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Shaping a stable world: The Military contribution (JDP 05)
published by DCDC in March 2016

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is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine)

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1. Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs)
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### RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

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ARCHIVED
Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution provides guidance into the way the military should think about their contribution to stabilisation. It is written primarily for the military commander and staff officer engaged in, or studying, such operations. It fills a gap in our body of professional knowledge.

Military forces can be used to assist the delivery of security, in order both to prevent de-stabilisation and to recover stability. The focus of JDP 3-40 is on the employment of military forces, in the context of an integrated campaign, whose purpose is reversing a spiral of instability – a worst case. It addresses the most challenging end of a spectrum of objectives – setting conditions for enduring stability. The doctrine recognises that most often we will be working as a supporting partner within an alliance or coalition, probably led by the US. However, JDP 3-40 has also been written to take account of circumstances where the UK takes a lead nation role.

The principal military audiences for JDP 3-40 are the instructors and students on Advanced Command and Staff Course, Higher Command and Staff Course and Royal College of Defence Studies. It should also be used by instructors at our military academies who have a key role in setting the intellectual direction of travel for future commanders, for it is in the schools and staff colleges that the doctrine is inculcated. It is also designed to help the theatre and formation levels of command such as in Afghanistan, and their interlocutors in Whitehall and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). A wider, but key, readership will be civilian partners who want to find out how the military thinks and works, and it will be of interest to the wider academic community, on whom we rely for constructive criticism and intellectual stimulus. It has been written as a book of reference for a wide audience, rather than as a technical manual to be read cover-to-cover in one sitting. A much shorter Guide for Security and Stabilisation published in parallel to JDP 3-40 is aimed at those requiring a summary of the key ideas.

Much use has been made of the body of classic Counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, most especially that espoused by General Sir Frank Kitson (updated during a recent personal interview), who framed it so clearly. Many of these ideas endure, and some of the criticism of the last few years should perhaps be of failure to implement what was already known. But there have also been profound changes in circumstances during that time, not least globalisation. Thinking has evolved, and the US Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency was a major step in this process as it provided a foundation not only for the US military, but also for all their coalition partners (who need to really understand how their major ally now approaches this business). The UK’s JDP 3-40 draws from FM 3-24, advice from leaders such as Generals Petraeus and Mattis, and writers such as Mr Frank Hoffman, Dr David Kilcullen and Dr John Nagl, but it also makes use of work by UK leaders and experts such as General Sir Rupert Smith, Dr David Betz and the King’s College London Insurgency Research Group, Professor Mike Clarke at Royal United Services Institute and numerous other non-military sources.

In order to make it digestible to such a diverse audience JDP 3-40 is divided into 3 distinct parts, with chapters covering the Why, the What and the How of the military contribution to stabilisation. Much of the critical material for the military practitioner is contained in Part 3. Parts 1 and 2 describe the inter-agency context for the use of military forces to deliver the security component of stabilisation – the comprehensive approach. These Parts also help to inform a wider, non-military audience as a common understanding of the problem and an agreed approach to solving it is essential. Much of this context, such as the Stable State Model in Chapter 1, the Societal Relationship in Chapter 2, the central role of Influence in Chapter 3 and the Operational Guidance in Chapter 4 are fundamental to the approach in Part 3 and need to be read by all. There is some repetition, but it has been minimised.
06 Interspersed between the chapters are related stand-alone essays – commissioned specifically for JDP 3-40 – by distinguished experts in areas related to stabilisation. These are not doctrine, but add texture and generate a better understanding of the issues.

- **Part 1.** Why is the stabilisation of fragile and failed states important?
- **Part 2.** What must be achieved in order to bring about stabilisation?
- **Part 3.** How should the military commander analyse, plan, execute and assess his contribution to stabilisation through campaign design and management?

07 The first two Parts require no knowledge of other doctrine or military processes. The third deals with the practical aspects of how a military commander or staff officer might put the ideas into practice and builds on the foundation in Parts 1 and 2. It is assumed that the reader of Part 3 will be familiar with the key Joint Doctrine Publications on operations and planning, and will have a reasonable level of military experience. JDP 3-40 does not replace other capstone or operational doctrine. Rather, it is designed to complement it by providing a lens through which military thought on stabilisation can be focused. We have deliberately made heavy use of vignettes and examples to stimulate thought and bring the text to life. Further supporting essays and reference material is available on the internet at www.dcdc.mod.uk and Defence intranet (RLI) at www.dcdc.dii.mil.uk. For even more detail on COIN refer to Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10.

Like all doctrine, although authoritative, JDP 3-40 requires judgement in its application.

08 The aim has been to produce a document written in plain English that is both practical and easy to read, while at the same time tackling some of the complex issues that come from operating in a multinational, multi-agency environment. The writing team engaged with a wide and varied selection of those who have recent experience in this area. In addition to military commanders, both British and allied, we consulted academics, civil servants, diplomats, politicians and those in the voluntary sector. In particular,

2. See the reading list at Annex 12B
3. JDP 3-00 Campaigning; JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning. These will be augmented by JDP 2-00 Intelligence – due for publication in 2010.
representatives from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the cross-government Stabilisation Unit provided guidance and advice in its production and staffing. As stabilisation is likely to be an adversarial process, we have given the adversary a voice in our doctrine, of which more below.

09 JDP 3-40 uses three types of box in addition to the paragraph text. These are:

- **A Vignette or Quote Box** to add understanding and texture to the Doctrine. 4

- **‘Top Tips’** - Definitions and Factual Information for Commanders and Staff.

- **An Adversary’s View**

At various points a red box such as this is used to present the view of an adversary. The adversary used in most cases is al-Qaeda. It has been chosen as an example of a global, franchised insurgent organisation with genuine strategic ambition. This is but one example of how an adversary thinks about their adversaries and shows they have strategic ends, operational ways and tactical means, even though they may not be expressed in our military language. The point is that strategy and operational art are not confined to conventional militaries and whilst stabilisation is about making the population secure, the adversary gets a vote.

A number of UNCLASSIFIED sources were used. The main focus is on the letters from Osama bin-Laden to ‘the American People’ (released to the press in November 2002), from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin-Laden (intercepted in February 2004) and from Ayman al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi (written in July 2005). These texts provide the motivation for action, using logical reasoning to convince and to justify the ‘jihad’ attaching Islamic meaning to every aspect of the world and the events within it. This material provides an insight to a way of thinking, central to which is a very specific world view. An example, outlining their phased strategy on which the Iraq campaign should be based, taken from the al-Zawahiri letter to al-Zarqawi reads as follows:

> ‘So we must think for a long time about our next steps and how we want to attain [our long-term goal], and it… requires several incremental [steps]: The first stage: expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of caliphate…

> The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighbouring Iraq. The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel…’

10 In learning how to operate in a multi-agency and multinational environment we must build relationships across it. Equally, to produce this doctrine we have had to consult widely, building similar relationships across government, international organisations, NGO and academic communities, both at home and abroad. Some organisations and people who have made a particular contribution are acknowledged below. However, the most valuable contributions have been made by the numerous servicemen and civilians who have shared their operational experience with us either in personal interviews or their post-tour reports.

11 Doctrine is not handed down on tablets of stone. It has enduring features, but it can – must – adapt in the light of experience. JDP 3-40 is a start, but work has already begun on the second edition. A team deploys to Afghanistan shortly to hunt lessons and test what works and what does not. I would ask all those with an interest in helping the UK military do this demanding work better, to engage with us as we hone our thinking, by contacting DCDC-AHFuncDoc@mod.uk.

Maj Gen PR Newton CBE
ACDS DC&D
12 November 2009

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4 Many of the vignette, quote and top tips boxes report US Commanders. This is because they have held the majority of theatre-commandal multinational, multi-agency stabilisation campaigns to date. Petraeus and McChrystal are obvious examples, but equally Richards is widely quoted as a UK example.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In learning how to operate in a multi-agency and multinational environment we have had to build relationships across it. Equally, to produce this doctrine we have had to consult widely, building similar relationships across the government, international organisation, NGO and academic communities, both at home and internationally. A small selection of the organisations and people who have made a contribution, been consulted and provided advice are acknowledged below.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Dr Paul Cornish
Mr Con Coughlan
Dr Russ Glenn
Sir Jeremy Greenstock
Mr Adam Ingram MP
General Sir Frank Kitson
Ms Clare Lockhart
Dr David Matthews – Australian DoD*
Dr Andrew Rathmell
General Sir Rupert Smith
Professor Hew Strachan
Dr David Kilcullen
Professor Colin Gray
Col (Retd) John Wilson
Col (Retd) Michael Crawshaw

* Denotes a permanent member of the writing team
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The rules-based international system relies upon stability. Security is the foundation on which stability is built. In a crisis it may have to be fought for. At the heart of the contest for security may be a bloody insurgency. However, defeating an insurgency is merely treating the symptom. For real, long-term success, you must address the root causes of the instability, and that requires an approach that combines economic, governance and security measures; a comprehensive approach. Notions of stabilisation are evolving. So too is the concept of comprehensive approaches (there is no single template), both are work in progress.

Stabilisation is the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict in order to: prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development. Its ultimate purpose is to strengthen an existing political order, or to reshape it, to become more acceptable to that nation’s population and more consistent with the UK’s strategic interests. However, stabilisation is rarely a goal in its own right. Instead, it may be a consequence of intervention for other reasons of national interest. For example, securing a
vital resource or restoring security to a region critical to the UK. It will therefore be a necessary and implicit act of most interventions, particularly in fragile or failed states.

In one way or another, stabilisation could play a part in many future conflicts. While many of the ideas in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 are equally applicable in circumstances where there is little external military involvement, the purpose of this document is to guide the employment of military resources, involving integrated security, governance and development efforts to secure a political settlement. Alternative political and military choices are not excluded: clearly there will be many situations when the Government wishes to retain a degree of strategic choice by minimising the UK's footprint within another state's sovereign territory and instead opt for a policy of diplomacy, containment, deterrence or coercion. Equally, there will be situations where the Government elects to intervene and thus engage in stabilisation; during and after major combat, for example. The most demanding – but not necessarily most likely – of cases occur where there is a violent contest for power. This is the focus of JDP 3-40.

The Long and the Short of Stabilisation

The military has been accused of having a narrow, short-term view and a predilection for action. Often this perception arises out of a lack of understanding of the nature of the military art. Where an insurgency is present or is at least latent, the contest for security will be a duel, or given the range of actors a brawl, between the security forces and their adversaries. It will require the commander to vary tempo, to create and exploit opportunities, and to be comfortable with uncertainty and risk. It is a contest in which the judicious application of violence and a philosophy of mission command are necessary to seize and hold the initiative. Without the ability to impose one's will on events, stabilisation is impossible. Yet there is no reason to expect that others involved in stabilisation should have similar perspectives to those of their military colleagues; all will be prisoners of their own experience and distinct organisational culture.

The military may have been guilty, too, of failing to appreciate the wider contributions made to stabilisation by civil agencies. Stabilisation campaigns require endurance and patience. At times observing and shaping, rather than engaging in aggressive operations, may be the best approach. This can be difficult for a military which expects to deliver rapid, ideally decisive results; just one of the paradoxes that these types of conflict present.

We must not fall into the trap of believing that there is some ideal comprehensive formula. Stabilisation is a creative process, not a science. There are, however, some keys to maximising the chance of success; for us, for the host nation and for the international system that requires a secure, stable environment if it is to function. Critical to achieving an enduring solution is to create a single, integrated, resilient team. JDP 3-40 puts this concept at the heart of military doctrine. For several years now the UK has
be developing a comprehensive approach, but there is no agreed, institutionalised framework for putting it into action. It does not help that the military has simultaneously been wrestling with the need to adapt its own approach to the evolving character of conflict in the 21st Century. And throughout this period we have been engaged in two bloody enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not surprising therefore that we have not yet got it right – but we must. Defence Strategic Guidance 2008 first provided policy in the form of a new Military Task, Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development (MASD) and this doctrine covers the circumstances for which the task is designed.

The need for security in stabilisation is non-discretionary. That is to say that a secure environment is an end in its own right, but without security nothing else can function. If adversaries can create and maintain a climate of fear, our efforts at reconstruction, for example, will be frustrated and judged to fail. This is why taking and then holding the security initiative – imposing one’s will on a ruthless and determined adversary – entails the use of force and offensive action. This uncomfortable reality cannot be avoided. It does not mean, however, that the military contribution is all about seeking the decisive defeat of the enemy in battle. Rather, the ultimate aim for the military commander is to make his adversaries irrelevant to such an extent that the other agencies can deliver their elements of the solution. It is the delivery of focused, comprehensive effect, not purely military effect, which will overwhelm the enemy in battle. Rather, the ultimate aim for the military commander is to make his adversaries irrelevant to such an extent that the other agencies can deliver their elements of the solution. It is the delivery of focused, comprehensive effect, not purely military effect, which will overwhelm the enemy in battle. Rather, the ultimate aim for the military commander is to make his adversaries irrelevant to such an extent that the other agencies can deliver their elements of the solution. It is the delivery of focused, comprehensive effect, not purely military effect, which will overwhelm the enemy in battle. Rather, the ultimate aim for the military commander is to make his adversaries irrelevant to such an extent that the other agencies can deliver their elements of the solution. It is the delivery of focused, comprehensive effect, not purely military effect, which will overwhelm the enemy in battle.

The Evolving Character of Conflict

Adversaries, both state and non-state, are adapting fast to counter the west’s military strengths and our preferred way of operating. Already this adaptation had made our assumptions, such as rapid decisive effect, look dated if not obsolete.Smart adversaries in regions with multiple persistent systemic problems, using de-centralised command styles and an ability to exploit the clutter of heavily populated areas, are unlikely to present themselves in sterile battlespace for precision attack. Conflict is less likely to end in clear ‘victory’ and it will be our resilience and institutional agility as much as our technological mastery that will define our chances of success. History shows that asymmetry is not ‘new’, but some of its modern manifestations are new to us. Traditionally we have referred to a spectrum of conflict, ranging from stable peace via humanitarian assistance, to general war. This implied that there are discrete types of conflict with traditional ‘war’ against near-peers as our professional benchmark. This binary, linear, sequential view overlooked the inevitable concurrency and unique challenges posed by conflicts that have different characteristics. Discrete operational themes actually overlap and merge. In one model this is represented by a fractured spectrum of concurrent missions, in which all types of conflict are shown to exist simultaneously, each coming to the surface at certain times. (See diagram overleaf).

Even this is inadequate to describe the contemporary character of conflict. We now see an increased blurring of the distinctions between adversaries and the way they use force to achieve political goals. Future conflict will blend the lethality traditionally associated with state conflict and the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular warfare. This complexity requires an alternative, non-linear model. (See diagram overleaf).

Stabilisation does not stand alone as a discrete type of operation; within it we should expect to conduct a range of military activity that includes high-end combat. Although the context may be new, this concept is very similar to Krulak’s description of the 3-Block War in which combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance all take place simultaneously and

require the force to show agility by transitioning between these activities at high tempo. Across this spectrum the array of opponents that exist will be diverse, but inter-linked. It will include both states and non-state actors such as insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. They will routinely operate independently but will be quick to cooperate where they see mutual benefit, even if they are ideologically opposed. They are likely to share information, lessons, tactics and procedures. Unencumbered by public accountability or bureaucratic process, they may be extremely quick to adapt to changes in the situation but they are also likely to take the long view of their campaigns. They are likely to share the same culture as the local population and they will exploit information quickly and effectively to gain their support. They will have thought about our weaknesses and will, where possible, attack us on a boundary or vulnerability. They are unlikely to share our legal or ethical framework, allowing them to challenge and exploit us in ways that we might not anticipate. Many of them will not subscribe to traditional views of victory and defeat. Thus, even when we do achieve military success, it may prove difficult to convince them (and hence our own public) that we have actually beaten them without ‘winning’ the population.

0812 The military contest is not likely to be one of absolutes; ‘losing’ and especially ‘winning’ are less relevant notions. More usefully, we should characterise success as the realisation by enough of our adversaries of the futility of further violence, and popular rejection of their political vision. From this, an accommodation in which they eschew violence can be brokered. This is not reconciliation; but is a ‘good enough’ step towards it, allowing political and economic progress towards a stable state.

0813 Conflict will require us to conduct a range of activities simultaneously. Some of them will be familiar, others are not yet fully understood and for which we are not optimised, such as stabilisation. It is not enough that all players cooperate; they must actively apply their full weight in support of one another during a conflict, with that effort focused in time and space as well as conceptually. When the security situation will not allow a particular department or agency to work effectively, then they should work to reinforce the security effect we are trying to create. And as soon as the military effort has enabled the effects of others to be unleashed, our focus should switch to supporting wider development and governance effects. Hence a working comprehensive
A Flavour of What’s New and What’s Not

JDP 3-40 recognises that there is still a great deal in our previous doctrine which is relevant. General Kitson, Sir Robert Thompson and Colonel David Galula in particular provide useful guidance. Equally, 30 years of internal security operations in Northern Ireland provided us with a pool of experience. For example, the strength of having a fully integrated intelligence system which allows you to generate and then share information with the local police and security services is something that we knew well in the past. Similarly, (although now more than ever) we need to carry with us both the local population, and our own population at home. Although we may use fresh terms such as the message and the narrative, these ideas are not new. The suggestion that perceptions matter as much as facts has been around for a long time but the way in which global communications now reach out even wider simply magnifies the importance of influence. We also know from long experience in such places as Malaya and Northern Ireland how the enemy in protracted campaigns will observe how we operate, and then change their tactics accordingly. As in these campaigns, where we showed great flexibility, we must now be equally agile and adaptive – bending our structures and processes into new shapes – if we are to keep pace with much less get ahead of our adversaries.

The Revolution in Military Affairs’ led some to believe that we could reshape conflict in our image. Reliance on precision fires and information dominance certainly reshaped our own approach, but adaptive adversaries found ways to negate these advantages and even turn them against us. The realisation that we may have less situational understanding than any other actor is a sobering one. And some aspects of contemporary operations are markedly different from earlier
COIN campaigns. For one thing, the requirement to maintain a persistent security force presence amongst the affected population demands mass. Initially at least, this will place a demand on international forces. Currently, this demand, particularly for all-volunteer western forces able to operate at the higher levels of capability, is greater than any time since the end of the Cold War. Second, it is unlikely that these operations would be conducted by a single nation, adding layers of complexity to command and control. Third, the need for police and paramilitary expertise is greater than ever before and western models of community policing may be inappropriate, leaving a capability gap. To compensate for all this, building the capacity of indigenous forces is an urgent priority, requiring coordination across several nations and the generation of new military skills.

Multinational and multi-agency complexities also add new dimensions as does the appearance of transnational adversaries with global reach and ambition. In addition, and fundamental to our purpose in stabilisation, is the fact that the host nation government must also be seen as part of that coalition. Host nation sovereignty will constrain the commander and his diplomatic partners, and they must in turn work out how to apply influence and leverage to ensure our collective strategies converge. All of this will take place under the scrutiny of international media, and those who oppose military action and who are free to challenge the actions of governments and, increasingly, subject campaigns to scrutiny in courts of law.

Strategic compression is an imprecise term that attempts to describe a number of phenomena that characterise current military operations, particularly stabilisation campaigns. The requirement to coordinate national instruments of power at the local level drags down some characteristics of the operational level into the tactical. Everyone with a mobile camera-phone has the potential to capture an image with global reach. Newsworthy events can break internationally within minutes. The net effect is a blurring and compression of the levels of warfare which, if not managed, could amount to a challenge to our core notion of mission command. Hence it is critical that the commander has a force prepared to operate in a highly nuanced manner, and has himself the skills of advocacy needed to secure freedom of action for it.

Nine Security Principles for Stabilisation

- Primacy of Political Purpose.
- Understand the Context.
- Focus on the Population.
- Foster Host Nation Governance, Authority and Indigenous Capacity.
- Unity of Effort.
- Isolate and Neutralise Irregular Actors.
- Exploit Credibility to Gain Support.
- Prepare for the Long Term (Perseverance and Sustainability).
- Anticipate, Learn and Adapt.

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8. The death of the female bystander, Neda Agha-Soltan, during the Iranian election protests was viewable on Internet sites within minutes of it being captured on a mobile phone.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE DHOFAR WAR
BY AIR CHIEF MARSHAL
SIR JOCK STIRRUP GCB AFC DSc FRAeS FCMI RAF
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

The Chief of the Defence Staff fought as a pilot in the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force from 1973 to 1975.

We are all of us, to some degree or other, prisoners of our own history. Our memories, and our interpretation of them, make us who we are and condition how we think. This can be both good and bad. Good, in so far as experience can teach us how to deal with the world around us with greater success: burning one’s fingers usually leads to a more circumspect approach to fire. Bad, in that we can, if we’re not very careful, take the singular and apply it inappropriately to the general: burning one’s fingers does not mean that fire is necessarily something to be avoided. The trick, of course, is to extract from particular experiences those principles that are of an enduring nature, and then to apply these carefully in the context of varying and often very different situations.

My own military character was greatly influenced by my experiences in the Dhofar War. I was on loan service with the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force from 1973 to 1975, leaving a few months before the war ended. I was then just a young pilot, flying close air support and interdiction missions in Strikemaster aircraft, and I can’t say that I devoted much thought at the time to wider strategic issues. But I did think about them more and more as the years passed, even before a turn of the wheel brought counter-insurgency operations into the UK military’s cross-hairs once again. And when that...
happened, I naturally had to consider what parts – if any – of my experience were relevant to our contemporary challenges.

First, it’s worth reflecting on the nature of operations in Dhofar. The tribesmen in that mountainous region were fiercely independent, extremely touchy (blood feuds were common), and hardy warriors with a long history of fighting. In the 1960s they became disenchanted with the ruling Sultan, seeing little benefit to them – and many disadvantages – from central Omani governance. It was also the heyday of communist-inspired revolutions and resistance movements around the world. One creation to emerge as a result of this trend was the Soviet-dominated People’s Democratic Republic of the Yemen, or PDRY, which lay directly to the west of Dhofar. In an attempt to spread further the influence of Moscow-directed communism, the PDRY seized on the opportunity offered by disaffected Dhofaris to create the rather grandly named PFLOAG: Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. So internal unrest within the south of Oman gained Soviet backing – physical as well as moral – and grew into a major insurgency. The early response from the government was almost entirely military; the Dhofaris had rebelled against their lawful ruler, and force was seen as the only appropriate recourse. The result was a protracted and costly campaign in which neither side made much progress. The tribesmen could make little impact on government enclaves, despite regular indirect fire attacks on Salalah airfield. On the other hand, they were very much at home on the Jebel, an area of difficult terrain and no infrastructure. Government forces could mount forays into the region, but any tactical successes were fleeting and had no real operational, let alone strategic, impact. There seemed no way forward.

But this all changed in 1970. There were a number of pivotal moments in the Dhofar campaign, but for me, the event that changed the whole course of the war, and as a consequence the future of Oman, was the accession of Sultan Qaboos. The new ruler saw very quickly that military action alone could not deliver strategic success. Yes, the Dhofaris had to understand that continued resistance was going to be a life-shortening experience, but at the same time they had to believe that there was a much more attractive alternative. There had to be a carrot as well as a stick. And so reconciliation became the second major plank in the counter-insurgency effort.

This was not about surrendering on the issue of governance – of finding, for example, a political place for PFLOAG. It was about making individual Dhofaris understand that what the system would deliver for them was much more palatable than the alternatives. It was about a social and political outreach programme that was, crucially directed by the Sultan. He was the government, and people needed to believe in his long-term commitment to whatever was proposed.

Did this bring the war to a rapid conclusion? Of course not; it went on for another 5 difficult years. Years that contained great frustrations; years that sometimes seemed to yield little in the way of progress; years that saw some painful losses. But it was this strategic shift that put the endeavour on the path to success. The journey still had to be made, but the road was at last the right one.

And throughout that journey, effective military operations remained essential. Vital though the social and political programme was, they would not have worked without the military campaign; the stick remained a crucial element in the mix. So what sort of operations proved most effective? Well, for a start, operations that supported the political effort.

The Dhofar Jebel was not the sort of terrain that lent itself to straightforward clear, hold and build; the population was too rural and dispersed for that. But the geography did allow enemy movement to be interdicted on the west-east axis. This allowed areas to be cleared sufficiently for the political programme to be applied. The effectiveness of the process was evident. Once the Hornbeam Line had been established, far to the west of the Salalah plain, the indirect fire attacks on the airfield dried up; the insurgents could no longer move weapons, ammunition and people through in sufficient numbers to sustain the effort.

But like the more conventional clear, hold and build approach, this area interdiction process was manpower intensive. And with the Hornbeam Line in place, the Sultan had just about run out of available mass, so for the time being that line of operation culminated. Occasional raids were mounted beyond the Hornbeam, and an isolated government fortification on the border with Yemen kept the insurgents on their toes, but there was no immediate prospect of extending governance throughout the rest of western Dhofar – the most difficult bit. The answer, of course, was more manpower, and this was eventually provided by the Shah of Iran. The additional mass allowed the resumption of area interdiction. A difficult and costly operation saw the establishment of the Damavand Line in early 1975, which was the beginning of the end for the remaining insurgents.

I say remaining insurgents, because while all this was going on there was a concerted effort to draw Dhofari fighters onto the government side. This was a cleverly targeted programme that focused on underlying motivations. Many
Dhofaris – certainly in those days – rather liked fighting. The trick was not to try and turn them into men of peace, but to offer them a better fight where they would be on the winning side. Hence the formation of the Firqat, an irregular formation of scouts and fighters under Omani Army command and control. This was successful not just because of the firepower and local knowledge that it brought to the government side, but because of the extent that it denied these things to the enemy. In the end, we came close to running out of people to fight.

There were other important tactical lessons regarding the application of force in these circumstances. The use of special forces on influence operations; the crucial role of helicopters in providing tactical mobility and logistic support in difficult terrain; the ability of responsive air power to multiply many times the force available to light, mobile units, and the consequent need for close air-land integration: all of this was and remained obvious to those who served in the Dhofar War. One famous incident, the Battle of Mirbat, demonstrated how relatively small numbers of special forces, backed up by effective air support, could defeat even large scale attacks. Indeed, that battle was the insurgents’ last conventional hurrah; thereafter they relied almost exclusively on an asymmetric approach.

Well, this is all – at least to me – an interesting personal view on a piece of history. But what does it tell us about today and the future? What enduring principles might we derive that do not depend purely on the particular circumstances of Dhofar in the 60s and 70s? The obvious one to start with is that insurgents have generally faced a choice: put up with the existing system or fight for something different. And their choice has been the latter. The aim therefore is to get them to reverse that choice, and the best method is to tackle both halves of the equation together: make the existing system much more attractive to them, and the costs of fighting unpalatably high.

The former requires a sustained and credible effort by those who run the existing system: reconciliation is an internal issue, and cannot be imposed from without. It must address people’s concerns for the future – and hence be carefully and sometimes individually targeted – and give them a stake in the governance structure, not surrender governance to a competing group. And it requires patience, people, once disaffected, cannot be turned back overnight. Rebuilding trust is a slow process, and there will be inevitable setbacks. But in the end, the campaign is all about politics.

As for the military line, the first thing to understand is that it’s indispensible. It cannot deliver strategic success, but is essential to its delivery. The second point is that it should at all times support the political line; the purpose of raising the cost to insurgents is to persuade them to make the right positive choice. Anything that drives them further from that choice is patently unhelpful. The next thing is that numbers matter; counter-insurgency operations are manpower intensive. But numbers by themselves are not the answer. A joint approach that applies numbers and technology (yes, even in the 1970s we had technology) to counter the enemy’s asymmetric advantages is crucial.

And again I would reiterate the need for patience. It’s difficult to pin down an exact start date for the Dhofar insurgency, but it lasted at least seven years before it was brought to an end. These campaigns take time and persistence, and there are inevitable ups and downs of tactical fortune along the way. It’s hard to take the long view from inside such a campaign, but it’s essential.

There are other, more detailed lessons that I might draw. But I hope I’ve gone sufficiently far to persuade you that the experiences of Dhofar, at least as I perceived – and still perceive – them, resonate strongly with our contemporary security challenges. That there are some enduring principles here that survive the particular and extend to the general. And that, looking at Oman today, there is ample evidence that the principles, when properly applied, do work.
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Shaping a stable world: The Military contribution (JDP 05)
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This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
Security is the foundation on which stabilisation is built. Some security challenges may be quickly contained; but in its most demanding form, at the heart of the contest for that security, may be a bloody insurgency. The insurgent must have the initiative taken from him; however, defeating an insurgency is merely treating the symptoms of the problem. For long-term success, the campaign must address the root causes of the instability, and that is likely to require an approach that combines economic, governance and security measures; a comprehensive approach.

Part 1 introduces the problem of societal conflicts within fragile states as the defining form of conflict at the beginning of the 21st century, and describes the UK approach to the stabilisation of such states. It aims to orientate the reader to the underlying causes of state fragility and societal conflicts, and introduces three big ideas. The first of these is the idea that stabilisation must be approached ‘comprehensively’ across security, development and governance lines of operation leveraging from all available arms of national and international power. The second is the notion that the central conflict relationship within fragile states is that between the host government, competing elites (including insurgent groups) and the wider population. The third is the assertion that the national strategic aim of interventions into fragile and failed states should be to foster the development of a political settlement, amenable to broader UK interests, between this triumvirate of actors.
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

CHAPTER 1
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF FRAGILE AND FAILED STATES

This chapter describes the role of states in the international system and provides a framework for understanding state fragility. Stabilisation takes place within fragile or failed states. It is the seriousness of the political, social or economic implications arising from the fragility and possible failure of a state that provides the context for a decision to employ military means in pursuit of stabilisation.

This chapter provides an understanding of the features of the international system and state fragility that forms the broad framework within which stabilisation efforts are conducted.

Fragile and Failed States
Countries that have a politically significant presence of irregular activity are likely to sit within the spectrum of fragile and failed states:

A Fragile State. A fragile state still has a viable host nation government, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state.

A Failed State. A failed state is where remnants of a host nation government, or some form of potential host nation government, may still exist. However, in such states, the government does not have a monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide security or simple basic services, and is not sufficiently legitimate or effective to protect its borders, citizens, or even itself. It may exert a very weak level of governance and rule of law in all or part of the state but, overall, the mechanisms and tools of governance have largely collapsed.

Section I The Role of States in the International System
The International System
Globalisation
Functions and Norms of the State

Section II A Framework for Understanding State Fragility
State Instability

Section III Societal Conflicts in Fragile States
Contesting the Political Order
Evolving Threats

A Political Perspective – The Right Honourable Adam Ingram MP

2. Irregular Activity is the use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 Campaigning (2nd Edition)). Note: Irregular Activity could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder.

3. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) - 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations.
4. JDP 0-01.1 United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Definitions.
5. Such as - linked global financial institutions and mechanisms and dependence on energy routes.
SECTION I
THE ROLE OF STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The International System

0102 A characteristic of the contemporary operating environment is the increasing number of transnational actors that seek to shape and influence global affairs. These include Inter-governmental Organisations (IGO), International Organisations (IOs), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs). IGOs are organisations that may be established by a constituent document such as a charter, a treaty or a convention, which, when signed by the founding members, provides the IGO with legal recognition, such as UN, NATO and EU. An NGO is a voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests, while a MNC has no single authoritative definition but can be understood as 'a company that has branches or subsidiaries outside their home country'. However, in spite of this fragmentation of political influence, states are still central to the international system.

0103 The number of member states of the UN has increased from 51 in 1945 to 192 in 2009. This indicates the powerful attraction of statehood. Political communities have overwhelmingly sought legitimacy and validation by seeking to establish a recognised state. However, internationally recognised borders do not automatically convey statehood. In the eyes of certain local populations, they can be somewhat meaningless (e.g. the Durand Line). For them, statehood is not bound by arbitrary frontiers (largely drawn up by foreigners); rather their sense of nationhood draws greater expression from a common language, culture, religion or history – Kurds are an example of this. In these instances, instability is not necessarily caused by challenges to the political settlement; it may be inherent in certain societies. Those particularly at risk are post-colonial countries that may be in effect artificial creations of a former colonial power.

0104 Crises and conflicts are addressed through an international system that is still based on the centrality of the state, within its territory, to deliver basic human security (described on page 6). The post-1945 international organisational architecture has struggled at times to cope with and adapt to the complexity associated with intra-state violence and instability. Organisations were designed to deal with inter-state conflict. Therefore, the approach has been based on applying the traditional norm of state sovereignty. But, state sovereignty can clash with the need for the international community to address security challenges internal to that state. This has often led to cumbersome, delayed or absent multinational responses to intra-state conflict and instability.

0105 A characteristic of fragile states is the inability of their governments to discharge their responsibilities effectively. Insecurity and instability is likely to follow, caused by those with specific grievances and opportunists keen to exploit the vacuum of authority. Frequently the state does not have an effective monopoly on the use of violence, which inhibits their ability to prevent or resolve societal conflicts.

Globalisation

0107 Globalisation is used as a collective term for the processes characterised by accelerating international interconnectedness. For many, these processes are seen as positive. However, globalisation has also sparked grievances and radicalisation in many parts of the world where some see the effects as exacerbating economic inequality, and disrupting traditional bonds and social relations. These effects are magnified by the opportunities globalisation provides for those with grievances to become more powerful, and also by criminal greed. New vulnerabilities have been introduced as economies and societies grow increasingly dependent on national and global financial information and communication networks. Simultaneously, these networks have empowered groups to communicate more effectively within states, across regions and directly to diasporas across the globe. These processes, when coupled with weapons proliferation, provide non-state actors with the destructive power and reach previously confined to states.

0108 Globalisation has important consequences for operations to provide security and stability in fragile states. For the commander there are three in particular that may have an impact on his operational design:

• **Unity of Effort.** Many relevant actors are likely to be present in, or have an influence on an operational area; an intervening force is but one. Contributing states may be joined by international and regional agencies,
institutions and organisations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental. Therefore stabilisation is likely to be a multinational and multi-agency activity. Private sector organisations and contractors will compete to supply services, products and even security. While unity of command remains the ideal, the complexity of actors rarely makes it achievable. Consequently, establishing and maintaining unity of effort may be the best that can be achieved, and will require a robust decision-making architecture. Without it, effective campaigning will be difficult.

- **Global Communications.** Local actors are also embedded in the mechanisms that form international interconnectedness. Transnational communications and media networks link insecure and unstable societies and the wider international community. These actors have become adept at using such technologies to feed insecurity.

- **Unforeseen Effects.** Interventions designed to have a local effect can have an impact on events and outcomes well beyond the immediate theatre of operations.

0109 These consequences of globalisation make purely localised conflict increasingly unlikely. They challenge the utility of traditional organisational concepts such as the bounded Joint Operations Area (JOA) and suggest a network of threats requiring a more sophisticated response.

**Functions and Norms of the State**

0110 Figure 1.1 introduces a simple model that illustrates the elements of a stable state: security, including national and human security; economic and infrastructure development; governance and the rule of law. While these elements can be analysed individually, it is unhelpful and potentially distorting to view them separately. The stability of the state depends upon the manner in which the elements interact and are mutually supporting.

0111 This is an idealised model. However, as the box below indicates, it is not simply a Western view of the elements of a stable state. Much of the logic incorporated into the model is shared by our adversaries.

In his letter to Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi outlines the threat of the Shi’a in Iraq taking control of the institutions of the state. Zarqawi regards the Shi’a as the greatest enemy. It is the Shi’a dominance in the burgeoning Iraqi Army and Police (security) and the other fledgling national institutions (governance - economy) that provide this threat to the establishment of the al-Qaeda governance model, the Islamic State of Iraq.

“They began by taking control of the institutions of the State and their security, military and economic branches. As you… know, the basic components of any country are security and the economy.”

0112 Some states demonstrably fail to provide the functions or capacities suggested but retain a form of stability, (the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1970s to 1990s is an example of this). However, they are usually unable to exert effective control over their territory and are liable to have the sort of ungoverned spaces that harbour the types of threats discussed earlier. Others achieve stability through ruthless oppression, nepotism and patronage. The stability of such states is often temporary and regimes capable of such behaviour are also likely to be amenable to alliances of convenience with the actors most threatening to global security.
JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

0113 National and Human Security. Security has traditionally been understood as National Security, concerning itself with territorial integrity and the protection of the institutions and interests of the state from both internal and external threats. However, increasingly, the understanding of security has been broadened to include the notion of Human Security which emphasises the protection of individuals who seek safety and security in their daily lives. Human security encompasses freedom from fear of persecution, intimidation, reprisals, terrorism and other forms of systematic violence as well as freedom from want of immediate basic needs such as food, water, sanitation and shelter. Importantly, where the state lacks the ability to meet the human security needs of the population individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises safety and protection, including irregular actors. Of note:

• There are obvious overlaps between national and human security. For example, the presence and activities of violent groups both exacerbates the fragility of the state and undermines the safety and security of the people.

• A stable state must protect the most basic survival needs of both itself and its people. This includes the provision of human security for the population in addition to the control of territory, borders, key assets and sources of revenue.

• A stable state exists within a regional context. As such it may import or export instability across its borders. Security issues that are outside of a host nation’s direct influence will require regional political engagement.

Human Security is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values.6

Personal Security is that part of human security which ensures protection of an individual from persecution, intimidation, reprisals and other forms of systematic violence.

National Security is the traditional understanding of security as encompassing ‘the safety of a state or organisation and its protection from both external and internal threats’.

Physical Security is that part of National Security that relates to national assets and infrastructure.

Security is the term used in JDP 3-40 to describe the combination of human and national security.

0114 Economic and Infrastructure Development. The economic infrastructure, level of natural resources, degree of technological development, industrial base, communications network and level of government revenue shape the ability of the state to provide stable governance; however these elements are likely to be less well defined and developed within a fragile state. Note that:

• Wealth determines the quality of life of the people in terms of jobs, basic commodities, health, education, shelter and energy.

• In a stable, prosperous state, decisions affecting wealth creation can be made on the basis of calculated risk assessments. This gives confidence to investors. The degree of predictability in the economic environment is a major element in shaping the decisions of international and domestic commercial investors, from the multinational corporations to the modest market stall holder. Given the increasing mobility of international capital, economies that become fundamentally unpredictable can rapidly lose their viability.

0115 Governance and the Rule of Law. A stable state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of internal contests for power. A brittle form of stability can exist using brutality and corruption:

• Iraq under Saddam Hussein is an example of such a state. However, such states require a constant demonstration of the power of the state in order to keep their populations in thrall. The prospect of genuine long-term stable governance only occurs when effective influence is exercised over a population and territory by methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the overwhelming majority of the governed.

• The rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance. However, this general principle is likely to be institutionalised in varying forms dependent upon the social, cultural and political mores of the particular society. It should always be acknowledged that legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by externally imposed criteria.

0116 Societal Relationships. The three elements above encompass the substantive functionalities and competencies of the state. However, the context is also determined by the societal relationships that underpin, and are interwoven, with these elements. In a stable state the social, cultural and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population.

The Importance of the Political Settlement. The structures of a state are determined by a stable political settlement forged by a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power. It is the achievement of this common understanding, more than anything else, which is the most important marker of progress in stabilisation.

“In essence political settlements are in place wherever those with the power to threaten state-structures forego that option either for reward (which may simply be personal security), for the sake of belief, or to wait an opportunity to become the government overseeing the existing structures.”

The political settlement is the mechanism by which states are, ultimately, able to undergo non-violent transformations. This understanding of political settlements underpins how elites should be defined in a stabilisation context. Elites are those individuals or groups with the power to undermine existing political settlements and prevent the establishment of new ones. They can achieve this through their ability to mobilise resources, decisive groups or broad swathes of the population.

Degradation in any one of these elements of a stable state may lead to erosion of the others. This in turn creates a web of poor governance, economic breakdown and insecurity that stimulates and exacerbates conflict. This may cause, or be caused by, a collapse in the political settlement that regulates key societal and state relationships. Despite huge contextual variations – and every situation is different – there may be a downward spiral of state fragility. This can be characterised by decline or disintegration at the junction where security and human security, economic development, governance and the rule of law meet, leading to the unravelling of the political settlement. Figure 1.2 illustrates this downward spiral.


Figure 1.2 – Fragile States: the Downward Spiral
SECTION II

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING STATE FRAGILITY

State Instability

Socio-economic, political and environmental factors spawn and exacerbate tensions. The factors that may lead to instability can include: disease epidemics; natural disasters; chronic economic decline; demographic pressures; climate change; scarce resources; mass population movements; government weakness; corruption; as well as a fragmented sense of identity and nationhood that undermines societal bonds. The biggest driver of instability is conflict and its associated violence, which can cause a descending spiral of insecurity and ungoverned space. (Ungoverned space refers to areas that are not effectively governed by state authority, although they may be subject to a variety of alternative forms of governance). These factors undermine the existing political settlement, open the space for hostile groups, and attract external actors motivated by profit, ideology or greed.

A State at a Tipping Point – Somalia 1990-92

By 1990 the Somali population had become disillusioned with the military totalitarian regime. Resource shortages, rampant inflation, an absence of food and water and general deprivation were fuelling a thriving black market. Government corruption was the close monitoring of visiting foreigners, harsh exchange control regulations and excessive control of the population and media became the norm, as did abductions. There was an absence of human security, chronic underdevelopment and a lack of effective government authority and the rule of law. This produced a downward spiral resulting in the collapse of the moral authority of the government along with the political settlement.

In 1991 President Barre was ousted by Ethiopian backed northern and southern Somali clans. The Somali National Movement in concert with the northern clans’ elders declared independence for Somaliland, the northern part of Somalia. President Ali Mahdi Muhammad was selected as interim state president; a fact contested by United Somali Congress, the Somali National Movement and the Somali Patriotic Movement. These competing elites were locked into a battle over resources and power. This rift soon developed into civil war.

The basis of the conflict was clan allegiances, competition for resources and the collapse of state authority. The unravelling of the political settlement saw competing elites embroiled in a zero-sum struggle for political and economic power.

A collapsing political settlement can also be the source, not just the symptom, of state fragility. If powerful elites believe that an existing or proposed political settlement is no longer in their interests they may actively seek to undermine it. This may include the use of large-scale violence to undermine the authority of the state. In such circumstances exacerbating and prolonging human insecurity, underdevelopment and weaknesses in governance and the rule of law, may be a deliberate and central part of their strategy.

This combination of structural weaknesses and deliberate human action produces powerful forces that grow in strength and progressively begin to rip the state apart. The purpose of stabilisation, through timely engagement, is to reverse the downward spiral of state fragility and failure; operations in support of stabilisation prevent, contain and then arrest those conditions which contributed towards instability.
Insecurity. One of the defining features of state fragility and failure is that, to varying degrees, the capacity of the government to contribute effectively to security, is degraded. If the situation has deteriorated to the point that foreign military intervention is required, as part of a broad stabilisation effort, it is highly likely that the host government will be unable to provide the basic structures that protect the population from threats to their human security. Note that:

- Hostile groups may seek to inflict a level of violence that weakens and discredits host government security forces and destroys the confidence of the population. Preventing and reversing security progress underpins their strategy. This task is made easier for hostile groups by the fact that such societies are often heavily armed.
- Hostile groups may seek to undermine the states’ monopoly on legitimate use of violence and local security by setting up parallel security and governance structures.

Economic Decline. In fragile or failed states the government’s ability to raise and distribute revenue effectively is often severely compromised. This can be caused by a combination of: corruption; poor border control; disincentives to invest; diversion of human and other capital to the security challenge; poverty and an absence of the appropriate mechanisms and tax systems. Thus basic functions, normally provided by the state, may depend upon substantial international assistance. In particular:

- Even where significant natural resources exist, these may prove to be a driver of instability. They can provide motivation for destabilising actors, both internal and external, who seek to control and exploit such resources; for example, the trade in conflict diamonds.
- The point at which economic decline stimulates challenges to the authority of the state differs from country to country. For example, if long experience of poverty generates low expectations of quality of life, then the initial standards of living may be quite low and even relatively minor progress can boost governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Conversely, populations that have artificially high expectation may challenge the authority of the state and aspirations will have to be managed.
- Wherever possible, the host nation government and local people should undertake projects and services themselves. Where this is not possible in the short-term, the transition of responsibilities to ministries and local authorities should be conducted as soon as practicable. It is particularly important that the host nation government receives credit for any positive developments. The delivery of projects and services tolerably by the host nation, may have more positive, long-term political impact than external actors delivering them well.

- Projects and services initiated by international forces, organisations and agencies should be self-sustaining. Programmes that are not might falter upon the departure of the international force, which may contribute to instability in the longer term.

Weak Governance and the Rule of Law. The security sector (see Chapter 5) is crucial to effective governance and the maintenance of law and order. Within a population’s hierarchy of needs, physical security is essential for effective and durable development and requires well-managed and competent personnel operating within an institutional framework defined by law. By contrast, a poorly managed security sector hampers development, discourages investment and helps perpetuate poverty. In a stabilisation situation, there can be important aspects of the conflict which can impact on the structure and functioning of the security sector. These include:

- Remnants of a national army or interior forces that are opposed to foreign intervention. These need to be reconciled (or, where this is not possible, defeated), noting that they may subsequently become the foundation for re-building a national security force.
- A broad-based insurgency comprising multiple groups that threaten the survival of the state. This can become a magnet for foreign insurgents, as in the case of Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

- The proliferation of predatory armed groups and militias for whom war and criminal activity are their main livelihood.
- The emergence of criminal networks, often with regional and international dimensions, protected by armed groups.
- The disappearance of the structures of governance, and the emergence of security voids, which provide opportunities for competing forms of political authority.
- Institutionalised corruption as the primary means of interaction between groups and individuals.

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8. The Security Sector is inherently linked to the Justice Sector and includes: state and non-state armed forces, police and paramilitary units and private military and security companies; intelligence and security agencies; the judiciary, prisons, prosecution and defence legal authorities as well as traditional (e.g. tribal) justice mechanisms, civil management and oversight bodies (including President/Prime Minister, Defence, Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs Ministries and the legislature), and civil society including the media, Non-governmental Organisations, professional and religious bodies.

9. An example of the Taliban follows paragraph 615.

Contesting the Political Order

0125 At the heart of the societal conflict is a contest over the nature of the political order. This may be a battle for political power between clearly identifiable sides. However, the conflict is likely to involve a kaleidoscope of indistinct groups with an array of motivations, goals, tactics and shifting allegiances, which may or may not be aligned with national boundaries. Causes can range from the deep-seated and strategic, to the temporary and local, modified as need and circumstance dictate. Motivations may include a sense of victimhood, alienation, humiliation, resentment, honour or revenge. Some groups feel a need to challenge modernity, or express loyalty to a clan, tribe, religious or ideological cause. Others, engaged in criminality, will wish to prevent or reduce interference in their activities, and may not be ideologically driven.

0126 Developing an understanding of the potentially multiple motivations, goals, tactics and allegiances of the key conflict groups is indispensable for a successful campaign. If these aspects are assumed rather than studied in depth, it is likely to result in inappropriate and counter-productive operations. In short, understanding what motivates key conflict groups, in particular operational contexts, may be central to designing measures to counter them. A key part is an acceptance that the ideas that drive such groups may be different from Western norms, but could still be seen as attractive and legitimate by sections of the society in conflict.

0127 Local elites usually seek to adopt persuasive causes to mobilise support, often based on real problems or unresolved contradictions inherent to any society. They seek to situate their activities within a compelling narrative that attempts to explain and justify their actions while simultaneously de-legitimising the motivations and behaviours of opponents. For example, such groups often inflict punishment on petty criminals and pass judgement on disputes within the community to establish themselves as alternative providers of justice. This is designed to both gain favour from the population and illustrate the failure of state justice mechanisms.

0128 Competing groups will seek to influence the population by communicating a vision of the future, commonly referred to as a narrative. Building such a narrative often involves the strategic manipulation of identity. All individuals possess multiple identities. These may relate to regional, national, religious, ethnic, clan, tribal or family forms of self-identification. Others relate to occupation, beliefs or interests. Of the many identities individuals possess, some are more important than others in shaping their political attitudes or behaviours. It is these politically significant identities that hostile groups seek to manipulate as part of a wider narrative that attempts to create belief in an us versus them story that paints those seeking to counter their activities as the oppressor. Consequently, developing a unifying counter-narrative that convinces key audiences and undermines the hostile groups’ portrayal is a vital aspect of stabilisation. This is examined in greater depth in Chapter 3.

0129 Boundaries between groups are usually blurred, with fluid membership and multiple allegiances. Specific labelling is often misleading. For example, members of the host nation government may also transition in and out of irregular groups. Such linkages between political power and illicit activity particularly undermine the development of effective governance and the rule of law. However, their fluidity also provides opportunities to change the campaign strategic geometry, as in the case of the Sons of Iraq programme.

0130 Hostile elements exploit a population where poverty and a lack of effective governance make the population vulnerable to coercion or inducement. Yet they sometimes provide a measure of physical and economic security for a community, as well as a range of social support mechanisms. An example of this can be seen in the actions of Hizbollah in Southern Lebanon. At other times coercion, terror and intimidation can be the main levers of influence. Usually, however, a combination of coercive and supportive methods will be adopted. These tend to concentrate on arresting or reversing any momentum in security and stabilisation provision established by the authorities.

0131 Central to the societal conflict, there is a battle to exert control over the security environment. At its most demanding, this could include countering a brutal insurgency. Doubt in the ability of the state to achieve this contributes to fragility. In order to prevent, arrest, and eventually reverse this fragility, hostile elements should be thwarted and, just as importantly, seen to be thwarted. The host nation government should be portrayed as the architect of any success.
Evolving Threats

0132 Warfare is an enduring element in the international system although its character changes over time. A feature of this evolution is the emergence – some argue re-emergence – of compound, or hybrid threats. These occur where states or non-state actors choose to exploit all modes of war simultaneously using advanced conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and disruptive criminality to destabilise an existing order. Such threats emanate from state and non-state actors that have access to some of the sophisticated weapons and systems normally fielded by regular forces. Conflicts are increasingly characterised by a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralised planning and execution, and state or non-state actors who may use both simple and sophisticated technologies in new ways. Access to advanced technology and weaponry has given some non-state groups formidable capabilities such as surface-to-air missiles, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear and thermobaric technologies. An example of this is Hezbollah’s use of an anti-ship cruise missile against an Israeli Navy Corvette in 2006.

0133 The power of information and the revolution in technology is a significant enabler in the activity of current and future adversaries. Technology has expanded the operating space through mass communication, creating the potential for the cyber mobilisation of dispersed communities.11 Groups have seized on the globalisation of information to execute the strategic communications campaigns that are central to their activities. The content and delivery of information has therefore shifted from the mass propaganda of revolutionary insurgents, such as Mao, to highly tailored campaigns. Adversaries have been quick to exploit the mobile phone, internet and social networking sites for recruiting, training, educating, motivating and controlling new members. Information now permits targeted individual mobilisation, an alternative to the old mass mobilisation.12

0134 Individuals and groups are a shifting, fluid network of disparate people, some of whom specialise in particular functions or tasks. In insurgencies in particular, clusters of cells or teams gravitate towards each other in informal communities of interest – to exchange intelligence and weaponry, reinforce a commonly held narrative, train and conduct attacks – and then disperse, perhaps never to meet again. Some groups employ a version of mission command based on ideas and ideology being passed through both the virtual domain and by word of mouth. Insurgency is no longer bounded by the aim of self determination, as was the case with the Peoples Liberation Organisation, ETA13 or Irish Republican Army. Instability emanating from fragile states and from diaspora and sympathetic populations in developed states can take the form of a franchised, globalised insurgency whose goals encompass profound changes to international order.

0135 States may choose to convert their conventional units into irregular formations and adopt new tactics. They may also be quick to cooperate with non-state actors where they see mutual benefit. Adaptive adversaries, therefore, combine various types of warfare in the same time and place. Consequently, attempts to counter them are unlikely to be successful if pursued in a linear, sequential or purely military manner. Evolving threats are likely to demand an agile and adaptive response. When warfare or conflict, however manifested, impacts a fragile state and its population, a comprehensive approach that combines the military, development, governance and rule of law measures of different organisations and nations is one means of achieving this. This theme is developed further in Chapter 2.

It was Edmund Burke, the 18th Century politician, who when asked, “Do you lead public opinion or follow it?” said “I meet it on the way.”

The very nature of our recent experiences, whether during the 40 years in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Iraq, or Afghanistan, prove that dictum in large measure. Initially, through military force or presence, we can try to lead to a conclusion by occupying the battle-space by denying the enemy real room for manoeuvre, but any war fought amongst the people means that military commanders and Government Ministers must be adaptable, aware and open to the changing dynamics of the political battle-space.

General Rupert Smith neatly defines it in the following way: “Rather than war and peace, there is no predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily either the starting or end point: conflicts are resolved, but not necessarily confronted.”

This elongated nature of modern conflict constantly presents new challenges which may prove to be a force for change or a force for missed opportunities. When Governments commit to a campaign the political objectives will be set whilst military commanders will decide the ways and means to achieve them. And, while there will be a continuum in the military command, ethos, and approach, with neat points of handover, this does not necessarily apply in the political sphere. Ministers from the lead Departments involved in a stabilisation or COIN campaign – the FCO, DFID and the MOD – will invest a large amount of time, understanding the complexities of the country and region in question. Yet, the vagaries of political life mean that they can be here today and gone tomorrow. There could even be a change of Government at a critical point in a campaign. The sophisticated nature of present day insurgents will be acute aware of this and they will not be slow in exploiting this political weak point of democratic societies.

Similar effort will be put in, both by in-theatre commanders, diplomats and others to establish good points of contact with the emerging leadership in the host country. While stable democracies can be subject to rapid and sometimes unpredictable change it applies even more so to the fragile make-up of the host country political relationships. So, no matter how sophisticated or structured the comprehensive plan is to deal with the creation or re-assembly of the new state, the political pack of cards can topple over night.

All of these ingredients, either in part or as a whole are the risks which have to be taken into account by Governments, Ministers and politicians when they commit our Armed Forces to actions in foreign fields. The question is: how are these risks to be accommodated?

First, the planning for any mission must be truly comprehensive. Once the political will has been determined, all Departments which have a role to play, and this will extend beyond the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, should be part of the planning framework. The military configuration should be decided on the basis of what is required, with built-in flexibility, and the civilian contribution should equally be constructed from the outset. It is imperative that a vacuum is not allowed to develop at any stage in the campaign, there must be constant momentum in the process as continuity reassures the host population. This means that the overall civilian component should be ready from day one. The key to stabilisation is a
well-resourced capacity building machine that can help to deliver the trappings of a functioning state. The military can hold the ground and provide a measure of security; it is the role of the civilian component to deliver the development and governance.

Second, military commanders must be truly sensitive to local needs. They should be alert to the changing demands of the insurgents and be prepared to accept that not all insurgents are in it to the death. My experience over 10 years as a Minister in Northern Ireland and in Defence informs me that at some point the host population gets tired of the killing. They may want the insurgents to be part of the future or they may not. The key is to be receptive to that point of departure and to build on it. Those closest to the action are perhaps best placed to pick up the signals, to report on them and to insist that they are listened to.

This leads me to my third point, the need for mutual understanding and respect between military commanders at all levels, and Ministers. To deliver stabilisation elsewhere means there must be a stable framework at home. It is vital that unity of efforts is maintained if our adversaries are not to exploit differences between us. In private, Ministers welcome the advice of a well-informed critical friend, but in public, such commentary can undermine the campaign. Ministers will be driven by a different timeline to military commanders.

The political environment, both at home and in-theatre, rather than events on the battlefield, can sometimes drive timing or sequencing of efforts and allocation of resources. Understandably, this can be frustrating for those undertaking difficult and dangerous operations.

In summary, Ministers need to balance a broad range of political risks in the planning, initiation and conduct of COIN and stabilisation campaigns. Success requires some give and take from all elements. It should not be seen as a one-way process of concession to political priorities — at times the military element will drive the politics and sometimes vice-versa. As Burke said, if military commanders and Ministers understand the complexities and meet them on the way, success can follow. Planning for all conceivable eventualities is a necessity but the plans must not obscure the vision.

Stabilisation: The UK Stabilisation Unit’s View

HMG defines a stabilisation environment as one in which:
- Conflict is severe enough to undermine the fundamental relationship between the state and society where the state lacks the will or capacity to meet the security needs of its population.
- There is an identified need to address the root causes of conflict and deal with the immediate security problem. Ordinary mechanisms for the delivery of the sustainable development that may be necessary to address these causes are broken or severely damaged, either across the state or in a significant part.
- The ordinary military mechanisms for identifying and neutralising security threats must be complemented by the need to pursue a workable political settlement and create entry points for sustainable development.
- There is a need for an additional security presence. The presence may be in the form of an army or police force and may be foreign or national.

