Joint Doctrine Publication 3-52
Disaster Relief Operations Overseas: the Military Contribution

Third Edition
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-52
Disaster Relief Operations Overseas:
the Military Contribution

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Abstract

Purpose

1. The purpose of Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-52, Disaster Relief Operations Overseas: the Military Contribution is to provide guidance for planning and conducting military support to humanitarian relief efforts in predominantly permissive environments overseas.¹

Context

2. Humanitarian crises and disasters (both natural and man-made), if not addressed rapidly and effectively, can deteriorate quickly with sometimes significant repercussions. Nations least able to withstand the effects of natural disaster, or at greatest risk to man-made disaster, are frequently among those that are most susceptible to political instability, civil disorder and unrest. Whilst the moral imperative to contribute to humanitarian relief will be paramount, there may also be other UK interest in intervening. JDP 3-52 describes operations by forces generated specifically to support disaster relief efforts overseas. Disaster relief operations are inherently multi-agency, and often multinational operations that are undertaken as part of an integrated approach;² hence, JDP 3-52 has been produced in cooperation with other government departments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

Scope

3. JDP 3-52 is primarily focused at the operational level; however, where relevant, it also covers appropriate strategic and tactical issues. The publication generally refers to joint disaster relief operations mounted by the Permanent Joint Headquarters. However, for disaster relief operations led by a front line command the principles are the same and front line command structures and processes should be substituted. JDP 3-52 does not cover humanitarian assistance operations in conflict affected areas, nor does it consider disasters that happen within the UK; both of these areas are covered elsewhere within the doctrinal architecture.

² Integrated approach exists doctrinally in across-government vocabulary to describe a multi-disciplinary team to plan, design or deliver a task. The term, although extant, is becoming less well used as full spectrum approach (FSA) gains favour. FSA is a development of both comprehensive and integrated approach using lessons identified from applying both through several recent crises. For further details see the Full Spectrum Approach Primer (due to be published in March 2017) and the subsequent joint doctrine note (due to be published in May 2017).
Audience

4. The primary audience for JDP 3-52 is military commanders and their respective staffs who are (or will become) involved in military operations that contribute to disaster relief operations overseas. The publication may also be of use to other government departments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations who may operate with, or alongside, UK military forces as part of an integrated approach.

Structure

5. JDP 3-52 consists of four chapters.

a. Chapter 1 provides an overview and sets the contextual background for disaster relief operations overseas. The chapter outlines key definitions together with the extant policy and guidelines – both national and international. Finally, this chapter explores the operating environment alongside some of the key characteristics present in a disaster relief operation.

b. Chapter 2 sets out the likely response of the UK Government to a disaster relief operation including which departments are likely to be involved. The chapter also covers timescales as well as financial and legal issues. This chapter concludes by looking at the role of the international community including the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and some of the key non-governmental organisations.

c. Chapter 3 covers military analysis and humanitarian assessment and planning. This includes an examination of the processes of both the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development and how we seek to ensure coherence between the two. The roles of key stakeholders are considered together with what mechanisms and structures exist to support the analysis and planning functions. The chapter concludes by looking more closely at specific military capabilities.

d. Chapter 4 is primarily concerned with the execution phase of disaster relief operations. The chapter describes what specific military support may be available to this type of operation before examining the command and control framework and concluding with a short section on monitoring and evaluation.
Linkages

6. JDP 3-52 should be read in conjunction with:

- Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning* (with UK national elements);

- AJP-3.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*;

- AJP-3.4.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support*;

- AJP-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*;

- AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction*;

- AJP-3.4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*;


- AJP-4.10(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support*;

- JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*;

- JDP 05, *Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution*;

- JDP 3-00, *Campaign Execution*;

- JDP 4-00, *Logistics for Joint Operations*;

- JDP 3-51, *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*; and

- Joint Doctrine Note 1/12, *Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution*.

\(^3\) Currently under review and will be renumbered as Allied Joint Publication-3.19.
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Chapter 1 provides an overview and sets the contextual background for disaster relief operations overseas. The chapter outlines key definitions together with the extant policy and guidelines – both national and international. Finally, this chapter explores the operating environment alongside some of the key characteristics present in a disaster relief operation.

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All across the world, increasingly dangerous weather patterns and devastating storms are abruptly putting an end to the long-running debate over whether or not climate change is real. Not only is it real, it's here, and its effects are giving rise to a frighteningly new global phenomenon: the man-made natural disaster.

Barack Obama
Chapter 1 – Overview

‘We respond rapidly to crises overseas, such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters and outbreaks of conflict or public disorder, in order to protect British nationals and British interests.’

National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

Section 1 – Context

1.1. Over the next 30 years urbanisation, population growth and climate change are all likely to contribute to greater numbers of people inhabiting areas that will be at significant risk of environmental disaster. This is particularly so in areas susceptible to volcanic and seismic activity and in low-lying coastal regions where extreme weather events, such as tropical cyclones and flooding are likely to become more prevalent. Droughts and heatwaves are also likely to increase in intensity, duration and frequency. Some of these events could precipitate natural disasters which, because of the interdependencies enabled by globalisation, may have consequences far beyond the site where the disaster occurs (for example, the spread of disease due to poor sanitation).¹ These circumstances will almost certainly result in an increase in humanitarian crises throughout the world, the response to which may require the UK military’s involvement.

1.2. The financial requirements for humanitarian assistance are generally expected to increase significantly over the next 20 years; in large part due to the effects of climate change. Funds available for disaster preparedness and relief are widely assessed to be inadequate. As the frequency and impact of natural disasters increases, this situation will likely worsen. Governments, particularly those in the regions most affected, are likely to become increasingly focused on: preventing, preparing for (and dealing with) the impact of environmental and climate-related disasters at home; and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief abroad. Armed and security forces, both at home and abroad, are likely to be more frequently

tasked with providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, perhaps supporting host-nation responders.

1.3. The disaster management cycle at Figure 1.1 illustrates the ongoing process by which governments, businesses and civil societies plan for and try to reduce the impact of disasters, react during and immediately following a disaster, and take steps to recover after a disaster has occurred. If appropriate actions are taken at certain points in the cycle it will lead to greater preparedness, better warnings, reduced vulnerability or even the prevention of disasters during the next iteration of the cycle. The complete disaster management cycle includes shaping public policies and plans that either modify the causes of disasters or mitigate their effects on people, property and infrastructure.

The complete disaster management cycle includes shaping public policies and plans that either modify the causes of disasters or mitigate their effects on people, property and infrastructure.

1.4. Following a humanitarian disaster overseas, whether the cause is natural or man-made, the UK may be requested to mount or lend support to a relief effort in the country or region affected. The UK’s contribution will almost certainly be led by the Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if civilian resources are insufficient or if it provides a comparative advantage. A memorandum of understanding between DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) sets out the relationship between the two departments and explains roles and responsibilities for responding to a disaster as part of an integrated approach. This document is reviewed and (if required) updated at regular intervals; the key points are detailed at paragraph 2.9.

Figure 1.1 – The disaster management cycle
Section 2 – Terminology and definitions

1.5. **Humanitarian disaster.** A humanitarian disaster\(^2\) is a catastrophe, the consequences of which put lives and/or livelihoods at risk, and exceeds the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources. A description of common disaster types, their typical effects and the likely post-disaster needs is at Annex A.

1.6. **Disaster relief.** Disaster relief is defined as: *the organised response to alleviate the results of a catastrophe.*\(^3\) The aims are to:

- save life;
- relieve suffering;
- limit damage;
- restore essential services to a level that enables local authorities to cope; and
- set the conditions for recovery.

1.7. **Humanitarian principles.** There are four core, widely endorsed, humanitarian principles, originally developed by the Red Cross Movement, which guide the majority of those responding to humanitarian disasters. Military assistance to disaster relief should be conducted cognisant of and, wherever possible, in accordance with these four principles detailed in Figure 1.2 below.\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanity</th>
<th>Neutrality</th>
<th>Impartiality</th>
<th>Operational independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.</td>
<td>Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.</td>
<td>Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.</td>
<td>Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.2 – Humanitarian principles

\(^2\) The terms humanitarian disaster, humanitarian crises and humanitarian emergency are often used interchangeably. This publication defaults predominantly to the term humanitarian disaster, however, where crisis or emergency are used no distinction is implied.

\(^3\) Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-52, *Disaster Relief Operations Overseas: the Military Contribution.*

\(^4\) Principles as defined by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the *Oslo Guidelines*. See paragraph 1.17 for further details.
1.8. **Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.** Although not a formally recognised doctrinal term, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is increasingly used by the military and is recognised by a variety of other actors. HADR can be considered as an overarching ‘label’ that encompasses both humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Note that this publication is only concerned with the latter. For the purpose of UK military doctrine the distinction between the two should be recognised – as described below.

**The distinction between humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations**

The UK military’s contribution in response to two earthquakes in Central Asia illustrates the distinction between humanitarian assistance and a disaster relief operation.

a. An earthquake in northern Afghanistan in March 2002 saw UK Chinook helicopters, already deployed in support of the International Security Assistance Force, undertaking relief flights as a secondary task within the wider mission and, hence, humanitarian assistance.

b. In October 2005 when an earthquake hit northern Pakistan, UK Chinooks were once more involved but this time as part of a bespoke disaster relief operation, Operation MATURIN, an operation specifically mounted in response to this disaster and, hence, disaster relief.

1.9. **Military disaster relief operations.** A military disaster relief operation is defined as: a Defence activity that is conducted as part of a disaster relief response, providing specific assistance to an afflicted population.⁵

1.10. **Humanitarian assistance.** Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles introduced at paragraph 1.7.

1.11. **Military humanitarian assistance.** Military humanitarian assistance is defined as: aid provided by military forces conducting operations other than disaster relief operations.⁶ In circumstances where there is a pressing humanitarian need there may be no option but to provide assistance. In such cases, the humanitarian principles of impartiality and humanity should be strictly applied, and responsibility handed over to an appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity. Whether the Joint Force

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⁵ On promulgation of this publication this term will replace the more generic definition for a disaster relief operation and will be included in JDP 0–01.1, *UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database.*

⁶ On promulgation of this publication this term will replace the more generic definition for humanitarian assistance and will be included in JDP 0–01.1.
Commander requires additional authority from Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to conduct humanitarian assistance will depend on the content and latitude of the mission directive. The military contribution to humanitarian assistance is covered in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance.

1.12. **Additional United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee definitions.** The United Nations (UN) Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) provides a number of other definitions which, although not formally included within existing national or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terminology, are widely accepted and understood throughout the civilian and non-governmental organisation community.⁷

a. **Civil-military coordination.** The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

b. **Complex emergency.** A complex emergency, as described by the IASC, is a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.

c. **Humanitarian actor.** Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are engaged in humanitarian activities.

d. **Military actor.** Military actors refer to official military forces, for example, military forces that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. This may include a wide range of actors such as the local or national military, multinational forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organised troops.

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⁷ Terms and definitions can be found in Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies. See paragraph 1.18 for further details.
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

1.13. The Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 sets our Armed Forces eight missions in support of the National Security Strategy.\(^8\) One of these is to support humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and conduct rescue missions.

Building Stability Overseas Strategy

1.14. The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)\(^9\) is an integrated strategy for conflict prevention, which sets the strategic framework for the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). BSOS outlines the three main, mutually-supporting, pillars of the Government’s stability strategy as being: early warning; rapid crisis prevention and response; and upstream conflict prevention. BSOS articulates that when crises create a humanitarian emergency, humanitarian action is a crucial part of the UK’s response. The humanitarian space\(^10\) needs to be protected and expanded, including in fragile and conflict-affected states. Humanitarian access is fundamental to ensure that those affected by disasters are protected and assisted. This area is a primary focus for DFID.

Protection

The term protection has very different meanings for the military and humanitarian communities. For humanitarians protection is described as all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the right of all individuals, without discrimination, in accordance with the relevant bodies of law. This means that protection is an objective central to all humanitarian action: when people face severe abuses or violence, humanitarians risk becoming part of the problem if they don’t understand how their own actions can affect people’s safety. Protection is a legal responsibility: the state has primary responsibility for making sure that people within its borders are safe. When it does not do so effectively, for whatever reason, national and international humanitarian organisations can play a part in ensuring that basic obligations are met.\(^11\)

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\(^10\) See paragraph 1.23 for an explanation of humanitarian space.

The UK’s humanitarian policy

1.15. DFID leads the UK’s response to overseas humanitarian crises. Its humanitarian work aims to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. The DFID humanitarian policy outlines three main goals.

a. **Improve the effectiveness of humanitarian responses.** To increase the quality of humanitarian response so that when a disaster happens we can respond in the right way, at the right time, with the right kind of help.

b. **Be a better donor.** To deliver adequate, predictable and flexible finance where it is most needed and in a way that strengthens the overall response from all parties.

c. **Reduce risk and extreme vulnerability.** To engage earlier and more effectively to reduce risk, and to provide political and economic security.
The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee endorsed guidelines

1.16. The humanitarian community has published two main documents, endorsed by the IASC, providing user-friendly tools to contribute to increased understanding of the humanitarian approaches to the civil-military relationship. These are written as non-binding guidelines but should be followed by the military when contributing to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations overseas.

- **Oslo Guidelines – Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief.**[^oslo]
- **Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies.**[^civil-military]

These two documents aim to assist humanitarian and military professionals dealing with civil-military issues in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in accordance with international law, standards and principles. They establish the basic framework to formalise and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in international disaster relief and complex emergencies.

1.17. **The Oslo Guidelines.** In the absence of conflict, international forces may be requested to assist in disaster relief operations in accordance with the *Oslo Guidelines*. These guidelines outline the process for making military or civil-military requests through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). They specify that foreign military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when using military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability, availability and should be seen as a tool that complements existing relief mechanisms, providing specific support to specific requirements. This support will be provided in response to a gap between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.

1.18. **Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies.** An increasing number of emergencies are related to conflict and have come to be known as complex emergencies (paragraph 1.12b). *Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies* has three distinct parts.


a. **Part one.** The first part provides insight on civil-military relationships in complex emergencies, including the difficulties and limitations of such relations. Considerations are linked to the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and concerns with regards to maintaining the separation between the humanitarian and military space. The guidelines emphasise the reasons why using military assets in support of humanitarian activities should be by exception and only as a last resort, and they provide a common understanding on when and how to, as well as how not to, coordinate with the military in fulfilling humanitarian objectives.

b. **Part two.** In the second part, the military and civil defence assets (MCDA) guidelines detail the use of international military and civil defence personnel, equipment, supplies and services in support of the UN in pursuit of humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies. It provides guidance on when these resources can be used, how they should be employed and how UN agencies should interface, organise and coordinate with international military forces with regard to using military and civil defence assets.

c. **Part three.** The third part provides specific guidelines for the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. It advises that they should be limited to exceptional cases and alternative options should be favoured. This part has been updated to take into account the last decade of humanitarian activities in the *IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys.*

**Level of support**

1.19. At the outset, any use of UK military assets for disaster relief should:

- be by exception;
- only take place upon request from the affected state or the humanitarian coordinator;
- be limited in time and scale; and
- present a transition plan that defines clearly how the function will be undertaken by civilian personnel as soon as practicable.

The military contribution provided by NATO-led forces can generally be categorised by the level of expected interaction with the local community. Understanding the category of likely support is important because it can help define which type of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support which military resources under different conditions, and to explain the nature and necessity of that assistance.
1.20. The operating environment is defined as: a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. This is the environment directly affected by the crisis in which the instruments of power are employed. The principal characteristics of the operating environment are unpredictability, permissiveness, humanitarian space and constraints.

**Unpredictability**

1.21. Normally disaster relief operations will be undertaken in unpredictable, chaotic and sometimes volatile environments. There are exceptions to this; for example, the likelihood of hurricanes in the Caribbean between June and November each year is predictable and therefore allows resources to be pre-positioned and contingency plans devised. Additionally, many disaster-prone countries now have national or regional disaster risk reduction strategies or disaster management plans to improve disaster preparedness.

**Permissiveness**

1.22. A disaster relief operation will normally be mounted at the request of the stricken state or through accepting an offer for assistance. While disaster relief operations are therefore likely to be conducted in a militarily permissive environment, there are scenarios where a more uncertain security environment exists due to ongoing conflict or unrest following the disaster; these are often referred to as complex environments. Security, including policing, remains the responsibility of the stricken state. Exceptionally, depending on the internal situation and taking account of any local tensions and the functionality of the state security system, there may be a requirement to provide security for personnel and essential assets. Such assets may include military equipment, accommodation, vehicles, transport aircraft and support helicopters. It may also include relief stores and supplies entrusted to the military if they are deemed to be at risk. However, care must be taken ensuring that the binding principle of neutrality is perceived to have been observed.

