Joint Doctrine Publication 02

UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security

Third Edition
Joint Doctrine Publication 02
UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security

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Foreword

This updated joint doctrine publication reflects the wide-ranging resilience and security challenges facing the nation as we head towards the 2020s. In facing these, Defence has a key role to play, supporting lead government departments, devolved administrations and civil authorities as they prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptive challenges and major national events.

The publication incorporates the latest UK Government policy on military aid to the civil authorities. There are two notable points contained within that modify how Defence contributes military support for resilience and security. First, and foremost, Defence is now no longer seen as the ‘last resort’ option; rather, it must now be ready and configured to play an early role in providing civil resilience. Secondly, in an effort to simplify the process and expedite requests for support, previously confusing terminology for how and where Defence can support the civil authorities has been rationalised under a single term – military aid to the civil authorities (MACA).

This joint doctrine publication provides both a military and non-military audience with the necessary guidance and practical understanding as to how Defence can contribute military support in dealing with natural hazards, major incidents or malicious attacks against the UK and Crown Dependencies. Accordingly, I commend this publication to the widest audience.

Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
“We are not preparing for the world we live in – we are preparing for the world we find ourselves in.”

Michael Mabée, *Preparing for a Suburban or Rural Community: Building a Civil Defense Plan for a Long-Term Catastrophe*
Abstract

Purpose


Context

2. The third edition of JDP 02 reflects a revision of military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) policy in 2016. This publication focuses on the following areas.


   b. This JDP complements the *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*.

   c. This publication recognises both the importance and correlation of security alongside resilience as outlined in *Defence Strategic Direction 2016*.

   d. This JDP incorporates changes to the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s) approach to supporting the civil authorities, as detailed in the *Policy Review of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities, 2016*.

Scope

3. This publication explains the context for MACA, against which Defence contributes to national security and resilience. This falls under the auspices of UK operations, as part of an integrated approach to civil contingency.

4. In producing this JDP, we undertook a wide consultation. This included other government departments and across wider Defence, including: the Cabinet Office; the Ministry of Defence; the Headquarters Standing Joint Commander (UK); the three single-Service Commands (Navy, Army and Air); Headquarters Defence Infrastructure

Organisation; Headquarters Directorate Special Forces; and with the regional liaison officers of all three Services.

5. There is a clear distinction in the UK between defending the UK against military threats, and civil contingencies. Defence of the UK sits outwith the scope of this publication.

Audience

6. This JDP informs a broad civil and military readership.

   a. JDP 02 provides guidance to those in Defence responsible for the planning, force generation and command and control of Defence assets tasked to provide support to the civil authorities.

   b. This JDP provides other government departments, devolved administrations, local authorities, partners and agencies with a broad understanding of the Defence contribution to resilience and security as part of an integrated/multi-agency approach to support the civil authorities.

Structure

7. This JDP comprises four chapters.

   a. Chapter 1 – Context explains civil contingency in the UK and the part that Defence plays. Factors that influence civil contingency are briefly highlighted, before describing the risk management process that underpins the UK approach to civil contingency.

   b. Chapter 2 – Policy: ends outlines the MOD’s policy to providing support to the civil authorities, which was revised in August 2016. It considers the legal basis for employing Defence resources on MACA tasks, and the charging policy applied to other government departments and civil authorities making a MACA request.

   c. Chapter 3 – Process: ways details the end-to-end process for the employment, command and control, and recovery of Defence capability assigned to providing support to the civil authorities. It outlines the resilience and security roles, the military aid request mechanism, and planning considerations.
d. **Chapter 4 – Delivery: means** considers key Defence capability that may be
tasked to MACA operations. It then outlines how Defence conducts resilience
and security education, training and exercises to prepare for civil contingency
tasks, alongside civil authorities, agencies and partners.

**Linkages**

8. JDP 02 is linked to a number of policy documents including:

- *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A
  Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, November 2015;

- *Defence Strategic Direction 2016*, April 2016;

- *Policy Review of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities*, February 2016; and

- *Responding to Emergencies The UK Central Government Response Concept of
  Operations*, updated April 2013.

It is also linked to statute, namely the:

- *Civil Contingencies Act 2004.*

9. JDP 02 is also linked to a number of other doctrine publications. It sits below
JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* (5th Edition) and it sits alongside other thematic
document publications, namely:

- JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*;

- JDP 04, *Understanding and Decision-making*; and

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Chapter 1 explains civil contingency in the UK and the part Defence plays. Factors that influence civil contingency are briefly highlighted, before describing the risk management process that underpins the UK’s approach to civil contingency.

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We will **strengthen** our domestic resilience and law enforcement capabilities **against global challenges** which **increasingly affect** our people, communities and businesses.

*The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*
Chapter 1 – Context

Section 1 – Civil Contingency

For the purposes of this publication the following definitions apply.

**military aid to the civil authorities**

Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority. This is subject to Defence Ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event.¹


**resilience**

Ability of the community, services, areas or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges.

Cabinet Office, *Civil Protection Lexicon Version 2.1.1*

**security**

The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and damage, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure.²

Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*

1.1. The UK Government has developed, and significantly improved, the nation’s civil response capability after a series of challenging resilience events during the early 21st Century. Civil authorities routinely take the lead in planning for, and responding to, emergencies. Devolved administrations have been assigned specific responsibilities.

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¹ This is a proposed new definition and on publication of this joint doctrine publication (JDP), this definition will be included in the UK endorsed terminology glossary.

² Whilst the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition is wide-ranging, this JDP explains Defence activities in support of the civil authorities in the UK responding to disruptive challenges identified by the Cabinet Office in their biennial National Risk Assessment.
responsibilities, including in a number of elements of resilience. Under military aid to the civil authorities (MACA), Defence plays a supporting role, providing niche capabilities, or more generalist support when the civil authorities’ capacity/capability is overwhelmed by an incident, when directed to do so, or when preparing for major national events. MACA activity is frequent, and occurs across the UK; recent significant events are listed below.

a. Providing widespread and general support during flooding events across the UK on a number of occasions over the last decade, including most recently in northern England and Scotland in 2015/16.

c. Assisting UK citizens stranded overseas by the Icelandic ash cloud in 2010.

d. Support in response to events not necessarily defined as a risk in the National Risk Assessment, but where military support is appropriate, such as providing assistance following the collapse of Didcot Power Station in 2016.

1.2. Civil authorities and emergency services are required to provide the first response when reacting to crises, emergencies and/or major incidents within the UK. Notwithstanding this, other government departments (OGD) or civil authorities are able to request military assistance from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Routinely, such requests will require ministerial authorisation. However, in very exceptional circumstances, for example, grave and sudden emergencies, when there is an urgent need to protect life, alleviate distress and/or protect significant property, a local commander is empowered to deploy assets to deal with the situation without recourse to additional ministerial authority.

**Strategic background**

1.3. Providing security and resilience within the UK is enshrined in the *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS/SDSR 15)*. Within this, National Security Objective 1 aims to ‘protect our people – at home, in our Overseas Territories and abroad, and to protect our territories, economic security, infrastructure and way of life’. To achieve this, the UK Government has bolstered community resilience and improved its crisis management architecture.

1.4. The UK Government is committed to continually improving the nation’s ability to respond to emergencies at the national, devolved administration, sub-national and

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3 The National Risk Assessment is explained further at paragraph 1.16.
4 Chapter 2 covers an urgent need to protect life, alleviate distress and/or protect significant property *et al* in more detail.
local levels. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 04) provides the framework for civil protection. It describes how organisations, particularly local responders, prepare and respond to emergencies. The Act comprises two parts.

a. **Part 1: arrangements for civil protection.** Part 1 establishes a clear set of responsibilities and roles for practitioners involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing different responsibilities on each.

   (1) **Category 1 responders** are organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies; for example, emergency services, local authorities and certain specified National Health Service bodies.

   (2) **Category 2 responders** comprise cooperating bodies who are less likely to be intimately involved in planning work, but who would be involved in responding to incidents that affect their specific sector, for example, the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies, and elements of the National Health Service.

b. **Part 2: emergency powers.** Part 2 of the Act permits temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious emergencies where existing legislation may inhibit the most effective response. To date, it has not been necessary to use these powers.

1.5. The strategic objectives that underpin the UK Government’s response to an emergency are:

   - protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment, and alleviate suffering;
   - support the continuity of everyday activity and restore disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
   - uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

Whilst set at the strategic level, these objectives underpin the response at all levels.

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6 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 04) received Royal Assent on 18 November 2004, repealing the Civil Defence Act 1948 and the Civil Defence Act (Northern Ireland) 1950. The Act imposes duties on specified bodies in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, with the aim of delivering a single framework for civil protection in the UK capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st Century.

7 Defence is neither a Category 1 nor Category 2 responder, but should be fully involved with cooperating in emergency preparedness work in a supporting role (Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme, March 2012, Chapter 2).

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 04) defines an emergency as: a situation or series of events that threatens or causes serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security in the UK. The definition covers a range of scenarios including adverse weather, severe flooding, animal and human-borne diseases, terrorist incidents and the impact of a disruption on essential services and infrastructure. Additionally, to constitute an emergency, an incident or situation must also pose a considerable test for an organisation’s ability to perform its functions. The common themes of emergencies are: the scale of the impact of the event or situation; the demands it is likely to make on local responders; and the exceptional deployment of resources.

Emergency management

1.6. The UK Government employs an integrated approach to crisis/emergency response comprising central government, devolved administrations, partners (for example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Environment Agency) and local resilience fora. Emergency management comprises three phases:

- preparation (pre-planning);
- response (protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality); and
- recovery (longer-term activity of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community).

1.7. Preparation. The Home Secretary has overall responsibility for the safety and security of the UK population. In tandem, ministers from lead government departments (LGDs) are responsible for contingency planning and response...
within their own specific areas. Within the UK, the Cabinet Office assumes overall responsibility for cross-government resilience preparedness and response capability.

a. Cabinet Office responsibility is exercised by the National Security Secretariat (NSS); within which the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) provides the coordinating function for contingency and resilience planning. It is responsible for ensuring a resilient and secure UK by improving the nation’s ability to absorb, respond to, and recover from potentially disruptive challenges. Underpinning preparations, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat employs an integrated emergency management approach that includes:

- shared awareness of multi-agency response and recovery emergency arrangements;
- a focus on consequences/wider impacts rather than the cause(s); and
- developing adaptable/agile arrangements to enable an effective coherent response and recovery to an emergency.  

b. Devolved administrations, comprising Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, are responsible for coordinating many aspects of resilience within their

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14 Integrated emergency management is the term used to define the civilian approach to contingency planning which comprises: anticipation; assessment; prevention; preparation; and response and recovery management.
respective jurisdictions. To ensure a coherent approach they work closely with the Cabinet Office.\textsuperscript{15} Whilst the UK Government retains responsibility for directing the response to events where powers have been reserved;\textsuperscript{16} in all other circumstances, devolved administrations will assume the lead in responding to events within their areas of jurisdiction.

c. At the local level resilience planning and preparation is coordinated, on a multi-agency basis, by local resilience fora. These comprise Category 1 responders, invited Category 2 responders and the military.

A local resilience forum (LRF) is defined as the: process for bringing together all the Category 1 and 2 responders within a police force area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act [2004]. An LRF transitions to a strategic coordinating group (SCG) during a response to an emergency. The SCG is usually chaired by a senior police officer and is defined as the: multi-agency body responsible for co-ordinating the joint response to an emergency at the local strategic level. Moreover, in Scotland the equivalent to a LRF is a local resilience partnership (LRP) which, for a response, becomes a resilience partnership made up of suitably empowered multi-agency representatives.

Cabinet Office, \textit{UK Civil Protection Lexicon Version 2.1.1}, February 2013

1.8. \textbf{Response}. In a UK emergency, a number of different organisations and partners have a role to play in coordinating a response.

a. \textbf{Central response framework}. Faced with an emergency,\textsuperscript{17} the central government response mechanism is initiated. At the heart of this response is

\begin{itemize}
\item The purpose of the Cabinet Office, as a government department, is to coordinate the activities of other government departments to ensure government works better.
\item An example of where powers have been reserved to Westminster is during the response to a terrorist incident.
\item The UK Government categorises three levels of emergency of national significance. These are, in descending order of magnitude, catastrophic emergency (Level 3); serious emergency (Level 2); significant emergency (Level 1). Below the national level there is a further category, local emergency, which is defined in as: emergency with local impact, the response to which is conducted by local responders, where necessary in conjunction with local government. Cabinet Office, \textit{UK Civil Protection Lexicon Version 2.1.1}, February 2013. In the case of a catastrophic or serious emergency, central government provides direction; in a significant emergency the central government provides support and nominates a LGD.
\end{itemize}
the activation of the UK’s crisis management facility, namely the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR).\textsuperscript{18} This provides:

- a senior decision-making body within government to oversee the response;
- a forum able to draw upon specialist advice from sub-groups and/or subject matter experts as necessary; and
- rapid coordination of the central government response supported by effective decision-making.

b. \textbf{Lead government department.} Within central government, during an emergency or when preparing for a major national event a single LGD\textsuperscript{19} is usually appointed, with responsibilities for:

- assessing the situation;
- ministerial briefings;
- handling the media and parliamentary interest; and
- providing coherent policy and other support to local responders.\textsuperscript{20}

c. \textbf{Local response.} Local responders, including national agencies and devolved equivalents (for example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Highways England), play a pivotal role in shaping a UK response.

(1) Category 1 responders join together to form a LRF; as required, Category 2 responders are invited to join. This helps ensure coherence during an emergency.

(2) Emergency services, comprising police, fire and rescue, and ambulance are usually the first responders to arrive at the scene of

\textsuperscript{18} Within the devolved administrations central government coordination is managed as follows: in Northern Ireland it is through the Crisis Management Group (Northern Ireland); in Scotland, through the Scottish Government Resilience Room; and in Wales it will be through the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales).

\textsuperscript{19} In Cabinet Office, \textit{Civil Protection Lexicon Version 2.1.1, February 2013}, a lead government department is defined as a: department of the United Kingdom government or devolved administration designated as responsible for overall management of the government response to an emergency or disaster. There are LGDs identified for both the response and recovery phases of emergencies.

\textsuperscript{20} The only time the MOD will act as the LGD is for the response to a Defence nuclear accident or emergency.
an incident. They provide operational, tactical and strategic levels of command, control and coordination.\(^{21}\)

(3) The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) provides coherent doctrine for the three emergency services and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to enable effective joint working and shared situational awareness. Details of JESIP are at Annex 1A.

d. **Coordination structures.** With the rapid onset of an emergency in a specific/limited geographic area, the emergency management framework is usually constructed from the bottom, upwards. Subsequent escalation of the event, either in severity or geographical extent, or as situational awareness improves, may require the implementation of operational, tactical and/or strategic-level coordination. Certain situations may dictate that all three levels run in tandem, while other situations, such as wide area/slow onset emergencies (for example, flooding) may see a response initiated by central government or by the sub-national tier. Procedures for controlling incidents are articulated in the Cabinet Office’s *Responding to Emergencies The UK Central Government Response Concept of Operations*.\(^{22}\) These procedures vary between agencies, so a multi-agency response to an emergency will require the integration of separate command structures with differing characteristics.

1.9. **Recovery.** The recovery phase is defined as: the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.\(^{23}\)

a. Preparations for the recovery phase form an integral part of emergency management. Arrangements for the recovery phase will be considered in the early stages of a response.

b. Recovery will likely comprise a multi-level approach. Depending on the scale of the emergency, activities may run concurrently at local, sub-national and/or national levels and usually involve central government, devolved administrations, partners, agencies and local resilience fora and partnerships.

c. In contrast to the response phase, the recovery phase is often protracted and may take many months and/or years to support affected communities through reconstructing infrastructure and restoring emotional, social, economic

\(^{21}\) The emergency services levels of command, control and coordination differ from Defence in that they use operational, tactical and strategic (with operational and tactical reversed for Defence); the civil authorities also refer to these as bronze, silver and gold commands.


and physical well-being. During events that cover a wide-area, it is not uncommon for the recovery phase to have started in one area, while an adjacent area remains in the response phase.

