COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 12 November 2009

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REV 1

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"I/A" ITEM NOTE

From: General Secretariat
To: Coreper/Council
No. prev. doc.: 11513/3/09 REV 3, 14988/09, 14859/1/09 REV 1, 14862/1/09 REV 1
Subject: Council conclusions on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security in the European Union - an EU CBRN Action Plan - Adoption
1. On 24 June 2009 the Commission adopted its communication on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security in the European Union - an EU CBRN Action Plan\(^1\), which was based on the findings of a CBRN Task Force established by the Commission in February 2008, involving both public and private stakeholders, as well as on the results of its closing seminar, held in Prague, Czech Republic in January 2009.

2. The overall goal of the above policy package is an all-hazard approach to reduce the threat of and damage from CBRN incidents of accidental, natural or intentional origin, including acts of terrorism.

3. The draft EU CBRN Action Plan, including a suggested preamble, and a set of draft Council conclusions, were examined by the Working Party on Civil Protection with the participation of CBRN experts at its meetings on 7-8 July, 16 September, 2 and 14 October. On 4 November 2009 the Working Party reached agreement on the text set out in the Annex\(^2\).

4. On this basis, the Permanent Representatives Committee is asked to invite the Council to adopt the conclusions and to approve the EU CBRN Action Plan set out in the Annex as an "A" item on the agenda of a forthcoming meeting.

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\(^2\) The Danish delegation entered a parliamentary scrutiny reservation.
COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security in the European Union - an EU CBRN Action Plan

1. **Acknowledging** that chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials are produced, transported and handled under many different circumstances, posing a risk to society; while so far major incidents involving CBRN materials, including terrorist acts, have been relatively few, the consequences of such an incident could be devastating;

2. **Noting** that the EU as well as the Member States have taken numerous measures to protect the population against the risks and threats of CBRN incidents of an accidental, natural or intentional origin;

3. **Noting** that it is primarily Member States' responsibility to protect the population against CBRN incidents and that initiatives at the EU level should be taken in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as be guided by the principle of solidarity;

4. **Considering** that any new EU measures in this field should be based on risk and threat assessments as well as a cost-benefit assessment, should draw upon existing work, avoid duplications and provide an added value for the Member States, while ensuring a coherent and consistent approach to security cooperation;

5. **Acknowledging** that counter-terrorism activities must be conducted with full respect for international law, including human rights and the principle of the rule of law; confidentiality of certain types of information should be duly taken into account;
6. **Recalling** that Member States and third countries facing CBRN incidents that overwhelm their national response capability can, at any time, request the activation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism\(^3\) to pool immediate civil protection and medical assistance available in Member States;

7. **Recalling** that on 20 December 2002 the Council and the Commission jointly adopted their programme to improve cooperation in the European Union for preventing and limiting the consequences of CBRN terrorist threats (CBRN Programme)\(^4\); **recalling**, in particular, the EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, created shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001;

8. **Recalling** that tackling terrorist access to weapons and explosives, ranging from components for homemade explosives to CBRN material, is a key priority under the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by Council on 1 December 2005\(^5\) and under the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003\(^6\);

9. **Recalling** that in its conclusions of 22 February 2007 on the Health Security Committee\(^7\) the Council extended the HSC's terms of reference to pandemic influenza and generic preparedness and response planning in addition to its competence in the field of CBRN, and that in its conclusions of 16 December 2008 on health security\(^8\) the Council emphasised the necessity to improve and strengthen the coordination of responses to CBRN threats;

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\(^4\) 14627/02.

\(^5\) 14469/4/05 REV 4, paragraphs 20 and 31.

\(^6\) 15708/03.

\(^7\) 5862/07 + COR 1.

\(^8\) 16515/08 + COR 1.
10. **Recalling** that the Council conclusions of 12 June 2007\(^9\) on preparedness for decontamination of casualties following CBRN incidents, invite countries participating in the civil protection mechanism to develop close cooperation, in particular in cross-border interventions with neighbouring countries, in order to facilitate mutual assistance and cooperation within the mechanism. **Stressing** to that end the need for joint exercises, in particular for mass decontamination and the decontamination of casualties;

11. **Recalling** that the Commission's green paper on bio-preparedness of July 2007\(^10\) increased the awareness of CBRN risks and threats and launched a process of consultation at European level on how to reduce biological risks and enhance preparedness and response, based on an all-hazards approach, targeting risks deriving from natural disasters and accidents, while giving priority to the terrorist threat; **and recalling** that the Council conclusions of 6 December 2007\(^11\) on CBRN risks and on bio-preparedness show the way forward for an all-hazard approach on how to address CBRN risks of natural or man-made origin, in particular those stemming from the terrorist threat;

12. **Having regard to** the inventory of EU CBRN instruments relevant for addressing prevention, preparedness and response to biological risks existing in the areas of human health, including occupational health and safety, animal and plant health, police, research, environment and civil protection, noted by the Council in June 2008\(^12\);

13. **Recalling** that Council Conclusions of 27 November 2008\(^13\) on the creation of a CBRN database invited EUROPOL to create a European CBRN database in which to gather and centralise technical information on CBRN terrorism-related events and CBRN products and materials which may be used with malicious intent;

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\(^9\) 10015/07.  
\(^11\) 16589/07.  
\(^12\) 10382/08.  
\(^13\) 15294/2/08 REV 2.
14. **Recalling** the obligations under various international agreements and treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the need to work with partners and international organisations on the non-proliferation of CBRN materials, as highlighted by the abovementioned EU strategies;

15. **Recalling** that an extensive framework has already been developed in the health sector, and that existing information exchange mechanisms, such as the EWRS\(^{14}\), RAS BICHAT, the RASFF\(^{15}\) and ECURIE\(^{16}\), will play an important role in the implementation of the health-related measures of the Action Plan;

16. **Recalling** the work of the CBRN Task Force launched in February 2008, with a view to preparing a list of measures that could be undertaken at EU level and in the Member States in order to lower the risks of terrorist acts using CBRN materials\(^{17}\); and **considering** the outcome of the conference "Enhancing CBRN security", held in Prague, the Czech Republic, on 29 and 30 January 2009 and the report of the CBRN Task Force;


\(^{16}\) Council Decision 87/600/Euratom of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency, OJ L 371, 30/12/1987, p. 76.

\(^{17}\) The final report of the Task Force was presented on 13 January 2009.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:

17. **WELCOMES** the Commission communication on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan\(^\text{18}\) containing actions concerning prevention, detection, preparedness and response, supported by horizontal measures in the context of high-risk CBRN materials;

18. **SUPPORTS** the overall goal of the CBRN communication to reduce the threat and possible consequences arising from CBRN incidents for the citizens of the EU, by means of a coherent, prioritised EU CBRN Action Plan;

19. **APPROVES** the EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Action Plan as set out in the Annex;

20. **CALLS ON** the Commission and the Member States to undertake the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan in order to enhance preventive, detection and response measures in the field of CBRN threats and risks, giving special attention to the implementation of the key actions identified in the Action Plan;

21. **SUPPORTS** the Commission's intention to establish a CBRN Advisory Group and sub-groups, bringing together state representatives, technical experts and relevant stakeholders, including, where appropriate, the private sector, in order to take the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan forward;

22. **ENCOURAGES** the Member States and the Commission to promote an enhanced security culture *inter alia* by:

- focusing on the enhancement of knowledge in Member States in the field of CBRN security by way of improved risk assessments, research, the exchange of best practices and joint training and exercises;

- contributing to an adequate perception of the risks associated with CBRN materials by disseminating experience and knowledge to relevant stakeholders such as public authorities, first responders, researchers, the general public, security managers and staff;

23. **WELCOMES** the Commission's intention to launch an EU CBRN Resilience Programme, bringing together the various civil protection activities included in the EU CBRN Action Plan and ensuring a consolidated contribution to the overall implementation of this Action Plan;

24. **INVITES** the Commission to report back to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan and to submit a comprehensive progress report for the first time by the end of 2011 and calls on the Member States to assist the Commission in this task through providing the necessary information on implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan at the national level.
EU CBRN Action Plan

The EU CBRN Action Plan is aimed at strengthening CBRN security in the European Union. Its overall goal is to reduce the threat and damage from CBRN incidents of accidental, natural and intentional origin. The EU CBRN Action Plan is broadly based on an all-hazard approach, including terrorist threats, and contributes to the implementation of the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy. The Action Plan constitutes a political commitment, which may be seen as a roadmap of intentions for the coming years.