Stabilisation objectives may include:
- To prevent or contain violent conflict; by coercion as well as political intervention and the commitment to address the causes of underlying tensions.
- Protect people, key assets and institutions; a security situation to allow people to begin conducting their daily lives and for government to function.
- Promote political processes for stability; seek political settlements which encourage power and resources to be contested peacefully without violence.
- Prepare for longer term development and address the causes of conflict; create entry points for the long term development that achieve sustainable stability.

The Stabilisation Unit exists primarily to: support planning by ensuring that Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) Departments establish a common aim for intervention, a single assessment of the problem, common objectives and clear lines of responsibility for delivering success; that lessons are learned from such complex environments and applied in future stabilisation interventions, and, to select, develop, train, deploy and manage civilians for stabilisation environments.

Humanitarian, development and stabilisation activities often share operational space. But although the activities may appear similar, the guiding principles are different:
- Stabilisation has explicitly political aims and is undertaken in pursuit of the national interest.
- Humanitarian assistance is strictly impartial.
- Development, for the UK, always focuses on poverty.
The Government is committed to tackling national security in a comprehensive way, and this is why plans are in place to tackle the causes of instability, and respond to those groups who pose threats.'

Cabinet Office National Security Strategy – June 2009

JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

CHAPTER 2
THE STABILISATION OF FRAGILE STATES

‘The Government is committed to tackling national security in a comprehensive way, and this is why plans are in place to tackle the causes of instability, and respond to those groups who pose threats.’

Section I Intervening in Fragile States
Setting Goals: Choosing Ends, Ways and Means
The Range of Military Responses

Section II The Evolution of the UK Approach to Stabilisation
Countering Insurgency
Supporting Peace Operations
Recent Intervention Operations
Stabilisation: The Need for a New Approach

Section III The UK Approach to Stabilisation
The Stabilisation Model
Building Human and National Security
Fostering Host Government Capacity and Legitimacy
Stimulating Economic Development
Permissiveness

Section IV Shaping the Key Conflict Relationship
Communication and Influence
The Key Conflict Relationship

Section V Working With Partners
The Command and Control Challenge in Stabilisation
The Host Nation Government
Integrated, Approaches
Transitions

A Diplomat’s Perspective – Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG

Stabilisation. The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power, and prepares for sustainable social and economic development. (JDP 3-40)

Peace Support Operations. An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. (AAP-6)

Insurgency. An insurgency is organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority.

Counter-insurgency. Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat or contain insurgency, while addressing root causes.

Irregular Activity. Irregular Activity is the use, or threat, of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))
There are two broad criteria that the UK Government will assess when determining the extent to which a particular crisis becomes a priority for action: first, the degree of impact on the UK’s national security or strategic interests and second, our ability to mitigate that impact by intervention. Each case will be judged against these broad determinants. The more direct the impact of a crisis, and the clearer our ability to mitigate this impact, the greater likelihood there is of UK intervention. Some generic examples of strategic interests and capacities are given above.

Possible Strategic Interests
- The crisis impacts on UK national security or international policy objectives.
- The crisis has significant economic implications for the UK.
- There is a humanitarian crisis requiring intervention as part of international obligations.
- There is a significant impact on British forces already deployed to theatre.

Capacity Considerations
- The likelihood and ability of others in the international community to act.
- Understanding of the conflict and the likelihood of a successful outcome.
- The ability to provide sufficient resources for the required duration.
- The impact of intervention on other crises and interests.

The Range of Military Responses
- In support of national security objectives, and invariably within a wider cross-government approach, UK Armed Forces provide critical capabilities that can support stability, tackle threats at source and respond to crises overseas before they impact upon our national security. To provide this capability the military are able to undertake a wide range of roles, at varying scales, including:
  - Regional Engagement and International Security Cooperation. In many circumstances instability within a state or region can be reduced by host governments and regional organisations with limited external support from the wider international community. In such a scenario the UK may choose to contribute to a limited-objective International Security Cooperation (ISC) initiative such as arms control, counter-drugs operations, military capacity building or Security Sector Reform (SSR). Operation BASILICA in 2000, which involved the retraining and re-equipping of the armed forces of Sierra Leone, is one example.
Counter Weapons of Mass Effect Proliferation. In some circumstances instability may be the catalyst for the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Effect (WME) technology into the hands of either belligerent states or armed non-state groups such as al-Qaeda. In this scenario it is likely that UK national security interests and imperatives will be engaged within a counter-proliferation operation. Over the period 1992 to 2003 the Royal Navy joined forces with the United States Navy to conduct maritime interdiction operations against vessels bound for Iraq in the Persian Gulf. This was to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq, including the prevention of the importation of conventional or nuclear weapons technology.

Deterrence or Containment. Instability within one state may provide a haven for groups intent on attacking the UK, its allies or its interests. Where this threat may be effectively deterred or contained, the UK may choose to participate in international operations designed to reduce the impact of the activities of these groups. The no-fly zones established by the US, the UK and France after the 1991 Gulf War to stop Saddam’s repression of Kurdish people in the north of Iraq, and the Shia population in the south, are examples. Also, air and maritime operations in the Arabian Gulf and Horn of Africa region have been used to interdict the flow of foreign fighters between unstable states.

Stabilisation in Support of Wider State-Building. In some circumstances state instability engages the UK’s interests or obligations to such a degree that deterrence will be ineffective. Here, the ability to conduct a spectrum of intervention operations – including high intensity warfighting, usually as part of a coalition – will be a more appropriate response. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, conducted by NATO as part of wider stabilisation and state-building initiatives within Afghanistan, is an example.

The ability to undertake this range of roles affords the UK Government choices for how to use the military instrument of power in support of national security objectives. The scale of military commitment can range through a single adviser, a single unit conducting ISC, to a sizeable Joint Force (see Figure 2.1). A regional military presence can be used in support of all levels of commitment within the affected country itself and in some circumstances can be applied as the only military activity in support of diplomatic efforts to prevent violent conflict. Clearly, an early commitment to help prevent a downward spiral in a fragile state will be considerably less onerous for intervening forces than the scale necessary to facilitate restoration. ISC activity to prevent will normally demand a coordinated rather than comprehensive effort. Equally clearly, the least intrusive form of response, consistent with the achievement of national objectives and policy imperatives, should be the goal and intervention operations requiring significant resources and persistence are invariably the choice of last resort. Activity to restore will always require a comprehensive approach.

While civilian statesmen, military commanders and inter-agency partners share a responsibility for the development of strategy, ultimately both the decision to intervene, and the nature of that intervention, will be decided by the Government of the day. It may choose to focus on the exportable threats of instability. Or it may elect to buttress indigenous security forces so that they can contain or defeat it themselves. Where the UK Government decides to intervene with a sizeable Joint Force, probably as part of a multinational coalition, it selects the most complex response option which carries the greatest amount of risk. It is this response option which Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 addresses.

Recognising the characteristics of stabilisation, the UK codified a new Military Task in 2008, Military Assistance as a form of regional military presence, and advice.
to Stabilisation and Development (MASD); JDP 3-40 provides Joint operational doctrine for this Military Task.

**Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development Operations**

MASD operations are likely to follow an intervention operation or a peace enforcement deployment. The security situation may vary from non-benign to limited permissiveness, while compliance is likely to be highly variable and the likelihood of disruption high. UK forces will normally be acting as part of a coalition with responsibility to support the recognised governing entity. These operations will tend to be complex and dynamic requiring a broad spectrum of military effects. The intensity will be variable across the theatre in time and space, characterised by a campaign to counter-irregular activity conducted initially by coalition forces, but handing off to the developed local security forces as soon as practicable. These operations will require a high degree of force protection. The widest range of coordinated stabilisation and reconstruction is to be expected, ranging from security assistance for civilian personnel through to, and including, limited reconstruction activity delivered by UK forces and extensive capacity building for local security forces. Engendering a secure environment through localised consent will allow Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) and Other Government Departments (OGDs) to take on the majority of this activity. These operations are likely to be enduring in nature.

**SECTION II**

**THE EVOLUTION OF THE UK APPROACH TO STABILISATION**

0209 The purpose of this section is to set out the provenance of the British approach to stabilisation within UK experiences of 20th Century COIN, PSO and more recent interventions. It allows current operations to be seen in perspective.

**Countering Insurgency**

0210 Some previous UK COIN doctrine is still relevant today. For those who wish further background reading, a short primer on the subject can be found on the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) website. It provides a historically-based overview of British COIN practice and traces the evolution of the British approach to COIN through a discussion of key themes and a series of case studies.

**Insurgency**

Insurgency is organised violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority. (JDP 3-40)

0211 **British Experience of Insurgency and COIN.** There are three phases of British experience in relation to small wars; conquest, internal policing or control; and colonial withdrawal. Stabilisation today is not necessarily the same as any of these, but they have shaped our development and thinking and merit some consideration. Early encounters included wars against American revolutionaries, Cetewayo’s Zulus, the Mahdi’s forces in Sudan and the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857. Fighting these wars called for ingenuity, adaptability and, crucially, sustainability where distance and terrain presented major challenges. While most campaigns featured some elements of guerrilla activity, the decisive battles were largely fought between formed bodies of combatants. C. E. Callwell’s book Small Wars, first published in 1896 is perhaps the definitive account of the tactics, techniques and procedures of the day. Although it provides context, it is at odds with much of the later 20th Century classical COIN (see paragraph 217). This is because a characteristic of classical COIN is an emphasis on winning the politico-strategic battle while containing at the tactical level. In contrast, Callwell saw regular armies as unlikely to win the politico-strategic battle and therefore concluded that the decision had to be sought at the tactical level.

0212 The South African War (1899-1902) had a major impact on the British Army. Following the defeat of Boer main forces the war regressed from conventional battles into a protracted and bitter guerrilla campaign. In this second phase the Boers operated in highly mobile mounted detachments (commandos) using raiding tactics. Kitchener’s adaptations to the Army’s operational concept were largely credited with defeating Boer guerrillas during this second phase. These adaptations were based on population and resource control measures (farm burning, detention and enforced relocations) which helped separate guerrillas from their support networks, and large-scale sweeps, and cordon and search operations. This formed the basis of UK COIN doctrine in the first half of the 20th Century.

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0213 The high-water mark of British COIN experience coincided with the retreat from Empire in the last half of the 20th Century. Campaigns include Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1956), Cyprus (1955-1960) and Oman (1965-1975). Often referred to as classical COIN, these operations have provided many of the lessons that informed the Northern Ireland campaign (1969-2007) and current British COIN doctrine. The Malayan emergency represented a turning point. Large-scale sweeps as well as cordon and search operations inherited from Kitchener’s tactics in South Africa initially produced poor results and were replaced by an ever-increasing reliance on deep patrols cued by improved intelligence. A feature of these new tactics was the use of parachute and helicopter insertions deep into the jungle and the offering of substantial cash sums to induce senior insurgent figures to defect. At the operational level, General Sir Gerald Templer initiated the Briggs Plan which provided unity of command across civil government, police and military (the so-called ‘three-legged stool’) and the resettlement of Chinese squatters in protected villages (the so-called ‘expanding ink spot’) which later formed the basis of the American Clear-Hold-Build approach.

0214 Thompson’s Five Principles of COIN. From his experience in Malaya, Sir Robert Thompson, the Permanent Minister of Defence for Malaya, formulated what have come to be known as Thompson’s Five Principles of COIN:

- The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
- The government must function in accordance with the law.
- The government must have an overall plan.
- The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.
- In the guerrilla phase of an emergency, a government must secure its base areas first.

0215 Insurgent Tactics and Critical Requirements. Experience in COIN campaigns over the past half century has also yielded increased knowledge of the tactics and critical requirements of insurgent movements. Insurgents have adopted practices from a wide variety of sources. There is much evidence of influence by Mao Tse-Tung (protracted war), Che Guevara (foco theory), Marighela (urban insurgency), and 19th century European nihilists (propaganda of the deed and word). Some insurgents appear to adhere to such classic forms of doctrine. Others develop their own approaches and adopt a lessons learned process from similar operations and open source material. Insurgents use a variety of tactics that may include:

- Provocation. Insurgents carry out acts deliberately designed to prompt opponents, whether coalition forces, governments or sectarian rivals, to over-react in ways that alienate local populations, increase instability and provide propaganda value.
- Intimidation. Insurgents seek to terrify and coerce those members of the population, or elements within their own communities, who cooperate with, or support, the government or coalition forces. Furthermore, they may attempt to terrify and coerce members of the security forces, whether local or international, and civilian administrators.
- Protraction. Insurgents attempt to draw out the conflict to avoid decisive confrontation with strong security forces, control their own losses, sap the will of counterinsurgents, and preserve their strength after setbacks.
- Exhaustion. Through use of carefully targeted attacks, insurgents seek to soak up security forces and government agencies in actions that require major effort, but do not significantly progress their mission, for example force protection tasks, and the protection of facilities and infrastructure.

"All we have to do is send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise the cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make their [US] generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without achieving for it anything of note…bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy."

Obama bin Laden 2004

0216 Insurgencies have a number of critical requirements:

- Leadership. Insurgencies require charismatic and credible leaders to persuade people to join the group and to motivate and drive the existing membership. They may exert direct control or operate indirectly by mobilising popular support. The larger the group the more difficult it will be to exercise central control without compromising security.
- A Cause. Insurgents require a cause, some animating grievance which a charismatic leader can exploit. The stated cause may be a useful cover for a less palatable strategic end-state.
- Tacit Consent. While most insurgencies can survive without a large base of active support from within the population, they cannot progress without the tacit consent of a major section of the population. They seek to leverage this through a mix of coercion, subversion and persuasion of the population.

This publication was no longer authoritative and has been archived.
• **Recruits.** Without the ability to maintain a flow of willing recruits, either from within the local population or foreign fighters, insurgents will be vulnerable to attrition, as in the case of the remnants of the communist insurgent Malayan Races Liberation Army, which was reduced to a fugitive existence, isolated and irrelevant, in the Thai border region.

• **Weapons.** In many conflict-riven societies weapons are freely available and so cutting supply (as was the approach in Northern Ireland) may be impractical.

• **Safe Havens.** Insurgents require areas where they can rest, regroup, train, resupply and plan their operations, and where they may declare their new political order, as was nearly the case when al-Qaeda declared the Islamic State of Iraq, centred in Al-Anbar Province. These will be areas in which counter-insurgents are operationally constrained. Cyberspace is a partial safe haven in which insurgents can recruit, mobilise, raise and move funds, and advance their narrative.

• **Essential Supplies.** Food, water, medical supplies, combat supplies and means of communication are vital for insurgents. These will tend to be drawn from the local population, or by appropriating humanitarian aid. If the flow of these supplies is disrupted or uncertain, the insurgency will be undermined.

• **Intelligence.** Insurgents require knowledge of the population in order to target, coerce, intimate and recruit as well as provide counter-intelligence to avoid penetration.

• **Finance.** Although insurgencies are inexpensive relative to costs of countering them, they rely on funds generated from two broad sources; illegal activities and donations:
  - Illegal activities can include trafficking, fraud, money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, theft, or any other areas likely to turn a profit. This has 2 important effects beyond simply providing insurgents with resources. First, it undermines government revenue, authority and legitimacy, particularly if government officials become implicated in the activities. Second, it leads insurgents into pacts of convenience with organised criminal networks.
  - Donations come from supportive communities or foreign governments motivated by either ethnic, ideological, religious, or geopolitical interests. Such funding can be overt or channelled through a web of connections designed to conceal the source and route of the donations.

5217 The Characteristics of Classical COIN. Following the success of COIN campaigns in the last half century and an increasing understanding of insurgent tactics and vulnerabilities, British COIN doctrine has coalesced around a familiar set of characteristics.

**Characteristics of Classical British COIN**

- Emphasis on winning the politico-strategic battle while containing at the tactical level.
- The doctrine of minimum force, meaning ‘the minimum force necessary to achieve the aim’.
- Joint unified command structures integrating civil government, police and military.
- Intelligence-based operations including extensive use of turned enemy personnel.
- Continuous offensive pressure on the insurgents by all elements of the security forces.
- Small unit, patrol-based offensive tactics, but supported by a large security force maximising its agility and ability to concentrate force provided by air manoeuvre and protected ground mobility.
- Population/resource control, and self-defence measures, to isolate the insurgent from the support of the population and to enhance the security of that population.
- Establishing, clearing, securing and extending base areas to provide safe zones.
- Emphasis on winning hearts and minds, and on Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in general.

2. The UN Charter included the concept of assigned military forces and a Military Staff Committee that was to be formed from the Chiefs of Staff of the UN Security Council permanent members.
3. The term peacekeeping is not in the UN Charter and was first adopted following the deployment of a UN force to the Sinai in 1956 (UN Emergency Force) to secure a ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces.
4. The habit of describing peace support roles in terms of the chapter divisions of the UN Charter had become the norm. With no clear legal status for peace enforcement the term Chapter II and a half was coined in an attempt to relativise the stance.
5. Although the inherent right to use force in self-defence is well grounded in law, the range of terms – minimum force, minimum necessary force, restraint in the use of force (Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3-4.1 Peace Support Operations) have been prone to wide interpretation.
7. Operation AGRICOLA.
Supporting Peace Operations

Q218 Post World War II. Following major wars there have often been attempts to regulate the behaviour of states. The UN Charter represents the most ambitious attempt to establish a global system for inter-state relationships. However, the UN’s ability to influence global governance has been constrained by an inability to empower the organisation as it was originally intended. There have been increasing demands for action to defend individual rights and freedoms, resulting in successive shifts in international conduct and the continual evolution of our approach to operations.

Q219 The Cold War. Although the UN Charter envisaged an international enforcement capability, Cold War paralysis prevented its delivery. Therefore the UN continues to depend upon the will of member nations to fund and participate in operations for which it provides the mandate. The UN was able to moderate international aggression throughout the Cold War by mounting what came to be known as traditional or Nordic Peacekeeping operations. Consent (to be given by all parties to the dispute before intervention) and neutrality of the national contingents were fundamentals to this approach. The existence of large standing forces during the Cold War helped enable these UN missions. Notable successes were achieved during this era, but this period of relative stability ended abruptly, with major implications for roles, capacity, flexibility and reach demanded of the UN.

Q220 Post Cold War – Peace Enforcement. After the end of the Cold War the UN Security Council (UNSC) became increasingly willing to act. Between 1998 and 1999 the UNSC mandated as many peacekeeping missions as it had done during the preceding 40 years. However, it was quickly evident that the traditional concept of peacekeeping was inadequate for contemporary conflicts that were no longer checked by the influence of the two Cold War superpowers. UN capacity was poorly matched to the tasks it faced. In parallel, the concept of enforcing the peace was born. The resultant UK doctrine compartmentalised PSO as a type of operation underpinned by a clear international mandate, based on three principles: consent, impartiality, and the application of minimum necessary force. The UK approach responded to the volatility of the Balkans conflicts by acknowledging the need for forces to act when consent was lost – but the adherence to strict impartiality and the use of minimum force were seen as essential underpinnings of consent. Thus a consent line, or Rubicon, was seen to divide peacekeeping from peace enforcement, and once consent was lost military force would default to the use of warfighting techniques. Thereafter consent was unlikely to be regained. The UK approach failed to provide doctrine for peace enforcement activity, although it did inform those outside the military sphere on the risk of mission creep and the uncontrolled escalation of conflict beyond the combat potential of the deployed peace support force.

Q221 The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations. UK experiences in Bosnia demanded a more flexible approach be developed for the grey area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which utilised a full spectrum of warfighting skills. The UN responded to the perception that it was poorly equipped for the tasks that it faced by transferring mission responsibility to NATO. This set the precedent for the UNSC mandating action by regional security structures and effectively outsourcing peace support. This created a fundamental shift in the context of PSO – a recognition of a need for an international, inter-agency approach to which there is a military contribution – a comprehensive approach, in which the PSO trinity of consent, impartiality and limits on the use of force, is replaced by a concept of campaign authority, vested in an international coalition or regional security alliance and derived from a mandate. This is equivalent to the authority vested in national government and described in paragraph 247.

Recent Intervention Operations

Q222 A New Paradigm. The operation to protect the indigenous population of Kosovo against Serb intervention was the catalyst for a new paradigm that removed previous assumptions about consent and impartiality. Intervention operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 have shown that neither the guidelines from classic COIN or PSO are adequate for tackling contemporary challenges to stability. Military forces have been drawn into wider stabilisation tasks that have gone beyond the delivery of security, and the mechanisms for effective stabilisation planning prior to deployment have been absent both within UK Defence and across government. UK’s response is constrained not only by the size of her Armed Forces, but also by the lack of deployable capacity amongst the non-security departments, the requisite terms and conditions of service that will allow civilians, such as police advisers, to operate in an often high risk environment, and the means to integrate both planning and delivery of broad-based stabilisation support in failed or failing states.

Q223 Developing Indigenous Security Capacity. Experience has shown that security is an enabler, but without adequate security other vital development cannot take place. Assisting the development of capable indigenous security capacity has been critical to the ultimate withdrawal
of international forces. Security capacity building has included military, border, police and other internal security forces. These local forces have to assume responsibility for the contest for security by first containing, and ultimately neutralising those irregular groups that threaten effective national governance. Therefore, building these units may demand emphasis that matches or exceeds that devoted to adversary-focused activity. Building effective indigenous units is transitory without strong security institutions, such as a capable ministry of defence with responsive planning, personnel and procurement processes.

0224 **Local Civil Development.** Some level of local security, rule of law and national governance are the necessary conditions for re-development of indigenous economic and institutional capacity. The US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction identified five principles of reconstruction:

- Security is necessary for large scale reconstruction to succeed.
- Developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as bricks and mortar reconstruction.
- Soft programmes (i.e. governance and economic development) serve as an important complement to military operations in insecure environments.
- Programmes should be geared to indigenous priorities and needs.
- Reconstruction is an extension of political strategy.

0225 **Current Capabilities.** The UK’s military structures are not currently optimised for the breadth of stabilisation tasks, in which mass matters and human factors, local context and cultural understanding are fundamental to success. In recognition of this, Defence has resourced new capabilities, training and doctrine. However, stabilisation is not simply a lesser included capability embedded in our current structures. Rather, in the same way we re-calibrated for operations in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, a continued commitment to stabilisation will benefit from further adaptation and resources. No conflict stands still. The UK’s involvement also acts as a catalyst for change. There may be an inexorable ebb and flow of conflict during stabilisation as international forces compete with adversaries to provide security; they will try to match our stability and security activities with coercion, instability and violence. The commander will often find that the situation has developed beyond that for which he prepared. This is likely to be a recurring theme for the more demanding stabilisation tasks, in which the military provides only part of a solution to a complex, primarily political problem that will demand a highly iterative approach and institutional agility. The comprehensive response should be seen pragmatically, as a work in progress.

**Stabilisation: The Need for a New Approach**

0226 **Classical COIN campaigns shared a number of similar features.** Recent UK operations, however, reveal significant departures from this classical pattern which together demand a new approach.

0227 **State Fragility.** In classical COIN, the UK buttressed an existing colonial political order with effective state security, governance and political structures. Recent operations, however, have been conducted within the context of state fragility and state failure. As such, state-building activities have constituted a significant component of recent interventions in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.

0228 **Complex of Intervening Actors.** In classical COIN, as the colonial power, UK forces and agencies controlled all levers of government. Recent operations, however, have been conducted by a bewildering array of intervening actors within the sovereign territory of another state. As such, the commander is forced to manage sensitivities brought about by working in multinational coalitions, with non-coalition international partners/stakeholders and, most importantly, the host government.

0229 **Smaller Forces.** The size of intervening armed forces is much smaller than in the 20th Century. Mass matters in wars amongst the people where the population’s perception of security forces’ ability to deliver greater security is almost as important as the reality. A 1995 review of operations suggested that, in crisis interventions, ‘although numbers alone do not constitute a security strategy, successful strategies for population security and control have required force density either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants.’ For a country the size of Afghanistan this implies a mix of some 760,000 local and international internal security personnel. But, the capacity of the force is as important as any ratio. This will depend on many factors, including the contact that the force has with the population; the degree of international commitment; the means available to security forces and their access to actionable intelligence. The implications of force persistence and presence are explored in Chapter 10, Section III.

0230 **Global Networks.** Classical insurgencies were usually generated and resourced locally; consequently, the outcome of classical COIN campaigns was locally determined. In contrast, recent conflicts have been generated and resourced
by international support networks which have provided funds, supplies (including weapons) and recruits. In addition, the presence of global media, the internet and communications networks has allowed instant coverage of conflicts thus furnishing non-state armed groups with a global reach previously confined to states. The outcome of contemporary operations is becoming increasingly globally determined.

Hezbollah’s Principles of War

Adversaries have doctrine too. These principles were designed specifically to defeat Israel, a technologically advanced enemy. This is an example of a contemporary, adaptive approach by a capable irregular actor.

• Avoid the strong, attack the weak – attack and withdraw.
• Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties.
• Strike only when success is assured.
• Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you have failed.
• Don’t get into a set piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his advantage.
• Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy’s weak points.
• Keep moving, avoid formation in a front line.
• Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear.
• The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories.
• Keep up the morale of the fighters; avoid notions of the enemy’s superiority.
• The media has innumerable guns whose hits are like bullets. Use them in battle.
• The population is a treasure – nurture it.
• Hurt the enemy and then stop before he abandons restraint.

Complexity of Hostile Groups

Classical COIN typically constituted a binary struggle. Recent operations, however, have highlighted numerous violent factions within a general climate of insecurity and instability. Internal violent opposition to government authority – irregular activity - may be motivated by grievance against the state or those keen to exploit state fragility. At times, groups with different motivations, aims and allegiances will form ad hoc alliances of convenience. Moreover, grievances may mutate over time. Rather than one simple unifying idea different groups may have multiple grievances that overlap. Resistance to the intervening force may become a cause in itself. At other times irregular actors may simultaneously hold government posts or transition in and out of government. As a result, boundaries between groups become blurred and memberships fluid.

In failed states, instability may result from fighting between groups competing for local authority, as has been the case in Somalia, the Great Lakes region of Africa and Southern Sudan.

Differences Between Classical COIN and Contemporary Stabilisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classical COIN</th>
<th>Contemporary Stabilisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective State Institutions</td>
<td>State Fragility and Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single Counter Insurgent (UK Forces)</td>
<td>Multitude of Intervening Actors</td>
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<td>Large Conscripted UK Army</td>
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<td>Local Conflicts</td>
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<td>Single Enemy (the insurgency)</td>
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<td>Guerrilla and Asymmetric Threats</td>
<td>WME and Hybrid Threats</td>
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Irregular Activity

Irregular Activity is the use, or threat, of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Note: Irregular Activity could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder.

8. Reconstruction is the term often used in US Government to describe those economic and governance development tasks identified in JDP 3-40 (chapters 6 and 7). Taken from Hard Lessons: the Iraq Reconstruction Experience, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) dated 2 February 2009.

9. James T. Quinlan, Burden of Victory: the Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations, RAND Corporation. Specific examples in the study included British operations in Northern Ireland and Malaya. Some doubt exists over Quinlan’s findings due to the limited number of cases studied, although other US Institute of Defense Analyses work appears supportive suggesting that densities of 25:1000 are required to provide a 50% chance of success. Ongoing research in the UK (DSTL) is not sufficiently mature to add insight at the time of publication.

10. We were Caught Unprepared, US Army Combined Arms Centre Combat Studies Institute Press Long War Series Occasional Paper No 26 2008.
Lethality. The lethality of our adversaries has been markedly increased through easy access to sophisticated weapon systems and inexpensive technologies; sharing successful tactics and techniques; and innovation. For example, by 2006 weaponry used by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon was being deployed in Afghanistan by organisations linked to the Taliban.\(^1\) In addition, radicalisation of hostile groups (supported by small elements of the diaspora) has increased their ambition to use WME.

For the foreseeable future stabilisation campaigns involving UK Forces will be conducted in the sovereign territory of a fragile, conflict-affected State. Here successful operations will entail an element of stabilisation and state-building. In contrast, however, instability may result from other forms of irregular activity besides insurgency. These include warring factions (e.g. South Sudan), large-scale criminality (e.g. Somalia), cartels (e.g. Colombia) or foreign fighters (e.g. Yemen).

Irregular activity is likely to be at the heart of any threat to the stability of a state, and a capable insurgency is the most threatening instance of irregular activity. Countering these threats will be central to the stabilisation effort. This is illustrated at Figure 2.2.

*Figure 2.2 – Stabilisation, Irregular Activity and COIN*

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This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

*Figure 2.3 – Stabilisation Model*
SECTION III
THE UK APPROACH TO STABILISATION

The Stabilisation Model

There are some generic tenets which underpin success. In addition to the essential requirement for a political settlement, discussed in Chapter 1, there are three broad, overlapping areas of progress that underpin successful stabilisation efforts: security, governance and development. Figure 2.3 illustrates the key tasks that fall within these areas. The Department for International Development (DFID) prioritises further by introducing the concept of survival functions. These are currently defined by DFID as a base level of functionality – sockets – which international development agencies can plug into. (Earlier references, pre-2009, to survival functions will refer to more specific functions such as ability to raise revenue and ability to rule through law.)

The tasks that fall out of the stabilisation model should be understood as part of the process that fosters the authority and legitimacy of the host government in the eyes of the population. This leads ultimately to the accommodation of competing elites within a workable political settlement.

Building Human and National Security

Traditionally, the security forces have focused on national security, however defined. The UN Commission on Human Security has proposed a framework for countries experiencing violent conflicts. It emphasises the need to ensure public safety, address immediate humanitarian needs as well as begin rehabilitation and reconstruction. In a stabilisation environment the lack of human security can be acute and it is critical that this is addressed if the situation is not to spiral out of control. Part of this involves creating the conditions that safeguard individuals from all kinds of violence. However, it also relates to the immediate needs for a decent life, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, employment, and education. The military contribution is described in Chapter 7.

Fostering Host Government Capacity and Legitimacy

Fostering host nation government capacity and legitimacy does not imply a particular form of governance, but does require the restoration of state survival functions. It may also mean helping that government to: reduce corruption; improve its practical ability to administer the state; become more open and transparent, and be seen as the only legitimate, impartial deliverer of justice, although this can also include government-sanctioned use of non-state traditional/customary justice mechanisms. The military contribution is described in Chapter 6.

Permissiveness

The model in Figure 2.3 shows the scope and nature of the tasks required if a successful outcome to a stabilisation mission is to be achieved. This is clearly a multi-agency endeavour and the military will usually only be responsible for the delivery of a proportion of these tasks. The key purpose of military involvement should focus on improving the security situation sufficiently to allow the appropriate civilian organisations to operate effectively. It is principally the results of the actions of these other organisations which will bring about the long term, self-sustaining solutions required. However, in addition to establishing a robust security framework, the military may, in non-permissive

In circumstances, be required to contribute to wider stabilisation tasks. Consequently, the following factors may need to be considered:

- At times the environment will be so unsafe that only the military can operate in it. Where such a major gap in civilian stabilisation capability delivery exists, this must be addressed at the strategic level as it goes to the heart of the credibility of the comprehensive approach. This could entail structural changes to military forces. In such circumstances the commander will need to manage the tension between immediate, visible security progress, and the longer term, sustainable reconstruction and development of the state. This tension has often been the cause of friction between civilian agencies and the military.

- As UK Armed Forces should expect to be deployed in a crisis, a clear priority should be arresting the rapid downward security spiral. The manner in which immediate needs are met may, however, affect long-term development and governance structures in a way that could undermine the authority of the host government. Equally, agencies whose focus is on long-term sustainability may need to accept that, for both political and military reasons, demonstrable early progress is required. This progress should be consistent with the needs and priorities of the local population.

Permissive and Non-Permissive Environments

Permissiveness is the ability of civilian actors to access an area without the need for protection. However, to be effective, many tasks require the active engagement of the local population, who will only do so if they feel that it is safe, even after we have gone. In assessing the level of permissiveness, also consider security from the local population's perspective.

Levels of permissiveness vary between organisations and activities: an area that is non-permissive for one may be permissive for others. Actions by one group may enhance or undermine the level of permissiveness for others. Military action may bring temporary security to an area thus, for a time, increasing the general level of permissiveness. However, it may also draw more response from adversaries when the military withdraw, with the result that some agencies may find they can no longer operate in areas that were previously safe for them.

Figure 2.4 – The Military Contribution to Stabilisation Tasks
Figure 2.4 uses the stabilisation model to illustrate the relationship between permissiveness and the military contribution. In non-permissive environments the military may provide degrees of support to most or all of the key tasks. As permissiveness increases, civil tasks should be handed over, as soon as is practicable, to other agencies within the coalition and/or host government.

Whether civilian access can be guaranteed or not, civilian expertise should be integrated into operational planning and execution of stabilisation tasks. In this way the commander is provided with a fuller understanding of how operations designed to have immediate impact on the ground can influence longer-term sustainable local capacity development, and hence host nation authority and legitimacy.

Influence. Individuals and groups derive their views and form their perceptions through a complex process of absorption through many different conduits and media. It is the combination of what audiences hear and what they perceive or experience, (the interaction of the word and the deed), interpreted through the prism of their culture, history and traditions that determines their opinion and behaviour. Consequently, all military activity should be understood as exerting influence. Communication and influence is examined in much greater depth in Chapter 3.

The Key Conflict Relationship

The campaign must reshape and stabilise a series of key relationships. The primary relationship is the triangular one between the host nation government, competing (violent) elites (of which there may be several) and the wider population. It is this set of relationships that holds the key to a sustainable political settlement. Significant relationships also exist that involve the international forces’ domestic audiences, regional and international populations and actors, as well as between the intervening actors themselves. The significance of these other relationships will be critical if collapse of domestic support is not to occur. The importance of the relationships between the host government, competing elites and the local population should be the focus of influence. But, these are complex human relationships with all the attendant unpredictability this implies.

Figure 2.5 illustrates the central relationship in societal conflicts. All stabilisation activity should be planned, executed and assessed in terms of the influence brought to bear on this relationship.

Host Government. Stabilisation interventions involve either supporting an extant government, or contributing to the establishment of a government where none exists.
This does not mean that our support is unconditional. It is legitimate, indeed essential, to seek to influence the conduct, attitudes and even, within the bounds of what is politically acceptable, the composition of that government. Improving the quality of governance is an essential aspect of stabilisation.

The Authority of the Host Government. A political settlement is unsustainable if the host nation government is unable or unwilling to build sufficient authority and legitimacy. A state’s authority is dependent upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of four factors:

- **Mandate.** The perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes a state authority, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, or a recognised and accepted caste/tribal model.
- **Manner.** The perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively.
- **Consent.** The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, may range from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given support.
- **Expectations.** The extent to which the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or are met by those exercising the mandate.

Competing Elites. Political settlement will entail the accommodation of competing elites, sometimes referred to as elite consolidation. Elites are those individuals and groups with the power (including capacity for significant violence) to undermine existing political settlements and prevent the establishment of new ones. Elites will accommodate themselves to political settlements on the basis of self-interest. Negotiation and peace agreements may be a part of a political settlement, but they are not synonymous. A clear cut victory of one set of actors over another could lead to a political settlement if the losers believe that the chance of improving their position through further conflict is limited; personal security can be a strong motivation for accommodation. However, unequivocal victories in complex societal conflicts are rare. Usually, success is based on including elements of hostile groups in the political system. Those unwilling to reach an accommodation, known as irreconcilables, must be captured, expelled, isolated or killed.

The Wider Population. The third element in the central conflict relationship is the wider population. The population should be the focus. Considerations include:

- Ideas such as winning hearts and minds, population focus and securing the population have become staples of policy and doctrine. However, they can be interpreted, and used as a guide for action, in counterproductive ways.
- Winning the hearts and minds of the population in terms of their attitudes to the international forces is of secondary importance. While widespread, outright hostility will impede stabilisation, it is not the relationship between the international forces and the population that is critical. People are unlikely to ever be happy or even content about a prolonged foreign military presence. What is important is the attitude of the population to the host nation government relative to rival elites seeking their support and mobilisation. It is the populations’ perceptions of their government that are critical, and it is these that the international forces should seek to influence.
- The population’s perception of security directly influences people’s judgements on the competence, authority and legitimacy of the government. It is vital, therefore, that there is a government face to security provision. Improving the security of an area, while it can create space and time for other stabilisation efforts, may have less positive, long-term political impact if all it does is build people’s confidence in the foreign military capability. The population should have confidence that, ultimately, the host nation government can sustain adequate security provision, as set out in a credible narrative.

A Competing Narrative

In 2006 the Taliban produced a simple, five line message to counter the expansion of ISAF into Helmand: “Our party, the Taliban. Our people and Nation, the Pashtun. Our economy, the poppy. Our constitution, the Shari’a. Our form of government, the Emirate.”

Kilcullen – The Accidental Guerrilla.
SECTION V
WORKING WITH PARTNERS

The Command and Control Challenge

Multi-agency operations require unique military command and control arrangements. Central authority is not achieved easily in stabilisation, which is characterised by multinational and interagency actors, who work to balance power through individual agendas within a loosely-knit web of bi- and multi-lateral engagement mechanisms. Some structures and organisations are inherently dysfunctional with no clear lines of authority and a blurring of responsibilities. Levels of military authority (theatre, formation, unit etc) do not always align with civilian counterparts. The plethora of actors involved may find it difficult – sometimes even impossible – to engage the host nation with a unified voice and even to understand the basis of their relationships with each other. The web of relationships does not fit neat military notions of Command and Control (C2); they can appear almost anarchical. Although partner agencies can function based on shared values, informal rules and practical protocols, it will take a shared top-down vision, patience, a willingness to compromise and a degree of organisation to achieve unity of purpose.

One of the most important facts for a commander to establish is, who is responsible to whom and for what? Although the UK may lead some operations, it is most likely that it will be working within an alliance, such as NATO, or in coalition as a supporting partner, for example with the US. In these cases, followership can be as important as leadership and the commander should recognise where his approach should be subordinate to that of the alliance or coalition. This can be extended to include civil figures such as High Representatives who have no formal military command authority, but possess a mandate to coordinate civil and military activity. When acting as part of an alliance or coalition, national agendas and direction can sometimes give the impression that the UK has a lead role in theatre when in reality it does not.

The Host Nation Government

The relationship between intervening actors and the host nation government is likely to be dynamic and, at times, fraught; interests do not always coincide and methods may not be compatible. A paradox is that success generates new challenges. For example, as the situation improves, the host government begins to feel more secure and develops greater capacity, so it will be more likely to assert itself. This can lead to differences in approach, such as over the timing and focus of operations. Generally, this should be welcomed as a sign of progress. However, it must be clear that our support is conditional upon harmonisation of strategic interests. This influence should be exerted as diplomatically as possible.

Integrated Approaches

In war we aim to overwhelm our enemy by integrating manoeuvre with fires. In stabilisation, we strive to achieve a similar effect on a particularly wicked problem – one that has no set formula for resolution, nor a clearly defined end-state – by integrating all the levers that our society can muster. A comprehensive approach is often, incorrectly, assumed to be synonymous with a UK cross-government approach. While a coherent government response is an essential element, a comprehensive approach is a much broader multi-agency and, often, multinational response. The frictions and difficulties associated with developing a coherent, cross-government approach multiply in multinational operations.

Taking a comprehensive approach involves more than just talking to the political or development adviser. Mutually-supporting cross-departmental and multi-agency effort should enable comprehensive tactical activity to deliver overwhelming campaign effect.

Al-Qaeda Recognises That Military Means Alone will not Achieve Success

"therefore, I stress again to you and to all your brothers, to direct the political action equally with the military action. By the alliance, cooperation and gathering of all leaders of opinion and influence… I cannot define for you a specific means of action… But you… must strive to have around you circles of support, assistance and cooperation and, through them, to advance until you become a consensus, entity, organisation or association that represents all of the honourable people"

Ayman al-Zawahirin

Opponents understand the importance and the fragility of a comprehensive approach and therefore are likely to use tactics that deliberately target and drive away vulnerable civil actors. By exploiting this fracture point adversaries aim to prolong the campaign, undermining the collective will and perseverance of the coalition. If successful, this leads to shortfalls in delivery as progress is hampered by the absence or weakening of civil expertise and capability. Reducing the delivery of comprehensive effect is an area where our opponents seek freedom of manoeuvre, both to spoil the authority and credibility of the host nation and to supplant it with its own.

In stabilisation, the notion of impartiality or neutrality has limited relevance. Civilian participants will automatically become part of the conflict. Civilian targets are often more lucrative than military ones. Attacks on civil capability can quickly undermine the broader stabilisation efforts and are likely to have greater impact on the domestic audiences of intervening actors. Given this reality, the idea of a shared enterprise should be continually defended and promoted.

A comprehensive approach requires an understanding of the different philosophies which will shape attitudes towards priorities. For example, the military will tend to focus on relatively short-term security deliverables while the extent to which the security environment of the UN is changing. Already, parties to hostilities in numerous conflicts are targeting civilians in order to draw military advantages, in violation of the most basic principles of international humanitarian law. In several instances, staff members of the UN and other humanitarian agencies have been victims of targeted attacks for their role in assisting these civilians. The bombings in Baghdad in Iraq and their colleagues throughout the world. Many in the UN system have been profoundly disconcerted not only by the destructive power of the attacks directed towards the UN but also by the mere fact that the UN could be the target of such devastating violence.

The attacks are signals of the emergence of a new and more difficult era for the UN system. It is of the utmost importance for UN management and staff to recognise the potential links to global terror groups, are significant developments that the UN needs to factor into its security strategy.'

The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, 20 October 2003
the development community will tend to give priority to broader, longer-term challenges. While there is no purely military solution to complex societal conflict, neither is there a purely developmental one. The President of the World Bank made the point that: "even the term 'security' may have different meaning to a soldier in body armour and a female NGO worker living in a village".15

When the UK is a supporting partner in a coalition it cannot expect to exert the same degree of control over the conduct of operations as it can for national operations. However, the commander should seek to maximise the influence the UK brings to bear. This requires an understanding of the doctrine, procedures, approaches and priorities of the lead partner.16 The UK contribution will need to be shaped in a manner consistent with this framework. Achieving influence may also demand a particular level of resourcing, but while commanders will advise, this is ultimately a matter of political choice. In any circumstance, commanders will need to be frank with the coalition command as to their force’s capability.

Transitions

Campaigns pass through a number of transitions as they progress. A key leadership function is analysis of the conditions required to enable an early transition of tasks to civilian actors and the host government. As the environment becomes less permissive, civil capacities decline. This draws in the military. As security and capacity building efforts begin to take effect the military progressively hands back functions to the appropriate authorities, bearing in mind that this may need to be revisited given that it is a characteristic of such campaigns to ebb and flow. Transitions call for fine judgement and close consultation between commanders and national, international and host nation actors.

Timely transitions meet the expectation of the host nation government and its population while generating a positive momentum. They enhance campaign credibility, which helps turn passive consent into active support. Their result should be the release of the military to their primary tasks – security and SSR – and a reduction in force profile. In contrast, poorly timed and conceived transitions create opportunities for hostile groups, especially if the host government fails adequately to discharge a responsibility that was previously being successfully undertaken by us. Such an outcome severely undermines population confidence in the government. However, being too cautious can lead to a dependency culture that institutionalises and prolongs the international presence. Guidance on transitions is in Chapter 11.

Timely and Premature Transitions: East Timor

The timely Australian-led INTERFET deployment in September 1999 responded to widespread instability following the previous month’s referendum. The mission was to stabilise the situation in order to allow for a transition to a UN Transitional Administration. This was widely seen as a success. Upon full independence in May 2002 the mission transitioned again to the UN Mission in Support of East Timor which was tasked with supporting post-independence development. This was deemed sufficiently successful to begin, in 2005, the process of ramping down the UN presence with the establishment of a new Office to oversee completion of the mandate by August 2006. Many commentators, at this point, saw the international involvement in East Timor as a model for successful stabilisation and transition.

However, in May 2006 the capital, Dili, was once more the scene of widespread violence. The proximate cause was the dismissal of 594 members of the Timorese Armed Forces; but, as the Secretary General’s report stated in August 2006, ‘it is now evident that those events were only the precursor to a political, humanitarian and security crisis of major dimensions.’

An Australian-led force was redeployed to stabilise the situation again and allow for a reformed UN Mission in Timor (UNMIT) to take over. UNMIT had its mandate extended for the third time in February 2009. East Timor illustrates the dangers of withdrawing support for a fragile state too early. The transitions from INTERFET to the successive UN Missions saw a gradual ramping down of international support. At each stage the judgement was made that the situation was improving sufficiently to allow transition. However, the underlying weaknesses of the state had not been sufficiently addressed and a major re-engagement of the international community was required to arrest a rapid downward spiral in a still fragile state.

If the world is changing rapidly, it is not surprising that defence structures that were honed for one generation have to adapt under pressure for the next. Charles Darwin demonstrated that natural evolution happens that way, under pressure from change. The fittest survive by adjusting, through luck or wisdom, to the new environment. Maintaining valuable capabilities, while innovating relevant new ones, is what it is all about. If there are parts of the system that go on working unnecessarily, that does not matter so long as the blood supply is there. But failing to grow essential new capacity is potentially lethal.

The Geopolitical Context for Stabilisation
Stabilisation comes into a category of modern-day overseas actions whose usefulness in terms of straight national interest is not yet fully proven. High-intensity inter-state war appears to be declining in frequency and likelihood, while trouble spilling out of failing or badly managed states is on the rise. The danger posed by the first, while diluted by its unlikelihood, cannot be ignored; and the cumulative erosion of global order threatened by the second must not be underestimated. But public opinion can be hard to convince, because the costs come early and the benefits are more intangible.
States fail because they have adapted poorly to modern conditions or to the pressures of globalisation. The distribution of globalisation’s benefits is uneven and the losers can retreat into protectionism, resentment, intensive selfishness and violence. In an environment of insecurity, people’s identities narrow. Near neighbours can become enemies. In such circumstances coherent communities grow smaller and more aggressive in their own defence. It is this type of breakdown which leads to highly unpredictable and irrational behaviour and often to serious conflict.

Stabilisation is intended to put the pieces back together again and to create a society that can once more look after itself, prosper on a national scale and live comfortably with neighbours. But this description indicates how complex the whole process is. People lie at the heart of successful political arrangements because they own the territory; and it is the people who must decide to live in harmony with each other, with their sub-region and with what the world throws them. Yet people have to have order before they have choice, because their choices can be meaningless, or highly divisive, in an atmosphere of disorder.

It is the primary purpose of a military intervention in these circumstances to provide that order. Physical security must take first priority. But social order goes beyond that. Psychological security is equally important, because fear breeds aggressiveness and violence. This broader kind of security stems from people’s confidence in the authorities, from the provision of essential supplies and services, from the cumulative regeneration of necessary institutions such as the police and the courts and from a sense of legitimate forward momentum. None of these things are too early to consider as the first troops land to restore order, because those troops will be running to stay in the same place until society manages to pick itself up. The stories of both Iraq and Afghanistan show deficiencies in mission conception and planning in these respects.

How then can the task be managed? No modern defence structure is capable of covering all these angles without working in close cooperation with other types of expert practitioners, particularly in civilian affairs, and with allies. While this appears obvious, the actual organisation of the teamwork required throws up numerous problems. With a plethora of contributors, who sets the mission? Who, for this reason, it helps considerably to have the basis of a UN Security Council resolution to define the objectives, because that limits the opportunity for subjective interpretation of the real reasons for the foreign presence. And the UN’s expertise in many of the civilian areas is superior to that of most governments.

It is our allies, however, who can pose the trickiest dilemmas. The UK can rarely act alone, except in a small theatre such as Sierra Leone. We have to be part of a team and we have grown accustomed to that through NATO. But recent experience shows that, even in an approved NATO operation, different participants can work to rather different national objectives and rules of engagement. In particular, the strategic approach of the United States, as our most capable partner by far, can be hard to mesh with. The Americans can devise methods which are less than ally-friendly and bear costs which are beyond the British. They have distinct and powerful national motivations. Yet they can achieve for us results which we could never attain on our own or with other partners. This relationship is part of our strategic context and each political and military leader has to adjust to its demands as appears appropriate at the time. It is best to address the issue with frankness as well as with respect for the US’s seniority, retaining the option of backing out if the pressures put on us are incompatible with what the British parliament and people are likely to tolerate.

That said, the UK is in general good at this type of operation, where teamwork and a cross-government approach is required. The tradition of pushing responsibility down to the field and allowing local commanders and managers to adapt as they see fit to the conditions they face gets the best out of our talent and training. The UK has to be clear, nevertheless, that it rarely has the resources or the accumulated power to accomplish the full range of tasks that stabilisation demands. This makes it all the more important for commanders to be sure that they have a clear mission given to them and that they do not begin an assignment without confidence in their own minds that task, resources and political commitment match up.
This expressive image of a Royal Marine in Afghanistan could be interpreted to support different narratives:

- Western observers with a positive disposition may see a young Afghan girl being rescued.
- Adversaries may portray a foreign occupier defiling a local girl and forcibly removing her from her family.

Our actions, words and images are always subject to interpretation through the filter of presentation, culture and opinion.

Part 2 describes the nature of military engagement and what must be achieved. It highlights the military’s role in influencing the societal conflict in ways which foster the development of a political settlement (Chapter 3) and describes the operational parameters of stabilisation (Chapter 4). Part 2 then considers in more detail the military contribution to specific tasks within the three stabilisation sectors introduced in Part One: security (Chapter 5), governance (Chapter 6) and development (Chapter 7).
‘You may not like what he is saying. You may abhor everything he stands for. But you are listening... The truth is that Osama bin Laden is very good at what he does. He is one of the great propagandists... He has an awesome understanding of the holy triumvirate of political communication: the power of the image, the message and the deed. And he understands how they work together’.

Jason Burke The Observer, 31 October 2004
This Chapter takes as its central theme the idea that all activity has influence. Through a sound understanding of target audiences, activity should be focused to achieve the desired influence. It also considers how Strategic Communication and Information Operations (Info Ops) can support this. All military action should be assessed by its contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship and shaping the eventual political settlement. The perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and opinions of individuals and groups are all fundamental to this outcome, so, influence is the guiding idea for the conduct of operations. Analysis, planning, execution and assessment then become a function of 2 questions: What effect do we want to achieve? and What actions will best achieve that effect?

This is not a reprise of a mechanistic form of Effects Based Approach to Operations, which simply does not work for complex and variable human systems. However, it requires commanders to consider the relationship between effects, the influence necessary to achieve those effects, and the activities to achieve that influence. Everything that we do, every action we take, will have an influence on part of the conflict relationship. This idea is central to JDP 3-40.

After the debacle of Suez in 1956, Operation MUSKETEER’s Commander, General Keightley, summed up the over-arching problem: “The one overriding lesson of the Suez operation is that world opinion is now an absolute principle… and must be treated as such.”

0304 The desired outcome of cross-government activities is to change or maintain the character or behaviour of agreed audiences through physical and psychological means. All multi-agency capabilities can contribute to this process.

To achieve the desired outcome, activities need to be coordinated and focused. Psychological effects on specific target audiences, rather than physical attacks on capability, are likely to be the lasting and decisive elements in stabilisation. But this is not easy. Human beings are neither benign nor passive; they will respond to influence in different ways. The inherent risk is how actions, words and images are received and processed cannot be controlled. Good analysis and understanding will mitigate this risk.

Some straightforward descriptions of common jargon

- **Influence.** The power or ability to affect someone’s beliefs or actions, or a person or thing with such ability or power.
- **Communicate.** To share or exchange information or ideas, or convey an emotion or feeling (verbal or non-verbal). A two-way, dynamic process.
- **Target (Designated) Audience.** An individual or group selected as the object of influence.
- **Narrative.** Communication that portrays a story designed to resonate in the mind of the audience that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan.
- **Theme.** An overarching concept or intention, designed for broad communication application.
- **Message.** A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific target audience.
- **Conduit/Channel.** A means by which a message is transmitted or received.

Influence is achieved when the behaviour of the target audience is changed through the coordination of all actions, words and images. It is not just about messages or media, but about how the combination of the word and the deed are portrayed, interpreted and understood by audiences through a lens of their own culture, history, religion and tradition. Influence is challenging, requiring subtle understanding of target audiences that is difficult to achieve. It will be contested with adversaries who may have a significant cultural advantage.
SECTION I
APPLYING INFLUENCE WITHIN THE CAMPAIGN

Understanding Target Audiences

People from different cultures both behave and think about the world in different ways. The commander should first try to understand how people from different cultures think and what symbols, themes, messages, etiquette and practices are most likely to resonate with them. This should include systems of reciprocity, kinship, allegiances and social obligations. Analysis and intelligence, discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, generates this understanding.

Understanding Cultural Complexity in Afghanistan

British Forces have gained considerable insight from locals in Helmand but still have more to learn. The conflict is not against a monolithic threat, but is entwined with older struggles rooted in tribalism, complex alliances and loyalties. Crude ethnic breakdowns (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Uzbeks and others) mask baffling complexity; there are 60 Pashtun tribes and a further 400 sub-tribes. One veteran says that “you must approach every village as its own campaign”.

Ousting the Taliban regime in 2001 resulted in renewed dominance for some tribes and lost status for others. The Taliban regard tribal custom as a deviation from sharia law, but where individual tribes feel aggrieved, the Taliban can be willing allies. Areas where tribal structures are strongest tend to be more resistant to Taliban encroachment. However, while tribal structures can help undermine support for the Taliban, the Pashtun code (with concepts of hospitality, honour and revenge), and its self-regulating system of elders and arbitration, is at odds with central government and other western-style ideals.

Culture is not just about tribes, nor is the significance of culture to the military confined to influence. Nevertheless, analysis of cultural factors, including tribal dynamics, is crucial to the success of influence strategies.

In failed or failing states, oral traditions are usually strong. Word of mouth compensates for low literacy rates and are the principal means by which messages are passed between opinion formers and local populations. Use of verbal and audio messaging is likely to have greater effect than the written word. Customs of story-telling in such societies and the modern introduction of mobile communication systems mean that messages, both good and bad, true and untrue, can be transmitted very rapidly. Commanders will need to ensure that their messaging is both timely, accurate and persistent to pre-empt rumour and manage the distortion inherent in verbal messaging.

Populations will usually be sensitive to any slight, humiliation or attack on their culture by outsiders, be that real or perceived, deliberate or unintentional. Misunderstanding can lead to mistrust and increased tension. Foreign Area Officers deployed cultural advisers and locally employed civilians can provide invaluable advice and the skills to decode and understand cultural nuance. Messages delivered by foreign spokesmen typically lack credibility and, regardless of content, are not as well received as those from familiar, trusted sources. International forces should seek to use established channels for messaging. Where these are absent or insufficient, they will need to build relationships with key leaders and the population in order to establish viable channels.
The Use of Human Terrain Teams in Operations
To understand the cultural dimension of interventions into fragile states, the US military’s Foreign Military Studies Office established and deployed the Human Terrain Team (HTT) – five man teams, comprising social scientists and military personnel, who advise operational and tactical level commanders on cultural awareness shortcomings. A 2007 US Department of Defence report on HTT states:

“The local population in the area of conflict – the human terrain – must be considered as a distinct and critical element of the battle space. Therefore, the HTT seeks to integrate and apply socio-cultural knowledge of the indigenous population to military operations in support of the commander’s objectives. In the words of one HTT member, ‘One anthropologist can be much more effective than a B-2 bomber – not winning a war, but creating a peace one Afghanistan at a time’.

By 14 April 2007 38 HTT personnel were deployed in Iraq distributed among five teams. Of those, eight were social scientists and thirteen spoke Arabic. Their role was to provide commanders with relevant socio-cultural knowledge and understanding, and to extend that further by providing specialists able to help integrate that understanding into the military decision making process.

Influence as a Contest
Adversaries may use sensational acts of terrorism to influence populations, the purpose of which is to generate a widespread sense of fear and descent into chaos. Cheap digital cameras and remote internet connections, combined with simple narratives to shape both local and global perceptions facilitate this. A video of the murder of American contractor Nicholas Berg by Zarqawi, probably initially sent from a computer somewhere in Iraq, was copied onto Internet contractor Nicholas Berg by Zarqawi, probably initially sent per se, and to some degree justifies it, he argues that by exercising restraint, influence can be maximised:

“Adversaries can have as much difficulty as us in trying to explain complex issues to local and global audiences. Yet despite his trade against the media in the quote above, he starkly acknowledges their importance:

“...and that this general opinion falls under a campaign by the malicious, pernicious, and fallacious campaign by the deceptive and fabricated media. And we would spare the people from the effect of questions about the usefulness of our actions in the hearts and minds of the general opinion that is essentially sympathetic to us.”

