The Casey Review

A review into opportunity and integration

Dame Louise Casey DBE CB
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Foreword

Over a year ago I was asked by the then Prime Minister and Home Secretary to undertake a review into integration and opportunity in isolated and deprived communities. The integration I wanted to look at was not just about how well we get on with each other but how well we all do compared to each other.

I wanted to consider what divides communities and gives rise to anxiety, prejudice, alienation and a sense of grievance; and to look again at what could be done to fight the injustice that where you are born or live in this country, your background or even your gender, can affect how you get on in modern Britain.

I wanted to be honest about how much harder life is for some and to think about what we can do to resolve this and build more cohesive communities.

I approached this task hoping that by improving integration and the life chances of some of the most disadvantaged and isolated communities, we could also inject some resilience against those who try to divide us with their extremism and hate.

I went where the evidence took me, talking to community groups, officials and academics as well as teachers, pupils and faith leaders. Some of the meetings and conversations I had were very challenging and the stories hard to hear, but none of the 800 or more people that we met, nor any of the two hundred plus written submissions to the review, said there wasn’t a problem to solve.

No review starts from a blank piece of paper, and I was grateful to all whose research and opinion I could call upon to help guide the work. This review takes and builds on all that expertise, and I hope that it does service to all those who took part.

At the start of this review, I had thought that I knew what some of the problems might be and what I might report on. Discrimination and disadvantage feeding a sense of grievance and unfairness, isolating communities from modern British society and all it has to offer.

I did find this. Black boys still not getting jobs, white working class kids on free school meals still doing badly in our education system, Muslim girls getting good grades at school but no decent employment opportunities; these remain absolutely vital problems to tackle and get right to improve our society.

But I also found other, equally worrying things including high levels of social and economic isolation in some places and cultural and religious practices in communities that are not only holding some of our citizens back but run contrary to British values and sometimes our laws. Time and time again I found it was women and children who were the targets of these regressive practices. And too often, leaders and institutions were not doing enough to stand up against them and protect those who were vulnerable.

I know that for some, the content of this review will be hard to read, and I have wrestled with what to put in and what to leave out, particularly because I know that putting some communities under the spotlight – particularly communities in which
there are high concentrations of Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage – will add to the pressure that they already feel. However, I am convinced that it is only by fully acknowledging what is happening that we can set about resolving these problems and eventually relieve this pressure.

None of this is easy. But too many leaders have chosen to take the easier path when confronted with these issues in the past – sometimes with good intent – and that has often resulted in problems being ducked, swept under the carpet or allowed to fester.

I approached this review with an absolute belief that we are a compassionate, tolerant and liberal country. But social cohesion and equality are not things we can take for granted; they require careful tending, commitment and bravery from us all.

In fact some of our most treasured national institutions are built on that belief; a health service that is free for all who need it, a media that exposes corruption and injustice whoever you are, and a legal system that treats everybody as innocent until proved otherwise.

So I hope that this review will be read in the same spirit with which I have tried to write it; with honesty and not shying away from the difficult and uncomfortable problems that we face.

A failure to talk about all this only leaves the ground open for the Far Right on one side and Islamist extremists on the other. These groups are ideologically opposed to each other but actually share the same goal: to show that diversity and modern Britain or Islam and modern Britain are somehow incompatible. But of course they are wrong.

We have always been at our strongest when most united. We are better for being open and inclusive as a society. Every person, in every community, in every part of Britain, should feel a part of our nation and have every opportunity to succeed in it.

There can be no exceptions to that by gender, colour or creed. Those are our rights. Those are our values. That is our history. It must be our future too.

My overriding hope is that we can work together in a spirit of unity, compassion and kindness to repair the sometimes fraying fabric of our nation.

Dame Louise Casey DBE CB

December 2016
1. Summary

1.1. In July 2015, the then Prime Minister and Home Secretary asked Dame Louise Casey to conduct a review to consider what could be done to boost opportunity and integration in our most isolated and deprived communities.

1.2. Despite the long-standing and growing diversity of our nation, and the sense that people from different backgrounds get on well together at a general level, community cohesion did not feel universally strong across the country.

1.3. The unprecedented pace and scale of population change has been having an impact, particularly in deprived areas, at a time when Britain has been recovering from a recession and concerns about terrorism, immigration, the economy and the future of public services have been running high. Problems of social exclusion have persisted for some ethnic minority groups and poorer White British communities in some areas are falling further behind. As the initial fieldwork for this review concluded, the EU referendum posed another question about our unity as a nation, sparking increased reports of racist and xenophobic hatred.

1.4. So it has been timely and right to step back, take stock and consider what more could be done to bring our nation together.

1.5. This report reflects what Dame Louise and the review team believe to be the best, most recent data to illustrate what we have seen and heard in our fieldwork. It summarises what has been drawn during the review from meetings, visits and discussions up and down the country with more than 800 members of the public, community groups, front-line workers, academics, faith leaders, politicians and others; over 200 written submissions; and a wide range of research, data and other evidence about the population and how it has changed.

1.6. In many cases, the report acknowledges that the available data are already feeling out of date (for example where we rely on the Census which, while comprehensive and rich, is only conducted every decade, with the most recent results coming from 2011). In others, data are not available at a sufficiently granular level to pick out trends that might exist or be emerging in smaller or newer groups in society. In general, better data and research are needed across a range of issues relating to integration.

1.7. The report considers immigration and patterns of settlement; the extent to which people from different backgrounds mix and get on together; how different communities – considering ethnic and faith groups in particular – have fared economically and socially; and some of the issues that are driving inequality and division in society; and it makes recommendations on what we should do next in a new programme to help unite Britain.
Why promoting integration and tackling social exclusion matters

1.8. In this country we take poverty, social exclusion, social justice and social mobility seriously and we do so across political divides. Creating a just, fair society where everyone can prosper and get on is a cornerstone of Britain’s values.

1.9. This is, in part, because we know that the consequences of economic exclusion and poverty are wide-ranging and long-lasting. Children from low income families are less likely to do well in school, are more likely to suffer ill-health and face pressures in their lives that can be associated with unemployment and criminality.

1.10. The less integrated we are as a nation, the greater the economic and social costs we face – estimated as approximately £6 billion each year in one study.

1.11. We know that where communities live separately, with fewer interactions between people from different backgrounds, mistrust, anxiety and prejudice grow.

1.12. Conversely, social mixing and interactions between people from a wider range of backgrounds can have positive impacts; not just in reducing anxiety and prejudice, but also in enabling people to get on better in employment and social mobility.

1.13. Resilience, integration and shared common values and behaviours – such as respect for the rule of law, democracy, equality and tolerance – are inhibitors of division, hate and extremism. They can make us stronger, more equal, more united and able to stand together as one nation.

Our population today

1.14. We consider some key trends in the population and factors which indicate and affect levels of integration.

1.15. There were an estimated 65.1 million people living in the United Kingdom in June 2015, with the population having risen by 4.1 million between 2001 and 2011. More than half of this growth was due to immigration. Some key trends stand out over that decade:

- We are an ageing population, with increased life expectancy and the impact of a ‘baby boomer’ generation with higher birth rates moving into older age groups, but with ethnic minority groups generally having a younger age profile.

- We are increasingly ethnically diverse. Although eight out of ten of us identified ourselves as White British in the 2011 Census, the White British population reduced by 0.4 million people, while all other ethnic minority groups grew - with the largest numerical growth among ‘other’ White (most notably Polish, up by 0.5 million) and Asian (most notably Indian and Pakistani, each increasing by 0.4 million) ethnic groups.

- We remain predominantly religious, with nearly 7 out of 10 of us belonging to a religion. Christians remain a majority, while a quarter of the population holds
no religion. But the proportion of Christians fell from 70% to 59%, while the proportion holding no religion grew from 17% to 26%.

- The number of people belonging to the other main religions grew, with the exception of the Jewish population which remained around the same size.

- Among faith groups the number of people identifying themselves as Muslim grew most significantly, by 1.2 million people. This 72% increase is higher than for any other religious group and Muslims make up the largest non-Christian religious population in the UK at 2.8 million in total, compared with 0.8m Hindus, 0.4m Sikhs, 0.3m Jews and 0.3m Buddhists.

- We have a significant lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender population, with an increase of self-identification within these groups over recent years.

1.16. As a nation, we are getting older, more secular and more open about our sexuality, while the growing ethnic minority population is younger and more likely to identify as religious (particularly among Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups).

**Immigration**

1.17. Many of these changes in our population are due to immigration and higher birth rates in some communities.

1.18. Britain is an increasingly diverse nation with a long history of immigration but it has changed dramatically in recent years. By 2011, 13% of us were foreign born and nearly 20% of us identified ourselves as belonging to ethnic minorities (compared with 9% and 12% respectively a decade earlier).

1.19. Over the last two decades, total immigration to the UK has doubled, from around 300,000 people per year prior in 1997 to more than 600,000 in 2015.

1.20. Significant immigration from Asia and other non-European countries has continued year-on-year over the last four or five decades, with much of this characterised by permanent settlement through marriage and family ties.

1.21. Rates of integration in some communities may have been undermined by high levels of transnational marriage – with subsequent generations being joined by a foreign-born partner, creating a ‘first generation in every generation’ phenomenon in which each new generation grows up with a foreign-born parent. This seems particularly prevalent in South Asian communities. We were told on one visit to a northern town that all except one of the Asian Councillors had married a wife from Pakistan. And in a cohort study at the Bradford Royal Infirmary, 80% of babies of Pakistani ethnicity in the area had at least one parent born outside the UK.

1.22. There has been an unprecedented increase in European migration over the last decade, largely for work and shorter-term stays, although there are signs that growing numbers of EU migrants are settling permanently.
1.23. In the year ending December 2015, the ‘net’ immigration figure was 333,000 – but emigration does not really ‘cancel out’ immigration; it is the total churn in population that can alter the characteristics of a neighbourhood and the net figure of 333,000 reflected almost a million people in total arriving in or leaving the country over 12 months. Additionally, the placement of asylum seekers across the country – often in poorer communities – and the presence of an unknown number of illegal immigrants, adds to the level of change being experienced.

1.24. Higher birth rates among foreign born parents are also contributing to the growing diversity of the UK - while foreign born residents made up 13% of the population in 2011, 27% of births in 2014 were to mothers born outside the UK (predominantly to Polish, Pakistani and Indian mothers).

1.25. The impact of these changes is far reaching.

1.26. We were told on a visit to Sheffield that more than 6,000 people of Roma or Eastern European heritage (of which more than half are under the age of 17) live predominantly in one ward. The impact on schools was evident with the number of EU nationals’ children having increased from 150 to 2,500 in five years.

1.27. At a national level, 18% of homelessness acceptances in 2015-16 were foreign nationals – more than double the number in 2009-10 – with implications for who gets priority for social housing.

1.28. In a situation where the country has been through an economic downturn, it is understandable that the pace and scale of immigration has felt too much for some communities.

### Settlement and segregation

1.29. Minority ethnic groups have tended to settle more in urban and industrial areas, often reflecting labour market gaps which immigrant communities came to fill in the 20th Century. As the diversity of the nation has increased another dynamic is also clear – people from minority groups have become both more dispersed and in some cases more concentrated and segregated:

- 50% of the British population lives in areas with relatively high migration flows.
- Half of all minority ethnic citizens in Britain live in London, Birmingham and Manchester.
- Similar patterns of urban concentration of ethnic minorities exist in Scotland and Wales.

1.30. People of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity tend to live in more residentially segregated communities than other ethnic minority groups. South Asian communities (people of Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi ethnicity) live in higher concentrations at ward level than any other ethnic minority group. These concentrations at ward level are growing in many areas. In 2011 there were:
• 24 wards in 12 local authority areas where more than 40% of the population identified themselves as being of Pakistani ethnicity; up from 12 wards in 7 local authorities in 2001.

• 20 wards in 8 local authority areas where more than 40% of the population identified themselves as being of Indian ethnicity; up from 16 wards within 6 local authorities in 2001.

1.31. Compared to other minority faith groups, Muslims tend to live in higher residential concentrations at ward level. In 2011:

• Blackburn, Birmingham, Burnley and Bradford included wards with between 70% and 85% Muslim populations.

1.32. The school age population is even more segregated when compared to residential patterns of living. A Demos study found that, in 2013, more than 50% of ethnic minority students were in schools where ethnic minorities were the majority, and that school segregation was highest among students from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds relative to other ethnic groups.

1.33. In January 2015, there were 511 schools across 43 local authority areas with 50% or more pupils from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds.

1.34. Residential and school concentrations of ethnic minorities are a consequence of a range of factors, including the pull of particular labour market gaps that have attracted immigrants in the past, a desire on the part of immigrants to live near to kin and others from similar backgrounds who might help them navigate life in a new country, cultural connections and, in some cases, a lack of social mobility resulting from relative socio-economic disadvantage. Rates of social mobility among Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups (who are the groups most concentrated in deprived areas) are significantly lower than rates for White groups.

1.35. In the case of schools, parental choice and wanting to go to a school close by, to be among pupils from a similar background, or to attend a school with a particular faith or cultural perspective, can also be important factors.

1.36. The Government had attempted to alter the segregation of pupils in faith schools by introducing admissions criteria for new faith-based Free Schools. But these did not seem to be having an impact on the diversity of minority faith schools and Government has now proposed replacing them with a wider set of integration tests.

1.37. Taken together, high ethnic minority concentration in residential areas and in schools increases the likelihood of children growing up without meeting or better understanding people from different backgrounds. One striking illustration of such segregation came from a non-faith state secondary school we visited where, in a survey they had conducted, pupils believed the population of Britain to be between 50% and 90% Asian, such had been their experience up to that point.
1.38. Research examined during the review suggests that concentrations of ethnic communities can have both positive and negative effects, and that outcomes do not appear to be uniform for all groups. Ethnic concentration can improve bonding between people from similar backgrounds, particularly when they are new to an area, but it can also:

- limit labour market opportunities, notably for Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups – although it appears to improve employment opportunities for Indian ethnic groups;
- reduce opportunities for social ties between minority and White British communities; and
- lead to lower identification with Britain and lower levels of trust between ethnic groups, compared to minorities living in more diverse areas.

1.39. Youth programmes that engage young people in altruistic activities seem to be having some success in enabling teenagers from different backgrounds to mix, leading to greater understanding and tolerance, and reduced prejudice and anxiety. Evaluation of the National Citizen Service found that 84% of young people on the 2013 programme felt more positive towards people from different backgrounds following participation. But these are not yet on a scale that is sufficient to reach as many young people in our most isolated communities as we need to.

**How do people feel about these changes?**

1.40. The impact of these changes and the challenges they present all of us are complex. Generally, measures of national sentiment show a strong sense of community cohesion and belonging. In 2015-16, 89% of people thought their community was cohesive and a similar proportion felt a sense of belonging to Britain.

1.41. However, other research reflects a different position, suggesting that the much more significant scale of immigration since the 1990s had affected public attitudes by 2011, with negative judgments about the cultural and economic impact of migration growing and 60% rating the settlement of migrants overall as negative.

1.42. Poorer groups felt even more negatively. But unease about immigration is not limited to traditional White British communities. In one northern town we visited, the long-standing Pakistani ethnic community felt very unsettled by an increase in the Roma population.

1.43. While there has been a range of polling that suggests British Muslims feel positive about Britishness and life in Britain, polls also highlight differences in attitudes, with some Muslims and some other minority faith groups or indeed other minority sections of society expressing less progressive views, for example towards women’s equality, sexuality and freedom of speech.

1.44. Polling in 2015 also showed that more than 55% of the general public agreed that there was a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society, while 46% of British Muslims felt that being a Muslim in Britain was difficult due to
prejudice against Islam. We found a growing sense of grievance among sections of the Muslim population, and a stronger sense of identification with the plight of the ‘Ummah’, or global Muslim community.

Social and economic exclusion

1.45. Successive Governments have focussed on and at times achieved progress with social and economic exclusion, worklessness, poverty and disadvantage. Historical attainment gaps for many of the most disadvantaged groups in society are narrowing; but there is still a long way to go.

1.46. Some minority groups have fared better over time than others. Those (particularly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity) with higher levels of residential and school segregation appear to be disadvantaged across a wider range of socio-economic factors. At the same time, some White British communities – particularly in areas of industrial decline – experience significant disadvantage and are increasingly being left behind. And Gypsies and Irish Travellers, while small in number relative to other ethnic groups (at 58,000 people or 0.1% of the population in the 2011 Census) also face persistent socio-economic disadvantage.

1.47. There are 13.2 million people across the UK living on relative low income. People living in households headed by someone from an ethnic minority background are more likely than their White counterparts to live on a ‘relative low income’, with 41% to 51% of households of Black, Pakistani, Chinese and Bangladeshi ethnicity on relative low income compared with 19% of White households.

1.48. Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations live disproportionately in the most deprived areas in England compared with other groups – with the most deprived 10% of areas of England home to 31% of Pakistani ethnic groups and 28% of Bangladeshi ethnic groups.

1.49. While children from many ethnic minorities are increasingly matching or outperforming White British pupils in education, there is growing evidence of poorer White British boys, in particular, falling behind. White British pupils on Free School Meals are less than half as likely to achieve five or more good GCSEs as pupils who are not eligible for Free School Meals.

1.50. Students eligible for Free School Meals are half as likely as all other students to go to the top third of higher education institutions, and less than half as likely to go to a Russell Group institution.

1.51. People from Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are three times more likely than White British people to be unemployed. And there are more concerning aspects of disadvantage relating to gender and age in particular groups:

- For young Black men, aged 16-24, the unemployment rate is 35%, compared with 15% for young White men.

- Where they are in work, men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity tend to be in low status employment – one in four Pakistani men are employed as taxi-
drivers and two in five Bangladeshi men work in restaurants (although a number of these will be in family-owned businesses).

- Economic inactivity levels remain unusually high among women from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups – 57.2% are inactive in the labour market compared with 25.2% of White women and 38.5% of all ethnic minority women.

1.52. English language is a common denominator and a strong enabler of integration. But Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups have the lowest levels of English language proficiency of any Black or Minority Ethnic group – and women in those communities are twice as likely as men to have poor English.

1.53. The range of socio-economic exclusion suffered by some groups must be given greater attention. The persistent disadvantage experienced by young Black men in employment, the falling behind of poorer White British communities in some areas needs to be addressed if we are to prevent cracks and divisions in society from growing.

1.54. But in relation to social and economic integration in particular, there is a strong correlation of increased segregation among Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic households in more deprived areas, with poorer English language and poorer labour market outcomes, suggesting a negative cycle that will not improve without a more concerted and targeted effort.

Equality and division

1.55. Equality is another important factor of successful integration. Britain has developed some of the strongest equalities legislation in the world, and provided greater freedoms to be different; but there is more still to be done.

1.56. This review has highlighted worrying levels of segregation and socio-economic exclusion in different communities across the country and a number of inequalities between groups; one of the most striking of which is the inequality of women.

1.57. We continue to make great strides in gender equality. But in many areas of Britain the drive towards equality and opportunity across gender might never have taken place. Women in some communities are facing a double onslaught of gender inequality, combined with religious, cultural and social barriers preventing them from accessing even their basic rights as British residents. And violence against women remains all too prevalent – in domestic abuse but also in other criminal practices such as female genital mutilation, forced marriage and so-called ‘honour’ based crime.

1.58. A similar picture is seen for lesbian, gay and bisexual groups – who suffer discrimination in mainstream society, but are affected twice over when they also belong to a community that can be culturally intolerant of non-heterosexual identification.
1.59. Growing concerns exist for the safeguarding of children in some communities. Ofsted has raised concerns about the well-being of children in segregated, supplementary and unregistered, illegal faith schools, which we witnessed ourselves during the review – where pupils are not getting opportunities to mix with children from different backgrounds or gain from a properly rounded education, where squalid and unsafe conditions exist and where staff have not been vetted to work with children.

1.60. In too many cases, the educational circumstances of children are not known to local authorities and Ofsted has been concerned that some people might be using the right to home education and its relatively lax regulation to place their children in unregistered and illegal schools.

1.61. Concerns raised with us throughout our engagement suggest that these inequalities and divisions are persisting. And they appear to be worsening in some more isolated communities where segregation, deprivation and social exclusion are combining in a downward spiral with a growth in regressive religious and cultural ideologies.

1.62. The prevalence and tolerance of regressive and harmful practices has been exploited by extremists, both ‘Islamists’ and those on the far right, who highlight these differences and use them to further their shared narrative of hate and division. These extreme ideologies feed on fear and suspicion, peddle hatred and prejudice, and seek to turn communities against each other in a vicious circle.

1.63. Incidents of hate crime are also on the rise. In 2015-16, there were 62,518 hate crimes (based on race, sexual orientation, religion, disability and transgender) recorded by the police – up 19% on the previous year. The Crime Survey for England and Wales suggests that the actual level of hate crime experienced – including anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks – is more than four times the number of recorded incidents. And there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that incidents increase following ‘trigger’ events, such as the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby or conflict in Israel and Gaza. Following the EU referendum, reported incidents of hate crime rose again, possibly reflecting another such spike, with perpetrators feeling emboldened by the result.

1.64. We all have a responsibility to counteract hate in any form, and to undermine those seeking to divide us, whoever they are and however uncomfortable it may be.

Leadership

1.65. For generations we have welcomed immigrants to the UK but left them to find their own way in society while leaving host communities to accommodate them and the growing diversity of our nation.

1.66. As some communities have become more segregated, the increased pace of immigration has added new pressures, leaving long-standing communities struggling to adjust to the changes around them. Too few leaders in public office have dealt with this key issue, perhaps hoping it might change or worrying about being labelled racist; or indeed fearing that they will lose the support of minority communities.
1.67. Too many public institutions, national and local, state and non-state, have gone so far to accommodate diversity and freedom of expression that they have ignored or even condoned regressive, divisive and harmful cultural and religious practices, for fear of being branded racist or Islamophobic.

1.68. This accommodation can range from relatively trivial issues such as altering traditional cultural terms to avoid giving offence, to the department responsible for integration policy spending more in 2011-12 and 2012-13 promoting the Cornish language than the English language, or some trade unions challenging a strategy for all public sector workers to speak English. At its most serious, it might mean public sector leaders ignoring harm or denying abuse.

1.69. This has not helped the communities which many well-intentioned people in those institutions have wanted to protect; more often it has played straight into the hands of extremists. As a nation we have lost sight of our expectations on integration and lacked confidence in promoting it or challenging behaviours that undermine it.

1.70. For the last fifteen years Governments have commissioned many reviews of community cohesion and developed strategies to improve it. But these cohesion or integration plans have not been implemented with enough force or consistency, they have been allowed to be diluted and muddled, they have not been sufficiently linked to socio-economic inclusion, and communities have not been engaged adequately.

1.71. Programmes and projects have followed the easier paths, talking up the ‘positives’ but not addressing the ‘negatives’. We have relied on inter-faith groups and faith leaders to take the initiative in dealing with many of the challenges but lacked the courage to set the values and standards we want the nation as a whole to uphold and unite around.

1.72. Some public institutions have stepped back and let groups attempt to undermine efforts to prevent terrorism and further alienate the communities we need to engage and protect – whether that is from terrorist radicalisers, perpetrators of violence and hate, criminal gangs or groomers intent on exploiting and abusing vulnerable people.

1.73. We need leaders at all levels – in Government, in public sector and faith institutions, and in communities – to stand up and be more robust on this.

**The future**

1.74. Against this backdrop, we have considered what more could be done to promote opportunity and integration. We recognise that this review raises some difficult issues which many would prefer to ignore. But we believe it is only by identifying and acknowledging the problems and harms that derive from a lack of integration that we can move on to solutions that will unite us.

1.75. We hope that this review will stimulate a national conversation and debate, and greater consideration of the steps that everyone can take to improve integration and opportunity. But we have also identified some initial recommendations, set out
in chapter 12 and summarised below, which we hope the Government will accept and take forward through a new communities programme to complement and underpin existing work to tackle extremism, hate crime and violence against women. Some of these will require local action, some require the Government to act. They are based around the themes of this review and are designed to:

**Build local communities' resilience in the towns and cities where the greatest challenges exist, by:**

1. Providing additional funding for area-based plans and projects that will address the key priorities identified in this review, including the promotion of English language skills, empowering marginalised women, promoting more social mixing, particularly among young people, and tackling barriers to employment for the most socially isolated groups.

2. Developing a set of local indicators of integration and requiring regular collection of the data supporting these indicators.

3. Identifying and promoting successful approaches to integration.

**Improve the integration of communities in Britain and establish a set of values around which people from all different backgrounds can unite, by:**

4. Attaching more weight to British values, laws and history in our schools.

5. Considering what additional support or advice should be provided to immigrants to help them get off to the best start in understanding their rights and obligations and our expectations for integration.

6. Reviewing the route to British citizenship and considering the introduction of an integration oath on arrival for immigrants intending to settle in Britain.

**Reduce economic exclusion, inequality and segregation in our most isolated and deprived communities and schools, by:**

7. Working with schools providers and local communities to promote more integrated schools and opportunities for pupils to mix with others from different backgrounds.

8. Developing approaches to help overcome cultural barriers to employment.

9. Improving English language provision through funding for community-based classes and appropriate prioritisation of adult skills budgets.

10. Improving our understanding of how housing and regeneration policies could improve integration or reduce segregation.

11. Introducing stronger safeguards for children who are not in mainstream education, including those being home schooled.
Increase standards of leadership and integrity in public office, by:

(12) Ensuring that British values such as respect for the rule of law, equality and tolerance are enshrined in the principles of public life and developing a new oath for holders of public office.
2. Why conduct an integration review?

2.1. This review was commissioned following a general election that brought a new government into power at a time when Britain was recovering from a recession, but with concerns about terrorism, immigration and the economy running high.

2.2. Despite the growing diversity of our nation and the general sense that people from different backgrounds got on well together, community cohesion did not feel universally strong across the country. Numerous reports on community cohesion and integration had been produced in the preceding fifteen years but the recommendations they had made were difficult to see in action. Opinion polls revealed growing concern about race relations, and extremism – often conflated with terrorism – was attracting increasing attention.

2.3. In 2011, the Coalition Government had promised a stronger integration strategy, in part to clarify and separate its ‘Prevent’ programme to tackle terrorism from wider efforts to promote community cohesion. But Prevent, while clearly focused on terrorism, continued to attract some controversy, not least because attempts to promote integration had not fulfilled their stated ambition.

2.4. So it felt right to step back, take stock and consider what should follow to unite the nation.

2.5. Integration is a nebulous concept which resists a single definition or description. These vary with political and research focus; and often appear to refer to very separate processes and goals. Of some of the many definitions and descriptions in submissions to this review:

- Professor Ted Cantle puts forward the idea of “living together” – in which we share a sense of belonging; build acceptance of (most) common values and behaviours; use a common language to communicate: develop our personal intercultural confidence/competence and religious literacy; and become comfortable with difference and plurality”.

- Professor Eric Kaufmann (Birkbeck College, University of London) promotes a concept of “multivocalism, something qualitatively distinct from both multiculturalism and the current policy of civic nationalism. This recognises that in allowing diverse people to attach to Britain in their own way, we strengthen, rather than weaken, British identity”.

- The Runnymede Trust focuses on economic development, suggesting that government policies on integration should give “priority to tackling the concentration of poverty in both people and places”.

...community cohesion did not feel universally strong across the country.
2.6. These are all useful perspectives. Drawing on what we have seen and heard during the review, we suggest integration is the extent to which people from all backgrounds can get on – with each other, and in enjoying and respecting the benefits that the United Kingdom has to offer, such as:

- our values of democracy, fairness, the rule of law, freedom of speech, inclusiveness, tolerance and equality between citizens regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion or sexuality;

- the opportunities and security that come from a good education, access to a strong labour market with a guaranteed minimum wage, and a welfare state that includes the National Health Service and support for people when they fall on hard times or are vulnerable; and

- our institutions, norms and idiosyncrasies – from the Monarchy and the BBC to queuing and talking about the weather, loving and hating all these things at once - which, while identifiable as quintessentially British, we refuse to have written down, fixed or imposed on us but in which we take great pride.

2.7. Research for the Social Integration Commission in 2015 estimated that the cost to the UK of a lack of integration is approximately £6 billion each year, specifically through long-term unemployment (£1.5 billion), recruitment and career progression (£0.7 billion) and, in areas relating to community health and well-being, costs to the UK economy including suicide (£1.7 billion), cardiovascular diseases (£1.2 billion) and health and social care among the isolated (£0.7 billion).

2.8. A paper for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 2008 summarised the impacts of a lack of integration:

“Institutionalized inequalities in rights and responsibilities mean that individuals from particular social groups are more likely to be poor. Groups that are discriminated against, either in legislation and policies or through service provider practices and self-exclusion, are unable to access services and resources on the same terms as others. This leaves them disadvantaged in relation to economic opportunities and consequent income.”

2.9. Academic research (discussed in chapter 4) reveals the benefits that relationships across traditional boundaries can bring: social mixing reduces anxiety and prejudice but also enables people to get on better in employment and to improve their social mobility.
2.10. Social mixing is not always a straightforward matter. The Integration Hub highlights the complicated relationship between segregation and economic prosperity, and the benefits of social clustering for some new immigrants and young communities.³

2.11. It is nevertheless the case that the less integrated we are as a nation, the greater the social and economic costs we face as a whole. Mistrust, anxiety and prejudice grow where communities live separately. That allows people with extremist agendas to step in and spread fear, hatred and division.

2.12. Long-standing – and worsening – divisions in our society are being exploited by extremists, predators, and those seeking excuses to legitimise their hate. In recent years we have seen a growth in the reporting of religiously and racially motivated hate crimes. These issues are too significant to be acted on only in the aftermath of incidents because of the vicious circle they set in motion. We must move from cure to prevention, and drive integration to build our nation’s prosperity, opportunity and resilience against all social shocks.
3. Our population today

Chapter Summary

- The population of the United Kingdom grew by more than 4 million people between 2001 and 2011 and has become older, more secular but also much more diverse in its ethnicity, beliefs and sexuality, with ethnic minority groups more likely to be religious and to have a younger age profile.

- Migration has been the most significant factor in the growth of our population in recent years, with significant long-term immigration from former Commonwealth countries (particularly India and Pakistan) continuing, and with a more significant increase in immigration from other EU countries, most notably Poland.

- More than 8 out of 10 identify themselves as “White British” and much of the country reflects this, but many more people in the United Kingdom are now experiencing high migration flows and the impact of migration in their communities – in schools, housing and other services.

- As the population’s diversity has increased, people from minority ethnic backgrounds have become more widely dispersed across the country, although ethnic minority groups remain more heavily concentrated in urban areas.

- People from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds and people of Muslim faith live in increasing and greater concentrations (relative to other minority ethnic and faith groups) in particular local electoral wards in certain areas in the north, the Midlands and London.

- There are high levels of segregation in our schools and these mirror residential patterns, being highest among Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups relative to other ethnic minority groups.
How our population is changing

3.1. In order to consider integration, it is important to understand the make-up of our population and how it has changed in recent years.

3.2. In 2015, there were 65.1 million people living in the United Kingdom: 54.8 million (84%) in England, 5.4 million (8%) in Scotland, 3.1 million (5%) in Wales and 1.9 million (3%) in Northern Ireland. The population of the United Kingdom rose by 4.1 million between 2001 and 2011, with more than half of this growth due to immigration. We are a multi-racial and multi-faith society and have changed across a range of demographic factors, becoming older and more secular as a whole but also even more diverse.

Gender

3.3. We are almost evenly distributed across the genders, with 50.7% of the population in the UK in 2015 female and 49.3% male. The historical predominance of women due to longevity is evening out as men’s life expectancy improves. Since mid-2005, the number of men aged 85 and over in the UK has increased by 54%, compared to a 21% increase in the number of women in that age range.

Age

3.4. As a whole, we are an ageing population, with increased life expectancy and the impact of the ‘baby boomer’ generation with high birth rates (following the Second World War and up to the early 1960s) moving into higher age groups.

Ethnicity

3.5. We are becoming more ethnically diverse, although more than 8 out of 10 regard themselves as White British. At the 2011 Census, across Great Britain:

- 81.5% were White British (50.0 million)
- 7.1% were Asian (4.4 million)
- 5.4% were White Other, including Irish and Gypsy/Irish Traveller (3.3 million)
- 3.1% were Black (1.9 million)
- 2.0% were Mixed (1.2 million)
- 0.9% were from any other ethnic group (0.6 million).
Population of Great Britain, 2011

3.6. Between 2001 and 2011 the White British population in Great Britain shrank by 0.4 million people and from just over 88% to just under 82% of the total population. Ethnic minority groups grew with the largest numerical growth in England and Wales among other White (most notably Polish, up by 0.5 million – a nine-fold increase) and Asian/Asian British (most notably Indian and Pakistani, each increasing by 0.4 million) groups.