The implementation of the actions in the EU CBRN Action Plan should be guided by the following principles:

- While it is first and foremost the responsibility of each Member State to protect its population against CBRN incidents, initiatives at the EU level should be guided by the principle of EU solidarity;

- Whereas the European Union can provide added value and support projects across the EU, and in general terms ensure a coherent and consistent approach to cooperation on this issue between the Member States, the European Union's supportive role in this area should be in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, giving preference where possible to non-legislative solutions;

- In order to avoid duplication, any new EU measures in this field should be coherent with and based on the existing national and international regulations and draw upon existing work in other relevant international organisations;

- Policies established by the Action Plan to address CBRN risks should be further developed in close consultation with national authorities and, where appropriate, in consultation with the private sector, academic institutions and other relevant stakeholders;

19 14469/4/05 REV4.
• Action to address the CBRN threat should be based on risk- and threat assessments and on cost-benefit assessments, in order to ensure that the measures taken are relevant and effective;

• The confidentiality of certain types of information should be duly taken into account during the implementation phase of the CBRN Action Plan;

• Action to address the CBRN threat should be conducted with full respect for international law, including human rights and the principle of the rule of law;

• The implementation of the actions included in the EU CBRN Action Plan will be financially supported through existing Community programmes and instruments, which include the Programmes: "Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related risks"\textsuperscript{20}, and "Prevention of and Fight against Crime"\textsuperscript{21}, as well as the Civil Protection Financial Instrument\textsuperscript{22}, and the Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities\textsuperscript{23} (in particular the Security Research theme). Moreover, the EU Health Programme 2008-2013 will continue to support the work of the Health Security Committee and actions on preparedness and response to CBRN threats to public health;

• There is a clear difference between environmental detection activities and human diagnostic activities. These distinct activities necessitate the involvement of specialists with a different profile.

\textsuperscript{20} OJ L 58, 24.2.2007, p. 1–6.
\textsuperscript{21} OJ L 58, 24.2.2007, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{22} OJ L 71, 10.3.2007, p. 9.
EU CBRN Action Plan

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1. PREVENTION

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<th>Radiological-Nuclear (RN)</th>
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**Goal 1: Develop EU lists of high-risk CBRN materials and risk-based approaches to security**

**Action H.1**

The Member States together with the Commission should establish and regularly update EU lists of:

- high-risk chemical agents;
- high risk biological agents and toxins;
- high-risk radioactive sources;
- of special security concern.

The lists should be developed through a joint effort involving various actors, with scientific and security expertise from the Member States, the Commission Europol, Eurojust and relevant international organisations. These lists should be based on a risk assessment analysis and should take account of existing relevant lists, including those developed by other international organisations. The work should include an agreement on the criteria and method to be used for establishing and applying such lists, including quantitative thresholds where appropriate.

This process should include the following steps:

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24 Although reference is made to CBRN materials throughout this Action Plan, nuclear materials are for the most part well-covered by existing regulations. This will be duly taken into account in the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemical (C)</th>
<th>Biological (B)</th>
<th>Radiological-Nuclear (RN)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• identifying and analysing relevant CBRN materials,</td>
<td>• assessing its potential for being used for malicious purposes and the possible impact;</td>
<td>• selecting the most dangerous materials in terms of their potential for being used for malicious purposes;</td>
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<td>• assessing its vulnerability in terms of theft/loss (ease of obtaining it).</td>
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**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies  
**Implementation period:** KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 1, 82, 83, 167**

**Action H.2**

The Commission should:

• establish fora for EU level dialogue between relevant authorities in the field of CBRN risk-management in order to take cross-border threats fully into account in national and EU planning processes. This should allow the attainment of a common understanding among the Member States and the Commission of the risks faced by the entire EU.

• facilitate the exchange of best-practices concerning CBRN risk-management by organising regional/EU level meetings and channelling funding toward the development/identification/implementation of suitable methodologies.

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 2, 88, 168, 169**
Goal 2: Enhance the security of high risk CBRN materials and facilities

Action H.3

The Member States together with the Commission should develop criteria on assessing security arrangements at high-risk CBRN facilities.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*

*Implementation period: 2011-2015*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 41, 99, 173*

Action H.4

The Member States should:

- work towards a clear definition of the responsibilities of the operator and the State in terms of security of high-risk facilities;
- ensure that local law enforcement authorities and other relevant security agencies possess information on high-risk CBRN facilities in their area.

*Involved actors: MS*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 35, 38*
### Action H.5

The Commission should launch studies on:

- the applicability of existing safety provisions to enhancing CBRN security;
- training requirements for inspection and enforcement entities, so that they can provide the highest possible levels of relevant CBRN security expertise.

**Involved actors: Commission**  
**Implementation period:** 2011  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 36, 40**

### Action C.1

The Member States should encourage relevant authorities to engage in dialogue with the relevant site security managers and to advise operators on the necessary levels of security. Member States should encourage the establishment of trusted relationships between security managers and law enforcement counterparts.

**Involved actors:** MS  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 39**

### Action B.1

The Commission should assist the Member States in the proper implementation of applicable procedures at "the laboratory bench level" and in developing mechanisms for assessing and monitoring its correct implementation.

**Involved actors:** Commission/MS  
**Implementation period:** Ongoing  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 89**

### Action RN.1

The Member States should ensure that law-enforcement authorities keep the operators of facilities in which high-risk radioactive sources are present informed on a need-to-know basis about potential threats. If no system exists, each Member State should consider establishing a communication mechanism in order to quickly transfer security related information to security managers in facilities in which high-risk radioactive sources are handled.

**Involved actors:** MS
### Action C.2

The Member States should take all appropriate measures to ensure that security plans/security management systems are in place in high-risk chemical facilities. The security plans should provide for graduated levels of security based on the existing threat level or situation. Relevant authorities of a Member State should be involved in assessing whether these security plans satisfy the necessary level of protection requirements. Security plans/security management systems should be integrated into the existing safety documents of the establishment.

*Involved actors: MS*
*Implementation period: from 2010*
*Task Force Recommendation No. 34*

### Action B.2

The Member States should establish:

- a registry of facilities possessing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins within each Member State while allowing access to law enforcement, taking security requirements into account;
- a process to verify whether security arrangements of facilities are adequate, including diagnostic laboratories handling and possessing any of the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins;
- a mechanism within facilities storing biological agents and toxins on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins to regularly review the need of such biological agents and toxins while keeping a good record of stored materials.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders*
*Implementation period: from 2010-2014*
*Task Force Recommendations No. 98, 100, 104*

### Action RN.2

The Member States together with the Commission should analyse potential gaps and, if needed, propose solutions with regard to security requirements for facilities in which certain high-risk sources are manufactured and/or disposed of (and which are located outside of nuclear facilities).

