

# Civil Contingencies Act (2004)

## *Duty to Communicate with the Public*

### Choosing your Lead Responders - An easy to follow Guide

#### 1.0 Lead Responders: The legislative framework

Before we approach the task of choosing your Lead Responders, in line with the Communicating with the Public duty, under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004), it is useful to review the key elements from the relevant section of the statutory guidance, *Emergency Preparedness*, as a reminder.

#### 1.1 Purpose of appointing lead responders

Why do we need to identify Lead Responders? Firstly, the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) states that LRFs are required to identify those Category 1 responders who will take the lead in maintaining arrangements to warn and inform the public, and educate the public about risks and other civil protection matters, for each risk identified in the LRF Community Risk Register (CRR).

However, in communicating with the public, there is a need to avoid causing confusion during an incident, and in the absence of a Lead Responder, every Category 1 responder would be obliged to issue warnings, thereby increasing the potential for confusion. Identifying Lead Responders also helps to avoid duplication of effort - there is no sense in all agencies using valuable resources to issue the same warning and / or information.

In short, selecting Lead Responders to maintain arrangements for warning and informing the public helps the LRF to ensure that the public receives consistent and agreed safety information from a lead source only. This can play a significant role in mitigating the impact of an emergency on a community.

#### 1.2 Regulations require Category 1 responders to have in place a mechanism for selecting Lead Responders either (a) in advance, or (b) at the time of an incident.

The ideal scenario is that your LRF will select Lead Responders in advance (i.e. before an emergency occurs). This will not only save your multi-agency tactical command valuable time during a major incident, but it will also smooth your path to full implementation of the duty as a whole. Agreeing your Lead Responders in advance for each risk in your CRR will enable your LRF to put in place a minimum number of warning protocols, thus keeping the process as simple as possible. Crisis management can be challenging enough without having to go through the process of choosing a Lead Responder at the same time.

However, if your LRF cannot agree on Lead Responders in advance, or indeed would prefer to leave it until the response phase of an incident, you must put in place mechanisms to allow that decision-making process to take place effectively when it is required.

### 1.3 Regulations permit Category 1 responders to have a mechanism for changing the lead as the emergency evolves.

As an incident proceeds through the response phase to recovery and beyond, the Lead Responder for warning and informing may need to change, and the Civil Contingencies Act allows for mechanisms to be established to enable these changes to be made. For example, at the conclusion of the response to a flood incident, the Police may pass management of the incident to the relevant local authority (as was the case during the Carlisle Floods in 2005). This might also be the appropriate time to change the Lead Responder for warning and informing the public, in this case from the Police to local authority.

**NOTE:** It is important to note that the Lead Responder is not expected to carry out the maintenance of warning and informing arrangements in isolation. The communicating with the public duty falls to all Category 1 responders. The Lead Responder concept steers LRF partners to provide support, advice and guidance to those agencies designated as Lead Responders throughout all stages of the disaster cycle. Partnership working is critical to success in implementing this duty effectively by assessing procedures against the risks identified in your CRR. This will help to ensure that the right messages are issued to the right people at the right time and help to promote a coordinated approach to communicating with the public.

## 2.0 Choosing your Lead Responders<sup>1</sup>

Following that reminder, it's now time to begin the process of selecting Lead Responders for warning and informing the public. The following steps, based on the methodology used by Cheshire, Halton & Warrington LRF, aim to assist with this process. This illustrates one way of approaching the task; as with the 10 Step Cycle, please inform CCS of new ideas or methods that your LRF develops.

