43 To support this, external actors can offer an understanding of relevant disciplines, functional skills and knowledge of what has and has not worked in other settings. They can also offer access to funding and resources, networks, supporting data and expertise, and connectivity to wider public opinion. The U2P process argues that solutions co-designed by civil society, internal security/police and military actors should also be co-implemented and co-monitored, to ensure there is consistency from beginning (understand) to end (endure).

1.44 Military forces are generally unfamiliar with co-design. To use it effectively they must develop, institutionally and in selected personnel, the appropriate range of competences.

Military competences

1.45 Military forces using the U2P process will require competence in prevention **at all levels of command**. This demands that the force develops a **collective** competence in how to:

- understand the destructive escalation of societal conflicts; and
- generate operational ideas for military contributions towards constructive conflict transformation.

One aim of this handbook is to support the development of this collective competence.

1.46 In this context, military competence is understood to be the disposition of a person to think, organise and act in new, complex and/or uncertain situations of conflict prevention in a self-organised manner. It is distinguished from skills, which nevertheless are part of an individual's competence.

A competence is defined as: the ability to successfully meet complex demands in a particular context. Competent performance or effective action implies the mobilisation of knowledge, cognitive and practical skills, as well as social and behaviour components such as attitudes, emotions, and values and motivations. A competence – a holistic notion – is therefore not reducible to its cognitive dimensions and thus the terms competence and skills are not synonymous.¹⁶

1.47 Prevention and peacebuilding competence is made up of four base competences.¹⁷ These may be further specified according to the relevant objectives of the military’s role in this activity, illustrated in Table 3.

Personal competence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credibility • Holistic thinking • Discipline • Reliability
Competence of activity and decision-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision-making ability • Initiative • Ability to act/execute
Professional and methodological competence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analytical skills • Objectivity
Social communicative competence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to solve problems • Ability to understand others’ perspectives • Ability to work in a team • Communications skills • Adaptability • Sense of duty

Table 3 – Competences of a military peacebuilder¹⁸

1.48 Competence is a disposition and, unlike skills, cannot simply be taught. The various elements of the required competence for prevention activities need to be fostered through training and education but can only be developed over time. The military actor competent in prevention and peacebuilding has been described in the following manner:

- recognises conflicts of interest with or between others and knows their own position;

¹⁶ Rychen, D.S. and Salganik, L.H. (Eds.), (2003), *Key Competencies for a Successful Life and a Well-Functioning Society*, Hogrefe and Huber.

¹⁷ (Heyse and Erpenbeck, 2007).

¹⁸ Focus group discussions with civil society organisations and Armed Forces of the Philippines officers and non-commissioned officers in Mindanao (2014) facilitated by Cdr T.Boehlke (GAFSCS).

- aware of potential (local) sources of conflict and able to recognise conflict dynamics and respective actors;
- has the insight and willingness/tolerance required to consider other interests objectively (avoiding bias) and critically challenge their own;
- reaches out to stakeholders in community, fellow soldiers or local leaders sensitively (with empathy) and can deal with conflicts;
- exercises impartiality in addressing/resolving conflict issues;
- has persuasive power;
- resolves resistance and obstruction by asserting both sides' interests convincingly;
- inspires trust and emanates confidence; and
- resolves conflicts to the conflicting parties' advantage in a way that increases their personal responsibility, creativity and social communication and is therefore sought as a mediator in cases of conflict.

Interoperability with police and civilian actors

1.49 The social communicative competences of being able to understand others' perspectives, work in a team, communicate and adapt are equally relevant to building relationships in a cross-sector security, justice and development context. These relationships are the basis of more effective cooperative working to deliver a coherent and comprehensive effort to prevent violent conflict, enhance citizen safety and establish the rule of law.

1.50 With regard to policing and multi-agency cooperation, the focus is increasingly on building professional competence, skill and behavioural frameworks for all those working to provide services that safeguard civilians. While the fundamentals of such frameworks contain similar components to military competences, the priority is to link performance to a behavioural and values-based foundation. This is especially relevant for personnel working in complex, stressful and insecure environments where their professionalism, performance and integrity are under increasing scrutiny.

1.51 The behaviours and values highlighted in Figure 7, combined with the competences outlined in Table 3, offer the core components of collaborative working between military, police and civilian actors engaged in the U2P process.




Figure 7 – Bespoke policing and joint interoperability competency framework¹⁹

1.52. The starting-point for such collaborative working is to recognise and understand the competences, roles and responsibilities of all the actors operating as part of a wider security, defence and development sector capability. In this regard, the UK’s Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) offers a scalable template²⁰ that could be used in a multitude of complex and high risk environments where organisations need to work together more effectively.²¹

¹⁹ <http://www.jesip.org.uk/home>

²⁰ http://www.jesip.org.uk/uploads/media/pdf/JESIP_Joint_Doctrine-The_Interoperability_Framework_fedition_2-July-2016.pdf

²¹ For more detail see ‘Policing development and interoperability’, pages 138-144.

Chapter 2 – Understanding conflict and violence

2.1 This section introduces the basic concepts that underpin the U2P process, drawn largely from the MCDC *Understand to Prevent* concept note.¹

2.2 With the decline in interstate war, contemporary violent conflicts have been characterised as ‘war among the people’.² Ambiguous and complex conflicts, with deeply-rooted causes and no clear frontlines, make it difficult to determine what roles the military can play in resolving these wars. However, while it is generally acknowledged that there is no purely military solution to these conflicts, there can be a military contribution to their resolution.

2.3 The military is an element of a state’s claimed monopoly of the use of force, the legitimate and legal (threatened) use of which will have an effect on a conflict’s dynamics. The objective for the military is therefore to use this power to create conditions that help to end hostilities, facilitate a settlement of the conflict through negotiations or dialogue, and prevent a relapse into violence. In its simplest terms, in a preventive capacity the military task is to remove the element of fighting from the escalatory sequence of 'naming – blaming – claiming' shown in Figure 8.

2.4 This sequence might eventually escalate to fighting/violence if a conflict actor expects this to leverage concessions from an opponent or to affect the balance of power in ensuing negotiations. Whether a conflict further escalates also depends on the way armed forces are employed by the state, how they respond to communal violence, civil protest or unrest, and how the public perceives their use and response.

2.5 In short, contemporary intrastate conflicts require armed forces to develop a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics, coupled with the competence to foster conflict management and transformation skills. Allied to this is the challenge to convince non-military actors – especially in government, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs – that military forces could make a contribution of this nature.




Figure 8 – Escalation to violence

¹ *Op. Cit.*

² Smith, R., (2005), *The Utility of Force*.

Key terms

What is conflict?

2.6 This handbook takes conflict to be a natural and inevitable feature of human relationships that arises when we perceive, correctly or not, that something we care about is being threatened or denied. This ‘something’ is invariably related to one or more of our fundamental human needs, which range from the basic and physical to the (often subtle) emotional and psychological.

2.7 Fundamental human needs are frequently in competition with one another, even within individuals, so conflict can be seen as a dynamic process of seeking to meet or prioritise those needs. This process can lead to negative consequences, including violence, if the needs of certain individuals or groups are pursued in a way that threatens or denies the needs of other individuals or groups. However, it can also produce healthy and productive development if the process is both nonviolent and seen as generally fair.

What is violence?

2.8 Drawing on the insights of the noted Norwegian peace scholar, Professor Johan Galtung, this handbook understands violence to take three different but related forms – direct, structural and cultural. As in an iceberg, direct violence is the part that is visible, while the much larger structural and cultural violence that supports it is less visible, ‘hidden’ below the surface as illustrated in Figure 9.




Figure 9 – The violence (DSC) triangle

2.9 Direct violence is the commonly understood definition of violence – behaviour intended to hurt, damage or kill someone or something. Direct violence might be perpetrated physically, verbally and through emotional or psychological pressure.

2.10 Structural violence refers to the inequality, exploitation and oppression of people that is formally or informally embedded within societies in their structures and systems – poverty, racism, sexism, corruption and class discrimination, for example. Military forces are considered by some commentators to be forms of structural violence, especially where they support unjust, exploitative or repressive policies and systems.

2.11 Cultural violence refers to those aspects of society that seek to legitimise, justify or normalise structural and direct violence through reference to religion and ideology, art and language, and empirical and formal science. These could include, for example, culture that depicts men as inherently superior to women, certain races as superior to others, or certain religions, ethnic groups or nationalities as a ‘historic’ threat or enemy.

2.12 Therefore, while the immediate concern might be to address a conflict’s direct violence, threatened or actual, it is vital also to consider its underlying structural and cultural causes. If these are neglected the likelihood is that at some point the direct violence will re-emerge.

What is prevention?

2.13 In light of these descriptions, it must be understood that in the U2P process ‘prevention’ means, in the first instance, to prevent direct violence. Beyond this, it can also mean to engage with transforming the structural and cultural causes of the conflict underlying the (threatened) direct violence, to seek to bring about positive change.

2.14 In short, conflict and the violent means that can be used to ‘resolve’ it should be understood and dealt with separately. Violence should be prevented and conflict should be managed, resolved or transformed (rather than ‘prevented’).

Summary

- In this handbook, 'conflict' is used in its widest sense to refer to disputes between people at all levels, from the individual and domestic to the collective and international.
- These conflicts might involve 'violence', which will be used as defined above and qualified where necessary by the words 'direct', 'structural' or 'cultural'.
- 'Conflict resolution' refers to the process of resolving a conflict permanently i.e. to the satisfaction of all the actors involved.
- 'Conflict transformation' refers to a change (usually an improvement) in the nature of a conflict; for example, a de-escalation or a reconciliation between people or groups. Whereas conflict resolution tends to focus on issues, conflict transformation includes a focus on the relationships between the people involved.
- 'Prevention' refers to the prevention of violence or violent conflict, according to the context.

Key concepts

The ABC triangle

2.15 It is difficult to define conflict in a way that embraces all cases – from the inner conflict of an individual, through a minor dispute between two individuals, to nation-states threatening all-out war. The 'attitude, behaviour, contradiction' (ABC) or conflict triangle (shown in Figure 10), is another concept developed by Johan Galtung, which seeks to reduce conflict to its basics and is now widely accepted by non-military actors working in conflict resolution.




Figure 10 – The conflict (ABC) triangle

2.16 This model argues that all conflict arises from the interplay of three essential elements. These are the:

- **contradiction** – the issue or resource over which there is disagreement or ‘incompatibility’;
- **attitude** of the conflict actors – their perceptions, emotions, judgments and desires – towards the contradiction and each other; and
- **behaviour** that arises from this.

For example, two actors strongly desiring (attitude) the same resource (contradiction) can provoke feelings of mutual hostility (attitude) that give rise to violent action (behaviour).

2.17 Attitude and behaviour can be both the cause and effect of conflict, and so tend to reinforce each other. For example, even the perception (attitude) in one actor that another actor might desire (attitude) the same resource (contradiction) can prompt in them a hostile attitude and behaviour towards the second actor and so provoke hostility in return.

2.18 From this it can be inferred that conflict needs more than simple difference, disagreement or incompatibility between the actors. What is needed to activate a conflict is the perception of **threat** to, or **denial** of, whatever is at the heart of the **contradiction**. If any of the actors fears that they will suffer loss or harm in some way, or will be denied something they care about, conflict will be triggered. Expressing this ABC dynamic in a single sentence, one can say that:

‘conflict arises when people perceive that something they care about is being threatened or denied’.

2.19 If the actor perceives no threat to, or denial of, the ‘something’ they care about, there is no conflict. Similarly, there is no conflict if the actor does not care about the ‘something’ being threatened or denied. Simply put – no threat or denial, or ‘don’t care’, means no conflict. This holds even if the actors express radically different views. On the other hand, the more that the actors care about the ‘something’ being denied, or the greater the perceived threat to it, the more intense the conflict will be. This is especially so if the core beliefs of one or more of the actors is involved.³

2.20 Importantly, whether the perception of threat or denial is accurate or not is immaterial; neither is the merit of the ‘something’. What matters is how the actor sees things, what they care about, and how much. The same goes for all the other actors involved.

³ See ‘Sacred value/core belief analysis’, pages 229-230.

2.26 The attitude of oneness sees conflict in relational terms – it exists because of various causes and conditions that are, in essence, malleable. As those causes and conditions change (the attitudes of the actors towards each other, the context in which they operate, and so on), the conflict will alter to reflect that change. The actors are therefore **connected** by the conflict, which can be viewed as a shared problem that they could work to solve, separately and in various combinations. To do this, though, they each have to overcome their hostility towards ‘the other’ through the conscious development of empathy – the ability to see the shared problem accurately from the other’s perspective, even while disagreeing with that perspective.

2.27 The behaviour that helps to develop empathy is dialogue. This is not to be confused with debate or negotiation. Dialogue is a process of exploring ‘the other’, based on non-judgmental listening and an openness to change through mutual influence.

2.28 The overall effect of this stance is to stimulate the creativity of the conflict actors towards the contradiction. Possible solutions are generated, evaluated, modified, accepted or rejected. The enemy – ‘them’ – becomes a partner in trying to solve the contradiction at the heart of the conflict. Some of the apparently most intractable conflicts have been transformed through applying this stance.

The peace triangle

2.29 The transformative possibilities that exist at the heart of any conflict can be summarised by another of Galtung’s concepts – the peace triangle, illustrated in Figure 12. This combines his conflict (ABC) and violence (DSC) triangles and shows the peace-related activity at each point.




Figure 12 – The ABC + DSC + peace triangles

2.30 **Peacekeeping** engages with the behaviour of direct violence; **peacemaking** seeks to transform the attitudes and cultural violence that drive the violent behaviour; and **peacebuilding** seeks to reform structural contradictions and injustices. Galtung argues that all three points of the peace triangle have to be addressed for lasting and sustainable peace to be established.

The conflict curve (cycle)

2.31 The conflict curve (or cycle) describes the key stages through which a conflict escalates into a violent phase and then de-escalates out of it. According to this model, preventive actions must be appropriate to the relevant point of the conflict curve,⁴ and always seek to direct the conflict dynamic (back) ‘downhill’ on both sides of the ‘peak’, as shown in Figure 13.



1-3 Preventing violent conflict (deep prevention, light prevention, crisis management)
 4-6 Preventing the intensification, prolongation and spread of violent conflict
 7-9 Preventing relapse into violent conflict

Figure 13 – Prevention and the conflict curve

2.32 To give more detail, **differences** exist quite normally between actors but can become the basis of a **contradiction** – a set of incompatible attitudes – which, if unresolved, can harden to the point that the actors **polarise** and turn to **violence**, even all-out **war**. After a time – if no one is strong enough to win, for example – the actors might decide to stop fighting and call a **ceasefire**, which can lead to talks and an **agreement**. As the situation **normalises**, opportunities arise for the actors to explore the possibility of **reconciliation**. Essentially, the conflict curve sees escalation (1-4) as an increasing constriction of negotiating space, the reduction of nonviolent options and the growing threat, then use, of violence. De-escalation (6-9) is the process in reverse.

2.33 Deep prevention means addressing the root causes of conflict to prevent it becoming violent. Light prevention aims to prevent violence by, for example, mediation and confidence-building measures; while crisis management might involve these actions, augmented by more overt security responses.

⁴ See Annex E (pages 261-270) for suggested military responses and complementary non-military actions relevant to each point of the cycle.

2.34 The challenge explored in the U2P process is to engage **as early as possible** – ‘upstream’ at *difference* and *contradiction* (1-2) – **to avoid prevention being enacted predominantly in terms of crisis management/response**. Similarly, actors now understand that if little or no action is taken ‘downstream’ towards normalisation⁵ and reconciliation (8-9), the chances will increase that the cycle will return to contradiction and polarisation (2-3), with the continuing danger of escalation once again into violence and war (4-5).

2.35 Figure 14 presents the conflict curve in a second format and relates the points in the curve to types of conflict resolution and response. The ‘hourglass’ shape represents the narrowing of political space as violence increases.




Figure 14 – The conflict hourglass⁶

5 Normalisation does not mean simply the return to the ‘*status quo ante*’, from which the violent conflict originally developed, but a new state in which the root causes of the conflict are being addressed and transformed without violence.

6 Adapted from (Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H., 2011).

2.36 At 1-3 the aim is to prevent the conflict turning violent through:

- (at 1) **cultural peacebuilding** activities to deepen mutual understanding;
- (at 2) **structural peacebuilding** – essentially reforms to redress societal imbalances – coupled with preventive diplomacy, both formal and informal; and
- (at 3) **peacemaking** (i.e. crisis management to change attitudes).

At 4-6 the aim is to prevent the intensification, prolongation and spread of violent conflict. The aim at 7-9 is to prevent the relapse into war and violence.

2.37 In peacekeeping the military role has centred on conflict containment (the area bounded by the red oblong – 4-6). In recent years it has been extended into activities to support ‘post-conflict’ stabilisation (the area bounded by the red circle – 4-8).

2.38 A third way of depicting the conflict curve recognises that contemporary conflicts are often complex and intractable, and cycle in and out of violent phases. As a result the terms ‘upstream’, ‘downstream’ and ‘post-conflict’ can, paradoxically, refer to the same point as seen from different chronological perspectives i.e. a relatively peaceful point ‘downstream’ of a violent episode (‘post-conflict’) might also be a point ‘upstream’ of the next violent episode. Figure 15 ignores chronology and represents contemporary conflict in terms of the relationship between violence and dialogue.




Figure 15 – Dialogue *versus* violence

2.39 As conflict escalates towards violence (in red), the space for dialogue (in green) contracts, and *vice versa*. However, even in all-out war dialogue between the belligerents is still possible, if only through intermediaries. Conversely, violence is still possible at times of peaceful normality.

2.40 At any point of conflict escalation or de-escalation, the direction of travel might turn in the opposite direction, or become fixed. For example, a political **agreement** might develop into **normalisation**, fall back into **violence** or become stuck in **polarisation**.

2.41 Again, various actors in the same conflict might experience these stages differently. For example, all the actors might consent to a **ceasefire**, then some join peace talks and come to an **agreement** while others return to **violence**. Similarly, different areas of the same country might experience high levels of violence during a conflict, while other areas might be entirely peaceful.

2.42 Military actors seeking to support efforts to prevent violence, promote dialogue and transform conflict must therefore be alert to the need to develop nuanced and flexible responses, appropriate to local conditions, while seeking always to encourage contending actors away from the 'violence' (red) and towards the 'dialogue' (green) sections of Figure 15. The co-design process can be regarded as both a cause and an effect of this persistent effort to expand the space for dialogue in any conflict.

Part 2

The Understand to Prevent process



Process and getting started

Purpose

1. The purpose of Part 2 of this handbook is to inform the detail of prevention planning. At each of the four stages – **understand, engage, act, endure** – suggestions will be offered to help the development of this planning.
2. By working systematically through the four Understand to Prevent (U2P) stages, military planners and the non-military actors working with them will together develop a rich understanding of the conflict under consideration and the various response options available. They will then be able to decide on the most appropriate range of actions that are likely to lead to sustainable peace, as part of an effective comprehensive approach.
3. This process will work best when built on a principle of mutual learning and planning. Analysis of the local context should bring all willing actors together in thinking through decisions on how to carry out the four stages of the process. **Ideally, military and non-military actors should develop mutual understanding and good working relationships prior to any crisis through collaborative training and other initiatives.**

Getting started

4. The U2P process is relevant to all levels – political, strategic, operational and tactical – and all points in the conflict curve. Its use can therefore be suggested by any actor.
5. At early points in the cycle (difference-contradiction) engagement could be on an alliance or bilateral basis and could mix formal and informal initiatives. Initiatives undertaken at these early points could involve military and non-military actors convening on the basis of simply sharing information, at Tier 3; while at Tier 1-2 (integration-cooperation) they might, for example, be focused on training together or contingency planning.
6. As a conflict escalates or if it has already turned violent, military and non-military actors might expect to be formally invited to convene at Tier 1-2 under the political authority of an agreed national or international body. One of the suggested conditions for this meeting could be that the U2P process will be used as the basis for collaborative analysis and planning.
7. Once the Tier 1-2 grouping has convened, the next step is for the actors to discuss and broadly agree to what point the conflict under consideration has developed (see 'Chapter 5: Act'). This initial appraisal will shape and determine the urgency of the following process. On this basis – which can, of course, be amended after further consideration and as the situation develops – the actors should then move fully to the '**understand**' stage of the U2P process.

Chapter 3 – Understand

3.1 The *Understand to Prevent* concept note identifies the following key features of the 'understand' phase of the U2P process:

- create understanding of the conflict and its dynamics;
- adopt a 'do no harm' approach;¹
- build relationships — build networks, adapt;
- be aware of opportunities for conflict transformation;
- engage in a substantial and iterative evaluation of the situation; and
- develop a narrative that describes what is going on.

Bearing these features in mind, the material in this section is focused on exactly how military planners and Tier 1-2 non-military actors can develop the best possible understanding of the conflict (or conflicts, as several can be intertwined within a larger one) within the scope of the prevention challenge.

3.2 Planners should aim for this understanding to be as comprehensive as possible, according to the nature and urgency of the task and the permissiveness of the environment in which it will be undertaken. The level of useful detail that they will need is therefore for them to decide.

3.3 Ideally, this process should be undertaken both 'at home' and in the conflict-affected context, and the analysis shared as far as possible between all the actors involved in prevention efforts. It is important that this understanding is regularly challenged and refreshed. Intrastate conflicts can change rapidly and frequently, for example, and potentially important voices can go unheard.

3.4 It is also important to view the 'understand' and 'engage' stages of the U2P process as mutually reinforcing. As understanding grows, more opportunities for engagement (relationship-building) will become apparent. As these are developed, understanding will grow further, and this continues in a repeated manner.

1 See Chapter 11, Conflict sensitivity, pages 175-178.

3.5 The 'understand' stage is undertaken in three distinct phases – self-assessment, conflict assessment and theory of change.²

- a. **Self-assessment** exercises help to assess the abilities and perception biases of those planning prevention and peacebuilding activities. These can be done by the U2P actors³ separately or in various combinations.
- b. **Conflict assessment** is a process involving basic or advanced interactive exercises to map the factors driving conflict and the factors supporting prevention and peacebuilding. As far as is possible this should be done by the U2P actors working together and – where relevant – to inform Phases 1-3 of the COPD.
- c. **Theory of change** explores the implicit or explicit assumptions about how prevention and peacebuilding efforts will affect a conflict-affected context, and begins to narrow down specific courses of possible action.

These three phases are amplified below and explored in more detail in Annexes A-C.

Self-assessment

3.6 Self-assessment is based on the 'systems thinking' that underlies a comprehensive approach. Systems thinking sees violent conflict as arising from a web of people and factors interacting in a complex local, cultural and historical context. Any actors engaging in that conflict, at any point in the cycle, become part of that system and their actions will have an effect on it – intentional, unintentional or both. The understanding that results from self-assessment (i.e. self-awareness) enables external actors to anticipate, plan for and respond appropriately to how other actors react to their engagement.

3.7 External actors can assume they hold an unbiased approach to the conflict they are considering, while those actors more directly involved are more biased. The U2P process presumes that the views of **all** the actors, internal and external, are shaped by their:

- own political assumptions and belief systems;
- direct and indirect experiences of the conflict – including media reports and academic studies; and
- perceptions of how the conflict affects their interests.

² Adapted from (Schirch, 2013). All material used with the author's kind permission.

³ 'U2P actors' refers to military and non-military actors working together through the U2P process.

3.8 One purpose of self-assessment is therefore to explore and clarify the starting-point of the actors, including their motives and intentions. In this way, the dangers to the conflict assessment of distortion arising from selective perceptions, unchallenged assumptions and groupthink are minimised (or at least made explicit).

3.9 Self-assessment also helps the actors focus on what they can and cannot do in a conflict-affected context. There might be a clear need for prevention or peacebuilding but that does not mean that just anyone can deliver it, as the identity of the actors will affect how local people view and support (or resist) their efforts. For 'Self-assessment step-by-step' see Annex A.⁴

Conflict assessment

3.10 The conflict assessment follows the same pattern of the self-assessment – where, who, why, what, how and when – but each question comes with a set of tools and lenses to explore it from a range of perspectives. There are 20 in total, but not every 'tool' will be appropriate for every conflict. A key decision will therefore be to choose, in light of urgency and time constraints, the 'tools' that are most relevant to the particular conflict you are considering.

3.11 The main questions to be asked will include the following.

- Where is the conflict taking place – in what cultural, social, economic, justice and political context?
- Who are the stakeholders – the people who have a stake or interest in the conflict?
- Why are the stakeholders acting the way they do? What are their motivations?
- What factors are driving or mitigating conflict?
- How is conflict manifested? What are the stakeholders' means and sources of power?
- When: are historical patterns or cycles of the conflict evident?

For 'Conflict assessment toolkit' see Annex B.⁵ Additionally, planners can refer to Parts 3 and 4 of the handbook for more focused guidance on specific issues that might arise in the course of their analysis.

4 See Annex A, pages 203-206.

5 See Annex B, pages 207-246.

3.12 When the conflict assessment has been completed, it is recommended that planners produce a **narrative report** that summarises the answers to the six main questions outlined above. The overall process is illustrated in Figure 16.




Figure 16 – Developing a narrative conflict assessment report

Theory of change

3.13 When a conflict assessment narrative report has been completed, military planners and their non-military colleagues need to consider which theory of change to apply to their planning process. A theory of change is a statement about how an action (or series of actions) hopes to foster change to produce intended outcomes and impacts. Theories of change can be either implicit or explicit assumptions about how prevention and peacebuilding efforts will affect a conflict-affected context.

3.14 Change in conflict rarely happens in a simple cause-and-effect pattern, as conflict can be seen as a complex system in which various factors and actors interrelate with each other. When moving from assessment to planning it is therefore essential that planners can explain how their theories of change are derived from their self-assessment and conflict assessment.

3.15 **In particular, they must be able to explain how a proposed action might address a key conflict driver or mitigator.** Untested and unstated assumptions create a gap between intent and impact, with the result that actions planned to support peace and stability can have no impact or prove counter-productive.

3.16 The U2P process recommends that all stakeholders make transparent and evidence-based decisions about the theories of change that will shape their prevention and peacebuilding planning. As shown in Figure 17, theory of change contains three components – factors, actions and impacts; specifically:

- a theory about what factors are driving or mitigating conflict;
- a theory about what action can be taken to strengthen or weaken those factors to achieve; and
- an impact that prevents violence and/or builds peace



Figure 17 – Theory of change – in theory

3.17 Planners should bear in mind that most theories of change involve hypotheses that need careful testing to become legitimate theories. Only through monitoring and evaluation can evidence be gathered so that the (course of) action achieves the desired impact on the factor. To avoid unintended impacts (as shown in Figure 18), efforts to achieve successful prevention and sustainable, strategic peacebuilding therefore require accurate conflict assessment and judicious articulation of theories of change and evidence supporting these theories.




Figure 18 – Theory of change – in practice?

3.18. There are several theories of change relating to prevention and peacebuilding, and more than one might be applicable to any conflict. The theories of change shown in Table 15 (see Annex C, pages 247-250) are not exhaustive.

3.19. Based on their conflict assessment, and using Table 15 and the questions that follow it, military planners and their non-military colleagues should design one or more theories of change that they believe are most relevant to the conflict-affected context on which they are working. This should then be appended to the Conflict Assessment Narrative Report.

	Self assessment	Conflict assessment lenses	Theory of change	Peacebuilding planning
Where	How well do you understand the local context, language, cultures, religions, etc.? Where will you work?	Where is the conflict taking place – in what cultural, social, economic, justice and political context or system?	If x parts of the context are at the root of conflict and division or provide a foundation of resilience and connection between people, what will influence these factors?	How will the context interact with your efforts? Given your self assessment, identify your capacity to impact the elements of the context that drive conflict and your ability to foster institutional and cultural resilience.
Who	Where are you in the stakeholder map? Where do you have social capital? To which key actors do you relate?	Who are the stakeholders – the people who have a stake or interest in the conflict?	If x individual or group is driving or mitigating conflict, then what action will incentivise them to change?	Who will you work with? Given your self-assessment, decide whom to work with to improve relationships between key stakeholders or support key actors who could play a peacebuilding role between key stakeholders.
Why	How do stakeholders perceive your motivations?	Why are the stakeholders acting the way they do? What are their motivations?	If x group is motivated to drive or mitigate conflict, what will change or support their motivations?	Why will you work? Given your self-assessment of your motivations and how stakeholders perceive your motivations, identify how these align with the motivations of the key actors. What is your goal?
What	What are you capable of doing to address the key drivers and mitigators of conflict?	What factors are driving or mitigating conflict?	If x power sources are driving and mitigating conflict, what actions will influence these factors?	What will you do? Given your self-assessment, identify which driving and mitigating factors you will address.
How	What are your resources, means or sources of power? How will these shape your efforts?	How is conflict manifested? What are the stakeholders' means and sources of power?	If x power sources are driving conflict, what will influence these sources of power?	How will you shift power sources in support of peace? Given your self-assessment, identify and prioritise your capacities to reduce dividers and to increase local capacities for peace.
When	Do you have the ability to respond quickly to windows of vulnerability or opportunity?	Are historical patterns or cycles of the conflict evident?	If x times are conducive to violence or peace, what will influence these times?	When is the best timing for your peacebuilding efforts? Given historical patterns, identify possible windows of opportunity or vulnerability and potential triggers and trends of future scenarios.

Table 4 – 'Understand' summary chart⁶

⁶ (Schirch, 2013).

Summary

- The three 'understand' phases outlined above – self-assessment, conflict assessment and theory of change – are summarised in the first three columns of Table 4. The fourth column offers questions to help apply answers from the first three columns to specific prevention and peacebuilding planning needs.
- The understanding developed through completing this first stage of the U2P process must be periodically revisited and updated during the 'engage', 'act' and 'endure' stages of the process. It must be also be amended in light of what is learnt through ongoing engagement with other actors, especially local ones.
- As far as possible, the understanding that is developed must be shared with other prevention actors and **their challenge invited**. In this way a common understanding of the conflict can be generated between the relevant actors.
- When planners have completed (for now) this stage of the U2P process, they should turn to the next stage – **engage**.

Understand

Notes:

Chapter 4 – Engage

4.1 The *Understand to Prevent* concept note identifies the following key features of the ‘engage’ phase of the U2P process.

- Getting key individuals involved through a respectful, human-centric approach.
- Seeking comprehensive inclusivity (local first/tactical, mid-level actors/operational, whole-of- government/strategic).
- Building credibility and trustworthiness by acting impartially.
- Respecting needs, but tapping in to beliefs, emotions and motivation to influence behaviour (i.e. create a positive effect).

4.2 For clarity, in the U2P process ‘engage’ means to build relationships with key actors (‘stakeholders’) relevant to the conflict being considered, with the aim of preventing violence, promoting dialogue and supporting conflict resolution/transformation. The ‘engage’ step can come at any point in the conflict curve.

4.3 This human-centric approach demands respect, impartiality and attention to people’s needs, and the open and honest acknowledgement of the emotions and motivations at work in all individuals and groups. It strives to enhance the credibility of all parties involved, so they can create a positive effect together. Creating small successes early on can be critical to building credibility and belief in the entire prevention endeavour.

4.4 Engagement should therefore be primarily focused on **increasing understanding and building trust with all the stakeholders**, as far as this is possible, since they all have the potential to affect the conflict positively or negatively – and might already be doing so.

4.5 Approaching engagement in this way allows a more complete picture to be built of the conflict dynamics — a ‘recognised conflict picture’ — which can lead to a deeper understanding of the problem. This can generate a prevention narrative from which further interaction, with more identified actors, can be developed, leading to greater understanding. In the U2P process, ‘engage’ and ‘understand’ are iterative, mutually reinforcing steps.

4.6 Moreover, just as it is difficult to build a ship while sailing, it can be difficult to build relationships based on trust as a crisis is escalating or when it has actually turned violent. It is important to recognise, therefore, that the ‘engage’ step of the U2P process can be initiated at any time, especially with international stakeholders whom the military are likely to encounter – and might have to work with – in the conflict space.

Stakeholders

4.7 'Stakeholders' are individuals and groups who have a 'stake' or interest in some issue or process. In a conflict-affected context it means those who are:

- directly involved in the conflict;
- or will be affected by it (or be affected by how it might be resolved); and
- not (yet) directly involved but might affect it, for example, various international organisations.

4.8 'Stakeholder engagement' comprises the formal and informal ways of staying connected with the stakeholders. 'Engagement' implies understanding their views and taking them into consideration, whilst being accountable to them when accountability is called for and using the information gleaned from them to drive innovative solutions.

4.9 Stakeholder engagement spans a continuum of interaction that reflects the degree of influence stakeholders have in decision-making. At one end, the military might simply inform stakeholders of their plans. At the other, stakeholders are deeply involved from early on in the decision-making process. In between are varying degrees of consultation and participation, which may be characterised as information sharing, consultation and collaboration. Together these correspond to the three tiers explained in Chapter 1 (pages 19-23). At a minimum, there needs to be a genuine effort to understand stakeholder views.¹

National and international stakeholders

4.10 Contemporary operations mostly take place in complex environments, where there are no single causes of conflict but rather a complex situation with many components and stakeholders (as shown in Figure 19). The environment becomes even more complex when international organisations, non-state armed groups (NSAGs), humanitarian organisations, private contractors and other foreign governments and military forces become involved in the peace and security issues in a host nation. In such environments there is no simple causal chain where a single action leads to predictable results.²

4.11 International stakeholders who might form part of the conflict environment include:

- international organisations, for example, the United Nations (UN);
- humanitarian organisations, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross;

1 <http://www.envpmsolutions.ca/resources/stakeholder-engagement-and-management-links>

2 See also 'Complex emergencies', pages 86-90.

- international non-governmental organisations;
- private contractors (including military contractors);
- intervening states (military and civilian agencies); and
- transnational NSAGs.



Figure 19 – Some of the stakeholders involved in contemporary conflicts

Arenas and levels of engagement

4.12 The U2P process sees the military contribution to prevention efforts as operating in three broad arenas.³ The ‘engage’ step of the process is relevant to building relationships in all three of these arenas, namely the following.

- a. Support to host nation authorities.

³ See Chapter 5 – Act, pages 61-64.

- b. Support to national ('home') or Alliance authorities, ideally as part of a 'whole-of-government' approach; and to augment these two arenas of support.
- c. Interaction with a variety of non-military actors, both at home and in the host nation. These will range from the friendly, through the neutral, to the hostile, i.e. both those who do not want to engage and those who are actively adversarial.

4.13 For prevention efforts to be effective, relationships in these three arenas must also operate across the main levels of military activity. Assuming a comprehensive approach has been agreed at the policy level, relationships must be built at the **strategic, operational** and **tactical** levels to ensure consistency of analysis, planning and execution. For example, an international non-governmental organisation will be much more likely to interact positively with military actors in the field if its senior management has already met their military counterparts at the strategic level and agreed procedures with them.

4.14 This implies that relationships must be built not only on a personal basis, important though this is, but must also be institutionalised. This will demonstrate commitment and safeguard continuity when individuals move to other roles.

4.15 It also implies that the nature of the relationships – and who is involved in initiating, developing and sustaining them – will differ according to the arena and level of activity. Table 5 can be used as a guide to help planners identify which stakeholders are relevant to which arena and level of engagement, and who should be responsible for each relationship. For example, while formal peace negotiations will take place at the national or strategic level, effective implementation of prevention measures will also need to focus on the grassroots level (local communities) and therefore call for detailed operational and tactical engagement.

Arena		Support to host nation	Support to home nation/alliance	Non-military actors		
				Friendly	Neutral	Hostile
Level						
Strategic						
Operational						
Tactical						

Table 5 – Level of stakeholder engagement

Stakeholder engagement cycle

4.16 Whatever the arena or level of engagement, the same basic approach (or elements of it) can be employed. The stakeholder engagement cycle is the process of planning and conducting interactions with relevant individuals or groups in support of prevention efforts. The process described below will enhance the understanding and, if appropriate, encourage the generation of military and complementary non-military actions for conflict transformation.

4.17 Each engagement develops in three phases⁴ as illustrated in Figure 20.

- **Phase 1: Planning**
Determines the objectives for the engagement, identifies and prioritises the stakeholders to be engaged, chooses the appropriate approach for each particular stakeholder and identifies who will make that approach.
- **Phase 2: Execution**
The implementation of the engagement plan by the designated individuals or units.
- **Phase 3: Assessment**
Once an engagement plan is implemented, its success (or not) in achieving its goals has to be assessed and fed back into the planning process. The respective measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) need to be developed in Phase 1.




Figure 20 – Stakeholder engagement cycle

Principles of engagement

4.18 The basic principles of stakeholder engagement are as follows.⁵

- a. **Relevance.** Deal with issues of mutual significance (to both you and the stakeholder). This includes the importance of acknowledging and understanding the emotions at play in the situation.
- b. **Involvement.** Establish involvement based on mutual respect and trust. Cooperative and complementary efforts towards mutual benefits and outcomes should be explored.

⁴ (AFP_OG7, 2013.)

⁵ *Ibid.*

- c. **Communication.** Open and effective communication means ‘active’ listening⁶ and offering clear, accurate, relevant and timely information. Directness and transparency are pre-requisites in dealing with partner stakeholders, but also in interacting with adversary stakeholders.

Multi-stakeholder engagement

4.19 The complex environments of conflict often involve several stakeholder groups and prevention is a challenge that requires the combined effort of many different groups, agencies and sectors. Multi-stakeholder engagement (MuSE) assumes that bringing together the resources, knowledge, perspectives, skills and constituencies of the various stakeholders can lead to the political will, collective capacities and sense of ownership needed to prevent violent conflict and build solutions for a sustainable peace.

4.20 The planning follows a ‘systems approach’, where the different actors and their initiatives are seen as complementary to, or directly affecting, each other and are part of a bigger, complex whole.

Stakeholder engagement cycle: Phase 1 – planning

4.21 The stakeholder engagement planning process follows four steps, shown in Table 6. For a detailed explanation of the four steps, see Annex D.⁷




Table 6 – Stakeholder engagement planning process

⁶ See paragraph 4.25.

⁷ See Annex D, pages 251-260.

Summary general engagement plan

4.22 Following the four-step process outlined above will result in a ‘general engagement plan’ that specifies different aspects of the engagement. This can be summarised in a variety of ways – Table 7 is one example.

Stakeholder	Aim	Purpose	Level of participation	Engagement activity
International organisation	Achievement of unity of effort in resolving an escalating conflict	To improve personal or working relationships	Tier 3 – Inform and consult	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cluster meetings⁷ Inter-agency coordination
Local peace council (community level)	Maintaining public order in conflict affected area	To identify potential issues, conflicts and benefits	Tier 2 – Collaborate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consensus building Mediation
Tribal elders/ community leaders	Facilitate community development	To harness people’s energies and resources	Tier 1 – Integrate > empower	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community needs analysis Key leader engagement
Local militia	Maintain ceasefire	To defuse conflict situations	Tier 2 – Involve	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish dialogue Negotiation

Table 7 – Summary general engagement plan

4.23 The general engagement plan will become an integral part of the strategic or operational design and be further specified in the course of action development, along with the appropriate measurement of effect (MOE) and measurement of progress (MOP), as outlined in paragraphs 4.27-4.34.

Stakeholder engagement cycle: Phase 2 – execution

4.24 While the execution of the stakeholder engagement plan must obviously adhere to the aims, purpose and activities as specified, it must be borne in mind that **all stakeholder engagement should be based on increasing understanding and building trust**. To this end, attention is directed to the short article ‘Trust’ (pages 58-60), which explains in some detail the four elements that are

⁸ See ‘Complex emergencies’, pages 86-90.

key to building trust – benevolence, competence, integrity and predictability. To the extent that military actors display these elements consistently in their engagements, so trust will be built with other stakeholders.

4.25 Additionally, the Behavioural Change Stairway Model (illustrated in Figure 21) could prove a useful reference for the development of trust between actors. Active listening involves feeding back to the speaker clear indicators that they have been understood – for example, by summarising, without value judgment, what they have said. This display of empathy helps to build rapport, at which point the speaker becomes more open to influence and behavioural change.




Figure 21 – Behavioural Change Stairway Model

4.26 It should be noted that if this process is pursued authentically, all of the actors involved – including the military – will be susceptible to influence and behavioural change. In other words, the Behavioural Change Stairway should not be viewed as a way to manipulate others to think and behave according to a pre-existing plan. Military thinking and behaviour could also change.

Stakeholder engagement cycle: Phase 3 – assessment

4.27 After each engagement, the military actors involved should assess it according to the agreed MOEs and MOPs. These could include metrics that use the four elements of trust and/or the Behavioural Change Stairway. Progress, challenges and/or changes towards the agreed aims and purposes should be recorded and fed back into the next iteration of the stakeholder engagement plan.⁹

4.28 Assessment may be described as ‘the continuous monitoring and evaluation of all effects and objectives specified in the plan’. The primary purpose of assessment is to support decision-making. It supports the measurement of progress and results, leads to improved planning, enhances knowledge and motivates performance.

⁹ See also Annex F – Measurement and evaluation step-by-step (pages 271-274) and Annex G – Design for measurement (pages 275-286).

4.29 Assessment is a means to evaluate progress toward specific goals to inform decision-making about future activity through the U2P process. Assessment is more than the presentation of measures and metrics. It is the interpretation of those measures in the context of the goals and process. It is possible to distinguish between task assessment (are we doing things right?), operational environment assessment (are we doing the right things?) and campaign assessment (are we accomplishing the mission?).

4.30 MOE is a metric used to measure a current system state. The MOE will help answer the question 'are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?' This may require multiple MOEs per intended system state to fully capture the changes.

4.31 MOP allows the measurement of progress, intending to answer the question 'are the actions being executed as planned?' If, during execution, progress towards the creation of desired effects is not made as expected, one possibility is that actions are not being carried out as planned.

4.32 Measure of success (MOS) is a top-level campaign assessment of overall mission success. This may be primarily a subjective assessment but should be supported where possible with objective metrics. MOS would be the ultimate level of assessment.

4.33 Planning for assessment should consider all contributors to the U2P process. This may include non-military actors such as local government bodies, other government organisations, non-governmental organisations and local philanthropic organisations. This introduces the need to ensure that the intent and intended use of the measures are understood by a wider audience.

4.34 An assessment cell, because of its critical and highly technical function, should be organised as a special staff cell. Not all organisations or military headquarters include a dedicated campaign assessment cell, but the function of coordinating and conducting campaign assessment ought to be assigned to operations research or systems analysis experts. Advantages of a dedicated cell include:

- staff are available to consider campaign assessment in conjunction with campaign planning;
- staff are available to coordinate data gathering and analysis across the headquarters without removing staff from other functions; and
- assessments can be more objective with analysis independent of the data sources.

Trust¹⁰

You trust another entity (person, groups or organisation) when you are willing to rely on them in situations that have risk, expecting that they will be there to provide you with something that you need if and when required. Trust has been determined ‘the single most important element of’ and is critical to the success of all relationships. High trust has been associated with various positive personal and group performance outcomes, including increased timeliness, productivity, communication, and information sharing, and less focus on monitoring the actions and intentions of others; while a lack of trust is associated with greater conflict, less cooperation, and a focus on controls that ensure self-protection rather than integrative problem solving. Trust is considered to be particularly important under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty or crisis...

As depicted [in Figure 22], the decision to trust involves assessments of another entity and is based on up to four dimensions: (i) perceptions of the other’s ability level i.e. competence; (ii) perceptions of genuine, unselfish care and concern i.e. benevolence; (iii) perceived adherence to a commonly-held and valued set of principles i.e. integrity; (iv) perceptions that the other will react in a consistent manner i.e. predictability.




Figure 22 – Four dimensions of trust

Although related, the dimensions are considered to be distinct. Thus, the extent to which each of the dimensions is deemed to be important is assumed to vary, for instance, according to the demands of the situation: in some cases skill and ability may be more important than benevolence (or *vice versa*). Although often based on another party’s past history with us, trust is always considered to be a prediction, i.e. a ‘leap of faith’ concerning future intentions and behaviour.

¹⁰ Excerpts from *Letter Report LR ST1405AL00*, DRDC, Toronto Research Centre, 2013.

Judgements of trust are made based on a combination of emotional and cognitive processes or analytical lenses. For instance, the decision to trust — or not to trust — another can be achieved via:

1. a simple viewing of the rewards against the risks of trusting (i.e. calculative process)
2. a determination that another's past behaviour is a good indication of their future reliability (i.e. prediction process)
3. a determination of the party's positive underlying motivations (i.e. intentionality process) and/or
4. conferring trust on a stranger based on a trusted third party's recommendation, or because they are a member of a trusted social network or agency (i.e. transference process)

...In their excellent analysis of research addressing trust differences across national cultures, Ferrin and Gillespie¹¹ concluded that trust has both universal and culture-specific elements. First, the overall concept of trust was found to exist across cultures, as were the underlying dimensions of integrity, benevolence, predictability and competence. However, there was also clear evidence that culture affected a variety of aspects of trust. For instance, one of the most robust findings was that generalised trust — defined as the level of trust conferred on strangers and acquaintances relative to trust in close friends and kin — differed by culture. There were similar cultural differences in the extent to which affect (i.e. trust based on personal relationships, mutual help, frequency of contact, kin ties) and cognition (trust based on perceptions of professionalism, competence, performance) were implicated in trust judgements, as well as in the specific indicators of trustworthiness such as the role of risk taking opportunities on trust building...

For example, all groups display in-group bias (termed ethnocentrism, and an issue to which we will return later) and trust tends to increase with level of familiarity, with members of all cultures tending to trust kin more than strangers. However, cultures that value individualism (e.g., typically Western industrial nations) and value lower power distance¹² tended to have higher levels of generalised trust of strangers and acquaintances than did cultures that embraced a more collective orientation (often Eastern and/or less industrialised countries). Cultures that value a collective orientation and/or a higher power distance were more likely to evidence higher levels of trust in family and kin and in-group members.

11 DL Ferrin and N Gillespie — 'Trust differences across national-societal cultures: Much to do, or much ado about nothing?' *Organizational Trust: A cultural perspective*, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

12 Power distance is a term coined by the Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede to describe the extent to which a society values hierarchical relationships and respect for authority. Low power distance indicates a preference for less hierarchy; high power distance indicates the opposite.