**Defence involvement**

1.10. **Direction.** The NSS/SDSR 15 reflects the UK Government’s strategic intent. It is a responsibility of the MOD to ‘defend and contribute to the security and resilience of the UK and its Overseas Territories’.\(^{24}\) Specifically, this includes ‘deterring attacks; defending our airspace, territorial waters and cyber space; countering terrorism at home and abroad; supporting UK civil authorities in strengthening resilience’.\(^{25}\)

Strategic direction for Defence is provided by the *Defence Strategic Direction 2016* (DSD 16), from which the Defence Tasks\(^{26}\) flow. Defence Task 1 – Defence, Security and Resilience of the Homeland and Overseas Territories – requires the MOD to provide support to the UK civil authorities in strengthening resilience, helping in the response to natural disasters, accidents and terrorist attacks. DSD 16 also directs that Defence should conduct its UK fixed tasks\(^{27}\) under MACA.

1.11. **Associated military operations.** Defence activities occurring in the UK\(^{28}\) that support the strategic and overseas Defence Tasks will fall under UK operations. While these operations do not support the civil authorities, they do require close civil/military liaison and cooperation. Accordingly, these activities use many of the mechanisms and procedures associated with Defence Task 1, but they are not classified as MACA and are covered in Chapter 3.

1.12. **Responsibility.** Across Defence, responsibility for resilience and security is provided at different military levels.

a. **Strategic.** The MOD’s Operations Directorate, through the UK operations team,\(^{29}\) has strategic responsibility for any Defence contribution to prepare for and respond to civil emergencies.

\(^{24}\) There are eight Defence Missions within the *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, November 2015, page 27, the first of which states ‘defend and contribute to the security and resilience of the UK and Overseas Territories.’


\(^{26}\) Defence Tasks ‘cover the full range of activity that Defence undertakes or could undertake, as well as the routine activity’. MOD, *Defence Strategic Direction 2016*, October 2016.

\(^{27}\) Fixed tasks are those tasks that have resources permanently assigned to them, for example, explosive ordnance disposal; support to UK counter-terrorism operations (including counter-chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability).

\(^{28}\) Examples include: military support to the mounting of operations, host-nation support to foreign forces based in, or transiting through the UK, reception arrangements for military patients and the nuclear emergency organisation.

\(^{29}\) The Operations Directorate works closely with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and when the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) is activated will likely represent the MOD when dealing with emergencies, incidents and events in the UK.
b. **Operational.** The Standing Joint Commander UK (SJC(UK)) is assigned an area of responsibility for resilience operations in support of the civil authorities in the UK in a separate directive from the Chief of the Defence Staff. This directive is reviewed on a regular basis. Maritime operations both inside and outside UK territorial waters will generally be under the operational command of the Fleet Commander. Air operations in UK airspace will be conducted under the operational command of the Deputy Commander Operations, Air Command.

c. **Tactical.** A network of regional points of command (RPoC), based on brigade and regional headquarters, and regional liaison officers exercise tactical responsibility, providing the primary link between Defence and civil authorities at devolved administrations, sub-national and local levels. When operating in this capacity, Army brigade and regional commanders are referred to as the joint military commander (JMC). Moreover, there may be circumstances where another commander other than the RPoC commander may exercise the JMC role.

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### Section 2 – The UK operating environment

1.13. Defence will support LGDs and civil authorities, when requested to do so, in accordance with the MACA criteria. Other factors may serve to compound resilience and security challenges facing the UK Government.

   a. The UK population is forecast to grow to 70 million by 2027 and its average age is increasing. This will see increased demand on national infrastructure (housing, transport and utilities) and public services (health, education and social services). As a result, spare capacity may be reduced or lost altogether for national infrastructure and public services to be able to respond or support an emergency.

   b. The UK Government and the commercial sector are jointly responsible for delivering the UK’s critical national infrastructure. Notwithstanding the

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30 The network of regional liaison officers comprises: joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs); Royal Navy regional liaison officers (RNRLOs); and Royal Air Force regional liaison officers (RAFRLOs).

31 Commander 8 Engineer Brigade was appointed as the Joint Military Commander in early 2016 for Operation TIDDLING – a flood defence asset survey to support the Environment Agency in southern England.

32 The Centre for Protection of Critical Infrastructure details 13 critical sectors: civil nuclear; communications; defence; energy; emergency services; finance; food; government; hazardous chemicals; health; space; transport; and water and sewage. Available at: [https://www.cpni.gov.uk/critical-infrastucture-0](https://www.cpni.gov.uk/critical-infrastucture-0).
contractual obligation to ensure business continuity, the UK Government is the ultimate guarantor in the event of any failure of critical national infrastructure.

c. As part of the NSS/SDSR 15, Defence Estate continues to be rationalised, with more units in larger, but fewer, UK bases. This will result in a reduced military footprint across the UK. Consequently, this may lead to a delayed military response as units need to travel further to reach any emergency. Once deployed, units may have less estate and infrastructure nearby on which to rely for support. Likewise, this will reduce options for Defence Estate to be used by civil authorities for other purposes, such as rest centres.

d. Frequent severe weather events are likely to continue to impact the UK. These have the potential to cause widespread local and even regional disruption, damage and injury that will test local responders’ capacity and capability.

e. Terrorist attacks in the UK are assessed as highly likely, whether executed by foreign or UK-based extremists. Government departments play a key role in deterring future terrorist threats and, in the event of an attack, the Home Office has the lead to respond to any attacks. Recovery and rebuilding public confidence would be a cross-government effort.
f. The increasingly interdependent nature of technology and infrastructure creates the potential for complex scenarios that are likely to challenge the capabilities of conventional emergency responders. The rapid onset of events may compromise the delivery of essential services. As a result, Defence should be prepared to respond adaptively and with agility to a range of circumstances, including attacks on critical national infrastructure.

g. The media can rapidly shape public opinion. In the face of crises, the UK Government will quickly come under pressure from the media to act. The pervasive nature of the media raises expectations and increases scrutiny. Defence may come under pressure to provide a contribution and, following any deployment, military personnel will be highly visible.
1.14. Not all emergencies are foreseeable. However, for those that are, the UK Government’s aim is to identify and mitigate the risk as far in advance as possible.

1.15. The UK Government conducts a NSS/SDSR every five years. Part of this process includes a National Security Risk Assessment, which in turn informs the Government-led National Risk Assessment. This is a classified assessment of the potential risks facing the UK during the next five years. An unclassified version of the National Risk Assessment, known as the National Risk Register, is produced for public release.

1.16. The National Risk Assessment considers the likelihood of a hazard or threat, assessing this against a number of consequences to determine the impact should the hazard/threat materialise. The resultant outcome produces a risk. A subsequent risk assessment allows individual risks to be categorised and prioritised. This enables appropriate action to be taken and/or the allocation of resources to eliminate, reduce or mitigate the effects of a risk, or reduce the probability of a risk materialising. Continuous horizon scanning allows risk to be reviewed and, if significant change is identified, revised.

Disruptions to national fuel supplies would greatly impact the economy

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34 Hazard is defined as: accidental or naturally occurring (i.e. non-malicious) event or situation with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment and/or economic, social and political structures. The Cabinet Office, UK Civil Protection Lexicon Version 2.1.1, February 2013.
35 Threat is defined as: intent and capacity to cause loss of life or create adverse consequences to human welfare (including property and the supply of essential services and commodities), the environment or security. Ibid.
36 Risk is defined as: measure of the significance of a potential emergency in terms of its assessed likelihood and impact. Ibid.
37 Risk assessment is defined as: a structured and auditable process of identifying potentially significant events, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall assessment of risk, as a basis for further decisions and actions. Ibid.
1.17. The National Risk Register 2015 describes three types of hazard and threat:\(^{38}\)

- **natural hazards** – human disease, animal disease, severe weather and flooding;

- **major accidents** – major industrial accidents, major transport accidents, widespread electricity failure, disruptive industrial action and widespread public disorder;\(^{39}\) and

- **terrorist and other malicious attacks** – terrorist attacks on crowded places, infrastructure, transport systems, unconventional terrorist attacks and cyber security.

LGDs are responsible for managing risks assigned to their respective portfolios and for conducting the associated contingency planning and preparation.


\(^{39}\) While it may not appear to be a major accident, both disruptive industrial action and widespread public disorder are categorised under major accidents in the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies, 2015 edition, March 2015, pages 40-41.
Key points

• The UK Government has developed, and significantly improved, the nation’s civil response capability following a series of challenging resilience events during the early 21st Century.

• Defence plays a supporting role, providing niche capabilities and more generalist manpower support, when the civil authorities’ capacity/capability is overwhelmed by an incident, or when directed to do so, or when preparing for major national events.

• Other government departments or civil authorities are able to request military assistance from the MOD.

• The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides the framework for civil protection.

• The UK Government employs an integrated approach to a crisis or emergency response.

• The Cabinet Office assumes overall responsibility for cross-government resilience preparedness and response capability.

• During an emergency, or when preparing for a major national event, a single lead government department is usually appointed.

• Defence is no longer viewed as the ‘last resort’ option; rather it is increasingly seen as supporting the lead government department.

• The National Risk Assessment considers the likelihood of a hazard or threat, assessing this against a number of consequences to determine the impact should the hazard/threat materialise.
Annex 1A – Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles

1A.1. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) focus on police, fire and rescue service, and ambulance service interoperability in the early stages of a response to a major or complex incident. Its purpose is to provide emergency services’ commanders with a framework to enable them to respond together as effectively as possible. JESIP is nationally recognised with support from emergency service chief officers and the Home Office, Cabinet Office and the Department of Health. Acting on recommendations from a number of post-event enquiries, JESIP was instigated at the request of the Home Secretary. Specifically, these concluded that the emergency services needed to work better together to collectively save lives and reduce harm.

1A.2. JESIP doctrine focuses on the interoperability of the three emergency services whilst also acknowledging that emergency response is a multi-agency activity and the resolution of an emergency will usually involve collaboration with other Category 1 and 2 responders and partner organisations. JESIP doctrine is not a prescriptive set of rules, rather it aims to guide, explain and inform. Specifically, it provides guidance:

- on how responders should train and operate, by applying common terminology, principles and ways of working;

- on responders’ actions in a multi-agency working environment, to achieve the degree of interoperability that ensures a successful joint response;

- for commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, on the actions they should undertake when responding to major and complex incidents; and

- on the Joint Decision Model as show at Figure 1A.1.

JDP 02 (3rd Edition)
1A.3. The need for interoperability between emergency services extends to other agencies that may be expected to operate with them, including our Armed Forces. Any contribution by military responders should be seen in a supporting role to the civil responders, who will have primacy throughout. Military responders must be aware of the JESIP and will be expected to adhere to the procedures wherever possible. JESIP comprises five principles.

a. **Co-location.** Co-location of commanders is essential and allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face-to-face, at a single and easily identifiable location, known as the forward command post. Defence personnel operating with civil authorities at all levels must be aware of both the use of the Joint Decision Model and the civil authorities’ approach to operational record keeping and decision logging.41

b. **Communication.** During incidents with a multi-agency response, civil commanders will use emergency services interoperability talk-groups, especially

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41 The Joint Decision Model log template is available at: [http://www.jesip.org.uk/joint-decision-log-template](http://www.jesip.org.uk/joint-decision-log-template)
when co-location proves challenging. To enable shared understanding, military responders need to be incorporated onto the network. The mnemonic METHANE will be used over communications networks; military units will be expected to use this format as required when dealing with the civil authorities. METHANE is:

- major incident declared;
- exact location;
- type of incident;
- hazards present or suspected;
- access – routes that are safe to use;
- number of casualties; and
- emergency services present and those required.

c. **Coordination.** One of the emergency services will generally take the lead role at an incident to ensure an effective response. Any military contribution will be in a supporting role. It is the duty of the commander of the military unit to identify themselves at the forward command post and establish effective coordination with the lead civil responder to ensure tasking is appropriate.

d. **Joint understanding of risk.** Commanders of civil emergency services will ensure the safety of responders by conducting a joint assessment of risk. This will include any military assets that are under the control of the civilian agencies. However, this does not absolve military commanders from their own assessment of the risks and, where necessary, military commanders must decide for themselves that the risks their personnel are exposed to are tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable. In the event of disagreement between the military commander and the civilian commander on a risk related matter, the military commander must inform the military chain of command at the first opportunity.

e. **Shared situational awareness.** Critical to success is a common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of an emergency, together with an appreciation of available resources and capabilities of all response agencies. To achieve this emergency services employ the IIMARCH briefing format.

1A.4. **Joint operational learning.** Military units/personnel with an assigned MACA responsibility should participate in joint learning opportunities to enhance their awareness of the JESIP. Local emergency services liaison groups across the UK provide the ideal forum to exchange ideas and develop mutual understanding before they are likely to meet one another in an emergency situation.

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42 IIMARCH is: information; intent; method; administration; risk assessment; communications and humanitarian issues.

43 The IIMARCH briefing template is available at: [http://www.jesip.org.uk/IIMARCH-template](http://www.jesip.org.uk/IIMARCH-template).
Chapter 2 outlines the MOD’s policy for providing military aid to the civil authorities (MACA), which was revised in August 2016. It considers the legal basis for employing Defence resources on MACA tasks, and the charging policy applied to other government departments and civil authorities making a MACA request.

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History has taught us to expect the unexpected. Events can, and do, take place that by their nature cannot be anticipated exactly.

Cabinet Office,
Responding to emergencies the UK Central Government
Response Concept of Operations
2.1. The UK Government’s policy for using our Armed Forces to support activities in the UK is derived from the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS/SDSR 15). The NSS/SDSR 15 sets out the UK national security vision as:

\[ \text{a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence.} \]

The NSS/SDSR 15 lists eight missions,\(^{44}\) the first of which is to ‘defend and contribute to the security and resilience of the UK and Overseas Territories.\(^{45}\) This includes deterring attacks; defending our airspace, territorial waters and cyberspace; countering terrorism at home and abroad; supporting the UK civil authorities in strengthening resilience; and protecting our people overseas.\(^{46}\)

Military assistance to the Overseas Territories is conducted through separate means via the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Military support to the Border Force outside UK waters is considered as military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) because the support is being provided through the Home Office to the Border Force.

2.2. The NSS/SDSR 15 informs the Defence Strategic Direction 2016 (DSD 16), from which the Defence Tasks are derived. Defence Task 1 is broken down into a number of sub-tasks to provide support to civil authorities in the security and resilience of the UK.\(^{47}\)

\(^{44}\) Whilst described in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS/SDSR 15) as ‘missions’, in subsequent documentation, including Defence Strategic Direction 2016 (DSD 16), the word ‘tasks’ is preferred.

\(^{45}\) The provision of military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) is limited to the UK and Crown Dependencies and is not applicable to the Overseas Territories.

\(^{46}\) NSS/SDSR 15, page 27.

\(^{47}\) Further details on Defence Task 1 sub-tasks can be obtained from DSD 16, page 28 and in Annex D (pages 111-112).
2.3. Defence supports the civil authorities in ensuring resilience in the UK through either augmentation and/or providing specific capabilities. Enduring contributions are generally limited to only those where:

- it is unreasonable or unrealistic to expect the civil authorities to develop their own capabilities; or
- delivering the capability offers significant and demonstrable benefit for Defence.

The above points are not applicable to MACA tasks relating to industrial action or the undertaking of activity in support of service level agreements. Defence activities are anchored in a ‘whole-of-government’ or integrated approach in support of wider national objectives.