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*
*Implementation period: 2011-2015*
*Task Force Recommendation No. 171*
<table>
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<th>Action B.3</th>
<th>Action RN.3</th>
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| The Commission together with the Member States should support:  
- a process whereby facilities (clinical, diagnostic, university, etc) would avoid keeping clinical samples containing any of substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins unnecessarily;  
- the identification and development of good practices on handling clinical samples containing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins;  
- progress in creating collaborative networks of facilities working on substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins while taking into account existing networks.  
*Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders*  
*Implementation period: 2011-2015*  
*Task Force Recommendations No. 102-103* |
| The Member States together with the Commission should conduct an analysis of the feasibility of linking security vetting/background check requirements to existing licensing systems used to authorise the handling of high-risk radioactive sources.  
*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*  
*Implementation period: 2011-2015*  
*Task Force Recommendation No. 186* |
Action C.3

The Member States together with the Commission should encourage the chemical industry to develop and implement the security side of the Responsible Care programme.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*
*Implementation period: 2011-2015*
*Task Force Recommendation No. 32*

Action B.4

The Commission together with the Member States should take relevant steps so that:

- a comprehensive overview of the relevant regulations or standards at hand and their relevance to biosecurity and biosafety is achieved;

- facilities possessing substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins consider as appropriate the implementation of the CEN\(^\text{25}\) Workshop Agreement (CWA 15793), WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance or their national equivalent standards - unless equal or more stringent national regulations have to be considered;

- appropriate national regulations or standards are met as part of a national authorisation or accreditation process or as a condition for issuing licences for work with substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins. Regular control over the adherence to and implementation of such regulations or standards

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\(^{25}\) European Committee for Standardisation.
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<th>Action C.4</th>
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<td>The Member States together with the Commission should develop a strategic approach to high-risk chemical facility security which identifies key objectives and steps to be taken in order to increase security, based on national risk assessment approaches.</td>
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<td><strong>Involved actors:</strong> MS/Commission/EU agencies</td>
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<td><strong>Implementation period:</strong> 2011-2015</td>
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<td><strong>Task Force Recommendation No. 37</strong></td>
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<td>The Member States together with the Commission should encourage industry to replace, where possible, the use of high-risk chemicals with suitable lower-risk alternates and to reduce the transport of high-risk chemicals where this is economically and technically viable.</td>
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**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/relevant stakeholder

**Implementation period:** Ongoing

**Task Force Recommendations No. 117, 119**
Action C.6

The Commission should bring together the relevant security authorities from the Member States in order to identify good practices concerning the security of high-risk chemical facilities. Based on this work, the Commission should develop a good practice document addressing such issues as:

- the responsibility of an authority to assess the security measures in place for various types of materials;
- varying levels of security measures adapted to the risk posed by particular chemical agents, amounts of certain materials or combinations of materials, including background checks for personnel, physical security measures and information security.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies
Implementation period: 2011
Task Force Recommendation No. 3
### Goal 3: Enhance control over high risk CBRN materials

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<th>Action C.7</th>
<th>Action RN.4</th>
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| Member States together with the Commission should make sure that where this does not take place already today, the chemical industry ensures that in line with international obligations, high-risk chemicals and equipment are only delivered to legitimate users. An appropriate customer qualification scheme should be established in this regard, which is proportionate to the risk and cost effective. The risks associated with trade of chemicals over the Internet should be investigated further.  

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*  
*Implementation period: from 2010-2012*  
*Task Force Recommendation No. 4* | The Member States should ensure that national source registries contain comprehensive information on all high-risk sources and their holders.  

*Involved actors: MS*  
*Implementation period: 2010-2015*  
*Task Force Recommendation No. 170* |
| Action RN.5 | The Commission together with the Member States should encourage users of high-risk radiological materials and other relevant stakeholders to follow best practice (e.g. on usage, transport, storage and disposal), on the basis of existing regulations, and where possible, replace high risk radiological materials with suitable alternatives.  
*Involved actors: Commission/MS* |
| Action C.8 | Member States together with the Commission should assess the benefits of establishing and if needed should consider creating a licensing scheme for certain high-risk chemicals (in particular for certain CWA\(^26\) precursors) similar to that existing for certain scheduled substances in the framework of the Drug Precursors Regulation. For chemicals covered by the CWC\(^27\) and the Australia Group, the CWC licensing scheme should be considered as meeting some or all of the set-out objectives. Appropriate |
| Action RN.6 | The Member States should, wherever possible, launch recovery programmes for disused high-risk sources. The launch of a source recovery programme could be coupled with the creation of a source exchange system among the Member States, so that recovered sources can be made available to those States that need them (rather than manufacturing new sources).  
*Involved actors: MS* |

\(^26\) Chemical Warfare Agents.  
\(^27\) Chemical Weapons Convention.
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<th>Action C.9</th>
<th>Action RN.7</th>
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<td>The Commission should perform a feasibility assessment on the possibility of using the delivery documentation mechanism to better understand and monitor the supply chain (possibly link it to tracking and tracing).</td>
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<td>Involved actors: Commission</td>
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<td>Task Force Recommendation No. 9</td>
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<td>Action RN.7</td>
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<td>The Member States together with the Commission should assess the potential and practicalities of establishing tracking systems for high-risk sources (e.g. user-accessible web-based systems; electronic tagging of sources), including a cost-benefit analysis.</td>
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<td>Involved actors: MS/Commission</td>
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<td>Task Force Recommendation No. 174</td>
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<td>Involved actors: Commission</td>
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<th>Action RN.8</th>
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<td>The Commission together with the Member States should launch studies on the causes and consequences of the loss of control over radioactive sources, on the current status of used and disused sources in the EU and on transport patterns for legal uses of radioactive sources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Involved actors: Commission</td>
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<td>Implementation period: 2010-2015</td>
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<td>The Commission should facilitate the exchange of experience on successful strategies concerning the detection and recovery of orphan sources (article 9 of the HASS Directive).</td>
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<td>Involved actors: Commission</td>
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### Implementation period: 2010-2015

**Task Force Recommendation No. 177**

**Action RN.10**

Europol, taking account of the studies already carried out, should lead an analysis of losses, thefts and other relevant criminal activities related to high-risk sources in the EU. This analysis should take due account of the nature of these particular incidents and the nature of the actual sources, including orphan sources. The analysis should also focus on the question whether and to which extent a black market for radioactive materials exists inside or outside Europe. It could be carried out in cooperation with the IAEA\(^{29}\), Interpol and other relevant authorities. It should be made available to the relevant national authorities and reviewed regularly.

*Involved actors: Europol/MS/Commission*

**Implementation period: from 2010**

**Task Force Recommendation No. 199**

\(^{29}\) International Atomic Energy Agency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Goal 4: Contribute to the development of a high security culture of staff</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action H.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should identify, develop and spread good practices in security training and education in order to raise awareness of appropriate protection procedures related to persons working with/having access to or handling high-risk CBRN materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration should also be given to developing EU guidelines for minimum security training requirements for persons working with, having access to, or handling such materials, based on the national experience across the EU 27. This could be done by way of a peer review process through which experts from the Member States would visit each other with a view to learning from their experience and exchanging best practices in specific fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Force Recommendations No. 26, 189</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action H.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Member States should develop and encourage the implementation of specific training programmes for private security staff who may encounter high risk CBRN materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies/private security companies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation period: from 2010</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Force Recommendations No. 29, 190</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Action H.8

The Member States together with the Commission should:

- engage with research stakeholders to raise awareness of security issues and facilitate the exchange of good practices on dealing with security threats;
- implement, where appropriate, specific security training for staff in industry and research, where high risk CBRN materials are present.