**Humanitarian space**

1.23. A key element for humanitarian agencies and organisations when they deploy is to establish and maintain a conducive humanitarian operating environment –
this is sometimes referred to as humanitarian space. It can refer to both physical/geographical boundaries and a perceptual space. The concept of humanitarian space includes the distinction between the role and function of civilian humanitarian actors and those with an official, commercial or political agenda, including the military. In an uncertain or hostile security environment, the perceived erosion of humanitarian space can increase the physical risk to civilian humanitarian workers. This perceived erosion could occur through associating the military with traditional civilian humanitarian roles, the overt relationship between military and humanitarian staffs, and the military use of civilian symbols (for example, civilian clothing and/or vehicles). While a less significant factor in permissive disaster relief operation environments, commanders should be sensitive to humanitarian space and consult civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)\(^{15}\) and/or civil-military coordination specialists where appropriate.

**Constraints**

1.24. Overseas disaster relief operations will always be subject to legal and practical constraints, including the availability of personnel, platforms and materiel. National interest, public expectations and/or other political considerations may also influence the nature of a response.

**Strategic influence**

1.25. In addition to the altruistic aims of disaster relief, listed previously, there may be specific UK interest in contributing, and being seen to contribute, to a disaster response. National interest may include the desire to promote stability and prevent a situation from worsening for political ends, or more generally to achieve favourable strategic influence.

1.26. A UK military contribution to a disaster response will be a visible and attributable representation of the UK response. Humanitarian goods and services supplied or funded by the UK Government should use the ‘UK aid’ logo to highlight UK Government funding. However, in deciding where and how UK funding is recognised, the safety, security and dignity of beneficiaries and staff should be considered. The respective strategic aims of participating UK Government departments should be mutually understood and recognised as complementary.

\(^{15}\) See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation.*
1.27. Strategic communication considerations will be central to any disaster relief planning and delivery effort. Effective strategic communication is vital for mitigating any adverse immediate impact from a humanitarian crisis or disaster at the outset. In addition, it is key to ensuring that words and deeds are consistent, that expectations are managed, that reassurance is provided, and also ensures that the UK derives the maximum positive influence from its intervention in any given situation.

1.28. Joint Doctrine Note 1/12, Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution\(^\text{16}\) provides more detail but at its essence effective strategic communication is about ensuring that words and deeds match up and all disparate means of communication from the practical delivery of aid, through to a Prime Ministerial speech or the transmitting of broadcasts or social media tweets, all deliver a coherent and consistent message. This will help ensure that the combined effect of the disparate activities of the various UK Government departments involved in the relief effort is greater than the sum of the individual parts.

1.29. Within MOD the Military Strategic Effects (MSE) division of the Operations Directorate have the lead for strategic communication and their approach is increasingly well recognised across Government. A key tool in MSE’s planning process is producing a strategic communications actions and effects framework (SCAEF) which acts as a handrail for all MOD activity. This can, and has where appropriate, acted as a handrail for all UK Government activities, as an effective way of corralling all activities in relation to communications for a disaster relief operation.

1.30. The SCAEF consists of the following key elements: a narrative, a list of the broad effects that need to be created, the key audiences and stakeholders that need to be addressed, master messages and measures of effectiveness. The SCAEF falls out of an estimate conducted at the outset of the operation by all communication stakeholders.

1.31. The narrative is probably the most important element of the SCAEF. The best narratives are usually brief and succinct and can encapsulate all UK activities associated with the mission. For Operation PATWIN, the UK’s response to Typhoon Haiyan which devastated the Philippines in 2013, the UK Prime Minister was instrumental in crafting a simple and effective narrative which can be encapsulated by three succinct phrases; namely: “We can help, we should help and we will help”. This message provided a steady drum beat for all of the UK humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts for this operation and has been used time and again since. Operation PATWIN was also a success because considerable effort went into ensuring that the UK captured the right images from its relief efforts and that any media efforts

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were focused not just on domestic UK press but were also promulgated through regional media and that the regional embassies, ambassadors and Defence Attachés amplified the message of UK efforts.

Section 5 – Characteristics of disaster relief operations

Responsibility

1.32. The overall responsibility for disaster relief rests with the stricken state. External relief efforts should complement the national plan with the host-nation government visibly in charge.

Civil-military cooperation – Operation LAYLAND, Nepal 2015

The military bring a unique skill set to a disaster zone, which the majority of non-governmental organisations cannot easily replicate. On Operation LAYLAND, military assets were requested to provide detailed technical recces of future hospital sites for the World Health Organization and engineering expertise to repair the Kathmandu potable water supply. Logistics subject matter experts were also requested to provide support to the World Food Programme. All of these assets enabled aid to be provided to those suffering and in most need during the critical rescue phase when civilian agencies are still building their delivery capability.
Bilateral contributions

1.33. Because of individual nations’ interests and different methods of contributing to disaster response efforts, contributions to disaster relief may be offered bilaterally with the stricken state, or as part of a multinational operation, with overall coordination often resting with the UN. Even if not part of a formal coalition, there may be opportunities for mutual support between other deployed forces. In these instances memoranda of understanding between participating nations may be negotiated. However, almost inevitably there will be competition for resources, including real estate, and this must be considered during the planning stage. UK Government departments will have to consult neighbouring countries over a range of issues such as overflight rights or the staging of UK forces. Commanders must ensure that efforts on the ground are coordinated with other contributors, through the UN if present, to promote unity of effort. Effective cooperation and coordination will help to reduce the logistic burden at potential choke points such as ports and airports.

Media interest

1.34. Media interest in disaster relief may be considerable and, in common with all operations, the media will have the ability to make uncensored live broadcasts and file instant reports from within the affected area. This area has grown exponentially over recent years and will continue to do so; driven, in part, by the rapid increase in the use of, and accessibility to, social media. There is therefore a risk that politicians, international leaders, the stricken society and the general public may draw misconceptions, build unrealistic expectations and generate pressure to take action. The media operations plan, normally led by the DFID Press Office, must take this into account and lines to take will be required as part of a coordinated national information strategy (see paragraph 3.29). Crucially, any media plan must consider key international audiences as well as domestic ones.

Actor complexity

1.35. International organisations and non-governmental organisations will be significant actors, as will host nation agencies and organisations. Ensuring that the military effort complements the contribution of other actors will be one of the major challenges to the military commander and staff, and one of the keys to success. The principles of CIMIC are largely applicable to disaster relief operations, hence commanders should ensure that substantial CIMIC expertise is incorporated into planning and executing disaster relief operations, including all the necessary linkages with DFID.

Historically, women and girls make up a higher proportion of the death tolls of natural disasters....
Gender-based violence

1.36. Historically, women and girls make up a higher proportion of the death tolls of natural disasters, and are often more vulnerable than men and boys in the aftermath. In particular, gender-based violence, including sexual assault, domestic violence and transactional sex, often increases. The UK Government is committed through the Call to Action on Protection from Gender-based Violence in Emergencies to consider this in its response. It is important that the UK’s role in the prevention of sexual exploitation, including appropriate training for all personnel, is prioritised throughout all types of operations; including disaster relief.

1.37. When disaster relief is being provided by military actors there can sometimes be additional difficulties for women and girls in interacting with the relief efforts. Cultural constraints and reputations of local and international soldiers can prevent women from feeling able to raise issues, seek help and participate fully in disaster relief programmes. In other situations where, for example, there has been forced conscription, men and boys may also be more reluctant. As with many scenarios, it is important to understand the gender dynamics of the particular situation to provide the necessary assistance to all members of an affected population.

Parallel relief efforts – Operation GRITROCK, Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone 2015

Due to the severity and nature of the disaster, non-governmental organisations found it difficult to get volunteers in sufficient numbers to deploy to Sierra Leone to work in the Ebola treatment centres and associated logistics chain. Consequently, they were very vocal in requesting military assistance to help with this vacuum of workers. Non-governmental organisations that had never before requested military aid to support them found themselves in a situation where the unique military capability was the only means of rapidly delivering support.
Do no harm

1.38. The do no harm principle is originally derived from medical ethics and is a guide for all those involved in humanitarian activities. All parties should ensure that their activities do not inadvertently exacerbate any existing conflict or tension. Care must also be taken to avoid harming or endangering the beneficiaries of assistance or to undermine other parallel responses to the crisis.

Last resort

1.39. The military can be used to fill an acknowledged ‘humanitarian gap’ between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. Therefore, foreign MCDA should only be requested where there is no comparable civilian alternative and when they can meet a critical humanitarian need; in other words MCDA should be unique in capability and availability. Foreign MCDA that comply with humanitarian principles can provide an important direct and indirect contribution to humanitarian actions based on humanitarian needs. They have clear advantages in terms of speed, specialisation, efficiency and effectiveness, especially in the early phase of a relief response. The use of MCDA must be needs driven, complementary to and coherent with other humanitarian aid operations and should respect the overall coordinating role of the UN.

Appropriate response

1.40. Good intentions do not necessarily guarantee an appropriate response, hence the need for constant consultation with host-nation authorities and experts in the design of a disaster response. For the MOD, the principal source for overseas disaster response expertise is DFID.

Following the 2001 floods in Mozambique, 50% of the donated drugs were either out of date or inappropriate to the need. The eventual expense to Mozambique’s government for safely disposing of the unusable medication was greater than the value of the donations provided in the first place. Although well meaning, the net impact of this response for the disaster affected nation was negative.
Key points

- Over the next 30 years urbanisation, population growth and climate change are all likely to contribute to greater numbers of people inhabiting areas that will be at significant risk of environmental disaster.

- Armed and security forces, both at home and abroad, are likely to be more frequently tasked with providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, perhaps supporting host-nation responders.

- The UK contribution to a disaster overseas will almost certainly be led by the Department for International Development (DFID).

- Military assistance to disaster relief should be conducted cognisant of and, wherever possible, in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence.

- A disaster relief operation will normally be mounted at the request of the stricken state or through accepting an offer for assistance.

- Disaster relief operations will always be subject to legal and practical constraints, including the availability of personnel, platforms and materiel.

- A UK military contribution to a disaster response will be a visible and attributable representation of the UK response.

- The military bring a unique skill set to a disaster zone, which the majority of non-governmental organisations cannot easily replicate.

- Media interest in disaster relief may be considerable and, in common with all operations, the media will have the ability to make uncensored live broadcasts and file instant reports from within the affected area.

- International organisations and non-governmental organisations will be significant actors, as will host nation agencies and organisations.

- The military can be used to fill an acknowledged ‘humanitarian gap’ between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.
Chapter 2 sets out the likely response of the UK Government to a disaster relief operation including which departments are likely to be involved. The chapter also covers timescales as well as financial and legal issues. This chapter concludes by looking at the role of the international community including the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and some of the key non-governmental organisations.

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Section 5 – Role of the international community . . 38
I'm proud of the fact that the UK has taken the lead in international relief with rapid response of warships, aircraft and equipment.

David Cameron
Requests for assistance

2.1. The affected government will normally make a request for assistance through the UK diplomatic mission in the respective country, the affected country’s embassy or high commission in London and/or the United Nations (UN) resident representative. The UN or UK representative may forward any request and recommendations for a UK response to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and/or the Department for International Development (DFID). The UK may also receive requests for assistance via multilateral organisations, such as the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism or the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat. In extremis, if the affected government is not functioning effectively then the UK Government may choose to act without invitation, either unilaterally or as part of a wider international aid effort.

UK Government lead

2.2. In all but exceptional circumstances, the UK Government’s response to a humanitarian disaster is initiated by the Secretary of State for International Development and led by DFID. In instances where DFID does not consider the magnitude of the situation merits UK assistance on purely humanitarian grounds, but the Government has wider political or domestic considerations that demand a UK response, the Cabinet Office and the FCO retain the authority to call upon the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to mount a disaster relief operation. A disaster occurring in a UK Overseas Territory may be such an instance where DFID does not consider the situation sufficient to overwhelm local capacity but the UK Government nevertheless feels it has a duty to assist. Should a disaster simultaneously affect a DFID priority country and a UK Overseas Territory (or other country meriting a response on other than purely humanitarian grounds), then the FCO will refer decisions for prioritisation and allocation of resources to the Cabinet Office or ministers.

2.3. Where a request for assistance is made by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Protection, the UK lead
Approach to disaster relief operations

department will be either DFID (in the case of humanitarian assistance) or the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (in the case of civil protection assistance).\textsuperscript{18} Requests for assistance via Directorate General for Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Protection may be under the European Union (EU) Civil Protection Mechanism, which can provide:

- civil protection assistance either inside or outside the EU, and
- humanitarian assistance outside the EU.

In the case of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations to deliver humanitarian assistance, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office will coordinate the UK response, working closely with DFID, FCO and MOD. However, it is unlikely the UK would respond to a humanitarian crisis exclusively through NATO, when more appropriate mechanisms would exist (bilateral assistance or assistance coordinated by the EU or UN).

\textbf{Ministry of Defence}

2.4. Any MOD role in a disaster response will be initiated by DFID and will probably be shaped by the Cabinet Office or an alternative, bespoke sub-group. Ministers decide on the most effective approach on a case-by-case basis, but may draw upon an existing Government committee such as the National Security Committee or the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) forum. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process describes how the MOD manages the crisis response and is described at paragraph 3.17. The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) are the designated UK military crisis response headquarters and have cross-Whitehall liaison responsibilities. JFHQ also has a presence within the FCO Crisis Management Department. Any response should also be cognisant of existing Defence Engagement with the country or region, including the links and experience this may provide, and any expectations it may raise.

\textbf{Foreign and Commonwealth Office}

2.5. The FCO has overall political responsibility for engagement with other nations and is responsible for obtaining political approval for UK military deployment into other nation states, including the stricken state for a disaster relief operation. The FCO will provide political advice on the circumstances for a potential disaster relief operation, including aircraftrouting and negotiating diplomatic clearance for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[18] The differentiation between humanitarian assistance and civil protection is not clearly defined, and the two areas have significant overlaps. However, broadly speaking humanitarian assistance relates to the personal safety and comfort of individuals and communities, while civil protection generally relates to specific capabilities to protect populations and deals with disasters such as flood defence, forest fires, industrial accidents or the consequences of man-made disasters.
\end{footnotes}
overflight, staging and the operation of a military forward mounting base, if required. Additionally, the FCO can assist by providing visas and arranging host-nation support and local resources to the Joint Task Force. The FCO Crisis Management Department will usually draw together experts from across Whitehall to a twice daily video teleconference with our in-country representatives.

**Department for International Development**

2.6. DFID is the lead UK Government department responsible for humanitarian assistance to people affected by disasters overseas and works in close coordination with other government departments. Within DFID, the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) leads on policy, monitoring and response for rapid onset disasters. DFID respects the four core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, and will only allocate funds to organisations that comply with these principles.

2.7. As a UK Department of State, DFID is not independent of politics but will promote humanitarian activities which prioritise the needs of those affected above political concerns or national interests. The *International Development Act 2002* provides the legal authority for most DFID expenditure. DFID aims to improve international disaster response capacity under the overall coordination of the UN. It is DFID policy to integrate disaster preparedness and response work into existing country and thematic programmes where possible. This allows for better transition from the emergency phase to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Approach to disaster relief operations

2.8. DFID’s response to a disaster may include:

- contributing financially through national or international humanitarian organisations;
- deploying humanitarian advisers and/or seconding personnel, usually to UN agencies;
- donating goods, stores and equipment;
- providing operational support (such as chartering aircraft and deploying search and rescue teams); and
- requesting UK military support.

2.9. Adopting an integrated approach, DFID has established arrangements with other government departments to facilitate rapid disaster response. This includes: the FCO, who assist in global surveillance of disasters; the Home Office, for deploying UK fire and rescue personnel; and the MOD who provide military capability. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between DFID and MOD sets out the principles and processes for collaboration in major humanitarian disasters. Below are the key points to note in this MOU.

a. All humanitarian interventions carried out by Her Majesty’s (HM) Government will be managed under a DFID lead and in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. UK military support will therefore be at the request of DFID and will be consistent with DFID’s response strategy.

b. In most instances, DFID policy will reflect the existing UN guidance, which makes clear that drawing on military capabilities for tasks with humanitarian objectives should be a last resort. This may occur when there is no civilian alternative; when the scale or urgency of needs have overwhelmed the civilian response efforts; or when the military option is judged likely to lead to the greatest humanitarian effect. Clearly this means that we may decide to use this option of ‘last resort’ first. DFID will reimburse marginal costs incurred by MOD in these circumstances.