2.4. There is a distinction between defending the UK from external military threats and responding to the internal and domestic hazards and threats identified in the National Risk Assessment. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) will act as lead government department for defending the UK from any external military threat, with other government departments acting in a supporting role. Conversely, Defence will routinely act in a supporting role to other departments in responding to internal and domestic resilience and security challenges.
Section 2 – Military aid to the civil authorities policy

2.5. **Policy.** The *2015 to 2020 government policy: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities for activities in the UK*[^48] is based on the government’s intent to provide an effective response to all types of emergencies and major crises at national, devolved administrations, sub-national and local levels. This means having a pre-planned, integrated and coordinated response from the emergency services, civil authorities and, where appropriate, the MOD. If there is an emergency or crisis in the UK, local emergency services provide the first response; government departments or civil authorities may then seek to request military assistance as part of their coordinated multi-agency response to augment local responders. The contribution of Defence reinforces national resilience through effectively providing military capacity, capability and resources, to assist in the planning, response and recovery for a wide range of disruptive events.

2.6. **Previous MACA categories.** In *2015 to 2020 government policy: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities for activities in the UK*, the previous titles of MACA categories[^49] were removed to simplify the process for those requesting military assistance. These legacy categories were intended for internal Defence use only, but caused confusion when asking for, and arranging, support both within Defence and across government. Requesting military assistance is now more straightforward, as there is just one category; requesting agencies should simply ask for military assistance. There are subtle differences to the funding basis depending on the nature of the request, but MOD staff will resolve these questions for each MACA request that is received.

2.7. **Policy principles.** The provision of military assistance is governed by four principles. MACA may be authorised when:

- there is a definite need to act and the tasks our Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear;


[^49]: These comprised military aid to the civil power, military aid to [other] government departments and military aid to the civil community. This includes the associated non-MACA term training and logistic assistance to the civil authorities.
other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted;\textsuperscript{50} and either

- the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or

- the civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.

However this, under exceptional circumstances, ministers can choose to temporarily waive these principles. This may happen when there are major events of national and international importance, or an event that is catastrophic in nature.

2.8. \textbf{Ministerial authorisation}. Ministerial authority must be sought for any request for military resources under MACA.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] Departments requesting military assistance will require their own minister's endorsement. In addition, the requesting department must accept the financial costs as calculated by MOD, and if required indemnify MOD against losses.

\item[b.] If a request for military assistance is made through a ministerial Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) meeting in response to an emergency, there is no requirement for a separate ministerial request by the government department needing military support, providing a Defence minister is present to accept the request. Agreement from the lead government department to meet costs and indemnify MOD is still required. Moreover, a written request will still be required from the lead government department so that all parties are absolutely clear on the nature of the effect that has been requested.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{50} Usually verified by the joint or single-Service regional liaison officer for requests received from the civil authorities at the sub-national level, usually in consultation with the government liaison officer and strategic coordinating group chair.

\textsuperscript{51} With the exception of circumstances of an urgent nature where there is an imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress, or to protect significant property, and requests to use Defence Estate that are not contentious.
Operation SHAKU: the Defence contribution to flood relief efforts across the north of England following Storms Desmond and Eva, December 2015 to January 2016

Following the widespread disruption and damage caused by Storms Desmond and Eva, Defence was asked to assist with recovery efforts to survey and clear roads in Cumbria. Whilst there were commercial options available to Cumbria County Council for this type of activity, the number of roads that needed assessment, and in some cases the remote nature of the area, was beyond the capacity and capability of the commercial sector in the region at that time. Under pressure to return the area affected to normal business as quickly as possible, Cumbria Strategic Coordination Group requested military assistance to support the recovery effort once the initial storm had eased. Under MACA, military engineers were deployed to survey routes, assess the level of damage to the road network and in some areas to clear debris and reopen key routes through Cumbria.
Operation BRIDLED: the Defence contribution following the Didcot Power Station collapse in February 2016

In February 2016, during the preparation for a civilian demolition operation, the boiler house building at A Site Didcot Power Station, Oxfordshire, partially collapsed. This resulted in the death of four civilian contractors. The remaining structure had been extensively pre-weakened as part of the demolition task. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse assistance was sought from Defence by Oxfordshire Fire and Rescue Service to assist with locating three of the contractors, initially reported missing after the collapse. Responding to an imminent threat to life, Defence personnel from 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Regiment deployed with specialist equipment to assist with this task, although the bodies were not found. Subsequently, the Health and Safety Executive placed a 50 metre exclusion zone around the site preventing further manual search and rescue. However, in May 2016 a MACA request was submitted by Thames Valley Police for military assistance to a new, bespoke demolitions plan. A military assessment team confirmed that a niche EOD asset, the Light Weight Tractor Radio Controlled could assist, and under the command of 11 EOD Regiment Royal Logistics Corps, a specialist team from 101 Engineer Regiment (EOD) undertook work in June and July 2016 to prepare the demolition of the remaining structure. The site was successfully demolished in July 2016. Full costs were levied for this activity.
2.9. **Central government intent.** The 2016 MACA Policy review also widened the scope for application of MACA to the full range of resilience tasks, under the Central Government principles of integrated emergency management; that is, our Armed Forces can now expect to become involved in planning and preparation, and recovery tasks, as well as responding to emergencies. This broader level of engagement between military and civil authorities reflects central government’s intent to use the full range of tools at its disposal to deal with crises and return to business-as-usual as quickly as possible. Under this wider range of tasks, the MOD may be called upon to assist civil authorities with:

- **planning** – collaborative planning using military campaign tools to build capability;
- **training** – awareness of MACA process and contingency planning; and
- **enhancement** – broadening the contribution of Defence in contingency planning for low-to-medium likelihood/high impact events.

2.10. **Defence position on providing MACA.** The Defence contribution to resilience is usually provided by our Armed Forces through spare capacity, so it is subject to the availability of resources. Where a request for Defence support is likely to conflict with the Department’s ability to deliver its core outputs, advice on prioritisation will be given to ministers by Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) in consultation with Director General Security Policy. The MOD does not usually generate forces or hold equipment specifically for resilience tasks. This is because:

- the requirement is unpredictable in scale, duration and capability;
- Defence is normally able to meet requirements from spare capacity; and
- it would involve using Defence’s budget to pay for other government departments’ responsibilities.

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52 Exceptions might include providing air defence assets to counter a terrorist air threat and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
Principles

2.11. It is a principle of the UK’s democratic system of government that the UK Armed Forces remain under the control of central government; and that Defence Ministers are publicly accountable for the actions of our Armed Forces.

2.12. The command structure of our Armed Forces is a single chain, stretching from the Defence Council (chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence) exercising the Royal Prerogative to the individual unit and Service personnel. Routinely, all Defence operations, including those conducted in the UK, require authorisation by Defence Ministers through the Defence Council.

2.13. All MACA operations must be conducted within the law. Service personnel are subject to Service discipline (the Armed Forces Act 2006) and military command at all times. Failure to comply with the law may result in criminal charges against an individual, and/or civil proceedings being brought against the MOD. Unlike the police, Service personnel simply have the same powers of arrest as ordinary citizens.

Legal basis for military aid to the civil authorities deployments

2.14. There are three possible legal bases for a MACA deployment:

- the Royal Prerogative for military tasks where support is supplied in addition to civil authorities’ capabilities;
- a Defence Council Order (DCO) under the Emergency Powers Act 1964 for civilian tasks where support is supplied instead of civil authorities’ capabilities; or

2.15. Service personnel can deploy under the Royal Prerogative for ‘military’ work. There is no legal definition or test for ‘military’ work, it is an assessment based on knowledge and experience. Indicators can include where service personnel have been trained by the military, where service personnel undertake that work as their ‘day job’, and for work which traditionally has been seen as military work. This type

53 Standing Defence Council Order 1983 reflected in The Queen’s Regulations for the Army, J11.001-010, for a response to an immediate emergency where civil authority capability is not yet available.
2.16. For non-military tasks, the mechanism of a DCO is used to authorise the deployment of military resources. A DCO is made using powers in Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964. The MOD’s Operations Directorate is responsible for producing and issuing the DCO. Key points for the DCO include:

- it requires ministerial authorisation and should be signed by two members of the Defence Council on the same day;
- the work must be both urgent and of national importance; and
- the Defence Council provides governance and decides whether the task is of an urgent and nationally important nature.\(^{54}\)

2.17. There is one standing DCO, dated 17 January 1983, which is used when there is an imminent\(^{55}\) threat to life, a need to alleviate distress, or to protect significant property. In these circumstances, local commanders may provide immediate assistance without recourse to higher authority. The 1983 DCO approves the employment of military personnel on tasks:

‘as being urgent work of national importance, such work as is considered by the local commander, at the time when the work needs to be performed, to be urgently necessary for the purposes of the alleviation of distress and preservation and safeguarding of lives and property in time of disaster and do hereby authorise the temporary employment in such work of officers and men of Her Majesty’s Naval, Military or Air Forces, and specific tasks to be performed by officers and men of these forces assigned to that employment being such as may be specified by or under orders of the officers commanding the forces’.

After initiating a response, commanders must inform the chain of command as soon as practicable, ensuring that the Headquarters Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (HQ SJC(UK)) and the MOD Operations Directorate are informed.

2.18. Devolved administrations should not request MACA directly from the MOD. Instead, they must approach the relevant UK territorial department (Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales Offices) to submit on their behalf. MACA requests from the Crown Dependencies should be submitted to the Ministry of Justice in the first instance.

2.19. Routine liaison between military and civil authorities, or providing military advice, does not require ministerial authority. Approval is provided by the MOD’s

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\(^{54}\) It is a ministerial decision to determine what constitutes ‘urgent work and of national importance’.

\(^{55}\) In this context, ‘imminent’ means that there is no time either to consult the chain of command or conduct detailed operational planning.
Head Operations (Military or Policy), or, at the sub-national level, by the Army’s regional point of command (RPoC) commanders and the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force through their respective regional liaison officers.\(^{56}\)

2.20. The Queen’s Regulations for the Armed Forces\(^{57}\) provides an authority for military commanders to act on their own responsibility without a request by the civil authorities. This applies where:

- in very exceptional circumstances, a grave and sudden emergency has arisen; and
- in the opinion of the local commander, the situation demands immediate intervention to save life, alleviate distress and protect significant property.

2.21. Using military personnel armed with weapons for MACA operations will always be an exception. The Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS’) Directive to the SJC(UK), or Operations Directorate’s activation order, will state explicitly whether the use of personal weapons or specialist equipment is authorised and, if so, whether guidance cards and a specific rules of engagement are to be applied.

**Indemnity and insurance requirement**

2.22. The MOD Operations Directorate will prepare ministerial submissions for all MACA requests. This will include any requirement for legal indemnity,\(^{58}\) insurance and the position regarding the provision of military resources against commercial alternatives and the implications of state aid. The MOD may wish to be indemnified against potential claims arising from the assistance requested; in this case, MOD legal advisers will provide advice. Joint military commanders (JMCs) are to use RPoC or Headquarter civil secretariats to manage charging and provide advice on relevant policy awareness.

**Health, safety and environmental protection**

2.23. The MOD is required to comply with the Secretary of State for Defence’s Health, Safety and Environmental Protection policy. When Crown exemptions apply, the MOD is under remit to produce internal policy guidance that, so far as is reasonably

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56 Sub-national liaison, undertaken primarily by regional liaison officers, does not require authorisation. The deployment of military teams/personnel to provide specialist advice will require authorisation from the MOD’s Operations Directorate Head Operations (Military).

57 The Queen’s Regulations for the Royal Navy J4801 – 4802, and J4805 – 4806; The Queen’s Regulations for the Army J11.001-010; and The Queen’s Regulations to the Royal Air Force J852.

58 For ‘notice’ operations the MOD’s Operations Directorate will agree indemnity principles with the requesting government department. Usually such principles will be set out in the memorandum of understanding between the MOD and the requesting department.
practicable, produces outcomes that correspond as closely as possible to legislative obligations.

2.24. The Defence Safety Authority (DSA) is responsible for regulating Defence health, safety and environmental protection. Details of the current policy can be found in the relevant joint service publication. Commanders should seek advice through the relevant DSA branch\(^{59}\) where there are concerns regarding health, safety or environmental protection issues. The DSA also provides advice on duty holder responsibilities, risk assessment and risk management.

**Personnel**

2.25. The employment of minors (under the age of 18) and cadets on MACA tasks is strictly governed. The following guidance applies.

   a. **Regular and Reserve Forces.** Regulars and reservists who have not completed Phase 1 military training are not to deploy on MACA operations.

   b. **MOD sponsored cadet forces.** The MOD’s Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets has issued separate direction regarding the employment of cadet force adult volunteers and cadets, and the use of cadet facilities, on MACA operations.\(^{60}\)

   c. **University cadets.** University cadets\(^{61}\) may only be employed on MACA tasks where there is an imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress, or to protect significant property if they are on duty at the time of the request.

   d. **Exchange personnel.** Where personnel from other nations serve on units assigned to operations in the UK, guidance should be sought from the MOD’s Operations Directorate, through the chain of command, before such individuals are committed to operations.

2.26. The Reserve Forces Act 1996 enables reservists to support the regular forces on MACA tasks. It contains a power to call out reservists in the event of national danger or great emergency (this power has not yet had to be used). As a matter of policy, reservists would not be used on front-line tasks in industrial disputes. Nonetheless, these policy limitations do not apply to unit full time reserve service, and non-regular


\(^{61}\) University cadets refers to fully trained members of University Royal Navy Units, Officer Training Corps and University Air Squadrons.
permanent staff personnel. Guidance should be sought from the MOD whenever there is an intention to employ reservists on MACA tasks.

2.27. Reservists attending for duty, including weekend training, can lawfully be ordered to provide support to emerging or ongoing MACA operations. The supporting period must not extend beyond their expected training/duty period and requires appropriate authorisation. Examples of support are described below.

a. Emergency assistance. Heads of establishment may authorise the employment of reservists who volunteer (not a formal call-out) for MACA tasks.

b. Routine assistance. Military assistance can be provided to communities for special projects or events of significant value to the community that do not meet MACA principles (covered later in this chapter). Where there is no benefit in strengthening resilience, such activity falls into the category of community engagement; which sits outside the scope of this doctrine.

2.28. Context. HM Treasury rules direct that government departments must charge for services that do not form part of their funded tasks and that departments must not profit from activity carried out on behalf of another department. With a few exceptions, MACA activity is not funded within the MOD budget and is conducted on a repayment basis.

2.29. Financial principles. Four financial principles govern military assistance.

- Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes.
- Defence assistance should, where necessary, be safeguarded against risks through appropriate indemnity and insurance arrangements.
- Military personnel must not be used as a cheaper alternative or in competition with commercial firms.
- The basis of any financial charge may vary according to the nature of the assistance to which it relates.

2.30. Charging levels and mechanisms. The three charging levels are:

- full costs;
- marginal costs; and
• zero costs.\textsuperscript{62}

Guidance on the MOD’s charging principles are shown in Table 2.1. Additional operational-specific guidance will be given by MOD Defence Resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Activity/detail</th>
<th>Cost to requesting authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military liaison officer (MLO) assessment</td>
<td>Advice from the MLO to civil authorities on the military capabilities and resources available to support an emergency response.</td>
<td>Zero cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assessment team</td>
<td>Advice from a small military assessment team to civil authorities on the military capabilities and resources available to support an emergency response.</td>
<td>Zero cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imminent threat to life</td>
<td>Immediate military intervention to prevent the loss of life.</td>
<td>Zero cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military response</td>
<td>The deployed military resource, carrying out agreed activities at the request of the civilian authorities in response to an emergency or major incident.</td>
<td>Marginal cost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marginal cost is predicated on the request for support being made by the strategic coordinating group (SCG) (the SCG must be activated) for an emergency response. Full costs will be incurred in the recovery phase.

\textsuperscript{62} More details can be found at Annex 2A.
2.31. **Financial responsibility.** Defence personnel dealing with requests for military assistance should be aware of:

- the financial principles likely to be applied;
- where applicable, the requirement for indemnity and insurance cover; and
- the financial implications of conducting the activity.

Civil secretariats should be used to provide authoritative costings.

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63 The local resilience equivalent in Scotland is termed the local resilience partnership.
2.32. The charging policy may change between charging mechanisms during the course of a MACA operation. Marginal costs are likely to be applied in the early stages of a response to an emergency, increasing to full costs levied during the recovery phase, due to protracted Defence involvement and the resulting impact on MOD primary output. When in the national interest, MOD ministers may agree to reduce or waive costs.