This work should lead to an increased security culture within research and industry.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 27, 207*

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Action C.11

The Member States together with the Commission should encourage the chemical industry to develop and to adopt codes of conduct concerning awareness of security-related issues.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 30*

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Action B.5

The Commission together with the Member States should encourage professional and other relevant associations working on bio-issues to develop and adopt codes of conduct for their Members.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*

*Implementation period: ongoing*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 95*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action B.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should define requirements for biosafety officers (roles, competences and training).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors:</strong> MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation period:</strong> 2010-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Force Recommendation No. 121</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Goal 5: Improve the identification and reporting of suspicious transactions and behaviour

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action H.9</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member States together with the Commission should:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• identify and exchange good practices on the reporting of suspicious transactions in relation to high risk CBRN materials used by private and public entities within the EU (e.g. industry, medical sector, research);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• establish modalities for reporting loss or suspicious transactions while enhancing awareness of relevant stakeholders about suspicious transactions and urge stakeholders to report such transactions to law-enforcement authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies/relevant stakeholders  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 7, 96-97, 195**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action H.10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member States together with the Commission should develop guidelines for the industry, the medical sector and the research community containing criteria identifying the forms of behaviour, in relation to transactions, which may give rise to suspicion. Member State authorities should provide guidance to stakeholders on what suspicious transactions are.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies/relevant stakeholders  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 6, 196**
Goal 6: Enhance the security of transport

Action H.11

The Commission should organise workshops on transport security with regard to CBRN materials. These workshops should bring together experts from the transport sector and other relevant sectors, the security services, law enforcement and supervisory authorities. The workshops should address the following issues:

- assess whether existing transport security rules fully cover all CBRN materials;
- identify and exchange good practices in the Member States concerning the transport of CBRN materials (e.g. limited quantities in one transport; or tracking systems);
- assess the need for developing tracking and tracing systems for the transport of CBRN materials;
- identify and exchange good practices concerning the implementation of current ADR\(^{30}\), RID\(^{31}\), ADN\(^{32}\) and IMDG Code\(^{33}\) requirements such as the development of security plans;
- identify security requirements for logistics enterprises for the transport of high-risk CBRN materials;
- consider the implications of a notification system for the international transport of high risk CBRN materials;
- consider the implications and costs/benefits of introducing a requirement that only licensed transporters would be used for the transport of high risk CBRN materials. These licensed transporters would be obliged to follow agreed minimum security requirements;
- assess the possible negative impact of strict requirements for transport on transporters of high risk substances and examine potential remedies.

This work should feed into existing processes such as the UNECE\(^{34}\)-OTIF\(^{35}\) Joint Meeting.

\(^{30}\) European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road.
\(^{31}\) European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail.
\(^{32}\) European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways.
\(^{33}\) International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (developed as a uniform international code for the transport of dangerous goods by sea, covering such matters as packing, container traffic and stowage, with particular reference to the segregation of incompatible substances).
\(^{34}\) United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies
Implementation period: 2011-2015
Task Force Recommendations No. 43, 115, 180

Action H.12

The Member States together with the Commission should encourage that links between law enforcement authorities, other relevant national security agencies and supervisory authorities and transporters of CBRN materials are enhanced.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies
Implementation period: 2011-2015
Task Force Recommendations No. 44, 110

Action H.13

The Member States should ensure that the training of transport staff concerning existing legislative requirements on the security of CBRN materials is improved where appropriate. CBRN exercises conducted by Member States should take matters of transport security into account.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies
Implementation period: 2011-2015
Task Force Recommendations No. 116, 179

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35 Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action B.7</th>
<th>Action RN.11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Commission together with the Member States should initiate the creation of an EU capability and mechanism to rapidly and safely transport biological samples, in accordance with international regulations.</td>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should assess the feasibility and potential costs/benefits of creating an electronic system for the control of cross-border transfers of high-risk radioactive sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors:</strong> MS/Commission</td>
<td><strong>Involved actors:</strong> MS/Commission/EU agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation period:</strong> 2010-2014</td>
<td><strong>Implementation period:</strong> 2011-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Force Recommendation No. 142</strong></td>
<td><strong>Task Force Recommendation No. 181</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th>Action RN.12</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Commission should launch a study analysing whether (and how) all radioactive sources, and especially those identified as high-risk, are covered by existing legal regimes concerning transport. Depending on the outcome of the analysis mentioned above, the need for new transport rules in relation to high-risk sources should be assessed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors:</strong> Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation period:</strong> 2011-2015</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Task Force Recommendation No. 182</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Goal 7: Improve information exchange

**Action H.14**

The Member States should analyse whether potential problem areas exist in the horizontal and vertical flow of information among the entities dealing with high-risk CBRN materials both within and across the individual Member States. Each Member State should assess whether relevant need-to-know information on actual threats reaches its license holders.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: 2010-2011*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 13, 193*

**Action H.15**

The Member States should ensure that each party within the supply chain informs without delay the relevant national authorities in the event of theft or loss of high-risk CBRN materials. The relevant national authorities should inform without delay the relevant law enforcement and supervisory authorities responsible for gathering and responding to this information where this has not already been done by the party concerned within the supply chain.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: 2011-2012*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 17, 197*
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Action H.16</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States should ensure a high level of information exchange between relevant actors by having a clearly established notification mechanism which would allow anyone to inform the relevant authorities about a loss/theft of high-risk CBRN materials or about a suspicious transaction. As a minimum requirement, facility security managers should have the necessary contact information for relevant local law enforcement authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies/relevant stakeholders  
**Implementation period:** 2011-2012  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 18, 198**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action H.17</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should encourage public authorities to provide, as appropriate, adequate security information to the entire supply chain of high-risk CBRN materials, first responders (police, fire-departments, medical services, other special units as needed) and educational establishments to focus attention on issues of concern.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies/relevant stakeholders  
**Implementation period:** 2010-2012  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 14, 245**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action H.18</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States and the Commission should consider establishing a mechanism in order to quickly transfer security related information to security managers in facilities in which high-risk CBRN materials are present.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Task Force Recommendation No. 15

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies/relevant stakeholders  
**Implementation period:** 2011-2012  
**Action RN.13**

The Commission should analyse whether existing systems, in particular the IAEA’s ITDB\(^{36}\), provide sufficient information for the users of the system. Europol should be closely involved in this analysis. If the analysis leads to the identification of gaps, further feasibility work should be conducted on the ways of addressing these gaps. This work should include considering the possibilities of the European CBRN database to address these gaps.

**Involved actors:** Commission/EU bodies and agencies  
**Implementation period:** KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 204**

\(^{36}\) Illicit Trafficking Database.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action RN.14</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should support the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database with a view to ensuring real time accessibility for law enforcement authorities, ensuring the highest possible quality of the recorded data. Enhanced EU cooperation in this area should lead to making sure that all relevant losses and recoveries of radioactive sources are reported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies/relevant stakeholders*

*Implementation period: 2010-2011*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 205*
## Goal 8: Strengthen the import/export regime

### Action H.19

The Member States together with the Commission should ensure consistent application of the existing regulations with respect to the import-export regime for high-risk CBRN materials.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders*

### Action RN.15

The Commission should assess the need to address the issue of import/export rules in relation to potential high-risk sources not covered by the HASS Directive.