DFID and the MOD will review the MOU at regular intervals, therefore the MOD custodian should be consulted for the current version. DFID and the Joint Force Headquarters conduct regular, routine meetings to enhance working relationships and familiarity.
Typhoon Haiyan UK Government response

Typhoon Haiyan was the strongest storm ever to hit land when it tore through the Philippines on 8th November 2013. As part of a global response, the UK Government, led by the Department for International Development (DFID) worked in partnership with the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organisations to deliver aid and provide help to over one million people.

The UK deployed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Royal Navy ships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 military aircraft (2 C-17, 1 C-130, 8 helicopters)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 UK aid cargo flights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 diggers, 1 forklift truck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 4x4 vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 DFID humanitarian experts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 UK medics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aid delivered by DFID included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency shelter for 496,495 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe drinking water and sanitation for 656,000 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary learning spaces for 73,000 children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for over 230,000 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blankets and cooking provisions for 78,000 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds and tools for growing rice for over 500,000 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential health services for over 65,000 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,230 hygiene kits</td>
<td>5,925 jerry cans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42,569 tarpaulins</td>
<td>100 tonnes of rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,912 shelter kits</td>
<td>23,164 buckets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,510 solar lamps</td>
<td>73 tonnes of transport equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UK public donations £94m  DFID assistance £77m  Total UN appeal £464m
2.10. All overseas posts and governors’ offices, including UK military and defence advisers, must consult with DFID before requesting the deployment of UK military assets for disaster relief. Given that any DFID request for military support is likely to come during an existing crisis, it is likely that the JFHQ will already be in the loop. JFHQ maintains a watch (commonly referred to as a ‘stare’ list) of worldwide regional areas of interest and works routinely with both the FCO Crisis Management Department and CHASE. CHASE has the ability to rapidly deploy personnel to conduct an early assessment of a developing disaster and may also take a representative from JFHQ.

2.11. JFHQ personnel are trained and equipped to deploy worldwide (at four hours notice to move) to provide liaison and military advice. JFHQ personnel also undergo specific humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) training, for example, by attending the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Civil-Military Coordination course. JFHQ routinely conduct engagement and liaison worldwide with HADR stakeholders, for example, through participating in the bi-annual Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS led by the United States Pacific Command.

‘When crises emerge we will act to deliver rapid crisis prevention and response, improving our ability to take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating or spreading. […] Implementing the strategy will require a consolidated effort, using all our diplomatic, development and defence capabilities as well as drawing on external expertise.’

**Building Stability Overseas Strategy**

2.12. UN guidelines, commonly known as the Oslo Guidelines,\(^{19}\) state that civilian assets are to be preferred over military when providing humanitarian assistance; this is linked to the principle of last resort. Therefore, DFID will normally only request military assistance when there is an acknowledged gap\(^{20}\) between humanitarian needs and the civilian resources to meet them, and where the response is acceptable to the local population and in support of the wider relief effort. The military response must have a comparative advantage over civilian options; such advantage may be: speed of reaction, scale of effort or availability of specific resources. A joint MOD and DFID analysis of desired effects and outcomes following a joint assessment of the situation by DFID’s CHASE and military recce teams should precede determining of capabilities and ultimately individual assets. Notwithstanding this, the MOD must anticipate likely requests at the onset of any humanitarian disaster situation and should offer timely advice on the suitability and availability of military support.

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\(^{19}\) See paragraph 1.17 for further details.

\(^{20}\) Jointly assessed by DFID and MOD through the memorandum of understanding (MOU) assessment process.
Support by UK forces overseas

2.13. Commanders of UK forces overseas, even when obliged by treaty or other technical agreement, should normally secure HM representative and MOD authority to act. This includes UK forces permanently stationed overseas and also those deployed temporarily on operations or exercise. All proposals for support to disaster relief efforts should be reported by commanders through their operational chain of command to the MOD. This was traditionally done by signal, however, nowadays is more likely to be done through routine electronic methods of communication.

2.14. The proposal should indicate the likely scope of the proposed aid, the estimated cost and whether the concurrence of HM representative has been obtained. However, in cases where seeking formal authority would involve an unacceptable delay, immediate emergency life-saving relief may be offered at the commander’s discretion subject to safety imperatives.

2.15. Emergency life-saving relief is defined as: the provision of small-scale supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. These may be provided directly from existing resources provided that Service requirements are not compromised. Any such relief should not exceed one week’s supplies and should normally be provided from first line stocks. Commanders should inform HM representative of any support undertaken and retrospective formal mechanisms should be put in place as soon as possible. Only once a formal request for assistance has been received can costs be reimbursed.

Military involvement: an alternative perspective

The airlift of famine victims in Ethiopia during the mid-1980s is often heralded as a shining example of an international military contribution to a disaster response. While the effects of the airlift were generally perceived to be very positive, enabling people to stay in place rather than congregate in camps, there are alternate views. For the price of one flight, a grain truck (which could carry twice the load of a C-130 aircraft) could have been purchased and fuelled for six months, and the truck left as a lasting legacy. That said, many areas were inaccessible by road due to the civil war and, ironically, the coming of much needed rain. More controversially, some feel the airlift actually helped to prolong the conflict. It freed the Ethiopian Air Force’s own transport aircraft to support the war effort, including a forced resettlement programme. It has also been argued that the relief airlift eased the pressure for diplomacy, negating potential opportunities that could have arisen through negotiations between the Ethiopian Government and the rebels over humanitarian access to the stricken population.

Supplies and services would likely comprise food, clothing, medical and subsistence stores, rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment.
Existing UK representatives

2.16. British embassies, high commissions, consulates and DFID country offices play a role in providing early warning of emerging crises and situational awareness following disasters. Their links with host governments and in-country humanitarian agencies make them an important information source and part of the coordination system in the affected country. They can also facilitate some UK disaster response activities, including local procurement of relief goods. In the case of military support, the Defence Attaché, if present, may be particularly useful in establishing links with the stricken state’s armed and security forces. Note that although the FCO does not have a presence in every country there are often agreements in place with other nations for those countries without UK consular support (for example, there is an existing arrangement with Belgium for Burundi).

Non-combatant evacuation operations

2.17. In circumstances where UK eligible persons\textsuperscript{22} are at risk as a result of a disaster, the FCO may request military assistance to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). The embassy/high commission would use the crisis management plan as the basis for any evacuation. The MOD would provide military assistance in accordance with Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-51, \textit{Non-combatant Evacuation Operations}.

\textsuperscript{22} Eligible persons will include UK nationals and those individuals from other nations for whom HM Government and representative have accepted responsibility. JDP 3-51, \textit{Non-combatant Evacuation Operations}. 
Civil-military coordination – Operation LAYLAND, Nepal 2015

Following the 2015 Nepal earthquake, despite the fact that the national government was functioning, the Nepalese military assumed a key role in the response. This included non-military activities such as maintaining good records of hospital admissions, the deceased and survivors. The UK Defence Attaché had an established relationship with the host-nation army and this proved to be a good source of accurate information and situational awareness. Additionally, they were also able to exert influence at the local level; for example, to secure better landing slots for subsequent UK military activity at Kathmandu airport.

Section 2 – Likely timeline of events

Initial contact

2.18. In cases where DFID does not have the lead (see paragraph 2.2), the Cabinet Office or FCO will convene a bespoke forum of relevant departments. In a DFID-led operation, as a crisis emerges DFID will activate its crisis response procedures. In addition to the liaison with MOD described here, there will be an ongoing dialogue between DFID, FCO and the Cabinet Office throughout the process. This liaison is particularly important where there are significant wider considerations, such as political, domestic or consular factors.

2.19. Within DFID, the lead responsibility for planning rapid onset disaster relief rests with CHASE. This is done in close collaboration with the appropriate DFID geographical departments and overseas offices. CHASE maintains an emergency response capability, with operations controlled from the CHASE Operations Room. Irrespective of the departmental lead, the FCO Crisis Management Department will usually run a twice daily crisis video teleconference with the staff in the affected
Approach to disaster relief operations

country attended by representatives from all key departments. A CHASE duty officer provides out-of-hours cover and, during a major crisis, the headquarters may be staffed 24 hours. If DFID identify a potential requirement for military support this will be managed through the DCMO process.\footnote{Details are contained in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation’s (DCMO) Standing Operating Procedures which are updated every six months.}

2.20. Within the MOD, Military Strategic Planning will be the initial point of contact within the Operations Directorate and will normally manage the transition to crisis mode. In extremis, and where the timescale is short, there is a fast track process between DFID and MOD Operations Directorate which is intended to speed up response times.

Liaison

2.21. Once DFID makes a formal request to the MOD Operations Directorate to explore military options, then direct liaison between CHASE and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) can take place. If appropriate, PJHQ will appoint an additional liaison officer to DFID, usually to be based in the CHASE Operations Room.\footnote{8 Engineer Brigade have a permanent liaison officer to DFID, based in Whitehall. The individual is a chartered engineer affiliated with the Infrastructure cadre, but is acquainted with DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) and has previously assisted DFID in using military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) purposes in Nepal, South Sudan, Yemen and Sierra Leone. Note that this post is assigned to the Africa Division and is not dedicated to HADR.}

Subsequently there may be a requirement for ongoing liaison between CHASE and various PJHQ and JFHQ divisions, especially J2, J4 and J5.\footnote{J1-J9 are recognised military staff branches. J2 – operational intelligence, J4 – logistics/medical and J5 – crisis and deliberate planning.} It may sometimes be appropriate for DFID and PJHQ to exchange additional liaison officers.

Approval

2.22. Following initiation of the requirement by DFID, either through a cross-Whitehall meeting or through the fast track process, the MOD Operations Directorate will assess availability and responsiveness of military assets together with any financial and opportunity costs. This information is then used to make the recommendations to Defence Ministers – presented at either COBR or a similar meeting. Once this recommendation has been approved, PJHQ will formulate a plan to match resources to the effects requested by DFID. DFID will then decide whether using a proposed military asset/package is appropriate and affordable, taking into account the UN Oslo Guidelines, (whilst recognising the UK is not bound by these).

2.23. Any decision to use MOD assets will almost always require MOD Ministerial approval for the specified course of action. This will be managed through the DCMO
process\textsuperscript{26} and in consultation with the Cabinet Office. The tasking of air or space reconnaissance, together with environmental and infrastructure analysis, separately or in conjunction with a ground assessment, may add much-needed clarity to a confused situation and DFID should consider these options early (in conjunction with MOD).

\textbf{Using force elements at readiness}

\textsuperscript{27} Medical, airlift and engineering assessment.

2.24. Military response to disaster relief operations is not always as fast as may be hoped for. This is not because of a slow response by individuals or organisations, but can be the result of a lack of awareness of the potential to use some military assets. Such delays may sometimes be compounded by the complicated, multi-layered and process-heavy nature of military tasking. Where possible, subject matter experts from key military capabilities\textsuperscript{27} should be deployed forward in the same timescales as the DFID CHASE team. This may involve deploying an operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT).\textsuperscript{28} Concurrently, Defence Attachés and CHASE should be educated in the potential use of these capabilities.
Section 3 – Financial issues

Financial authority

2.25. As dictated by HM Treasury, costs for disaster relief operations fall to the lead department, usually DFID, and are attributed against the UK Government’s official development assistance expenditure. One exception to this is diverting military assets already in the vicinity for immediate life saving, where no charges will be raised, and costs will lie where they fall. The estimated cost of using military assets is likely to be a critical factor in DFID’s decision to request military support in the first place. Cost recovery in situations where DFID is not the lead department will be dealt with in a separate agreement with the requesting department.

Charging policy

2.26. Defence Finance Strategy, Finance Management Policy and Accounting is the lead authority for levels of charging and cost recovery. Defence Resources is responsible for providing advice to ministers on appropriate charging regimes, and negotiations with Government departments on charges and cost recovery. Cost estimates submitted by the MOD to DFID should normally be on a marginal basis in line with the existing agreement. This approach ensures that the Defence budget is not unduly affected as a result of unscheduled activity.

Costings

2.27. Producing rapid and accurate cost estimates is an iterative process requiring a balance between urgency and reliability. To ensure consistency in advice offered, all costs provided to DFID or other departments must be endorsed by the Defence Resources Operations team. Initial cost estimates will likely be generated by the Defence Resources Operational Costing Model to inform the decision-making process. Defence Resources will then nominate a lead financial authority. These cost estimates will form the basis of agreed limits of liability with other departments for that operation.

Financial approval, cost capture, reporting and recovery

2.28. Defence Resources will issue a specific in-year management notice for each operation, providing details on the charging regime, cost capture and reporting requirements. Depending upon the scale of the operation, a top level budget (TLB) (likely to be Joint Forces Command) will be appointed as the sole financial authority.
All costing exercises and requests for funding are to be directed through the sole financial authority, and in response to officially accepted requests for military assistance, as endorsed by the Operations Directorate. Only those costs for tasks endorsed by the Operations Directorate and agreed with the other department will be accepted. Financial authority may be delegated with agreement from Defence Resources.

2.29. Costs will be recovered from other departments either through the supplementary estimates process or via invoice. TLBs must be prepared to provide supporting documentation when requested. When assets are being used in response to a call for assistance through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, there may be opportunities for costs to be recovered from the European Commission – particularly in relation to transport, where up to 85% of costs can be recovered by the UK Government. In this instance it is essential that there are clear invoices and audit trails between the MOD and DFID for the specific costs of the assistance being provided. Where this includes in-kind aid items transported by military transport that are also carrying other materiel, it will be necessary to identify the proportion of the cost of the movement which directly relates to the aid items.

Section 4 – Legal issues

2.30. Most disaster relief operations are launched at the request of a host nation. Commanders at all levels should be aware of the precise legal basis for the operation as this will determine the nature and extent of the presence and activities of UK forces, as well as the use of force permissible under the rules of engagement (ROE). Commanders should also be aware of any legal constraints and in all circumstances should seek advice from their legal staff. UK forces must operate at all times within UK national, international and (subject to a status of forces agreement (SOFA) or similar arrangement) host-nation law.

Status of Forces Agreement

2.31. There may be no standing SOFA with the government of a stricken state or existing arrangements may not cover the requirement. In such circumstances, PJHQ J9 will seek to secure appropriate jurisdictional arrangements over deployed UK military personnel and MOD civilians. Given the time imperative, initial agreement

29 In the case of humanitarian assistance tasks within conflict or a complex emergency this will normally be in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution.
30 PJHQ J9 Division is an integrated team of civil servant and military professionals who are expert in the management of policy, presentational and legal risks and issues relating to current and future operations.
will normally be achieved by an exchange of letters with the government of the stricken state. Wherever possible these arrangements should be in place before deployment. If there are likely to be forward mounting bases or other logistic footprints in third countries, similar but separate arrangements will need to be made with each country. Should the time available not allow for a SOFA to be negotiated, issues should be included in the negotiated document which may take the form of an MOU, military technical/implementing arrangements and/or exchanges of letters between governments. Although not an exhaustive list, issues covered by a SOFA include:

- status of personnel including privileges and immunities;
- jurisdictional arrangements;
- exemption from taxes and duties;
- exemption from immigration controls and import regulations;
- wearing of uniforms;
- issue and carriage of personal weapons and ROE (for self-defence);
- use of UK vehicles and validity of UK driving permits;
- freedom of movement in connection with conducting a disaster relief operation;
- understanding on the resolution of claims and liabilities;
- investigation of accidents;
- engineering design and construction liability; and
- provision of, and payment regime for, host-nation support (this is normally better dealt with in a separate implementing arrangement completed under the umbrella of the main SOFA/MOU).

Visas

2.32. Notwithstanding the potential negotiations about the status of UK forces, which may take some time, identifying visa requirements early is essential.\textsuperscript{31} The MOD should seek FCO guidance at the first indication of a potential disaster relief operation.