3.7. Over that same period:

- the number of people living in England and Wales who were born outside the UK increased from 4.6 million (9%) to 7.5 million (13%);

- the number of people in Britain classifying themselves as belonging to a minority ethnic group (including White non-British) increased from 6.7 million (12%) to 11.4 million (19%) and while not officially recorded, many more of us have immigrant ancestry.

Source: 2011 Census
Religion

3.8. We remain a largely religious country, with nearly 7 out of 10 of us across Great Britain in 2011 saying we belonged to a religion. Christians remain a majority, while just over a quarter of the population holds no religion.

- 58.8% were Christian (36.1 million)
- 26.1% were of no religion (16.0 million)
- 4.5% were Muslim (2.8 million)
- 1.4% were Hindu (0.8 million)
- 0.7% were Sikh (0.4 million)
- 0.4% were Jewish (0.3 million)
- 0.4% were Buddhist (0.3 million)
- 0.4% were of other religions (0.3 million)
- 7.2% of people did not answer this Census question (4.4 million)

3.9. Different ethnic and religious groups have very different age population profiles. This has a significant impact on a whole raft of socio-economic measures and the dynamics within and between communities. The chart below demonstrates this difference by religion, with a notably younger age profile among Muslims.

**Median age by religion, England and Wales, 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Median Age (yrs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religion</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion not stated</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2011 Census
3.10. We discuss religion in more detail in chapter 8 but there are three significant changes in the religiosity of the British population to note in the period 2001 to 2011:\(^\text{13}\):

- An increase in secularity – the percentage of people reporting that they had no religion grew from 16.8% to 26.1% (9.7 million up to 16.0 million).

- A decline in Christianity – the percentage of people identifying as Christian reduced from 70.1% to 58.8% (40.2 million down to 36.1 million).

- A growth in minority faith communities, particularly Muslims – the percentage of people in all the other main non-Christian religions except the Jewish population grew, with the number of Muslims growing most, by 72% (from 2.8% to 4.5% of the population or 1.6 million up to 2.8 million), illustrated below.

Non-Christian religions in Great Britain, changes between 2001 and 2011

![Bar Chart]

Source: Census 2011 and 2001

3.11. It is important to note, as many have pointed out to us, that while the 72% growth in the Muslim population in Great Britain between 2001 and 2011 has been the most significant increase in any faith community, Muslims are religiously and ethnically diverse, including people from Sunni, Shia and Ahmadi denominations and originating from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, among many other regions and countries – and with just under half of British Muslims born in the UK. The majority of Muslims in the UK belong to the Sunni denomination, while the two largest ethnic groups within the overall Muslim

...the 72% growth in the Muslim population... has been the most significant increase in any faith community...
population in England and Wales are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins, accounting for around 38% and 15% of Muslims in England and Wales respectively.\textsuperscript{14}

**Sexuality**

3.12. There has been an increase in self-identification as lesbian, gay or bisexual over time.

3.13. There are well known difficulties with surveys of sexuality, with many thought to be reluctant to acknowledge their own sexuality in a survey if they are not open about it with friends or family. So while Treasury actuaries have estimated that around 6% of the population is gay lesbian or bisexual, the Office for National Statistics' Integrated Household Study in 2014 produced a survey figure of just 1.6% for the UK population. Within this, there were differences in identification levels between age groups; with only 0.6% of over 65s identifying as gay, lesbian or bisexual compared to 2.6% of 16-24 year olds, and 2.2% of 25 – 35 year olds.\textsuperscript{15} While survey figures have remained relatively stable at around 1.5% since 2010,\textsuperscript{16} the comparatively higher figure among the under-50s suggests that open identification might increase over the foreseeable future.

**Sexual Identity by age, UK 2014**

![Sexual Identity by age, UK 2014](source)

3.14. Highlighting the trend towards non-heterosexual identification, a 2015 YouGov poll\textsuperscript{17} measured the scale of identification between hetero- and homo-sexual, suggesting that 49% of people aged 18-24 identified as 'something other than 100% heterosexual', compared to 23% of the general population (across all ages).
Immigration

3.15. Immigration is undoubtedly a key factor influencing many of the demographic changes we are seeing in our population today and the scale and pace of change has increased in recent years.

3.16. Britain is, of course, used to immigration. It has a long history of immigration through the Roman Empire and subsequent Anglo-Saxon, Viking and Norman invasions and migrations. Since the end of the Second World War, immigration patterns have been driven mainly by British nationality law – in particular from the Republic of Ireland and from former colonies and territories of the British Empire such as the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and parts of Africa - together with labour market gaps. More recently, other migrants have come as asylum seekers under refugee conventions or from member states of the expanding European Union under rights of free movement.

3.17. For much of the 20th century, the number of people leaving the UK and the number of immigrants arriving were roughly in balance. Over the last two decades, however, total immigration (people coming to live in the UK) has doubled - from around 300,000 per year prior to 1997 to just over 600,000 in 2014-15. Emigration (those leaving) has fluctuated to a greater extent since the 1990s but has remained significantly lower than immigration, which has meant a net immigration figure (adding to the population) of just under or just over 200,000 each year since 2004, rising to more than 300,000 in 2014 and 2015.

3.18. A focus on the net migration figure can, however, obscure the total impact of migration on population change, or the extent to which the public may notice such change. For example, in the year ending December 2015, we experienced a net addition to our population through migration of 333,000 people – around 0.5% of the UK population. But this net figure reflected 630,000 people arriving intending to live here for more than a year, and at the same time around 297,000 leaving to live abroad for more than a year. Taken together, 927,000 people arrived or left the country in a year. Therefore, the impact on the population of this total ‘churn’ is and can feel considerably greater than a net figure of 333,000 or 0.5% of the population might suggest.

3.19. Of the 630,000 arriving, 270,000 were from the European Union and 277,000 came from non-EU countries. A further 83,000 were British nationals returning to the UK having lived abroad for more than a year. While of the 297,000 leaving, 123,000 were British citizens, 85,000 were EU citizens and 89,000 were non-EU citizens.
3.20. The nation is experiencing both net emigration of British citizens (higher numbers of British citizens leaving each year than are returning) and net immigration of EU and non-EU citizens (higher numbers arriving each year than leaving). It is not just the arrival of immigrants, but the churn of both British citizens leaving and EU and non-EU citizens arriving (together with demographic changes such as ageing in the existing population) that plays through into changing characteristics of our population.

Total migration in the UK in year ending December 2015

Source: Office for National Statistics, Quarterly report: May 2016

3.21. Over the last four years, the number of EU immigrants has increased significantly, while the number of non-EU immigrants has decreased slightly – although there remained a higher number of non-EU immigrants than EU immigrants arriving each year.

3.22. According to Home Office research\(^21\) (2012), migration of EU citizens had up to that point tended to be more circular than that of non-EU citizens – in other words, EU nationals tended to come to Britain but then return home to a greater extent (reflecting greater ‘freedom of movement’ rights and lower distances and travel costs).

3.23. Conversely, non-EU nationals coming to Britain other than for study were more likely than Europeans to settle permanently. And among non-Europeans coming to Britain between 1991 and 2010, those from the ‘New Commonwealth’ countries, particularly India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, were much more likely to stay permanently compared to migrants from ‘Old Commonwealth’ countries such as Australia and New Zealand.
3.24. Of the 125,653 people granted citizenship in 2014\textsuperscript{22}, the five largest nationalities were Indian, Pakistani, Nigerian, South African and Bangladeshi. Indian and Pakistani nationalities accounted for around a quarter of all people granted citizenship, while all five nationalities accounted for nearly half. In 2015, the top four nationalities remained unchanged, while Polish overtook Bangladeshi as the fifth largest\textsuperscript{23}.

3.25. While this rise in Polish people granted citizenship might result simply from a growing number who have been in Britain long enough to qualify for citizenship, it also supports a growing view that the ‘circularity’ of EU migration (people coming to work for a few years then returning) may be reducing, with a growing number of eastern European workers now settling in the UK with families. Professor Louise Ryan of Middlesex University has been conducting qualitative research among Polish communities in London and has found that while most migrants initially arrive intending to stay only for a short period, an increasing number are choosing to stay for longer periods (initially on an ‘another year and another year’ basis) and often settle more permanently after establishing relationships or putting children into school\textsuperscript{24}. Our visits during the review to areas experiencing high levels of EU immigration - for example in Boston, Lincolnshire – leant weight to this pattern.

Immigration for family/marriage reasons

3.26. There is a variety of reasons why people come to the UK, and differences in how long they stay in the country, with those coming to join family far more likely to settle permanently.

- There are large numbers of students arriving each year (192,000 in the year to June 2015)\textsuperscript{25} but analysis of administrative records for migrants granted visas in 2009 shows that only 17% of those granted student visas had achieved permanent settlement or valid leave to remain after five years, while just 1% did so within five years.

- Of those who originally came to the UK on a skilled work visa, 25% had achieved permanent settlement, while a further 10% had valid leave to remain\textsuperscript{26}.

3.27. In contrast with these more temporary forms of immigration for study and work, 81% of those granted family visas appeared to have legal leave to remain five years after arrival, with 77% having achieved permanent settlement\textsuperscript{27}.

3.28. Pakistan, India, the United States, Bangladesh and China have accounted for the highest numbers of spouse/partner visas issued in recent years. The data for 2013 shows a predominance of wives or fiancé\'es by nearly 3 to 1 over husbands or fiancés entering via spouse/partner visas\textsuperscript{28}.
3.29. David Goodhart from Policy Exchange has highlighted the creation of a ‘first generation in every generation’ phenomenon resulting from the high number of transnational marriages – with second, third and subsequent generations being joined by a foreign born partner, and children in each new generation growing up with a foreign born parent\(^29\), which may be acting as a bar to integration in some communities. It came up regularly in meetings in some areas as a reason for the strong perpetuation of foreign cultural practices and lower levels of English language proficiency. We were told in a review visit that in one northern town all except one of the Councillors of Asian ethnicity (all men) had married a wife from Pakistan.

3.30. A number of estimates have been made around the prevalence of transnational marriages among the Pakistani ethnic community in particular:

- A study by Bristol University found that half of British Pakistanis married back in Pakistan, and that most of these marriages were between cousins or other members of extended kin groups\(^30\).

- In a cohort study, ‘Born in Bradford’, at the Bradford Royal Infirmary, 80% of babies of Pakistani ethnicity born in the area had at least one parent born outside the United Kingdom, 63% of mothers of Pakistani ethnicity were married to cousins and these mothers were less likely to be educated or in employment compared with mothers of Pakistani descent who had not married cousins\(^31\).

3.31. In 2012, the Government introduced a new requirement that British citizens and permanent residents should meet an income threshold of £18,600 (higher if there are accompanying children) before being allowed to bring a partner into the UK from outside the EU, which it expected to result in fewer partners coming to the United Kingdom. The number of migrants being given leave to enter the United Kingdom to join family has decreased in recent years (from 70,119 in 2006 to 37,859 in 2015)\(^32\).

3.32. While this reduction is seen as a policy success, challenges remain – for example, there are concerns that some British citizens get around the restrictions by moving to a European country where they meet up with a foreign (non-EU) born spouse and, after living in Europe for a short period, return together to Britain under European Union rights of free-movement. There are also concerns about sham marriages and use of false or misrepresentative documents to demonstrate co-habitation.

Asylum seekers

3.33. The UK also accommodates a varying number of asylum seekers each year. Following the introduction of new border controls and restrictions on appeals from
applicants from some countries, the number of asylum claims in the UK fell from a peak of 84,132 in 2002 to a 20-year low of 17,916 in 2010, but has been rising again since then, reaching 32,414 in 2015. Asylum seekers are generally not eligible to work, and have no access to public funds or services, while awaiting a decision on their claim for asylum. However, if they are destitute and/or homeless, they can apply for financial subsistence (£36.95 per person per week) and/or accommodation on a no-choice dispersal basis to areas where housing costs are cheaper.

The length of time that an individual remains an asylum seeker varies depending on the complexity of the case. The Home Office suggests that applicants should be able to expect a decision within six months; although more complex cases may take longer. The result is a concentration of asylum seekers in less affluent areas of the country.

**Illegal immigration**

While difficult to estimate, the presence of illegal immigrants also has an impact on communities and on public attitudes towards immigration.

Illegal immigrants are generally non-EU nationals who have either entered the country illegally (for example being smuggled in a lorry) or entered legally (for example through a short term visa or as an asylum applicant) but who have remained after the expiry of a visa or a decision to reject an asylum claim. EU migrants do not have an unconditional right to be in the UK and can become illegal immigrants if, after three months, they are not exercising treaty rights.

Estimates of the illegal immigrant population in the UK range from 460,000 to 1.1 million. Estimates of the illegal immigrant population in the UK range from 460,000 (an estimate produced for the Home Office using a ‘residual method’ adapted from the United States, in which an estimated number of foreign born residents in the UK legally is deducted from the total number of foreign born residents recorded in the 2001 Census) to 1.1 million (Migration Watch, 2010). The reintroduction of exit checks for all scheduled commercial international air, sea and rail routes from April 2015 might improve future attempts to estimate levels of illegal immigration.

Enforcement action is taken to remove illegal immigrants, although the number returned each year to their home countries using public funds is relatively low (just over 16,000 per year on average between 2008 and 2012). Out of a total of 88,865 illegal immigrants returned to 180 different countries between January 2008 and June 2013, more than half were returned to just ten countries: India (8,570), Pakistan (8,180), China (6,085), Afghanistan (6,035), Nigeria (5,610), Brazil (5,905), Bangladesh (3,705), Vietnam (3,105), Jamaica (2,960) and Iraq (2,800).
Birth rates

3.40. Birth rates among foreign-born residents are higher proportionately than those of UK-born residents. Office for National Statistics data on live births in England and Wales in 2014 show a growing percentage of births to mothers born outside the UK (up 1.4% from 2013) and a decrease in the percentage born to UK-born mothers (down 1.1%), as well as a higher fertility rate for foreign-born mothers (2.09 compared with 1.76 for UK-born mothers). More than a quarter (27%) of births in 2014 were to mothers born outside the UK – the highest percentage since this information was first collected in 1969. Poland was the most common country of birth for foreign-born mothers between 2010 and 2014, followed by Pakistan and India, while Pakistan was the most common country of birth for foreign-born fathers between 2008 and 2014, followed by Poland and India. In the London Borough of Newham, more than three quarters (76.7%) of births were to foreign-born mothers in 2014 (the highest percentage for any local authority in the UK).

Overall population change

3.41. So, when birth rates are taken into account, the total impact of migration has altered the make-up and diversity of our population even more significantly between 2001 and 2011, with:

- the total population of the United Kingdom increasing by 4.1 million;
- the White British population shrinking;
- ethnic minority groups growing (most notably, Polish, Indian and Pakistani);
- an increase in people not belonging to any religion;
- the Christian population reducing and the Jewish population staying the same size, while other main religions, most notably the Muslim population, grew, and
- the population aging as a whole but with the growing ethnic minority population generally having a younger age profile.

3.42. With such notable and rapid change, it is not surprising that many communities are feeling the impact of immigration to a greater extent and that this is playing out in wider public attitudes towards immigration.
Impact on communities of higher immigration

3.43. Historically, most migration to the UK has been to England. This remains the case today, with 88% of the 632,000 immigrants in 2014 arriving in England, 6% in Scotland, 4% in Wales and 2% in Northern Ireland (roughly in line with existing proportions of the UK population across the four countries).45

3.44. Post-war immigration from Commonwealth and other countries was encouraged to fill labour market shortages and settlement often reflected this—tending towards major cities and towns where industry needed workers.

3.45. Recent immigration has been on a more significant scale, albeit less organised or encouraged, with immigrants (apart from asylum seekers and refugees) making their own arrival and settlement arrangements, and communities and local authorities and services adapting to the changes going on in their areas. While there is plenty of evidence and plenty to say about the positive impact of immigration to the economy and culture of Great Britain, these aspects were not what responses to the review questions brought out.

3.46. Changes in immigration, particularly the significant increase in migrants from the EU, are changing the picture of settlement of migrants in the UK. In 2014, most migrants arrived in London (178,000) but the next most significant areas for migrant arrival were the East and South East (70,000 in each), ahead of the North West (55,000).46 Analysis by the Home Office suggests that 50% of the population of England and Wales is now living in areas that are experiencing relatively high migration flows.47

3.47. Some areas such as Herefordshire and East Cambridgeshire have seen large numbers of migrants from countries that have joined the EU more recently settling due to the availability of manufacturing and agricultural jobs.

3.48. The drive to provide cheaper accommodation for asylum seekers being supported by taxpayers has led to larger proportions being dispersed in poorer areas, resulting in some places such as Middlesbrough and Glasgow taking higher numbers than other towns and cities.48 In turn, we heard during the review that this increases local feelings of unfairness over pressure on housing and other resources and can exacerbate community tensions.
3.49. In submissions to the review and during our visits, a number of local authorities raised integration issues related to the relatively sudden emergence of new communities in their areas, particularly Polish and other Eastern Europeans, for which they had not been prepared and for which they did not feel resourced. A few also cited the pressures they faced in their communities as a result of high numbers of asylum seeker placements and refugees. Others were concerned with highly concentrated mono-religious and/or mono-ethnic communities becoming increasingly separated from the existing or wider community.
3.50. In a review visit to Sheffield, we saw the issues faced by the local authority and the community following a sudden growth in a Roma community in the city. The Council estimated that around 6,000 Roma and other Eastern European people now reside in Sheffield, predominantly in the Page Hall area of the city, with 53% under 17 years old. This is creating pressure on schools, with an estimated increase in Eastern European children from 150 to almost 2,500 in the space of four to five years. A head teacher told us that educational attainment gaps against the Sheffield average are huge, with only 8.9% of Roma children reading and 3.5% writing at Key Stage 1, compared to 80.1% reading and 70.3% writing among the general population. Community tensions are also arising over alleged practices such as fly tipping and benefit fraud. Clive Betts, MP for Sheffield South East, described to the House of Commons in 2014 how many Roma immigrants are themselves scammed on arrival. He said:

“They are given a package: they are offered a deal whereby when they obtain jobs, which are mostly unskilled and low paid, those who give them the jobs take money from their pay packets and use it to pay the rents for the often grossly overcrowded housing they are given…. That scam is going on…"

Social housing and homelessness

3.51. Analysis of Core social housing lettings data, set out below, suggests that lettings to new tenants slightly under-represent foreign nationals (which might be expected given eligibility restrictions for foreign nationals’ access to social housing), and slightly over-represent non-White households:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of new social rent lettings by nationality and ethnicity, 07/08 -14/15</th>
<th>07/08</th>
<th>08/09</th>
<th>09/10</th>
<th>10/11</th>
<th>11/12</th>
<th>12/13</th>
<th>13/14</th>
<th>14/15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total population in England in 2011</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UK Nationals</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>93%</td>
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<td>91%</td>
<td>91%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign nationals</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non White</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.52. There has been some debate about the impact of choice-based lettings, introduced in most local authority areas over the last 15 to 20 years, with a study undertaken by the Centre for Housing Research at the University of St Andrews in
2011\textsuperscript{50} finding that choice based lettings had led to greater segregation of ethnic minority communities in deprived areas.

3.53. On the ground, people in established communities see more housing being allocated to ‘newcomers’ from different backgrounds. Some local authorities have responded to these concerns by strengthening prioritisation criteria around ‘local connection’ to the area when allocating social housing. But this is only one of a range of criteria and the vulnerability of applicants (assessed against ‘reasonable preference’ categories such as homelessness or overcrowding) will often outweigh local connection. The feeling of unfairness over who gets priority for housing can also be fed by:

- the use of former council housing (sold under the Right to Buy and subsequently turned into privately rented housing, but probably still regarded by local communities as social housing) being let to immigrant and ethnic minority households who themselves might not be eligible or have sufficient priority for social housing, and who are unable to buy their own homes;

- use of former social or private sector housing that has been contracted to accommodate asylum seekers or statutorily homeless households; or

- the illegal sub-letting of social housing.

3.54. People from ethnic minorities and foreign nationals are disproportionately represented, and increasingly so, in homelessness cases dealt with by local authorities, which have implications for who gets priority for social housing. Ethnic minority households made up 34% of all statutory homelessness acceptances by local authorities in England in 2015-16 (up from 25% in 2008-09) and 18% of homelessness acceptances were foreign nationals – around half from European Economic Area countries\textsuperscript{51}, more than double the number in 2009-10\textsuperscript{52}.

3.55. The number of people sleeping on the streets of the UK has been increasing in recent years, particularly in London. The number of rough sleepers in the Capital from Central and Eastern European countries has risen from 6% of all people sleeping rough (104 individuals) in 2005-06\textsuperscript{53} to 36.8% (2,924 individuals) in 2015-16\textsuperscript{54}. Pressures exist in other parts of the country too, including Manchester, Derbyshire and Peterborough.

3.56. Rough sleeping impacts on communities and places significant pressures on local authorities and other agencies. The longer these individuals spend sleeping rough, the more likely they are to develop complex needs (such as substance misuse) and face increased difficulties in finding suitable accommodation or returning home.
Funding for local services

3.57. The rate of change of immigration is not factored in to local authority funding allocations from the Department for Communities and Local Government.

3.58. Funding for local authorities comes from a mix of central government grants, council tax and business rates. The Government’s policy has been to move towards greater self-sufficiency for local government, with less reliance on central grant, and more incentives for economic growth and house building. The assessment of relative needs and local resources that underlies the calculation of the grant and redistribution of business rates was fixed in 2013-14 as part of this objective, with an expectation that there would be a ‘reset’ of this system in 2020. Some of the data that this assessment was based on, including population, is based only on projections from the 2011 Census.

3.59. In February 2016, the Government announced the Fair Funding Review. This will consider what the needs assessment formula should be in a world in which local government spending is funded by local resources not central grant from the end of the current Parliament. It will look at how needs could be measured differently, and how often they should be reassessed. A discussion paper on this was published in July 2016, alongside a consultation on the overall local government finance reforms55.

3.60. We recognise that there is a balance to be struck between giving local authorities long-term certainty about their finances and their being able to respond to unexpected spending pressures. We hope that this, and the particular impact of immigration in some areas, will be considered as part of the Government’s Fair Funding Review and would urge local authorities to engage with this process. Better and more timely information about local population change feels an essential factor. We also note that, although relatively small in size, the new Controlling Migration Fund will have a role to play here.

3.61. Education funding could be seen as more adaptable to changes in population size. Local authorities are under a statutory duty to provide sufficient school places, and they retain autonomy over forecasting for this. Forecasts are reported annually through the School Capacity Survey (SCAP) and are used as the basis for capital allocations.

3.62. However, the Department for Education’s understanding of the impact of immigration on education appears inconclusive56. They do not make explicit assessment of changes to school populations or resource implications for individual schools; although a study submitted by the Department to this review did note that:

- the population of non-UK born children was increasing, though the exact figure was unknown;
- any additional strain on education services is difficult to quantify; but might include a need for extra classroom resources, teacher training, administrative resources, and school places;
• benefits of migration on education are similarly under-researched but could include boosting pupil numbers in under-subscribed schools, enriching cultural experiences, and attracting extra school investment; and

• slightly lower attainment levels may be apparent in immigrant children, but these appear to level out by the age of 16.

3.63. So while rapid change is evident to local communities and services who experience it, the data and evidence available to central and local government to influence funding and policy decisions often feels out of date and insufficient. More needs to be done to connect the up-to-date evidence and views held by local communities and service providers with central Government decision-making, including projections of demands and impacts on services at a much more sophisticated level.
Settlement patterns and segregation

3.64. Immigration and a growing ethnic minority population are inevitably leading to a greater dispersal of people from ethnic minority groups across the country, creating more diverse areas and less segregation over the population as a whole. At the same time, however, there are a number of local areas where minority ethnic and faith communities are increasing in both concentration and segregation. In this context, concentration is the total proportion of a particular faith or ethnic group living within a wider area, regardless of the degree to which they are distributed in relation to other groups; while segregation is the extent to which households from a particular ethnic or faith group live side by side with others from the same background within an area.

3.65. Historical patterns of immigration and settlement can still be seen strongly in the geographical spread of ethnic minority populations across the country today.

Map: Percentage population in electoral wards from an ethnic minority
3.66. Ethnic minorities are predominantly urban:

- In 2011, 79% of White British people lived in urban areas compared to 99% of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations, 98% of Black African, Black Caribbean and Arab and 97% of the Indian ethnic population\(^{57}\).

- Half of Britain’s ethnic minority population lived in three English cities – London, Birmingham and Manchester\(^{58}\).

- In Glasgow, 12% of the population was from a minority ethnic group, in Edinburgh and Aberdeen it was 8%, and in Dundee it was 6% (compared to 4% for Scotland as a whole). These areas also saw the largest increases in Scotland between 2001 and 2011 in the proportion of their population who are from minority ethnic groups\(^{59}\).

- In Wales, ethnic minority groups are more heavily concentrated in Cardiff (15%), Newport (10%) and Swansea (6%), compared to 4% across Wales as a whole\(^{60}\).

**Smaller area concentration**

3.67. Between the 2001 and 2011 Census, people from ethnic and faith minority groups represented a substantial proportion of the population in an increasing number of local authority areas, with:

- Ethnicity: around 10% (32 out of 326) of local authorities in England in 2011 comprising a 40% or more non-White British population, up from 6% of local authorities in 2001\(^{61}\); and

- Faith: 5 local authorities in 2011 with more than 40% of the population belonging to a minority faith, compared to 1 local authority in 2001\(^{62}\).

3.68. While it is not possible to make exact comparisons between ward populations over time – because of frequent boundary changes – there seems to be a growing concentration of ethnic and faith minority groups at that more local spatial level:

- Ethnicity: In 2011, 682 electoral wards within 88 local authorities in England comprised more than 40% non-White British residents; up from 404 wards in 58 local authorities in 2001\(^{63}\).

- Ethnicity: In 17 of these wards, 90% of the population was non-White British, compared to just 1 ward in 2001\(^{64}\).
• Faith: There were 178 electoral wards within 44 local authorities in which more than 40% of the population belonged to a minority religion in 2011, compared to 107 wards within 31 local authorities in 2001.

• Faith: In 4 of those wards the proportion belonging to a minority religion in 2011 was more than 80%; no wards had such high concentrations in 2001.

3.69. Analysis of Census data using the Index of Dissimilarity (a demographic measure of the evenness of distribution of ethnic groups across neighbourhoods within a larger geographical area) indicates more spreading out and less residential segregation overall of ethnic minority populations, reflecting the growing diversity of the nation as a whole. The exceptions to this are the Chinese population (likely to be explained by student migration into University towns and cities). The analysis also identifies the relative levels of segregation between ethnic groups, as set out in the graph below. This shows that:

- levels of residential segregation are highest for Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations relative to other ethnic groups;
- while Pakistani ethnic groups’ segregation levels as a whole declined between 1991 and 2001, there has been no reduction since 2001;
- Black African ethnic groups’ segregation reduced the most compared to other ethnic groups between 2001 and 2011.

Ethnic group residential segregation in England and Wales, for wards, 1991-2011

Source: Catney, 2015
3.70. Despite the overall decreases in residential segregation suggested by this analysis, there are a notable number of wards where high concentrations of ethnic and faith minority groups have increased since 2001, even accepting that there would be some impact from boundary changes.

3.71. The most significant increases in minority *ethnic* ward-level concentrations have been among Pakistani and Indian ethnic groups. In 2011 there were:

- 24 wards in 12 local authority areas where more than 40% of the population were of Pakistani ethnicity; up from 12 wards within 7 authorities in 2001\(^70\).
- 20 wards in 8 local authorities where more than 40% of the population were of Indian ethnicity; up from 16 wards within 6 authorities in 2001\(^71\).

3.72. The greatest increases for minority *faith* ward level concentrations have been among Muslim faith groups. In 2011 there were:

- 69 wards in 24 local authorities where more than 40% of the population identified as Muslim; up from 36 wards within 16 authorities in 2001\(^72\).
- 9 wards in 4 local authorities where more than 70% of the population identified as Muslim, with one ward over 85%, up from 2001 when just two wards in one authority were over 70% Muslim\(^73\).

3.73. In total, by 2011 there were 42 wards across 16 local authorities where a minority faith or ethnic community had become a local *majority* of more than 50%, with the ten areas of highest concentration listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Local authority</th>
<th>Predominant faith/ethnic groups</th>
<th>Percentage concentrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bastwell</td>
<td>Blackburn with Darwen</td>
<td>Muslim/Pakistani</td>
<td>85.3 / 46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latimer</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>Indian/Hindu</td>
<td>79.2 / 70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shear Brow</td>
<td>Blackburn with Darwen</td>
<td>Muslim/Indian</td>
<td>77.7 / 54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washwood Heath</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Muslim/Pakistani</td>
<td>77.3 / 57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daneshouse with Stone</td>
<td>Burnley</td>
<td>Muslim/Pakistani</td>
<td>76.3 / 48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toller</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Muslim/Pakistani</td>
<td>76.1 / 72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manningham</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Muslim/Pakistani</td>
<td>75.0 / 60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordesley Green</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Muslim/Pakistani</td>
<td>73.9 / 50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford Moor</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Muslim/Pakistani</td>
<td>72.8 / 63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitefield</td>
<td>Pendle</td>
<td>Pakistani/Muslim</td>
<td>70.3 / 69.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2011 Census
3.74. There were no wards in which any other single minority ethnic or faith group other than Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi ethnic groups or Muslim or Hindu faith groups exceeded 50% of the ward population, and only 1 where such concentration exceeded 40% (Kersal in Salford, with 41% of the population of Jewish faith). It should be noted that this analysis is based on Census data, the most recent of which come from 2011. So, while the analysis picks out the areas with the largest minority group concentrations in the 2011 data, it is possible that these and other groups will have grown in size since then at local levels. While the predominance of Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi ethnic and Muslim faith concentrations was evident in many areas we visited during the review, the growth of newer Eastern European communities also stood out in a number of areas, mentioned earlier.
Segregation in schools

3.75. Schools vary in the extent to which they are representative of local populations in terms of different characteristics such as social class, ethnicity or religion. In its 2012 report, Education at a Glance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), found that the UK had unusually high levels of segregation with poorer and immigrant pupils concentrated in the same schools rather than being more evenly distributed. Among the children of immigrant families, 80% were in schools with high concentrations of other immigrant or disadvantaged pupils (based on 2010 data).74

3.76. In Britain, the ethnic minority population generally has a younger age profile than the wider population. So, while we know from the Census that, in 2011, 19% of the population as a whole were from an ethnic minority background, the Department for Education’s census of “Schools, pupils and their characteristics: January 2016” found that 31.4% of primary pupils, and 27.9% of secondary pupils, came from ethnic minority origins.75

3.77. Demos found that, in 2013, more than 50% of ethnic minority students were in schools where ethnic minorities were the majority. Demos looked at segregation between White British pupils and all other ethnic groups and found wide variation by local area, using the Index of Dissimilarity. Like the residential index mentioned in the preceding section of this chapter, this measures the percentage of White British or ethnic minority pupils in an area who would have to move schools in order for the ethnic make-up of each school in the area to represent the overall population of pupils in the area. Using this index, Demos found the top ten areas in which the ethnicity of school populations were most out of kilter with the overall population of school aged children in the area (in other words, with disproportionately high levels of ethnic concentration in particular schools) were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Authority</th>
<th>Dissimilarity Index Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn with Darwen</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochdale</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirklees</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotherham</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Integration hub

3.78. The Demos study found that children from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds were more segregated in their schooling than other ethnic minorities. In their study, Demos also found that:

“Levels of school segregation relative to all other ethnic minorities tend to be highest among Bangladeshi (ID=0.74) and Pakistani students (ID=0.74). Black
Caribbeans also have a high level of segregation (0.71). For Indians, the level of segregation at year 11 stands at 0.66 which is roughly the same score for Black Africans. For Chinese and White Others it stands at 0.59 and 0.45.  

3.79. Several of the local authority areas identified by Demos as having high levels of segregation in schools (in the table above) include electoral wards with high concentrations of residents from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups:

- 72% of residents in Toller (Bradford), 59% of residents of Milkstone and Deeplish (Rochdale), 58% of residents of Washwood Heath (Birmingham) and 57% of Bordesley Green (Birmingham), identified as being of Pakistani ethnicity in 2011.
- 60% of residents in Coldhurst (Oldham) identified as being of Bangladeshi ethnicity.