Perhaps particularly relevant to the issue of foreign militaries working with local militaries and civilian populations, research has also demonstrated that cultural differences have a range of effects on inter- (i.e. different) versus intra- (i.e. same) cultural teams. These include more cooperative behaviour with people of the same culture and more competitive responses when interacting with individuals from a different culture. Furthermore, these cultural differences were observed beyond differences in the individual personality traits among the participants.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the sometimes complex nature of trust, the research reviewed suggested that the basis for the differences in cultural norms was also multi-dimensional, being at least associated with, if not actually determined by, macro-level institutional, economic, social and/or environmental factors. For instance, trust has been shown to be stronger in nations that have higher and more equal incomes, with more formalised institutions that restrain the predatory and arbitrary actions of organisations and governments and among populations that had better education and moderate levels of ethnic homogeneity (relative to populations with high or low ethnic homogeneity)...

In summary then, although developed from the perspective of organisational psychology, the conclusions of Ferrin and Gillespie have clear applicability to the issue of the role of intercultural trust in international military missions:

1. Do not ignore trust. It is crucial for ... [task] success and individual well-being.
2. Ignore cultural differences at your peril. Understanding cultural norms, values, assumptions, and beliefs and how they are manifested in ... behaviours and attitudes, is critical for ... success and individual well-being...
3. Recognise that there are cultural variations in the enactment of trust. Appreciate what it takes to be perceived as trustworthy in one country may differ (however subtly) in another country. When in a foreign culture, adapting one's own behaviour [where possible] to be in line with important local cultural norms typically helps engender trust.

Chapter 5 – Act

5.1 External actors can be invited or mandated to engage in preventive and peacebuilding action at any point in the conflict cycle. Accordingly, this section introduces a grid of possible preventive military actions and complementary non-military actions that can be taken at every point in the cycle. The grid as it relates to ‘1: Difference’ is shown in Figure 23 as an example. The complete grid can be found at Annex E.¹

5.2 The grid can be used for reference by military and non-military actors – especially during the ‘engage’ phase of the U2P process – to explore what complementary preventive actions they might take, on the basis of a common understanding of the conflict that works towards a common goal.

5.3 At each stage of the cycle the most achievable, measurable **main goal** will probably be to de-escalate the conflict by one stage, for example from **violence** (4) to **polarisation** (3) or from **ceasefire** (6) to **agreement** (7). However, this is for the U2P actors to decide, paying particular attention to the views of those on the ground in the conflict-affected environment.

5.4 The first column of the grid – **Stage of conflict** – relates to the conflict cycle. The words ‘Consent of host nation’ or ‘Consent of host nation or international mandate’ indicate the legal basis for the involvement of external actors, of any scale or type. However, regardless of the legal position, it is highly likely that the **legitimacy** of at least some of the external actors will be contested by others, in the host nation and/or external to it, as the conflict escalates and political space narrows.

5.5 The second column of the grid – **Possible desired outcomes** – describes the features of the end-state towards which both military and non-military actors could be working at each stage of the conflict. The details of these will be set either by agreement with the host nation or by the terms of the international mandate. Table 11 (pages 212-216) offers a useful generic guide to possible desired outcomes in various categories.

5.6 The third column – **Military contribution to the host nation** – itemises the specific actions that external military actors can take within the host nation in support of prevention. During phases of the conflict cycle when there is little or no violence these will be focused mainly on aspects of security sector reform.

¹ See Annex E, pages 261-270.

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non-military actions
1. Difference Consent of host nation	Increased human security Good governance Stable and legitimate state institutions Civilian control of security sector Nonviolent management of conflict	Defence diplomacy and relationship development with U2P focus Security sector reform (SSR) Joint military/police/civil society training Prevention (U2P) advice Influence advice Anti-weapons of mass destruction training SMEEs Observer missions	Relationship development, i.e. improve cooperation with relevant actors ('whole of government', international organisations, non-governmental organisations) through MuSE Knowledge and understanding development Joint military/police/civil society training Prevention (U2P) advice Horizon scanning Early warning	Cultural peacebuilding Legal reform Support for local dispute resolution mechanisms and conflict resolution/transformation training Joint military/police/civil society training Fact-finding and peace commissions Promote culture of tolerance and respect Promote acceptance of multiple and inclusive identities

Figure 23 – Example from the U2P 'Actions' grid

5.7 The fourth column – **Military contribution to the home nation/alliance** – itemises the specific actions that military actors can take in their home countries and/or NATO in support of prevention. These fall into three main areas:

- advice to policy-makers;
- collaborative prevention training with non-military actors (police and civil society); and
- relationship building with a wide range of other actors.

5.8 Finally, the fifth column – **Complementary non-military actions** – lists what non-military actors could be doing at each stage of the cycle to work towards commonly understood goals. Again, Table 11 (pages 212-216) offers a useful generic guide for possible complementary non-military actions in a number of categories.

5.9 No part of the grid is exhaustive and additions to any of the boxes are welcome. The aim is to develop as comprehensive a picture as possible.

5.10 The grid should also be used in conjunction with the subjects (and suggested linked actions) in **Part 3 – Pillars of U2P**, **Part 4 – Other U2P themes** and **Part 5 – Annexes A-N**.

Act

Notes:

Chapter 6 – Endure

6.1 In the U2P process, to ‘endure’ means to see the transformation of violent conflict through to a sustainable conclusion of self-governance by maintaining the necessary level of commitment.

6.2 The U2P process considers it vital not to squander hard-won trust and credibility as an external actor by failing to follow through on the implicit promise of sustained assistance. The aim, however, is to help build enduring local capacity for nonviolent conflict management.

6.3 It must therefore be understood that to help shape a society’s values towards to stable and lasting peace demands a high level of commitment from all involved. Consequently, **sustainability of effort** must be factored into the prevention and peacebuilding planning process from the outset.

6.4 Sustainability is best supported when military and non-military actors adhere throughout their involvement in conflict transformation to the key principles of peacebuilding design, shown in Figure 24.

Key principles of peacebuilding design

Based on research – Uses evidence from conflict assessment and self-assessment.

Inclusive – Includes local people on all sides of the conflict.

Local ownership and leadership – Recognises the self-determination and capacities of local people to identify, lead and participate in peacebuilding.

Participatory – Involves stakeholders in decision-making in the designing of conflict assessment approaches and peacebuilding design, monitoring and evaluation.

Transparent – Shares information about goals, activities, selection processes, funding and outcomes of any peacebuilding effort.

Equity – Ensures that the peacebuilding effort contributes to a culture of treating people fairly and does not reinforce social divisions.

Accountable – Responsible for negative impacts on local people and the local context such as elite control, co-optation or diversion of funds for their own gain.

Do no harm – Invests effort to prevent negative impacts on local people and the local context.

Support human security – Prioritises the goal that local people view the peacebuilding effort as increasing their human security.

Figure 24 – Key principles of peacebuilding design¹

1 (Schirch, 2013).

Scope and time

6.5 It is important that military forces – and the policy-makers who deploy them – understand their commitment in terms of **scope** and **time**. Figure 25 depicts the military contribution towards the prevention of violent conflict in terms of scope. In essence, this sees the range of military activity increasing – and non-military activity decreasing – as conflict escalates (and *vice versa*). It is the mirror-image of the ‘hourglass’ shown in Figure 14.²




Figure 25 – The range of military activity expands with escalation

6.6 At difference-contradiction, external military activity with regard to a host nation is normally limited to various forms of military-to-military relationship; for example, defence diplomacy, training support and SSR. As conflict escalates towards violence, external military forces – whether acting by invitation or under an international mandate – become both more active and, in contemporary conflicts, tend to expand their role beyond war fighting to fill gaps vacated by a fragile, failing or failed state. The grid elaborated in Annex E (pages 261-270) gives some idea of the range of activity that military forces might undertake in seeking to prevent or limit contemporary violent conflicts.

6.7 De-escalation sees the process in reverse. By the time normalisation-reconciliation is achieved, external military activity will again be focused almost wholly on military-to-military relationships as the state reasserts its basic functions.

² See page 35.

6.8 The 'endure' implications of this are three-fold.

- a. During the more stable and less violent stages of the conflict cycle (1-2, 8-9) external military forces need to sustain a range of action (endure) focused primarily – though not exclusively – on helping the host nation security forces develop in line with the earlier discussion on 'local first and the security sector'.³
- b. During the less stable and more violent stages of the conflict cycle (3-7) external military forces, in concert with their non-military partners, need to sustain a range of action (endure) focused primarily – though not exclusively – on bringing about, stage-by-stage, a conflict environment that is more stable and less violent.
- c. Some form of enduring 'safety mechanism' needs to be established to ensure that no action taken in either (i) or (ii) has irreversible negative consequences (for example, detention facilities in Iraq). In other words, the military must develop an inherent ability to 'test and adjust' (see 'monitoring and evaluation' below).

6.9 Figure 26 depicts the scale of peacebuilding ambition plotted against the likely time needed to achieve that ambition. In short, this sees more ambitious goals as needing more time to fulfil.




Figure 26 – Scale of peacebuilding ambition plotted against timescale⁴

³ See pages 18-19. See also Chapter 10 – Security sector reform, pages 151-172.

⁴ Adapted from (Schirch, 2013).

6.10 Relating this timescale to the scope of military activity as discussed above, it is clear that external crisis response forces can, at best, deal only with the immediate issue or issues. Wider transformation demands an enduring commitment to military-to-military relationships – in the form of defence diplomacy, joint military-police-civil society training and SSR – that goes far beyond the immediate demands of crisis management.

Monitoring and evaluation⁵

6.11 Key to the sustainability of prevention and peacebuilding efforts is that they are creating their intended effects, as elaborated in the chosen theories of change. Monitoring and evaluating these efforts is therefore essential and **should be included in the planning process from the start**.

6.12 Learning is central to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and to improving the chance of successful interventions. It should offer real-time feedback to the conflict assessment and theories of change to ask whether the assumptions made during the design phase are still relevant to the current context and conflict dynamics. This learning has two aspects, however, which depend on the urgency of the task.

- a. **Providing needed services.** If the goal is to provide needed services in an emergency, a robust monitoring approach is essential so that the intervention can be changed rapidly if it is failing to get the job done.
- b. **Learning whether an intervention works or not.** If the task is less critical, the intervention should be played out to its planned end and the success or failure of the approach evaluated (unless the intervention is clearly making the situation worse). This will provide guidance and lessons learned for others. Changes to the intervention before its planned end will make proper evaluation more difficult.

6.13 Additionally, what and how to measure in relation to conflict, and the conclusions that can be drawn from those measurements, are difficult issues. Cause and effect claims – that X intervention brought about Y result – are often challenged as ‘proving’ no more than a correlation i.e. that X intervention was followed by (or is associated) with Y, but cannot be shown to have caused it.⁶

6.14 Even so, by following the U2P process – which stresses: understanding of self, the conflict dynamics and theories of change; direct engagement with the relevant actors wherever possible; and co-designing, planning and taking action with those actors as far as possible – many of the inherent challenges of M&E can be successfully met. For an explanation of the five steps in the M&E process, see Annex F.⁷

5 Based on (Schirch, 2013).

6 For a fuller discussion, see Annex G, pages 275-286.

7 See Annex F, pages 271-274.

6.15 To support M&E, two basic log frames are offered (Tables 8 and 9) that bring together key elements of the U2P process in a logical sequence. Table 8 helps you summarise your plan – what you are trying to change and how.

Self assessment, organisational capacity, inputs	Goal	Activities	Theory of change	Key audience	Time frame
What resources (economic, skills and social capital) do you have to achieve this goal?	What are you trying to change?	What efforts will you use to foster change?	What is your rationale for this strategy?	Who will be involved?	When will these activities take place?

Table 8 – Prevention and peacebuilding log frame

6.16 Table 9 helps you to monitor and evaluate the effects of putting this plan into action. In this log frame:

- **outputs** refer to how the plan has involved the intended audience, for example, 1000 people complete a training programme in gender awareness;
- **outcomes** refer to the effect of the plan on the intended audience, for example, 87% of those trained report a greater understanding of gender perspectives in various contexts; and
- **impacts** refer to the immediate and longer term effects of the plan on the wider system – this includes second, third (and more) order effects, including those that might be unintended, for example, training in gender awareness might be followed by an increase in female representation in key leader engagement.

Outputs	Indicators or benchmarks	Intended and actual outcomes	Goal, intended and actual impacts
What activities actually took place, how many people were involved, etc.?	How will you measure change?	<p>What are the desired effects of the effort?</p> <p>What were the actual effects?</p> <p>What did you learn about the system?</p>	<p>What will the change look like if you are successful?</p> <p>What were the actual impacts?</p> <p>What did you learn about the system?</p>

Table 9 – Monitoring and evaluation log frame

6.17 Whether or how the outputs, outcomes and impacts are or could be related must then be clarified and the linkages, if any, evaluated.⁸

6.18 Additionally, log frames themselves must be treated with caution, as they can invite thinking about a complex context that is too simple and linear. However, as part of the iterative U2P process, they can help reduce the complexity of a conflict-affected system to something more manageable.

6.19 At the conclusion of the M&E process a summary document should be produced that addresses the three fundamental questions posed in the theory of change formula.

- a. Have we correctly identified all of the factors driving or mitigating the conflict(s)?
- b. Have we taken the correct or sufficient action to weaken the conflict drivers and strengthen the conflict mitigators?
- c. To what extent has violence been prevented or reduced and conflict transformation enabled?

The answers to these three questions and suggestions for improvement should then be fed back into the U2P process, as part of the 'endure' stage, to inform deeper understanding, further engagement and future action.

Normalisation and reconciliation

6.20 When the time is right, military forces can make a key contribution to the process of normalisation and reconciliation that can help prevent the recurrence of violent conflict.⁹

⁸ See Annex G, pages 275-286.

⁹ This might be developed as part of a programme for religious leader engagement; see Chapter 12, pages 179-188.

6.21 To do this, military actors need to understand that even if they have adhered scrupulously to international humanitarian law and the terms of their mandate, their actions might have produced a legacy of bitterness and resentment in others in the conflict environment. If not transformed, these sentiments could fuel future violence. Conversely, reconciliation can mitigate the trauma suffered by some military actors as result of their experience of the conflict; the process works both ways.

6.22 Building on the experience of psychological therapies developed in the wake of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, practitioners at the Eastern Mennonite University in the USA devised the STAR¹⁰ programme for trauma healing and reconciliation. This seeks to break the aggressor/victim ('acting in' and 'acting out') cycles.¹¹

6.23 Psychologists working in this field see the desire for revenge or justice-through-violence as stemming from a sense of victimhood and humiliation following an act of aggression. When there is little or no self-reflection on either an individual or group level, and when grief and fears are not expressed and worked through but suppressed, thought and action tends to focus on punishing the perpetrator/enemy – or even simply 'the other', who can become the scapegoat/proxy for one's anger. At the same time, those who have suffered the trauma can cast themselves, perhaps unconsciously, as perpetual victims.

6.24 In other words, although points 8-9 in the conflict cycle – normalisation and reconciliation – are often called 'post-conflict', for many of those involved the conflict might be continuing in another form and could escalate again into a violent phase if underlying attitudes are not addressed.

6.25 The STAR model, illustrated in Figure 27, is a three-step process of:

- seeing and beginning to break free from the habitual cycles of victim and aggressor;
- confronting and coming to terms with the past; and
- while integrating a transformed view of the past, consciously choosing to shape a new reality.

Efforts to understand one's own role in the traumatic event and its place in a wider context can lead to reconciliation and healing. Justice is not abandoned but is more restorative than punitive – punishment is generally sought only for leaders, for example. At other levels of society mutual recognition of hurt and responsibility, and even forgiveness, might be stressed. The ultimate aim is both to relieve suffering in the present and to ensure that it does not become the cause for future violence.

10 Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience.

11 See also pages 231-232.




Figure 27 – The 'Star' model for trauma healing and reconciliation¹²

12 See also Figure 47 – 'Reaction to trauma: acting in, acting out', page 232.

Part 3

Pillars of Understand to Prevent



Articles in Part 3 and Part 4 follow a similar template:

- (i) a definition or description of the topic under discussion;
- (ii) an explanation of how the topic is relevant to prevention;
- (iii) some background and contextual material;
- (iv) a discussion of how the military might – or already does – contribute to the topic area;
- (v) some initial questions for military planners to consider; and
- (vi) suggestions for further reading.

Chapter 7 – Protection of civilians

7.1 This chapter features seven articles related to the protection of people and property:

- protection of civilians;
- the Norwegian concept for protection of civilians;
- complex emergencies;
- early warning;
- unarmed civilian protection;
- health; and
- cultural property protection.

Section 1 – Protection of civilians

Definition

The protection of civilians (POC) is an evolving concept with, as yet, no commonly agreed definition. For example, POC in the United Nations (UN) peace operations is currently described as involving:

All necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government.¹

By contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offers a ‘conceptual framework’ for POC that is broader in scope and more proactive.

The protection of civilians (persons, objects and services) includes **all efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects** that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment.

Promoting long-term, self-sustained peace, security and stability is best achieved in **cooperation with the local authorities, population and civil society**, such as relevant organizations working for human rights, including gender equality. Avoiding, minimizing and mitigating harm to civilians is an indispensable element of this approach.

¹ ‘The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping’, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support, Reference 2015.07.

The protection of civilians may include a range of activities including the use of force to **prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations** in which civilians suffer or are under the threat of physical violence.

To be effective in integrating the **Protection of Civilians**, NATO efforts need to take into account **the roles and activities of other international actors**.²

While the debate about its precise meaning continues, the term POC is broadly understood to embrace all efforts to reduce the effects of war on civilian life.

Relevance to prevention

7.2 Threats to the well-being and physical safety of civilians can be seen as both a cause for, and an effect of, violent conflict. These threats range from direct targeting, through ‘collateral damage’, to the indirect harm caused by violent conflict; for example, economic disruption and refugee flows.

The ‘protection onion’ (as shown in Figure 28) illustrates the different ‘layers’ of POC.




Figure 28 – The protection ‘onion’ illustrates the different layers of protection of civilians³

² http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160705_1607-protection-civilians-en.pdf

³ Compare with the ‘protection onion’ shown in Figure 31, page 97.

7.3 Responsibility for providing protection in these different layers lies primarily with the host nation government. If the host nation government is unable or unwilling to provide this protection – or is itself actively denying it or perpetrating violence against civilians – the likelihood of internal conflict will increase. Various external actors – military or civilian (for example, non-governmental organisations) – might also intervene to fill the gaps. Military intervention could be by invitation from the host nation government, by external UN mandate or by illegitimate force; for example, from transnational non-state armed groups. Establishing the four layers of the protection ‘onion’ is therefore a key element in preventing violent conflict.

Context

7.4 The protection of civilians has a universally recognised legal basis in international humanitarian law, which requires all parties to armed conflicts to differentiate civilians from ‘combatants’. Under international humanitarian law, civilians are ‘protected persons’ – they cannot be targeted and their life and dignity must be respected. Civilians lose this protection only if, and for as long as, they ‘directly participate in hostilities’. International humanitarian law prohibits combatants from posing as civilians and provides special protection for vulnerable groups of civilians such as children. Nevertheless, before the end of the Cold War even UN peacekeepers were not mandated specifically to protect civilians in areas affected by armed conflict.

7.5 Thinking changed as a result of the atrocities suffered by civilians in the intrastate wars of the 1990s, especially the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre. Realising that civilians had assumed a primary role as both objectives to be won and targets to be attacked in modern-day armed conflicts, a new doctrine, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), was developed and formally recognised by the UN in 2006. Key to R2P is the duty it places on nation states to protect their own citizens. If they fail to do so, the international community is obliged to act.

7.6 R2P has, however, proved problematic. Libya in 2011 was the first – and so far only – instance where the UN authorised a military intervention based on R2P. The decision soon sparked fierce controversy, as critics accused the intervening powers of using R2P as a cover for regime change. Additionally, it is unclear how far R2P can apply to refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) who are not being directly threatened with physical violence.

Military contribution

7.7 Despite the challenges of the R2P concept, POC has become an increasingly important objective in contemporary military operations. Depending on the nature of scenario and the threat it poses, POC can be achieved in a variety of ways. The primary response, if possible, should be through engagement and dialogue with the relevant actors. Other initial responses are to provide physical protection and to establish a protective environment.⁴ Consideration also needs to be given to what long-term mechanisms, structures and reforms need to be established to

4 These responses are based on the UN DPKO/DFS, *Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping*, (2015).

guarantee the sustained protection of civilians. Part of this might involve, for example, reforming the host nation military forces.

7.8 In each scenario, planners should engage with relevant non-military actors to explore the potential for civilians to be mobilised in support of their own protection. This could be, for example, through local early-warning mechanisms, unarmed civilian protection and religious leader engagement.⁵

7.9 Needless to say, all POC initiatives at the operational and tactical level have to be nested within political and strategic thinking that also gives primacy to the protection of civilians. If there is no consistent approach across all levels of response, efforts at the operational and tactical level run the risk of being compromised.

Questions checklist

See 'The Norwegian concept for protection of civilians', pages 79-85.

Further resources

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), (2013) *Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide*.

DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Dilemmas, Emerging Practices and Lessons Learned.

Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

Draft DPKO/DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping. See further Draft outline: 'Mission-wide POC strategies in UN peacekeeping operations'.

Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (2015) *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook (v1.0)* available at https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/CMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%20v1.0_Sept2015.pdf

Further UN Documents for the protection of civilians, available at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/protection-of-civilians/>

⁵ See 'Unarmed civilian protection', pages 96-100.

Section 2 – The Norwegian concept for protection of civilians

Introduction

7.10 In 2014, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) published a scenario-based approach to POC.⁶ It provides guidance and advice on how military forces can use their capabilities more effectively to protect civilians from different types of physical threats.

7.11 The Norwegian POC concept describes seven different scenarios⁷ where military forces may be expected to protect civilians in current and future operations. These are:

- | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Genocide | 2. Ethnic cleansing | 3. Regime crackdown |
| 4. Post-conflict revenge | 5. Communal conflict | 6. Predatory violence |
| | 7. Insurgency | |

7.12 The scenarios depicted in Table 10 (pages 82-83) supplement the ways planners normally develop situational awareness of a crisis situation, by providing greater understanding of the willingness and ability of actors to attack civilians. Below is a **list of implications for military forces identified in the Norwegian POC concept, which outlines possible military response options** that could be considered during prevention planning of military operations, for each particular scenario.⁸

Genocide

- In operational terms, time will be of the essence.
- Ensure threats of military response are convincing.
- Protect moderates, political leadership of the victim group.
- Confront the perpetrators and the units executing the violence on the ground.
- Provide static protection at potential killing sites.
- Militarily defeat the perpetrators on the ground.
- Degrade the political and military leadership's ability to exercise command and control.

6 Beadle, A.W. & Kjeksrud, S., (2014), '*Military planning and assessment guide for the protection of civilians*', FFI-rapport 2014/00965 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment). Close reference to this work is strongly recommended.

7 For a full description of the methodology, parameters and characteristics of each scenario, see Beadle, A.W., (2014), '*Protection of civilians – military planning scenarios and implications*', FFI-rapport 2014/00519 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment).

8 Beadle, A.W., (2014), '*Protection of civilians – military planning scenarios and implications*', FFI-rapport 2014/00519 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment).

- Target media outlets, for example, seize broadcasting facilities.

Ethnic cleansing

- Defend certain cities, villages, enclaves or sites.
- Coerce perpetrators to abandon ethnic cleansing as a strategy.
- Show of force, for example, punitive strikes or larger joint operations.
- Reduce the perpetrator's ability to cleanse civilians, which often depends on freedom of movement for smaller units.

Regime crackdown

- Explore the chance that the regime can be militarily coerced to negotiate.
- Design operations to weaken the regime's ability to target its own citizens and population centres.
- Defend larger population centres or buffer zones through shows of force or punitive and sustained air strikes against fielded armed units.
- Target the forces solely dedicated to regime survival.
- Destroy command and control-nodes and disrupt lines of communication.
- Defeat the perpetrating regime, either directly or indirectly,

Post-conflict revenge

- Ensure recognition of 'who is killing whom' as the role of perpetrators and victims can change.
- Establish static protection of isolated 'safe sites', such as housing complexes, villages or religious buildings.
- Facilitate the orderly return of refugees.
- Deploy rapid reaction forces and civilian police in response to outbreaks of violence.

Communal conflict

- Deter attacks through presence of military forces.

- Protect not only people but also property (such as livestock).
- Establish physical separation through curfews, checkpoints, roadblocks, walls or positioning of forces between the communities.
- Pre-emptively, coerce perpetrators into changing their minds about attacking.
- Develop coercive incentives for parallel disarmament of both communities.

Predatory violence

- Establish protection through presence of military forces in vulnerable areas with many 'easy targets'.
- Protect women and children in particular.
- Degrade the ability of rebel groups to operate freely.
- Employ saturation-approaches typical of counterinsurgency operations.
- Conduct 'search and destroy' missions.
- Raise the costs of continued rebel activity beyond the potential economic rewards of targeting civilians.
- Militarily defeat rebel groups.

Insurgency

- Reduce the number of civilian deaths caused by own actions during operations against insurgents.
- Avoid tactics that will unnecessarily increase the threat of insurgent violence against civilians, such as by patrolling into or provoking fire-fights in insurgent held areas, as this will increase the threat of retaliation against the population.
- Be careful of conducting larger clearing operations into insurgent strongholds or safe havens, as this is where the insurgent threat to civilians is likely to be smallest.
- Carefully evaluate intelligence-driven operations aimed at killing local insurgent leaders on basis of potential retaliation against civilians.
- Deny perpetrators access to the weapons or tactics responsible for the majority of civilian casualties, such as improvised explosive devices.

Generic military planning scenarios for the protection of civilians

Generic scenario	Type of actor	Rationale	Strategies and tactics	Relevant military capabilities	Expected outcome
Genocide Halabja ('88) Rwanda ('94) Srebrenica ('95)	States or the militarily superior actor	To exterminate a certain group	Destroy existence of a group through several simultaneous mass killings, deportation, camps, systematic rape to prevent reproduction	Command and control, freedom of movement for special or irregular units, sufficient small arms	Majority of targeted civilians killed (>50%), in relatively short time
Ethnic cleansing Bosnia ('92–95) Kosovo ('99) Kyrgyzstan ('10)	States or the militarily superior actor	To expel a certain group from a specific territory	Force targeted group to leave through threats, demonstrative killings, brutality, mass-rape, destruction of property	Command and control, freedom of movement for special or irregular units	Only a few per cent killed, but vast majority of victims expelled (~90%); destruction of victim homes and cultural buildings
Regime crackdown Iraq ('86–89) Darfur ('03–) Libya ('11) Syria ('11–) Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ('13–)	Authoritarian regimes or <i>de facto</i> authorities in an area	To control restless populations, on the basis of real or perceived affiliation with opposition	Violently repress the population at large, through selective and indiscriminate violence, threats, mass-detention, rape as terror, massive destruction, occasional massacres	Command and control from regime, freedom of movement for regular forces, heavy weapons, special/irregular units in support	Mostly combatant deaths, gradual increase in civilian deaths due to heavy weapons and in accordance with intensity of fighting; large-scale displacement; widespread destruction of population centres
Post-conflict revenge Kosovo (post '99) Iraq (post '03)	Individuals or mobs	To avenge past crimes on a personal basis	Tit-for-tat score-settling through criminal acts of violence, such as murder, arson, kidnapping, looting	Freedom of movement for individuals and small groups to access victims	Only a few killed (dozens, hundreds), but groups associated with perpetrator may flee following relatively little violence

Generic scenario	Type of actor	Rationale	Strategies and tactics	Relevant military capabilities	Expected outcome
Communal conflict Ituri ('99-'03) Iraq ('06-'07) Jonglei ('09-)	Whole tribal, ethnic or sectarian communities (possibly with outside support)	To avenge a previous attack and to deter further retribution in order to protect themselves	Attempts to coerce other community into submission through massacres, abductions, raids, destruction of homes and means of survival, often seeking to maximise violence	Freedom of movement to reach other communities, access to deadlier weapons and means of communication is associated with higher lethality	Relatively high number of people killed and abducted, especially women and children; livelihoods stolen or killed; temporary displacement in homogenous areas, more gradual withdrawal to 'their own' in mixed areas
Predatory violence Renamo ('75-'92) RUF ('91-'02) LRA ('94-)	Rebel groups (predatory behaviour)	To survive or make a profit by exploiting civilians	Coerce civilians into compliance through plunder, taxation, forced recruitment, opportunistic rape, brutality, especially against 'easy targets'	Freedom of movement to pick time and place of attack, operational secrecy, outside support, possibly central command	Temporary, but large-scale displacement in affected areas and disproportionately many relative to the number of people actually attacked; many abductions, especially of young adolescents
Insurgency FARC ('64-) Taliban ('06-) al-Shabaab ('06-)	Rebel groups (classic insurgents with political or ideological objectives)	To control populations upon which they depend and undermine trust in their rivals	Selective and indiscriminate violence, through threats, targeted killings, bombings, retribution, depending on their level of control	Freedom of movement to pick time and place of attack, access to indiscriminate and explosive weapons	Fewer killed and injured than in other scenarios, most due to indiscriminate weapons; gradual displacement from areas of heavy fighting

Table 10 – Generic military planning scenarios for the protection of civilians⁹

⁹ Reproduced with permission from FFI. Source: Beadle, A.W. & Kjeksrud, S., (2014), 'Military planning and assessment guide for the protection of civilians'. FFI-rapport 2014/00965, page 13.

Assessment of protection of civilians¹⁰

7.13 The Norwegian POC-concept has also identified six ways of measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of actions taken to protect civilians. These are:

1. Civilian casualty figures
2. Civilian behaviour
3. Perception of security
4. Shifts in territorial control
5. Access to/delivery of humanitarian assistance
6. Perpetrator capabilities

These can be used as a basis for developing relevant and concrete metrics during the planning of prevention operations.

Questions checklist¹¹

- What type of actor is responsible for the majority of violence against civilians?
- What is the perpetrator's rationale for attacking civilians?
- What strategies and tactics does the perpetrator employ against civilians?
- Which capabilities are relevant to the perpetrator's ability to attack civilians?
- How imminent is the threat to civilians?
- Where is the threat to civilians most imminent?
- What military capabilities do perpetrators require to attack civilians in the ways they want?
- Who are the civilians, where are they and to where are they moving?
- What is the most likely perpetrator course of action (COA) against civilians?
- What is the most dangerous perpetrator course of action against civilians?
- Which of our own courses of action may reduce the threat to civilians?
- Which of our own courses of action may increase the threat to civilians?

10 Våge, A.S. & Beadle, A.W., (2014), *Assessing protection of civilians in military operations*, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, (FFI-rapport 2014/00966).

11 Captured from Beadle, A.W. & Kjeksrud, S., (2014), *'Military planning and assessment guide for the protection of civilians'*. FFI-rapport 2014/00965 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment).

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Section 3 – Complex emergencies

Definition

A complex emergency (also known as a complex crisis) has been defined by the UN as a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.¹²

Relevance to prevention

7.14 Complex emergencies are characterised by:

- extensive violence and loss of life;
- massive displacements of people;
- widespread damage to societies and economies;
- the need for large-scale, multifaceted humanitarian assistance;
- the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints; and
- significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas.

A complex emergency can be both the cause and the effect of violent conflict, in which military actors can play a significant mitigating role, if so tasked. The guidance offered in this handbook is relevant to many of the challenges military actors can face when dealing with a complex emergency. The term ‘complex emergency’ is used to identify humanitarian crises that occur in contested security environments.

Context

7.15 The Australian Civil-Military Centre notes that:¹³

The role of the military in complex emergencies is a contentious matter within the civil-military community. Militaries can secure an environment to allow humanitarian actions to proceed. Militaries can also provide a range of logistics and personnel to

¹² UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), December 1994.

¹³ *Civil-Military-Police Language Guide: Promoting Shared Understanding*, Australian Civil-Military Centre, February 2015.

deliver humanitarian assistance to an affected population. Whether humanitarian actors wish to take advantage of broader military capabilities, or whether they choose to rely on the military simply to provide a secure environment, either action presents the risk of compromising humanitarian independence by association.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as an example, relies on adherence to the ‘humanitarian principles’ to preserve its security. To ensure it is perceived as neutral and independent from any parties to the conflict, the ICRC does not use military logistic assets or armed escorts. On the other hand, some non-governmental organisations (depending on their mandate and donors’ wishes) will engage with security services, accepting that the safety of their personnel requires acquiescing to the presence of security providers.

Military contribution

7.16 The military contribution to the alleviation of a complex emergency varies considerably, according to the nature of the emergency and the political and organisational context in which military forces are deployed; for example, as part of a UN, regional (for example, European Union, African Union or NATO) or bilateral mission. The mandate that authorises their deployment will set the limits of military operation – on the use of force, for instance – but if it is either too vague or too prescriptive it can also cause significant problems.


7.17 In all cases, a persistent challenge for military forces will be to integrate, coordinate or simply share information with other ‘friendly’ actors operating in the same space. These can include the following.

- Other military forces, for example, from the host nation and its allies.
- UN mission – assembled and deployed in response to the crisis, it will usually comprise a civilian, military and police element (Figure 29). The civilian element could be further divided between a ‘political’ element and a humanitarian relief element, the latter of which is normally organised according to the ‘cluster system’ (Figure 30).
- UN country team – usually already in place and focused on development issues, for example, poverty, health care and education.
- Other international organisations, for example, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or the ICRC.
- International and local non-governmental organisations, for example, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding.
- Private contractors, for example, security companies, logistics companies.
- International and local media.

7.18 All of these actors will be operating in pursuit of their own goals and according to their own mandates and protocols, which will not usually harmonise with one another. Neither will these actors necessarily wish to work together, let alone integrate efforts under a commonly accepted authority.¹⁴ Relationship building by military actors at all levels with this broad community, **before and during deployment**, is therefore key to the successful execution of their mission.

7.19 A contemporary UN Integrated Mission (Figure 30) will be headed up by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), supported by two Deputy Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (DSRSG). One DSRSG will be responsible for the political, military and police aspects of the mission and the other for the humanitarian aspects, which will normally be organised according to the ‘cluster approach’, although this is under review. The Force Commander will be expected to work in close liaison with his DSRSG, the SRSG and the Police Commissioner.

7.20 The ‘Cluster System’ (Figure 29) is the main functional coordination mechanism of the humanitarian community. It works around humanitarian areas (sectors), to prevent gaps in humanitarian response and ensure a coherent approach. It is designed to provide predictability and accountability in humanitarian coordination.



© Based on UN OCHA

Figure 29 – UN Cluster Approach

14 See *Same Space – Different Mandates (International Edition): A Civil-Military-Police Guide to Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response*, Australian Civil-Military Centre, April 2015. Also see pages 19-23, 'The challenges of commonality – a tiered approach'.




Figure 30 – A model UN Integrated Mission Structure

(Picture: Patrick Cammaert/Fincent 2016)

7.21 'Clusters' are groups of dedicated subject matter experts who support humanitarian assistance delivery by identifying needs and available resources, coordinating, implementing and monitoring projects, and conducting joint needs assessments and gap analyses in the field. It is important to note that clusters are not command and control structures. Action is agreed through consensus, cooperation and information sharing to gain a clear picture of the situation and prioritise resources to address needs and avoid duplication of effort.

Questions checklist

- Are the overall mandate and your force's role within it clear?
- Which other 'friendly' actors are operating within your force's area of responsibility? How do their mandates overlap or conflict with yours?
- What mechanisms are necessary to liaise with these other actors? Is it clear which are willing to integrate with your mission, which to cooperate/coordinate with and which will simply share information?
- Which actors will have little or no contact with your forces and why? What problems might this cause and how can they be overcome?
- How might the guidance offered in this handbook support your work with other actors in your area of responsibility?

Further resources

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (August 1999), *OCHA Orientation Handbook on Complex Emergencies*.

United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, (March 2003), *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*.

United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, (June 2004), *IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (November 2007), *Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief*.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (2014), *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Guide for the Military*.

Australian Civil-Military Centre, (2015), *Civil-military-police language guide: promoting shared understanding*.

Section 4 – Early warning

Definition

Early warning is a process of producing and communicating knowledge about rapidly growing risks of harm to a given value or interest that enables potential responders to take preventive, or at least mitigating, action. It is motivated by the belief that early recognition is crucial to early action, which is seen as less costly and risky than responding only when a threat has fully manifested itself. It has been used to pre-empt or defend against attacks from states, but also more recently against civil war, instability and mass atrocities.

At its core are typically the interlinked tasks of collecting, analysing and communicating risks to relevant responders. In conflict early warning, a substantial emphasis is also placed on the related tasks of prioritising and monitoring risk situations, and analysing suitable options for response. For non-governmental warners especially, conflict early warning seeks to overcome resistance among decision-makers to inconvenient surprises and early action.

Relevance to prevention

7.22 Early warning is deemed an essential component for effective conflict and mass atrocity prevention and mitigation. It should be designed back to front, namely starting from the relevant decision-makers interests, priorities, worldviews, instruments and ways of operation. It can enable, stimulate and inform preventive action, particularly within the setting of intra-state conflict. Shaped by the experience of genocide, ethnic cleansing and more generally identity-based conflict in the Balkans and Africa, early warning starts from the premise that conflicts drivers and early indicators of escalatory dynamics can be sufficiently known to inform warning and facilitate preparedness and, ultimately, prevention. More specifically, early warning can help to:

- rationalise and prioritise scarce foreign and security policy attention and resources to areas of greatest potential harm;
- identify conflict risks and threats to foreign populations early, but also highlight indirect threats and problems such as terrorism, refugees, weapons trafficking and destabilisation of neighbours;
- devise suitable options for early preventive action or enhance preparedness;
- persuade decision-makers to overcome disbelief and short-termism, for instance, by spelling-out the consequences of non-action in a way that relates to their interests and key assumptions; and
- build relationships and understanding between analysts and decision-makers and thus facilitate more informed policy and more relevant warning.

7.23 Early warning and response systems have been mainly developed by regional organisations such as the European Union, African Union and Economic Community of West Africa States. They operate with different methodologies, such as ‘indicators’ and regular reporting processes, resulting in country ‘watchlist’ or ‘risk of instability’ reports (UK), which are assessed at regular intervals to create ‘decision-forcing’ points.

7.24 In addition, there is ‘outside-in’ early warning from non-governmental organisations. These are contained in qualitative reports by the International Crisis Group or International Alert; more formal measurement of genocide risks by the Early Warning Project¹⁵ of the US Holocaust Museum; and media warnings by foreign correspondents.

7.25 Significant obstacles to early warning realising its potential to facilitate early action have been identified. These include:

- psychological biases in assessing conflict risks and enemy intentions;
- divergent views on what should be warned about;
- ambiguous, imprecise, non-actionable and mistimed warnings;
- insufficient understanding and trust between warners and responders;
- slow moving information processing and decision-making within organisations;
- ideological resistance, over-confidence and disincentives to act early among decision-makers; and
- too long a lead-time for crucial resources or instruments to mobilise.

Context

7.26 Conflict early warning is a relatively young field when compared with the study of early warning about state attacks within particularly the US (military) intelligence.¹⁶ The concept of conflict early warning dates back to the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* report by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali. It gained further currency among practitioners and scholars in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the wars of former Yugoslavia, and through the reports to the Carnegie Commission the Prevention of Deadly Conflict in 1997. Its attractiveness rose with the frequency of intrastate wars after the end of the Cold War and the adoption of conflict prevention by the OSCE, European Union and subsequently major states in strategic thinking.

¹⁵ <https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/how-to-prevent-genocide/early-warning-project>.

¹⁶ See (Grabo, 2010) and (Wohstetter, 1962) in ‘Further reading’, page 95.

7.27 New initiatives have focused on creating warning response systems that are local and involve citizens or community leaders, such as in Sri Lanka and Kyrgyzstan, with different degrees of effectiveness. Similarly, growing emphasis is placed on the use of big data and crowd-sourcing to facilitate citizen-based early warning and response. Since the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a new norm, early warning about mass atrocities has emerged as an area related to, yet distinct from, warnings about conflict or instability.¹⁷

Military contribution

7.28 Whilst some of the enthusiasm for conflict early warning was fed by the promise that military action can be avoided through early non-military action, there is growing recognition that the military can positively contribute to conflict and mass atrocity prevention if it is properly integrated in a comprehensive approach and is highly sensitive to local conditions. Distinguishing preventive operations from conventional military intervention that has often served distinctly political aims (such as bringing about regime change) is crucial to the legitimacy of the use of military means, particularly when contested by some conflict parties or without United Nations Security Council authorisation. Early warning intelligence for military operations with a preventive purpose differ in important respects from warning intelligence regarding conventional threats. The military's contribution to early warning and response can include:

- sharing its culture of being alert to unwelcome developments and learning lessons from failure;
- promoting prioritisation criteria that integrate risks of conflict alongside national security risks;
- feeding into conflict early warning directly, through better understanding of the military capabilities and strategies of conflict actors, based on intelligence capacities usually not available to analysts relying on open source materials;
- working with civilian warners to improve the military component of options for preventive or mitigating action, including lead-times, thus increasing the actionability, credibility and timeliness of early warning;
- increasing the persuasiveness of warnings to local actors and enhancing preventive diplomacy through military-to military contacts;
- contributing military means to prevention, for example, deploying troops for deterrence purposes, possibly in combination with, or as back-up to, gendarmerie-type robust policing, to prevent riots and deter aggressors;

¹⁷ See (Bellamy, 2001) in 'Further reading', page 95.

- helping to implement measures that restrict the ability of conflict parties to recruit and arm, including withdrawal of military assistance;
- mounting operations to jam or destroy media promoting hate-speech and incitement to violence, which could be countered with counter-propaganda operations; and
- providing safe-havens and corridors to enable victims to escape harm, establishing and enforcing no-fly zones, and restricting the use of certain types of military equipment.

Questions checklist

- What is the level of interest in a specific country, or in preventing specific kinds of threat to national interests, or the protection of fundamental human rights?
- Which response instruments are available at local, regional and foreign-state level to prevent conflict and create peace in these countries (alone or with partners) and what is their 'lead-time', including typical decision-making speed?
- Is it possible to devolve (to the lowest possible level) the authority to warn and respond? The action and reaction threshold for local responders is lower than Western states, and so they might be able to act earlier with other instruments and greater legitimacy.
- What is the scope for shortening response lead-times by shortening either decision-times or lead times for instruments (for example, by devolving authority downwards, creating fast-track channels, or creating new or improving current instruments)?
- Who are the key decision-makers responsible for mobilising these instruments? What are their time resources, information needs, interests, and worldviews?
- Is it possible to ring-fence the time of bureaucratic and individual decision-makers for preventive rather than reactive action? If not, prevention will always be crowded out by crisis response.
- What is the expertise available in-house, in the region or in collaboration with others for early warning about specific conflicts in specific countries/regions?
- Are warning producers trained about the most common errors when generating warnings, such as wishful thinking, mirror imaging, denial and so on?

- What is the relationship between warning producers and decision-makers?
 - o Are decision-makers aware of the potential and limits of forecasts about violence and expertise on how to interpret warnings?
 - o Are warning producers aware of decision-makers information needs, receptivity, worldviews, capacities for taking action and how to effectively communicate warnings?
- Do you have the methods and procedures to assess when warning-and-response has been successful or unsuccessful? Unless one celebrates preventive success, warning and preventive action will not pay.

Further reading

Bellamy, A., (2001), *Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent*, Policy Analysis Brief, Stanley Foundation (which has many useful resources on conflict prevention)

George, A. L. and Holl, J.E., (1997), *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Corporation.

Grabo, C., (2010), *Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security*. Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education Series. Edited by Jan Goldman, Volume Number 12, Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

Meyer, C. O., Smith, K. E. et al, (2013), *Report on Strengthening the EU's Capacities for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities and Genocide*, Budapest Centre for International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities.

Meyer, C. O., (2015), *Early Warning about Violent Conflict: Better Intelligence for Early Action*, Policy Brief of the Foresight research group.

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Wohstetter, R., (1962), *Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.

Section 5 – Unarmed civilian protection

Definition

Unarmed civilian protection (UCP) is an approach that involves a combination of nonviolent methods aimed at preventing violence, providing direct physical protection to civilians in a variety of contexts, and strengthening local peace infrastructures. Nonviolent principles and methods define the skills needed by UCP practitioners who, in turn, operate in the framework of internationally set guidelines. Applied together, these elements constitute the core of unarmed civilian protection.

Unarmed civilian protectors (UCPs) also support local actors as they work to address the roots and consequences of violent conflict. UCP adopts a bottom-up approach in determining protection needs, applying methods and identifying local capacities to address those needs and support the peace processes.

Relevance to prevention

7.29 UCP may be applied in situations of violent conflict, imminent violence and post-crisis situations. During early stages of conflicts, UCPs can be deployed to prevent or reduce violence; at later stages, they can intervene to sustain peace agreements.

7.30 While maintaining their independence, UCPs may operate alongside, and collaborate with, international and regional peace structures and operations also deployed on the ground, as illustrated in Figure 31. Though mandates very often overlap, the specific guiding principles and methods of UCP differentiate unarmed practitioners from other actors. In places where regional and/or international structures are in place, UCPs may play a complementary role; for example, in strengthening community-based protection capacities, protecting civilians in areas where security protocols prohibit armed peace operations and in accompanying or supporting mediation processes (through ongoing engagement with conflict parties at the local level). Similarly, UCPs may play an important role in identifying and addressing protection needs of particularly targeted groups, such as human rights defenders and journalists.

7.31 UCPs may also work in environments where regional or international organisations are not present. As unarmed protection is provided upon request from local actors and does not require multilateral authorisation or formal governmental consent before initiation (although visas are typically required), the intervention of UCP organisations into conflict and post-violent conflict environments can be easier and quicker than the entry of more formal regional and international actors.




Figure 31 – UCP sits within a layered scheme of protection

Context

7.32 UN peace operations have assisted states in protecting civilians. However, there are many situations of war and violent conflict where UN peace operations cannot be deployed and where government actors are not able or willing to provide protection to (all) civilians. The international community has been struggling, in theory and in practice, with the question of its responsibility to protect civilians within the territory of sovereign states. In addition, the scale and complexity of protection challenges in the Balkans, Rwanda, Darfur, Libya, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, South Sudan and the Central African Republic have demonstrated that threats to civilians are complex and dynamic and that no single international actor is capable of mitigating them without significant support from other institutions.