Rules of engagement

2.33. Disaster relief operations after natural disasters should in principle be unarmed. If it is necessary for military personnel to be armed (with either firearms or

\textsuperscript{31} In some cases it may be worth certain personnel holding two passports to mitigate delays with visas.
non-lethal weapons), the MOD and PJHQ will be responsible for providing a draft ROE profile and submission, and for providing ROE advice at the military strategic and operational levels respectively. At the earliest opportunity, the MOD will ensure that the FCO and DFID are aware of the ROE. The nominated commander is responsible for the promulgation to theatre of authorised ROE profiles and guidance cards, in accordance with Joint Services Publication 398, *United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement*. In crafting ROE, account should be taken of:

- the legal basis for the operation;
- the prevailing security conditions;
- host-nation capabilities; and
- agreements on providing security.

Based on these considerations, ROE will govern the use of force in specific circumstances. Within the context of a disaster relief operation, ROE are likely to restrict the use of force to that required for protection of UK forces and other designated persons. Should the circumstances demand broader ROE, for example, to prevent looting or for the wider protection of designated persons, appropriate changes should be requested through the chain of command.

**Arrest or detention**

2.34. It is not envisaged that UK military personnel will be engaged in arrest or detention activities. Exceptionally, where such a requirement arises, this will ordinarily be at the request of the host nation and legal authority will derive from host nation laws; UK forces are unlikely to have powers to do any more than assist local authorities.

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32 Although drafts may also be produced by front line commands.
Civil-military coordination – Operation LAYLAND, Nepal 2015

The importance of civil-military coordination was displayed when a UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) team was invited to establish a permanent liaison function within the Multinational Military Coordination Centre (MNMCC), based at the Nepalese Army headquarters. This proved vital to facilitate information sharing and coordination, as well as enhancing joint situational awareness between the MNMCC and the On-site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), and processing of any requests for military support.

A Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre was established by the UN-CMCoord team as part of the Nepal earthquake response operation to provide a predictable humanitarian-military-police coordination platform and to facilitate the interface between humanitarian, national/foreign military actors and national police. This was the ‘space’ where humanitarian capacity gaps during the critical period emanating from the OSOCC, the Humanitarian Country Team or UN Cluster teams could be temporarily augmented by available military capacity.
2.35. A number of international organisations, including UN agencies and non-governmental organisations may have been working in the stricken country for some time prior to the present disaster. The humanitarian consequences may easily overwhelm in-country capacity and require a shift in focus or an increase in response capacity by those organisations working in emergency relief. The main national and international elements to an emergency relief response are below.

a. **National response.** The response from the affected nation includes the government, local emergency services, civil protection, armed and security forces, local administration, community organisations and non-governmental organisations. Most lives are saved in the first few hours following a disaster, often by neighbours and local first-responders. It is important to acknowledge and support, rather than undermine, the efforts of local populations in the immediate aftermath.

b. **United Nations.** The UN works closely with and in support of national authorities to set-up response structures generally based on established principles, policies and existing humanitarian coordination structures, such as the humanitarian country team and the cluster system.\(^33\) It is essential that UK assistance forms a coordinated part of the in-country response based on a coordinated and agreed assessment of need.

c. **European Union.** The EU’s lead department for disaster relief is the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), whose mandate is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict. ECHO can coordinate activity, and in certain cases act directly, either within or outside the EU.\(^34\) Additionally, the EU’s Civilian Protection Mechanism facilitates the mobilisation of support and assistance from member states in the event of major emergencies. As part of this mechanism a permanent Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) operates from ECHO in Brussels. The ERCC is staffed at all times and is responsible for receiving alerts and requests for assistance, and communicating threats, risks and situation reports to member states.

d. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** The NATO doctrine for disaster relief is contained within Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance*. This document states that tasks in support of humanitarian operations should only be conducted ‘by exception and upon request’. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO headquarters is responsible for coordinating the NATO disaster relief response.

\(^33\) See paragraph 2.36b for further details.

\(^34\) The future impact and implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit) are not known at the time of publication.
response of member and partner countries; noting that this will usually be done in close consultation with the UN OCHA. The EADRCC is a non-standing, multinational force of civil and military elements, which can be deployed in the event of a major natural or man-made disaster in a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) country. For deployments outside the EAPC area, disaster relief operation force elements may be provided by the high readiness NATO Response Force.

e. Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The national Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies, supported by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), will often play a major role responding to a disaster, especially in the early hours and days. The primary purpose of Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies is to act as auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field and, where required, to supplement them in providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people. However, the auxiliary role must always be considered alongside the need to work on the basis of neutrality, independence and impartiality. These organisations can mobilise very rapidly; for example, to assist civil authorities with search and rescue efforts and distributing relief items. In many conflict-affected countries, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may also be present and able to provide similar support.

f. Non-governmental organisations. International non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam, Save the Children and Médecins Sans Frontières may have a permanent presence in disaster prone countries and will usually respond to disaster situations. In a major emergency many other organisations are likely to deploy, increasing the requirement for coordination and information sharing. The deployment of large numbers of non-governmental organisations may place an increased strain on limited and already stretched resources.

g. Donors. Donor governments (through agencies such as DFID, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the United States Agency for International Development, and multilaterals (such as the
European Community Humanitarian Aid Office\textsuperscript{35} may provide funding, technical personnel and operational support such as logistics and communications. Some donors may have their own representatives or offices \textit{in situ}; others will work from national or regional capitals.

2.36. **United Nations mechanisms.** The UN coordinates mechanisms for international disaster response.

a. **Resident coordinator or humanitarian coordinator.** Many countries at risk from natural disasters will have a standing UN presence, with a resident coordinator or representative. Before disaster occurs, the UN resident coordinator coordinates preparedness and mitigation activities, monitors and provides early warning of potential emergency situations and leads contingency planning. When an emergency arises, a humanitarian coordinator may be appointed or the resident coordinator may assume that role. In complex emergencies the UN Secretary General may appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary General with UN OCHA\textsuperscript{36} playing the central coordinating role. Other UN agencies working in emergency response include: the UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization.

b. **Clusters.** A UN cluster is a group of organisations with a designated lead (usually a UN agency), working in a common area of humanitarian response. These areas include traditional assistance sectors (for example, water and sanitation, nutrition and health), service provision (for example, emergency communications and logistics) and cross-cutting issues (for example, camp coordination, early recovery, protection and gender-based violence). The aim of the cluster system is to strengthen the coordination framework and response capacity. An example is detailed in Figure 2.1.

\begin{quote}
Many countries at risk from natural disasters will have a standing UN presence, with a resident coordinator or representative.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{35} The European Commission’s humanitarian aid and civil protection department.
\textsuperscript{36} ReliefWeb is the leading humanitarian information source on global crises and disasters. It is a specialised digital service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs available at \url{http://reliefweb.int}
**United Nations humanitarian country team.** The UN humanitarian country team, under the leadership of a humanitarian coordinator, is the central focus of the UN humanitarian coordination architecture. A humanitarian country team will be established in all countries with a humanitarian coordinator position. In countries where no humanitarian coordinator exists then a humanitarian country team may be established on the authority of the resident coordinator. During an emergency, the UN humanitarian country team is the main in-country mechanism by which international agencies coordinate policies and programmes of humanitarian assistance in support of the national authorities. This will include setting common objectives and priorities, establishing clusters, providing guidance on lead agencies and advising the humanitarian coordinator on the allocation of resources from in-country pooled funds.37

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37 Further detail on humanitarian country teams is at [https://interagencystandingcommittee.org](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org)
d. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. UN OCHA has a mandate to coordinate humanitarian response and actors involved in this response. UN OCHA works closely with global cluster lead agencies and non-governmental organisations to develop policies, coordinate inter-cluster issues, disseminate operational guidance and organise field support. At the field level, UN OCHA helps ensure that the humanitarian system functions efficiently and in support of the humanitarian coordinator’s leadership. UN OCHA provides guidance and support to the humanitarian coordinator and humanitarian country team, and facilitates inter-cluster coordination. UN OCHA also helps ensure coordination between clusters at all phases of the response, including needs assessments, joint planning, and monitoring and evaluation.\[^{38}\]

\[^{38}\] Further detail on UN coordination organisations and mechanisms can be found at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/who-does-what
Key points

• In all but exceptional circumstances, the UK Government’s response to a humanitarian disaster is initiated by the Secretary of State for International Development and led by the Department for International Development (DFID).

• Within DFID, the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) leads on policy, monitoring and response for rapid onset disasters.

• A memorandum of understanding between DFID and the Ministry of Defence sets out the principles and processes for collaboration in major humanitarian disasters.

• United Nations guidelines, commonly known as the Oslo Guidelines, state that civilian assets are to be preferred over military when providing humanitarian assistance; this is linked to the principle of last resort.

• In circumstances where UK eligible persons are at risk as a result of a disaster, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office may request military assistance to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation.

• Most disaster relief operations are launched at the request of a host nation.

• Within the context of a disaster relief operation, rules of engagement are likely to restrict the use of force to that required for protection of UK forces and other designated persons.

• The UN coordinates mechanisms for international disaster response.
Chapter 3 covers military analysis and humanitarian assessment and planning. This includes an examination of the processes of both the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development and how we seek to ensure coherence between the two. The roles of key stakeholders are considered together with what mechanisms and structures exist to support the analysis and planning functions. The chapter concludes by looking more closely at specific military capabilities.

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Our visits to four communities assisted by HMS Illustrious showed that the military response was well planned and managed and left a highly positive impression on the affected populations.

The Independent Commission for Aid Impact, report on the Philippines after Operation PATWIN
Chapter 3 – Military analysis, humanitarian assessment and planning

Section 1 – Military analysis and humanitarian assessment

Terminology

3.1. For the military the main activities within operations design are analysis and planning. Detail on the operational-level planning process, including both multinational and multi-agency crisis management, is contained in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine. Whilst the military will routinely conduct analysis, the Department for International Development (DFID), and most civil actors, refer to the initial stage as assessment. The civilian humanitarian assessment is a critical element of the military analysis for any disaster relief operation. To enable the commander to understand their contribution in the context of the civilian terminology and sequence of events, the term ‘assessment’ is used in this chapter unless specifically referring to military analysis.

Multi-agency planning

3.2. Within an integrated approach, commanding military forces does not necessarily confer command or control of the overall situation; this is particularly applicable for disaster relief operations. Where control is vested in another government department, joint force commanders should support coordinated planning with military advice and by contributing to the collective execution of the overall mission. Commanders should also consider the impact of having to temporarily assume responsibility for some, or all, of the non-military lines of operation if the security or political situation precludes delivery by other agencies or authorities. The resource implications of such a contingency may be significant and joint force commanders should be prepared to prioritise their efforts accordingly.

3.3. DFID will invariably have the lead for disaster relief, with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) usually playing a supporting role. DFID are configured to respond quickly and sometimes even pre-emptively, to assess needs and move urgently needed resources to a disaster area. Whilst the UK uses a civilian-led approach for disaster relief it should be noted that some countries do not. In some places (for example, the Asia Pacific region) the military have a formal role for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief which then becomes a force driver (unlike for the UK where it is done at ‘best effort’). In such circumstances the military presence within a wider UK response can be useful in coordinating and liaising with other military actors. This may include conducting preliminary assessments, contributing to a (non-UK) military-led planning process or command and control of deployed force elements.

**Departmental processes and cultures**

3.4. Each department will have differing timelines, planning capacities, priorities, cultures and approaches to risk. It should not be assumed that a military approach will be universally acceptable or understood. This may introduce frictions and misunderstandings. In the early stages of an operation, where conditions are non- or semi-permissive, the military may sometimes be the principal contributor. When giving advice, commanders must use plain, jargon-free language and recognise that certain words and phrases can be misconstrued. Where command and control arrangements are unclear, commanders should be prepared to coordinate activity as required.

**Military analysis and planning**

3.5. Military analysis and planning processes are as applicable to disaster relief operations as to any other military operation. Detailed descriptions for military planning can be found in the relevant North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and UK doctrinal publications. For a disaster relief operation, the military analysis should start at the earliest opportunity and where possible, should attempt to complement, the civilian humanitarian assessment. This will routinely include a review of the:

• nature and magnitude of the disaster, geospatial information,\textsuperscript{41} cultural factors and any specific hazards; and

• impact of the disaster on the population and infrastructure,\textsuperscript{42} and what should be done and at what scale to save and sustain life.

**Humanitarian assessment**

3.6. However urgent the situation, a comprehensive (though often phased) assessment of the needs of the crisis-affected population is essential for achieving a coordinated, effective relief effort. Poor assessment will hamper decision-making and may prolong suffering and cost further lives through misdirected efforts. The government of the affected state bears primary responsibility for the initial needs assessment. Some governments may be able to make an initial assessment within the first 12-72 hours following a disaster. However, many will not and, particularly in the case of major disasters, the national authority may request external assistance from the United Nations (UN) or from other international actors. For larger emergencies, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) may mobilise a UN disaster assessment and coordination team to meet international needs for early information and coordination during the first phase of an emergency.

**DFID initial assessment**

3.7. In parallel with the national and UN processes, DFID will make its own initial assessment, complemented by information from Her Majesty’s (HM) representative and other sources, including the military, where appropriate. Providing access to military intelligence material, such as infrastructure dependency analysis\textsuperscript{43} may be particularly useful to DFID staff. The DFID humanitarian assessment will include four main topics that consider:

• whether to intervene;
• the nature and scale of the intervention;
• prioritisation and allocation of resources; and
• programme design and planning.

\textsuperscript{41} Geospatial information includes aeronautical, geographical, hydrographical, oceanographical and meteorological information.

\textsuperscript{42} This may take the form of infrastructure dependency analysis which adds context to the geospatial information dataset and generates engineering intelligence on the situation.

\textsuperscript{43} This is a process by which all available information about the physical environment within an area of operation is collated, sifted and analysed. This is a scalable process that can be applied from continent/country scale down to individual facility. The process enhances situational awareness and supports decision-making and planning development. It can be carried out in the UK, and the results passed forward.
3.8. A guide to the DFID initial disaster impact assessment, which outlines the initial information necessary for a humanitarian assessment, is at Annex B. The topics for consideration include:

- general information, including disaster type, secondary hazards, weather and climate, and area affected;
- the size of population affected;
- public health, including hospitals, medical centres and pharmacies;
- shelter;
- water and sanitation;
- transport, including roads, railways and rivers, as well as vehicles;
- infrastructure;
- food;\(^45\)
- power supply, including fuel for heating/cooking;
- communications;
- search and rescue;
- law and order, including force protection issues; and
- initial responses.

Assessment factors

3.9. At the core of humanitarian relief are the priorities of saving lives, reducing suffering and protecting dignity. A number of factors contribute to an accurate assessment.

a. **Distinguishing between emergency and chronic needs.** Most developing countries have long-standing chronic needs across multiple sectors. Assessment teams must differentiate between what is ‘normal’ for the location and what is a direct result of the disaster so that the relief effort can be directed to those most in need. Addressing existing chronic needs is outside the scope of a disaster relief operation. However, waiting for a needs assessment is not necessary before instating action such as preventing gender-based violence and reproductive health support.

b. **Timeliness.** A balance must be struck between the need for in-depth assessments to adequately inform decision-making and rapid assessment to initiate the response.\(^46\)

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\(^44\) *Humanitarian Needs Assessment and Decision-making*, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

\(^45\) Note the requirement to consider religious/environmental restrictions on certain types of food.

\(^46\) See paragraph 3.20, force generation.
c. **Coordination.** DFID assessments should be conducted with reference to the assessment activities of other humanitarian actors, so that the lead authority can prioritise across the whole relief response. In practice, the timely collation and analysis of information, disaggregated by sex, age and disability, remains one of the biggest challenges in humanitarian response, particularly where disasters have disrupted host-nation communication infrastructures. The passage of this information back to the UK – potentially using UK military systems – should therefore be considered, to allow collation and analysis to take place. A UN-led cluster system will be established and the cluster leads will centralise information.  

47  See paragraph 2.36b for further details.

48  The standards can be accessed at [http://www.sphereproject.org](http://www.sphereproject.org)

Wherever possible DFID will describe needs using objective standards, such as the Sphere Standards.