3.80. Further evidence from the Department for Education showed that in January 2015:

- there were 390 state funded primary schools with 50% or more pupils of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity and 36 with 90% or more;
- there were 81 state funded secondary schools with 50% or more pupils of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity and 4 with 90% or more.

3.81. These 511 schools are distributed across 43 local authority areas, many of which overlap with the same areas Demos have identified as having high levels of segregation.

**Causes and consequences**

3.82. The degree of segregation or ethnic concentration in schools appears to be a product of where people live, family size, parental and pupil choice and admissions policies:

- Most children do not travel very far to school. At primary schools, the average distance travelled by pupils is 1.6 miles, while at secondary schools, it is 3.4 miles.

- People from similar backgrounds may make similar choices and there is some evidence that people look for alternatives to their nearest schools if their child would be in a minority. There is a school in the north of Oldham with a large majority of pupils of Bangladeshi ethnicity, despite the area having a majority White British population, with Bangladeshi pupils travelling to it from more central parts of Oldham and White British children travelling elsewhere.

- It is hard to disentangle admissions policies from parental choice but, where faith schools are over-subscribed and where children of faith come from particular groups (usually minority faith groups including Muslim, Sikh and Hindu), admission policies do seem to play a role in reinforcing ethnic concentrations.
3.83. Because there is varying performance across schools it is difficult to identify the impact that segregation in schools might be having on educational attainment at GCSE level, and the data available does not capture attainment levels for children who are being educated outside the school system – for example those being home educated or in unregistered, illegal ‘schools’. There is, however, evidence – discussed in chapter 4 – that contact with young people from different backgrounds promotes better understanding and more positive views, leading to less anxiety, fear, prejudice and discrimination between people from different backgrounds; and that inter-ethnic contact and networks can improve employment outcomes.

3.84. Local authorities (for example, in Luton, Preston and Slough) who felt schools in their area already had high levels of ethnic, faith and/or gender segregation sought to resist applications for new schools that they felt would worsen this. They reported poor success in the past in influencing decisions by the Department for Education to approve such new applications. Although local authorities are playing less of a role in running individual schools, there remains an important strategic role they should be able to play in shaping provision in their areas.

Free schools policy and segregation

3.85. The Free Schools programme is the main route through which public funding can now be sought to increase school provision and the Government has an ambitious programme to support 500 new Free Schools over the life of the current Parliament. More restrictive admissions criteria have been applied to new faith-based Free Schools than are applied to non-religious Free Schools. Under these rules, where a new faith-based Free School was over-subscribed, only 50% of pupils could be selected directly on the grounds of their faith.

3.86. The Department for Education does not record data on the faith of pupils. Nevertheless, ethnicity data for Free Schools suggests that the criteria have not been having the effect on diversity they were intended to, with the use of other admissions policies based on siblings or catchment areas, combined with parental choice, allowing more-or-less the same selection as 100% faith admissions would have, particularly in minority faith schools.

3.87. Analysis of Free Schools’ ethnicity relative to ethnicity in the surrounding area (local authority and ward levels) carried out for the review by the Department for Education showed that:

- Sikh, Muslim and Hindu Free Schools do not seem to be very ethnically diverse despite the 50% faith admissions rule – although many are located in wards
with a high proportion of minority ethnic pupils and are therefore relatively close to the overall ethnic make-up of the local ward.

- Christian Free Schools tend to be close to the ethnicity average for their wards and, on this measure, are more ethnically diverse than minority faith schools. This does not necessarily mean that they are religiously diverse – it may reflect the ethnic diversity of Christians.

- Church of England and Roman Catholic schools were near the average for their localities on both proportions of White British pupils and Asian pupils, but some ‘other’ minority Christian schools had fewer than average Asian pupils.

3.88. When children being educated in segregated schools are also growing up in an area where all of their neighbours are from the same ethnic and/or faith background, it vastly reduces opportunities for them to mix with others from different backgrounds. It deprives them of the benefits – individually and to society as a whole – that are known to derive from mixing with people from different backgrounds.

3.89. We were particularly struck by the results of a survey of pupils in a non-faith secondary school with a high Asian population which we were told about on a review visit. Pupils had been asked to identify the percentage Asian population of Britain and their estimates ranged from 50% to 90% (the actual figure is 7%), presumably reflecting their experience in the local community, and a relative lack of knowledge about the country as a whole.

3.90. We were presented with a range of strong views on the Free Schools admissions cap for faith schools. These ranged from the abolition of the cap to the abolition of faith schools.

3.91. The New Schools Network recommended abolishing the 50% rule and replacing it with a more effective approach which would not deter new provision from high-quality groups wishing to establish new schools. It noted the popularity of faith schools among parents, with faith schools receiving more applications per place than schools without a religious character and pointed out that faith secondary schools are 10% more popular than those that are not based on faith. The New Schools Network’s concern was that the 50% rule did not appear to have succeeded in what it set out to achieve. Free Schools are no more segregated than other state funded faith schools which can select up to 100% of pupils on the basis of faith but they are not much more integrated either.

3.92. The Catholic Education Service pointed out to the review that the Catholic Church, a long-standing major provider of schools in the UK, has declined to develop new schools under the Free Schools programme because of the faith admissions criteria, while arguing that it has, traditionally, attracted a more ethnically and socially
diverse school population, which aids integration. They emphasised that the cap would impact on Catholic schools more severely than other faith schools: Catholic Schools are popular for Catholic faith as well as other faith and non-faith parents – they are likely to be over-subscribed and therefore more often in a position where the cap would apply compared to other minority faith schools.

3.93. The admissions cap also placed pressure on existing Catholic provision. As the Catholic Church felt unable to open new schools, there is increased competition for existing Catholic places according to the Catholic Education Service. This makes it harder for those who are not Catholic to gain a place in an existing Catholic school. If the Catholic Church was able to participate in the Free Schools programme, it would open schools which would meet the increasing demand.

3.94. The British Humanist Association (BHA) and Accord support the abolition of state funding for faith schools altogether, saying that such schools play a negative role in promoting a cohesive and tolerant society and act as drivers for segregation. They view the cap, although imperfect, as sending the right signal from government to faith schools on the importance of encouraging integration in the education system. The BHA sees religious selection in the school system as contributing to socio-economic segregation in society, and recommends that the extent to which schools are able to employ it in their admission arrangements should be gradually reduced until it is phased out altogether.

3.95. On the face of these submissions and the Department for Education’s analysis for the review, the Free Schools policy on admissions appears not to have been having a positive effect on integration, with new minority faith schools being set up and the proportion of minority faith schools in areas with existing high levels of segregation in schools being allowed to grow.

3.96. And while the admissions cap might send a policy signal about the importance of integration and diversity in faith schools, the importance and power of parental choice on applications, combined with residential patterns of segregation, means that the admissions cap policy was not by itself creating diverse applications or admissions in faith schools. Nor does the policy have any impact on the wider number of existing schools in which high levels of segregation are apparent.

3.97. Taking account of all the submissions and evidence we have seen, we consider the popularity of faith schools with parents to mean that the abolition of state funding for faith schools would be unproductive. Segregation appears to be at its most acute in minority ethnic and minority faith communities and schools, so ending state support for all faith schools would be disproportionate.

3.98. The Department for Education is consulting on its intention to remove the 50% admissions cap for new faith schools and to replace it with new integration.
measures. It is clear to us that radical change and a new approach across all schools is required, not just in relation to admissions but also to the fundamentals of what is taught in schools to grow tolerant, resilient pupils, capable of reflective, critical thinking. If we can tackle the harmful effects of segregation in schools and help build greater resilience in our children today, we can go a long way towards breaking the cycle of wider segregation in our communities of tomorrow.
4. Social interaction

Chapter Summary

- Social interactions between people from different backgrounds play a significant part in enabling integration and social mobility.

- Where high concentrations of any ethnic or faith group are also segregated, with a lack of mixing, there are higher levels of prejudice, greater perceived threat and fewer inter-ethnic friendships.

- Despite the benefits of social interactions between people from different backgrounds, many groups in society remain relatively segregated, with the Social Integration Commission finding that we have fewer social interactions than our population mix would suggest we should across ethnicity, age and social grade.

- This places a premium on social mixing among young people in schools and in wider youth social action initiatives, with evidence that programmes such as the National Citizen Service are having a positive impact in improving understanding and relationships between young people from different backgrounds.
The benefits of meaningful contact and interaction

4.1. In the previous chapter we highlighted the changing nature of the population in Britain, becoming more diverse and with an increasing proportion of people from ethnic minority backgrounds. It showed that, as the population and proportion of ethnic minorities has increased, they have also become spread more widely across the country. At the same time, however, there has continued to be a concentration of some ethnic and faith minority groups in particular areas. This is evident in the schools in those areas and more prevalent among people from Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds and people from Muslim faith backgrounds than among people from other ethnic or faith minority groups.

4.2. A relative lack of social mobility may be at play here. A Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity report in 2013 found that 43% of White men and 45.6% of White women moved up to a higher socio-economic class than their father. In contrast, first generation men of Black African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity had significantly lower upward mobility rates. Just 34.3% of first generation men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity and 27.6% of women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity moved up from the socio-economic class of their father. We consider socio-economic factors in more detail later in this report but social interactions also have a significant part to play in enabling social mobility.

4.3. There is strong evidence around the benefits that can derive from high levels of meaningful contact between people from different backgrounds. Analysis of the academic evidence base and a number of case studies conducted for the review suggests that social mixing can:

- reduce prejudice;
- increase trust and understanding between groups (with a knock on effect that allows negative perceptions of other groups to be challenged);
- lead to a greater sense of togetherness and common ground; and
- promote resilience to extremist ideologies and provide a challenge to dangerous world views.

4.4. Whereas, a lack of mixing can:

- reinforce ethnic segregation, even in diverse areas; and
- increase community tensions and risk of conflict.

4.5. High concentrations of particular ethnic or faith groups (and the lower levels of opportunity they imply for social mixing between people from different backgrounds) are
therefore a cause for concern where they exacerbate disadvantage and lack of social mobility, or where they have a negative impact on community cohesion.

4.6. In his submission to the review, James Laurence at the University of Manchester drew our attention to new research he is conducting with Professor Miles Hewstone to consider how segregation affects community cohesion. He notes that communities with equally high concentrations of minority groups can be either highly integrated (where individuals from different groups are evenly distributed across the community) or highly segregated (where individuals from groups are concentrated in their own areas) and that simply looking at the size of a minority group in a community gives no indication of how segregated they are.

4.7. By looking at a random sample of individuals drawn from England and designed to be representative of the population of England as a whole, Laurence and Hewstone have examined prejudice, inter-ethnic friendships and perceived threat and conclude that relations between ethnic groups are at their most fraught in communities that contain a high minority concentration that are also segregated. As such, high concentrations of minorities alone do not appear to be problematic for social cohesion between groups, but where this is accompanied by segregation, the research found higher levels of prejudice, greater perceived threat and fewer inter-ethnic friendships.

4.8. A submission from Anthony Heath and Magda Borkowska at the Centre for Social Investigation at the Nuffield College, Oxford, suggests that living close to people of the same ethnic or faith background is a positive choice for many people, particularly for those who have recently arrived in Britain and who lack fluent English. Support from people from the same background can be vital in finding housing, employment and in negotiating life in a strange environment. A number of negative and positive consequences can arise from ethnic or faith concentrations but the effects are not uniform for all groups. Their review of research suggests that ethnic concentration:

- limits labour market opportunities for some groups, notably women of Pakistani or Bangladeshi background (probably because concentration reinforces traditional norms) – although it can improve labour market opportunities for some minority groups such as people of Indian ethnicity;

- reduces opportunities for ‘bridging’ social ties between minorities and the White British majority, which may also limit job opportunities – although segregated communities might benefit from bonding social ties which provide support and protection from psychological difficulties;

- leads to lower identification with Britain compared with minorities in more diverse areas and has negative effects on inter-ethnic trust – although bonding
ties within segregated ethnic communities may also facilitate political engagement and participation.

4.9. Evidence shows that, for immigrants, having an indigenous friend or partner (compared to being single) can improve employment outcomes and occupational status.  

4.10. The likelihood of having an inter-ethnic friendship increases in time across the UK, with 46% of first generation migrants having only friends of the same ethnicity, reducing to 28% in the second generation. Close inter-ethnic friendship is more likely for people who are younger, more educated, have a higher income and are proficient in English.

4.11. Despite the apparent wider distribution of ethnic minority groups across Britain, White British and Irish ethnic groups are least likely to have ethnically mixed social networks, while people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity are least likely to have friends from outside their neighbourhood. Black African and Mixed ethnicity groups, on the other hand, are most likely to have friends from outside their neighbourhood.

4.12. People from Mixed and multiple ethnic groups are most likely to be in an inter-ethnic relationship (85%), while White British (4%) are least likely, followed by Bangladeshi (7%), Pakistani (9%) and Indian (12%) ethnic groups. The prevalence on transnational marriage among Asian communities in Britain (particularly within Pakistani communities) as discussed in chapter 3, is likely to be a factor in reducing the likelihood of inter-ethnic relationships for these groups.

4.13. According to the Citizenship Survey for 2010-11, 82% of people said they mixed socially at least once a month with people from different ethnic or religious backgrounds, with similar levels of mixing reported in the prior two years. But the same survey illustrated that a lack of social mixing was felt to be a key barrier to getting on with people from different backgrounds, with 1 in 4 people who disagreed that they lived in a cohesive area citing lack of social contact and mixing as the reason.

4.14. The Social Integration Commission conducted a nationwide survey in 2014 and found that we have fewer social interactions with people who are different to us than if there was no segregation, with the average Briton:

- 14% less integrated by social grade
- 42% less integrated by age; and
- 48% less integrated by ethnicity.
4.15. The Commission also found that:

- Londoners, despite socialising more with people of different ethnic groups were proportionately less integrated by social grade, ethnicity and age than the rest of Britain – suggesting that greater diversity does not automatically lead to stronger integration;

- people aged 18 to 34 where there are high levels of mobility or involvement in further and higher education institutions were the most ethnically integrated group, with levels of segregation rising from 35% to 56% for those aged 35 to 54 – suggesting that moving away from the home environment is a positive factor for integration;

- those under 17 years old had 53% fewer interactions with other ethnicities than would be expected if there was no segregation – suggesting that young people are even more segregated ethnically than adults.

4.16. While the benefits of social mixing are clear, the evidence on the extent to which different groups are integrated socially and getting on with each other is a cause for concern and stronger action, especially among young people.
Young people

4.17. The Social Integration Commission’s findings as well as many contributors to the review have stressed the importance of social mixing among young people from different backgrounds and the positive impact this can have for society as a whole. If our children grow up playing and learning with people from different backgrounds, they will be less prejudiced, more understanding of difference, more confident and more resilient living in a globalised and connected society. Parents and families are undoubtedly key to ensuring this and should see social mixing as an important part of their role in raising children.

4.18. Schools provide an important opportunity for children and young people to meet and work with those from different backgrounds to themselves. This interaction, together with access to a broad curriculum, can help build a shared understanding and respect for others’ perspectives, just as segregated schooling and narrow teaching can limit it. A study in Oldham has tracked changes in attitude where a predominantly white British and a predominantly Asian school were merged to create a new school with a more balanced pupil population. This found a consistent reduction over time in the anxiety the Asian and White British pupils felt about contact with the other group.

4.19. Another approach sometimes pursued where there are segregated schools is to bring pupils from different schools together to pursue joint activities. One approach to this, the Schools Linking programme, was evaluated by the National Foundation for Educational Research in 2011, which found it had a positive impact on pupils’ skills, attitudes, perceptions and behaviours, including their respect for others. We examined school segregation in more detail in chapter 3 but turn here to wider youth programmes and their potential to improve social mixing and integration.

Youth social action

4.20. The positive effects of youth volunteering were shown by a randomised control trial conducted by the Government’s Behavioural Insights Team into projects funded in 2013 by the Youth Social Action Fund. It found significant increases in employability skills and character traits for adulthood such as empathy, community mindedness and grit and resilience. There were also recorded increases in the number of participants intending to volunteer later on in adult life.

4.21. Ipsos MORI research shows that while White and Black and Minority Ethnic participation in youth social action is proportionately almost exactly equal, females are more likely than males to take part (by 46% to 35%) and those from more affluent ABC1 families are more likely to take part than those from less affluent
C2DE families (by 45% to 34%). The same research also shows that those who identify with a religion are more likely to participate in youth social action than those who do not (by 43% to 37%).

4.22. A range of recent programmes was brought to our attention during the review with contributors highlighting their potential to improve positive social interactions between young people:

- The Youth Social Action Fund supports the Step Up to Serve campaign with around £1 million of funding. Step Up to Serve aims to get 1.5 million more 10-20-year-olds involved in social action between 2013 and 2020, with an emphasis on targeting under-served areas and communities.

- In recent years, ‘uniformed’ Youth Groups have come together under the ‘Youth United’ banner, bringing together the Scouts, the Girl Guides, the Army, Air, Sea, Fire and Rescue, Police and St John Ambulance Cadets, the Boys Brigade, the Girls Brigade and the Jewish Lads and Girls Brigade. Between them, they currently have around 1.5 million members in the UK, which is around 10% of the 4 to 25-year-old population. Evaluations of the Youth United programme point to very positive impacts on factors such as wellbeing, confidence, communication and willingness to volunteer in the future.

4.23. While such programmes are generally best provided by voluntary sector organisations, we would like to see more Government support for guiding them into the areas of most need and an onus on public sector bodies to support participation.

**The Prince’s Trust**

4.24. There is a place for providing extra support for young people to ensure that those who are most vulnerable – such as care leavers, those facing homelessness or mental health problems, or those who have been in trouble with the law – get the support they need to access work and education or training. For over 40 years, the Prince’s Trust has developed programmes that support 13 to 30-year-olds, providing the practical and financial support needed to stabilise their lives. Three in four young people supported by The Prince’s Trust move into work, education or training.

**National Citizen Service**

4.25. The National Citizen Service (NCS) programme for 15 to 17-year-olds is the main source of Government activity in the area of youth services. It provides mixed groups of young people with an out-of-school programme that includes at least one residential stay away from home at an activity centre, soft skills training and participation in a social action scheme. Underpinning all three strands is an emphasis on social mixing, character and resilience building, confidence and employability.

4.26. Evaluation of NCS reports very positive outcomes across a range of measures. In particular, evaluation of the programme in 2013 found that following participation in the programme:
84% of National Citizen Service participants felt more positive towards people from different backgrounds;

48% of parents said their child definitely had more friends from different backgrounds;

89% of parents said their child had better understanding of people from different backgrounds;

79% of parents said their child returned with a better understanding of the local people and organisations that have influence in their community;

72% of participants said that they were more likely to help out locally; and

there was a 7 percentage point increase in the number of participants who said they were absolutely certain to vote.

4.27. NCS is doing well at engaging young people from a wide range of social backgrounds. The tables below show the proportion of participants from different ethnic and disadvantaged groups compared to comparable proportions of the population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16-17 year-olds 2011*</th>
<th>NCS participants 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White groups</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black groups</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed/Multiple groups</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian groups</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16 year olds*</th>
<th>17 year olds*</th>
<th>NCS participants 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of people claiming free school meals</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data from 2011 Census

4.28. NCS is currently being rapidly scaled up. From 39,000 young people taking part in 2013, its first full year, 80,000 were expected to have done so in 2015. Over the course of the current parliament it is planned to expand almost ten-fold from its starting point, with 360,000 places being available by 2020-21, meeting a manifesto pledge to offer a place to every young person who wants one. This compares to the approximately 600,000 young people that become eligible for the programme each year.

Duke of Edinburgh Award

4.29. The Duke of Edinburgh Awards scheme gives many thousands of 14 to 24 year olds a chance each year to have fun and face a challenge. More than 1,800
organisations across the UK including schools, colleges and youth clubs help run more than 13,200 Duke of Edinburgh centres. These types of awards are also recognised in universities and other onward activities as a positive achievement.

**Funding**

4.30. Youth services have traditionally been provided by the voluntary sector and local government, and local education authorities have a statutory duty to secure services and activities for young people to improve their wellbeing. While the national picture is unclear, several submissions to the review highlighted that these services have been under particular strain and many have closed altogether as a result of the spending squeeze in place on council budgets since 2010. Cabinet Office research in 2013 showed councils were making sharp budget reductions to youth work and other activities for young people in both targeted and universal services, but especially the latter (which lost around £90 million, or a third of funding, between 2011/12 and 2013/14).

4.31. It is clear that new approaches need to be found to expand the reach and impact of youth social action, building on the strong network of voluntary and community sector organisations (including faith groups and uniformed groups) and ensuring greater prioritisation and promotion by public bodies and private sector businesses.
5. Public attitudes and the media

Chapter Summary

- **Attitudinal research** can be important in assessing levels of integration and we have referred here to results which reflect many of the views and issues we found in our fieldwork.

- **There is a concern,** however, that insufficient research is conducted at a level or rate that keeps pace with what is happening in our communities, or that is brave enough to explore more difficult issues.

- **Large scale population surveys** have suggested that feelings of community cohesion and Britishness are high, but there is also evidence of growing concern about immigration, racial and religious tensions, and a divergence of attitudes and values among minority communities.

- **While there has been much attention** in surveys on the attitudes of British Muslims in particular, which do reveal divergences, not enough research or engagement has been done to fully understand the factors at play.

- **The news media plays an important role** in influencing attitudes and levels of integration, both through investigative reporting and through fair and accurate portrayal of difficult issues.

- **Digital media also has an important part to play.** While it can be seen as a risk for radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, it could also play a protective role and be important in better engaging increasingly diverse communities across the UK.
Public attitudes

5.1. Measuring the attitudes of the general population and of particular communities can be helpful in assessing many issues, including how integrated we are as a nation and how levels of integration change over time. There is a wide range of polling on attitudes relevant to this Review. These vary in their ‘robustness’ and are based on different population sample sizes, some of which are too small to be relied upon as representative, or are conducted at points in time when opinions might ‘spike’ as a result of major events. Nevertheless, the attitudinal research highlighted in this report reflects many of the issues and views we found in our fieldwork.

5.2. A number of the polling companies that we met suggested that, to date, academic and government research has either sought to highlight and demonstrate positive trends, or focused on specific, more quantifiable issues such as socio-economic disadvantage. Very little reliable research has been done into more controversial questions related to integration, which might include views around:

- the acceptability of different sexualities, abortion, drug use;
- rigidity of gender roles;
- tolerance of views which directly contradict your own;
- conflicts between tradition and values such as equality; and
- grievances among non-immigrant communities in poor and traditionally working class areas.

5.3. This resonated with our feelings in conducting the review, where very little research seemed to capture the mood of communities we met and listened to. Too often, research and data analysis seems to be conducted at a level that is so high or general that no meaningful conclusions or policy decisions can be reached. This risks creating further disengagement by the general public and may increase perceptions that their views and opinions are being ignored and difficult issues swept under the carpet.

5.4. With increasing focus on integration as a sharing of values, and not just of space, it may be that a shift of research focus is needed. Understanding opinions on specific social and ethical issues could give an insight into fundamental
divergences in opinion which are driving integration – or segregation – within the population.

Community cohesion and belonging

5.5. National measurement of levels of community cohesion and sense of belonging (to the local neighbourhood and to Britain) has been in place since 2003 through the Citizenship Survey until 2010-11 and in the Community Life Survey subsequently. Generally, these show a strong sense of community cohesion and belonging

- In 2015-16, 89% of people thought their community was cohesive, agreeing that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together. This feeling of cohesiveness has risen slowly from 80% in 2003.

- When this question was asked in the localised Place Survey, up until 2009, it revealed significant differences in feelings of cohesion at the local level. People from ethnic minority groups or those expressing a religious affiliation were slightly more likely to think their area was cohesive than White people or those with no religious affiliation.

- 89% of people in 2015-16 felt that they belonged very or fairly strongly to Britain, with this level of belonging having been fairly constant since 2009.

Immigration, race and religion

5.6. NatCen Social Research’s report on British Social Attitudes to immigration has examined longer term trends and suggests that the much more significant scale of immigration since the 1990s had affected public attitudes by 2011. The report found that, between 2002 and 2011, public demands for a reduction in overall immigration increased, while views about the economic and cultural impact of immigration had grown more negative:

- the proportion who viewed the economic impact of migrants negatively increased from 43% to 52%;

- negative judgments about the cultural impact of migration grew from 33% to 48%;

- in 2011, 60% rated the settlement of migrants overall as negative and only 24% held a positive view, and many of those who held positive views about the economic or cultural impacts of migration still felt negatively about migration overall;

- more than half of those rating the economic and cultural impacts of immigration as good still wanted to see inflows reduced; and
• more economically threatened groups, such as poorer and working class Britons, gave more negative assessments of both the economic and cultural impacts of migration than economically secure groups.

5.7. Attitudes towards race relations and integration were tested in polling for The Guardian by Opinion Research in 2015\textsuperscript{104}. This showed that:

• 47% felt that race relations in Britain now, compared with 5 years ago, were a little or a lot worse, while 21% felt they were a little or a lot better;

• 79% felt that British Muslims should definitely or probably make a special effort to state their allegiance to Britain, while 22% felt they should probably or definitely not;

• 65% agreed that Islamophobia is common in Britain today - above class prejudice (57%), racism (56%), sexism (43%) and homophobia (40%); and

• In the same survey, terrorism (58%) and immigration (53%) were among the top three issues that people were personally worried about – behind the NHS (59%) and above the economy (46%), cuts to local services (44%), and crime/law and order (43%).

British values

5.8. The idea of certain values that are seen as particularly ‘British’ has gained importance under recent governments, including the last Labour administration, the Coalition and the current Conservative administration. While individually these values are recognised as not uniquely British, the current Government in its Counter Extremism Strategy considers the following \textit{combination} integral to a successful and cohesive nation:

• Democracy

• The rule of law

• Individual liberty

• Equality

• Freedom of speech

• Mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs.
5.9. During the review, we found mixed views on the notion of promoting British values. It was supported and rejected by many. Those who supported it argued that we should be proud of Britain and being British and that the promotion and adoption of British values was fundamental to integration. Those who rejected it felt it was forcing a choice on individuals, not allowing for plurality or multiple identities and, ironically, rubbing against fundamental British values of freedom of speech and expression. What both sides of this debate appeared to agree on was an acceptance that integration requires common values – but these need to strike the right balance between the benefits of diversity and those of unity or cohesion.

5.10. Evidence from a set of opinion polls and surveys suggests a reasonable and consistent level of support among the public for a set of core ‘British’ values over recent time:

- Respect for the law has featured as a popular attribute in a variety of surveys on values and Britishness, including a 2015 ComRes poll in which it was ranked second for ‘most important’ British values; the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey in which 85% thought it was an important attribute for being ‘truly British’; an ICM poll in 2014 with 69% identifying it as a British value; and the 2008 Citizenship Survey, in which it was the most commonly chosen value (by 57% of respondents).

- Freedom of speech also features as an important value in 2014 polls run by ICM, in which 66% identified it as a British value, and by ComRes, in which 46% record it as one of ‘the most important’ values. Freedom of speech/expression was identified by 36% of respondents in the 2008 Citizenship Survey as an important value for living in Britain, ranking among the top five listed values chosen by participants.

- Equality was identified by only 23% of respondents as one of ‘the most important’ British values in the 2015 ComRes poll, ranking behind ‘a sense of humour’ (29%) and ‘politeness’ (27%). However, it is interesting to note that ‘equality between men and women’ was identified by 61% of respondents in the 2014 ICM poll as a British value. Equality of opportunity was identified by 38% of respondents as an important value for living in Britain in the 2008 Citizenship Survey.

- Tolerance of others ranked 5th overall in the 2015 ComRes poll (behind politeness), with 26% choosing it as one of the most important British values, while respect for other people’s religion and beliefs’ was chosen as a British value by 52% of the 2014 ICM poll’s respondents, ranking 7th out of a supplied list of 10 values. In 2008, it was the second most commonly identified value recognised by 56% of respondents in the Citizenship Survey.
• English language skills, while not strictly a ‘value’, were considered important to living in Britain by 95% of respondents in the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey. Speaking English was not offered as an option in the list of values offered to respondents in the ICM and ComRes polls but, in the 2008 Citizenship Survey, English language capability was one of the most commonly chosen attributes (36%) considered important to British life.

5.11. Across these surveys and polls, it is possible to see some variations in the consensus on these values by age, ethnicity and religion, although such distinctions should be treated with caution because the sample sizes tend to be small and results influenced by different wording for the questions asked:

• By age, younger people are likely to place greater importance on equality and respect for people from different ethnic groups, while older age groups tend to value respect for the law and freedom of speech above equality.

• By ethnicity, the 2008 Citizenship Survey noted that White people and people from ethnic minorities were equally likely to cite respect for the law as an important value, while White people were less likely and other ethnic groups more likely to mention equality of opportunity, respect for all faiths and respect for people from different ethnic groups.

• By religion, Sikh (68%), Muslim (61%) and Hindu (47%) respondents in the 2008 Citizenship Survey were more likely than Christians (32%) to mention respect for all faiths as an important value for living in Britain.

**Attitudes of Muslims in Britain**

5.12. With the increased visibility of Islamist extremists in the media, and in public discourse, there has been significant growth in interest in the attitudes and values of Muslims in Britain. A number of polls and surveys have been conducted over the past few years, providing some insights into the views of some members of this religion; albeit with limited comparison to other minority groups.

5.13. Analysis of the views of Muslim respondents on values in the 2008 Citizenship Survey, compared to all other respondents, is illustrated in the chart below. This shows stronger support among Muslims for respect for all faiths, respect for people from different ethnic groups, freedom of religious choice and for the importance of voting; while showing weaker support among Muslims for the importance of pride in country/patriotism, freedom of speech/expression, speaking English, justice and fair play and responsibility towards others in the community.

5.14. In 2008, Muslims were also noted to be less likely than the general population to agree that people should be free to say what they believe even if it offends others (48% of Muslims agreed with this statement compared with 65% of the general population) and were also more likely to strongly agree (53%) that different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and differences.

5.15. While somewhat dated, this 2008 data in relation to freedom of speech is complemented by more recent polling (ComRes, 2015) in which 78% of Muslim
respondents reported that they ‘find it deeply offensive to me when images of Prophet Mohammed are published’, while 68% agreed that ‘acts of violence against those who publish images of the Prophet Mohamed can never be justified’.

Most important values for living in Britain, England, 2007-08

![Bar chart showing values]

Source: Citizenship Survey 2008

5.16. A number of polls have supported concerns put to us by some in the review that British Muslims are feeling increasingly under siege and suspicion. ComRes polling of Muslims for the BBC in February 2015 found that while 95% felt loyal to Britain and 93% believed Muslims in Britain should always obey British laws:

- 46% felt being a Muslim in Britain was difficult due to prejudice against Islam; and

- Muslim women were more likely than men to feel unsafe in Britain.

5.17. A YouGov poll on religion in March 2015 found that 55% of British adults agreed that there is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society, while 22% felt Islam was generally compatible.

5.18. A poll published in April 2016 (based on data gathered in June 2015) by Channel 4 and ICM Unlimited examined a range of attitudes among Muslims in Britain compared to attitudes of the general population. The polling received some criticism. We considered this carefully and found some design limitations – in that the survey oversampled in areas with populations of 20% or more Muslims (so could not be said to be representative of the attitudes of the whole Muslim population in Britain), and that the polling did not examine the attitudes of any other minority groups (who might also hold different views to the general population).
Nevertheless, we concluded that the results were valid and representative of the views of British Muslims living in areas of 20% or more Muslim population (accounting for nearly half – 45% – of all Muslims in Britain).

5.19. The reported survey results included the findings that:

- A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to their local area (91%) - higher than the national average (76%).
- A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain (86%) - also higher than the national average (83%).
- A large majority of British Muslims feel that they are able to practice their religion freely in Britain (94%).
- 88% of British Muslims think that Britain is a good place for Muslims to live.
- 78% of British Muslims would like to integrate into British life on most things apart from Islamic schooling and some laws.