7.33 Over the past decade, the international community has begun to recognise that civil society organisations may play a long-established and often critical role in seeking to address large unmet protection needs. Both the UN’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the global study in the implementation of UNSCR 1325¹⁸ cited and made recommendations regarding UCP. With Nonviolent Peaceforce leading the field, a dozen of these organisations focus specifically on providing direct physical protection to civilians and reducing violence, through UCP, in 17 areas of violent conflict. Between 1990 and 2014 over 50 civil society organisations applied UCP methods in 35 conflict areas.

Military contribution

7.34 UCP draws its strength and legitimacy from adhering to the core principles of nonviolence, non-partisanship, independence and giving primacy to local actors. Working closely with military

18 *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.*

forces can therefore be inherently problematic. Nevertheless, if military forces are sensitive to those core principles they can support UCP through appropriate liaison at different points in the conflict cycle and collaborate on protection activities. To do this effectively they need to understand how UCP works, which is illustrated in Figures 32 and 33.



Figure 32 – Understanding unarmed civilian protection

7.35 UCP employs four main methods: proactive engagement, monitoring, relationship building, and capacity development. These methods are applied to:

- prevent violence and reduce the impact of violence;
- increase the safety and security of civilians threatened by violence; and
- strengthen local peace infrastructures.

Each of these methods has a number of different applications. At their core, UCP methods (and related skills) are focused on creating productive relationships with actors across different levels of society (grassroots, middle-range and top level), as well as across dividing lines of conflict.

7.36 **Proactive engagement** refers to the need to be proactive and assertive in order to provide protection. Though the mere presence of expatriate observers may contribute to protection efforts, cases tend to be isolated. To be effective, UCPs must strategically engage with various parties to the conflict and apply UCP methods based upon a conflict analysis and ongoing contextual analyses. Proactive presence has three different, but closely related, applications: protective presence, protective accompaniment and inter-positioning.

7.37 **Monitoring activities** include ceasefire monitoring, rumour control, and early warning/early response. Though ceasefire monitoring is perhaps the most prominent and most complex application of monitoring, UCPs also monitor many other events and proceedings, such as disarmament processes, political events (for example, demonstrations and elections), legal proceedings (for example, trials and tribunals) and social events (for example, holidays, celebrations, parades, religious festivals and funerals).

7.38 **Relationship building** is essential to all UCP activities. Having credible relationships with key actors and other stakeholders helps to open up channels of communication between conflict parties. It helps to quell rumours and support interventions that could prevent escalating violence. It also enhances the safety and security of UCPs deployed in areas of violent conflict.

7.39 Similarly, **strengthening local capacities** is at the core of UCP practice. UCPs work to preserve and reinforce these capacities, to enable local communities to take direct responsibility for protection and the broader local peace process.

7.40 **Capacity development** takes several forms; in particular, the direct involvement of communities in UCP practice provides an opportunity for the effective and sustainable transfer of skills and competences from UCPs to local actors. Additionally, the exposure of local communities to nonviolent methods supports the transition from a culture of violence to a culture of peace. It shows affected communities that it is possible to reduce violence without violence; that is, without relying on the use of armed force.



Figure 33 – The scope of UCP activities

Further resources

Ellen Furnari, Huibert Oldenhuis and Rachel Julian, (2015), 'Securing space for local peacebuilding: the role of international and national civilian peacekeepers', in *Peacebuilding*.

Bernardo Venturi (2015), 'Mainstreaming Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping', in *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 27:1, pages 61-66.

Kara Beckman, MA and Kenneth B. Solberg, Ph.D., (November 2013), *Measuring the Impact of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: A Pilot Study*.

Rachel Julian and Christine Schweitzer, (2015), 'The Origins and Development of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping', in *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 27:1-8.

Ellen Furnari, 'Relationships Are Critical for Peacekeeping', in *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, Volume 27, Issue 1, 2015.

Janzen, Randy, 'Shifting Practices of Peace: What is the Current State of Unarmed Civilian Peace-keeping?' in *Peace Studies Journal*, Volume 7, Issue 3, 2014, available at <http://peaceconsortium.org/peace>

Georgi Engelbrecht and Vidushi Kaushik, 'Community-Based Protection Mechanisms', *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, Volume 27, Issue 1, 2015.

Ed. Christine Schweitzer, (2010), *Civilian Peacekeeping: A Barely Tapped Resource*, available at <http://bit.ly/1pDZ1oB>

Nonviolent Peaceforce, (July 2015), *Case Studies of Unarmed Civilian Protection*, available at http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/images/publications/UCP_Case_Studies____vFinal_8-4-15.pdf

Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace: Global Study on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2015), page 153, 157 UN Women, New York.

Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnership and People, Report of the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (2015), page 23, United Nations, New York.

Section 6 – Health

Definition

Health is defined by the World Health Organization as:

‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.

It goes on to affirm that ‘health is a fundamental human right and that the attainment of the highest possible level of health is a most important world-wide social goal whose realisation requires the action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health sector’.¹⁹

The Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion²⁰ recognises that the fundamental conditions and resources for health as being: peace (including human and state security), shelter, education, food security, a secure income, a stable ecosystem, sustainable resources, social justice, and equity (including gender and religious freedoms).

Relevance to prevention

7.41 Health and well-being contributes directly to improved human and state security and an increase in human and social capital, whereas a decline in, or neglect of, the health and well-being in any population or group has the opposite effect. Violent conflict may therefore be prevented by addressing health and well-being issues through a public health lens, which is by definition, and in accordance with the Ottawa Charter, both local and people-centric. Health and well-being issues should therefore be directed as part of the diplomatic, economic and information lines of operation and supported by the military along the conflict curve. They should not, as is often the case, be treated as an afterthought or only in response to violence or disaster – natural or man-made.

7.42 This is important because we know that conflict has a direct impact on population health as:

- individuals become injured due to the fighting;
- sickness takes hold due to fractured infrastructure; and
- chronic conditions cannot be treated due to disruption of medical resupply.

Prolonged violence wears down peoples’ psychological resilience causing mental health problems. It should therefore be incumbent upon commanders (military and civilian) to prevent or lessen

¹⁹ World Health Organization (1978), ‘*International Conference on Primary Health Care*’, Alma-Ata, USSR.

²⁰ World Health Organization (1986), ‘*First International Conference on Health Promotion*’, Ottawa.

health crises caused by conflicts and catastrophes. Furthermore, it is the state that is accountable for the protection of its people and they must ensure that provision, including for health and well-being, is made.²¹

Context

7.43 The World Health Organization recognised the part that health plays in human and state security in the Ottawa Charter in 1986. This recognised the wider determinants of health and that governance should include the development of healthy public policy to ensure investment in health and well-being to improve human, and therefore social, capital. The conclusion was that failing to heed this principle leads to inequalities and stokes the politics of violence.

7.44 In 2000 the UN adopted its eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by 2015. The aim was to reinforce earlier commitments by linking the causes of poverty to peace, security and development, using globalisation as a positive force. Only three of the MDGs directly related to health. The others addressed the wider determinants of health, making this theme everyone's business.

7.45 The UN recognised the progress made against the MDGs in 2015 and the following year set new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including Sustainable Development Goal 3: 'ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages'. Building on the MDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals reinforce the Ottawa Charter in recognising three pillars of sustainability – social, environmental and economic – and that the promotion and protection of health contributes to the prevention of violence and violent conflict.

Military contribution

7.46 The military contribution²² in this area can follow the four stages of the U2P process. These are: 'understand', 'engage', 'act' and 'endure'.

7.47 **Understand.** Systems should be in place to deliver health interventions and care appropriate to social and societal norms. Military planners need to conduct a medical intelligence preparation of the mission space to appreciate what is there and what the health burden is likely to be. There should be no reason not to respect health care workers who are neutral, as well as their facilities and material, in accordance with the Oslo Guidelines²³ and Geneva Protocols.²⁴

7.48 Where provision of health and care is missing or inaccessible, planners should prioritise restoring population health as rapidly as possible. This is not only to ensure independence in the

21 UN (2016), *The Responsibility to Protect*, Office of the Special Adviser on Genocide, available at <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/responsibility-protect>

22 MOD UK (2014), Joint Doctrine Note 3/14, *The Military Medical Contribution to Security and Stabilisation*. DCDC, Shrivenham.

23 UN OCHA (2008), *Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the use of Foreign Military And Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* (Revision 1.1 November 2007). UN, Geneva.

24 ICRC (1977), 'Article 8(c) of Additional Protocol I' cited in Coupland R *et al* (2012), *Health Care in Danger: The responsibilities of health care personnel working in armed conflicts and other emergencies* pages 10-14. ICRC, Geneva.

long term but also to demonstrate the intent to support the population's development following the cessation of violence. Effort spent in the 'understand' phase will contribute to better preparation of health and care force elements prior to deployment. Measures of effect should be assessed, planned and developed.

7.49 **Engage.** Adhering to the humanitarian principles laid down in the Oslo Guidelines is paramount. Health and care activities must 'do no harm', but alleviate and relieve suffering where required. This makes confirming the credentials of all medical, nursing and paramedical personnel essential, to ensure that they meet the host country's regulatory standards and that their actions are clinically and culturally appropriate and open to scrutiny.

7.50 All health-related personnel must work in partnership with individuals and agencies on the ground to promote advocacy (relevant, coherent and coordinated) and sustainability. Health and care workers need to be physically and psychologically resilient to engage in these types of operation. Integrated preparation for operations is available at centres such as UK Joint Force Headquarters, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence in the Netherlands, UN Peacekeeping Training Centres and online. Early engagement with partners promotes transparency, understanding, trust, cohesion and coordination, all of which are essential to success in the comprehensive approach. These centres can also provide force health protection and force protection training. Measures of effect should be developed further in collaboration with advocates, actors and audiences. Media might be employed to widely disseminate relevant messages.

7.51 **Act.** Military public health and medical activity should be directed and therefore properly resourced as part of persistent engagement, defence engagement, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). Levels of cooperation with indigenous governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations and international non-governmental organisations will often dictate what can be achieved.

7.52 The simplest way to deliver military health care assistance is by supporting the indigenous security forces. This may be achieved under existing status of forces agreements. At the **tactical** level this may be mentoring and developing pre-hospital care, including effective casualty transfer systems.

7.53 At the **operational** level the security forces may require assistance with developing their health and care system, remembering that this may be inextricably linked to the state healthcare system at secondary care and above. This can add a tension, as both sectors compete for competent health care personnel, funding and training. Economies of effort need to be identified and worked up to avoid duplication and wastage.

7.54 At the **strategic** level the health and care system has to be considered alongside wider corporate governance, reconstruction and development efforts. Gender, religious, moral and ethical issues must be identified and addressed. Medical rules of eligibility must also be determined and access levels agreed for the local population, contractors and other contributors

to the total force. Measures of effect should be well established and in use by this stage, which may include using the media to project success as part of the information operations campaign.

7.55 **Endure.** Continuous support might be provided in the form of peer review, mentoring and coaching, teaching, research, policy and doctrine development; both in or out of country. Some of this can be achieved by Skype, video teleconference (VTC), telephone and email, for example, and engagement methods will depend on progress as demonstrated by agreed measures of effect. SSR and DDR programmes might include encouraging military medics or soldiers to undertake further education and training as state registered health workers.

Questions checklist

- Why have we been asked to intervene?
- What do people need rather than want? Is there a recent Health Impact Assessment?²⁵
- Who are the gatekeepers determining eligibility of health and care?
- How is health and care resourced? Is there evidence of nepotism/corruption at any level?
- Where are indigenous (civilian and military) health care personnel educated and trained?
- Who is responsible for confirming the credentials of health care personnel?
- Who is operating in the mission space?
- Do belligerents respect the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent/Crystal?

Further resources

Blanchet K and Martin B (Eds), (2011), *Many reasons to intervene: French and British approaches to humanitarian action*. Hurst and Company, London.

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²⁵ World Health Organization (2016), *Health Impact Assessment*, available at <http://www.who.int/hia/en/>

Section 7 – Cultural property protection

Definition

Cultural property comprises the tangible evidence of the past – the sites, buildings and objects identified as of historic importance at local, national and international levels. A useful distinction can be made between cultural property and cultural heritage, the intangible evidence of the past – for example, the stories, songs and customs of a group.²⁶

It has traditionally been accepted that cultural property is damaged and destroyed in armed conflict as ‘collateral’ (i.e. unintentional) damage and that there is nothing that can be done to avoid such damage. In recent years this has been challenged and cultural property protection is the explicit activity of trying to mitigate such damage and destruction.

Relevance to prevention

7.56 Military theorists from Sun Tzu, writing in 6th century BC China, to von Clausewitz, writing in 19th century AD Europe, have suggested that the purposeful damage of a vanquished enemy’s cultural property is poor military and political strategy as it can undermine the long-term governance of the conquered land and become a factor prompting the next conflict. Conversely, if an army protects cultural property, wherever it is fighting, it can use such protection as ‘soft power’ – winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of a local population. In this way cultural property protection becomes a military (and political) ‘force multiplier’ – something that can make an intervention easier, or at least no more difficult.

Context

7.57 During the Second World War the protection of cultural property was seen clearly as part of the responsibility of the combatants; the Allies, and some elements of Axis forces, took this responsibility seriously. Given the massive destruction of cultural property in the war, the international community came together and developed the 1954 ‘Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict’. As defined above, cultural heritage is effectively protected under international legislation that protects civilian populations.

7.58 However, no countries maintained a really credible cultural property protection capacity. In the fighting in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, cultural property was specifically targeted and it was clear that the 1954 Convention was no deterrent. The 2nd (1999) Protocol to the Convention therefore made the specific targeting of cultural property a potential war crime.

26 This is a useful distinction in international humanitarian law as it is cultural property, not heritage, which is protected specifically under the 1954 Hague Convention. However, more recent usage frequently uses cultural heritage as an umbrella term to cover both tangible and intangible heritage. For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) uses ‘heritage’ instead of ‘property’ in the 1972 Convention on the Protection of the World’s Cultural and Natural Heritage.

7.59 Cultural property is damaged and destroyed specifically during conflict for six reasons:

- it is not regarded as important enough to include in pre-conflict planning;
- it is regarded as legitimate ‘spoils of war’;
- it becomes collateral damage;
- through lack of military awareness;
- through looting; and
- as the result of specific targeting.

Once this is recognised, far from being an inevitable consequence of war, the destruction of cultural property can be seen as something that can be proactively addressed and the impact of which can be mitigated.

7.60 In anticipation of the 2nd Protocol, in 1996 the international community created the Blue Shield organisation as an umbrella for the major heritage non-governmental organisations relating to archives, libraries, museums, and sites and monuments.²⁷ The Blue Shield is ‘committed to the protection of the world’s cultural property, and is concerned with the protection of cultural and natural heritage, tangible and intangible, in the event of armed conflict, natural or human-made disaster’ (Statutes, Article 2). It is currently an entirely voluntary organisation and concentrates on addressing the above six reasons through:

- policy development;
- liaison with military and other emergency organisations;
- training programmes;
- producing lists of ‘important’ cultural property in conflict zones;
- during conflict and post-conflict assessment missions; and
- publications/raising awareness.²⁸

The Blue Shield is increasingly working with other international non-governmental organisations and emergency organisations to develop generic training materials for the military.

²⁷ More information available at <http://www.ancbs.org/cms/en/>

²⁸ See (Stone 2012; 2013; 2016).

Military contribution

7.61 To date, 126 countries have ratified the 1954 Hague Convention, confirming (in principle at least) that their armed forces will take all possible measures to protect cultural property during conflict, only stepping away from this commitment if ‘military necessity’ dictates. Those countries that have not ratified the Convention or its Protocols are nevertheless, in theory, bound by customary international law to protect cultural property in those areas in which they are operating.

7.62 Especially since the 2003 invasion of Iraq (where there was considerable looting of, and damage to, cultural property), state militaries have begun to take their responsibilities more seriously. For example, NATO has proactively protected archaeological sites and other cultural property identified by the Blue Shield. More armed forces are including cultural property protection as part of their general training; NATO is developing an organisation-wide cultural property protection doctrine; and the NATO-affiliated Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence has published *Cultural Property Protection Makes Sense*. The Lebanese Armed Forces have recently set up a specific cultural property protection unit and the UN specifically included cultural property protection in its military deployments in Lebanon and Mali.

Further resources

Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, *Cultural Property Protection Makes Sense*, (2015), available at <http://www.cimic-coe.org/products/conceptual-design/downloads/ccoe-publications/>

1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols of 1954 and 1999, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

Stone, P.G., (2012), ‘Human Rights and Cultural Property Protection in Times of Conflict’, in *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 18(3), pages 271-284.

Stone, P.G., (2013), ‘A four-tier approach to the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict’, in *Antiquity*, 87(335), pages 166-177 (also published in *British Army Review*, 2013/14, 159, pages 40-51).

Stone, P.G., (2016), ‘The challenge of protecting heritage in times of armed conflict’, in *Museums International*.

Notes:

Chapter 8 – Gender perspectives

8.1 This chapter features three articles related to gender:

- gender perspectives;
- children; and
- conflict-related sexual violence.

Section 1 – Gender perspectives

Definition

Gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female, which can determine a person's position and value in a given context. A person's gender is learned through socialisation and might change between cultures and over time.

A **gender perspective** is the capacity to assess when and if men, women, boys and girls are differently affecting or affected by a situation. Having a gender perspective extends to mitigating any negative effects that any actions might have on men, women, boys or girls and ensuring that positive effects of prevention actions reaches the whole population.

A **gender analysis** – the systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations – can identify social structures and inequalities based on gender. A gender analysis should be integrated into a larger analysis of social factors regarding an operational environment, such as age, ethnicity, religion and socio-economic class. A gender analysis can guide relevant information gathering as well as planning for actions preventing violent conflict.

Through **gender mainstreaming**, a gender perspective should also be integrated into all activities and initiatives in any engagement to create maximum effect.

Gender is a cross-cutting theme and an analytical tool with application to all themes and principles is presented in this handbook.

Relevance to prevention

8.2 Contemporary violent conflict is characterised by its complexity. It is predominantly enacted 'among the people', with civilians as both actors and targets. This has led to an increasing focus on the human domain of violent conflict and 'people-centric' responses. A concept central to the U2P process is 'local first', which always should involve both men and women. The gender perspective should be applied in prevention efforts at every stage of the conflict cycle and in all U2P phases.

8.3 A crucial part of analysing the human domain is knowledge and understanding of gender. A gender perspective involves understanding the different roles that men, women, boys and girls

play in precipitating and mitigating conflict; the people of different gender; and the relations **between** people of different gender. A gender perspective can also be used to understand the social drivers and triggers of conflict; for example, the relationship between masculine ideals and recruitment into armed groups.

Context

8.4 The integration of a gender perspective and the participation of both men and women in preventing violent conflict is a key theme in the Women, Peace and Security resolution agenda of the UN Security Council.

8.5 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 urges member states to ensure the representation of women at all decision-making levels in institutions and mechanisms for the prevention of conflict. To highlight a few resolutions from the agenda, UNSCR 1820 reinforces this message and urges all parties to discuss how measures to prevent and resolve conflict can better incorporate the full and equal participation of women.

8.6 In UNSCR 1888, the UN Security Council reaffirms that steps to prevent and respond to acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Military contribution

8.7 The checklist below (paragraphs 8.9-8.19) is designed to highlight considerations relevant to using a gender perspective in preventing violent conflict. Note that the checklist is not exhaustive and, while structured according to the U2P phases, various considerations might be applicable to multiple phases.

8.8 The key consideration that is applicable to all phases is the use of a gender analysis to guide the staff work. A gender analysis begins with gathering information on both men and women when preparing for analysis. This includes assessing factors pertaining to gender relations and analysing the planned action to be aware of, and sometimes ensure, its effects on both men and women.

Understand

8.9 Having a gender perspective is crucial for mapping one's self-assessment. The actor's own beliefs regarding gender structures and stereotypes should be assessed and mitigated in favour of real facts and gender analyses of the operational environment.

8.10 Information about men and women in a local context is best gathered from those same men and women. Ensuring local women's participation in establishing a joint understanding of the conflict is crucial to the overall 'understand' phase.

8.11 To detect early warning signs of violent conflict, it is essential to use gender-sensitive indicators that are based on a gender analysis of the particular context. Gender-sensitive indicators can, for example, detect circumstances only affecting people from one gender and include perspectives from both men and women.

8.12 Having a gender perspective in the self-assessment analysis can, for example, involve the following questions.

- How is the mission perceived by local men and women? Do the perceptions differ between people of different gender?
- When assessing key stakeholders, are both men's and women's stakes in the conflict included? If not, important perspectives that are crucial for a sustainable situation might get lost.
- Are you aware of the stakeholders and relationships that you do not have access to? For example, men and women in positions alienated from the elite?
- How might your mission's or organisation's beliefs and understanding of gender roles and gender equality (compared to human rights) influence your effect in the conflict?
- Does your involvement in the conflict and engagement with the local population present any new threats to them?

8.13 The conflict assessment must include a gender perspective to achieve a comprehensive understanding and not miss any important factors. In the spirit of 'local first' and a people-centric analysis, aspects and perspectives relating to both men and women must be assessed. Make sure these (sometimes overlooked) gendered aspects to conflict are covered in the assessment.

- **Escalating violence or violence that could escalate that faces both men and women.** Do not overlook domestic violence, gender-based violence or sexual violence as these forms of violence could be both a trigger and a cause of the conflict, as well as a potential protection responsibility for the mission.
- **Connections and relationships between individuals or groups of men and women.** Analysis that fails to see connection between different genders might overlook important dynamics of the society.
- **'Macro' factors** – for example, politics, economy, climate – which, if they change, might have a substantial and unforeseeable effect on the vulnerable; for example, women or children.
- **Paid and unpaid labour.** A focus on economic factors risks excluding half of the population from the analysis. In many societies, women conduct most of the unpaid

labour close to the home. However, economic situation, patterns of movement and interests relating to this work might still be affected by the conflict in the same way as paid labour.

In assessing interests and positions in the conflict, do not combine women and men as homogenous groups. Factors such as ethnicity, age, class, profession and demography will, together with your gender, affect your stance and situation in a conflict.

8.14 A checklist of the minimum of factors to be considered in a conflict assessment include:

- the male and female stakeholders in the conflict;
- threats and risks facing both men and women;
- interests and influence of both men and women;
- groups and networks where both men and women are represented;
- resource allocation between men and women;
- activities and tasks of both men and women;
- social hierarchies, status and power structures between men and women; and
- relations between men and women.

8.15 The following information regarding the **conflict dynamics** should be considered.

- Are there gender-based interests or is there gender-bias in the conflict?
- Is the violence gender-based?
- Is the violence directed towards – or committed by – any particular group(s)?
- Are gender structures part of any ideological or religious party, or political objective, included in the conflict?
- Are both men and women taking part of the conflict, either as military, armed groups, local security forces, political actors or support functions?
- Are girls and boys actively involved in the conflict? Do they have different roles?
- Are men, women, girls and boys mitigating the conflict in any way? Do they have different roles?

8.16 It should be recognised that while gender is rarely a root cause of violent conflict, it may well be a catalyst or a manifestation of a violent conflict; seen in, for example, increased domestic violence or changed gender patterns in society. For a guide on conducting a gender analysis of the operational environment, see the *Functional Planning Guide* released by NATO Allied Command Operations.

Engage

8.17 Engaging with a gender perspective does not mean engaging only with women, but ensuring that the effects of prevention activity reach the **whole** population. Engaging men and boys might, for example, prevent their recruitment into violent groups. With this in mind, the following advice should be followed.

- a. Ensure that the mission has legitimacy among both male and female groups in society. Through a gender analysis, be aware of the perception that local men and women have formed of the mission. This is also part of self-assessment.
- b. Make sure that information spread to the local population about the mission reaches women as well as men.
- c. Make sure all parts of society are reached in any liaison or engagement activities. For example, strive to have a good relationship with female key leaders and local women's networks and organisations.
- d. Women's involvement in politics will differ widely between different contexts, but in many societies facing 'potential' violent conflict women are generally involved in politics and social issues at the grassroots and mid-level rather than at national/governmental level. In these cases, reaching women in a Track 2-3 approach to diplomacy¹ and peacebuilding must be a clear focus.
- e. In many communities, the masculine role is closely associated with violence and masculine ideals might be a trigger for violence. To mitigate this, space should be organised for local contact groups where a positive masculine role – based on nonviolent characteristics such as negotiation, cooperation and equality – can be promoted.
- f. In some contexts, the gender analysis will show that women are best placed to help the planning team give the planned prevention effect; for example, liaising with women's groups or assessing gender-based indicators. At other times, a mix of men and women might give different perspectives and increase the capabilities of the team. However, at all times, team composition should strive for a high gender balance in all functions and levels.

¹ See Annex M: Glossary for 'diplomacy', 'multi-track diplomacy' and 'preventative diplomacy'.

- g. Include a gender adviser or unit in the mission structure to advise the commander. The gender adviser should be actively included in the planning process.
- h. Ensure that all personnel receive training on how to integrate gender perspectives into their work. Knowing how to apply a gender perspective to prevention engagement is part of the collective competence that military actors need to ensure successful conflict transformation.

Act

8.18 Using a gender perspective when planning prevention efforts will guide both which actions to plan for and the assessment of their effects on the whole population. As a simple guide ask the following.

- Do our planned actions affect men and women differently?
- If so, is that our intention?
- If not, how can we mitigate any unintended negative effects or reinforce any unintended positive effects on men and women?

Additionally, make sure that patrolling, reporting and other information collection activities employ a gender perspective and collect sex-disaggregated data and information (i.e. data and information that distinguishes between men, women, boys and girls).

Endure

8.19 For a long-term involvement to prevent violent conflict or its recurrence, the following points should be considered.

- a. Gender relations tend to change leading up to and during violent conflict. Women can be relegated to a lower social status or, alternatively, promoted to a higher one by supporting or joining an armed group. Gender relations must therefore be monitored throughout the conflict cycle and reassessed at each step.
- b. Unemployment and lack of resources, especially among men who might have the burden of supporting a family, can be a catalyst for violent conflict. Support for employment opportunities must therefore be an ongoing factor in any post-violence DDR process.
- c. It is crucial that both men and women are represented and participate in peace processes and any political negotiations. When women are involved in these processes, agreements are both more likely and more likely to be implemented. Military actors

- can support this by, for example, actively liaising with women on their security needs and views on the conflict, and offering security provision for female participation.
- d. Women who have held an important social or political role during a violent conflict will often lose this influence when life returns to 'normal'. This can create new lines of discrimination that could, over time, decrease stability. If women are at risk of losing status, efforts must be made in peacetime to secure their social and political influence. Military actors should be mindful of this possible effect and analyse any structures they give support to, so that the position of women is secured and not lessened.
 - e. Efforts to prevent violent conflict that involve making concessions to belligerent groups must ensure that women's rights are upheld and avoid granting impunity for acts of sexual violence.

A gender perspective should be mainstreamed in all prevention efforts and not be limited solely to the actions suggested in this chapter.

Further resources

'Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure', Bi-Strategic Command Directive (BI-SCD) 40-1.

UN WOMEN, (October 2012), *Gender and Conflict Analysis*, gender dimensions to structural causes of conflict.

International Alert, (2014), *Re-thinking gender in peacebuilding*.

Saferworld briefings, (May 2014), *Gender and conflict early warning*; examples of gender-sensitive indicators.

Centre for Peacebuilding, (October 2012), *Gender Analysis of Conflict*; list of gender dimensions at different levels of conflict.

Saferworld, (October 2014), *Masculinities, Conflict and Peacebuilding*.

UN WOMEN, (2015), *A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*.

NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), (July 2015), *Functional Planning Guide*.

Section 2 – Children

Definition

The UN defines a child as: 'every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.'²

Relevance to prevention

8.20 Children are one of the most vulnerable groups of the population that need protection from violence, abuse and exploitation. Failing to protect children or, worse, harming them, even inadvertently, generates particularly strong emotions that can fuel conflict for an extended period.

8.21 It is essential that military actors protect children and respect their specific needs and vulnerabilities. The protection of children's rights benefits not only their future, but also the future of the societies in which they live. Military personnel should protect schools in particular, as far as possible, since education plays a key role for children, giving them a sense of normality and safety, and supporting their hope for a better life.

8.22 In conflict-affected contexts, the military can support humanitarian agencies by collecting information in any situation when the following violations occur:

- killing or maiming of children;
- recruitment or use of children as soldiers;
- rape and other grave sexual abuse of children;
- abduction of children;
- attacks against schools or hospitals;
- denial of humanitarian access for children; and/or
- arbitrary detention of children by any party to the conflict.

When such information is collected and shared with the appropriate stakeholders, collective action can be pursued that fosters compliance with international child protection standards and norms, makes a positive difference to the lives of children and helps to prevent future violent conflict.

² The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989.

Context

8.23 Natural disasters and human-made crises affect children in multiple ways. Boys and girls can be killed or injured, recruited by armed groups or criminal gangs, separated from their families, forcibly displaced, sexually exploited or trafficked. They suffer disproportionately from malnourishment and illnesses, having a high mortality rate, and they also make up a large proportion of landmine victims. They often cannot go to school during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies. In addition, the violence experienced or witnessed during conflict has long-term repercussions for children.

8.24 In situations of conflict or emergency, children are among the most affected population groups. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that:

- 230 million children live in conflict-affected areas;
- almost 10 million children are refugees;
- nearly 15 million children were caught up in violent conflicts in 2014/15; and
- 19 million have been internally displaced.

In addition, 34 million children affected by conflict do not have access to any kind of education.

8.25 All actions that contribute to violent conflict prevention should take into account the best interests of the children and the principle of ‘do no harm’. Children in emergency situations must be protected, ideally in a caring family environment, and their basic needs must be met, including safety, access to health care, food assistance, nutrition, hygiene, psycho-social support and education.

Military contribution

8.26 Military personnel should be fully acquainted with the principles and rules of care of children and protecting them from harm. Military commanders must ensure that personnel under their command are aware of their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect vulnerable populations, especially children.³ It is essential that peacekeeping or enforcement troops receive adequate training in how to apply international humanitarian law before and during deployment.

8.27 Protecting children’s rights – and guaranteeing that resources are available to do so, despite conflict and displacement – must be an integral part of the military’s response in emergencies. These actions include the following.

³ Article 87(2) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.

- a. Peaceful zones should be established to protect children and other vulnerable people from hostilities. Where possible, vulnerable people should be removed from areas in which hostile forces are operating.
- b. Wherever possible, children should have their wishes taken into account when decisions are made about them, and the decisions should be in their best interests.
- c. When relief assistance is provided during emergencies, children should be among the first to receive relief and aid. They must also generally be allowed access to the necessary food, clothing and health care.
- d. If necessary, children should be removed temporarily from an area of hostilities to a safer place. The consent of parents or guardians should be obtained wherever possible, and the children should be accompanied by people who are responsible for them. Children should be kept with their families and communities whenever possible.
- e. Military personnel in combat who confront children associated with opposing armed forces or armed groups can lawfully defend themselves, using the minimum necessary force. They may also use the force needed to further their military aim but their actions must carefully balance military considerations against the need to respect human life and well-being (the proportionality principle). In general, as regards conditions of detention and due process, captured child soldiers are entitled to the same legal protections as child civilians.
- f. Landmines pose a particular danger to children and their use is generally forbidden under international law. Military personnel should help to provide information to children and others about the dangers of such weapons and how to avoid them.
- g. Military commanders should establish an efficient monitoring, reporting and response system to protect children from any violence, physical or sexual abuse or exploitation by their own troops or allied forces in the communities where they operate.
- h. The military should have a code of conduct in place that summarises basic principles for military personnel regarding the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. The code can include the following.
 - o Ensure the safety and protection of civilians (paying particular attention to women and children).
 - o Respect the basic needs of children (safety, clean water, food, shelter, health care).
 - o Do not separate children from their parents.
 - o Do not rape or sexually abuse children.

- o Do not use schools for military purposes.
 - o Protect children from landmines.
 - o Children should not be used in armed forces; we must protect them, not use them.
 - o In self-defence, use minimum force against children.
 - o Cooperate with humanitarian organisations.
 - o Always report child rights abuses.
 - o Be firm, fair and friendly; remember ‘the child belongs to everybody’.
- i. During deployment, the military should engage and strengthen national and local institutions to better protect children. They should also develop mechanisms for a smooth transition when their mission is completed.

Further resources

Strengthening National Child Protection Systems in Emergencies through Community-Based Mechanisms, CPWG, Save the Children UK, 2010.

The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, Paris Principles, 2007.

Inter-Agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children, Inter-Agency (ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, Save the Children and International Rescue Committee, World Vision International), 2004.

UNICEF, (2010), *Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action*.

Section 3 – Conflict-related sexual violence

Definition

Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is linked, directly or indirectly (in time, geographically or causally) to a conflict. The link might be evident in the profile of the perpetrator, the profile of the victim, in state collapse or a climate of impunity, in the cross-border dimensions or in violations of the terms of a ceasefire agreement.

CRSV also refers to patterns or incidents of sexual violence that occur in settings post-violent conflict or other situations of concern (for example, political strife), and is not confined to periods of ongoing violent conflict. However, the term does not include all gender-based violence, or harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation, or sexual exploitation and abuse as individual infractions of the law or codes of conduct and discipline.

Relevance to prevention

8.28 CRSV is deemed a threat to international peace and security, and the international community has an interest and obligation in preventing any occurrence of CRSV. An increased prevalence of sexual violence in a society might serve as an early-warning indicator of instability, impunity and the emergence of violent conflict.

8.29 Along with the individual short-term and long-term suffering caused, CRSV causes significant damage to the social fabric of a society. Peacebuilding after the cessation of violent conflict is even more challenging if there is a legacy of CRSV. On the other hand, attending to the needs of survivors of CRSV, in addition to monitoring and mitigating its occurrence, can help prevent a later relapse into violent conflict.

Context

8.30 CRSV is not new; it has been a feature of most violent conflicts. However, the political focus on sexual violence has shifted from it being considered as a 'natural' side-effect of war, to now being recognised as a strategy that might be used by parties to the conflict. CRSV is seen as a grave breach of human rights and a war crime, and its perpetrators are liable to prosecution and conviction in the International Criminal Court (ICC).

8.31 In UNSCR 1820, the UN Security Council affirms that effective steps to prevent and respond to acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and UNSCRs 1888, 1960 and 2106 reaffirm and build upon this view. UNSCR 1960 calls for, among other things, systematic monitoring and reporting of the occurrence of CRSV, while UNSCR 2106 stresses the participatory role of women and formal and informal community leaders in preventing CRSV.

Military contribution

8.32 CRSV can be viewed as both a trigger and an indicator of violent conflict. It is important to understand the military's role in monitoring indicators of CRSV and preventing its occurrence.

Identifying conflict-related sexual violence

8.33 It should not be assumed that CRSV is not prevalent in a conflict simply because it is not reported or because other manifestations of violence are low or not apparent. Chaotic circumstances, shame, social stigma and the fear of reprisals involved with sexual violence, especially for male survivors, can mean that few cases come to light.

8.34 In the absence of reports, various indicators of CRSV might be observed in the nature of the actors – for example, an armed group – and the observable environment. Research suggests that particular types of armed groups may be more prone to committing CRSV than others; for example, those with lax command and control structures or those that depend on lootable resources. Other indicators might be observed in the social sphere of the armed group, internally and externally. All, however, are highly context dependent.⁴

Preventive actions

8.35 The following suggested actions to prevent and/or mitigate CRSV might be undertaken before or in response to the identification of CRSV indicators, after consultation with those concerned.

- a. **Preventive physical protection: armed patrols and escorts.** These include patrolling areas and routes where groups are vulnerable to sexual violence, for example, latrines, firewood patrols, market area patrols, night patrols and unarmed patrols in camp settings.
- b. **Joint protections teams.** Patrols composed of military, police and civilian personnel that aim to support community protection (in humanitarian settings, for example).
- c. **Quick impact projects.** These might include construction of shelters to provide psycho-social support, and providing fuel or firewood, which would put vulnerable groups at risk if they had to collect it.
- d. **Deterrent tasks, including through visible presence.** This could involve setting up demilitarised zones, safe heavens or temporary/mobile operating bases, or using flares and flashlights at night to show a visible presence.

4 For warning indicators see: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MatrixEarlyWarningIndicatorsCSV_UNAction2011.pdf

- e. **Community liaison.** Trust and confidence-building measures could include establishing offices or cells in refugee/internally displaced persons camps and coordinating with women's organisations to support women's roles in community safety.
- f. **Advocate to local military and security actors on issues of impunity.** Community liaison could include communicating with armed groups and security actors to establish good connections and foster a culture of discipline. Military forces might share information on national and international law regarding sexual violence, as well as provide training on how to uphold discipline and ensure forces adhere to codes of conduct.
- g. **Public-information: monitoring, reporting, behavioural change communication.** A military presence can provide security to high-profile events that raise gender awareness and inform about CRSV, as well as ensuring the safety of women providing the information. Military personnel can also monitor information flows and propaganda, and pick up on early-warning indicators of CRSV.
- h. **Gender-sensitive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration/demilitarisation.** Gender-sensitive programming of DDR should include special provision for survivors of sexual violence that have been a part of any armed group. Such provision might include health considerations (for example, pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases), gender-sensitive camp design and considering people with the security of the survivor in mind (sometimes the perpetrator of CRSV might come from the same armed group). DDR programs should also ensure that participants are secure from CRSV whilst they are in the programme.
- i. **Non-combat evacuation operations/safe passage.** Military units can provide logistical support to survivors of CRSV and ensure their safe passage to medical and psycho-social care. Alternatively, upon request, they can safeguard humanitarian actors providing this care.
- j. **Counter human trafficking operations.** Military units can conduct raids and investigations of places and persons suspected of involvement in human trafficking, which can be both a manifestation and a trigger of conflict.

Further resources

UN WOMEN, (October 2012), *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice*.

Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, *Early-warning Indicators on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*.

UN Secretary General, (23 March 2015), *Conflict-related Sexual Violence Report of the Secretary-General*, reference S/2015/203.

UN Action to Stop Sexual Violence in Conflict, (May 2011), *Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict-related Sexual Violence*.

Secretary General NATO, (June 2015), *Military Guidelines on the Prevention of, and Response to, Conflict-related Sexual Violence and Gender-based Violence*.

UN DPKO/DFS, (February 2015), *Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions*.

Notes:

Chapter 9 – Rule of law

9.1 This chapter explores four closely related themes:

- rule of law;
- policing and public order;
- policing development and interoperability; and
- corruption.

Section 1 – Rule of law

Definition

The UN defines the rule of law as:

‘The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’¹

Relevance for prevention

9.2 The concept of rule of law is something relevant to all states, not just fragile or ‘post-conflict’ states. It is the defining element of modern civilisation and the foundation for all democratic governance models found in stable, sovereign states and the ‘international community’ that they collectively represent.

9.3 Conceptually, the rule of law means that all actors know how to conduct their affairs and relationships before they act or enter into agreements with others. It stands for the certainty that there are clear and transparent rules that govern society, and that those rules are made openly and publicly – and enforced fairly and equally – by a government that serves the interests of its people. In a stable state, the people are expected to understand the rules that govern their society and respect their obligations to abide by them. All actors know that there are predictable consequences for violating the law. The government’s role, along with other legitimate actors, is to provide accountability and justice in the administration and enforcement of the law. When a society loses respect for the law or confidence in their government's, officials’ and representatives’

¹ Report of the Secretary-General: *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies* (S/2004/616).

fair and impartial enforcement of it, people may resort to alternative methods of accountability that destabilise the state and generate violent conflict. It is important therefore to look at disenfranchised groups in particular and their access to equitable justice.

Context

9.4 The rule of law is a cornerstone for good governance. A free and fair political system, the protection of human rights, and public confidence in the police and the courts all depend upon state institutions that are accountable in law. The judiciary must operate independently of the government so that it can serve the interests of justice and be immune from the influence of any individual or particular political pressure. This is to ensure fair and accessible application of the law, and respect for international human rights standards.

9.5 Participation and equality are key components of good governance and the rule of law. Men and women must have equal rights and be treated equally before the law. Access to justice is especially important where structural or systemic biases discriminate against individuals on account of their gender, ethnicity, religion, political views and so on.

9.6 All the major multilateral international organisations, such as the United Nations, African Union, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) promote adherence to the rule of law. This is backed by an extensive system of international customary law, conventions and treaties, as well as by more traditional systems of justice.

9.7 A growing inequality between rich and poor, even in more affluent and rules-based societies, is giving rise to dissatisfaction with how rules and laws are enforced, and who benefits from them. This poses political problems that go beyond a 'thin' focus on the equitable application of formal procedures, and has instead a 'thick' focus on the substance of laws.

Military contribution

9.8 The military's contribution to promoting the rule of law, in an international intervention into conflict-affected regions, is to provide the secure and stable space in which national justice and governance capacity can be built. The international military's demonstrated ability to responsibly balance state security with human security is vital to restoring the public's confidence in the competence and integrity of government in general, and their own public servants in particular. A well-constituted military operation may be able to halt violence by suppressing and disarming the combatants in an armed conflict. To sustain that peace and to capitalise on the human and material sacrifice made by the military in achieving it, however, requires other actors, and dramatically longer commitments.

9.9 The military contribution, therefore, must be sequenced properly and sufficiently sustained to allow the other actors time to establish the framework for a stable state based upon the rule of law. It also must be clearly separated from those other capacity-building initiatives and

subordinated to the appropriate civilian authority as soon as possible. To do otherwise risks undermining the very concept of the rule of law as it reinforces the resort to a dominant military that so frequently typifies a dysfunctional, conflict-affected state.

Understand

9.10 The military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict is found in its ability to apply the skills of soldiers, in combination with many other technical experts in diverse disciplines, towards a common goal of building sustainable peace. This requires an in-depth understanding of the roles, competencies and mandates of those other actors and a respect for the differences between them. It also requires that those other actors in turn understand the capabilities and limitations of the military force deployed and an appreciation of its appropriate use. Each actor and institution – from the military contingent to police experts, from corrections advisors to judicial officers, and from public financial and budgetary professionals to election observers – all represent ‘tools’ available to the international community in its long-term strategy to help restore a country’s ability to govern itself peacefully, under the rule of law. Each of these tools is unique and must not be misused or misapplied.

9.11 Mapping the duties, responsibilities and goals of the local rule of law system makes it easier to obtain a clear focus when deploying. Furthermore, **to work effectively on rule of law issues in a specific country or region, one needs to have an understanding of the local legal system, culture and context.** Rule of law in the host nation might not look familiar to those deployed on the mission; however, this does not necessarily mean that traditional systems of justice do not have their specific utility in the local context. It will be important to fully understand why the current system of justice is in place and how it operates, before being able to suggest ways to develop it. In many cases, the traditional justice system meets needs and instils confidence in a way that cannot easily or quickly be supplanted by a new system, which might not be seen as legitimate in the eyes of stakeholders.

9.12 Another area that needs attention at this stage is transitional justice, as ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. In ‘post-conflict’ environments allegations will frequently be made that international crimes have been committed. Whether these ‘crimes’ will be prosecuted or dealt with in some other manner can be a delicate issue, which impacts culture, history and law and can have wider repercussions beyond ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ concepts of rule of law.

9.13 From a peacekeeping perspective of providing a safe and secure environment, or from a force-to-force capacity-building perspective, it will be important to understand whether siding with host nation armed forces and services is exacerbating an inequitable *status quo*. Being perceived as ‘taking sides’ can undermine the credibility needed to be seen as an effective rule of law advocate.

Engage

9.14 There has been much push back from civilian counterparts regarding the involvement of mission personnel in building civilian capacity. The non-availability of personnel from other government ministries, international organisations or non-governmental organisations does not necessarily legitimise the use of military personnel in their place. The mission therefore can gain most traction by focusing specifically on military aspects of the rule of law, such as the military justice system of the host nation; any gendarme or military police roles; and military border guards (if such exist); as well as looking at how these aspects interact with the civilian juridical system.

This implies a need to develop relationships with civilian counterparts both in the international community and with the host nation. When a stability policing capability is available within the mission – and if so mandated – it can contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of public order and security, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, as described in NATO’s Allied Joint Publication-3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*.²

9.15 When the rule of law is in place, the state has a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, which is strictly regulated by law and divided between relevant institutions, based upon their specific mandates. The military, border police, internal security police and intelligence services are common examples of specific agencies with specific mandates to exercise specific lawful force with which to serve the public interest. Each has specific training, equipment, logistical capabilities and legal authority matching the demands of their mandate. Other than the authority for the use of force, and an obligation to support the rule of law within their mandates, they have only limited interchangeable skills. In other words, in a stable state soldiers are not policemen and border police are not combat troops. Equally, members of the security forces are not civilian judges, politicians, prosecutors, legislators, prison guards, probation officers, auditors or civil engineers.

9.16 Dealing with fragmented armed services and numerous militias will be extremely difficult without a peace deal and an appropriate agreed road map or national security vision. Again, it will be important should such circumstances arise not to take a side inadvertently, but to reinforce conditions for rule of law.

Act

9.17 Governance underpinned by the rule of law is a very delicate and highly political process in the best of circumstances. It cannot be over-simplified or expedited with ‘quick wins’ or the infusion of equipment or infrastructure alone. It can frequently take decades of sustained and multidisciplinary commitment to show tangible results. Building rule of law is partly achieved through reforming the security sector, one aspect of which might be to encourage opportunities for the reintegration of demobilised troops.³

2 See ‘Policing and public order’, pages 132-137.

3 See Chapter 10 – Security sector reform, pages 151-172.

9.18 Further pointers for where military engagement in rule of law could be useful can be found in the 'questions checklist' below.

Endure

9.19 The objective of sustainable peace and the restoration of public confidence in government is a long-term process requiring multifaceted capacity beyond those found in the typical force deployment. Though the promotion of the rule of law is part of the reasonable mandate of many institutions and actors in an international peace operation into a conflict-affected region, it is not within the capacity of any one of them alone, including the military.

9.20 The coordinated effort of all actors is essential to meet the long-term challenge of building an effective executive authority, parliamentary legitimacy, credible judicial capacity, a comprehensive legal framework, and the disciplined and responsible state and human security agencies that are necessary for a rule of law culture to exist. Only then can the nation itself prevent violent conflict, sustain public order and govern itself peacefully. Working together under a coordinated and synchronised plan is a strength of military commanders. It is also a basic requirement for stability to take hold in a state that is emerging from violent conflict.