In stabilisation, the state’s authority, legitimacy and reach are in direct competition with their adversaries. Adversaries may make strong use of religious or cultural narratives, norms or imagery. They may also choose to place the conflict within existing ethnic tensions. Their proximity to local populations may have either a coercive or persuasive effect. This can aid them in the construction of a simple, culturally attuned and emotive message to support their cause.

3. The US Defense Intelligence Agency deploys a cadre of long service Foreign Area Officers to provide a pool of contextual understanding and to enable partnership and capacity-building operations.
4. Tatham, S. Strategic Communication: A Primer. Advanced Research and Assessment Group Special Series (ARAG), Defence Academy of the UK.
Northern Ireland - Coverage of Events and Public Perception Matter

On 30 January 1972, in what later became known as Bloody Sunday, during the course of a protest march in Londonderry, thirteen people were shot dead and another died from his wounds. One recent published version of events commented as follows:

‘Members of the Parachute Regiment appeared to have run amok, live on TV, and the pictures of a Catholic priest running, half-crouched, through the Bogside waving a white handkerchief to try and help a fatally wounded victim will haunt the British establishment for ever. Its effect was devastating. Gerry Adams later commented that on the back of Bloody Sunday ‘money, guns and recruits flooded into the IRA’.7

The perceptions of individuals and groups are formed by personal experiences and second-hand assimilation of news and information. Adverse events will normally be amplified by greater media coverage and discussion than positive events. A single event early in a campaign can set an enduring critical public perception and tone that will be hard to break, and it may greatly assist the adversary. The commander cannot prevent all mistakes, but he can and should set the tone for how the military force will behave and build a reserve of positive reputation by highlighting constructive events in support of the people to mitigate the negative.

0312 The commander’s strategy for winning the influence contest can easily be undermined by actors and events outside of his control; corruption, ineptitude and chronic failings of the host government are possible examples. The attitudes, policies and actions of the UK or its allies on all manner of seemingly unrelated issues can also impact on efforts to achieve influence in-theatre.

0313 Speed of response is vital. First impressions count and the commander should reinforce his message through synchronised words, deeds and images in advance of counter narratives proffered by adversaries — be first with the truth. The most powerful and convincing messages are factually true and are mutually reinforced through our actions. However, much messaging will cover subjective issues where the truth is not self-evident, or differs according to individual perception or cultural values. Commanders may wish to capitalise on subjectivity where the benefits (e.g. legitimate military deception) outweigh the potential risks.

Narratives

0314 The narrative seeks to explain the actions of the main protagonists. Commanders should explain the purpose of their presence and develop an appropriate narrative for each audience. The best narratives are those which embrace the concepts and language of target audiences; known as the stickiness of the message. All Forces should understand the narrative of their activities. Actions should be planned and executed to support this narrative, and not the other way around. Sometimes this will involve the controlled and coordinated release of themed information; other times it may involve specific security operations amongst local populations. Both words and actions and the persistent manner in which they are carried out reinforces the narrative.

An Adversary’s Narrative

In November 2006 al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia issued a statement justifying attacks on Shi’ites and the coalition forces in language designed to provide a unifying narrative to a splintered Sunni insurgency:

“The arrows of the [Sunni] mujahadeen focused on the occupying crusader enemy until the black hatred of the Shia in Iraq for the Sunnis became obvious...This sect, alongside the invading Crusader forces, became the tip of the spear in the fight against the mujahadeen.”8

Note: The use of terms such as occupation, Crusader and the play upon sectarian and religious fissures in Iraqi society. Other statements played upon traditional Sunni Arab suspicion and enmity towards the Persians. This referred both to Iran, and the Shia politicians in power in Baghdad who had, or were perceived to have, links with the Iranian regime.
Narratives should be flexible so that they are not undermined by local messages designed to respond to contemporaneous events. They should also be consistent with both the strategic communication strategy and, where possible, narratives of the host government. Strategic level narratives set out broad themes which are reinforced by tailored, flexible local messages, creating a hierarchy of related messages. It follows that a narrative must be preceded by a strategy. Characteristics of a good narrative include:

- It is clear and credible; it explains the campaign.
- It is acceptable to all intervening parties and the host government.
- It is linked to the UK’s political objectives.
- It supports local messaging and can be adapted at local level.
- It is able to be backed up by coherent physical activity and imagery.
- It has a positive impact on a variety of target audiences at tempo and relative to the competing narratives.

Recent operations have shown that some of the most successful mechanisms for spreading messages lie at either end of the technology spectrum. In Iraq and Afghanistan, ancient and traditional mechanisms for discussion such as Shuras and Loya Jirgas carry great weight. At the other end of the spectrum, emerging media outlets such as blogs and social networking sites can be highly effective. However, the most credible mechanisms are the many daily interactions between the population, host government and international forces. For example, daily contact during security sector reform between liaison and mentoring teams and the indigenous security forces generate thousands of individual opportunities to reinforce key messages, but one that is seldom used systematically. Each member of the indigenous security force provides a channel to his friends and family. Every action, inaction, interaction and transaction sends a message. All should be consistent with the narrative. Influence operations need some discipline and care in execution, as with a kinetic fireplan.

Adversaries will have their own narrative which should be analysed, countered or rebutted. If an adversaries’ narrative can be discredited, acquiescence to the host government’s authority and legitimacy should follow. The commander should seek to identify the potential resonances and frictions between adversarial narratives and local audiences. Where friction is identified, a counter-narrative should be developed to exploit it.

Undermining Adversaries’ Narratives – Missed Opportunities

The Legitimacy of the Taliban

Taliban leader Mullah Omar received widespread media coverage when, in 1996, he took Mohammed’s shroud out of storage in the shrine of Kharka Sharif in Kandahar, and wore it in a public rally, as a way to identify himself with the Prophet. However in 2007 there was no coverage of the decision of the elders of Kandahar that he should be stripped of the cloak for his un-Islamic actions. This was a fleeting opportunity to undermine the adversaries’ narrative.

The Global War on Terror

The narrative of the Global War on Terror has made use of terms such as jihad (holy struggle) and mujaheddin (struggler) in reference to adversaries. However, the use of such a vocabulary has served to reinforce adversaries’ claim to legitimacy in the Islamic world whereas terms such as hirabah (unlawful war) and irahabi (terrorist) might have achieved the opposite effect.

Actions, Words and Images

Gaining and holding an audience’s attention is as important as crafting the message. The most powerful tool is the image. The more dramatic, the more attention it attracts and the more it will endure. Visual images resonate and persuade, shaping social and political agendas.

The Adversary Aligning the Word and the Deed

In discussing the way ahead, Zarqawi analyses the various groups that are present – the Kurds, the Shia (for whom he reserves his most bitter hatred), the Americans, and the (Shia dominated) Iraqi military and security forces. In addition to setting out his reasons for initiating a bitter civil war along sectarian lines (Sunni v Shia), he sees the importance of influence and perceptions. In terms of selling his carefully prepared narrative he states:

“Perhaps we will decide to go public soon, even if in a gradual way, so that we can come out into the open. We have been hiding for a long time. We are seriously preparing media material that will reveal the facts, call forth firm intentions, arouse determination, and become an arena for jihad in which the pen and the sword complement each other.”

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
The standard adversarial use of the image is the propaganda of the deed. This might be an act of violence conducted against an enemy, (usually the host government or intervening actors), whose visual impact or symbolic value summons support from sympathetic communities. It is part of a process of narrative construction and reinforcement, and it may constitute the core of the adversaries’ influence strategy. Targets tend to be selected for their symbolic impact, amplifying their ability to resonate meaning to their audience. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon are contemporary examples.

International forces and agencies, on the other hand, should use propaganda of the deed with care. Shock and awe strikes on adversarial targets beamed around the world may create an impression of success, but may also generate significant antipathy amongst otherwise neutral populations. Often, the value of the propaganda of the deed overrides the military value of the deed itself. However, the interpretation of the deed is even more important. It may be better to focus on visible development, or safety and security within politically significant communities.

The Power of the Image

The image is a powerful influence tool; it is the visualisation of the deed that endures long after the event itself. It portrays meaning without words, crossing language, literacy and cultural barriers. Its power can be positive or negative, the latter demonstrated in this image from Iraq showing a newspaper featuring graphic photos of US soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners. These images were enough to instantly undermine and discredit the coalition narrative of liberators, and allow the adversary to generate one of coalition occupiers and torturers.
SECTION II
THE INFLUENCE FRAMEWORK

Influence – Organisation and Capabilities

0321 Strategic Communication. Strategic communication is the articulation of cross-government guidance on influence and supports the synchronisation of the words and deeds of friendly actors to maximise desired effects. As the term implies, being pitched at the strategic level, many of the ways and means used to conduct strategic communication fall outside the remit of the commander. Strategic communication messages are coordinated at the national strategic level through Targeting and Info Ops or through the National Information Strategy. Strategic communication also provides the framework for the delivery of psychological effects at lower levels, where the operational military contribution is known as influence activities. Strategic Communication has two overlapping aspects – that relating to crisis management and that concerning enduring requirements.

0322 Coordinating the UK Message. During crisis management and military operations, strategic communication is guided by the narrative, laid out in a cross-government Information Strategy.

- Cohesion. Cohesion is achieved by a common understanding between partners on the ways and means to achieve crisis-resolution objectives. Nationally, cohesion is required between government departments and agencies, and between the UK Government and its domestic audience. Cohesion is particularly important in the context of coalition and alliance operations, given that our adversaries will attempt to disrupt coalition unity.

- Coherence. A clear and simple high-level narrative explains the stabilisation mission, the purpose and the role of its participants, and is aimed at supporting the operational and tactical activities undertaken by the deployed forces. Coherence is achieved through the use of clear, mutually supportive themes and messages, which resonate with our target audiences. These should cover the full range of issues relevant to crisis resolution, for all phases of a campaign and include contingencies for high risk adverse events – but this will likely be impossible at first – and guard against ambiguity and scope for misinterpretation. Coherence is challenging at any time; where national objectives differ and our forces face multiple cultures in theatre it may be impossible to achieve.

0323 Coalitions and Alliances. A single, integrated strategic communication plan should be the aim. This aspiration is likely to be limited by different national objectives, legal frameworks, and constitutional or cultural positions. It is likely that a coalition strategic communication plan will be modest in scope and bland in order to achieve consensus between partners. Not all partners will have national plans to fall back on, but the UK will seek to reflect the agreed coalition communication plan in its own Information Strategy. In the absence of a coalition information strategy, the strategic communication vision of the Lead Nation is likely to prevail. Within NATO policy, the North Atlantic Council has responsibility for providing mission-specific strategic and political guidance on all information related aspects of NATO’s operations and activities. Emerging NATO doctrine on Info Ops expects that such guidance will be in a similar format to a UK Information Strategy.

0324 The National Information Strategy. At the highest levels within the UK, strategic communication is coordinated through cross-government Information Strategy Groups. These are normally chaired by a 2* official from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and produce a National Information Strategy (NIS) in relation to a particular operation. Each NIS aims to articulate the strategic level narrative that will be used across the UK Government. It contains details of:

- The campaign objectives and end-state.
- Information objectives.
- Target audiences.
- Core script.
- Key themes and messages related to campaign progression.
- Lines to take.
- Channels of communication.
- Measures of effectiveness.
- Planning factors and constraints.

The NIS will be part of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive to the operational level, enhanced with military-strategic guidance. Operational planners should note that information objectives may be considered as decisive conditions and themes as supporting effects, or as factors and constraints in their own analysis and planning processes, to be
coordinated with other government departments or agencies and international partners.

The Commander’s Influence Tools

“We conduct all operations in order to influence people and events, to bring about change, whether by 155mm artillery shells or hosting visits; these are all Influence Operations. We sought to make use of every lever we had to influence events.”

Divisional Commander Iraq, 2008

0325 The commander’s role is, initially, to establish the effects necessary to exert the desired influence. Assisted by his staff, he then derives the activities required to realise those effects, and subsequently orchestrates them during execution. Joint Action provides a framework to support this process by ensuring that all capabilities and types of activity are considered and, where appropriate employed, to realise both physical and psychological effects in the most efficient and effective manner. Though Joint Action brigades activities by type, these should not be viewed as discrete nor exclusive groupings. While convenient to visualise activities as primarily seeking either a physical or psychological effect, the realisation of any one effect may require the orchestration of many types of activity or, for example, the specific employment of physical means (fires) to realise psychological effect. The aim of Joint Action is to achieve synergy between different purposeful activities; organising them by type simply provides structure and aids the allocation of planning and execution responsibilities.

We typically design physical operations first, then craft supporting information operations to explain our actions. This is the reverse of al-Qaeda’s approach. For all our professionalism, compared to the enemy’s our public information is an afterthought. In military terms, for al-

0326 Fires and manoeuvre clearly achieve psychological, as well as physical effects. Additionally, the commander has a range of non-lethal tools specifically tailored to manipulate information, or perceptions of that information once received. These include: Info Ops; Media Operations (Media Ops); Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC); and Operations Security (OPSEC). Fusing them into an approach, that is coherent with both fires and manoeuvre is the objective of the Joint Effects Board (JEB). The JEB uses coordination mechanisms, adapted from time-sensitive targeting procedures, with membership expanded to include inter-agency partners and those responsible for the delivery of non-lethal effects to achieve synchronised influence activity at the local level.

0327 During stabilisation the range of tools is supplemented by other activities, such as security sector reform, infrastructure or governance projects, which present opportunities for delivering a coordinated message. While these do not fit easily within the generic types of activity, the underpinning logic of Joint Action is equally pertinent to their consideration and application.

0328 The practical detail of how the military commander can make best use of influence tools is covered in Part 3, Chapters 10 (Planning) and 11 (Execution). He should always keep in mind that his role is to align the appropriate selected actions, words and images of the coalition forces in time and space on the correctly identified target audiences. By doing this he may change behaviour and achieve influence that will bring about a political settlement. Figure 3.1 illustrates that the military contribution to stabilisation is to achieve influence through the correct balanced and synchronised interaction of lethal and non-lethal activities in a manoeuvrist manner.13

12 Queda the ‘main effort’ is information for us, information is a ‘supporting effort’

David Kilcullen12

13 New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict US Department of State Foreign Policy Agenda Volume 12, Number 5

13 Because Joint Action is optimised for conventional operations and is less well suited to political focussed, stabilisation campaigns, the term Information Activities is used here in preference to Influence Activities. Thus, Fires, Manoeuvre, Information Activities and Other Activities are, individually and collectively, are used to exert influence in Stabilisation.
The Military Contribution to Stabilisation

Figure 3.1 – The Commander’s Influence Tools: Aligning Actions, Words and Images in Time and Space
“In the campaign against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. What the Pentagon calls ‘kinetic’ operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.”

This chapter provides the civilian reader with an overview of some stabilisation considerations, so that they may contribute to the campaign planning process, and offer operational guidance. It seeks to operationalise the stabilisation model and describes the practical application of operational art in stabilisation. It briefly considers the issues of leadership and ethics. Finally, it offers some conceptual ideas for the delivery of the military contribution and describes the military principles for stabilisation.

SECTION I

THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL ART

The Differing Requirements in Stabilisation

Civilian readers will encounter the term operational art. This is the theory and practice of planning, preparing and conducting campaigns. It concerns a commander’s skill in orchestrating tactical actions in concert with other agencies to achieve the desired outcome. It is realised through a combination of the commander’s expertise and intuition, and the staff-assisted processes of campaign design and execution. It translates creative and innovative thinking into practical action.

In stabilisation, operational art should be based on a detailed understanding of the local political dynamics, and an in-depth knowledge of the friendly, neutral and adversarial groups. Modern stabilisation can take place amidst semi-anarchic situations, where the central structure of government is limited and adversaries can be a loose confederation (like the Taliban in Afghanistan) or franchise (such as al-Qaeda in Iraq). This contrasts with the centralised, hierarchical and slow approaches of previous adversaries – closed systems – such as Provisional Irish Republican Army and Group of Soviet Forces Germany. Current and future adversaries are de-centralised, flat and agile. They tend to focus on specific, relatively short-term issues rather than strategy. As a result their actions can appear contradictory, which makes them unpredictable. Such open, de-centralised adversaries require us to respond with an open, de-centralised approach – where commanders delegate beyond the point of discomfort. A critical challenge for him will be to adapt the thinking, organisation, tactics and procedures of the force to the requirements of stabilisation rather than conventional war.

While UK Forces will be deeply involved in the provision of security and countering irregular activity, they will also need to contribute to the wider stabilisation effort. It is this wider context which makes stabilisation so complex. The political context will be dynamic; it is unlikely that initial political guidance to the commander will be sufficient in itself, or sufficiently enduring, to ensure that the continually evolving strategic context is adequately captured. In addition, political sensitivities may inhibit a clear public articulation of the strategic rationale. Rapidly changing events can quickly render previous judgements and appreciations obsolete. The commander must be engaged as part of a continual strategic and operational review that relates changing conditions on the ground to the political purpose of operations. There will be different perspectives; the situation will look different when viewed from capitals, strategic headquarters or in-theatre. The challenge will be to align them.

One of the paradoxes of these environments is that they can appear mired in strategic stalemate. There can be a perception over months or even years of a lack of any progress. Domestic populations and policymakers may be uncomfortable with the appearance of stalemate. However, these interventions will have been based on a calculated strategic choice that brings together the capacity and strategic interest considerations outlined above. The commander should play his part in helping to shape domestic understanding of the ebb and flow of these conflicts. It will be important to retain focus on campaign shifts, not tactical
incidents – beware the tyranny of the weekly report. They are protracted, because shaping the political settlement within a conflict-riven society is inherently difficult and groups hostile to that effort have a vested interest in prolonging the conflict to wait out the intervention.

0406 The Clausewitzian dictum that war has its own grammar but not its own logic is at the heart of the military contribution to stabilisation. The strategic and political purpose of operations is central to these types of integrated campaigns. In traditional warfighting, the commander could afford to be relatively unconcerned about the nuances of political purpose. The requirement to defeat the enemy carried its own logic and provided sufficient guidance. This was certainly true of NATO planning in the Cold War, and in operations such as the recapture of the Falkland Islands. In contrast, in stabilisation, victory in combat will not necessarily translate into tangible agreed measures such as Rules of Engagement (ROE). Having understood the explicit and implicit constraints, his operational design will need to balance the needs of his force with the competing priorities and approaches of the host nation. The international forces’ support will be conditional.

The Commander’s Relationship with the Host Nation

0410 The relationship between an international force and the host nation is elastic; it can be pulled and placed under tension, but it must not be allowed to break. A commander will balance the needs of his force with the competing needs of engagement within the host nation. The international forces’ support will be conditional.

The Commander’s Relationship with Other Actors

0411 The commander will utilise operational art across multiple relationships in addition to the host nation. These include coalition partners, national capitals and other regional players. He should be adept in making a case for the necessary freedoms and permissions to use force, sensing the diverse political nuances at work within his force. These will translate into tangible agreed measures such as Rules of Engagement (ROE). Having understood the explicit and implicit constraints, his operational design will need to accommodate national caveats as they apply to parts of his force. As a coalition or alliance partner, he will need to recognise when to lead and when to follow, and to explain his logic to the national chain of command. His relationship with the senior national diplomat (Ambassador or a Special Representative) will be critically important since this is the nexus of diplomatic and military instruments to achieve unity of effort, and is also the key point of access and influence between them. Together they must set the tone and share the judgement as to how the elastic can be stretched or eased with the host nation. It is by understanding which levers are available to influence host nation government behaviour, and how they may be employed, that the levers become mutually reinforcing. This will be based on a mix of personality and process. Of these, the most important is personality.

"Cooperation was not optional. We were going to work together. Ryan Crocker and I sat down and committed to that, and whenever anybody tried not to do that, it was made known that that was unacceptable." 

General Petraeus

"General Petraeus and I had begun our own coordination before either of us arrived in country. We were in secure communication when he was still in Fort Leavenworth and I was still at our Embassy in Islamabad."

Ambassador Crocker

Joint Centre for Operational Analysis interviews, 2009

In the absence of formal authority over other agencies, the commander needs to build tacit authority using his powers of persuasion. Through his personal engagement, he should establish mechanisms for cooperation and coordination that allow him some degree of control – not over the people of other nations and agencies – but over the coherence of their activities with his and with one another. The military's ability to coordinate and integrate is part of their smart power in stabilisation. While a commander can still exert full authority over his subordinate military chain of command, with other nations and agencies he can only use influence underpinned by his tacit or personal authority.

Leadership

"The first things the population will want after war is security, and if the thing the population will want after war is security, and if the

Projection of Personality. Field Marshal Viscount Slim said that: 'First and foremost military leadership is about the projection of personality. It is that combination of persuasion, compulsion and example that makes other people do what you want them to do.' He went on to say: 'The first thing the population will want after war is security, and if the

There is plenty of British military literature in support of developing leadership, but surprisingly little guidance on ethics. Ethics inform law and they go beyond law. This section summarises the key legal principles that underlie armed conflict, which are themselves rooted in ethics, and also those aspects of leadership that are pertinent.

Leadership

0414 The Contemporary Environment. Although the advice given in 1949, quoted above, remains valid, there are additional aspects that need highlighting:

• The commander needs to appreciate his subordinates’ difficulties in balancing the risks to their own troops, against the need to offer maximum protection to the civilian population.
• The possible absence of a well-understood, common moral code, especially when operating with a large mix of host nation military and civilian organisations.
• The risks associated with the reality of unity of effort in place of unity of command.
• The pressures of working in the glare of the global media. The commander should be resilient, despite demands to respond to short term shocks.
• The political nature of the role of the military commander.

"The most important thing I had to think about was what the moral choices of command were; the moral choices that flow from fighting and the realisation that we were going to lose people. I had to think through what must be done to move the operation forward for the price I was certain we would have to pay. I chose to do everything I could to move the operation forward once we were deployed, and in this I deliberately drove the operation hard. I knew we would lose people, and I did not think it would be acceptable to lose people and not move the operation as far forward as we could have done. One final reason why thinking through the moral choices is so important; and that was because it was to them that I returned when the stresses of the operation were at their greatest, and they have also allowed me to live with the consequences of what we did, and the losses that we suffered."

UK Battle Group Commander, Afghanistan, 2008
the start, soldiers have to do it through martial law.' It is in this situation that the commander needs to provide the clearest leadership. His subordinates will transition between combat and peaceful interaction with the locals regularly. Units engaged in warfighting can be expected to support local governance and economic development as soon as combat ceases. It is important therefore, that a commander clearly thinks through these issues and potential tensions. At critical points in the campaign the commander will need to find ways to impose his will on the chaos and articulate his vision. Such was the case in 2008 when General Petraeus updated his Coalition campaign guidance in Iraq, see Annex 4A.

Taliban Leadership Impose Code of Conduct on its Fighters

In an attempt to consolidate and control their disparate organisation, the Taliban leadership have issued a set of guidance and rules about how it should conduct itself. This is a form of commander’s guidance, covering a range of subject areas; for example, prisoners, civilian casualties, and suicide bombings.

Support to Subordinates. Military leaders are responsible for delivering national aims within national laws and ethical standards. Leaders are also responsible for the standards of their subordinates. The pressures of prolonged stabilisation missions will require leaders to be aware of signs of stress in both individuals and units. Commanders sometimes need to de-escalate a situation and this may mean risking their own men’s lives in order to protect the lives of the indigenous population.

"Communicate what to do and what not to do clearly through as many channels as feasible … Commander’s intent often is misunderstood; check to see what leaders far down in the organisation believe you expect of them. Commanders tend to have too many transmitters and not enough receivers. Use (others) to alert you to problems you may not have heard about through line subordinates. Seek information.”

Thomas B. Grassey - the James B. Stockdale Professor of Leadership and Ethics at the US Naval War College.

Cultural Tolerance Versus Immutable Standards.

Lieutenant General Sir John Kizsley identified the cultural requirement of the contemporary coalition commander as an ability to respect the differences of others while still achieving effective command. He identified four attributes essential for a coalition commander: political acumen, diplomacy, applied intelligence and mental stamina. All apply to any senior military leader, but they become particularly important when operating with forces and agencies from other nations. Local culture does not relieve the commander of his responsibility for maintaining ethical and moral standards. He will need to strike a balance between tolerating what is acceptable behaviour in one culture, against condemning that which is unacceptable in any circumstance. Through all its actions and messages, the international force should lead by example, demonstrate compassion and empathy for the population, maintain the moral high ground and provide a moral compass for others.

Dealing with Mistakes. Mistakes are inevitable, and the commander will need to acknowledge when things do go wrong. He will try to minimise the risk of his subordinates operating outside the law (in combat, prisoner handling or engaging with the population), behaving insensitively or causing excessive collateral damage. Where these do occur, he should be ready to respond swiftly and honestly.
Coalition Considerations

Observations on the UK Military by a Partner Nation – There is Much to Learn!

- UK military process: “…we did have to learn British abbreviations (it is suspected that they use more than they actually understand themselves).”
- Arrogance: “…people were being talked down to. For example, on verifying last-minute changes to orders and attempting to explain the consequences that these would have on our battle procedures, the British tended to repeat the same orders, but this time very slowly…”

Legal Requirements

0419 The fundamental principles that underlie the Law of Armed Conflict are military necessity, humanity, distinction (or discrimination) and proportionality. These have strong ethical roots. The increasing reach of International Human Rights Law further controls the behaviour of armed forces and affords protections and advantages in certain situations to those who are affected by military operations.5 In stabilisation there may also be good political or military reasons for exercising a greater degree of self-restraint than is legally required6.

0420 The Principles of Proportionality and Distinction.

The principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian property or a combination thereof, incidental to attacks, must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Distinction (or Discrimination) requires combatants only to attack military objectives and use means/methods of attack that can discriminate between military and civilian objectives.

0421 Determination of Target Value.

When dealing with a High Value Target, who will often be an individual, the same principles of proportionality and distinction apply. What may differ is that the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained will generally be greater than for a low ranking (or low value) individual. Thus, as a matter of law, proportionality may allow a higher level of collateral damage for High Value Targets than for a gunman, for example.

However the potential strategic, negative effect of even legitimate and justifiable collateral damage should be weighed against the potential advantage.

0422 Minimising Unwanted Outcomes.

The commander should not only determine the kinds of weapons to use and how to employ them, establishing whether lethal means are permitted – or even desired.7 He will consider first, second and third order effects as well as desired and possibly undesired ones. For example, bombs delivered by fixed-wing close air support may destroy the source of small arms fire from a building in an urban area; however, lower-calibre direct fire weapons may be more appropriate. This is not only because of the risk of collateral damage to nearby buildings and non-combatants, but also to the effect on the community and the overall impression given to the civilian population in the media which may undermine strategic objectives.

Sometimes explaining that you have chosen not to engage may be the best course of action. Tactical commanders should always have an eye on the wider strategic objective; fires should only be used when necessary.

Unintended Consequences: the Zawahiri letter

Adversaries face similar dilemmas: here al-Qaeda are confronted by ideological schisms between the Sunni and the Shia sects, and this poses a problem for the Sunni leadership who see the Shia as a greater threat to their ambitions (of establishing a caliphate), than the West. A Shia-dominated Iraq would be a major set-back to al-Qaeda’s ambitions. They wrestle with the paradox of attacking Shia, who are, in the eyes of most Sunni, still Muslim Arab brothers:

“Even if we attack the Shia out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures? And do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?”

0423 Policing and Countering Irregular Activity.

The purpose of policing is to maintain law and order, usually with the consent of the population. In stabilisation, military forces aim to defeat adversaries in order to establish civil authority. Once the aim is achieved, these same forces must preserve that security until host nation police forces can assume responsibility. This wider policing task will be unfamiliar. Although there is a clear difference between combat and policing, for UK forces at least, stabilisation requires that the military contribution must be able to adapt to both.
Maintaining the Rule of Law. Maintaining the rule of law entails very different ethical obligations than fighting to establish it. Effective security exists when institutions, civil law, courts, prisons, and effective police are in place and can protect the recognised rights of individuals. Typically, this requires that:

- Operations continue to neutralise adversaries to the extent that they are no longer a threat to the government’s authority.
- Institutions necessary for law enforcement (including police, the judiciary and prison services) are functioning.
- Such institutions are credible and the population has faith in their ability to resolve disputes.
- Where a functioning civil authority does not exist, the military may be required to help establish an interim government.

Corruption. Our very presence changes the situation in unforeseen ways. Corruption takes many forms, for example, it can be a factor in local procurement, to bribes being demanded on the street for safe passage or security, and to non-meritocratic awards of jobs. Citizens have a pragmatic sense of what is corrupt and what is culturally acceptable. Where corruption on a grand scale is occurring under the cover of the security provided by our forces, the commander will need to make it clear to the host government that our cultural norms are being flouted.

Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War

During the Algerian war of independence between 1954 and 1962, French leaders decided to permit torture against suspected insurgents. Though they were aware that it was against the law and morality of war, they argued that:

- This was a new form of war and these rules did not apply.
- The threat the enemy represented (communism) was a great evil that justified extraordinary means.
- The use of torture against insurgents was measured and non-gratuitous.

Officially condoning torture had several negative consequences. It empowered the moral legitimacy of the opposition, undermined French moral legitimacy, and caused internal fragmentation among serving officers. In the end, failure to comply with moral and legal restrictions against torture severely undermined French efforts and contributed to their strategic failure, despite significant tactical successes. Illegal and immoral activities made the French extremely vulnerable to enemy propaganda inside Algeria among the Muslim population, as well as in the United Nations and the French media. Torture also degraded the ethical climate throughout the French Army. France eventually recognised Algerian independence in July 1963.
Identifying the Parameters. Wider cross-government activities need to be set within defined parameters. Kitson conceived four such parameters which formed a generic frame within which operations could be successfully conducted. By working within his defined frame, a government and its supporting allies should be able to use force successfully in support of stabilisation objectives, without damaging their position; generating a freedom to operate. While not excluding the possibility of operating outside of the frame, Kitson suggested that by doing so, it would be ‘highly probable that the use of force will do more harm than good.’ The parameters he identified were:

- The establishment of good coordinating machinery.
- The creation of a political atmosphere that allows government measures to be successful.
- The setting up of effective intelligence networks.
- A steadfast adherence to the rule of law.

Updating the Parameters. These four parameters are still valid today, but require some modification for the current operating environment. Together they bound the freedom to operate:

- **Comprehensive Coordination Mechanisms.** To put in place structures and mechanisms to coordinate a fully comprehensive approach, from the strategic to tactical levels, to direct and execute the campaign. In a fragile or failed state these mechanisms can act as a spine or nervous system to connect the government with regional and local leaders.
- **Influence to Achieve the Appropriate Political Settlements.** To assess and implement appropriate Security, Governance and Development measures to achieve the necessary political settlements. The influence thus created will reshape the relationship between the host nation government, competing political elites and the wider population.
- **Understanding and Intelligence.** To develop understanding through the establishment and continuous refinement of intelligence organisations and campaign continuity initiatives. This will help underpin analysis, shape the campaign plan to win the active support of target populations, and direct offensive action against hostile groups to cause long-term damage to them.
- **Governance Through the Rule of Law.** Perceived inequalities in the administration of the law, and real or apparent injustices, are triggers for instability. It is of paramount importance that all actions taken by a government and its agents in attempting to restore stability are legal.

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**Figure 4.1 – The Parameters of the Freedom to Operate**
Establishing Comprehensive Coordination Mechanisms

0428 Managing Tensions. There will be tensions between the various agencies. Coordinating machinery must be designed to reduce and work through them. They must be robust enough so that when breakdowns occur there is a process by which reconciliation can occur. This is described in the US Inter-agency COIN Guide as an integrated conflict management system.10 The likelihood of friction within a national structure is high, but increases in coalition operations. Coordination mechanisms must also be capable of coherent linkage with the host nation and the commander should involve himself in their design (See Chapter 10, Section II). Since adversaries will seek to exploit the fault lines that exist within any alliance or coalition, particularly one that is reliant on the comprehensive approach to generate stabilisation, coordination mechanisms should mitigate the risks inherent in the coalition.

0429 Achieving Integration. Successful comprehensive mechanisms involve real integration, including: collocation of civil and military headquarters, shared staff and common processes and co-terminus boundaries. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are examples of structures employed to achieve better integration in the delivery of national support to local governance and development in both Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002. Integrated process should include combined regular updates, a combined theatre integrated plan and inter-agency campaign assessment and synchronisation boards. Technical interoperability between information systems is critical, but rarely achieved. In a new campaign, the commander should strive for this from the outset.

Influence to Achieve the Appropriate Political Settlement

0430 The commander should generate confidence in the perception that the host nation authorities will prevail, and will be supported by the international community for as long as is necessary. Host nation authority may enable an accommodation with decisive elites, and lever the active support of target populations.

Perception and Credibility – Aden

Kitson explains the consequences of lacking credibility, as a provider of long-term security. ‘In February 1966 Britain made public her intention of withdrawing from Aden when that country became independent in 1968. In effect this meant that Britain would pull out in 1968 regardless of whether the insurgents had been defeated and regardless of whether the intended successor government was able to handle them. That at any rate is how the people of Aden saw the situation and few of them doubted that the insurgents would ultimately gain control of the country. As Julian Paget put it: ‘The announcement was a disastrous move from the point of view of the Security Forces, for it meant that from then onwards they inevitably lost all hope of any local support.’

Effective Understanding and Intelligence

0431 Understanding and Intelligence Requirements. Relevant, accurate and timely intelligence is critical to the successful conduct of any campaign. In stabilisation that requirement for intelligence should be translated into understanding. Understanding is essential to taking and subsequently holding the initiative. Chapter 8 discusses the detail of intelligence and understanding, but a few specific points are highlighted below.

0432 Early Investment. At the outset of the campaign it is unlikely that commanders will have a complete understanding of the environment. Early allocation of forces and collation assets, purely for the purpose of gaining understanding, should be considered before other activities are undertaken. The first commanders deployed will often want to achieve decisive results during their tour, and there can be a logic to nipping an insurgency in the bud. But action must be predicated on understanding; it may be better to build the detailed picture. Early investment in intelligence and understanding will pay dividends in the longer term.

0433 Establishing Intelligence Networks. Understanding a multi-faceted networked problem requires a networked, task-organised intelligence structure to gather and exploit information. If influence is the central idea, intelligence-enabled understanding is the way influence is cued. Intelligence (both multinational and indigenous), must be harnessed by active management of information and analysis. In creating these networks advice should be sought from International Organisations (and even Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), many of whom will have been
operating in the area long before military forces deploy. While not all may be willing to be a formal part of the intelligence network, some may be persuaded to engage informally, if only for their own force protection.

Governance Through the Rule of Law

As a rule the impartial use of the law is not only morally right but expedient because it is more compatible with the government’s aim of maintaining the allegiance of the population.\footnote{12}

0434 Legitimacy. Over the last thirty years the legal framework for such operations has developed in both breadth and complexity and now must take account of host nation sovereignty and changes in both UK domestic and international law. There has also been an increase in the emphasis on human rights legislation. In spite of this, today’s legal framework is as much an operational enabler as a constraint. The UK’s adherence to the law, while others do not, should be exploited to underpin legitimacy driving a wedge between the adversary and the population.

The Mandate

0435 Implications. The mandate provides the legal framework to conduct operations.\footnote{13} It also provides direction on freedom of action and constraints.

When the Coalition Provisional Authority was disbanded UN Security Council Resolution 1546 established new parameters for the Multinational National Force (MNF) in Iraq, changing the relationship from occupation to partnership. An annex set out the new, collaborative security architecture, including new committee structures. The annex stated ‘The structures…will serve as the fora for MNF and the Iraqi government to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership…’. The requirement to ‘reach agreement’ was a new dimension, demanding of the coalition a shift in mental as well as procedural approach.

0436 The commander may find it helpful to list the activities that he intends to conduct and consider whether the mandate he has to operate under supports them. Where it does not, he should seek to amend it to ensure that it provides him with the maximum freedom of action, while limiting that of the adversary. The following aspects are pertinent:

- **Powers of Arrest, Detention and Internment.** The mandate should lay down what, if any, powers of arrest, detention or internment are permitted. This will particularly be the case when police primacy is inapplicable, and the military are leading the fight against criminality. The mandate should specify who is permitted to detain those arrested and what rules apply to such detention. If the police are unable to act effectively against criminals, the commander may need to make the case for additional mandated powers.

- **Access.** The mandate will need to cover access to ports and airports, exemptions from custom duties, visas, local taxes, driving licences etc.

- **Immunity.** UK forces overseas will probably require some degree of immunity from host nation law, and this must be included in the mandate. As a minimum, such immunity should provide protection from criminal liability and protection from civil claims. Failure to gain, or maintain, appropriate immunity, as has occurred in Iraq in 2009, could undermine the strategic viability of the operation.

- **Rule of Law.** The mandate must address which legal system is going to be applied in the theatre. The legal status of coalition forces with respect to indigenous military and police forces must be established. Recognition of where primacy in law enforcement rests is critical, as is an understanding of the local legal system. All UK support should be conditional to adherence to acceptable codes of behaviour. For example, the UK would be unable to support any legal system that condones torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading punishments.\footnote{14}
Managing the Mandate

**Types of Mandate.** The highest legal authority is a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). Mandates can also take the form of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), Military Technical Agreements, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or a host nation request for support under their domestic law, which may be more constraining. However, the form of the mandate is no guide to the limits to freedom of action it provides, which can only be deduced by analysis of the specific mandate for a given operation. A UN Mandate (drafted by committee) is seldom clear-cut, therefore the commander needs to know how to use this to his advantage. Annex 4B shows the changing Iraq legal framework.

**Aspects of a Mandate that can Affect Operational Freedoms and Constraints**

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<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Constraint</th>
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<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>C2 of own forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basing</td>
<td>Freedom of movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overflight</td>
<td>Status of contractors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carriage of arms and ammunition</td>
<td>Jurisdiction over criminal offences</td>
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Questions the Commander Should Ask When Considering the Mandate:

- How has the government categorised the stabilisation operation; which laws and obligations apply?
- Do any of these laws require interpretation?
- What are the implications for operations?

0437 Chapters 1 and 2 lay out a model for stabilisation based on:
- Security
- Economic and Infrastructure Development
- Governance and Rule of Law

0438 All three elements build towards achieving an appropriate political settlement. When trying to describe a theory for change, it is useful to have a framework to describe stabilisation activity. The purpose of any framework is to provide a model that enables a shared lexicon; a common understanding can then be developed in a multi-agency community. The commander should be able to use it to articulate to his civilian counterparts the key elements of his plan; what is to be conducted, where and by whom. In this sense it helps to operationalise the plan.

0439 The Operational Framework (Shape-Engage-Exploit-Protect-Sustain) is still relevant in stabilisation, as it is to all military operations, but it was designed for a different purpose; conventional warfighting, focused on the enemy. Stabilisation requires a population and environment focused framework. A number of frameworks already exist:
- Clear – Hold – Build
- Understand – Shape – Secure – Hold – Build
- Shape – Secure – Develop

0440 The precise framework employed is arguably less important than the integrated approach and shared understanding; no one framework is necessarily more correct than any other. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 adopts a framework for stabilisation activity which takes its provenance from the approach described in US COIN doctrine:
- Shape
- Secure
- Hold
- Develop

0441 This builds on proven counter-insurgency theories and enables closer conceptual linkage to governance and
development. It has an obvious relationship to the US
approach of Clear-Hold-Build, but reflects the importance the
UK places on Shape in order to develop both understanding
and plans as well as cueing civilian agency support for
subsequent Develop activity. Secure is used to reflect a focus
on the population rather than just terrain or enemy. Hold seeks
to highlight the critical transition from military-led
security to civilian-led development and articulates the risk
in this period of consolidation and transition. Develop is
used because it describes more intuitively the development
of capacity, primarily by civilians. Security progress should
be seen not just as a sequential series of steps into whose
footprints civil actors can move, but rather as the creation
of conditions and windows of opportunity through which
others must be ready to move, to exploit and develop
campaign momentum.

A key in stabilisation is aligning military and civil effort
so that neither is wasted. A large military force will require
a large civilian effort to conduct development. Civil-Military
Co-operation (CIMIC) effort under Shape-Secure-Hold will not
be sufficient. The purpose of the military contribution is to set
the security conditions for cross-sector exploitation with the
necessary momentum. Where the civilian force is missing or
lacks momentum, there can be no Develop and the strategic
initiative will swing back to the adversary. In this case, a new
plan will be required.

The apparently sequential articulation of the
framework – Shape, Secure, Hold, Develop – must not be
confused with its application and execution. At theatre level
it is definitely not a sequential process. There is overlap and
concurrency, as Figure 4.2 illustrates. The higher the level of
the operation at which the activity is being described, the
more concurrency and overlap there is likely to be. At the
tactical level it is likely that the activities will be required to
be implemented in sequence, but it will take place within a
higher level, concurrent plan. At the theatre level, it is the
need to seize the initiative that demands the framework is
not applied in a linear manner in which only one activity is
being conducted at a single moment, or in one area. Rather,
the framework provides for a span of activity to enable a
comprehensive approach in which, at any one given moment,
one or all of its components may be enacted. To do otherwise
would be to cede space, time and ultimately the initiative
to the adversary. There are a number of constants that run
throughout the campaign, such as engagement, analysis,
assessment and an aim towards transition. Most importantly
of all, influence is the overarching effect that all the elements
of a stabilisation campaign will seek to achieve. Therefore, the
framework can be described as sitting within an all embracing
sphere of influence that is the net effect which security,
governance and development activity seeks to deliver.

16. The most demanding of three approaches to counter-insurgency described in the US
17. In use with ISAF in Afghanistan: Julian Alford and Scott Cuomo, Operational Design for
18. British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency
Shape - Secure - Hold - Develop

The framework is developed in Chapter 11, Execution. Here, the meaning of its four elements, and how they interact, is considered only briefly.

0445 **Shape.** Shape starts the process of understanding the problem. Drawing upon all the expertise and contacts created during Prevent engagement, Shape is where multi-agency planning begins. Shape activity initiates the contest for security with the adversary. The aim is to build a coalition for joining up security, governance and development activity, and to design a military force that is complemented by an appropriate weight of civilian effort. It envisages wide engagement with multi-agency actors in order to shape and influence them, and in turn to influence and shape its own plans. It includes offensive operations such as raids and special forces strike operations, designed to disrupt the enemy, denying him safe havens and gaining intelligence. Elements of Shape (liaison and key leadership engagement, for example) continue throughout the campaign. At the strategic level it will define objectives and secure resources; at the operational level it will achieve comprehensive campaign design. At the tactical level it will improve understanding and help build local governance structures to meet the needs of the population.

0446 **Secure.** Secure describes activity to deliver security in a defined area. It is focused on the population, but it may also include the securing of the UK’s own line of communication and vital infrastructure. As international forces may be deployed after the campaign has reached a critical point, adversaries may have identified key terrain and vital ground, such as the national capital. This will be a priority for early Secure activity. Where there is no insurgency, it may not be necessary to conduct security operations. In operations where there is an insurgency, security forces will need to neutralise and isolate insurgents and irregulars in order to create the space and conditions for Hold and Develop activity. Secure is the point at which the adversary is confronted throughout his depth and made to fail, where international forces seize the security initiative in order to deliver enduring security to the local population. Violence should be expected to spike as adversaries fight to protect their footholds. Both military force and comprehensive measures need to be fused to support the commander in his task of separating the adversary from popular support. Resources (both military and inter-agency) will invariably be a constraint on concurrency. In Iraq in 2004/5 the tempo of security operations was limited by the availability of American funding for rebuilding homes damaged in battle. At this stage there may be little opportunity for major development initiatives due to a lack of permissiveness, however money can be used successfully to enhance persistent security effect.

0447 **Hold.** After securing an area it will usually be necessary to Hold it. Failure to do so may impact on the ability to maintain the initiative. Operational design should match the aspirations to Secure with the availability of forces to Hold. This necessitates close coordination between offensive operations and Security Sector Reform (SSR) stands of the campaign plan. It is possible that discrete military activity will be required to Hold only temporarily, for instance to buy time and space for other activity, but this is likely to be rare. Hold is the critical point at which Other Government Departments, International Organisations and NGOs begin to invest significant effort in a semi-permissive environment, and is the point at which the emphasis of being the supported element shifts from the military to the civilian organisations. Typically, it is also at this point where indigenous forces deploy in greater strength in order to provide security, perhaps raising non-standard security forces (village militias etc) as a temporary expedient to generate the necessary mass. Additionally, it is at this stage the rule of law is restored and the government is physically re-connected to its population via local elections and visits by ministers. This will create the vital links necessary between the people and their legitimate government. The adversary is likely to be investing his resources in protecting critical areas and his networks. Simultaneously, he may adapt to discredit and undermine progress, for example, through intimidation and mass-casualty terrorist attacks. Indigenous forces will need sufficient training and capability to carry out the security tasks, thereby releasing international forces to move on to Secure elsewhere. Hold is an act of tangible commitment that should start to inculcate in the population a sense of hope based upon demonstrable progress. This confidence should be apparent through increasing intelligence tips. Engagement with reconcilable adversaries should be sought from a position of advantage, and this may be the moment to exploit discreet links generated through Shape to fracture the opposition.

0448 **Develop.** The term Develop, rather than ‘build’ is used because it focuses on the wider aspects of capacity building, rather than on infrastructure alone. This activity includes investment and the development of governance structures and functions such as customs and excise, the legislature and the judiciary. Its benefits will usually be delivered by civilian actors operating within an increasingly permissive environment. The security initiative, now gained, must be consolidated and further strengthened during Develop.
Avoiding Misunderstanding: a Comparison with the US

We use the term Secure in preference to Clear as it relates to the notion of Human Security, and describes a more intuitive and militarily realistic objective. US doctrine describes Clear: ‘...to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area. The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants. This task is most effectively initiated by a clear-in-zone or cordon-and-search operation. The operation’s purpose is to disrupt insurgent forces and force a reaction by major insurgent elements in the area. Commanders employ a combination of offensive small-unit operations. These may include area saturation patrolling that enables the force to defeat insurgents in the area, interdiction ambushes, and targeted raids.’ After insurgent forces are eliminated, insurgent infrastructure is removed.

The US definition of Hold is similar to the UK’s. Joint Publication 3-24 states that ‘...the establishment of security forces in bases among the population furthers the continued disruption, identification and elimination of the local insurgent leadership and infrastructure. The success or failure of the effort depends, first, on effectively and continuously securing the populace and, second, on effectively re-establishing a host nation government presence at the local level. Measured offensive operations continue against insurgents as opportunities arise, but the main effort is focused on the population...’ It emphasises the need to secure and protect key infrastructure and identifies four key target audiences during Hold: Population; Insurgents; COIN forces; and regional and international audiences.

In the US Clear-Hold-Build model, Build means maintaining a safe environment for the people and the local government. It describes measures to develop self-sustaining security in an area, including building the capacity of indigenous security forces. A number of tasks that ‘...provide an overt and direct benefit for the community are key, initial priorities. Special funds (or other available resources) should be available to pay wages to local people to do such beneficial work. Accomplishing these tasks can begin the process of establishing host nation government legitimacy. Sample tasks include: ...collecting and clearing trash from the streets; ...building and improving roads; ...providing guides, sentries and translators; ...building and improving schools and similar facilities in coordination with the local population, host nation, and other actors; ...development of local and regional markets.’ The UK has chosen Develop as the term to describe the span of capacity development that will be required to enable enduring local stability.

for this reason that Hold without being ready to Develop risks dislocating the campaign.
SECTION V
THE SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF STABILISATION

0449 Principles serve as the foundation for action, but they are not inflexible rules. They provide a way of thinking about a particular problem from a particular perspective: in the case of JDP 3-40, the inherent political and multinational requirements of stabilisation at the theatre level. The following security principles of stabilisation are derived from analysis of UK and Allied doctrine, recent operational experience and lessons learned, and history. They encapsulate the issues articulated in the previous chapters and should be used to guide military planning and execution. They are included in this section specifically to help civilian readers better understand the military approach.

Primacy of Political Purpose

Political aims dictate the desired outcome and drive the planning and conduct of the campaign.

0450 The purpose of UK military participation in security and stabilisation is the achievement of the desired UK political aim. This should be at the forefront of the commander’s campaign planning, implementation and assessment efforts, noting that this may require adaptation where political aims change in the light of the conduct of the campaign. The aim of stabilisation activities is to achieve a political settlement between the host nation government, competing elites and the wider population. Critics of stabilisation missions cite unachievable goals (such as the creation of Jeffersonian democracy), this may be to misrepresent the purpose, which may be demanding, yet wholly pragmatic. To have utility, military activity and particularly the use of force should shape and drive this political settlement as a part of the solution to security and stabilisation problems. The different interests, goals and methods of coalition nations and host nation competing elites, may create tensions of political purpose. The commander has a key role in shaping the conditions for, and providing a military perspective on, this dynamic process.

Understand the Context

A shared understanding of the context within which insecurity and instability has arisen, between the UK military and their immediate partners, is essential to provide a basis for focused and coordinated action, known by some as a Theory of Change.

A common understanding is the basis of a common approach, but it cannot be assumed. To understand the contextual aspects of security and stabilisation, anthropological, religious, ethnographic, social, political and economic information is required to inform campaign analysis and assessment. It is essential that the broad conflict dynamics are understood and agreed, and the analysis shared with all appropriate partners. The establishment of an effective and adaptive intelligence mechanism may require restructuring the intelligence architecture. Effective intelligence gathering is proactive, aggressive and bottom-up in nature. The intelligence organisation should provide for the greatest possible level of information exchange between nations, government departments and multi-national and local security forces at all levels. The commander is, initially, faced with uncertainty in the planning process, which should diminish with focused intelligence gathering and analysis. Growing and maintaining this intelligence capability should form a central part of planning and execution. Effective and imaginative knowledge management in theatre and at home is critical. This requires early investment in, for example, cultural advisers and databases, to manage challenges of continuity and roulement. From understanding flow the campaign big ideas, or theory of change.


The US experience in Somalia demonstrates that, without understanding the cultural and operational context, it is impossible to create a platform upon which successful planning and influence can be built. The clan system was misunderstood. Unified Task Force (UNITAF) overlooked the fact that Somalis viewed an attack against one clan as an attack on all clans. By targeting General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a clan leader, UNITAF unwittingly provided a unifying purpose, coalescing the clans in a war perceived by Somalis in general as legitimate, against the outsiders. American helicopters dropped leaflets over Mogadishu’s primarily illiterate population. This encapsulated a Western intervention with a high dependence on technology but a low level of host nation cultural understanding. The oral tradition and ready access to radios would have made broadcast a more suitable medium. US Marine Brigadier General Anthony Zinni observed: “What above all made Somalia a tough place to do business was the United States’ lack of comprehension of its intricate and unfamiliar social and cultural fabric.”

Focus on the Population

The needs of the population, whose expectations will vary from one situation to another, must be met to promote human security and encourage support for the political settlement.

The inability of a state to provide for the basic needs of its population can be both the cause and result of insecurity and instability. Failed states fail their people: the atomisation of societies makes them more open to manipulation and radicalisation. A desperate population will turn to any provider, including potential adversaries, when basic needs are not met. Similarly, adversaries will seek to fill the vacuum of needs where the government is absent or ineffective. The commander should identify what the military may be required to contribute to human security tasks, recognising that military provision is a last resort and that the main responsibility lies with international organisations and the host nation government. Failure to provide for the populations’ needs may undermine the foundations of stabilisation as the people struggle for survival. Political progress is unlikely to take place in the midst of chronic human insecurity. Focusing on the population does not mean ignoring the adversary; on the contrary, the contest for security will be fought amongst...
the population and for their support. The population may not like us, but our military aim is not the pursuit of popularity, although this is important for indigenous forces. International forces should seek to husband respect, to prevent the adversary from gaining influence and security control, and to re-connect the population with their government; this requires their government be perceived as credible. People need to believe that their situation is more likely to improve under the government than its adversaries. There will be a dynamic relationship between the international forces’ own and the opponents’ narratives, and the perception of audiences should be considered when planning courses of action. The adversary must be marginalised; hence the term ‘the population is the prize’, noting that international forces are competing on behalf of the host government, not themselves.

**Focus on the Population – Iraq 2007-8**

The Iraqi *Surge* demonstrates how the human security needs of a population are best met locally, with decisions delegated down to the lowest level. In 2007-8 the substantial increase in the US force helped to deliver a significant and sustained reduction in violence across the Country. Stationing US troops alongside their Iraqi counterparts (in joint security stations) placed a very strong physical presence in previously abandoned and conflict-ridden communities. Gated communities, concrete barriers and the well-targeted attrition of armed groups that continued to fight, alongside engagement and accommodation with others, allowed the focused use of resources by local commanders to rebuild services in the newly controlled areas. The murder rate fell and refugees began returning. Economic life slowly re-started. Across Iraq as a whole, civilian deaths declined significantly. Transitioning local security to a local lead was a central tenet in the plan. The battle against al-Qaeda succeeded because extremism was rejected by the Sunni tribes, and al-Qaeda was subjected to remorseless targeting by special forces. Exploiting the early progress of an ‘Anbar Awakening’, the US launched a major engagement effort, to agree local security accommodations with neighbourhood tribal (often former-insurgent) groups. This consolidated and expanded the security gains made under the US *Surge*. Al Sadr demobilised Jaish al Mahdi in response to public pressure, causing internal frictions to erupt. These improvements, together with the growing capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces, gave the Iraqi Government increased confidence in their political and physical authority. This in turn allowed them to intervene against the Shia militia in Basra. Delivering security in the south, combined with the general successes of the *Surge* across other parts of the Country, offered the Iraqi government the opportunity to re-connect with its people. The security action created political space and options.
Foster Host Nation Governance, Authority and Indigenous Capacity

Host nation ownership of, and responsibility for, security and stabilisation requires the development of sufficient governance, authority and indigenous capability.

0453 All governments exercise control through a combination of consent and coercion. Legitimate governments function with the tacit consent of the governed and are generally stable, whereas regimes generally considered illegitimate rule entirely, or mainly through coercion. The more a state relies on coercion, the greater the likelihood of collapse if that power is disrupted. Legitimate governance can be undermined by many issues including corruption, greed, incompetence, bias, disregard for the rule of law and disenfranchisement. However, legitimacy is determined by the local population, not imposed externally. Coalition partners should not try to replace the functions of the government. They should work with it to rebuild its capacity and competence by establishing local trust in governance based on consistent and fair, rather than arbitrary, application of the law. All coalition actions should aim to foster host nation authority and capacity in order to underpin enduring stability. The military contribution is primarily in the field of security capacity, but should contribute to the wider development of robust institutions.

0454 Capacity-building and SSR are essential parts of the overall stabilisation solution and will require significant investment in time, resources and the commander’s attention. He will need to design a coherent, effective capacity-building and SSR operation, albeit in concert with allies and partners, in a way that overcomes the inefficiencies inherent in a multi-lateral enterprise. The goal is to field capability at a tempo that matches the demands of the changing problem. Host nation capacity facilitates the international forces’ reassignment to new areas in order to spread campaign and government authority, and is the enabler of transition and eventual withdrawal. SSR is not about creating forces that look like ours, and nor is it necessarily about creating what the host nation wants. Forces should be appropriate to the local cultural and security context, agreed by the host nation, and sustainable. Tensions may arise when there is a divergence between the plans and activities of the indigenous nation and coalition partners. Timely diplomacy should produce a solution that is acceptable to both sides if momentum and unity is to be maintained.

Foster Host Nation Governance, Authority and Indigenous Capacity – Sierra Leone

In addition to its human consequences, the 11-year war also brought about the destruction of the country’s economy, infrastructure and state institutions. During the conflict, the often unpaid and unfed Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was as much a source of instability as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). They were known by the civilian population as ‘sobels’ – (soldier by day, rebel by night) due to their violent and predatory activity. Their ineffectiveness, along with that of other state institutions such as the police, saw the use of local militias and private military security companies against the RUF. The British joint task force that intervened in May 2000 (Operation PALLISER) went through a number of mission and role transitions. Initially an evacuation force, then a stabilisation force, before concluding as a training organisation. One of the keys to long term success in Sierra Leone was the UK’s commitment to training and institution building. In their part of a comprehensive approach, UK forces initially operated as short-term training teams and later as a permanent International Military Advisory and Training Team. This small but high-profile team helped build the new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, and reassure the population that they had not been abandoned when UK combat forces withdrew. This addressed their concern that the SLA may regress to its old ways. Confidence was bolstered by use of highly visible demonstrations in support of the Government through short term military deployments, ship visits and joint training exercises to coincide with local political events, such as elections.