5.20. But the reported results also included the findings that:

- 39% of Muslim respondents agreed that wives should always obey their husbands (compared with 5% of the British population).
- 31% agreed that it is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife (compared with 9% of the British population).
- 52% did not agree that homosexuality should be legal in Britain (compared with 11% of the British population).
- 47% did not agree that it is acceptable for a homosexual person to be a teacher in a school (compared with 14% of the British population).
- 23% supported the introduction of Sharia law instead of British laws in some areas of Britain.
- 32% refused to condemn people who take part in violence against those who mock the Prophet.
- 34% would inform the police if they thought somebody they knew was getting involved with people who support terrorism in Syria (compared with 30% of the British population).
- 4% sympathised with people who take part in suicide bombings (compared with 1% of the British population).
- 4% sympathised with people who commit terrorist actions as a form of political protest (compared with 1% of the British population).
5.21. Further analysis of the raw polling data illustrated that there was a relationship — though not necessarily a causal connection — between sympathy for extremist or radical actions, and other views that diverged from those of the general population:

- British Muslims who said they wanted to live a largely Islamic life rather than integrate, were more likely to express sympathy towards extremist actions;
- those who said they were sympathetic to extremism were more likely to say that religious harassment is a problem in their area;
- those with the greatest sympathy for extremist and violent actions were more likely to think that girls and boys should be taught separately and to support the introduction of Sharia law;
- analysis of the polling results also indicated that socio-demographic factors which had an association with sympathy towards extremist actions included where the person lived and their social class.

5.22. On the face of it, the divergence of attitudes among some Muslims in Britain from the general population is concerning. While, on the one hand, many Muslims feel more strongly attached to Britishness and British values than the general population, some are expressing more regressive attitudes towards women and freedom of speech and are, in a small minority, expressing greater sympathy for violent extremist action. These differences in attitudes could be pushing communities further apart. But our understanding of what lies behind this divergence is poor. From what we have seen and heard during the review, it is likely that it arises from:

- cultural and religious influences;
- demographic and economic factors (for example, age and earnings);
- growing identification with the plight of Muslims internationally and a sense of grievance or disagreement with ‘Western’ and/or British foreign policy in Muslim countries;
- grievances stemming from disadvantage, discrimination and racial and religious hostility, including a growing sense of Islamophobia;
- uncertainty about identity and the compatibility of Muslim life and British values; and
- the influence of extremist organisations who promote a grievance narrative.
5.23. More detailed research into wider public attitudes, including views on immigration, combined with stronger engagement with different communities in Britain to challenge negative influences and address real or perceived grievances will be essential in better understanding these factors and helping to shape future attitudes for a more united nation.
The media

5.24. Access to the media and levels of media consumption can be important factors in influencing integration and public attitudes. Different forms of media provide channels through which communities can access information and help to navigate society and understand and, increasingly, engage with public and private sector services – from keeping up with the news and buying the weekly shopping, to completing tax returns and applying for jobs. It is also important for Government, public and private sector organisations to understand media consumption among different groups to help them reach and communicate with all sections of society.

5.25. Media portrayal of events, issues and communities can also be key in keeping the population as a whole informed of issues they might otherwise be unaware of and influencing attitudes. It was put to us by some organisations in submissions to the review that negative media portrayals of Muslims in Britain were contributing to Islamophobic sentiment and a demonisation and alienation of British Muslims, making some feel unwelcomed and blamed in particular for terrorist acts and a wider threat to British society. Some Muslim organisations have said they find it hard to trust mainstream media organisations which they fear have an anti-Muslim bias.

5.26. While the news media will to some degree inevitably be dominated by bad news more than good - and they do have an important role to play in shining a light on problems that might not otherwise be exposed – some representations to the review have argued that sections of the British media have on some occasions gone further than failing to highlight positive stories about Muslims and instead actively amplified the view that Muslims and their faith are incompatible with life in Britain. We have been told that this has caused some British Muslims to fear for their own personal safety, or supported a self-fulfilling prophecy of increasing segregation.

5.27. There is some research to support these views. A report by Cardiff University (2008) concluded that “decontextualisation, misinformation and a preferred discourse of threat, fear and danger, while not uniformly present, were strong forces in the reporting of British Muslims in the UK national press”\textsuperscript{108}. A study conducted by Insted Consultancy for the Greater London Authority (2007) found that “the tone of language is frequently emotive, immoderate, alarmist or abusive”, and suggested that coverage is “likely to provoke and increase feelings of insecurity, suspicion and anxiety amongst non-Muslims”, and “provoke feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and alienation amongst Muslims”\textsuperscript{109}.

5.28. A University of Birmingham (2012) report\textsuperscript{110} brings these findings together with others to conclude that “the evidence shows an overwhelmingly negative picture, where threat, otherness, fear and danger posed or caused by Muslims and Islam underpins a considerable majority of the media’s coverage” which, in light of the fact that 64% of the British public claimed that what they know about Muslims...
and Islam is acquired through the media, “has the potential to ensure stigmatisation, marginalisation and intolerance”.

5.29. In a submission to the Home Affairs Select Committee, Dr Saffron Karlsen of the University of Bristol argued that effective counter-narratives to radicalisation need to recognise and respond to the effects of hostility expressed by wider British society, including via the media. The Anti Muslim Hatred Working Group is seeking to work with media regulators to address negative portrayal of Muslims in the media.

5.30. That is not to say that journalists should be prohibited from investigating and reporting issues of genuine public concern in any community. We were struck during the review by the wider lack of robust academic studies into some of the inequality and harmful practices that exist across communities, discussed further in later sections of this report. In many cases, investigative journalists and documentary makers are shining a light on these issues – helping to open up otherwise largely closed communities and expose and challenge unacceptable practices. Any efforts to curtail sensationalist, alarmist or abusive discourse should not impede the strength of genuine investigative journalism, which has a tradition of exposing wrong-doing and influencing positive societal change. Lord Puttnam, in his TED Talk, Does the media have a “Duty of Care”, discussed the importance of reasonableness and the need for accurate, unprejudiced information on which people can make their own judgements.

**Digital media**

5.31. Concerns have been raised widely about use of the internet as a source of divisive messages and abuse, as well as of radicalisation. A poor sense of awareness about the internet and concern about IT skills were also raised with the review:

- We received submissions from two local authorities identifying a lack of IT skills among certain ethnic minority female cohorts, one of which was running a project to improve the IT skills of ethnic minority women, enabling them to have a better understanding of what their children may be accessing through the internet, as well as empowering them to use the internet for their own purposes.

- We were told about examples from within the Somali community in Leicester where mothers of young boys had expressed their despair in not being able to communicate with their children on issues such as radicalisation, extremism and internet safety. They recognised the power a mother’s voice can have in countering hate narratives but that this is diminished when unable to communicate with their children.

- In meetings we held during the review with women’s community groups, mothers were concerned about their lack of understanding of digital media and the internet and their concerns about controlling their children’s usage.
5.32. We also noted an Ofcom survey on use of and attitudes towards different types of media:

- 29% of adults thought that all or most of what is written on-line is regulated\(^{113}\).
- 40% of adults agreed that “I should be free to say and do what I want on-line”\(^{114}\), while only 36% agreed that “everyone should be free to say and do what they want on-line”\(^{115}\).

5.33. Evidence on digital media consumption indicates notable variation by socioeconomic status and age. The Coalition Government’s Digital Inclusion Strategy\(^{116}\) in 2014 noted that:

- 5% of the adult population do not have basic literacy skills, making internet use a bigger problem for this group.
- Digital exclusion affects some of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society, with people living in social housing, on lower wages or unemployed more likely to be digitally excluded – 37% of digitally excluded households are in social housing, while 17% of people earning less than £20,000 per annum never use the internet, compared with 2% of those earning more than £40,000.
- Older people are more likely to lack digital skills (53% of people who lack digital skills are over 65, while 6% are between 15 and 24 years of age).

5.34. The Office for National Statistics bulletin on internet users in the UK in 2016\(^ {117}\) showed that 88% of adults (45.9 million) had used the internet in the last three months but 10% (5.3 million) had never used the internet:

- Of those who had never used the internet, just over half were aged 75 years or older.
- 47% of men aged 75 years or older were recent internet users compared with 33% of women aged 75 or older – there was little difference in rates of internet use between men and women in all age groups under 65 years.

5.35. An Ofcom report in 2013 found that there were also notable ethnic variations in media consumption that are important to note for community engagement in Britain\(^ {118}\):

- Around 25% of adults rely on TV to keep informed – this was on average higher among ethnic minority groups (27%) than White British (24%). Those from Pakistani (37%) and Bangladeshi (36%) ethnic backgrounds were most reliant on TV to stay informed.
- Around 71% of people have broadband at home - a higher proportion of those from Indian (82%), Mixed ethnic (80%), Black African (76%), Bangladeshi (75%), Pakistani (73%) and Black Caribbean (71%) ethnic groups have broadband at home, compared to White British (70%).
Almost 1 in 5 young people (19%) aged 16-24 had recently used the internet to post opinions on civic or political issues. A higher proportion of people from Bangladeshi (37%), Indian (35%), Mixed (32%) and Pakistani (30%) ethnic groups were likely to be influenced by comments/reviews posted online, compared to Black African (25%), Black Caribbean (19%), and White British (18%) ethnic groups.

5.36. Despite the generally higher broadband prevalence and internet usage among ethnic minority communities, the Office for National Statistics bulletin on internet users (quarter 1, 2016) showed that, across ethnic groups, households from Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds were most likely to have never used the internet (10.7%), followed by White (10.6%), Pakistani (10.3%) and Indian (9.4%) groups.

5.37. The role of the media and the internet in integration is a vast topic and we have not had the time or capacity to do it justice in this review. TV consumption is already diverse with access to digital and satellite channels, including international and foreign language channels, and is changing even more with reducing use of scheduled programming. Social media and the internet are seen as potential negative factors in allowing access to radicalising material from Islamist and far right extremists, and in limiting views and entrenching bias through ‘echo chambers’. However, greater digital awareness may also be a protective factor in improving knowledge, understanding and access to public services.
6. Social and economic exclusion

Chapter Summary

- **Social and economic progress is perhaps the most important indicator of successful integration. Socio-economic exclusion, therefore, is a sign of integration failure.**

- **Where socio-economic exclusion correlates with segregation, it indicates a negative cycle of very significant concern.**

- **While significant progress has been made by Governments across the years in narrowing gaps and tackling poverty and deprivation, some groups remain left or falling behind.**

- **Across the issues of deprivation, educational attainment, employment, and English language, gaps exist for several ethnic minority groups and for poorer households in the majority White British population.**

- **For poorer White British households in some areas, problems of educational attainment appear to be growing. Persistent unemployment stands out for young Black men, while people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity suffer significant disadvantage across a range of measures – on deprivation, income, employment and English language proficiency – relative to other ethnic minority groups.**

- **There are also issues of social exclusion across other areas of social policy, including crime, housing need and public health which affect many of the same communities. We have not focused as closely on these issues at this stage.**
Deprivation

6.1. Across the UK, after housing costs are taken into account, there are 13.2 million people (21%) on relative low income\(^{120}\). Individuals are said to be on ‘relative low income’ if they live in a household with an income (adjusted for household size and composition) below 60% of the average (median) income of the year in question. For 2013-14, the relative low income figure, after housing costs, was £232 per week\(^{121}\).

6.2. Households more likely to be on low income include those living in social rented housing (almost four times as likely to live on relative low income compared to home owners)\(^{122}\), in workless households (71% of people in households where one or more people were unemployed and 56% of people in inactive households were living on relative low income in 2013-14) and in lone parent households (41% in 2013-14)\(^{123}\).

6.3. People living in households headed by someone from an ethnic minority are also more likely to live on relative low income and this is particularly the case for households of Bangladeshi, Chinese, Pakistani and Black ethnicity – with 51%, 49%, 46% and 41% respectively on relative low income compared with 19% of White households\(^{124}\).

6.4. Additionally, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic populations and Muslim faith populations live disproportionately in the most deprived areas in England compared with other ethnic or faith groups.

- By ethnicity, people with a Pakistani background are most likely to live in the most deprived areas in England – with 31% in the 10% most deprived areas, followed by 28% of people with a Bangladeshi background, 20% of Black groups, 15% of Mixed White/Black/Asian groups, 17% of other non-white ethnic groups, 10% of people of Chinese ethnicity, 9% of White groups and 8% of people with an Indian background\(^{125}\).

- By faith, analysis of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation\(^{126}\) shows that 26% of the Muslim population live in the 10% most deprived areas in England (compared with 10% of all people holding a religion, 10% of people with no religion, 9% of Christians and Sikhs, 8% of Buddhists, 5% of Hindus and 3% of Jews).

6.5. There is a strong correlation for Muslim faith and Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups between concentration in our most deprived areas and high ward level concentrations, discussed in chapter 3, suggesting a vicious circle: It is not clear whether the economic exclusion suffered by these groups results...
from a choice they make to live and stay in these areas; or whether they are unable to move as a consequence of the social exclusion that arises from living in these areas. The most common view we came across in the review was that it was probably both.

6.6. Across other parts of the UK:

- In Scotland, White Polish and African ethnic groups are most likely to live in the most deprived areas, while Asian ethnic groups are less likely to live in these areas\textsuperscript{127}.

- In Wales, the ethnic minority population is more likely than average to live in deprived areas, with 15% living in the 10% most deprived areas. Within Black and Minority Ethnic groups, ‘Other Black’ people are the most likely to live in deprived areas in Wales (31% live in the 10% most deprived areas), followed by people of African (28%) and Bangladeshi (22%) ethnicity\textsuperscript{128}.

- The pattern in London differs somewhat from England as a whole too. In London, 19% of people from a Bangladeshi background live in the 10% most deprived areas (compared to 37% of the Bangladeshi ethnic population across the rest of England), followed by Black African and Black Other ethnic groups (12% of each living in the 10% most deprived areas of London, compared to 31% and 36% across the rest of England)\textsuperscript{129}.

6.7. Patterns of deprivation, family size and age appear to dictate levels of benefit receipt\textsuperscript{130}. The highest levels of Child Tax Credit are claimed by households headed by members of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups (27%), followed by Black (23%) and White (11%) groups, probably reflecting both rates of low-paid work and family/household size across these groups. The receipt of Disability Living Allowance and Personal Independent Payment is highest among White households, likely to reflect their older age profile.

6.8. People who fare poorly in educational attainment and employment and who live in deprived areas are more likely to suffer wider social exclusion. Although we have not considered in detail issues such as poor physical and mental health, being a victim and/or perpetrator of crime or living in poor housing, these are all issues of social exclusion that may hamper educational attainment and economic progress. It is a double bind that holds people and communities back.

**White British ethnicity**

6.9. Analysis of different minority ethnic groups is important in understanding the range of factors at play in social and economic exclusion, just as it is also important to understand gender, age and other variations. Policies that treat minority groups as a homogenous whole can mask wide differences and allow successful groups to continue to succeed, while less successful groups fall further behind.
6.10. There is also a risk in considering the White British majority ethnic group as one in measuring and analysing its socio-economic progress. In recent decades, it appears that in some respects, rather than becoming more of a classless society, sections of white working class Britain have become more isolated from the rest of the country and the rest of the White British population.

6.11. Deindustrialisation accelerated in the 1980s and several studies have looked at how hard it has been for many communities previously reliant on heavy industry and manual labour to recover, with subsequent effects of economic, political, social and cultural isolation, self-reinforcing cycles of poor educational attainment, low-skilled, insecure and low-status employment, worklessness, poverty and associated problems such as drug abuse, crime, poor housing, health and mental health.

6.12. At the same time, research such as that by the Sutton Trust and the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission has shown how working class access to the professions and the sharp increases in social mobility in the post-war years have since slowed down or dried up, despite dramatic increases in further and higher education participation.

6.13. This has been accompanied by the rises in immigration (discussed earlier in this report) both from Commonwealth countries across decades since the 1950s and Eastern Europe in more recent years. Several studies have looked at the phenomenon of ‘white flight’ from the inner cities as a result of immigration and the fact that it has often been more prosperous middle class families who have benefited most from the positive impacts of immigration, for example in the service economy or in reciprocal benefits of globalisation such as cheap foreign travel. Others have looked at how the far right has sought to exploit white working class opposition to mass immigration and conflate it with their resentment of deindustrialisation and sense of decline in their communities.

6.14. All of this appears to have created a strong sense of disaffection and alienation among many white working class communities, particularly in areas such as coastal towns formerly reliant on domestic tourism, former mill towns in the north of England (also discussed extensively in relation to their South Asian ethnic communities) and other areas where heavy industry has declined without being adequately replaced, for example in the Potteries and Teesside and former coal mining towns such as those in South Wales, the East Midlands and Yorkshire.

6.15. Governments of different political persuasions have made efforts to address this through initiatives such as City Challenge, Neighbourhood Renewal, the Social Exclusion Unit, Connecting Communities, the Coastal Communities Fund or the more recent Troubled Families programme, none of which were specifically targeted at white working class communities but reached them more than most, with varying degrees of success. But it appears clear that further concerted and consistent effort is required.

All of this appears to have created a strong sense of disaffection and alienation among many white working class communities...
Education and attainment

6.16. In recent years there has been a general improvement in educational attainment in schools, with a narrowing in the gap between White pupils and pupils from Pakistani, Bangladeshi and African/Caribbean/Black ethnic backgrounds, although persistent and in some cases widening educational attainment gaps remain (for example for White children from poorer backgrounds). Several ethnic minority groups now out-perform White British pupils.

6.17. In 2015, during the early years foundation stage (aged 5 years), children of Indian ethnicity had the highest levels of achievement with 74% assessed as having a good level of development. Children of White Gypsy and Roma ethnicity had the lowest level of attainment at this age, with just 24% assessed as having a good level of attainment.

Achievement: Early years foundation stage by ethnicity and free school meals (FSM) eligibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of development</th>
<th>% of pupils eligible for FSM achieving a good level</th>
<th>% of all pupils achieving a good level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All pupils</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveller of Irish Heritage</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsy/Roma</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other White background</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Black Caribbean</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Black African</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Asian</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other mixed background</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other Asian background</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other Black background</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other ethnic group</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department for Education, 2015

6.18. Children eligible for Free School Meals (and generally coming from poorer backgrounds) performed less well with 51% achieving a good level of development compared with 69% of children not eligible for Free School Meals – a gap of 18
percentage points. And despite White British children being among the higher performing groups at this age, White British children on Free School Meals had the second biggest performance gap (after pupils of White Irish ethnicity) compared to those not on Free School Meals, indicating that disadvantage plays an important role in educational attainment even at very early stages\textsuperscript{134}.

6.19. In 2014-15, 57.1\% of all pupils in state-funded schools in England attained five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C or equivalent, including English and Mathematics, as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of eligible pupils</th>
<th>Percentage achieving 5+ A*-C grades inc. English &amp; mathematics GCSEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All pupils</strong></td>
<td>553,469</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white British</td>
<td>438,576</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>413,060</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traveller of Irish heritage</td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsy / Roma</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any other white background</td>
<td>22,437</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mixed</strong></td>
<td>22,513</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white and black Caribbean</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white and black African</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white and Asian</td>
<td>4,857</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any other mixed background</td>
<td>7,838</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asian</strong></td>
<td>49,411</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>13,329</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>19,941</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>7,972</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any other Asian background</td>
<td>8,169</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td>27,244</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black Caribbean</td>
<td>7,314</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black African</td>
<td>16,677</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any other black background</td>
<td>3,253</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese</strong></td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any other ethnic group</td>
<td>7,760</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department for Education, 2016
6.20. A number of ethnic minority groups, including pupils of Chinese, Indian, Irish, and Bangladeshi ethnicity, outperformed White British pupils on this ‘good GCSEs’ attainment measure. However, pupils of Pakistani and Black ethnicity had an attainment gap of more than 5 percentage points lower than White British pupils. Pupils of White Gypsy and Roma ethnicity had the lowest attainment levels with only 8.6% achieving five or more good GCSEs\textsuperscript{135}.

6.21. The gap in attainment for pupils on Free School Meals was even greater at this stage – with 33.1% achieving 5 or more good GCSEs, compared with 60.9% of pupils not on Free School Meals\textsuperscript{136} – a gap of nearly 28 percentage points.

6.22. White British pupils had the second biggest gap in attainment (after a small number of pupils of White Irish ethnicity) between those eligible and not eligible for Free School Meals – 33.2 percentage points. White British boys on Free School Meals were less than half as likely as all other pupils to get five good GCSEs\textsuperscript{137}, highlighting a very significant issue for poorer White British households.

Proportion of Free School Meals eligible pupils achieving 5+ A*-C grades (including English and Mathematics GCSEs) by ethnic group, 2014-15

Source: Department for Education 2016\textsuperscript{138}
6.23. The House of Commons Education Select Committee concluded in 2014\textsuperscript{139} that white working class educational underachievement is “real and persistent”, expressing particular concern at the widening gap from age five onwards and the fact that the consequences are getting worse, given the ever greater need for qualifications and skills in the modern labour market. Further statistical analysis by Centre Forum\textsuperscript{140} (now the Education Policy Institute) in 2016 of the newer ‘Progress 8’ measure of school attainment suggested that these trends were being exacerbated under the Government’s higher standards expectations, with disadvantaged white children falling further behind both more advantaged white children and minority ethnic children.

6.24. Pupils from poorer neighbourhoods are significantly less likely to be in Ofsted-rated outstanding schools and significantly more likely to be in satisfactory and inadequate schools. However, the achievement gap does not appear to be down to schools alone, with some significant gaps continuing within good and outstanding schools. The causes of this – and disentangling what is specific to poorer white children as opposed to all poorer children – are less clear, but some research\textsuperscript{141} has suggested that cultural factors may be involved, including both a lack of aspiration in white working class communities and families, which can devalue the importance of school, and a lesser degree of engagement by white working class children in school. Long-term white-working class family backgrounds in manual labour for which few qualifications were required, for example, may contrast with most ethnic minority children being more closely connected to relatively recent waves of economically aspirant migration.

6.25. In a visit to Barking and Dagenham, the review team heard that there was historically a culture of low white working class educational achievement locally, and little incentive for the schools to improve because there had always been relatively well-paid, secure jobs available for low-skilled workers at the local Ford car factory. But when the factory closed, the schools were still poor and the local culture of aspiration remained low.

6.26. A lack of aspiration and engagement can also be self-reinforcing, contributing to further poor educational and employment outcomes and lack of aspiration in the next generation and so on. And while white working class pupils may not lack ambition, they may connect this less with the need for formal qualifications. A report for the then Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, for example, found that disadvantaged white pupils put less emphasis on the need to get a university degree in order to get the best jobs than all other ethnic groups (with the exception of Black Caribbean pupils)\textsuperscript{142}.

6.27. The Government’s Pupil Premium policy – which directs extra resources to schools educating disadvantaged children, as measured by being eligible for Free School Meals – is designed to address the achievement gap. But as the Chief Inspector of Schools, Sir Michael Wilshaw\textsuperscript{143}, and others have argued, further consideration should be given to the
particular reasons why the gap is worse for some White British children than those from minority communities, with action taken to address them. This could include further research into teaching methods and work to attract the best school trusts, headteachers and teachers into the areas most in need of support such as coastal towns and former industrial areas; the family and parenting factors at play; and a programme of action to raise aspiration among white working class children through mentoring, extra-curricular activities and connecting them with high quality careers advice, apprenticeships, universities and employers.
Further and higher education

6.28. The number of young people aged 16 to 17 who go on to all forms of further education and training is generally high at around 91%\(^{144}\). Those from White, Mixed and ‘Other’ ethnic backgrounds had the lowest participation in further education and training. Young people from Chinese, Asian and Black backgrounds had the highest recorded participation\(^{145}\).

6.29. Rates of progression to higher education institutions vary by socio-economic and ethnic background. In 2013-14, just under half (48%) of all students from state-funded mainstream schools and colleges went to a UK higher education institution\(^{146}\):

- 17% went to the top third of higher education institutions; 11% went to Russell Group institutions; and just 1% went to Oxford and Cambridge\(^{147}\).

- Students who had been eligible for Free School Meals were half as likely as all other students to go to a top third higher education institution and less than half as likely to go to a Russell Group institution\(^{148}\).

- Students from the highest socio-economic backgrounds are 37 percentage points more likely to go to university than those from the lowest socio-economic backgrounds – although the types of schools attended, prior levels of attainment and other factors contribute to this as well as socio-economic differences\(^{149}\).

- Students from a Chinese ethnic background (32%) were most likely to progress to Russell Group institutions, followed by students from White Irish (22%), White and Asian (19%) and Indian (18%) ethnic backgrounds. Ethnic groups least likely to progress to Russell Group institutions were White and Black Caribbean (7%), Black other (6%) and Black Caribbean (5%) – although students of White Gypsy and Roma ethnicity were so low in numbers as to not be recorded\(^{150}\).

- Students from Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds do slightly better in accessing the top third higher education institutions but not Russell Group institutions when compared with all students from state-funded mainstream schools and colleges, and do better than students of Pakistani ethnicity across both\(^{151}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Top third institutions</th>
<th>Russell Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All students</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department for Education
6.30. These differences in socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds also play out in variations in higher educational attainment. Differences can be seen in the proportions of graduates from the most and least disadvantaged neighbourhoods who gained first or upper second class degrees in 2013-14 – although the attainment gap is reduced (from 11 to 3 percentage points) once prior qualifications and other factors such as age, sex, subject of study, school and higher education institution attended are taken into account.

6.31. White graduates achieve significantly higher degree classifications than graduates from other ethnicities, with a 15% difference between Black and other minority ethnic groups and their White counterparts in attainment of first or upper second class degrees – even allowing for prior qualifications and other influencing factors.

6.32. There are likely to be other factors at play too in under-representation of Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic groups at the best universities and in their subsequent lack of representation in top professions:

- Students of Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnicity are less likely to achieve AAB grades or above (of which two are facilitating subjects) than White students, with 7.4% and 9% of Bangladeshi and Pakistani students respectively achieving this level against 12.2% of White students. Moreover, they are far less likely to achieve three A* or A grades at A-level, with 10% of White students achieving these grades against 6.4% and 5.5% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi students respectively.

- One of the factors that was frequently brought up as a means of explaining poor performance in general at the higher end of A-level attainment was a lack of English capability, particularly ‘academic’ or formal English, among otherwise academically able pupils. However, this might not be a problem that is particular to students from Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds, or to others for whom English is a second language. One head teacher we spoke to felt that the lack of ‘academic English’ was something that applied more widely to young people in disadvantaged communities from any ethnic background.

6.33. Faith might also be a factor affecting rates of attainment. In several visits during the review we were told that a prominent factor reducing the number of young Muslims and particularly Muslim women accessing Russell Group universities and reaching top professions was a reluctance to travel to universities outside their local area. Research conducted by Demos found that young Muslims’ decisions on whether to apply to study at universities outside their local area can be influenced by their parents’ desire to shelter and protect their children. This could contribute to under-representation in the top professions. We were also told by community...
groups that this reflected choices due to tuition fees, and was a growing phenomenon among poorer households from all backgrounds.
Employment

6.34. Despite a narrowing in the attainment gap at GCSE level and relatively high participation in further and higher education among most minority ethnic groups, with some outperforming the White British majority, almost all ethnic minority groups still have unemployment rates around double the national average.\footnote{156}

6.35. Some slight improvement has occurred over the last decade, with the ‘employment rate gap’ between employment levels for White British people compared to minority ethnic people narrowing from 15.6% in 2004 to 12.8% in 2015.\footnote{157} Nevertheless, people from Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are still around three times more likely than those from White groups to be unemployed:

- White 4.8%;
- Black 14.0%;
- Pakistani/Bangladeshi 11.5%.

6.36. Ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated in specific, often low status, sectors of the economy. Even where they are represented in other or higher status sectors, they do not make as much progress to leadership roles as their White peers:

- Analysis by the Department for Work and Pensions\footnote{158} has shown that almost half of all ethnic minority workers are employed in four sectors: wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food services, and human health and social work.
- One in four men of Pakistani ethnicity are employed as taxi-drivers\footnote{159} and almost half of all men of Bangladeshi ethnicity work in restaurants.\footnote{160}
- Fewer than 10% of professional, scientific and technical and education sector workers are from ethnic minority groups, and Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups are under-represented.\footnote{161}
- The proportion of Black and Minority Ethnic civil servants has risen from 5.7% in 1998 to 11.2% in March 2016, which is closer in line with the economically active population (11.7%). However, there are currently no Black and Minority Ethnic Permanent Secretaries (heads of Departments) and between 2007 and 2016 the proportion of Black and Minority Ethnic staff in the...
Senior Civil Service rose from just 3.2% to 4.4%.164

- In 2014, the Green Park “Public Service Leadership 5,000” survey165 revealed that there was less ethnic diversity in public sector leadership across the UK than in the FTSE 100; even the most diverse area of Britain – London – had a lower proportion of visible minority executives than the FTSE 100.

6.37. Demos analysis of Census data across the eight-tier occupational class system found little distinction between White British and ethnic minorities in class 1 higher level occupations, with 9.8% of White British and 10.3% of ethnic minorities found in this class166. But some ethnic minorities were better represented than others – for example, 15.4% of people of Indian ethnicity were in class 1 but only 7.5% of Black African, 6.2% of Black Caribbean, 6.6% of Pakistani and 4.2% of Bangladeshi ethnic groups167.

6.38. Controlling results of the analysis for differences that might be explained by age or education, the Dustmann et al analysis168 cited by Demos also found a much more significant wage gap between White British men and men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity, who were earning 35.2% and 45.4% less respectively in 2009. Wage gaps were also apparent between White British men and men of Chinese and Indian ethnicity but these were less apparent and only showed up when controlling for the effect of higher educational attainment among Indian and Chinese groups.

6.39. The same analysis shows that the wage gap between White British men and men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity narrowed for those who were born in the UK – by around a third to 20.3% for Pakistani men and by around two-thirds to 14.7% for Bangladeshi men.

6.40. Average (median) hourly earnings declined between 2008 and 2013 for all ethnic minority groups, with the exception of people from mixed ethnic backgrounds169. Labour Force Survey data identified average hourly income for people in work of £10.60 for White people, compared with £10.20 for people from Black African and Caribbean backgrounds. Pakistani and Bangladeshi earnings were the lowest for all ethnic minority groups, at £8.30170.

6.41. In 2011, only 4.7% of White British people were in the bottom ‘never worked and long-term unemployed’ category, compared with 11.1% of ethnic minorities. Gypsy and Traveller people are the group most likely to have never worked or to have been long-term unemployed. Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups also stand out in this category171.

6.42. Inactivity rates for adults aged 16 to 64 are higher for Pakistani/Bangladeshi (37.9%), Black (25.7%) and Indian (24.3%) groups compared to White adults
(20.5%)\textsuperscript{172}. There are though some very significant and worrying ethnic, age and gender differences across levels of unemployment and economic inactivity:

- For young Black men, aged 16-24, the unemployment rate is 35\% compared with 15\% for young White men\textsuperscript{173};

- Economic inactivity levels remain unusually high among women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity – 57.2\% are inactive in the labour market compared with 25.2\% of White women and 38.5\% of all ethnic minority women\textsuperscript{174}.  

- Women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity have an unemployment rate of 15\%, more than three times the rate for White women (4.6\%)\textsuperscript{175}.

- The differences between UK-born and non-UK born women is significant in this group, with 44\% of non-UK born Pakistani and Bangladeshi women aged 16-24 classified as unemployed or inactive and not in Full Time Education – compared to 27\% of their UK-born peers. This percentage gap (17\%) is considerably higher than that for Indian women (11\% difference) and White women (2\% difference)\textsuperscript{176}.

Proportion of people aged 16 - 64 who are economically inactive, Great Britain, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed or multiple</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani/Bangladeshi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department for Work and Pensions\textsuperscript{177}
6.43. There are regional variations in employment rates, but the data\textsuperscript{178} suggests that additional barriers exist for Black and Ethnic Minority groups. For example:

- In Hackney, the White employment rate is 80.5%, while the ethnic minority rate is 51.5%;

- In Bradford, the White employment rate is 70.6%, while the ethnic minority rate is 47.7%;

- In Glasgow, the White employment rate is 68.9%, while the ethnic minority rate is 40.9%;

- In Cardiff, the White employment rate is 68.8%, while the ethnic minority rate is 46.3%.

6.44. The gap in the employment rate between White and ethnic minority groups tends to be smaller in the East and South East of England and higher in Yorkshire and the Humber and the North West.

**Causes of variation in employment rates**

6.45. Discrimination, real and perceived, racial and religious, remains a significant barrier in minority groups’ employment:

- In a study for the Department of Work and Pensions between 2008 and 2009\textsuperscript{179}, researchers sent 2,961 job applications to 987 advertised job vacancies. The applications were identical apart from using different names of varying ethnic origin. Of the applications with whitesounding names, 10.7% received a positive response, compared with 6.2% for those with ethnic minority-sounding names.

- According to the 2012 Labour Force Survey, British Muslims are more likely to report that they have felt discriminated against in job interviews, with 15% reporting discrimination – compared with a national average of 8%\textsuperscript{180}.