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d. **Description of need.** DFID should ensure that assessment data is quantified and relevant to humanitarian priorities, as this data will form the baseline against which progress is measured. Wherever possible DFID will describe needs using objective standards, such as the Sphere Standards. The Sphere Standards are a set of universal minimum humanitarian standards covering such themes as water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, shelter and health services which aim to focus the effectiveness of humanitarian relief and help to make humanitarian agencies more accountable.

e. **Needs and vulnerabilities.** The humanitarian community refers to ‘needs, vulnerabilities and coping capacities’. ‘Needs’ are immediate requirements for survival (food, water, shelter and medical) and are assessed after an incident has occurred. ‘Vulnerabilities’ are potential threats and factors that increase the risks to a population. Vulnerabilities can be assessed both before and during an emergency and are expressed in terms of their origins (physical/material, social/organisational or motivational/attitudinal).

f. **Coping capacities.** The means and resources that the affected population can mobilise to address their own needs and vulnerabilities are referred to as ‘capacities’. An accurate assessment of needs and vulnerabilities measured against coping capacities provides a way of:

- preventing an escalation of the emergency in which today’s vulnerabilities become tomorrow’s needs;
- targeting assistance to the most vulnerable groups; and
- helping towards a sustainable recovery based on local resources and institutions.
Field assessment

3.10. In the very early days of a response a DFID team may conduct a field assessment. If the initial DFID humanitarian assessment determines that military support is likely to be needed then DFID should request support through the Operations Directorate. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) may dispatch an operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT) from the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) at the request of DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) or independently as a contingency measure. Ideally, a joint-departmental reconnaissance team should be formed, benefiting from the subject matter expertise held within the respective departments and supported by the secure communications available to the OLRT. A useful contact for initial military liaison in advance of deploying an OLRT, could be the defence attaché of the affected country’s embassy or consulate in London.49

Military intelligence liaison officer

3.11. PJHQ may request the deployment of a military intelligence liaison officer (MILO) to provide an additional information gathering source in country. MILO’s are trained as Defence Attachés and can provide assistance to HM representative and, if present, the resident Defence Attaché. MILO’s may be granted temporary diplomatic status.

Media profile

3.12. To avoid raising public expectations about a military response, PJHQ J950 should ensure that military involvement within the disaster assessment process is carried out with a low media profile, and coordinated with DFID, who, as the lead department, will be responsible for the media strategy. While media interest should not be allowed to directly influence military analysis and planning, commanders and their staffs must be prepared to deal with considerable media interest.

Commanders and their staffs must be prepared to deal with considerable media interest

49 Noting that not all countries have a permanent diplomatic presence in the UK.
50 PJHQ J9 division is an integrated team of civil servant and military professionals who are expert in the management of policy, presentational and legal risks and issues relating to current and future operations.
Section 2 – Planning

Contingency planning

3.13. The MOD conducts UK contingency planning for military involvement in disaster relief operations, in consultation with the FCO and DFID. Plans may be drawn from a number of sources including one or more of the following.

a. **Civil plans.** DFID and the FCO will be involved in generating a range of generic and bespoke plans for use in potential disaster areas. Where possible, this activity should take place in close cooperation with the host nation.

   (1) **Post emergency and civil contingency plans.** All diplomatic missions have a generic crisis management plan providing staff instructions for the response to a disaster or major incident involving UK eligible persons. Post emergency plans may be supplemented with annexes for specific disasters to which a nation may be prone. Some missions in countries that may face risks leading to an evacuation of UK eligible persons will also hold a crisis management plan with a separate annex for conducting an evacuation.\(^{51}\)

   (2) **National disaster management plan.** Many countries and regions where the risk of natural disaster is high have established planning cells which routinely exercise responses to a disaster. These cells may be developed within a specific ministry or agency, supported by UN and DFID funding, to build an indigenous capacity to prevent or mitigate the effects of disaster. Ideally, the ministry or agency should be capable of providing warning of and reporting on a disaster and also act as the focal point for an international response. The Defence Attaché will have a key role in liaising with host countries for this type of activity.

   (3) **Pre-event planning support.** One area where many countries are happy to take military advice is in pre-event planning and analysis. This can be delivered through the Defence Attaché in an exercise format allowing the expertise of both regular and reserve forces to be leveraged. It provides a ‘scrub’ to existing plans of both the host nation and PJHQ.

b. **Military plans.** PJHQ prepare and update military contingency plans on formal direction from the MOD.\(^{52}\) The detail contained in the plan will vary with

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\(^{51}\) For more information see JDP 3-51, *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*.

\(^{52}\) For more information see JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*. 
the likelihood of its use and its update cycle. In increasing level of detail, the two types of plan are detailed below.

(1) Joint planning guides. Joint planning guides contain general planning data for a particular region, country or type of operation, such as a disaster relief or non-combatant evacuation operation, which can be used as the basis for more detailed planning during an emerging crisis.

(2) Joint contingency plans. Joint contingency plans will be prepared for specific situations where there is a likelihood of a crisis or problem which might affect UK interests, or when the anticipated warning time is reduced. In addition to planning data, joint contingency plans contain the UK’s strategic objectives and desired end-state, together with the force capabilities required and deployment options, including readiness states where appropriate. PJHQ will refine the joint contingency plan prior to implementation to take account of the situation as a crisis develops.

Command and control

3.14. In the majority of cases the command and control arrangements for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief will be joint although there are some exceptions when a nominated front line command may be responsible. The most likely command and control framework when deployed will be through the civil-military coordination cell operating under the regional coordinator (usually UN OCHA).

3.15. An important consideration for effective command and control is to establish, develop and maintain a comprehensive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief network. Building relationships with key stakeholders prior to any disaster occurring will contribute to a more agile, focused and ultimately effective response.

Intelligence publications

3.16. Civil and military plans are supported by defence profiles and infrastructure briefing memoranda, prepared and updated by Defence Intelligence. The defence profiles includes military intelligence information, including local force composition and capability, whilst the infrastructure briefing memoranda provides data such as climate, topography and civil infrastructure. Additionally, the Joint Forces Intelligence Group, part of Defence Intelligence, may be able to provide geospatial products including mapping and geographic research information papers and can be tasked to provide specific products, for example, lines of communication status or extent of flooding.
The Defence Crisis Management Organisation

3.17. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) coordinates input from the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Head Office, Joint Forces Command, PJHQ, Director Special Forces and the single-Service commands. The DCMO is the focus for providing Defence advice within the Government’s overall management and resolution of crises. It provides the conduit for all briefings to ministers and directs and monitors deployed commands. The DCMO process applies equally to a disaster relief operation as it does to other operations. Although the overall planning process is sequential, much of the activity occurs concurrently as an iterative process that can be compressed to address the scale and urgency of the situation. The process is outlined below.\(^\text{53}\)

a. As indications of a developing crisis emerge, analysis will take place within several government departments. Within the MOD the Chiefs of Staff Committee directs the formation of a current operations group or a strategic planning group. In practice, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) will normally initiate the current operations group or strategic planning group and will assess the need to brief the Chiefs of Staff Committee. A strategic planning group may also be formed at the discretion of the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations). The life-span of the strategic planning group and the periodicity of its meetings will be governed by the situation. It will inevitably be bespoke, its remit and exact composition being dependent on the scale and nature of a crisis.

b. The strategic planning group (coordinated by Military Strategic Planning) conducts a political/military estimate in consultation with other government departments and stakeholders as a basis for informing the political strategic assessment across Government. The political strategic assessment is a cross-government process and is not the sole responsibility of any single department but will be formed from a number of contributions. It seeks to facilitate a definition of UK’s national intent in addressing a crisis situation. This analysis will also provide initial strategic planning guidance to the Joint Commander, usually Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) at PJHQ, issued as a Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS’s) Planning Directive. Planning may begin based upon the receipt of a warning order or inferred, rather than explicit, direction to expedite the process through concurrent activity.

c. Once agreement on the principle of UK military involvement has been reached, PJHQ (supported by MOD staff, front line commands and DFID) will conduct a military strategic estimate. The output of this estimate forms the

\(^{53}\) A full explanation is in JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.
basis of detailed advice for ministers on the military options available, the
nature and scale of forces required, the implications and likely costs, and a
recommended course of action.

d. Once ministers have approved the preferred option, CDS issues a directive
(drawn up by Military Strategic Planning) to the Joint Commander. This
should include command and control arrangements, joint operations area
and resources required. While CJO has responsibility for the deployment,
sustainment and recovery of the force, a deployed operational-level
commander, usually the Joint Task Force Commander, will have responsibility
for command and control of forces in theatre. The Joint Task Force Commander
will conduct an operational estimate. The output of this planning is issued to
subordinates as a set of directives, orders and plans.

Preparatory actions

3.18. During the estimate process, deductions may emerge which require action in
advance of a formal directive, such as:

- procuring shipping and airlift;
- tasking air or space reconnaissance;
- tasking environmental and infrastructure analysis; and
- deploying liaison teams.

Such preparatory actions need careful consideration. They may have political,
financial, security and presentational implications, may impact on overall capability
or indicate a premature level of commitment and thereby unnecessarily raise
expectations of military participation in support of disaster relief efforts. However,
where appropriate, preparatory actions may be essential for a swift and effective
response.

Section 3 – Planning considerations

3.19. The key planning considerations for disaster relief operations are described
in this section. In addition, Annex C provides a detailed checklist for planning and
conducting a disaster relief operation. This framework may be used to facilitate the
dialogue between humanitarian organisations and military forces that must precede
support to any disaster relief effort. There is significant overlap between Annex B
(DFID initial assessment) and Annex C (MOD planning checklist), and both guides
should be used in parallel to help inform a comprehensive military analysis.
Force generation

3.20. One advantage of the military is the ability to deploy some elements relatively quickly once the formal decision to deploy has been made. It should also be noted, however, that in some instances civilian assets may be both quicker and cheaper than the military equivalent (for example, contractor supplied airlift). Forces will normally be drawn from those assigned to the NATO Response Force (NRF) or the UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). These rapidly deployable elements include maritime, land, air and logistic forces held at short notice to move ranging from 24 hours to 30 days.

**Already deployed forces, Dominica 2015**

Tropical Storm Erika hit the Caribbean island of Dominica on 27 August 2015. The British support ship, Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Lyme Bay was tasked by the Department for International Development to offer assistance to the communities of Coulibistrie, Colihaut, Dublanc and Bioche which had been severely damaged by a combination of flash flooding, mudslides, landslides and rock falls. In addition, most of the communities had been left inaccessible, following the erosion of major transport routes.

RFA Lyme Bay was stationed in the Caribbean during the hurricane season and as part of its primary tasking acted as a first responder in the event of a disaster in the region. The ship is specifically designed to land large numbers of troops and equipment ashore into unprepared areas and was therefore ideally suited to offer assistance to the island. The ship was equipped with disaster relief stores that included bedding, shelter, torches and stretchers, as well as considerable supplies of fresh water. Also onboard was a Lynx Mk 8 helicopter which conducted an early aerial survey of the region. Within hours of arriving the Commanding Officer led the disaster management team on to the island to take part in a crisis briefing at the National Emergency Operations Centre.
3.21. Already deployed forces, particularly naval forces with their sustainability and reach, command and control abilities, disaster relief training and, frequently, organic air assets, may also be available. Additionally, there may be other discrete capabilities that can make a significant impact in the disaster situation such as medical or infrastructure assessment subject matter experts. Military planners should bring these capabilities and the warning times required for the Joint Task Force to the attention of DFID at the earliest opportunity. The warning time is the period before the Joint Task Force is ready to conduct operations and consists of the decision, readiness, deployment and in-theatre preparation times. The information received from the timely use of reconnaissance assets may have a direct impact on subsequent force generation and could, in some circumstances, remove the need for deploying a larger (and more expensive) force.

**Notice to move**

3.22. MOD promulgates notice to move for all military assets. Some elements may be able to generate capacity to fulfil a disaster relief operation role ahead of a declared notice to move. Early ministerial agreement to a reduction of notice to move, redeployment of assets, sailing of ships and the recovery of aircraft may be essential for the timely support to an international disaster response effort. The cost implications of this should be considered early and the cross-departmental financial arrangements agreed.

**Budgetary constraints**

3.23. DFID funding for humanitarian operations is governed by legal constraints in the form of the International Development Act 2002. Funding is based on providing a capability to meet humanitarian needs. The budget for the force will therefore be restricted to that which is strictly necessary. Hence, force generation will need to be carefully managed to ensure that no superfluous capacity is included.

**Legal issues**

3.24. Legal factors that might arise during the operation should be identified and addressed during the planning phase. For example, in addition to the legal basis for the operation and rules governing the use of force and arrangements for the physical safety and protection of UK forces, there may also be contractual, duty of care and related liability issues.\(^{54}\) Timely advice and advance planning can reduce the associated risk.

\(^{54}\) This also includes the need to comply with necessary legislation and guidelines, for example, complying with engineering standards for construction and the safe storage of explosives, fuel or food.
Sustainability

3.25. Host-nation support to deployed forces must not undermine the state’s own ability to cope with the emergency. Therefore, a deployed force may have to be self-sufficient or seek alternative sources of support. PJHQ should determine the extent of host-nation support at an early stage, as this will influence the size and make-up of the deployed force. Furthermore, DFID and PJHQ must ensure that the host nation is fully engaged and not marginalised in the planning process. Competition for resources, deconfliction and cooperation with the relief responses of other nations and organisations will be important considerations during planning.

Multifunctional issues

3.26. Depending on the capacity of the affected state’s coping mechanism, and the degree of humanitarian coordination, it may be necessary for the Joint Task Force Commander to establish direct liaison in separate areas of government, including local security forces, airspace control and port authorities, as well as with individual centres of humanitarian coordination and other nations’ military forces. However, wherever possible, coordination should be done through DFID and the international system, normally headed by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, humanitarian coordinator or UN OCHA.

Communications

3.27. Successful integration will rely on good communication. While operational security will not normally be paramount in permissive operations and the majority of information will be from public sources, there may be a need to pass sensitive data, particularly in less stable environments. In addition to military communications, there will be a critical need to communicate with the civilian sector to achieve integrated support for the relief effort. PJHQ should not rely on commercial bearers, particularly within the affected state, as the primary means of communication. PJHQ will coordinate identifying and providing military communications to support disaster relief operations, supported by the front line commands. The military may need an ability to access all partner access networks (APANs).

Information activities

3.28. Communicating the narrative and ensuring our words and actions are integrated to support a disaster relief operation is vital and strategic communication must be an integral part of its strategy and design. At the strategic level, information

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55 See Joint Doctrine Note 1/12, Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution.
activities\textsuperscript{56} should consider promoting assistance and agreement of neighbouring and other participating nations in the disaster area. Within the operational area, information activities should aim to reinforce or deter specific types of behaviour by affecting an approved audience’s will. The information operations staff will coordinate the delivery of information activities by capabilities such as psychological operations, electronic warfare, cyber, media and activities such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), key leader engagement and presence, posture and profile. Initial reconnaissance should include specialists able to carry out target audience analysis. The following should be considered when planning information activities.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Reassurance of the local population while ensuring that the national authorities can take the appropriate level of credit.
  \item[b.] Reassurance of the local population that military intervention does not have hostile intent.
  \item[c.] Encouragement of regional cooperation and involvement in reconstruction efforts.
  \item[d.] Dissuasion of criminal or destabilising activity, for example, looting or political opportunism.
  \item[e.] Delivery of relief activities information to news media to promote understanding and support for the military operations, within the context of the civilian-led relief effort.
  \item[f.] Coordination of influence activities with other participating relief-delivering nations and organisations.
  \item[g.] Preparing target audiences to accept the exit strategy.
  \item[h.] Participation of CIMIC and media operations staff in engaging and liaising with other government departments, media, local authorities, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.
\end{itemize}

\section*{National Information Strategy}

3.29. The National Information Strategy, formulated by the across-government Information Strategy Group, must consider the points of view of the:

\textsuperscript{56} AJP-3.10, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations}, defines information activities as: \textit{actions designed to affect information or information systems. Information activities can be performed by any actor and include protection measure}. 
Military analysis, humanitarian assessment and planning

- stricken state or regional population;
- international community; and
- UK domestic audience.

All involved departments, including the Cabinet Office, should agree media lines that set out the UK Government’s policy on the disaster response; in most cases, DFID will lead this process, unless there are specific aspects of UK interest which dictate a Cabinet Office lead. Regular inter-departmental contact and dissemination of these lines throughout the chain of command will be necessary, ensuring a coherent message is communicated to the media. In particular, experience has shown that MOD and DFID respective funding responsibilities can be misreported as a source of tension between the departments. Therefore, the financial charging regime should be made clear to the media. Disaster relief operations are dynamic and agreed media lines will need to evolve with the operation enabling personnel to react appropriately. Changes to media lines will also need to be communicated. Notwithstanding this, the lead department, normally DFID, must clear other department’s press statements before release.