Unity of Effort

Military force is but one element required for the delivery of security and stabilisation. The collective contribution of all actors is required and must be coordinated to ensure unity of effort in every facet of the mission.

0455 Cross-government and inter-agency cohesion is vital but relationships and processes have no agreed template. In the past, a single UK leader may have had authority over all UK government agencies. However, in a contemporary campaign, such unity of command is unlikely. Consequently, once the Theory of Change has been agreed, the commander should focus on achieving unity of effort. Much will rest on willingness to collaborate in a way that each participant agrees to accept constraints in order to achieve a degree of
**Isolate and Neutralise Irregular Actors**

By isolating those who oppose the government from their cause and the source of their support they can be made irrelevant.

0456 The primary role of the military is to provide sufficient security for the people and control over the operating environment. Security cannot be achieved solely through the presence of military forces, or just by killing or capturing adversaries. Unlike in general war, the objective is not the defeat or destruction of the enemy, but neutralisation of a threat to stable society. Neutralisation can take many forms, but isolation of the adversary is attractive as it makes him irrelevant through loss of legitimacy and erodes his popular support. Isolation may begin the process of accommodation; but campaign success is likely to require the irreconcilable elements to be killed or captured. Military forces will have to fight and win in the physical, virtual and cognitive domains. The physical domain may include significant combat operations to establish the host nation government’s monopoly of the use of force, and provide a secure environment for the population. There is a growing contest for domination of the information environment. For example, websites supporting violent extremism grew from twelve in 1998 to over 4000 by 2008. Additionally, in the cognitive arena, the host government should provide the people with a more credible vision of the future than the adversary and tangible human security in the short-term.

0457 There must be no safe havens. Ways and means include physical population control, border security, international legal and diplomatic action to limit financial or political support and removal of internet-based virtual havens that propagate support, training and doctrine. In instances where isolation cannot be achieved or is insufficient, targeted strike to complete neutralisation is required. The commander may choose to keep his adversaries constantly under pressure and on the move, or contain them within an area where they can be monitored and exploited. Commanders should consider military activity not just for its security and political effects, but also the impact it will have on the adversary’s cohesion and confidence. Seizing the initiative and thus denying it to the adversary is key; it creates momentum, demoralises adversaries and shows tangible security progress. These pro-active measures come at a price.

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Unity of Effort – Borneo 1963-66

Commonwealth forces defeated a complex insurgency actively supported by Indonesian forces infiltrating across the border. A combination of security, judicial and political action based on a coordinated civil-military plan, and extensive use of psychological operations, suppressed the urban insurgency. The conflict was displaced to the jungle interior, where ultimately a well-coordinated approach led to the insurgents’ defeat. Extensive manoeuvre, using aviation, created an illusion of large-scale military presence, the impact of which was amplified by highly aggressive, but carefully targeted, military action. Sensitive handling of the local population led to Commonwealth forces, rather than the insurgents, being regarded as the providers of security. Through a well-orchestrated combination of physical and psychological effects, the Commonwealth succeeded in the complete demoralisation of Indonesian forces and the defeat of the internal insurgency. This enabled an enduring political settlement in the north of Borneo that led to the provinces of Sarawak and Sabah remaining secure within the Federation of Malaysia.

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Neutralise and Counteract Irregular Actors Oman – 1965-1975

In a classic example of economy of force a Special Air Service (SAS) squadron of about 90 men was deployed into the Omani hinterland where it fused the civil and military elements of the COIN strategy. The British wished to keep the strategic footprint small, to enable plausible deniability of direct involvement in the conflict. For this reason, a significant number of additional British officers were privately contracted to the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) in specialist, mentoring and leadership roles. The SAS raised, trained and led jebali militias known as firqats which isolated the insurgents from the locals, and set secure conditions allowing effective implementation of the civil aid programme. The SAS were also directly involved in the provision of civil aid, helping to establish clinics, schools and bore wells. A Royal Engineer squadron provided specialist support with infrastructure projects and an ambitious road building programme dramatically improved SAF access into the mountains.

A UK military medical unit provided ad hoc medical and health care while clinics were constructed. Civil aid was complemented by an information operation which countered the insurgent’s communist ideology; this was largely delivered directly to the jebalis by the SAS teams. SAS-led firqats fought a series of small, but intense, battles to neutralise insurgents which enhanced the effect of regular SAF operations. The SAF successfully interdicted the border with Yemen and denied insurgent movement in the mountains through the extensive use of barriers and airpower. Once the insurgents were isolated and neutralised the new Sultan was able to establish an ambitious programme for change.

Exploit Credibility to Gain Support

Consent is the minimum requirement, but it is not enough. Credibility must act as a lever to shift tacit consent into active support for the campaign. UK forces must be perceived to be both legitimate and credible locally (especially amongst opinion-forming elites), regionally and with UK audiences.

Credibility is capital; it can be lost or exploited. It is used to change the conflict. The commander should adapt to the political and social dynamics, managing expectations. His approach should be to under-promise and over-deliver. This will ensure that both he, and his force, are credible to all parties. The UK should seek to create campaign momentum, moving from a situation of partial opposition, through consent (which can be passive), to one in which the host government enjoys the active support of the vast majority at the expense of the adversary. As a result, there will be an increased flow of actionable intelligence and recruits and an acceptance of governance by the people, for example, by voting in elections.

Credibility is delivered and leveraged on a number of levels. The adherence to local cultural norms and high professional standards by security forces will generate basic credibility for the force, but not credibility for the enterprise. Instead, this requires the host nation government to articulate a vision that is matched by action. Coalition and host nation actions should mutually reinforce, deliver benefit, generate consent and support the narrative that articulates how the population’s lives will change for the better if they give their support. This theory of change is key.
Support – Later Stages of Northern Ireland

On the night of 7 March 2009, two British soldiers were murdered outside Massareene Barracks in County Antrim. The Real Irish Republican Army (IRA), a dissident splinter group of the IRA, accepted responsibility. The murders were seen as defiance of, and a challenge to, the popular cross-community support and commitment to the political process outlined in the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement. Martin McGuinness, Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, a former senior member of the IRA, made a public statement that those carrying out attacks in Northern Ireland were ‘traitors to the island of Ireland’ and reaffirmed that the ‘only legal mandate’ was the Good Friday Agreement. His actions reinforced the credibility of the Stormont Assembly and broad support for the political settlement. The effect was the further isolation of violent dissident groups and growing support for the political process.

Adversaries Ignore Their Doctrine

During the Anbar ‘awakening’ of 2007 al-Qaeda lost the support of the Iraqi population and suffered an operational-level defeat. Local tribes joined forces with the US Marines when the tribal leadership recognised that al-Qaeda was a greater threat to their interests than the US ‘occupation’.

Al-Zawahiri emphasises the fundamental importance of popular support:

“If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate…will not be achieved except through jihad…then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahedeen movement while it is cut off from public support: …[He goes on to note that]… popular support would be a decisive factor between victory and defeat. In the absence of this popular support the Islamic mujahedeen movement would be crushed in the shadows…[Furthermore, he warns that the west is]…stealthily striving to separate [the Jihadist elite] from the misguided or frightened masses. Therefore, our planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the mujahed movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle for them.”

Prepare for the Long Term – Perseverance and Sustainability

The stabilisation of a failed or failing state will tend to take a long time. It will require the provision of significant cross-government resources, immersion in the problem, and demonstration of resilience in the face of short-term setbacks.

The protracted nature of security and stabilisation campaigns presents a challenge. The political desire to balance the cost of national commitment to the stabilisation campaign against other domestic priorities may inadvertently communicate a lack of resolve, resulting in a short-term approach to campaign design and resourcing. A lack of continuity of approach may also result. One of the principal adversary strategies is to outlast the international deployment, such as in Somalia. The local population must be convinced that external support for their government will be sufficient and enduring. Indications of transitory engagement will undermine the credibility of the campaign. Against this should be set the danger of creating a sense of permanence amounting to dependency, and leading to a perception of occupation.

Early investment in supporting infrastructure, specialist capabilities and capacity building are essential, both for the successful conduct of the campaign and as an indication of national commitment. Many fragile states return to conflict after the departure of external military assistance. Even if the UK commitment is time limited, forces should generate capabilities and the mindset that can adopt the necessary long-term approach, before transition or withdrawal.
Long-Term Commitment – The ‘NITAT Moment’ in Northern Ireland -1972

The first units to deploy to Operation BANNER in 1969 had no pre-deployment training. The need for specific theatre training became increasingly clear: generic colonial-era COIN methods were inappropriate. The Northern Ireland Training Team (NITAT) was established in 1972 to fill the theatre-specific gap. The idea adopted an approach used successfully at the Jungle Warfare School at Kota Tingi in 1948 to train units deploying to the Malayan Emergency. Using high-quality military and police instructors fresh from operations to design and deliver the training, NITAT also developed specialist training areas and ranges representative of the conditions in theatre. Despite the costs and distraction from training for general war on NATO’s Central Front, a second team was established at Sennelager shortly afterwards, to train units deploying from Germany, and then a third in Northern Ireland to train individual reinforcements. This enterprise required a leap of faith. It was by no means clear that the campaign would be protracted, but the necessary investment was made to put force preparation on a campaign footing. Operational standards were raised and without doubt lives saved. From 1973 onwards no unit or individual deployed to Northern Ireland without passing through NITAT, which constantly adapted to meet evolving threats and changes to the operational requirement.
Anticipate, Learn and Adapt

Complex, uncertain and dynamic operating environments demand continuous anticipation, learning, and adaptation (without detriment to the maintenance of the aim). Adversaries will adapt; so must the UK forces if their adversaries are to be outwitted.

Constant change is not a sign of failure; it is a defining characteristic of such operations. Disaggregated adversaries and often loose central governance demands a de-centralised response by international forces. Anticipation and adaptation should therefore be seen as a sign of initiative, an active process that the commander should drive throughout the campaign. Assessment mechanisms should be established to identify and interpret the results of the UK forces’ own, and other actors’ actions, to exploit success and correct errors. The commander should be robust, yet apply his judgement to assess whether setbacks are temporary or require a change of approach. Adversaries, due to their structure, size of organisation, and agility, may adapt more rapidly; their survival depends on it. Consequently, coalition forces should not just learn and adapt quickly in a reactive manner but anticipate at sufficient relative tempo in order to seize or retain the initiative. This means designing new structures, bending existing ones out of shape and constantly refining our training and education. One relative advantage that coalition forces will normally hold is the use of technology. The commander should establish staff structures and procedures to drive change, including to equipment and structures. Reachback can build continuity and mobilise the institutional capacity out of theatre to support the campaign.

Anticipate, Learn and Adapt – Make Best Use of What’s Available

In late 2002, RAF Maritime Surveillance Aircraft were re-equipped for a new task never previously envisaged for this platform. They were fitted with the WESCAM MX-15 electro-optical system, together with new defensive aids and an enhanced communications suite and re-roled to overland tasks. The work, completed in six months, has allowed the Nimrod MR2 to be continuously tasked since in support of ground forces participating in Operations TELIC and HERRICK. The system is shown here over the Kajaki Dam in Afghanistan.
Secure and Serve the Population. The Iraqi people are the decisive "terrain." Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies.

Live Among the People. You can’t commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.

Hold Areas that have been Secured. Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Iraqi partners will not abandon their neighborhoods. When reducing forces and presence, gradually thin the line rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces.

Pursue the Enemy Relentlessly. Identify and pursue Al-Qaeda Iraq and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations.

Generate Unity of Effort. Coordinate operations and initiatives with our embassy and interagency partners, our Iraqi counterparts, local governmental leaders, and non-governmental organizations to ensure all are working to achieve a common purpose.

Promote Reconciliation. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the 'reconcilables' from the 'irreconcilables' through engagement, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.

Defeat the Network, not Just the Attack. Defeat the insurgent networks to the 'left' of the explosion. Focus intelligence assets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, financiers, suppliers, and operators.

Foster Iraqi Legitimacy. Encourage Iraqi leadership and initiative; recognize that their success is our success. Partner in all that we do and support local involvement in security, governance, economic revival, and provision of basic services. Find the right balance between Coalition Forces leading and the Iraqis exercising their leadership and initiative, and encourage the latter. Legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people is essential to overall success.

Punch Above Your Weight Class. Strive to be "bigger than you actually are." Partner in operations with Iraqi units and police, and employ "Sons of Iraq", contractors, and local Iraqis to perform routine tasks in and around Forward Operating Bases, Patrol Bases and Joint Security Stations, thereby freeing up our troopers to focus on tasks "outside the wire."

Employ All Assets to Isolate and Defeat the Terrorists and Insurgents. Counter-terrorist forces alone cannot defeat al-Qaeda and the other extremists; success requires all forces and all means at our disposal – non-kinetic as well as kinetic. Employ Coalition and Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, Sons of Iraq, and all other available multipliers. Integrate civilian and military efforts to cement security gains. Resource and fight decentralised. Push assets down to those who most need them and can actually use them.

Employ Money as a Weapon System. Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each ‘round’ expended, and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit’s overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Employ a ‘matching fund’ concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment.

Fight for Intelligence. A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. Analyse the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a ‘need to share’ rather than a ‘need to know’ basis; disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.

Walk. Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don’t drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.

Understand the Neighbourhood. Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand local culture and history: learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, and local security forces. Understand how local systems are supposed to work – including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy – and how they really work.

Build Relationships. Relationships are a critical component of counter-insurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners.

Look for Sustainable Solutions. Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental institutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the Coalition Force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and help Iraqis make them work.

Maintain Continuity and Tempo Through Transitions. Start to build the information you’ll provide to your successors on the day you take over. Allow those who will follow you to virtually ‘look over your shoulder’ while they’re still at home station by giving them access to your daily updates and other items on SIPRNET. Encourage extra time on the ground during transition periods, and strive to maintain operational tempo and local relationships to avoid giving the enemy respite.
- **Manage Expectations.** Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troops and our partners are aware of our assessments and recognize that any counterinsurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow.

- **Be First with the Truth.** Get accurate information of significant activities to your chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumours. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don’t put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we’ve learned and how we’ll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies’ bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.

- **Fight the Information War Relentlessly.** Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and United States has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media.

- **Live our Values.** Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. This is what distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher endeavour than the one in which we are engaged. It is often brutal, physically demanding, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we cannot give in to dark impulses nor tolerate unacceptable actions by others.

- **Exercise Initiative.** In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide broad vision and paint ‘white lines on the road,’ but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn ‘big ideas’ into specific actions.

- **Empower Subordinates.** Resource to enable decentralized action. Push assets and authorities down to those who most need them and can actually use them. Flatten reporting chains. Identify the level to which you would naturally plan and resource, and go one further—generally looking three levels down, vice the three levels down that is traditional in major combat operations.

- **Prepare for and Exploit Opportunities.** “Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity” (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of ‘reconcilables’ and ‘irreconcilables’) in anticipation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them.

- **Learn and Adapt.** Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas (none of us is smarter than all of us together). Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in one area today may not work there tomorrow, and may or may not be transferable to another part of Iraq.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
General, United States Army
Commanding
Coalition operations in Iraq from 2003 until 2009 show how the legal framework can change dramatically during the course of a campaign, and the consequences this can have for a Force’s operations, its freedoms and obligations.

**The Invasion**
On 20 March 2003 Coalition forces invaded Iraq. This was a classic international armed conflict governed by the Laws of Armed Conflict, including the full panoply of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Subject to these laws, and to the political and military direction of the Coalition states’ themselves, the Coalition forces had operational freedom to defeat the Iraqi forces and to subdue the government of Saddam Hussein.

**The Occupation May 2003 – June 2004**
Establishing the Coalition Provisional Authority.
General Franks’ freedom message of 16 April 2003 announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a civilian administration which would exercise temporary governmental authority in Iraq. After major combat operations were declared to be complete on 1 May 2003, albeit that hostilities did not end on that date in all parts of the country, the US and the UK became occupying powers within the meaning of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. Though much misunderstood, occupation did not take away sovereignty.

On 13 May 2003 Mr Paul Bremer was appointed as the Administrator of the CPA. The CPA promptly set about the business of government, issuing Orders, Regulations and Memoranda. By CPA Regulation No 1, dated 16 May 2003, the CPA assumed ‘all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war’. Iraq laws, unless suspended or replaced by the CPA, were to continue to apply insofar as they did not prevent the CPA from exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with Regulations or Orders issued by the CPA. The Coalition forces, though having a separate chain of command to the US Defense Secretary (a point of doctrinal and practical
interest), were the right arm of power for the CPA, providing the conditions for delivering its goals and suppressing the insurgency.

04805  UNSCR 1483 (May 2003). Resolution 1483 was adopted by the Security Council on 22 May 2003. Its opening recitals reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and acknowledged the US and UK Permanent Representatives’ letter of 8 May to the President of the Security Council which, inter alia, recorded the creation of the CPA, the requirement to provide security, and the provision of temporary administration of Iraq while facilitating Iraqi efforts to form a representative government based on the rule of law. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, UNSCR 1483 took occupation law to new heights with its thrust towards constitutional, legal, judicial, economic and political reform. It was a nation-building Resolution which tipped the balance from the conservationist to the reformist approach, and doubtless justified only by the UN’s political and economic aims for the fledgling democracy. In July 2003 an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was established, which the CPA was to consult on all matters concerning the temporary governance of Iraq.

04806  UNSCR 1511 (October 2003). On 16 October 2003 Resolution 1511 was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Operative paragraph 1 underscored the temporary nature of the CPA’s exercise of its specific responsibilities, authorities and obligations until an internationally recognised, representative government was established by the people of Iraq. In a new departure, the Council as operative paragraph 13 authorised

‘a multinational force [MNF] under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and programme as well as to contribute to the security of [UNAMI], the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure’.

What is clear from operative paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1546 is that the Coalition forces had become the UN-authorised MNF before the occupation had formally ceased. This was a point of relevance to the Force Comd in understanding his strategic mandate, although there was little practical difference on the ground to the mission between October 2003 and June 2004 because there was still a belligerent occupation.

04807  Transitional Administrative Law. On 8 March 2004 the IGC promulgated a transitional administrative law, paving the way towards an interim and then an elected Iraqi government.

Post-Occupation – UNSCR Mandate for the Multinational Force 2004 to 2005

04808  UNSCR 1546 (June 2004). On 5 June 2004 the Prime Minister of the newly formed Interim Government of Iraq and the US Secretary of State wrote to the President of the Security Council. Dr Allawi asked for the support of the Security Council and the international community until Iraq could provide its own security, including through the arrangements set out in Mr Powell’s letter. Mr Powell’s letter recognised Dr Allawi’s request for the continued presence of the MNF in Iraq and confirmed that:

‘Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force protection. These include activities necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will include combat operations against members of these groups, in utmost where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security. A further objective will be to train and equip Iraqi security forces that will increasingly take responsibility for maintaining Iraq’s security. The MNF also stands ready as needed to participate in the provision of humanitarian assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction assistance requested by the Iraqi Interim Government and in line with previous Security Council Resolutions.’

This letter clearly contributed to the Force Commander’s understanding of his operational and legal freedoms, and had to be considered as part of his mission analysis process.

04809  Resolution 1546, adopted by the Security Council on 8 June 2004, reaffirmed the authorisation under UNSCR 1511 (2003) for the presence of the MNF under unified command with the consent of the Interim Government and decided:

‘that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this Resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people [. . .] and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without
intimidate the timetable and programme for the political process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities…'

04B10 Operative paragraph 11 of the Resolution made clear that the Allawi and Powell letters governed the operational remit of the MNF from July 2004 and set out the security arrangements between the MNF and the Interim Government with an emphasis on partnership, coordination, consultation and agreement. The partnership could clearly not be an empty agreement to agree, but a good faith, purposive interpretation of the mandate. Dr Allawi’s letter annexed to UNSCR 1546 specifically mentioned that sensitive issues would need to be ‘resolved in the framework of a mutual understanding’. Nevertheless, subject to the ultimate sanctions of the Iraqi Government terminating the mandate or the MNF withdrawing altogether, the UNSCR could not regulate this partnership in detail, and the ways in which differences and disagreements would have to be, and were, resolved, or simply ignored with unilateral action by one party, inevitably form the unseen narrative of this period June 2004 to December 2008.

04B11 The Council further decided that the mandate for the multinational force should be reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or 12 months from the date of the Resolution and that the mandate should end on completion of the political process described earlier in the Resolution, but the Council undertook to terminate the mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq.

04B12 On 27 June 2004 the CPA issued a revised CPA Order 17 giving members of the multinational force and the CPA general immunity from Iraqi process, and providing that they should be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending states. On the following day power was formally transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government, the CPA was dissolved and the occupation of Iraq by coalition forces came to an end.

The UNSCR Mandate for the Multinational Force 2006 to 2008

04B13 UNSCRs 1637, 1723 and 1790. After this date there were three further Resolutions of the Security Council, which extended the MNF mandate year on year. They were Resolution 1637 of November 2005, Resolution 1723 of November 2006 and Resolution 1790 of December 2007, which effectively preserved the presence of the MNF in Iraq under the Resolution 1546 mandate, subject to gradual shifts in the balance of power that reflected the progress Iraq had to make in the area of security. Thus, for example, in 2004 (UNSCR 1546 operative paragraph 8) Iraqi security forces were being developed and would progressively play a greater role, but by 2008 (UNSCR 1790, paragraph 4(2) of Mr al-Maliki’s letter annexed thereto) the Iraqi Government (established in May 2006, succeeding the Transitional Government of May 2005) was ready to take full responsibility for the command and control of all Iraqi forces and the MNF would provide ‘support and backing’.

Post UNSCR Mandate – the Bilateral Agreements

04B14 On 31 December 2008 the mandate for the MNF came to a close and the presence of US and UK forces would in future be governed by more restrictive, separate bilateral agreements. These set out what they could do, where they could go, what jurisdiction applies and the relationship between visiting forces and the host nation for the command and control of military operations and training.
Every commander of whatever rank must understand that if there are non-combatants on or in his objective, he is responsible for the outcome of his action as it affects them. It does not matter whether the commander in question is a corporal clearing a house or a general taking a town: the principle remains the same. In the heat of battle, with the imperative of overcoming the enemy and little information, it is difficult to balance the responsibilities – of achieving the objective at the least cost to one's own with concern for the non-combatant – so as to reach a decision regarding the way of achieving one's objective. Nevertheless, a decision must be reached.

The moment the objective is gained, or starts to be gained in the case of a large one, then the decision must be reassessed. The objective must be secured and the responsibility for the non-combatant, if present, discharged. For example, in the Kosovo operation of 1999 Serbian targets in both Kosovo and the rest of Serbia were bombed to the point that the Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo and NATO forces entered the province. The objective of the bombing was achieved. However, the moment those alliance forces entered Kosovo the objective changed to one of securing the population as a whole, and in particular those Kosovars of Serb ethnicity. The change of objective would have occurred even if the NATO forces would have had to fight their way into Kosovo. If such had been the case, the overall commander would have been conducting operations with two objectives simultaneously: the defeat of the Serbs, and also the protection of Serb non-combatants as the operation succeeded.

The successful conduct of an operation with two objectives to be achieved simultaneously requires a method of command appropriate to the particular circumstances. If one is advancing through a territory and the enemy are in front of one's forward troops, the two objectives are separated by one's own forces and a subordinate commander can be tasked with securing the rear. However, if the enemy continue their resistance in your rear, in spite of your advance and particularly if they are operating amongst the people, then the achievement of the two objectives is not separated in spatial terms. Nor is there a separation of the achievement of the objectives in terms of time or activity: the rear cannot be secured without the defeat of the enemy; but the enemy cannot be defeated without a secure rear. In practice, forward and rear as generally understood become useless terms in these circumstances. The objectives and their achievement are superimposed in terms of space, time and activity, and the method of command (the allocation of responsibility, authority, priorities, forces and resources) must have the capability of handling this complexity.

A commander conducting such an operation – a security operation with two superimposed objectives – must hold two ideas firmly in mind as he seeks to defeat his enemy. The first is to ensure the provision of the basic needs of all non-combatants. Note that ensuring the provision of the need is not the same as providing for the need, although in extremis the latter may be necessary. These needs are: food, water, shelter, warmth and access to some level of health care. The more the non-combatants are dependent for these needs on others, such as humanitarian organisations, the more vulnerable they are and the longer it will take to achieve security and stability.

The second is to ensure the security of the individual: the sooner law and order are established the better. This requires a body of law, a police service, the collection of evidential information, courts and all such. Until these are in place and functioning adequately the society and the individuals in it are not secure, and until they are secure the military cannot leave. The main point is this: the military can establish order but it is not a law enforcement agency, particularly in a different state to its own. Nonetheless, it is still incumbent upon the commander to ensure security, unless he is prepared to fail to discharge his duty to the non-combatant on his objective.
“The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy. . . . we must get the people involved as active participants in the success of their communities.”

General SA McChrystal, COMISAF, August 2009

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The Military’s Role in Stabilisation by Andrew Rathmell
SECTION I
ADDRESSING THE DRIVERS OF INSECURITY

The Politics of Conflict in Stabilisation

Of twenty failed states in 2008 almost all were experiencing violent conflict or political violence. At the heart of the political problem lies a contest between the way political power is organised, and who wields that power. A commander will need to convince decisive elites that their interests are best served through an accommodation with the approved political settlement, rather than renewed conflict. Where this is not possible, the use of military force can influence and alter the political dynamics, which may remove the barriers to any accommodation.

Decisive Actors

Everyone present has the potential to influence the course of events in ways which may be positive or negative. The commander will strive to understand the full range of actors; their motivations, aspirations, interests and relationships. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5-00 (2nd Edition) Campaign Planning suggests a generic way of dividing actors into five categories based on their aims, methods and relationships. They are: adversaries, belligerents, neutrals, friendly and spoilers. These generic categories can be tailored to the specific needs of stabilisation in fragile and failed states.

Adversaries. Terms such as insurgents, irregulars, terrorists, jihadists, warlords and criminals are commonly used in stabilisation and counter-insurgency (COIN) literature, and each nation and organisation has different understandings of these terms. Here they are all covered by the term adversary. Adversaries may oppose either the host government or the international forces, or both. Some of them can be actively and violently hostile, while others will be antagonistic. Not all violence will be perpetrated by adversarial groups; in many societies low level violence has long been a characteristic of politics. Equally, many less ardent adversaries will stop short of significant violence against coalition forces or government authorities in their day to day behaviour, but may provide materiel or moral assistance to more hostile elements. Their reasons for providing such support will not necessarily be personal antagonism towards the host government but may, for example, be based on traditional understandings of hospitality and obligation (e.g. Pashtunwali) or coercion, or fear of reprisals. Motivation and commitment will be variable across and within groups, and some adversaries will be irreconcilable. Many may be receptive to concessions, or a path back into the mainstream, in the form of limited or national settlements and confidence building measures. Constant assessment and probing will reveal fault-lines within and between adversarial groups which can be exploited to change the conflict geometry.

Belligerents. Belligerents are primarily hostile to each other. Their motivations, intentions and relationships and may be influenced by historical grievance, self-interest, ideology, religion, or ethnicity. While belligerent hostilities are usually not directed towards UK forces, they contribute to the societal conflict in destabilising ways. Examples include competing tribes and warlords, nationalist groups or religious organisations attempting to influence local or national power structures through the use of violence. In recent operations adversaries have attempted to mobilise belligerent groups by focusing their existing ideological, religious or ethnic tensions towards the international force. An example of this is al-Qaeda’s attempt to mobilise Sunni tribes to oppose coalition forces in Iraq by playing on pre-existing Sunni-Shia tensions, and claiming that coalition forces were supporting a general de-Sunnification of Iraq’s political elite.
Neutral. Neutrality covers those who may stop short of active opposition to the host government at the one end, through passive consent, to those who support it but with reservations at the other. The conflict produces uncertainty for neutral actors with the potential for both risk and reward. Groups in this category will often play a critical role in the campaign, especially if they constitute a large proportion of the population. Historically, the passive acquiescence of neutrals has proven to be vital to the success of an insurgency. This group cannot be expected to support the host nation government until it has clearly shown that it is likely to prevail.

Friendly. Friendly actors broadly support the host nation government and the international force. They may include members of host nation government institutions (including the security forces), dominant groups within the political settlement under contest and, if fortunate, large sections of the population. Building and then maintaining a broad coalition of friendly actors (which may be in competition with one another) is part of the operational art in stabilisation.

Opportunist. Opportunists are referred to as spoilers in JDP 5-00 and some academic works, but this term is more descriptive of their role in stabilisation situations. They exist in all conflict-affected countries. They tend to be highly enterprising and adaptable, making use of the conflict environment to further their interests. In some cases, opportunists have an interest in maintaining the status quo, and may attempt to frustrate progress or to prevent any change harmful to their interests. Examples include arms dealers, pirates and smugglers. Some opportunists may not have a decisive impact on the situation, but criminal gangs operating in organised networks, possibly across national borders (for example, narco-criminals) can have a significant destabilising effect. Criminal opportunists and adversaries will exploit the nexus of interests, sharing lines of communication and exploiting instability for their own ends. For example, in 2008 Afghanistan produced the opium for 90% of the World’s heroin, which in turn funded insurgency and terrorism, and fuelled systemic corruption. Opportunists—a category that includes various smaller elements in the categories cross-classify each other in complex ways. For example, Jaish-al-Mahdi is an armed militia group, but it is part of the Safe Trend which is a political and social movement. Belligerents may be friendly on some issues and hostile on others, adversaries today may be neutral tomorrow (or vice versa). Warlords, for example, may start as belligerents, squabbling amongst themselves, but then be drawn into the conflict and act as adversaries. Additionally, as al-Qaeda is recruiting fighters as young as fourteen, although they may be radicalised individuals, it would be absurd to say that they are all irreconcilable. Any categorisation must balance the need to organise our approach to a problem with building walls to compartmentalise and using labels to describe things, that are in reality porous and ambiguous.

Shifting Allegiances. Assessment based on observed behaviour is useful, but can be misleading. Applying labels such as adversary or irreconcilable is a way to organise our thinking when dealing with a wicked problem. However, they should be used with care. Groups are rarely fixed and bounded entities, and seeing them as such can inhibit the commander’s understanding of social interactions and deprive him of opportunities for influencing key actors. People have many, shifting identities and allegiances, and the categories cross-classify each other in complex ways. For example, Jaish-al-Mahdi is an armed militia group, but is part of the Safe Trend which is a political and social movement. Belligerents may be friendly on some issues and hostile on others, adversaries today may be neutral tomorrow (or vice versa). Warlords, for example, may start as belligerents, squabbling amongst themselves, but then be drawn into the conflict and act as adversaries. Additionally, as al-Qaeda is recruiting fighters as young as fourteen, although they may be radicalised individuals, it would be absurd to say that they are all irreconcilable. Any categorisation must balance the need to organise our approach to a problem with building walls to compartmentalise and using labels to describe things, that are in reality porous and ambiguous.

Tailored Approaches. A well targeted, differentiated, strategy for engaging the various actors can transform the strategic geometry of the conflict. Such a strategy may allow the commander to co-opt once adversarial or belligerent groups into the emerging political settlement. Consequently, efforts should be focussed on:

- Supporting, protecting, empowering and reassuring friendly groups and neutrals; for example, by giving public credit for changes in force posture.
- Persuading, providing incentives or compelling belligerents, opportunists and reconcilable adversaries.
- Marginalising, disempowering and targeting irreconcilable and actively hostile adversaries.

The extensive media coverage of the capture of the oil tanker, the Sirius Star, by Somali pirates in November 2008 precipitated an international naval response. The impact of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean delays cargo, increases the cost of transport (typically ransom sums are $2m per vessel) and the premiums on shipping insurance, with detrimental impact on trade. Global, as well as regional, stability depends upon the freedom to trade and the prosperity it brings.

In the coastal regions of Puntland, from where most of these pirates originate, fortunes being amassed by the few are destabilising an already fragile economy, diverting men of working age into the lucrative piracy business. Much of the money is being used to fund warring factions within Somalia, including international terrorist groups.

Piracy originated when local fishermen attempted to protect their fishing grounds from illegal international exploitation. However, it soon became clear that significantly more gains were to be made by targeting trade rather than illegal fishing vessels. Tapping into a long-standing Somali tradition of the heroic bandit (or shifta), the pirates have become community heroes, a *maritime mafia* upholding local social order while resisting foreign power. Just as *shiftas* flourished in the lawless mountain regions of 19th Century Somalia, so the abject failure of the modern Somali state has led to the explosion of piracy.

Listed as number one on Foreign Policy’s failed states index in 2008, Somalia has suffered fourteen failed governments in two decades. In the absence of a functioning economy or state apparatus, piracy has become a national industry. In 2008 alone pirates extorted US $150 million. These raids have continued unabated for the better part of the last decade. The only time between 1998 and 2008 that piracy was effectively curtailed was the six months of rule by the Islamic Courts Union – a clear indication that piracy in the Gulf of Aden is largely opportunistic, conducted by people benefiting from the failure of Somali state security forces. Experts say there will be no order at sea until there is rule of law in Somalia.²
0512 Where violence is extreme, daily life effectively stops; produce cannot get to market, children cannot attend school and large parts of the population are displaced. People become preoccupied with their immediate needs – food, security, health and survival. When conflict causes people to flee their homes and villages their vulnerability to predators, disease and malnutrition increases, often dramatically.

Protecting the Population

0513 Where the state lacks the capability or will to meet human security needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs, including adversarial groups. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services and a crude form of justice. Winning the contest for human security therefore, is fundamental to the development of host nation government authority and, ultimately security of the state.

Only by living and operating among the people can an outsider gain an understanding of local security needs, and intelligence on the adversary. Embedding in the local security forces and engaging with the population enables personal relationships to be forged, the conduit for the two-way passage of influence. But placing forces amongst the population carries with it a risk of placing them closer to potential threats – a risk that may have to be carried in order to achieve progress.

Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance

0516 Human security may include protection from deprivation and disease as well as protection from violence. Conflicts can generate large scale population movement which, in turn, can trigger a famine or an epidemic. Where development or humanitarian agencies are absent, international forces may need to provide emergency shelter, medical or food aid within the limits of their existing capacity. However, military delivery of aid may further politicise humanitarian assistance and is not always welcome by external agencies. UK forces should only undertake humanitarian assistance in close consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development, or with International Organisations working through these departments.

Developing Secured Areas

0517 As well as isolating the adversary from the population, securing key areas helps to support economic activity, enable major infrastructure projects and encourage effective governance and rule of law. Once the situation allows such areas should be consolidated and expanded. It will be critical to bring the weight of a comprehensive approach to bear at the right time and place; concepts such as secured development zones can provide a focal point by concentrating security, local governance and development effort to be mutually reinforcing. Rapid integration of local government apparatus, including security committees, together with initiatives that generate local employment and economic growth will be critical to maintaining security and stability.
SECTION III
SECURITY FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING

0518 Providing protection for civil society and expanding security and development zones has, historically, involved greater security force levels and has been more difficult than first expected. The number of forces required to carry out security tasks in stabilisation may exceed those needed during conventional combat operations. Force ratios – usually used to describe the relative numbers available to friendly and hostile forces, are rarely instructive in stabilisation. There are hard choices to be made between allocating UK troops for concurrent capacity building and allocating them for operations to isolate and neutralise adversaries, recognising that the demands of these separate tasks require different skills and structures. Ultimately, success will involve recruiting, training, possibly equipping indigenous security forces, and embedding with them. It may also entail the creation of non-standard security structures, such as village or neighbourhood guards and tribal police forces in order to attain the critical mass which population protection demands. Today, when British and other allied nations have fewer forces than in the past, investment in capacity building is ever more important.

0519 In addition to bolstering security force numbers, indigenous forces lower the profile of intervening actors and reinforce the security capacities of the state. In contrast, sectarian or poorly disciplined forces may fuel the conflict. The host nation government may require firm advice, as well as financial support, to sustain the capabilities required. Previous capacity building efforts have floundered due to a lack of sustainability; vehicles have been delivered without the means to maintain them, for example.

0520 Integrating host nation security forces into the campaign also provides a vehicle for on the job training and mentoring. However, care should be taken to ensure that they are not over-faced before they are demonstrably capable. In the early stages of their development, examples of their tactical employment may include:

- Static guarding and border security tasks.
- Patrolling areas that have earlier been secured such as development zones.
- Facilitating local contacts to gain intelligence while working with us to overcome language barriers and develop our cultural understanding.
- Conducting deliberate, limited offensive operations having been set up for success by international forces.
- Protecting host government officials.

0521 It is likely that a range of combined arms functions, such as joint fires, airborne surveillance and combat search and rescue, will be required to underpin the indigenous capability to conduct operations. If local forces do not yet possess these capabilities, then international forces may be required to fill the gap even after indigenous units have achieved combat readiness. A coherent reform programme is likely to include the provision of Monitoring, Mentoring and

Security Force Ratios: Northern Ireland and Afghanistan Compared

In the mid-1970s in Northern Ireland, the total security force strength was 35,000 for a population of 1,539,000, giving a force density of 23 security force personnel per 1000 local population (expressed as 23:1000).

In early 2009 in Helmand, the total security force strength (International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)) was 14,000. This rose to 18,000 by the summer of 2009 with the deployment of an additional US Brigade and further trained ANSF. With a population of ~1,400,000, this gives force density of 10:1000 and 13:1000 respectively.

These figures do not reflect local concentrations of force against specific threats, and of course the nature of these two campaigns is different. Some historical analysis indicates that a ratio of 20:1000 is a viable benchmark, although the validity of this analysis is currently being questioned. In the 2008 operation against the Tamil Tigers, force density were as high as 60:1000.

The absolute requirement for mass may be misleading. Although mass is undoubtedly relevant, metrics of persistency and density may be more helpful. Favourable force capacity can be achieved not only through numbers of international forces, but also by population control measures; raising indigenous or militia forces; the availability of technology such as biometric data; access to intelligence obtained through constant contact with the indigenous population; and attrition of adversaries. This is covered in Chapter 10.
Training Teams (M2T) which is covered in more detail in Annex 11A, as well as the simultaneous delivery of: equipment and infrastructure; operational support through the provision of logistics; and support to financial and managerial systems.

0522 Once an acceptably secure environment is established and public order restored, the commander should consider moving from an international military security lead to an indigenous lead. This will be a political as well as security judgement. There are at least two options: transition from international forces to an indigenous military security lead; or transition direct to a civil (police) lead, i.e. police primacy. In either case, the international community is likely to be asked to assist the host nation government to generate basic policing capacity so that the rule of law can be seen to apply. Developing civil security capacity and police forces is touched on in Chapter 6, Section II. Since the UK has no equivalent of a gendarmerie, military commanders may be drawn into policing and interior security matters. Commanders may need to improvise using military police and other re-roled forces, augmented with any deployable police specialists that are available from contributing nations.

0523 Police primacy should be the ultimate goal as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. It demonstrates the host nation government’s commitment to governing through the rule of law. However, police primacy will often be un-achievable until relatively late in the campaign and may even be an alien concept in some societies. Premature police primacy can be disastrous.

Failure to Prioritise – Afghan National Police

The Afghan National Police (ANP) was the least competent of the government’s forces, with little training or investment. The ANP was not an international priority in the early stages of the insurgency and received significantly less money and attention than the Army. Key problems included the failure to conduct follow-on mentoring and not providing significant institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior. Although the ANP was vital to establishing order in urban and rural areas, it lacked any semblance of a national police infrastructure, with little oversight at provincial or district levels. These deficiencies affected not only the COIN campaign, but also security more broadly.5
The generation and subsequent training of indigenous security forces should be conducted in a coordinated manner with broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives such as the development of civilian oversight bodies, judiciary and detention institutions, as well as transitional justice mechanisms and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. Chapter 6 deals with the military contribution to these broader governance and institutional aspects of SSR, while training indigenous forces is covered in more detail in Chapter 11.

SECTION IV
COUNTERING ADVERSARIES

Direct military action against adversaries may be a central component of a stabilisation campaign. In which case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement will entail breaking the ideological, financial or intimidatory links both within and between different adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as between them and the broader population.

Understanding Adversarial Groups

Developing and maintaining an understanding of the motivations of different adversarial and potentially violent groups allows the commander to tailor his approach to each. It may be that the most effective way of countering some of these groups is to reach an accommodation from a position of strength through formal accords or local bargains. However, there may be a number of actively hostile and irreconcilable adversarial groups, and countering these requires a balanced mix of the use of:
- Force.
- Money.
- Detention.

The Use of Force

International forces should expect to meet resistance; as they mount the challenge to restore security that resistance can be expected to grow. In its most demanding form this could come from committed, irreconcilable and well organised adversaries. Such resistance may set up a fierce contest for the initiative, freedom of movement, authority, the provision of security and the popular support of the local people in areas of symbolic, political, economic and security significance. Campaign progress may dictate the need to prioritise effort in such areas, where the adversary may be at his strongest. A reactive stance may have attractions, but a purely defensive posture risks fixing the force. Failure to wrest the initiative from adversaries who have gained popular support and sapped host nation government authority can undermine the campaign fatally. Offensive air, land, maritime and special operations in a targeted, measured and highly discriminate manner, supported by the full range of comprehensive effects, will be needed. Such operations are likely to be designed to:
- Decapitate adversarial command structures by killing or capturing key leaders.
- Defeat adversarial armed groups where they hold something that has particular operational or political significance.
- Disrupt or destroy adversarial offensive, support, and propaganda capabilities.
- Deny adversarial groups safe havens from where they may launch attacks or challenge legitimate governance.

“In wars among the people, if you are using a lot of firepower, you are almost certainly losing”.

General Sir David Richards (Geneva, September 2008)

Offensive operations should minimise civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. If not, they risk undermining the broader influence campaign. An operation that kills five low-level adversaries is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more. Sometimes the more force used, the less effective it is. The dilemma is that adversaries will often choose to fight amongst the people for just this reason.

There is a risk that operations to secure an area simply displace an adversary to a new safe haven beyond the commander’s control. If this happens, they can regroup, possibly gaining strength, and strike where the host government and international forces and agencies are less able to respond. An alternative may be to isolate adversarial groups, seek to gain information and disrupt their activities. In some circumstances it may be better not to strike but to gather intelligence for later decisive actions, including accommodation.
The Use of Money

“Some of the best weapons for counter-insurgents do not shoot”
Sarah Sewall

0530 In the battle to influence decisive actors, the judicious use of money can help persuade both individuals and groups to accept the authority and legitimacy of the host government. Like lethal weapons, money can have either lasting or transitory effects. Additionally as with lethal weapons, there are risks associated with its use. However, money may both enable and magnify the delivery of immediate security effects, which may not have been achieved through the use of force alone. It can be a substitute for force. In particular, money can be used for direct security programmes such as the funding of indigenous forces, or indirect consent-winning initiatives such as the settling of specific grievances before they become sources of dissatisfaction and resentment. The controls placed upon its use by accounting procedures should reflect the requirement for agility and risk, as with all Rules of Engagement. Existing targeting mechanisms can be easily adapted to make them more comprehensive in composition.

0531 Examples of the use of money for security effect include:
• Recruiting non-standard security forces on short or long-term contracts.
• Remunerating a militia or funding weapons buy-back under DDR.
• Compensating civilians for disruption, inconvenience or loss brought about as a result of military activity in the area.
• Short-term job creation.
• Counter-narcotics alternative livelihood programmes.
• Offering rewards for the capture of prominent insurgents.
• The provision of temporary accommodation for key leader meetings.

0532 Operational experience has shown that the use of money to fund consent-winning activities can make a significant contribution to security effect. For example, the secondary effect of quick impact projects as part of a development programme can be improved security. However, under current UK funding rules, such projects need to be linked to longer-term development. The commander will wish to access the widest possible source of funds: see Chapter 7, Section II.

The Use of Detention

0533 Arrest, detention, trial and imprisonment will ideally be conducted by the host nation judicial system. International military forces will wish to employ such civil mechanisms wherever possible. However, as will often be the case, when the host nation government lacks an effective police force, an independent judiciary, or a penal system with the capacity or resolve to be effective, it may be necessary for the UK to conduct military detention operations. A well-coordinated screening and interrogation mechanism can have the added bonus of providing a valuable source of actionable intelligence and a direct channel to the adversary. This, in turn, enables more precise targeting and stimulates the perception of progress, restraint and legitimacy. However, there are risks associated with detention operations. The factors affecting the execution of detention operations are described in detail in Chapter 11, Section III.
Effective detention operations must identify the motivations of those held and provide incentives that weaken the links within the adversarial network. In this way, the reconcilable can be separated from the irreconcilable.

Those detained must be brought swiftly under due legal process to bolster perceptions of normality and the rule of law. This underscores the need for the collection and proper handling of evidence to ensure that individuals can be successfully dealt with by appropriate courts.

Transfer of Detainees in Afghanistan

A Memorandum of Understanding (agreed in April 2006) between the UK Government and the Government of Afghanistan notes the 'need to respect basic standards of international human rights law such as the right to life, and the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment'.

It outlines the responsibility of UK Armed Forces to transfer detainees to Afghan authorities and the obligations of the Afghan authorities to treat individuals in accordance with its international human rights obligations, allow access to detainees by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, UK Personnel, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and relevant UN human rights institutions. It also outlines record keeping and use of the death penalty.

British forces or Embassy staff routinely visit detainees transferred from British forces’ custody. Any allegation of mistreatment, if received, is thoroughly investigated. Simultaneously, the UK has provided funding for the renovation and rebuilding of National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Ministry of Justice detention facilities; provides training for NDS Prison Officers; and funds a Rule of Law capacity building project in Helmand province.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN STABILISATION

BY ANDREW RATHMELL

Dr Andrew Rathmell, a director of Libra Advisory Group, has served as Deputy Director of Strategy at the FCO, Senior Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, and Head of Plans for the Coalition Provisional Authority. He has published numerous reports on stabilisation, security sector reform as well as regional and national security issues.

What is the military for?
This is a question that challenges today’s military professionals even more than it did their predecessors who led the transition from a Cold War force to the messy world of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention of the 1990s. Serving readers of this doctrine will have to answer this question for themselves. Some may fear that the ambitious agenda laid out here – of stabilisation, counter-insurgency, state-building and peace-building – once again asks military commanders to take on too much. Is it really right that commanders can be asked to, perhaps simultaneously, deliver high-intensity kinetic campaigns against insurgents, engage in subtle tribal diplomacy, rebuild civilian ministries and manage agricultural development programmes to wean poppy farmers away from narco-traffickers?

In practice, military commanders have shown incredible flexibility in turning their hands to these tasks, and more, in recent stabilisation missions. Perhaps, it’s not fair that military personnel – whose core raison d’être is to act as society’s specialists in the application of organised violence for political ends – have had to learn to paint on a far broader canvas. And it’s far from ideal that soldiers, sailors and airmen, often with no preparation, have had to become development workers, police officers, or city councillors. But this demand is likely to persist. The UK’s civilian agencies, and our international partners, will make progress in the coming years in recruiting and deploying qualified civilian experts to plan, manage and implement the non-military aspects of stabilisation. But the military’s natural advantages – its organisation, discipline, mobility, force protection and appetite for risk – means that the next generation of military commanders will continue to have to take leading roles in designing and managing stabilisation.

If we are to get this right and to avoid, yet again, relearning hard lessons on the job, often at the cost of lives, then readers need to take the hard-won lessons in this doctrine to heart. And, while the primary audience of this doctrine is the military readership, in the absence of comparable civilian doctrine, civilian readers need to adopt much of the advice provided in this publication.

There are perhaps four guidelines that are a good starting point for the operational commander tasked with preparing himself for a stabilisation task:

- Accept ambiguity and embrace uncertainty by building a learning organisation. Direction from the political and military chain of command is likely to be unsatisfactory, lack clarity and be subject to change, especially when operating in a multilateral mission. At the same time, circumstances may change rapidly on the ground. The only response to this environment is to build a flexible, responsive and self-critical culture into your force.

- Encourage criticism, lessons learning, and initiative at all levels. Have the moral courage to challenge the objectives set by the chain of command and by London, which does not always know best.

- Tap into expertise. There is lots of expertise available out there, but it is likely that little of it will be on tap in your units or within normal government channels. Be imaginative in how you tap and deploy this expertise.

- Be robust but accountable. Some local actors will pursue their own interests and will clearly be enemies and spoilers, others may appear as your friends. Focus on bringing even violent extremists into the political process wherever possible but stand up early on and robustly to those who want to intimidate us and the populace.

Crucially, however, ensure that you insist on accountability. Local populations will often respect a firm hand but you’ll create enemies if you don’t enforce the highest standards of accountability and behaviour by your forces.

- Stay longer – and return. Local knowledge, credibility and relationships are central to this game. Do what you can to ensure that you and your staffs extend your tours in theatre, continue working on the issues when back home, and look for opportunities to redeploy multiple times so that you can really get under the skin of the environment.
This chapter describes the military contribution to governance capacity building and the wider non-military components of security and justice sector reform. It describes anti-corruption measures and the challenges of developing police capability. The ability to govern, and to be seen to govern, fairly and consistently becomes a precondition of long-term stability. Regardless of the success of an intervention, international actors will be unable to compensate for a government which does not undertake necessary reform. Success depends on the host nation government.

0602 Improved governance helps to reduce grievances and marginalise adversarial groups, intent on portraying the state as ineffective and corrupt. Conversely, where governance is authoritarian, exclusionary or corrupt, it fosters conflict and undermines the legitimacy of the state. This is often the case where a dominant ethnic, religious or sectarian group dominates an unrepresentative government. Stability results from both a political settlement, and an effective, representative government.

0603 Support to governance has two dimensions, fostering the processes that underpin a political settlement (elite consolidation) and enhancing the state’s ability to function (capacity building). The former attempts to allocate power amongst competing elites in order to resolve the conflict. The latter is about generating sufficient institutional capacity for the state to fulfil its survival functions and meet at least some of the expectations of the population. A balance must be struck between these two imperatives. For example, it is common for governments to use public appointments to cement alliances and reduce opposition. Political settlements may depend upon a degree of patronage which undermines broader institution building initiatives in the short term.

0604 A realistic immediate aim would be to support steps toward good enough governance without undermining parallel processes of elite consolidation. While good governance may be characterised by inclusivity, accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity, legality and decency, good enough governance could be defined as the ability of the host government to balance the priorities of powerful elites with basic security, administrative and service delivery tasks on a sustained basis. Accordingly, good enough governance is likely to be relationship and personality based, and only later extend to large-scale institution building.
SECTION I
ADDRESSING CRITICAL GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS

Determining the Military Contribution to Governance

Determining the military contribution to governance will require an understanding of what constitutes good enough governance in context. Local security levels will affect the capacity of international forces to contribute to wider governance. Given limited resources of time, money, troops and organisational capacities, prioritisation of those tasks that may fall to the military will be essential. Where possible, governance activities should be implemented by international civilian agencies and enabled, only where necessary, by the military.

In non-permissive environments civilian access will be limited. However, security is usually conditional on a degree of popular consent and this, in turn, may be conditional on the restoration of basic governance. Accordingly, military forces may be drawn into those governance areas essential for early progress. Military substitution for absent civilian actors should be temporary. Civilian expertise must be integrated into planning through reachout, or by in-theatre governance advisers.

Occupation. International forces may be designated as an occupying power. Occupation exists whenever an area is placed under the authority of external military forces. This will occur after a conflict in which an enemy has been defeated (known as belligerent occupation) or may occur where international forces are deployed to restore law and order in the absence of a formal treaty or agreement with that state. The latter, however, is likely to be as a result of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) or other legal mandate, and thus may not amount to occupation in legal terms. Occupation establishes a legal relationship between international forces and the civilian population, involving rights and responsibilities on both sides, such as the protection of the population and the administration of the territory. Here, military substitution for absent civilian governance actors is both an operational necessity and a legal obligation.

Protection of Civilians. Where a host nation government is unable to provide security, international forces may be required to fulfil this basic state function. Military forces should expect to be drawn into policing as well as military security tasks.

Restoration of Essential Services. Local services, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter and medical care, contribute to human security. The military contribution may be optimised in supporting local and international humanitarian and development organisations to expand their access to the population. Where these agencies cannot operate, the military contribution could include:

- Restoration of potable water supply and sanitation – while respecting local customs (for example, Afghan women may have the opportunity to socialise outside their homes only at the local well).
- Enabling the supply of power and fuel to homes.
- Assisting local authorities to reopen markets.
- Restoration of local hospitals, schools and clinics.

Governance Tasks

Local confidence is likely to be enhanced by demonstrable participation of host nation authorities. International forces should work through government agencies to generate local capacity and influence. We must be prepared to become involved in tasks for which we have to carry out much of the planning and delivery, but for which ultimate responsibility lies with local authorities. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are examples of integrated civil-military structures that enable governance and reconstruction activity to be coordinated where the security situation prevents civilians from working freely. These are described in greater detail at Chapter 7, Section I. The following paragraphs describe examples of tasks in which military forces may find themselves engaged.
The military should only lead on civilian health provision for as short a time as possible, until the appropriate civilian authority can take over. The general rule should be to support whoever is the appropriate lead: the government if it exists, even if its capability is currently small. If there is no effective government then a lead agency will provide health coordination temporarily. In most cases that will probably be the World Health Organization but it could be another UN agency such as UNICEF, or even a medical Non-governmental Organisation (NGO).

- Identifying the specific health needs of the local population.
- Optimising all local NGO and military agencies for health provision.
- The disproportionate influence that simple medical interventions can bring in developing countries.
- Providing leadership and coordination to what may be a chaotic NGO and Other Government Department (OGD) mix.
- Recognising that security and health can combine to reinforce stability.
- Cultural sensitivity; western medicine may not be ideal and patient-centred cultural sensitivity should guide your response.
- Maintaining the local health economy and foster confidence in local healthcare providers.
- Ensuring consistency with the national health policies and sustainability at the local level. It should not endanger other civilian healthcare providers.
- Helping the local population to help itself. Better health leads to people better able to be economically, politically and socially productive.
- Training healthcare workers to raise local health education.
- Veterinary health - it can significantly increase local wealth.
0611 **Engagement and Conflict Resolution.** Societal conflicts are rarely resolved quickly or decisively; negotiated settlements are usually necessary locally and nationally. International forces are likely to be involved in negotiations that assist communities to connect with the government. Typical tasks may include:

- Providing a secure environment for negotiations.
- Direct and regular engagement with key elites and government authorities.
- Settling disputes, for example over land and property seizure.
- Public outreach and information programmes.
- Enforcing ceasefires and support to transitional justice arrangements.

0612 **Supporting Elections.** Fair and secure elections are good indicators of stability. However, if elections are conducted too early they may provoke an increase in violence. The commander should assess their likely impact on security and advise host nation government and international agencies accordingly. Considerations include:

- How local elites, government authorities and International Organisations are perceived locally and nationally will impact the plan for delivering an election.
- The election should be implemented by the host nation government where possible.
- International authorities may be required to deliver the election where local authorities generate feelings of intimidation and insecurity.

0613 **Anti-Corruption.** Corruption undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a minority and can be used by elites to protect their positions and interests. It affords adversaries propaganda opportunities and contributes to wider crime and instability. Yet there is no absolute test of corruption; practices that are acceptable in some societies are considered corrupt in others. Some, however, such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion are universally considered corrupt. Others, such as nepotism, patronage or preferred client systems are less clear; local customs should guide the assessment.

0614 **Grand and Petty Corruption.** It may help to distinguish between grand and petty corruption. Grand
corruption is at the highest levels of government and erodes confidence in the rule of law. Petty corruption involves the exchange of small amounts of money or the granting of minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment. The critical difference is that grand corruption distorts the central functions of the state whereas the impact of petty corruption is at a lower level, where people interact with agents of the state. Although it may be within local norms, petty corruption can affect the local economy and security, and thereby the legitimacy of the state. It may be rife in the host nation police forces.

Anti-corruption measures are likely to directly affect those elites on which a political settlement depends – they will resist. Anti-corruption measures may need to be tempered so that they do not undermine local accommodations. Once anti-corruption initiatives are in place, international forces may need to support:

- Integrated coalition efforts to eradicate grand corruption.
- Enforcing codes of conduct for indigenous security forces and civil servants.
- Training in ethics and standards of conduct for security forces.
- Monitoring deployed security forces to prevent opportunistic extortion.
- Audit, prosecutorial and judicial support.
- Tracking the movement of aid such as food, clothing, and weapons.
- Overseeing contract management procedures, for example, in dispersing reconstruction funds with local companies.
- Ensuring security forces are properly paid and the funds accounted for.
- Whistleblower protection schemes.