- A number of people on our visits have seen racial or religious discrimination as a key obstacle to obtaining employment or promotion. Women in London felt that racism was the only explanation to persistent failure to obtain employment despite multiple degrees and substantial work experience in other countries.

6.46. In a welcome move to address such discrimination, organisations from across the public and private sectors, together responsible for employing 1.8 million people in the UK, signed up to a pledge in October 2015 to operate recruitment on a ‘name blind’ basis.
6.47. Location of ethnic minority groups in some of the most deprived communities in the country suggests that economic deprivation may be a significant factor in access to employment.

6.48. Cultural or religious factors and attitudes may also be contributing to poorer labour market outcomes for some communities. Data from the Understanding Society survey found that 38% of Muslims think that “husbands should do work, wives should stay at home” compared to 18% of Christians and 11% of non-religious people. In addition, 52% of Muslim respondents thought that “the family suffers if the mother works” compared with 34% of Christians and 23% of non-religious people.¹⁸¹

6.49. In its 2015 report, “Is Britain Fairer?”¹⁸², the Equalities and Human Rights Commission found that Muslims had experienced the highest unemployment rates, lowest employment rates and lowest (and decreasing) hourly pay rates between 2008 and 2013.

6.50. The UK Parliament Women and Equalities Committee inquiry into employment opportunities for Muslims in the UK found that barriers to employment included discrimination and Islamophobia, stereotyping, pressure from traditional families, a lack of tailored advice around Higher Education choices and insufficient role models across education and employment.
English language

6.51. In relation to integration and economic success, one factor that stands out strongly as a barrier to progress is proficiency in English. English language is a common denominator and ensuring everyone is able to speak English enjoys strong public support\(^1\). Lack of English skills presents a clear barrier to social and economic mobility – going for a job interview, writing a letter to a bank or understanding the country you live in.

6.52. According to 2011 Census data\(^2\), 8.4% of the population in England and Wales (aged 16 and over) did not have English as their main language – around 3.6 million people. More than 760,000 people aged 16+ in England (1.8% of the population) could not speak English well or at all. Among children, data from the Department for Education showed that, in 2015, 19% of state primary school and 15% of state secondary school pupils were known or believed to have a first language other than English – around 694,000 secondary pupils and 477,000 primary school pupils\(^3\).

6.53. Across faith and ethnic groups, analysis of Census data highlights the English language proficiency issues in Muslim, Polish, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities and reveals some worrying inequalities for women and girls in particular communities\(^4\):

- By nationality, people in England and Wales who were born in Poland have the highest proportion (24.6%) aged 3 or over (141,395) who can’t speak English well or at all.

- By ethnicity, Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic groups have the highest proportions of people aged 16 or over with poor English language proficiency – with 62,367 (21.9%) of the Bangladeshi ethnic population and 109,687 (18.9%) of the Pakistani ethnic population not speaking English well or at all, compared with 121,424 (12.6%) Chinese/other Asian, 49,756 (11.9%) Arab or other ethnic, 95,145 (8.4%) Indian, 29,728 (4.4%) Black African and 7,004 (4.1%) of other (non-African/Caribbean) Black, 291,209 (0.8%) of White and Mixed/multiple and 1,435 (0.3%) of Black Caribbean ethnic groups.

- By faith, the Muslim population has the highest number and proportion of people aged 16 and over who cannot speak English well or at all (282,136 people, 16% of all Muslims), compared with 57,826 Hindus (8%) and 257,785 Christians (1%).
• There is a notable pattern of poorer English language among women of Muslim, Hindu, and other non-Christian religions, with 189,931 (22.4%) Muslim women, 40,503 (12.7%) Hindu women, 138,598 (1.0%) Christian women and 66,519 (3.4%) women of ‘other’ religions reporting not being able to speak English well or at all.

• Muslim and Hindu women were more than twice as likely as Muslim and Hindu men not to speak English well or at all, with 189,931 (22.4%) Muslim women compared with 92,205 (9.9%) Muslim men, and 40,503 (12.7%) Hindu women compared with 17,323 (5.1%) Hindu men.

Proportion of people who can’t speak English well or at all by Country of Birth and gender, England, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Middle East &amp; Asia</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member countries (March 2001)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Americas &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antarctica, Oceania &amp; other</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2011 Census

A8 is the eight Accession countries which joined the European Union in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia

• Muslim and Hindu girls (aged 3-15) were also more than twice as likely as those from other religions not to speak English well or at all. However, it is interesting to note that a similar pattern also exists for Muslim and Hindu boys (aged 3-15) and that the significant gap between Muslim and Hindu men’s and
women’s ability to speak English well or at all appears to open up after the age of 16.

- Birmingham has the largest number of women who are non-proficient in English (30,446) while Newham has the greatest proportion (11.1%).

Geographic distribution of women who cannot speak English well or at all

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Authority</th>
<th>Number of women who cannot speak English well or at all</th>
<th>% of women who cannot speak English well or at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Birmingham</td>
<td>30,446</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Newham</td>
<td>15,578</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Bradford</td>
<td>15,293</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Leicester</td>
<td>14,844</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Brent</td>
<td>13,914</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ealing</td>
<td>13,637</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>12,101</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Enfield</td>
<td>10,435</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Haringey</td>
<td>9,949</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Manchester</td>
<td>9,779</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Waltham Forest</td>
<td>8,199</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Barnet</td>
<td>8,151</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Redbridge</td>
<td>7,998</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Harrow</td>
<td>7,924</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Hackney</td>
<td>7,857</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sandwell</td>
<td>7,544</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Hounslow</td>
<td>7,113</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Kirklees</td>
<td>6,792</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Leeds</td>
<td>6,787</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Luton</td>
<td>6,538</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2011 Census

6.54. Additionally, research by Demos\(^{188}\) has highlighted that:

- By linguistic groups, people who speak Pakistani Pahari (with Mirpuri and Potwari) and Bengali (with Sylheti and Chatgaya) as their first language are among the least likely to speak English proficiently, at 55% and 70% respectively\(^{189}\).

- Almost 14% of British Muslims for whom English was not a first language felt that language problems had resulted in difficulty finding or keeping a job, against an average of just under 12% of all those for whom English was not their first language\(^{190}\).
6.55. This is particularly worrying because poor English language skills have been shown to create a number of disadvantages, including:

- a wage gap attributable to English as an additional language of 26% for men and 22% for women, and a lower employment rate (48.3%) for those who are non-proficient in English than those who are proficient (65.4%)\(^{191}\);

- inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in public services due to lack of communication\(^{192}\);

- a negative impact on children’s integration, education and life chances: while gaps are narrow and narrowing, speakers of languages other than English perform less well than the average across all school Key Stages\(^{193}\);

- an impact on community cohesion and integration: 95% of people living in this country think that to be considered “truly British” you must be able to speak English (up from 86% in 2003)\(^{194}\) and 87% of people with English as their main language felt they belonged strongly to Britain compared to 79% of people without\(^{195}\);

- a lower likelihood of participation in civic engagement or volunteering\(^{196}\);

- a power imbalance which occurs in families where the man speaks English and the woman does not\(^{197}\).

6.56. Conversely, we know that 27% of ESOL (English as a Second or Other Language) learners go on to further learning and that there is a clear link between the level of English spoken and the level of qualifications attained, and between levels of English and employment rates and labour market capabilities.

6.57. During the review, a number of providers of English Language courses told us that funding for such provision from Government had reduced in recent years, was being devolved locally and focussed more on higher-level language and other skills for those seeking employment. They felt that there was a significant gap in funding for pre-entry and entry level English language courses.

6.58. Most non-European migrants coming to the UK have English language requirements placed on them as part of the immigration process. These have been in place since 2008 for work visas and since 2009 for student visas. With exceptions made – for example for people applying under exceptional talent categories, or students with disabilities – these requirements range from a ‘basic user’ level A1 (for example, for a sportsperson) to an ‘independent user’ level B2 (for example, for a Minister of Religion or a degree level student) to qualify for entry. Since 2010, requirements to speak and understand a basic level of English have also been in place for non-European Economic Area (EEA) partners of a British citizen or person settled in the UK applying for a spouse/partner visa, and the Government plans to
introduce a higher (level A2) requirement for non-EEA partners for further leave to remain after 2.5 years in the UK where they are on a route to indefinite leave to remain. Adult migrants, whether European or non-European, must have passed a ‘Life in the UK’ test and met a B1 level of English language proficiency before they can achieve British Citizenship.
The integration gap

6.59. In a study for the Department for Communities and Local Government, as yet unpublished, Professor Anthony Heath and a PhD student were asked to examine the 'integration gap' where members of Black and Minority Ethnic groups obtained poorer outcomes than White British people. It focussed on settled communities rather than more recent EU migrants to understand why longer-established ethnic groups have yet to achieve parity. It did not consider gaps within the White British community (for example among traditional ‘working class’ White British communities).

6.60. The study supports much of the analysis in this section of the review in relation to longer-standing Black and Minority Ethnic groups, and concern for the socio-economic integration in particular of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African ethnic groups, with particular issues for women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity and young Black men.

6.61. The variations in socio-economic integration evidenced in this chapter, while often narrowing, have persisted for some groups and demand a more focussed effort, geographically, by ethnic and faith groups and by age and gender. We should not be shy of targeting minority groups for assistance in a genuine endeavour to create a fairer and more equal society.
7. Inequality and harm

Chapter Summary

- Across the United Kingdom and throughout our history we have established some of the strongest equality rights in the world. But there remains further to go.

- Women still do not enjoy equality with men across a range of factors such as pay and representation. Women from all backgrounds are vulnerable to different forms of domestic violence and abuse, and there are particularly acute inequalities and harms suffered by women in some communities, including female genital mutilation, forced marriage and so-called ‘honour’ based crimes. Too often, these are perpetuated under the guise of cultural and religious values.

- Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people are also suffering abuse and harm and, where they come from less progressive religious communities, can face hate and stigmatisation from other communities because of their religious identity, and from their own community for their sexuality.

- There are also concerns, raised by Ofsted and others, about the well-being of our children in some state schools and non-school settings, legal and illegal. In these areas, educational segregation is being forced or created by parents and self-appointed leaders; and some children are spending significant amounts of time in squalid conditions with un-vetted staff, and in circumstances where they are deprived of a rounded education and the opportunity to mix with children from other backgrounds.

- What we saw and heard throughout our engagement suggests that these inequalities and divisions are persisting and appear to be worsening in more isolated communities where segregation, deprivation and social exclusion are combining in a downward spiral with a growth in regressive religious and cultural ideologies.
Inequality and harm

7.1. Across the United Kingdom, we rightly take pride in having established a society, today, in which people from all different backgrounds are shown respect and are given equal rights and strong legal protection from discrimination. We have a long tradition of providing rights and addressing inequality in law, from the Magna Carta in the 13th Century, through Acts of Parliament like the Catholic Relief Act of 1829, the Representation of the People Acts in 1918 and 1928, to the establishment of the Welfare State in the 20th Century. In more recent years, a raft of legislation (largely consolidated in the 2010 Equalities Act) has been put in place to tackle discrimination and prejudice on grounds of race, gender, disability, religion and belief, sexuality and age, reflecting Britain's strong values of tolerance and fairness.

7.2. There is further to go on these issues. But our position today has grown out of a history that is marked by things which we should take pride in as a nation; as well as things of which we should not be proud but from which we should draw even greater strength in fighting for equality and social justice.

7.3. Our analysis in earlier chapters of this report on social and economic integration has thrown up some worrying indications of inequality and harm which should be of significant concern in 21st Century Britain. These concerns have been reinforced by people we have heard from during the review – in visits and meetings, and in written submissions – and in events that occurred as we conducted the review. This chapter reflects what we have seen and heard.

7.4. The causes of inequality vary and can be both internal and external to the communities in which they are suffered. Common traits which we observed were that they:

- often affect women – but have a knock-on, negative impact on children and the wider community;
- taken to their extremes, are criminal acts;
- in some cases are directly harming children;
- in too many instances are the result of division, suspicion, fear, prejudice and hatred between communities, and retrenchment within communities;
- can also feed division, suspicion, fear, prejudice and hatred between communities and be exploited by extremists, pushing people further away from mainstream society and creating a vicious cycle; and
- may be described, excused and all too often ignored or ‘swept under the carpet’ as cultural or religious practices.
7.5. It is debatable whether some of this withdrawal into behaviours and practices that should have been left behind centuries ago as society progressed is a reaction to external pressures – such as discrimination and hostility, or disadvantage and deprivation – or a deliberate choice to sustain existing cultures, identity and power-bases, and an active decision not to integrate. What is not debatable is that the harms that result must be tackled.

7.6. There is a broad spectrum of behaviours at play between what might be described as cultural conservatism and acts that are clearly illegal. It is more straightforward to condemn criminal acts but more difficult to challenge or act on behaviours that fall into ‘grey’ areas along this spectrum – where one person’s arranged marriage is another’s forced marriage; where one person’s loving relationship is another’s coercive control; or where one person’s religious conservatism is another’s homophobia. We need an honest debate in society about this spectrum.
**Women’s inequality**

7.7. It has been nearly 90 years since women achieved the same voting rights as men, over 40 years since the Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay Acts were passed, and 37 years since we had our first female Prime Minister. However, while we have made significant progress in this space, persistent gender inequalities remain. Despite women being – numerically – the majority population, they do not enjoy equal outcomes and their inequality remains ‘labelled’ and subject to special targets and focus:

- The female employment rate for January to March 2016 was 69.2%. This is the highest since comparable records began in 1971, but still lags behind men at 79.3%\(^1\).

- Despite marked increases in recent years, women remain under-represented on both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards. In June 2016, women accounted for 26% of FTSE 100 Directors, up from 12.5% in February 2011. The majority of these women occupy Non-Executive roles; 31.4% of Non-Executive Directors are women against 9.7% of Executive Directors. These figures drop slightly for FTSE 250 boards - women account for 20.4% of FTSE 250 Directors; 25.7% of Non-Executive Directors and 5.6% of Executive Directors. There are no remaining all-male boards in the FTSE 100, but there are still 15 all-male boards in the FTSE 250\(^2\).

- As of November 2015, the overall UK gender pay gap for full and part time employees was 19.2 per cent\(^3\). This gap is not just about unequal pay for comparable jobs. Women tend to be concentrated in occupations and sectors with less scope for financial reward, and a proportion is due to differences in accumulated experience in full-time work, or the negative effect on earnings of taking time out of the labour market to look after children or relatives.

- The 2011 Census revealed gender inequality in unpaid care across all English regions and Wales, with women taking on a greater share of the unpaid care burden. Of the 5.41 million unpaid carers in England, 58% were female and 42% male; of the 0.37 million in Wales, 57% were female and 43% male. Whether working full-time, part-time or unemployed, women provided more unpaid care than men\(^4\).

7.8. While the latest pay gap figure is the lowest on record, no gender pay gap is acceptable and we fully support the Government’s ambition to eliminate the gender pay gap in a generation, as well as plans to introduce mandatory gender pay gap reporting for private and voluntary sector employers in England, Scotland and Wales with at least 250 employees, and to extend these plans to the public sector in England.
7.9. Women remain underrepresented in many spheres of political and public life:

- Only just over one third of those attending Cabinet are women – even with our newly installed Prime Minister who has increased the number of women serving with her in the Cabinet.
- 30% of MPs are female\(^\text{203}\).
- Female representation in the House of Lords is 26%\(^\text{204}\).
- 32% of local authority councillors in England were female as of 2013\(^\text{205}\).
- 54% of Civil Servants were female as of March 2016, though this fell to 40% of the Senior Civil Service\(^\text{206}\), and 19% of Permanent Secretaries (the Civil Service heads of Government Departments)\(^\text{207}\).

7.10. This wider picture of discrimination and disadvantage remains despite numerous studies, strategies and targets over the years. There are several particularly acute inequalities suffered by women in some minority communities, as set out earlier and later in this report, including lower levels of access to the labour market, poorer proficiency in English language and discrimination in politics. But there are also a number of very serious harms suffered disproportionately by women across society, such as domestic violence and abuse; and by some women in particular communities as a result of cultural and religious catalysts, including female genital mutilation, forced marriage and so-called ‘honour’ based crime. The relationships between race, community and violence against women are complex, often unclear and need to be dealt with sensitively.

**Domestic violence and abuse**

7.11. Women from all backgrounds are at greater risk than men of different forms of domestic and sexual violence and abuse.

7.12. Overall, 8% of women and 4% of men reported experiencing domestic abuse in the past year\(^\text{208}\). This is equivalent to an estimated 1.3 million female victims and 600,000 male victims.

- Office for National Statistics data for 2015 (drawn from the Crime Survey for England and Wales) shows that the highest rates of domestic abuse are experienced by women from White and Black Caribbean (14%) and Irish (12%) ethnic backgrounds\(^\text{209}\).
• Data from the Crown Prosecution Service (for 2015-16) indicates that those prosecuted for domestic abuse were overwhelmingly male (92%), while 71% were White British and 74% aged between 25 and 59 years\(^{210}\).

7.13. Studies such as *Violence prevention the evidence: Promoting gender equality to prevent violence against women* by the World Health Organisation, suggest that gender inequalities increase the risk of violence by men against women\(^{211}\). Gender inequalities can also be worse in some ethnic groups than others – which is not to say that violence against women does not take place in all communities, when it clearly does, or that gender inequalities are exclusive to any ethnicity or faith.

7.14. Data collected by Women's Aid, providing a snapshot of 128 refuges and 96 community-based services for the week 21 to 25 September 2015, show a different profile among victims of domestic violence who turn to services for help. White British victims made up 41% of refuge users, followed by people of Asian/Asian British ethnicity (18%) and Black (14%) victims. Community-based services showed a different profile: again, the largest group was White British, this time at 67%, followed by people of Asian/Asian British ethnicity at 9% and from Other White ethnic backgrounds at 6%\(^{212}\). It is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from this data, having been captured from a single week snap-shot across a range of services (including 10% specialist services for Black and Minority ethnic communities) in locations that might not be representative of the population as a whole. Nevertheless, it merits further, more in-depth research into the experience of domestic violence among ethnic minority women.

7.15. Research on domestic violence\(^{213}\) documents the particular vulnerability of some immigrant or ethnic minority women that might exacerbate their experience of domestic abuse, including:

- lack of English language skills hampering understanding of rights and services available and the ability of service providers to respond; and

- social isolation and notions of honour and shame in some communities, including fear of censure from wider family and community which leads victims to report later and can involve greater safety risks.

7.16. We have heard concerns from service providers and experts that a lack of English language skills can create further complicating problems for victims of abuse in coming forward and getting help that might include:

- the need for a translator (often a family member) when interacting with services, meaning a victim is less likely to reveal abuse;

- having a reliance on a husband’s English skills economically and socially, making a victim more fearful of seeking help;
• a reliance on a husband for their immigration status which victims fear would be at risk from coming forward; or

• a lack of awareness - that abuse is unacceptable in the UK, of services that may be available to help or of how to access them, or sometimes even that they are being abused at all.

Cultural and religious catalysts

7.17. Throughout our review we have encountered countless examples of abuse and unequal treatment of women enacted in the name of cultural or religious values, or as a reaction to those values:

• Islamophobic hate crime attacks, discussed later in this report, can be disproportionately targeted at women. This appears to relate to more visible and identifiable forms of cultural dress, such as wearing a hijab, veil, niqab or burkha.

• Pressure from families or wider communities to marry against one’s will, posters being put up instructing women to only walk on one side of the road, and preferred dress codes issued for parents.

• Mosques and Islamic organisations offering regressive advice about the behaviours expected of Muslim women and girls – including not being allowed to travel more than 48 miles from home without their husband or male chaperone, or not being able to wear jeans – despite noted Islamic theologians dismissing such advice as inappropriate.

• The segregation of women and men in mosques is common but has also been found by Ofsted in independent Muslim and Orthodox Jewish faith schools and reported in wider non-religious community meetings, including meetings of political parties and in universities.

• Several ethnic and faith minority women’s groups told us of a misogynistic culture that prevails in their communities, with women disempowered and treated as second-class citizens, and with the abusive and controlling behaviour of men often reinforced by their mothers, by religious leaders and through religious councils or courts.

• Community groups which sought to empower women, for example through teaching English language skills, told us that men in the household often discouraged and prevented their wives from attending classes, or were highly wary about allowing them to attend. Several groups had devised specific tactics to overcome this. But they feared reprisals if they spoke out publicly about these issues.
Practitioners have raised concerns with us about some of the same overlaying factors being behind gender inequalities more generally and violence against women in some communities. These include greater levels of patriarchal control or uneven balances of power in a relationship; the acceptance of ‘home country’ norms in terms of both domestic abuse and a woman’s role in the home; or insular communities that deal with problems internally and, as such, are less likely to engage with services or mix with others. The ‘first generation in every generation’ trend in some communities, mentioned in chapter 3, can be a further exacerbating factor.

Female genital mutilation

A 2015 study estimated that there were approximately 137,000 women and girls living permanently in England and Wales with female genital mutilation (FGM) and 60,000 girls who were born in England and Wales between 1996 and 2010 to mothers with FGM.

There were 5,700 newly recorded cases of FGM reported in England in 2015-16, according to the first annual statistics published by the Health and Social Care Information Centre since the Government introduced compulsory reporting for NHS trusts and GP practices. More than half of all cases related to women and girls from the London NHS Commissioning Region, comprising 52% of newly recorded cases and 58% of total attendances. Of women and girls with a known country of birth, 90% were born in an Eastern, Northern or Western African country; Somalia accounted for 37% of all newly recorded women and girls with a known country of birth, while Eritrea, the Sudan, Nigeria and the Gambia also had a large volume of cases. There were 43 newly recorded cases of FGM involving women and girls reported to have been born in the UK. Between July 2015 and March 2016, 46 FGM Protection Orders were issued following their introduction at the beginning of that period.

Forced marriage

The Crown Prosecution Service’s most recent violence against women and girls crime report shows that the volume of forced marriage referrals to them from the police had risen from 67 in 2013-14, to 90 in 2015-16, with charges in 57 (63.3%) cases. To date, more than 1,000 Forced Marriage Protection Orders have been made to prevent people from being forced into a marriage and to assist in repatriating victims.
7.23. In 2015, the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) gave advice or support relating to a possible forced marriage in 1,220 cases. Most of the cases (80%) involved female victims, and there were 67 ‘focus’ countries to which a victim was at risk of being, or had already been, taken in connection with a forced marriage. The five highest volume countries were: Pakistan (44%), Bangladesh (7%), India (6%), Somalia (3%) and Afghanistan (2%). In 14% of the cases, there was no overseas element, with the forced marriage activity taking place entirely within the UK.\textsuperscript{221}

7.24. The Government makes a clear distinction between forced and arranged marriages:

- A forced marriage is where one or both people do not (or in cases of some people with learning or physical disabilities or mental incapacity, cannot) consent to the marriage and where violence, threats, or any other form of coercion are involved. Coercion may include emotional force, physical force or the threat of physical force, and, financial pressure. Examples include someone being made to feel like they are bringing shame on their family, or financial abuse (taking wages away or not providing any money).\textsuperscript{222}

- An arranged marriage is not the same as a forced marriage. In an arranged marriage, the families take a leading role in choosing the marriage partner, but both parties are free to choose whether to enter into the marriage or not.\textsuperscript{223}

7.25. Nevertheless, we have heard that many forced marriages begin as arranged marriages, where an originally consenting party changes their mind, but faces pressure to proceed with the marriage; when consent is withdrawn, it ceases to become an arranged marriage and becomes a forced marriage. In some cases, the dividing line is not clear. We have heard of cases where, having agreed to an arranged marriage, one party vocalises their non-consent to a third-party, but does not want to vocalise it to their family. This appears to be a grey area where a seemingly arranged marriage in fact involves elements of non-consent and pressure which feel closer to the definition of a forced marriage.

**So-called ‘honour’ based crimes**

7.26. Data released by the police in July 2015 showed that more than 11,000 so-called ‘honour’ based crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2014.\textsuperscript{224} The Crown Prosecution Service’s most recent Violence Against Women and Girls crime report shows that the volume of referrals for such offences, having increased in 2013-14 and 2014-15, fell in 2015-16 to just 216 cases.\textsuperscript{225} Several people have called for the removal of the word ‘honour’ from descriptions of such crimes as an entirely inappropriate term, while
others we have spoken to during the review told us that changing the description risked obscuring the cultural issues that lie behind such violence.

Under-reporting

7.27. In a 2015 report, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary said it was clear that “many, many instances of honour-based violence, forced marriage and female genital mutilation go unreported” and that police preparedness for dealing with those crimes was “pretty patchy”, with forces not understanding enough about the cultural issues behind such violence – with notable exceptions in London and the West Midlands where knowledge was found to be very good\textsuperscript{227} \textsuperscript{228}. It is vital that Government and other agencies continue to drive improvements in data collection in this area, as well as engaging with local communities to improve understanding and raise awareness among women of services that are available if they require help.
Intolerance of different sexuality

7.28. There is evidence that some people in particular ethnic and faith communities have views around Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people that are at odds with mainstream modern British values and laws. Such views are frequently ascribed to more hard-line and extreme individuals in those communities.

7.29. During this review, however, we have come across a worrying prevalence of anti-LGBT sentiment. Intimidation and hatred for those who leave their faith was brought to the attention of the team, particularly from people who left more traditional or conservative religious sects and who felt persecuted within their own community.

7.30. This is not hidden. In the 30th British Social Attitudes survey (2013), 40% of Anglicans and 35% of Catholics in Britain thought that being gay was “always” or “mostly” wrong. Less progressive views towards sexuality may also be found among older people and those with low educational qualifications. But the trend across society is towards more liberal and progressive views.

7.31. Polling of British Muslim attitudes by ICM in April 2016, discussed earlier in this report, found that 52% of Muslim respondents said that they thought homosexuality should be made illegal in Britain (compared to 11% among the rest of the population), while 47% said that teachers should not be gay (compared with 14% of the general population).

7.32. Sadly, regressive views and attitudes are also being acted upon. Recent research by the University of Sussex found that most LGBT people have been a direct victim of a hate incident in the past three years, and even more know someone who has been a victim. The report found that members of the community who know a victim of a hate crime:

- feel more anger, anxiety, and shame;
- are more likely to avoid certain locations, more likely to join community based organisations; and
- some are more likely to want retaliation.

7.33. During the review, we heard from a number of LGBT members of faith communities, in particular from within the Muslim community, about their experiences. These people face hate and stigmatisation both for being a Muslim and from within their own community for being gay and are therefore particularly isolated and held back. Some Muslim groups we spoke to advocate an interpretation of British Islam which maintains the values of the Qur’an and embraces all sexualities. However, more conservative Muslim groups fundamentally disagree with this view.

7.34. The Government’s Forced Marriage Unit has dealt with issues around minority communities and LGBT rights. Although the overall numbers are small, in 2010 the unit reported a 65% increase in the number of men being made to marry – including a number of gay men being forced by their families to marry women. While we did
not hear about the issue of men and women being forced into heterosexual marriages as a result of their homosexuality during the review, we concur with the view that these findings may under-report the prevalence of this issue in some of our most isolated communities.
Risks to our children’s well-being

7.35. Schooling and education are fundamental to the well-being of our children and play a major part in fostering resilience, tolerance and critical thinking. Schools can also provide an environment in which children from different backgrounds mix and gain a broader view of the diverse communities and cultures that make up our society today. But the high levels of ethnic and faith segregation in some of our schools, discussed earlier in this report, are a cause for great concern. They risk children’s well-being when pupils in segregated schools do not have the opportunity to mix with children from other backgrounds or gain from a properly rounded education.

7.36. The Department for Education has strengthened requirements on all schools to promote fundamental British values, including respect and tolerance of those with different religions and beliefs, and Ofsted inspectors have increased their focus on how schools deliver this and the breadth of the curriculum offered to pupils. It has also increased transparency about governors and taken stronger powers to remove those that are unsuitable.

7.37. We are concerned, however, that schools in some areas face a constant battle in reaching out to parents to engage them and convince them not to withdraw their children from key parts of the school’s activities (whether that is swimming or visiting the theatre) that would help them gain a broader understanding of the world in which they are growing up and the people from different backgrounds that they will meet in life. In some schools, teachers face a constant challenge from parents and/or ‘community leaders’ who want to narrow the education and activities available to their children. This felt like hard work, and teachers were crying out for more backing from Government in their efforts to persuade parents to give their children a fully rounded education.

7.38. In addition to visits to schools across the country, we held review discussion groups with teachers in Birmingham, Manchester and Bristol which highlighted the value that they place on discussion of personal, emotional and health issues outside of a purely academic context. All groups were clear about the importance of promoting shared values (though the methods of doing so varied) in order to develop children’s tolerance of difference, ability to reason and critique, and to build their resilience to harmful influences later in life. They noted the importance of tackling parental objection to this kind of education, and of preventing divisive environments which can act as a barrier to messages of equality and tolerance. Teachers wanted the freedom to teach values in a way that suited their particular
schools but felt that insufficient weight or recognition was given to their role in this respect in the Department for Education’s frameworks, including Ofsted inspection.

**Trojan Horse**

7.39. The role of faith and education were thrown into the spotlight in 2014 with the ‘Trojan Horse’ episode, following attention being drawn to a letter which set out how a number of schools in Birmingham had been taken over to ensure they were run on strict Islamic principles. There have been numerous inspections of the schools involved, a number of independent inquiries and extensive media coverage of the affair. It is important to note that these were not ‘Muslim’ or ‘faith’ schools. Peter Clarke, in his July 2014 report said:

“I took particular note of the fact that the schools where it is alleged that this has happened are state non-faith schools.”

7.40. He highlighted a range of inappropriate behaviours across the schools including irregularities in employment practices, bullying and intimidation, changes to the curriculum and educational plans, inappropriate proselytising in non-faith schools, and unequal treatment and segregation, with specific examples including:

- a teachers’ social media discussion called the “Park View Brotherhood”, in which homophobic, extremist and sectarian views were aired;

- teachers using anti-Western messages in assemblies, saying that White people would never have Muslim children’s interests at heart;

- the introduction of Friday Prayers in non-faith state schools and pressure on staff and students to attend – in one school a Public Address system was installed to call pupils to prayer, with a member of staff shouting at students who were in the playground, not attending prayer, and embarrassing some girls when attention was drawn to them because girls who are menstruating are not allowed to attend prayer; and

- senior staff calling students and staff who do not attend prayers ‘k****r’.

7.41. Peter Clarke concluded:

“There has been co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained action, carried out by a number of associated individuals, to introduce an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos into a few schools in Birmingham. This has been achieved in a number of schools by gaining influence on the governing bodies, installing sympathetic headteachers or senior members of staff, appointing like-minded
people to key positions, and seeking to remove headteachers they do not feel sufficiently compliant."

7.42. Many of the individuals involved deny the allegations against them and continue to this day to maintain they were acting in the best interests of pupils. We heard wider views in Birmingham that sought to underplay the seriousness of the issues or to deny the extent of the problem, portraying the whole episode as a conspiracy and the letter a fake.

7.43. Professional misconduct and legal proceedings are underway against the individuals involved so we will only have a complete picture when these conclude. However, at the point of finalising this review, four teachers had been found guilty of unacceptable professional conduct and three of these have been prohibited from teaching. The independent panels hearing the cases have found that teachers:

“agreed to the inclusion of an undue amount of religious influence in pupils’ education; did not show tolerance and respect for the rights of others; expressed personal beliefs in ways which could exploit pupils’ vulnerability; and breached proper recruitment processes.”

7.44. We noted with concern that, as recently as 8 July 2016, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector, Sir Michael Wilshaw, wrote to the Secretary of State for Education about Birmingham City Council’s support for vulnerable schools and noted that while many of the schools at the centre of the episode have improved, the situation remains fragile, with:

- a minority of people in the community who are still intent on destabilising these schools;
- a lack of co-ordinated support for the schools in developing good practice;
- a culture of fear in which teachers operate having gone underground but still there;
- overt intimidation from some elements within the local community; and
- organised resistance to the personal, social and health education (PSHE) curriculum and the promotion of equality.

7.45. The ‘Trojan Horse’ episode highlighted weaknesses in how leaders in education – whether in the Council or as head teachers – deal with robust requests from a minority of parents claiming to represent the community. While such ‘requests’ are made on the basis of accommodating religious and cultural needs of Muslim children, they are often about sustaining the power of self-appointed...
community leaders intent on perpetuating inequality and regressive attitudes.