Although choosing your Lead Responders for warning and informing may seem a challenging task at first, it can actually be relatively straight forward if you follow the simple steps below:

- 2.1 Call together a specific 'Task & Finish' session for your LRF Public Warning Task Group, ensuring that all Cat 1 responders are present - over the course of the next couple of hours, your task is to assign a Lead Responder agency against each of the risks contained in your CRR.
- 2.2 Ensure that copies of the CRR are available with an additional column added, so that you can insert the agreed Lead Responder for each incident phase as you go along (see the attached example from the Cheshire, Halton & Warrington LRF at Annex A).
- 2.3 Now, with one task group member taking the lead, 'walk through' each risk scenario, analysing every phase of the disaster cycle, and deciding which agencies have a role as Lead Responder as the scenario / incident evolves. These agencies

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<sup>1</sup> **IMPORTANT NOTE:** The '*Choosing Your Responders*' note should be used in conjunction with the existing statutory guidance, *Emergency Preparedness*. '*Choosing Your Responders*' should be considered as supporting guidance, not a replacement of the formal guidance.

should then be inserted into your amended CRR table. You will also have to identify trigger points for the handover of the lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising from one responder body to another, and the procedures to achieve this (see Annex 7C, *Emergency Preparedness*).

2.4 However, your task group, where possible, should attempt to select one overall Lead Responder to take the lead against each risk, to ensure arrangements are maintained, and most importantly, to issue warnings during the immediate aftermath of an incident being declared (no-notice), or in the period prior to a potential incident (notice), to prevent imminent danger to life and property. This agency is the Lead Responder for both the planning, and immediate emergency response phase. As stated at 1.3 above, they should expect the full support of all Category 1 responders in undertaking this role.

2.5 The following scenarios are provided as examples - one notice type scenario (Flooding - Major Fluvial), and one no-notice (toxic release).

#### 2.5.1 Notice Type Scenario: *Flooding - Major Fluvial*

- ⇒ **Outcome Description (taken from CRR):** Sustained period of heavy rain for two weeks; rising river levels over all regions; 10,000 properties affected for 7 to 21 days; some risk to life; impact on roads and rail infrastructure.
- ⇒ **Pre-Flood:** right up to the point where the water is about to breach the river banks, the Environment Agency (EA) will have issued a series of warnings to the public and other key stakeholders (i.e. Flood Watch, Flood Warning, and Severe Flood Warning). Therefore, the EA as the Lead Responder at this stage is the agency best placed to issue an alert in the run-up to the incident.
- ⇒ **Flood Response:** once the multi-agency response is activated, and the emphasis changes to consequence management, the Police will coordinate all public safety messages, to ensure that a common message is being transmitted. In addition, all other Category 1 responders will be communicating with stakeholders that are specific to their own individual organisations (e.g. local authorities will communicate with their internal services, the voluntary agencies, schools, residential care homes, and Elected Members). Once the flood situation has receded, the EA will then issue an All Clear message. At this stage, as the incident enters the Recovery Phase, the Lead Responder role will probably change from Police to Local Authority.
- ⇒ **Outcome?** In this example there are three major changes in Lead Responder for this scenario: Environment Agency - Police - Local Authority. However, from a preparedness perspective, you may wish to select one agency to take the lead. Its role would be to lead on the preparations for (a) maintaining arrangements to warn and inform, and (b) to educate the public about risk. However, as indicated above all other Category 1 responders would have a duty to assist that lead agency in completing these tasks.

### 2.5.2 No-Notice Type Scenario: *Toxic Release*

- ⇒ **Outcome Description (taken from CRR):** Toxic chemical release, up to 3 km from site, up to 50 fatalities, and 2000 casualties.
- ⇒ **Pre-Incident and Response:** There are three types of scenario considered here: the first is where the site is known, and is operated by a company governed by the COMAH, REPPiR, or PSR Regulations<sup>2</sup>. The second involves a site that is not known, and is not governed by the aforementioned Regulations. And finally, the third is a 'mobile incident' - in other words, a tanker, ship, and rail carriage - an incident that can occur anywhere and at any time.

Let's consider scenario 1. The site operator/ pipeline owner has a duty under COMAH / REPPiR/ PSR to provide safety information to the public working in, living in, or passing through its Public Information Zone (PIZ). This frequently takes the form of calendars and/ or letters. The site operator / pipeline owner also has a duty under the above legislation to warn the public of a major accident when they occur. However, your LRF still needs to designate a Lead Responder(s) to ensure that warning and informing arrangements are maintained - this might involve site visits, assessment of existing warning infrastructure, provision of safety information outside of the PIZ.