These measures may assist international forces to develop accountable indigenous forces that accept the need to operate in a non-predatory and transparent manner. We should expect resistance to the notion of public accountability at first. Ultimately, if grand corruption threatens campaign progress, then international partners may need to make their support conditional upon host government reform.

Coalition governance efforts should build on the foundations of existing capacity, however informal or insubstantial. The trick is to join local, functioning centres of power to the national authority of the indigenous government. In Afghanistan the local goal is frequently to reinvigorate the lapsed power of the Malik (the government’s representative) and the Khan (the tribal leader) to balance that of the Mullah (the religious authority), thereby creating an informal system of governance – one that is imperfect, and does not deserve the term architecture – but that connects the dots between central and local authorities. This is an example of working with the grain of local life, in this instance, Pashtunwali. By building on existing structures, the expansion of governance is more likely to succeed than a system imposed by outsiders.

Perceptions of Corruption and Justice in Afghanistan

Corruption by state officials can cause the local population to turn back to the very people the government is seeking to isolate them from:

“In Helmand Province a cadre of four Taliban judges travel the countryside deciding cases referred to them by village elders. In the way they work they are rather reminiscent of the medieval English circuit courts and they have established a reputation for fair and quick justice. A recent, well publicised, case took place in Germsir where the formal state court had sentenced a murderer to six months imprisonment. The shortness of the sentence, for a crime which would usually attract the death penalty, was said to have been explained by the fact that the murderer’s family had bribed the judge. Not satisfied with the state judicial process, the victim’s family referred the case to the Taliban who re-arrested the murderer on his release from Lashkar Gah prison. The Taliban heard the case again, found him guilty, and presented him to the victim’s family who subsequently killed him.

This kind of justice is common in Helmand where the Taliban are keen to portray the government as ineffectual and chronically corrupt.”

Where local institutions are absent or ineffective, then alternative forms of non-state authorities are likely to fill the vacuum. These may derive their status from a mix of coercion and local incentives. If this has occurred, there may be no choice but to create new authorities from scratch. Local knowledge and an assessment about those locals who wield influence will be critical in determining what is likely to work and what will not. But new institution building initiatives could make matters worse by eroding the local, informal capacity, in which case strengthening local forms of governance may be a better option. However, where local authorities are criminal or insurgent-based, there may be no choice.

SECTION II
REFORMING THE SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTORS

“The risk of conflict is heightened when security forces are not subject to proper discipline or civilian control ... properly constituted and reformed security forces can act as a force for good ... helping to reduce instability and contributing to a reduction in human suffering”

DFID, FCO and MOD SSR Policy Brief, November 2003

Accessible Security and Justice

The security and justice sectors deliver a fundamental function of government and are the cornerstone of state sovereignty. They comprise those institutions responsible for national security, and safety and justice for the population – this is far more than the security forces. In addition to military forces, intelligence services, militia and police, the security sector includes judicial and penal systems, oversight bodies, the Executive, parliamentary committees, government ministries, legislative frameworks, customary or traditional authorities, financial and regulatory bodies.

When functioning effectively the security and justice sectors contribute to a generally safe environment for the population. These sectors also contribute to wider regional security, for example through effective coastal and border protection.

Societal conflicts create ideal conditions for the proliferation of predatory armed groups, criminal networks and an increase in opportunistic crime. For many, conflict and criminal activity becomes their livelihood. In turn, the population’s experience of state security forces can be extremely negative: security forces may perpetrate human rights abuses; judicial systems may be weak, corrupt or dominated by sectarian interests; and prisoners be held in inhumane conditions.

Those opposing the government will prey on perceptions of injustice by depicting the state as ineffectual and corrupt, and international forces culpable by association. It is, therefore, essential to show progress towards a security sector that is effective, legitimate, transparent, just and subject to the rule of law.
Challenges to Reform

Ideal preconditions for reform will rarely exist because justice and security underpin a country’s balance of power and, in some circumstances, the fragile political settlement from which a government’s authority is derived. Attempts at reform may challenge vested interests and upset existing power relationships. Therefore, reform is primarily a political undertaking and not simply a technical activity.

The Political Implications of Security Sector Reform: de-Ba’athification

On 22 May 2003, the same day the UNSC approved Resolution 1483 recognising the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as the temporary governing authority in Iraq, the CPA issued Order Number 1 eliminating all Ba’ath Party structures and banning senior party members from service within Iraq’s public sector. The order, which became known as de-Ba’athification required the immediate dismissal of all in the top three layers of management within the Iraqi government if he or she had been a full member of the Ba’ath Party. Because the vast majority of senior leaders in Saddam’s regime were Ba’ath party members, the order effectively fired most senior leaders in the Iraqi government. Lieutenant General Sanchez, Commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq later said “the impact of this de-Ba’athification order was devastating … Essentially, it eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation. Organisations involving justice, defense, interior, communications, schools, universities and hospitals were all either completely shut down or severely crippled, because anybody with any experience was now out of a job.”

One week after issuing the de-Bathification order the CPA issued Order Number 2, entitled Dissolution of Entities, which abolished virtually the entire Iraqi security sector including the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Information, Ministry of State for Military Affairs, Iraqi Intelligence Service, National Security Bureau, Directorate of National Security and Special Security Organisation. The order put some 500,000 men, with guns in their hands, immediately out of work, many without any compensation.

The impact of these orders was immediate. Sunnis tended to equate the orders with a general de-Sunnification of the government. In Mosul, where the then Major General Petraeus was commanding the 101st Airborne Division, disbanded military members demonstrated for several days before sparking a riot in which 18 US soldiers were wounded. Petraeus later said that the order sparked anti-coalition sentiment amongst the Sunni which fuelled the nascent insurgency in Iraq creating tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of additional enemies.
Determining the Military Contribution to Reform

0624 Opportunities to drive through change may result from the negotiations leading to a political settlement; for example, on the back of initiatives to demilitarise society, as clauses within formal peace agreements, as conditions attached to foreign aid, or following elections. The UK contribution is likely to be determined by a team drawn from the MOD, DFID, FCO and the Home Office, and may range from providing temporary training teams to rebuilding whole areas of defence and national security.

0625 If possible, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) analysis to establish the scope of the reform programme – and by implication the military contribution – would result from a full assessment involving both the host nation government and international partners. It would include:

- The priorities of other nations involved in the provision of equipment, training and infrastructure.
- An estimate of the pace and cost of reform.
- Agreement with the host nation government regarding the size, shape, role, governance arrangements and priorities for its security and justice sectors.
- Agreement on the broad structures of the security and justice sectors and their impact on society.

0626 Alternatively, the commander may need to conduct a pre-assessment in the absence of indigenous and international civilian agencies, based on assumptions. A full assessment should follow as soon as possible. The assumptions may include:

- The likely role, size and budget of the military and police forces, judiciary and penal systems.
- Priorities for early capacity building (for example, whether the army or police take priority) and within this, what security capabilities are needed first, and at what scale, to support his campaign.
- The need for immediate disarmament, as a security imperative, ahead of any full Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme.

Specific Military Tasks

0627 Likely military tasks include the demilitarisation of society; reform of the defence ministry, and the initial generation and subsequent development of the armed forces. However, the military contribution may expand to include the initial development of indigenous policing and support to the promotion of judicial and law enforcement institutions. A detailed consideration of the issues that could arise when working with indigenous forces is provided in Chapter 11, but a few of the key areas are outlined below.

0628 Initial Generation of Indigenous Forces. In some instances the commander may need to rely on non-state security forces to support his campaign. Parallel development of basic support structures for indigenous forces is essential.

In Dhofar, the use of Firqats (local units formed by surrendered enemy personnel taking up arms against their former colleagues), directly supported by coalition specialist forces, proved critical to campaign success.

0629 Management of Indigenous Forces. The operational capability of local forces is likely to reflect the quality of basic administration; pay, feeding and equipment husbandry. International training teams should establish the fundamentals of effective administration parallel to operational training, unless the commander has consciously decided to resource these functions as part of his operational design.

0630 Education. A programme of education will help to ensure that both the population and their new security forces understand their role and responsibilities. The programme should emphasise a culture of service to the people and an understanding of the relationship between the armed forces and the state.

0631 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Significant armed groups, or a disproportionately large military, are likely to impact security. While some of these groups could be put to work on behalf of the state to generate mass and bolster local security, other groups will require inclusion in an arms management programme and their members re-trained and reintegrated back into civil society. DDR usually forms part of wider post-conflict restoration processes. Its aim is to ensure that combatants, and their weapons, are taken out of the conflict and provided with a transition package so that they do not seek to return to arms again. As such, DDR is not just a technical military activity, but a political process with economic and social consequences:

- Disarmament initiatives may encourage a local arms trade.
- Early disarming may leave a security vacuum which may be filled by younger, new combatants. It may change factional security balances, setting conditions for reprisals.
- Ex-combatants who are detained in encampments can create unrest. Funded re-integration programmes (such as jobs and skills training) may be required to prevent militia leaders from re-forming their groups.
While DFID and the UN may offer DDR expertise, there is no universal model. Each situation is unique. International actors must adopt a consistent approach and provide the means to monitor and evaluate progress.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – Two Successful Examples**

In Southern Sudan there were many semi-autonomous clan militias. Rather than alienate these militias and flood the region with unemployed ex-combatants, the Southern Sudanese Parliament decided to absorb the clans into the national army, corrections system and wildlife enforcement. This deliberately expanded an already bloated army. The government then initiated a programme of force reduction over the next six years across the whole security sector, rather than any specific clan.

In Sierra Leone, a similar programme was initiated following the cessation of hostilities. The new army integrated 2600 former members of rebel and militia groups before implementing a significant force reduction programme. Downsizing to an affordable and sustainable force was done predominantly through retirement, including senior officers, using severance payments largely funded by the UK.

**Police Primacy in Maysan**

In the summer of 2005 UK forces transitioned responsibility for security of urban areas to the Iraqi police while the British Army concentrated on patrolling the Iranian border with the aim of interdicting the movement of weapons and foreign fighters. However, with sharply divided loyalties, serious corruption and a security force density of about 3 per 1000 head of population, the Iraqi police were incapable of maintaining civil order. Given the existence of a highly politicised and violent population, the decision to transition can now be seen as premature, and was undoubtedly a factor in the burgeoning growth of the Mahdi Army and, by implication, Iranian influence.

**Invest in Quality**

The development of the Malayan Armed Forces had to reflect the needs of the post-emergency, independent state. This included identifying high quality individuals and giving them extra training to make them more effective. As one example, the best senior members of the Malay Police Force were selected for expert training to become Special Branch (Counter Terrorism) officers. The improved campaign intelligence provided by this cadre, through their local contacts and knowledge, provided the lead for wider professional improvement across the Force.

**Developing Indigenous Police Services**

The responsibility for on-going internal security should ideally be provided by a demilitarised police force with a mandate for law enforcement and strong links to the judiciary. Ideally, this sees the creation of a community-based police service, with a clear separation between the roles of the police and the military. However, while police primacy for internal security remains an aspiration, community policing models assume consent which is unlikely to be achievable in the midst of violent conflict. The policing model must be realistic.
Restoration of Judicial Institutions. In many developing states, the primary sources of justice are traditional ones. These include tribal elders, religious authorities and informal local courts administering long-held rules and customs. During the initial stages of a campaign, military forces may be involved in the identification of local key leaders and any informal justice mechanisms to incorporate them into the reform process. International forces may also be required to begin the refurbishment or reconstruction of facilities, possibly including court houses and prisons.

Border Forces. Effective border control is essential to combat regional criminality and the movement of foreign fighters. Additionally, in the absence of significant natural resources, customs and immigration duties are often a major source of government revenue. International forces may be tasked to patrol borders and mentor customs, immigration and border control agencies.

Intelligence and Security Services. Intelligence and Security Services (ISS) are normally located within central government reporting directly to senior decision-makers. In conflict-affected countries, ISS are routinely misused, often acting as a repressive arm of the state. It is common for there to be a proliferation of ISS, serving different power blocs within government and the security forces. In addition, there may be rivalry between the ISS and the armed forces. The commander should track local ISS activities; those factors that will lead to a lack of transparency and the extent of any inter-service rivalries.

Enduring Partnership. Following successful transfer of security responsibility to host nation authority, UK may offer a Security Sector Development and Advisory Team, and continuity training support in UK. As with prevent activity, these soft power strategies can be highly effective, but in the interests of brevity are not covered in this Joint Doctrine Publication.
A GOVERNANCE AND STATE-BUILDING PERSPECTIVE
BY CLARE LOCKHART

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‘The Character and Context of Failed States and the Impact of Military Intervention; Maximising the Positives and Minimising the Negatives’.

A stable, sovereign state requires legitimacy, won and sustained by the trust of its own citizens in return for fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of those citizens, and through responsible international behaviour according to agreed rules. A large number of states are now failing to meet this double compact to their citizens and neighbours, representing a significant threat to global security. The ultimate aim of international engagement in these contexts must be a coherent and integrated process of state-building, through which international and national actors seek to enhance state legitimacy and functionality over a long-term timeframe. It is only through such a process of co-production that a vicious cycle of destructive politics can be transformed into peace and constructive change.

The counter-insurgency (COIN) literature, from Galula and Thompson, to the recent U.S. COIN manual emphasises that the use of force must be part of a process of movement towards political objectives, as part of a coherent multi-dimensional effort. A state-building approach, which creates support from the population for positive change through a reframing of the relations between state, market and citizen, must be central. It is often illegitimate leadership, abuse of power and misuse of resources that results in alienation of segments of the population. Efforts to expand networks of rights and obligations give citizens a stake in the system, rather than outside it, and create widening spheres of opportunities to underpin peace and stability.

Stabilisation doctrine must provide a clear roadmap for soldiers to understand the tasks they should be performing, across what timeframes and in what ways, with what resources, and in concert with which other actors. These are not easy challenges, nor are there generalisable answers – indeed, a failure to date has been the propensity of international actors to use off-the-shelf solutions. Furthermore, while understanding of these issues has now evolved at the strategic level, the international community often lacks the tools at the operational level to translate thinking into practice. That said, analysis of British experience from a range of contexts indicates a number of useful lessons.

First, in stabilisation it must be recognised that state functions are interdependent, and that security is only one aspect of state functionality across the spectrum of tasks a national government must perform. This does not mean that British troops should perform more tasks across a wider variety...
of sectors; rather, they should understand that developing security forces also requires understanding the spectrum of functions that underpin and complement those services, including a judiciary system, a legal framework, a public finance system and health and education services. All functions cannot be performed simultaneously: the issue is rather to determine which functions are appropriate to context, at what level of governance (from village to capital) they should be performed, and how their performance should be prioritised and sequenced over time. They must be able to design an appropriate response to the problems, understanding which tasks they, and which others, will be responsible for, and which tools different actors bring to the table. Lastly, they must have the ability to be able to supervise tasks which they are directly responsible for.

As the goal of stabilisation is ultimately to return the control of the territory to a legitimate government, stabilisation should be carried out in such a way as to create and empower legitimate national actors wherever possible, rather than substitute for those actors. While it is understood that the skills base can often be low in fragile contexts, it is critical to build capacity within national institutions to ensure that stability becomes sustainable. This requires a long-term approach – state-building is a 10 to 20 year endeavour at a minimum – with a comprehensive mapping of assets at the outset, and with clear timelines and benchmarks for the handover of responsibilities to the national government. All local actors are not necessarily legitimate in the eyes of the population, and so care must be taken not to empower illegitimate actors, without bringing them within a framework of rule of law and accountability for use of power.

Finally, stabilisation should recognise that in the past, aid has not always been appropriately designed for context, and that mere spending of money on thousands of uncoordinated, unsustainable small projects will not win the population or create stability in the longer term. Learning is currently taking place among development actors on how to improve their behaviour and instruments, including through use of trust funds, programmatic instruments and private sector financing tools. National Programs which allow a government to mobilise the relevant forces – government, the private sector and civil society – to execute critical tasks across state territory can be a key component of stabilisation processes. In Afghanistan between 2001-2005, for example, a National Programme for the Afghan National Army ensured an institutional foundation within a law and order framework, with fair and transparent recruitment processes, and the National Solidarity Programme transferred decision-rights over funding to locally elected bodies which could then identify reconstruction and development priorities. Support for this type of programming can enhance stabilisation in such contexts. Ultimately, the key instrument of change and accountability is the national budget process, and thus the key counterparts are not western aid agencies, but national representatives of government, civil society, business and media.

As the result of past experience and forward-thinking, the UK has been better than most at developing and implementing stabilisation processes in difficult contexts. The confidence that a British military presence can generate, both within the countries in question, and among the larger international community, is significant. This does not mean, however, that our efforts have always been appropriate or successful, and it is critical that our thinking evolves as quickly as the threats and issues that our soldiers face in the field. This means a movement towards long-term, coherent, people-centred approaches, with a clear division of labour with other stakeholders. It also necessitates support for nascent state institutions and capacity building wherever possible, and a holistic, programmatic approach that marshals the relevant resources and actors behind national, partner-country objectives. It is only through thinking of this type that the UK will be able to withdraw its troops from these places and leave behind sustainable state institutions that provide for security and stability, which should be the ultimate objective at the outset.
CHAPTER 7
ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Section I
Addressing Critical Development Needs
Determining the Military Contribution to Development
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Stabilising the Economy
Reconstructing Enabling Infrastructure
Generating Employment
Addressing the Economic Drivers of Conflict

Section II
Quick Impact Projects
Overview
Categorising Quick Impact Projects
Accessing Funding for Quick Impact Projects
Guidelines for the Effective Use of Quick Impact Projects

Peace Building and State Building - the Department for International Development Approach by Joelle Jenny

0701 This Chapter discusses the military contribution to economic and infrastructure development. Poverty can be both a cause and effect of conflict, and should be addressed as part of a comprehensive approach to stabilisation. While aid relieves poverty in the short term, only sustained economic growth can reduce it in the long term. However, standard economic interventions designed to address familiar development problems are often inappropriate in conflict-affected societies. In these circumstances, effective programmes require an understanding of how economies change during conflict and how targeted economic and infrastructure development initiatives can prise open possibilities for political settlements and vice versa. For example, improvements in employment prospects not only help raise people out of poverty but may support an emerging political settlement by bolstering support for host government authorities while reducing the pool of frustrated under-employed young men and women from which adversaries can readily recruit.

0702 Research of some African states suggests that for every year [a state is] in decline, it will take at least one year in recovery. This ratio can easily be greater as states can sometimes lose 7% to 8% of their total economic product in a year of conflict. Achieving this level of growth is difficult at the best of times. Key areas for development to enable reform include: property rights; policy predictability; legal and admin reform; trade facilitation; and financial services, tax policy and risk ratings. Campaign planners might usefully check that development initiatives address these issues. However, they are not easily resolved and it should be clear that the process of economic and infrastructure development is likely to be a long one, and wholly dependent on civilian agencies.

0703 Growth requires a stable and secure environment. In helping to deliver this environment, the military will always have a significant, if indirect, contribution to make. There may also be times when more direct military involvement in economic development will be necessary; for example, when conditions restrict civilian movement or when civilian agencies have not yet arrived on the ground. Although security and governance reform remain priorities, early attention to economic growth increases the likelihood of success. Accordingly, while economic measures and reconstruction are not the panacea for stability, they should constitute a significant component of the solution. Priorities for international agencies and forces includes measures designed to stabilise the economy, protect and reconstruct critical economic infrastructure, generate employment and address any underlying economic drivers of conflict.

1. Jeffrey Herbst, Confronting Fragile and Failed States in Africa, RUSI Whitehall Report 2-08
2. Mauro De Lorenzo, Why Entrepreneurship and Business Climate Reform Should Be the Centrepiece of Peace-Building Operations
Shaping a stable world: The Military contribution (JDP 05) published by DCDC in March 2016

This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

SECTION I

ADDRESSING CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

Determining the Military Contribution to Development

There are fundamental differences in both approach and timeframe between stabilisation and development:

- Development activity focuses on poverty reduction and addressing the drivers of poverty over the longer term.
- Stabilisation focuses on violence reduction, while addressing the drivers of conflict; it has greater immediacy and visibility in the short term.

Conflict is a significant driver of poverty and vice versa. Consequently, UK forces will often find themselves working in theatre alongside, supporting or being supported by targeted development programmes. The key UK partner in the delivery of in-theatre development assistance is likely to be DFID. The commander should therefore understand the drivers underlying the DFID approach to enable effective cooperation.

DFID is responsible for managing the British Government’s aid to developing countries and supports longer term programmes to help tackle the causes of poverty, such as conflict and state fragility. Its work forms part of a global partnership to support progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals and its overseas development assistance budget which constitutes most of DFIDs funding, is required by law to comply with the International Development Act (2002). This stipulates that no funds may be spent on assistance which fails to contribute to the overall goal of reducing poverty.

The UN Millennium Development Goals

- Halve the number of people living in extreme poverty and hunger.
- Ensure that all children receive primary education.
- Promote sexual equality and give women a stronger voice.
- Reduce child death rates.
- Improve the health of mothers.
- Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
- Make sure the environment is protected.
- Build a global partnership for those working in development.

At the strategic level, cooperation between DFID and the military may involve joint assessments and the development of shared objectives. At the operational level it will require cooperative implementation planning or pre-deployment training. At the tactical level it could involve the secondment of DFID development advisers into deployed military headquarters or the military execution of DFID-funded projects.

In addition to DFID, there could be an array of development organisations represented in theatre, all with highly individual aims and objectives. The commander will need to build relationships with the more significant of these organisations. He should assess the potential effects these projects could have on stability within the region, as well as the potential effects of his own security operations on current or planned development projects. The commander should seek to synchronise and coordinate his activities with those of the host nation and development agencies, ideally within a single integrated theatre plan (see Chapter 10).

In a permissive environment, the military contribution to economic and infrastructure development should be minimal, limited to maintaining the security necessary for others to operate and move freely. In volatile environments adversaries are likely to target development workers, be they government or non-government, indigenous or intervening, military or civilian. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) (see paragraphs 711-713) containing military and civilian capabilities, may be critical to achieving local development. The commander should be aware of the potential risks development workers face within his area of operation, consider what priority should be accorded to their protection, and advise them of potential security risks.

In those circumstances in which civilian agencies are unable to deploy, international forces may be requested, or as part of the integrated campaign plan, initiate specific, high priority, localised development tasks. These may include generating employment opportunities, infusing money into local economies, restoring and protecting essential infrastructure or supporting the restoration of market activity. The commander should, where feasible, use local knowledge, skills, manpower and materials as well as link local...
Working with DFID in Theatre

DFID is likely to be represented in theatre by the DFID country office. A typical country office will comprise two to four international staff, a handful of locally employed staff and additional specialist advisers who are deployed for short periods to support specific events. It is likely that the number of DFID staff will increase when UK forces are deployed; the Afghanistan office (DFID's largest) currently has fifty staff. The majority of offices are situated within the capital city but may not be collocated with the British Embassy. Some cover several countries and the country head will usually have at least ten years relevant experience although many will have twenty or more.

The country office manages the UK's development assistance programme to the country and will be working to a country plan developed to support the host nation's poverty reduction strategy. Country plans take a five-year perspective and will normally draw upon a range of assessments including Strategic Conflict Assessment, Political Economy, Drivers of Change and Gender and Social Exclusion Analyses. DFID will normally try to work in partnership with other donors and through host government ministries. They do not deliver programmes directly, but channel development through implementing partners such as international and regional organisations, Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) or civil society groups.

The commander can therefore expect DFID to have a good understanding of who the key development actors are within the country, their objectives, major programmes and their comparative strengths and weaknesses. They are also likely to have a good network of contacts and may be helping to coordinate the international development assistance to the country. In addition they should have conducted a number of assessments that can help identify the dynamics and underlying causes of any conflict. Even where access for international civilian staff is limited, DFID may, through their implementing partners, have an understanding that reaches beyond the capital and to elements of society other than ruling elites.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

0711 PRTs are civil-military organisations designed to operate where the freedom of movement for civil agencies is constrained. They are usually delivered by a single nation. Originally designed to extend the reach of the government beyond the capital, PRTs had three objectives when introduced in Afghanistan: to improve security; extend the authority of the government, and to promote reconstruction. The approach was later introduced into Iraq. The reality is that each PRT's role, structure and approach has been defined by the priorities of the donor country – there is no single model.

0712 US PRTs are military-led comprising mainly of military personnel with support from other US Government departments and often including contractors working on police and military reform. The UK PRT in Helmand comprises 120 people of which 80 are civilians from UK, US, Denmark and Estonia. It works closely with the UK Helmand Task Force. It is led by a director (2*) from FCO with deputies from DFID and MOD. Its focus is on capacity building, working to a province-wide plan agreed between the government of Afghanistan and its international partners covering politics and reconstruction, governance, rule of law, security, economic and social development, counter-narcotics and strategic communications. It is collocated with the Task Force Headquarters in Lashkar Gah and has stabilisation teams in outlying districts. These teams work closely with the local international military and depend on them for security. PRT funding is usually from contributing nations, although some comes from international sources such as the UN and EU. Sources are described later in Section II. US in-country allocation for nineteen PRTs in Afghanistan was $450m in FY 2007.

0713 The following characteristics and observations about PRTs are derived from reports on a variety of multinational experiences:

- PRTs are shaped by the contributing nations’ political priorities and capabilities.
- PRT field operations are enhanced where interagency organisations exist in nations capitals.
- Common funding promotes unity of effort.
- Pre-deployment training significantly improves staff coordination in the field.
- Civilian leaders shift the focus from security to development initiatives to national priorities, programmes and structures. The military presence will have a significant impact on local economies, and the advice of civilian specialists will be vital.

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longer-term development.
- The military role in reconstruction can lead to a short-term focus.
- PRTs add most value to Security Sector Reform when they partner host nation security forces.
- Evaluating the impact and effectiveness of PRT activity is generally poor.
- PRTs are most effective when integrated as a component of a wider strategy.

Stabilising the Economy

In addition to security, monetary policy is fundamental to stabilising an economy. Military activity in the field of monetary policy is likely to be limited to enabling safe passage of World Bank or International Monetary Fund officials to key ministries and meetings, and ensuring the security of critical financial institutions, infrastructure and stockpiles. The international force should also be careful not to undermine monetary policy by, for example, making large cash payments in foreign currency and instead reinforce currency stabilisation initiatives by making payments to contractors in the local currency at local rates. Economies cannot stabilise until levels of violence begin to fall allowing local people to re-establish normal patterns of economic life.

Looting the Central Bank of Iraq

After the fall of Baghdad, looters broke into the Central Bank of Iraq and stole the printing press, paper and engraving plates. With the potential for counterfeit bills of that quality flooding the market, the Coalition Provisional Authority was forced to replace the national currency, further complicating efforts aimed at economic stabilisation. If the building had been secured then restarting central bank operations would have proceeded more quickly and smoothly.

Economic recovery often follows a predictable pattern and can easily be seen to fit within the activity framework for stabilisation described in Chapter 4:

While a reduction in violence is likely to stimulate a restoration of normal economic activity, local growth may depend on targeted international development assistance. If international interventions are successful, growth will be self-sustaining. Consequently, successful businesses expand and begin making longer-term investments, entrepreneurs re-appear and locally financed reconstruction can resume.

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<td>In the initial stages of an intervention economic recovery is unlikely. The commander may be confronted with a deteriorating economic situation as well as a declining security situation.</td>
<td>During operations to secure a locality, combat with armed adversaries may contribute to a declining economy. However, once international forces have managed to secure an area, the local population should perceive it as safe to return to more normal modes of economic activity. These areas can serve as a magnet attracting both trade and local migrants, which in turn stimulates further demand.</td>
<td>Attracted by improvements in the security situation host government authorities and international agencies descend on the locality and generate demand for local goods and services such as housing, restaurants, hotels, interpreters and skilled labour. Such donor consumption provides further stimulation to the local economy, although it is unlikely to generate sustained growth. Major projects will be planned as quicker impact tools, such as micro-loans for small business start-up have an immediate effect.</td>
<td>International agencies can now undertake targeted investment in specific sectors. This can range from agricultural rehabilitation to health clinics, schools and large infrastructure projects. Donor investment provides a third impetus to growth. International agencies should guard against so-called ‘dutch disease’ whereby rapid surges in investment increase the exchange rate, making exports less competitive. Inward investment does not need a risk-free environment; but investors do need to be able to assess and manage risk.</td>
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0717 As violence fluctuates so too, do local economic conditions. Once areas have been secured, they have the potential to become important centres of economic recovery and the commander should be aware of the impact that security has. Plans should identify mechanisms for accessing development funds and channelling them into areas that are held at the necessary tempo – economic action relative to the contested security situation – in order to promote further development, minimise gaps in delivering security or economic progress, and transition to host nation responsibility.

**Reconstructing Essential Infrastructure**

0718 Infrastructure is fundamental to economic recovery. Transport networks allow freedom of movement, trade and social interaction; telecommunications systems support every element of society from the host government, to the private sector, to the media and the wider population; and power generation facilities constitute the engine room of economic production.

0719 When prioritising and sequencing infrastructure projects it is useful to distinguish between infrastructure associated with essential government services such as hospitals, schools, water and sanitation, and infrastructure associated with the country's economic capacity such as transport links, telecommunications, significant commercial facilities and power generation and distribution systems. Both are important. However, whereas the former are associated with the immediate well-being of the population, and are dealt with in Chapter 6, the latter are essential for the immediate recovery of the economy.

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0720 Although airports, railways, ports and communications facilities may represent iconic projects, if they do not come with air traffic controllers and ground crew, train drivers, shipping masters and engineers to maintain them, they are unsustainable. One of the most damaging aspects of long-term conflict is the departure of the most highly trained people in the economy, many of whom will never return. The only way to replace these is to train a new generation, something that takes significant time and effort. Prioritisation and expectation management are essential.

0721 The military contribution to infrastructure development is likely to be an enabling one. However, in environments in which civilian agencies are absent or unable to move freely, intervention forces may need to implement critical infrastructure reconstruction tasks themselves. In these circumstances the military contribution might include:

- Priority repairs to and protection of national transportation infrastructure (airports, roads, bridges, railways, ports).
- Restoration and protection of essential telecommunications infrastructure.
- Repair and protection of important commercial facilities and key assets associated with economic production, import and export (vital for revenue generation).
- Repair and protection of key power generation facilities and distribution systems.
- Training and developing indigenous expertise.

Generating Employment

0722 Unless local people have a reasonable prospect of restoring their livelihoods and improving their living standards, support for the host government is likely to be low. Therefore, activities which stimulate economic growth and generate employment may be crucial to stability.

0723 When international forces and agencies occupy an area they stimulate economic recovery through increased demand for goods and services as well as targeted development initiatives. In some circumstances, international forces and agencies may sponsor large-scale employment programmes – cash for work programmes – as a temporary solution to mass unemployment. These are often low-wage job opportunities for unskilled workers and are designed to minimise interference with more traditional and profitable sectors. Such initiatives, however, should be translated into sustained employment prospects based on traditional transactions amongst the local population.

0724 The agricultural and fishing sectors are central to the well-being of the population. The commander should familiarise himself with local crops and seasonal cycles, and understand how these are used by adversaries to generate funds and may relate to surges in the level of violence. The location of markets, areas of primary production which support them, and the transport routes and storage facilities en-route are all critical components of the sector. The commander may be required to ensure safe access from the farm-gate to market and security for local consumers. In
In September 2008, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ensured that a new turbine was successfully installed in Helmand province. The ultimate purpose of the operation was to increase the capacity to generate electrical power, so contributing to the improvement of the quality of life for the people in southern Afghanistan. It was funded by the United States Agency for International Development.

The multinational convoy travelled 180km over road and desert tracks to reach its destination, involving 4,000 ANSF and ISAF troops along with NATO air support, who protected the convoy and dominated the mountains surrounding the dam. The project demonstrated that major development can be a key driver for setting security priorities. This is covered in Chapter 10, Planning.

A contributory factor to the increase in Afghan opium production is the way in which dealers purchase the crop from farmers, particularly in the more volatile and insecure areas. Often dealers will contract to purchase the entire crop and provide sizeable cash deposits to farmers prior to planting. Dealers will also arrange to collect the harvested product directly from the farm gate. This process significantly reduces the risks incurred by the farmer; from crop failure, the threat of eradication, and in transporting the product over insecure roads. While the profit margins on conventional and illicit crops may be broadly similar, conventional crops are often stolen by criminals or taxed by corrupt policemen on the way to market. This erodes the economic viability of licit crops and substantially increases the financial and personal risks inherent in this form of agriculture.

Accordingly, the international community is taking a more effective approach to countering narcotics production by offering more competitive, less risky alternatives, based on an understanding of the value chain for agricultural production in Afghanistan. This approach identifies the steps between growing the crops and selling them in the market place. Its objective is to reduce the risk incurred by the farmer during different parts of the economic chain. In some areas this has increased the incentives for licit crop production through contract purchasing of crops in advance of planting and arranging for their collection direct from the farm gate after harvest. The intention has been to make farmers perceive that licit agriculture is economically viable and entails less risk than growing poppy.
some circumstances, direct assistance to producers will be required to accelerate both the recovery of agricultural and fisheries production, and the repatriation of the displaced rural population. Possible military tasks include:

- Repair to enabling agricultural and fisheries infrastructure (irrigation systems, power generation and distribution systems, fishing vessels, etc).
- Provision of supplies, including an adequate supply of fuel.
- Protection of post-harvest storage facilities.
- Mediation of land or fisheries disputes.

While hiring local labour and issuing contracts boosts incomes and generates broader economic growth, care should be taken to minimise potentially disruptive effects on local labour markets, in particular, pay scales. International forces should seek to avoid creating large disparities in wages between what can be earned on the local market or working for the host government, and what is possible working for international forces. Commanders usually need to remunerate local staff at higher levels to attract quality personnel and compensate for added risks associated with supporting international forces. However, salaries should not be so far above local market rates that they entice skilled workers or professionals to leave important jobs in the community for less important, but better paying jobs working for international actors. It is particularly important to get this right with respect to security force wages. Local personnel working for international forces should not make more money than those working for the indigenous army or police.

Addressing the Economic Drivers of Conflict

Development initiatives, where possible, should be designed directly to confront the economic and political drivers of conflict, and not simply execute programmes based on narrow technical considerations. This adds complexity to typical development activities, which do not usually need to consider conflict dynamics. The commander should develop an understanding of the drivers of societal conflict and be an advocate for those development activities that best address the causes of local instability. Critically, he will need to ensure that development does not reinforce divisions.

If inequality or discrimination are central to the conflict then development activity should be broadly based. A perception that development is being distributed unequally may lead to resistance from aggrieved local groups. In these circumstances, programmes should be judged on whether they strengthen one party to the conflict at the expense of others in addition to traditional considerations of effectiveness and efficiency. Equally, if powerful warlords are central to the conflict, there must be a concerted effort not to allow development activity to finance the rebuilding of old ownership structures.

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The commander should consider who benefits and who risks exclusion from development initiatives and programmes, and the potential negative effects. A particularly useful tool is the Red Cross Better Programming Initiative. This explores the potential impact of development programmes on the connectors and dividers between people, allowing planners to gauge more accurately the likely effects of programmes and projects on conflict dynamics. Experience shows that the delivery of aid may exacerbate the conflict by having the following unintended consequences:

- It may be misappropriated by adversaries.
- It may distort local markets.
- It may benefit some groups and not others, causing further tension.
- It may substitute for local resources, freeing them up for further conflict.
- It may legitimise the cause of competing factions and adversaries.

Failure to Implement the ‘Do not Harm Principle’ – Tajikistan

At the end of the civil war, one international NGO undertook massive housing construction in a southern province. The intent was:

- To encourage people who had been displaced during the fighting to return to the region.
- To support reconciliation between the two groups who had fought by getting them to work together in rebuilding the destroyed villages.

Priority for reconstruction went to the villages that had suffered the most damage. In these, the NGO worked with local people to decide which houses would be rebuilt and to organise work crews to do the construction. They agreed that ‘anyone from the village who wanted a job’ would be hired in these crews.

A few months later, they had successfully sponsored the reconstruction of almost 60% of the damaged housing in the region. However, one day a local man came into the NGO compound with a Kalashnikov and threatened the staff, saying, “Why are you favouring that group that we defeated in the war? If you don’t start building some houses for my clan, I will kill you.” The NGO staff members were astounded. They had meant to be completely inclusive and to ensure that everyone who suffered in the conflict received equal attention. They had not known, until this moment, that during the conflict, the greatest damage was done in villages occupied by only one (rather than both) of the local, warring groups.

By focusing their assistance on the areas of greatest damage, and by hiring people to work on the construction who came from those villages, they had inadvertently provided almost all of their assistance to one side of the conflict. Their project design had unintentionally reinforced existing inter-group divisions by focusing on villages that were mono-ethnic and providing all their support to these groups. However, with a project redesign, the NGO was able to supply building materials and support to multi-ethnic villages, to damaged homes of the other ethnicity, and to community buildings that both groups shared such as schools, clinics and mosques.
Section II
Quick Impact Projects

Overview
0729 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are characterised as short-term, small-scale, low-cost and rapidly implemented initiatives that are designed to deliver an immediate and highly visible impact, generally at the tactical level. Their primary purpose is to facilitate political and economic progress and attempt to generate confidence in, if not consent for, the host government. By design, QIPs should leverage consent, however on occasions access may be all that can be achieved. In non-permissive environments, where it is deemed that the project is critical for early stabilisation and cannot wait until the security situation improves, the military might implement QIPs. In more permissive environments, it is only where there is a capability gap that cannot be filled by another actor, or where the military possess particular specialist skills that QIPs are likely to be implemented by the military.

Categorising Quick Impact Projects
0730 It is useful to distinguish between two types of QIPs:
• Direct QIPs – critical, and rapidly implemented, security, governance or development projects that directly support a goal on the path to stability and longer term development.
• Indirect QIPs – rapidly implemented security, governance or development projects that serve primarily as instruments of influence and are designed to generate consent for the host government or, international forces, thereby indirectly contributing to stability. Their effect may be more short term.

0731 Direct QIPs have tended to focus on key elements of security (such as the repair and refurbishment of police stations and vehicle check points), critical enabling infrastructure (such as market places, roads and bridges) or the delivery of essential services (such as schools and health clinics).

Examples of Direct Quick Impact Projects in Recent Operations:

• Reconstruction of roads in South Sudan facilitating access to markets and the return of displaced persons.
• Grants to communities in Ethiopia and Eritrea for emergency repairs of schools, clinics and restoration of basic services.
• The restoration of salary payments to civil servants in Iraq.
• Emergency supply of seeds and tools to farmers in Liberia in time for the planting season.
• Proper disposal of dead bodies and livestock and the restoration of a potable water supply in Bosnia to restore public health and prevent epidemic.

0732 Indirect QIPs focus on influencing perception and gaining consent. They are used to communicate positive messages, provide incentives for compliance, facilitate key leader engagement or demonstrate tangible benefits from peace. Indirect QIPs are particularly effective where lack...
of demonstrable progress is seen as an important driver of instability. Examples include the construction of parks and the refurbishment of stadia, the clearance of waste or drainage systems and broader infrastructure refurbishment programmes. Often, the most appropriate indirect QIPs are ones which cluster projects by visibly rolling out initiatives in sufficient numbers to create the perception of systematic change.

0733 When using QIPs for these purposes the commander should be clear on:

- Who will provide the consent?
- What will the beneficiaries of the QIP consent to?
- What purpose this will serve?
- Why might he expect to generate the consent through the use of the QIP?
- How long is the consent expected to endure?

Accessing Funding for Quick Impact Projects

0734 Where PRTs exist, much of this activity will be funded, planned and implemented by development agencies coordinated through the PRT. In these circumstances, development and security activities will need to be mutually reinforcing within a civil-military theatre integrated plan. In other circumstances however the commander needs to understand the various sources of funding himself in order to capitalise on opportunities for QIPs as they arise. This involves understanding the purpose of different funds, the regulations governing their use, the basis on which funds are allocated and how he may be able to rapidly access them. The commander, where possible, should make use of the specialist advice of a Military Stabilisation Support Team, or individual Stabilisation Advisers and Development Advisers. Given the typical six week funding process, commanders will need to exercise judgment in selecting QIPs, which must be defined by their influence on the population, not their impact on the operational tour.

0735 The sources of funding for QIPs are varied and change frequently. At present, funding for direct QIPs is available through the Conflict Pool (DFID’s budget being reserved for direct poverty reduction initiatives). Funding for indirect QIPs, on the other hand, is available via the Commander’s Consent Winning Fund. In addition to these primary sources, there may be numerous alternative sources of funding available, including pooled inter-departmental funds and money from international partners – such as the US Commander’s Emergency Response Program, abbreviated to, and commonly known as CERP. There is also the potential of funding from international organisations such as the UN, NATO or EU.

Guidelines for the Effective Use of Quick Impact Projects

0736 As discussed in Chapter 3, all military action should be assessed by its actual or potential contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship within the society and shaping the eventual political settlement. It is on this basis that the utility of each QIP must, ultimately, be assessed. To help the commander balance short and long-term imperatives and avoid unintended consequences, a number of guidelines for the effective use of QIPs are provided:

Guidelines for the Effective Use of Quick Impact Projects:

- **Influence.** Ensure that there is a strategy for communicating the positive benefits of the project, that politically significant communities are included and that key leaders are engaged. Use the project to promote understanding, if not reconciliation, across sectarian divides and shape the emerging political settlement.

- **‘Do No Harm’.** Ensure that the project is conflict-sensitive and avoids creating or exacerbating conflicts, jealousies or rivalries by the selection of beneficiaries.

- **Participation.** Ensure that the host community and local government are involved in planning, design and delivery.

- **Efficiency.** Ensure resources are used in the most efficient and cost effective way and that the project is not diverting resources from more important ones.

- **Timeliness.** Ensure that the project will be implemented or completed in a time frame relevant to the commander’s overall campaign.

- **Sustainability.** Address recurrent costs associated with the project.

- **Coordination.** Ensure the project coheres with national priorities and is coordinated with the activities of other relevant actors.

- **Delivery.** Ensure that the most appropriate agency delivers the project, favouring local expertise and civilian agencies whenever practicable.

- **Monitoring and Evaluation.** Ensure there is a plan for assessing the project’s effectiveness as well as its impact on the overall conflict dynamics.

13 Gordon, S. Stabilisation Quick Impact Projects, Stabilisation Unit (2009), London, UK.
14 Training and Doctrine Command (United States Army) (TRADOC) Technical Guide.
15 Gordon, S. Stabilisation Quick Impact Projects, Stabilisation Unit (2009), London, UK.
Building peaceful states and societies is at the heart of achieving lasting poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals in highly fragile environments. State-building and peace-building must therefore be central to donor responses and wider international engagement. They are long-term, complex political processes involving continual negotiation between the state and society. The influence of external actors is limited, but crucial.

This DFID approach explains what state-building and peace-building mean, and sets out a new, integrated approach to inform DFID’s work. It is based on 4 inter-related objectives, set out in diagram 7A.1.

State-building has two dimensions – enhancing the state’s ability to function, and the political processes that underpin the state-society relationship. Peace-building aims to establish durable peace and prevent violence by addressing the causes of conflict through reconciliation, institution-building and political and economic transformation.

We will work with our development partners to help them:

- Support inclusive political settlements
- Develop state survival functions
- Address causes of conflict & build resolution mechanisms
- Respond to public expectations

Figure 7A.1 - DFID Approach to Building Peaceful States and Societies
An integrated approach highlights the commonalities between state-building and peace-building, particularly the need to support the evolution of an inclusive political settlement. It also ensures that actions taken are complementary, and informed by both perspectives. Short-term measures to secure peace should take into account their implications (positive or negative) for long-term state-building and growth. Equally, state-building needs to take account of past or potential causes of conflict, and incorporate formal and informal conflict resolution mechanisms. At times, tough decisions may need to be made – for example, providing health and education services immediately through contractors or supporting the local ministry to develop delivery capacity.

The key operational messages for DFID and other donors, are: stay engaged for the long term, over decades, not years; understand and become more closely engaged in the political dynamics in partner countries; take a regional approach where necessary because cross-border issues have a direct impact on state fragility and conflict; and think carefully about priorities and sequencing before identifying which instruments to use in different contexts.

Examples of how specific interventions can be designed to support the four objectives:

- Support an inclusive political settlement – this establishes the rules of the game through which political power is organised and exercised. Initially, a settlement may only involve elites, but must broaden out to include wider society and bring in excluded groups. Donors can support mediation efforts and peace processes, as well as democratic institutions, constitution making and political processes. Support to formal institutions should be complemented by engagement with informal and traditional institutions.

- Address causes of conflict and build resolution mechanisms – addressing the underlying causes of conflict is DFID’s core business, and includes a wide range of interventions to address issues such as exclusion, unemployment and lack of accountability. DFID’s work on deepening democracy can help political systems to become more inclusive and manage tensions peacefully. We can also support community initiatives to prevent conflict from escalating, and engage with informal dispute resolution mechanisms, paying careful attention to their compatibility with human rights.

- Develop state survival functions, a base level of capability which can be developed. For example, security, a revenue base and rule of law are necessary to ensure the survival of the state. DFID’s approach to security and justice works with state and non-state actors to build accountability and ensure that justice systems respond to the needs and rights of the poor. Our support for taxation needs to balance the incremental improvement of taxation receipts with the state’s ability to respond to public expectations.

- Respond to public expectations – these include delivering public services (e.g. health, education, infrastructure), macro-economic stability and social protection, and supporting voice and accountability (e.g. fair elections, free media, anti-corruption). It is important not to make assumptions about the expectations of different groups in society, and DFID can support research such as public expectations surveys, as a starting point.
This publication was replaced by:
Shaping a stable world: The Military contribution (JDP 05)
published by DCDC in March 2016

PART 3
CAMPAIGNING IN STABILISATION

Strategic Objectives

Commander's Skill

Campaign Design
- Frame the Problem
- Refine and Develop Ideas
- Express Vision
- Revise Plan

Analyse
Plan
Assess
Execute

Campaign Management
- Integrate
- Coordinate
- Synchronise
- Prioritise
- Disseminate
- Assess Progress

Tactical Employment of Forces

Operational Art and Orchestration at the Operational Level

This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
Part 3 discusses the specifics of campaigning within stabilisation. It provides military commanders and staff with some additional tools and insights necessary to aid analysis, planning, execution and assessment within societal conflicts. Campaign Design and Campaign Management framed by the Commander’s Operational Art, as described in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 (2nd Edition) Campaigning, remains the authoritative model (Fig overleaf). With some additions, Part 3 is structured in accordance with JDP 01.

It is assumed that the reader is already familiar with JDPs 01, 2-00, 3-00 and 5-00, which remain the foundation of campaigning. JDP 3-40 Part 3 provides some further advice and instruction on how to apply, and in some cases adapt, the generic campaign processes and techniques to make them more useful in a stabilisation context.
“If you do not, as the Operational Commander, directly engage with your intelligence team, personally direct their work, demand of them Herculean tasks, and expect carefully considered insights on which you will decide the campaign’s course of action, you will probably fail.”

Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb, Commander Field Army
SECTION I
THE DEMANDS OF STABILISATION

0801 This Chapter describes an expanded approach to intelligence. Stabilisation demands of the J2 community a far wider span of expertise than conventional operations. Military intelligence has traditionally focused on analysis, based upon doctrinal models and equipment capability, for example, where and when a tank regiment may cross a river. In stabilisation, understanding is about unique human dimensions. A J2 is as likely to be required to advise on the intricacies of applied sociology or economics as on the adversary Order of Battle. This is the expanded terrain pertinent to stabilisation.

0802 Information and Intelligence. Information and intelligence are defined as:

**Information.** Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence. (Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6). Information concerns facts. **Intelligence.** The product of processing information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. (AAP-6). It provides a coherent and comprehensive narrative or material tailored to the specific ends of the recipient.

The relationship between information and intelligence is best illustrated by the use of an example. There are armed civilians at a given location, in an area frequented by insurgents (fact – information). From supporting information it is deduced that these armed men are from a local private security company (intelligence). Had the initial information been acted on immediately then there could have been a friendly fire incident. Both information and intelligence will inform decision-making. Information acted on without analysis incorporates a higher degree of risk, but time imperatives or lack of ability to corroborate may force the pace of decision-making.1

0803 The Pre-eminence of Intelligence. Effective, accurate and timely intelligence is vital in any operation. It will not only drive analysis and subsequent planning, but it will also enable assessment and the ability of the force to anticipate, learn and adapt. Commanders’ direction is fundamental to setting these priorities, and the intelligence effort. Operations are command-led and intelligence-enabled. Intelligence drives operations and, equally, successful operations generate information which can be processed and analysed to produce intelligence. Although intelligence may be produced and disseminated by J2 Staff, they require the support of J3/5 as forces will need to be deployed to gain information. The natural dynamic, especially in warfighting, is to acquire targeting intelligence to engage and defeat the enemy through faster decision-action cycles. The Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) effort is synchronised by the J3, which by definition, is focused on the current battle. However, in these operations, it is necessary to shift the balance between collection effort for immediate targeting, and that for longer-term intelligence to develop understanding. In stabilisation missions tactical actions frequently have strategic effects, while tactical intelligence may have operational or strategic value. Once generated, intelligence must be treated as a common resource – available in useable form to whoever needs it.

0804 Understanding. Understanding is the accurate interpretation of a particular situation, and the likely reaction of groups or individuals within it. It ensures that timely, appropriate measures are developed to influence competing elites and the wider population. Understanding is derived from continuous analysis and engagement with the decisive actors; it requires a progression through shared knowledge and awareness, and an intuitive feel for the behaviour of local individuals and groups; J2 continuity is crucial. Intelligence staff and others in key appointments must become immersed in the theatre. The challenge is to institutionalise intuition and create an accessible corporate memory. Intelligence architecture should be designed to support understanding by, for example, early investment in databases, network enabled reachout and novel approaches to continuity, such as the use of retired experts on contract.

0805 Understanding Group Dynamics. Identifying the motivation of decisive groups requires a detailed understanding of individual leaders, those around them and their interactions. It is important to determine how adversarial groups will mobilise the means and methods to conduct violence, and their sources of political, economic and popular support. Such groups will always be part of a complex social and political dynamic. Their objectives will be arrived at according to their position in the political order. For this reason the military must understand the relationship between themselves and all other friendly, neutral, belligerent
and adversarial groups, and the potential consequences of their actions.

0806 Early Establishment of Effective Structures and Networks. The western way of warfare assumes information superiority. However, in stabilisation, commanders should assume that they will deploy with an incomplete understanding of the situation. In order to develop timely knowledge, awareness and understanding, intelligence structures (and networks between intelligence communities) need to be established early. Important insights can be gained by establishing strong channels to multinational partners, Other Government Departments (OGDs), International Organisations, possibly some Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and from open-source material. Designing an effective information management system is a pre-cursor to sound decision-making.

0807 Flow of Intelligence. In conventional combat operations against a defined adversary, the enemy’s intent is usually identified and assessed at the strategic level and subsequently confirmed by operational and tactical level activity. In stabilisation missions the flow of intelligence is generally reversed. Military intelligence organisations must adapt to this change. Small groups and individuals may alter their stance more quickly than conventional military opponents. Commanders should instil into their J2 and wider staffs this idea of building the intelligence picture from the bottom up. Sources of intelligence are also likely to be non-traditional and the environment may be most effectively understood through engagement with local religious, economic or social leaders, local contractors and NGOs. J2 staff should be trained to access and analyse these different sources, and how to determine the accuracy of the information given according to the potential bias and intent of the source. This calls for analytical skills that differ from those employed in conventional warfighting.

0808 The Find Function. A systematic approach and long-term investment is required to allow understanding to be built up over time. Hostile groups must be identified and found before they can be neutralised. This will involve finding their networks, and systematically unravelling them. Irregulars, particularly leaders and core activists, will seek anonymity amongst the population. They will use them as cover and hosts, with or without their knowledge and consent. J2 must acquire information to help the commander differentiate between the irreconcilable activists, the opportunists, the reticent supporters and the non-supporters within a group. This allows exploitation of potential fracture points and the splitting of irreconcilable from reconcilable elements. It is not easy to obtain the granularity and timeliness of information to enable precise strike and ‘striking’ may cut the flow of intelligence.

0809 Relationship with the Population. The population is a rich source of intelligence. The relationship between the security forces and the population is linked to the application of force and its impact on trust. The greater the degree of trust, the greater the flow of information. The active support of the population is central to long term success. Protecting them against intimidation or attack by adversaries, as well as from any unintended results of action taken by UK forces, is essential for intelligence gathering. For this reason, when an operation is being considered, an essential question is: “How will it impact on the population who will be providing me with information in the future?” Only when he has answered this, can the commander make a properly informed decision as to whether to proceed as planned, or look for alternative ways to exploit his situational understanding.

0810 Host Nation Vulnerabilities. Hostile groups will seek to infiltrate host nation organisations and security forces, intimidate potential sources, feed deceptive information and use civilians locally employed by international forces in intelligence gathering roles. They will have their own collection plans and will pursue them aggressively, potentially with support from external states. A counter-ISTAR plan is required. This includes thorough record-keeping and the screening of locally employed civilians and host nation forces, possibly by use of biometric technology, and robust information protection policies. Care should be taken, however, to avoid damaging relationships which have painstakingly been built up with local forces.

0811 Own Force Vulnerabilities. The capability to intercept non-secure communications is now commercially available and is used by irregular adversaries. Controlling the use of personal mobile telephones and the internet by UK forces in theatre is difficult but essential. As well as the more obvious threat to operational information, an adversary may seek to exploit information on home locations, including families and friends.

0812 Counter-intelligence. Counter-intelligence produces intelligence related to the identity, capability and intentions of hostile (individuals or) organisations that may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism directed against UK forces. Counter-intelligence staffs provide intelligence to support the development of force protection measures. This
involves contributing to the assessment of the adversary’s intent, risks, capabilities and their opportunities afforded to mount attacks. Counter-intelligence staff should be included in the planning of significant cross-government and host nation programmes to advise on any security requirements.

SECTION II
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH

0813 Developing High Quality Intelligence. A common theme in post operational reports is the lack of high quality intelligence. Even when good intelligence is available, it is rarely in the right form and requires further analytical work to be developed into high grade targeting intelligence. This is not a new problem; nearly forty years ago in Low Intensity Operations, Kitson described two interlinked functions that he believes underpin successful operations. The first involves collecting ‘background information’ and the second further develops this into ‘contact information’. Kitson himself recognises that this division is an oversimplification, and that it belies the highly dynamic, symbiotic and mentally intensive analytical process that it entails. This basic model is still valid. Refined, the two functions become:

- Generation of an intelligence picture to underpin understanding.
- Development of target intelligence.

0814 Generating an Intelligence Picture to Underpin Understanding. Wide situational awareness and understanding is developed through what Kitson referred to as ‘background information’. Detail is important here. The intelligence picture informs the campaign plan, engagement strategies and wider comprehensive activities to win the active support of target populations and achieve political accommodation with key elites. It will draw information from many sources, both military and civilian, including information gained from debriefing, interrogation and informant handling. However, on its own, this intelligence picture is unlikely to be sufficiently refined to target specific groups or individuals.

0815 Developing Target Intelligence. High quality targeting intelligence is required to direct kinetic or non-kinetic activities against specific groups or individuals, whilst reducing collateral risk. It is achieved by focused tasking and analysis designed to ‘zero-in’ on adversarial groups. This requires the explicit direction and involvement of the commander himself, not least as it is likely to require the commitment of resources. Forces should be deployed for the specific task of gaining information and refining intelligence.

‘All actions designed to retain and regain the allegiance of the population are relevant to the process of collecting background information because its provision is closely geared to the attitude of the people...the whole national programme of civil and military action has a bearing on the problem’.

Kitson, Low Intensity Operations

The Virtuous Spiral. The process described above, which takes information and transforms it into targeting intelligence, is illustrated in Figure 8.1. It is the intelligence picture which forms the body of knowledge from which targeting intelligence is derived. The model illustrates how the process of continual refinement should work. This is a variation on the traditional question-led intelligence cycle. It is not fixed in duration, and at each stage the commander will need to decide whether it requires further intelligence development, or if he wishes to act on what he knows at that point in time. His personal intelligence requirements, based upon his own hypothesis of the conflict and the way to resolve it – the theory of change – act as the engine for the process. They force J2 to focus effort and challenge the hypothesis (continuously testing the campaign big ideas). The process requires the J2 to build and refine a richer but sharper picture, whilst either confirming the hypothesis or leading the commander to adjust it.