7.46. Ian Kershaw’s report commissioned by the Council found that individuals had placed pressure on head teachers to deny pupils their right to access a broad and balanced curriculum, including understanding world religions and sex and relationship education. He concluded that the Council’s inability to act where head teachers were being pressurised and undermined was exacerbated by a culture within the Council of not wanting to address difficult issues and problems with school governance where there was a risk that the Council may be accused of racism and Islamophobia. We found several examples of this across the country, with people not wanting to believe such practices were taking place, calling the episode the ‘Trojan hoax’ and accusing Government and Ofsted of being anti-Muslim.

7.47. These dual issues of public officials accepting claims by a small number of individuals to represent the views of a wider community and failing to challenge their views due to concerns around racism or community relations, or simply a lack of knowledge and confidence, are not unique to this episode; indeed we have been told by head teachers and others of similar experiences, poor practice and unhealthy power dynamics elsewhere – and we saw this for ourselves in other areas of the country. Ofsted are also investigating in a number of other areas, including Bradford, East London and Luton. We return to wider issues of leadership later in this report.

**Children in unregulated environments**

7.48. As the requirements on all schools, including independent schools, have been strengthened, the focus on the safety and well-being of children receiving education in settings which are not registered has sharpened. Settings where children are receiving a full-time education are required to register as independent schools; failure to do so is a criminal offence.

7.49. Ofsted are checking more than a hundred cases of such institutions which may potentially have to be registered but are not, and found instances of squalid conditions, concerns with the safety of the premises and no evidence that staff had been vetted to work with children. In his letter to the Secretary of State for Education of 16 May 2016, Sir Michael Wilshaw said the Ofsted inspection process:

> “Firmly reinforces my belief that there are many more children hidden away from the view of the authorities in unregistered schools across the country than previously thought. Last month, inspectors issued seven warning notices to suspected illegal schools… In total, around 350 children or young people were found to be on the premises during these visits.”

7.50. The narrow curriculum offered would be unlikely to meet the standards expected of an independent school. It is important that, despite parents accepting
the conditions and type of education, the rights of children to be safe from harm and to a suitable education come first and Ofsted is preparing cases for the Crown Prosecution Service to pursue prosecutions where the law has been broken.

7.51. There are also a significant number of settings which are not full-time where children receive some form of education outside school, such as sport clubs, dance studios and religious settings. During this review, the Department for Education conducted a call for evidence on whether to regulate settings providing intensive education (6-8 hours per week) and to prohibit:

- corporal punishment;
- unsuitable premises;
- the appointment of unsuitable staff; and
- undesirable teaching, such as promoting extremist views.

7.52. It proposed that Ofsted would be able to inspect such settings where there were concerns that prohibited activities were taking place and that appropriate sanctions would be introduced.

7.53. Concerns about the welfare of children in out-of-school settings, including being exposed to extremist views, are long-standing (they were mentioned in the 2011 Prevent Strategy) and we noted widespread public support for the Department for Education’s proposals. According to a Survation poll of 1,031 members of the British public for the Huffington Post UK conducted online on 7 October 2015, 62% of respondents endorsed the plans, while 13% were opposed and 24% were undecided.

7.54. The proposals drew public concern from a range of religious organisations, principally around the requirement to register, which they regarded as unnecessary state interference in religion and, for some, that the prohibition on extremist teaching could be interpreted as preventing the teaching of traditional religious beliefs. There have also been calls for inspection to be undertaken by faith organisations themselves rather than by Ofsted. When the proposals were debated in Westminster Hall on 20 January, MPs raised concerns about whether they were proportionate.

7.55. In trailing the proposals in October 2015, the then Prime Minister said:

“But in some madrassas we’ve got children being taught that they shouldn’t mix with people of other religions; being beaten; swallowing conspiracy theories about Jewish people. These children should be having their minds opened, their horizons broadened…not having their heads filled with poison and their hearts filled with hate.”
7.56. During the review this was mentioned by several people we met as signalling that the proposals were actually targeted at madrassas and Muslims. Few who said this seemed to have read the Department for Education’s proposals. A ‘Keep Mosques Independent’ campaign was launched in opposition to the Department for Education’s call for evidence, providing a website with campaign resources such as posters and sermons and selective quotes from the Prime Minister. The campaign website provided no copy of or link to the Department for Education’s document – which made it clear that the call for evidence was not only about madrassas but all out-of-school settings.

7.57. Despite the negative reaction among some Muslim groups, we did also hear concerns, particularly from mothers, about the availability and quality of Islamic religious teaching; whether all parents felt able to question what their children were being taught; and about the use of physical punishment in madrassas.

7.58. While no reliable records exist to identify the number of madrassas or other supplementary schools that exist across Britain, or the number of children attending them, the scale is believed to be significant, particularly within Muslim communities. Estimates have been produced to suggest there are around 2,000 madrassas in the UK (Hayer, 2009244), attended by more than 250,000 British Muslim children (Abrams, 2011245).

7.59. Ensuring the welfare of children must be paramount and it does no good to deny that there are concerns and particular risks with settings about which not much is known and where a significant number of children spend a considerable amount of time; or to reject out of hand proposals to ensure the well-being of our children. And while the recent campaign of resistance has stemmed mainly from Muslim communities, these are not concerns limited only to madrassas or Muslim children. The main churches in England, the Church of England and the Catholic Church, and the Jewish community, are not free of historic problems in ensuring the well-being of children in their institutions.

Home education

7.60. Education is the fundamental right of every child. According to the Education Act 1996 it is parents (not the state) who are responsible for providing their children’s education ‘at school or otherwise’246. There are a number of reasons why some parents may choose to home educate their child, including philosophical or religious motivations or high rates of travel – for example for work. In other cases, a child might start off in school but later be taken out and educated at home – perhaps because a child has special needs or the parent does not think the schools available are suitable for their child. These are all valid reasons and there are many responsible parents and parents’ groups who argue strongly for their right to exercise
their statutory responsibility to educate their children in the manner they regard most appropriate.

7.61. The 1996 Education Act stipulates that parents are responsible for providing an ‘efficient’ and ‘suitable’ education for their children\textsuperscript{247}. But there is no definition in law of what constitutes a ‘suitable’ education. In 2007, the Department for Education issued guidance\textsuperscript{248}, still in place, using a definition which was taken from commentary in a judicial review case in 1985. ‘Suitable’ was referred to in R v Secretary of State for Education and Science (1985\textsuperscript{249}) as education that:

“primarily equips a child for life within the community of which he is a member, rather than the way of life in the country as a whole, as long as it does not foreclose the child’s option in later years to adopt some other form of life if he wishes to do so.”

7.62. This definition from a 30-year old case runs counter to efforts to foster British values in schools across the country and contrary to efforts on integration and building cohesive communities which are based on shared values. Even independent schools, which do not have to follow the national curriculum and have a lot of autonomy on what and how they teach, are required to teach fundamental British values on the principle that all children should be equipped to participate fully in British life. It seems wrong, therefore, that this should not also be the case for home-educated children. All children should have equal opportunity in attainment and life chances regardless of the method of education chosen for them.

7.63. While there are many proponents of the benefits and strengths of home education, there are a number of difficulties and risks associated with it and little evidence we could find to assess the educational attainment and socio-economic progress made by home educated children.

7.64. There is no requirement for parents to register or notify their local authority that they are home educating their child. Local authorities do not therefore have any sure way of knowing the extent of home education in their locality, nor the quality or ‘suitability’ of education being provided outside school settings. A study in 2014 put the figure of registered home education children in England at 27,292\textsuperscript{250}. The unregistered number is unknown and thought to be several multiples of this.
7.65. A further concern – expressed by Ofsted and others – is that some people may be misusing the right to home educate and its light regulation to place their children in unregistered and illegal schools. In cases where Ofsted found unregistered schools there is evidence to suggest some of these schools are using the freedoms afforded to genuine home educators as a cover for their activities.  

7.66. Some local authorities have also raised concerns with us that the current legal framework has serious limitations on the extent to which local authorities can lawfully and effectively investigate to establish the suitability of education being provided to home-educated children, and so also be aware of any child protection issues that may arise from the nature of education being provided and the home in which it is being provided.

7.67. At the beginning of 2016, the Department for Education consulted on tightening up regulation on pupil registration in schools to improve local authorities’ awareness of pupil destinations and track children going missing from education, following concerns raised by Ofsted who identified risks that such children may face, including forced marriage, child sexual exploitation, female genital mutilation and falling prey to radicalisation.

7.68. We welcome action to address this but it only has the potential to improve tracking of children who have been attending but then been withdrawn from school. We believe further action is necessary to cover children who are home educated without ever having attended school – otherwise there will always be a cohort of pupils who are not known to local authorities and the opportunity to abuse the system will remain.

7.69. Parents should continue to have the right to home educate their children but stronger safeguards are required to ensure the child’s right to a decent and suitable education for life in Britain, and to protect them from harm. The evidence we have seen in this review shows it is too easy for children to be raised in a totally secluded environment that does not provide a suitable education or sufficient protection from harm. One case of this happening is one too many.

7.70. The harms and inequalities highlighted in this chapter often result from cultural practices and behaviours that are out of step with modern British values and in many cases, the law. More effort is required to ensure illegal acts are met with the full force of the law. But attitudinal change is required too and we hope communities will not deny, reject or shy away from the difficult issues brought out in this review, but engage constructively in a debate about improving equality and reducing harm – for the benefit of all.
8. Religion

Chapter Summary

- There is a rich tradition of religion as a force for good in this country and we remain largely religious, with 7 out of 10 of us saying we belong to a religion.

- But there has been a significant shift in the religious landscape of the nation, with a reducing number identifying themselves as Christian, more people saying they hold no religion and more diverse and growing minority faith populations, of which Muslims are the most prominent.

- This increase in the diversity of faiths and beliefs in the UK has increased the visibility of tensions between religious groups and the presence of more visible signs of religion, for example in the growth of mosques, and led to increased anxiety – which has not been sufficiently acknowledged or discussed.

- The connection between violent Islamist terrorist groups and Islam, while rejected by many Muslims, has also increased public attention and awareness of more regressive attitudes in some minority religious groups, and the abuse of religious codes like Sharia law. These attitudes, and the behaviours that stem from them, suggest support in some groups for the inequalities and harms addressed in this review and increase the sense of separatism and divergence from modern values.

- Faith leadership has not to date been strong enough to counter the vocal minority who are bringing religion into disrepute and influencing the attitudes of people who increasingly regard religion as a force for bad.
Religion

8.1. There is a rich tradition of religion as a force for good in this country and much that is currently being done by people of faith that we can build upon. Many people still look to religion and to religious leaders for guidance in times of turmoil and crisis, whether personal or societal and it is notable that, during episodes of heightened community tension, our political leaders often turn to religious leaders for messages of peace and calm. During the course of the review we have heard a great deal about the work of churches, mosques, synagogues and temples to:

- care for the sick or the elderly or the socially excluded;
- help educate, protect and empower our children;
- feed, clothe and house the poorest in society, fight the trafficking of women and children, and address a range of social justice issues.

8.2. We heard, for example, about:

- young Muslims taking it in turns to drive to Cumbria to help flood victims;
- religious representatives bringing people of different faith and ethnicities together to support local projects;
- many thousands of people of faith coming together across the country through events (such as Sadaqa Day and Mitzvah Day) and organisations from the Caritas Social Action Network (the Catholic Church in England and Wales’ social action arm) to Kumon Y’All (a small Yorkshire-based youth group) to undertake social action and help make local communities in Britain a better place to live.

8.3. Such work is selfless, often unremarked upon in society, but can have a dramatic impact in relieving individual human anguish and suffering. For all those involved, faith is not something incidental to their actions. It is fundamental: the font, the origin, the thing that makes these people who they are and do what they do. To them, their faith is realised in action: in commitment to others; in caring; in compassion; in an all-embracing feeling of solidarity.

8.4. But there are also a significant number of people who regard religion as a negative and divisive force in society. There is a global history of wars, persecution and other harms that have been perpetrated in the name of religion, against or between religious groups, and many of these have left on-going tensions between different religious communities and sects that impact on community cohesion.
Trends in religion in Great Britain

8.5. Over the past half century, Britain’s religious and belief landscape has been transformed. As discussed in chapter 3, there has been an increase in the number of people with non-religious beliefs and identities. While nearly 70% of the population described themselves as belonging to a religion in the 2011 Census, with 25% saying they held no religion\textsuperscript{253}, the National Centre for Social Research’s annual British Attitudes Survey suggests that almost half the population sees itself as non-religious\textsuperscript{254}.

8.6. We remain an officially Christian country with our Head of State, Her Majesty the Queen, also Supreme Governor of the established Church in England, while at the 2011 Census, 59% of us described ourselves as Christian. But that figure had fallen significantly from 72% a decade earlier\textsuperscript{255}. And the Church of England has seen a steady decline in church attendance over the last half century, with the proportion of the population attending Sunday services now only one third of that in the 1960s\textsuperscript{256}.

8.7. At the same time there has been a shift away from mainstream Christian denominations and a growth in evangelical and Pentecostal churches, largely reflecting changes in ethnic diversity\textsuperscript{257}.

8.8. There has also been an increase in the variety of faiths being practiced. Fifty years ago, Judaism – at less than 1% of the population – was the largest non-Christian faith in the UK. Now it is the fourth largest non-Christian faith with 269,000 people identifying as Jewish in the 2011 Census behind Islam (2.8 million people), Hinduism (833,000), and Sikhism (432,000). Although still comprising less than 10% of the population, minority faith groups have younger age profiles than the largest Christian groups, and can be expected to grow as the latter decline\textsuperscript{258}. The increase in people identifying as Muslim has been particularly noticeable, with 1.2 million more – a 72% rise - in the 2011 Census than the 2001 Census\textsuperscript{259}, attributable mainly to immigration and higher birth rates.

8.9. The nature of religion in Britain has therefore changed dramatically in recent years.

Religious tensions

8.10. This increased variety of faiths – and the cultures, histories and global links that they bring with them – has led to increased awareness and visibility of the tensions between some religious groups, many long-standing. Our engagement has particularly highlighted the many intra- and inter-faith disputes inextricably linked to today’s geopolitical crises across the Middle East, and in many parts of Africa and Asia. Many of these disputes are reflected back into British society and are now part of the everyday experience of people living in Britain, creating or exacerbating tensions between different communities.
8.11. Religious leaders on the national and international stage, as well as those working locally in our communities, have recognised and responded to this. There has been a great deal of ‘inter-faith’ work to bring faith communities together around the values that they share. Government strategies for community cohesion and integration have supported such work, including financially, and we comment on this later on in this report. We do not undervalue the importance of inter-faith work; neither do we underestimate how hard it is to draw together the communities with the most polarised and entrenched views.

8.12. We have heard a lot about the anxiety that rapid change has caused. Some faith groups are concerned about what they describe as an aggressive secularisation taking hold of Britain, exemplified by curbs on signs of religion being displayed or worn in some public services; and religion seen as being side-lined, marginalised and downgraded in the public sphere.

8.13. Others express concern about an increase in signs and symbols of religious fundamentalism or, as some described it, the ‘Islamification’ of Britain (including, for example, concerns about the growth in the numbers of mosques and traditional Islamic forms of dress).

8.14. There has been a reluctance to discuss or acknowledge the impact that this is having on long-standing communities, akin to the sensitivity we have seen over immigration. In turn, this can cause disaffection and it has been seized upon by far right extremists to pull people towards their agenda.

Growth of mosques

8.15. The growth in the number and visibility of mosques, madrassas and other Islamic buildings has proven an issue of particular contention in some communities. The growth in recent years has been exponential, but the particular impact felt in communities may be explained by a) the more rapid growth in recent years of the Muslim population in Britain compared to other faiths, b) the stronger tendency towards geographical concentration among Muslims compared to other minority faith groups, c) the decline in longer established churches, d) the distinctive architectural style and features of mosques and e) the attention that has been drawn over the last decade or more to some mosques as ‘breeding grounds’ for radicalisation and terrorism.

8.16. The online religious data resource, British Religion in Numbers[^260], records the number of officially registered mosques in Britain over time, drawn from data held at
the General Register Office. While noting that this tracks only the number of mosques that are officially registered as places of worship (not the total number of mosques), it shows the long-term growth trend in the chart below:

Number of mosques certified as registered Place of Worship in England & Wales, 1910 - 2012

8.17. A significant number of mosques are not registered as places of worship and best estimates we have seen during the review suggest that there are now more than 2,000 mosques in the UK, distributed broadly in line with the high concentrations within the Muslim population identified earlier in the report. The Muslims in Britain website identified the following geography of mosques in this country: Birmingham 161, Bradford 91, Leicester 71, Tower Hamlets 60, Kirklees 52, Manchester 62, Newham 47, Blackburn with Darwen 45, Sheffield 36 and Oldham 30. Glasgow has 28 and Cardiff 15262.

8.18. Data analysis of registered places of worship by British Religion in Numbers (excluding the Church of England or Church in Wales which, as the established churches, are not required to register) indicates a net reduction in longer-established Christian churches, and a growth in places of worship for Christian communities outside the traditional categories and other non-Christian religions, notably Muslim, Sikh and ‘other’263. However, the scale and rate of growth of places of worship for non-Christian religions appears significantly smaller than for mosques.
8.19. The rapid growth in mosques has played a part in an increase in community concerns and tensions. In a major city in the North West of England, we visited a street on which there were four mosques along a stretch of road less than a quarter of a mile long, each serving a slightly different Muslim community or offering prayers in different languages. They had all been built in a short time period. The mosques along this road faced a largely white working class community and the police told us tensions were high, particularly on Friday afternoons in the summer as Muslim men from the area assembled for prayers. When we spoke to members of the white community in the area, they felt they were unable to express any concerns about the growth in the number of mosques because they would be accused of being racist and ignored by the authorities.

8.20. We also heard about growing community opposition to new mosque proposals. Often, the most strongly expressed concerns – for example in objecting to planning applications – were about the impact on local parking. But there was also a sense of community concern about the architectural appearance of mosques. The public mood was described to us as having changed from acceptance and curiosity about a small number of buildings that seemed rare, to a concern about an unknown culture increasingly dotting the British skyline and highlighting difference. During the review, Baroness Warsi called publicly for the development of mosque architectural designs that better contextualised Islam in 21st Century Britain.

"During the review, Baroness Warsi called publicly for the development of mosque architectural designs that better contextualised Islam in 21st Century Britain."
Century Britain. Such a step could be symbolic of a wider desire in the Muslim population to cultivate a British flavour of Islam, comfortable in its identity, discussed later in this chapter.

8.21. We visited several mosques during the review and met Imams and members of mosque governing bodies who were keen to emphasise the links they were making to the community through charitable acts and open events. But we were also struck by the defensiveness of some Muslims about any Government or authority interest in mosques, plainly driven by them feeling under suspicion and that such engagement seemed to them to be driven primarily if not solely by a desire to spot and act on signs of radicalisation. This is a shame. Now more than ever, mosques and their leadership need to be open and transparent to the communities around them to help break down suspicion and build trust. A new approach to engagement between mosques, Government, local authorities and communities is needed urgently.
Regressive attitudes

8.22. Unfortunately, when some people in Britain think of faith they also think about terrorism, extremism, sectarian violence, child abuse, discrimination and a rejection of many of the values that we hold dear in this country (including democracy, the rule of law and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths, beliefs and life styles).

8.23. While many people in the UK appear to be seeing religion as increasingly less important and, in some cases, less of a force for good, for others, religion is very important in their daily lives. Within this latter group there appear to be some who are keen to take religion backwards and away from 21st Century British values and laws on issues such as gender equality and sexual orientation; creating segregation and pulling communities apart.

8.24. Public concerns about the increasing visibility of Islam in Britain may be driven by practical concerns but also by anxiety and fear of the unknown, including the twisted version of Islam that, while unsupported and denied by many Muslims, is promoted vociferously by Islamist terrorist and extremist organisations. They may also be driven by the widely reported shift to more traditional, literalist and some would say regressive or extremist interpretations of Islam in some communities.

8.25. In this review, we have heard a number of theories about the drivers for the emergence of more regressive Islamic religiosity. Before the early 2000s, both the Saudi state and private Saudi citizens are reported to have actively promoted a Saudi interpretation of Islam overseas, including in Britain. This included the production of Islamic literature and promotion of teachings that claimed the supremacy of ultra-conservative Salafi Sunni Islam which encouraged intolerant views, including anti-Semitism, hatred of other sects (Sufi and Shi’a Muslims), anti-Western sentiment and violent punishment for homosexuality. Saudi officials are, naturally, quick to emphasise that these judgements were not intended to be applied in the UK and that Islam mandates observance of local norms for Muslim citizens of non-Muslim states – but this message does not appear to have got through to practice on the ground in many places.

8.26. Since 9/11 some have claimed that there has been a reduction in the scale and impact of Saudi influence in the UK and a fragmentation of Salafi networks that has diluted their influence. Despite this, Salafi interpretations of Islam and other literalist and intolerant interpretations of Islam remain easily accessible and still appear popular in some parts of the UK, especially among the young and those new to Islam. We visited several mosques where we were told it was nigh on impossible to get well qualified English speaking Imams and in one we were told they felt pressured and even persecuted by other Saudi-influenced mosques in the surrounding area.
8.27. Speakers from the Deobandi revivalist movement in Sunni Islam have also become increasingly prominent in Britain in recent years, and although not necessarily supporting terrorism, they have promoted anti-Western and isolationist messages that are not conducive to integration.

8.28. Scholars who argue that religious guidance should be contextualised in the 21st Century are a small minority. Deobandi networks exert a significant influence in Britain, particularly in Birmingham, parts of London, Leicester and towns in the North West. Their scholars have a significant authority and influence on their communities. Some 45% of UK mosques follow Deobandi teachings and Dar ul-Uloom seminaries are responsible for the majority of UK Islamic training.

8.29. Many people talked to us during the review about the teachings and interpretations of their religions. Some Muslims recognised the challenges that arose from the diversity and complexity of their faith – for example the different strands of Islam, lack of formal hierarchy or authority, scarcity of Imams who speak good English, and the role and power politics of self-appointed leaders – and the need for clearer interpretation of Islam for life in the UK. The idea of a modern British understanding of Islam is also advanced by Dilwar Hussein, founder of New Horizons in British Islam, who argues that the Qur’an should be interpreted for modern times and modern values. Past attempts to contextualise Islam in Britain have been fraught with difficulty and have not made sufficient progress but we think there is strong merit in these being pursued with more vigour by Muslim leaders and communities.

8.30. Academic research suggests that there has been a rise in the more traditional markers of faith particularly among young Muslims. Many young Muslims in Britain attribute a greater salience to Islam for their personal identity and there is a greater adherence to Muslim dress than among previous generations. Some have attributed this to young Muslims being far more politically active, albeit largely outside of the traditional British party political system with which many are disillusioned, and conscious of international issues – especially suffering experienced by the ‘Ummah’ (the wider global Muslim community) and their responsibilities towards it. Young people feel ‘problematic’ and alienated because of their religion and pull further away from mainstream society as a result.

8.31. It has been said that the outward physical manifestation of religiosity is a reflection of an inner contestation over the nature of fractured identities: Wearing of religious dress is “a sign of defiance and resistance in the face of persistent negative media and political vilification”. Others, including Muslim women we met during the review, have described the pressure on Muslim women to wear traditional and cultural forms of Islamic dress (such as the veil and niqab) as another reflection of misogynistic attitudes towards women. We were struck also by points on these issues attributed to Sadiq Khan during his London Mayoralty campaign.
“When I was younger you didn’t see people wearing hijabs and niqabs, not even in Pakistan when I visited my family. In London we got on. People dressed the same. What you see now are people born and raised here who are choosing to wear the jilbab or niqab. There is a question to be asked about what is going on in those homes. What’s insidious is if people are starting to think it is appropriate to treat women differently or that it has been forced on them. What worries me is children being forced to adopt a lifestyle. It’s not for me to tell women what to wear. But I do think that in public service we should be able to see each other’s faces. Eye contact matters. You should be able to see the face. There is no other city in the world where I would want to raise my daughters than London. They have rights, they have protection, the right to wear what they like, think what they like, to meet who they like, to study what they like, more than they would in any other country.”

8.32. As common-sense as Sadiq Khan’s viewpoint is, it has been clear during the review that not everyone shares it. We have heard about various religious institutions across Britain and preachers accessible on widely available British media stations and the internet which have argued a very different view, that men have numerous rights over women. We do not believe this is happening everywhere but it does exist and, wherever it does, it is wrong. Examples we have come across during the review included advice that:

- “A woman should seek her husband’s permission when leaving the house and should not do so without his knowledge”\(^{270}\), and
- It is for men to grant permission for women to travel, even if the decision of the husband goes against the wishes of the female, and banning women from driving a car for long distances (three days/48 miles) without a male chaperone\(^{271}\).

We do not believe this is happening everywhere but it does exist and, wherever it does, it is wrong.

8.33. We also came across examples of literalist interpretations and advice that increased divisions between communities. In the West Midlands, we were given a leaflet that was branded as coming from a ‘Public Council’ in the city, calling on Muslims to boycott a community music festival in a local park. It advised that:

- “This kind of events [sic] not only increases the proliferation of sinful activities; it also threatens the very structure of our community” and
- “it is the duty of every Muslim to boycott and abstain from this kind of events [sic] and discourage their families, children and relatives from attending these events”.

8.34. There are examples of inequality and intolerance in other ethnic and faith groups, with concerns expressed to us during the review about increased Sikh extremism (for example in disruptions to mixed faith couples’ weddings), the treatment of women in some strictly Jewish Orthodox communities (with children reportedly being taught that a woman’s role is to look after children, clean the house
and cook) and newer Christian churches (with activists seeking to ‘cure’ people of homosexuality). All such instances undermine integration and should be challenged.
Religious codes

8.35. The laws in this country provide for equal rights and security for every citizen regardless of ethnicity, faith, gender, sexual orientation or financial standing. As our earlier discussion of values showed, there is widespread acceptance of the rule of law as a core value in the UK to which majority and minority ethnic and faith groups subscribe strongly.

8.36. Many people in this country of all different majority and minority faiths follow religious codes and practices, seek guidance from faith leaders in dealing with a wide range of life issues and matters of conscience, and benefit from the guidance they receive. Religious communities also operate counselling and mediation services, arbitration councils and boards to resolve disputes. Under British civil laws, a third party can be used to resolve a dispute as long as both sides agree to the arbitration. They cannot, however, replace civil law. The overriding principle is that these rules, practices and bodies must operate within the laws of the UK.

8.37. However, we received a number of representations during the review that suggested some religious bodies might not be following this principle - operating in ways that are discriminatory, causing harm and subverting individuals' legal rights.

8.38. Sharia Councils have been operating in the UK since the 1980s. While there have been a number of controversial media headlines about them, not much is known about how they actually operate across the country. There are reported to be between 30 to 85 such councils in the UK but there could be more. We have been told that much of their work focuses on providing advice to Muslims who choose to use them to resolve civil and family disputes.

8.39. Functions generally include mediation, issuing religious divorce certificates and occasionally guidance on how to conduct day-to-day activities such as which mortgages or insurance products are consistent with sharia law. How they operate varies considerably depending on factors such as ethnicity, culture, sect and school of thought.

8.40. However, we heard about discriminatory practices against women which, in some cases, are causing serious harm. Some women's rights groups have accused Sharia Councils and other parallel legal systems of denying vulnerable women and children access to equality and human rights. There have been claims that some Sharia Councils have been supporting the values of extremists, condoning wife-beating, ignoring marital rape and allowing

The overriding principle is that these rules, practices and bodies must operate within the laws of the UK.

Some women's rights groups have accused Sharia Councils and other parallel legal systems of denying vulnerable women and children access to equality and human rights.
forced marriage. It has also been claimed that their influence is growing.

8.41. We heard about women being charged higher fees than men for using the same service (sometimes up to four times as much) and women facing lengthier processes for divorce than men. Most concerning of all, we were told that some women were unaware of their legal rights to leave violent husbands and were being pressurised to return to abusive partners or attend reconciliation sessions with their husbands despite legal injunctions in place to protect them from violence.

8.42. We also heard evidence that some Muslim Arbitration Tribunals in the UK exceeded their mandate in arbitrating on issues outside of their jurisdiction, such as child custody and domestic violence. It was claimed that lack of oversight and an absence of consistent standards meant individuals with little or no training were found dispensing life-changing advice. These experiences often left the women and children feeling traumatised. We have heard reports that there are now up to 100,000 sharia marriages in the UK, many of which are not recognised under UK laws and leave women without full legal rights upon divorce. It has been claimed that 70 to 75% of Muslim marriages in the UK have not been registered under the Marriage Act. The Muslim Women’s Network publication, ‘Information and Guidance on Muslim Marriage and Divorce in Britain’, cites research that found that over half of the cases dealt with by Birmingham Central Mosque Sharia Council involved couples who were not married under English civil law; and references data from their own helpline in which 30% of enquiries about divorce were from women in marriages not recognised legally.

8.43. The prevalence of unregistered marriage would be concerning in any group, as an indicator that people were not accessing their rights. It is particularly concerning in a group that includes those known to have lower levels of female employment, lower levels of English language and, anecdotally at least, a lack of awareness of other civil rights. The potential for women (in particular) to find themselves in what they believe to be a binding commitment, be economically and socially dependent on their spouse, and yet have no legal marriage status, is worryingly high.

8.44. The imbalance of power in such relationships has been raised a number of times throughout this review. We heard that some men had refused to give or agree to a divorce even though they had moved forward with their lives and remarried; refused or contested an Islamic divorce to extract a more favourable financial settlement from their wife; threatened women with an instant verbal divorce (without having to go through a formal procedure); or threatened to marry again and commit polygamy.

8.45. The practice of ‘unregistered polygamy’ appears to be more commonplace than might be expected. The existence of matchmaking sites like "secondwife.com"
and a number of accusations, anecdotes and assertions encountered throughout our engagement imply a common acceptance of polygamy – which impact negatively on women (and their children) who have not had a legal marriage, through denial of inheritance and maintenance rights – even if most people would not wish the situation upon themselves. In situations of polygamy, the power imbalance of an unregistered marriage is compounded by the power imbalance of being one of many spouses – something the United Nations has condemned as particularly “contraven[ing] a woman’s right to equality with men, and [having]… serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependents”

8.46. The practice highlights the complexity that we as a state, and as a society, face in challenging issues of cultural difference. In the eyes of the law – provided no bigamy, or encouragement or assistance of bigamy or any other crime is committed – there is nothing illegal with living with a wife and a girlfriend. Condemnation of the practice on the grounds of a spouse’s rights becomes more difficult without a clear legal framework; and falls into a realm of cultural sensitivity which many people are uncomfortable dealing with.

8.47. For example, a BBC Asian Network interview with the founder of secondwife.com, while questioning whether the justification for polygamy is strictly applicable in the modern context, shied away from presenting any direct criticism. Instead, the interview focussed on gently ridiculing the founder’s verbal blunders and contradictions, allowing the statements that thousands of women are willing to be second wives and that the website is most popular in the UK to pass as unexceptional.

8.48. We have also heard about cases where devout Orthodox Jewish women in some communities, despite being able to get a divorce in British law courts, have felt trapped in a marriage they cannot get out of, as only the husband has the power to grant a ‘get’ (a Jewish divorce document authenticated by a Rabbi and given by a husband to his wife releasing her from their marriage).

8.49. While Government and law enforcement agencies must take swift and decisive action against any practices that are incompatible with UK laws, reform, especially on matters of equality, must also be driven from within faith communities. We welcome the tireless work being done at grassroots level by some groups and individuals to support vulnerable women and children who have been victimised by such systems and to raise awareness of the rights afforded to all British citizens. We also recognise that some faith groups and leaders have called on such religious bodies to ‘do the right thing’ and have named and shamed those who have not. Some faith leaders are working to formalise and standardise procedures in order to address some of these concerns. But this alone is not enough and there is more that needs to be done to ensure that all religious and cultural tribunals operating in the UK comply with our standards of equality and our legislation.
8.50. All marriages, regardless of faith, should be registered so that the union is legally valid under British laws. We have heard strong arguments that the Marriage Act should be reformed to apply to all faiths and that faith institutions must ensure they are properly registered and operate within existing legislation. Faith groups and leaders, with the support of Government, must ensure anybody advising couples is appropriately vetted and adequately trained, not simply theologically but also in matters pertaining to domestic abuse.

8.51. We need to ensure that women in 21st century Britain are better informed about their rights and, in particular, practices relating to marriage and divorce. We must put a stop to cases where, in the name of religion, women and children are given short shrift, discriminated against and denied the rights that this country provides for everyone.