Transition and termination

3.30. Commanders should formulate a transition and termination plan\(^{57}\) early, in conjunction with DFID and/or other humanitarian actors. Ideally, this should be based on the humanitarian gap, namely the difference between humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and the relief resources available to meet them, and should take into account the rate at which the shortfall is being addressed. The termination plan may be expressed as a date estimated from progress towards bridging the humanitarian gap or the achievement of certain criteria. However, the transition and termination plan will need to be reassessed as the operation progresses, taking account of international expectations and the damage that a perceived premature withdrawal could cause to the UK’s reputation. The MOD and DFID will need to consider funding and concurrency issues should an extension to the operation be proposed.

\(^{57}\) The transition and termination plan was previously known as the exit strategy.
Section 4 – Military capabilities

Effects and capabilities

3.31. The composition of a joint task force will depend on the available assets needed to meet the requirement. To achieve this the following military capabilities with potential disaster relief operation utility might be considered.

a. Air, land, sea or space survey/assessment and analysis, including infrastructure engineering, the use of satellites and geospatial information.

b. Movement of relief items, personnel or equipment supplied by donor countries to the stricken state. Given the time imperative the military contribution will in many instances involve strategic airlift.

c. Movement of relief items, personnel or equipment into or around the affected area.

d. Search and rescue.

e. Emergency support or repairs to vital infrastructure.

f. Design and construction of emergency facilities where other agencies are unable to do so.

g. Advice on logistics or service provision.

h. Specialist equipment or capabilities in logistics, maritime or air safety, and engineering, for example.

i. Additional capacity in planning, management or organisational skills.

j. Emergency medical treatment for victims and casualty evacuation.

k. Communications support and links, including strategic and secure communications.

l. Coherent and coordinated media/information operations.

m. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities can be a significant force multiplier to disaster relief operations with the ability to reach into remote or cut-off areas, vastly improving situational awareness and understanding. They can also be used to locate survivors.

n. Intelligence and security capabilities, together with threat advice, can be essential in helping to protect deployed military personnel.

o. Life support to other government departments in the field.
Specialist personnel

3.32. Figure 3.1 details a number of specialist personnel and niche capabilities which may have particular value in disaster relief operations and where relevant should be drawn to the attention of DFID at the earliest opportunity. This list is for illustrative purposes and is not exhaustive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialist personnel</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Engineering personnel include geospatial teams and specialists in water, wastewater, power, fuel, roads and bridges to aid analysis and assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Aeromedical teams from the Tactical Medical Wing, specialise in moving patients by air, and environmental health technicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
<td>77 Brigade provide a staff officer to support the Joint Force Headquarters and a CIMIC support team on very high readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint media operations</td>
<td>Joint media operations teams from the Defence Media Operations Centre can deploy and run a press information centre and provide stills and broadcast-quality video.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic planning</td>
<td>Logistic planning staff may be offered to augment UN Joint Logistic Centre staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air movement</td>
<td>Personnel from 1 Air Movements Wing, specialise in loading and unloading personnel and freight from the Royal Air Force air transport fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter support</td>
<td>Mobile air operations teams provide the reconnaissance for, and support the establishment and operation of, helicopter landing sites. The Joint Helicopter Support Unit specialises in helicopter handling and underslung load operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist communications</td>
<td>Specialist communications personnel can provide secure strategic communications. This may be provided from ships using their existing communications infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1 – Specialist personnel and capabilities for disaster relief operations

Cultural, historical and political considerations

3.33. In matching resources to effects it is necessary to consider cultural, historical and political implications. Host nation defence attachés based in London, or members of the relevant diaspora may be a useful source of advice on local perceptions and potential reactions.
Key points

• Within an integrated approach, commanding military forces does not necessarily confer command or control of the overall situation; this is particularly applicable for disaster relief operations.

• At the core of humanitarian relief are the priorities of saving lives, reducing suffering and protecting dignity.

• The Ministry of Defence conducts UK contingency planning for military involvement in disaster relief operations, in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development (DFID).

• The Defence Crisis Management Organisation coordinates input from the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Head Office, Joint Forces Command, Permanent Joint Headquarters, Director Special Forces and the single-Service commands.

• One advantage of the military is the ability to deploy some elements relatively quickly once the formal decision to deploy has been made.

• Legal factors that might arise during the operation should be identified and addressed during the planning phase.

• Host-nation support to deployed forces must not undermine the state’s own ability to cope with the emergency.

• Communicating the narrative and ensuring our words and actions are integrated to support a disaster relief operation is vital and strategic communication must be an integral part of its strategy and design.

• Commanders should formulate a transition and termination plan early, in conjunction with DFID and/or other humanitarian actors.

• The composition of a joint task force will depend on the available assets needed to meet the requirement.

• There are a number of specialist personnel and niche military capabilities which may have particular value in disaster relief operations and where relevant should be drawn to the attention of DFID at the earliest opportunity.
Chapter 4 is primarily concerned with the execution phase of disaster relief operations. The chapter describes what specific military support may be available to this type of operation before examining the command and control framework and concluding with a short section on monitoring and evaluation.

Section 1 – Military support to disaster response . . 72
Section 2 – Command and control . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Section 3 – Monitoring and evaluation . . . . . . . 78
Operation PATWIN delivered considerable success, from tactical to strategic levels, and offers an exemplar of Defence's role in a supporting capacity to another government department.

Defence Operational Capability, Operational Lessons Report
Chapter 4 – Executing disaster relief operations

4.1. Disaster response has three principal stages.

   a. **Immediate life saving.** Search, rescue and medical first aid.

   b. **Relief operations.** Life preserving relief operations such as delivering aid to prevent the situation deteriorating.

   c. **Recovery.** Rehabilitation and reconstruction.

4.2. From the outset, military planners must consider the transition from the initial response to the relief and recovery phases. However, these stages are likely to overlap requiring a flexible response. Both the relief operations and recovery stages are likely to include work on preparedness to withstand future similar disasters. However, preparedness projects are unlikely to involve UK military personnel deployed on a disaster relief operation.
Section 1 – Military support to disaster response

Military involvement in disaster response

4.3. The military contribution to an international disaster relief effort can be split into the following six phases. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Pre-event engagement, assessment and advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Reconnaissance and assessment (military analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Mounting and deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>Supporting the relief efforts to meet basic needs and stabilise the situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>In extreme circumstances, and only if requested, assistance may be provided to restore the affected state’s capacity and critical infrastructure to a level that enables the state to resume full responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 6</td>
<td>Transition and termination, including collating post operational lessons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.1 – Six phases of an international disaster relief effort

Scope of the military role

4.4. Under all but exceptional circumstances, UK forces will be deployed in a supporting role and will not assume leadership of the overall response. This does not preclude UK forces supporting civil command and control or providing command and control infrastructure when necessary. However, wherever possible, maximum use of established infrastructure should be made to avoid UK forces becoming a hub upon which other agencies become reliant, thereby creating dependency and making it more difficult to redeploy. The Joint Task Force Commander will consult with the senior Department for International Development (DFID) representative to determine the effects required from military activities on the ground. Should circumstances on the ground require a substantial review of the envisaged operation or if significant additional costs are likely to be incurred, then the Joint Task Force Commander should seek guidance from DFID and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)/Ministry of Defence (MOD).
Timeline

4.5. The military will often work on a much shorter timeline than their civilian counterparts. In many cases there will be pressure for the military to deploy quickly and to provide upfront assistance before handing over roles and responsibilities to the civilian organisations and agencies that will have an enduring involvement. A pre-determined and controlled exit strategy should always be part of the initial military planning process. Figure 4.2 illustrates how all of the phases of a military deployment could sometimes be compressed into a small window; this could see a military transition out of the disaster area even before the civilian-led relief effort is fully underway.

![Figure 4.2 – Military and civilian disaster response timeline comparison](image)

Deployment

4.6. Appropriate air and/or sea platforms, possibly including civilian charter assets, will usually be required to deploy the force to and from the joint operations area. Given the time imperative of disaster relief operations, this is most likely to be strategic airlift, particularly when forces are deployed from the UK.
Mobility

4.7. Mobility assets will be force multipliers, particularly airlift, helicopters\(^{58}\) and maritime assets; the latter could include ships for bulk transfer, amphibious units, small craft and hovercraft in littoral or riverine environments. When airports are unusable, the sea may provide the only means of access. Indeed, maritime forces may sometimes be necessary to open airports.\(^{59}\)

Emergency relief stores

There are occasions when the inherent capability of all ships to support humanitarian disaster relief efforts needs to be enhanced by carrying additional emergency relief stores (ERS). There are two scales of ERS, large and small, and these are allocated to ships based on the operational requirement and perceived risk of disaster in the operating area. Deployed Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships often carry a large ERS pack, while deployed frigates and destroyers may hold a small ERS pack.\(^{60}\)

Strategic communication

4.8. Information operations staff will analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities to influence audiences. This comprises of three interrelated areas: preserving and protecting freedom of action; focusing on behaviours, perceptions and attitudes; and focussing on countering propaganda. The Information Activities Coordination Board is the forum for the coordination of information activities within a headquarters at the operational level and meets as a subset of the Joint Coordination Board. It will be important to understand the following information.

a. **Information operations.** In disaster situations there may be the potential for underlying tensions to be exacerbated by the intervention of UK forces and the presence, posture and profile\(^{61}\) of a joint task force must be considered. To mitigate this risk it is essential to communicate a clear and simple intent for the joint task force which will ensure that the purpose of UK actions are understood by all involved including: the stricken state government; local population; humanitarian actors; and joint task force personnel. Delivering assistance must be, and must be perceived to be, impartial. The impartial distribution of assistance, based on the criteria of need, should enhance the perceived legitimacy of the deployed forces amongst both the local population.

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58 This will include assets from Joint Helicopter Command and Navy Command, including Joint Helicopter Force Headquarters.

59 This occurred in Grenada in 2004 and in the Turks and Caicos in 2008.

60 The point of contact for any queries relating to emergency relief stores is SO2 N4 Operational Logistics in Navy Command Headquarters.

61 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00, *Campaign Execution*. 
and humanitarian actors. Conversely, any failure to act, and be seen to act, impartially is likely to impact adversely on the credibility of the force, and may well be detrimental to the overall security of the wider relief effort.

b. **Media operations.** It is important that the military contribution to a disaster response is presented as part of an integrated UK Government approach. Media activity will be directed and coordinated by the media office of the lead department, for example, DFID. Media activities in theatre should emphasise that UK military assets are present supporting other agencies responding to the relief effort. The media policy should also include details on social media as this can be particularly relevant to disaster relief operations. Media operations staff should consider the dignity of the stricken population at all times (see paragraphs 1.34, 3.12 and 3.27).

c. **Civil-military cooperation.** Effective civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) will be pivotal to the successful integration of civil and military elements. In large relief operations, the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) will usually deploy a UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) cell, which should negate the need to establish separate CIMIC centres. Wherever possible, national CIMIC staff should be UN-CMCoord trained. The key to successful cooperation and coordination is for UK military operations centres to integrate effectively into existing civil coordination infrastructure. This will enhance the ability of leaders to prioritise, allocate and undertake tasks, with a view to withdrawing military forces as soon as coping mechanisms have recovered. This will help to maintain unity of effort and avoid the inadvertent creation of a parallel military relief effort setting its own priorities.
EXECUTING DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

Do no harm

4.9. All those involved in humanitarian interventions must be guided by the principle to do no harm. The Joint Task Force Commander, in consultation with DFID, should ensure that activities will not exacerbate any existing conflict or tensions, nor harm or endanger the intended beneficiaries of assistance, or undermine other response mechanisms.

Section 2 – Command and control

Operational chain of command

4.10. Once ministers have authorised preparations for a disaster relief operation overseas, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) will appoint a joint commander, who will exercise operational command. This will normally be the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), particularly when PJHQ is the operational headquarters. However, there may be occasions when it is appropriate to give responsibility to a front line command commander-in-chief. The Joint Commander will then appoint a Joint Task Force Commander, or National Contingent Commander if it is a multinational operation, who will exercise operational control and will command forces allocated to the operation, normally from a Joint Task Force Headquarters deployed in the designated joint operations area. The size and location of the headquarters will depend on the situation.

Tactical command

4.11. Normally UK military support to the DFID disaster response effort will be of sufficiently small scale that the Joint Task Force Commander will exercise direct command over assigned forces. However, there may be occasions when individual component commands are required.

Advance force command and control

4.12. Assigned UK forces already deployed close to the disaster region prior to the initiation of a disaster relief operation should normally be placed under operational control of the Joint Task Force Commander. This should be done as soon as they are in a position to assume command.

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62 Within PJHQ the Joint Mounting Cell is responsible for deploying, sustaining and recovering UK joint forces.

63 Further details can be found in JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine, and JDP 3-00, Campaign Execution.
Military command and control

4.13. The military command and control relationships for a disaster relief operation overseas, where PJHQ has the MOD lead, is shown at Figure 4.3.

4.14. In certain circumstances, such as when DFID only requires strategic sea or air transport or when a front line command has responsibility, the military tasking chain will shorten as shown at Figure 4.4. Front line commands must keep PJHQ informed in case the requirement escalates and the commitment evolves into a joint operation.
DFID representative/Joint Task Force Commander relationship

4.15. The senior DFID representative will be responsible for passing advice to the Joint Task Force Commander on providing support to the DFID disaster response effort. Whenever possible, either the Joint Task Force Commander or their deputy should collocate with the senior DFID representative\(^{64}\) ensuring detailed coordination of the military input to the wider relief effort. However, the Joint Task Force Commander remains responsible for executing the UK military operation.

Defence Attachés

4.16. For those countries that have them, the Defence Attaché will be a critical link in pulling together a coordinated military effort. Defence Attachés will represent and promote UK Defence-related interests in their respective countries in support of Defence diplomacy and wider UK interests. Of particular importance are regional security trends and peace and security issues which could lead to the commitment or involvement of UK forces. A detailed knowledge and experience of their respective countries, together with their networks of key stakeholders, will be invaluable in assisting with the planning and deployment of military force elements as part of a disaster response. During a crisis the Defence Attachés may embed themselves within the Multinational Military Coordination Centre or the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre. The Defence Attaché will also act as the senior UK military commander on the ground until such time as they are relieved by a deployed force commander.\(^{65}\)

Section 3 – Monitoring and evaluation

4.17. The monitoring and evaluation of the humanitarian response to a disaster, including the military contribution, is necessary to gauge the effectiveness of the relief effort in meeting victims’ needs and to provide a baseline for progress. In military terms this is known as assessment.\(^{66}\) However, to avoid confusion with the civilian assessment process described in Chapter 3, it is described here as monitoring and evaluation. The military may be useful for assessing the most immediate needs at the beginning of a response. Although this will be fairly coarse, in comparison with some of the more sophisticated civilian processes, using the existing military

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\(^{64}\) The senior DFID representative should have the appropriate security clearances.

\(^{65}\) Regional British Defence Staffs (where formed) are established and may be able to provide additional assistance from a regional perspective in support of a Defence Attaché. The senior British Defence Staff representative could take command if the situation expanded beyond a single country.

\(^{66}\) See JDP 3-00, Campaign Execution.
command and control chain can be used to help inform decision-making at an early stage before other agencies and methods have been properly established.

**Standards**

4.18. Awareness of, and adherence to, consistent standards in response to humanitarian emergencies will increase the effectiveness of the overall relief effort. Effective and consistent standards will simplify the task of evaluation, eliminate anomalies such as varying quality and quantity of humanitarian relief and will enable greater unity of effort and more efficient resource allocation. A set of minimum standards for delivering humanitarian relief exists in the form of the Sphere Standards (see paragraph 3.9d), which should be used as the basis for providing support to the relief effort, particularly if involved in the direct delivery of aid to an affected population.  

**Measurement of activity and effect**

4.19. The Joint Task Force Commander should ensure that measurement of activity (MOA) and measurement of effect (MOE) are agreed with DFID, where possible standardising reporting formats. The Military Strategic Effects division routinely assess MOE as part of the initial process of drafting a strategic communications actions and effects framework (SCAEF). Suitably crafted MOA/MOE can help to put a humanitarian emergency into perspective by comparing pre- and post-disaster states. For example, changes in morbidity and mortality rates, if available, are good indicators of progress in relieving human suffering. The amount of water supplied to a refugee camp *versus* the total requirement, or the number of tents erected *versus* people without shelter, are good indicators of the sufficiency of support towards overall relief effort objectives.