There are two further aspects of this model that should be considered:

- **Patience.** At each point at which the commander draws his deductions he will need to weigh the benefits of immediate action, against the potentially greater benefits that may be gained from further refinement. Clearly a decision to gather further information risks missing perhaps fleeting opportunities. Yet, premature exploitation not only causes set-backs in the spiral, it may have far wider implications including, support of the wider population being lost through unintended consequences, or the loss of the UK forces’ grasp of the adversaries’ pattern of life (painstakingly built up) due to tightened operations security. This business should not be viewed in terms of tour lengths. Building a pattern of life in a foreign society is a long-term investment. In the long run, time invested in growing intelligence capital will pay dividends. Once the intelligence picture has been sufficiently developed, the two intelligence functions – understanding and targeting – will have a synergistic effect.

- **Multiple Spirals.** Throughout a campaign there are likely to be multiple spirals operating, both in and out of theatre. Each network or adversarial group could require its own analytical spiral. Gathering information to fuel these spirals relies on the prioritisation and coordination of collection assets, and the adoption of organisational structures and information sharing protocols which differ markedly from those employed in more conventional warfighting operations.

Applying Pressure to Adversarial Groups. The focused and systematic application of intelligence assets and the tightening of the virtuous spiral will apply pressure to adversarial groups. They are likely to improve their countermeasures, making the ‘find’ function more challenging. For example, they may stop using communications systems and reduce their inner-circle to remain cloaked. Overt and covert security operations that protect security forces’ sources of information will be crucial to maintain the visibility of adversarial groups; this will demand tight control of exploitation (see Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG), paragraph 845). However, the paranoia that successful intelligence and wider operations induce in adversarial groups can be advantageous. Not only may it reduce their freedom of manoeuvre and cause paralysis; it can have destructive effects within their organisations. It can cause them to self-destruct, increase intimidation on the population (thus losing them support) or create panic that forces them to take greater risks, exposing them to further security force action. However, direct action may have unintended consequences to wider intelligence operations or cause the groups to mutate into something more dangerous.

The political decision to intern all known Irish Republican Army (IRA) members in 1972 removed the majority of the Special Branch’s networks within the IRA organisation. The new IRA commanders that emerged were more extreme, and an unknown quantity.

By the latter stages of the campaign, the Provisional IRA was preoccupied with internal security; by this stage more IRA terrorists were being killed by their own as suspected informers than by the security forces.

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3. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 2-10.1 Human Intelligence, due for publication late 2009 provides more guidance.

4. Known as Covert Human Intelligence Sources, or CHIS.
SECTION III
COORDINATION AND
APPLICATION OF
INTELLIGENCE ASSETS

Functions and Capabilities

0819 Intelligence coverage will invariably have major gaps and the J2 must tell the commander which he can – and more importantly, cannot – cover. Collection must be prioritised and coordinated to prevent duplication of effort and missed opportunities. Intelligence constructs have been designed to allow synergy between the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements, his Intelligence Requirements and the availability of collection capabilities, including assets from wider intelligence agencies. Care needs to be given to the tracking of Requests for Information, and Information Management should be an active rather than a passive function. The following collection capabilities have particular value. Competition for these often scarce resources will be fierce, both between different levels of command and the variety of operations being conducted at a particular time.

0820 Human Intelligence. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is a category of intelligence derived from information provided by, or collected on, human sources and individuals of intelligence interest, as well as the systematic and controlled exploitation, by interaction with, or surveillance of, sources or individuals.

- Human Intelligence Sources. Sources include passive informal walk-ins, routine liaison and key leadership engagement, to more active source handling and interrogations. All personnel in contact with actors across the Joint Operations Area will inevitably be dealing with potential HUMINT sources. However, while HUMINT may be obtained from a wide variety of sources, the development and exploitation of informants4 is the preserve of specialist organisations, such as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Intelligence Collection Group’s Defence HUMINT Organisation. Specialist HUMINT capabilities are limited and deployment should be prioritised to achieve maximum effect. HUMINT encompasses the management of human sources and is likely to include information gained from detainees, refugees and the civilian population; it will often require language support.
• The Value of Human Intelligence. Building HUMINT source networks is a long-term process. HUMINT is tasked like any other ISTAR asset, but getting results may take considerable time and is dependent on access to the right sources, which must be handled by the right people. HUMINT (along with Signals Intelligence) is particularly good at providing evidence of people’s intentions, motivations, wants and fears as well as the effect of friendly action on them, thus developing understanding of the context within which decisions are made. At its best, it is literally a conversation with the adversary. This understanding is vital in order to positively influence the situation; other ISTAR assets cannot develop this, only support it.

• Reports. HUMINT reports are categorised by originator. Military (M) HUMINT (X) reports are known as MX. SIS reports are known as CX. They are likely to be highly classified, but with tear-lines (sanitised text to mask the source) for wider dissemination.

0821 Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (SIGINT/EW). The generic term to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence, when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence or to represent fusion of the two. (AAP-6). Electronic Warfare (EW) is often referred to as tactical SIGINT. Intelligence from national and military SIGINT/EW capabilities will be essential to the operational and tactical levels of command. SIGINT/EW can provide real-time intelligence from a range of platforms. It can be used not only to identify geographic positions, but also to build a picture of the adversary’s network and to provide real-time insights into intentions and objectives.

0822 Geospatial Information. Geospatial Information (GEOINF) comprises of facts about the Earth referenced by geographical position and arranged in a coherent structure. It describes the physical environment and includes data from the aeronautical, geographic, hydrographic, oceanographic and meteorological disciplines. GEOINF includes data, products and services in graphic, textual and digital form,
which may be used to support navigation, targeting and situational awareness. It can be critical to precision strike.

**Geospatial Intelligence.** Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) comprises the integration and analysis of imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial information. It provides a geospatial framework to establish patterns or to aggregate and extract additional intelligence. It provides the means upon which to collate, display and precisely locate activities and objects, assess and determine their inter-relationships, in order to provide an understanding of a situation. GEOINT units generate mapping and sophisticated briefing products, and rely on specialist Communications and Information Systems (CIS).

**Imagery Intelligence.** Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is intelligence derived from imagery acquired by sensors which can be ground based, sea borne or carried by air or space platforms. (Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1). It can be delivered via tactical, operational and strategic collections assets and has been proven to be a force multiplier on operations, in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. Its use ranges from general area surveillance design to contribute to an understanding of the operational theatre, through the production of target packs for individual operations, right down to providing cueing action against specific targets.

**Open-source Intelligence.** Open-source Intelligence (OSINT) is derived from publicly available information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. (AAP-6). Major sources of information include the internet and the media; for example, the BBC Monitoring Service. It can be a rich source to support understanding of the local population’s needs and assessment of military activity. Qualified linguists may be required to exploit local media ranging from web-sites through to religious sermons or even graffiti. Discussions with locals as a collection task around capacity building provides OSINT but many such opportunities are missed.

**Measurement and Signature Intelligence.** Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender, to facilitate the latter’s measurement and identification (AAP-6). MASINT results in intelligence that facilitates the detection, tracking, and identification of targets or systems and describes the distinctive characteristics of fixed or dynamic targets.

**Technical Intelligence.** Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) concerns foreign technological developments, and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes. (AAP-6). Evaluation of equipment employed by hostile groups can provide useful TECHINT, which contributes to assessment of their capability and links to wider support. This is primarily provided by Weapons Intelligence Units that exploit captured weapons and explosives devices and analyse post-incident forensic evidence. Additional support can be provided by reach-back to the Defence Intelligence Staff and through deployed Scientific Advisers. TECHINT product tends to be used in support of force protection measures. In particular, intelligence on the capabilities and construction of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) assists the counter-IED process. However, TECHINT capabilities can be used more widely. For example, TECHINT can help to establish which external support networks in-theatre irregular groups are exploiting.

**Intelligence Exploitation.** The detailed forensic exploitation of captured documents, electronic media and technical material can provide vital intelligence, as can the in-depth exploitation of captured personnel through tactical questioning, interrogation and biometric techniques. Material and Personnel Exploitation (MPE) is closely allied to TECHINT, and provides focused intelligence support to develop actionable intelligence, support the development of wider situational awareness, and enable the development of effective counter threat measures. MPE uses a variety of collection and exploitation techniques to provide multiple-source, responsive intelligence for specific purposes or to...
contribute to open-source assessment. Initial exploitation takes place in-theatre and is linked to Defence Exploitation facilities for more forensic analysis. MPE is likely to be an increasingly important means of intelligence gathering as adversaries make more use of technology in, for example, Information and Communications Technology. As with TECHINT, the preservation of forensic detail requires training.

Supporting Functions

**Key Leadership Engagement.** Key leaders are engaged as a source of information, to achieve influence and for assessment. Key Leader Engagement should only be conducted by personnel with suitable experience and authority. Trust and rapport needs to be built up, which takes time. Individuals in senior positions and those with particular personal access, may need to remain in post beyond the standard tour length. Engagements (such as a meeting with a local senior official) should be recorded, or the insight will be lost.

**Screening.** Screening is the process of identifying and assessing individuals who may have knowledge of intelligence value. Screening is not in itself an intelligence collection technique, but it is a filter to identify those who could be of value. These individuals may be high level officials, adversary foot-soldiers or ordinary members of the public who could provide useful intelligence. Screening, where possible, should be conducted by trained operators, but all military personnel need to know the basics, including how to recognise potential HUMINT sources and ways of soliciting information of potential value. Even routine engagement with the people must be exploited.

**Biometric Data Collection.** Understanding can be significantly enhanced by the use of biometric data. This is costly and it may take time to gather a sufficient volume to be effective. Early decisions and investment are required. Legal and procedural protocols for sharing the information gathered with other security agencies, including the host nation, are also required.

**Arrest, Detention and Internment Operations.**
Such operations present an opportunity to gather and exploit documents, information technology and HUMINT. They also provide opportunities to turn individuals to the government’s cause. Even the perception of this can paralyse a covert network. Turning may include detention as a ploy, whereby an individual is questioned and released before the community has registered his absence. Thoughtless use of force, or even the inadvertent arrest of potential sources of information, can lead to lost opportunities. Detainees will have channels to their external organisation, so it is possible to have an informal dialogue and to pulse ideas to the adversary.

**Fear of Compromise Resulting from Arrest:**
“I want to reassure you about our situation. The summer started hot with operations escalating in Afghanistan. The enemy struck a blow against us with the arrest of Abu al-Faraj, may God break his bonds. However, no Arab brother was arrested because of him. The brothers tried and were successful to a great degree to contain the fall of Abu al-Faraj as much as they could.”

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8. In some exceptional cases the Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG) may fulfil the entire UK J2 function (e.g. Headquarters British Forces South Atlantic Islands).
9. Examples are targeting opportunities and threat information.
SECTION IV
ORGANISATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

A Single Intelligence Environment. All intelligence should be available to those who need it, in usable form. Intelligence collected by national and multinational agencies, such as Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), may be useful at the tactical level. Conversely, material collected by foot patrols may have strategic importance. This makes centralised coordination of collection and processing resources and the sharing of intelligence through a single intelligence environment vital. Intelligence communities of interest must be identified and re-assessed throughout a campaign. Accessibility must be a characteristic of intelligence, and any tendency to over-classify and compartmentalise intelligence product must be addressed. The commander needs to ensure that trust with intelligence agencies is maintained. The intelligence community is one based on norms that emphasise trust and discretion; a balance must be struck between the need to know and need to share. Sources and methods for gaining intelligence must be protected from accidental or ill-conceived compromise by the wider recipients. At the same time, it is important to share intelligence widely in order to reap the maximum benefit from it. This is amplified in a multinational, cross-government environment where risk will be viewed differently. Intelligence should be written for release. Paragraphs should be individually classified so that lower-classified material or ‘tear lines’ can be distributed more widely.

Interoperability. Organisational structures, procedures, and interoperability challenges between military and non-military intelligence agencies (including those of the host nation), will present obstacles that need to be overcome. It is essential to strive for a common intelligence picture.

You will never completely get the intelligence wing of an agency, such as the army or the police, to relinquish its independence. After a number of mistakes, we got people to agree that we were all on the same side, and therefore would share intelligence.*

Assistant Chief Constable Albiston, formerly Head Special Branch, Police Service of Northern Ireland

The Operational Intelligence Support Group. To enhance information sharing across national and multinational intelligence agencies the UK fields an Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG). The OISG provides a deployable and scaleable facility to complement the organic J2 capability* that is able to reach out to national intelligence support and specialist capabilities in order to provide assessed material and fused multi-intelligence product particularly at the higher levels of classification. Fusion of the national and defence intelligence picture with organic intelligence across the SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT and MASINT domains will provide the most complete available picture, enabling a locally based team of Defence and OGD specialists to provide focused, timely information and interpretation. The OISG will also prepare sanitised product for local dissemination, in response to specific tasking, as regular updates, or to push priority information to those with an immediate requirement for it. It will contribute to the strategic picture where the operational or tactical picture is seen to provide relevant new information. The following should be noted:

- The depth and continuity of knowledge that an OISG provides means that it can also fulfil a think-tank function or Red Team, from which commanders can rapidly access informed opinion to enhance their understanding.
- The OISG should provide the focal point for the risk management of need to know versus need to share. It should give guidance on how to exploit intelligence while protecting and supporting the sources of that intelligence.
- Intelligence operators in the OISG need to have a clear understanding of the reality on the ground. This means that they should routinely deploy with units in order to enable them to add value and nuance to their assessments.
- Although the OISG concept applies in both national and multinational environments, in practice it is difficult to fully integrate OISGs with allied and host nation intelligence networks. It may be necessary for the OISG to be gradually developed as the campaign progresses.

Open-source Analysis Cells. Below the theatre-level OISG, an All source Analysis Cell comprises a military command element and task-organised production section for processing information and intelligence to provide open-source intelligence products. All-source Analysis Cells augment intelligence cells throughout a force but do not have the direct reachout capability, nor the cross-government representation, of OISGs. Close coordination between them and the OISG enhances assessment, as does the fusion of caveated OISG material into more widely distributed J2 products. The Cell coordinates closely with J2 Plans to ensure...
that intelligence products meet commander’s needs, and that Information Requirements and Requests for Information (RFIs) raised during processing are addressed accordingly.

0837 **Network Enabled Reachout.** In-theatre commanders and staff require reachout, i.e. access to rear-based communities of subject matter experts. The role of these networks is to exploit the (often latent) intellectual capacity that can be tapped in support of the theatre. Reachout encompasses areas such as analysis on psychological profiling and previous adversary patterns of activity. Senior mentors are another source of corporate memory. This will ensure that knowledge and expertise can be leveraged even if it is not physically deployed. Knowledge networks should be coordinated by the Permanent Joint Headquarters on behalf of the theatre commander and formed from personnel recently returned from the operation along with those relevant experts in wider defence, industry, academia and government.

0838 **Intelligence Liaison Officers.** To facilitate information sharing between multinational organisations, trained intelligence personnel may be employed as intelligence liaison officers. Military intelligence liaison is overt contact by individuals with members of friendly organisations, including indigenous military and police organisations that, by virtue of their official positions, have access to information of potential intelligence value. The overt nature of this activity means that an organisation contacted will know the status of the liaison officers and the reason for interest. Military intelligence liaison is most effective when rapport and a mutual sense of trust have been developed between individuals.

0839 **Wider Distribution of Intelligence Expertise.** To facilitate the effective analysis of information and its broader access up, down and across the chain of command a wide distribution of intelligence staffs across the force is required. This should extend down to sub-unit level. These intelligence staffs must also be distributed among indigenous military and police forces both to acquire intelligence and, ultimately, to help them to build a self-sustaining indigenous intelligence capability. Commanders need to resource this wider distribution of intelligence staffs either through the provision of additional specialist intelligence personnel, or through the training of generalists for the role. However it is achieved, emphasis should be placed on the ability of all intelligence staffs to analyse HUMINT and SIGINT.

0840 **Improving Tactical Intelligence Capability.** While the maxim ‘every soldier is a sensor’ may be hackneyed, it is still pertinent. To maximise their potential, units (and staff officers) need to report assiduously what they observe on the ground and in meetings. This behaviour must be inculcated in pre-deployment training. Everyone must be briefed on the types of information that they are trying to obtain, methods and postures needed to extract it. Units require the technical means to pass information up and across the chain of command, as well as to input their own information requirements. The flow of intelligence is not a one-way street and, to be effective, generalist units will require access to wider information to focus their intelligence gathering role.

0841 **Specialist Intelligence Units.** The formation of theatre-specific intelligence units may be required to enable specialised surveillance and reconnaissance, HUMINT and indigenous capability to be exploited. Historically, in Kenya, Malaya, Northern Ireland and Rhodesia, the formation of such specialist units significantly enhanced the military intelligence capability to understand and neutralise adversarial groups.
SECTION V

EXPLOITING TECHNOLOGY

0842 Establishing an effective intelligence organisation requires major investment, both within and outside the theatre, and should be done from the outset of the campaign. Experience shows that investment made at the earliest stages will prove to be cost-effective in the long run. If done well, it will read across into savings in other areas, such as force protection.

0843 Communications and Information Systems:

- **Shared Databases.** Intelligence databases, in which information is available to different agencies in a common format, are a non-discretionary vital capability. This lesson was learned and successfully implemented by the Army in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s but has been overlooked in more recent operations. Since then even more powerful data mining techniques have been developed which can form a powerful collective memory.

- **Networks and Infrastructure.** Robust Communications and Information Systems networks, linking both military and non-military intelligence organisations, are critical to the gathering and exploitation of intelligence. Advances in web-based systems should be capitalised to enhance information sharing, which is constrained by traditional hierarchical chains of command. Procedures must be established so informal networks can rapidly be established, and information accessed between and across various levels of command within the security force and wider agencies.

- **Technical Compatibility.** System and software incompatibilities must be addressed in order to allow information sharing at required levels. Security will always be an issue, and some classification protocols will undoubtedly have to be adapted. However, even in multinational environments, systems can still remain secure whilst allowing the necessary access.

0844 **Emerging Technologies.** The integration of technologies such as face-recognition and side-scanning radar down to the lowest levels will significantly enhance operational effectiveness. This is especially true in theatres where there is a lack of national personal data (such as National Insurance numbers and driving licence details) or where western militaries find facial recognition difficult.

**Evolving an Intelligence Framework – Northern Ireland**

In 1994 Northern Ireland had over 37 separate intelligence gathering computer systems operating. Their focus was detection before, during and after paramilitary activity with a particular focus on PIRA. Key to the transformation was an electronic spring-clean of the Military Intelligence cupboard. Throughout the IRA ceasefires of 1995 and 1997-98, the British Army energetically transformed its armoury of computers. The scale and cost of this programme reflected the Army’s belief that it would continue to fight an intelligence war in Northern Ireland and that the surveillance war would increasingly become part of normal life in England.

The uses of two systems in particular were force multipliers: VENGEFUL, dedicated to vehicles, and CRUCIBLE, for people; the former linked to the Northern Ireland vehicle licensing office, the latter capable of ‘holding a personal file containing a map/picture showing where a suspect lived as well as details of family and past’. The two systems provide total cover of a largely innocent population, the sea within which the terrorist fish swam’.

From *The Irish War* by Tony Geraghty, JHU Press (2000)
“To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting”

Sun Tzu

SECTION I
Ends

SECTION II
Ways and Means

SECTION III
Critical Requirements of Adversaries

SECTION IV
Exploiting the Contemporary Operating Environment

08A01 Describing adversaries is difficult. Different terms and definitions are used for insurgents, irregulars, terrorists and criminals. Furthermore, different nations and organisations derive different meanings from these terms depending on the context.

Adversaries
Groups who oppose the host government and international force, and who possess a willingness to employ violence against them in addition to other subversive techniques such as instigating civil disorder by exploiting legal demonstrations, strikes or exacerbating political discontent.

08A02 Understanding the motivation of adversaries in a particular operational context is a prerequisite to designing measures to counter them. Military action to counter adversarial groups is usually required when normal law enforcement agencies cannot contain the level of routine violence. An approach based on categorisation of their likely ends, ways and means can be useful.
The Range of Adversaries. Numerous adversarial groups can affect the campaign simultaneously. They may come from diverse states and ethnic groups, and include foreign fighters and warlords. In most cases, adversarial groups will pursue specific objectives, be they economic or political.

Aims and Objectives. Groups mobilise, unify and define themselves around an aim or goal. This will shape the organisational structure and approach that the organisation adopts to both politics and the use of violence. It can be helpful to categorise adversarial groups, but it is not always straightforward to do so. Developing the decisive actors described in Chapter 5, four broad categories of adversarial groups may be identified:

- Indigenous Insurgents.
- Global Insurgents.
- Local Power Brokers.
- Adversarial Opportunists.

Each group is likely to align themselves for reasons of expediency, with other adversarial groups (which may include states).

Indigenous Insurgents. The indigenous insurgents will require popular support or acceptance. They may be nationalist and focused on an internal civil struggle, albeit with an ideological element. These groups are motivated to gain some state control and therefore they are often amenable to reconciliation through compromise on both sides. The support of an external state may also be a factor. The many proxy wars that took place in the 20th Century are examples of this, as are aspects of contemporary operations. Classical Counter Insurgency (COIN) theories, such as Mao’s Protracted War, still provide useful models to orientate military officers to the basic ends, ways and means of such nationalist groups.

Global Insurgents. Global insurgents will look to exploit the conflict for wider political purposes. Typically, their aim will be regional autonomy, or the destruction of the existing political order. Examples include Chechnya, Somalia and East Timor, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan in the form of al Qaeda cells and foreign fighters. The nature of their aims and objectives makes reconciliation unlikely. The focus of any intervention should be to separate global insurgents from indigenous groups, and neutralise them. The utility of a Joint Operations Area is challenged by global insurgents who work across such boundaries.

Local Power-Brokers. In some regions local power-brokers may predominate. The aim of such groups is to keep central governance weak. These groups are usually tribal and sometimes criminal. They may not aspire to political control, but rather to maintain local autonomy and power through mobilisation of support from the local population. Engagement may be necessary to prevent their alignment with, or exploitation by, insurgent groups.

Adversarial Opportunists. Opportunist groups, such as arms dealers, smugglers, people traffickers, pirates and narco-criminals, are motivated by greed and criminal activity. The absence of effective rule of law allows them to flourish. These groups are unlikely to be decisive and it may not be necessary to establish a political accommodation with them. Once sufficient governance as well as law and order have been established, their influence will be reduced by the host nation. In contrast, locally these groups may need to be dealt with in order to demonstrate government authority and to gain the support of local populations. Opportunist groups may acquire wealth which can be exploited by other adversarial groups, as well as denying revenue to the host nation. One example of this is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, initially a political movement, but which now incorporates armed criminal groups who sustain its activities from oil theft and ransom, which diminishes the oil revenue of Nigeria by more than $1billion a year.

1. The coordination of political and military action through a three phase strategy of Strategic Defence, Strategic Equilibrium and the Strategic Offensive phase.
SECTION II
WAYS AND MEANS

08A09 Finding a Cause. The leadership of adversarial groups will use a persuasive cause to mobilise support based on real grievances or unresolved contradictions with the host nation government. Adversaries will select causes that range from the deep-rooted and strategic, to the temporary and local. They will use a compelling narrative to justify their actions, while simultaneously depicting the motivations and behaviours of their opponents as illegitimate.

08A10 Invalidating the Cause. Where causes do not fully align with the real motivation of a group, they provide a fault-line that international forces can exploit to separate the adversary from the wider population. Where the cause is valid, and compromise politically acceptable, remedial action is required to remove the grievance and deny it as a source of leverage to the adversary. If the cause is not valid it should be demonstrated that adversaries cannot deliver their promises, or that their achievement will have disastrous political and social consequences.

08A11 Alternative Delivery. The adversary may challenge the delivery of human security and establish parallel governance structures. The host nation will need to demonstrate that they can deliver security, justice, governance and economic prosperity more effectively than their adversaries.

08A12 Accommodation Strategy. Commanders may need to strike accommodations with less hostile adversarial groups. This is not short-termism, but may be essential for long-term success. It is by these means that the commander may re-establish links between the national government, local authorities and the population. These activities need to be conducted with the full knowledge of the host nation government. Money and other resources may be useful levers to achieve such accommodations.

Mobilising Support

In December 2004 Osama Bin-Laden issued a statement that played to another source of resentment - the "stolen" oil, a narrative that would resonate throughout the region (note the breadth of what we would call the 'targeting directive' in the quote). This also provided a rationale for attacks against the coalition's economic Lines of Operation (and is evidence of why all elements of our own comprehensive approach are in the fight, whether they like it or not):

“One of the most important reasons that made our enemies control our land is the pilfering of our oil. Exert all that you can to stop the largest stealing operation in history ... Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf.”

In late 2005 Ayman al-Zawahiri told the Muslims of Iraq to concentrate their campaign on the “Muslims stolen oil...most of whose revenues go to the enemies of Islam.” Al-Qaeda aimed to raise the costs of the US occupation to an unacceptable level with attacks on oil infrastructure so that the full burden fell on the American taxpayer.

In December 2004 Osama Bin-Laden issued a statement that played to another source of resentment - the "stolen" oil, a narrative that would resonate throughout the region (note the breadth of what we would call the 'targeting directive' in the quote). This also provided a rationale for attacks against the coalition's economic Lines of Operation (and is evidence of why all elements of our own comprehensive approach are in the fight, whether they like it or not):
SECTION III
CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS OF ADVERSARIES

08A13 All adversarial groups are likely to have the following critical requirements. Following analysis (Chapter 9) it should be possible to identify those requirements most suitable to be attacked and denied. Potential approaches are described in the grey box.

08A14 **Figureheads.** Some groups may have a figurehead that embodies the cause and unifies support; this is not the same as leadership. Figureheads, such as Osama bin Laden or Moqtada al-Sadr, may not directly control the actions of adversarial groups but mobilise popular support. Indeed, they may already be a martyr.

The host nation government needs to compete against the figurehead without reinforcing their credibility. In some instances they may be able to use a narrative to counter them, but often they will have to work around them rather than risk bolstering their cause.

08A15 **Leadership.** All groups require leadership. They may exert direct control or operate indirectly. The larger the group the more difficult it will be to exercise central control without compromising security.

Identify, analyse and undermine it. Well-judged strike operations to neutralise individuals can also coerce others to desist or seek reconciliation.

08A16 **A Cause.** Groups require a cause; some animating grievance capable of being exploited.

See 08B10: Invalidating The Cause.

08A17 **Freedom of Movement.** Freedom of movement is dependent on tacit consent and the ability to blend in with the local population.

Physical movement can be restricted by population control (Chapter 11) and legal means, such as identity cards linked to a database. Interdicting lines of communication has proved to be difficult in the past, but offers high returns when successful. The most effective long-term solution is separate the adversary from the people, to isolate and neutralise him.
Recruits. Without the ability to maintain a flow of willing recruits, either from within the local population or foreign fighters, groups will be vulnerable to attrition. Paying-off potential recruits or offering them alternative opportunities can erode the recruiting base. Breaking the ideological link between the leaders and recruits may best be achieved through indirect means. For example, analysis of Palestinian groups in Lebanon showed that measures taken to prevent the radicalisation of young men should be directed at their fathers and not the youths themselves.

Weapons. The means to fight are a critical requirement. In many conflict-riven societies weapons are freely available, and so cutting supply may be impractical. Limiting access to weapons is difficult in armed societies. Even in unarmed societies, global markets and networks mean that high-tech weapons, traditionally confined to states, may be available to our adversaries. Coercion of states may limit or abate supply, but will not prevent it indefinitely; good intelligence and diplomacy will only go so far. Where no commercial product is available, adversaries improvise, often using very low-tech equipment. Equipment and adaptive Tactics (TTPs) (including attacking their weapon production system) are our best mitigation.

Safe Havens. Groups require areas where they can rest, regroup, train, resupply and plan their operations. Cyberspace is a partial safe haven in which insurgents can recruit, mobilise, raise and move funds, and advance their narrative. Both virtual and physical safe havens should be identified and monitored. If an intelligence advantage is likely to accrue, they should be attacked and denied to keep pressure on the adversary.

Essential Supplies. Food, water, medical supplies, combat supplies and means of communication are vital for adversarial groups. These will tend to be drawn from the local population, or by appropriating humanitarian aid. If the flow of these supplies is disrupted or uncertain, the threat will be undermined. Since these will often be delivered through a network in the population, the best approach will be to isolate the adversary physically and psychologically from popular support.

Intelligence. Adversarial groups require knowledge of the population in order to target, coerce, intimidate and recruit as well as provide counter-intelligence to avoid penetration. Counter-intelligence analysis, Operations Security and good TTPs, for example to spot dickers and informants, will reduce the adversary’s ability to generate intelligence. Again, since his collection systems move among the population, separating him from it is key.

Finance. Although irregular activity can be inexpensive relative to the costs of countering it, groups rely on funds generated from two broad sources: illegal activities and donations. Work comprehensively to identify the physical and virtual networks for raising, moving and hiding money. Identify the physical links in theatre and break them. Attack the nexus between illicit activity that generates revenue and adversaries that use it.

3. Dinker is a colloquial term used to describe seemingly innocent bystanders who are actively monitoring and reporting on security force activity.
SECTION IV
EXPLOITING THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

08A24 Propaganda of the Deed. Adversarial groups orchestrate violence to have the maximum effect on targeted audiences. The media effect of this violence may be more important than the physical damage since the act of violence is often designed to undermine international efforts and build their own support base. Understanding the effects sought by adversarial groups can assist in establishing defensive and offensive measures to counter them. Figure 8A.1 illustrates some of the desired effects of violence by adversaries.

08A25 Effects Aimed to Undermine the Host Nation/ Intervention Forces Objectives. The following paragraphs are the generic, but not exhaustive, effects that adversarial groups may wish to achieve on target audiences through violence:

- Undermine Political Resolve. An example may be an act of terrorism used to undermine international political resolve.
- Unhinge a Comprehensive Approach. Attacks on vulnerable civilian agencies may create a perception within the comprehensive community that security is inadequate, so preventing them from operating.
- Dissipate Security Forces' Effort. Widespread insecurity may dissipate and fix the security effort, thereby reducing the freedom of manoeuvre of the commander.
- Provocation. Violence may be designed to provoke an over-reaction that will deepen popular grievances against the security forces and government.

Figure 8A.1 - The Desired Effects of Violence by Adversaries
Effects Aimed to Support Adversaries’ Objectives.

• Create Disorder. Attacks designed to create disorder and weaken government control may enhance tacit support and freedom of manoeuvre.

• Increase Discontentment. Disorder is likely to foster popular discontent and the perception of the host nation government’s inability to deliver security.

• Intimidate the Population. Violence may be designed to coerce and compel local support.

• Recruitment. Acts of violence can stimulate the recruiting base, particularly among young disenfranchised men who crave the kudos, comradeship and opportunities that come from being in a fighting organisation.

• Underpin Credibility. The capability to deliver violence may demand a response from government and security forces so conferring status and credibility on a group out of proportion to its size and popular support.

Attacking Political Resolve: 11 March 2004, emergency services at the scene of the Madrid train bombing which killed 191 people and injured 1,824. The attack, claimed by sympathisers of al-Qaeda, the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade, was the worst terrorist strike Spain had ever known. Commentators noted plausibly that the incident may have contributed to the result of the Spanish national election and subsequent withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.
The relationships between strategic and operational intelligence organisations is mapped in Figure 8B.1.

**Figure 8B.1 – Strategic Intelligence Relationships**

- BSS: British Security Service
- CDI: Chief of Defence Intelligence
- DFID: Department for International Development
- DGC: Defence Geographic Centre
- DHO: Defence HUMINT Organisation
- DIS: Defence Intelligence Staff
- FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- FLC: Front Line Command
- ICG: Intelligence Collection Group
- JAGO: Joint Aeronautical and Geospatial Organisation
- JARIC: Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre
- JSSO: Joint Service Signals Organisation
- NSO: National SIGINT Organisation (GCHQ)
- PJHQ: Permanent Joint Headquarters
- OISG: Operational Intelligence Support Group
- SCOG: Security Cooperation Tasking Group
- SIS: Secret Intelligence Service
- SOCA: Serious and Organised Crime Agency
- SIS: Secret Intelligence Service
- SOCA: Serious and Organised Crime Agency

This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
08B02  The Defence Intelligence Staff. The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) is responsible for strategic intelligence and provides all-source intelligence support to current and contingent military operations, the latter in concert with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). It also monitors potential crisis areas in accordance with designated priorities. DIS activity is also affected by the Security Cooperation Operational Tasking Group (SCOG) process (Figure 8A.1). Owned by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations), the SCOG draws together MOD Commitments Staff, DIS and PJHQ to consider worldwide matters of concern and the potential for any UK military activity.

08B03  Permanent Joint Headquarters. PJHQ J2 leads on Chief of Joint Operations’ intelligence policies within the theatre, providing, for example, information exchange policies and legal policy for Human Intelligence (HUMINT). It supports the Joint Task Force (JTF) through the supply of intelligence, conducting collaborative research with the JTF J2 and the DIS and providing a route for Information Requirements from theatre. PJHQ has operational command of any deployed Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG), which, through forward deployed liaison officers, provides operational level links to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Government Communications Headquarters and the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre. These organisations in turn have links with other countries’ national agencies. PJHQ is responsible for:

• Owning and planning the JTF intelligence architecture
• Owning and staffing all J2 requirements for the JTF
• Managing the Intelligence Directive, and co-writing the initial Intelligence and Security Management Plan with the Joint Headquarters.
• Managing the Naval Command N2 and Air Warfare Centre A2 subject matter expert support, which is provided to PJHQ J2 under a Service Level Agreement.

08B04  Joint Task Force Headquarters. A JTF Headquarters will usually have an integral intelligence organisation, adjusted or augmented to meet its requirements. This may include an OISG and support from strategic intelligence organisations and agencies, or from outside the intelligence community providing local, regional or cultural expertise.

08B05  Joint, Inter-Agency and Multinational Operations. Command and control of the intelligence process on coalition operations must reflect the need to integrate with Joint, inter-agency and multinational partners in order that situational awareness is maximised. National and local agreements should outline the architecture, access and processes to be adopted. National caveats can be mitigated through the use of ‘tear lines’ where necessary. To facilitate multinational shared situational awareness, National Intelligence Centres (NICs) should, where possible, be collocated with J2. Additionally NIC staff should be integrated and include officers with the authority to release national intelligence.
CHAPTER 9
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS

‘Do not believe what you want to believe until you know what it is you need to know’

RV Jones1

This chapter describes the process and output of analysis. It explains the imperative to analyse the interaction of key groups and their impact on national politics. Before attempting to solve a problem it is necessary to understand it. Analysis is the process through which that understanding is achieved, and from which the commander can begin to develop scenarios that test his theory for change based on a clear grasp of the strategic context. Supported by intelligence, it provides that basic knowledge which informs planning. The output can then inform the estimate and provide the depth of understanding necessary to plan and execute military operations.

Strategic and regional analysis does not start with crisis planning; it is part of contingency planning and should have driven the National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence) sub-committee and Ministry of Defence (MOD) Strategic Planning Groups in reaching their conclusions on national strategy. An operational level commander would hope to have a considerable amount of information and intelligence available to him. However, in reality, this is often not the case, as in Kosovo in 1999 when even basic campaign planning data was scarce. Analysis is primarily for the benefit of the commander. He is the main recipient of it, and is also the main contributor due to his theatre-wide perspective and access to other leaders and actors. He should develop his own analysis team drawn from his headquarters and where possible include international partners, Other Government Departments (OGDs) and host nation officials.

Analysis is the examination of the relationship between elements to obtain the optimal understanding of the operational context, and anticipates its likely development. Climate and topographical details, sources of water and energy, features and their implications (e.g. Helmand River and ‘Green Zone’; Kajaki Dam and Khyber Pass) will shape Courses of Action (CoAs) and possible responses. An analysis of the people involved, their wealth, society and culture, their neighbours and their relationships will also be critical to campaign design. However, a commander will rarely be able to develop the sophisticated, nuanced understanding of how other actors make their policy decisions, or how an unfamiliar economy, society or individual and collective psychology of leaders and citizens actually work. Caution should be exercised in trying to model human systems and the results of military action against them. Human groups are not physical systems, and the science of systems analysis has limited utility in modelling human behaviour; an understanding of sociology and anthropology is probably more relevant.

Initial analysis conducted jointly by the military and OGDs should inform the formulation of the theory of change; a robust thesis on the ways and means required to resolve a problem. It primes campaign planning but must not be done just once. Analysis should be continuously refined and the assumptions challenged. A combination of continuous analysis and assessment should identify changes and identify the potential effect of planned activities, allowing the commander to refine his plan and minimise undesirable consequences.

Analysis factors will vary from one situation to another. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5-00 Campaign Planning suggests factors that apply to all operational scenarios including: geo-strategic; the physical environment; and national and regional infrastructure. These are pertinent and should be analysed, but stabilisation will always require analysis of the politics of the conflict, with groups as the focus, in order to determine how influence can be applied to achieve the desired political settlement.

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3. Defined in COED – study of mankind, especially of its societies and customs.
4. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla, 2009, describes the factors that lead significant groups to conform to the methods of terrorist and insurgent groups without sharing their political motivation.
SECTION II

FOCUSING ON POLITICAL ANALYSIS

0906 Political Order. A detailed political and social analysis should identify the decisive social groups and the source of their political authority, their interactions – including their political alliances – interdependencies and rivalries, and the critical economic and political resources over which these groups compete and cooperate. A broad classification of groups is in Chapter 5, Section I (groups may be seen as friendly, neutral, belligerent, opportunist or adversarial – of a combination of these). Finally, it will identify their propensity for violence. The resulting picture of the political order is likely to look very different from western democracies. For instance, bodies such as the Office of the Commander-in-Chief in Iraq may wield significant direct and indirect power.

0907 Social Groups. Any human collective can be considered as a social group, whatever its size, when participants unite around common goals they become a social group. Typically, these draw upon unifying social distinctions such as language, ethnicity, tribe, clan, religion, income and qualifications. Once unified, they are then able to cooperate with each other – groups might then monopolise resources, thereby excluding others, to achieve their goals. No social group exists in isolation. All are affected by their interaction and competition with other groups; they are likely to be mutually interdependent and reactive. This is what is meant by a conflict eco-system. As a result of globalisation, this eco-system may have wider regional and even international consequences. Western culture is heavily individualist and tends to emphasise the propensity for individual, rational decision making. In other cultures, the group identities are likely to be shaped by the objectives and tribal links of the collective group. Identifying the decisive groups and their identities, and then persuading them to support the government through focused influence campaigns may be more effective than killing and capturing adversaries.

0908 Gaining Support. It is likely that dominant groups will enjoy privileged and unrepresentative access to political and economic resources in fragile states. They may own the sources of wealth, enjoy the support of powerful allies and use military force to intimidate or defend the population. Part of the commander’s task is to remove or ameliorate these obstacles to legitimate political control, so that the government is able to gain the support, or at least the consent, of the majority of the population. To do this, the government will need to demonstrate that the benefits it offers are preferable to those offered by other groups.

0909 Reversing Social Fragmentation. Establishing a legitimate regime around an identified group can be difficult. The group should be empowered so that the population becomes contentedly reliant on it. However, there will be other competing groups trying to undermine its authority. International intervention is likely to assist the selected groups to attain sufficient economic, political and military authority so that they can command the allegiance of the wider population through the provision of resources. However, in failed or failing states the means to achieve this may be absent, and where people have little experience of centralised government, this can be difficult to achieve. Intervention must also counter the causes of state fragmentation. Accidental guerrillas* result from the atomisation of society, the absence of effective justice and governance and catalyse factors, such
as the presence of foreign troops. The population will need to be turned away from their dependence on adversarial hostile and belligerent forces by fracturing these groups and their linkages to the population.

**Application of Resources.** The offer of economic, political and military resources to the decisive group could be used to stimulate internal reform of indigenous neutral and friendly groups. Prompting changes that have to be consistent with the local political realities and avoid the impression of imposing inappropriate external systems. The involvement of international organisations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, UN and EU to support the emergent regime will be necessary. These organisations not only provide critical economic and political resources, but will confer legitimacy on the regime which adversarial and belligerent groups lack.

**Networks.** It is useful to consider social groups as a network of networks. The different strategies and aims of each group affect the others. Commanders should map the geography of the social and political network, identifying the relations between groups and their mutual interaction. The networks may not be confined to the specific province or country; many networks are transnational. In order to defeat the network not just the attack it may be necessary to involve the international community in support for the friendly regime, whilst simultaneously denying critical resources such as money, political favour, media access, legitimacy and weapons to adversarial groups from transnational networks.

**Elites.** Political elites are small groups which hold disproportionate power. Those which are capable of achieving a political accommodation with decisive groups need to be identified and persuaded. The leaders of elites are invariably the product of the social group, representing its collective character and objectives, rather than necessarily determining them. Such leaders are the channels through which the commander can achieve an effect on the group. The aim is to identify them, understand their relationships and potential influence, and their sources of power.

**Working Through Elites.** Political analysis may help to identify the elites which should be empowered and those which not. It may be that the elites which are capable of winning popular support and stabilising the country may not offer the preferred solution. However, providing that their behaviour can be modified, working through them may be preferable to promoting elites who do not have the credibility to achieve the necessary popular support. Having identified credible elites through whom to work, it should be made clear that support for them will be conditional. Deciding those leaders and elites which are to be supported is a significant political choice and, at the start of a campaign, the military

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**Local Elites.** A political settlement will be the result of local political leaders bargaining and coming to an agreement, often facilitated by a third party. Agreement that excludes a major grouping will lack legitimacy and is unlikely to endure. Here, Iraqi political leaders discuss the formation of a new Government during a meeting at President Talabani’s residence on 24 March 2006 with the US Ambassador.
The Importance of Geographical Locations.

Geography is important. One of the consequences of violence erupting in fragile or failed states is that populations begin to migrate and concentrate around group identities. They move to places which have symbolic, political, economic and security value to them. Furthermore, the significance of cultural and religious symbols may spur the government to make their security a priority, to invest in their protection as they might for critical national infrastructure. It may also delegate authority and responsibility to regional authorities for this purpose, thereby creating a local political accommodation with a competing elite. These geographical locations have operational significance, as they become focal points for influence by political, economic and military means.

The Importance of Symbolic Locations and Buildings.

Often unguarded, as their importance may not be clear to coalition forces, the adversary will target and exploit any opportunity due to his greater understanding of local cultural factors.

These pictures are of the golden mosque of Imam Hassan al-Askari in Samarra (left). This shrine has enormous significance for Shia Muslims. On 22 February 2006 militants bombed the shrine (centre) leaving it in ruins. It was al-Qaeda’s intention to trigger brutal nationwide Shia and Sunni sectarian clashes that would sharply underscored Iraq’s religious divide and lead to civil war. The civilian death toll rose from 2165 in February 2006 to a peak of 3700 in November that year before falling off again to below 1000 civilian deaths per month by August 2008. The strategy failed and in February 2008, Iraqi workers began a reconstruction project aimed at restoring the revered shrine (right).

History and Culture.

History will often provide key pointers to the evolution of a country’s power base. This can be deeply personal with religious, cultural and sectarian issues helping to fuel a legacy of conflict. For example, the Battle of the Boyne 1690 helps us to understand the Northern Ireland (NI) Protestant tradition; the Dublin Easter Rising 1916 has a similar significance to the Irish Republican movement; and Serbs hold dear the history of the Battle of Kosovo 1389, the location of which near Kosovo Polje was an important factor in understanding the Serbian position during the Kosovo conflict. Culture is shaped by history and planners will need to be familiar with both. It is important to ensure that we work with the social and cultural grain and do not impose solutions that will not root and endure when local institutions are leading.
How to Conduct Political and Social Analysis

Centre of Gravity (CoG) identification and analysis lies at the heart of operational art. In stabilisation, the myriad groups likely to impact the outcome – and their varied political objectives – demand detailed analysis. For this reason CoG analysis demands a different focus from conventional campaigning. The deductions made from CoG analysis will help the commander choose on whom, when and where to exert influence. In turn they will help him define his decisive conditions.

Defining Centres of Gravity. A CoG is a moral, political or physical centre of power, characterised by what it can do and the influence it can exert. This influence is the sum of its critical capabilities. Because the ultimate aim of stabilisation is a political settlement, it may be useful to think of CoGs as the elites or leaders of the decisive groups that are in competition within the conflict eco-system. Multiple CoG analyses are likely to be required on the decisive groups in order to understand them and their relationships with each other.

Multiple Centres of Gravity Analysis. Understanding the impact of the decisive groups (friendly, neutral, opportunist, belligerent and adversarial) demands a sociological analysis. The greater understanding of the controlling elites that can be achieved, the better the ultimate plan to re-balance the conflict relationship. Success will depend on developing a detailed intelligence picture to identify those covert irregular groups and their leaders, and to provide evidence to support the analysis and subsequent planning. This picture will emerge from early prevent activity and be reinforced by shape operations. Over time, group identities and dynamics change, and CoGs may shift.

Analysing of Critical Requirements. Having determined the multiple CoGs through an iterative process of identifying their critical capabilities, the commander can then begin to identify and analyse their critical requirements and their critical vulnerabilities. A CoG is not usually attacked directly, but is unlocked by neutralising their critical capabilities by threatening, denying or attacking those critical requirements that can be reached; commonly these are their critical vulnerabilities. In this way, it may be possible to simultaneously attack or undermine numerous adversarial critical requirements while protecting those of groups deemed friendly. Critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities are likely to be a mix of political, economic, and military attributes. From these the commander can begin to describe a series of decisive conditions pertaining to each decisive group, which must be met for the stabilisation operation to achieve the desired end-state (the political settlement).

Stabilisation Centres of Gravity Analysis

Critical Capabilities: Primary moral, political or physical attributes that allow the CoG to exert its influence in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission.

Critical Requirements: Essential conditions, resources and means for a CoG to be fully operative.

Critical Vulnerability: Derived from Critical Requirements, these are essential conditions, resources and means that, if successfully threatened or attacked, will fatally weaken the CoG.

Friendly Centres of Gravity Analysis. Because an adversary’s CoG may be difficult to identify initially, a good starting point may be to examine the CoGs of friendly groups, since empowering them should help contribute to the development of a stable state. The government is likely to be the principal, decisive friendly group, and its critical capability will be its ability to govern. The analysis should include: the political order the government seeks to establish; the extent of its control and the extent to which it can exert its authority throughout the country; the level of support of competing elites and the wider population it requires to govern; and the basis of its legitimacy. Once these factors have been considered, the critical requirements can be identified. These may include economic resources, governance structures and effective security forces. The government will also require the active support of other elites and a sustainable political settlement amongst those with whom they compete. Once these critical requirements are identified, the analysis can move on to the government’s critical vulnerabilities. These may be derived directly from the critical requirements. For example, if the critical requirement is the impartial rule of law, then a critical vulnerability is that which will prevent an independent legal system operating. Once identified, these vulnerabilities must be protected or reduced; in many cases through the reform of governance structures.
Opponent Centres of Gravity. Analysis will identify the adversaries’ elites and critical capabilities, their political objectives and how they are challenging the government. As understanding develops, analysis should identify how the adversarial groups view themselves, their goals and objectives, and how they mobilise themselves and their supporting population in pursuit of these. Like friendly groups, adversaries have critical requirements that are also political, economic and military. For example, groups may depend on extortion for funding, or to gain unrestricted movement through checkpoints. These critical requirements should be identified and their weaknesses, that is their critical vulnerabilities, exploited. It is also necessary to understand the narrative which adversaries will use to exploit grievances in other target groups, and the political and social dynamics that give context to their behaviour.

Nested Centres of Gravity. CoG analysis may reveal that one group may already be, or will become a critical requirement of another. Through mapping of the conflict relationship and identification of these group relationships and inter-dependencies, we can begin to design how we might alter the conflict relationship. Indeed, analysis may identify that a third group is such a critical requirement to a number of competing elites that it may become a CoG within the conflict relationship as a whole. When trying to influence groups (neutral, belligerent or opportunist) to support government, the commander should seek to use constructive acts to gain leverage. For example, by providing the key resource that a group needs he may be able to alter the inter-group relationship, and shift a local balance of power. Conversely, where a friendly group, such as the government, is obstructing campaign progress it may be appropriate to deny a critical requirement until their behaviour is modified. The support to all groups by international partners should be seen as conditional. However, care is required; the conflict relationship is an open system. It must be understood that there are clear limitations for predicting accurately the effects of leverage on groups. They also evolve, and analysis must capture this.

Identifying Critical Vulnerabilities

There are fracture lines within insurgencies. In March 2007, in an open letter, a Sunni insurgent leader questioned al-Qaeda Iraq’s lack of consultation over setting up an Islamic State: breaking up Iraq had never been a goal of the mainstream Ba’athist ‘honourable resistance’ movements. This fundamental difference over ends as well as frictions over ways and means (attacks on civilians for example, and al-Qaeda-Iraq’s challenge to tribal power structures) was a major factor in the Anbar Awakening.8

Cross-Government Analysis. Typically, military J2 organisations are ill-equipped to conduct political and social analysis. Expertise should be brought in or exploited through reachout. This may include the following:

• Sociologists and anthropologists.
• Psychologists to profile individual leaders.
• Indigenous cultural and political experts.
• Seeking to understand local economic markets and conditions.
• Other security experts (Police, organised crime, customs and excise).

Methodologies. Many methodologies can be used
to conduct analysis. Commanders will have preferences and the context may demand a specialist approach. One common methodology used extensively is Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information. Other human terrain analysis tools, such as social network analysis and Human-Geospatial products, may help to analyse the links between and within groups. However, these tools may lack fidelity at the theatre level. Table 9.1 is intended to assist the JS/3 branches. It lays out a series of iterative questions focused on the groups which should continually be addressed and refined throughout the campaign. This will allow information requirements to be better focused and improve understanding.

SECTION IV

**Questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Deductions</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Who are the decisive groups in the conflict? [Friendly, Neutral, Belligerent and Adversaries’ CoG]</td>
<td>Identify: • Causes and symptoms of the conflict, and the existing conflict relationships. • Decisive groups in the conflict-ecosystem as the campaign’s multiple CoGs. • What or where does the decisive group derive its power? Alternatively, since the relationship will be one of mutual benefit, what, or who does the group influence? • The political elites/key leaders in the decisive groups and determine the influence they have on their groups and wider situation.</td>
<td>Prioritise the groups and elites to be empowered/supported, reassured, persuaded or marginalised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the political goals of each of the decisive groups? [Critical Capabilities]</td>
<td>Identify: • The key resources/issues that decisive groups are competing, which forms the basis of their political goals. • The basis of mobilisation to achieve their goals and thus the power base they require – e.g. ethnic, national, tribal, religious, economic, class, ideological. • The political order they seek to create or exploit to achieve their goals.</td>
<td>Identify the potential political settlement and specific accommodations which are likely to be achievable on each decisive group to meet UK interests. This will range from modification of behaviour of some groups to the neutralisation of irreconcilable groups. (Note: multinational and host nation partners may have differing opinions on what accommodations are acceptable.) Determine how to engage with the political elites, through economic, military and diplomatic means in order to achieve the required political settlement. This may include the removal of some leaders to change the behaviour of the group or neutralisation of other groups.</td>
</tr>
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Table 9.1 – CoG Analysis on Decisive Groups (continued opposite)
This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

### JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Deductions</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 3. What are the groups’ primary economic resources?  
[Critical Requirements/Vulnerabilities] | To achieve their goals, all groups need economic resources to sustain themselves. The staff should identify those critical to the attainment of the group’s goals, and determine how they are likely to be attained. | The means which are available to facilitate or impede access to economic resources. This is a key area of political leverage over friendly, neutral, belligerent and adversarial groups.  
*(May form a decisive condition or supporting effect.)* |
| 4. What are the groups’ primary political resources?  
[Critical Requirements/Vulnerabilities] | Identify:  
• The local, national and transnational political alliances/rivalries which enable or impede the group from achieving their goals.  
• The institutions of government which the group is able to use or needs to use to achieve their goals (judiciary, prison system, police and militias). | The means of consolidating/fragmenting the alliances of the decisive groups.  
The means of protecting/supporting friendly groups from adversaries while exposing those of the adversaries.  
The measures necessary to increase the political authority of friendly groups.  
The kinship links of friendly and hostile groups which often act as key political resources.  
*(May form a decisive condition or supporting effect.)* |
| 5. What are the decisive groups’ military resources?  
[Critical Requirements/Vulnerabilities] | Identify military resources, access to arms, ordnance and recruits.  
See Understanding Adversaries Annex 8B. | Identify the measures to reinforce or degrade this capability of particular groups. This may have transnational political implications.  
*(May form a decisive condition or supporting effect.)* |

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9 Decisive groups will need to be defined at a macro-level to prevent being immersed in detail. Additionally, creating too many splinter groups may be expedient in the short term, but will make longer-term management by the host nation very difficult. The ultimate goal is to unite groups within a viable state.
THE OUTPUT OF ANALYSIS

0925 Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix. The questions in the Aide Memoire at Table 9.1, supported by more detailed analytical tools, enable the staff to capture the output of the analysis of decisive groups in a CoG matrix. Each group’s CoG, critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities, and linkages to other groups can then be refined and the means to influence specific groups can be deduced. Annex 9A offers examples of CoG analysis matrices on a (generic) government and an adversarial group. Although CoG analysis may be conducted on multiple groups, in a complex operating environment the commander may wish to select a focal CoG linked to the campaign end-state, contained in his strategic guidance. For example, a candidate focal CoG could be popular support for the indigenous government (from which it derives its ability to govern – its critical capability).

0926 Schematics and the Map. Although the CoG matrix is a useful tool for analysis, the relationships between decisive groups are most easily represented on a map schematic. Although they risk over-simplifying the situation, schematics can help to unify understanding and ensure that the big ideas do not get lost in detail. An example of a conflict relationship schematic to capture the dynamic between decisive groups is at Annex 9B, which can be produced on the agile campaign planner used by the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). This level of fidelity is appropriate at the theatre level. At the tactical level, more detailed analysis will examine streets and local kinship networks. A common approach across the theatre is required to ensure that there is a clear link between all levels of command.

0927 Depicting Groups by Attitude to the Political Settlement. Figure 9.2 is an illustration of the attitude of specified groups towards the local government at a given time. This technique may help to generate shared understanding and approaches, (both military and non-military), to determine how to influence the behaviour of groups. As the Northern Ireland vignette on page 9-14 shows, the attitudes and behaviour of groups change over time and therefore should be constantly re-assessed.

0928 Advice. Understanding developed through analysis should enable commanders and partners to provide informed advice to ministers or strategic partners. A good understanding of the problem and the potential scenarios that might emerge will help inform both political and operational choices. This can be particularly useful when deciding upon early levels of investment, modification to military and OGD structures, and the capabilities likely to be required in theatre.

10 As represented by the Population Support overlays in US Field Manual 3-24 Counter-insurgency (Appendix B-6).
In 1968 the main protagonists in Northern Ireland were the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Stormont Government. The nationalist and unionist paramilitaries were initially minor players. While the Irish Government was assumed to want the unification of Ireland, it was expected that the UK Government would steadfastly support Stormont. Although right in 1968, it became clear that both of these assumptions changed over time.

Once NICRA’s demands had been met their significance faded. By 1970, the nationalist paramilitaries, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), had effectively split into two groups: the Official (OIRA) and Provisional wings (PIRA), with PIRA taking the leading nationalist role. The British Army had deployed to the Province in strength to protect the Catholic community, in response to the actions of the Protestant paramilitary groups, who had begun to wage their campaign of sectarian attacks.

In March 1972, Stormont was suspended in favour of direct rule from Westminster. The Irish Government were now calling for a UN peacekeeping force to prevent the clandestine delivery of arms to Northern Ireland; overtly demonstrating their lack of support for unification in the circumstances of the day.