Again, walk-through the scenario - in the pre-incident phase, all Category 1 responders could theoretically take a lead role.

If you review the Cheshire, Halton & Warrington LRF example (Annex A), you will note that the Police are the Lead Responder agency for several scenarios involving COMAH, REPPiR, and Major Accident Hazard Pipelines. In this case, the task group agreed that the Police would be the Lead Responder for warning and informing during the response phase, as local arrangements require that agencies to coordinate all safety messages issued to the public for these types of incident (whether supplementary to the operator's initial warning, an initial warning as a result of an operator's failure to warn, and / or subsequent safety action information, such as '*Go In, Stay In, Tune In*'). In the recovery phase, the Lead Responder changes to the local authorities, with key input from healthcare authorities and agencies.

- ⇒ **Outcome?** In this example, there are two major changes in Lead Responder for this scenario: Police - Local Authority / Health agencies. Again, from a preparedness perspective, you may wish to select one agency to take the lead. Its role would be to lead on the preparations for (a) maintaining arrangements to warn and inform, and (b) educating the public about risk. And as indicated above, all the other Category 1 responders would have a duty to assist that lead agency in completing these tasks.

**2.6** It is likely that as you assess through each hazard sub-category you will find that a natural rhythm develops within the task group, with patterns emerging as you proceed. The key factor to remember is that this is very much a partnership exercise with support flowing from all partners involved in managing communications in an emergency. Even if a particular Category 1 responder is

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<sup>2</sup> [Radiation \(Emergency Preparedness and Public Information\) Regulations \(2001\) \(REPPiR\)](#); [Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations \(1999\) \(COMAH\)](#); [Pipelines Safety Regulations \(1996\) \(PSR\)](#).

assigned more Lead Responder tasks than another, it should expect to receive the full support and cooperation of all other responders.

**2.7** The selected Lead Responders need to be recorded on your adapted Community Risk Register.

## **2.8 Good Practice**

If your LRF has examples of good practice, or ideas for improving this guide, please inform CCS. Information may be added to future editions, and posted on the UK Resilience website.

## Annex A

### Example of Lead Responder matrix

Hazard Sub Category	Outcome Descriptions	Risk Rating	Lead responder	Other organisations which may play a lead or a significant role, and at what stage in an incident	Lead National Agency	Current warning arrangements in place	Current information arrangements in place	Current educational arrangements in place	New systems required
Industrial Accidents / Environmental Pollution									
FIRE OR EXPLOSION AT A GAS TERMINAL, LPG, LNG & OTHER GAS ONSHORE FEEDSTOCK, PIPELINE & FLAMABLE GAS STORAGE SITE	UP TO 3KM AROUND SITE. UP TO 500 FATALITIES. 1500 CASUALTIES. LONG TERM IF CONTROL EQUIPMENT DAMAGED	M	Police	Comah operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements		To be decided
FIRE OR EXPLOSION AT AN ETHYLENE GAS PIPELINE	UP TO 3 KM AROUND SITE. UP TO. 500 FATALITIES. 1500 CASUALTIES. IMPACT ON DOWNSREAM PRODUCTION	M	Police	MAHP Operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided

FIRE OR EXPLOSION INVOLVING A PIPELINE	UP TO 3 KM AROUND SITE. UP TO 10 FATALITIES, 100 CASUALTIES	M	Police	MAHP Operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
FIRE OR EXPLOSION AT AN OIL REFINERY	UP TO 3 KM AROUND THE SITE. UP TO 500 FATALITIES 1500 CASUALTIES FIRE COULD BURN FOR DAYS. BURN INJURIES AND IMPACT INJURIES	M	Police	Comah operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements		To be decided
FIRE OR EXPLOSION AT A FUEL DISTRIBUTION AND TANK STORAGE OF FLAMMABLE AND TOXIC LIQUIDS	UP TO 3 KM AROUND THE SITE. UP TO 150 FATALITIES. 2000 CASUALTIES	M	Police	Comah operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements		To be decided
FIRE OR EXPLOSION AT AN ONSHORE FUEL PIPELINE	UP TO 1 KM AROUND THE SITE. UP TO 100 FATALITIES. 500 CASUALTIES	M	Police	MAHP Operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided

EXPLOSION AT A NATURAL GAS PIPELINE	LOCAL TO SITE UP TO 200 FATALITIES	M	Police	MAHP Operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE (primary cloudburst)	UP TO 10 KM FROM SITE., UP TO 2000 FATALITIES. 10000 CASUALTIES	M	Police	Comah operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements		To be decided
TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE (primary cloudburst)	UP TO 3 KM FROM SITE., UPTO 50 FATALITIES. 2000 CASUALTIES	M	Police	Comah operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements		To be decided
TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE (primary cloudburst)	UP TO 1 KM FROM SITE, UP TO. 10 FATALITIES. 100 CASUALTIES	M	Police	Comah operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements		To be decided
TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE (secondary cloudburst)	As per above	M	Police	Site operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where cloudburst has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided



RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE RELEASE	UP TO 4 KM FROM SITE., UP TO 150 FATALITIES. 1500 CASUALTIES	M	Police	REPPIR Operators (initial warning), Police (initial warning where hexaflo has not previously been declared), All other cat 1 responders + NII (supporting role)	NII	Mixture of off site sirens and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens and media arrangements		To be decided
RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE RELEASE DUE TO INCORRECT HANDLING OR DISPOSAL OF SOURCES	UP TO 5 FATALITIES. 100 CONTAMINATED CASUALTIES. WORRIED PERSONS SELF PRESENTING. GROUND CONTAMINATION OF SEVERAL KMS	M	Police	Police (initial warning), All other cat 1 responders + NII (supporting role)	NII	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
MAJOR CONTAMINATION INCIDENT WITH WIDESPREAD IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD CHAIN	FOOD PRODUCTION/MARKETING IMPLICATIONS DEPENDING ON SCALE AND AREAS AFFECTED. Animal and human health effects-fatalities, consumer confidence issues leading to lost markets/panic buying	H	FSA (Local lead to be confirmed)	All other cat 1 responders	FSA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided

MARITIME POLLUTION	SPILLAGE OF 100K TONNES CRUDE. 200 KM OF COASTLINE AFFECTING AMENITIES, AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM	M	MCA	All other cat 1 responders + pollution incident reaching shore (local authority)	DFT	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
MAJOR POLLUTION OF CONTROLLED WATERS	ANY POLLUTANT AFFECTING WATER QUALITY, ECOSYSTEMS, ABSTRACTION POINTS, AMENITY VALUE OR HUMAN HEALTH.	H	tbc	All other cat 1 responders	EA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
MAJOR LAND CONTAMINATION	POLLUTION INCIDENT. PERSISTANT/EXTENSIVE EFFECT ON LAND QUALITY, ECOSYSTEMS, PROPERTY, AMENITIES, ANIMAL AND HUMAN HEALTH	M	tbc	All other Cat 1 responders (especially local authorities)	EA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
MAJOR AIR QUALITY INCIDENT	POLLUTION INCIDENT LEADING TO PERSISTANT OR EXTENSIVE EFFECT ON AIR QUALITY, ECOSYSTEMS, AMENITIES AND HEALTH	H	tbc	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
INDUSTRIALEXPLOSION AND FIRE	UP TO 1 KM FROM SITE. UP TO 10 SERIUOS INJURIES. 100 CASUALTIES. IMPACT AND BURN INJURIES	M	Police	Police (initial warning where a major incident has not previously been declared). All other cat 1 responders + HSE (supporting role)	HSE	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements	Mixture of off site sirens, AVM systems and media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Transport Accidents</b>									