4.20. Measurements of activity and effect may also expose emerging problems, permitting early decisions on when and where to shift effort during the iterative planning process. In parallel with the wider effort, the Joint Task Force Commander may wish to establish their own, bespoke, MOA/MOE to assist them in managing the military contribution. MOA/MOE can also assist in establishing and assessing exit criteria and the Joint Task Force Commander should ensure that measurements are linked into an overall campaign effectiveness assessment.

67 The standards can be accessed at [http://www.sphereproject.org](http://www.sphereproject.org)
Key points

• From the outset military planners must consider the transition from the initial response to the relief and recovery phases.

• Under all but exceptional circumstances, UK forces will be deployed in a supporting role and will not assume leadership of the overall response.

• Information operations staff will analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities to influence audiences.

• Once ministers have authorised preparations for a disaster relief operation, the Chief of the Defence Staff will appoint a joint commander, who will exercise operational command.

• Normally UK military support to the Department for International Development (DFID) disaster response effort will be of sufficiently small scale that the Joint Task Force Commander will exercise direct command over assigned forces.

• The senior DFID representative will be responsible for passing advice to the Joint Task Force Commander on providing support to the DFID disaster response effort.

• For those countries that have them, the Defence Attaché will be a critical link in pulling together a coordinated military effort.
Annex A – Types of disaster

A.1. Some common disaster types are listed below. This list is not exhaustive, but is illustrative to aid planning and decision-making.

a. **Geological.** Earthquake, landslide, tsunami and volcanic eruption.

b. **Climatic.** Drought, flood, tropical cyclone/hurricane and wildfire.

c. **Man-made.** Chemical and industrial accident.

d. **Secondary hazards.** Additional hazards caused as a direct result of the initial hazard. For example, an earthquake may cause flooding, fire, landslides and disease.

e. **Secondary effects.** Mass population movement (caused by geological, climatic, man-made disasters or conflict).

### Geological hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors contributing to vulnerability</th>
<th>Typical adverse effects</th>
<th>Typical needs post-disaster onset[^68]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>Casualties – often high, particularly near the epicentre or in highly-populated areas. Fracture injuries are the most widespread problem. Secondary threats of communicable diseases due to flooding, contaminated water supply or breakdown in sanitary conditions.</td>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Location of settlements in seismic areas</td>
<td>• Physical damage – damage to key structures and infrastructure.</td>
<td>Medical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rigid structures not resistant to ground motion</td>
<td>• Water supply – severe problems likely due to damage to water systems.</td>
<td>Disaster assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dense collections of buildings with high occupancy</td>
<td>• Waste disposal – loss of sewerage/effluent disposal.</td>
<td>Food, water and shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Repair and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mobility assets (rotary-wing and vehicles)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^68]: Note that all typical needs will be informed by the need for information, understanding and situational awareness (which may be in short supply with host nation).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors contributing to vulnerability</th>
<th>Typical adverse effects</th>
<th>Typical needs post-disaster onset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landslide</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Search and rescue</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Settlements built on steep slopes, soft soils and cliff tops</td>
<td>- Casualties – fatalities or injuries due to landslide.</td>
<td><strong>Medical assistance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Settlements built at the base of steep slopes and on mouths of streams from mountain valleys</td>
<td>- Physical damage – anything on top of, or in the path of, landslide will suffer damage.</td>
<td><strong>Food, water and shelter</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Roads and communication lines in mountain areas</td>
<td>- Waste disposal – loss of sewerage/effluent disposal.</td>
<td><strong>Mobility assets (rotary-wing and vehicles)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Buildings with weak foundations</td>
<td>- Casualties – fatalities or injuries due to landslide.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Buried pipelines and brittle pipes</td>
<td>- Physical damage – anything on top of, or in the path of, landslide will suffer damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tsunami (seismic sea wave)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Warning and evacuation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Location of settlements in low-lying coastal regions</td>
<td>- Casualties – deaths principally by drowning and injuries from debris.</td>
<td><strong>Search and rescue</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack of tsunami resistant buildings</td>
<td>- Physical damage – resulting from the initial force of water and debris or follow-on flooding.</td>
<td><strong>Medical assistance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack of timely warning systems and evacuation plans</td>
<td>- Water supply – contamination by salt water and debris or sewerage may make water non-potable.</td>
<td><strong>Disaster assessment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack of public awareness of destructive forces of tsunamis</td>
<td>- Crops and food supply – harvest, food stocks, livestock, farm implements and fishing boats may be lost. Land may be rendered infertile due to salt-water incursion.</td>
<td><strong>Food, water and shelter</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Buried pipelines and brittle pipes</td>
<td>- Waste disposal – loss of sewerage/effluent disposal.</td>
<td><strong>Mobility assets (rotary-wing and vehicles)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors contributing to vulnerability</td>
<td>Typical adverse effects</td>
<td>Typical needs post-disaster onset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volcanic eruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Settlements on the flanks of volcanoes</td>
<td>• Casualties – death from pyroclastic flows, mud flows, lava flows and toxic gases. Injuries from falling rocks, burns, respiratory difficulties from gas or ash.</td>
<td>• Warning and evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Settlements in historic path of lava or mud flows</td>
<td>• Physical damage – complete destruction of everything in path of pyroclastic, mud and lava flows. Collapse of structures under weight of wet ash, flooding and blockage of roads or communication systems.</td>
<td>• Search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Structures with roof designs not resistant to ash accumulation</td>
<td>• Crops and food supply – destruction of crops in path of flows, ash may break tree branches, livestock may inhale toxic gas or ash. Grazing lands may be contaminated.</td>
<td>• Medical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presence of combustible materials</td>
<td>• Waste disposal – loss of sewerage/effluent disposal.</td>
<td>• Food, water and shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of evacuation plan or warning systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Relocation of affected population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobility assets (rotary-wing and vehicles)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Climatic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors contributing to vulnerability</th>
<th>Typical adverse effects</th>
<th>Typical needs post-disaster onset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drought</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Location in an arid area where dry conditions are increased by drought</td>
<td>• Casualties – deaths principally from deterioration of nutritional status. Secondary threat of disease.</td>
<td>• Measures for maintaining food security; price stabilisation, food subsidies and food distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Subsistence farming</td>
<td>• Water supply – reduction in drinking water sources.</td>
<td>• Develop livestock programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of seed reserves</td>
<td>• Crops and food supply – reduced income of farmers. Reduction of spending on agriculture. Increase in price of staple foods. Increase in inflation rate. Loss of livestock.</td>
<td>• Develop supplementary feeding programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of agricultural inputs to improve yields</td>
<td>• Migration.</td>
<td>• Develop complementary water and health programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Area dependent on rainfall weather system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Area of low soil moisture retention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of resources to cope with drought</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors contributing to vulnerability</td>
<td>Typical adverse effects</td>
<td>Typical needs post-disaster onset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Location of settlements on floodplains</td>
<td>• Casualties – deaths from drowning and deaths/injuries from debris. Secondary threats of communicable diseases due to flooding, contaminated water supply or breakdown in sanitary conditions.</td>
<td>• Search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of awareness of flooding hazard</td>
<td>• Physical damage – structures damaged by washing away, impact by floating debris and collapsing. Landslides from saturated soils.</td>
<td>• Medical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-resistant buildings and foundations</td>
<td>• Water supply – contamination of wells and ground water possible.</td>
<td>• Disaster assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High-risk infrastructure elements</td>
<td>• Crops and food supply – harvests and food stocks may be lost to inundation.</td>
<td>• Evacuation/relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unprotected food stocks, livestock and standing crops</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Short-term food, water and shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Water purification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Epidemiological surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tropical cyclone/hurricane</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Settlements located in low-lying coastal and adjacent areas</td>
<td>• Casualties – deaths from drowning/debris but relatively few serious injuries. Secondary threats of communicable diseases due to flooding, contaminated water supply or breakdown in sanitary conditions.</td>
<td>• Evacuation and emergency shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poor communications or warning system</td>
<td>• Physical damage – structures lost and damaged by wind force, flooding, storm surge and landslide.</td>
<td>• Search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lightweight structures, old construction and poor quality masonry</td>
<td>• Water supply – ground water may be contaminated.</td>
<td>• Medical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poorly protected infrastructure elements, fishing boats and maritime industries</td>
<td>• Crops and food supply – standing crops, food stocks and tree plantations ruined.</td>
<td>• Water purification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Re-establish logistical and communications networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Disaster assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Seeds for planting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Types of disaster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors contributing to vulnerability</th>
<th>Typical adverse effects</th>
<th>Typical needs post-disaster onset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wildfire</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Location of wildfire prone areas</td>
<td>• <strong>Casualties</strong> – effects of smoke and burns.</td>
<td>• Fire fighting resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wildfire threat tends to be seasonal</td>
<td>• <strong>Physical damage</strong> – can be very destructive, especially in loss of buildings, timber and livestock.</td>
<td>• Temporary shelters in safe havens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Speed of onset may vary depending on the climatic conditions</td>
<td>• <strong>Recovery</strong> – the effects on the environment may take several years to recover.</td>
<td>• If required, smoke masks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evacuation of communities may be difficult and dangerous in the face of a major fire front</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Fire spotting transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diseases and epidemics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disease and epidemics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proximity of population, structures, livestock and crops. Large-scale releases of airborne pollutants may spread for hundreds of kilometres</td>
<td>• <strong>Casualties</strong>.</td>
<td>• Medical assistance, facilities and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of safety features or lack of evacuation plan</td>
<td>• <strong>Public order breakdown.</strong></td>
<td>• Messaging/influence advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of awareness by vulnerable persons of the potential danger</td>
<td>• <strong>Starvation</strong> – exposure due to shutdown of critical infrastructure and services.</td>
<td>• Policing/law and order advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reluctance of vulnerable populations to leave homes and livelihoods, especially if danger is not immediately apparent</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Critical infrastructure assessment and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Endemic poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Water purification and distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of modern healthcare capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sanitised logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of clean water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural practices (for example, washing of the dead in Sierra Leone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Man-made hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors contributing to vulnerability</th>
<th>Typical adverse effects</th>
<th>Typical needs post-disaster onset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemical and industrial accident</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Proximity of population, structures, livestock and crops. Large-scale releases of airborne pollutants may spread for hundreds of kilometres  
  • Lack of safety features or lack of evacuation plan  
  • Lack of awareness by vulnerable persons of the potential danger  
  • Reluctance of vulnerable populations to leave homes and livelihoods, especially if danger is not immediately apparent | • **Casualties** – many people may be killed or injured and require medical attention. Industrial fires may spread toxic contaminants.  
  • **Physical damage** – may occur to structures and infrastructure.  
  • **Contamination** – of the air, water supply, land and animal life. | • Medical assistance  
  • Disaster assessment  
  • Evacuation/relocation  
  • Short-term food and water supplies  
  • Water purification  
  • Epidemiological surveillance |
| **Dam collapse**                      |                          |                                  |
| • Size of the dam  
  • Stability of the dam (includes design, underlying geology, age and level of maintenance in place)  
  • Collapse mechanism  
  • Stress on the dam, including, water level to rear, rate of flow/fill (weather) upstream  
  • Height of dam above sea level  
  • Populated areas in flood zone downstream  
  • Populated areas supplied by power from the dam  
  • Bridges and critical infrastructure in flood zone downstream  
  • Food production downstream of the dam  
  • Debris particle size in flood zone | • **Casualties** – drowning, blunt force trauma.  
  • **Disease** – water borne.  
  • **Physical damage** – may occur to structures and infrastructure.  
  • **Physical damage** – to crops/food supply.  
  • **Contamination** – of water supply.  
  • **Shortages** – of water, power and food.  
  • **Immobility and isolation** of people. | • Medical assistance  
  • Disaster assessment  
  • Evacuation/relocation  
  • Short-term food and water supplies  
  • Water purification  
  • Epidemiological surveillance  
  • Earth moving plant  
  • Emergency bridging  
  • Infrastructure/building assessment and repair |
## Secondary effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors contributing to vulnerability</th>
<th>Typical adverse effects</th>
<th>Typical needs post-disaster onset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass population movement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unwillingness of authorities to take measures to mitigate vulnerability</td>
<td>• <strong>Casualties</strong> – increased mortality rate due to poor food, sanitary and health conditions. Secondary diseases as a result of conditions.</td>
<td>• Food, water and shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inability to act to mitigate their own vulnerability</td>
<td>• <strong>Local destabilisation</strong> due to:</td>
<td>• Medical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited acknowledgement of their plight by international community</td>
<td>• overburden on infrastructure;</td>
<td>• Support to host infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited self-sufficiency</td>
<td>• increased tensions as a result of ethnic imbalances;</td>
<td>• Ameliorate impact on host population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No supporting infrastructure</td>
<td>• civil unrest and inter-communal violence; and</td>
<td>• Medium-term food security measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited means to generate income</td>
<td>• impact on economy and staple food supply.</td>
<td>• Medium-term feeding programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Medium-term water and health programmes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Types of disaster

Notes
Annex B – DFID 
humanitarian assessment: 
information requirements

Purpose of an initial disaster impact assessment

B.1. The overall purpose of an initial assessment is to identify:

- the impact a disaster has had on a society, and the ability of that society to 
cope;

- the most vulnerable populations (for example, women, children and the 
elderly) that need to be specifically targeted for assistance;

- the level of response by the affected country and its internal capacities to 
cope with the situation;

- damage to infrastructure, for example, hospitals, airstrips, ports, roads and 
bridges;

- secondary threats/hazards (dams, buildings that might collapse, pollution, 
fires and explosions, for example);

- the priorities of the affected population(s) and their preferred strategies for 
meeting them; and

- the level of response from other donor countries, United Nations (UN), 
relief organisations, private voluntary organisations, non-governmental 
organisations and international organisations.

B.2. After an impact assessment a more thorough assessment of needs will follow. 
These activities may be carried out concurrently by trained and experienced 
personnel if present. Otherwise the information provided here will enable experts 
located remotely to make a preliminary judgement on whether a response should 
be launched, what it should comprise and how it will be delivered. If necessary, 
specialists will deploy to a disaster zone to assist with the impact assessment to assess 
needs and to support the response.
B.3. It is important that the information provided is as accurate as possible and that the sources are documented. Where estimates are made these should be stated. It is important to keep situations under review and to update data as new information becomes available. It is advisable to leave space in assessment reports for updates, making it easier to record changes and retain immediate history (which may be the basis for decision making).

“......the information provided here will enable experts located remotely to make a preliminary judgement on whether a response should be launched, what it should comprise and how it will be delivered.”
# The initial impact assessment – checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What type of disaster is it?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What time did it occur?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where is the problem?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What locations have been affected?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the severity of the crisis in the different locations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a regional dimension to the emergency?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there more than one country involved?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was the population in the affected areas before the disaster (size, economic status and location of communities)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who has the most reliable and accurate information about what is going on?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the impact of the crisis on the government?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the expected response of the government and local authorities, if any?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the government formally requested international assistance?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What type of development or other aid programmes were, or are, operating in the area?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the present and forecast weather conditions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the reported numbers of dead, injured and missing persons?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have family members become separated? If so, how many?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the approximate number of people affected by the crisis (directly or indirectly)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are traditional coping mechanisms operating? If so, what are they?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DFID humanitarian assessment: information requirements

- **Are there especially vulnerable groups?**
  - How many?
  - Who are they?
  - Where are they?

- **Are people threatened because of age, gender or ethnic, political, religious or national identity?**

- **Is the host community assisting or able to assist those who are displaced?**

- **How many of those have been displaced by the emergency?**

- **Where have they gone?**
  (churches, schools, camps, friends and family?)

- **What type and quantity of possessions have people brought with them?**

- **Is the host community assisting or able to assist those who are displaced?**

- **If people have stayed in the affected areas, what kind of conditions are they living in?**

- **Do they have shelter, clothing, blankets, cooking utensils and so on?**

- **What are the immediate and obvious health problems?**
  - Wounds?
  - Disease?

- **Are health facilities functioning?**

- **Do people have access to food?**
  For example, cash to buy food and pay for transport to shops and markets?

- **Is food still locally available?**

- **Do people have access to safe drinking water? If not, why not?**

- **Where are people defecating?**
  - Is this the norm?