*Involved actors: Commission/MS
Implementation period: 2012
Task Force Recommendation No. 183*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action RN.16</th>
<th>Action RN.17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Commission should assess to what extent the Code of Conduct and the IAEA Guidance cover the export and import of all high-risk radioactive sources and how these documents are implemented in the EU Member States.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Involved actors:** Commission/MS  
**Implementation period:** 2012  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 184** |
| The Commission should examine the need and feasibility of drawing up common EU criteria for authorising imports and exports from and to third countries, following an assessment of how the EU Member States implement the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. |
| **Involved actors:** Commission/MS  
**Implementation period:** 2010-2012  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 185** |
### Goal 9: Strengthen cooperation on the security of nuclear materials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action RN.18</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should progress the ratification of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials by the EU Member States/Community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Involved actors: MS/Commission</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Implementation period: ongoing</em></td>
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<td><em>Task Force Recommendation No. 215</em></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action RN.19</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should facilitate discussion among regulators, security specialists and performance assessment experts from the EU Member States, as well as the IAEA, in order to discuss progress on the implementation of the amended Convention and identify and exchange good practices concerning physical protection measures. Existing forums should continue to be used as appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Involved actors: MS/Commission</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation period: ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force Recommendation No. 216</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. Detection 37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizontal (H)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biological</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radiological/Nuclear</td>
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</table>

Goal 1: Establish a scenario-based/modelling approach to identifying work priorities in the detection field

**Action H.20**

The Member States together with the Commission should:
- develop scenarios at EU level based on EU wide risk assessment (including events with cross-border effects) built on existing scenarios and national experience while using the "black box" 38 mechanism;
- carry out a gap analysis by creating a matrix for each developed scenario of what is needed to identify CBRN materials and the detection technology already available.

**Involved actors: MS/Commission**

**Implementation period:** KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010

**Task Force Recommendations No. 45, 47, 127, 217, 220**

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37 There is a clear difference between environmental detection activities and human diagnostic activities. These distinct activities necessitate the involvement of specialists with a different profile.

38 The original "black box" was the World War II bomb sight whose internal mechanism was kept a secret. Later, it came to refer to any mechanism to which a variety of inputs could be given and whose outputs could be observed, but whose contents, that is, whatever it was that transformed inputs into outputs, were unknown. In practice, this means that the input from the participating Member States' experts is expected to be extrapolated from existing locations, names, real events or situations to more general (still) real and relevant information/scenarios. Therefore, the aim of the debate will not be to analyse in detail the specific challenges individual Member States face, but rather to build on the knowledge of participating experts.
Action H.21

The Member States together with the Commission should strengthen and support:

- the exchange of methods and procedures for developing scenarios and for modelling;
- interconnecting detectors at national level where feasible, including data on incidents;
- the exchange of information and data regarding broader trends of what has been detected;
- the exchange and coordination of information on exercises and on lessons learnt among the Member States and other stakeholders when relevant.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant agencies*

*Implementation period: from 2011*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 46, 128, 218, 222, 223*

Action H.22

The Member States together with the Commission should develop a mechanism for information exchange among Member States on methodologies of scenario development related to sampling and detection. The Commission should prepare an overview of Member State activities in this area. The Commission will support, as far as required, the exchange of further information by those Member States wishing to do so, taking appropriate confidentiality requirements into account.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 132, 219, 221*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Chemical</th>
<th>Biological</th>
<th>Radiological/Nuclear</th>
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<td>Action B.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should develop detection models for different biological pathogens and toxins, considering distribution, possible vectors, infectious dose and stability.</td>
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<td><em>Involved actors: MS/Commission</em></td>
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<td><em>Implementation period: 2012-2014</em></td>
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<td><em>Task Force Recommendation No. 129</em></td>
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</table>
Goal 2: Establish trialling, testing and certification schemes for CBRN detection in the EU

Action H.23

Taking into account the European (e.g. Euratom) and international requirements of legal metrology, the Member States together with the Commission should:

- map out and document the technical requirements necessary for the sampling and detection of CBRN materials, according to the field of application of the devices;
- exchange good practices, approaches to, and methodologies for quality assurance related to CBRN detection in the Member States;
- establish an EU wide validation and certification scheme to indicate whether detection systems and tools meet set requirements relying on existing capabilities and facilities. It should comprise continuing quality assurance mechanisms;
- establish an EU wide testing scheme for detection tools and systems to assess the performance and quality of solutions relying on existing capabilities and facilities;
- establish an EU wide trialling scheme to evaluate the quality of both detection tools and systems in practical field operations relying on existing capabilities and facilities.

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission

**Implementation period:** from 2011

**Task Force Recommendations No.** 49, 50, 51, 52, 135, 136-138, 225, 226
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Action B.9</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should define;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• sets of relevant simulants of biological agents for field tests, practical exercises and field technology trialling at national level and EU level, where appropriate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• criteria for method validation across detection of human, animal and crop threats.</td>
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</table>

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: 2012 - 2014*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 139, 141*
Goal 3: Develop minimum detection standards

Action H.24

Based on the outcome of actions [under Goal 2] aimed at establishing validation/certification schemes for CBRN sampling and detection in the EU, the Member States together with the Commission should as far as feasible develop a coherent set of minimum technical detection standards (including within the context of border monitoring) based on scenarios, user requirements and risk and threat assessments while building on existing work (e.g.: CEN). When developing such minimum technical standards, adequate engagement of the private sector, where appropriate, should be ensured and forensic requirements for evidence considered.

When developing such minimum technical standards, adequate engagement of the private sector, especially the European Standardization Organizations (ESOs) (e.g. CEN, CENELEC\(^{39}\), ETSI\(^{40}\)), where appropriate, should be ensured and forensic requirements for evidence as well as legal general requirements for measurement instruments (legal metrology) should be considered.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: 2012-2014*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 48, 224*

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\(^{39}\) European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation.

\(^{40}\) European Telecommunications Standards Institute.
<table>
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<th>Action B.10</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member States together with the Commission should, building on existing work and networks across the EU, develop reference material of biological agents for both clinical and environmental samples (according to internationally accepted standards) in order to achieve quality assurance in detection.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors:</strong> MS/Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation period:</strong> 2011-2014</td>
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<td><strong>Task Force Recommendation No. 134</strong></td>
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<th>Action B.11</th>
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<tr>
<td>Member States together with the Commission should set minimum requirements for sampling, detection, identification and monitoring of pathogens and toxins within a civilian security context at the EU level and make these requirements available to the private sector, if appropriate, subject to applicable requirements on confidentiality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors:</strong> MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation period: 2011-2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force Recommendation No. 148</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Goal 4: Identify good practices related to the detection of CBRN materials, awareness raising and training

**Action H.25**

The Member States together with the Commission should assess the feasibility of EU handbooks on sampling and detection of CBRN materials for practitioners (e.g. operators of detection devices) in view of the creation of joint investigation teams as well as an action card for first responders, building on existing work done at the EU and international level, and within the Member States. These handbooks should be translated into all official EU languages.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders*

*Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 54, 149, 229*

**Action H.26**

The Member States together with the Commission should:

- establish a mechanism of exchanging best practices in the field of awareness raising, training and exercises;
- support cooperation and information exchange among the Member States on calibrating detection devices;
- support the exchange of good practices on how to respond when CBRN materials are detected;
- identify and exchange good practices on sampling and detection methods and processes.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders*

*Implementation period: 2012-2014*
### Task Force Recommendations No. 55, 56, 57, 130, 131, 227, 228, 230

#### Action H.27

The Commission should:

- launch a study on what is currently in place in terms of CBRN border monitoring in the EU;
- support the exchange of best practices on optimal localisation of sampling and detection equipment based on the experience of the Member States.