Within four years it can be seen that each group had changed their position due to a combination of military and political action. Any classification of groups should be regarded as a snapshot in time rather than a permanent evaluation.11
Focal Friendly Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign End-state: The Political Settlement/Political Order required – achieved through reaching a political accommodation with each decisive group to accept it.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Accommodation/Modification of Behaviour Required: Determine the modification of behaviour and political system of local government that is acceptable to competing elites to achieve a political settlement (for example representative, not corrupt).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 - Centre of Gravity (The elite of the group)</th>
<th>2 - Critical Capabilities (What operationally decisive thing is the CoG able to do, or is trying to do?)</th>
<th>3 - Critical Requirements (What does a CoG need in order to be able to act?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The indigenous central government.</td>
<td>The ability to independently govern and control competing elites.</td>
<td>Any threat to the Critical Requirements, typically from the insurgency but also from competing elites, internal incompetence or corruption (real or perceived).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Critical Vulnerabilities (What stops a CoG from acting?)</td>
<td>5 - Critical Requirements (What does a CoG need in order to be able to act?)</td>
<td>Legitimacy: the government must mobilise domestic support around coherent shared understandings or ideologies (be they ethnic, nationalist, religious or political). It must communicate its intentions, an effective narrative is necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisive conditions will aim to eliminate vulnerabilities and ensure that the critical requirements are met.</td>
<td>Economic base: the ability to raise funds sustainably, particularly through taxation.</td>
<td>Security: monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal system: the capacity to provide impartial justice and rule of law.</td>
<td>Legal system: the capacity to provide impartial justice and rule of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other departments of state: especially those that meet the basic needs of the people.</td>
<td>Political alliances with elite groups domestically and internationally.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Centre of Gravity (CoG) analysis is the process used to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of the principal protagonists. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5-00 (2nd Edition) Campaigning Planning considers bi-polar, multiple, non-opponent and focal point CoG. They all share a common approach; only the factors applied, and the situation for which they are best suited, differ. This Annex adds texture to the process to better support security and stabilisation tasks; in a contested environment, a commander is likely to require CoG analysis for multiple (decisive) groups – friendly, neutral, belligerent and adversarial. Focal CoGs are intended for complex situations involving many actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix: Belligerent or Potential Adversarial Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Campaign End-state:</strong> The political settlement or political order required – achieved through reaching a sustainable political accommodation with each decisive group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Political Accommodation/Modification of Behaviour Required:</strong> Determine what modification of behaviour is required to achieve accommodation. The cessation of violence outside the law imposed. To adhere to the national law and relinquish desire for autonomy. Neutralisation of the Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>1 - Centre of Gravity</strong> (The elite of the Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The elite of Belligerent or Adversarial group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>2 - Critical Capabilities</strong> (What is the operationally decisive thing that the CoG is able to do or is trying to do?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to challenge indigenous government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilise population against the government by reference to political ideology, religious or ethnic identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>3 - Critical Requirements</strong> (What does a CoG need in order to be able to act?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monopolise critical political resources (internal and external), local and global alliances. Local kinship links will be crucial as will alliances with other subversive groups globally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monopolise critical economic resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monopolise military resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(For examples of critical requirements see Annex 8B, Section III).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4 - Critical Vulnerabilities</strong> (What stops a CoG from acting?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contradictions in or inadequacy of their ideology/legitimacy. Information campaigns demonstrate that the goal and objectives they seek are impossible or dangerous. They cannot deliver the benefits they offer without the support of the host nation government and wider international community. Their dependence on economic, political, and military resources may be exploited or interdicted. The group can be weakened by isolating it from its critical requirements through military and non-military means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decisive security conditions will address these vulnerabilities of the insurgency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 9B

SCHEMATIC OF CONFLICT RELATIONSHIPS

Map A – Key Centres of Political Influence and Economic Resources
‘Campaign planning is a term fraught with danger. Many say they are doing it, when only a few should be – and then, only rarely. The many should be planning operations arising from, and in support of, the Campaign Plan... If care is not taken, planning at the ‘Campaign’ level can be irrelevant to that happening on the ground; indeed activity continues despite the planning, not because of it.’

Senior UK Military Planner
This chapter considers cross-government, campaign and military planning. Reflecting on the quotation at the start, the reader should note the following:

1. A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of ends (outcomes and objectives), ways (the paths to them) and means (resources, which includes time). A successful strategy for stabilisation will require the means to be weighted. As the campaign develops, so weight of effort will shift between the instruments of power. Resources will be multinational and inter-agency, and should be brought to bear at the right time and sequence and in the right place. The management of this is made more difficult because effects within a comprehensive approach occur at different rates.

2. In-theatre planning will be conducted at all levels and in different locations. There will be a profusion of plans which, while linked, will rarely form a neat hierarchy. There can only be, however, one campaign plan, which must be understood and supported in letter and spirit by all involved.

3. The need for plans to be aligned creates tension between the actors. The skill is to avoid its destructive potential, but instead use it creatively. Assimilating cross-government objectives into a theatre integrated plan will provide a reference point against which disaggregated, yet coherent planning can take place. Planners should then prioritise, synchronise and sequence activity to achieve pan-theatre coherence.

Campaign design should decentralise command and decision-making. Our traditional approach that casts an enemy in our own mould and relies on centralised targeting boards and a faster decision cycle to deconstruct it will not be appropriate. The theatre headquarters should set out the major milestones in an integrated campaign plan that includes a description of the broad direction of travel for all partners, and provides the unifying purpose. It should confer on more junior leaders the authority to execute it, and afford them the freedom and means to do so in ways that meet local needs.

Only in exceptional and unusual circumstances will purely military objectives be appropriate. All activity, military or otherwise, that supports the campaign objectives is conducted for political purpose. Activity conducted in isolation will only achieve short-term narrow effects, or be nugatory and fail to contribute in any meaningful way to the long-term solution. Military planners must constantly ask themselves: how does my planned activity support the wider, cross-government and coalition initiative; and, does my plan tie-in sufficient cross-government and coalition support?

Where Are We Now?

At the point of production of this doctrine, the UK approach to cross-government, comprehensive planning is evolving. The Stabilisation Unit Guidance on Strategic Planning and Execution seeks to formalise a cross-government process, but it is not yet endorsed across Whitehall. Previous attempts at cross-government planning which have included the MOD have failed to be truly comprehensive. What has resulted instead is a broad government strategy and a profusion of departmental plans beneath it. Even where attempts by the FCO, DFID and MOD have been made to join up an approach such as the Helmand Road Map, the plan has arguably failed to take full account of the direction of the Alliance campaign plan which sets the higher theatre direction; multinationality brings its own challenges of followership and cooperation.

The MOD is able to plan and manage crisis activity on a scale that Other Government Departments (OGDs) are not. Somehow there is a need to find a gearing mechanism to coordinate government strategy with the individual departmental plans by fusing their high level aims and objectives. If this can be done in a truly comprehensive way, it will be possible to produce a comprehensive campaign plan. If it cannot, the best that may be achieved are departmental plans – for the military a campaign plan – that act comprehensively. As the notion of a comprehensive approach gains traction across government and the international community, the aspiration for the former is increasingly likely to be realised.

There is currently no universal template for collaborative planning at the operational or theatre level. Existing models described in JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition) Campaign Planning suggest several variations in inter-departmental collaboration. Three illustrative scenarios are described in which the military either acts: first alone; second in loose cooperation with national agencies as part of a multi-agency operation; or finally with close inter-agency collaboration under a unified cross-Government Strategy (Figure 10.1 Model C). However, in complex stabilisation tasks not even Model C goes far enough in ensuring that the theatre campaign plan is knitted into the cross-government strategy and supports OGD plans. As a result, an additional Model D is offered. This envisages a theatre integrated campaign plan which provides for the operational level design and campaign management of a complex stabilisation task that includes a challenging level of insecurity.
In the future, the Cabinet Office Stabilisation Plan (paragraph 1009 onwards) should provide what the military would consider to be a Model D style pan-theatre integrated campaign plan. However, this approach may not be appropriate in a multinational coalition operation such as Iraq or Afghanistan, where a coalition authority (i.e. NATO) will design and own the campaign plan. In this case, it is the coalition’s campaign plan that provides for the operational level design and campaign management of the complex stabilisation task, including the theatre-integration of national and multi-agency activity. Complementary to it, the UK might choose to develop its own sub-theatre national plan to articulate the national critical path; the Helmand Plan is an example. Whatever its form or name, the purpose of a theatre integrated campaign plan is to articulate how strategic objectives can be achieved through a combination of tactical military, governance and development activity; the ways. Its golden thread is the coordination, cooperation and, where appropriate, integration of the political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments.

The Stabilisation Approach.

The cross-government nature of stabilisation requires a modified approach, although within Whitehall departments the internal planning mechanisms will be largely unchanged. In a national operation, where a significant military contribution is required, the Cabinet Office will take the lead in initiating planning; it may use an existing contingency plan developed by a department. The Stabilisation Unit will provide advice and expertise on how to coordinate cross-government planning, but it has no executive authority nor owns any plans. The highest level output of cross-government planning should be a Stabilisation Plan. This should comprise a common...
assessment, common strategic aims and objectives, departmental targets and a sequence and priority of activity. It will describe a critical path through the numerous tasks that different government departments, including MOD, need to undertake. It does not replace any single departmental planning process, but is designed to achieve integration and coherence at the strategic and operational levels. In a coalition or Alliance operation, the Stabilisation Plan should reflect coalition or Alliance objectives, not purely national ones. Ideally, it should be nested within an integrated plan for the theatre. This is illustrated in Figure 10.2.

Coalition Campaigns. The UK strategic aim and objectives will both shape, and be shaped by, the international view. National departmental plans should be integrated and these must be consistent with integrated multinational plans if we are to achieve unity of effort. Ideally, planning teams should be collocated, but at the start of operational planning this may be unrealistic. However, as the campaign matures and develops authority, the UK should look to disaggregate national planning to better support and draw upon coalition in-theatre planning.
National Campaigns. When operating alone, a UK Stabilisation Plan will be the de facto cross-government integrated campaign plan for the theatre. If, for any reason the Stabilisation Plan is crafted solely at the strategic rather than strategic and operational levels, it may be necessary to develop a separate national theatre integrated campaign plan beneath it. In this case, it is likely that it will use a military planning framework. In such cases, the campaign plan must use the same Strategic Objectives and Outputs to shape it. A comprehensive solution will only be realised in this way.

Planning Lead and Coordination. Cabinet Office will initiate planning where significant contributions are needed from more than one department, otherwise it will usually be the FCO. In Whitehall, a steering group of key government departments will direct a Strategic Planning Team comprising representatives of the FCO, DFID’s Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE), MOD, Cabinet Office, Stabilisation Unit and others as required. The role of this Strategic Planning Team is to: propose a strategic aim; agree a common assessment of the problem; identify stabilisation objectives, their priority and sequencing; and identify lead responsibilities as well as measure and report success against the strategic plan. The Steering Group will agree the aim, objectives and responsibilities, and are accountable to Ministers for delivery of the plan. The single strategic aim will be a compromise between political ambition, resources and susceptibility of the problem to solutions. It is likely to identify an end-point several years in the future. The Strategic Planning Team may use the framework of a Joint Stabilisation Assessment (JSA) to conduct its analysis. This is shown in Figure 10.3.

Strategic Objectives, Outputs and Tasks. In a similar methodology to military campaign planning, the strategic aim will be broken down into lines of outcome. These identify dependencies and priorities, but there is no set format. Typically, but not exclusively, lines of outcome may be established for security, economic, social development, governance and strategic communications. Strategic objectives are set for these outcomes and a critical path derived in order to sequence and prioritise them. An Operational Planning Team may be formed to derive stabilisation outputs and tasks, and to manage and measure success of the plan at the operational level. It will deploy into theatre and either integrate fully into the J5 element of the military headquarters, or where there is only limited military involvement, into an Embassy or DFID Office. The planning

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**Figure 10.3 – Cross-Government Strategic Planning: Joint Stabilisation Analysis**
cycle from initiation to operational management may look like Figure 10.4. The cycle should be re-visited during strategic reviews.

Integrating Strategic and Campaign Planning. The process described above is an ideal. It is subject to variation for reasons such as competing priorities, concurrency, staff capacity, time pressure and a potential lack of clarity of political purpose at the beginning of a crisis. The relationship between the Cabinet Office-led, Stabilisation Unit coordinated strategic planning process and campaign planning in the PJHQ must be a close one. Indeed, it may be so close that they not only complement each other, which is the minimum requirement, but they are capable of replicating each other where required at the operational level. It is at the tactical level, where plans for operations are crafted, that aims and objectives will be defined by military, rather than comprehensive activity or effect.

Figure 10.4 – Stabilisation Planning Cycle
Campaign Planning Guidance

1015 Purpose. The purpose of a campaign plan is to develop, synchronise and sequence all the lines of military, political, economic and social activity necessary to achieve strategic objectives. It should be as broad as possible, taking into account factors such as the influence from neighbouring states, culture, religion, history and politics. The planning team should be drawn from a broad spectrum also. It should include military, government, academics, regional experts, business, partner nations and alliance members amongst others. Managing this complex group is best achieved by dividing the group into planning teams, each of which focuses on a specific area; for example, on economic, development, security or vital infrastructure aspects. Teams’ plans should then be reviewed and integrated by an executive board.

Joint Strategic Assessment Team

Stabilisation planning lends itself to the formation of short duration, ad hoc planning teams that will confront the accepted norms and practices while seeking practical alternatives. An example is the Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) that was formed in Iraq in 2007. It was given the task of producing a joint, inter-agency, multinational Campaign Plan in just over one month. Its methodology was: ‘starting with a political plan, then devising an influence plan to achieve it and only then developing military, economic and governance activities to achieve it.’ The team was headed by a senior US State Department civilian and a US Army colonel. The hand-picked team had 24 members which included representatives from intelligence, diplomatic, military, economic, information, doctrine and academic communities. A similar JSAT focused on the Afghanistan-Pakistan regional issue in 2008.

1016 Output. The output from the campaign plan should be a framework from which other work flows and from which clear missions and tasks can be easily derived. The key takeaways should be a few big ideas that set the tone for subsequent operations and activities. Through further analysis and planning, these ideas are refined and expressed with increasing focus and detail. In the military they are expressed as Operation Plans (OPLANS) by J5, Operation Orders (OPORDs) by J3/5, and Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) by J3 (see paragraph 1061 and JDP 5-00, paragraph 287). Having provided context for the conduct of future work, the campaign plan should designate effect or time-based leads for subordinate tasks; for example, security sector reform, anti-narcotics, agricultural reform and infrastructure development.

1017 Influence and Strategic Communication. One of the most important outputs of planning is a shared and agreed understanding of how activity will exert influence. Specifically, planning must identify the principal tenets of the UK narrative and establish how strategic communication, narrative and influence will be stitched together with objectives, outputs, activity and tasks. Influence should become the guiding reference point for activity, and strategic communication should set out clearly and simply the narrative; it explains the stabilisation mission, the purpose and role of its participants and is aimed at supporting the operational and tactical activities undertaken by the deployed forces. Influence and strategic communication must also be capable of dynamic adjustment since the effects sought will not just happen. They will only be realised through constant effort and refinement of the means.

A Personal View of Cross-Departmental Planning

All government departments have planning processes – the names may vary, but each has a recognisable planning cycle. The issue is more often to do with language and terminology, rather than process. As government departments continue to work together, some of the inter-departmental barriers will come down, while others, principally for budgetary reasons, are likely to remain. The nirvana of complete integration is therefore unlikely to be achievable. Nevertheless, experience has shown that government departments have more in common than they have differences between them – but the requirement and ability at the human level to ‘reach out’ remains paramount.’

Emma Sky, Stabilisation Adviser, Iraq 2006

Campaign Design and Resources

Where the UK is engaged in a multinational mission, campaign design options may include focusing its contributions into a British area which will enable significant freedoms in the design and execution of the local campaign. But, this is likely to present resource challenges as the demands rise, as well as fall, with the ebb and flow of security activity. Alternatively, pooling UK effort with other international support may enable us to tap greater resources and permit clearer limits to be placed on the UK resources that are committed. The ability to control campaign design and execution will be delivered mainly through the lead coalition nation or the alliance command arrangements. An example of how the UK Joint Plan for Helmand in its original form was nested with other national, alliance and agency plans is shown at Annex 10A. The key is to balance UK aspirations (ways) with our ability to resource them (means). Where the UK is reliant on external means, such as Commander’s Emergency Response Plan (CERP) or USAID funds, then it may need to accept less autonomy over ways.

Planning Timeframes. Since the cross-government strategy looks out to a strategic aim that may be several years away, a theatre integrated campaign plan may need to set a lesser horizon. A six-month to three-year period is probably appropriate, noting that lower level OPLANS, OPORDS and FRAGOs, as opposed to a campaign plan, will typically be valid for between six months and a matter of days. Similarly, civil partners will produce, for example, country plans and business plans to direct and manage their equivalent tactical activity.

Other Government Department Planning Methodologies. A guiding principle of a truly comprehensive approach is that institutional familiarity will enhance collaborative working and trust between entities. Just as familiarity with alliance and US doctrine will enhance conduct in multinational operations, so too, an understanding of partners’ methodologies should enhance integrated planning, be they government or international organisations. Each has its own unique approach and lexicon. The commander should understand the different tools and methodologies so that they know how the different organisations function and how they can interact with, and influence, one another. The military should also know the constraints and freedoms under which others may operate, such as their approach to risk. It will also be necessary to agree with OGD planners what integrated or collaborative planning process will be most effective. Early personal contact between the commander and staff with key OGD representatives technical to developing personal trust and understanding. Ideally this will start before pre-deployment training and continue as the campaign progresses. Understanding each other’s terms helps; see Figure 10.5.

Synchronisation of Planning and Activity.

By comparison with civil agencies, military operational headquarters are well staffed. The capacity to plan different options and contingencies simultaneously is unlikely to be matched by civil partners. Military staffs trained in common procedures to meet tight timelines have a unique potential to support and integrate inter-agency planning and activity. Civil partners are therefore likely to produce focused plans, supporting specified options. They may select potential solutions earlier than military headquarters. Incoherence will result if these different approaches remain disconnected. Some form of gearing mechanism is required that allows the synchronisation of planning and activity.

Synchronising Cross-Departmental Planning and Activity

From his involvement in Exercise JOINT VENTURE 2008 (a PJHQ operational level exercise in late 2008) Commander Field Army recognised a requirement for a gearing mechanism to facilitate complementary planning mechanisms and varying tempo in planning activities across organisations and government departments:

"The military staff and decision-making process are not dissimilar to a Hoover Dam Turbine – massive energy and massive output demanding massive input and turning at monstrous speed. The FCO and DFID are smaller, but more perfectly formed, slower engines. Should all of these be connected through a single drive shaft … the outcome would be simply catastrophic for all three. The aim therefore should be, while embracing [each other’s] individuality and independence, to seek to provide a clear, single reference point – an artificial horizon – which provides a crude but nevertheless common perspective of the problem. A recognised campaign picture, drawn from all Departments, [that is] influential not prescriptive, implicit not explicit, authoritative not autocratic, will prove a steady reference point for all parties wherever they are, whatever they are doing. A common understanding, agreed by all but constantly adjusted and contested, will allow each Department to prosecute at its own pace its part in the enterprise through its own plan and planning process, with the result that the activities become self-synchronising, a much sought after, but seldom achieved objective. Less in this case is simply more."
Commander’s Considerations

1023  Stakeholder Analysis. Identifying the range of stakeholders and their command chains early in the endeavour may be more complex than it appears. A simple stakeholder analysis to identify who is responsible for what, and to whom, should be an early task. Actors, and their influences, may be depicted diagrammatically to show formal, and informal, relationships – in essence a stakeholder network can be drawn up. The purpose is to identify the framework of empowered actors with whom the commander can engage. Identifying the network and understanding the motivations and interaction of the players, is often lengthy and complicated. A series of linked questions have been developed to help:

- **WHO** (are the relevant actors)? Who are the predominant interlocutors with whom I need to interact in order to enable holistic planning and to deliver coherent execution (delivery)?
- **WHAT** (are their motivations)? What is their mandate and constraints?
- **WHY** (are they involved)? What are their specific interests

5. JDP 01 (2nd Edition): Campaigning
6. These include Strategic Conflict Analysis and Critical Path Analysis developed by the Stabilisation Unit and the Country Assistance Plan and Logical Framework Analysis used by DFID.
and objectives? How may they be affected by the proposed crisis resolution and theory of change, and what are their likely responses?

- **SO WHAT** (does their involvement mean to me)?
  - What can I expect to leverage from them and, conversely, what are they likely to want to leverage from me?
  - What steps do I need to take to integrate them into, or exclude them from my process? What must I do?
  - How can discipline be imposed on their engagement (e.g. who is the lead interlocutor with each player)?

Multi-agency Leadership. A comprehensive response to any situation is most likely to succeed if a single figure, ideally formally empowered, draws together and orchestrates the activities of the various agencies involved. How the role may be agreed, and the formal authority that the leader could be granted, varies on a case-by-case basis. For UK national campaigns, an Ambassador, a political appointee, or a military commander may be appropriate. In multinational operations undertaken by the UN, the Special Representative of the Secretary General is likely to be the multi-agency leader.

On other occasions, there is no framework nation, it is not uncommon for an individual to emerge, often by force of character, as the accepted leader. The ability to build consensus and work in collaboration with civilian partners, as well as other military cultures, will be essential qualities of the theatre commander, and will have a significant impact on the whole character and conduct of the campaign. It is unlikely, however, that the conditions will exist that enable overall authority to be vested in one person – authority is more frequently vested in committees with responsibility to integrate and coordinate activity.

Committee System. Where multinational and multi-agency engagement is required to solve complex issues a hierarchy of committees can facilitate successful collaboration between departments. The committee system complements the normal departmental chains of command, and allows the key civil, political and military figures to develop a shared analysis and provide coherent direction to their own planners. An excellent example of this system was the British authorities’ response to the Malayan Emergency; similar arrangements were also developed in Northern Ireland. Whether a single
leader or committee system is used, both models will require a
tiered system of collaborative committees to synchronise and
coordinate activity; they will act as the nervous system in a
failed or failing state. Since stabilisation that requires a military
contribution is often characterised by semi-anarchy – where
there is no central governance structure – the military may
need to provide a skeleton of security committees which can act
as a spine for governance.

1026 **Effective Consultation.** Pre-deployment training
should include key advisers and partner representatives so
that the commander can initiate consultation and begin to
build not only his team, but the cross-departmental one. He
will also want to develop early the working practices to deliver
a comprehensive approach.

### A Guide to Effective Consultation

“Templer in Malaya was running a single-nation effort and
everyone beneath him would do as they were told. In my
position there were thirty-seven nations, all of whom could
second-guess what I wanted; there was also a President, a
number of ministries and the UN to satisfy. I could not have
hoped to pull the levers in the same way as Templer did. I
needed to influence and needed to convince them as best I
could using (a mnemonic this time) the LIC process: Listen,
Influence and Coordinate. (That was the function of the
Policy Action Group)…”

Lt Gen Sir David Richards, COMISAF IX, May 2007

1027 **Managing Relationships.** The commander will need
to manage a variety of relationships including with PJHQ, in-
country representatives from HMG, international and bilateral
partners and, above all, with local power centres within the
host nation. These power centres may include residual or new
governments, powerful interest groups and political elites,
oportunists or even hostile groups. Consider:
- Personal time, energy and resources are required
to develop and maintain constructive relationships.
Established agreements and relationships may quickly
faUte; they need to be tested and assessed, and steps
taken to rebuild them, or to modify processes if required.
- The skill of persuasion is paramount and many will
demand the commander’s time – a deputy commander is
likely to be required.
- Roulement of commanders and key staﬀ will impact
relationships. The value of continuity is particularly
important in fragile states where personal contact is often
more important than institutional links. Handling over key
relationships, therefore, will take time – a week may be
too short.
impact of inappropriate actions and messages applied locally. Yet, decentralised decision-making and the wider application of mission command is important to enable junior commanders to seize fleeting opportunities – for example, by judging when to use overwhelming force – thereby generating tempo.\(^\text{10}\) Successful decentralisation relies on junior commanders understanding the theatre commander’s intent and applying good judgement. Demanding, well-resourced training that replicates the conditions in theatre is the key enabler.

1032 **Delegation of Capability.** The delegation of capability should go hand-in-hand with decentralised command. Some capabilities, traditionally held at the operational level, may need to be permanently allocated to the tactical level. An example of this may be the allocation of unmanned aerial systems and joint forward air controllers down to sub-unit level.

1033 **Understanding and Employing Coalition Capabilities.** Many implications flow from working with coalition partners, and no list will be wholly inclusive.\(^\text{11}\) Understanding coalition partner capabilities is essential to inform the employment of forces. Some fundamentals are:

- Identify the strengths and weaknesses of contributing nations’ forces, their national objectives and motivations, and their capabilities and caveats.
- Each nation may have a different interpretation of similar doctrinal terms. The commander should explore how coalition members view their role in terms of doctrine, activities and Rules of Engagement.
- All contributing nations have national chains of command to which they are likely to refer major decisions. This extends the planning process and introduces delays between planning and execution. Frustrating though it may be, a multinational planning cycle may follow these steps: plan – consult – plan – consult – agree – plan – refine – consult – issue orders.
- The commander should socialise potentially novel or contentious elements of the plan with involved parties in order to avoid misunderstanding and delay. No elements of the plan should come as a surprise to those taking part, whether military or civilian. Proactive coalition management will include direct briefings in the capitals of contributing nations.
- When working as a supporting partner in a coalition it is necessary to understand and consider adapting to the doctrine, routine and procedures used by the senior partner. This will be critical if the commander wishes to synchronise and influence decisions made at the higher level. In reports and when expressing views, the use of British understatement should be avoided.

1034 **Regional Engagement.** Planning must include a regional dimension. Instability may be exported from fragile states, threatening regional security. Neighbouring states will have some political, security, economic and social influence on the affected state – for good or bad. Securing their active support for the political settlement may be necessary, and ideally take place as a preventative measure, so avoiding the need for intervention. Regional engagement should include, for example, the protection of international borders, denial of safe haven for irregular groups, management and return of refugees, and garnering support for wider, regional security initiatives. In certain circumstances, a regional security consensus will be required that is capable of integrating the host nation within a regional context. The international force may need to align its area of influence with its area of interest – greatly increasing the area of operations. Regional

\(^{10}\) Tempo is not the pace of operations; instead it is the speed of action and reaction relative to the adversary.

\(^{11}\) One valuable guide is the American-Britain, Canada-Australia (ABCA) Coalition Operations Handbook. This is regularly updated, helping allies commanders to maintain interoperability in multinational operations.

\(^{12}\) Taken from the April 2009 Cabinet Office Document UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Way Forward.
engagement can then be used to restrict the flow of money, men and materiel in support of local irregular actors. Conversely, failure to engage with the wider region and imposing artificial boundaries will almost certainly foment regional instability and result in an unachievable campaign plan. The box below provides an example of a policy-led imperative for a regional engagement plan.

### A Regional Approach – Why Afghanistan and Pakistan matter

Afghanistan and Pakistan are of critical strategic importance to the UK and the international community as a whole. Instability and insecurity in both countries have a direct impact on our national security and the safety of our citizens. Of the six major sources of threat listed in the UK’s National Security Strategy, Afghanistan and Pakistan are relevant to at least four:

- **Terrorism** – Afghanistan was the base for al-Qaeda’s terrorist activity, including the largest ever terrorist atrocity of 11 September 2001; al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is currently located in the border areas of Pakistan, and three quarters of the most serious plots investigated in the UK have links back to Pakistan.
- **Conflict** – the insurgency in Afghanistan and insecurity in Pakistan have an impact on regional instability which affects the UK’s interests, not least given deep connections with the region and the large British Pakistani community.
- **Transnational crime** – Afghanistan is the source of 90% of the heroin in the UK, and it is estimated that roughly half is smuggled via Pakistan.
- **Weapons of mass destruction** – Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. Its proper control of its weapons and nuclear material, and the prevention of proliferation to other countries or non-state actors, is vital to UK interests.

### Integrated Headquarters Considerations

Stabilisation is likely to require a different headquarters construct. The political, multinational and multi-agency nature of the problem means that:

- The operational commander is likely to find himself concerned with factors that affect strategic decisions. The focus of subordinate tactical headquarters will be similarly elevated. In a multinational operation, national areas of focus and command chains will exacerbate this blurring of the levels of command.
- Staff structures need to evolve to accommodate these changes. Choices will need to be made between the relative efforts afforded to non-kinetic or soft effects, such as influence and engagement, and direct, kinetic activity or hard effects. Although they are not mutually exclusive, the ratios of effort will vary at different levels of headquarters and with campaign progression. A commander will need an enlarged J5/J35 staff.
- The underlying tempo of staff activity (battle rhythm) is generally slower since military effort needs to be synchronised with the governance and development lines of operation, and it seeks a human, psychological effect which takes time to develop and then assess. However, overall activity, particularly J2 and J3, may be as fast as in conventional operations. The political interface, too, absorbs time.
- The multinational, multi-agency nature of the operation will require tailored structures into which partners can plug. All-source information will need to be analysed, fused, shared, protected and exploited. Information management will be critical.

### The Case for Theatre Integrated Headquarters

Delivering Model D levels of integration and synchronisation requires more than dialogue alone. Further measures will be necessary. These include exchanging empowered planning staff, by the physical collocation of headquarters, or ultimately the development of a fully integrated campaign staff in a single headquarters. In non-permissive environments, the military may be well placed to provide a platform on which OGDs base themselves until the situation improves. This allows civil and military planners to integrate and interact in pursuit of their own mandated tasks, identify areas of mutual support and de-conflict.

### Design of an Integrated Headquarters in Stabilisation

Adaptive force generation will be required to create the structures and organisations, both within the integrated headquarters and more widely within the construct of the force. The design will differ from that required to support conventional operations. While the constituent elements and staff branches may be broadly similar, they will have a different emphasis; some roles may change and this will be reflected in their relative size and influence. The operational headquarters will need to be capable of conducting high level inter-agency planning while concurrently offering support to, and enabling, tactical level military activity. The following observations are worthy of note:

- Multi-agency synchronisation of effect must be achieved at the operational level. Whatever model is adopted, it must promote coherence across all activity, both military and civilian. There is unlikely to be a civilian
organisational level that matches up with a corps or divisional headquarters.

• The operational headquarters should remain focused on delivering ‘synchronised output’ rather than on process per se. The guiding mantra for headquarters design should be ‘form follows function’. This requirement drives the trend towards larger and better integrated planning branches (notably J2, J5, J35 and J9), whose precise composition needs to reflect their expanded responsibilities and which will change shape over time.

• The J3 function executes operational level activity while coordinating and supporting tactical level output. This includes the Command and Control (C2) of assigned tactical manoeuvre units in the short term, which has the benefit of generating situational understanding that can be fed back into the planning process. Although this is not significantly different from warfighting, the span of activity sets it apart.

• The design of the headquarters should institutionalise the process of learning, and adaptation (see Chapter 12).

• As the planning horizon will be greatly extended, cells and branches must record the planning assumptions which they used to develop their plans. This will mitigate the effects of staff turn-over and loss of corporate knowledge. A trickle posting system for the staff can help, but this has its own problems as staff do not train together before deployment and often never gel as a team.

1038 Headquarters’ structures constantly evolve, and new ideas for getting the best out of an inter-agency approach are being tested. One such evolution being used increasingly by the US is the Joint Inter-agency Task Force (JIATF).

1039 Advisers and Analysts. The headquarters is likely to have embedded within it a number of additional experts, advisers and analysts drawn from the MOD and partner departments and agencies. Annex 10B gives a brief description.

1040 Points of Emphasis. The design of a headquarters should include:

• The ability to expand, adapt and contract as the campaign demands. Learning organisations cannot stand still. There may be occasions when a function becomes too large or too complex for a single staff branch to manage. In this case, the branch may have to reorganise and separate out

The US JIATF: Principal Characteristics

JIATF have been used by the US in a number of ways to deal with challenges outside the singular remit of the Department of Defense. They have a potential utility for stabilisation. This table summaries the strengths and limitations of these relatively novel organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Characteristic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address a specific trans-departmental issue. For example, the standing US Task Force for the Horn of Africa and AFRICOM have embedded State and Justice Department manning, as well as US AID, to reflect the cross-cutting characteristics of the challenges that each faces.</td>
<td>Single agency lead (appropriate to task), with other agencies (national and international) embedded. All US JIATF are currently Defense-led.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share resources, information, planning and execution approaches.</td>
<td>A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) formalises arrangements between agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empower decision makers.</td>
<td>Usually adopt a single-issue focus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use network of networks to overcome stovepipes and lack of resources.</td>
<td>Adopts collaborative approaches focused on outcomes rather than process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Construct

• Form follows function. No two JIATFs are the same.

Mission analysis identifies the outcomes and skills that are required.

• Team structure (lead agency, numbers, support, workspace) designed round analysis.

Processes within each JIATF are based on the agreement codified in the MOU.

Inter-agency manning contributes to wide connectivity in-theatre and through reachback to cross-government resources.

Strengths

• Successfully cuts across agency and departmental stovepipes.

• Each is outcome-focused.

Weaknesses

• Dependent on personalities and almost exclusive single-nation participation.

• Inadequate structural capacity to expand beyond single-issue focus.
from the integrated headquarters to form a functional headquarters of its own. An example is Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq, which was formed for its specific purpose and commanded at 3* level.

- Liaison Officers are critical. They enable a commander to extend his reach as he attempts to influence others. Key liaison officers should be personal appointees by the commander, and he should consider how best to empower them. Headquarters’ design must cater for in-coming liaison officers, allocating the connectivity and information systems, and giving access to information that allows them to integrate effectively.

- Visitors may provide a means of communicating with important target audiences, such as allied nations, the home base, superior headquarters and local leaders. Briefing and managing them is an important business, not peripheral or nuisance activity.

- Media and press briefings should be accessible to local, domestic and internationally accredited media. Media access to the commander and principal staff should be enabled rather than restricted.

- Reachback will enable the headquarters to tap additional resources. If constructed and organised, reachback provides rapid, tailored information, with the appropriate level of fidelity and a sounding board for the commander and his staff.

1041 **Operations Security.** Recent security and information assurance studies have re-defined the relationship between protective security and Operations Security (OPSEC).\(^\text{13}\) There is a requirement for specific OPSEC posts and training at the practitioner and command levels. Detail is in OPSEC policy\(^\text{14}\) and JDP 3-80.1 OPSEC, Deception and Psychological Operations.

1042 **Creating Synergy with Host Nation Headquarters.** As the campaign develops, there may be increased need to integrate with host nation staff, for example to plan joint operations or share analysis. Full collocation or embedding key personnel may be options, but the solution will need to balance OPSEC against campaign cohesion. Joint Coordination Centres have been created to provide a formalised – but air-locked – relationship.

1043 **‘Connectivity’ of the Commander.** For the duration of his appointment, whether he is in theatre or not, the commander should have the ability to remain connected and engaged. Although others can assume responsibility for routine decision-making, the pivotal role of the commander in shaping the campaign means he should never be beyond reach. Secure systems that enable the commander to remain engaged (even remotely) must be resourced.

1044 **Tour Lengths.** In protracted operations, consideration should be given to the benefits of longer tours for the commander and his key staff. Where possible, the approach should be linked to the Coalition approach. This should be an early consideration on transition from a contingent operation onto a campaign footing.

\(^{13}\) Set out in JDP 03 Security in the Contemporary Operating Environment.

\(^{14}\) Policy: DCDS(C)/DTIO/OPSEC dated 25 January 2006.
Working with the Host Nation

Overload. Working constructively with the host nation is a delicate task, largely because governments of fragile states are likely to have immature structures and capabilities. There may be a dearth of talent, exacerbated by under-investment in human capital and an exodus of experienced people. Host nation authorities can easily be overwhelmed by a profusion of good ideas emanating at speed from a variety of well-meaning external agencies. Overloading the host nation in this manner results in disenchantment and paralysis. Less engagement, in this case, is often more. A staff branch should be charged with imposing engagement discipline.

Generating a Productive Relationship. The aim will be to enable host nation authorities to have legitimate control over their own affairs. To that end, there is a need to understand the host nation’s concerns and aspirations, as their views should shape the overall approach. If this is not done from the start, then they may force unwelcome alterations to the plan at a later stage.

Politics and Politicking. Local politics will impose constraints in various forms, which have the potential to generate friction. Local politicking will generate internal tensions within the host nation’s government as, for example, ministries jostle for position or key personalities within government manipulate and manoeuvre for personal or political advantage. The commander needs to be attuned to these tensions.

Sovereignty. As the host nation’s sovereignty begins to mature (as a result of UN Security Council Resolutions or elections), its government will become less receptive to external guidance, and seek to exercise greater autonomy. This can give rise to tensions with and between its international partners over the conduct and direction of the campaign. There is a danger that much progress and success could be undone if this situation is not handled sensitively. Military commanders and their civilian partners must be prepared to work through these difficulties. They are, perversely, a manifestation of the success achieved so far.

The Importance of Cultural Symbols. The significance of cultural symbols, including events, times and places, should be carefully studied and understood. In certain societies symbols may include tangible objects such as the national flag, insignia, icons, saints/martyrs, or intangible ones such as particular dates in the calendar. These symbols can have a powerful motivating effect and, where possible, should be capitalised upon. Equally, if symbols are misjudged, misapplied or misunderstood, this will have a detrimental impact.

Host Nation Politics: The Afghan parliament in session. Local politics will often act as a constraint and source of friction. These are the unavoidable consequences of shifts in position and local power. Politics, such as the timing and conduct of elections, will impact on the campaign.

Growing Sovereignty

‘The new Security Agreement was a further step in Iraqi sovereignty. Many of the Iraqis had been in the Army that had been so rapidly defeated by the Coalition in 2003, and were still ashamed by that. Now they were asserting themselves as the drivers, and we had to become back-seat passengers. There were frictions from this.’

A UK Brigade Commander, Operation TELIC

15. For more detailed information, refer to Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/09 The Significance of Culture to the Military.
This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

SECTION II

PLANNING TECHNIQUES

Health Warning

‘Plans are nothing - planning is everything’
– von Moltke the Elder

The purpose of the planning tool is to provide an example; a reference. Commanders and their staff will exercise their own judgment, experience and style in order to develop the tools that best support them. JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning remains authoritative, but this section describes how planning techniques may be adapted to meet the specific demands of the stabilisation environment.

Campaign Planning

A Quick Guide to Military Planning Terminology

In a joint-interagency environment, taxonomy compromises often have to be made. In Iraq, definitions and taxonomy were amended to reflect the views of the US State Department officials and US military in the Joint Campaign Plans (JCP) from 2008 to date. For example, the term campaign goal was used as a cross-cutting term rather than the military term, decisive condition.

National Strategic Aim. The national strategic aim is the UK Government’s declared purpose, in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition) Campaigning).

The national strategic aim may be articulated personally by Ministers, or it may be discerned indirectly from UK foreign policy statements, or through discussions between politicians and officials. Achieving the national strategic aim requires contributions from across government and, perhaps, multinational contributors. It provides the unity of purpose for military commanders as well as their civilian partners and needs to be integrated into the wider objectives of multinational and host nation partners.

Strategic Objective. A strategic objective is a goal to be achieved through one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).

Campaign Objective. A campaign objective is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).

Campaign End-State. The campaign end-state is reached when all the campaign objectives have been achieved.

It therefore represents the extent of the commander’s contribution to meeting the national strategic aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).

Decisive Condition. A decisive condition is a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)). Decisive conditions are the building blocks that deliver campaign objectives. Of course in many complex situations it is impossible for any one condition to be absolutely ‘decisive’, and the term should not be taken too literally.

Supporting Effect. The intended consequence of actions. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)). In order to arrive at a particular decisive condition it is necessary to achieve one, or a number of, supporting effects.

Centre of Gravity. Characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)). The leader in stabilisation is not necessarily the military commander, he may also be a diplomat or DFID In-Country Head. Since cross-departmental support is not mandatory, but is vital if a comprehensive approach is to work, two other definitions are relevant:

Supported Commander. The commander having primary responsibility for any given task assigned by a higher authority. (JDP 0-01.1 (7th Edition)).

Supporting Commander. A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a Supported Commander, or who develops a supporting plan. (JDP 0-01.1 (7th Edition)).
Planning Tools

The Foundations of Planning. Crisis response planning addresses 3 questions: what are the features of the current situation; what should the more favourable situation look like in the future; and what is the commander’s theory of change? A commander should start his operational estimate armed with a basic situational understanding and a working definition of the strategic aim. The commander will begin the process of campaign design by conducting his own analysis in order to frame the problem. He will consider two campaign planning concepts in particular: the end-state which should be derived from the Strategic Objective, and Centres of Gravity (CoGs). These will form a foundation for subsequent planning and help identify initial decisive conditions. Since there should be only one campaign plan, this must incorporate cross-government objectives and activity articulated in strategic direction or the Stabilisation Plan. In planning for a cross-government stabilisation plan, or where a military planning process is providing the framework for cross-government planning, the principal outputs of the planning team are agreement and cross-government support for the campaign objectives and their building blocks. That which DFID may call a goal, the Stabilisation Unit a stabilisation objective, and the MOD a decisive condition must be coordinated. If possible, the activity to achieve these objectives (or decisive conditions) should also be agreed. The art for the commander, and his civilian counterparts, is to plan and coordinate activity within and across different LoOs in order to realise the campaign objectives. This is the definitive cross-government activity in stabilisation. Figure 10.6 shows how the generic model in JDP 5-00 may be adapted for stabilisation.

Adjusting the Planning Approach. The planning tools of end-state, campaign objective and decisive conditions may benefit from some adjustment. In JDP 5-00, which

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**Figure 10.6 – The Coordination of Activity in Stabilisation**

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This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

This publication was replaced by: Shaping a stable world: The Military contribution (JDP 05) published by DCDC in March 2016
is primarily written for inter-state warfighting operations, objectives are defined as military goals: ‘Campaign objectives are assigned to the Joint Force Commander as part of the MOD’s overall strategy; their collective achievement represents the campaign end-state’. Within stabilisation, such purely military goals are inappropriate. Instead, it is helpful to think in a broader, political context since it is the political settlement that delivers long-term stability. It may also be helpful to view activity: from the strategic to the tactical, through the prism of building security; stimulating economic and infrastructure development; and fostering host nation government capacity and legitimacy. This is the Stabilisation Model, first introduced in Chapter 2 and now reproduced in Figure 10.7. The campaign end-state, objectives and decisive conditions should be defined and agreed within this broader framework, and will be shaped by the nature of the intended political settlement. The military has a role to play, to a greater or lesser extent, in all the areas of the Stabilisation Model as indicated in the key.

1053. **Integration at the Operational Level.** At the heart of any integrated theatre campaign plan should be the means in time and space to influence the decisive groups in order to enable a political settlement. The operational commander, working with host nation, multinational and cross-government counterparts may need to broker a series of separate, lesser political accommodations at the local level. These will be achieved through bespoke and synchronised economic, governance and security activities targeted at decisive groups and their centres of power and influence, as depicted in Figure 10.8. This shows how activity varies at a local level, at any given moment. Such localised solutions must remain

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**Stabilisation Model**

- **Stimulate Economic & Infrastructure Development**
  - Restore Basic Services & Infrastructure
  - Rebuild Effective Economic & Financial Management
  - Begin Long-term Social & Infrastructure Development

- **Build Human and National Security**
  - Neutralise Hostile Groups
  - Provide Public Order (protect population & key assets)
  - Enforce Ceasefires
  - Ensure Territorial Integrity
  - Deliver & Sustain Essential Commodities

- **Foster Host Government Capacity & Legitimacy**
  - Reform Security, Police & Justice Sectors
  - Support Engagement & Reconciliation Processes
  - Facilitate Political Processes Re-establish Government Machinery

**Key:**
- **Military Deliver** in all circumstances
- **Military Assist** in semi-permissive environment
- **Military Enable** in a non-permissive environment

*Figure 10.7 – The Stabilisation Model*
within the bounds of the UK’s political purpose and they must support its longer-term objectives. As the campaign progresses, the locations and relative weight of effort will also shift.

**Focusing Campaign Objectives on Decisive Groups.** In JDP 5-00 a campaign objective is defined as a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, their collective achievement represents the campaign end-state. LoOs are used to visualise the relationship between decisive conditions, campaign objectives and, by inference, the end-state. Many campaign plans use LoOs that are focused on security, governance and economic development. An alternative approach that may be useful is to focus the campaign objectives and resultant LoOs on the decisive groups, as it is the influence brought to bear on them which will rebalance the conflict relationship and achieve a positive outcome. The sum of comprehensive measures required to influence each group can be defined in decisive conditions, which should reflect the inter-dependencies between individual decisive conditions and the relationship between each condition, the operational CoGs and campaign objectives. As was explained in Chapter 9, CoG analysis can be used to identify the decisive groups and their critical capabilities and vulnerabilities, from which decisive conditions can be derived. If the decisive groups form the focus of campaign objectives, such outputs of CoG analysis can be captured in a campaign plan. However:

- Developing the understanding of groups, their motivations, allegiances and aims takes time. A feel for the cultural traditions of the nation, its people and the environment is also critical.
- Understanding will usually need to be developed on the ground, probably drawing upon indigenous expertise.
- At the outset of campaign design, lack of understanding may preclude the effective focus on decisive groups. This will need to be developed as the campaign progresses.
1055 **Stabilisation Decisive Conditions.** Where campaign objectives are achieved by a combination of local conditions leading to a political accommodation, these local conditions may be viewed as decisive conditions (i.e. the localised approaches represented in Figure 10.8). Although this is a military term, it should not be seen or defined as a military condition but rather a cross-government one. (The FCO, DFID and Stabilisation Unit will have their own equivalent terminology to decisive conditions – see Figure 10.5). The important element in campaign planning and management is to ensure that this level of activity (decisive conditions), which might largely be planned and managed on discrete LoOs, is properly coordinated, synchronised and resourced across all LoOs. For example, activity on a development LoO must be coordinated and cued with the security LoO in order to move from **Hold** to **Develop**. Equally, activity to isolate and neutralise one decisive group might need to be coordinated with an accommodation or empowerment of another. Activity on any one LoO should complement activity on the others. If it fails to do so, a gap will develop between the LoO that adversaries and competing elites can exploit.

Northern Ireland

The UK Government made the decision to improve the poor housing conditions in the Province. These conditions principally affected the Catholic community and it was hoped that by removing one of their legitimate grievances the local population’s support for the Irish Republic Army would diminish. Such activity could have been viewed as a LoO focused on the Catholic community. However, Protestant groups seized on this as an example of discrimination and used it to rally support for their negative perception of Westminster’s policy. This may have been because the implications of the activity on one group (the Catholic community) was not readily identifiable on another (the Protestant group), and thus a gap appeared.

1056 **Supporting Effects.** Supporting effects realise decisive conditions. They are achieved primarily through tactical operations but, like decisive conditions, they should not be seen as exclusively a military activity, but a combination of human security, host nation governance and economic effects. Figure 10.9 shows how coordinated activity to deliver supporting effects drawn from the Stabilisation Model are, in turn, brought together in order to achieve a decisive condition.
Campaign Schematics

Visualising a Theatre Integrated Campaign Plan. The commander will need to articulate the purpose, priorities and resources in the plan and, where necessary, arbitrate over-competing interests. Various techniques can be used. A traditional campaign schematic using decisive groups as the campaign objectives is one, but notable in the Crocker/Petraeus plan is the method adopted to visualise the plan on a map. This showed how activity across LoOs was integrated and focused in order to satisfy local requirements in time and space, allowing cross-government actors to visualise the plan – an important attribute. An example of such a theatre integrated campaign plan briefing schematic is at Figure 10.10.

Military readers will note that the traditional campaigning symbol of decisive conditions or supporting effects has been replaced by the stabilisation model spheres. Their relative size indicates the weight of effort between security, governance and economic measures over time.

Conceptualising the Campaign Plan for Key Audiences. Traditional military campaign design is impenetrable to most civilian audiences. Instead, commanders and staff should find words and images that explain clearly and convincingly what they are trying to achieve. The model that General Petraeus used to articulate his strategy to target al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) for audiences such as Congress is at Figure 10.11.

Figure 10.10 – Campaign Shifting in Emphasis over Time

Oil-Spots in Action – Afghanistan

“The Afghan Development Zones (ADZs)… were designed to get at the psyche of the population so that they would support their government… We then had to string that together by selecting ADZs (one or two per Province) and, to make the whole package deliverable, we needed to establish a mechanism in Kabul to support it. We therefore created the President’s Policy Action Group. This involved weekly meetings of key Afghan ministers who were involved not only in security but reconstruction and development, economy, counter narcotics, finance and foreign affairs. It was an internationalised War Cabinet and, as it depended so much on international support, it included representatives from organisations like the UN and the World Bank, as well as the military and the ambassadors from interested nations. This enabled us to produce a coherent comprehensive approach to the problems in theatre.”

This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
Supported and Supporting Relationships. The established military concept of supported and supporting relationships can be used to describe the primacy of security, economic or governance effort at any given point in time. Where activity is focused on population centres, the supported – supporting relationship will evolve as the security situation improves; and economic and governance activities assume a greater weight of effort. Relationships will also change as a result of transitions, discussed further in Chapter 11.

Organisational Requirements. Planning meetings and committees will need to be organised into a battle rhythm. These include Comprehensive Policy Planning Groups, Joint Force Planning Groups, bespoke Staff Planning Groups and Joint Effects Meetings (which inform a Joint Coordination Board to plan, prioritise and synchronise targeting activity to achieve a specific influence). In order to synchronise outputs and to deliver integrated effects, the composition of these bodies is adjusted to ensure appropriate multinational, civil and host nation partners’ representation. Collocation of key organisations and individuals makes this much easier to achieve. Technology should be exploited to enhance integration where this is not possible; video teleconferencing, for example. Decisions on the location of cross-government headquarters will drive the requirement for CIS infrastructure and liaison.

Civil - Military Integration. Even when a civil-military headquarters has been established, it may be necessary to retain some degree of separation as different organisations operate under different legislation and policy. There is also a need for organisations to be auditable and to manage staff in accordance with their own conditions of service. However, separation should be minimised and the planning process as inclusive and comprehensive as possible. This inclusive approach will be underpinned by four guiding principles: proactive engagement; shared understanding; outcome-based thinking and collaborative working. The key to achieving coherent planning is to ensure that effective, integrated C2 mechanisms are established at all levels.

Figure 10.11 – Multinational Force – Iraq Conceptualising Model

Planning Coordination

1059 Supported and Supporting Relationships. The established military concept of supported and supporting relationships can be used to describe the primacy of security, economic or governance effort at any given point in time. Where activity is focused on population centres, the supported – supporting relationship will evolve as the security situation improves; and economic and governance activities assume a greater weight of effort. Relationships will also change as a result of transitions, discussed further in Chapter 11.

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Central to achieving a stable world is the relationship between military and civil efforts. The military concept of supported and supporting relationships can be used to describe the primacy of security, economic or governance effort at any given point in time. Where activity is focused on population centres, the supported – supporting relationship will evolve as the security situation improves; and economic and governance activities assume a greater weight of effort. Relationships will also change as a result of transitions, discussed further in Chapter 11.
sequence and synchronisation of decisive conditions with civilian counterparts in order to achieve campaign objectives is the key part of this process. Both decisive conditions and campaign objectives however, may take time to deliver. In order that a datum for progress can be set, additional short-term objectives, consistent with the campaign plan, such as supporting effects and other activity, may need to be established. These should be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely – SMART.

**Lines of Operation**

1062 Military Objectives and Lines of Operation. The military will produce their OPLAN or OPORD to support the cross-government stabilisation plan or any theatre integrated campaign plan. An example is the Multinational Corps (Iraq) Plan.\(^\text{25}\) The military plan will describe how to achieve decisive conditions and campaign objectives made at the higher (theatre) level. The delivery of military effects will require the commander to coordinate his activity across other generic LoOs – security, governance and economic development – so that he can sequence, synchronise and resource military activity across his area of operations.

1063 Candidate Lines of Operation. LoOs will be selected to fit the purpose. The military are likely to be focused on four key areas of activity drawn from the Stabilisation Model at Figure 10.7. These may form candidate LoOs within a military plan:

- **Establishing a Secure Environment.** Experience has shown that to be successful in stabilisation, military operations need to focus on the population in order to provide human and physical security. Such operations should not only focus on the local population alone, but also on the civilian community engaged in stabilisation activities since it is essential to enable non-military organisations to implement the economic and governance measures that deliver long-term stabilisation. Although operations to secure base areas,\(^\text{26}\) may have a defensive characteristic, these are not static tasks. Some offensive operations will be required to maintain the initiative and write-down adversaries. Initially, operations to secure populations are likely to focus on securing key centres of political, military and economic importance, such as ports, power-stations and communication centres. Once secured and controlled, these areas, will need to be expanded so as to demonstrate tangible progress to the local population. Such expansion will require further security mass and the integration of indigenous security forces.

- **Isolate and Neutralise Adversarial Groups.** Offensive activities to isolate and neutralise adversaries will be required. At the same time, the introduction of wider comprehensive measures should undermine the adversaries’ support base. It is through a combination of attrition and marginalisation, that either an accommodation can be leveraged, or the adversary can be rendered irrelevant or increasingly vulnerable.

- **Establishing Territorial Integrity.** Any viable state must be capable of establishing and maintaining its own territorial integrity. Fragile or failed states, however, tend to be incapable of guaranteeing their own territorial integrity, which prolongs state fragility. Porous borders threaten security by allowing adversaries to exploit sanctuaries in neighbouring countries. Lack of border control also denies the government vital tax and excise revenue, and encourages the black economy. Efforts to improve border control need to be cross-governmental and multinational. While the military can develop some capacity, wider governance and economic measures will be critical in developing the border control system that includes its administration, legal authority and the ability to collect and manage revenue without corruption.

\(^{25}\) Issued by Lieutenant General L Austin, Commander, Multinational Corps - Iraq, 10 May 2008.

\(^{26}\) Drawn from Thompson’s Principles of Counter-insurgency (COIN) – in the guerrilla phase of an emergency, a government must secure its base area first.

\(^{27}\) Such as the Concerned Local Citizens forces created in Anbar Province, Iraq during early 2007 onwards.

\(^{28}\) Such operations should take place in close cooperation with the host nation authorities.
• **Capacity Building and Security Sector Reform Tasks.** A fundamental task will be to develop and support a durable, legitimate and effective indigenous security force that is capable of managing the security situation on its own. Indeed, this will be a key determinant of campaign progress as indigenous forces take over from international forces via transition. In the short to medium-term, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme needs to generate the mass to supplement the international forces, and then integrate the newly created indigenous security force units into the overall mission. This both creates the necessary mass required to secure the environment, and helps establishing legitimacy. It will also improve intelligence by exploiting local knowledge and helping to overcome cultural and linguistic barriers. The long-term objective is to transition authority and responsibility for security to the indigenous security force. Planners need to address the issues set out in Chapter 5 Section III, and Chapter 6 Section II.

• **Information Operations.** Given their pivotal contribution, the commander may wish to accord information operations their own separate LoO. If so, this LoO will need to be coordinated with other partners who may also be conducting information operations in support of their own activities.

**Additional Candidate Lines of Operation.** Other campaign LoOs may drive some security operations for example, security support to elections or measures to enforce ceasefires. Additional LoOs that have been used in previous military plans include: Influence, Diplomatic, Political, Regional Engagement, Rule of Law, Counter-Narcotics, Restoration of Essential Services, Transition, Engagement and Reconciliation.

**Security Force Capacity.** The size of the force (its mass) and the capacity to employ that mass effectively – the means – are the factors which, when effectively combined give it the momentum to change the dynamics of security. Contact with the people, gained for example by patrolling in the populated areas and effective engagement with local leaders, as well as by embedding mentors and trainers in indigenous security forces, will be an important component of force capacity. So too are the means available, for example, for population control. The ability to stop and search, constrain vehicle and population movement, or employ curfews (which clearly has significant political impact) or detain suspects are examples of population control measures that will affect the ability of a force to contribute to effective security operations.28 Technology also – for example the ability to use biometric data for population screening – may enable a given force to operate more effectively. So too will the use of money (such as US CERP funds) for security effect. Access to timely, actionable intelligence, which itself is likely to flow from frequent and effective contact with the local population, will be the critical factor in enabling security forces to gain the momentum in this competition for security.
Persistent Security. To be effective over time, a favourable perception of the security situation must pervade throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA). To achieve this, once an area has been secured, it must be held as failure to do so will result in a loss of confidence in the security forces. A lack of persistence undermines the perception of the host nation and international forces’ ability to protect the population. Where areas were once secured, but not subsequently held, the adversary may inflict retribution or intimidate inhabitants. Therefore, prior to investment into an area, a plan to generate and maintain persistent security, and to kick-start development activity will be required.