### Constraints

- **What are the security threats for the affected population and humanitarian actors?**

- **Is there fighting, landmines, banditry, blockades, rioting, natural hazards, secondary hazards, for example?**

- **Are there other impediments to access such as:**
  - damage to transport infrastructure;
  - political; or
  - cultural?
### Response

**Who is responding to the emergency and what are they doing?**

Responders may include the following:
- British High Commission
- British Embassy/Consulate
- Department for International Development (DFID)
- National/local government
- Civil defence
- Fire or rescue services
- Armed forces
- Red Cross/Crescent
- World Food Programme (WFP)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
- Non-governmental organisations or civil society organisations
- United Nations (UN) resident/humanitarian coordinator/resident representative
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)
- UN Disaster Management Team
- UN Country Team
- UN Equipo Técnico de Emergencias (UNETE)
- UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- UN Development Programme (UNDP)

Are you able to provide contact details of those responding?
Annex C – Disaster relief planning checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question/consideration</th>
<th>Supplementary questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What information is available?</td>
<td>• Has an assessment been conducted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is the information complete?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• On what is it based (substantive or anecdotal)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What information gaps are there?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the disaster?</td>
<td>• What is the state of civilian administration, infrastructure and national organs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the stricken state response mechanisms coping with the</td>
<td>• Is there a lead ministry/body?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impact of the emergency/disaster?</td>
<td>• What in-country contingency plans exist and what is the degree of their implementation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What is the role of national military and civil emergencies services?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the UK’s overall response?</td>
<td>• What assistance can be provided by the British High Commission/Embassy (including</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>briefs, facilitating accommodation, host-nation support, communications, interpreters,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for example)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Does the Department for International Development (DFID) have a country-office in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the embassy or elsewhere?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the UK Armed Forces’ role in supporting this</td>
<td>• Are there UK military assets in the immediate vicinity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response?</td>
<td>• Are there national or local sensitivities to foreign military involvement?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question/consideration</th>
<th>Supplementary questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Situation (continued)** | Have budgetary and financial planners been consulted from an early stage?  
• Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the disaster relief operation?  
• Are they delivering the most effective ‘value for money’?  
• What are the financial freedoms and constraints?  
• Is it stated in terms of working towards pre-emergency/disaster status?  
• Is the desired end-state sustainable by the stricken state and remaining humanitarian organisations contributing to the international relief effort?  
• What are the criteria for mission accomplishment, and transition and termination strategy (sensitive)? |
| **Mission** | What is the disaster relief operation mission?  
• Where and how big is the disaster area?  
• What is the level of continuing or emerging hazards?  
• What is the accessibility to and within the disaster area?  
  • Roads/bridges?  
  • Airfields/helicopter landing sites?  
  • Sea-ports?  
  • Anchorages, beaches and inland waterways?  
  • Satellite/fixed/mobile communications?  
• What are the impacts of weather and climate?  
  • On the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation?  
  • On aviation and air movement?  
  • On maritime operations?  
  • On deployed equipment?  
  • On logistics? |
| **Disaster environment** | What are the environmental impacts on the disaster relief operation?  
• Where and how big is the disaster area?  
• What is the level of continuing or emerging hazards?  
• What is the accessibility to and within the disaster area?  
  • Roads/bridges?  
  • Airfields/helicopter landing sites?  
  • Sea-ports?  
  • Anchorages, beaches and inland waterways?  
  • Satellite/fixed/mobile communications?  
• What are the impacts of weather and climate?  
  • On the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation?  
  • On aviation and air movement?  
  • On maritime operations?  
  • On deployed equipment?  
  • On logistics? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question/consideration</th>
<th>Supplementary questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factors/impacts/needs</td>
<td>How has the disaster impacted in relation to coping capacities? • What is the effect on/situation with respect to the following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The population?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Law and order?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public health?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Housing/shelter?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Water and sanitation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Transport infrastructure?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Food?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Communications and power supply?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the perceived need?</td>
<td>What is the perceived need? • Has a formal request for international assistance been lodged?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What has been requested?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster response</td>
<td>What are international community interests/aims? • What other agencies are responding?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What is their capability and level of response?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there a lead United Nations (UN) agency?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What coordination mechanisms and hierarchy are in place?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What centres/operations rooms and meetings schedules have been established?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there a UN Humanitarian Coordinator or UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team present?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are there any identifiable capability gaps?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What is the impact of the disaster on neighbouring countries and what is the degree of cross-border cooperation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the involved civil actors been engaged to offer</td>
<td>Have the involved civil actors been engaged to offer appropriate and relevant advice? • Who is setting relief priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appropriate and relevant advice?</td>
<td>• Who is tasking responding assets to meet the set priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How can UK Military assets best be integrated into the overall effort?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How are contributing actors communicating?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How well is the international relief effort complementing national efforts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question/consideration</td>
<td>Supplementary questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster response (continued)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| What in-theatre coordination is required? | • What are the humanitarian coordination mechanisms, hierarchy and responsibilities?  
• What are the liaison requirements – with the stricken state, other nations headquarters, humanitarian mechanisms?  
• Are interpreters required? |
| What other nation’s military assets are deployed/deploying? | • To what extent would other nation’s military capabilities complement or duplicate a UK military response?  
• Is there likely to be critical competition for resources, including real-estate? |
| How will military forces get into theatre? | • Can the stricken state infrastructure support the force?  
• Is a regional forward mounting base necessary? |
| What host-nation support is available? | • Can host-nation support be achieved regionally (from the forward mounting base)?  
• How self-sufficient will the force need to be?  
• How long will the logistics pipeline be? |
| **Force protection** | |
| What are the force protection issues? | • What needs to be protected and to what level?  
• What threat advice is available?  
• Is the carriage of weapons required and are the rules of engagement appropriate?  
• Whilst a nominally permissive environment, do rules of engagement reflect any civil tensions caused by the disaster, criminality and take account of stricken state security capabilities?  
• What are the potential health risks to deploying forces?  
• What medical support is necessary for own forces?  
• What is the requirement for immunisations (potentially time critical)?  
• Are there any residual risks from previous conflicts in terms of unexploded ordnance? |
<p>| <strong>Influence activities</strong> | |
| How can influence activities best support the mission? | • Have all target audiences been considered? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question/consideration</th>
<th>Supplementary questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influence activities (continued)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Is the influence being considered coherent? | • Has the activity of the UK military element been deconflicted/coordinated with that of other UK Government departments to achieve a coherent approach?  
• Are our influence activities coherent with that of the host nation? |
| What additional force elements are required to conduct influence activities? |  |
| **Time and space** |  |
| What are the necessary timelines to meet the humanitarian emergency/disaster response requirements? |  |
| **Legal and political** |  |
| What is the legal status of the disaster relief operation? | • What is the legal basis (or mandate) for the disaster relief operation?  
• Is there a status of force agreement (SOFA)? Is there a need for an exchange of letters?  
• What are the regional requirements, for example, forward mounting base, SOFA?  
• What are the rules governing the use of force?  
• What are the security implications for the disaster relief operation?  
• What host nation or other legal constraints will operate?  
• Is there provision of adequate, informed legal advice to commanders? |
| What are the political constraints? |  |
| **Media** |  |
| What are the media handling principles and procedures? | • Are these agreed with the Department for International Development (DFID)?  
• Have coherent press lines been agreed?  
• Has the media-handling requirement been assessed? |
| **Communications** |  |
| What are the communication requirements to support the operation? | • Are secure communications required?  
• Is UK equipment compatible with other key actors? |
| **Life support** |  |
| What is the joint task force’s own life support requirements? (This drives location, force package and host-nation support) |  |
### Annex D – Military capabilities

The following UK military capabilities are examples of potential military contributions to a disaster response.

#### Joint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment/command and control</th>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>Search and rescue</th>
<th>Infrastructure support</th>
<th>Transport, supply and distribution</th>
<th>Public health/medical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Operational liaison reconnaissance team (OLRT) deployment</td>
<td>• Media operations support</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Movement control</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Command and control capability</td>
<td>• Information operations support</td>
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<td>• Contract management</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Liaison teams</td>
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<td>• Logistic planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Intelligence and information, including geospatial/geographic information and assessments</td>
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#### Maritime

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<tr>
<th>Assessment/command and control</th>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>Search and rescue</th>
<th>Infrastructure support</th>
<th>Transport, supply and distribution</th>
<th>Public health/medical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Small boats coordination</td>
<td>• Strategic communications link</td>
<td>• Limited supply of potable water</td>
<td>• Tactical bulk transport of relief stores and aid</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Hydrographic support</td>
<td>• Small-scale provision of field communication</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Small boats capability, both integral and specialist</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Airspace coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited supply of emergency rations</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Aerial survey and reconnaissance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Helicopter transport</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Helicopter landing site preparation/control</td>
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### Air

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment/command and control</th>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>Search and rescue</th>
<th>Infrastructure support</th>
<th>Transport, supply and distribution</th>
<th>Public health/medical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Airspace/air traffic control</td>
<td>- Airborne communications link</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tactical delivery of relief stores and aid</td>
<td>- Casualty evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Aerial survey and reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Strategic delivery of relief stores and aid</td>
<td>- Aeromedical evacuation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Airhead management</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Helicopter transport</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Helicopter landing site preparation/control</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment/command and control</th>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>Search and rescue</th>
<th>Infrastructure support</th>
<th>Transport, supply and distribution</th>
<th>Public health/medical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Engineer assessment and analysis</td>
<td>- Provision of communications infrastructure</td>
<td>- Rotary search and rescue</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Aid distribution</td>
<td>- Medical assistance and triage capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Geospatial support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Stockholding of aid</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Aerial survey and reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
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<td>- Port management</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Route marking and tfic control</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Small boats capability</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Helicopter transport</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Helicopter landing site preparation/control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Casualty evacuation
- Aeromedical evacuation
- Medical assistance and triage capability
- Environmental health advice
### Lexicon

#### Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied administrative publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAN</td>
<td>all partner access network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHASE</td>
<td>Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (within DFID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSF</td>
<td>Conflict, Stability and Security Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADRCC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERCC</td>
<td>Emergency Response Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERS</td>
<td>emergency relief stores</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance and disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbr.</td>
<td>full form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>joint doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEF</td>
<td>Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>military and civil defence assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILO</td>
<td>military intelligence liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNMCC</td>
<td>multinational military coordination centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>measurement of activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measurement of effect</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>Military Strategic Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLRT</td>
<td>operational liaison and reconnaissance team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSOCC</td>
<td>on-site operations coordination centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAHO</td>
<td>Pan American Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>royal fleet auxiliary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAEF</td>
<td>strategic communications actions and effects framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status of force agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLB</td>
<td>top level budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-CMCoord</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNETE</td>
<td>United Nations Equipo Técnico de Emergencias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Part 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into three areas. First, we list endorsed terms and their definitions. We then list modified definitions proposed by this publication and finally we list terms and descriptions used across the wider humanitarian and disaster relief community which may be helpful to the reader.

Endorsed definitions

civil-military cooperation
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06)

disaster relief
The organised response to alleviate the results of a catastrophe.
Note: The aims are to: save life; relieve suffering; limit damage; restore essential services to a level that enables local authorities to cope; and set conditions for recovery. (Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-52)

emergency life saving relief
The provision of small scale supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. (JDP 3-52)
Notes:
1. Supplies and services would likely comprise food, clothing, medical and subsistence stores, rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment.
2. These may be resourced from available Service sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised, should not exceed one week’s supplies and be provisioned from on-the-spot stores.

fragile state
A fragile state still has a viable host nation government, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state. (JDP 0-01.1)
Lexicon

**humanitarian disaster**
A catastrophe, the consequences of which put lives and/or livelihoods at risk, and exceeds the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources. (JDP 3-52)

**joint operations area**
An area of land, sea and airspace, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A joint operations area including its defining meters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

**joint task force commander**
The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

**joint task force headquarters**
A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a joint task force commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

**measurement of activity**
Assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose. (JDP 0-01.1)

**measurement of effect**
The assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (JDP 0-01.1)

**non-combatant evacuation operation**
An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (AAP-06)

**stricken state**
Any state within which a humanitarian emergency or disaster has occurred. (JDP 3-52)
Modified definitions proposed by this publication

**military disaster relief operation**
A Defence activity that is conducted as part of a disaster relief response, providing specific assistance to an afflicted population. (JDP 3-52)

**military humanitarian assistance**
Aid provided by military forces conducting operations other than disaster relief operations. (JDP 3-52)

Other terms and descriptions

**crisis**
General: an inherently abnormal, unstable and complex situation that represents a threat to the strategic objectives, reputation or existence of an organisation.

**disaster**
Emergency (usually but not exclusively of natural causes) causing, or threatening to cause, widespread and serious disruption to community life through death, injury, and/or damage to property and/or the environment. (HM Government, Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 5th Edition)

A disaster is a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human suffering and distress, and large scale material damage. (The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief)

**disaster risk reduction**
The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. (Sphere Project Handbook)
early warning
The provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response. (*International Strategy for Disaster Reduction*)

environment
The environment is understood as the physical, chemical and biological elements and processes that affect disaster-affected and local populations’ lives and livelihoods. It provides the natural resources that sustain individuals and contributes to quality of life. It needs protection and management if essential functions are to be maintained. (*Sphere Project Handbook*)

humanitarian assistance
Aid to an affected population that seeks, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182. (*ReliefWeb, Glossary of Humanitarian Terms*)

humanitarian relief
Process that seeks to lead to sustainable development opportunities by generating self-sustaining processes for post-disaster recovery. Humanitarian relief encompasses livelihoods, shelter, governance, environment, and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations. It also addresses the underlying risks that contributed to the crisis. (*World Bank, Guide to Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks*)

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)
A body established in June of 1992 in response to General Assembly Resolution 46/182 to serve as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance in response to complex and major emergencies.

international disaster relief assistance
In the context of the present guidelines, international disaster relief assistance means material, personnel and services provided by the international community to an affected state to meet the needs of those affected by a disaster. It includes all actions necessary to grant and facilitate movement over the territory, including the territorial waters and the airspace, of a transit state. International disaster relief assistance delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles identified above is humanitarian assistance.
**internally displaced persons**
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. A series of 30 non-binding “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” based on refugee law, human rights law and international humanitarian law articulate standards for protection, assistance and solutions for internally displaced persons. (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA))

**inter-governmental organisations**
Organisations constituted by two or more governments. It thus includes all United Nations agencies and regional organisations.

**military and civil defence assets**
Military and civil defence assets comprise relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organisations for international disaster relief assistance. Further, for the purpose of this project, civil defence organisation means any organisation that, under the control of a government, performs the functions enumerated in paragraph 61 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. When these forces are under United Nations control they are referred to as UN military and civil defence assets. (UN OCHA, Oslo Guidelines)

**natural disaster**
Natural disasters are events brought about by natural hazards that seriously affect the society, economy and/or infrastructure of a region. Depending on population vulnerability and local response capacity, natural disasters will pose challenges and problems of a humanitarian nature. The magnitude of the consequences of sudden natural hazards is a direct result of the way individuals and societies relate to threats originating from natural hazards. (Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters, IASC Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, 2006).

**natural hazards**
Natural processes or phenomena that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. (ReliefWeb, Glossary of Humanitarian Terms)
non-governmental humanitarian agencies
The term non-governmental humanitarian agencies (NGHAs) has been coined to encompass the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – The International Committee of the Red Cross, The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its member National Societies – and the non-governmental organisations. (The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief)

rapid onset disaster
(sudden onset disaster)
Any disaster that has not been predicted or if predicted the scale of the disaster is far greater than anticipated. For example: cyclones, earthquakes and floods. (UN OCHA)

reconstruction
A set of activities aimed at achieving the medium- and long-term recovery of the components and structures that have been affected by a disaster or emergency. (Regional Disaster Information Centre (CRID))

recovery
The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. (HM Government, Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 5th Edition)

relief
Assistance and/or intervention during or after disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs. It can be of emergency or protracted duration. (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs).

resilience
The ability of the community, services or infrastructure to withstand the consequences of an incident. (HM Government, Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 5th Edition)

response
The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety, and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. (World Bank, Guide to Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks)
secondary impacts of natural disasters
Secondary impacts of natural disasters can include natural or physical impacts such as landslides caused by heavy rainfall or seismic activity. They could also encompass impacts by the initial disaster on industrial installations and infrastructure, for example, damage to hydro dams or damage to pipelines and chemical factories that may cause spills of hazardous materials which pose a threat to human health and lives. (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Operational Guidelines On The Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters)

United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)
The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. (UN OCHA, Oslo Guidelines)

vulnerability
The susceptibility of a community, services or infrastructure to damage or harm by a realised hazard or threat. (HM Government, Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 5th Edition)