RAPID ACCIDENTAL SINKING OF PASSENGER VESSEL	UP TO 50 FATALITIES. 300 CASUALTIES.	M	Police	All other Cat 1 responders	DFT / BW / MSC	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
AVIATION ACCIDENT OVER MAJOR CONURBATION	UP TO 800 FATALITIES. 300 CASUALTIES. LOSS OF AMENITIES, HOMES, RETAIL, INDUSTRY. EFFECT ON ECONOMY	M	Police	All other Cat 1 responders + CAA + Airline operators	DFT	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
AVIATION ACCIDENT	UP TO 50 FATALITIES. 250 CASUALTIES	M	Police	All other Cat 1 responders + CAA + Airline operators	DFT	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
RTC MOTORWAY/TRUNK ROAD	MULTI VEHICLES UP TO 10 FATALITIES. 20 CASUALTIES. LANE CLOSURES, DELAYS DISRUPTION	H	Police	Highways Agency (initial warning) + all other Cat 1 responders	DFT	Media arrangements + motorway gantry signs	Media arrangements + motorway gantry signs		To be decided
RAILWAY ACCIDENT	UP TO 30 FATALITIES. 100 CASUALTIES. LOSS OF FREIGHT. DELAYS. . DISRUPTION	M	BTP	All other Cat 1 responders + Network Rail and Train Operating Companies	DFT	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
RTC INVOLVING HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES	UP TO 30 FATALITIES. 500 CASUALTIES (BASED ON GASEOUS CHEMICAL INVOLVEMENT)	M	Police	Highways Agency (initial warning) + all other Cat 1 responders + tanker operating company + HSE	DFT	Media arrangements + motorway gantry signs	Media arrangements + motorway gantry signs		To be decided
MARITIME ACCIDENT OR DELIBERATE BLOCKADE OF PORT	FATALITIES. INJURIES (ONLY IF HAZ SUBS ARE INVOLVED)	M	MCA	All other Cat 1 responders	DFT	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided

RTC INVOLVING TRANSPORT OF HAZ SUBS/EXPLOSIVES	UP TO 30 FATALITIES. 20 CASUALTIES. AFFECTING 1 KM RADIUS. 30 TONNES OF PRODUCT LOST. DELAYS, DISRUPTION, POLLUTION	M	Police	Highways Agency (initial warning) + all other Cat 1 responders + tanker operating company / haulage company + HSE	DFT	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Severe Weather</b>									
STORMS AND GALES	STORM FORCE WINDS FOR 6 HOURS AFFECTING MOST OF THE COUNTRY	M	Met Office	All other Cat 1 responders	Met office	Early warning from the national severe weather warning service and media arrangements	Early warning from the national severe weather warning service and media arrangements		To be decided
LOW TEMPERATURES AND HEAVY SNOW	SNOW LYING OVER MOST OF THE COUNTRY FOR 1 MONTH. 7 DAYS AT -3 CELSIUS	H	Met Office	All other Cat 1 responders	Met office	Early warning from the national severe weather warning service and media arrangements	Early warning from the national severe weather warning service and media arrangements		To be decided
HEAT WAVE	DAILY TEMPS ABOVE 32 CELSIUS. MINIMUM 15 CELSIUS FOR 5 DAYS.	H	Met Office	All other Cat 1 responders (especially HPA)	Met office	Heat health watch and media arrangements	Heat health watch and media arrangements		To be decided
FLOODING: MAJOR COASTAL/TIDAL	SEA SURGE, HIGH WINDS, SPRING TIDE, HEAVY RAINFALL. AFFECTING 10000 PROPERTIES FOR 7 DAYS. FATALITIES, STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ECONOMIC IMPACT	M	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements		To be decided
FLOODING- MAJOR FLUVIAL	SINGLE LARGE URBAN AREAS. FLOOD DEFENCE FAILURE. LIFE RISK, LOW RESPONSE TIME. 10000 PROPERTIES AFFECTED FOR 7-21	M	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements		To be decided