**Operation PRISMED: October 2014 to January 2015**

In late 2014 a number of trade unions with extensive representation in the health service secured a mandate for industrial action. To maintain normal services, health authorities across England put in place plans to mitigate the impact of the industrial action, including a request for Defence assistance. Different circumstances across the country meant that the scale and type of support required of Defence varied between trusts with, at one extreme, a large requirement from the London Ambulance Service and, at the other, some ambulance trusts requiring no support at all. A consolidated request for Defence assistance was submitted by the Department of Health, and subsequently authorised by the MOD. Headquarters Standing Joint Commander (UK) developed a nationwide plan, which saw Defence successfully conduct Operation PRISMED between October 2014 and January 2015, when the industrial action was cancelled. As this was a planned operation, the Defence contribution was charged at full cost.
Key points

- Defence Task 1 provides support to the civil authorities for resilience and security in the UK.

- With a few exceptions, Defence ministerial authority must be sought for any request for military resources under military aid to civil authorities (MACA).

- Under the Government’s integrated emergency management principles, our Armed Forces can now expect to be involved in planning and preparation, responding to emergencies, and recovery tasks.

- The Defence contribution to resilience is usually provided by the Armed Services through spare capacity.

- There are three possible legal bases for a MACA deployment: the Royal Prerogative; a Defence Council Order (DCO) under the Emergency Powers Act 1964; or emergency regulations made under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

- Where there is imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress, or to protect significant property, military commanders are authorised to provide immediate assistance without recourse to higher authority.

- Providing military assistance is governed by four principles, authorised when:
  - there is a definite need to act and the tasks the Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear;
  - other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted; and either
  - the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
  - the civil authority has all or some of the capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.

- With a few exceptions, MACA activity is not funded from the MOD budget and is therefore conducted on a repayment basis.
Annex 2A – Charging for military aid to the civil authorities activity

Charging levels

2A.1. The Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s) charging mechanisms are described in more detail in this annex. They are shown in descending order of scale, but application is in accordance with Table 2.1.

2A.2. **Full costs.** Full costs cover both direct and indirect expenditure incurred in providing the assistance, including basic pay, allowances of the personnel involved and marginal costs expenditure. Under Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury rules, it is normal for government departments to recover full costs as default. Full costs are likely to be recovered in the following circumstances.

   a. When there are extended or repeated calls for the same MOD support. Regular use of the same MOD resources is likely to attract full costs, even if they are being used by different civil authorities.

   b. Where the civil authorities are capable of making alternative arrangements (for example, mutual aid) but have not done so.

   c. Where the civil authority charges for the service they are providing (through the military) or have an additional budget allocation for the overall task.

   d. Where support is non-emergency, planned or routine support, unless it is judged there is a military benefit to Defence which offsets the cost.

2A.3. **Marginal costs.** Marginal costs are costs for military activity that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. This includes: travel; subsistence; fuel; the cancellation of contracts as a result of Defence conducting military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) tasks; mobilisation bounty for Reserve Forces; and any similar expenditure. In addition, there may be an ‘opportunity cost’. This is the cost of a

64 The content of marginal costs is set out in 2A.3.
65 If Service Commands choose to deploy a reservist over a regular in support to other government departments then the appropriate top level budget will absorb the additional cost, unless they are providing a niche capability.
resource in terms of its alternative use. For example, the costs of deferring/cancelling planned Defence activity or recalling personnel from leave or stand down to hold them at increased readiness. Defence Resources may recommend applying a flat rate to cover such costs. Marginal costs may be applied when:

- a task is undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities and has a direct benefit to the MOD;

- a task can be combined with an action that the MOD would undertake on its own behalf (for example, when a MACA task provides Defence-related training for our Armed Forces); and

- responding to an emergency, the strategic coordinating group has been established.

2A.4. **Zero costs.** Costs may be waived when there:

- is an imminent threat to life;
- is a need to alleviate distress;
- is a need to protect significant property; or
- other exceptional circumstances.

In all other circumstances, the decision to waive costs is taken by ministers. Military liaison/advice activity provided to civil authorities responding to an emergency is free of charge.

**Guidance**

2A.5. **Contingency.** During the planning phase, and dependent on the likely MACA task, Defence Resources will recommend charging a contingency amount to cover unforeseen costs. This provides the requesting authority with a realistic figure to help with planning and evaluating value for money.

2A.6. **Recovery.** The Director General Finance is responsible for coordinating the recovery of costs when multiple MOD top level budgets (TLBs) are involved in MACA activity. Command/Civil Service secretaries will be issued with a financial instruction detailing the procedures to be followed. In all other cases, individual TLBs are responsible for ensuring processes are in place to recover costs. In all cases, TLB finance staff are to be consulted.

66 Or local resilience partnership (LRP) in Scotland.
2A.7. **Records.** All expenditure/receipts (estimated or otherwise) should be reported by single-Service Command/TLB finance staff, through the budgetary chain of command to civil secretary/budget manager. Units must keep detailed expenditure records with invoices, for audit purposes.

2A.8. **Cost estimate.** It is often difficult to accurately predict the cost of military support. A civil authority that bases its request for MACA on the assumption that military support is cheaper than commercial sources could be mistaken. As a rule, therefore, the MOD does not guarantee to provide a cost estimate (as opposed to guidance on the charging regime) when it considers providing the support.

2A.9. **Value added tax.** In most circumstances, MOD will not charge value added tax (VAT) to other government departments. However, if there is a commercial alternative to MOD service/goods, then VAT must be charged so that the UK Government is not undercutting the commercial market. Each scenario is reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

2A.10. **State aid.** State aid is described as any advantage granted by public authorities through the application of state resources on a selective basis to any organisation that could potentially distort competition and trade. The description of state aid is very broad because ‘an advantage’ can take many forms: it is anything which an undertaking (an organisation engaged in economic activity) could not get on the open market. Using taxpayer-funded resources to provide assistance to one or more organisations in a way that gives an advantage over others may be considered as state aid. State aid rules can (among other things) apply to the use or sale of a state asset for free or at less than market price. The rules can apply to funding given to charities, public authorities and other non-profit making bodies where they are involved in commercial activities.

"It is often difficult to accurately predict the cost of military support."
Chapter 3 details the end-to-end process for the employment, command and control, and recovery of Defence capability assigned to providing support to the civil authorities. It outlines the resilience and security roles, the military aid request mechanism, and planning considerations.

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“All things are ready, if our minds be so”

Henry V, William Shakespeare
Chapter 3 – Process: ways

Section 1 – Roles

3.1. In response to requests for military assistance, Defence may contribute in five main roles, or functions, as follows:

- command and control;
- liaison;
- specialist advice and capability;
- general and non-specialist support; and
- education, training and mentoring.

Role 1 – Command and control

3.2. Strategic. The MOD acts as both a military headquarters and a Department of State. Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) and the Director General Security Policy (DG Sec Pol) provide strategic guidance to ministers and other government departments through the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). The Operations Directorate will take the lead for all UK operations activity.

3.3. Full command. Full command will usually be retained and exercised by the single-Service chiefs.

3.4. Operational command. At the military operational level, the Army’s Commander Home Command is appointed as the Standing Joint Commander UK (SJC(UK)). The SJC(UK) is responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) for the planning, execution and conduct of Defence’s contribution to resilience operations and other nominated operations in the UK during peacetime. CDS issues a formal directive to the SJC(UK), which specifies tasks and an area of operations covering the UK land mass and the Crown Dependencies. A small standing headquarters sits alongside the SJC(UK) to provide staff support. Headquarters Standing Joint Commander (UK) (HQ SJC(UK)) is able to conduct joint actions and maintains close links with the three single-Service commands and Defence agencies for force generation.
3.5. **Tactical command.** At the tactical level, command and control of Defence forces will usually be delivered through the Army’s RPoC structure. The RPoCs comprise the Headquarters of London District, a 2* headquarters in the capital, together with nine further Army brigades and headquarters across the remainder of the UK. RPoC headquarters maintain strong links with the civil authorities within boundaries to understand the likely disruptive challenges that may occur. When tasked by the SJC(UK), they provide joint military commanders who will exercise command over Defence assets. In some circumstances a joint commander from another Service may be appointed for specific operations. For example, maritime and air tasks will be allocated to the Fleet Commander, Navy Command, and Deputy Commander Operations, Air Command, respectively.

3.6. **Coordinating authority.** The HQ SJC(UK) will execute the role of coordinating authority over the activities of Defence agencies within boundaries. Specifically, it oversees the deployment, management and recovery of any assets generated from Defence agencies. Figure 3.1 shows the command and control model.

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HMS Bulwark served as the maritime multi-agency bronze afloat to command and coordinate security for the London Olympic sailing events

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67 London District is commanded by a major general, referred to as a 2*. The further nine regional points of command (RPoCs) comprising seven Army brigades are commanded by a brigadier, referred to as a 1*, and two headquarters, which are commanded by a colonel (NATO OF5 rank). Details of Army resilience areas of responsibility are at Annex 3A.
3.7. Defence support to the civil authorities is dependent upon timely and effective liaison with other government departments, civil authorities and, occasionally,
commercial concerns. Defence’s resilience capability is built around full-time liaison officers provided by the single-Services, which comprise:

- joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs);
- Royal Navy regional liaison officers (RNRLOs);
- Royal Air Force regional liaison officers (RAFRLOs); and
- military liaison officers and teams.  

**Role 3 – Specialist advice and capability**

3.8. Defence can deploy specialist capabilities and provide advice to support the civil authorities. Defence specialist support is focussed on five areas:

- explosive ordnance disposal (EOD);
- specialist scientific support, primarily the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl);
- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR);
- communications; and
- cyber.  

**Role 4 – General and non-specialist support**

3.9. Defence may deploy general support to the civil authorities. The MOD’s Operations Directorate is likely to use the most appropriate and available regular unit or Service personnel. While personnel may not need specific pre-deployment training, all personnel required to support a Defence operation in the UK will undergo a period of reception, staging, onward movement and integration, to include task-oriented training or familiarisation.

a. **Counter-terrorism operations.** Although counter-terrorism operations are a Home Office lead, there may be circumstances where Defence is required to deploy in support of the police.

b. **UK Standby Battalion.** The Army fields three UK Standby Battalions (UKSBs); they provide the Army’s generalist force of choice for operations in support of civil authorities. These are described further in Chapter 4.

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68 Details of these are in Annex 3A.
69 The Defence lead for cyber support is the Joint Force Cyber Group.
70 For more information, see Cyber Primer, (2nd Edition), July 2016.
Role 5 – Education and training

3.10. The MOD directs and delivers a wide range of resilience collective and individual training. This is described in more detail in Chapter 4.

Section 2 – Tasks

3.11. Defence support to the civil authorities falls into four broad categories:

- fixed tasks;
- enduring tasks;
- response phase tasks; and
- recovery phase tasks.

3.12. **Fixed tasks.** Fixed tasks directly relate to the Defence Tasks expressed in *Defence Strategic Direction 2016*. These tasks are the irreducible minimum tasks that Defence is liable to deliver on a continual basis irrespective of other demands, including in the event of war-fighting at scale. Fixed tasks are non-discretionary and delivered by assigned forces.
3.13. **Enduring tasks.** These comprise a wide range of tasks, usually undertaken on an open-ended basis, and may be underpinned by written agreements with requesting government departments. Examples include the Royal Navy’s contribution to fishery protection and the tri-Service support to explosive ordnance disposal.

3.14. **Response phase tasks.** One of the UK Government’s standing strategic priorities during an emergency is to ‘protect life and, as far as possible, property, and alleviate suffering’. Defence support during the response phase of a civil-led operation contributes to delivering the desired outcome. The process to be followed for delivering Defence support will depend upon the specific circumstances at the time. In the event that life is at risk, where there is a need to alleviate distress, or there is a need to protect significant property, then the local commander has the authority to deploy any assets under their command.

a. **Urgent response.** A local commander is authorised to deploy any assets under command where there is an imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress, or to protect significant property, in accordance with a Defence Council Order (DCO), dated 17 January 1983, under circumstances where the need for assistance is urgent and where time does not allow a local commander to consult the higher chain of command.
b. **Routine response.** In all other circumstances where there is time to consult the higher chain of command, Defence assistance will be sought using the request process and documentation described in Section 3. Requests from the local level will usually, although not exclusively, be made by the chair of a strategic coordinating group (SCG) and submitted in writing, to the relevant lead government department (LGD) for further consideration.

### Section 3 – Requesting Defence support

**General**

3.16. Requests for support from Defence will follow two broad channels: ‘top down’, where the request will be driven from central government, or ‘bottom up’, where the request will be made by civil authorities at the sub-national or local level. Support may be requested during the preparatory, response and/or recovery phases. Requests will always be required in writing and will need authorisation through a process which is described below and highlighted in Figure 3.2.

**Principles**

3.17. **Top down requests.** Top down requests will usually be generated above the local level by the LGD or by the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). Before proceeding with the request, MOD staff will ascertain the details of which department will fund the cost of Defence support and where any liability might lie. Operations Directorate staff will determine the capability required and balance this against current Defence priorities and operations in submissions to ministers.

3.18. **Bottom up requests.** Requests for support are submitted in writing, usually signed off by a police officer of at least chief superintendent rank, the chair of a SCG, or an individual of equivalent status from an organisation categorised as a responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. On those rare occasions that a commercial concern requires military assistance, the request must be channelled through the appropriate LGD.

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71 Or the regional resilience partnership in Scotland.
3.19. **Devolved administrations.** The LGD principle applies, and Defence will expect requests relating to support in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to be channelled via the Northern Ireland Office, the Scotland Office or the Wales Office as appropriate, and not direct from the devolved government.

3.20. **Request format.** Requests must be submitted in writing using a template providing as much information as is available at the time (explained further at Annex 3B). The key information required includes:

- the desired effect;
- acceptance of financial responsibility; and
- acceptance of liability.
3.21. Written request. The request is to be written and authorised by a senior representative of the requesting civil authority. The request format must contain the name of the requesting organisation, which organisation will be accepting financial liability, and as much detail as possible on the nature of the desired effect. Joint or single-Service regional liaison officers and the Government Liaison Officer should be consulted when compiling the request. HQ SJC(UK) should be provided with a copy of the request submitted to the LGD by the regional liaison officer as soon as possible.

3.22. Consideration by the lead government department. LGDs will consider whether or not to support the request. Factors that will influence their decision include:

- financial constraints;
- availability of mutual aid; and
- availability of commercial and other sources of support.

A request for military assistance must be approved at ministerial level within the requesting government department. Once the request is approved, it should be sent to the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Duty Officer within the MOD.  

3.23. Considerations by the Ministry of Defence. The MOD’s Operations Directorate will consider the request against the four military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) principles and the legal tests detailed in Chapter 2. The Operations Directorate will provide policy-based military advice to ministers to help them decide. Their decision will address:

- policy – whether the request is compliant with Defence policy;
- political picture – if there is a political imperative or direction to undertake a task;
- precedent – if Defence has previously undertaken a similar task, then that may increase the likelihood of further requests being approved; and
- capacity/capability – whether Defence has the ability to conduct the task.

3.24. Activation. The MOD will follow the process detailed at Annex 3C. A hierarchy of documentation related to the operation is likely to include the following:

a. Defence Council Order. If the task is for non-military activity authorised under the Emergency Powers Act 1964 (Section 2), a DCO is required. It will authorise Defence to undertake defined tasks within a specified time frame.

b. Memorandum of understanding/service level agreement. For planned support, a memorandum of understanding or service level agreement (SLA) will

72 Copied to the MOD UK Operations Team.
be agreed between the requesting civil authority and Defence setting out the principles of the support provided and the respective roles and responsibilities.

c. **Activation order.** A formal, military document authorising the force generation of assets, from all three Services if required, to undertake specified tasks and, usually, placing them under the operational command of SJC(UK).

d. **Operational staff work.** The Joint Commander, single-Service commanders and RPoC commanders will issue a range of operational staff working as appropriate to the operation.