8.52. During this review, the then Home Secretary announced an independent inquiry into the role of Sharia law. We think this is timely in the light of points put to us and believe it should have a particular focus on equalities issues and the treatment of women.
**Faith leadership**

8.53. We discuss broader aspects of community and public leadership in a later chapter but, across the wider range of concerns about religious practices and influences that were put to us during the review and which we have reflected in this report, it is clear that there are too many religious leaders condoning or promoting intolerant and hateful teachings. Too often, these views appear to be based on warped theology, designed to sustain the power of particular individuals or groups and to excuse or even legitimise their transgressions.

8.54. These have an impact on vulnerable individuals who might feel they should follow them, but they also increase the fear and suspicion of others. They are a vocal minority. But the majority of peaceful, tolerant and liberal religious leaders, who have the potential to heal the divisions between communities of different faiths and none, are not being loud enough or bold enough to protect vulnerable individuals or to reduce the fear and suspicion of others.

8.55. We were pleased to note during discussions with the leadership of the Church of England, the Catholic Church in Britain and the Jewish faith, as well as with some influential Muslim and other minority faith leaders, an enthusiasm for continuing inter-faith dialogue, a willingness to share learning from their respective histories and experiences, and a recognition of the importance of promoting tolerance and greater respect for all, regardless of colour, creed or sexuality.

8.56. We hope those leaders will respond positively to this review and push this important work harder and faster, including through their education and school arms, to promote shared human values, confront the harms we have identified and enable anyone of any belief, or none, to feel respected, not condemned; protected by the laws and traditions of the United Kingdom. And we hope that Muslim leaders will respond to the demand in their communities for a clearer interpretation of Islam for modern life in Britain.
9. Hate and extremism

Chapter Summary

- Recorded hate crimes are on the increase and, while there is some debate about whether this is simply a result of better reporting, the Crime Survey suggests that only around one in four incidents is reported.

- There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that hate crimes increase following ‘trigger events’ such as terrorist incidents that raise tensions between particular communities, and the increase in reported hate crimes following the EU referendum may be another example of such a spike.

- Groups that record crimes against particular religious groups also report an increase in anti-Muslim (Islamophobic) hate crime, in violent anti-Semitic assaults and in sectarian violence.

- Prominent Islamist and far right extremist groups are peddling fear and hatred and pushing communities further apart. While diametrically opposed to each other, they are both pushing an ideology that Islam and British values are incompatible, creating a vicious circle that increases fear and prejudice and further alienates Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

We hope those leaders will respond positively to this review and push this important work harder and faster.
Hate crimes

9.1. Hate crimes are “crimes committed against someone because of their disability, gender-identity, race, religion or belief, or sexual orientation”\(^ {279} \). They are a particularly powerful manifestation of prejudice and discrimination as they are often directed at characteristics over which we have no control; striking against the respect and individual liberty that most of us hold dear as a British and human value.

9.2. The vast majority of hate crimes remain race related as opposed to other forms of hatred – although we were told during the review that the threshold for proving a hate crime was religiously motivated was harder to pass when compared to racially motivated crime, and that many religiously motivated hate crimes were therefore being prosecuted on grounds of race (and thereby under-reflected in the data).

9.3. In 2015-16, there were 62,518 hate crimes recorded by the police\(^ {280} \), an increase of 19% compared with 2014-15:

- 49,419 (79%) were race hate crimes;
- 7,194 (12%) were sexual orientation hate crimes;
- 4,400 (7%) were religious hate crimes;
- 3,629 (6%) were disability hate crimes; and
- 858 (1%) were transgender hate crimes.

9.4. There were increases in offences recorded for all five of the monitored hate crime strands (race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity) between 2014/15 and 2015/16\(^ {281} \).

9.5. The Office of National Statistics has attributed much of the recent increase in police-recorded hate crime to improvements in recording rather than an increase in offences. Indeed, the Crime Survey for England and Wales\(^ {282} \) estimated that there were 222,000 hate crimes on average per year from 2012/13 to 2014/15, representing a decrease of 56,000 compared with the previous period covered by the survey\(^ {283} \). This includes a decrease in religious and race hate crimes. Nevertheless, it also indicates that the number of hate crimes people experience is around four times higher than those recorded, suggesting a very significant level of under-reporting.

9.6. There is some evidence and anecdotal reports which suggest that increases in race
and religious hate crimes may be due to higher levels that follow specific highly publicised incidents or ‘trigger’ events, such as the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013. Monthly monitoring of race and religious hate crimes by the Home Office shows spikes following a number of events over the last couple of years:

9.7. The increased level of reported hate incidents in the wake of the EU referendum result – including violent attacks on Polish and other Eastern Europeans – might be another such spike, with perpetrators feeling emboldened by the outcome. In the week following the referendum, online reporting site True Vision received reports of 331 hate crime incidents, in comparison with a weekly average of 63 reports, although it is important to note that this is just one reporting mechanism. National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) data showed that, in the last two weeks of June 2016, 3,192 hate crimes and incidents were reported to police forces across England, Wales and Northern Ireland, an increase of 1,031 compared with the same period in 2015. This fell to 3,001 hate crimes and incidents in the first two weeks of July 2016 but was 20% higher than the equivalent period last year. The main type of offence across both periods was violence against the person - chiefly harassment, common assault and other violence. It is difficult to ascertain how far the increase in reported incidents is due to an increase in incidents as opposed to an increase in reporting: the NPCC emphasise that forces have been monitoring and managing hate crime more robustly since the Paris attacks of 2015; and it is likely that media coverage of hate crime would similarly lead to greater awareness and increased reporting.

**Anti-Muslim hate crime**

9.8. Tell MAMA, a confidential third-party reporting service for individuals who experience anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes, reported a 200% increase
in offline Islamophobic incidents in 2015. They found that 61% of all recordable victims were female, and 75% of female victims were visibly Muslim, concluding that visibility through the hijab and niqab play a role in the targeting of the individual. Where the gender and ethnicity of the perpetrator were known, 76% were male and 89% were white. The three most common places where attacks occurred were public areas (26%), the transport network (20%), and places of business (12%).

9.9. Research evidence (Pew, 2008; Change Institute, 2009; DCLG, 2011) points to increasing negativity towards Muslims and Islam after 2001. Though the reasons behind this increase are complex and difficult to unpick, academic commentators suggest the growing anti-Muslim sentiment has been associated with wider public feelings of fear and anxiety (Bleich, 2011) and linked to a perceived or symbolic threat of conflict between Muslim and British/Western culture (Alam and Husband, 2013).

Anti-Semitic hate crime

9.10. The Community Security Trust (CST), a charity that monitors anti-Semitism and provides security for the Jewish community in Britain, recorded 557 anti-Semitic incidents across the UK from January to June 2016, which represented an 11% increase on the same period in 2015, and the second highest incident total CST has ever recorded for this period. According to CST, the number of anti-Semitic incidents has remained at a relatively high level since summer 2014, when the UK saw a large spike in incidents in relation to the conflict in Israel and Gaza. Of the total 557 incidents, 79% were recorded in Greater London and Greater Manchester, areas with the two biggest Jewish communities in the UK. While the 379 anti-Semitic incidents recorded in Greater London represented a 62% increase on the same period in 2015, the 62 anti-Semitic incidents recorded in Greater Manchester represents a fall of 54%. The data also shows that:

- In contrast to anti-Muslim incidents, where CST received a description of the gender of the victim, the majority were male (64% of such cases), while 27% were female and 9% mixed-gender groups.

- In cases where the age of the victim was described to the CST, 21% were believed to be minors.

- Where CST received a description of the offender, 84% were reported to be male, 54% were described as White – north European, 5% as White – south European, 20% south Asian, 13% Black, 7% Arab or north African, and 1% as east or south east Asian.
Sectarian violence

9.11. In addition to abhorrent teachings about homosexuality, the place of women in society, anti-Semitic views and intolerance towards apostates, tensions between different ethnicities and religious sects are also evident in some communities. Tell MAMA reports\(^\text{294}\) that the number of cases of abuse against minority sects, particularly the Ahmadis, has increased over the past five years.

9.12. In March 2016, Glasgow shopkeeper Asad Shah was attacked and killed at his premises. Mr Shah was an Ahmadi; an Islamic movement that arose in Northern India and recognises its founder Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. Ahmadis face persecution in many Muslim countries for this belief, particularly in Pakistan, where the group cannot legally identify as Muslim and are subject to protests, arrest and violent attack. A Glasgow-based Human Rights lawyer called for unity in Scotland’s Muslim community\(^\text{295}\) following the events, but reported receiving death threats as a result, with abuse and hatred across social media.

In the case of shopkeeper Asad Shah’s murder, the perpetrator, Tanveer Ahmed, claimed that:

“this all happened for one reason and no other issues and no other intentions. Asad Shah disrespected the messenger of Islam the Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him. Mr Shah claimed to be a prophet.... If I had not done this, others would and there would have been more killing and violence in the world”\(^\text{296}\).

In Ahmed’s trial, at which he pleaded guilty, the prosecuting Advocate deputy said:

“the accused’s consistent and repeated account as to his motivation for murdering Asad Shah was that Shah claimed to be a prophet, which so offended his feelings and his faith that he had to kill him.”\(^\text{297}\)

The judge, concluding that he would face a very lengthy period of imprisonment, said:

“This was a truly despicable crime, motivated, it seems, by your sense of offence at a man’s expression of his religious beliefs, which differ from yours. Let me be clear - there’s no justification whatsoever for what you did.”\(^\text{298}\)
9.13. Such intolerance is in no way restricted to Islam. Many British residents are acutely aware of the ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland, which is entangled in sectarian divisions between Catholicism and Protestantism. While we do not deal with the conflict in Northern Ireland in this report, it is hardly possible to discuss Islamic sectarian violence without noting the long running impact of Catholic-Protestant tension throughout the last decades of the 20th Century and the potential to learn lessons from it.

9.14. This tension remains present in many communities across Great Britain. Scotland in particular remains affected by the mark of sectarianism, with 299 charges in 2015-16 brought against people for Religiously Aggravated Offences against Roman Catholics, and 141 against Protestants. The majority of these charges related to ‘threatening or abusive behaviour’ against both groups, although 26 assaults were also recorded – 20 against Catholics and 6 against Protestants.

9.15. The Scottish Social Attitudes survey 2014 highlighted that 88% of 1,500 respondents believed sectarianism to be a problem in Scotland, 54% and 41% said that Catholics and Protestants (respectively) are the subject of at least ‘some’ prejudice.
Extremism

9.16. Extremism is a subjective concept, defined in a number of ways. It is generally taken to mean the holding of an extreme view or taking an extreme action, usually associated with a political or religious ideology, which is at odds with the views of mainstream society. Extremist views will often be seen as uncompromising or intolerant, while extremist actions (or tactics) can be violent and non-violent.

9.17. In her book, The Battle for British Islam, Sara Khan defines extremists as including any who incite violence, hatred or discrimination for political, religious or ideological causes. She goes on to say that this can often include undermining the rule of law and democracy, that extremism is not just about violence, and that in the twenty-first century, universal human rights and norms should be the means by which we judge extremism.

9.18. The Government has defined it in the 2015 Counter-Extremism Strategy. This states that extremism is:

“the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist.”

9.19. This definition attempts to make the concept of extremism less subjective; framing fundamental values, and exemplifying these, as the mainstream social norms against which extremist views or actions can be assessed. It is also an attempt to distinguish the wider concept of extremism from terrorism. While it is true that not all extremists are or will become violent or terrorist, it is the case that all terrorists are extremists. The public and news media do not necessarily understand or make any distinctions between these terms.

9.20. During the course of this review, there have been a number of terrorist attacks across the world, including those in Paris, Brussels and Baghdad. Additionally, more than 800 British citizens, including a growing number of women and girls, have chosen to travel to territory in Syria and Iraq controlled by the so-called Islamic State (or Da’esh). Attacks in non-European countries have tended to result in higher numbers of casualties and many victims have been Muslims. While all loss of life is a tragedy to be mourned, the proximity of attacks on mainland Europe have brought home to British citizens the stark reality and likelihood of such attacks happening again on our own soil and are likely to have contributed to increased public concern about terrorism, and anxiety and mistrust between communities.
9.21. Extremist organisations exist in many forms in Britain and maintain significant support across the country, promoting divisive, supremacist and inflammatory narratives. In Britain today, the most significant and popular extremist ideologies are those of Islamist extremists and the far right wing.

9.22. The most well documented harm associated with extremism (both Islamist and extreme right wing), is the widespread promulgation of racist, discriminatory and intolerant material, which is judged to foment social tensions and encourage isolationism, including the view that Muslims cannot reconcile their British and Muslim identities. The academic evidence suggests a large proportion of hate crimes are related to extremism, but the relationship is not well understood.

9.23. There is a substantial network of political Islamist groups – often describing themselves as advocacy and human rights organisations – which have developed and promoted narratives and a sense of grievance that attempt to undermine Western values and, by frequently accusing the state of persecuting Muslims and the Islamic faith, have sought to set Muslim citizens apart from the rest of society.

9.24. Frequently funded through individual charitable donations, these groups’ business model is based on presenting a picture of persecution and oppression of Muslims in Britain, with a heavy-handed state blamed for all forms of inequality or obstacles faced by Muslims. Their messages push an extremist narrative that the West and the UK Government are systematically trying to subjugate and harm Muslims, establishing a security state that needs to be opposed at all costs.

9.25. There are a number of extreme right wing groups whose activity consists of demonstrations, invasive marches in areas with high concentrations of Muslim communities and significant social media activity. Social media activity in particular, for example the use of videos and memes to attract large numbers of ‘likes’ and re-postings, can create a sense of wider public support than turn-out at demonstrations and marches would suggest exists. While there remain neo-Nazi groups pushing anti-Semitic messages, the focus of far right groups in recent years has been much more directed against Islam and Muslims in Britain, where twenty to thirty years ago their messages were more generally White supremacist and directed at Black and Minority Ethnic communities on grounds of race.

9.26. It is a sad irony that Islamist and far right extremist groups are seen to be diametrically opposed – but in fact advocate the same corrosive message. This is the message that Islam and life in the West are incompatible. The existence and interaction of Islamist and far right extremists is creating a vicious circle with each side’s hate feeding off the other and reinforcing tensions between communities, pushing them further and further apart, as exemplified in the following diagram:
9.27. While we believe from all that we have seen during this review that the argument for a stronger approach to integration is justified on a much wider basis than counter-extremism – with very significant social and economic benefits for the nation – we also believe a more integrated society would reduce hate crime and sectarian violence and improve our resilience in responding to extremism and terrorism. Conversely, the less integrated we are, the more vulnerable communities and individuals become to the divisive narratives and agendas of extremists and, potentially, the greater the likelihood becomes of hate crime, sectarian violence and terrorist attacks.
10. Past and current approaches

Chapter Summary

- There have been numerous studies and reports on community cohesion over the last fifteen years but a failure to implement practical actions with sufficient consistency, persistence or force to keep pace with the rate of change in communities over that period.

- Not enough has been done to help the hardest to reach and improve socio-economic exclusion, nor to address the concerns of ‘host communities’ in areas experiencing the highest levels of immigration and change.

- Many well-meaning projects have been supported in recent years but these have not been sufficient to tackle the very serious issues we face as a nation.

- Attempts to address concerns about the Prevent programme securitising community cohesion have been positive, and the police are delivering ground-breaking improvements to keep communities safe.

- But the initial criticisms of the programme have not gone away, an anti-Prevent lobby has been successful in stirring up anxiety and concern without offering any constructive alternatives to protect communities, and even some civic leaders have been too ready to condemn the programme.

- Training and other support for teachers and other front-line workers is important in better equipping them to implement Prevent alongside their wider responsibilities for safeguarding children from all types of harm and building their resilience.

- There are lessons to be shared and learned with other countries on approaches to integration and community cohesion.
Community cohesion

10.1  Few of the issues raised in this report are new. Much of this is ground that has been covered before – often repeatedly – by previous commissions of inquiry, their official reports, government responses to them and departmental strategies that have been published as a result. We have reviewed a selection of these and they are at Annex A. They make sorry reading as the vast majority – if not all – of these findings, recommendations and concerns could be or are echoed in this report.

10.2. But the awareness of many of these issues and subsequent failures to address them arguably makes the situation worse, not better. The problem has not been a lack of knowledge but a failure of collective, consistent and persistent will to do something about it or give it the priority it deserves at both a national and local level. The work that has been done has often been piecemeal and lacked a clear evidence base or programme of evaluation.

10.3. This is not a criticism directed at any particular administration. To varying degrees all have been at least in part responsible for underestimating the emphasis and priority needed on integration to match the pace of change in our communities. It is clear that, despite the best efforts of some well-intentioned individuals and organisations, successive governments have simply got their approach to cohesion, as well as their immigration policies, wrong, with a long-standing failure to manage the settlement of migrants a particular concern.

10.4. Not enough has been done to help the hardest to reach and most isolated communities, nor to address the concerns of existing residents or ‘the host community’ in areas experiencing high levels of population change, either through bespoke projects and programmes or the mainstreaming of integration objectives into public services.

10.5. The first explicit community cohesion policy arose under the then Labour Government, following the riots across a number of Northern towns and cities at the start of the Millennium and the subsequent reports by Ted Cantle and others. Initial pathfinder projects were established by the Home Office and these developed, later under the Department for Communities and Local Government, into a broader framework which included guidance and funding for local authorities and others, with a national Public Service Agreement target and an ability for local authorities to prioritise and receive extra funding.
for community cohesion work through Local Area Agreements negotiated with central Government.

10.6. Progress against the Public Service Agreement target and Local Area Agreements was assessed through attitudinal surveys that measured changes in the extent to which people from different backgrounds felt they got on well together. Projects on the ground tended to focus on community engagement and empowerment, bringing young people together, for example, or on activities that encouraged mixing and dialogue between people from different faith backgrounds. Although in general the attitudinal indicators of community cohesion were moving in a positive direction, evaluation work was not able to demonstrate that such movement was the direct result either of the overall strategy or of local projects.

10.7. Since 2010, cohesion policy has largely been squeezed out, with Government only willing to act exceptionally over the issue, falling well below its stated ambition to “do more than any other government before us to promote integration”\textsuperscript{302}. The Coalition Government’s approach in 2012 was set out in its main integration policy document ‘Creating the conditions for integration’\textsuperscript{303} which framed its approach in an even more ‘localist’ context, with Government action described explicitly as “exceptional” or delivered through mainstream policies. Government’s policy consisted of a relatively small pot of funding going towards small-scale exemplar projects such as inter-faith dialogue, training curry chefs or cross community social events such as the ‘Big Lunch’ and ‘Our Big Gig’. This has been described to us as amounting to “saris, samosas and steel drums” for the already well-intentioned. These are worthy and enjoyable projects which should continue but they are not enough on their own, nor should they be a substitute for tackling difficult issues.

10.8. There appears to have been little strategic thought behind the up to £14 million per year budget\textsuperscript{304}. For example, in 2011-12 and 2012-13 the Department for Communities and Local Government was spending more on supporting the Cornish language than the English language – although it subsequently invested significantly larger amounts for community based English language teaching in 2013-14 and 2014-15.

10.9. Concerns were also expressed to the review team that much of the work avoided addressing the more challenging integration issues. It was put to us that some of the interfaith work not only avoided the difficult conversations that were needed but had also provided an unchallenged platform or legitimacy to those whose views and values actually undermined cohesion. We were told that the strong desire of some in the inter-faith community to be inclusive had left some initiatives feeling soft in their impact: “like preaching to the converted” and a “coalition of the willing”. It was said that they had been unable to reach more troublesome ends of different faiths and seemed unwilling to challenge regressive and intolerant practices.
10.10. Submissions to the review, including from several academic experts and institutions we spoke to, pointed to social mobility and educational and employment opportunity as being the biggest single drivers of successful integration. As well as providing economic advantages, social mobility also provides knock-on benefits such as reducing grievances, heightening a sense of belonging to a country or community and increasing geographic mobility and social mixing too. Yet there was very little attention paid to these factors in previous Governments’ integration or cohesion strategies.

10.11. While there is no explicit community cohesion duty on public authorities (apart from schools) there is an expectation in equalities legislation that they will foster good relations and have due regard to the need to, among other things: eliminate discrimination, harassment, and victimisation; advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; and foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it. No attention seems to be paid to the extent to which this obligation is being fulfilled by public authorities.

10.12. Government policy in this space has, to date, lacked the ambition and – more importantly – the understanding necessary to make significant change in these areas. Well-intentioned but generalised approaches can focus too greatly on headline figures and risk leaving behind harder-to-help groups.

Migration, integration and community cohesion

10.13. Various initiatives have sought to provide central dialogue with and support for areas experiencing the impact of rapid and/or high levels of migration. The Labour Government in 2007 introduced a Migration Impacts Forum (MIF) designed to listen to local views before making further national policy decisions on immigration. Alongside this a new Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) was established in 2007 to provide independent evidence as a non-departmental public body on migration issues such as skilled labour shortages. While the MIF was seen by some who submitted evidence to the review as too easily captured and dominated by vested interest groups, the MAC was generally considered to be more robust and retains its role today.

10.14. From 2009 to 2011, £70 million was also allocated to a Migration Impact Fund designed to mitigate the pressures of migration on local public services, funded by a £50 levy on migration visas. Local activities and spending included initiatives on registering migrants with GPs to divert pressure away from hospitals, improving private sector housing provision, English language teaching and fire safety...
and prevention advice. However, no national evaluation of the Fund was completed and the Fund was ended (although the £50 levy was not) by the Coalition Government in the 2010 Spending Review.

10.15. In 2009, the then Labour Government had also sought to address the specific issue of the dislocation and underachievement of poor white working class communities who had shown a susceptibility to far right causes and beliefs in response to local immigration and other changes. It launched a time-limited £12 million Connecting Communities programme to reinvigorate and connect with those neighbourhoods feeling the most acute pressure from the recession. The programme used data to identify neighbourhoods most at risk of poor cohesion and employed coordinators to develop local plans for employment and economic opportunities. Evaluations of four of these areas suggested that unlocking this capacity was possible but that it required active and sustained support and should not rely too heavily on voluntary activity in areas where there are lower levels of social capital at the outset.

10.16. The current Conservative Government is committed to implementing its 2015 election manifesto pledge:

“To help communities experiencing high and unexpected volumes of immigration, we will introduce a new Controlling Migration Fund to ease pressures on services and to pay for additional immigration enforcement.”

10.17. The new fund has been confirmed recently but the challenge will be whether this can be delivered in a way that matches the scale and pace of the impacts being felt in those communities most affected by recent and on-going immigration. That is a wider challenge we also face in any future programme to improve cohesion, integration and opportunity, set against the scale and pace of change in our communities.
Prevent

10.18. Prevent was introduced following the July 7, 2005 attacks on London as part of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST\(^{309}\) and is aimed at stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It was not explicitly a programme to improve community cohesion and it has been controversial.

10.19. In its early guise the programme was run by the Home Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government. The DCLG-led element focussed on the role of communities in preventing violent extremism and set out a programme of work under Prevent that intended to focus on strengthening local partnerships, empowering Muslim women and young people, and improving faith capacity and understanding.

10.20. In 2011 the Coalition Government undertook a review of Prevent which resulted in a decision to have a more focussed programme aimed solely at preventing terrorism and led by the Home Office, while DCLG would separately concentrate on support for integration (discussed earlier in this chapter), so as not to confuse the two.

10.21. The 2011 Prevent Strategy argued that:

“Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy. But integration alone will not meet Prevent objectives. And Prevent must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past.”

10.22. The new approach to the Prevent programme aimed to:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;

- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and

- work with the public sector where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

10.23. In July 2015 the Government also introduced a statutory ‘Prevent duty’ for schools, colleges, universities, prisons, probation services, local authorities and health institutions. They are now under a legal obligation to “have due regard to the need to prevent people [in their care] being drawn into terrorism”. In the main this involves frontline staff in these sectors being aware of radicalisation as a safeguarding issue within their wider safeguarding responsibilities, with a duty to act appropriately on any concerns.
10.24. During the review, we saw a wide range of work being delivered under the Prevent programme, much of which was impressive and heartening. We were particularly impressed by the level of engagement of Prevent police officers with communities in several complex and sensitive areas. While the police appear to be further ahead of other agencies in developing this work, the recently introduced Prevent duty has increased the engagement of public sector bodies with Prevent and there are good examples of local staff across the public sector who are not only engaged but confident in delivering Prevent. They should be proud and unapologetic about the important work they do to keep us safe.

10.25. Positive achievements of the Prevent programme include:

- delivering 140 community projects in 2015-16, reaching more than 42,000 people;

- disrupting more than 150 attempted journeys to the Syria/Iraq conflict area, including action by the family courts, which protected approximately 50 children (from around 20 families) from being taken to the conflict area in 2015;

- providing support through the Channel programme on a voluntary basis for more than 1,000 people considered most at risk of radicalisation since 2012, with the vast majority of the individuals leaving the programme presenting no further terrorist related threat;

- working with industry to remove 200,000 pieces of online terrorist material since February 2010;

- supporting civil society groups to deliver counter-narrative campaigns, generating 36 million online viewings since January 2014; and

- raising awareness of radicalisation through training of more than 550,000 front line staff since 2011, including teachers and health professionals.

10.26. Most of the teachers we spoke to in three different areas we visited had a positive perspective on the training around radicalisation. They highlighted the importance of understanding Prevent in the context of safeguarding and resilience-building – and noted the beneficial support and training staff had received.

10.27. Many mentioned the importance of partnership working, especially the need for the police to share information so that realistic risk assessments could be drawn up. Some of the issues raised in discussions with teachers felt symptomatic of the development and implementation of Prevent through a broader range of public services that are new to this work, for some this included the desire for further training.
10.28. However, we also found that in some cases the only engagement some predominantly Muslim communities felt like they had had with the Government was through their interaction with Prevent, or as part of broader counter-extremism efforts. And a few community based organisations said they felt they could only get funding for their work if they said it was related to Prevent - even if the benefits were much wider and preventing terrorism was not the main driver for their work.

10.29. The commencement of the Prevent Duty last summer has also seen the increasing prominence of an active lobby opposed to Prevent. In some cases, local leaders have been too ready to complain about Prevent without any real understanding of its work or knowledge of its community-based projects and partnership working with local people on the ground.

10.30. More worrying are some elements of this lobby who appear to have an agenda to turn British Muslims against Britain. These individuals and organisations claim to be advocating on behalf of Muslims and protecting them from discrimination. We repeatedly invited people we met who belonged to these groups, or who held similarly critical views, to suggest alternative approaches. We got nothing in return.

10.31. Opponents of the programme do not appear to have any constructive alternative proposals for tackling terrorism and the effect they are having is not to improve the life chances of British Muslims but to make them feel even more alienated and isolated – and therefore more vulnerable to extremists and radicalisers.

10.32. In order to undermine Prevent these opponents have deliberately distorted and exaggerated cases by purporting to show that teachers have acted disproportionately. Media coverage has often echoed and distorted these criticisms.

10.33. One such case, dubbed the “terrorist house case”, gained widespread media coverage in January 2016. Lancashire Police were reported in the media to have interviewed a pupil referred to Prevent after he had simply misspelled “terraced house” as “terrorist house” in a school creative writing exercise, imagining the life of a fictional character. In fact, the pupil had also written that “I hate it when my uncle hits me”. The teacher quite appropriately and acting in the best interests of the child, therefore raised a concern. A social worker and neighbourhood police officer then visited the family and concluded that no further action was required. No referral to Prevent was ever made. No Prevent officers were involved and Lancashire Police rightly maintain that they and the school acted responsibly and proportionately in looking into a number of concerns, using a low key and sensitive approach.

10.34. In an earlier case in May 2015, the parents of a 14 year-old boy started legal action after their son was questioned following a French lesson in which he had been talking about “eco-terrorists” – something he said he had learned about at a debating
society meeting. After the lesson, he was reported to have been taken out of class and asked whether he was affiliated with Isis. His parents sought a Judicial Review, saying he had been discriminated against because of his Muslim background.

10.35. In fact the pupil was never referred to Prevent or Child Safeguarding (nor removed from the class), and there was no police involvement. A concern about the boy was correctly raised by a teacher to the school’s Designated Child Protection Officer, who spoke to the pupil in an interview two days later which included asking whether he had “heard of Isis”.

10.36. The Judicial Review was thrown out of court as totally without merit. It had sought to challenge the lawfulness and rationality of the guidance around the Keeping Children Safe in Education policy and the Prevent duty, and made no challenge about the way the pupil was treated. The Judge who dismissed the review in the High Court said:

“In so far as the core proposition is that for the first interested party to have a strategy at all that seeks to protect schoolchildren from terrorist propaganda and ideology is unlawful because it is more likely that concern may be directed to children of Muslim faith, I consider that proposition is wholly unarguable where the context is present concern about the effect of the propaganda activity of extremists who are purportedly Islamic in faith.”

10.37. The Government needs to be more robust in countering false perceptions and to guard against allowing only critical narratives to dominate in the media. As Peter Neumann, from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at Kings College London, has said:

“If they highlighted successful cases too, [then Prevent] would be more plausible in the eyes of the community concerned.”

10.38. The Prevent programme is an important part of the Government’s wider counter-terrorism strategy and needs to build on existing work in engaging communities to gain their trust and support and in giving frontline workers the capability and support they need to deliver effectively. There has recently been an expansion in the network of voluntary sector and community projects being funded through Prevent. This greater reach and impact is to be welcomed. But it would benefit from being matched with an increase in the profile of these programmes through greater transparency and publicity; the Government needs to do significantly more to achieve this.

10.39. Prevent is mainstreaming the aim of safeguarding potentially vulnerable people, and allows those involved in its delivery to correctly focus their attention and further work with individuals where it is needed most - on the very small minority who are at risk of radicalisation or who have already been radicalised. But the programme casts a wider shadow. In part, this is because of the absence of any work on integration on a similar scale. It is also partly the result of a vocal lobby whose aim is to portray the programme at its worst. But the absence of sufficiently consistent and coherent communication by Government of the aims and benefits of the programme has also allowed confusion and resentment to persist.
International dimensions and experience

10.40. In cities around the world, promoting integration and countering extremism is high on the agenda. There is much to learn, share and analyse in issues faced and approaches being taken. Not least in Europe, where migration influxes and recent terrorist attacks carried out in Europe by European nationals are shaping the debate on integration with a polarising impact on the political discourse.

10.41. Across Europe, there is a long history of established migration flows from former colonial countries. The issues we are facing in the UK on segregation and integration are not unique to us and are being faced in other countries in Europe. We have set out in Annex B a summary of a rapid assessment of integration across a number of European countries, conducted with the assistance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and our Embassies in the countries considered.

10.42. There is strong evidence in overseas contexts that the drivers of extremism correlate to political and social exclusion and marginalisation. Tackling extremism requires promoting inclusion and opportunity, as well as tackling divides on ethnic and religious fault lines.

10.43. We live in an inter-connected world, with inter-connected populations. Communities in the UK are umbilically linked through cultural, economic, social and demographic links to different parts of the world. What happens overseas impacts directly on UK communities, and vice-versa. We are unlikely to achieve integration in the UK if our approach does not reflect how people move across national boundaries and how their attitudes are influenced by others far beyond their home locations.

10.44. These international links bring enormous benefit to the UK and contribute to the richness and diversity of British society. However, they also present challenges to community cohesion and integration in the UK, such as where societal norms overseas run counter to British values. Whether this relates to patriarchal norms which discourage the role and achievement of women in society, discrimination against minorities or social harms and practices, we need to better understand these links and the challenge they present to integration and community cohesion in the UK. We also need to understand the extent to which values and practices from countries of origin can be drivers for insularity or barriers to integration in the UK.

10.45. This warrants further analysis with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
11. Leadership

Chapter Summary

- Too many leaders in public and faith institutions and in communities have allowed diversity and difference to become separatism and segregation that has divided communities.

- Whether the drivers for this have been fear of accusations of racism, of wanting to be welcoming, tolerant and accepting of foreign cultures, or concerns about disrepute or loss of support, the results have been more harmful than good.

- While these issues may sometimes attract attention as trivial or even ridiculous cases of officialdom being overly politically correct, they can soon turn into harmful neglect or even legitimisation of very serious issues, like child sexual exploitation.

- Some politicians at a local and national level have been guilty of being too willing to turn a blind eye to practices that, at best, exacerbate inequality and hold back community integration.

- The processes for formal intervention in local government are not sophisticated enough to deal with these issues.

- Representation among our political leaders does not reflect our communities sufficiently to signal a good level of integration and selection processes feel biased, particularly against women from minority communities.