*Involved actors: Commission*

*Implementation period: 2010-2012*

#### Action H.28

Member States should initiate the development of mobile detection, identification and sampling capabilities, supported by the Commission at the EU level.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: 2010-2014*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 147*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action B.12</th>
<th>Action RN.20</th>
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</table>
| Member States together with the Commission should enhance and support:  
- cooperation among laboratories assigned to deal with unknown pathogens and toxins at national level;  
- networking among existing laboratories which are competent and have capacity across the EU specialising in high risk biological agents and toxins as well as establish a network of reference laboratories within the EU where appropriate. | The Member States together with the Commission should develop an adequate and sustainable training programme at EU level to ensure a minimum level of training for frontline officers. The JRC\(^{41}\) can play an important part in this process.  
*Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders*  
*Implementation period: 2012-2014*  
*Task Force Recommendation No. 231* |

\(^{41}\) Joint Research Centre of the European Commission.
### Goal 5: Improve the exchange of information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action C.12</th>
<th>Action B.13</th>
<th>Action RN.21</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| The Member States together with the Commission should communicate the technical requirements of sampling and detection devices established in accordance with Action H 23 to the private sector. They should acquire knowledge of available capabilities and future research plans of the private sector. | The Members States together with the Commission should support:  
- EU and national projects performing measurements of biological background at specific areas, and enhance cooperation and information exchange among Member States on the procedures in such projects;  
- exchange good practices among Member States on cases and processes when a dangerous biological substance is detected. | The Member States together with the Commission should promote and support EU and national projects performing monitoring of radiation (background levels) for security purposes. Cooperation and information exchange among the Member States on such projects should be enhanced. |

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission  
**Implementation period:** ongoing  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 53**  

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 150 - 151**  

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission  
**Implementation period:** ongoing  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 233**
3. **PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE**

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<th>Horizontal (H)</th>
<th>Chemical (C)</th>
<th>Biological (B)</th>
<th>Radiological/Nuclear (RN)</th>
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</table>

**Goal 1: Improve emergency planning**

**Action H.29**

Each Member State should:

- ensure that CBRN risks are appropriately taken into account in their emergency response plans (where applicable into both national and local plans) on the basis of risk and threat assessments. The requirements of possible criminal investigations and forensics should be adequately taken into account in these plans;

- assess CBRN emergency response plans for high risk public locations and high-risk public events;

- exchange information with other Member States on their existing CBRN emergency response plans.

*Involved actors: MS*

*Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 59, 155, 235, 239*

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42 Work within the Framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism will be streamlined through the launch of an EU CBRN Resilience Programme.
Action H.30

Each Member State should assess whether all operators handling high-risk CBRN materials possess emergency response plans. These emergency response plans should be consistent with public authorities' emergency response plans. The feasibility of extending, where needed, emergency response plan requirements to such operators should be assessed. Based on the analyses of the existing regulations, possible gaps should be identified.

Involved actors: MS
Implementation period: from 2011
Task Force Recommendations No. 61, 238

Action H.31

The Member States, together with the Commission, should develop and conduct, on the basis of risk assessments, regular exercises at European and international level.

The Member States should develop and conduct, on the basis of risk assessments, regular exercises at local, regional, and national level.

These exercises should involve-and test cooperation of all relevant organisations, particularly of health, first responders, security radiation protection and judicial authorities; where appropriate, involvement of private sector stakeholders in such exercises should be foreseen. Possible criminal investigations and forensics should be part of these regular exercises. These simulation exercises could also be focused on transnational cooperation of one specific type of organisation (law enforcement authorities, health services, or other responders.

The Commission should ensure coordination of relevant exercises at EU level. Within the Framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, simulation exercises should regularly address CBRN Scenarios.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies
Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010
**Task Force Recommendations No. 60, 154, 236**

**Action H.32**

The Commission should launch a study regarding the organisation of Member States’ capacity concerning CBRN incidents. The results of the study should be further discussed by the CBRN Advisory Group.

*Involved actors: Commission*

*Implementation period: 2010*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 237*

**Action H.33**

The Member States together with the Commission should identify good practices on responding to security incidents involving the facilities possessing any of the substances on the EU lists of high risk CBRN materials and elaborate them further in the context of the CBRN Advisory Group.

*Involved actors: MS/ Commission/relevant stakeholders*

*Implementation period: 2011- 2014*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 101*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action B.14</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission should encourage better cooperation among relevant agencies in crisis and consequence management, response and recovery management. A bio-specific checklist of requirements for consequence management, response and recovery should be developed and discussed by the CBRN Advisory Group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders*

*Implementation period: 2011-2014*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 157*
Goal 2: Strengthen countermeasure capacity

**Action H.34**

Further analysis is required to ensure that sufficient capabilities are available through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in case of need. The Commission should therefore:

- update the 2005 assessment of the capabilities that may be available in the event of CBRN incidents. A flexible approach should be developed, avoiding extensive data gathering and focusing on those types of assistance for which insufficient information was available in 2005. The assessment should where appropriate take into account the location of the available capabilities to assess the response capacity made available by the Member States through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism;

- on the basis of risk and threat assessment, explore the possible need for further developing CBRN modules in the framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism;

- explore the feasibility of pre-positioning certain key modules in the event of large public events as a further way of enhancing European resilience against CBRN emergencies;

- facilitate the implementation of Article 5 (6) of the Recast of the Civil Protection Mechanism.

*Involved actors: Commission/MS*

*Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010*

**Action H.35**

Each Member State should:

- assess the required amounts and types of medical countermeasures in case of a incident involving high-risk CBRN materials;

- assess the availability of medical resources for the decontamination of victims, transport and of required countermeasures in the form of technical CBRN equipment;
- assess the possibility of sharing medical counter-measures across borders in case of an incident.

**Involved actors: MS supported by the Commission**

**Implementation period: 2011**

**Task Force Recommendations No. 62, 63, 240, 241**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action H. 36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Commission should collect and disseminate good practices among the Member States concerning the ways in which medical staff and other first responders can receive guidance on dealing with large scale CBRN emergencies and a rapid increase of the number of victims.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Involved actors: Commission/MS**

**Implementation period: 2011**

**Task Force Recommendations No. 64, 242**
**Goal 3: Improve domestic and international information flows regarding CBRN emergencies**

**Action H.37**

The Member States together with the Commission should establish a process in order to develop generic scenarios illustrating the law enforcement response to a potential event involving CBRN materials at the national and the international level. This process should in particular identify the relevant stakeholders who need to be informed about a particular situation and the applicable thresholds for triggering information exchange procedures. The process should at least involve representatives of the Member States, the Commission and Europol.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/Europol*

*Implementation period: from 2011*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 247*

**Action H.38**

The Member States together with the Commission should setup a network of specialised CBRN law enforcement units to facilitate the exchange of information and good practices, organising joint training exercises and up-dating them on the latest developments.

*Involved actors: Commission/MS/Europol*

*Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010*

**Action RN.22**

The Member States together with the Commission should...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>assess the adequacy of existing platforms for international exchange of information during radiological emergencies and build on and integrate them, if necessary. Consideration should also be given to their applicability to all radiological and nuclear incidents of concern (scenario-based). An effort should be made to assess the possibilities of streamlining alert messages going through different rapid alert systems.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation period: from 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force Recommendation No. 246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Goal 4: Develop improved modelling tools and strengthen decontamination and remediation capacity

Action H.39

The Commission should fund an assessment of existing modelling tools for the purpose of seeing whether there is need to invest in further research. The evaluation of existing modelling tools could be undertaken by the Commission's Joint Research Centre. This work should include the organisation of meetings of modelling experts and emergency response personnel from EU Member States in order to assess practical requirements for modelling tools. Based on this analysis funding could be provided for further research into the development of robust modelling tools applicable to events involving dangerous substances. The Commission should fund an assessment of the role of modelling tools for either pre-event scenario studies or as decision-support systems.

Involved actors: Commission

Implementation period: from 2010

Task Force Recommendations No. 71, 250

Action H.40

The Commission, together with the Member States, should facilitate the preparation of an EU Emergency Response Guidebook for first responders, based on existing national practices, applicable to the context of CBRN emergencies. The guidebook would be provided to the Member States free of charge and could be translated into all official EU languages. As part of the process of preparing an Emergency Response Guidebook, a stocktaking of existing documents/guidebooks should be conducted.

Involved actors: Commission/MS

Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010

Task Force Recommendations No. 72, 252
Action H.41

Each Member State should conduct a regular assessment of the available means for decontamination of the affected population, environment and infrastructure, and its capacity to deal with mass casualties with reference to CBRN materials within different cultural and social contexts. Information about current decontamination procedures should be shared with all Member States and decontamination protocols should be regularly assessed.