9.21 The transfer of leadership and strategic planning skills from force to force, including at the command level, and from host nation force back into civil society, can be crucial to stability and respect for rule of law over the long term. Investments made when reforming the security sector to enable a sustainable retirement and resettlement system for ex-military, across the ranks, into an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and personal and professional development, will sow long-term seeds for stability.

9.22 Monitoring and evaluating rule of law in the form of democratic control over the military can help determine and direct progress and ensure sustainability. It can also communicate and build confidence with the public when progress is made.

Questions checklist

- Who are the rule of law leads in the international community, or who should they be?
- Who (local and international) can assist the mission to gain a better understanding of the rule of law context (i.e. a 'thin' focus on structures, processes, actors, why these are in place and how they work) in the host nation?
- How is rule of law interpreted in the host nation? (Specifically, a 'thick' focus on the substance of the law, why it concentrates on certain items in the way that it does, and does this interpretation meet the needs of the people it is designed to serve? Do local stakeholders feel the law could serve them better and in what way?)
- What type of rule of law gaps and activities are being addressed in the wider international assistance effort?
- In the military/defence field, how can the mission complement what is going to be, or is already being, done elsewhere by other actors?
- Are rule of law activities specifically mandated or implied in the mission?
- If implied, are other actors clear about or willing to have mission involvement?
- Who has conducted a thorough stakeholder analysis of the field? If one has not been done, who is best situated to do so and to share with other stakeholders?
- How can the mission access the full breadth of stakeholders? If not, who is best suited to do so? And, how will we share information?
- How much host nation military/defence activity (including logistics, support and sustain activities) is open, transparent, accountable and subject to checks and balances, both within the military and by civilians?
- What laws govern military and defence activity and reform, and especially military activity conducted on home ground?
- How well does the military/defence interact with civilian oversight?
- What internal oversight is in place in the military/defence to ensure compliance with rule of law?
- How well is rule of law understood within the military and defence?

Further resources

Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), *Rule of Law Makes Sense, A way to Improve Your Mission*, (2012), available at <http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Rule-of-Law-Makes-Sense.pdf>

Council of Europe, *The Rule of Law Checklist*, (2016), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/images/SITE%20IMAGES/Publications/Rule_of_Law_Check_List.pdf

NATO, (2015), Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

UNDP Global Programme to Strengthen the Rule of Law, available at <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/rule-of-law--justice-and-security/>

UN DPKO and OHCHR, *UN Rule of Law Indicators*, available at http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2011/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf

United States Institute for Peace (USIP), *Toward a Rule of Law Culture*, (2016), available at <http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/12/29/toward-rule-of-law-culture>

World Justice Project (WJP), *Rule of Law Index 2015*, available at <http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index>

Section 2 – Policing and public order

Definition

Policing generally refers to arrangements made to maintain the internal security of a sovereign state against crime and public disorder, and to ensure that the population obeys the law and keeps the peace. The word also denotes the force of sworn personnel and civilian staff employed for this purpose.

Relevance to prevention

9.23 Crime and corruption are among the biggest problems the world faces today. Poverty is not alleviated because of it, terrorism relies on it and in some cases criminals have even stolen the state.⁴ Close examination of large-scale civil conflict reveals that the primary initiators have been motivated as much by illicit personal gain as inter-group hostility, historical injustices and social grievances; and those powerful and corrupt individuals have sought to pursue power and financial advantage at whatever cost to the majority.

9.24 Famine, overpopulation, economic decline, tribalism, drugs and religious intolerance all lend themselves to criminal exploitation. Additionally, organised crime commands great wealth, in some cases sufficient to threaten the rule of law and even overwhelm a nation's entire economy. Criminals and warlords roll the proceeds of crime into legitimate business, which makes them not just difficult to prosecute but also creates a culture of impunity that can fuel social unrest.

9.25 Additionally, while dealing with insurgents is generally considered to be the exclusive role of the military, insurgency and terrorism both require money to prosper, the chief sources of which are illegal. The fundamental requirement for successful counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, counter serious and organised crime and crime control is, therefore, the presence of a government that is capable of providing institutions strong enough to manage the precursors to crime – notably an effective police force.

9.26 Police officers and civilian members of the police act to uphold the rule of law on behalf of the society they serve. All 193 UN member states have agreed and are therefore committed to a definition of the rule of law (see page 125) – which is in essence about the rights of the individual, not the state, and a principal test of which is whether people can seek redress for their grievances. Such grievances include police failing to properly investigate allegations of crime. The manner by which the rule of law is administered is a crucial element in building mutual respect and tolerance within and between societies.

⁴ See *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security*, Sarah Chayes, New York, 2015.

Context

9.27 The UN has by far the greatest experience of policing world disorder, both during the Cold War and in the complex peacebuilding operations necessary to manage the elements of present-day intra-state conflict. For decades, the UN has been sending police officers from around the world to 'post-conflict' areas, and more recently European Union and African Union states have been doing the same. Consequently, there are police officers with significant knowledge of working with host nation counterparts to restore security to damaged societies who can identify what has been done well, badly, and what can be improved.

9.28 Within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Police Division maintains contact with former and serving UN Police Commissioners and uses them to help compile a Strategic Guidance Framework for international police peacekeeping within UN peace operations. In New York, there is also a Strategic Police Advisory Group comprising at least 18 police attachés of their member states' Permanent Missions to the UN. Individuals from all these groupings have rich experience of working with diplomats, the military, international organisations and non-governmental organisations from different countries, and with organisations keen to maintain a knowledge base of policing in peace operations.

9.29 Notable amongst the latter are the following.

- The United States Institute for Peace, Institute to Promote the Rule of Law (USIP-INPROL), which supports police leaders in the field.
- The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, International Security Sector Advisory Team (DCAF-ISSAT), which provides continuing professional development for international senior police practitioners.
- The Stimson Institute (US), which is the major research partner for UN peacekeeping.

9.30 National police agencies, police forces and individual police officers have contacts with their counterparts throughout the world. Police officers within countries searching for progressive ways to reach international expectations welcome the offer of capacity-building in such things as:

- how better to prevent and manage public disorder;
- how to build relationships with protest leaders;
- how to build relationships with journalists who themselves are valuable sources of information; and
- ensuring female police are trained to deal with reports of rape and sexual assault and there is always a trained female officer on duty 24 hours a day.

9.31 Ideally, relationships and exchange programmes should be created between donor states and failing or failed states with a cultural similarity. The early co-location with their host nation counterparts of donor-state policing experts – as well as lawyers, jurists, victim support specialists and border, excise, penal institution and civil administration experts – can be sufficient to safeguard the rule of law against the slide towards corrupt governance and political control exercised for personal gain.

9.32 If donor governments are unable or unwilling to commit these resources in full, an alternative could be to invite international commercial and financial organisations that behave ethically and are reluctant to invest in a particular country (because of its poor governance) to offer investment on condition of the co-location of rule of law experts and agreed outcomes.

Military contribution

9.33 Whilst military and policing aims should not overlap, **whenever military assistance or intervention in a host nation is planned to prevent or respond to intrastate conflict or counter-insurgency, complementary planning for police intervention should also take place so that military and police commanders enter theatre closely aligned.** The various levels of associated preparation and planning should be rehearsed as a matter of course to support a political offer of early assistance or requirement for intervention. The possibility to intervene, if required and mandated, with stability policing specialised assets within the military force can also be considered by planners. Reference can be made to the military or police attachés of the Permanent Missions to the UN in New York, or to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels when NATO is involved.

9.34 In the longer term, SSR provides a framework of practical measures to reform or establish security institutions in fragile, failing and failed states to prevent or mitigate conflict. The reform or restoration of indigenous police forces is an essential component of SSR and security force capacity-building. Some police development may occur in a third party nation when conditions have not yet developed to allow police to be trained in their host nation. Local police force development should be given a high priority. **Police forces take longer to develop than military forces** because they:

- require higher levels of literacy and education;
- must be trained in individual and limited collective tactics;
- need extensive classroom training in law and its application; and
- must be trained to work in small groups or in isolation.

9.35 Police forces are a hallmark of a stable and peaceful society and will be the enduring element to provide security to the civilian populace. It is usually inappropriate to use military forces as the norm to secure civilian populations in the face of normal domestic threats. Military

forces have other roles to fulfil and given the nature of those roles, they are not an ideal force for civil policing. Nevertheless, many nations have gendarmerie forces, which are police forces with a military status, performing civilian police functions alongside with the civil police. Police capacity-building is a specialised process aimed at restoring, reforming or developing indigenous police. It is fundamentally an activity that should preferably be performed by personnel with a civilian police mind-set aimed at the civilian population, such as civilian police or gendarmerie.

9.36 The permissiveness of the environment and the availability of such assets, however, will determine the level of military involvement. Military forces are not usually the most appropriate actors to conduct police capacity-building, but their police component, inclusive of gendarmeries and military police, is suitable to conduct this activity in the absence of a civilian capacity and in a non-permissive environment. They can perform stability policing activities, ranging from strengthening the local police (through monitoring, mentoring, training, advising, partnering and reforming) to replacing them when necessary (for example, when local police are non-existent, or unable or unwilling to perform their duties).⁵

9.37 Forces undertaking police capacity-building will likely be working in close coordination with other agencies, as they address other facets of security force capacity-building and establish other government services. This implies that broad programmes will be executed within a framework of a comprehensive approach; that is, the integration of multiple agencies to create enduring stability within an operational environment. The importance of establishing a comprehensive approach that involves both civilian and military partners at all stages, from planning through to establishing an autonomous indigenous police force, cannot be over-emphasised.

Questions checklist

- Has a thorough assessment of the police forces' capabilities been carried out and by whom?
- Has the assessment taken into account the local understanding and perception of security?
- How are the police perceived by the local population? Are they seen as a legitimate, effective, fair and accountable force?
- What is the plan to fill the assessed police capability gaps?
- Has the host nation government been involved in defining the desired end-state and the plan to meet it?
- Is the plan coordinated within a wider security sector reform effort?

⁵ See AJP-3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*, NATO, Edition 1, Version 1, July 2016 for what this might entail.

- Who is resourcing it?
- Has it taken into account the interactions with, and the status of, other related institutions, such as the judiciary and prison system?
- Who are the key actors involved in the process? Who is in the lead?
- Is there unity of purpose and effort among the involved actors? Is there a comprehensive approach towards a shared end-state?
- How permissive is the environment?
- Is there a requirement for the military to intervene to reinforce or temporarily replace the local police until responsibility can be handed over to other organisations or back to the host nation?
- How will the police capacity-building effort be measured against the desired end-state?

Further resources

NATO, (July 2016) Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*, (Edition 1, Version 1).

Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations 'The Brahimi Report' United Nations A/55/305–S/2000/809.

David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito., (2010), *The Police in War*.

International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, (2012), *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Folke Bernadotte Academy.

United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, (1 April 2015), *Police Capacity-Building and Development*.

Repository of Police Capacity and Institution Building Reports at the United States Institute of Peace, Institute to Promote the Rule of Law (USIP- INPROL), available at <http://inprol.org/>

Catalogue of Literature relating to Police in Peacekeeping at the Stimson Center, Washington, USA, available at www.stimson.org

UN Publications, (2011), *United Nations Rule of Law Indicators*.

United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, (February 2014), *United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions – Policy*.

United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, (January 2016), *United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions – Guidelines*.

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Section 3 – Policing development and interoperability

Definition

‘Interoperability’ has several definitions and interpretations, according to the context. From a military perspective, NATO defines it as member states being able ‘to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives’.

From a policing perspective, in the UK it is focused on multi-agency capability, cooperation and joint working, so that ‘organisations or discrete parts of the same organisation [can use and] exchange operational information to inform their decision making’.⁶

In wider emergency or crisis responses, the UK’s Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) defines it as: ‘the extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of routine.’

Relevance to prevention

9.38 The factor that makes policing and interoperability essential to the wider security, defence and development sectors is the protection of civilians (POC). With new European Union thinking⁷ about human security engagement and a renewed UN focus⁸ on building sustainable peace, justice and effective institutions, it is imperative to regard prevention, early warning, crisis response, security and reconstruction as intertwined activities.

9.39 In this context, military-civil planning must recognise the strategic importance of policing in dealing with the exponential growth in globalised challenges, organised crime networks, terrorism, technology and changing public expectations – all with limited resources. Such thinking, combined with the principle of ‘do no harm’ and the need to coordinate with the wider development (aid) community, reinforces the relevance of interoperability.

Context

9.40 With many millions of people living in countries experiencing significant violence, political conflict, crime and insecurity, there is an urgent need to see – as part of a coherent prevention strategy – tangible improvement and reform in professional, democratic policing services. This must include improved military-civil (police) joint working to help create a more responsive, accountable and structured policing service capability and a network that integrates better when dealing with prevention.

6 Association of Chief Police Officers, (2009). Now replaced by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC).

7 From *Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking EU Strategy* (The Berlin Report of the Human Security Study Group) – Presented to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (February 2016).

8 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG16 – Peace, Justice and Stronger Institutions), available at <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment>

9.41 A 2016 review of current international policing development policy, practice and learning subjects⁹ considered a range of strategic themes or areas within the context of wider security, justice and development sector reform. These include (but are not restricted to) the thematic areas shown in Figure 34.



Figure 34 – Current strategic themes in international policing development

9.42 For there to be a comprehensive and effective prevention strategy, the military requires a more in-depth understanding of how it can contribute to these themes, especially in countering international and transnational crime. This is particularly relevant in developing or insecure parts of the world, where criminality ‘weakens economies and undermines democracy as criminal gangs prey on governments too powerless to oppose them or resist the temptations of the immense profits they generate’.¹⁰ The link between criminal activities originating abroad that impact locally, or crimes committed domestically that have international ramifications, is an ever-present threat that has to be countered by closer joint working.

⁹ Policing Principles and Development Research, undertaken by the Commonwealth Rule of Law Division, Commonwealth Secretariat (Eyre, 2016).

¹⁰ Casey, J., (2010), *Policing the World – The Practice of International and Transnational Policing*.

9.43 According to the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC), this closer joint working depends on improving joint professional respect and relationships. It is therefore imperative for civil-military organisations working in a conflict-affected context to understand each other's mandates, cultures and responsibilities. In this regard, the relevant ACMC's guide¹¹ aims to:

- provide an overview of militaries, police, government agencies and the aid community and their responses to complex emergencies overseas;
- clarify key terminologies used within these contexts as a means of helping to create understanding and, ideally, an ability to communicate more effectively;
- highlight the complexities, challenges and limitations of engagement between the various stakeholders within the civil-military-police dimension;
- enhance understanding and utilisation of the major agreed civil-military guidelines; and
- provide a set of key references and publications to help further inform all stakeholders.

As the guide stresses, the critical link between understanding the contextual environment, the stakeholders and the challenges of preventing violent conflict lies in the application of relevant, professional, accountable and consistent individual and organisation competences, skills and behaviour.

Military-policing cooperation and interoperability

'If you want to build a banana republic, build the military; if you want to build a republic, build a police force.'¹²

9.44 The need for continued improvement and reform in global policing policy, operational practice, training, efficiency and culture is of the utmost strategic importance for military-civilian collaboration and cooperation to be more effective. There are gaps in coherent, practical, collaborative joint responses to conflict-related threats and vulnerabilities at local, national, regional or international level.

9.45 The UK Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP)¹³ was established in 2012 to improve how the police and emergency services work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents. By developing and consolidating much needed practical response guidance, it has helped shape a far more resilient and consistent framework of guidance, standards and training support. As a scalable programme, JESIP's five joint working principles and capability

11 Australian Civil-Military Centre, *Same Space – Different Mandates. A Civil-Military Guide to Australian Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response*, 2015.

12 Casey, J., (2010), *Policing the World – The Practice of International and Transnational Policing*.

13 For more information see <http://jesip.org.uk/home>

models are applicable to any type of multi-agency challenge in a multitude of environments, including military-civilian prevention work.

Principles for joint working

9.46 Multi-agency working within a complex emergency requires effective communication, cooperation and coordination. Applying a simple set of principles for joint working is always important in dealing with the early stages of an issue or incident, where clear decisions and actions need to be taken with a minimum of delay and in the face of often rapidly changing circumstances.

9.47 In supporting the need to develop both strategic and tactical options for planning and response within a prevention context, the joint working principles for a military-civil (policing) interoperability model could be as shown in Figure 35.



Figure 35 – Suggested principles for joint working

9.48 If such principles are followed and, critically, military and policing organisations continue to seek ways to improve and integrate their policy, practice and training in prevention, there will be significant improvement in developing and implementing more comprehensive and appropriate working strategies. The goal throughout is for all parties to understand what is going to happen, when, where, how, who will be involved and why.

9.49 To reach this point, **more formal policy and professional development thinking, planning and training must take place between the military, police and justice sectors, internationally and organisationally.** In many states the potential already exists to use joint national security and defence strategies and thinking to provide the direction for such joint working; not least as it is clear that global challenges (for example, in transnational and organised crime and violent extremism) require a far more effective and 'globalised' military-policing capability to protect citizens, uphold the rule of law and prevent violent conflict.

Questions checklist

- What, if any, joint operational working processes or structures exist either nationally or locally in the context of national security activities?
- Which government ministry or department does policing come under? Is there any strategic alignment with the Ministry of Defence?
- What is the national construct for public security? Does it comprise a combination of gendarmerie (para-military), civil policing and the military, such as that found in many of the European Union countries, or is it a more singular (constabulary/force/service) responsibility, such as found in the UK?
- In the event of a national security incident, such as a terrorist attack, who holds primacy for the public safety response – policing or the military?
- Is there any indication of joint leadership and/or specialist, operational training taking place either at a national or local level?
- What levels of policing legitimacy exist at a local level?
- Who are the key actors?
- How is national and local intelligence gathered and shared amongst the security services? Where in government is such information presented, coordinated and acted upon strategically?
- What new capabilities and competences are required for there to be more effective joint working and coherent interoperability at a policy, practice and learning level?

- How evident are professional, organisational and leadership training and development plans for policing? Is there a well-defined path to acquiring capability, capacity and competency?
- What is the public perception of policing nationally and locally? Is there evidence of tangible community consent or is policing more focused on enforcement?

Further resources

Australian Federal Police, International Deployment Group – *Strategic Framework for Police Development*, available at <https://www.afp.gov.au/what-we-do/our-work-overseas/international-deployment-group>

The Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) – *Same Space – Different Mandates: A Civil-Military Guide to Australian Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response*, available at <https://www.acmc.gov.au/>

Commonwealth Charter, (2013), available at <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-charter>

Commonwealth Harare Declaration, (1991), available at <http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/harare-commonwealth-declaration>

Dominique Wisler and Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe, *Community Policing: A Comparative View*

IPES Working Paper Number 6, (May 2007), available at www.IPES.info Emergency Planning College (EPC) New Series. Number 13 (April 2015).

The Berlin Report of the Human Security Study Group, (February 2016), *From Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking EU Strategy* – Presented to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

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UN SDG16 – Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions 2016, available at <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/>

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Section 4 – Corruption

Definition

Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Corruption can flourish at all levels: nationally and internationally, as well as in the public, private and non-governmental sectors. It can be manifested through, for example, bribery in public procurement, leading to sub-standard goods and services being bought at inflated prices; nepotism in hiring and promotions; and diversion of state resources for the benefit of patronage networks.

Relevance for prevention

9.50 Corruption is a root cause of conflict, insecurity and terror. In many fragile and conflict states, corrupt elites systematically extract resources for their own benefit and brutally repress any form of dissent. This can lead to violent conflict.

9.51 Where a government lines its pockets at the expense of providing basic services or corrupt elites limit the economic opportunities of ordinary people, violent extremism can flourish. Disenfranchised citizens can also become targets for recruitment by violent extremist groups. The Taliban, ISIS and Boko Haram all draw on deep public anger at the abuse of official power to secure support. Fighting corruption is therefore a prerequisite for preventing conflicts, building stability and countering terrorism.

9.52 Corrupt practices in the defence sector are particularly harmful, as they affect institutions that are mandated to provide security and have the monopoly on the use of force. Corrupt defence forces can contribute to insecurity instead of tackling it, and can abuse their power to prey on the population they are supposed to protect. In addition, institutional structures weakened by corruption are unlikely to withstand challenges of insecurity. Corruption in recruitment and payment chains contributed to the collapse of the Iraqi Army in the face of ISIS, while corruption in procurement chains weakened the operational effectiveness of the Ukrainian Army. Preventing corruption in the defence sector would therefore help create robust forces, well connected to the civilian population, and capable of responding to challenges and creating security.

9.53 Finally, stabilisation and peacekeeping missions can fail to prevent a relapse into violent conflict if they fail to consider the impact of corruption on mission goals. In Afghanistan, for example, failure to counteract corruption weakened state institutions and negatively affected the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international mission.

Context

9.54 In the last 20 years, international civil and military operations have taken place in complex environments with excessive levels of corruption and organised crime. Operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, and UN peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Guinea Bissau have all had to grapple with high levels of endemic corruption in theatre.

9.55 Some missions have themselves contributed to increased corruption levels, either through individual behaviour or a through a failure to understand the consequences of injecting high levels of unsupervised spending into the environment. The United States Commission on Wartime Contracting¹⁴ found that the United States had lost between \$31 billion and \$60 billion in Afghanistan and Iraq in contract waste and fraud. In Afghanistan, reliance on private security contractors within the supply chain enabled the creation of a protection racket benefiting corrupt warlords and insurgents, which in turn undermined the United States armed forces' ability to achieve their strategic goals.¹⁵

9.56 Efforts to help build the capacity of defence institutions in peacetime can also be undermined by corruption among recipient institutions. Weak institutions are less able to absorb assistance, training and equipment, all of which can be wasted or diverted through corrupt practices. In Mali, the United States sought to provide security assistance to an institution that was well-managed and trained – the 33rd Parachute Regiment, or the 'Red Berets'. But the way security assistance was distributed ignored the power distribution between different parts of the Army. The 'Red Berets' were the presidential protectors, and there was a division between them and the 'Green Berets' – the other, less elite units of the Army. While the Army struggled with a range of issues, corruption in recruitment and promotion had weakened its cohesion and ability to withstand challenges.¹⁶ It was the troops of the 'Green Berets' who were most negatively affected by the patronage networks that had enriched the Army leadership. They deposed President Toure in a coup, led by Captain Sanogo. The 'Red Berets' were arrested for attempting a counter-coup, and they were disbanded. Security assistance and attempts to strengthen the capacity of the Malian Army had been undermined by systemic corruption.

9.57 Corruption is not a marginal issue: it is a strategic problem that can frustrate the success of a mission, cost the lives of troops and result in relapse to violent conflict. Corruption should be addressed by all parties – military, civilians and police contingents – from the early stages of a mission and throughout the period of deployment.

14 Commission on Wartime Contracting, (2011), *Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks*, available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-Cover-ExecSum.pdf

15 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 'Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the US Supply Chain in Afghanistan', June 2010, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/HNT_Report.pdf

16 Transparency International Defence and Security Programme, *Security assistance, corruption and fragile environments: exploring the case of Mali 2001 – 2012*. London 2015.

Military contribution

9.58 The ability of the armed forces to achieve their goals – be that in defence capacity-building or in military operations in complex environments – can be significantly affected by corruption. Moreover, the forces can exacerbate corruption levels by supporting some local actors or injecting significant resources into the operational environment. Therefore, countering corruption should be a necessary component of strategic, operational and tactical planning.

9.59 A transparency, accountability and counter-corruption (TACC) framework should be developed to guide efforts early on in a mission. This should include integrating TACC into doctrine, policy and plans prior to a conflict. Corruption risks and pathways can be analysed using a framework developed by Transparency International's Defence and Security Programme,¹⁷ which groups corruption risks into five categories: political, financial, personnel, operations and procurement. Recognising the manifestations of corruption is the first step towards counteracting it. Counter-corruption training, exercises and tactical guidance should be provided to deploying troops. Military intelligence collection and analysis can provide indicators of corrupt activity, through mapping social and political dynamics, enabling smart decision-making.

9.60 To identify and deal with cases of corruption, it is key that systems and guidance are in place to allow personnel to blow the whistle on corrupt behaviour. This should include a robust whistle-blower protection policy that protects whistle-blowers from reprisal.

9.61 International missions should also establish viable procedures for contracting and procurement. Procurement and contracting practices should minimise empowering corrupt networks or allowing the diversion of funds. One model that has shown promise in Afghanistan is the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), a joint Afghan-international monitoring body that benchmarks progress on anti-corruption reform and investigates cases of corruption.

9.62 Integrity and anti-corruption should become core elements of training for host nation security forces, strengthening their institutional structures and conveying best practice in governance and civil-military relations. Through the above measures, the military can minimise the threat that corruption poses to peace and security and achieve greater stability for citizens.

Questions checklist

- Has the risk of corruption in the crisis area/host nation been thoroughly assessed?
- What are the affected areas? Does it include the security sector?
- What is the host nation government's attitude towards corruption? And that of the local population?

¹⁷ See 'Further resources', page 148.

- Are there any preventive measures or counter-corruption systems in place? If so, how effective are they?
- How can the host nation, and internal and external actors support a common effort to tackle corruption?
- Has the risk of corruption been taken into account while planning for any engagement in the host nation/crisis area?
- Are military personnel aware of corruption risks as well as of counter-corruption procedures, particularly within the procurement and contracting areas?
- Is there any institution to which the corruption, within the host nation or within the organisation itself, could/should be reported?
- Are there viable procedures in place to report on corruption indicators or practices?
- Within the SSR efforts, has corruption been addressed to prevent it from undermining the rebuilding of recipient institutions?
- Are integrity and counter-corruption training included in the training curricula of both the local military and the police forces, at all levels?

Further resources

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- *Corruption threats and international missions: Practical guidance for leaders*. London 2014.

- *Corruption and Peacekeeping: strengthening peacekeeping and the UN*. London 2013.
- *Corruption: lessons from the international mission in Afghanistan*. London 2015.
- *Security assistance, corruption and fragile environments: exploring the case of Mali 2001 – 2012*. London 2015.
- *Operational Transparency, Accountability and Counter-Corruption (OPTACC) training package*. London 2015.
- *Regional results: Asia Pacific. Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index*. London 2015.
- *Results: NATO members & partner states. Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index*. London 2015.
- *Regional results: Middle East and North Africa. Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index*. London 2015.
- *Results: G20. Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index*. London 2015.

Yannick Weyns *et al*, (November 2014), *Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic*, available at <http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IPIS-CAR-Conflict-Mapping-November-2014.pdf>

Notes:

Chapter 10 – Security sector reform

10.1 This chapter features four articles related to security sector reform:

- security sector reform;
- good governance in security;
- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and
- children and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

Section 1 – Security sector reform

Definition

Security sector reform is a process that establishes or transforms security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security.¹

Relevance to prevention

10.2 Almost a hundred peace agreements in the past 30 years have included reform of the state security sector because of their role as perpetrator of violence and abuse of power. As stipulated in all the major regional framework agreements on security sector reform (SSR), the SSR process should be undertaken proactively and early (as illustrated in Figure 36 overleaf) to reduce the possibility of future violent conflict sparked by corrupt and unjust institutions. SSR has a prominent role in the prevention of violent conflict and is not simply a set of operations restricted to stability and peacekeeping operations, and post-conflict peacebuilding activities. **Lasting reform requires embedded local leadership.** Accelerating reform assistance beyond the capacity of legitimate local institutions and cultures risks exacerbating resistance to reform. This can provoke rather than prevent violence when supporting militaries draw down and attempt to exit.

1 International Security Sector Advisory Team, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF-ISSAT).




Figure 36 – Security sector reform, from conflict prevention to peacebuilding²

Context

10.3 Many states and international organisations have adopted SSR as an integrated concept and field of action.³ SSR is a multi-agency undertaking and needs to be understood holistically. ‘Improving’ effectiveness in one sector (for example, making arrests) can cause blockages and lead to greater human rights abuses in others (for example, detention centres).

10.4 **Situational awareness – the comprehensive security sector reform assessment.** SSR may have to be conducted at any stage along the spectrum of conflict, ranging from requested assistance during peacetime military engagement to post-major combat operations. Regardless of the stage of conflict, any SSR intervention needs to understand where it fits into reform of the overall security system (including police, justice, corrections and non-state providers), to avoid later, potentially very negative, repercussions. Increasingly, comprehensive and holistic SSR assessments are done jointly with the host nation, usually with a multilateral lead (for example, those done in the Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, and Madagascar).

² Picture: DCAF-ISSAT.

³ See, for example, OECD-DAC 2007; European Security Strategy 2016; UN Secretary General reports on SSR 2008, 2013; African Union Framework Policy for SSR 2013; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Integrated Guidance Notes 2016), available at <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/SSR-Overview>, <http://ssrbackgrounders.org>; NATO, Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Annex B.

10.5 The absence of such an assessment triggers the need to decide how to do one; whether a subset of a comprehensive assessment has utility; who to do it; what role the military plays; and what skills are needed to deploy to do this and when, including producing warning orders. A lead nation may be the best way to instigate an assessment, but preferably several nations in conjunction with the host nation. Friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) via established liaison with the host nation will be critical to contributing to any assessment.

10.6 **Perception of host nation forces.** An understanding of how host nation forces are perceived, and the problems they face or pose, is paramount to understanding what would be appropriate initial reform measures. These may be quantitative or qualitative measures.

- Quantitative measures – is it simply a matter of rightsizing (for example, more soldiers, fewer officers), recruiting and retention?
- Qualitative measures include:
 - o basic craftsmanship – classic training needed in shooting, section/platoon/company attacks, operational planning and so on; and
 - o professionalism and leadership – if the host nation forces are part of the problem due to human rights abuse and corruption, then giving them training on how to shoot straight and on operational planning is not going to reassure the local population about their (or our) intentions, and could in fact make things worse on all fronts by seeming to legitimise the problem.

10.7 **Reform space.** The most demanding situation for SSR will occur when the supporting military is tasked to impose a secure environment. In such a situation, the military will need to balance the operational imperative to improve effectiveness of the physical aspect of fighting power with the essential requirement to pave the way for the accountability, integrity and responsibility of wielding lethal force on behalf of the state. Most reform needs to be done out of battle. In ongoing hot stabilisation scenarios, the physical and political space that can be secured, to allow reform of at least part of the host nation armed forces, will be a decisive condition for achieving an SSR objective.⁴

10.8 **Mutual support.** Due to the diverse nature of SSR, it is essential that a mutually supportive, comprehensive approach is adopted that uses political, economic and military input, guided by unity of effort and underpinned by a common information campaign. A clear requirement for the security sector must be developed from analysis of the threat, historical precedent, cultural requirements, economic sustainability and, most importantly, the aspirations of the host nation. **The formation of a security sector is a strategic-level task shaped at the highest political level, and the ownership of any programme must lie with the host nation government.**

4 See <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Share/Forum/Are-there-any-good-examples-of-military-reform-efforts> (examples include Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone and South Africa).

Military contribution

10.9 For the external military, SSR is classified as a stability operation that supports the transformation or establishment and training of host nation armed forces, within the strategic guidelines set for the reformation of the security sector. This constitutes, to a large extent, security force capacity building.⁵ Capacity building is the process of increasing a host nation's ability to achieve self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital, development and reconstruction. The ultimate aim is to hand over the execution of and responsibility for public order and security to the local authorities.

10.10 If a comprehensive SSR assessment has already been conducted jointly by the host nation and a multilateral or bilateral lead, then a variety of short-, medium- and long-term recommendations will have been made, including for the reform of military forces. If a full or partial assessment has still to be conducted, then, providing there is political engagement for reform, an initial reform process can be started, particularly as confidence-building measures and potentially to contribute to overall security. Without genuine and wide-reaching political engagement for reform by the host nation, external support for reform is likely to be misused and potentially further destabilising.

Supporting doctrine on the military contribution to SSR is at NATO's Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*, (Edition A, Version 1), Annex B: Security Sector Reform, paragraphs B001-B036.

10.11 **Reform skills requirement.** The reform measures that can be undertaken will affect who is brought in to support them – providing a battalion to support SSR should not imply a battalion of infantry soldiers or an armoured unit. In most cases a 'mixed battle group minus' concept would need to be senior non-commissioned officer and officer heavy, with considerable experience in training, advice and mentoring.

10.12 **Initial reform measures.** Whereas 'train and equip' alone can be counter-productive, if there is political will for change, some reform measures – under the leadership of the host nation – can help to achieve immediate results. Examples include training consolidation, infrastructure improvement, recruitment standards,⁶ education in leadership, internal oversight mechanisms, disciplinary and justice systems, and command and control measures.⁷ Once a suitable and secure reform space is available, it will be important to determine the:

- number of troops to undergo reform at any given moment (i.e. who and what size of unit can be cycled out of normal duty for enhanced training); and

5 Security force assistance and military assistance tend to major solely on building to achieve purely military objectives, without enough consideration of the legitimacy and accountability of reform measures that will have significant political implications.

6 Vetting comes with its own considerable issues, including on transitional justice, and should not be undertaken without in-depth knowledge of good practice and potential pitfalls.

7 See, for example, <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Case-Studies/Capacity-and-accountability-in-the-military-some-examples-from-the-SSD-program-Burundi>

- length of training – which may need initially to be quite short (six weeks or two to three months) and to use a phased approach that allows troops to cycle in and out of normal duty.

10.13 **Supporting effects for decisive conditions** The effects that the SSR objective of the operation needs to create include:

- strengthening host nation forces (along physical, intellectual and moral components – i.e. training in leadership – as well as in planning, equipment provision and management, and infrastructure husbandry);
- reassuring the local population; and
- deterring adversaries.

Implementing such effects will require not only actual reform measures, but also supporting influence and communication measures. This in turn will require an understanding of local channels of communication, and if necessary, potential skills transfer to the host nation forces on local community relations. Improving local community relations is in itself a strong reform and confidence-building measure.⁸

10.14 **Long-term change enablement.** Longer-term measures will include institutional, educational, career management and oversight reform, which will likely require an understanding of the necessary legal underpinnings in the host nation as well as potential opportunities for change. The support of the nation's population will be a key to re-establishing the legitimacy of reform measures and, ultimately, of the host nation force. Sustainable reform will need to be fully locally owned, ideally from the outset, and incorporate mechanisms for future reform.

10.15 **Measures of success.** A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of potential positives and negatives is needed to measure effect and provide early-warning indicators of potential risks and opportunities. Traditional 'craftsmanship testing after training' is a straightforward measure, but the internalisation of training and education in leadership is culturally diverse and requires more sophisticated measures. Other measures might include how:

- infrastructure changes help to improve morale, a sense of duty, pride in the unit, an ability to learn, team spirit and comradeship;
- attitudes to diversity and gender mainstreaming in the armed forces are changing (if this is a stated objective of reform); and

8 See, for example, <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Case-Studies/The-Philippines-Civil-Society-Military-Police-Capacity-Building>

- the local population's perception of the armed forces is changing as a result of reform efforts.⁹

Questions checklist

- Does a comprehensive SSR assessment on the country exist already?
- How permissive is the environment?
- What physical and political space could be secured to allow reform of at least part of the host nation armed forces?
- How many personnel can be released for training at a time (section, platoon, company size)?
- What length of training is needed before they can be recycled back into service (six weeks, three months, six months)?
- What levels of legitimacy exist in the local security forces?
- Who are the key actors?
- How does the strategically-driven campaign plan align with the reality experienced on the ground?
- Is there unity of purpose and effort between all of the agencies involved and how is this coordinated?
- What new capabilities and competences are required for the effective functioning of professional, ethical and respected security forces?
- Is there a well-defined path to acquiring these capabilities and competences?
- What is the plan for the host nation to assume responsibility for independent operation of the reformed security forces?
- What training, education and professional development requirements are there for rule of law?
- What considerations are there for the sustainability of this particular SSR?

9 Further information on measures of effect can be found in ABCA Publication 369, *Security Force Capacity Building Handbook*, Edition 2, (2011), Chapter 8 'Measuring the effect', available at <https://info.publicintelligence.net/ABCA-SecurityForces.pdf>

- What are the socio-cultural and language factors that have significant impact on this SSR endeavour?
- What needs to be put in place early on to measure the effect created and provide early-warning indicators of potential risks and opportunities?

Further resources

ABCA Publication 369, (2011), *Security Force Capacity Building Handbook*, Edition 2.

DCAF, *Introduction to SSR*, e-learning course, available at <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/E-Learning>

SSR Backgrounders, available at <http://ssrbackgrounders.org/>

Department of National Defence, (2012), B-GL-322-010/FP-001, *Stability Activities and Tasks*.

Department of National Defence, (2012), B-GL-323-000/FP-001, *Security Force Capacity Building*.

Major, Claudia, Tobias Pietz, Elisabeth Schöndorf, and Wanda Hummel, (2012), *Toolbox Crisis Management: From Civilian Crisis Prevention to Peacebuilding: Principles, Actors, Instruments*, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)/Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF).

NATO, (December 2015), Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*, (Edition A, Version 1), Annex B: Security Sector Reform.

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Section 2 – Good governance in security

Definition

There is no exhaustive definition of governance. There is good governance and bad governance. Whilst governance is the exercise of authority and power, it is not the same as government. The term ‘governance’ can be used to describe the rules by which an organisation, like a company or a government institution, is run. But ‘governance’ can also mean all the formal and informal processes, actors and values that shape the provision and use of any kind of shared good. These include social norms for interacting with other people, use of the world’s resources, or the proper conduct and training of soldiers exercising the use of force.

Relevance to prevention

10.16 Good governance is essential for fair economic development, justice and security. It is key to the prevention of conflict and particularly for recovery from the repercussions of violent conflict. Good governance at a structural and systemic level paves the way for rule of law at the individual level. Poor governance of a country’s political system can bring about considerable conflict, along with calls for reform of parliament, presidency and the electoral system. Due to the critical role that security institutions play in upholding the rule of law, poor governance of the security sector quickly leads to opportunities for corruption, misuse of security forces, abuse of power and descent into insecurity and lawlessness.

Context

10.17 The comprehensive context of today’s and future military missions means that strengthening good governance of both the political system and the security sector is forming an increasingly important element of the mission. Improving governance is important not only for the public and political appreciation of the success of any national reform process, but also for any parts that external assistance and intervention play in the reform. Good governance encompasses many aspects beyond the security sector, including a free and fair political system and sharing of national resources. A military contribution to improving governance generally can have significant insight, entry and legitimacy by concentrating on the governance, accountability and integrity of the security sector at the organisational and individual level.

10.18 Defence or military engagement during peacetime, or peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions during or after violent conflict, will quickly encounter the complexity of the political and governance landscape. In the absence of strong governance or civil society, or when the military are first to secure and gain local confidence, it is enticing to use the military to continue momentum and build up state functions. However, it is **not** the task of the military to take over the job of local or even international civilian actors (unless required and specifically

mandated). Reform of any sector will need to consider moving at a pace and along opportunities that maximise national ownership and sustainability, and which fit as part of a whole system. This has brought about the consideration of ‘good enough governance’.¹⁰

10.19 Good governance of the security sector will generally encompass the following characteristics.¹¹

- **Accountability** – including sanctions for breaches and checks against impunity.
- **Effectiveness** – service responsibilities completed to a high professional standard.
- **Efficiency** – services making the best possible use of public resources in their duties.
- **Participation** – inclusive opportunities for all men and women of all backgrounds.
- **Responsiveness** – a service sensitive to the different security needs of the population.
- **Rule of law** – for all persons and institutions, including the state.
- **Transparency** – of information and processes, made available to the widest public audience where possible, or to suitable accountable institutions.

Military contribution

10.20 Based on a comprehensive assessment conducted with local and international civil actors, a military contribution to governance in security should build on what is already in place, both state and non-state, and be sensitive to what is socially and politically possible. The following institutional features¹² of good security sector governance give aiming points for the military contribution to governance in security:

- the use of force is defined and conducted according to a legal framework;
- control and management of the security sector are institutionalised (not personalised);
- security sector institutions have sufficient capacity to fulfil their responsibilities effectively and sustainably;
- the mandates and missions of different private and public security actors are clear and distinct; and

10 See Grindle, M., *Good Enough Governance Revisited*, (2011); also Lawrence, T., *Twenty-seven Articles*, (1917): ‘Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.’

11 DCAF, SSR Backgrounders, *Security Sector Governance*; also UNESCAP, *What is Good Governance?*

12 For full citation see DCAF, SSR Backgrounders, *Security Sector Governance*.

- the security sector functions according to a culture of public service.

10.21 As an interlocking system of checks and balances, good governance of the security sector will need to nurture processes throughout all levels of service for the following.

- Leadership** is an area that the military majors in. Leadership needs nurturing and is necessary at all levels of command, from lance corporal upwards. Leadership style changes considerably, but has been evidenced throughout the ages and continues to be revised even by modern armies to keep up with the demands of modern warfare and public legitimacy.¹³ Within the military it can take the form of command and control, mission command, systems of delegation, personal discipline and integrity.
- Framework and policy development** can range from the constitution and legal frameworks, including a possible Law on the Army, through to codes of conducts – including values and standards, military justice and the acknowledged role of integrity and a sense of duty as the state representative for the legitimate use of force. In addition to formal policy development, often imposed by civilian oversight, it is also about the military doctrinal development of the moral aspects of fighting and of war.¹⁴
- Oversight** can be divided into internal and external oversight mechanisms. The military will have little control over the development of external control mechanisms, such as ombudsmen institutions, legislative defence committees and the media, but it does have considerable control over the development of internal control mechanisms. The latter range from armoury checks, stores inventories, annual tests, post-operational reports and lessons, to protective marking systems, military regulations and standard operating procedures (SOPs), equipment procurement procedures, and unit safety and security checks.
- Management** includes management of performance, human resources and finances. Good management creates effective, efficient and professional security organisations and improves the use of resources and service delivery. Furthermore, it ensures the right people are in the right job and it can help increase participation of marginalised groups. It is also essential for policy implementation within the military. Management requires specific training, just like any other skill.
- Legitimacy** of the host nation security structures and governance (and any external assistance to them) is ultimately granted by the local people's acceptance and trust in them. The legal right to the monopoly of force does not make it legitimate *per se*. On

13 See Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 'By leadership I mean the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness...!'; General Graf von Baudissin on 'leadership development' within the German army after WWII; the UK's *Army Leadership Code* (2016).

14 UK Defence Doctrine considers that fighting power is made of three components: physical, intellectual, and moral; if any of the three are lacking then fighting power will be weakened; Sun Tzu and Clausewitz similarly major on the moral aspects of the art of war.

the contrary, a top-down approach in societies that value informal non-state structures, especially where formal state structures are abusive, will gain little legitimacy and trust. Ways to gain such trust are through openness,¹⁵ communication, transparency, political independence and a fair, service-oriented culture.¹⁶ Transparency does not need to compromise confidentiality but it does reject secrecy.

- f. **Representation.** Fair security and justice should be delivered irrespective of gender, age, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and so on. From a military perspective, delivering security can be improved if gender, ethnicity and diversity of background are adequately represented in the sector. Whilst this may take time to fulfil, the opportunity for participation can be nurtured so that perceived or actual cultural and structural barriers do not become reasons for potential conflict. This will require an understanding of what barriers there are to representation, and communicating changes and opportunities to previously disaffected parts of the population.

Checklist questions

- What is the legal, policy and doctrinal framework governing the armed forces?
- How does the military interact and respond to this framework?
- What monitoring is in place to ensure compliance with laws, regulations and policies?
- How are those who transgress the law being called to account?
- How is leadership developed and nurtured in the host nation's military?
- How is good leadership recognised, rewarded and promoted?
- What values and standards are the host nation's military working to?
- Are these values and standards formalised or informal, and how are they tested?
- How does the host nation's military identify systemic problems and make policy recommendations for reform?
- How does the host nation's military support institutional and behavioural change once policy and doctrinal changes have been made?

15 See case study on Burundi Army Unit Open Day, available at <http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ASB-29-Lessons-from-Burundis-SSR-Process.pdf>

16 See Annex K – Case study: Civil society-military-police capacity building in the Philippines, pages 295-298.

- What checks are in place to oversee the effectiveness and efficiency of security sector institutions and to ensure that public funds are not being misused?
- How do civil actors and the populace at large contribute to defining security policies?
- How are the various oversight processes monitored to ensure they too are performing correctly?
- What criteria are in place for promotion, eligibility for career development or retirement?
- What system is in place to overview human resources, their skills and needs?
- What chain of payment systems are in place and how are administrators trained to use them?
- What anti-corruption mechanisms are in place and at what levels?¹⁷
- How does the disciplinary system work?
- How is policy and doctrine translated into field manuals and tactics, techniques and practices; for example, combating conflict-related sexual abuse?
- What is the public perception of the host nation's military?
- How does the host nation's military compare with non-state security providers?
- What are the attitudes, internal and external to the host nation armed forces, to the inclusion of women, LGBT¹⁸ and minority groups in the military?

Further reading

CCOE, (2012), *Good Governance Makes Sense*.

DCAF, (2015), *Security Sector Governance, SSR Backgrounders*.

Grindle, M.S., (2011), *Good Enough Governance Revisited*, Development Policy Review, Volume 29. United Nations UNESCAP, *What is Good Governance?* available at <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>.

¹⁷ See 'Corruption', pages 145-149.

¹⁸ Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender.

Section 3 – Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

Definition

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a process that involves the collection of arms and equipment, the selective demobilisation of forces or other armed, combat and non-combat personnel, and the return to civilian life of those who are not retained for the armed forces.¹⁹

A broader treatment of each element of DDR can be found under 'Context' below.

Relevance to prevention

10.22 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is fundamentally about reducing prospects for the recurrence of violent conflict by:

- re-asserting the state's democratic control over the legitimate use of force;
- breaking command and control of previously armed factions;
- creating space for reconciliation and peace by redistributing power, altering the *status quo*, neutralising spoilers, and enabling options other than war and violence.

In most cases, DDR will be part of a wider reform of the security sector which will look at reducing excessive military expenditure as well as the propensity and opportunities for politically motivated collective violence.