	DAYS.								
FLOODING-MAJOR FLUVIAL	SUSTAINED PERIOD OF HEAVY RAIN FOR TWO WEEKS. RISING RIVER LEVELS OVER ALL REGIONS. 10000 PROPERTIES AFFECTED FOR 7 TO 21 DAYS. RISK TO LIFE. IMPACT ON ROADS AND RAIL.	H	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements		To be decided
MAJOR LOCAL COASTAL/TIDAL FLOODING	SEA SURGE, HIGH WINDS, SPRING TIDE, HEAVY RAINFALL. AFFECTING 1000-10000. FAILURE OF DEFENCES. AFFECTING PROPERTIES, STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ECONOMIC IMPACT. TRANSPORT DISRUPTION FOR 1-3 DAYS	H	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements		To be decided
LOCALISED COASTAL/TIDAL FLOODING	SEA SURGE, HIGH TIDES, GALE FORCE WINDS AFFECTING ONE REGION. SOME DEFENCE FAILURES. 1000 PROPERTIES AFFECTED. TRANSPORT DISRUPTION FOR 1-3 DAYS	H	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements		To be decided

MAJOR LOCAL FLUVIAL FLOODING	2 WEEKS HEAVY RAIN. RISING RIVER LEVELS. LOCALISED FLOODING OF 1000-100000 PROPERTIES. TRANSPORT DISRUPTION	H	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements		To be decided
MAJOR LOCAL FLUVIAL FLOODING	2 WEEKS HEAVY RAIN. RISING RIVER LEVELS. LOCALISED FLOODING OF 100-1000 PROPERTIES. TRANSPORT DISRUPTION	H	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements	Floodline warnings direct and media arrangements		To be decided
LOCAL FLUVIAL FLOODING (FLASH FLOODS)	HEAVY RAINFALL LEADING TO FLASH FLOODING. NO FLOOD DEFENCES IN PLACE. NO WARNING SERVICE. 200 PROPERTIES AFFECTED	H	EA	All other Cat 1 responders	EA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Structural</b>									
LAND MOVEMENT (TREMORS, LANDSLIDES)	ROADS IMPASSABLE FOR A TIME. DIFFICULT EMERGENCY ACCESS. CONGESTION OVER A WIDE AREA. LOSS OF UTILITIES. TRAPPED OR MISSING PERSONS. 5 FATALITIES	VH	Police	All other Cat 1 responders + long term problems (local authority or owner / responsible body)	To be resolved	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
BUILDING COLLAPSE	PERSONS TRAPPED OR MISSING. LOSS OF UTILITIES. LOCAL ACCESS/EGRESS DIFFICULTIES. UP TO 5 FATALITIES	VH	Police	All other Cat 1 responders + long term problems (local authority or owner / responsible body)	To be resolved	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided

BRIDGE COLLAPSE	ROADS AND ACCESS ROUTES IMPASSABLE. SEVERE CONGESTION. RESTRICTED/ DIFFICULTY EMERGENCY ACCESS. PERSONS TRAPPED OR MISSING	M	Police	All other Cat 1 responders + long term problems (local authority or owner / responsible body)	To be resolved	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
MAJOR RESERVOIR DAM FAILURE	DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE TO 200 DOWNSTREAM PROPERTIES. SEVERAL THOUSAND FLOODED. UP TO 50/60 KM AFFECTED DISTANCE, DEPENDING ON TOPOGRAPHY. UP TO 2000 FATALITIES DEPENDING ON WARNING TIME/EVACUATION	H	Police	All other Cat 1 responders + long term problems (EA / United Utilities)	To be resolved	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Human Health</b>									
INFLUENZA TYPE DISEASE- EPEDEMIC	SERIOUS EPEDEMIC-NOT JUST SEASONAL. 400 PER 100K OF POPULATION AT PEAK	H	HPA	All other Cat 1 responders	DOH	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
INFLUENZA TYPE DISEASE- PANDEMIC	PANDEMIC IN TWO WAVES, 3-9 MONTHS APART AT 12 WEEKS EACH DURATION. QUARTER OF POPULATION AFFECTED. 500 OF 100K CONSULTATIONS PER WEEK OVERWHELMING HEALTH SERVICES. CLINICAL ATTACK RATE OF 25% WITH	VH	HPA	All other Cat 1 responders	DOH	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided

	MORTALITY OF 1-3% OF THOSE INFECTED.								
SARS TYPE DISEASE	250-2000 CASUALTIES	M	HPA	All other Cat 1 responders	DOH	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
LEGIONELLA / MENINGITIS OUTBREAK	LOCALISED WITH UP TO 10 FATALITIES / 50 CASUALTIES	H	HPA	All other Cat 1 responders (especially local authorities)	DOH	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Animal Health</b>									
NON-ZOONOTIC NOTIFIABLE DISEASES (FMD, SWINE FEVER ETC)	SLAUGHTER OF 4 MILLION AFFECTED AND EXPOSED LIVESTOCK PLUS CULLING. BIRDS COULD BE UP TO 120 MILION CULLED. OUTBREAK UP TO 6-18 MONTHS	M	Local Authority	All other Cat 1 responders + DEFRA + SVS	DEFRA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
ZOONOTIC NOTIFIABLE DISEASES (AVIAN FLU, RABIES, WEST NILE VIRUS)	CULLING OF 120 MILLION POULTRY OR EUTHANASIA OF 20 COMPANION ANIMALS. SLAUGHTER OF 20-1000 HORSES	M	Local Authority	All other Cat 1 responders + DEFRA + SVS	DEFRA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Public Protest</b>									
LARGE SCALE PUBLIC PROTEST	10K OF HIGHLY MOTIVATED PROTESTERS INC HARD CORE OF 2K, CAUSING DAMAGE AND REQUIRING NATIONAL POLICE RESPONSE	M	Police	All other Cat 1 responders	Home Office	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided



TARGETTED DISRUPTIVE PROTEST	NATIONAL COORDINATED EVENT THAT COULD GENERATE SHORTAGE OF ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES FOR 1 WEK	H	Police	All other Cat 1 responders	Home Office	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Industrial Technical Failure</b>									
TECH FAILURE OF UPSTREAM GAS/OIL NETWORK LEADING TO DISRUPTION IN PRODUCTION	TECH FAILURE LEADING TO CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT. 6 MONTHS TO RESTORE NORMAL WORKING. 5-30% LOSS OF SUPPLY LEADING TO CUTS, DISCONNECTION, AFFECTING GENERATION OF POWER SUPPLIES	H	Network Provider	All Cat 1 responders	DTI	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
ACCIDENTAL FAILURE AT WATER TREATMENT WOKS	10-50K WITHOUT PIPED WATER FOR 3 DAYS	M	United Utilities	All Cat 1 responders	DEFRA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
NO NOTICE FAILURE OF PUBLIC TELEPHONY PROVIDER	LOSS OF SERVICE FOR 100K PEOPLE FOR 5 HOURS	M	Network Provider	All Cat 1 responders	CSIA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
TECHNICAL FAILURE OF ELECTRICITY NETWORK	TOTAL SHUTDOWN OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY FOR WHOLE OF MAINLAND UK FOR 24 HOURS	M	Network Provider	All Cat 1 responders	DTI	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
TELECOMMUNIC ATION INFRASTRUCTU RE-HUMAN EROR	LOSS OF TELECOMMS FOR 5 DAYS	H	Network Provider	All Cat 1 responders	CSIA	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided

TECHNICAL FAILURE OF ELECTRICITY NETWORK	TOTAL SHUTDOWN OF SUPPLY OVER A REGION FOR 24 HOURS	H	Network Provider	All Cat 1 responders	DTI	Media arrangements	Media arrangements		To be decided
<b>Terrorist Incidents</b>									