*Involved actors: MS*

*Implementation period: ongoing*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 73, 253*
Action RN.23

The Commission should further investigate the possibility of using the RODOS\(^{43}\) and ARGOS\(^{44}\) or other similar Decision Support Systems to address CBRN releases (e.g. radiological dispersal devices, events such as the polonium incident in 2006, etc.), as well as the development of transport and dispersion models for large buildings (e.g.: airports, railway stations) and underground systems.

*Involved actors: Commission*

*Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 251*

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\(^{43}\) Real-time On-line Decision Support system for off-site emergency management in Europe.

\(^{44}\) Accident Reporting and Guidance Operational System.
### Goal 5: Improve the capacity to conduct criminal investigations

#### Action H. 42

Each Member State should ensure that first responders receive training on forensic awareness in a CBRN crime-scene.

*Involved actors: MS*

*Implementation period: ongoing*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 75, 257*

#### Action H.43

The Commission should analyse potential problems in the transport of CBRN contaminated evidence across borders within the context of criminal investigations and emergency situations in general.

*Involved actors: Commission/EU agencies*

*Implementation period: 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 77, 259*
Action H.44

Eurojust, together with the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, should develop recommendations on ensuring that collected forensic evidence in a CBRN crime-scene is of a high enough quality to be admissible in court proceedings in the EU Member States. Eurojust, Europol, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, the JRC-Institute for Trans Uranium elements and other relevant organisations should contribute to establishing laboratory practices such that results can be used during legal prosecution (e.g.: accredited sampling and measurement procedures; chain of custody). The exchange of experience and good practice concerning the transport, handling, and forensic analysis of contaminated materials in the context of criminal investigations should be pursued.

*Involved actors: Eurojust, relevant organisations*

*Implementation period: 2010-2011*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 76, 258*

Action H.45

The Member States together with the Commission should enhance and support cooperation between forensic laboratories, reference and specialised laboratories, including those equipped for measurement/analysis of CBRN materials.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: ongoing*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 144, 260*
### 4. Actions Applicable to CBRN Prevention, Detection and Response

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Horizontal (H)</th>
<th>Chemical (C)</th>
<th>Biological (B)</th>
<th>Radiological/Nuclear (RN)</th>
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<td><strong>Goal 1: Enhance international cooperation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Action H.46</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Member States together with the Commission, within their respective competences, should continue to strengthen the international exchange of good practices with third countries and international organisations concerning staff-awareness and training, including work undertaken by already established groups of relevant international organisations.</td>
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<td><em>Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies</em></td>
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<td><em>Implementation period: ongoing</em></td>
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<td><em>Task Force Recommendations No. 31, 192</em></td>
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<td><strong>Action H.47</strong></td>
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<td>The Member States together with the Commission should, where appropriate, exchange information on their participation in various CBRN-related international fora and should strive toward coordinating their positions in order to ensure that common EU objectives are achieved.</td>
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<td><em>Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies</em></td>
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<td><em>Implementation period: ongoing</em></td>
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<td><em>Task Force Recommendations No. 206</em></td>
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</table>
Goal 2: Improve communication with the public

Action H.48

The Member States together with the Commission should regularly organise meetings of Member States' communication specialists dealing with security issues (in particular CBRN events) with a view to encouraging the spread of good practices concerning communication strategies.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies
Implementation period: from 2010
Task Force Recommendations No. 24, 67, 202, 244

Action H.49

The Member States together with the Commission should review existing international guidelines and incorporate appropriate existing procedures or, when needed, should establish common approaches for the development of communication strategies involving CBRN incidents. These common approaches should adequately take into account the needs at national level and would involve all relevant agencies.

These common approaches could be integrated with existing emergency planning and communications strategies, and could be used in a CCA context.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies
Implementation period: from 2010
Task Force Recommendations No. 25, 66, 165, 201
### Action H.50

Each Member State should look into the practical implementation of the good-practices on public and media relations identified in a joint effort by the Commission, Europol and the Member States.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*
*Implementation period: from 2010*
*Task Force Recommendations No. 65, 200, 243*

### Action H.51

The Member States and relevant national agencies should in developing their risk communication strategies include the possibility of raising public awareness for the generic risks of high-risk CBRN materials. The Member States and relevant national agencies should develop crisis communication strategies for the public living close to facilities holding any high risk CBRN materials.

*Involved actors: MS/relevant stakeholders*
*Implementation period: 2010 - 2012*
*Task Force Recommendation No. 166*
Goal 3: Develop improved information tools for CBRN security

Action H.52

The Commission, in consultation with the Member States, should establish a web portal in which good-practices on CBRN security could be shared, using as far as possible already existing systems.

*Involved actors: Commission*

*Implementation period: 2010-2011*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 16, 194*

Action H.53

The Commission should establish a database of resources which could be used by the relevant national authorities (in particular the law enforcement community, public health and fire and rescue and radiation protection authorities). The database would contain applicable information on the nature of high-risk CBRN materials and their handling. This database could include national contributions from the Member States. In light of the potentially sensitive content of such a reference database, the need for classification and thus restricted access will be considered.

*Involved actors: Commission*

*Implementation period: 2010-2011*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 80, 214, 263*
**Action H.54**

The Member States together with the Commission should establish a law enforcement Early Warning System (EWS) for incidents related to high risk CBRN materials, taking account of existing systems and experiences. Such a mechanism would include information on immediate threats, losses/thefts, and suspicious transactions and would in any case need to be accessible to the law enforcement authorities and relevant emergency responders of the Member States and to Europol. As a first step, the extension of the existing G6 system could be considered. The system should be without prejudice to the exchange of information on public health issues.

**Involved actors:** Commission/EU bodies and agencies  
**Implementation period:** KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 11, 12, 203**
### Goal 4: Improve training

**Action H.55**

The Member States, together with the Commission, should develop and conduct, on the basis of risk assessment, regular training at European and international level.

The Member States should develop and conduct, on the basis of risk assessment, regular training at local, regional, and national level.

This training should involve and test cooperation of all relevant national agencies, particularly of health, first responders, security and judicial authorities; where appropriate, involvement of private sector stakeholders in such training should be foreseen. Existing Training for CBRN responders should be further developed to enhance interoperability.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*

*Implementation period: KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 60, 154, 236*

**Action H.56**

The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN) should address the need for developing guidelines, based on existing standards, for CBRN training of EOD specialists. The applicability of the standards developed by the European Defence Agency to the non-military context may be assessed in this regard. Training should be provided to EOD personnel in terms of contacting relevant CBRN specialists and on forensic awareness.

*Involved actors: EEODN*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 68, 248*

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45 Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
### Action H.57

The Member States should ensure that CBRN information, including on EOD matters, is integrated into training programmes for relevant first responders and local authority personnel. The Member States and the Commission should ensure that emergency response personnel receive training concerning available modelling tools.

**Involved actors:** EEODN/MS, Commission  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 70, 249**

### Action C.13

The Commission should provide support for the organisation of specific HazMat specialist training.

**Involved actors:** Commission  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 69**

### Action B.15

Member States together with the Commission should identify and spread:

- good practices on well targeted training for and education of individuals working with, having access to or handling substances on the EU list of high-risk biological agents and toxins;
- good practices on academic training on biosafety, potential misuse of information and biological agents and toxins, and bio-ethics for undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students;
- good laboratory practices.

### Action RN.24

The Member States together with the Commission are encouraged to use the capacity of the planned European Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) to provide nuclear and radiological security related training and to support and complement such activities at the national level.