10.23 As DDR goes through its third generation²⁰ of revision, there is much debate about the relevance and contribution of DDR to peace and nation building and the prevention of the recurrence of violence. Bridging the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration gap is crucial to ensuring that DDR is worthwhile. Disarmament and demobilisation without reintegration can cause more harm than good and actually contribute towards violent extremism.²¹ DDR, under the shadow of military operations, poses the dilemma of military targeting against the very groups that DDR processes seek to engage. Ongoing military operations can thus jeopardise the neutrality and impartiality of DDR processes. Prolonged containment during disarmament and demobilisation, without a smooth transition to reintegration, risks legal implications of involuntary detention.

¹⁹ DCAF-ISSAT.

²⁰ Muggah, R. and O'Donnell, C., (2015). *Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development. 4(1), p.Art. 30. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fs>

²¹ See Chilcott, J., (2016), *The Iraq Inquiry*, Chapter 11 'De-Baathification'.

10.24 All these dilemmas highlight the need for economic development and reintegration considerations to be taken into account long before disarmament and demobilisation is put in place. **If reintegration opportunities exist, then much of the target population for DDR will demobilise of their own accord, and few will seek to re-arm.**

10.25 In contrast, hasty disarmament and demobilisation processes can fuel arms trafficking by incentivising the procurement of arms in return for economic reinsertion packages. Additionally, economic reinsertion packages can appear to favour and reward rebels and militia, leaving the non-combatant civilian population resentful or even motivated to join militia groups. DDR processes, therefore, need to be acutely context and conflict sensitive.

Context

10.26 DDR is usually a named objective of a post-violent conflict peace agreement which gives it the legal authority and legitimacy needed for popular and political support. Without a peace deal in place, and political support, it is extremely difficult to successfully conduct DDR.

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres or via roving regional centres, to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

Adapted from: UN Secretary-General, Note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005

10.27 Correctly identifying combatants for inclusion in the DDR process will increase the chances of successful DDR. Combatants include not only those bearing arms, but also:

- those in non-combat roles such as in training, recruitment, command structures and support roles (including cooks, cleaners, sex slaves, spies, informants and dependants);
- veterans and ex-combatants, especially those with disabilities; as well as
- those who may have arrived in a host country as ordinary civilians, and only afterwards assume, or show determination to assume, the role of combatant.

Large numbers of combatants, especially those in non-combat and support roles, are women and children who require additional special treatment (which is legally mandated in the case of children by the application of The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict). It is therefore critical that personnel are separated by categories for demobilisation to support the special needs of high-risk groups.

10.28 Regular military personnel with short service, who are normally conscripted, require well-thought-out demobilisation actions but not necessarily extensive support and reintegration actions. Many will have jobs or skills to which they can return. Military personnel with longer service, normally professional career soldiers, require demobilisation and supporting actions that ensure full reintegration and the continuance of follow-on service support and entitlements. This may possibly include dependant support programmes.

10.29 Those soldiers who have been professionalised in the services will require a planned and phased return to society to ensure that they have economic support and jobs that will help occupy and motivate them, and ideally prevent them from moving to a paramilitary or adversary organisation. Some military forces facing eventual demobilisation can have their mission redirected to national support, infrastructure improvement or public works programmes. Some military units can be retrained for other governmental support requirements such as security guard elements, but experience shows that re-training for policing services has so far been ineffective and fails to achieve the needs of individual and community-based human security. Importantly for large-scale military forces, demobilisation plans should be instituted on a draw-down basis, commensurate with the economic and stability situation in the host nation.

10.30 Demobilisation of irregular combatants requires similar levels of support as for regular combatants. The reintegration of irregular combatants is critical and must support job creation and integration within the community. Training and re-education are critical components for addressing irregular forces' reintegration. In an ideal situation, many of them will have jobs or trades to which they can return.

10.31 Some combatants may be harder to demobilise due to their special status with a previous regime or ideology. These include political or religious troops, secret police and so forth. These types of combatants may require additional security or screening. Some may be wanted for

international war crimes. The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, as well as other nationally applicable laws, such as the Leahy Act in the United States, means that selection for re-training, or retention in armed forces with which donor nations are going to work, must include relevant screening and de-selection of those who have committed human rights abuses.

10.32 Female combatants often make up 10-30% of armed forces undergoing DDR, but in practice they are rarely considered a priority group in DDR processes as large numbers self-demobilise and possession of a weapon is often required to enter a DDR programme. Women remain too often forgotten in DDR programmes but are key to leveraging support and legitimacy for DDR and SSR processes, both from the local community and from fellow male combatants.

10.33 DDR processes should recognise that sexual violence is likely to have been committed against not only female combatants but also male combatants, child soldiers and the local population. Personnel who have suffered sexual violence should be given access to counselling and the opportunity to assist with the recording of human rights abuses.

10.34 Support for child combatants should be in accordance with international guidelines. Attempts must be made, when confronted with this issue, to engage the appropriate indigenous and international specialised child protection agencies, such as UNICEF, the ICRC, the local Red Cross, Save the Children, and so on. Even if those agencies are not immediately available, their advice should be sought. As a minimum, measures should include immediate separation from adult combatants (while keeping children with family or close guardians), access to counselling, education and vocational training from qualified agencies, and aim for whole family reunion.²²

10.35 Support for disabled combatants should be based on immediate medical attention to save lives, while planning the transfer of responsibility to another non-military agency to start longer-term rehabilitation, and other social services as required. Former combatants and soldiers traumatised by violent conflict may require extended counselling prior to reintegration into the local populace. This is especially important when dealing with child soldiers.

10.36 The reintegration of combatant families may require support; and communities who have suffered from conflict, and/or who receive former combatants, will also need support.

Reintegration therefore requires looking not only at individual needs but also at community needs. At a wider societal level, many countries undertaking DDR are going through a triple transition from war to peace, from a planned or resource dependent economy to a market economy, while also transitioning to a more open and accountable democracy.

10.37 Programmes must adequately address the enablement of transitional justice and reconciliation to avoid violence re-emerging from combatant groups or organised criminals. Demobilisation involves deliberately dismantling combatant chains of command and belligerent group loyalties, replacing those with more appropriate group affiliations and restoring their identity as part of the national population. The demilitarisation of combatant groups and individuals

²² See 'Children and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration', pages 170-172.

enables the eventual development of value systems, attitudes and social practices that help them reintegrate into civil society. Any demobilisation should be supported by programmes for social reintegration and local employment, to avoid the creation of a large mass of unemployed and disenfranchised former soldiers.

Military contribution

10.38 DDR is a multi-agency undertaking. Generally, the military does not lead the planning and execution of the DDR programme. However, military forces must be integrated in the planning of DDR from its inception as it will likely be a significant operational objective of what should be a strategically-driven campaign plan. That campaign plan will have several lines of inter-linked effort, many of which will have an impact on the DDR line. The DDR line will need dedicated resources, a clear end-state, objectives and measures of success.

10.39 It is important to note that the DDR process may only apply to a portion of a military (for example, conscripts) or militia, while the remainder may come under a more overarching and simultaneous security sector reform effort, including vetting, (re-)recruitment/selection and retraining. Setting the conditions and planning for ex-combatant reintegration is a long-term process, for which the lead will likely be a civilian agency. The supporting donor military forces' contribution to DDR, therefore, tends to be specific tactical tasks to assist in the disarmament and demobilisation aspects of the process, for which military forces should be prepared to accept the lead agency role.²³

10.40 Military forces can be tasked with disarming belligerent parties and insurgents. This may include setting up collection areas for weapons that have been taken in, guarding and eventually destroying them. Additionally, military forces and police, whether from external sources or the host nation, may need to secure and protect former belligerent groups that have been disarmed and are awaiting demobilisation. Demobilisation and severance packages must be sensitive to the type of combatant and their options for reintegration (see Context).

10.41 The state of the criminal justice system in the host nation will affect whether military forces might be tasked to assist with establishing and operating internment facilities or ensuring the continuity of detainee programmes. Such a tasking lies significantly outside the scope of normal military training and skills, and must be done only in support of a lead agency such as the police, justice department and ministry of interior.

10.42 **Communication with the local populace is vital for building understanding and acceptance of DDR programmes**, and to harness their support as community stakeholders, especially throughout the long reintegration process. Local support helps to provide local legitimacy for the process and can be facilitated through effective information operations that use leader and soldier

23 For details on what this might entail see NATO's Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*, (Edition A), Annex B: Security Sector Reform, Paragraphs B037-B041, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. December 2015.

engagement to leverage the interaction between military forces and the local populace. Military forces should ensure that the population within the secured area understands the legitimacy of any action, appreciates the levels of security provided and has hope for future development for the entire community. Open communication channels will provide opportunities for local stakeholders to express their concerns and so allow for these to be dealt with appropriately. This reinforces the requirement to plan early and in harmony with campaign objectives.

Questions checklist

- Does this DDR process support an agreed end-state such as a peace deal?
- Which agency is leading the DDR process? Host nation military, supporting donor military, UN agency or other donor agency?
- Who is resourcing the DDR process?
- Is there political and popular consensus and will for the process? If not, how can this be built?
- Do the demobilised soldiers see a realistically positive outcome in their situations? If not, why not, and how are their concerns being addressed so that they do not reappear as spoilers later?
- What measures are in place for an information campaign to support the DDR process?
- Which civil agencies or authorities are playing a role in the process and how is this coordinated with the military?
- How is a reconciliation initiative coordinated with the reintegration process?
- What security requirements are there for personnel and materiel undergoing the DDR process?
- How is the process of selection of those undergoing DDR controlled and coordinated with the host nation?
- What are the broader socio-economic considerations of DDR for the local areas affected?
- How are specific gender issues (for example, female or child combatants and non-combatant assistants) being addressed in this instance of DDR?
- How are sexual violence issues being addressed in this instance of DDR?

- What social, economic, educational and psychological support is required in the local areas affected by the DDR process?
- What reinsertion, repatriation and resettlement considerations are in place for various categories of former soldiers?
- How is the process for selecting former armed persons for retention in national security services considered (and seen to be considered as) legitimate?

Further resources

NATO, (December 2015), Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*, (Edition A, Version 1), Annex B: Security Sector Reform, Paragraphs B037-B041, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

UN *Integrated DDR Standards*, available at <http://unddr.org/iddrs.aspx>

UN, *Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the IDDRS*, available at <http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/SMN-FINAL.pdf>

UN, *Operational Guide to the IDDRS*, available at <http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>

UNDP, *How to Guide: Monitoring and Evaluation for DDR Programmes*, available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/cpr/documents/ddr/ddr_how_to_guide.pdf

UN Peacebuilding Support Operations (PBSO), (November 2011), *DDR and Peacebuilding*, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/DDR%20PBF%20Thematic%20Review.pdf>

UN University, (June 2015), *UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for Purpose?*, available at <http://cpr.unu.edu/can-the-un-demobilize-and-disengage-violent-extremists.html>

Section 4 – Children and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

Definition

‘A child associated with an armed force or armed group’ refers to any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.²⁴

‘Release’ includes the process of formal and controlled disarmament and demobilisation of children from an armed force or armed group as well as the informal ways in which children leave by escaping, being captured or by any other means. It implies dissociation from the armed force or armed group and the beginning of the transition from military to civilian life. Release can take place during a situation of armed conflict; it is not dependent on the temporary or permanent cessation of hostilities. Release is not dependent on children having weapons to forfeit.²⁵

‘Child reintegration’ is the process through which children transition into civil society and enter meaningful roles and identities as civilians who are accepted by their families and communities, in a context of local and national reconciliation. Sustainable reintegration is achieved when the political, legal, economic and social conditions needed for children to maintain life, livelihood and dignity have been secured. This process aims to ensure that children can access their rights, including formal and non-formal education, family unity, dignified livelihoods and safety from harm.²⁶

‘Prevention of recruitment, and the demobilisation and reintegration’ (PDR) of children is a continuous, ongoing process and reintegration programmes should offer viable alternatives to military life for all war-affected children. The aim of PDR programmes for children associated with armed forces and groups is to ensure their effective and sustainable reintegration. The elements of the process work together and support each other: prevention is an ongoing activity supported by reintegration; demobilisation is a tool to achieve reintegration; and reintegration aims to prevent re-recruitment.²⁷

(The full definition of DDR can be found on page 163.)

²⁴ Source: Note by the Secretary-General on administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of UN peacekeeping operations, 24 May 2005, (A/C.5/59/31).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Integrated disarmaments, demobilization and reintegration standards, Children and DDR, page 4.

Relevance to prevention

10.43 Strategies and programmes pertaining to DDR should be based on a comprehensive analysis of the political, social, economic and cultural context, informed by a gender (plus) analysis.²⁸ The comprehensive analysis should include threats, deficits and weaknesses as well as opportunities, capacities and resources. Such an analysis should describe the reasons why children have, or may, become associated with armed forces or armed groups and identify ways to address them. Likewise, a comprehensive analysis should be undertaken to understand the motivations and incentives of those recruiting or using children. Both these aspects will help in addressing root causes of conflict and contribute towards preventing their recurrence.

10.44 A thorough risk analysis should be conducted to ensure that the children, families and communities assisted by programmes are not placed at greater risk for being part of any programme. Children not provided with adequate specialised care and support, whether in or out of a PDR programme, can exacerbate conflict later due to the vulnerable nature of their development. Children who are deprived of education and family support are prone to (re-)recruitment and a propensity for crime and violence.²⁹

10.45 It is also important to note that a regional or sub-regional approach should be taken, especially where conflicts spill across international borders. This is to prevent children's unlawful recruitment and (re-)recruitment into armed forces or armed groups in neighbouring countries or conflicts, and other forms of violations of children's rights across borders.

Context

10.46 Armed conflicts around the world have resulted in the use of large numbers of child combatants. Currently, there are tens of thousands of children being recruited and used by armed forces, who can make up anywhere between 10-50% of armed groups. Of that number, 40% are girls. However, international law prohibits all recruitment – voluntary or compulsory – of children under 18 years of age by armed forces and groups.³⁰ The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes the conscription of children under the age of 15 a war crime, leading to individual criminal responsibility.

10.47 **As a result of the illegality of recruiting children, PDR should take place immediately and need not wait for a peace deal to be signed that includes provision of DDR.** It is imperative that children who have been recruited and used by armed forces and armed groups are unconditionally released from their ranks, so that they can access appropriate services that promote their physical and psychological recovery, and social reintegration.

28 In gender-based analysis PLUS (GBA+) the 'plus' signifies that gender-based analysis goes beyond gender to include intersecting identification factors such as age, education, language, geography, culture and income.

29 See 'Children', pages 116-119.

30 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

Military contribution

10.48 From the planning stage onwards, actors should recognise that girls are at risk of being 'invisible' and take measures to ensure that girls are included and relevant issues addressed at all stages. It is important that the differences between the experiences of girls and boys are understood and taken into account by all actors, and that programming for children who are, or have been, associated with armed forces or armed groups explicitly reflects the particular situation of both girls and boys.

Questions checklist

Please see the questions checklist for DDR in the preceding section. Additional questions for consideration specifically in the case of children involved in DDR include the following.

- What is the specific nature of the involvement of children with the armed force in question (combatant, supporter, worker, for sexual purposes)?
- What are the prospects for family or community reunification (especially in view of prior acts of violence which may have been committed)?
- Is it appropriate for a uniformed armed force to participate in the DDR of children in this case, or might it cause further psychological trauma?
- Is there a specific process and resources set up to deal with children in this particular DDR?

Further resources

Paris Principles Steering Group, (2007), *The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups*.

United Nations DDR Resource Centre, (2006), *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization Standards*.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612, (2005), on Reporting and Monitoring Mechanism on Use of Child Soldiers.

Part 4

Other Understand to Prevent themes



Articles in Part 3 and Part 4 follow a similar template:

- (i) a definition or description of the topic under discussion;
- (ii) an explanation of how the topic is relevant to prevention;
- (iii) some background and contextual material;
- (iv) a discussion of how the military might – or already does – contribute to the topic area;
- (v) some initial questions for military planners to consider; and
- (vi) suggestions for further reading.

Chapter 11 – Conflict sensitivity

Definition

Conflict sensitivity ('do no harm') can be described as:

- understanding the conflict context – the history, social, demographic, political, economic and security context of the conflict;
- understanding the potential interaction between any planned action and the conflict context; and
- adapting planned interventions to minimise negative and maximise positive impacts on peace.

Relevance for prevention

11.1 Conflict sensitivity can contribute towards the prevention of violent conflict by helping an organisation to gain a sound understanding of the ways in which its presence in a context is likely to be both affected **by** the conflict and how it is likely to impact **on** that conflict. It helps an organisation to identify what factors lie at the root of conflict, and then to assess how each aspect of its presence might impact (intentionally or unintentionally) on these conflict drivers. Conflict sensitivity therefore forces an organisation to consider several issues.

- What are the implicit messages that its presence and actions might send to local people – for example, does engaging with an influential local person confer legitimacy on that person?
- What is the potential for its actions to empower certain actors in a conflict or marginalise others – for example, might one group derive more benefit from your intervention than others? What impact is that likely to have on relations between those groups?
- How is the organisation likely to be perceived by local groups – for example, does the organisation run the risk of becoming a target for violent action itself?

11.2 Adopting a conflict sensitive approach means that once the organisation has made an assessment of the potential positive and negative impacts on conflict in the context, it can then act to both minimise any negative and maximise any positive impacts of its activities on conflict.

Context

11.3 The concept of conflict sensitivity, and related tools and approaches, largely emerged out of practice and research by humanitarian and development workers in conflict-affected countries in the 1990s. Following the Rwandan genocide, for example, humanitarian and development workers came to realise that aid had played a significant role in increasing tensions between groups and exacerbating the conflict. Since then humanitarian and development workers have largely come to accept that any intervention in a conflict-affected context inevitably has an impact on the social, political, environmental or economic factors that influence the conflict in that context. These impacts may be positive or negative; direct or indirect; physical or intangible; intentional or unintentional. Conflict sensitivity is an umbrella term for approaches to managing these impacts.

11.4 Although originating in the humanitarian field, the concept has since been applied in a wide range of sectors. Many sector-specific tools and frameworks have been developed, with the objective of minimising any negative, and maximising positive, impacts on peace for different intervention types and actor groups.

Military contribution

11.5 Any intervention implemented by military actors, irrespective of whether they employ force or the threat of force, is highly likely to have an impact on the conflict context.

11.6 Military actors from NATO member and partner states are, for example, extremely unlikely to be present in a conflict-affected context without an invitation from the government of that country. Given that the state is frequently an active participant in conflict (and is always an interested party), it is unlikely that NATO militaries will, initially at least, be perceived as impartial actors by local people. For example, surveys of Afghan perceptions of military efforts to 'win hearts and minds' through quick-impact projects have found that local people see them as contrived and politically driven, and prefer multi-year long-term sustainable development projects.

11.7 It is important for military actors to consider the implicit messages that their engagement might send to local communities, and the implications this can have on peace and conflict dynamics. It might, for example, be necessary for the military to undertake certain roles due to their ability to operate in insecure environments, such as supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid in contexts in which civilian agencies are unable to access communities. However, if they are seen as being associated with one party in a conflict, then activities or beneficiary communities might become seen as 'legitimate targets' by other armed groups. Military actors might not therefore be welcome by local people, irrespective of the benefits that may be accrued.

11.8 Likewise, culturally inappropriate or unaccountable behaviour by military actors can also fuel grievances of local people, and result in undermining overall objectives (for example, by reinforcing locals' feelings of powerlessness and making narratives of non-state armed actors more attractive). Military actors engaged in capacity building of host militaries meanwhile need to

consider the potential impact that this can have on conflict dynamics if those host forces go on to commit human rights abuses.

11.9 Military actors operating under a stabilisation mandate, with the principle objective of building the capacity and legitimacy of the government in contested areas, should be particularly conscious of the dilemmas this is likely to raise in terms of their ability to 'do no harm'. For example, in some contexts strengthening the capacity of state structures and institutions can become a barrier to promoting genuine political reform, by helping to insulate the state from public pressure to address legitimate grievances. Similarly, a lack of transparency in defence procurement can facilitate corruption within host nations, which can further undermine public confidence in state structures and contribute to underlying drivers of conflict. Strategic planners (including military planners) therefore need to carefully assess the impact of military support on any political reform processes that might be needed for prevention and peacebuilding.

11.10 Military actors can play a key role in promoting more conflict sensitive engagement across governmental and international conflict prevention activities. By drawing upon their unique networks (for example, through military-to-military engagement or military attachés), they can help planners develop comprehensive cross-government conflict analysis that is informed by perspectives that are often difficult for civilians to access. Military analysis should also draw upon civilian sources (diplomatic, developmental and so on).

11.11 Furthermore, military actors often have access to insecure environments that civilian agencies find very difficult to reach. As such they may be well placed to support others in capturing the perceptions of local people, and ensuring that these are fed into higher-level strategic planning processes and operational implementation of civilian-led initiatives. If, however, community engagement is interpreted as intelligence gathering for military purposes by local people, it is likely to place both communities and development workers at risk, and undermine the potential for establishing effective conflict prevention interventions.

Further resources

Haider, H., (2014), *Conflict Sensitivity: Topic Guide*, Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

Dennys, C., (2013), 'For Stabilization', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 2(1), pages 1-14.

Fishstein, P. & Wilder, A., (2012), 'Winning hearts and minds? Examining the relationship between aid and security in Afghanistan'. Somerville, MA: Tufts, Feinstein International Centre.

Conflict sensitivity

Azarbajjani-Moghaddam, S., Wardak, M. & Zaman, I., & Taylor, A., (2008), 'Afghan hearts, Afghan minds: Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations.' London: BAAG.

Dennys, C. & Fitz-Gerald, A. M., (2011), 'Intervention hangovers in stabilisation operations. Case studies from Afghanistan and Iraq'. København: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Chapter 12 – Religious leader engagement

12.1 This chapter features three articles:

- religious leader engagement;
- case study from Kosovo (2005-6); and
- case study from Afghanistan (2006-7).

Section 1 – Religious leader engagement

Definition

Religious leader engagement (RLE) is a command authorised, chaplain conducted activity focused on establishing or facilitating trust and building relationships among indigenous religious leaders. As a chaplain operational capability, RLE is contextually driven – adapting to domestic, humanitarian and expeditionary operations with army, navy and/or air force elements.

Relevance to prevention

12.2 Religious extremism fuels much contemporary violent conflict, adding complexity, enflaming sentiments and often overpowering the tolerant religious voice. The development of religious leader engagement (RLE) as a capability within present operational structures can aid local religious leaders in the task of countering such extremism.

12.3 Religious leaders are among the dominant centres of gravity within indigenous populations and are often revered at community and regional levels. Military chaplains, as religious leaders in their own right, can function as ‘boundary spanners’, moving with relative ease – security permitting – among religious communities and engaging with their leaders. Chaplains routinely strive to build relationships and establish trust with local religious leaders to improve communication and understanding, especially with the moderate religious leaders in conflict-affected societies who are often key to initiating dialogue. Referred to as middle range actors, moderate leaders often possess both local and national capacities at the grassroots and upper levels of society. These relationships of trust within the operating environment can also therefore create important new entry points for other whole-of-government partners.

12.4 Additionally, chaplains can be directly involved in mediation and other dispute resolution processes that are effective approaches to precluding violent conflict; for example, conciliation – a third party intervention between alienated groups to help correct misunderstandings, reduce fear

and distrust, and generally improve communication. As religious leaders, chaplains naturally gravitate to such operational roles.

12.5 In these various ways, RLE reinforces the concept of ‘local first’ by seeking to understand the underlying causes of conflict through listening to and hearing local actors.

12.6 In the longer term, the benefits of the religious element in preventing or resolving conflict are often best realised within ‘coalitions of structural interdependence’ such as national peace platforms/forums for consultation, collaboration and coordination of peace issues by relevant actors and stakeholders. RLE can support the establishment of such enduring structures.

Context

12.7 The role of chaplains in engaging the leaders of religious communities is not new in operational environments. It has occurred on an ad hoc basis over decades wherever chaplains have deployed with troops, regardless of nationality. In various forms, RLE has been a successful means of civic engagement in active conflict zones, in peace support operations and in ‘post-conflict’ environments where brokered ceasefires have led to mission mandates enforcing peace agreements. A number of NATO and NATO partner nations are currently looking into the viability of RLE, and some are already institutionalising it operationally.

Military contribution

12.8 RLE should be based on a **religious area assessment**. This involves deploying chaplains who possess the skills to accumulate and categorise information relating to the religious practices and traditions of indigenous populations within an area of operations. This information – gathered from as wide a range of resources as practicably possible prior to force deployment – remains a living document once networking among local religious leaders and their communities becomes a reality.

12.9 Networking among religious communities in an area of operations is therefore an integral aspect of a religious area assessment. Engendering trust soon develops into the chaplain/religious leader encounter becoming a ‘safe space’ for these community leaders to share their concerns and aspirations. Further RLE activities will naturally flow out of the religious area assessment conducted by chaplains, since one is built upon the other – both are necessary to the full scope of engagement among local religious communities.

12.10 Coupled with advanced theological training, the religious area assessment thus positions chaplains to better interpret – and advise commanders on – the nuances of religious belief that often escape detection and that could colour how local actors respond to mission initiatives, plans of action and troop movements, for example.

12.11 Whatever other forms RLE might take – such as humanitarian assistance, helping to identify community need – all such initiatives advance conflict transformation and peace. As RLE

becomes more institutionalised, the probability of specialist RLE chaplains embedded in Provincial Reconstruction Team-like civil-military organisations is growing.

Questions checklist

- Has a religious area assessment been conducted and, within it, have tolerant religious leaders been identified?
- Who are the key indigenous religious leaders?
- What role does religion play within the culture? How are its religious leaders perceived?
- Do the religious actors practise ‘strong’ religion (for example, they are connected to recognised theological training facilities and/or have oversight bodies) or ‘weak’ religion (for example, their religious practices are not sanctioned by outside bodies, religious leaders are charismatic but often untrained/unlicensed)?
- Do religious groups respect the rights and practices of those of differing faiths?
- Does the military force employ chaplains who are trained to conduct religious area assessments and RLEs?
- Does religion factor into the present conflict? If so, in what ways? Is there evidence of peaceful applications of religion at work?
- Are there mechanisms for resolving conflict available in local traditional religion that would resonate with the people and could be employed respectfully?

Further resources

Moore, S.K., (2013), *Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments*, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Patterson, E., (2015), *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond: Advisement and Leader Engagement in Highly Religious Environments*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Moore, S.K. & Mansoor, S., ‘Religious Leader Engagement: An emerging aspect of the Comprehensive Approach’ in *The Three Swords Magazine*, Issue Number 24. NATO Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway, 2013, pages 60-65.

Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, (2013), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_05.pdf

Section 2 – Case study: religious leader engagement in Kosovo, 2005-06



Introduction

To avoid a humanitarian crisis and further conflict between military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army, NATO-led forces deployed to Kosovo on 12 June 1999 in support of United Nations (UN) Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). This was under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

In 2006, with the full support of Command, French Chaplain (Lt Col) Michel de Peyret engaged the national religious leaders of the Albanian Muslim, Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic communities. The social capital he earned during his first tour, when he assisted the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo following severe rioting in 2004, lay the foundation for a historic meeting with the leaders of these religious groups. At this he facilitated the building of trust among the leaders that helped create the conditions for further dialogue.¹

Narrative

The 2004 deployment of Chaplain Michel de Peyret brought him to Kosovo just a few months after major rioting between the Kosovar Albanian Muslim and Kosovar Serbian populations, which, due to the level of targeted destruction, had left the Serbian community devastated. Trust among the Serbian population in the seemingly incapable or indifferent Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops was at an all-time low. This was especially acute among the Serbian Orthodox religious community, as many cultural and religious sites and symbols had been destroyed during the three days of uncontrolled rioting.

Rebuilding the frayed trust between the Serbian religious community and KFOR fell to de Peyret. Over a period of months, this Roman Catholic priest began the arduous task of binding up the wounds through the French-led restoration of the Serbian monastery at Devič. On designated

¹ To read this case study in its entirety, see Moore, S.K., (2013), *Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments*, pages 169-184.

days, as many as 60 troops would participate in the reconstruction, news of which soon reached the local Orthodox Bishop, Monsignor (Mgr) Teodosije. The social capital that de Peyret earned with the Bishop led to him becoming a significant figure during the his second tour to Kosovo.

At the behest of the new Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR), de Peyret was extended for a second tour and elevated to the position of Formation Chaplain, with the mission to establish good relations with the national leaders of all three religious traditions: Mufti Terrnava (Albanian Muslim), Mgr Teodosije (Serbian Orthodox Bishop) and Mgr Sopi (Albanian Roman Catholic Bishop). Having already established a good rapport with the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Bishops, it remained for de Peyret to gain the confidence of Mufti Terrnava.

When it emerged that no historical account existed in Kosovo of Muslim, Orthodox and Roman Catholic religious leaders ever coming together for dialogue, de Peyret saw an opportunity to seed reconciliation, hopefully to start a new narrative of cooperation and the healing of memory for these communities. Through his continued overtures he eventually built enough trust to bring the three leaders to a shared lunch with COMKFOR.

But Mgr Tedosije was late – an inauspicious beginning. As tension mounted he was hurrying back from Belgrade, where he had been to get permission from the Orthodox hierarchy to attend the meal. After his arrival conversation was stilted but then, during a lull, Mgr Tedosije stood and offered a sincere apology for any wrong his people might have caused the Albanian Muslim community. Before a speechless gathering, Mufti Terrnava rose to his feet, took the Bishop by the hand and pledged his support if it were ever needed. Encouraged by such progress, the following week all three religious leaders returned for a second meal, which this time included the highest representatives of the UN Mission in Kosovo, the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and the media. All three leaders voiced their confidence that more meetings would be held in the future, to facilitate mutual recognition and restore confidence between their communities.

This experience can be seen through the lens of the U2P process as follows.

Understand

- COMKFOR demonstrated great insight as to the significance of the Kosovo religious leadership for enhanced community relations and sustained peace.
- It was also realised that a comprehensive approach could be applied more expansively by involving the Formation Chaplain with the Kosovo religious leaders, which gave more definition to the public interface between KFOR and the local population.

Engage

- As a Roman Catholic priest, Lt Col de Peyret was able to gain the confidence of the Kosovo Muslim leaders thanks to the trust he had established with the Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic communities.
- COMKFOR gained greater insight into the religious dynamics of a significant segment of Kosovar society through the engagement of his chaplain with their religious leaders.

Act

- Respecting the significance of religion in Kosovo to the people and with the aid of his chaplain, COMKFOR created an opportunity where an encounter between the three religious/national leaders evolved naturally, challenging prejudices and engendering an atmosphere of growing trust.
- The success of the first private meeting between these leaders spurred COMKFOR to build on the momentum. Realising the potential for second and third order effects within the populace, the religious leaders agreed to a second meal with the Kosovo government and UN leadership present – in full public view of the media. Strategically, it was especially beneficial to improved community relations that the people of Kosovo witnessed such solidarity and cooperation among their religious leaders.

Endure

- Noting the value of meeting with Kosovo national religious leaders, other KFOR Commanders and senior officers have followed suit.
- Institutionalising religious leader engagement is a necessary step in seeing such gains sustained.

Key lessons learned

- In operational theatres, military chaplains are able to engage religious leaders at all levels: local, regional and national.
- It is of strategic merit for commanders to recognise the significance religion holds in certain societies and, when respectfully engaged, its potential for peace. Promoting dialogue, understanding and cooperation among a nation's religious leadership is a long-term investment in sustaining peaceful relations.
- Mechanisms remain deficient to sustain the positive outcomes of such engagements. Structures are needed whereby individuals and organisations with expertise in religious peacebuilding can implement strategies that will further integrate inter-communal cooperation – an enduring peace dividend.

Section 3 – Case study: religious leader engagement in Afghanistan, 2006-07



Introduction

Upon the request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2002, which became a NATO-led mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Employed within this theatre of operations were Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRT is an evolution of the earlier peacekeeping model, which served to enforce ceasefire agreements by creating buffer zones between the belligerents to a conflict. These stand-alone units were designed to support the state and capacity building endeavours of security sector reform (SSR). They emphasised good governance, justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development.

As an Islamic nation, religious belief and practice are of singular importance within Afghan society, characterised by Sunni, Sufi and Shi'a faith expressions. For NATO troops and their whole-of-government partners, Afghanistan presented an extraordinary introduction to the complexities of the *intra*-faith dynamics of Islam, compounded by an insurgency fuelled by a radicalised Sunni Taliban.

Narrative

A cogent operational example of the effectiveness of religious leader engagement (RLE) aiding the whole-of-government mandate was demonstrated in the work of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Chaplain, Imam Suleyman Demiray, at the Kandahar PRT while Regional Command South was under Canadian command (2006-7).²

The Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Commander recognised the significant role the religious leaders (mullahs) played in the Province of Kandahar, the cradle of the Taliban. Before Imam

² To read this case study in its entirety, see Moore, S.K., (2013), *Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments*, pages 144-163.

Demiray's arrival, attempts to engage the mullahs had gone unheeded and the POLAD was convinced that his lack of success was due to what he believed to be his identity as a 'Western secularist'. Demiray immediately began to collaborate with him in engaging the local religious leadership.

Initially, Demiray chaired a *shura* in the PRT compound for the Ulema Council of Kandahar Province – a government-appointed body of Islamic scholars mandated to advise the Provincial Director of Religious Affairs on matters pertaining to Koranic interpretation, public practice and the general oversight of mosques. This was the first contact that either the Commandant of the PRT or the POLAD had affected with the religious leadership of Kandahar Province since their arrival in 2005. Following this first meeting, Demiray began attending local *shuras* of both Sunni (majority) and Shia (minority) faith groups and a picture began to form of the relations between their religious leaders.

Some two years before Demiray's arrival the Taliban had assassinated the senior mullah of the Ulema Council. The province's demographics dictated that the majority of mullahs be Sunni, with a Shia mullah serving as their representative on the Council, but Shia participation had stopped on the death of the senior mullah. Communication at the highest religious levels between these two faith communities had ceased.

The Sunni-Shia sectarian violence of Iraq held many lessons for the ISAF leadership. As a predicament to be avoided at all costs in Afghanistan, Demiray and the POLAD began to work out how the senior Shia mullah (the Ayatollah) might be reunited with the Ulema Council, thus ending the alienation of his community from the majority Sunni population.

As regular meetings with the local Sunni and Shia religious leadership continued, a strategy began to emerge. Demiray learned that both faith groups shared similar concerns:

- numerous young Sunni males continued to stream to the Territories in eastern Pakistan, where they came under the influence of the radical teachings of the Taliban – a worry to Sunni and Shia alike;
- both groups were desirous of help in restoring/building more *madrassas* in Kandahar Province, where their youth could be taught the more moderate teachings of Islam; and
- both groups were frustrated by their diminished role as advisors to the Provincial Director of Religious Affairs – an aspect of their mandate.

Over a period of months, and with much dialogue, the Sunni and Shia leadership agreed that their interests were indeed similar and that presenting their concerns as a united body held the greatest prospects for success. In early 2007, at the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City, Shia representatives re-joined the Ulema Council to discuss how they may best present their shared concerns to government leaders.

This experience can be seen through the lens of the U2P process as follows.

Understand

- Depth of insight into the inner dynamics of the regional religious leadership was achieved through the involvement of a religious leader in uniform – a CAF Muslim chaplain.
- For the POLAD, greater awareness emerged of the limitations and challenges that Track 1 diplomacy can encounter in Islamic nations. The collaborative Track 2 endeavour with the chaplain aided the Track 1 mission – a contextual consideration when ‘entry points’ within an ethno-religious society are difficult to realise.

Engage

- Where earlier overtures to engage the Kandahar religious leadership had failed, the chaplain succeeded in building relationships and establishing trust through the common ground that he had with the mullahs as a religious leader.
- The chaplain worked closely with the POLAD, sharing pertinent information entrusted to him by the religious leaders for that express purpose.
- Through the engagement of the chaplain with the mullahs, the POLAD learned of the estrangement that had emerged between the Sunni and Shia religious leadership, aiding him in determining the best course of action to improve relations between them.

Act

- Chaplain Demiray’s continued presence at Sunni and Shia shuras was a crucial action to understand the estrangement between the Sunni and Shia religious leadership of Kandahar Province.
- Conflict transformation took the form of **conciliation**, in that Demiray helped the Sunni and Shia mullahs to better understand the other’s perspective, reducing fear and distrust. Through the repeated actions of listening and sharing, prospects of renewed communication between the religious leaders were gently introduced.
- The superordinate goal (achieving together what neither could accomplish alone) of jointly presenting their concerns to the Governor of Kandahar Province became the impetus to their reunion.

Endure

- The continuation of the newly combined Ulema Council was encouraged and actively supported by Command.

- Following his tour of duty, Demiray returned to Kandahar three times, each for three weeks, in an effort to support the renewed relationship between the Sunni and Shia religious leaders.

Key lessons learned

- As religious leaders in uniform, chaplains share common ground with their religious counterparts that can open up opportunities for dialogue that otherwise may not occur.
- As in the case of the chaplain-led *shura*, ritual events often provide natural opportunities to build trust and establish relationships with local religious leaders.
- Collaboration between chaplains and whole-of-government actors holds great potential in religiously-oriented societies.
- RLE has too often been *ad hoc* and personality driven and, as such, difficult to sustain. Institutionalising this capability will provide the structural/organisational support necessary for enduring success.

Chapter 13 – The military and the environment

13.1 This chapter features three articles related to the military and the environment:

- environmental impacts of military operations;
- environmental peacebuilding; and
- climate change.

Section 1 – Environmental impacts of military operations

Definition

The environmental ‘boot print’ of military operations relates to the environmental impact and derived human consequences of activities at all stages in the conflict cycle, from training and readiness, to the prosecution and aftermath of conflicts. Such impacts may be diverse, they may be transient or persistent, and in many cases they are predictable and preventable.

‘The environment’ is understood to include natural resources, both abiotic and biotic – such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora – and the interactions between them; the characteristics, amenity and cultural value of landscapes; and the role all these factors play in human health, livelihoods and well-being.

Relevance to prevention

13.2 Environmental degradation resulting from military operations can have direct and indirect consequences for the survival, well-being and livelihoods of the civilian population. These forms of damage – for example, to water quality or agricultural land – can have serious consequences for civilian health and for effective peacebuilding and reconstruction after violent conflict, building resentment among communities and national authorities.

13.3 The failure to properly assess the environmental consequences of decisions taken in the planning and conduct of operations can have serious repercussions, both financial and reputational, which may subsequently impact on the ability of militaries to operate. The environmental conduct of militaries is typically judged relative to the regulatory environmental norms applicable in peacetime or domestically.

13.4 Initiatives to promote positive environmental conduct and deliver environmental gains in areas of operations – for example, through improvements to sanitation, waste management or irrigation – can confer dividends in relations with local communities and host nations. Environmentally responsible practices can also help protect the health and readiness of deployed forces and the sustainability of installations.

Context

13.5 Environmental standards among many militaries have been gradually improving, driven by increasing domestic environmental regulation, better monitoring and growing environmental awareness. However, there remain significant gaps in regulation and implementation between domestic and overseas operations in what may often be perceived as more permissive regulatory environments, and where environmental considerations can struggle for prioritisation. Similarly, the weak environmental protection currently afforded by international humanitarian law has often facilitated and sustained environmentally damaging military behaviours in both combat operations and post-conflict settings.

13.6 As with industrial activities in the civil sphere, the environmental impact of military activities is under increasing scrutiny from regulators and civil society, and such scrutiny is likely to intensify in the coming years. Environmentally dubious practices that are identified as being particularly harmful to personnel or to the civilian population are coming under pressure. Observers will be particularly sensitive to remedial actions that are seen as ‘greenwash’ and which are used to avoid genuine improvements in policy and practice.

13.7 There is an expanding body of guidance and best practice on minimising the environmental impact of operations, whose development reflects the recognition that mainstreaming environmental considerations in activities makes good operational sense. To be effective, environmental mainstreaming must take into account environmental considerations at all stages in the planning and delivery of operations.

Military contribution

13.8 Military actors can best contribute to minimising the environmental impacts of military operations in three ways. They can:

- ensure environmental mainstreaming throughout the life cycle of operations and across all settings;
- apply contributing nations’ domestic environmental standards and norms to military operations overseas and in basing agreements; and
- work to support and augment the capacity of national authorities for environmental assessment and mitigation.

Further resources

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Liljedahl, B., Waleij, A., Sandström, B., and Simonsson, L., (Earthscan 2012), 'Medical and environmental intelligence in peace and crisis-management operations', *Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post Conflict Peacebuilding*.

European Conference of Defence and the Environment 2013, Proceedings, available at http://www.defmin.fi/files/2608/Conference_proceedings_web_2013.pdf

Section 2 – Environmental peacebuilding

Definition

Environmental peacebuilding is the process of governing and managing natural resources and the environment to support durable peace. It includes efforts to prevent, mitigate, resolve and recover from violent conflict, and involves renewable natural resources (such as land, water and fisheries), non-renewable natural resources (such as minerals, oil and gas), and ecosystems (including their services).

Relevance for prevention

13.9 Environmental peacebuilding comprises diverse concepts and activities relevant to prevention, such as:

- governing natural resources and sharing benefits in a transparent manner to sustain peace and build confidence between stakeholders;
- preventing or reducing environmental threats to human health and livelihoods caused by violent conflict;
- using shared natural resources as an entry point for dialogue or as a basis for cooperation and trust building between divided groups; and
- developing natural resources in a conflict-sensitive manner.

13.10 One of the core objectives of environmental peacebuilding is to support the transition from fragility and violence to stability and durable peace by building on opportunities associated with natural resources and the environment more broadly. It can do this by making a critical contribution to five key dimensions of peacebuilding; for example, by:

- supporting the redistribution and sharing of benefits and revenue (political);
- securing resource rich sites and restoring access (security);
- offering pathways for delivering access to basic services and food security (basic services);
- enabling productive, sustainable and rewarding livelihoods (economic); and
- providing platforms for dialogue and confidence-building between stakeholders (social).

13.11 Environmental peacebuilding relies on good resource governance and management at all levels, from local mechanisms to national laws to bilateral and multilateral agreements. It is particularly important to establish effective governance mechanisms and safeguards (i) at the **national level** for high-value resources that generate revenue and have the potential to trigger corruption and conflict; as well as (ii) at the **local level** for renewable resources that sustain livelihoods and ecosystem services. Local-level mechanisms are often based on a combination of statutory and customary frameworks.

Context

13.12 Conflicts over natural resources are among the greatest challenges in 21st century geopolitics. Over the last 45 years, there have been a number of efforts to address linkages between natural resources, conflict and peace, and to respond to the challenges and opportunities that exist across the conflict cycle. Typically, the role that natural resources and the environment can play in the conflict cycle is divided into three main phases.

- a. Attending to the **environmental causes** of conflict (often referred to as ‘environmental security’). This involves preventing and resolving conflicts over resource access, ownership, benefit sharing and decision-making.
- b. Assessing and addressing the **environmental impacts** of conflict and the use of natural resources to finance armed groups. It is essential to assess the direct and indirect environmental damage caused by conflict and the associated risks to human health, livelihoods and ecosystems services. To combat illicit trade and exploitation of natural resources that finances armed conflict, a significant number of United Nations Security Council resolutions have contained sanctions targeting such trade and related financing of armed groups.
- c. Advancing **environmental recovery** and efforts to use natural resources to support peacebuilding after violent conflict. In this period, natural resources such as land, timber, minerals and fossil fuels are often the primary assets readily available to governments. How they use these assets can fundamentally alter the course of subsequent peacebuilding. The challenge lies in encouraging the responsible use of those natural resources and then converting the revenues derived from natural resource extraction into livelihoods, jobs, infrastructure and the basic services needed to consolidate and sustain peace. Effective and equitable management of natural resources has the potential to transform countries emerging from violent conflict by providing tangible peace dividends that can propel the peace process forward, while also kick-starting economic growth and supporting state-building.

13.13 Environmental peacebuilding offers a means for collecting these fragmented concepts within an overarching conceptual and operational framework. The framework aims to maximise the positive peacebuilding potential of natural resources across the conflict lifecycle while mitigating potential risks.

The military contribution

13.14 Issues addressed by environmental peacebuilding can be integrated into several established processes that take place at different points in the conflict cycle. These include prevention at the pre-violence stage; restricting wartime actions during violent conflict that damage natural resources, as well as supporting conflict resolution and peacemaking; and environmental recovery in post-violence peacebuilding.

13.15 In the context of prevention, environmental peacebuilding includes the application of equitable, inclusive, accountable and conflict-sensitive strategies for natural resource management. To achieve these strategies, a number of enabling conditions are needed. These are:

- public access to information on natural resources;
- clear recognition of resource rights combined with legitimate dispute resolution processes;
- ensuring free, prior, and informed consent of local communities before resource development takes place; and
- a national vision and compact between citizens and government on how natural resources will contribute to overall development and how benefits will be shared.

13.16 **Creating early warning systems and standing response mechanisms can help identify and resolve resource conflicts before they escalate.** Through these and other means, environmental peacebuilding can contribute to preventing escalation and supporting de-escalation of resource conflicts. A series of six guidance notes has been produced by the European Union (EU) and the UN on concrete measures that can be taken to prevent and manage conflicts over natural resources.¹

13.17 If prevention fails and tensions escalate to violence, armed conflicts can have a range of direct and indirect impacts on the environment. Direct impacts include targeting of natural resources (for example, poisoning wells or levelling forests to remove cover), destruction of industrial sites and municipal infrastructure, and collateral damage in protected areas. Indirect environmental impacts often stem from the:

- breakdown of governance and rule of law (which often leads to resource looting);
- displacement of people and the coping mechanisms they use to survive; and

¹ See the EU-UN Partnership on Land, Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention, available at <http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/>

- unsustainable use of natural resources in the delivery of humanitarian aid or in peacekeeping operations.

It is essential to understand how this combination of direct and indirect impacts can undermine human health, livelihoods and ecosystem services, both during and in the aftermath of conflict.²

13.18 Environmental peacebuilding approaches can also assist processes of conflict resolution, mediation and peacemaking. Since natural resources are often a key motivation and source of financing for conflict, the inclusion of natural resource governance issues in peace negotiations can be essential to reaching an agreement that satisfies all parties. Over the last decade, all major peace agreements have included provisions on natural resources, which speaks to their rising political and economic importance. Moreover, addressing natural resource governance through the peacemaking process can lay the foundation for a more robust, enduring peace.