- More needs to be done to restore confidence in public and political leadership.
Leadership in communities and institutions

11.1. Many of the problems described in this and the preceding chapters have been allowed to happen. Too many people in communities and in public and faith institutions, often with good intentions, have turned a blind eye to practices that, at best, are denying individuals – and all too often children and women – their basic rights. Rights that have been hard-fought for and won over the years.

11.2. There are a variety of potential underlying reasons for denial, turning a blind eye and, in some cases, condoning unacceptable behaviours and practices, rather than confronting, challenging and stopping them. None are acceptable.

11.3. It might be that, within some communities, people are afraid to expose problems because they are worried about the impact it will have on others’ perceptions of their community; that it will feed prejudice and hate; or that the media will portray the issues unsympathetically and in ways that bring everyone in the community into disrepute.

11.4. We heard numerous claims that some communities preferred to deal with such issues themselves, privately and did not want to ‘wash their dirty linen in public’. But from what we have seen and heard, this too often results in problems being ignored or swept under the carpet. And in a society where the rule of law is a fundamental and shared value, it is plainly wrong to try to keep illegal acts out of the criminal justice process.

11.5. It might be that, within public institutions, leaders may lack the confidence to call out harmful practices or behaviours because they have become excessively concerned about being culturally sensitive to different values so as not to offend or alienate minority communities; or they may fear crossing a line into racial or religious discrimination and not feel well enough informed to make the right distinctions. Or it may be that ignoring and not confronting such problems is the easier path to take. But that is a very narrow and short term perspective.

11.6. All too often, the desires of public institutions to respect difference have turned into statements and actions that are open to ridicule and cause offence – and unnecessary expense – to the wider community. There is evidence that even minority communities believe public institutions are going over the top in some instances.

11.7. Some faith leaders have condoned or even promoted interpretations of their faiths that have perpetuated discrimination against women, people of different sexuality and beliefs, and promoted narrow and in some cases harmful educational environments for children.
11.8. There are numerous examples which were brought to our attention during the review of local authorities, agencies and individuals bending over backwards to ‘accommodate’ people from minority faiths or ‘different’ cultures:

- A head teacher took down a poster aimed at protecting and supporting the reporting of Forced Marriage concerns, for fear of it upsetting the local community.

- Towards the end of 2015, several unions criticised Government proposals designed to ensure that public sector workers in public-facing roles could speak fluent English.

11.9. Perhaps more worryingly, among local political leadership, it might be that difficult issues are ignored because political leaders are focussing on what they think their communities want to hear, rather than what they believe is right, for fear of losing the support of a particular community. That is an approach that lacks the courage and integrity people want from their representatives and which are reflected in the Nolan principles of public life; and in the worst cases can cause significant harm.

11.10. Local authorities represent the backbone of British democracy. Yet across the country, examples of councillors and officials bending rules that perpetuate discrimination and division have been disappointingly easy to find.

11.11. Ironically, in many cases authorities are acting in a misguided but well-meaning desire to support and respect cultural differences. The inability to consider the consequences of such actions has caused a great deal of harm and helped to reinforce the perception of difference and division between certain groups. Those who do this are not necessarily helping the communities they seek to protect and, in some cases, have brought them into disrepute and greater risk of harm.

**Child sexual exploitation**

11.12. The case of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham was a catastrophic example of authorities turning a blind eye to harm in order to avoid the need to confront a particular community. The town saw upwards of 1,400 children sexually exploited over more than a decade; groomed by predominantly Pakistani-heritage men offering drugs, alcohol and attention, followed by sexual abuse and mental and physical coercion.

11.13. Despite the widespread knowledge of this practice across the local authority, statutory partnerships and many local residents, those with the...
power to act chose to defend ‘community cohesion’ and political correctness over the vulnerable children in their care. Destroying evidence of perpetrator ethnicity and shutting down services was preferable to confronting criminals from a minority ethnic community; such was their fear of offending local cultural sensitivities.

Legitimising extreme views

11.14. Throughout the review we have encountered repeated examples of regressive, discriminatory and harmful attitudes and behaviours being sanctioned by authorities in the name of tolerance and multiculturalism.

11.15. In a northern town, the council supported and funded the work of two religious representatives, one Muslim and one Christian. These men very openly held unacceptable views, including that:

- All information outlets from the BBC to the UN demonstrated Islamophobia, and that accurate information could be obtained only from religious scholars. This included promoting the belief that ISIL were not a terrorist organisation, and that al-Baghdadi (the ISIL leader) was being misrepresented.

- Religious practice held primacy over rights, equality, and common sense; the Imam boasting the ability to marry and divorce people at a moment’s notice without registration, and both men actively petitioning a non-faith school to provide for Friday prayers and permit staff to wear niqabs.

11.16. Members of a major political party in the North West and West Midlands have been accused of allowing political meetings to be organised on a gender-segregated basis. This promotion and legitimisation of division between the sexes was denied at the time, but is undermined by photographs of the audience and statements on event advertisements.

11.17. A leading local politician in the West Midlands was allowed to continue in post, unquestioned, after making the following (recorded) statement in January 2016:

“It is ridiculous that the Government is saying Muslims are becoming radicalised. David Cameron says 500 people have gone to Syria to become radicalised, but where is the evidence? And out of a population of three million Muslims in the UK, what kind of percentage is that?”

11.18. He eventually apologised for his words, but only after external pressure led the council to address the issue several days later.

Intervention

11.19. Under the current system, there is very little recourse to address inappropriate behaviour by councillors; even where this is seen to be damaging or divisive. Councillor conduct is largely self-regulated, with local authorities producing their own codes of conduct (based on the broad...
Nolan Principles of Public Life), with no external checks on quality or compliance. An “independent person” must be involved in creating the code, and resolving related disputes – but there are no external checks on how “independent” this person is (only stipulation in legislation that they should not be an employee of, or related to an employee of the council).321 322

11.20. There are processes for registering complaints, and pressure can be applied to councillors to change their behaviour. However, such processes are far from robust:

- Private individuals can raise complaints with the council’s internal Monitoring Officer; though in several authorities this involves their identity being revealed to the subject of the complaint, as a matter of course, in all but exceptional circumstances323.

- Should this internal complaints system prove unsatisfactory, concerns can be raised with the Local Government Ombudsman, who can investigate, with full powers to obtain information and documents. Their findings and recommendations will be published, but they have no powers to require the council in question to accept them324.

- Political parties can put pressure on councillors to step down, can remove them from committees and can expel them from the party. They do not, however, have the power to force a resignation from the council325.

11.21. Ultimately, there are very few points at which a councillor can be removed from their post. These are:

- via the ballot box (every 4 years);

- if they receive a custodial sentence for three months or more within the UK;

- if they become employed by the local authority or its contracted services; and

- if they become bankrupt326.

11.22. The requirement for the sentence to be custodial is being reviewed, in light of the sentencing of a Parish councillor in the North West327. The councillor was found guilty of possessing indecent images of children and sentenced to a 28-day curfew between 8am and 4pm, completion of a treatment programme for sexual offenders, signing of the sex offenders register, and Probation Service supervision for the next two years. He refused to resign from his position on the council, saying it was his “responsibility” to continue serving his constituents. The council was unable to remove him due to his sentence being non-custodial, and despite multiple requests from other councillors for him to resign, he is permitted to continue to hold office until the next election328.

11.23. Central Government intervention is available where there are serious concerns about councillor conduct. Central Government can intervene where the local authority is deemed to be failing to effectively provide statutory services. It has
no power to intervene on councillor behaviour directly – but can do so where this behaviour negatively affects the running of services or governance of an authority to the point that the authority is not securing "continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness."\(^{329}330\).

11.24. Should this happen, Government has the power to investigate a local authority if it believes it may fail in its Best Value duty, to direct it to take any necessary actions to reach compliance with the law, and/or for the Secretary of State or their nominated person to take over one of the local authority’s functions.

11.25. Central Government has used such power only four times since 2010:

- imposition of Commissioners in Doncaster following both a children’s services inspection and corporate governance inspection, both finding service failures and a breakdown in the relationship between the Mayor, councillors and council officers;

- imposition of Commissioners in Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council following the Sexual Exploitation of an estimated 1,400 children\(^{331}\);

- imposition of Commissioners in Tower Hamlets following evidence of widespread corruption in governance and financial management\(^{332}\); and

- a non-statutory Senior External Review in Birmingham after extensive patterns of nepotism, bullying and poor governance were uncovered in Birmingham schools by the ‘Trojan Horse’ investigation\(^{333}\).

11.26. Both statutory inspection and intervention and Senior External Reviews are used rarely and only in extreme circumstances; they are a very public intrusion into local democracy. But that leaves a void between what can feel like ineffective action locally on serious misconduct, and exceptional intervention in cases of widespread and serious failure.
Representation

11.27. Civic engagement and representation are further indicators of integration and vary between different ethnic groups across Britain. The evidence we have reviewed shows a mixed picture, perhaps suggesting lower levels of ethnic minority engagement in formal politics and more equal engagement in wider civic engagement (for example volunteering or taking part in consultation). It is interesting that – but not clear why – Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are slightly better represented in local decision-making bodies than other ethnic groups, but feel least able to influence local decisions; while Black ethnic groups have lower levels of civic engagement generally but feel most able to influence local decisions.

11.28. We have discussed the gender imbalance in politics earlier in this report. It is also evident that ethnic minorities, and especially Black groups, are under-represented in the UK Parliament and among local authority councillors. While nearly 20% of the population in England and Wales are from a minority ethnic background:

- only 6% of MPs (41 of the 650 MPs in 2015) were from minority ethnic groups – up from 4.2% in 2010;
- just 4% of councillors were from ethnic minority backgrounds in 2013 (0.6% were of Black ethnicity and 2.8% were of Asian ethnicity);
- in Wales, just 0.8% of councillors had an ethnic minority background when data was last recorded in 2004; and
- in Scotland, the percentage of non-white councillors, at 3.4%, was closest to its population.

11.29. Issues of block voting within some communities were regularly brought to our attention. The most prominent example of this was through the ‘Biraderi’ (brotherhood or clan) networks in Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic communities, which are used to commit multiple votes to one cause through a single – male – leader. The independent research organisation, Democratic Audit, based at the London School of Economics, noted in 2015 that Biraderi networks had been encouraged to carry out the local campaigning responsibilities of political parties who have assumed they can mobilise an Asian block vote. They went on to say that:
• Biraderi politics can also lead to electoral fraud where the line between votes cast on the basis of community and ethnic loyalties and vote coercion becomes blurred;

• Biraderis are hierarchical and patriarchal, led by male elders, which leaves little space for the views and interests of women and young people who are particularly vulnerable to pressure; and that

• In their role as middle-men, elders may coerce members of their Biraderi to vote for their favoured candidate.

11.30. The Electoral Commission in response to this research and in discussions with the review team noted the prevalent perception of electoral fraud in Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic communities and that such voting networks exist in a number of places. However, they held back from reaching any firm conclusions or making hard-edged recommendations to tackle this. Instead, they concluded that such practice was not universal and that vulnerability factors in relation to electoral fraud could exist anywhere. They argued that low levels of awareness about what constitutes electoral fraud, as well as low levels of literacy and lack of English skills, could exacerbate these vulnerabilities. In the light of points made to us during the review, their own research and the High Court Decision in relation to the 2014 Tower Hamlets Mayoral Election, we were surprised that the Electoral Commission had not gone further on this, while noting their point that they and other bodies (such as the police, Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers) have different roles in relation to electoral fraud.

The High Court Decision in relation to the 2014 Tower Hamlets Mayoral Election\(^\text{342}\) included the conclusion that:

“Events of recent months in contexts very different from electoral malpractice have starkly demonstrated what happens when those in authority are afraid to confront wrongdoing for fear of allegations of racism and Islamophobia. Even in the multicultural society which is 21st century Britain, the law must be applied fairly and equally to everyone. Otherwise we are lost.”

11.31. We also heard repeated concerns that such networks were being used to block women attempting to stand as political candidates. In one of many examples, a female councillor in the North West of England said that she had to stand in a neighbouring town, as she would have been prevented from doing so in her own local authority. Her own council was made up entirely of male councillors, who took active steps to block female candidates from being elected. This extended even to setting up independent candidates to stand against her and dilute the vote. The councillor noted that opposition to female candidates was common; with many councils fielding only male councillors and men deciding the vote in many households. This was raised with us on many occasions...
by politicians at local and national levels. The Muslim Women’s Network UK also raised concerns about women being blocked by men from becoming councillors, calling for an inquiry into what they called the “systematic misogyny” they had witnessed in local authority councillors.

11.32. During the course of the review, an MP in the North of England raised concerns in the media that “clan loyalties” within parts of her community were resulting in women being blocked from political office. The MP complained of “shocking” levels of misogyny and reported discussions among fellow party members about looking for evidence to smear her character.

11.33. While some individual British politicians of Asian ethnicity have themselves raised concerns, national political parties seem to consider such activities outside of their concern, related only to local activists and beyond their capacity to control or police, and not in their interests to curtail where it is not obviously illegal or fraudulent, is bringing large numbers of votes for minimal effort and is considered acceptable practice locally. Instead, political parties’ responses to criticisms have focussed on their national policies and wider records in attracting women and ethnic minority candidates.

11.34. These are serious issues that further erode public trust and confidence in public and political leadership. Much more needs to be done to restore this trust and confidence and we need leaders in all public spheres to step up to the challenges posed in this review.
12. The future

Recommendations

12.1. This chapter sets out our initial recommendations to Government for a new programme to help improve integration and opportunity.

**Building local communities’ resilience in the towns and cities where the greatest challenges exist:**

Recommendation 1:

Central government should support a new programme to help improve community cohesion. This could back area-based plans and projects addressing the key priorities identified in this review. It would see targeted support provided for projects, ideally evidence-based, that would help build more resilient communities. The Government should agree a final list of project criteria but these should include:

- The promotion of English language;
- Emancipating marginalised groups of women;
- Raising employment outcomes among the most marginalised groups;
- Increasing participation of women in the labour market;
- Improving IT literacy among parents in segregated areas;
- Boosting out of school mixing between young people – including through sporting activity;
- Other programmes with a clear focus on reducing segregation identified with local areas.

Recommendation 2:

It is also vital that all local authorities are able to pick up and act upon signs that integration is breaking down at the earliest stage. **Central and local government should develop a list of indicators of a potential breakdown in integration.** These might include incidences of hate crime or deficiencies in English language. **Local authorities should collect this information regularly.**

Recommendation 3:

Drawing on the most effective approaches, **central government should work with local government to bring together and disseminate a toolkit of approaches which have seen success.**
Improving the integration of communities in Britain and establishing a set of values around which people from different backgrounds can unite:

Recommendation 4:

The promotion of British laws, history and values within the core curriculum in all schools would help build integration, tolerance, citizenship and resilience in our children. More weight should be attached to a British Values focus and syllabus in developing teaching skills and assessing schools performance.

Recommendation 5:

The Government should review how those on the visa routes most likely to settle permanently in the UK are given support on arrival. The Government should consider whether additional integration support should be provided immediately post arrival, and how clearer expectations on integration could be set, potentially in advance on application for a visa, so that those moving to the UK get off to the best start, and know their rights and obligations.

Recommendation 6:

The Government should also review the route to full British Citizenship, which is of huge national, cultural and symbolic value. The Government should look at what is required for British citizenship, as opposed to leave to remain, and separately consider an Oath of Integration with British Values and Society on arrival, rather than awaiting a final citizenship test.

Reducing economic exclusion, inequality and segregation in our most isolated and deprived communities and schools:

Recommendation 7:

The report notes how isolation can begin at a young age, with some children’s experience of school marked by segregation from wider British communities. The Government has included a social need criterion in the allocation of free schools funding and should now move to work with schools providers and local communities to encourage a range of school provision and projects to ensure that children from different communities learn alongside those from different backgrounds, perhaps purchasing sites in the areas of highest segregation in advance and encouraging Multi-Academy Trusts to have a diverse range of provision.

Recommendation 8:

The introduction of Universal Credit will bring a much wider range of people into contact with support in finding work for the first time. The Government should build on classes to tackle English language deficiencies with the development of classes
to tackle cultural barriers born out of segregation which are identified as a barrier to work, supporting both employment and integration goals.

Recommendation 9:

A shared language is fundamental to integrated societies. The Government should supporting further targeted English Language provision by making sufficient funding available for community-based English language classes, and through the adult skills budget for local authorities to prioritise English language where there is a need. It should also review whether community based and skills funded programmes are consistently reaching those who need them most, and whether they are sufficiently coordinated.

Recommendation 10:

Where we live can be both a cause and effect of isolation and segregation. The Government should work with local government to understand how housing and regeneration policies could improve or inhibit integration locally, and promote best practice approaches.

Recommendation 11:

It is extremely concerning that children can be excluded from mainstream education without sufficient checks on their wellbeing and integration. The Government should step up the safeguarding arrangements for children who are removed from mainstream education, and in particular those who do not commence mainstream schooling at all. All children outside mainstream education should be required to register with local authorities and local authorities duties’ to know where children are being educated should be increased. It should also consider the standards against which home education is judged to be clear that divisive practices are not acceptable in any setting. While every parent has the right to choose what is best for their child, local authorities must be satisfied that children are not put at risk. Ofsted and the Charity Commission should be resourced to support additional central and local government action to ensure the safeguarding of all children in mainstream and supplementary educational environments.

**Increasing standards of leadership and integrity in public office:**

Recommendation 12:

We expect the highest standards in all civic leaders in selflessness and integrity, so too we should expect all in public office to uphold the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect for and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs and for those without faith. The Government should work with the Committee for Standards in Public life to ensure these values are enshrined in the principles of public life, including a new oath for holders of public office.
Annex A

Past community cohesion reports and programmes

A1. Ted Cantle’s 2001 independent Community Cohesion Review Team report[^343] took a national perspective following the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham that year. It identified the problem of ‘parallel lives’ in some communities and called for:

- frank and honest public conversations;
- a rights and responsibilities agenda;
- strong local and localised leadership and communications;
- action to tackle the problem of mono-cultural funding and community facilities, ‘sweetheart deals’ and ‘back home’ politics; and
- action to promote inter-racial and inter-faith contact and understanding, including twinning between schools.

A2. Similarly Lord Ouseley’s 2001 report on the Bradford riots[^344] sought to reverse the trend of ‘them and us’. Its recommendations included stronger civic leadership and new behavioural competencies for all public service employees.

A3. David Ritchie’s 2001 report on Oldham[^345] worried about:

- youngsters reaching school with limited if any command of English;
- white children not mixing with those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds;
- an overwhelming feeling among young people in all the inner areas of Oldham that there are insufficient social and leisure facilities for them; and
- Oldham lacking strategic direction more generally.

A4. Ted Cantle’s final Community Cohesion Panel report in 2004[^346] noted some progress in the northern towns but also many unaddressed wider issues:

- More should be done to ‘manage settlement’ as well as migration.
- Migration must not just be seen as an economic issue. The social and psychological needs of communities must be managed with a new approach by both central and local government.
- Opposition to migration should not simply be condemned as ‘racist’… The ‘pace of change’ should take account of the time needed to both adjust to newcomers and to settle them in.
- There should be clear accountability in government for settlement and citizenship; and the leadership role at a local level should be taken by local authorities to bring all agencies together and to promote integration and tolerance.

- To achieve this everyone must have a real sense of belonging and they must share common values... All citizens, whether by birth or naturalised, White or from a Black and Minority Ethnic group, whatever their faith, need to be able to see themselves as ‘British’, whether or not they add their cultural identity to the term.

A5. The then Government responded with its 2005 ‘Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society’ strategy. It noted that:

- Many [people from Black and Minority Ethnic communities] still suffer particularly poor outcomes in education, employment, health and other life chances, for a complex mixture of reasons, including racial discrimination, lack of opportunities, inadequate thought in how public services address the needs of different communities, the neighbourhoods they live in, longstanding lack of skills and cultural factors.

- A cohesive society relies on more than equal opportunities for individuals. It also relies on a number of social conditions that help people from all backgrounds to come together and develop a sense of inclusion and shared British identity, defined by common opportunities and mutual expectations on all citizens to contribute to society.

- Those from majority communities can also feel excluded or left behind by social change.

A6. It set out a six-point strategy and vision for an inclusive British society in which:

i. young people from different communities grow up with a sense of common belonging;

ii. new immigrants are integrated;

iii. people have opportunities to develop a greater understanding of the range of cultures that contribute to our strength as a country [including through sport and the arts];

iv. people from all backgrounds have opportunities to participate in civic society;

v. racism is unacceptable; and

vi. extremists who promote hatred are marginalised.
A7. Darra Singh’s 2007 Commission on Integration and Cohesion\textsuperscript{348} picked up on many of the same points. It called for:

- a sense of shared futures – with an emphasis on articulating what binds communities together rather than what differences divide them;
- an emphasis on a new model of rights and responsibilities – including both a sense of citizenship at national and local level, and the obligations that go along with membership of a community, both for individuals or groups;
- a new emphasis on mutual respect and civility that recognises that alongside the need to strengthen the social bonds within groups, the pace of change across the country reconfigures local communities rapidly, meaning that mutual respect is fundamental to issues of integration and cohesion; and
- a commitment to equality that sits alongside the need to deliver visible social justice, to prioritise transparency and fairness, and build trust in the institutions that arbitrate between groups.

A8. It also specifically called for a clear government statement of integration and cohesion policy; a shared vision and strong leadership at a local level that matched a deep local understanding of each community; the ‘mainstreaming’ of integration and cohesion objectives into wider service delivery, particularly for youth provision; and a rights and responsibilities agenda.

A9. The final report of the Equalities Review (under Trevor Phillips) in 2007\textsuperscript{349} called for:

- Targeted action on persistent inequalities, including those particularly affecting Pakistani and Bangladeshi women and especially in the areas of: early years and education; employment; health; and crime and criminal justice.
- It noted that among ethnic minorities, the situation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women merits particular focus and attention both because of the size of the [employment inequality] penalty and its persistence. The employment penalty associated with this group of women, has remained relatively constant over the 30-year period, in contrast to White women. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, with the same characteristics as White women, are 30 per cent more likely to be out of work... Language is also a barrier to employment.

A10. The 2008 Government publication, ‘Face to Face and Side by Side’\textsuperscript{350}, promised to “support a stronger dialogue between people of different faiths and beliefs in every community and encourage the kind of practical inter faith cooperation that can make pleasant and harmonious neighbourhoods for all”. And, in 2008, the Government also issued guidance on the translation of publications\textsuperscript{351} in a bid to curb the number and type of documents that were translated into foreign languages and encourage more people to learn English.

A11. Further Government guidance on community cohesion and meaningful interaction in 2009\textsuperscript{352} stressed again the need to mainstream cross-community
integration and interaction into services as more effective than running purely community cohesion focussed services and events.

A12. Since 2007 there has been a duty on all state schools to promote community cohesion. Prior to 2011 there was also a requirement for Ofsted to report on this duty as part of a school inspection. However, as part of a slimming down of the school inspection framework in 2011, this explicit requirement was removed and is likely to have downgraded the importance of the duty for many schools. However Ofsted does retain a duty to consider the impact of provision for pupils’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural development as part of standard school inspections. And, since 2014, all schools have had a new duty to promote Fundamental British Values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs.

A13. Following the 2011 riots in London and other cities, Darra Singh’s Independent Riots Panel report in 2012 called for a major drive to help build character and resilience in young people, particularly among those facing disadvantage.

A14. There then followed in 2012 the Coalition Government’s ‘Creating the Conditions for Integration’ paper which pledged to “robustly promote British values such as democracy, the rule of law, equality of opportunity and treatment, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind”. It further noted that “it is these values which make it possible for people to live and work together, to bridge boundaries between communities and to play a full role in society. When this is underpinned both by opportunities to succeed, and a strong sense of personal and social responsibility to the society which has made success possible, the result is a strong society.”

A15. It identified five underlying factors which contribute to integration:

- Common ground – a clear sense of shared aspirations and values, which focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences;

- Responsibility – a strong sense of our mutual commitments and obligations, which brings personal and social responsibility;

- Social mobility – people able to realise their potential to get on in life;

- Participation and empowerment – people of all backgrounds have the opportunities to take part, be heard and take decisions in local and national life; and

- Tackling intolerance and extremism – a robust response to threats, whether discrimination, extremism or disorder, that deepen division and increase tensions.
A16. Matthew Taylor’s 2015 Social Integration Commission report\textsuperscript{357} called, among other recommendations, for:

- schools’ intakes to reflect the economic and ethnic diversity of their communities;
- schools to provide opportunities for their pupils to interact with children belonging to different ethnic groups and income backgrounds;
- people living in diverse areas to be encouraged to get to know their neighbours;
- public services to be designed and managed so as to bring together different groups of people; and
- publicly-funded moments of celebration to be open to people from all religions and none.

A17. The Woolf Institute’s 2015 Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life report\textsuperscript{358}, called for: a ‘national conversation’ led by faith communities to create a shared understanding of the fundamental values underlying public life; an enhanced mutual understanding of religion and belief; more socially representative schools; and more and better Religious Education and integration within schools.
Annex B

A rapid review of integration in a selection of European nations

Population information

B1. While this review focusses on the state of integration in Britain, it is important to understand the broader context in which our nation sits. Conducting a rapid, comparative analysis through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s embassy network, we have gained an overview of social integration across our European neighbours and the issues faced by other nation states.

B2. There are many lessons to be learned from our European counterparts and the summary below sets out some of the key points. In particular, we note the similarities around lower education and employment outcomes for ethnic minorities.

Belgium

B3. In Belgium, lack of a shared national language and identity is seen as a significant barrier to integration, with ethno-linguistic differences between Dutch-speaking (Flemish), French-speaking (Walloon) and German-speaking Belgians.

B4. Ethnic minorities suffer poor employment and education outcomes compared to the wider population.

- Almost 50% of people with a Turkish or North African background are unable to find a job within a year after they graduate, compared to only 14% of Caucasian people.

- 30% of men and 25% of women from an ethnic minority background leave schools without obtaining a high school diploma, compared to 13% and 7% of Caucasian men and women.

- For Turkish or North African boys, this figure rises to over 40%.

B5. Geographical segregation is an issue in some areas, such as Molenbeek in Brussels, where Belgian sociologist Jan Hertogen estimates nearly 40% of the population to be Muslim. This translates to 36,545 people in a resident population of 94,653; 90 of whom are believed to have returned from fighting for militant groups in Syria and Iraq.

Netherlands

B6. The Netherlands has a history of immigration from former colonial areas, and 12% of the population is made up of migrants from non-Western countries.
B7. Ethnic minorities suffer poor employment and education outcomes compared to the wider population.

- Unemployment among minority groups (people born outside the Netherlands or with at least one parent born outside the Netherlands) is 15.2%, compared to 5.6% for the rest of the population.

B8. The Netherlands face geographical segregation in areas of The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. The poorer Schilderswijk neighbourhood of The Hague, for example, has a population made up of 90% ethnic minorities – mainly Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese.

France

B9. French law prohibits the collection of data on race, religion and ethnicity. This makes it difficult to accurately analyse the size and nature of integration issues, or educational attainment for ethnic minorities.

B10. However, research from non-government sources indicates pockets of higher socio-economic deprivation, particularly in the ‘banlieues’ (suburbs or housing projects) around Paris.

- More than 4.4 million people are believed to live in ‘priority zones’ within the suburbs, facing what President Hollande has reportedly described as “unbearable discrimination”.

- The latest (2016) unemployment rate for the department (locality) of Essone is 7.7%, but this figure may hide the pockets of deprivation within the area. The suburb of Grigny is believed to have shown 23.3% unemployment and a 44.8% poverty rate at the latest 2013 Insee (Office for National Statistics equivalent) collection.

Spain

B11. Spain has seen a dramatic increase in immigration over the past 16 years, with immigration multiplying ten-fold from 2000 to 2010.

B12. Disparities exist in employment attainment rates for immigrant and native groups.

- The unemployment rate is higher for immigrant groups (26%) than for the population as a whole (18.9%).

- Highly-educated, long-settled non-EU-born immigrants are 10% less likely to have a job than native Spanish peers with the same level of education.

- Highly educated immigrants are 50% more likely to be over-qualified for their jobs than their native peers. Non-EU born women are twice as likely to be overqualified for their position in comparison to native-born women.
Germany

B13. Around 17.1 million of Germany’s 82.2 million population is of immigrant background. Around 4 million are EU citizens and more than 3 million are ethnic Germans who have been resettled since the early 1990s, in particular from the former Soviet Union.

- Residents from migrant backgrounds have concentrated particularly in cities in the west and south of the country such as Frankfurt, Munich and Cologne, as well as the capital, Berlin, where they represent over 20% of the population.

- In some town and city districts, immigrants represent the majority of under-18-year-olds.

B14. Ethnic minorities suffer poor employment and education outcomes compared to the indigenous German population.

Policy responses

Germany

B15. Recent years have seen increased efforts to coordinate local and regional integration efforts at a national level. A series of national integration summits culminated in 2012 in a National Plan of Action, covering areas such as:

- reforming local Aliens Offices to embody a welcoming culture by offering integration-related services to new arrivals;

- a raft of measures to support education and labour market access; and

- boosting opportunities for people of migrant background in the public sector.

B16. In August 2016, Germany passed its first ever national Integration Act, designed to manage the influx of recent refugees and migrants, and prevent the formation of asylum-seeker ‘ghettos’. The legislation focuses on a combination of incentives and conditionality, including:

- expanding asylum-seekers’ access to – and obligation to attend – integration courses, regardless of their prospects of remaining;

- improving their access to the labour market, and legal assurances for employers;

- applying sanctions to their refusal to participate in integration measures on offer by reducing benefits; and

- designated asylum-seekers’ places of residence to ensure integration and avoid social hotspots and ghettos developing.
Belgium

B17. Belgium is also moving towards more national coordination over integration issues. In early 2016 the Flemish Secretary for Migration launched a “newcomers’ statement”.

- This is a pledge to accept ‘European values’, which must be taken by any non-European citizen (except asylum seekers and students) who wishes to remain in Belgium for more than three months.

- Refusal to sign the statement results in refusal of entry, and those who cannot prove that they are actively working on their integration will be deported.

B18. Citizenship has become stricter since 2013, when the Belgian federal government decided that applicants would have to:

- have stayed in the country for at least five years;
- have abided by laws;
- speak one of the official languages;
- have worked at least 468 days;
- be integrated.

Spain

B19. Spain has created a Strategic Integration and Citizenship Plan, based on the premise of “convivencia intercultural”, or “intercultural living-togetherness”. This focuses on the idea of mutual adaptation, as opposed to separate and parallel lives. The underlying theme of the plan is that integration is a process of mutual adaptation, and sets out a policy based on actions that are aimed at all citizens, whether immigrant or Spanish nationals.

Denmark

B20. Recent initiatives at the national and local level can be applied to tackling parallel societies and bringing people into mainstream community through:

- strengthening association with labour market and educational systems;
- tackling residential segregation through building renovation, refugee assignment strategies, and change of rental and tenant prioritisation rules;
- change to school districts, and increased supervision of independent schools.
France

B21. The recent terrorist attacks in France have resulted in pressures to address integration, through measures such as promoting French values and reducing inequality.

B22. For example, in January 2015 the French Education Minister, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, announced 11 new measures to instil the values of the French Republic in students. This included measures such as:

- training 1,000 school representatives, such as teachers, directors and counsellors, in civic and secular education; and
- more rigorous inspection of home education, with teaching experts accompanying inspectors.

B23. At the time of writing, the Sports and Cities Minister, Patrick Kanner, is leading a new Bill titled “Project de loi égalité et citoyenneté”. This aims to tackle what Prime Minister Valls has described as the “Territorial, social and ethnic Apartheid” in France, with measures including:

- increased access to civic service opportunities for all citizens;
- greater transparency around allocation of social housing;
- greater focus on French language training at all stages of life; and
- strengthened sanctions against acts of racism and discrimination

Lessons for Great Britain

B24. There are a number of similarities between the state of integration in Britain and that in other Western European countries. These are most obvious in terms of educational attainment, access to employment, and physical and social segregation.

B25. There is broad acknowledgement of the importance of equality, a sense of belonging, and access to opportunities as the means of tackling integration gaps.

B26. There are also some differences, which highlight some relative advantages of our position. In particular, the United Kingdom has no legal restriction on the collection and analysis of ethnographic and religious data. This allows us to analyse and track education and employment outcomes – and understand the size and nature of the issues we face – in a more scientific and precise manner than some of our European neighbours.

B27. We have seen that this country shares a number of problems with its neighbours. However, we are in a strong position to learn from them and to use our own assets to forge new and better solutions to segregation.
Annex C

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