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/EU agencies  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 191**
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Involved actors: Member States/Commission/relevant stakeholders</th>
<th>Implementation period: 2010 -2012</th>
<th>Task Force Recommendation No. 91</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Action C.14</strong></td>
<td><strong>Action B.16</strong></td>
<td><strong>Task Force Recommendations No. 92-94</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The Member States should, together with the relevant stakeholders, organise regular exercises based on risk assessments concerning the security of chemical facilities in order to test preparedness measures in place and raise awareness among staff. | The Member States together with the Commission should consider and, where appropriate, develop:  
- together with relevant stakeholders, guidelines at the EU level for minimum training requirements for persons working with, having access to or handling, substances on the EU list of high-risk biological agents and toxins;  
- in conjunction with universities and professional associations, minimum requirements for academic training on biosafety, potential misuse of information and biological agents and toxins and bio-ethics for undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students. |  
**Involved actors: MS/relevant stakeholders**  
**Implementation period: from 2010**  
**Task Force Recommendation No. 28**  
**Involved actors: Member States/Commission/relevant stakeholders**  
**Implementation period: 2010 -2012**  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 92-94** |
Goal 5: Strengthen personnel security

**Action H.58**

The Commission, in consultation with the Member States should launch a study concerning existing background check procedures and security vetting requirements within the industry dealing with high-risk CBRN materials in order to identify gaps and good practices.

The Member States together with the Commission should assess the feasibility of developing and introducing, on the basis of risk analysis, common graduated criteria for background checks and vetting requirements in relation to personnel having access to or handling high-risk CBRN materials along the whole chain of production, storage, distribution and use. These common criteria should be based on a graduated approach, taking into account the position of the involved personnel in the organisation. In the course of the recruitment process, the recruiting organisation should ensure that the credentials of the candidates are properly checked and assessed.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*
*Implementation period: 2010-2011*
*Task Force Recommendations No. 20, 23, 105, 107, 186*

**Action H.59**

The Member States together with the Commission should analyse the need to establish at the EU level a system of mutual recognition of background checks and security vetting processes for certain categories of personnel.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*
*Implementation period: 2010-2011*
*Task Force Recommendation No. 188*
**Action H. 60**

The Member States together with the Commission should identify and exchange good practices on approaches to background checks and security vetting processes of visiting staff and students; Member States should aim at common procedures to be applied across the EU.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: 2010-2012*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 109*

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**Action H.61**

The Member States together with the Commission should identify and exchange good practice on robust management structures at commercial, industrial, health care and research facilities which hold high-risk CBRN materials, in order to ensure regular security appraisal and monitoring of staff.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant organisation*

*Implementation period: Ongoing*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 21, 108, 187*
**Action H.62**

The Member States should ensure by legislative or non-legislative measures that each Member State and/or owner/operator has a secure registry of personnel having access to or handling substances on the EU lists of high risk CBRN materials (along the whole chain of production, storage, distribution and use), taking into account privacy legislation. Law enforcement should have access to such a registry in accordance with national legislation.46

*Involved actors: MS*

*Implementation period: 2010-2011*

*Task Force Recommendation No. 106*

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46 Diagnostic facilities would only be concerned, if they stored isolated biological agents and toxins from clinical samples.
Goal 6: Strengthen and prioritise research

**Action H.63**

The Member States together with the Commission should improve the aggregation and spread of research results both at EU level as well as at national level across the EU Member States. For unclassified materials, this should be done by way of organising conferences and setting up a dedicated research web-portal (for all of CBRN security) which would contain a summary of the relevant research projects and contact information where further details can be obtained, as well as opportunities for future research collaboration and work.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 78, 211, 261*

**Action H.64**

The Member States together with the Commission should engage in further research cooperation with international partners with a view to enhancing synergies and avoiding duplications. They should also improve the use of existing scientific networks to enhance research in the detection area.

The research work performed by the European Defence Agency and the Joint Research Centre as well as the recommendations to be made by the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) should be taken into account in these efforts. The Commission should organise periodic meetings of CBRN experts, including specialists from other partner countries, in order to share and spread good practices on CBRN issues. The results of these meetings should be collected and disseminated among the Member States.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 79, 212, 234, 262*
Action H.65

The Commission, in close consultation with the Member States, should launch studies on:

- the necessity and impacts of assessing scientific research and scientific publications against security aspects;
- the potential psychological effect of CBRN emergencies on the population and the likely reactions of local populations in case of incidents, and possible action-oriented responses;
- the economic and social consequences of a CBRN terrorism incident and identify practical and action-oriented responses;
- rehabilitation of contaminated areas following malevolent dispersal of CBRN materials, which also addresses the question of acceptable levels of residual contamination;
- decontamination procedures which do not damage forensic evidence.

**Involved actors:** Commission  
**Implementation period:** KEY ACTION to be initiated in 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 74, 81, 126, 208, 254, 255, 264**

Action H.66

The Member States together with the Commission should continue encouraging funding organisations (be it public or private) to take security aspects of proposed research projects and other publications into account, as well as the suitability of the funds receiver (from both a safety and a security perspective) to work on the research the receiver is proposing. Best practices of funding organisations should be identified and exchanged across Member States.

**Involved actors:** MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders  
**Implementation period:** from 2010  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 123, 124, 210**
### Action C.15

The Commission together with the Member States should support research into the following areas:

- **Prevention:**
  1. Development of low-risk alternatives to high-risk chemicals.

- **Detection:**
  1. Ensuring interoperability and network application of detection devices in view of joint team operations;
  2. Improving the presentation of detection results in a way that they can easily be understood by end-users, particularly first responders.

- **Response:**
  Decontamination of the affected population, responders, equipment, goods and environment.

- **Technology research:**

### Action B.17

The Commission together with Member States should enhance:

- research on capabilities for response and recovery from biological incidents;
- the understanding of and research in emergency logistics and distribution operations (e.g. of medicines) at the regional, national and international level.

**Involved actors:** Commission/MS/relevant stakeholders  
**Implementation period:** Ongoing  
**Task Force Recommendations No. 163-164**

### Action RN.25

The Commission together with the Member States should support research into the following areas:

- **Detection:**
  1. Detection and identification of difficult to detect radioactive sources and nuclear materials;
  2. Detection and identification of masked and shielded sources;
  3. Improving spectrometry based detection and address the problems of "innocent" and false alarms;
  4. Detection and location of radiation source in large crowds.

- **Response:**
  1. Assessment of the detected signal for launching the correct response;
1. Further miniaturising detection equipment, which should combine various capabilities in one device;

2. The development of transportable equipment which can be used by emergency responders in the field.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 3, 58*

| 2. The further development of nuclear forensics; |
| 3. The development of radiological forensics; |
| 4. Guidance on storage of contaminated evidence for an extended period of time; |
| 5. Guidance on the disposal of contaminated materials; |
| 6. Decontamination of the affected population, responders, equipment, goods and environment; |
| 7. Particle size distribution and potential chemical composition changes following an explosion; |
| 8. Other gaps identified based on a risk-assessment process. |

- Technology research:

1. Detection technologies and electronic tracking systems for radioactive sources;

2. Integration of different technological equipment [address the current status when numerous devices are required for detection];
3. Improving detection software;

4. Enhance mobility and portability of detection solutions;

5. The development of transportable equipment which can be used by emergency responders in the field (including neutralisation and detection equipment for bomb squads);

6. Decontamination equipment.

*Involved actors: MS/Commission*

*Implementation period: from 2010*

*Task Force Recommendations No. 211, 213*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal 7: Ensure the criminalisation of CBRN terrorism</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Action H.67</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Commission should analyse the criminal law provisions enacted in the Member States concerning CBRN terrorism, in order to assess whether any further work at EU level is necessary, taking into account EU and international instruments, such as the Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism.(^{47})</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Involved actors: Commission</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Implementation period: 2010-2011</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Task Force Recommendation No. 19</strong></td>
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