13.19 Environmental peacebuilding can also further the aims and objectives of peacekeeping activities. Peacekeeping includes both the physical dissuasion from violence (through a military presence in conflict-affected areas) and managing potential drivers of conflict. Therefore, peacekeeping operations can be rendered more effective by working to restore the national and local governance of natural resources, and by securing resource-rich sites that may finance conflict and otherwise serve as an incentive to spoil peacebuilding efforts.

13.20 During post-conflict recovery, peace dividends can be enhanced by focusing early on the governance of natural resources to catalyse economic recovery and generate the revenues needed for reconstruction and basic services. One of the most essential tasks of environmental peacebuilding is to maximise job creation and sustainable livelihoods from natural resources. This is especially important for returning displaced persons and for the process of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants. Job creation from natural resources should also take into account the specific (and sometimes differing) training needs of men and women, as well as key structural factors such as land ownership.³

13.21 Shared natural resources can also be used as an entry point for dialogue or as an initial platform for cooperation and trust building between divided groups. If structured in a strategic manner, cooperation around shared environmental priorities can also spill over or extend into other areas of collaborative action. The way new authorities govern resources and share benefits is critical to building public confidence in both government and governance, and thus to demonstrating the legitimacy of the government.

2 See 'Environmental impacts of military operations', pages 189-191. There is also substantial guidance on this. A good starting-point is Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, 28 May 2015, UN Doc. A/CN.4/685: available at <http://undocs.org/A/CN.4/685>, Chapter V.

3 See *Women and Natural Resources: Unlocking the Peacebuilding Potential*, November 2013, available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_UNDP_NRM_DDR.pdf

13.22 To conclude, military planners can both benefit from and support environmental peacebuilding processes at different phases in the conflict lifecycle. Illustrative measures include:

- when preventing and mitigating hostilities, ensure effective, equitable and conflict-sensitive strategies for natural resource governance;
- during military operations, respect legal frameworks on governing natural resources and the environment, and take measures to mitigate the environmental footprint of military operations themselves; and
- in the aftermath of violent conflict, help identify and remediate environmental hotspots caused by conflict that pose immediate risks to human health, while supporting the recovery of resource-dependent livelihoods.

These are just a few examples of the environmental peacebuilding activities that could be considered, depending on the specific context. By raising awareness and training forces on the potential roles of natural resources and the environment throughout the conflict cycle, military operations can be made safer, more successful and more sustainable.

Further resources

United Nations Environment Programme, (February 2009), *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment*, available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf

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United Nations Environment Programme, (June 2014), *Relationships and Resources: Environmental Governance for Peacebuilding and Resilient Livelihoods in Sudan*, available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan_RnR.pdf

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Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace, (17 June 2015), *Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*, UN Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446; available at http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf

European Union and United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, *Toolkits and Guidance Notes for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resource Conflicts*; available at <http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/>

Section 3 – Climate change

Definition

Climate change impacts can amplify the risks of instability and conflict by exacerbating underlying security fragilities. Shocks and stressors such as storms, droughts and sea-level rise can place additional stress on social and political systems. These dynamics can impact human, national and international security. Climate change can be a contributory factor, rather than a primary cause, of armed conflict.

Relevance to prevention

13.23 Climate change has the potential to act as a major driver of insecurity in the 21st century, by increasing stresses on critical resources like food, energy and water, and straining social, economic and political systems. The ability of governance mechanisms and institutions to manage these additional challenges will influence how they affect the security environment. These challenges will escalate over time as climate change intensifies. Because of this, anticipating the risks that climate change poses and enhancing resilience in vulnerable areas will be an effective strategy for the prevention of violent conflict in coming decades. This is especially true in already unstable and conflict-prone regions.

13.24 Preventative action is particularly relevant to countering climate-driven risks, because of the self-reinforcing dynamic of exposure to climate impacts and impaired response capabilities. A lack of climate adaptation and resilience measures increases exposure to climate hazards, which could impact livelihoods and reinforce destabilising trends such as population movements and political unrest. In an environment of weak governance, instability and conflict, adaptation and resilience measures are more difficult to implement, leaving a population more exposed to climate hazards, which in turn can reinforce dissatisfaction with the state and mobilisation for change.

13.25 Addressing climate-related risks is also important in post-violence contexts to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict. Focusing on resource governance issues, livelihoods, disaster response capabilities and risk reduction, and considering other post-violent conflict reconstruction issues in light of climate change, will enhance the effectiveness of these operations.

Context

13.26 Environmental security has been a field of study since the 1990s, examining the links between resource and environment issues (particularly resource scarcity) and conflict. In the mid-2000s, growing awareness of climate change impacts, alongside the urgency of making progress in international efforts to address climate change, led to a surge in interest in understanding how climate change can affect the security environment, and in using this to overcome barriers to collective action on climate change.

13.27 Promoting the concept of climate change as a security threat was initially led by the UK, and the US Department of Defense has also been assessing the issue consistently for almost two decades. The UN Security Council has held a handful of discussions on the topic since 2007. The issue has gained traction within the security community and 70% of countries now reference climate change as a threat in their national security strategies.⁴ The risks posed by climate change have become a basis for military-military engagement; for example, as the US rebalanced its strategic focus on Asia, it focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capacity-building with militaries in Asia-Pacific. Concern about climate change has also provided an impetus for greater civil-military engagement; for example, on disaster risk reduction.

13.28 Popular understanding of the linkages between climate change and conflict has increased after the Arab Spring, and particularly the war in Syria. The origins of both of these events were influenced by climate impacts on agriculture, food prices and population movements, and the unwillingness and inability of governments to insulate their populations from these impacts. Syria has drawn media attention as a ‘climate war’, although, more accurately, it demonstrates how climate impacts can act on intermediary factors to influence the outbreak of violent conflict. The severe drought which decimated livelihoods in the east and caused a major population shift to the cities – in combination with the Assad regime’s disregard for citizens’ needs, the political upheaval elsewhere in the region, long-standing sectarian divisions and the brutality of the regime’s crackdown on expressions of dissent – ultimately led to the outbreak of the war in Syria.

The military contribution

13.29 Militaries play a key role in responding to the effects of climate shocks; for example, through humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. Effective operations can minimise dissatisfaction and unrest in fragile contexts, mitigating risks to political stability, and can also foster positive relations between affected and responder nations. Military-military cooperation around capacity-building and disaster risk reduction can also build trust and goodwill between countries that can benefit international relationships.

13.30 The defence and security community also have a role in analysing medium and long-term risks resulting from climate change, and communicating the nature of those risks to other areas of government. This is to inform policymaking on development and adaptation, national climate legislation, and other areas of risk and conflict management.

4 American Security Project, The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change, available at <http://www.americansecurityproject.org/climate-energy-and-security/climate-change/gsdicc/>

Further resources

Adelphi, International Alert, Wilson Center, European Union Institute for Security Studies, (2015), *A New Climate for Peace*, available at https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/sites/default/files/NewClimateforPeace_ExecutiveSummary_0.pdf

International Alert, (2007), *A Climate of Conflict*, available at <http://www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/climate-conflict>

The Center for Climate & Security, (2014), *Climate Security 101*, available at https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/climate-security-101-2_21_15.pdf

CNA, (2014), *National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change*, available at https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/MAB_5-8-14.pdf

Peters, K., Vivekananda, J., (2014), *Topic Guide: Conflict, Climate and Environment*, available at <http://www.evidenceondemand.info/topic-guide-conflict-climate-and-environment>

Part 5

Supporting material

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Annex A – Self-assessment step-by-step¹

1. First, the Understand to Prevent (U2P) actors should together broadly confirm their overall purpose.

- Why have you convened under this particular political authority to discuss this particular conflict? Have you been invited to become involved by the host nation? If not, who is authorising involvement and why?
- What is your mandate for this task? Is it clear? Is it sufficient? What is its nature and scope? What will success look like?

2. The responses to the following questions and prompts serve to clarify and refine this overall purpose, and to shape the U2P process to meet it.

3. **Where?**

- Where will the assessment take place? Does the location pose any challenges regarding access, politics or safety? How will this choice be perceived by various local and external actors?
- Which region, community or city will be the focus of your efforts? Why this place rather than other places? How will other actors perceive these choices? What are the costs and benefits of your chosen location(s)?
- How well do you understand the local context, language, cultures, religions, systems, networks and so on? Do you know the limits of your knowledge? What types of information about the local context can you **not** access? How will you continue to gather relevant information throughout the conflict assessment effort?

4. **Who?**

- Who is involved in your prevention or peacebuilding efforts? What relevant competences do they bring to the task?
- Which individuals and groups will you approach for your basic research information and to critique your analysis and plans? Who will do this basic research? How might their identities and life experiences influence what they are likely to perceive (or miss) in gathering information?

¹ Adapted from (Shirch, 2013).

- Which stakeholders are your adversaries or allies? How do they view your organisation? How might your engagement alter or support current perceptions? How do you want it to alter or support them?
- To which key actors or relationships do you have access? Based on your conflict assessment, with whom will you choose to work in your prevention or peacebuilding effort and who will be left out? Why?
- How positively or negatively do you see each of the relevant actors? Might you find it difficult to remain impartial, if that is important?
- Which people or groups might inadvertently benefit from your prevention or peacebuilding efforts, from the elite to grassroots levels, and who might feel threatened by them? Might any of them have an interest in shaping your conflict analysis?

5. Why?

- Why are you engaged in this conflict? What is your group's core value or belief? Do you see it as being threatened or denied in some way by the conflict? If so, how?
- How explicit have you made your motivations to other stakeholders? How do they perceive your motives? Have public figures or media outlets commented on them? How will you explain your motives and address criticisms or suspicions of them?
- Why is the involvement of military forces appropriate? If it is, at what level and on what scale?

6. What?

- What international and domestic political pressures are at play that could affect the outcome of your efforts?
- What are your narratives or assumptions about who or what is driving and mitigating the conflict? Where and how did you develop these views? What other experiences might shape your point of view?
- What are your ultimate goals? What change are you seeking: individual, relational, cultural, or structural?² What beliefs, attitudes or behaviours do you intend to change? In what way do your goals connect with the needs and interests of the other actors?

² See Table 13, page 237.

- What are the worst-case scenarios, potential unintended impacts and negative consequences that might result from your prevention or peacebuilding efforts?

7. How?

- What are the resources, means or sources of power available to you and how will these shape or limit your prevention or peacebuilding efforts?
- How is your organisation uniquely positioned for the task you are taking on?
- How could your organisation consult with governmental, international organisations and non-governmental organisations groups to foster coordination of relevant efforts? What partnerships does your organisation already have with organisations working in this region?

8. When?

- How long do you have to complete a conflict assessment? What time pressures do you face?
- What is your organisation's capacity for crisis response or to adapt your plans quickly in response to windows of vulnerability or opportunity? How will it adapt to changes or crises that might emerge before or during the conflict assessment?
- When is the best timing for your prevention or peacebuilding efforts, given the assessment of the timeline and possible triggers or windows of opportunity/vulnerability? Are there specific times for your efforts that take advantage of windows of opportunity or address windows of vulnerability?
- Do your prevention/peacebuilding efforts aim to foster change in six to 12 months, five to ten years, or over a longer period? When will your engagement end? Is the relevant funding and/or political commitment limited? Will ongoing peacebuilding efforts continue in this locality? How long do you think the prevention or peacebuilding effort should last to make an impact or bring about sustainable change?
- What indicators will be used to monitor the progress of the prevention or peacebuilding effort and signal the end of your involvement?

9. Before planning and designing their involvement, military and non-military actors could also conduct together a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis to identify areas of mutual strength, weakness, opportunity and threat.

Other considerations

10. A comprehensive approach to prevention and peacebuilding requires **partnerships** between:

- groups from inside and outside of the conflict-affected context;
- those working at different levels (from government to grassroots);
- those working in different sectors; and
- international and local actors at various levels.

11. Such partnerships present opportunities for developing collaborative working but also pose challenges, especially if they are bilateral arrangements outside the Tier 1-3 U2P process. Whether partnerships are forged within or outside this process, **using this handbook as a common tool** can help harmonise approaches and support shared assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation.

12. To further support the U2P process, which will involve actors from a wide range of different organisations, it is advisable to set up a **grievance resolution process** to manage any internal conflicts. To anticipate and transform potential conflicts, the process should also include a regular review of how the relationships between the various actors are functioning.

13. **It is essential to understand how others might perceive the relationships within the U2P process.** For example, how local people view a non-governmental organisation can change if it partners with a government body, military actors or actors with obvious ties to political interests. Likewise, government or international organisations that partner with certain civil society organisations might be accused of bias or favouring these groups over others. An assessment should map how local people view different external actors in their community, so that potential partners can assess the risks and opportunities of such a relationship.

14. **Make partnerships known.** Partnerships in a conflict-affected context work best when they agree explicit principles and act in an open and transparent manner. It is advisable, therefore, to use the logos and names of all partners together on public statements and reports, and to **include a joint statement defining the nature of the partnership.**

Annex B – Conflict assessment toolbox¹

Where is the conflict taking place – in what cultural, social, economic, justice and political context?

1. Nested model of micro and macro context

How does the immediate crisis relate to the broader regional or international context? What is the relationship between micro and macro views on the conflict?




Figure 37 – Nested model of conflict

Overview

People undertake a conflict assessment because of some presenting issue – a problem or conflict that has escalated to the point that someone decides something needs to be done to bring about change. Often these are smaller problems that relate to larger ones. This nested model (as illustrated in Figure 37) begins a discussion about how the presenting issue relates to, or is nested within, a larger system.

¹ Tools adapted from (Schirch, 2013), (West, 2014) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF-ISSAT).

How does this contribute to prevention/peacebuilding planning?

This model illustrates how a strategic, coordinated prevention/peacebuilding effort can address systemic issues as well as the immediate, presenting issue. Military planners can use this model to explore with non-military colleagues the possibility of addressing each level of the nested model through different efforts.

Key questions

- What is the presenting issue in this conflict? How does it relate to the immediate, national or regional and global contexts?
- Will different prevention/peacebuilding initiatives be necessary at other levels to support any efforts to address the presenting issue?

2. 'Iceberg' of violence map

What forms of direct, structural and cultural violence are occurring?

Overview

This lens illustrates the relationship between direct violence and the structural and cultural violence that supports it.

How does this contribute to prevention/peacebuilding planning?

Prevention and peacebuilding calls on actors to address each part of the 'iceberg' of violence. Prevention includes keeping people safe during a crisis, while peacebuilding addresses the structural and cultural root causes driving conflict and also reduces harms from the direct violence that arises from them. Figure 38 illustrates how structures and cultures that perpetuate forms of exclusion, and discrimination that benefit certain groups at the expense of others, can lead to direct violence at three levels – within the self, between individuals and between groups (including forces of the state).




Figure 38 – The 'iceberg' of violence

Key questions

- Direct violence – where and how has it occurred in the past, how is it occurring now and how might it occur in the future? Who is responsible for it, directly and/or in the background?
- Structural violence – how does it appear in this society; for example, repression, exploitation, inequality, control?
- Cultural violence – how is direct and structural violence normalised and legitimised in this culture?
- Will actors – external and local – be operating in a permissive, semi-permissive or non-permissive environment? Is this general or does it differ from place to place?

3. Connectors and dividers

What are the most significant connectors and dividers between people and how do they relate to early warning indicators in the local context?

Overview

This examines a wide range of factors in the broader context that can contribute to divisions between groups or help to foster better relationships, as shown in Figure 39.

Connectors refer to everything that links people, particularly at the level of fundamental human needs. **Dividers** are tensions or fault lines that divide people or deny their human needs.

Different aspects of society can often be both connectors and dividers. For example, a vital resource (such as water) can provoke both conflict and cooperation; commemorating past victories or defeats can prompt reconciliation or fuel continuing resentment.

Dividers can also act as useful **early warning indicators** of escalating conflict.



Figure 39 – Connectors, dividers and early warning²

² (Schirch, 2013).

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

This lens helps you to identify creative ways to support connections between groups and to design your efforts to avoid negative unintended impacts.

Table 11 (on page 212) illustrates (i) potential dividers within a context; (ii) early warning indicators that these dividers may trigger violence; and (iii) connectors or indicators that there are openings for peacebuilding in each of the five categories of peacebuilding and human security – legitimate governance, sustainable economy, safe and secure environment, justice and rule of law, and social and cultural well-being.

You can use this table to identify connectors, dividers and early warning indicators in a particular context. Feel free to add to it.

Connectors, dividers and early warning indicators

Dividers	Early warning indicators	Connectors or peace indicators
Legitimate governance		
Politicising along ethnic, economic, religious lines	Adopting violence to advance the political cause of identity groups, such as increased hate crimes	Increased willingness of dominant political opposition groups to talk peace and seek justice in situations of hate crimes
One group dominates government and military	Increasing dominance or absolute control of one group in the military and state structures	Establishing political institutions with increased representation and power-sharing
Some groups are systematically excluded from government institutions	Increasing systematic exclusion of groups from government institutions	Encouraging an inclusive government
Restricting the constitutional rights of some groups	Increasing restrictions and denial of constitutional rights of some groups	Granting political power and reserving seats for disadvantaged groups; releasing political prisoners and returning of exiles
Little sense of participatory democracy, winner-takes-all political system	Rigged elections, no elections or violence during elections	Free and fair elections accompanied by robust public-private dialogue in all sectors and with active participation at all levels
Lack of accountability of political leaders and institutions to citizens	Increasing lack of accountability of political leaders and institutions to citizens	Encouraging accountability and serious attempts to build trust in government, involving stakeholder groups in consultations, and considering the views of communities in decision-making
Weakening democratic system of elections, parliament, district/local levels	Failing democratic systems	Moving to consensual democracy with power-sharing or federalism, where regions have a great deal of power
Widespread corruption accepted	Escalating corruption	Addressing issues of corruption
Limited freedom of the press to travel or publish without restrictions	Media increasingly restricted in their ability to travel or publish	Increased freedom of the press to travel or publish with few restrictions

Dividers	Early warning indicators	Connectors or peace indicators
Sustainable economy		
Unequal economic growth among different territorially situated groups	Increasing geographic divisions of economic growth	Economic growth more equitable across the region
Unequal access to social services and/or relief and development programmes	Increasing disparity of access to social services and/or relief and development programmes	Conscious efforts to ensure equal access to social services and/or relief and development programmes
Scarcity of natural resources, exploitation of resources, deforestation and population increases	Worsening scarcity of natural resources, increasing exploitation of resources and rapid population increases	Introducing policies to prevent deforestation and exploitation of resources
Unequal access to natural resources and/or politicisation of resource scarcity	Increasing inequality of access to natural resources and/or politicisation of resource scarcity	Introducing policies for equitable access to natural resources
Low economic growth rates, inflation/deflation, large debt	Slowing economic growth rates, rising deflation/inflation, growing debt	Rising economic growth rates, declining deflation/inflation, managing debt
Rich/poor divide is widely accepted	Growing disparity among rich/poor, particularly along identity lines	Lowering rich/poor disparity, particularly along identity lines
Dependence on primary commodities or natural resources such as diamonds, timber, oil	Increasing dependence on primary commodities or natural resources such as diamonds, timber, oil	Decreasing dependence on primary commodities or natural resources such as diamonds, timber and/or oil, and increasing production of alternative goods and services
Development programmes favour one group	Development programmes favour one group	Development policies systematically ensures that programmes do not alienate any groups

Dividers	Early warning indicators	Connectors or peace indicators
Population movements (forced or due to no opportunities to participate in economic life)	Rising or potential population movements – through threats to civilians, expulsion or forced internal displacement – disrupt economic activity and limit access to markets	Fostering resettlement and reintegration, and ensuring the resumption of productive and increasing economic incentives for all groups
Increase in child malnutrition	Increase in child malnutrition	Introduction of health-care programmes to reduce child malnutrition
Increase in female-headed households	Increase in female-headed households because of men leaving for war, dying; gender exploitation	Increasing number of programmes to assist victims of war, especially female-headed households
Safe and secure environment		
Large numbers of potential recruits for armed groups due to lack of other options	Active recruiting for armed movements, especially of youth	Increased employment possibilities, particularly for youth
Availability of arms and resources for armed movements	Mobilisation of arms and resources for armed movements	Decrease in availability of arms and resources for armed movements
Large and powerful military with little relationship to or control by civilian leadership	Military increasingly influencing political decision-making	Increasing accountability of military to civilian leadership, and division of powers enforced between state and military
Large military budgets	Increase in armed forces, military budget and/or availability of arms	Reducing military budget, arms control agreements and restrictions to prevent the availability of arms
Justice and rule of law		
Inequitable laws that discriminate between groups (or the perception of such discrimination)	Increasing number or implementation of laws that discriminate between groups (or the perception that they are increasing)	Strengthening the judicial system and efforts to remove or correct the perception of biases

Dividers	Early warning indicators	Connectors or peace indicators
Abuse of human rights, particularly along identity lines with arrests, rapes, disappearances, army/police brutality	Escalating human rights violence with political murders, arrests, brutality and increasing abuse of civil rights and liberties	Establishing human rights committees and implementing and protecting civil rights impartially and universally
Sporadic acts of violence, such as armed robberies	Increasing cases of violence and armed robberies, and increasing inability to protect civilians	Decreasing levels of violent crime and increased determination to protect civilians
Volatile region, with violence happening close by	Increasing level of violence in the region; military interventions, increased flow of arms, influx of refugees from neighbouring countries, demonstration effect of identity groups in neighbouring regions fighting for self-determination	Negotiated resolution of violent conflicts in the region, return of refugees, maintaining positive relationships
Social and cultural well-being		
Media controlled by separate identity groups and reinforces negative attitudes towards other groups	Growing politicisation and division of the media, which increasingly acts as a propaganda tool to reinforce negative stereotypes of other groups	Encouraging impartial and fair media; media used to support coexistence and tolerance between groups
Pre-existing social divisions, such as limited intermixing in schools, businesses and marriage, and a sense of 'us versus them'	Increasing divisions between groups; growing segregation in schools, businesses, social groups, marriages and cultural events	Increased respect and cohesion between groups; increased intermixing in schools, business, social groups and marriages

Dividers	Early warning indicators	Connectors or peace indicators
Divisions between groups are overlapping along lines of ethnicity, religion, economic advantage or territory	Increasing identity consciousness among groups and restriction of cross-group associations	Growing incentives to cooperate in increasing number of cross-group associations, such as women's groups across ethnic lines
Negative stereotypes and inflammatory rhetoric between groups	Worsening negative stereotypes and dehumanising images and language to describe the 'other'	Diminishing negative stereotypes and re-humanising efforts to make 'the enemy' fully human
Different versions of history taught to children	Increasingly different versions of history taught to children	Correcting historical untruths or myths and creating shared histories to teach children
Tradition of solving problems with violence; using violence weapons seen as a cultural tradition	Leaders highlight, glorify and praise the cultural traditions of violence and use of arms	Leaders highlight a history of positive relationships between groups and portray the current situation as the exception, and discourage the use of arms or violence to solve problems
Historic trauma continues to play an important symbolic role in narratives of conflict and identity	Active recalling of historic traumas by media and key public figures	Media and public figures use narratives emphasising shared traumas and collective desire to end war
Support for identity groups from diaspora or kindred identity groups outside the context, with the goal of increasing their group's power in the conflict	Growing material, military and political support from kindred identity groups and diaspora	Diaspora and kindred identity groups from outside the context support peace in the region

Table 11 – Connectors, dividers and early warning indicators³

3 (Schirch, 2013).

Who are the stakeholders – the people who have a stake or interest in the conflict?

4. Stakeholder mapping

Who are the key stakeholders driving, mitigating and impacted by the conflict?

Overview

A stakeholder map creates a visual image of the main stakeholders and the absence or presence of relationships or social capital between them. Stakeholder maps illustrate alliances and divisions between simplified stakeholders. A stakeholder map can illustrate an entire system of actors – those driving, mitigating and impacted by conflict. But sometimes these maps become too complex. Narrowing down on a subset of the entire system can give new insights.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Effective peacebuilding requires knowing those individuals or groups that are driving and mitigating conflict, and developing peacebuilding efforts that specifically aim to influence these groups. This tool helps prioritise which individuals, groups or relationships to focus on, and can also introduce topics that are relevant to the actors (as illustrated in Figure 40).




Figure 40 – Suggested symbols for stakeholder mapping⁴

4 DCAF-ISSAT.

5. Culture and identity group dynamics

What are the stakeholder's identity and cultural groups? What are the stakeholder's worldviews and perceptions related to the conflict?




Figure 41 – Aspects of identity⁵

Overview

Cultures structure how groups of people think and act according to shared beliefs and aspects that overlap and influence each other (as shown in Figure 41). Understanding cultural and identity group dynamics helps to explain more about the stakeholders and how they see themselves and others in the conflict.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Identity analysis can assist in creating contexts where key stakeholders might be able to see the common identities that they share. Prevention and peacebuilding planners who understand identity group dynamics can help foster programmes that uncover common ground between identity groups.

Key questions

- Using Figure 41, can you identify cultural/identity groups related to the key stakeholders who are driving and mitigating conflict?
- How is identity a driving or mitigating force in the conflict?

⁵ (Schirch, 2013).

- What overlapping identities might key stakeholders share?
- How can prevention/peacebuilding efforts create a context that emphasises these shared identities?

6. Social network mapping

Which internal networks, visible and hidden, bind together the stakeholders in the conflict, both those driving it and those working to mitigate it? Which networks might be activated to support prevention efforts?


Overview

Social network analysis maps how relationships, rather than the innate characteristics of people, affect behaviour in individuals and groups. These relationships are formed and sustained by family ties, friendship, affection, obligation, mutual interest, payment, loyalty, gratitude and so forth, and vary in strength along a spectrum running from positive, through neutral, to negative/hostile. Human networks are inherently dynamic, since the relationships they comprise are always changing.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Understanding the essentials of human networks offers insights into how conflict might be managed.

Figure 42 – The six sub-processes of ‘auto-organisation’⁶



For example, it is argued that the effectiveness of human systems depends on the efficient

⁶ Guntern, G., (1982), *Auto-Organization in Human Systems*, Behavioural Science, Volume 27.

integration of the six sub-processes of ‘auto-organisation’ shown in Figure 42. Violent networks might therefore be disrupted by undermining their capacity at one or more of the points of the hexagon; for example, by weakening their lines of control or their ability to evaluate correctly the *status quo*.

By contrast, the undeveloped ‘auto-organisation’ of local actors in prevention initiatives can be actualised by the appropriate external help (hence ‘co-design’).

Implicit in the analysis of human social systems, therefore, is the role of leadership at each point of the ‘auto-organisation’ hexagon.

Mapping of social networks can include:

<p>Business networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • chambers of commerce • sectoral associations <p>Charity networks</p> <p>Criminal networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • organised crime • corruption • patronage <p>Cultural networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • artist groups; for example, musicians • recreational, such as music fans • sports clubs and supporters <p>Diaspora networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • internal i.e. foreign • external i.e. indigenous 	<p>Ethnic/tribal networks</p> <p>Extended family networks</p> <p>Online networks</p> <p>Political networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • political parties • advocacy/campaign groups <p>Professional networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • health • education (+ alumni) • law • government <p>Religious networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • formal; for example, church, mosque • informal; for example, charities and NGOs 	<p>Security networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • police • paramilitaries • militias • military academy alumni • veterans <p>Women’s networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • advocacy/ campaign groups • mothers groups • professional groups <p>Youth networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • formal, such as Scouts/ Guides • informal; for example, gangs • students/sports <p>Workers’ networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • trade unions • collectives/co-ops
--	--	---

Key questions

- Who belongs to this network? Is membership formal or informal? How does one join or belong? Can members leave? Is there a leadership structure?
- What is the purpose of this network; for example, mutual support, shared interest, personal advancement, political/social influence? What are the benefits of belonging?
- How coherent/organised/disciplined is the network in mobilising to achieve common goals?
- How are members of the network controlled, disciplined, supported or influenced? What is the network's dominant ethos and culture?
- What is the geographical reach of the network? How do members typically communicate? What is the social reach of the network? Is it restricted to a particular class or group or does it cross societal divides?
- Must the network be disrupted for violence to be prevented, dialogue promoted and conflict transformed? Or might the network itself be transformed or co-opted to support one or more of these processes?
- In this regard, what specific actions might be taken to strengthen or weaken the network at one or more of the six nodes of auto-organisation (Figure 42)?

Case study

To see how social networks were mobilised to prevent a civil war see Annex H, pages 287-290.

7. Leadership analysis

Who are the formal and informal leaders in this context at elite, middle-range and grassroots levels?

Overview

Academic research suggests that complex societies have many leaders, grouped at three levels in the form of a pyramid. These are the elite, middle-range and grassroots levels. Figure 43, adapted from the work of Professor John Paul Lederach, gives more information and shows the prevention and peacebuilding efforts appropriate at each level.



Figure 43 – Leadership pyramid

The elite leadership represents the fewest people, in some cases a handful of key actors. By contrast, the grassroots level involves the largest number of people, who best represent the population at large.

Conflict can arise within and between levels, with leaders playing a key role to organise and escalate the conflict or, if acting as peacemakers, to contain and de-escalate it.

The most powerful leaders (who might appear at any level but are usually found in elite positions) are those who are able to operate across all three levels and convince most networks in society to follow a particular course of action.

However, the power of any leader ultimately derives from the willingness of others to follow him or her, especially the leaders of sub-networks at each level of the pyramid who have more direct influence on their own constituents.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

To determine the appropriate approach to prevention and peacebuilding it is important to map the formal and informal leaders at each level, along with the network of control and influence that they exercise.

A common challenge is to design truly inclusive conflict management processes, especially in the wake of violence. Peace agreements are typically made by elite groups but often fail to include middle-range or grassroots actors. Conversely, grassroots peacebuilding can often fail to impact on policies made by elites.

Trusted individuals who can facilitate communication within, and between, networks at all three levels are, therefore, especially valuable in prevention activity.

Key questions

- Who are the leaders at each level of the ‘peace pyramid’?
- What group, constituency or network do they lead? How big is it? What role does it play in the political, social and cultural life of its society?
- How do these leaders operate – do they exert influence or control, or generate loyalty?
- What is the source of the leader’s legitimacy and authority? Who are their key supporters?
- What are the relationships between leaders? Do any of these relationships cross societal levels?
- Which leaders are involved in the conflict, directly or indirectly? Who are using or promoting violence and who are advocating dialogue and nonviolent means to resolve or transform the conflict?

8. Organisation mapping

What are the relationships between actors, roles and locations within an organisation? Who are the decision-makers and what is the chain of command?

Overview

Organisation mapping describes the links between actors, roles and locations within an organisation tree. It provides information on the chain of command and decision-makers within the organisation, as shown in Figure 44.

Any organisation can be represented in terms of connections between actors, or between actors and organisational units showing hierarchical links, reporting lines, communications and/or responsibilities.

Variations of the organisation mapping exercise include the mapping of multiple organisations. This may include mapping by functions or mapping by size. Mapping by function will assess the thematic areas covered by various organisations/institutions to assess gaps and overlap. Mapping by size includes assessing the mandated number of staff members against actual numbers to identify over/under-staffed divisions/units.




Figure 44 – Example of an organisational map⁷

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Understanding the structure of organisations helps locate where real power (or vulnerability) is located and how it is transmitted within and beyond the organisation. Such understanding can be used to focus prevention/peacebuilding efforts on where they can most effectively support or weaken that organisation.

Examples of organisation mapping by function are shown in Figure 45.

⁷ DCAF-ISSAT.

	Defence	Public order	Crime detection	Crime prevention	Close protection	Drug enforcement	Anti-riot capacity	Organised crime	Anti-terror	Intelligence	Immigration	Customs	Border security	Civil emergencies	Prison security	Court security
National police		█	█	█		█	█	█	█				█	█	█	█
Border security						█					█	█	█			
Traffic police		█				█										
Municipal police		█	█	█		█										
Presidential guard		█			█											
Special forces	█	█	█		█	█	█	█		█			█	█		
National intelligence agency		█				█		█		█						
Gendarmerie		█	█	█		█	█							█		
Airport security service		█			█						█		█			
Correction service															█	

Judicial system		
Actor	Mandated # of judges	Actual # of judges
Constitutional court		
High court		
District court 1		
Communal court 1A		
Communal court 1B		
Communal court 1C		
General prosecutors		
District 1 prosecutors		
...		

Figure 45 – Examples of organisation mapping by function⁸

⁸ DCAF-ISSAT.

Key questions

- How is the organisation you are looking at structured? What are the lines of control? What are the lines of accountability (if any)?
- Is the **formal** structure underpinned or subverted by a different structure – or even a different organisation – where the **real** power lies?

Why are the stakeholders acting the way they do? What are their motivations?

9. Positions, interests and needs analysis

What are the positions, interests and needs (PIN) of each of the actors involved in the conflict? Are there any commonalities or points of mutual concern, especially at the level of interests and needs?

Overview

The theory of ‘positions, interests and needs’ is founded on human needs theory; namely, that the drive to satisfy core human needs shapes human behaviour and, on the basis of their needs, human beings pursue certain interests and create positions that they believe will satisfy those needs.

Human rights and human needs are basically the same in that people have a right to these needs being satisfied.

Conflict – violent or nonviolent – occurs when people perceive that others are obstructing or threatening their needs and rights. This is often framed in terms of grievances, unfairness or injustice.

In a conflict, the public positions that the actors adopt are therefore seen as the tip of a larger ‘iceberg’ of usually hidden interests and needs, as illustrated in Figure 46.



'I'm *for* this and/or *against* that!'
(for example, 'I support independence')

These are the things I care about
(for example, my job, family, house)

This is what's *really* driving everything
(for example, need for safety, autonomy,
growth, community)

Figure 46 – Positions, interests and needs analysis

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

A common approach of those working in conflict management is to encourage the actors to analyse their underlying interests and needs, and explore the possibility that they might be met in other ways. What is wholly incompatible on the surface – the positions – might be reconciled at the level of interests or needs.

Threats and punishments are generally ineffective in changing the behaviour of people trying to satisfy what they perceive to be their basic human needs. Rather, satisfying basic needs has been found to be the most effective way to change behaviour, end violence, transform conflict and foster healing.

Key questions

- Using Table 12 (page 228), can you identify the positions, interests and needs of each of the stakeholders involved in the conflict?
- Do the stakeholders tend to focus on their own or others' **public** positions or do they understand the **interests** and **needs** that underlie these positions? How do they perceive their own material, social and cultural needs?
- Are there any commonalities or points of mutual concern at the level of interests and needs? How might these be developed between the stakeholders? Do key actors have the skills to negotiate on interests and underlying needs instead of battling and bargaining over positions?

People/parties	Issues/problems	Positions	Interests	Needs	Means of influence	Willingness to negotiate
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary, secondary and tertiary groups or individuals The roles that groups or individuals play in the conflict, directly and indirectly <p>Example: settled farmers</p>	<p>Matters in contention; substantive problems that must be addressed (on which parties will have positions, interests and needs)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overuse of water points Destruction of crops Threats/harassment from nomads passing through. Political marginalisation 	<p>Stated demands; what people say they want</p>	<p>Preferred way to get needs met and underlying motivations, desires, concerns and fears that drive the position</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preserve land Protect crops from damage Greater access to decision-making 	<p>Basic human physical, social and emotional, requirements for life that underlie interests</p>	<p>Sources of power and influence over other parties; negotiation, leverage</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Control of land Ability to block passage of herds and people Alliance with opposition party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Readiness to talk and reach an agreement BATNA⁹ Cost/benefit calculus Status of negotiation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distrust of government (bad past experiences) Would talk if process were perceived as fair

Table 12 – Template for stakeholder analysis¹⁰

⁹ Best alternative to a negotiated agreement; see Annex M: Glossary.

¹⁰ (Aulin and Moviazadeh, 2015).

10. Sacred value/core belief analysis

What do the stakeholders value above everything else?

Overview

A sacred value (also known as a core belief) refers to what a person **prizes above all other things**. It is what one bases one's life on, consciously or unconsciously, to give it meaning. It can be described as a person's most essential needs attached to a specific goal, activity or object, real or abstract.

A person's self-identity is closely bound to their sacred value. All individuals and groups have one, which is also the basis of individual and group morality. For example, a person might never be violent – except to protect their sacred value. Examples include:

family	power	work/career	belief system
key relationship	fame	talent/activity	abstract principle
peer group	status	pleasure/fun	nature
organisation/team	wealth	a substance	culture/land/nation
animal/pet	possession(s)	mission	the enemy

For as long as one's sacred value is perceived to be intact, within reach or recoverable, one will draw strength and inspiration from it. On the other hand, the loss of one's core belief/sacred value leads to confusion, suffering, decline and even death. A threat to (or denial of) one's sacred value is the most serious of all challenges and can prompt the earliest and strongest reaction.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Differing sacred values can be at the heart of the most intense and protracted conflicts, because the sacred value is the one thing that the actors will never compromise or negotiate away – they would rather die than betray it. If the sacred value is lost, they will do everything possible to win it back, or even pass the task to future generations.

On the other hand, promising to respect the sacred value of one's opponent can reduce the sense of threat that they feel and help open a way for conflict transformation.

It is important, therefore, to establish whether a sacred value is involved in any conflict, as it can play a significant role in determining how the conflict – especially the 'clash of wills' – might be resolved or transformed.

Key questions

- Can you identify the sacred values of all the stakeholders, both individuals and groups (including your own)?
- Are any of these sacred values perceived by the relevant stakeholders as being threatened or denied in the conflict? If so, how?

11. Negotiation analysis

What is the key stakeholders' 'best alternative to a negotiated agreement' (BATNA)? What is their negotiation skill level? Are there existing forums for communication between stakeholders?

Overview

In violent conflict, all stakeholders assess their BATNA to determine whether to continue fighting. The 'ripeness' for negotiation centres on whether the stakeholders believe they have more to gain from talking or fighting.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

A key task of prevention and peacebuilding is to help stakeholders create processes to satisfy their basic human needs without denying the needs of other stakeholders.

This tool (to be used with the PIN analysis on pages 226-228) helps planners to support stakeholders in identifying and prioritising their positions, interests and needs as a preparation for a negotiation process.

Key questions

- Do key actors have an accurate sense of the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)? Are there trained facilitators and mediators who can help them 'reality test' their own self-assessment of their options?
- Do the stakeholders have forums for communicating with each other? Do they have access to trained facilitators and mediators who can create channels for negotiation?

12. Perceptions, narratives, worldviews and trauma

How might trauma be affecting key stakeholders? Might a trauma-sensitive peacebuilding approach enable them to move to more productive and positive relationships with others?

Overview

Each stakeholder in a conflict views the world in a different way. The worldview of the key stakeholders shapes how they think, feel and act in conflict, as well as the stories they tell about whom the conflict involves and why it is happening. Contradictions or new information that goes against one's current worldview can be stressful.

In addition, conflict, violence and trauma can greatly impact people's ability to think and perceive accurately. The trauma experienced by whole societies can profoundly influence their cultural beliefs and political systems, and their ability to address current problems and conflicts creatively.

As Figure 47 illustrates (page 232), the reaction to trauma can be internalised or externalised, or display elements of both. For example, the desire for revenge can lead from a victim cycle to an aggressor cycle, where people put their own needs over others, and even use violence.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Peacebuilding is a process of changing perceptions, narratives, worldviews and behaviour. Understanding the existing worldviews of stakeholders is essential to planning efforts to shift these perceptions. Planners should be aware that this shift might be possible only if their efforts identify and target the defence mechanisms that prevent worldview change.

Key questions

- Does the behaviour of the key stakeholders suggest they are 'acting in' or 'acting out' their trauma? If so, where in Figure 47 would you place them?
- In terms of self-assessment, what are the potential or actual impacts of trauma affecting **you or your organisation**? Where might **you** be on the trauma diagram?
- If you think trauma is impeding the key actors, how is this manifested? What would a trauma-sensitive approach look like and how might it enable the key actors to move to a more productive and positive relationship with others?




Figure 47 – Reaction to trauma: acting in, acting out¹¹

11. Developed by the STAR program (Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience), Eastern Mennonite University, USA.

What factors are driving or mitigating conflict?

13. Drivers – ABC triangle

What are the issues (contradictions) at the heart of the conflict, what are the attitudes of the conflict actors and how are these manifested in their behaviour?




Figure 48 – The ABC triangle

Overview

The concept of the attitude-behaviour-contradiction (ABC) or conflict triangle argues that all conflict arises from the interplay of three essential elements, the:

- **contradiction** – the issue or resource over which there is disagreement or ‘incompatibility’;
- **attitude** of the conflict actors – their perceptions, emotions, judgments and desires – towards the contradiction and each other; and
- **behaviour** that arises from this (Figure 48).

Conflict is activated by the perception of **threat** to, or **denial** of, whatever is at the heart of the **contradiction**. If any of the actors fears that they will suffer loss or harm in some way, or will be denied something they care about, conflict will be triggered. As a rule of thumb, one can say that ‘conflict arises when people perceive that something they care about is being threatened or denied.’

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

This tool offers a basic approach for exploring the underlying issues and attitudes of the conflict actors. It is useful for identifying what people care about, how this gives rise to what they say and do, and for examining perceptions of threat and denial, which might or might not be justified.

Key questions

- What are the issues (contradictions) at the heart of the conflict, what are the attitudes of the conflict actors and how are these manifested in their behaviour?
- What do the conflict actors care about? How do they see what they care about as being threatened or denied?
- What needs to change – their (mis)perceptions, the real threats/denials, or both?

14. Drivers – Conflict tree

What are the root causes and what are the effects of the current conflict?

Overview

Conflict arises when people perceive, correctly or not, that something they care about is being threatened or denied. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the symptoms of conflict and the root causes that are giving rise to it, as efforts to address the presenting issues without addressing the root causes will have little effect on the system.

For example, in Figure 49, systemic factors such as social and economic inequality and government corruption are identified as the root causes of ethnic clashes and a high crime rate. The tree trunk represents the immediate presenting issue or crisis.




Figure 49 – Conflict tree

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

This tool offers a basic approach to thinking about conflict in terms of systems. It is useful for group dialogue about the root causes or core grievances within a context that give rise to symptoms or effects of conflict. Identifying root causes in this way can be a foundation for exploring how best to intervene to stop the cycle of violence and build peace.

Prevention efforts usually focus on the (potentially) violent symptoms of conflict. The long-term goal of **peacebuilding** is to address root causes through building societal institutions, structures and cultures that meet human needs.

Key questions

- Using the conflict tree as a guide, can you identify the **presenting** issue of the current conflict, its other **symptoms** and its **root causes**?
- How might each of these three be addressed, without violence, in the short, medium and long term?

15. Mitigators – appreciative inquiry

In this conflict-affected context, what is already working to reduce violence and foster resilience? What specific institutions and relationships are resilient and able to be flexible and adapt in times of crisis? What peacebuilding activities are already happening?

Overview

Local capacities for peace include individuals and institutions that work to sustain some sort of harmony or intergroup peace in a social system. An appreciative inquiry identifies local capacities to respond positively to conflict and foster resilience: i.e. survive, adapt, absorb or respond to a crisis or severe change. Table 13 offers a framework to help identify different forms of local prevention capacity (building) in five categories.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Rather than looking at what is wrong or missing from a local context, the focus is on improving and strengthening what is already working. This tool fosters awareness that there could be local solutions to local problems. Any new peacebuilding effort will therefore look to work with and expand the local resiliencies and capacities for peace.

Key questions

- In this scenario, which individuals, groups, institutions and structures are already working for conflict transformation and to prevent violence? How?
- What – if anything – has worked in the past to prevent or limit violent conflict in this context?
- In this context which actors, not yet active, might be mobilised to support preventive action, dialogue and conflict transformation?
- Given your self-assessment, how might you communicate and coordinate with existing peacebuilding initiatives?

Levels of change	Legitimate governance	Sustainable economy	Safe and secure environment	Justice and rule of law	Social and cultural well-being
	Predictable and participatory decision-making and governance	Access to basic resources and conducive to socially responsible business	Personal safety and freedom of movement	Perceived equity in social relations and justice systems	Respect and dignity between people of different cultures and identities
	Peacebuilding efforts include these activities in each category:				
Structural	Build formal and informal governance institutions Develop independent media Foster civil society organisations that advocate for public issues	Build infrastructure Promote just, sustainable economic policies within the regulatory and legal environment Address institutional obstacles to economic equity	Conduct security sector reform Create institutions to restrain perpetrators of violence Use security forces to enforce ceasefires, peace zones Disarm and demobilise armed groups Prevent and mitigate natural disasters	Foster legitimate and just legal frameworks Monitor human rights Build independent courts Community policing Create systems for restorative and transitional justice	Create inter-religious or inter-ethnic task force on preventing violence Support cultural, religious and media institutions that provide information on intergroup relations
Cultural	Use media programmes and religious and cultural venues to discuss values of citizenship, political equality, and democracy	Address culture of corruption Deter war profiteering and illicit trade	Foster respect for human rights and humanitarian law Promote understanding of environmental sustainability	Use media programmes, and religious and cultural venues to promote respect for rule of law and human rights	Use media programmes, rituals, the arts, and religious and cultural venues to foster group relations, trauma healing and peace
Relational	Create multi-stakeholder governance processes Use mediation and negotiation to reach political solutions Build state-society relations with policy advocacy	Develop processes for community-based economic development	Improve relations between security forces and communities Reintegrate armed groups	Mobilise citizens to advocate for fair and just law and policies	Use media and the arts for prejudice reduction Intergroup dialogues Support women's empowerment and gender sensitivity
Personal	Train government and institutional leaders in peacebuilding skills and processes	Train citizens in starting and supporting socially responsible businesses	Train citizens to provide security sector oversight and participate in community watch	Inform citizens of their legal rights and legal processes	Use rituals, memorials for individual and group trauma healing

Table 13 – Examples of local prevention and peacebuilding efforts¹²

12 Adapted from (Schirch, 2013).

How is conflict manifested? What are the stakeholders' means and sources of power?

16. Power and means analysis

What are the key stakeholders' means or sources of power? How do other stakeholders depend upon them?

Overview

Power is the ability to do – to change oneself, others or the environment. Power exists in relationships between people and is always shifting. People can create or diminish power by altering the ways they relate to others.