### Subsequent operation orders

Following the receipt of an activation order, HQ SJC(UK) will issue its own operation order. Subordinate headquarters may issue their own operation orders if required.

### Miscellaneous

#### Reserve Forces and Cadets Association estate

Where the civil authorities request to use estate owned or managed by the Reserve Forces and Cadet Association (RFCA), the relevant regional liaison officer is to ensure that the local RFCA headquarters is made aware of the request. Formal authorisation for its use will be in accordance with the flow chart at Annex 3C. Advice can be sought from the MOD’s Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets.

#### Non-core estate

A number of ranges and other elements of Defence estate within the UK are owned by the MOD but managed by AWE, Dstl or QinetiQ under a long-term partnering agreement. Should such estate be required, then the relevant Army RPoC brigade/headquarters commander is to be informed. In addition, the request is to be submitted by the relevant regional liaison officer to the Training, Evaluation, Services and Targets team within Headquarters Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), who will advise on the appropriateness of the request for its use. Formal authorisation for its use will be given by DE&S, in consultation with the relevant agency.

#### Defence Infrastructure Organisation

Arrangements for using Defence estate managed by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation are in Chapter 4.

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73 Joint Service Publication (JSP) 814, Policy and Regulations for MOD Sponsored Cadet Forces, February 2016, provides further guidance.
Section 4 – Planning considerations

3.29. **Planning assistance.** Military planners are able to support the civil authorities in the UK. Following recent examples of successful joint planning in response to an emergency or major national event (for example, the 2007 Gloucestershire floods and the 2012 London Olympics), civil authorities are now encouraged to seek early assistance from our Armed Forces. Planning guidance within Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning* (with UK national elements) will allow military planners to assist civil authorities in preparing for, and managing the response to, and recovery from, an emergency.

3.30. **Military assessment team.** A military assessment team may be deployed alongside existing liaison officers (JRLO and MLO) to provide specific or specialist military advice to civil authorities in preparation for, or in response to emergencies. No charge will be made to the civil authority requesting military advice. Deployment of a military assessment team can be authorised by Head Operations (Military) within the MOD’s Operations Directorate.

3.31. **Readiness.** When directed, Defence will provide capability at readiness to support the civil authorities. Readiness is defined as: the period of time measured from an initiation order to the moment when the HQ or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward deployed) or ready for deployment. 74 Readiness may be described in two ways.

   a. **Notice to move.** This is the time allowed, expressed usually in days/hours, for units to be able to move from their base location following an order from higher authority to do so.

   b. **Notice to effect.** The time allowed, expressed usually in days/hours, for units to be at a location of employment, generating a pre-arranged effect, with an agreed capability.

3.32. **Best effort.** Best effort is defined as: the rapid generation and deployment of personnel or capability, not nominated or pre-warned, for a particular operation, at best speed. 75 Generating the force quickly may require risk to be taken against personnel, training and equipment, and may have an impact on other activities.

75 This is a proposed new definition which will be added to the UK endorsed glossary when this publication is promulgated.
Under certain circumstances, such as security or counter-terrorism operations, the need for rapid support from Defence might be of critical importance to the UK.

3.33. **Whole Force.** Where appropriate, the Whole Force approach will be applied, with regulars, reservists, contractors and civil servants being considered for use on operations in the UK. With the exception of certain roles and capabilities, reservists are not held at readiness for operations in the UK; in the event they are required for such operations, the MOD’s Operations Directorate is to be informed soonest. The following considerations apply.

a. In *extremis*, where a call out order is not in effect, reservists may be used on Man Training Days for a period that does not exceed five days without recourse to mobilisation.

b. The SJC(UK) holds delegated authority to mobilise 2 Signal Group reservists employed on high readiness reserve.

3.34. **Apportionment.** Where niche capabilities are requested to support the civil authorities, the MOD’s Operations Directorate will assign these from the single-Service command best placed to meet the task. For larger, more generic operations, the Operations Directorate may apply the 1:3:1 principle; against this ratio, personnel will be provided from the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force respectively. Often this principle is combined with a geographic-based approach to force generation (for example, the Royal Marines are more likely to be used in South West England).

3.35. **Cooperation and integration.** The MOD’s Operations Directorate will provide direction on any emerging requirement for military planners/specialists to augment other government departments, or work in conjunction with foreign governments during an emergency or event. Similarly, military planners/specialists should be prepared to establish quick, durable links with the equivalent civil authority planners.

3.36. **Skills and capability.** When considering military support, military planners and regional liaison officers should steer civil authorities towards asking for an effect. Using effects terminology allows the MOD’s Operations Directorate to task the optimal military solution. This may comprise:

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76 Some reservists on 2 Signal Group are held on high readiness terms and conditions of service.

77 Mobilisation is the default option. It provides reservists with the optimal conditions of service including renumeration, employment protection and medical support. A call-out order should be enabled within 24 hours. Man Training Days can be used until the mobilisation process is implemented. Where the required timeframe is less than 24 hours Reserves Forces and Cadets should be consulted.

78 The 1:3:1 principle means that, for every five personnel generated, one will be from the Royal Navy, three from the British Army and one from the Royal Air Force (RAF). It is usually applied based on ‘colour of cloth’; whereby RAF personnel serving with the Joint Helicopter Command are viewed as RAF, not Army (in whose chain of command the Joint Helicopter Command resides).

79 Resilience effects include: understand; clear; protect; reassure; and support.
• niche capability (for example, divers or boat units to assist with understand, clear and support);
• specialist personnel (for example, photographic interpreters or Specialist Teams Royal Engineers to assist with understand); and
• units (for example, UKSB, to assist with support, clear, protect and reassure).

**Operation PITCHPOLE: aerial imagery during Thames Valley flooding**

In 2013/14 severe winter weather brought significant localised flooding to many parts of the UK. The effect of successive storms required local, sub-national and national coordinated responses. Defence initially responded to routine requests for assistance, but once the scale of the situation had been recognised, Defence put in place a flood relief operation (Operation PITCHPOLE) led by the Standing Joint Commander (UK). The continuous rainfall led to widespread ground saturation, with the River Thames recording the highest flow rates on record. There were a great number of MACA requests both for manpower and niche capabilities. While the National Police Air Service helicopters were able to provide low level imagery, three of the strategic coordinating groups (SCGs), responding to the flooding, and the Environment Agency approached Royal Air Force regional liaison officer (RAFRLO) London and South East on 12 February 2014 to request more strategic imagery. The RAFRLO worked with the SCGs to identify areas of interest for the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance air platforms to overfly. Both Sentinel and Tornado GR4, fitted with RAPTOR pods, aircraft were used. Following analysis by RAF image analysts, the imagery product greatly assisted strategic planning and decision making. This helped reduce both risk to life and damage to properties and infrastructure.
3.37. **Support.** Preparing for, and during, emergencies, civil authorities may seek to use Defence estate. This comprises providing Defence estate, facilities and/or equipment to:

- support the mounting of a civil authority’s operation; or
- support training and exercising activities undertaken or led by such authorities.

In both cases a formal request is required, even when there is a mutual benefit to Defence from supporting such activity. Requests to support operations, those that are sensitive or likely to attract media attention require authorisation from MOD Head of Operations (Military). Under specific circumstances they will require ministerial authorisation. All other requests relating to training/exercising may be authorised by single-Service commanders at the local level. Unless directed otherwise, then the pre-planned activities will be charged at full cost.

3.38. **Lessons capture.** Lessons are likely to be identified during all three phases of an operation: preparation; response; and recovery. Adhering to Defence policy, military lessons capture will apply the six principles:

- capture;
- analyse;
- fuse;
- assess;
- exploit; and
- track.

At the end of each operation, HQ SJC(UK) is responsible for coordinating the capture of military lessons, through post-event reporting, and the appropriate follow-up action. Defence may be invited to contribute to the civil authorities’ lessons capture process. While we are not obliged to support these events where appropriate and when invited, Defence should endeavour to attend.

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Section 5 – Integrity of UK waters and airspace

Direction

3.39. The UK is dependent on both sea and air lines of communication. Within Defence Task 1, the subordinate fixed task, namely ‘maritime and air integrity of the UK’ directs the MOD to ‘maintain and where necessary, demonstrate the capability to enforce UK sovereignty within territorial waters and UK airspace’.  

UK waters

3.40. The United Nation’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the international body overseeing maritime safety and security worldwide. The Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency are responsible for implementing the IMO’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code within UK waters and port facilities. The code contains detailed security-related requirements for national governments, port authorities and shipping companies.

3.41. The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security details the UK’s approach to maritime security. This contains five maritime security objectives; the third and fourth of which have particular relevance to resilience and security within UK waters. The strategy requires a number of partners comprising other government departments and agencies to work together in delivering maritime security, which includes the MOD. This is achieved by: understanding; influencing; preventing; protecting; and responding.

3.42. In addition to Defence Task 1, the MOD formally supports other government departments and agencies with responsibility for aspects of UK maritime security. These are summarised in Table 3.1.

81 Defence Strategic Direction 2016, October 2016, page 111.
82 This is a mandatory requirement for all countries party to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974; the UK is a signatory.
85 Ibid; page 9. Third objective: ‘protecting the UK, our citizens and our economy by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign group-flagged passenger and cargo ships’. Fourth objective: ‘assuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK Marine Area’.
86 For example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Border Force, HM Revenue and Customs, the National Crime Agency, the police and our Armed Forces.
87 For example, the National Maritime Information Centre embodies the strategy’s core principles of integration and collaboration, by acting as the national fusion focal point for intelligence/information sharing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Government department/agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritime environmental protection</td>
<td>Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage</td>
<td>Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations of maritime accidents</td>
<td>Department for Transport/Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of air accidents</td>
<td>Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety at sea</td>
<td>Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil search and rescue</td>
<td>Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port and shipping security</td>
<td>Department for Transport – transport security(^{88}) and MOD(^{89})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration control</td>
<td>Home Office/Border Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of UK customs and fiscal enforcement</td>
<td>HM Revenue and Customs(^{90})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious and organised crime including counter narcotic interdiction</td>
<td>National Crime Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine enforcement</td>
<td>Marine Management Organisation on behalf of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency and, in Northern Ireland, the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster relief and humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Home Office/local authorities/police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 – UK Government department responsibilities for maritime security

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88 The Department for Transport is responsible for the security of all major means of transport. Transport Security is the department’s coordination arrangements for responding to serious disruption.
89 MOD: Naval Base Commander for naval dockyards.
90 HM Revenue and Customs has departmental responsibility to the Chief Secretary of the Treasury; this arrangement reflects Customs primary responsibility which is to collect revenue on goods brought into the UK.
UK airspace

3.43. The UK is responsible under International Civil Aviation Organisation and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations for the safety and security of aircraft flying through UK airspace. The Department for Transport, the MOD and the Civil Aviation Authority are responsible for the integrity of UK airspace. This is achieved by establishing situational awareness\textsuperscript{91} to detect and analyse potential airborne threats,\textsuperscript{92} with contingency plans for the interception, escort and potential neutralisation of established airborne threats.\textsuperscript{93}

3.44. Detailed contingency plans for ensuring the integrity of UK airspace against airborne threats exist. However, these are beyond the classification of this publication.

Section 6 – Military operations in support of strategic and overseas tasks

3.45. **Direction.** *Defence Strategic Direction 2016* requires our Armed Forces to support standing strategic and overseas military tasks.\textsuperscript{94} These require Defence to work closely with civil authorities and adopt the same command and control protocols as those employed for UK security and resilience. These tasks although categorized as UK Operations, are not considered to be MACA even though they may include military support to some form of resilience or security operation or activity.

3.46. **Military support to the mounting of operations.** The planning, deployment, support and recovery of overseas operations are known as military support to the mounting of operations (MSMO). MSMO cover:

- reception arrangements for military patients;
- UK lines of communication;

\textsuperscript{91} Situational awareness is achieved by fusing civil air traffic control pictures with corresponding military data and resources to form the recognised air picture.

\textsuperscript{92} Potential airborne threats comprise: aircraft losing communications; renegade aircraft (a stolen or hijacked aircraft by terrorists to perpetrate a terrorist act); and asymmetric capabilities (including light aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and slow moving airborne platforms).

\textsuperscript{93} Further details on defence counter-air operations are in Air Publication (AP) 3002, *Air and Space Warfare*, Third Edition, February 2016, page 6-10.

\textsuperscript{94} *Defence Strategic Direction 2016*, April 2016, pages 26-31.
• United States/UK lines of communication;
• the security of Defence critical assets;
• Defence nuclear emergency; and
• return of UK Armed Forces and their dependants.  

Planning for MSMO requires extensive liaison between military staffs and civil authorities, particularly the police. Direction on MSMO will be issued under separate arrangements by the MOD’s Operations Directorate.

Section 7 – Related activity

3.47. **Aircraft post-crash management.** Aircraft post-crash management (APCM) is not MACA activity. Occasionally, the civil authorities mistakenly view APCM as MACA activity. This is due to the similarity between MACA activity and an APCM response requiring the military and civil authorities to work together. APCM policy is set by the Military Aviation Authority (MAA), which is part of the Defence Safety Authority (DSA); this sits outside the scope of this publication.  

3.48. **Youth engagement.** Youth engagement activity between Defence and youth groups/cadet forces is covered in a number of joint service publications. Youth engagement activity sits outside the scope of this publication; the Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets within the MOD will provide direction and guidance on youth engagement.

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95 Details of these operations are at Annex 3D.
96 The Military Aviation Authority’s *Manual of Post-Crash Management*, April 2015, is the definitive policy for air post-crash management.
Key points

• At the military operational level, the Standing Joint Commander (UK) has primary responsibility for overseeing the Defence contribution to the planning and execution of joint and other government department-led civil contingency operations in the UK within a defined area of responsibility.

• Defence’s resilience capability is built around full-time liaison officers provided by the single-Services. These include: joint regional liaison officers; Royal Navy regional liaison officers; and Royal Air Force regional liaison officers.

• Defence can provide advice and deploy specialist capabilities and general support to the civil authorities.

• Defence support to the civil authorities falls into four categories:
  o enduring tasks;
  o fixed tasks;
  o response phase tasks; and
  o recovery phase tasks.

• Requests for support from Defence arise from: ‘top down’ where the request is driven from central government; and ‘bottom up’, where the request will be made by civil authorities at the regional or local level.

• Planning civil authorities are now encouraged to seek early assistance from our Armed Forces; when directed, Defence provides capability to support the civil authorities; and where able, the Whole Force approach will be applied.

• When considering Defence support, planners and regional liaison officers should steer civil authorities towards asking for an effect.

• Implied within Defence Task 1, the MOD supports other government departments and agencies with responsibility for aspects of UK maritime security.

• Detailed contingency plans for ensuring the integrity of UK airspace against airborne threats exist.
Notes
Annex 3A – Liaison

3A.1. Royal Navy regional liaison officers. The Royal Navy maintains a regionally-based organisation of four Naval Regional Commanders (NRCs) in the UK, all of whom have a broad range of single-Service responsibilities. Their duties include providing specialist advice on Royal Navy and Royal Marines capabilities and this is delivered through four Royal Navy regional liaison officers (RNRLOs). A map showing the laydown of RNRLOs within the Royal Navy regional chain of command is shown at Figure 3A.1.

Figure 3A.1 – Royal Navy regional commands within the UK

98 The Naval Regional Commanders are based in Rosyth, Liverpool, Bristol and London.
3A.2. **Joint regional liaison officers.** There are 14 full-time joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs) and they all serve under the operational command of their respective RPoC commanders. They maintain direct liaison with HQ SJC(UK). JRLOs have primacy amongst the pool of regional liaison officers. A map showing the British Army’s RPoC structure, through which JRLOs are deployed, is at Figure 3A.2.