There are many sources of power. Stakeholders in a conflict can mobilise any of these sources as a means to fight others. People can also use or create these sources of power in peacebuilding efforts. Examples include:

- physical or military strength;
- identity (gender, ethnic background, family of, position or authority);
- personal ability (such as communication skills or professional competence);
- economic resources;
- access to information;
- education (knowledge, skills);
- moral or spiritual power;
- the personal power of charisma; and
- social capital (the quantity and quality of relationships between people and groups, shown horizontally and vertically within the pyramid in Figure 50).




Figure 50 – Social capital model

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Planning for prevention and peacebuilding requires identifying existing and potential sources of power, which stakeholders can draw on to fight – or to prevent violence and build peace. Peacebuilding often involves a process of stakeholders rebalancing the power within the system in which they operate.

Key questions

- What are the key stakeholders' different sources of power and social capital?
- How are the stakeholders in the conflict dependent on each other? Are they interdependent, or does one side have more influence on the others?
- Which stakeholders have 'power with' or 'power over' others? How does power play into the dynamics of the conflict? In what ways do stakeholders use power as a means to wage conflict with each other?
- Given your self-assessment, what influence might you have to increase power for disempowered groups, to better enable a negotiation or support for peace? How might you increase or support the power of groups mitigating conflict to play peacebuilding roles? How might you decrease the power sources of groups driving conflict?

17. Identity and power imbalances

How are power and identity interrelated?

Overview

Violent conflict can be an expression of unequal power distribution among people of different religious, tribal, ethnic, regional, gender, linguistic, racial and other identities. Dysfunctional power imbalances cause problems both for those with more power and those with less power, who could also have internalised feelings of superiority or inferiority and oppression.

Table 14 gives examples of social and institutional patterns that enforce identity and power imbalances.

Type of power	Identity	Example of who may hold more power	Example of who may hold less power
Racism	Race/skin colour	White	People of colour
Sexism	Gender	Men	Women
Classism	Socioeconomic class	Middle, upper class	Poor, working class
Elitism	Education level, Place in hierarchy	Formally educated, managers	Informally educated, clerical, staff
Religious oppression	Religion	Depending on context	Depending on context
Ageism	Age	Youth or elders	Youth or elders
Heterosexism	Sexual orientation	Heterosexuals	Gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender
Ableism	Physical/mental ability	Currently able-bodied	Physically/mentally challenged
Xenophobia	Immigrant status	Indigenous	Immigrants/refugees
Linguistic	Language	Dominant language	Minority language

Table 14 – Examples of power imbalances¹³

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Prevention and peacebuilding efforts often involve challenging social systems that deny certain groups the ability to live their lives in dignity, free from fear and want, without being humiliated or discriminated against because of their identity. This tool helps planners reveal the dysfunctional power imbalances in the conflict-affected context.¹⁴

¹³ (Schirch, 2013)

¹⁴ See also Chapter 8 – Gender perspectives, pages 109-123.

Key questions

- How do identity groups within the conflict context use power over other identity groups?
- How do identity groups within the conflict context rank each other? Is there agreement on the social ranking? Is the social ranking seen as 'natural' by all groups?
- How can prevention and peacebuilding efforts address the power relationships between stakeholders in different identity groups to foster more egalitarian approaches?

When: Are historical patterns or cycles of the conflict evident?

18. Timeline and legacy

Looking at history, what significant points in history do key stakeholders identify as traumatic or memorable in shaping their identity and leading to the current crisis? How do these key historic moments link together in a cultural narrative?

Overview

In a conflict-affected context, groups of people often have completely different experiences, perceptions and understanding of history. Some groups focus on chosen traumas where their group felt helpless, victimised or humiliated. Other groups focus on chosen glories; for example, the shared memory of an event that supports their identity and self-esteem, possibly including a triumph over an enemy.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

The purpose of the timeline lens is not to develop a 'correct' or 'objective' history but to understand the perceptions of the stakeholders. People in conflict often emphasise different events, describe history with different narratives or stories, and attach contrasting emotions to the same events.

Ideally parallel timelines are constructed in a group made up of key stakeholders from different sides of the conflict (as illustrated in Figure 51, overleaf). This process brings the most insight into the symbolic meanings attached to events by different groups, and can itself be a spur to prevention or peacebuilding dialogue.



Figure 51 – Timeline exercise in Afghanistan¹⁵

Key questions

- Can you and your civilian colleagues – ideally supporting different stakeholders in the conflict – identify the key points in history where one side’s trauma might be the other side’s glory?
- How might these memories create opportunities for transforming the current crisis; for example, for acknowledgment of – and possible apology for – past events?

19. Conflict dynamics and early warning

Looking at trends over time, what are the indicators that conflict is escalating or de-escalating?

Overview

Many conflicts begin between individuals arguing over a particular issue (also known as the ‘contradiction’). As conflict escalates through the conflict cycle the number of people involved increases and, often, so do the number of problems. Further escalation can see whole communities or organisations dividing and polarising as more and more people feel compelled to take sides. Communication decreases and tensions increase as the dynamics evolve, as shown in Figure 52. If the right action is taken, however, the conflict can de-escalate. Conflicts can escalate and de-escalate many times.

¹⁵ See http://www.conflict-assessment-and-peacebuilding-planning.org/Photos_of_Exercises.php




Figure 52 – A common pattern of conflict escalation

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

This tool helps to identify social and communication patterns that indicate if conflict is escalating or de-escalating. Prevention and peacebuilding efforts can respond positively whether conflict is increasing or decreasing. For example, early warning that conflict is increasing can indicate the need for preventive diplomacy. Evidence that conflict is decreasing can indicate the ripeness for negotiation or acts of reconciliation.

Key questions

- How has the conflict evolved over time? At what stage is it in the conflict cycle?
- Referring to Table 11 (pages 212-216), what early warning indicators of potential violence – or signs of increasing social cohesion and peace – can you identify?
- Given your self-assessment, are you best situated to work at early or later stages of the conflict? How?

20. Trends, triggers, scenarios and windows

Looking forward, what are potential triggers or windows of opportunity and vulnerability that can be anticipated, based on past patterns? How can prevention and peacebuilding efforts prepare to maximise windows of opportunity and minimise threats posed by windows of vulnerability?

Overview

An awareness of time and timing is essential for those involved in prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

A **trend** is a long-term development in a particular direction that affects the conflict context (for example, globalisation).

A **trigger** is either a predictable event with significance (for example, an election), or a surprise event (such as a corruption scandal or a natural disaster), which sets off a chain of reactions with wider positive or negative effects.

Windows of vulnerability are specific times, events, places or situations that provide an opportunity for groups to use violence in their efforts to influence political or economic structures.

Windows of opportunity are specific times, events, places or situations when there may be more openness to fostering peace; creating new, more inclusive structures through negotiation; and depolarising negative relationships by addressing core grievances.

Windows of uncertainty are specific times, events, places or situations that could be opportunities for either addressing or magnifying core grievances and structural forms of exclusion. In other words, danger might also present opportunity and *vice versa*.

How does this contribute to planning for prevention/peacebuilding?

Anticipating potential risks, tensions and obstacles arising during a prevention or peacebuilding effort recognises that good intentions could lead to counter-productive and harmful impacts. Finding ways to avoid possible negative side-effects or second-order impacts is a responsibility of those planning peacebuilding efforts.

Table 11 (pages 212-216) lists a range of indicators of potential escalation of conflict that is useful for identifying trends. Based on a range of potential events, planners can develop possible future scenarios; for example, the most likely or the most dangerous.

Key questions

- Looking at the past timeline of the conflict, can you identify possible political, cultural, religious or economic events in the coming year that could provide times that would be ripe for a peace effort, or that could lead to violence?
- What are future windows of vulnerability or uncertainty?
- What are possible future scenarios? How might prevention/peacebuilding efforts prepare to maximise windows of opportunity and minimise threats posed by windows of vulnerability, given these possible future scenarios?

Notes:

Annex C – Sample theories of change

Table 15 illustrates sample theories of change in five basic categories of human security.¹

	Legitimate governance	Sustainable economy	Safe and secure environment	Justice and rule of law	Social and cultural well being
	Predictable and participatory decision making and governance with effective governmental and non-governmental institutions	Access to basic resources and conducive to socially responsible trade and business	Personal safety and freedom of movement	Perceived equity in social relations and justice system	Respect and dignity between people of different cultures and identities
Political theories					
Actors/fields	Theories of conflict and violence	Theories of change and approaches to peacekeeping			
Negotiation, mediation, peace process	Armed groups have grievances that drive their desire to fight. Regions that lack institutions to provide participatory decision-making processes to address human needs and issues are more prone to conflict. States whose institutions perform at low levels cannot endure challenges to their authority during a natural disaster, war or insurgency.	Negotiation, mediation and comprehensive peace processes can structure a series of official Track 1 diplomatic forums and unofficial or multi-track initiatives to develop mutually satisfying agreements to bring an end to war.			
Governance and institutional performance		Improve institutional performance, equity and participatory processes for the state and other governance institutions to increase the quantity and quality of public services and public legitimacy, and improve state-society relations.			

¹ This table is adapted from (Schirch 2013) and relates to the discussion on theories of change, pages 44–47.

Democracy	People without an opportunity to affect decisions that impact their lives may feel frustrated and disempowered. Violence becomes a tempting option without other channels of political expression.	Foster participatory democracy and active citizenship, and include all relevant stakeholders when making public policy.
Leadership	Ineffective leadership results in political problems escalating towards violence.	Leadership training, including skills in principles negotiation and mediation, enables more effective leaders better able to solve problems through diplomacy.
Political elite	Political elites use their power to further their own interests through violence and repression.	International pressure, boycotts and media campaigns to reduce benefits and increase the costs of elites pursuing their interests through violence.
Advocacy and activism	Structural violence fosters power imbalances that restrict the ability of some groups to address their issues and meet their needs.	Citizen resistance and social movements employ nonviolent forms of power by raising public awareness and using tactics that highlight a group's political, economic, social and 'people' power through media reports, demonstrations and other campaigns.
Economic theories		
Actors/fields	Theories of conflict and violence	Theories of change and approaches to peacebuilding
Economic development	Violence occurs when societies do not have adequate political, economic and social capacities to address people's basic needs.	Create the political, economic and social capacity within communities to meet their own needs.
Economic inequality	Violence can occur when economic disparities are great, as this can lead to a sense of humiliation, frustration and expectation among those who have less.	Political reforms to address structural constraints that reinforce economic inequalities, targeted economic development, and levelling access to education between groups to foster equality of access.
Resource of war	War requires weapons, money and other resources.	Arms embargoes, interrupting supply lines, public boycotts and advocacy for cutting military budgets for repressive governments can increase the costs for using violence and increase the incentives for peace.

Humanitarian aid	States may not be able to respond to humanitarian crises in the midst of natural disasters or war. Without assistance, people might look to armed groups to help meet their needs.	Alleviate suffering and provide an alternative to people who might otherwise support armed groups.
Justice and Rule of Law theories		
Actors/fields	Theories of conflict and violence	Theories of change and approaches to peacebuilding
Legal and judicial systems	Lack of order and social control creates an environment in which violence increases.	Support laws and judicial institutions that enforce laws.
Restorative and transitional justice	Crime and violence happen in a social context. Crime and violence create needs for victims and obligations for offenders.	Provide restorative and transitional justice forums for identifying victims' needs, reparations, truth commissions, traditional rituals, and institutional reforms for holding offenders accountable to victims and the community.
International humanitarian law	Lack of order and social control creates an environment where war atrocities occur.	Establish and protect international humanitarian law and institutions such as the International Criminal Court
Security theories		
Actors/fields	Theories of conflict and violence	Theories of change and approaches to peacebuilding
Peacekeeping	The cycle of violence makes it difficult to have the space for negotiation.	Ceasefires, peacekeeping forces, and peace zones reduce the amount of direct violence and create a space where political negotiations can take place.
Security sector reform	Traditional military approaches to solving problems often end in increased levels of violence.	Ensure military focus is in protecting 'human security' and a positive relationship between citizens and security forces.
Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR)	Armed groups may continue fighting for the economic, security, political and identity benefits that war brings to them.	DDR creates economic, political, security and identity incentives to increase the benefits of disarming and demobilising. Reintegration allows armed groups to reconcile with their communities and address trauma, land claims and other issues following war.

Sociocultural and psychological theories		
Actors/fields	Theories of conflict and violence	Theories of change and approaches to peacebuilding
Cultural and identity-based conflicts	People identify themselves according to many cultural groups, such as their religion, ethnicity, sex/gender, or nation. Discrimination by some groups against others is common. People may fight and die to protect their dignity and identity.	Intergroup dialogue, prejudice reduction, training on tolerance and coexistence, people-to-people exchanges, confidence-building measures and citizen diplomacy foster better understanding and improve intergroup relations.
Psychology/trauma healing	Violence creates deep physical, emotional and spiritual wounds. Many perpetrators of violence were once victims.	Psychological trauma healing, involving both individual and group therapy and training, can enable individual and group transformation, so that people stop pursuing revenge and the cycle of violence.
Education, media	Violence occurs because people are not aware of – or do not believe there are – other options for addressing conflict.	Educational and training programs in schools, mass media campaigns and 'edutainment' shows, and public symbolic events build capacity and support for citizens to communicate, advocate, negotiate and engage in creative problem-solving and efforts to pursue their interests.
Public opinion	Cultural and social forces mobilise public attitudes towards violence.	Use the mass media and empower religious, political and public figures to denounce violence and influence public attitudes towards violence.

Table 15 – Key questions

- o Based on your self-assessment and conflict assessment, what are your theories of change for this conflict-affected region? What evidence supports these theories?
- o How does your assessment of what is driving and mitigating the conflict compare to those of others working in the region?
- o How do your theories of change compare to theirs? Do you identify the same key factors? Are you planning similar actions to address these factors? Do you hope to have the same impacts?
- o If your actions are different from those of others working in the region, how will your actions affect theirs and theirs yours? How might your actions be complementary and work towards the same overall goal?

Annex D – Stakeholder engagement planning

1. The stakeholder engagement planning process follows four steps, shown below in Table 16.




Table 16 – Stakeholder engagement planning process

Step 1: Analyse mission

2. Here the core elements of **what** needs to be accomplished are developed. Planners will determine what should be the desired outcome of their mission – the overall **aim**, expressed in criteria for success. The **purpose** or reason for this specific stakeholder engagement will be determined according to that aim and is one of the most important steps in the stakeholder engagement process. Table 17 (overleaf) provides examples of potential aims and purposes for engaging stakeholders during an operation.

Stakeholder	Aim	Purpose
International organisation	Achieve unity of effort in resolving an escalating conflict	Improve personal or working relationships
Local peace council (community level)	Maintaining public order in conflict-affected area	Identify potential issues, conflicts and benefits
Tribal elders/community leaders	Facilitate community development	Harness people's energies and resources
Local militia	Maintain ceasefire	Defuse conflict situations

Table 17 – Possible aims and purposes for stakeholder engagement

3. Table 18 identifies the three broad levels at which military forces can seek to interact with different stakeholders.¹ This is especially relevant with regard to maintaining or generating local ownership in prevention efforts, which is reflected in the final 'Empower' line of the table.

Possible levels of interaction		
Tier 3 – Sharing	Inform	To provide stakeholders with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or solutions
	Consult	To obtain stakeholder information and feedback for decision-makers on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions
Tier 2 – Cooperation	Involve	To work with stakeholders throughout the process and ensure their concerns and aspirations are considered in the decision-making process
	Collaborate	To work with stakeholders in each decision, including the development of alternatives and the identification of preferred solutions, but with stakeholders remaining autonomous
Tier 1 – Integration	Integrate	To partner with stakeholders in each decision, including the development of alternatives and the identification of preferred solutions, under a commonly agreed authority
>>>	Empower	To place the final decision-making in the hands of the public/stakeholders

Table 18 – Stakeholder participation²

4. Key questions for initiators of stakeholder engagement processes include the following.³

- Is a multi-stakeholder approach necessary or would other approaches, such as advocacy and lobbying strategies, be less risky and equally (or possibly more) effective?

¹ See also pages 19-23.

² Adapted from 'Revit Stakeholder Engagement Tool Kit', Gray, (2006).

³ (Schirch, 2015), page 107.

- Are there good reasons to believe stakeholders of substantial influence will join in a collective approach?
- What factors could make the process unmanageable and ultimately unproductive, and could they be mitigated?
- Is sufficient funding available to sustain the process? Do people view the funding source as biased, neutral, with/without an agenda? Will the resources still be available once the process has taken off (for example, to implement planned joint activities)? If not, are there fundraising capacities or connections within the group?
- How might the multi-stakeholder process cause unintended negative consequences, especially with respect to conflict dynamics? How might these effects be prevented or minimised?

5. Key questions for potential participants include the following.

- How might the multi-stakeholder process meet your organisational interests and goals?
- Does the process have institutional support from your organisation?
- What will be your exit strategy, i.e. when will your organisation consider the multi-stakeholder process to have fulfilled its objectives and when will it be seen to be underperforming or failing? What does it mean for your participation?
- Does the process encompass the personal needs of the individuals directly involved, taking into account personal capacities, skill development, support and encouragement?
- What are the benefits of joining, as compared to an alternative outsider strategy?

Step 2: Identify stakeholders

6. There is usually a wide range of stakeholders in any prevention mission and their role and accessibility needs to be assessed during the planning and preparation for a potential engagement. (Table 5, page 52, can be used to help identify which stakeholders are relevant to which arena and level of engagement.) This process will form the basis for a stakeholder engagement plan.

7. The following questions can help to identify stakeholders.

- Who is responsible for making decisions?
- Who is influential in the area, community or organisation?
- Who will be affected by any decision on the issue?
- Who runs organisations with relevant interests?

- Who is influential on the issue?
- Who can obstruct a decision if not involved?
- Who has been involved in the past?
- Who has not been involved but should have been?

8. Land force commanders at all levels will encounter a wide range of individuals and groups within the operational environment. These actors, who may very well have a significant influence on the successful outcome of the mission, cannot be simply divided into classifications of friend or foe. Indeed, many will shift from one classification to another along a range of positions in relation to their support for the campaign (Figure 53).⁴ The commander must understand:

- where each individual or group that impacts the campaign sits along this range in relation to their support;
- how they may influence the strategic, operational and tactical outcomes; and
- whether and how they might be brought to support the campaign.




Figure 53 – The range of actors in the land operational environment⁵

9. A conscious decision is required for designing and implementing a multi-stakeholder **security dialogue** at the local, regional or national level.

- At the **local** level, a multi-stakeholder security dialogue could take place between police, local government, and male and female community members (making sure to include women's perspectives and experiences of safety concerns).

⁴ More descriptions of the range of actors who could influence the campaign can be found in NATO's STANAG 1241. The key issue is for a commander to understand that this range exists and how it might be shaped.

⁵ (NATO, 2016).

- b. At the **regional** level, military, police, regional government and regional civil society organisations, including women’s organisations, might be involved in a security dialogue focused on border security or a regional security issue.
 - c. At the **national** level, a security dialogue might include all major stakeholders and identify diverse definitions and approaches to national security. The security sector and/or civil society can use a multi-stakeholder engagement process to: conduct a joint conflict assessment process to identify security challenges; jointly plan and implement a programme to improve human security; or jointly monitor and evaluate security governance, accountability and performance.⁶
10. Once the relevant stakeholders are identified for engagement they might be classified with regard to their level of influence, which is context-specific.⁷
- **Key stakeholders** are decision-makers who have a direct say or influence on a decision, programme or issue.
 - **Primary stakeholders** are directly affected (favourably or unfavourably) by a decision, programme or issue.
 - **Secondary stakeholders** have an indirect influence on a decision, programme or issue.
 - **Tertiary stakeholders** have no say or influence on a decision, programme or issue but may still be able to affect it in some way.

Step 3: Analyse stakeholders

11. The analysis of each stakeholder will help to determine the general and specific approach to engaging and interacting with them. The two tools below are recommended for a stakeholder analysis.⁸

- **Stakeholder analysis: position, interests, issues and power⁹**
 - **What is it?**
 - A tool for developing a conflict profile of each major stakeholder and some minor ones. Stakeholder analysis involves listing the primary (directly involved), secondary (interested), and tertiary (affected) parties, and then identifying, for each one, their stated (public) positions or demands, the interests that lie behind

6 (Schirch, 2016).

7 (AFP_0G7, 2013).

8 (Aulin & Movlazadeh, 2015).

9 See Table 12, page 228.

those demands and the basic needs that might be involved. The process continues to identify the key issues in the conflict, the sources of power and influence of the party, and finally an estimate of the willingness of the party to negotiate.

- Note 1: To obtain gender balanced and holistic information, consider using the tool with separate groups of women, men and youth. This might reveal new points of entry for action.
 - Note 2: To include an understanding of the stakeholders' underlying **needs** – a vital element of the analysis – use the position, interests, needs (PIN) tool offered in Annex B.¹⁰
- o **Purpose**
 - To understand each party and their relation to the conflict.
 - To develop a deeper understanding of the motivations and logic of each group.
 - To identify the power dynamics among the parties.
 - o **When to use it**
 - In a preliminary way, before working directly with the parties, but then updated or elaborated as you gain information from working with them.
 - In preparation for a negotiation process, as these factors will influence how the parties act at the negotiating table and away from it.
 - Later in a negotiation, to provide information that might help break a deadlock.
- **Stakeholder mapping¹¹**
 - o **What is it?**
 - A technique for graphically showing the relationships among the parties in conflict and in relation to the problem.

¹⁰ 'Positions, interests and needs analysis', pages 226-228.

¹¹ See also 'Stakeholder mapping', page 217.

- o **Purpose**
 - To understand the situation better.
 - To see more clearly the relationships between parties.
 - To understand how much influence the parties have – what is important to them and how they might contribute to, or block, prevention initiatives.
 - To clarify where the power lies.
 - To check the balance of one’s own activity or contacts.
 - To see where allies or potential allies are.
 - To identify openings for intervention or action.
 - To evaluate what has been done already.

- o **When to use it**
 - Early in a process, along with other analytical tools.
 - Later, to identify possible entry points for action or to help the process of strategy-building.

12. For further analysis, a two-step approach using a **power and interest matrix** may be applied.¹² It classifies stakeholders based on the relative power they possess and their interest on an issue or project.

13. The following questions may help us to identify the interests of stakeholders.

- What does the stakeholder expect from the project/issue and how will they benefit from it?
- Are there any conflicting interests that the stakeholder may have with the project/issue?
- How committed is the stakeholder to the project/issue? Are they willing to commit tangible resources?
- Are there existing relationship conflicts between stakeholders that can hinder the project?

¹² See Table 20, page 259.

14. The power or level of influence that stakeholders exercise may be positional or personal. An assessment of the relative power the identified stakeholders possess is another analytical step to further specify a potential approach to stakeholder engagement, as shown in Table 19.

Positional power		Personal power	
Legitimate power	Based on position in an organisation	Expert power	Based on knowledge/expertise
Reward power	Ability to reward desirable behaviour	Referent power	Power to influence/morally persuade
Coercive power	Ability to punish or prevent someone from obtaining desirable rewards	Connection power	Networking / whom you know
		Information power	Having the most reliable information

Table 19 – Positional versus personal power

15. A careful selection has to be made as to whom to involve in the stakeholder engagement process. The criteria may include the following.¹³

- What balance and diversity do you need to consider in the composition of the group, embracing gender, age, social or geographic considerations?
- Which constituency groups are indispensable to the process?
- What would motivate those groups to participate or to stay away?
- What are the implications for not engaging certain groups?
- How does the purpose relate to hardliners and potential spoilers? Are there other ways to engage them outside of the multi-stakeholder process?

Step 4: Determine engagement approach

16. There will be a general approach to particular stakeholders that needs to be determined and subsequently complemented by a detailed engagement plan. This general approach can be derived from the power and interest matrix, which charts stakeholders' power against their interest in a particular course of action. The result is four basic positions, as illustrated in Table 20.

¹³ (Schirch, 2016)

Power	High	High power, low interest Keep them satisfied to increase interest	High power, high interest Engage them closely and influence them actively
	Low	Low power, low interest Monitor them (minimum effort)	Low power, high interest Keep them informed
		Low	High
		Interest	

Table 20 – Power and interest matrix (general approach)¹⁴

17. The power and interest matrix can be further exploited to determine the general approach for each quadrant and to identify appropriate activities for engagement. The following sample of activities (shown in Table 21) is taken from the Armed Forces of the Philippines *Stakeholder Engagement Practitioners' Handbook*:¹⁵

High power, low interest	High power, high interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultation • Consensus building • Focused dialogues • Negotiation • Involvement/participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus group discussions • Collaborative efforts • Joint initiatives or ventures • One-to-one meetings • Mediation • Cooperation management • Alliance building
Low power, low interest	Low power, high interest
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Surveys • Interviews • Periodic visits • Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Press release • Briefing • Social networks • Road shows • Public meetings or forums • Empowerment efforts • Community organising

Table 21 – Sample engagement activities for each quadrant of the power and interest matrix

¹⁴ (AFP_OG7, 2013)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Summary general engagement plan

18. The general engagement plan that results from following the four-step process outlined above can be summarised in a variety of ways. Table 22 is one example.

Stakeholder	Aim	Purpose	Level of participation	Engagement activity
International organisation	Achievement of unity of effort in resolving an escalating conflict	To improve personal or working relationships	Tier 3 – Inform and Consult	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cluster meetings¹⁶ Inter-agency coordination
Local Peace Council (community level)	Maintaining public order in conflict affected area	To identify potential issues, conflicts and benefits	Tier 2 – Collaborate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consensus building Mediation
Tribal elders/ community leaders	Facilitate community development	To harness people’s energies and resources	Tier 1 – Integrate > Empower	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community needs analysis Key Leader Engagement
Local militia	Maintain ceasefire	To defuse conflict situations	Tier 2 – Involve	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish dialogue Negotiation

Table 22 – Summary general engagement plan

19. The general engagement plan will become an integral part of the strategic or operational design and be further specified in the course of action development, along with the appropriate measures of effectiveness and performance.

¹⁶ See ‘Complex emergencies’, pages 86-90.

Annex E – Suggested preventive actions for conflict stages 1-9

Main goal: encourage stability/resilience

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions ¹
1. Difference Consent of host nation needed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased human security Good governance Stable and legitimate state institutions Civilian control of security sector Nonviolent management of conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defence diplomacy² and relationship development with U2P focus Security system reform³ Joint military/police/civil society training⁴ Prevention (U2P) advice Influence advice Anti-weapons of mass destruction training Subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs)⁵ Observer missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relationship development i.e. improve cooperation with relevant actors ('whole of government', international organisation, non-governmental organisations) through MuSE⁶ Knowledge and understanding development Joint military/police/civil society training⁴ Prevention (U2P) advice Horizon scanning Early warning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cultural peacebuilding Legal reform Support for local dispute resolution mechanisms and conflict resolution/transformation training Joint military/police/civil society training⁴ Fact-finding and peace commissions Promote culture of toleration and respect Promote acceptance of multiple and inclusive identities

1 Throughout all stages (1-9) of the conflict cycle these complementary non-military actions will focus on support to human security. The complementary non-military actions suggested at each stage in this grid are not exhaustive; see also Table 13, page 237.

2 Also known as 'Defence Engagement'. See Annex L (pages 299-301) for more detail on suggested activities.

3 Security sector reform when embedded in a wider reform of governance and justice systems.

4 For recent initiatives see (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli, 2015).

5 Subject matter expert exchanges – international conferences, workshops, seminars and so on.

6 Multi-stakeholder engagement – see page 54.

Main goal: encourage de-escalation towards 'difference' and discourage escalation towards 'polarisation'

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
<p>2. Contradiction Consent of host nation needed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stage 1 outcomes plus • Conflict escalation managed without violence • Dialogue encouraged • Polarisation discouraged • Conflict transformation encouraged • Root causes addressed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defence diplomacy and relationship development with U2P focus • Support efforts to bring conflict actors into dialogue • Security system reform • Joint military/police/civil society training • Prevention (U2P) advice • Influence advice • Anti-weapons of mass destruction training • Subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs) • Observer missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Join Tier 2-3 initiatives⁷ • Relationship development i.e. improve cooperation with relevant actors ('whole of government', international organisations, non-governmental organisations) through MuSE • Knowledge and understanding development • Joint military/police/civil society training • Prevention (U2P) advice • Horizon scanning • Early warning • Conflict analysis and contingency (prevention) planning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convene Tier 2-3 initiatives • Cultural peacebuilding • Structural peacebuilding • Development assistance • Civil society development • Governance training and institution building • Joint military/police/civil society training • Human rights training • Mediation • Track 2⁸ mediation and problem-solving

7 See pages 19-23.

8 See Annex M – Glossary, page 308 – ‘Preventive diplomacy’.

Main goal: encourage de-escalation towards 'contradiction' and discourage escalation towards 'violence'

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
<p>3. Polarisation</p> <p>Consent of host nation needed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe and secure environment maintained • Organised armed violence prevented • Conflict escalation managed with minimum/no force • Dialogue/conflict transformation encouraged • Polarisation checked and/or reversed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stage 1+2 contributions plus • Promote and support MuSE • Encourage/support/facilitate nonviolent empowerment of conflict actors, for example, non-state armed groups (NSAGs)⁹ • Encourage/support/facilitate co-design of prevention actions with conflict actors • Preventive peacekeeping • Border patrolling • Maritime and air operations • Influence operations • Deploy operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT) with specific prevention focus¹⁰ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stage 2 contributions plus • Activate COPD • Convene Tier 1 planning • Develop Tiers 2-3 initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediation • Preventive (multi-track) and coercive diplomacy¹¹ • Special envoys • Official mediation • Negotiation • Joint military/police/ civil society training • Unarmed civilian protection

⁹ Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) often need training in negotiation and mediation skills, for example.

¹⁰ See COPD V2.0, 3-26e.

¹¹ See Annex M – Glossary, page 308 – ‘Preventive diplomacy’.

Main goal: encourage de-escalation towards 'polarisation/agreement' and discourage escalation towards 'all-out violence/war'

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
<p>4. Sporadic increasing direct violence</p> <p>Consent of host nation or international mandate needed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Escalation to all-out violence/war prevented Public order maintained/restored Safe and secure environment for civilians established Conflict de-escalated Dialogue promoted Political agreement negotiated 	<p>Support Tier 1-3 coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crisis management/containment Show of force, for example, over-flights, exercises Deploy operational liaison and reconnaissance team with prevention focus Deploy civil-military cooperation group with prevention focus Deploy interposition force Prevention (U2P) advice Protection of civilians, for example, create buffer zones, secure corridors, safe havens Encourage/support/facilitate MuSE Encourage/support/facilitate nonviolent empowerment of conflict actors; co-design prevention actions Set up secure physical and communications infrastructure to support negotiation/mediation Military support to (hybrid) diplomacy Intelligence support Influence operations, for example, strategic communications teams Stability policing support Introduce rule of law, gender, security sector reform considerations as appropriate 	<p>Support Tier 1-3 coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> COPD +¹² Strategic communications and media narratives 	<p>Tier 1-3 coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mediation Preventive (multi-track) diplomacy Coercive diplomacy Unarmed civilian protection Confidence-building measures Community defection committees¹³

¹² COPD (i.e. crisis planning starts in earnest), incorporating various U2P elements already listed in Stages 1-3.

¹³ Local host nation initiatives to encourage defection from non-state armed groups and manage the result.

Main goal: stop 'all-out violence/war' and encourage de-escalation towards 'decreased violence/ceasefire'

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
<p>5. All-out direct violence/war</p> <p>Consent of host nation or international mandate needed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cessation of hostilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support Tier 1-3 coordination Stage 4 contributions plus Military-to-military/non-state armed groups negotiation Forcible separation of belligerents Peace enforcement: kinetic actions as necessary Support United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) Military advice Gather evidence of war crimes Support local policing Identify/isolate opportunists, criminals, political spoilers, violent actors Protect cultural heritage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support Tier 1-3 coordination COPD+ Strategic communications: maintain narratives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tier 1-3 coordination Mediation Preventive (multi-track) diplomacy Coercive diplomacy Unarmed civilian protection

Main goal: encourage de-escalation towards 'agreement' and discourage escalation back towards 'all-out violence/war'

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
<p>6. Ceasefire Consent of host nation or international mandate needed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relapse into hostilities • Safe and secure environment for civilians established • Peace process sustained and strengthened 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Tier 1-3 coordination • Facilitate/support peace process • Preventive peacekeeping • Influence operations • Force protection • Support local stability policing, security and reassurance • Deploy civil-military cooperation group • Deploy liaison officers • Capacity building for human security; for example, protection of civilians (including internally displaced persons), rule of law, security sector reform and gender considerations • Engineering, medical, strategic communications and logistics support • Humanitarian assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Tier 1-3 coordination • COPD + • Advice to civilian authorities on exit strategy • Strategic communications and media narratives sustained 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tier 1-3 coordination • Preventive (multi-track) diplomacy • Unarmed civilian protection • Confidence building measures • Security in the community through joint military/police/civil society training • Community defection committees

Main goal: encourage de-escalation towards 'normalisation' and discourage escalation towards 'violence'

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
<p>7. Agreement</p> <p>Consent of host nation or international mandate needed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No relapse into hostilities Safe and secure environment for civilians maintained Peace process sustained and strengthened Conflict actors engaged in conflict transformation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support Tier 1-3 coordination Stage 6 contributions plus Support/facilitate/police implementation of peace agreement Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration Joint military/police/civil society training Security force capacity building Support investigation, arrest and prosecution of war criminals Prevention (U2P) advice Influence operations Provision of regional security if necessary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support Tier 1-3 coordination COPD+ As per Stage 6 contributions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tier 1-3 coordination Elite negotiation Mediation Preventive (multi-track) diplomacy Unarmed civilian protection Electoral and constitutional reform Power-sharing and decentralisation of power Joint military/police/civil society training Cultural peacebuilding Structural peacebuilding

Main goal: encourage de-escalation towards 'reconciliation' and discourage 'polarisation'

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
8. Normalisation Consent of host nation or international mandate needed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe and secure environment for civilians maintained • Peace process sustained and strengthened • Functioning and legitimate state • Conflict actors engaged in conflict transformation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Tier 1-3 coordination of transition • Stages 6-7 contributions plus • Support 'winning the peace' (for example, via Defence diplomacy) • Sustain mentoring in security sector reform, rule of law • Joint military/police/civil society training (incorporating lessons identified, lessons learned) • Subject matter expert exchanges • Ongoing monitoring and observer missions • Support establishment of peace and reconciliation infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Tier 1-3 coordination of transition • COPD+ • Stages 6-7 contributions plus • Ongoing relationship development • Knowledge and understanding development • Joint military/police/civil society training (incorporating lessons identified, lessons learned) • Prevention (U2P) advice • Horizon scanning • Early warning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tier 1-3 coordination of transition • Co-design and implement 'Winning the Peace' • Collective security and cooperation arrangements • Economic resource cooperation and development • Joint military/police/civil society training (incorporating lessons identified, lessons learned) • Cultural peacebuilding • Structural peacebuilding

Main goal: encourage stability/resilience/reconciliation

Stage of conflict	Possible desired outcomes	Military contribution to host nation	Military contribution to home nation/alliance	Complementary non military actions
<p>9. Reconciliation</p> <p>Consent of host nation or international mandate</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe and secure environment for civilians maintained • Peace process sustained and strengthened • Functioning and legitimate state • Conflict actors reconciled/engaged in conflict transformation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stages 6-8 contributions plus • Complete sustainable handover of military infrastructure • Participate (at some point) in reconciliation process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stages 1, 6-8 contributions plus • Full review conducted at Tiers 1-3 and report(s) produced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-design and implement 'Winning the Peace' • Reconciliation and healing initiatives • Commissions of enquiry/truth and justice commissions • Joint military/police/civil society training • Peace media development • Peace and conflict awareness education and training • Cultural exchanges and initiatives, sport as reconciliation

Notes:

Annex F – Measurement and evaluation step-by-step¹

1. Figure 54 shows the five key steps in the measurement and evaluation (M&E) process.



Figure 54 – The measurement and evaluation process

2. **Define purpose.** This relates to what you are trying to change and how (your theory of change and the hypotheses related to this). Specifically, it refers to what aspects of your plan you intend to measure and evaluate.

3. **Decide scope and level of coordination with others in a joint evaluation.** This relates to the level of analysis for the M&E process (for example, national, village, individuals) and with whom you will need to work to carry it out. It also means deciding who does what. As a rule of thumb, external and local actors will co-design the process, local actors will execute the data collection strategies (as they usually have better access), and external and local actors will then co-evaluate the data.

4. **Identify baselines, benchmarks and indicators of what you will measure.** This task is usually best done by external and local actors working in concert. For military reform programmes, baselines, benchmarks and indicators developed in conjunction with the host nation army will be important in developing dialogue around locally applicable values and standards.

5. **Baseline** (or starting) information can be drawn from the conflict assessment and allows a comparison of what changes happened in the conflict context before, during or after a prevention or peacebuilding effort.

6. **Benchmarks** are objectives set to determine whether a prevention or peacebuilding effort is making progress towards its stated goal.

7. **Indicators** measure progress towards a benchmark. They are used to see if the action taken is affecting the factors that your theory of change says are driving or mitigating the conflict.

¹ Adapted from (Schirch, 2013).

- Indicators should be SMART – specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-related.
- **Etic** indicators are quantitative measures that can be seen from the outside the system (objectively) and have a numerical measurement.
- **Emic** indicators are qualitative measures developed by local actors within the system and are descriptive/subjective in nature.
- **Identity-based indicators** (demographics) look at the impacts of a prevention or peacebuilding effort on different identity groups, for example, men compared to women, children compared to adults.

8. **Identify and execute data collection strategies.** Data should be collected before and after an intervention and, if appropriate, during it too. Although some data will be available from public sources and can be collected through desk research, much that is useful in a conflict-affected context has to come from locally relevant collection strategies, especially if marginalised communities are involved. While regular observation reports by patrols can contribute, they are insufficient on their own, so most of these strategies are best carried out by local actors. They can include:

- Interviews;
- focus groups;
- community consultations;
- polling;
- mobile phone and Internet surveys;
- anonymous mechanisms (to guard safety);
- conflict diaries to identify day-to-day tensions and possible solutions; and
- local vigilance committees.

9. **Produce summary document of methodology, findings and suggestions.** Having gathered the relevant data, a document can be produced that summarises each of the boxes that make up the log frames outlined in Tables 8 and 9 (pages 69-70). This can be further summarised to answer the three fundamental questions posed in the theory of change formula:

- a. Have we correctly identified all of the factors driving or mitigating the conflict(s)?
- b. Have we taken the correct or sufficient action to weaken the conflict drivers and strengthen the conflict mitigators?
- c. To what extent has violence been prevented or reduced and conflict transformation enabled?

10. The answers to these three questions and suggestions for improvement should then be fed back into the U2P process, as part of the **endure** stage, to inform deeper **understanding**, further **engagement** and future **action**.

11. For additional established M&E processes see: <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/SSR-Methodology-Guidance/Support-Programme-Cycle/Evaluate#activity-presentation>.

Notes:

Annex G – Design for measurement¹

This annex has been written to provide U2P practitioners with measurement guidance. Effective measurement of programmes can provide robust evidence of the success (or failure) of prevention and peacebuilding programmes. Demonstrating effectiveness is key to the sustainability of prevention and peacebuilding efforts, while demonstrating a lack of effectiveness can help planners learn from their mistakes and programme more effectively in the future.

The annex will lay out the importance of (and how to generate) scientific theory and hypotheses for informing programme design. It will then describe experimental and quasi-experimental designs that can be applied to programmes. The chapter concludes with an interview with the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (2015-17), which amplifies the concepts discussed in the text of this annex.

The importance of theory

Before measurement of any kind is undertaken, the measurement must be grounded in theory. **Researchers and practitioners should never plan a programme or other course of action without a strong theory underlying their efforts.**

A strong theory is an organisational framework that lays the ground for an entire programme, project or intervention. A theory provides a roadmap for programme design and measurement, and will determine the research, design, analytic approach and interpretation of results.

Developing a theory

To develop a theory appropriate to your task, which is key to the entire intervention effort, you need to follow these three steps.²

1. **Clearly articulate the problem at hand.** This might seem obvious, but even seasoned researchers can fall into the trap of designing a research project or programme with an ill-defined problem. In many cases, a problem to be resolved might be too broad or vague (for example, what is the cause of poverty?). Vaguely defined problems tend to leave researchers feeling overwhelmed. The solution is to reduce such questions to workable and soluble problems by focusing on relations among the specific variables that a researcher believes are at work. By clearly narrowing the scope of the problem, the programme will begin on solid footing.
2. **Consult a broad scope of research literature.** Consulting the research literature on the subject will often assist in trimming the problem into more manageable elements. One difficulty is

1 Authored for this handbook by David J Y Combs, US Department of State, (2015-16).

2 Pedhazur, E.J. & Schmelkin, L.P., (1991), *Measurement, Design, and Analysis: An Integrated Approach*, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

knowing where to find solid research literature, so a planner would be wise to consult multiple fields of research, because in many cases they examine the same (or similar) phenomenon. In instances where such efforts are constrained, we advise as much literature review is done as possible – something is better than nothing.

3. **Generate a proposed theoretical causal path diagram.** Once a literature review is completed, generate a simple diagram that captures the essence of the literature and lays out a proposed set of causal relationships between the factors thought to be driving the issue(s) at hand. A planner should attempt to support each element of the path diagram with observable verifiable evidence from the literature review. **Where possible**, quantitative evidence based on statistical findings should generally be prioritised over qualitative case studies. Of course, the convergence of quantitative and qualitative evidence makes a causal claim all the more compelling.




Figure 55 – Simple theoretical causal path diagram

For example, Figure 55 presents a simple path diagram which suggests that three factors (education, wealth and beliefs about the supremacy of one’s religion) are associated with support for violent extremism.³ The positive and negative signs indicate the proposed direction of effect (positive means a positive relationship. i.e. as religious supremacy increases, so does support for violent extremism; negative means an inverse relationship, for example, as education increases, support for violent extremism decreases).

³ This example is for illustration only.

Theory criteria

Once a theory is generated, how can its strength be evaluated? Seven criteria have been proposed.⁴

1. **Posits causal relationships.** A good theory should clearly make causal claims about how a set of factors operate together to drive some phenomenon of interest.
2. **Coherence.** Elements of a theory should naturally flow from one another and not contradict one another. Meanings of terms should not shift from one element of the theory to another.
3. **Easily remembered and communicated.** The theory should essentially tell a useful and easily communicated story about the phenomenon under study. The overall theoretical cause and effect process should ideally have a clear beginning, middle and end – ‘the theory should posit a process that solves a problem’.⁵
4. **Parsimony.** The theory should account for the overall process of interest using as few concepts, factors, diagrams, arrows and so on as possible to explain the phenomenon. Simpler theories are preferable to overly complicated ones. Furthermore, the theory and diagram should usually not include factors that cannot be measured or tested.
5. **Testable and falsifiable.** A theory (and hypothesis, described below) should be laid out in testable terms. The elements of a theory **must** be disprovable i.e. a researcher must be able potentially to find observable evidence that would ruin the theory. If elements of the theory cannot be tested, they should be removed from the theory diagram and disregarded as part of the process under study.
6. **Generalisability.** A strong theory should be generalisable across situations and time. It should make the case that a general phenomenon is true, not only some specific instances. For example, a weak theory would be that ‘economic upheaval in Germany caused the Second World War’. A more useful general theory might suggest that ‘countries experiencing economic upheaval are more likely to become involved in war’.⁶
7. **Solves a clear problem.** Finally, a strong theory should help solve a critical problem. It should provide the groundwork for answering hard problems that cannot currently be resolved.

Once the overarching problem is clearly articulated, the research literature has been consulted and a theoretical causal path diagram has been generated, the planners should then evaluate a theory based on the above seven criteria. For the situation shown in Figure 55 for example, the theory might be ‘people with little wealth and poor education but a strong belief in the supremacy of their

4 Fiske, (2004), ‘Personality and Social Psychology Review’.

5 *Ibid.*

6 Johnson, J.B. & Reynolds, J.T., (2012), *Political Science Research Methods*. Los Angeles: Sage.

religion are more likely to support violent extremism'. If the theory appears strong, planners should have a solid idea about the nature of the problem at hand.

Hypotheses

Once strong theoretical grounding is established, the process moves into practical hypothesis generation. This involves specifying the **independent and dependent** variables under examination. **Independent** variables are the measurements of the phenomenon that are thought to influence, affect or cause some other phenomenon. **Dependent** variables are thought to be caused, depend on or be a function of an independent variable. The term 'hypothesis' can be described as:

'An explicit statement that indicates how a researcher thinks the phenomena of interest are related... it represents the proposed explanation for some phenomenon and how an independent variable is thought to affect, influence or alter a dependent variable. Since hypotheses are proposed relationships, they may turn out to be incorrect.'⁷

Like a theory, a good hypothesis often has several characteristics.⁸

- **Empirical statement.** A hypothesis should be a statement, based on the generated theory, about the specific relationship(s) under study. This statement should not be a statement about how the relationships **ought** to work but a statement about how the theory suggests they **do** work.
- **Correspondence with testing approach.** A hypothesis should begin to lay out how a planner means to test the concepts under study. In the violent extremism example, rather than stating that wealth, education, poverty and beliefs about religious supremacy drive violent extremism, a strong hypothesis should state how the planner will test and measure these concepts. In addition, the hypothesis should state how the concepts under study (independent variables) are thought to impact the dependent variable. For example, one strong hypothesis within the context of the violent extremism example might suggest specifically that 'as education rates rise, as measured by self-reported educational attainment in a public opinion survey, survey respondents' support for violent extremism, as measured by favourability expressed towards extremist group X, will decrease'. This statement begins to suggest **how** one of the independent variables is thought to generate an impact on the dependent variable.
- **Testability.** Finally, it must be possible to gather empirical data that will confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. If such data cannot be gathered the hypothesis is of no value.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

Designing interventions for evaluation

Once a strong theory is in place and hypotheses are generated, a planner is in a strong position to begin designing an intervention to tackle whatever question or problem is at hand. This should be based on two factors, the:

- theory and hypotheses already generated (i.e., the question at hand); and
- degree to which the programme designer needs to demonstrate the causal effects of an intervention on whatever outcome is of interest.

It is important to note that unambiguously **demonstrating** the causal impacts of a programme is different from **arguing** the causal impacts of a programme. **If a planner needs to be able to demonstrate the causal impact of the intervention on some outcome, only one design type will suffice: the controlled experiment.** If a planner needs only to be reasonably certain of the causal impact of the intervention, then quasi-experimental designs might fit the bill.

Controlled experiments

Two features of any project or programme distinguish it as experimental.⁹

1. It must have some sort of **intervention** (i.e. an introduced independent variable) that is experienced by several ‘comparison groups’ – in simple terms, there must be at least one ‘control’ group against which the experimental group is compared.
2. The ‘units’ under study (for example, people, businesses, schools, communities and so on) must be randomly assigned to the comparison groups of the intervention i.e. everyone in the study/ programme must have an equal chance of being in any of the comparison groups of the intervention.

Randomisation is essential because it evens out various differences between those in the comparison groups, such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, gender and so on. Having achieved statistical uniformity, the measured difference between the groups during or after the experiment will be attributable to their exposure to the intervention.

Quasi-experimental approaches

What can be done when planners wish to test cause and effect claims but find that conducting a controlled experiment is impossible or unethical? A planner who wishes to understand the relationship between the effects of drone strikes and subsequent support for violent extremism, for example, is in a situation where a controlled experiment is unethical.¹⁰

⁹ Pedhazur, E.J. & Schmelkin, L.P., (1991).

¹⁰ All designs in this section are from Campbell and Stanley’s classic book on experimental and quasi-experimental designs. See Campbell, D., & Stanley, J., (1963), *Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, for a classic analysis of such designs. Their text provides far more detail than this annex can about quasi-experiments and provides a host of quasi-experimental design types potentially useful for planners.

This is when a **quasi-experiment** can provide powerful insights. A ‘quasi-experiment’ refers to investigations in which interventions are administered but randomisation is absent. For this section, the following abbreviations will be used to describe potential quasi-experimental designs:

- **Tx(1)** means an intervention;
- **Tx(2)** means a second (different) intervention; and
- **Obs(1)** means an observation/measurement.

As a simple example:

- **Tx1 : Obs1** means ‘an intervention occurs followed by an observation/measurement’.

This style of project is quite common but has so many methodological problems that it has almost no scientific value. Basic to scientific evidence is the process of comparison. To understand if the intervention (Tx1) has had any effect, the question ‘compared to what?’ must therefore be answered. If no baseline measurement prior to the intervention has been established this approach should never be the intentional design of a study or programme.

The one group pre-test/post-test design

- **Obs1 : Tx1 : Obs2**

The one group pre-test/post-test design is a simple and more helpful extension of the case study presented above. A baseline measurement is taken (Obs1) of the selected group, an intervention is made (Tx1), and a second measurement is taken (Obs2) to see the effect of the intervention.

This style of project is also quite common. While it has fewer drawbacks than the first example, it still has several. For example, the quasi-experimental group might be more or less susceptible to the intervention than other groups and/or factors external to the experiment might be influencing the measurement.

The time series pre-test/post-test design

- **Obs1 : Obs2 : Obs3 : Tx1 : Obs4 : Obs5 : Obs6**

The time series pre-test/post-test design is another simple extension of the designs presented above. By providing, over a set period of time, a more granular set of measures for the intervention (TX1), this approach would be more likely to catch changes in attitudes that could be attributable to some other cause. This design does not help resolve problems of outside influences but can show whether they are at work.¹¹

¹¹ If a programme officer is relying on any of the above comparative designs (pre-test/post-test or time series designs), one helpful approach to keeping track of possible outside influences on programme participants is to have them keep a structured journal of activities during the life of the programme. Such approaches can help planners better understand the nature of outside factors that could be impacting participants.

The equivalent time samples design

- **Tx1 : Obs1 : Tx2 : Obs2 : Tx1 : Obs3 : Tx2 : Obs4**

The equivalent time samples design is probably most useful when a planner has multiple programme types and wishes to compare them. For example, as denoted in the formula above, suppose there are two anti-violent extremism messaging campaigns (**Tx1** and **Tx2**) which are alternated over a period of time, with the response measured after each campaign (**Obs1**, **Obs2** and so on). If one campaign works better than the other there would probably be a distinct pattern of fluctuating results that would follow the alternating treatments.¹²

One advantage of this design is that it does not suffer from the same kind of ‘outside influence’ problems described for the other designs. Even if the participants were being subjected to some outside influence, the alternating interventions make it unlikely that it could impact the alternating observations/outcomes in a systematic way. That is, the outside influence would probably be unable to produce the same pattern of alternating results that would be expected from the alternating treatments.

The non-equivalent control group design

This approach is probably most useful when comparing multiple pre-existing groups of people (for example, two provinces, two villages, five classrooms and so on).

- **Obs1 : Tx1 : Obs2** (for example, Province Y)
- **Obs1 Obs2** (for example, Province Z)

In this example, the top line represents an observation given to Province Y, followed by an intervention (for example, the anti-violent extremism messaging campaign), followed by an observation. The second line represents Province Z, which is similar to Province Y but on the other side of the country. Both provinces are treated identically, except that Province Y receives the messaging campaign and Province Z does not. After **Obs2**, the results are compared to see what difference the intervention has made.

This sort of design can be easily be modified to test multiple intervention types (TX1, TX2 and so on); for example:

- **Obs1 : Tx1 : Obs2** (for example, Province Y);
- **Obs1 : Tx2 : Obs2** (for example, Province Z); or
- **Obs1 Obs2** (for example, Province A).

¹² This approach is probably most useful when the effects of a treatment are expected to increase with the treatment and be reduced in the absence of a treatment.

And it can be modified for a time series design as presented above:

- **Obs1 : Obs2 : Obs3 : Tx1 : Obs4 : Obs5 : Obs6** (for example, Province Y); or
- **Obs1 : Obs2 : Obs3 Obs4 : Obs5 : Obs6** (for example, Province Z).

As noted, quasi-experiments can be useful when controlled experiments are not feasible and many designs are possible, according to the unique nature of the intervention at hand. The number of potential designs is constrained only by the imagination of the programme designer.

Summary

Measurement related to prevention and peacebuilding should follow three major steps.

1. **Create a strong theory** – this clearly articulates the problem at hand and sets the framework for the project or programme.
2. **Generate testable hypotheses from your theory** – these state how you think the variables within the problem at hand are related and act on each other.
3. **Test your hypotheses using controlled experiments and/or quasi-experiments** – controlled experiments involve randomisation; quasi-experiments do not.

The decision whether to choose a controlled or quasi-experimental design will probably come down to two major factors:

- the theory and hypotheses already generated; and
- the degree to which it is important to **demonstrate** the causal impacts of a programme, – if causal demonstration is critical, a controlled experiment is essential; however, if causal demonstration is not so critical, or conducting a controlled experiment is impossible (for practical or ethical reasons), a quasi-experiment could be appropriate.

Monitoring and evaluation in conflict zones

Interview with Sharon Morris, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, US Department of State (2015-17).

DAS Morris has more than 15 years of experience designing and implementing programmes in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Nigeria, and Somalia. Previously, she served as a senior advisor to the acting President of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), where she was the Jennings Randolph senior fellow 2013-14. She holds a PhD and Master's Degree from the University of Chicago.

Q. You have spent a large portion of your career working with and in NGOs in some of the most hostile environments in the world. Might you share some of your initial perspectives on the challenges of effectively measuring in non-permissive/violent conflict zones?

A. One of the major difficulties people – not just NGOs but militaries and others – deal with is trying to measure absolutely everything. In a non-permissive environment, you need to remember that sometimes you need to measure one or two things – that's it. You can measure a lot in a permissive area but, in an area where a mistake could be lethal, sometimes simply getting in, measuring simply and getting out is key.

Q. How do you go about deciding what to measure?

A. Well, that's always difficult. Ultimately, practitioners need to avoid measuring something simply because it can be measured. Just because something can be measured doesn't mean it's a useful gauge of the effectiveness of a programme. If you're trying to find ways to make a military more ethnically integrated, you clearly want to measure the ethnic composition of the military. I've seen people doing information campaigns measure the effectiveness of a leaflet drop not by changed attitudes but by the distance the leaflets actually travelled out the back of an airplane. Sure it's measurable – but is this what we really care about?

Q: What kinds of practical advice do you have for people as they go about setting up an evaluation approach in difficult areas?

A: Simpler measures are usually better. And it's critical to specify a level of analysis (e.g., national, village, persons) and stick to that level. If you're interested in an intervention regarding the tribal leaders of District X, measure the effects of your intervention on the tribal leaders of District X. I'd also tell people to avoid proposing some long causal chain. Have a simple theory, grounded in evidence, and let that guide your programme.

Once you have that in place, it's almost always better to rely on local contractors to actually carry out the programme and the measurement of that programme. Don't send in the military (or the diplomats etc.) to measure effectiveness. Have local staff take your measurements. And make sure they are competent to do so. Don't think you can train locals to do sophisticated measurements. Find locals who are capable. They may be hard to find. There may be very, very few of them but this will work better than you trying to do it or training people to do it.

Q. Do you have a good example from your own career to illustrate what you've been saying?

A. I was once working with a team in Somalia. Ultimately the project crashed and burned but it was a good lesson regarding the points I've just been going over. Our background theoretical and conflict analysis work had made it clear that a major factor driving the violent conflict we were witnessing had to do with competition over natural resources (timber, coal, etc.). So we gathered everyone in the area that had a stake in the matter – local elders, leaders and others. We managed to secure a negotiated agreement that would put a stop to the harvest of these resources.

We had a lot of excitement in the area and at first it seemed to be working. But we failed to account for the fact that the people who most needed the work – youth and women – would simply move to a new district and start again. The problem just moved on.

So we tried again and this time managed to get a more complete programme that accounted for these kinds of factors. Frankly, I think this round of the programme was successful. But from a measurement perspective we completely failed. We tried to measure absolutely everything – attitudes, cooperation, local leaders caring about women's issues and a lot of other things. The whole thing got so unwieldy that it just collapsed under its own weight.

This is what I mean by simple measures. What did we care about? Reduced violence. We could have easily measured that. And, as a follow up, we could have demonstrated that fewer women and youth were moving to other areas to harvest there. But we didn't. Had we constrained our measures to only what we cared about we would have been able to show that we were successful. Instead, we could talk all we wanted about success – but ultimately we couldn't demonstrate it to others.

Q. What's the future of M&E? Is it technology?

A. No, I don't think so. I think the future of M&E is simply far more disciplined approaches such as experimental and quasi-experimental programme designs. You can have the best measure in the world and it ultimately is meaningless without the right programme design. In many cases, implementers don't even want to measure. But in my thinking a far larger amount of budgets need to go directly to rigorous, methodologically sound M&E. As I noted earlier, this can be tough for people in the field and can place a major burden on people. But, ultimately, this is the future.

Q. Finally, do you have any advice for military practitioners in particular?

A. Only to remember that, for local NGOs, working with militaries – or any western organisation, for that matter – can place them in a difficult situation. Working with western organisations can place these people in extraordinary danger. In many cases, it might be best to go through an intermediary. For us, the work will eventually end and we'll go home. But for the local Somali woman, say, this is her life – and we all need to be mindful of that fact.



Further resources

Sarah Jane Meharg, (2009), *Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations and Crisis Management*, McGill-Queen's University Press.

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/SSR-Methodology-Guidance/Support-Programme-Cycle/Evaluate#activity-presentation>

Notes:

Annex H – Case study: Civil society helps prevent civil war in Kenya, 2007-2008



Introduction

Violence erupted in Kenya at the announcement of the presidential election results on 30 December 2007.

The violence quickly evolved from apparent spontaneity to well-orchestrated attacks and counter-attacks involving massacres, arson, looting, rape, evictions and dispossession. Ethnic tensions surfaced, camouflaged by a façade of political affiliation. The police response added to the violence and deaths. In less than two months, more than 1,300 people were killed – almost half within the first two weeks – while more than 500,000 people were displaced from their homes. Kenya seemed to be on the brink of disintegration.

The situation was turned around by the swift ‘bottom-up’ intervention of a citizen diplomacy group, the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), which paved the way for the official ‘top-down’ mediation by the African Union’s Panel of Eminent Personalities, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

This locally-led ‘bottom-up-top-down’ combination culminated in the National Peace and Reconciliation Accord of 28 February 2008, which established a power-sharing Grand Coalition Government.

Narrative

Less than 24 hours after the announcement of the contested results five Kenyan citizens came together to analyse the situation. They were:

- Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat – renowned mediator and former Special Envoy to Somalia;
- General Daniel Opande (Rtd) – former UN peacekeeper in Namibia, Liberia and Sierra Leone;
- General Lazaro Sumbeiywo (Rtd) – served as Special Envoy to the Sudanese peace process (1997-98) and then as mediator (2001-05);
- Dekha Ibrahim Abdi – global peacemaker, winner of the 2007 Right Livelihood Award (the ‘alternative Nobel Peace Prize’); the only female in the core group, she was invited by the other four to be the Chairperson; and
- George Wachira – policy advisor with Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa.

These five, all highly experienced in conflict management and peacebuilding, became the core of a movement known as the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP). Seeing the void in national leadership, they realised that violence was likely to erupt and that decisive action was needed. Working publicly and behind the scenes, they mobilised peace-minded volunteers and professionals from a wide spectrum of Kenyan society into a web of preventive action that stands out on several counts.

- a. Speed – the core team mobilised only hours after the onset of violence. This early engagement, in the form of televised appeals for peace and dialogue, was critical at a time when the country appeared to be on the edge of complete collapse. The peace-builders’ initial focus was to plead publicly and privately with the political leadership for dialogue, while calling on Kenyans to stop the violence and wanton destruction of property.
- b. The CCP mobilised a web of actors committed to nonviolent negotiation as a means of resolving the crisis. Included were media and business professionals; political analysts and writers; university vice-chancellors and student leaders; government officials, the police and the military; religious leaders and politicians.
- c. CCP quickly established an open and inclusive public posture, inviting any willing Kenyan to participate in its activities, while at the same time engaging in quiet and confidential diplomacy. Their daily ‘Open Forum’ quickly generated a wide range of ideas for action, which were matched with the available funds and volunteers’ time. Working committees were formed, while ‘Concern’ became a brand name used by other affiliates of CCP – Concerned Writers of Kenya, Concerned Women, Concerned Youth for Peace and so on. In the first month of the crisis, the Open Forum became the place where Kenyans

from all walks of life came together for several hours every day to reflect, analyse, strategise – and act.

- d. CCP set the pace for the international mediation process by initiating the visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, by briefing the Eminent Persons, and by interacting with the process led by Kofi Annan. The CCP's base, the Serena Hotel, was also the venue for the formal mediation process, creating an ideal link for CCP.

The connections generated in the Open Forum enabled CCP to take several initiatives, it:

- urged the public to stop the violence while also pressing politicians at all levels to resolve the crisis through dialogue;
- engaged with the formal mediation process from the very beginning;
- worked strategically with the media – television, print, radio, electronic, blogs, and texting; Kenyans topping up their pay-as-you-go mobiles would receive an automatic message urging them not to take violent action;
- worked with public institutions to prevent the spread of the violence;
- worked with the private business sector;
- worked across lines of tribe, ethnicity and religion, at all levels of society;
- offered practical support for mourning, confidence-building and healing; and
- supported local-level actions by key individuals and groups to avert and respond to the violence.

This last point is key and warrants more detail:

'One of the methods they used [to stop the killing] was to ask the sixty thousand members of a women's organisation, who had cell phones, to look out of their windows and report what they saw. The information started pouring in. They began to plot not only the hot spots of the violence but also the cold spots, since it was important to know where people were running to, so they could be protected. They then began to develop strategies for each spot, with the help of trusted local leaders, to work out together how they could stop the killing without using force. Almost miraculously, in less than three weeks, with the help of community, youth and church leaders, sports personalities, the police and the media, these strategies brought the violence under control.'¹

1 Scilla Elworthy, 'Dekha Ibrahim Abdi Obituary', *Guardian*, 9 August 2011 (Dekha Ibrahim died on 14 July 2011 from injuries sustained in a car crash).

Additionally, the Generals Sumbeiywo and Opande were able to assure the CCP – and through it the wider populace – that the Kenyan army would not become involved in the conflict on either side, an impartiality possible thanks to earlier reforms that had professionalised and ensured an ethnic balance in the military.

Key lessons learned

Without CCP's intervention, Kenya could have collapsed into civil war. Deep-seated problems could have been exacerbated by the violent dynamics of the moment. CCP's actions can be seen as an example of the crucial need, at a time of crisis, to create an 'enabling environment' that helps to prevent self-destruction and encourages everyone to focus on identifying and resolving the conflict's underlying causes. Specifically, the CCP's strategy was to:

- stop the violence, not to solve the conflicts (plural, because many past and present grievances were folded into the violence); and
- approach leaders at all levels of society simultaneously with this aim.

Its success was built on:

- the legitimacy of the core CCP actors – their authority, impartiality and experience;
- a speedy, well-informed response, driven by use of the Ushahidi text/web platform – which gave prompt situation reports – and the Open Forum, whose openness and inclusion generated effective ideas for action;
- dialogue and nonviolence; and
- an appeal to a higher goal/prize – 'Kenya'.

The total cost of CCP's actions was roughly US\$200,000, donated at short notice following urgent requests to international non-governmental organisations. The violence in Kenya lost its economy an estimated \$3.6 billion in the short-term and depressed GDP going forward. How much higher this would have been – not just for Kenya but the entire region – had the CPP not been formed and intervened as it did is impossible to say.

However, contentious structural issues remain in Kenyan society and work continues to transform the conflicts arising from them.

Annex J – Case study: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1995-2000



Introduction

The preventive measures undertaken in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)¹ between 1992 and 2000 serves as an example of how swift action by the international community can prevent communities in conflict from escalating into violence or even all-out war. This case study highlights some key lessons that strategic military planners could use to help understanding, engagement and action during nonviolent phases of conflict.

Narrative

Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, armed conflict broke out between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). In response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), but its mission was hampered by vague mandates and poor, often uncoordinated political leadership. As a result the UNPROFOR peacekeepers could do little to prevent the war crimes and attacks on the civilians whom they had been deployed to protect.

The best illustration of this was the Bosnian Serb assault on the UN safe area of Srebrenica in July 1995. The murder of approximately 8,000 people – most of whom were civilian refugees seeking refuge from the fighting in eastern BiH – has since been characterised as a genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). While the conflicts in Croatia were

¹ The Republic of Macedonia became a member of the United Nations in 1993 but, due to an ongoing dispute with Greece over the use of the name Macedonia, was admitted under the provisional name 'the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', abbreviated as FYROM.

primarily resolved by the Croats themselves, the war in BiH was not halted until the UNSC authorised a NATO air campaign against the Bosnian Serb positions in the latter half of 1995.

The UNPROFOR experience in FYROM played out differently, however.

The Socialist Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from the Yugoslav federation in September 1991. At the request of Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, in November 1992 the UNSC authorised the deployment of a specific branch of the UNPROFOR mission in the country. The rationale behind deploying peacekeepers into FYROM was primarily to prevent the growing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo from spilling over into this neighbouring republic. This regional understanding of the conflict was reflected in the initial tasks given to the peacekeepers:

- deploy peacekeepers along Macedonia's international border;
- monitor and report developments that could threaten the stability of the country; and
- deter violence.

In time a new understanding of the conflict emerged as it became clear that Serb forces would not challenge FYROM's borders. The focus now changed to internal threats – something that had not been significantly discussed during 1992. Some 350,000 ethnic Albanian refugees had fled from Kosovo and violence was feared between FYROM's Macedonian, Serb and Albanian populations.

As a result of the changing understanding of the conflict, the UNSC started tasking UNPROFOR to engage in so-called 'human dimension' functions, which included peacebuilding activities between Slav, Macedonian and Albanian communities.

In March 1995 the mission's name was changed to the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). This was the first UN mission in history that explicitly focused on prevention rather than 'traditional' peacekeeping between belligerents. UNPREDEP's mandate included not only military tasks but encouraging FYROM's ethnic groups to co-exist peacefully. It discharged this mandate by facilitating inter-group confidence-building, supporting humanitarian organisations with their projects and helping to develop the country's infrastructure. UNPREDEP did this in close cooperation with its civilian colleagues in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

In 1998, due to rising tensions in Kosovo and the FYROM border regions, UNPREDEP's mandate was expanded to include monitoring and reporting illicit arms flows and other prohibited activities.

A significant strength underlying the international intervention in FYROM during this period was the close coordination between military and civil institutions. UNPREDEP never had more than 1,000 soldiers at its disposal, leaving it helpless if Serb forces invaded but also evidence of the effectiveness of the peacekeepers' deterrent function.

On the civilian side, a number of initiatives deserve to be mentioned. Shortly after the declaration of independence in 1991, a specialist Working Group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia started extensive mediation efforts, including fact-finding missions, personal shuttle diplomacy and the establishment of trilateral forums. These forums, in which the country's three main ethnic groups could meet on official and unofficial levels, have been highlighted as one of the main reasons why there was no widespread violence in FYROM during this period.²

Another important non-military institution was the OSCE's mission in the country from 1992 onwards. Especially influential was the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). The HCNM mandate focused on the integrity of FYROM's borders and the prevention of spillover from the other regional conflicts raging at this time, and the High Commissioner's frequent meetings with a range of local actors was highly significant. These included not only political, civil and religious leaders but also journalists, trade union leaders and ordinary people.³

UNPREDEP was terminated in February 1999 when, prompted by FYROM's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, China vetoed in the UNSC the extension of its mandate. The force was withdrawn despite the FYROM government calling for it to stay.

According to several commentators, UNPREDEP played an important role in mitigating conflict and preventing large-scale violence following the country's exit from the Yugoslav federation. Writing in 1997, Radoslava Stefanova claimed that 'a distinct causal relationship can be observed between the presence of UNPREDEP and the other preventive initiatives, on the one hand, and the sustained relative stability in the region during the last five years, on the other hand'.⁴ It should be stressed that the successful prevention of violent conflict came not from isolated military activities but from UNPREDEP's cooperation with other international actors within the country. It should also be noted that the success of international preventive action in FYROM between 1991 and 2000 was partly because national elites within the host state accepted the basic premise of the international community's activities. Without the consent of the nation's leadership, the situation in FYROM could easily have taken a far more violent turn, as was the case in neighbouring states.

Key lessons learned

- Domestic authorities and international organisations need to show political will to act together.
- Military deployment before significant violence has occurred can have a strong deterrent effect, especially if done at the invitation of the host nation government.
- Institutions other than the United Nations – and a broad range of international actors working together – can make a significant contribution to effective prevention.

2 (Ackerman, 2003).

3 *Ibid.*


4 (Stefanova, 1997).

- Military actors can effectively support activities beyond the purely military.
- Inter-institutional awareness: what does the military think the civilian institutions are capable of and *vice versa*?
- Understanding of conflict triggers is crucial for the right prevention strategy.
- Close consultation and joint action with local actors at all times is imperative.

Further resources

Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. D., (2010), *Understanding peacekeeping* (2nd Edition).
Cambridge: Polity.

Annex K – Case study: Civil society-military-police capacity building in the Philippines¹



Introduction

Following a long period of colonial rule by first Spain and then the United States, authoritarian policies executed by the government of the Philippines prompted increasing accusations of human rights abuses by military forces. Civilian control of the military declined and internal insurgency movements grew, the main ones being the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

An increasingly emboldened civil society's opposition to authoritarianism led to a broad-based democratic movement of 'people power' that toppled President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Subsequently, civil society-military cooperation contributed towards making the transition to a democratic political system. While foreign security assistance programmes for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) concentrated on train-and-equip programmes aimed to enable counter-insurgency, Filipino civil society organisations identified the military and police as critical stakeholders in the peace process and reached out to the AFP to begin dialogue.

A number of Filipino civil society groups have now taken part in large-scale capacity building in peacebuilding values, skills and processes for thousands of military officials, staff and civilian reserve forces in the Philippines. These activities focused on conflict assessment, facilitation, mediation, negotiation, building a culture of peace and other conflict transformation strategies.

¹ Edited from (Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli, 2015).

Narrative

Like most other Filipino civil society groups, Balay Mindanaw had no intention of working with the military when they began their peacebuilding activities in 1996. The director of Balay Mindanaw, Ayi Hernandez, first directly encountered military officers in a leadership development programme. 'While all I heard about the military before was their abuses, here I was talking face-to-face with soldiers who are willing to change, willing to help improve our people's lot.' In particular, Hernandez built a relationship with then AFP Colonel Raymundo Ferrer.

Balay Mindanaw reached out to the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) to explore training the military in peacebuilding but when military personnel applied to take courses, there was at first resistance. MPI members worried that admitting military personnel into their courses might affect the safety of other participants, or would change the dynamic of the learning environment, intimidating other students. There was also concern that the military wanted to spy on non-governmental organisations attending the training, to gather intelligence.

Trainers at MPI had had previous negative experiences with military forces. Lead trainer Deng Giguiento had been on a fact-finding mission in North Catobato when soldiers stopped her. The soldiers were drunk and had removed their name-tags, so they could not be identified, and six pointed their guns at Giguiento, pushing the rifle barrels into her dress. So she was subsequently hesitant about letting military personnel take her course on conflict transformation.

However, other MPI members had had more positive experiences with soldiers. Rudy Rodil had been part of a government panel that negotiated a truce with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and had seen, through that process, that soldiers could become respectful and skilled peacebuilders. As a result of civil society actors advocating on behalf of their military colleagues, Giguiento agreed to let Colonel Ferrer into her course on conflict transformation.

MPI members set strict ground rules for military personnel attending courses: 'No guns, no uniforms, no bodyguards, no ranks – just the participants' first and last names would be used – and no intelligence gathering.' Military personnel learned side-by-side with civilians working for civil society organisations. The mixed workshops were opportunities for the military to engage with unfamiliar groups, such as Muslim peace advocates, grassroots peace leaders and young peace activists. This allowed stereotypes to be broken down and new relationships to develop.

Balay Mindanaw, MPI and other Filipino civil society groups followed up after these initial trainings. Various groups established support mechanisms for the trained military men and women, mostly informally through conversations, phone calls and texts. Formal strategies included conducting regular meetings, inviting trained military personnel into local peace networks, and civil society visits to military camps. Local-level initiatives between military commanders, local leaders and communities included joint community-based peacebuilding efforts such as local zones of peace,

local dialogue between warring parties at the village level, and community development projects. Key leaders in civil society began reframing their perspective of the military from an enemy to a partner in supporting the peace process.

Ferrer continued to reach out to Filipino civil society groups working in peace, development and human rights after his training at MPI. His promotion to Brigadier General came along with the title of ‘Peace General’ because of his peace leadership and negotiation skills. Recognising the history of bad relations and military abuses, he sought to involve soldiers in acts of atonement and reparation. ‘We had become part of the problem in the conflict in Mindanao,’ he says. The AFP had used excessive force against armed opposition groups in deterring violence, but the more force used, the more people joined armed opposition groups. Meanwhile, government services reached only main cities.

In recognising the roots of civilian distrust, Balay Mindanaw and Ferrer co-designed a joint project to provide peacebuilding and conflict management training workshops for the officers and soldiers of the 1st Infantry ‘Tabak’ Division, with the goal of de-escalating the violence in Mindanao. Ferrer committed his entire division to Balay Mindanaw’s Operation Peace Course (also known as ‘OP KORs’).

Balay Mindanaw’s president Kaloy Manlupig supported the project, recognising that peacebuilding had to involve the security sector, which was at the centre of peace and security issues in the Philippines. Manlupig quoted Albert Einstein’s famous observation that ‘no problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it’. Trained for war fighting, soldiers working for peace would at first glance appear to be contradictory. For transformation to happen, security forces needed to learn communication skills so they could de-escalate and defuse conflicts through active listening, dialogue, negotiation and mediation processes.

Balay Mindanaw offered three levels of training of soldiers for peace:

- a two-day course for senior officers, since they can only be absent from their command for a maximum of three days;
- a five-day course for junior officers, some of whom were trained as trainers so they could take the lessons back to their respective battalions, companies and units; and
- a five-day course for non-commissioned officers at the community level – this included training with members of the volunteer Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs).

Balay Mindanaw also aimed for change at the policy level. First, it sought to institutionalise its training courses in the academic institutions of the Department of National Defence and the Armed Forces. Second, it lobbied to change the criteria for promotion, so that soldiers would be rewarded for their peace leadership and not just for how many enemies were killed or captured, or how many weapons neutralised.

Through the training and Ferrer's leadership, soldiers in violence-prone Basilan province improved their relationships with local civilians and worked side-by-side with them to build houses and water supply systems. He questioned why his troops had been taught to scowl at people – 'to put on a fierce face' – and encouraged them to smile at people and greet them with respect. Ferrer wanted his troops to be 'peace multipliers' not 'force multipliers' – and slowly his efforts yielded results. People began going to the security forces with their concerns rather than running away from them when they approached.

As an example of the impact of training the military in peacebuilding, the AFP's 403rd Infantry 'Peacemakers' Brigade arranged a ceremony for a return to the community by 22 members of the insurgent New People's Army. Living a life of abject poverty in a remote village far from government services, the young men had been easy recruits to the NPA, which had promised them a right to self-determination if they took up arms to topple the government.

Recognising the power of offering respect to each human being, regardless of their identity, the AFP did not use the term 'surrender' and issued an apology to the young men, noting that the AFP had committed human rights abuses against their people. AFP officers also helped the former NPA members to reintegrate; for example, by pushing civilian government officers to do their job in providing medical care.

AFP regulars are now perceived as being more respectful in their dealings with people. Police and military officers have started to help mediate large and small conflicts in the communities, including defusing local disputes over land. When the public calls on security forces to respond, police or military soldiers trained in mediation use these skills rather than force.

Lessons learned

- The importance of policy buy-in at a senior level, both politically and in the military.
- The need to build trust between military and civilian actors on a one-to-one basis, with no ranks or uniforms.
- It is best if civilians lead the peacebuilding training and co-design process.
- It is important that military peacebuilding competence is established on a personal and an institutional level, so that 'peace soldiering' is recognised in the military career structure.

Annex L – Defence diplomacy

To give an idea of how defence diplomacy could be adapted to support a prevention agenda, Table 23 shows a range of UK Defence Engagement (i.e. diplomacy) activities. Several of these could adopt a prevention focus; for example, ‘training and education’ and ‘exercises and operations’, regional conflict advisors and conferences *inter alia*.

Category	Activity type	Sub activity type
Visits (inwards/outwards)	High-level international engagement (HLIE), including inward visits	Ministerial visit ¹
		Chief of Staff visit ²
		Top official visit ³
	Working-level international engagement, including inward visits and work of Foreign Liaison Staff	Conference/seminar ⁴
		2* visit
		Staff talks and visit
		Ship visit ⁵
		Unit visit
		Aircraft visit
		Sport visit
		Ceremonial/musical visit
		Conference/seminar
		Support to Foreign Defence Attachés in UK
		Other working-level international engagement ⁶

1 UK ministers outbound, foreign ministers inbound.

2 CDS, CNS, CGS, CAS, CJFC, VCDS, PUS (4* military and civilian).

3 3* military/civilian.

4 Includes financing, sponsoring, hosting and attending inbound, outbound and third party conferences and seminars.

5 Includes visits in support of Defence exports.

6 Including work with think tanks.

Category	Activity type	Sub activity type
Personnel, resources and enablers	UK presence in host nation (under UK Embassy)	Defence section
		Non-Resident Defence Attaché
		Regional conflict advisers
		Civilian defence adviser
		Other presence in host nation
	Embedded personnel	Loan service personnel
		Exchange officers
		Support to multilateral organisation
		Other embedded personnel
		Foreign embed in UK post
	UK resources and enablers	Provision of UK facilities and infrastructure
		Provision of equipment
		Provision of UK intelligence/information
		Provision of UK logistic/engineering support
		Provision of access, basing or overflight (ABO) rights in UK
		UK involvement in joint projects (including science and technology)
		Other UK resources
		International agreement/memorandum of understanding
	Support to Defence exports	Participation in trade/air show
		Equipment demonstration
Defence and security industry day		
Defence section support to exports		
Other export activity or support		

Category	Activity type	Sub activity type
Training and education	Routine training/education	International Defence Training (IDT) – Tier 1 ⁷
		IDT – Tier 2 ⁸
		IDT – Tier 3 ⁹
		UK places on foreign course
		Masters programme
		English language training
		Other courses
	Short-notice or bespoke training	Regionally Embedded Training Team ¹⁰
		Short Term Training Team (STTT) ¹¹
		Training for UK Forces by host nation
		Training for UK Forces by UK
		Adventure training
		Other short-notice or bespoke training
		Exercises and operations
UK support to host nation exercise		
UK exercise in host nation		
Training for UK forces by UK (for example, BATUK or BATUS)		
Foreign observers at UK exercise		
Multinational exercise		
NATO exercise		
UK observers at a foreign exercise		
Other exercise		
Operations	Partnered operation	
	UK operation	
	Enabling support to UK-led operation	
	Other operation	

Table 23 – UK Defence Engagement activities¹²

7 Education and training courses ‘that are considered to be of the highest security cooperation value and are regularly over-subscribed’. (Joint Service Publication (JSP) 510, *International Defence Training*, paragraph 0504.) It covers key officer career courses and initial officer training.

8 ‘Courses of international security cooperation value, where demand for places does not normally exceed capacity.’ (JSP 510, paragraph 0507.)

9 ‘Courses of lesser or no international security cooperation value.’ (JSP 510, paragraph 0508.) Can include Cranfield University and Defence Academy courses.

10 For example, permanently based overseas and established (can be international) for example, BMATT, BPST(EA), IMATT – training is bespoke.

11 Majority operating abroad, wide range of potential activities, organised as a response to a need.

12 Taken from the UK’s Joint Doctrine Publication 05, *Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution*, 2016.

Notes:

Annex M – Glossary

Some terms commonly used in peacebuilding and conflict management.

alternative dispute resolution

ADR

A collective term for various means of settling disputes without litigation; for example, arbitration and mediation. A neutral third party is often involved in ADR.

arbitration

A method of resolving a dispute in which the actors present their case to an impartial party, which then makes a (usually binding) decision that resolves the conflict.

BATNA

A term invented by Roger Fisher and William Ury that stands for ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’. Any negotiator should determine his or her BATNA before agreeing to any negotiated settlement. Also sometimes used are WATNA (‘worst alternative to a negotiated agreement’) and EATNA (‘estimated alternative to a negotiated agreement’).

civil-military cooperation

CIMIC

The coordination and cooperation, in support of a specific mission, between military and civil actors, who can include the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

civil society

Refers to ‘the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations [e.g.] community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations and foundations.’
(World Bank definition.)

compromise

A solution to a mutual problem that meets some, but not all, of each of the actors’ interests.

conciliation

Conciliation involves efforts by a third party to improve the relationship between two or more disputants. It may be done as a part of mediation or independently. Generally, the third party will work with the disputants to correct misunderstandings, reduce fear and distrust, and generally improve communication between them. Sometimes this alone will result in dispute settlement; at other times, it paves the way for a later mediation process.

conflict management

A generic term for all aspects of engagement with conflict as a process. Also used to refer to the long-term containment of conflict to keep it from escalating.

conflict resolution

Usually refers to the process of resolving a conflict permanently i.e. to the satisfaction of all the actors involved.

conflict transformation

Refers to a change (usually an improvement) in the nature of a conflict; for example, a de-escalation or a reconciliation between people or groups. Whereas conflict resolution tends to focus on issues, conflict transformation includes a focus on the relationships between the people involved.

consensus

A process that demands the actors develop an agreement that is good enough (though not necessarily perfect) for all of them to agree to it.

context-driven

The principle of matching solutions to problems as the problems change. This means that the value of any practice depends on its context; there are good practices in context, but there are no 'best practices'.

contradiction

Term used for an underlying conflict situation that includes the actors' actual or perceived incompatible goals.

cultural violence

A term used to describe those aspects of societies that seek to legitimise, justify or normalise structural and direct violence through reference to religion and ideology, art and language, and empirical and formal science. (See also 'direct violence' and 'structural violence'.)

de-escalation

Developments that reduce the intensity of a conflict. They can be conscious – for example, concessions or other placatory moves by one or more of the actors – or can come about because of the reduced capacity of the actors.

de-humanisation

The psychological process of making opposing actors seem less than human and therefore not worthy of humane treatment.

dialogue

The process of sharing and learning about another's beliefs, feelings, interests and needs in a non-adversarial, open way, sometimes with the help of a third party. Unlike mediation, in which the goal is usually to resolve a conflict, the goal of dialogue is often simply improving understanding and trust between the actors.

diplomacy

Generally refers to the interaction between two or more nation-states, traditionally carried out by government officials, who act as advocates for their governments and negotiate treaties, trade policies and other international agreements. The term has been extended to include unofficial exchanges of private citizens (such as cultural, scientific, and religious exchanges) as well as unofficial (sometimes called 'citizen' or 'Track 2') diplomacy in which private citizens try to help develop solutions to conflicts.

direct violence

A term used to describe behaviour involving action intended to hurt, damage or kill someone or something. Direct violence might be perpetrated physically, through words, and through emotional or psychological pressure. (See also 'cultural violence' and 'structural violence'.)

embedded actors

Actors indigenous to the conflict who seek to work towards its resolution or transformation.

empathy

The ability to understand and share the feelings of others. Empathy is generally thought to take two forms. 'Affective empathy' refers to sensations and feelings that arise in response to others' emotions; for example, mirroring those emotions oneself. 'Cognitive empathy' – also known as 'perspective taking' – is the ability to identify and understand the views and emotions of others.

empowerment

The process by which a person or group gains more power; for example, through education, coalition building, community organising, resource development or advocacy assistance.

escalation

An increase in the intensity of a conflict. As a conflict escalates, the actors will adopt an increasingly confrontational stance. The number of actors tends to increase and the issues involved tend to broaden. Actors can change from simply wanting to win to wanting also to hurt the opponent.

face saving

An approach that prevents the opposing actors (or oneself) appearing in a negative light. By allowing actors to save face, a negotiated settlement becomes more likely.

facilitation

Actions of a third party to help actors clarify their positions and to communicate with one another.

force

Pressure applied to actors to make them do something against their will. Force need not be violent. It can simply be the threat of a negative consequence if the actor does not comply with a demand.

framing

The process of defining an issue. Just as a frame can be placed around a photograph, including some parts of the picture but cropping others, framing tends to draw attention to some aspects of a conflict while ignoring others. (See also 'reframing').

hard power

The use of military, economic or political strength to persuade or force others to a particular course of action.

human security

The protection of individuals in their daily lives, encompassing freedom from fear of persecution, intimidation, reprisals, terrorism and other forms of systematic violence; as well as freedom from want of immediate basic needs such as food, water, sanitation and shelter.

impartiality

The concept of non-discrimination i.e. one favours none of the actors in a conflict but might nevertheless be involved in some even-handed and supportive capacity; for example, as a mediator. (See also 'neutrality').

intervention

Often used to mean the introduction of third party armed forces into a conflict but more widely can refer to any third party involvement in a dispute; for example, unarmed civilian protection is a form of intervention.

lose-lose situations

Game theory makes a distinction between positive-sum 'games' (situations) which everyone can win (also referred to as 'win-win'), negative sum games in which all sides lose (also referred to as 'lose-lose') and zero-sum games in which one side wins only if another side loses.

mapping

The process of determining who the actors are in a conflict, how they relate to each other and what their positions, interests and needs are. It also involves the determination of external constraints and any other factors that define the conflict. Also called 'scoping'.

mediation

A method of conflict resolution carried out by an impartial third party who works with the disputing actors to help them improve their communication and analysis of the conflict, so that they can design a solution themselves.

multi-track diplomacy

The idea that international exchange can take many forms beyond those between official diplomats. Examples of multi-track diplomacy include official (Track 1) and unofficial (Track 2) conflict resolution efforts, which can sometimes be combined (Track 1½); and grassroots citizen and scientific exchanges, business negotiations, cultural and athletic activities and other international contacts and cooperative efforts (Track 3).

narrative (strategic)

The idea that effectively telling a story that explains unfolding events can also influence the events themselves. The 'strategic' element of the narrative lies in understanding how to develop and enact a story whose internal logic induces its various audiences to behave in ways that will lead to a desired outcome.

nation-building

A term widely used during the period of decolonisation to describe the process of forging national identity, often from a highly diverse population, to transcend subordinate loyalties. (See also 'peacebuilding' and 'state-building'.)

national security

The protection of a state's territorial integrity, its institutions, interests and citizens from both internal and external threats. Also known as 'state-centric' or (sometimes) 'hard' security.

negative peace

The condition that exists when there is the absence of direct violence. (See also 'positive peace'.)

negotiation

The process of bargaining between two or more actors to find a solution to a conflict. Seeking a solution that is mutually beneficial is called 'win-win' or cooperative bargaining. Seeking to prevail over opponents is called 'win-lose' or adversarial bargaining.

neutrality

The concept of non-allegiance i.e. one stands aside from a conflict and sides with none of the actors. (See also 'impartiality').

nonviolence

The principle that conflict should be managed, resolved or transformed without recourse violence in any of its forms. (See also 'cultural violence', 'direct violence' and 'structural violence'.)

peacebuilding

Actions taken to reduce the risk of actors lapsing or relapsing into violent conflict. It works by (i) strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and (ii) laying the foundation for sustainable peace and development by addressing in a comprehensive manner the cultural and structural causes of violent conflict. (See also ‘nation-building’ and ‘state-building’.)

peace enforcement

The application, under the authority of the UNSC, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force, to restore international peace and security in situations where the UNSC has judged there to be a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

peacekeeping

Efforts to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Contemporary peacekeeping incorporates many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

peacemaking

Actions taken to address active conflicts and bring hostile actors to a negotiated agreement. Peacemaking efforts may be undertaken by a wide range of actors including various agencies of the UN, governments, groups of states, regional organisations, unofficial and non-governmental groups, community leaders and prominent personalities working independently.

polarisation

The movement of actors in a conflict towards increasingly irreconcilable positions; it is both a cause and an effect of escalation.

positive peace

The condition, founded on equality and mutual respect, which seeks to manifest the inherent potential of all individuals and where direct, structural and cultural violence have been removed.

preventive diplomacy

In broad terms, preventive diplomacy refers to any nonviolent action taken to prevent a conflict from escalating into violence, or to limit its spread if it does turn violent. More narrowly, it refers to the work, both public and private, of high level diplomatic envoys used by the conflict actors, their allies or impartial third parties to encourage dialogue, compromise and the nonviolent resolution of tensions. This is also often referred to Track 1 diplomacy. Track 2 preventive diplomacy is unofficial and/or conducted at mid-level, often involving civil society in some form, while Track 3 preventive diplomacy refers to grassroots activity.

principled negotiation

An approach to negotiation that calls for ‘separating the people from the problem’, negotiating on the basis of interests rather than positions, identifying options for mutual gain, and using objective criteria to judge the fairness of any proposed settlement.

problem-solving approach

The process of working cooperatively with other actors to solve a common problem based on identifying and seeking to meet the underlying human needs. It can be contrasted with the adversarial approach which views the other disputants as opponents or enemies to be defeated.

reconciliation

The normalisation and repair of relationships between people or groups. According to peace scholar John Paul Lederach, it involves four simultaneous processes – the search for truth, justice, peace and mercy/forgiveness. When all four of these factors are brought together, he says, reconciliation is achieved.

reframing

The process of redefining a situation to see a conflict in a new way, usually based on input from others with a different perspective. (See also ‘framing’.)

restitution

Payment in cash or kind to a person or group for harm that was done to them. Although lost lives can never be replaced, making a symbolic payment of money, giving social or economic assistance, or otherwise trying to alleviate damage or harm that was done can help resolve a conflict and move the actors towards reconciliation.

soft power

The ability to attract and co-opt others to a particular course of action, rather than to induce their cooperation with rewards or simply coerce them.

stabilisation

The efforts made – often by intervening actors – during or after a period of violent conflict to reduce violence and return the affected society to normal life, repair damaged infrastructure and political institutions, and begin the process of reconciliation. Stabilisation efforts can be contested if conflict actors perceive them as favouring opponents.

stakeholders

Those who are involved in a conflict, who are or will be affected by it, or by how it might be resolved.

stalemate

A situation in a conflict in which no actors are able to dominate or where negotiation has stalled. Often actors must reach a stalemate before they are willing to negotiate a resolution to their conflict and/or invite in external mediators.

state-building

Efforts to (re)build self-sustaining institutions of governance capable of delivering the essential public goods required to underpin legitimacy as perceived by citizens. (See also ‘nation-building’ and ‘peacebuilding’.)

structural violence

A term used to describe the inequality, exploitation and oppression of people that is formally or informally embedded within societies in their structures and systems. (See also ‘cultural violence’ and ‘direct violence’.)

sustainable peace

A term that can mean to establish national security (q.v.) or both national and human security (q.v.).

tactical escalation

A deliberate move by one or more actors to intensify a conflict in an attempt to gain some perceived advantage.

theory of change

In general, a theory of change defines all the elements required to bring about a given long-term goal. In conflict management and peacebuilding, it defines what practitioners identify as the key elements that need to change – and how – for conflict to be resolved or transformed.

third party

An impartial person or body who tries to help the actors find a solution or at least communicate better. Examples of third parties are mediators, arbitrators, conciliators and facilitators.

transitional justice

Various judicial and non-judicial measures – for example, criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programmes and various kinds of institutional reforms – that seek to redress the legacies of human rights abuses in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. Transitional justice typically seeks to recognise the rights of victims, promote civic trust and strengthen the rule of law.

triggering event

An event that initiates a conflict or that brings a hidden or frozen conflict into view.

violence

See ‘cultural violence’, ‘direct violence’ and ‘structural violence’.

win-lose (adversarial) approach

An approach that assumes that the conflict is a contest in which the other actors are adversaries who must be defeated.

win-win (cooperative or problem-solving) approach

An approach that assumes conflict is a joint problem that can be solved by the disputing actors cooperating to find a solution that satisfies all the disputants.

zero-sum games or situations

Situations in which one side benefits only if the other side loses; for example, when there is a finite amount of a resource to be distributed. This often triggers a win-lose approach.

Notes:

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International organisations	
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International Committee of the Red Cross, UK & Ireland	World Health Organisation, Department of Injuries and Violence Prevention
UN Development Programme	UN Environmental Programme, Environmental Law Institute
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	

Non governmental organisations	
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