![Figure 3A.2 – British Army regional point of command structure in the UK](image-url)
3A.3. **RAF regional liaison officers.** The RAF maintains a network of ten regional RAF liaison officers (RAFRLOs) in the UK which, from a resilience perspective, are the single-Service focal point. They have additional responsibilities for: aircraft post-crash management; arms control; and business continuity advice. Whilst based across the UK, they fall under the operational command of Headquarters Air Command. RAFRLOs all have deputies, employed on reservist terms of service, holding the rank of squadron leader. A map showing the laydown of RAFRLOs is at Figure 3A.3.

Figure 3A.3 – RAF regional point of command structure in the UK
3A.4. **Wider liaison.** A number of recent operations highlighted the need for Defence to be prepared to field a wider range of liaison officers. For example, during the 2012 Olympic Games liaison officers were deployed into key government departments, the Metropolitan Police at various levels, and into some of the Games’ organisational bodies. To respond to current planning requirements, Defence has generated a pool of liaison officers specifically for land-based security tasks. The nature of any wider liaison requirement will be driven by the event, but Defence must remain prepared to field, at short notice, liaison officers at all levels from strategic to tactical.
Annex 3B – Military aid to the civil authorities request form guidance

3B.1. If military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) is required then a request form should be completed. A MACA request form has several sections that need to be populated. A copy of the revised template can be obtained from Standing Joint Commander UK (SJC(UK)). Guidance on completing the MACA request form, with example text highlighted, follows.

a. Summary of the situation – to be completed by the requesting agency
   This includes:
   • an estimate of the severity and the number of properties/people affected;
   • any special considerations, such as vulnerable communities and future forecasts;
   • the implications of not achieving this request; and
   • an outline of next actions or events.

b. The requesting agency should indicate what effect the military support is seeking to achieve. An example of this text is below.

   In view of the identified risks of widespread flooding in multiple locations throughout the county the request for military assistance is as follows.

   **Preparation and prevention**
   Assist multi-agency responders to maximise the safety and security of communities by taking all reasonable steps to protect vulnerable premises and locations by:

   • erecting temporary demountable flood defence barriers (where, how many, by when);
   • constructing sandbag flood defences as required (where, how many, by when); and
   • clearing debris that may lead to blockages of waterways (where, how many, by when).
Response
Assist multi-agency responders by:

- warning and informing the community of the flood risk (where, how many people, by when);
- being prepared to provide support to evacuate the community to designated rest centres (where, how many people and are any vulnerable communities involved, by when); and
- gaining access to communities cut-off by flood waters, ensuring that essential provisions are provided (where, how many people and are any vulnerable communities involved, by when).

c. The requesting agency should indicate whether there is a requirement for armed assistance.

d. When is the effect required? The requesting agency should complete and the following key words should be considered for use (this list is not exhaustive but these are terms recognised within Defence and may speed up the provision of capability): clear, confirm, coordinate, deliver, deny, deploy, distribute, escort, establish, evacuate, extract, find, guard, inform, liaise, protect, relieve, reassure, replenish, search, support, transport, warn.

e. The requesting agency should indicate what alternatives have been considered as explained in the example below.

Due to the size of preparation and prevention measures, and potential requirement for large-scale evacuation effort, the multi-agency response capabilities of responders has become stretched. Mutual aid for XXX County Council is in place along with a number of volunteer organisations.

f. What, when, where, how and for how long? The MOD liaison officer is to complete this, and include:

- effect to be achieved;
- what (assets required);
- when (date-time-group of all taskings and duration); and
- where (location).

g. An impact statement – MOD liaison officer to complete as far as is practicable. To include:

- disruptions to Defence;
h. A list of liabilities and charges which the MOD liaison officer is to complete. It should highlight that the requesting authority:

- accepts responsibility for a risk assessment;
- accepts own indemnity against loss, damage, injury or death while on MOD estate;
- has been issued with an appropriate licence from Defence Estates; and
- is aware that costs will be recovered by the MOD.

i. As far as practicable the liaison officer should complete the estimated costs.

j. A comment from by HQ SJC(UK) (if required).

3B.2. When completed by the requesting department, the MACA request form should be sent to the Operations Directorate, copied to the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Duty Officer.
Annex 3C – Military aid to the civil authorities request process

Is the assistance required urgently to save life, alleviate distress or protect significant property?

Activity can be undertaken at the local commander’s direction using the 1983 Defence Council Order – inform MOD as soon as possible.

Is the assistance requested ‘normal military work’?*

Ministerial authorisation required.

Is the assistance requested ‘urgent work of national importance’?**

Defence Council Order needed authorising the work as ‘urgent work of national importance’ – must be signed by minister and military representative.

Is the assistance requested, use of Defence estate/facilities to support a civil authorities’ operation?

1* Operations Directorate (Military) sign-off required.***

May be authorised by single-Service regional commander.****

Is the assistance requested, use of Defence estate/facilities to support a civil authorities’ training?

Is the assistance required urgently to save life, alleviate distress or protect significant property?

Activity can be undertaken at the local commander’s direction using the 1983 Defence Council Order – inform MOD as soon as possible.

Is the assistance requested ‘normal military work’?*

Ministerial authorisation required.

Is the assistance requested ‘urgent work of national importance’?**

Defence Council Order needed authorising the work as ‘urgent work of national importance’ – must be signed by minister and military representative.

Is the assistance requested, use of Defence estate/facilities to support a civil authorities’ operation?

1* Operations Directorate (Military) sign-off required.***

May be authorised by single-Service regional commander.****

Is the assistance requested, use of Defence estate/facilities to support a civil authorities’ training?

Is the assistance required urgently to save life, alleviate distress or protect significant property?

Activity can be undertaken at the local commander’s direction using the 1983 Defence Council Order – inform MOD as soon as possible.

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1* Operations Directorate (Military) sign-off required.***

May be authorised by single-Service regional commander.****

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May be authorised by single-Service regional commander.****

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1* Operations Directorate (Military) sign-off required.***

May be authorised by single-Service regional commander.****

Is the assistance requested, use of Defence estate/facilities to support a civil authorities’ training?

Is the assistance required urgently to save life, alleviate distress or protect significant property?

Activity can be undertaken at the local commander’s direction using the 1983 Defence Council Order – inform MOD as soon as possible.

Is the assistance requested ‘normal military work’?*

Ministerial authorisation required.

Is the assistance requested ‘urgent work of national importance’?**

Defence Council Order needed authorising the work as ‘urgent work of national importance’ – must be signed by minister and military representative.

Is the assistance requested, use of Defence estate/facilities to support a civil authorities’ operation?

1* Operations Directorate (Military) sign-off required.***

May be authorised by single-Service regional commander.****

Is the assistance requested, use of Defence estate/facilities to support a civil authorities’ training?

* What constitutes ‘normal military work’ is a policy question, but in general terms would involve activity which involves some degree of training which Defence already possesses for military purposes.

** What constitutes ‘urgent work of national importance’ is a policy question, but the implication is that this should be exceptional and rare.

*** Delegated from Minister for the Armed Forces – novel or contentious requests should be referred for ministerial authorisation and considered for Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury endorsement. In the absence of Head Operations Military (Hd Ops Mil), Assistant Head (Military) UK Operations (AH (Mil) UK Ops) is empowered to authorise.

**** Royal Navy – Naval Regional Commander or Naval Base Commander; Army – regional point of command commander; and Royal Air Force – RAF station commander. Referred for ministerial authorisation and considered for HM Treasury endorsement. In the absence of Hd Ops Mil, AH (Mil) UK Ops is empowered to authorise.
Annex 3D – Military support to the mounting of operations

Reception arrangements for military patients

3D.1. Military casualties sustained overseas requiring specialist treatment will be repatriated to the UK whenever possible. Potentially, within an overseas theatre, prisoners of war and local/other civilians will be treated the same. The National Health Service is responsible for the reception, triage and acute secondary care of military patients repatriated to the UK. The National Health Service is responsible for apportioning casualties to hospitals, which is based on bed availability and clinical need.

UK lines of communication

3D.2. Our UK Armed Forces deploying on overseas operations will need to use peacetime lines of communications. To enable the deployment and during times of heightened threat, the lines of communication may need protection. Measures include movement control and the main road route system. When tasked by the MOD Operations Directorate, Headquarters Standing Joint Commander UK (HQ SJC(UK)) is responsible for maintaining plans to support the protection of UK lines of communication.99

United States/UK lines of communication

3D.3. Under the United States (US) Visiting Forces arrangement, the US military maintains bases in the UK. The number and size of US bases may increase during times of heightened tension/crisis. This arrangement allows for the provision of ad hoc assistance without recourse to politicians for the requisite authority. In addition, the UK Government has a bilateral arrangement with their US counterparts known as the US/UK lines of communication. This arrangement covers the in extremis provision of host nation support that extends beyond the scope of the United States Visiting Force arrangement. Specifically, this covers the reception and out load of US forces to/from the UK and the staging of forces through the UK prior to, or during a deployment. On behalf of the MOD, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Logistic

99 Requests for details on movement control and main road route system measures should be directed to the HQ SJC(UK) Duty Officer.
Operations) (ACDS (Log Ops)) is responsible for the US/UK lines of communication, supported by the MOD’s Operations Directorate, with HQ SJC(UK) providing the operational command focus for support activity.  

Defence critical infrastructure

3D.4. Defence critical national infrastructure (DefCNI) is an installation, system or facility which is of critical and unique importance in supporting any military operation. The protection and security of any DefCNI is the responsibility of the parent establishment, who are responsible for maintaining contingency plans that enable increased security measures to be established at the DefCNI during periods of heightened threat. DefCNI protection planning also includes providing increased security measures outside the boundary of the DefCNI, which is enabled through agreement with local civil police forces. Any requirement for manpower augmentation in order to enhance security will, in the first instance, be staffed through the Defence agency responsible for that DefNCI site. However, HQ SJC(UK) oversees the augmentation of DefCNI security; following a formal request, by arranging for the provision of additional manpower should the resources of the parent establishment and the higher authority/chain of command be insufficient.

Defence nuclear emergency

3D.5. Ministerial responsibility for nuclear emergency response arrangements within the MOD resides with the Minister for the Armed Forces. The Defence Business Resilience department is responsible for issuing policy and day-to-day management of Defence nuclear asset safety and security. In the event of a nuclear emergency involving a Defence nuclear asset, Headquarters Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation is responsible for:

- providing military and policy advice to the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and Defence ministers on the status of the emergency and any mitigating actions;
- issuing strategic direction and guidance; and
- representing the MOD as the lead government department within the UK Government’s response.

Further information on the US/UK lines of communication is available through the MOD’s Chief of the Defence Staff’s Duty Officer.

Headquarters Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation is part of the MOD’s Defence Crisis Management Organisation.
During a Defence nuclear emergency response, SJC(UK) is a supporting commander and, as such, can be expected to provide a range of support to the civil authorities, as directed by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), including capabilities and personnel from across our Armed Forces, Defence agencies\textsuperscript{102} and QinetiQ. On activation of a nuclear emergency response, in accordance with contingency plans, a number of niche Defence capabilities will automatically deploy. Head Operations (Military) is the lead within Operations Directorate.

**Return of UK Armed Forces and their dependants**

3D.6. A large-scale evacuation of UK Armed Forces personnel and their dependants from a foreign-based UK garrison may require support from UK-based military units. Support may include assistance with:

- reception at the air or sea port of disembarkation;
- accommodation;
- feeding; and
- rehabilitation.

\textsuperscript{102} Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the Defence science and technology laboratory (Dstl).
Chapter 4 considers key Defence capability that may be tasked to support military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) operations. It then outlines how Defence conducts resilience and security education, training and exercises, to prepare for civil contingency tasks, alongside civil authorities, agencies and partners.
A few honest men are better than numbers.

Oliver Cromwell
Chapter 4 – Delivery: means

Section 1 – Capability

4.1. When requested, Defence can provide a range of niche capabilities along with non-specialist personnel to support the civil authorities. The MOD’s Operations Directorate, supported by the Headquarters Standing Joint Commander UK (HQ SJC(UK)), works closely with single-Service commands to identify the best placed military capability to support a request. In the first instance, civil authorities should consult with their joint or single-Service regional liaison officers when considering a request for military support.

Explosive ordnance disposal and search

4.2. Defence maintains a joint, rapidly deployable explosive ordnance disposal and search (EOD&S) capability that is organised and scaled to counter the threat posed by explosive ordnance hazards. The explosive ordnance threat exists on land and at sea. This threat includes: conventional munitions; improvised explosive devices, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices.

4.3. Each Service of our Armed Forces contributes to the joint EOD&S capability. Their specialist capability reflects the environments in which they operate.

   a. Royal Navy. The Royal Navy conducts maritime EOD (incorporating maritime IED disposal) and underwater search in tidal waters and inland waterways, on the coastline below the high-water mark, in vessels at sea or in port, and on or in offshore installations.

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103 Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) is defined as: the detection, identification, on site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordinance. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2016.

104 Search is defined as: the capability to locate specific targets using intelligence assessments, systematic procedures and appropriate detection techniques. Pamphlet No 11 Search Amendment 1, Military Engineering Volume II Field Engineering, 2009.

b. **British Army.** The Army acts as the command lead for EOD&S across Defence. Within the UK the Army is responsible for: EOD command and control; the disposal of legacy wartime air-delivered munitions and Service ammunition; CBRN devices; use of EOD electronic countermeasures; and providing advanced search, including hazardous environmental search, in the land environment.

c. **Royal Air Force.** The Royal Air Force (RAF) acts as the lead Service for crashed aircraft (less underwater) and air-delivered munitions (less World War Two types) and is the technical lead for UK air-dropped munitions. The RAF provides air operations EOD, which includes airfield clearance.

4.4. Deployed Defence EOD&S assets operate in support of, and under the direction of, the civil police throughout the UK.\(^{106}\) The senior police officer present at the scene will be the incident commander. Tactical command of EOD&S teams is delegated to the Joint EOD&S Operations Centre. For major incidents a joint police/military command and control structure will be established; specialist military EOD&S advisers may reinforce police command levels.

4.5. Requests for EOD&S assistance are made directly to the Joint EOD&S Operations Centre by the civil police or the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. The best placed, available joint or single-Service specialist team will be identified and then tasked.\(^ {107}\)

**Salvage and maritime operations**

4.6. Defence provides a specialist team for salvage and maritime operations (SALMO); the civilian manned team belongs to the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) agency. The SALMO capability is held at very high readiness to support the MOD and other government departments’ marine salvage requirements. SALMO comprises a range of tasks/roles which can be used for military aid to the civil authorities (MACA), including:

- carrying out first aid repairs to damaged or submerged vessels;
- recovering ditched aircraft from the sea or inland waters;
- clearing ports, facilities and approaches;
- locating and recovering objects from the seabed, including deep water; and
- providing specialist advice on salvage operations.

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106 Defence assets are responsible for explosive ordnance disposal and search (EOD&S), in support of the civilian police throughout the UK, with the exception of Greater London inside the M25 motorway, where Metropolitan Police assets are responsible for EOD&S.
4.7. The Defence SALMO capability relies on the commercial sector to provide specialist platforms and plans. An on-call commercial cell is available to support requests for SALMO capability. Under MACA arrangements the SALMO capability supported the Air Accident Investigation Branch following the crash of a Super Puma helicopter off the Shetland Islands in 2013.

**Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance**

4.8. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) provides Defence with situational awareness, upon which timely and effective decisions and plans can be made. Defence ISR capability may be provided to support MACA operations. Defence ISR can assist with:

- locating missing persons;
- wide area reconnaissance;
- infrastructure damage analysis and assessment; and
- intelligence products to support our operations and other government department and civil authority decision-making.

4.9. Any request for ISR assistance must be driven by information requirements, rather than a specific collection platform. In a UK-directed operation, following direction from the MOD’s Operations Directorate through HQ SJC(UK), the Joint Intelligence Operations Centre is responsible for allocating and prioritising the collection requirement.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sortie to support a police manhunt in Northumbria.

In July 2010, Northumbria Police led a major operation to apprehend a male fugitive from Newcastle-upon-Tyne who was on the run after shooting three people in two days. After five days on the run and a search involving over 160 armed officers, many from other police force areas, police helicopters and specialist search teams, Northumbria Police submitted a military aid to the civil authorities request for assistance with the manhunt. Specifically, they requested airborne reconnaissance capability flown from a height that would not disturb the fugitive. The RAF was tasked to provide and exploit the imagery of the area. Two Tornado GR4 aircraft using a variety of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors imaged the search area, and Northumbria Police received the analysed imagery six hours after the first overflight. This post-flight exploitation of the imagery by RAF image analysts enabled the police to locate the fugitive’s camp. Later that day the fugitive was recognised by police and contained in the open. A short time later one of the largest manhunts in modern UK history was brought to an end. As a result of the successful initial sorties, Northumbria Police subsequently made a further request for imagery collection and analysis in connection with a criminal case, and a further Tornado GR4 reconnaissance sortie was flown. This imagery was ultimately used in the court trial.

Mobility

4.10. Defence maintains an array of mobility\textsuperscript{108} capabilities able to operate on water, land and in the air, to move both people and materiel to where they are needed.

\textsuperscript{108} Mobility is defined as: a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission. AAP-06.
This capability has wide utility when supporting MACA, including the rapid movement of military forces and specialist equipment into an area and, in extremis, to help evacuate civilians away from a place of danger or threat. Each Service contributes to this capability.

a. **Royal Navy.** The Royal Navy’s mobility capability is able to operate in all three environments (sea, land and air). This includes ships, maritime helicopters (adapted for using over water), patrol boats and small boats (rigid inflatable boats) capable of operating in the open ocean and the littoral (including coastal areas and inland waterways). Within the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines provide landing craft and amphibious vehicles that can lift vehicles, personnel and equipment in water and on land.

b. **British Army.** The Army’s mobility capability is able to operate in all three environments. This includes bulk equipment and personnel lift vehicles, small boats, and Joint Helicopter Command helicopters.

c. **Royal Air Force.** The RAF’s mobility operates on land and in the air. It includes bulk equipment and personnel lift vehicles,\(^\text{109}\) mechanical handling equipment and heavy equipment transporters for use on the land, and a range of aircraft, including helicopters, from the RAF’s Air Mobility Force.\(^\text{110}\) These aircraft are able to rapidly move personnel and materiel around the UK.

The MOD’s Operations Directorate will approach the appropriate single-Service tasking authority to task mobility in support of MACA.

**Planning specialists**

4.11. Defence planning staffs are well-versed, trained and practised in the principles of planning to meet specific strategic objectives. Military personnel assigned to support the civil authorities with planning will need to be fully conversant with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP),\(^\text{111}\) as these underpin multi-agency emergency services planning. Defence is able to support across recognised levels of military command.

a. **Strategic.** The MOD’s Operations Directorate develops plans for Defence to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of disruptive challenges detailed in the National Risk Assessment. When required, and usually in response to a request from other government departments, the

\(^{109}\) Provided from the Engineering and Logistic Wing and the Force Protection Force.
\(^{110}\) The RAF Air Mobility Force operates C17 Globemaster; C130 J Hercules; A400M Atlas; A330-200 Voyager; BAe146; and the Agusta A109E helicopter.
\(^{111}\) Described in Chapter 1.
MOD will embed planning staffs, permanently or temporarily, to help develop contingency plans.

b. **Operational.** At the military operational level, following direction from the MOD’s Operations Directorate, HQ SJC(UK) will develop scenario-specific contingency/operation plans for providing Defence support to the civil authorities. Where able, these plans will be validated in conjunction with the civil authorities.

c. **Tactical.** At the military tactical level, planning support can be delivered by:

- regional point of command (RPoC) headquarters;
- single-Service units across the UK;
- a UK standby battalion (UKSB); and
- specialist units providing niche capability (for example, air/aviation, communications and logistics).

### Command and control

4.12. Each Service is able to provide a command and control capability to complement and support civil authorities responding to a major incident/emergency or when planning for a major national event. Each of the single-Services offers differing styles of command and control capability.

a. **Royal Navy.** Royal Navy vessels (frigates or larger), either at sea or alongside a port, can be used as an effective command and control facility for Category 112 responders during a major incident/emergency or when supporting a major national event. A Royal Navy vessel may provide a useful alternative/back-up command and control node or a forward presence. Vessels are equipped with on-board facilities and communications and information systems; this provides embarked responders with limited accommodation, meeting/planning rooms and real life support.

b. **British Army.** The Army defaults primarily and routinely to the RPoC headquarters and occasionally to the UK standby battalions to provide command and control support to the civil authorities. Both these units are able to quickly plug into civil authority command and control nodes from operational

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112 Described in Chapter 1.
(bronze) through to strategic (gold) level. This capability is routinely practised with civil authorities during multi-agency exercises.

c. **Royal Air Force.** The RAF can use RAF Force Protection Wing headquarters and RAF Regiment squadrons to provide forward command and control in support of civil authorities. Equipped with organic communications and information systems, these deployable forces are able to plug-in to civil authorities command and control nodes. Working to the lead RPoC headquarters when deployed, these self-contained RAF formations have a proven capability working at tactical coordinating group\textsuperscript{113} and bronze levels.

\textsuperscript{113} See Annex 1A for definition.
Operation OLYMPICS – embarked command and control for the Olympic and Paralympic sailing events in 2012

The 2012 London Olympics and Paralympic sailing events were held on the sea off Weymouth. Following a MACA request for support from the Dorset Police, under the auspices of Operation OLYMPICS, the Royal Navy deployed HMS Bulwark to Weymouth harbour in the run-up to and during the sailing events. The ship provided an important command and control function, acting as the bronze afloat for Dorset Police. In addition to police, the ship hosted representatives from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the London Organising Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games and other agencies.

Communications

4.13. The Joint Force Communications and Information Systems UK (JFCIS(UK)) is held at readiness to support UK operations. JFCIS(UK) delivers information communication services for UK operations. \(^{114}\) This strategic capability is delivered via a combination of barracks-based systems and deployable communications and information systems (CIS), operated by regular and reservist personnel.

4.14. JFCIS(UK) assets assigned to UK operations are held at 48 hours notice to effect, or less. Reservist readiness depends on a combination of high readiness reserve, the regular cadre and reservist good will. Reservists provided CIS support during

\(^{114}\) Less special forces and some specific air operations.
Operation SHAKU\textsuperscript{115} in December 2015. The MOD’s Operations Directorate tasks JFCIS(UK) for UK operations bringing with them a set of capabilities.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Fixed ICS which supports HQ SJC(UK) and RPoC headquarters.
  \item[b.] A command support team/immediate response team\textsuperscript{116} – which supports small deployed command and control nodes.
  \item[c.] Reebok, which supports larger deployed headquarters, for example, Joint Maritime Centre’s forward headquarters and silver/bronze headquarters supporting a Defence nuclear emergency response.
  \item[d.] Airwave,\textsuperscript{117} which is the Home Office radio system used by emergency services and Defence personnel assigned to UK operations.
  \item[e.] BOWMAN, which supports fixed/deployed locations in the event of a catastrophic failure of the UK communications infrastructure.
  \item[f.] TACIT, which supports the UK’s counter-chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response.
\end{itemize}

4.15. In addition to JFCIS (UK), both the Royal Navy and RAF have organic communications capability. Royal Navy ships are equipped with communication and information systems that can enhance and interoperate with civil authorities’ systems. The RAF communications capability may be used to enable air operations in support of MACA.

Engineering

4.16. Army engineers offer a wide breadth of engineering capability that can be used in support of civil authority-led operations in the UK. Many of the skills and equipment in the civilian engineering industry are replicated by the Royal Engineers. These can be deployed into austere environments or situations where local authorities and other government departments lack the integral capability or time to set up contracts with civilian industry. In addition, Commander 8 Engineer Brigade can provide specialist military engineering advice to a joint commander when required.

\textsuperscript{115} Operation SHAKU was the Defence name for the operations in support of civil authorities in northern England following severe weather events resulting in widespread flooding, see Chapter 2 for more details.

\textsuperscript{116} Command support team/immediate response team delivers identical capability. Immediate response teams are manned by regulars; whereas, command support teams are manned by reservists.

\textsuperscript{117} Airwave will be replaced by the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme. Airwave ceases to operate on 31 December 2019, with the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme being brought on line from September 2017.
4.17. **Engineer reconnaissance.** The Royal Engineers can deliver a variety of reconnaissance activity.

a. **Initial reconnaissance.** This is the rapid assessment of general civilian infrastructure and routes. This form of reconnaissance is sufficient to establish whether Royal Engineers capability can meet the task required and also to determine the level of damage that has been sustained. Initial reconnaissance output is likely to include a site sketch and potential courses of action.

b. **Detailed infrastructure reconnaissance.** The Royal Engineers have Chartered Engineers in all disciplines (civil, electrical and mechanical) that are able to conduct detailed technical reconnaissance on damaged and/or at risk infrastructure. The output from such activity will routinely be a complete, detailed design report.

c. **Dive reconnaissance.** The Army’s diving capability rests with the Royal Engineers and the majority of these units maintain a dive team at high states of readiness, albeit not at readiness for operations in support of the civil authorities in the UK. These are able to conduct underwater reconnaissance, construction and demolition tasks.

4.18. **Survey and mapping.** The Royal Engineers have the ability to survey and generate mapping of the UK at short notice. This capability includes a comprehensive geospatial capability with associated production facilities that are able to deploy and operate in austere locations if required.

4.19. **Planning and design.** All Royal Engineers units are able to assist joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs) in providing resilience planning advice to local authorities and other government departments. Deployment of Royal Engineers advisers to work alongside JRLOs during major incidents has proved highly advantageous. Mobile, detailed design capability can deploy forward to assist civilian authorities where required; this includes the initial reconnaissance skillsets and draughtsmen.

4.20. **Resource.** Royal Engineers units have their own specialist logistic and resourcing capability. This can be tasked to support civil authorities when their logistic capability is over-matched.

4.21. **Construction.** Royal Engineers capability may be used in rapid repair and access tasks where temporary military solutions can deliver critical access for emergency services and evacuation, or to conduct emergency infrastructure repair. Much of the military equipment, such as bridging assets, may not be suitable for general use by
civilians during the recovery phase, as they do not comply with local authority Health and Safety standards.

4.22. **Demolition.** The Royal Engineers possess the ability to conduct explosive demolitions. Whilst unusual, this capability has been used in the past but can only be deployed where there is absolute necessity.

**UK Standby Battalion**

4.23. The Army provides three UK standby battalions (UKSBs) at extremely-high readiness to support UK operations. Assigned geographic areas of responsibility, the UKSBs provide the Army with a generalist force of choice to support civil authorities during an emergency/major incident. Since formation in 2011, UKSBs have completed diverse resilience roles including industrial action mitigation and flood mitigation during Operation SHAKU. In addition, the UKSBs are assigned to support the police with specific security operations in the UK.

4.24. Once deployed, the UKSBs are held under the operational command of SJC(UK). The UKSB characteristics include:

- agile command able to plug into civil authority systems;
- adaptable and scalable force packages able to deploy large numbers of trained, disciplined, military personnel to a wide range of roles;
- up-to-date situational awareness of the UK joint operations area; and
- self-contained logistics allowing sustainment for 48-hours anywhere in the UK.

4.25. On a routine basis UKSBs, in conjunction with the Environment Agency, undertake familiarisation in the construction of Environment Agency-owned temporary flood barriers which can be erected rapidly when required. When deployed operationally, Environment Agency staff will always be present on site, providing direction and oversight.

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118 Comprising: North (Northern England, Scotland and Northern Ireland); Midlands and South West (Wales, the East and West Midlands and South West England); and London and the South East (remainder of the UK). When circumstances dictate, the UKSBs can operate outside their assigned areas of responsibility.

119 Ranging from an eight-man section to the entire UK Standby Battalion (UKSB) of400 personnel.
Air logistics

4.26. The RAF provides logistics to support air operations worldwide. These have wide utility and may be used to support MACA tasks. Air logistics encompass a number of capabilities.

a. **Real-life support.** Real-life support for UK operations comprises catering (including field catering), accommodation management and deployed laundry services. Personnel and equipment are held at high readiness, primarily to support major incidents and aircraft post-crash management.

b. **Aircraft recovery.** The Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron (JARTS) provide Defence’s aircraft recovery and transportation capability for helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft and uncrated aircraft components. JARTS is tasked via the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (Air). A memorandum of understanding between the MOD and Civil Aviation Authority that allows JARTS to deploy to civil air crash events without the specific authority of MOD.
c. **Rapid runway clearance.** A specialist team is kept at high readiness to provide rapid runway clearance. Capabilities comprise specialist aircraft lifting and towing expertise, aircraft cutting skills and aircraft hazard management.

d. **Mountain rescue.** The RAF Mountain Rescue Service provides a ground based, all-weather search and rescue organisation, maintained at high readiness. They operate in difficult terrain and poor weather conditions that inhibit helicopter operations. While the core role is aircraft post-crash management, they routinely support the emergency services under MACA arrangements and civilian mountain rescue teams to locate missing persons.

**RAF Mountain Rescue Service support the police in the search for a missing child**

In June 2016, Cheshire Constabulary requested the assistance of the Royal Air Force Mountain Rescue Service (RAF MRS) in the search for a 14 year old girl who had gone missing four days earlier. Twelve members of RAF MRS deployed from RAF Valley to the search area in Cheshire. On arrival, the team was briefed that the missing girl was diagnosed with depression and had not taken her medication. She had a history of running away and making shelters in the local woods; however, these areas had already been searched by friends and family members. The RAF MRS was tasked with searching high probability wooded areas in the vicinity until light faded. The following morning the RAF team was tasked with further search areas in conjunction with search teams from North East Wales Search and Rescue (SAR), Cheshire Constabulary, Merseyside SAR, Cheshire SAR, National Police Air Service, Bolton SAR and Woodlands SAR. Shortly after the teams had deployed to their respective search areas the missing girl made herself known to a member of the public in an area five kilometres to the south east of the search area. She had been hiding in a hedge for five days and had become delirious due to dehydration and hunger. She was taken to hospital by ambulance and given the all clear soon afterward.
The MOD owns and operates a diverse estate totalling 452,000 hectares, making it one of the largest landowners in the UK. Defence's estate comprises:

- training areas;
- firing ranges;
- transit camps;
- naval bases;
- army barracks;
- airfields;
- service families accommodation; and
- Defence facilities.

The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) is responsible for managing the estate on behalf of the MOD. In the majority of cases, DIO fulfils these responsibilities using large support contracts with commercial industry partners.

During an emergency or when planning for a major national event, early consideration should be given to the potential use of Defence's estate. This may include forward mounting assets (both military and civil authorities), temporary accommodation for personnel, catering services (both on and off site), and storage for equipment and material. Early engagement with the DIO's Operations Directorate will confirm that the required Defence estate, and the infrastructure present, is available, properly authorised for use, fit for purpose, and the infrastructure present is available, properly authorised for use, fit for purpose.

This equates to 1.8% of the total UK landmass.

Her Majesty's Naval Base Devonport is the largest in Western Europe covering more than 65 acres.
the intended purpose, and that the suggested activity can be supported through existing contracts with MOD industry partners.\textsuperscript{121} While heads of establishment command individual sites, they are not considered infrastructure specialists. In all such instances, and prior to a plan being enacted, advice and guidance should be sought from the local DIO site representative.

4.30. Rationalisation of Defence’s estate will lead to a 30\% reduction in built estate\textsuperscript{122} by 2040.\textsuperscript{123} This may impact longer-term civil authority emergency/major incident contingency plans. On a case-by-case basis, where Defence estate is used to support longer-term contingency plans, a memorandum of understanding or memorandum of temporary occupation may be required. The MOD Operations Directorate will lead on drawing up the memorandum of understanding, supported by MOD legal advisers, in conjunction with the relevant legal department of the civil authority. Together they will draft such memoranda to formalise arrangements (for example, clarify payment for services, terms of occupancy and financial/legal liabilities).

**Counter-chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear**

4.31. In the event of an incident involving a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) activity, Defence is able to bring together a counter-CBRN response from military and scientific agencies in consultation with the civil authorities. Details of this response are beyond the classification of this publication.

**Fire and rescue**

4.32. The Defence Fire Risk Management Organisation (DFRMO) is Defence’s professional fire and rescue capability, primarily in support of Defence airfields. DFRMO units are based throughout the UK, often in geographically remote locations. The organisation is subordinate to Army Headquarters.

4.33. Under MACA arrangements, DFRMO assets can respond to life-threatening incidents, when local authority fire and rescue services are unable to provide an effective and timely life-saving response.\textsuperscript{124} During larger incidents, DFRMO units may respond to support local authority fire and rescue services and national resilience assets. Likewise, DFRMO duty officers may be requested to attend major incidents.

\textsuperscript{121} While general principles of cost recovery apply to resilience and security operations, MOD industry partners who supply services outside the scope of their contract will invariably seek to recover additional costs from civil authorities.

\textsuperscript{122} Defence estate divides between rural estate (training areas/firing ranges) and built estate (naval bases/airfields/barracks) on a ratio of 83\% to 17\% respectively.

\textsuperscript{123} This reduction in Defence estate is directed in the *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, November 2015, pages 33-34, paragraph 4.62.

\textsuperscript{124} Any support to the local authority fire and rescue services will depend on the capacity of the Defence Fire Risk Management Organisation unit to maintain its primary output in support of flying operations.
or emergencies to provide specialist advice on using DFRMO capability. The DFRMO duty officer acts as the focal point for advice and requests for both assistance and attendance. With the exception of events where life is at risk, or there is a need to alleviate distress, or a need to protect significant property, the deployment of DFRMO assets will remain subject to ministerial authorisation.

Non-specialist capability

4.34. When responding to major incidents and emergencies and planning for national events, Defence may need to consider deploying large numbers of non-specialist personnel to support the civil authorities across a wide area or multiple locations. This was the case during Operation PITCHPOLE in 2014 (Defence support to flooding in the Thames Valley and Somerset Levels) and Operation OLYMPICS. The Defence contribution may comprise personnel from formed units and non-formed units.

a. **Formed units.** Formed units have the advantage of deploying with established command chains and potentially organic communications, logistics and mobility.

b. **Non-formed units.** Non-formed unit personnel are classified in military terms as individual augmentees, who are drawn from across a single Service. They form together for the duration of the task, under a nominated command chain/structure and are reliant on external military formations for real-life support, logistics and mobility. The MOD’s Operations Directorate staffs work closely with the single-Service commands during the force generation of non-specialist personnel to ensure they are not over-matched by the task.

Section 2 – Education and training

Governance

4.35. The MOD’s Operations Directorate is the strategic lead for UK operations training and exercising within Defence. Direction and guidance is provided annually through the Training Management Group mechanism, with representation from across Defence. The Training Management Group’s remit is to coordinate all Defence resilience and UK operations training and exercising.

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125 The Training Management Group is chaired by a representative from the Operations Directorate’s UK Operations Team.

126 Representatives from: Operations Directorate (UK Operations); HQ SJC(UK); single-Service commands; Defence agencies/organisation (for example, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and QinetiQ); and Defence Materiel.
4.36. Within Defence, HQ SJC(UK) provides the operational-level lead for education, training and exercising that relates to resilience and UK operations. Direction is issued via the HQ SJC(UK) annual training and exercising directive. The SJC(UK) chaired Defence Resilience Training Management Group defines the operational requirement by ensuring that military resilience training complies with Defence’s strategic-level and operational-level objectives and that it meets civil authorities’ requirements. The SJC(UK) fulfils the Joint Service Training Requirement Authority\textsuperscript{127} for all resilience individual education and training. Moreover, HQ SJC(UK) is responsible for programming and supervising security and resilience exercises across Defence.

4.37. At the Defence tactical level, the Army’s Headquarters Regional Command (HQ RC) serves as the Training Delivery Authority\textsuperscript{128} for all resilience and UK operations activities.\textsuperscript{129} HQ RC assists HQ SJC(UK) develop, programme and resource training, helped by the single-Service commands. The Army’s RPoCs provide the focal point for integrated resilience training with civil authorities at the regional and local level.

Integrated approach

4.38. Defence is not listed as a categorised responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Although not in response to a statutory requirement, Defence, at all levels, adopts a forward leaning posture towards integrated resilience training with the civil authorities in a range of events, in accordance with the \textit{National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015}.\textsuperscript{130} This includes:

\begin{itemize}
\item table-top exercises;
\item command post exercises;
\item field training exercises; and
\item study and briefing days.
\end{itemize}

4.39. The Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat, with support from lead government departments, is responsible for cross-Whitehall resilience and security training/exercising. The Operations Directorate, UK Operations team provides the MOD’s input to this. When invited and appropriate, the MOD will support all

\textsuperscript{127} Joint Service Publication (JSP) 822, \textit{Defence Systems Approach to Training – Direction and Guidance for Individual and Collective Training}, Part 1, Version 2.0, March 2016, page 6, describes the Training Requirements Authority as representing the end-user of the trained output and is the ultimate authority for the derivation and maintenance of the Role Performance Statement. The Training Requirement Authority is responsible for the evaluation of the effect of the training in achieving the Role Performance Statement wherever the training is delivered.

\textsuperscript{128} JSP 822 also states that the Training Development Authority must be distinct from the Training Requirement Authority and is the organisation responsible for training delivery, but not always for the actual training itself.

\textsuperscript{129} With the exception of specialist activity such as explosive ordinance disposal.

\textsuperscript{130} Available at \url{https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf}. 
resilience and security exercises, from national to local level. At the national level, this includes Tier 1 and Tier 2 exercises; while at the local level this will likely comprise RPoC headquarters or sub-units supporting local resilience forum exercises/training events.

**Training categories**

4.40. The nature and volume of Defence resilience and security training has increased markedly. This upturn coincides with the UK Government placing a greater emphasis on the nation’s security and resilience. Defence resilience and security training is broken down into three categories:

- education;
- individual training; and
- collective training.

Annex 4A provides an outline of each training category.

4.41. The underlying principle applied is that Defence support to civil authority led training events may be charged at marginal cost or waived altogether. HQ SJC(UK) issues direction when required; clarification/advice should be sought by the requesting civil authorities from the JRLO\textsuperscript{131} in the first instance.

\textsuperscript{131} Royal Navy regional liaison officers (RNRLOs) and Royal Air Force regional liaison officers (RAFRL Os) are equally able to provide direction and guidance.
Key points

• Operations Directorate staffs work closely with single-Service commands to identify the best placed military capability to support a request.

• Defence maintains a joint, rapidly deployable explosive ordnance disposal and search capability to counter threats from explosive ordnance hazards.

• Defence intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability provides situational awareness, upon which timely and effective decisions and plans can be made.

• Defence planning staffs are well-versed, trained and practised in the principles of planning to meet specific strategic objectives.

• Defence is able to provide a command and control capability to complement and support the civil authorities during an incident or when planning for a major national event.

• Military engineers offer a wide breadth of engineering capability that can be used on resilience operations in support of the civil authorities.

• The UK Standby Battalions are held at extremely-high readiness and provides generalist support to UK operations.

• Early consideration should be given to the potential use of Defence Estate in consultation with the Defence Infrastructure Organisation to support military aid to the civil authorities.

• In the event of an incident involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) activity, Defence is able to bring together a counter-CBRN response from military and scientific agencies in consultation with civil authorities.

• Defence adopts a forward leaning posture towards integrated resilience and security training with civil authorities in a range of training and exercising events.
Delivery: means
# Annex 4A – Categories of Defence training

## Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sponsor/delivery</th>
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| Cross-government briefing day              | **Aim:** educate non-military audiences on how and what Defence contributes to security and resilience in the UK.  
**Audience:** ministers, civil servants from lead-government departments.  
**Activity:** briefing day/twice a year. | **Sponsor:** MOD Operations Directorate – UK Operations Team  
**Delivery:** Headquarters Standing Joint Commander (UK) (HQ SJC(UK)) |
| Defence contribution to resilience course – level 3 | **Aim:** educate a Defence audience on military assistance to the civil authorities (MACA) in the UK responding to a disruptive challenge at the national, devolved administration and regional levels.  
**Audience:** middle/senior ranked Defence personnel, uniform and non-uniform, with a resilience role.  
**Activity:** three-day residential course/five times a year. | **Sponsor:** HQ SJC(UK)  
**Delivery:** HQ SJC(UK) |
| Defence contribution to resilience course – level 2 | **Aim:** educate a Defence audience on MACA in the UK responding to a disruptive challenge specific to a region.  
**Audience:** military personnel from the three Services with a resilience role.  
**Activity:** one and a half day course/at least annually. | **Sponsor:** HQ SJC(UK)  
**Delivery:** regional point of command (RPoC) |
## Individual training

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sponsor/delivery</th>
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| Counter-terrorist training | Aim: prepare a Defence audience for specific counter-terrorism operations.  
Audience: Defence personnel from the Royal Navy, Army and RAF assigned to counter-terrorism operations.  
Activity: rigorous training to ensure Defence personnel meet the exacting operational standards required by the UK Government and police. | Sponsor: MOD’s Operations Directorate - UK Operations Team  
Delivery: units assigned to the specific counter-terrorism operation |

## Collective training – generic

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sponsor/delivery</th>
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| Study days  | Aim: educate/exercise formation headquarters in their resilience role.  
Audience: military formation headquarters staff.  
Activity: raise awareness through briefings/seminars of a scenario drawn from the National Risk Assessment.  
HQ SJC(UK)/RPoC will conduct at least one study day each per annum. | Sponsor: HQ SJC(UK)  
Delivery: RPoC |
| Other events| Aim: raise awareness/educate Defence personnel on civil authority resilience capabilities and roles.  
Audience: Defence personnel, usually drawn from HQ SJC(UK), RPoC, Regional Liaison Officers and UK standby battalion (UKSB).  
Activity: support to/participate in civil authorities running field/live exercises. | Sponsor: HQ SJC(UK)  
Delivery: HQ SJC(UK), RPoC and/or UKSB |

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132 The specific counter-terrorism operation name and detail is classified above this publication.
| Defence Regional Resilience Exercise (DRRX) | **Aim:** assess the ability of RPoC Headquarters to plan and conduct operations in support of civil authorities in the UK.  
**Audience:** RPoC Headquarters staffs – whole force approach (regulars, reserves, civil servants and contractors).  
**Activity:** DRRXs are planned, prepared and delivered by HQ Regional Command staff and last usually for up to five-days. DRRXs are preceded by a defined programme of preparatory events and exercises, including planning conferences and two-day long Preparatory Planning Exercise designed to practise RPoC staffs in planning and conduct of UK Operations.  
**Sponsor:** HQ SJC(UK)  
**Delivery:** Headquarters Regional Command |}

**Collective training – mission specific**

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<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sponsor/delivery</th>
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| **Scenario specific training** | **Aim:** analyse and refine a Defence response to a specific scenario/event.  
**Audience:** Defence personnel from RPoC, UKSB or a unit assigned a resilience role.  
**Activity:** multi-agency table-top exercise/command post exercise/field training exercise based on a scenario likely drawn from the National Risk Assessment. | **Sponsor:** MOD’s Operations Directorate – UK Operations Team  
**Delivery:** HQ SJC(UK)/RPoCs |
| **Rehearsal of concept drills** | **Aim:** rehearse impending security/resilience operation prior to deployment.  
**Audience:** key unit commanders and staff with responsibility for executing the plan. If able to, this should include multi-agency representation.  
**Activity:** end-to-end review and confirmation of the prepared plan; ideally this should have multi-agency participation to aid understanding. | **Sponsor:** HQ SJC(UK)  
**Delivery:** HQ SJC(UK)/unit assigned to the contingency operation (for example, UKSB) |

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133 RPoC will run one unassured exercise in the years in which a Defence regional resilience exercise is not conducted.
**Aim:** inform/update a Defence audience assigned to a contingency operation in support of the civil authorities.

**Audience:** Defence personnel assigned to a specific contingency operation in support of the civil authorities.

**Activity:** either immediately prior to deployment, or by standard arrangement a structured brief explaining the situation, MACA policy, role and likely tasks.

**Sponsor:** HQ SJC(UK)

**Delivery:** unit assigned to the contingency operation (for example, UKSB)
Lexicon

Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APCM</td>
<td>air post-crash management</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWE</td>
<td>Atomic Weapons Establishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA 04</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Act 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>Defence Council Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE&amp;S</td>
<td>Defence Equipment and Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DefCNI</td>
<td>Defence critical national infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFRMO</td>
<td>Defence Fire Risk Management Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIO</td>
<td>Defence Infrastructure Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRRX</td>
<td>Defence Regional Resilience Exercise</td>
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<td>DSA</td>
<td>Defence Safety Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSTL</td>
<td>Defence Science and Technology Laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD&amp;S</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal and search</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Emergency Powers Act 1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Her Majesty</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JARTS</td>
<td>Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>joint doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JESIP</td>
<td>Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCIS(UK)</td>
<td>The Joint Force Communications and Information Systems UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>joint military commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRLO</td>
<td>joint regional liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>joint service publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGD</td>
<td>lead government department</td>
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<td>LRF</td>
<td>local resilience forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRP</td>
<td>local resilience partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACA</td>
<td>military aid to the civil authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>military assessment team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLO</td>
<td>military liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRS</td>
<td>[RAF] Mountain Rescue Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSMO</td>
<td>military support to the mounting of operations</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>NRR</td>
<td>National Risk Register</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>other government departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAFRLO</td>
<td>Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFCA</td>
<td>Reserve Forces and Cadet Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNRLO</td>
<td>Royal Navy Regional Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPoC</td>
<td>regional point of command</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>regional resilience partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALMO</td>
<td>specialist team for salvage and maritime operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>search and rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>strategic coordinating group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJC(UK)</td>
<td>Standing Joint Commander UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLB</td>
<td>top level budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKSB</td>
<td>UK Standby Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>value added tax</td>
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Part 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into three parts. First, we list terms and their descriptions that are used as reference for this publication only. Secondly, we list proposed new definitions that will be added to the UK agreed terminology. Thirdly, we list endorsed terms and their definitions which may be helpful to the reader.

Terms used for reference in this publication only

emergency
An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or of a place in the UK.
Note: to constitute an emergency this event or situation must require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responder.

hazard
Accidental or naturally occurring (i.e. non-malicious) event or situation with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment and/or to economic, social and political structures.

indemnity
Security against or exemption from legal responsibility for one’s actions.

lead government department
Department of the UK government or devolved administration designated as responsible for overall management of the government response to an emergency or disaster. There are LDGs identified for both the response and recovery phases of emergencies.
liability
A thing for which someone is liable, especially a financial obligation.

major incident
Event or situation requiring a response under one or more of the emergency services major incident plans.

recovery
The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.

resilience
Ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges.

response
Decisions and actions taken in accordance with the strategic, tactical and operational objectives defined by the emergency responders. At a high level these will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of an emergency and create the condition for a return to normality.

risk
Measure of the significance of a potential emergency in terms of its assessed likelihood and impact.
New definitions

**best effort**
The rapid generation and deployment of personnel or capability, not nominated or pre-warned, for a particular operation, at best speed.

**military aid to the civil authorities**
Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority. This is subject to Defence Ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of the event.

Endorsed definitions

**crisis**
A situation, which may or may not be foreseen, which threatens national security or interests or international peace and stability, and which requires decision and action.

**notice to move**
A warning order that specifies the time given to a unit or headquarters to be ready to deploy. Note: This order normally precedes an order to move and may increase or decrease the time to prepare.
Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, 2016.

**readiness**
The period of time measured from an initiation order to the moment when the HQ or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward) deployed or ready for deployment.
security
The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and damage, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure.
Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2016.
Note: whilst this NATO definition of security is wide ranging, this JDP explains Defence activities in support of the civil authorities in the UK responding to disruptive challenges identified by the Cabinet Office in its biannual National Risk Assessment.

threat
The probability or likelihood of an attack or undesirable event taking place. Threat includes such factors as capability, resources and intention and probabilities.
Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1, United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database (8th Edition), September 2011.