Adopting an Incremental Approach. To achieve the force ratios and persistence required, an incremental approach to security may be necessary. Initial investment in softer areas may be advantageous before moving into the heartlands of hostile groups. For example, securing areas that are in danger but, as yet, have not fallen under the control of the adversary may be a priority for early investment. This may have to be balanced with conducting concurrent punitive activities against the adversary in other contested areas in order to isolate and neutralise him. Such an approach may generate a number of quick-wins that can help develop positive perceptions amongst local, domestic and international audiences, generating momentum in the campaign, while allowing the force to consolidate. It also provides the time and space necessary to build capacity within the indigenous security force, before committing them to the fight. Once sufficient force-levels and capabilities have been developed, further operations with indigenous security forces can be conducted to secure the heartlands.

Competing Demands and Risk. Competing demands will require commanders to identify and manage risk. For example, on the one hand, the need to satisfy the political pressure to limit casualties may demand high levels of force protection and a stand-off approach; on the other hand, to gain the confidence of the local population the force will have to engage in face-to-face contact with them. Commanders will need to identify where risk exists and be able to articulate it up the command chain. They will then need to manage that risk.29

Managing Economic Risk. There will also be risk when implementing economic measures and balancing short and long-term needs of the population. These 3 areas should be considered:

- Bias. The apparent disproportionate allocation of economic resources to one group of the population may inadvertently stimulate grievances in another. Great care needs to be taken to assess the likely impact of economic measures, with an assessment taken across the whole community, and not just on those to whom the measures are being applied.
- De-stabilising the Economy. The introduction of some economic measures may inadvertently and, sometimes rapidly, de-stabilise the local economy. In Iraq for example, the practice of paying the locally employed contractors in US dollars quickly caused inflation and created distortions in the market, which the local population could not cope with.
- Unbalancing the Social Class Structure. The short-term and expedient employment of the professional and educated classes by international forces can compete with the host nation’s needs. In Kosovo, most interpreters employed by the international community were teachers, lawyers or similarly educated professionals. Their pay far exceeded that of their professional peers who were being paid by the fledgling government, and so their skills, essential for the development of the human capital of the country, were misdirected.

Corruption. Corruption is present in fragile states, and is endemic in failing and failed ones. Indeed it could be a major contributor to the state’s decline and, if left unchecked, may remain a significant threat to recovery. Corruption is invariably difficult to eradicate. Where it exists, there is a hierarchy that can encompass the whole of society. In some cultures, certain levels of what may be considered corrupt practices will be perfectly normal in the eyes of the indigenous population. However, where it begins to effect the pace and efficiency of the recovery, it must be addressed through administrative, judicial and legislative measures. If it is perceived that the UK and multinational forces are associated with corrupt organisations, our legitimacy will also be tarnished and international forces will lose the support of the population.30

Force Protection

Force protection is a key enabling activity to sustain operational effectiveness and generate freedom of action. A failure of force protection at the tactical level can result in casualties, which may have a disproportionate impact at the
political or strategic level. For example, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of casualties that they have inflicted, and the resultant media and public attention illustrates the importance of force protection. However, balance is required. Becoming fixed, isolated or losing our agility because of force protection is likely, in fact, to increase our vulnerability.

In planning, joint force protection is predominantly an iterative risk management activity that requires a thorough J2 assessment of all possible threats and hazards. The detailed threat assessment must then be analysed to determine a range of measures to counter the identified threats and hazards. These measures will comprise a balance of proactive or offensive means, and reactive or defensive means depending on the severity of the threat. In a multinational and multi-agency environment, this process is complicated by varying levels of acceptance of risk and hence differing approaches to force protection. The Joint Force Commander may also have to consider the force protection of OGDs, Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) and International Organisations in order that they may continue to be effective and to achieve the campaign end-state. Coordination at the planning stage is essential to providing a coherent approach, including appropriate battlespace management, across the JOA. Specific guidance on force protection is provided in Allied Joint Publication-3.14 Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection and JDP 3-64 Joint Force Protection.
SECTION IV
INTEGRATION OF THE FORCE

Design and Composition of the Force

1074 To date, western standing military forces have generally been configured for state-on-state industrial warfare and so, at the start of any stabilisation campaign, it is likely that the force will have to be adjusted and new capabilities created. This is in contrast to conventional warfare where force packages are assembled from already-trained force elements held at readiness.

1075 Force design will impact how military activity is conducted and may trigger changes in individual and unit roles, their composition, their equipment, their operating procedures and their training. These changes will only deliver the operational effect sought if the force design is right. If the initial deployment of the force is on the basis of a contingent intervention operation which then transitions to a stabilisation campaign (e.g. Iraq 2003 – 2004), then the force may have to adapt its approach, structures, equipment, and composition in contact. Equally, since the operational context will evolve, the security force will need to adapt; force design and force adaptation are separate, but linked activities. Even the best designed force must remain agile, adaptive and responsive to the ever changing demands of the operational theatre.

As David Galula wrote in 1964:

“As long as the insurgent has failed to build a powerful regular army, the counter-insurgent has little use for heavy, sophisticated forces designed for conventional warfare. For his ground forces, he needs infantry and more infantry; highly mobile and lightly armed; some field artillery for occasional support; armoured cavalry, and if terrain conditions are favourable, horse cavalry for road surveillance and patrolling. For his air force, he wants ground support and observation planes of slow speed, high endurance, great firepower, protected against small-arms ground fire; plus short-takeoff transport planes and helicopters, which play a vital role in counter-insurgency operations. The Navy’s mission… is to enforce blockade, a conventional type of operation that does not require elaboration here. In addition, the counter-insurgent needs an extremely dense signal network.”

The counter-insurgent, therefore, has to proceed to a first transformation of his existing forces along these lines, notably to convert into infantry units as many unneeded specialised units as possible.

The adaptation, however, must go deeper than that. At some point in the counter-insurgency process, the static units that took part initially in large-scale military operations in their area will find themselves confronted with a huge variety of non-military tasks which have to be performed in order to get the support of the population, and which can be performed only by military personnel, because of the shortage of reliable civilian political and administrative personnel… They have to be organised, equipped and supported accordingly.”
on high-grade intelligence. Although these strikes are usually kinetic, they should be supported by information operations either before, or where the interests of operational security require it, immediately after the completion of their task.

- **Surge Forces.** Surge forces are deployed to reinforce framework forces in order to achieve specific effects. They can be a separate part of the overall force package and based over the horizon, or in-country and redeployed where needed. They can be used in support of Strike forces, or as a reserve for a specific operation. Although good for achieving temporary localised mass, they lack the finely tuned awareness of framework forces and will require liaison officers, continuity personnel or local security forces attached to them to provide local knowledge. Alternatively, surge forces can be generated by output from the SSR process.

- **Capacity Building Task Forces.** These forces are made up of specialists who, subject to policy, are likely to be embedded in host nation units. If they are, they must be capable of ensuring their own force protection, but must be trained, equipped and resourced to carry out their primary function as trainers, advisers and embeds, even in non-permissive security environments. They should have a deep cultural understanding of the local population and will need to build robust working relationships with them. They are likely to have to work in demanding, often spartan conditions. In order for them to be effective, the commander must ensure that he has fully resourced the necessary force protection and risk mitigation measures for what are often small, detached, and isolated groups. They may also deliver capabilities, such as air support and medical, that the local forces lack.

- **Special Forces.** By virtue of the quality of their personnel and their high level of training, Special Forces (SF) are ideally suited to fighting irregular forces in complex terrain, and for gathering intelligence. As they are a scarce and valuable resource, they are employed in accordance with some enduring principles, the foremost of which is that they are employed for strategic effect. This often means they are used in support of the theatre level main effort, which may not be the stabilisation line of operation or indeed in the UK’s Area of Operations at all. However, with their broad spectrum of roles, capabilities and core characteristics they can represent a significant force multiplier for the operational commander. They have a critical role in shaping the operational environment and setting the conditions for the entry or engagement by the main force. The following points should be considered:
  - As SF activities are planned and executed in pursuit of strategic objectives, they will always be commanded at the highest level. This can create tensions at the operational and tactical levels as SF are likely to operate in the same battlespace as other forces.
  - SF strike activities are likely to be specifically targeted at causing maximum destruction to the adversary, his leadership and his network. These activities are likely to draw heavily on scarce military resources such as Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquision and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and air aviation assets.
  - It is important that the operational commander should forge a sound working relationship with the SF commander and should take him into his confidence allowing them to work through issues together. This will allow the activities of all force elements to be prioritised and sequenced so as to maximise the availability of assets to all users and to minimise any potential adverse effects.
  - Procedures at the tactical level that help de-conflict what is likely to be an already cluttered battlespace must be worked up so that all force elements can pursue their own goals without fear of compromise, interference or reprisal.
  - **Joint Enablers.** Joint enablers, are those elements that move, sustain, maintain and support the other elements of the force. This element can often prove to be a very large proportion of a stabilisation force and the requirement for joint enablers should not be underestimated. For example, in Afghanistan in 2009, the UK commitment was split more or less equally between troops interacting with the local population, and those in enabling, support or staff functions.

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Joint Force Integration – Borneo Campaign, 1963 – 1966

Borneo has often been described as the 'helicopter war' because of the way in which this developing technology allowed Commonwealth security forces to consistently out-maneuvre their numerically superior opponents. Operating out of permanent forward bases, helicopters were able to move ground forces rapidly into the heart of the jungle to cut off insurgents. This gave the impression that the security forces were everywhere at once and had a major psychological impact. However, these helicopters and the ground forces which they supported were only the spearhead of a remarkable joint operation. The RAF was at the forefront of a logistical supply line stretching back to Singapore which was only viable to the less heralded efforts of the various Commonwealth navies and constant RAF shuttle runs forward. Further, the prospect of RAF offensive intervention deterred the Indonesian Air Force and helped maintain escalation dominance. The various roles of the RN were equally low-profile, but no less important. Aside from re-supply, the RN helped to keep northern Borneo free from incursions from the seaward flank, and worked tirelessly up and down the rivers inland where it became a popular presence and useful source of intelligence in its own right.

1077 Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. ISTAR staff, capabilities, processes and force elements develop situational understanding. An integrated system of systems is required to collect, analyse and disseminate information that becomes intelligence. The joint, interagency, international demands on the ISTAR system are likely to exceed the available capabilities. Consider:

- Capability will be required throughout the intelligence cycle (Direct-Collect-Process-Disseminate). An over-emphasis on collect should be avoided since other areas will have less capacity. For example, there will probably be insufficient staff to process information and produce intelligence, insufficient bandwidth to disseminate the product, and insufficient Information Systems connectivity to access it. Commanders and staff will therefore need to select and manage their information requirements carefully.
- ISTAR requires its own command and management structure to enable selective exploitation and generate greater tempo.
- The range of collection capabilities must be a balance between:
  - Endurance with responsiveness and flexibility.
  - Wide area surveillance against high resolution narrow focus capabilities.
  - Point-to-point systems against those that can be more widely networked.
  - High cost, highly capable but relatively scarce capabilities against those that can be fielded more widely, in greater numbers and cheaper.
- The precise kinetic attack of physical targets with low yield weapons will drive a requirement for commensurately higher levels of resolution in our understanding of targets.
- Non-kinetic targeting will place an emphasis on understanding that is beyond that seen in more conventional operations.
- The ISTAR system must support the measurement and assessment of effect in both the cognitive and physical domains it support to the targeting process is to be effective.

1078 Third Force. Unlike the UK, some coalition partners employ a third force such as a gendarmerie for internal security. Their duties include the containment of serious civil disorder. This delegates the conduct of routine, community (but high risk) policing functions to a separate element of the police force. In the right circumstances, these third force elements can lead in the conduct of internal security and population control tasks, which will release the military for other tasks.

1079 Specific Focus Task Forces. Depending on the complexity of the threat, there may be a need to develop specific focus task forces that target narrow aspects of the conflict. These task forces will usually include cross-government representation, possibly including the security services. For example, if the adversary has a dynamic IED capability, then developing a specific task force that targets the whole of the network and IED system may be necessary to bring the threat under control. Areas that could attract the creation of specific focus task forces with a diminishing military involvement may be: counter-IED, counter-terrorist, counter-narcotics and counter-corruption task forces.

1080 Non-regular Militias and Cadres. As a short term expedient to free-up other security resources or to generate sufficient mass, the commander may consider the use of locally recruited militias and other cadres. Being lightly armed, they can provide point security and guard vital installations such as government buildings and businesses. They should not be trained or empowered to conduct offensive operations nor arrest and detain people. These militias may be drawn from armed civilian groups including concerned local citizens, or former irregular parties to the conflict; or they may be the
Sustainment of the Force: Investing in facilities to sustain a deployed force will present a number of paradoxes. Short 2-3 year planning horizons may drive balance of investment decisions towards temporary facilities or ad hoc solutions using a mix of military and contractors. Often this leads to the expensive re-provision of facilities as more realistic timescales emerge.

Air-Land Integration

Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted the requirement for air-land integration in the battle against a less sophisticated, yet tactically aware adversary. The success that was achieved came from hard-won experience, as well as massive investment in technology, equipment and joint training. Consider:

- Conducting effective air-land integration in a multinational context will demand greater levels of joint integration and training. This carries attendant training implications, such as the development and practice of commonly understood and applied tactics, techniques and procedures.
- Planners will need to apply judgement in establishing the balance of capability between strike and find assets. Often the capability will be present in a single asset, and therefore prioritisation will be key.
- There may be inherent problems in developing equally successful air-land integration in indigenous forces. In addition to the financial, practical and technical hurdles to be overcome, there are likely to be political sensitivities. For example, providing this level of capability to a force that may be vulnerable to penetration by adversaries carries risk.
- Planners need to identify the effect sought, and not be prescriptive as to which capability they need, noting that the effect could be delivered by a variety of different air assets.

Sustainment and Personnel

Logistics in Context.

Stabilisation activity is likely to take place within a state with weak or inadequate infrastructure. This complicates logistics. It also places greater demand on the commander as logistic decisions, such as basing, will have an impact on his freedom of action. The logistic architecture will be shaped by a wide variety of factors that may be outside of the commander’s control.

38. Taken from: Dr Stuart Griffin, Joint Operations: A Short History, March 2005.
39. Fundamentally a human function or activity.
40. For a detailed description of Air-Land Integration, see Joint Doctrine Note 2/08 Integrated Air-Land Operations in Contemporary Warfare.
41. Logistic planning considerations are covered in detail in JDP 4-00 (3rd Edition) Logistics for Joint Operations and JDP 4-03 Medical Support to Joint Operations (2nd Edition).
Some issues, (for example clearances for over-flights, basing issues and access to port facilities), will require considerable cross-government effort to resolve and will be complicated by host nation factors. Once decisions in these areas have been made, they are difficult to reverse and can prove very costly to change later on. Early logistic decisions will have a long lasting impact on the campaign, the structure of the force and the conduct of operations. The establishment of access arrangements – setting the theatre – is important at the outset and will require adjustment throughout the campaign, as the viability and resilience of both basing options and Lines of Communication (LOCs) ebbs and flows. Logistics will be both a planning factor and a constraint on the commander’s freedom of action.

The J4 Contribution to Wider Campaign Effect.

The J4 contribution can present opportunities to generate wider and enduring stabilisation effect. This can be achieved by aligning military logistic planning with the longer-term needs of the host nation. To be successful, it will require foresight, simplicity and cooperation in logistic planning. To realise this wider campaign effect, there will be a need for visibility and a clear understanding of national, inter-agency, multinational, NGO and host nation development goals. Such transparency may engender partnerships and joint ventures where the more immediate requirements of enabling military capability may align and converge with medium to longer-term development needs. Such levels of cooperation may also present a more efficient means of delivering campaign objectives and sustaining the force over time through an interagency approach. These initiatives will be subject to considerable friction, and solutions will need to have inbuilt agility and redundancy. Particular attention will need to be paid to the issues raised in Chapter 7 with regard to stimulating economic growth, as the mere presence of a foreign military may destabilise and unbalance economic and infrastructure development activities.

Throughout a campaign, a great deal of money will be spent on supplying and sustaining the force. Where feasible, some of this expenditure should be used to develop in-country capacity where the military and host nation needs align. In identifying suitable development areas, care has to be taken to avoid distorting local markets while ensuring that the deliverables are transferable to the local economy following redeployment of the force. It should also recognise the need to overturn illegal activities, such as corruption, and the threats and risks posed to local producers. This latter area may be tackled through realistic and competitive pricing of commodities for joint force sustainment (which represents a ready market for the local economy). Reducing illegal activity can be achieved through opportunities to develop alternative livelihoods. Areas for consideration include:

• In-country Supply Initiatives. Over time, and through early investment, the need to run expensive, contracted hub-and-spoke supply chain operations should be reduced and complemented by developing host nation capacity to meet the force requirement. Adopting a long-term view of sustainable agricultural development may also assist in marginalising illegal markets. In concert with other agencies and contractors, recent operational initiatives have incentivised local producers through the development of local food crop production, including in-country commodity and fuel processing chains. While not entirely military in nature, these initiatives do have beneficial spin-offs, but need considerable inter-agency cooperation in order to be realised.

• J4 Infrastructure Development. Where military J4 requirements for road, power, water and fuel pipelines, converge with host nation and interagency development aspirations, infrastructure development initiatives may be shaped to satisfy all users’ requirements. For example, the production of bottled water within secure and insecure facilities both reduces the costly movement of high bulk

42. Setting the theatre is a US term used to describe the setting up of access and LOCs in sustainment design.  
43. For example the Peace Dividend Trust is a non-profit making organisation dedicated to the idea that effective, efficient and equitable international operations result in cheaper, faster and more successful missions, delivering a stronger peace and a more sustainable recovery.  
44. The use of contracted logistics should stipulate a requirement to recruit and train local work forces, avoiding where possible the employment of third country nationals, an issue that may engender resentment due to a lack of local employment opportunity.
- local value products, and enables the development of much needed local infrastructure, skills and the employment of a local workforce. The requirement to maintain and repair local infrastructure must also be considered from the outset, so that its development is both appropriate and sustainable.

- **Developing Human Capital.** Capacity building involves the development of things and people. Neither can work effectively in isolation; for example, new, well equipped hospitals without trained staff cannot deliver their intended services. Therefore, sustainable development also requires capacity to be generated within the host nation’s human capital. A common feature of states with instability is a brain drain. The longer this goes on, the harder it is to stop, and the more difficult it becomes to reverse. Consideration must be given to the development of human capital throughout all levels of the host nations’ blue and white-collar workforce. J4 can contribute to this by engaging local contractors and by using local services. Training and mentoring will mitigate some of the short-term risks inherent in this approach, but the enduring effect on stabilisation is self-evident. This approach will be convergent with the initiatives by other actors involved in capacity building, for example in SSR.

- **Inter-agency Contracting.** Long-term development and human capital investment can be achieved through well coordinated interagency contracting. This will include specific caveats on the requirement to let local sub-contracts, to use local services and to employ local people. This may not occur at the outset, but over time, local stakeholders must be brought into the process with the aim being that the scale of their involvement eventually displaces that brought in from outside of the country giving them a greater share.

The **Logistic Footprint and its Effect on Operations.** The traditional way in which logistic lines of supply are implemented (1st, 2nd, 3rd and reachback) will not always apply in stabilisation. The logistics architecture will be dictated by the security situation, for example, the extent to which civilian contractors can freely move around. The complexity of the sustainment, maintenance and joint medical plans requires early engagement and logistics planners must feature in any joint reconnaissance. The logistic footprint that is established will set limits on the tempo of operations, and should be at the forefront of planning. Logistic infrastructure will always be vulnerable to interdiction as well as to regional and strategic events; some of which may not be under the control of the joint force. Long lead times and the ability to flow men and materiel through the joint coupling bridge will determine relative priorities and the art of the possible. Further, when operating in a land locked region, the Land LOCs may also be subject to commercial pressures and prioritisation of movement that are, once again, outside the commander’s control. Tactical constraints imposed by an inadequate logistic capability could have operational and strategic implications. Greater reliance on ‘just in case’ logistic support, rather than ‘just in time’ will have an impact on the physical footprint of the logistic support chain, which must be considered in terms of impact on the local community, as well as on military capability.

**The Adversary Will Attack Our Vulnerabilities**

Baitullah Mehsud, head of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan - an umbrella organisation of Pakistani Taliban - told local media in early 2007 that he would ‘cut off supply lines for Coalition forces’.

“The leader of al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, Abu Basir, claimed that the group has launched a plan to cut supply lines serving US forces present in the Arab Peninsula.” The announcement was made by al-Qaeda in the Yemen in the 7th issue of its online magazine Sada al Malahem. This was realised by the attacks on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) warehouses and LOCs inside Pakistan in early 2009.

**Afghanistan Lines of Communications**

Experiences in Afghanistan since 2001 illustrates the inherent difficulties and risks associated with complex lines of communications, both in-theatre and throughout the joint coupling bridge. Such constraints placed emphasis on the need to prioritise sustainment flow and maintain a logistic reserve in theatre; as the freedom to flow both personnel and material into theatre was critical to mission success and vulnerable to both interdiction and external factors that inhibit logistic activity.

With the closest Sea Port of Disembarkation being located in Southern Pakistan there were significant force protection issues and a considerable reliance on commercial solutions. The ability to transport materiel 500 miles overland through challenging terrain was key to the maintenance of the force. These factors, along with the added security, customs and political complexities of moving military equipment through Pakistan to Afghanistan, placed a much greater reliance on resilient storage methods and a robust Air LOC.
Communications and Information Systems

Information Exploitation. Timely information is critical to effective decision making and the efficient application of resources. The sharing and exploitation of information in order to gain individual and corporate knowledge should be seamless throughout the planning process and be continued throughout execution. The array of ISTAR and other data feeds and information can quickly lead to information overload. The commander will need to prioritise the limited resources available for Information Exploitation if he is to gain maximum effect from all the information available.

Information Management. In order to exploit information effectively sound Information Management is required. This transcends electronic working practices or the delivery of CIS and must be resourced and sufficiently prioritised across all functional areas. The Defence policy for information management is described in detail in Joint Service Publication 747. Investment in well-resourced information management is important because:

- Poor information management will lead to ineffectual information exploitation.
- Without good information management the force will not have the ability to generate, store and access its corporate memory.
- Without well-resourced information management and effective information exploitation, the force will not be capable of learning and adapting at tempo.

Interoparability. Multinational and multi-agency operations necessitates an enhanced degree of interoperability. If the UK is a supporting partner in a coalition, it will need to ensure it has connectivity with the lead or framework nation. Equally, if it is to act as the lead or framework nation, then it must understand and fulfil its attendant obligations to supporting partners. Whatever the case, there will be a premium on interoperability of CIS and commonality of tactics, techniques and procedures. Difficulties in communicating at the tactical level, as well as issues such as electronic counter-measure fratricide, can be resolved by developing common procedures, exchanging liaison officers and communications equipment. Early consideration of the OPSEC implications is required.
Enabling Interoperability with Allies – Iraq

“What having Multinational Corps-Iraq Tac [temporarily co-located] taught us was that, to work under an American Corps Headquarters, you have to get to use American software and staff procedures exclusively. The American staffs … will only action requests using their own systems…. It was not until we had enough US staff and SIPRNET access that we were able to function as a formation under Multinational Corps-Iraq. My strong advice is that, when we put formations under [another country’s] command in the future, we must insist on having a fully staffed and [appropriately] equipped Liaison Team, not just a couple of Liaison Officers and a terminal; which is what we had when we arrived…”

Reachback or Reachout?

Reachback will extend the capability of the headquarters, allowing it to tap in to additional resources that are not directly allocated to the theatre. However the concept of reachback only to the UK is too narrow. There will be other reachout resources that a commander will wish to tap.

- Reachback is traditionally the term used to describe the ability to communicate directly back to headquarters and other capabilities in the UK. It can offer a deployed force access to information resources not immediately available in theatre. Not only will it provide connectivity for those who are preparing to deploy, it should also enable connectivity to be established with those who can contribute to the clarification of intelligence in theatre.
- When confronted by a globalised conflict, the UK-centric focus of reachback may be too constraining. Rather the process should aim to enable a secure global reach to any organisation that can contribute to the fight. In that case, reachback is perhaps a less useful term and should be changed to ‘reachout’. To be effective, the process must be supported by an appropriately resourced CIS infrastructure, which includes sufficient bandwidth.

PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are a feature of the contemporary operating environment. Their use by governments and international organisations complicates the framework within which commanders operate. The following planning considerations apply to PMSCs and help to distinguish between them and contractors on deployed operations.

Although there is little regulation, most British-registered PMSCs sign up to an industry code of conduct which requires them to conduct tasks that are consistent

45. SIPRNET: Secret Internet Protocol Router Network.
46. Post Operational Tour Interview GOC MND(SE), Operation TELIC 2008.
47. For more detailed guidance on working with PMSCs, commanders should refer to JDN 1/08 Military Interaction with Private Military and Security Companies.
with British values and interests. However, commanders are likely to encounter an array of international PMSCs, under contract to different governments, not all of whom will share our culture, goals or values. Indeed, our adversaries may contract with PMSCs, and others may be contracted for purely commercial interests. All of this increases the complexity of the operating environment.

Tensions between Campaign Objectives and Contractual Obligations

Participants in conflict are likely to have different agendas and objectives, although it is hoped, within a single nation’s contribution that most should be working towards similar goals or pursuing common themes. However, PMSC activity will always be contractual while the military approach is outcome-focused. Tensions can arise between them when government departments contract PMSCs for security or development activities. The military focus will be on campaign progress, whereas PMSCs will focus on meeting their contracted performance objectives.

Capabilities and Services

PMSCs offer both armed and unarmed services. When working for commercial clients most will be unarmed, but armed capabilities are offered where either the threat or the contract requires. When considering how the presence of PMSCs should be managed, the key question should not be whether they are armed or unarmed, but whether there is scope for some form of adverse impact on the campaign from their use.

Armed Capabilities. PMSC capabilities can range from the purely defensive, such as close-protection of diplomats, to providing combat support to military operations. Two broad capability areas may be considered:

- Security Support. Armed security support may provide protection for personnel or assets worldwide, in support of military, governmental and commercial organisations. These companies may deliver training packages for clients that may include skill-sets that the UK Government would consider the prerogative of the military, such as SF and Civil-Military Cooperation.

- Military Support. Some commercial PMSCs are prepared to agree contracts that could have an adverse impact on the security and political environment of the host nation, either through the nature of the capabilities provided, or through the manner in which the contract is fulfilled. Most British PMSCs would not offer services of this nature, and the UK Government would not contract with these companies, or for such services. Mercenary groups still...
exist that offer those who hire them the ability to engage in offensive operations. 49

1095 Unarmed Capabilities. PMSCs can provide a wide variety of services that seek to minimise the operational risk to clients operating overseas. More recently, this category has developed security and justice sector capabilities in order to compete for stabilisation contracts. This includes the development of SSR and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. The broad range of services offered by PMSCs to clients, 50 include:

• Training. Military and police training for governments as part of SSR programmes, and security awareness training to commercial organisations, civilians and diplomats deploying to hostile environments.

• Development. Services that may include reconstruction, governance, mine survey and clearance, and delivery of aid.

• Intelligence and Research. Some have the ability to provide tailored intelligence and research services.

• Corporate Tracker and Insurance Services. Based on risk analysis and intelligence work, global threat awareness and assessment programmes, including provision and execution of hostage rescue and extraction plans.

Factors for the Operational Estimate

1096 Private Security Company Analysis. It is helpful for the commander to focus his analysis of PMSCs on some specific areas. This will help him determine the likely risks and benefits of interaction with any particular PMSC. Consider:

• General Background. Gain an understanding of the PMSC, its reputation, culture, history, ethos, other contracts, and other operating locations, and, if a British PMSC, whether it is a member of the British Association of Private Security Companies. 51

• Head Office. Confirm the location of the PMSC's Head Office and which national laws may apply, and which major stakeholders have an interest in the PMSC, including Government departments.

• The Client. Understand with whom the PMSC is contracted and over what time. Develop an awareness of the client ethos and attitude, goals, agendas and approach to risk. Determine the likely client responses to a range of potential threats or challenges. Identify the relationship between British Armed Forces and the client, and whether any responsibilities or liabilities may exist. Understand the different rules and regulations that apply, depending on which client 52 sets the contract.

• Capabilities and Services. Understand the nature of the contract, whether armed or unarmed, which services are to be provided, and which are not provided. Understand performance parameters and contract management procedures. Identify potential benefits or shortfalls that may subsequently have a bearing on military operational planning. Understand the capabilities that the PMSC has offered, and has the skills to offer.

• Location. Determine where the contract is to be performed, the threat environment, what support or resources may be required, what military facilities exist in the area, what potential demands may emerge.

• Employees. Identify which nationalities are employed by the PMSC, what their backgrounds 53 and motivations are, their likely ethics and operating procedures, their military or law enforcement experience and training, and what their national government's position 54 is relative to the crisis at hand.

• Use of Force. Gain a clear understanding of the PMSC's rules guiding its employees in the use of weapons, what weapon training may have been provided, how those Rules for the Use of Force relate to the Rules of Engagement for UK forces and host nation procedures and authorisations for the use of a range of weapons from small arms to heavy weapons. Any such differences identified, will need to be reflected in the PMSC Risk Assessment.

• Information Sharing. Consideration should also be given to the obligation (or otherwise) to share relevant aspects of threat assessment and other information to enhance the survival of PMSCs contracted to, or in support of, coalition operations. Because of the nature of their likely tasks, PMSCs may be operating under higher threat thresholds that other deployed contractors. They can be useful sources of information, and their threat assessments can, in turn, contribute to the clarity of the overall picture. It may also be helpful to establish a C2 node to exchange information and de-conflict activity such as convoy moves; a Civil-Military Operations Centre for example.

48. PMSCs are used by the US government to guard military installations on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
49. Offensive operations are 'operations in which forces seek out the enemy in order to attack him' - JDP 0-01.1 UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (7th Edition).
50. Increasingly includes the humanitarian sector.
52. For example, in the US system, different procedures apply depending on whether the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Department of State sets the contract; only those PMSCs contracted through DOD may be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (US Service Law).
53. While UK and US PMSC employees are frequently former UK or US SF or other regular military or law enforcement personnel, it has been alleged that some personnel employed by other PMSCs may be former Special Police with service under oppressive or harsh regimes.
54. For example, South Africa has drafted legislation that would, when enacted, prohibit its citizens from participating in conflicts or crises opposed by the South African Government.
ANNEX 10B

ADVISERS AND ANALYSTS

10801  Ministry of Defence Advisers and Analysts.

There are a variety of advisers and analysts available to the commander who will provide him with specialist advice and contribute to the planning process within his headquarters. Some of these advisers may be serving officers but most are MOD civil servants who bring with them specific knowledge and expertise that will help the staff develop and refine critical elements of the plan. As well as integrated members of his Command Group, the advisers should also prove to be a valuable source of contact with other government departments and agencies thereby further strengthening the bonds that cement the comprehensive approach. An overview of the key responsibilities of each adviser/analyst is as follows:

- **Defence Adviser.** Defence Analysts are experienced civil servants (Band B2 to 1* equivalent) who work within the host nation’s defence ministry. Their role is to build capacity by working with key defence leaders, both politicians and senior civil servants, and advise them on how to improve their organisation, develop their personnel and implement their plans.

- **Policy Adviser.** Policy Advisers (POLADs) are MOD civil servants (Band C1 or B2) who work directly to the commander. Their role is a bridging one that ensures that national policy takes proper account of the needs and views of the deployed commander and, in turn, that the deployed commander understands that he is acting within Government policy. They provide advice to the commander and staff on the full range of defence, national and international policy. They can also be used to support the development of new policy for use within the theatre of operations.

- **Legal Adviser.** Operational Legal Advisers (LEGADs) serving in the UK Armed Forces are qualified solicitors or barristers who are likely to have specialised in criminal law. They may have further specialised in another area of law notably, international law. LEGADs overarching duty is to provide the commander with accurate, relevant and robust legal advice. They also have a key responsibility to guide planners on the principles of necessity and proportionality in the use of force.

- **Media Adviser.** Media Advisers are senior MOD civil servants who provide advice to the commander and his Media Operations staff on all aspects of media presentation and handling. They are responsible for coordinating theatre media activities with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), the MOD Press Office and others in order to maximise media potential and to complement the UK Information Strategy. They also support the in-theatre military spokesperson.

- **Civilian Police Adviser.** The Civilian Police Adviser is likely to be a senior MOD police officer whose principal role is to provide expert advice on host nation police.
development matters and contribute to the development of Rule of Law as an essential element of the wider stabilisation agenda.

- **Scientific Adviser.** The Scientific Adviser (SCIAD) will be a civilian scientist (Band B1 or equivalent) whose primary role is to provide independent, broad ranging scientific advice to the commander and coordinate all deployed science and technology staff.

- **Operational Analyst.** Working closely with the SCIAD, Operational Analysts will generally deploy in small teams and be filled by a spectrum of civil service grades (Bands D to B). Their primary role is to provide the commander with advice based upon the analysis and interpretation of campaign data. Operational Analysts primarily support the planning function in the headquarters; the JS branch is an appropriate point of integration.

- **Civilian Secretary.** Generally the Civilian Secretary (CivSec) is a MOD Band B civil servant holding delegated responsibilities from PJHQ Command Secretary. His role is the management of commercial, financial and claims functions in an operational theatre. The CivSec is the senior financial adviser in theatre, providing advice and guidance on all aspects of financial activities.

- **Commercial Officer.** Commercial officers are augmented to the in theatre CivSec team to provide commercial policy and guidance in accordance with current MOD best policy and practice. They hold sole Commercial Delegation for the commitment of funds against commercial contracts within their Letter of Commercial Delegation.

- **Civilian Intelligence Analyst.** Civilian intelligence analysts are generally Band C1 civil servants who fill posts within Operational Intelligence Support Groups and other bespoke roles in support of national and multinational intelligence teams. Their primary role is to provide high grade analysis and assessment of intelligence using their expertise and reaching back to the operational support teams in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). They are likely to be part of J2, but will be expected to personally brief and support the senior commander whenever required.

- **Defence Estates Commercial Operations.** Deputy Director Commercial Defence Estates Operations International (DE Commercial) currently provides commercial support to PJHQ and 170 Infrastructure Support Group RE (in-theatre and rear-based in the UK) for the delivery of infrastructure requirements in all operational locations. The main stakeholders who interact with DE Commercial are PJHQ J4 Infrastructure, PJHQ JB Finance Operations, Royal Engineers Works Groups and the local CivSec teams.

- **Area Claims Officer.** Area Claims Officers provide advice on third party compensation claims brought against British Armed Forces within the theatre. To handle, adjudicate and settle all property and personal injury related claims from third parties arising from on-duty and off-duty British Armed Forces activities including fatalities from road traffic accidents, liaising with CivSec, POLAD, LEGAD and force commanders as necessary.

**Other Government Department Advisers.** In most circumstances, the Joint Force Commander will have access to a number of additional advisers who will be seconded from Other Government Departments, or from contract that are integrated into his Joint Task Force Headquarters. A brief definition of their roles is as follows:

- **Senior Stabilisation Adviser.** The Senior Stabilisation Adviser (GTSAAD) may work in support of a Senior Field Team Leader who is working at the strategic level, and may in turn coordinate the activities of one or more Stabilisation Field Team Advisers operating at the tactical level. He will be a generalist with a broad knowledge and experience of designing programmes to bring about political stability.

- **Governance Adviser.** The Governance Adviser (GOVAD) assesses political affairs and governance issues in the host nation administration. Additionally he provides advice and assistance with developing strategies across public administration, political institutions, local governance and community engagement.

- **Rule of Law Adviser.** The Rule of Law Adviser (ROLAD) is concerned primarily with the host nation judiciary, ministry of justice and courts. He holds a wide-ranging legal and legislative brief and will be an expert in institutional reform.

- **Development Adviser.** The Development Adviser (DEVAD) is an expert in private sector development, including having relevant experience of regenerating immediate livelihoods. He will be familiar with the planning and implementation of small-scale and subsistence agriculture programmes and environmental affairs. He will design and implement job creation projects, micro-finance chains of production, as well as business training and development programmes.

- **Cultural Adviser.** The Stabilisation Unit is currently redefining the definition for this post, but it is likely to include both a cultural and linguistic element.
“The shooting side of this business is only 25% of the trouble”

General Sir Gerald Templer

CHAPTER 11
EXECUTION

THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Section I
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- The Purpose of Shape
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- Engagement with Neutral and Friendly Groups
- Engaging with Adversaries
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Section II
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Section IV
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MEASURING CAMPAIGN SUCCESS

Section V
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- Planning Assessment
- Gathering Evidence for Assessment
- Evaluating Evidence in Assessment
- Using Assessment to Support Decision Making

Annex 11A
Developing Indigenous Forces

This publication was replaced by:
Shaping a stable world: The Military contribution (JDP 05)
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This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
This chapter describes the conduct of military operations using a population focused activity framework. The framework of Shape-Secure-Hold-Develop is a model designed to enable a shared lexicon, a common understanding and characterisation of stabilisation activities in a multi-agency community. It allows the commander to explain his operational design and intent. He can use it to describe what activities are being conducted at any given moment, where they are planned to be conducted, and by whom. In this sense, the framework can help operationalise the plan.

At the theatre level, this framework is not applied in a linear or sequential manner. Instead, there is overlap and concurrency of activity, as areas that have previously been secured and held become ready for greater civilian-led development activity, while elsewhere other areas or population groups are still being secured. Building momentum and progress in this way allows the security forces to invest in new areas and expand their influence. In contrast, at the tactical level, the framework is more likely to be applied sequentially. Allowing for these differences in approach, the framework has utility across all levels of the operation. In any circumstance, within the framework of stabilisation activity, conventional tactical military activity will need to take place. For example, it will be necessary within Shape-Secure-Hold-Develop to raid, deter, disrupt, deny, contain, retain, mentor and partner in order to conduct our tactical business.

Civilian-led development has a pivotal role in the stabilisation process. Military and civil effort must be aligned so that neither is wasted. This is a key function of the planning process (Chapter 10). A large military force will require a large civilian effort to conduct development. Where the civilian force is missing, a new plan will be required. Hold is described as a separate element of the framework because of the inherent risk in the transition from military-led Secure, through Hold, to civilian-led Develop. Hold is a defining moment in the campaign; the point at which the weight of effort shifts from the military to civilian agencies. It is critical that this civilian-led development is planned and cued during Shape and Secure. Hold is the point at which indigenous security forces are likely to be invested into the campaign in strength, and where they begin to assume formal responsibility for local security. In turn, this allows the international forces to progress on to other, new areas and begin to Secure them. It is in this way that campaign influence spreads and progress is made.

The Shape-Secure-Hold-Develop framework has a clear relevance to the US approach of Clear-Hold-Build. The UK version simply reflects the importance we place on Shape in order to develop both understanding and plans, and to cue civilian agency support for subsequent Develop activity; Secure reflects a focus on the population rather than just terrain or enemy; and Develop is used because it describes more intuitively the development of capacity, primarily by civilian development organisations. The difference is described in more detail in Chapter 4. The adversary may also have a framework for his activity:

This adversary follows the same logic as the UK’s activity framework, starting small, consolidating and then expanding into new territory.‘Our body has begun to spread into the security vacuum, gaining locations on the ground that will be the nucleus from which to launch and move out in a serious way’ 1

‘What has prevented us from going public is that we have been waiting until we have weight on the ground and finish preparing integrated structures capable of bearing the consequences of going public so that we appear in strength and do not suffer a reversal.’ 2

In Section I, the purpose of Shape and the nature of engagement is explained. Section II deals with Secure and offers some considerations for the use of force, and some implications of ROE and targeting. Section III discusses Hold, while Section IV addresses Develop activity including training, economic development, transition and reconciliation. Finally, Section V, under the heading of Measuring Campaign Success, examines assessment.

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2. Ibid.
THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

SECTION I

SHAPE

Likely Context in which to Shape

- In the opening stages of an intervention, the adversary is likely to have mounted a credible challenge to the authority of the host nation government. In certain areas, he may hold the initiative in terms of being able to offer ‘security’ or ‘protection’ or a ‘viable political alternative’ to the population, or to key elements of it. Some of this may be real, in the sense that he maintains a presence on the ground among key populations, in safe havens for example; and some may be perception, created by fleeting attacks and his own disruptive and influence operations. He will seek to maximise his influence by manipulating all available media (for example, the internet, radio and TV images), and through the use of coercive means.
- A significant and natural advantage held by the adversary is that he will be operating from, and among the people that he is claiming to represent. He will already have established a connection with the population, and be able to influence them and their community leaders through his own narrative and, when necessary, his coercive acts.
- The adversary will already have established his influence mechanisms and support networks, and have developed his Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. As the operation progresses, he will refine and adapt these to pitch his strength against our weakness. He will analyse our intentions and our capabilities in detail after every encounter, especially if he feels his Operations Security (OPSEC) has been breached.
- In developing his narrative and building his influence, the adversary will not be constrained by the need or desire to tell the truth (as the UK perceive it to be). He is likely to index his words and actions against a different set of values and use a different logic to our own. His application of violence is unlikely to be bounded by any of the rules of warfare that international forces would normally apply.
- In the early stages of the campaign, it is likely that the adversary will hold the initiative in the competition for the minds of the people.

The Purpose of Shape

1106 As perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and opinions of individuals and groups all matter, so influence becomes the guiding reference point for stabilisation. Shape begins the influence process. It comprises four elements. These are a combination of: developing situational understanding, influencing specific audiences to attain specific outcomes in planning and resource terms; persuading and empowering other actors to make choices that are advantageous to our own aims; and conducting limited offensive operations in order to keep adversaries off-balance. All of these elements will need to be refined as the operation progresses. Successful Shape will require engagement with groups, actors and elites on the widest possible scale using words and messages that are backed up by kinetic and non-kinetic activity.

1107 Throughout Shape, influence is central and all activity can directly contribute to, or detract from it. Previously, during training for Northern Ireland, units were told that ‘every contact leaves a trace’. This holds true; everyone, no matter what their level of involvement, will leave some impression, however faint. Since everything said or done exerts a degree of influence – good, bad, intended or otherwise – bringing structure and order to Shape activity will focus the effort to harness desired effects.

- Developing Understanding. The first element of Shape is the intellectual engagement to develop an understanding of the operational environment. Some US doctrine, notably that used in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has understand as a separate element of the framework: Understand – Shape – Secure – Hold – Build. Cross-government resources must be committed to find out what is happening and why, and to begin to understand the dynamics. Understanding the adversary is only one aspect of the mosaic; an orientation on wider factors, such as history, culture and values is also essential. It is important to identify who are the competing elites and who wields true power, which is not necessarily the same as those who hold positions of authority. Groups, societies, tribes and allegiances must be determined in order to facilitate the development of a coherent plan. The political, social and economic dynamics must be mapped in order to exercise influence. Empowering the host nation government and gaining the support of key elites and the wider population will be pivotal. Traditional enemy-oriented military intelligence will be inadequate and it will be necessary to adapt existing intelligence structures and build more comprehensive organisations, such as the Operational Intelligence Support Group.
Developing Options. Armed with sufficient understanding, *Shape* activity can become more proactive. Commanders can begin to deduce what supportive and coercive effects are required on specific groups in order to alter the operational situation. Supportive effects are used to empower and influence key elites and gain the consent of target populations. Coercive effects are used to neutralise adversarial groups, or isolate them from their support base, thereby either brokering an accommodation on behalf of the host government or setting the conditions for their defeat. Military plans must support the cross-government objectives set out in any theatre integrated campaign plan. Commanders need to work with both the host nation government and their civilian counterparts in order to secure agreement and resources for their proposals. The commander needs to become an advocate for cross-government support to the campaign, and he should be able to articulate the requirement to other partners. It is largely his own planning that determines the requirement, but it is also his personality and powers of persuasion that will deliver it. This is not discretionary; it is a fundamental aspect of his role. Once options are agreed, they should be prioritised across all Lines of Operations (LoOs). Each activity in the plan will require resourcing and may involve partners agreeing to compromise their own activities for the greater campaign good. Partners will bring their effects to bear; in turn the military provide resources and secure locations, to support those partners in order to enable them to deliver their contribution.

Offensive Operations. Offensive operations are integral to *Shape*, and have two purposes. Firstly, they apply and maintain pressure on adversaries in order to contain their destabilising activities. Secondly, they build intelligence that either contributes to understanding or triggers further, more precise strike operations. In this way the security forces can keep adversaries off-balance in the early stages, and *Shape* them for more decisive activity later in *Secure* and *Hold*. If they do not already have it, it is during these latter activities that the security forces will wrest the initiative from the insurgents.

Engagement Strategy

*Shape* is delivered by an engagement strategy – or more accurately, a series of them – which need to bring both adversarial and friendly groups into the political process. The objective is to build constructive relationships between the host nation government, competing elites, and the population, if necessary, enabled by the coalition. Figure 11.1 provides an example of the sorts of triangular relationships that are needed to effect a successful engagement strategy. The key is that the coalition must both enable and support the building of effective relationships between the host nation elements, rather than interposing between them. In practice, finding channels to engage with individuals and groups may not be the difficulty, there will be direct and covert channels to all parties, including exchanges in the media. The difficulty is to engage with a purpose, and this requires policy to be established as the basis for initial and subsequent productive engagement. For example, an adversary based outside the country tentatively exploring the possibility of an accommodation, will wish to know his legal status, should he wish to return. This may demand formulating and agreeing a legal and policy mechanism, such as conditional immunity for a probationary period prior to full amnesty. When dealing with irregulars, it can be difficult to verify their claims to leadership. This may entail setting tests, such as a tangible reduction in violence in a given place, to establish their authority and commitment.

Elements of an Engagement Strategy. At its most complex, the coalition will contribute by forming a series of triangular relationships with:

- The host nation government and competing elites.
- Competing elites and the host nation population.
- The host nation government and its population.
- A further, potentially complicating, dimension (not shown in Figure 11.1) is the need to situate this engagement strategy regionally.

Key Leader Engagement. It is necessary to capture the views of community leaders both for the purpose of developing understanding of the situation, and in order to influence them. Much of this will be part of a deliberate, intelligence-led process to target specific individuals to achieve influence upon them and the groups that they lead. Some, however, will be less structured; informal gatherings, social meetings, discussion groups and impromptu *shuras* for example. Some of this engagement can be achieved by the commander himself, but it is helpful to spread the burden. Deputy commanders, senior staff officers and deployed civil servants can be especially useful in this regard; the trick is to apply some discipline to Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and then share the information generated. It may be useful therefore to develop a management system for all engagement which the intelligence community can also access. Carefully selected cultural and stabilisation advisers will aid understanding, advise on key leader engagement, and extend influence. There are numerous reasons why the UK may seek influence through KLE, examples are:
• In support of Planning:
  - **To Secure Agreement for Objectives and Resources.** It will not be possible to identify all objectives, in all time frames at the outset of the campaign. Many will emerge as the campaign progresses. Political and adversary action may also force adjustments to the plan. For the military commander, KLE will be necessary with the host nation ministries and international organisations in order to gain their support and to coordinate, synchronise and prioritise activity in order to achieve the building blocks of the decisive conditions that realise campaign objectives. This requires powers of advocacy to inform and build consensus. KLE will also be necessary to negotiate and prioritise the allocation of resources to achieve common objectives.

• In Pursuit of the Political Settlement:
  - **To Reinforce the Authority of Legitimate Leaders.** Engaging with certain individuals or groups, such as giving them the credit for detainee releases, can legitimise their position, while ignoring others can weaken theirs. Transparent engagement with the host nation government at every level encourages the population to recognise their authority.
  - **To Restore Confidence and Enable Reconciliation.** Restoring public confidence in their government is a key objective. The aim is to engage in concert with the government, although in practice this can be complex. The host nation may not have a strategy, or it may have a different set of engagement priorities whose pursuit may actively obstruct the attainment of the UK’s objectives. Alternatively, the host nation may have links to some groups that the UK does not, and vice versa. In Iraq, the coalition had good connections to some elements of the Sunni insurgency, whereas the Government had better connections to the Shia militias. A mechanism was developed to harmonise and exploit both channels. Engagement to test the ground for accommodation is a vital first step towards ultimate reconciliation. The conflict will be settled by locals not outsiders, through an agreed framework of confidence-building measures.

See Annex 10B for a description of advisers and analysts.

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**Figure 11.1 – Engagement Relationships**

Key:
- Confidence Building
- Engagement Strategy
- Accommodation or Destruction
- Break the Influence

SOFA, MOU, Mandate and Other Formal Arrangements

Host Nation Government

Coalition

Competing Elites

Host Nation Population

This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
In Pursuit of Security:

• **To Obtain Intelligence.** Human Intelligence (HUMINT) may be gathered both by specialists and through KLE by others. It will provide texture and context, ideally through prolonged and widespread engagement and ideally on the basis of personal relationships.

• **To Deliver Targeted Messages.** Using locals—including tribal and other informal structures—as the conduit for messages into their communities has greater impact than an outsider delivering the same message. However, the message can be corrupted and should therefore be disseminated down multiple channels.

• **To Provide Feedback.** Engagement also enables those delivering messages to judge whether or not they are having their intended effect on target audiences. If properly targeted, it is a valuable, though subjective, contribution to campaign assessment.

**Engagement Case Study – Sierra Leone**

The identification of, and engagement with, key leaders within the major influence groups operating in Sierra Leone was an integral part of the UK’s operations during Operation PALLISER. The major de-stabilising force within the country was composed of a number of street gangs who were heavily involved in criminal activity associated with diamond smuggling and extortion. These gangs formed loose associations and alliances based on their short-term interests. By engaging with their leaders, it was possible to split these alliances and significantly alter the balance of power between the gangs. This allowed the security forces to exert greater influence over individuals and groups, resulting in the disintegration and marginalisation of a number of them.

Wider UK engagement with other key leaders within other influence groups, including the local population, international organisations, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other African states, was also conducted. This ensured that the purpose and duration of UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone was widely understood, and this garnered domestic, as well as international support for operations.

**Engagement with Neutral and Friendly Groups**

**Leadership.** It can be difficult to identify the legitimate leaders within a community, especially in the early stages. It may also be difficult to distinguish between those that hold apparent authority, and those who hold positions of real influence; the latter matter most. In some countries, ministers are merely bureaucratic functionaries with the real
In most failing states, corruption is rife and few leaders are untainted by it. Equally, elites are likely to be tainted by criminality. Commanders will be wary of compromising their own legitimacy but will have to deal with unsavoury characters.

Host Nation Government Representatives. Engagement takes place from the highest level of government, utilising the hierarchy of committees, right through to routine business at the local level. It can be conducted directly with government representatives or through the use of liaison officers embedded within key ministries. Connecting the work of these committees allows coherent messaging (both ways) and a nascent nation-wide ‘nervous system’. Patience and tact are essential, choosing people with the right skills is critical.

Regional Engagement. Stability will demand support from neighbouring states, and therefore regional
engagement. Engagement manages the risk that instability will be exported thus threatening the entire region. Equally, neighbouring countries may exert political, security and economic influence that has the potential to be both positive and malign. Regional engagement should be politically led. However, operational necessity or the absence of capacity may require a commander to conduct this task, not least to arrange technical matters, such as cross-border security coordination. Significant investment in liaison may be required and boundaries set to avoid imposing artificial lines on seamless problems.

Engaging with Adversaries

Engagement with adversaries is highly sensitive and commanders need to provide clear guidance on it to the force. In reality, engagement with the adversary is conducted directly or indirectly at the tactical level every day through contact with the local population. In any group there will be a spread of commitment, a mix of reconcilable and irreconcilable members. The aim is to distinguish between them; accommodate with the reconcilable, and kill, neutralise or isolate the irreconcilable, particularly the leadership element. Engagement will add tension to the group. Achieving accommodations may break its cohesion and foster mistrust and internal tensions. Identifying these tensions and exploiting them generates opportunities.

Internees and Detainees. The most frequent engagement with adversaries will be when they are held as internees and detainees. They represent a valuable information resource, and this must be exploited within a legal framework.

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6. The tripartite relationship between the Afghan National Security Force, Pakistan Military and ISAF is an example.
7. A term used by General Petraeus in Iraq to describe an unstoppable momentum of success.
8. For a visual representation of this, see Figure 4.2
Security Accommodations. A commander may have to broker local security accommodations in order to stabilise the situation. An example is the arrangements that tactical commanders may broker with groups of concerned local citizens to contribute to the local security situation. While, in certain circumstances, these may be necessary at the tactical level, they will have operational and, perhaps, strategic repercussions that must eventually be addressed, in particular with the host nation. Any such accommodations should, where possible, be established from a position of strength. Offensive operations may be used as a precursor to establish that firm basis. Accommodations, by definition, involve compromise and risk on all sides. The terms of the accommodation are negotiable. The declared reason why an adversary seeks an accommodation may not be his ultimate objective; some of the groups engaged in Iraq in 2007, for instance, sought an accommodation with Multinational Force-Iraq to fight al-Qaeda in the short-term as a precursor to their strategic goal of changing the political balance. Adversaries will typically demand release of prisoners and operational restrictions, such as a cessation of raids. If and when these cards are played it is politically and militarily sensitive, demanding the full engagement of politicians, diplomats, intelligence agencies, international organisations (such as the UN) and military commanders. Due to the security risk of ceding hard-won initiative, it is a test of operational art. As Musa Qal‘eh in 2007 illustrated, accommodations are not guarantees; but taking risk is essential for campaign momentum.

- Accommodation is about conflict management.
- Reconciliation is about conflict termination.

Negotiating with Reconcilable Adversaries. This could be the most important form of engagement, as it may be the first step towards conflict transformation. If the military are involved, some considerations are:

- Negotiation is a delicate process, and the broad terms, such as no deal that undermines the host government, must be clearly set from the outset. Frequently, however, the parties will initially be divided by a gulf of misunderstanding and misperceptions. Identifying these, much less starting to address them, will not be possible until the process of exploration starts. Setting definitive boundaries, therefore, such as whether or not the release of prisoners is contemplated, is likely to be counterproductive. Negotiation is not a sign of weakness; rather it confronts the adversary and forces him to decide whether or not to join the political process. He should be left in no doubt as to the alternative of not joining the process.

- Offering conditional immunity from prosecution may permit an accommodation, without granting a general amnesty which may more properly be part of reconciliation.

- Once started, engagement may generate a momentum that transforms the campaign, creating a ‘Mesopotamian Stampede’ effect.7 These relationships carry risk and may be seen by the government as threatening. Transparency is essential as suspicion that the international coalition is brokering a separate deal has the potential to cause a strategic rift. The government will need to share an assessment of the risks and see how they are to be mitigated, for instance by the collection of biometric data which will allow tracking of those involved. The coalition should remain engaged until a political settlement is achieved.

Offensive Operations

Shape through engagement continues throughout the campaign.8 It occurs in areas where Secure – Hold – Develop is being enacted and also in areas where security force presence has yet to be established. In both these situations, adversaries will seek to secure or create their own safe havens. They will do this to secure a population to their own cause; force-generate or recuperate; or to develop and protect funding and resource streams. Although military resources will inevitably be stretched, the adversary cannot be allowed the freedom of action that these ungoverned spaces afford, unless it is to our advantage. Instead, even though our force may be largely committed elsewhere, some activity will be necessary to raid, disrupt and deter into these areas, or at least understand their capability exists. In addition, local militia cadres may be established with appropriate mentoring and enablers. This provides a twin benefit of establishing mass and a force that demonstrably addresses local security concerns. Through such forces and their outposts, there is scope to build an early connection with the local community and to garner intelligence. However, there are clearly risks to be weighed. These include: the sustainment burden; the inherent risks of isolated bases; the requirement to provide reinforcement, often through the use of fires with the associated risks of collateral damage; and the trustworthiness and motivations of cadres if used and the risk of retribution to the local population if the cadres fail.
Likely Context in which to Secure

- The adversary’s ability to read our intentions, adapt and counter international forces’ efforts will improve. By modifying his approach, he aims to find weaknesses and negate technological advantage. He may employ a variety of means to bolster and broaden his appeal to the population, and may expand the span and tempo of his activity to demonstrate continued relevance.
- Because he recognises that the conflict is principally about gaining influence over the population and supplanting ideas, he will refine, and possibly redefine, his narrative as he tries to maintain the initiative and the perception that he still offers a viable alternative. He may attack legitimate authorities and their partners.
- The adversary will extract every advantage from being almost indistinguishable from the local population. He will seek sanctuary and establish safe havens in areas in which he can gain moral and physical ascendancy over an adversary. He may attack legitimate authorities and their partners.
- The commander may not be quick. The tactical aspects of secure are covered in Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, Counter-insurgency Operations.

The Purpose of Secure

1120 Like Shape, Secure comprises both supportive and coercive effects. The re-establishment of government control is supportive; the reduction of the influence and freedom of action of adversarial groups is coercive. In Secure, it is necessary to focus on the population, not just the adversary, terrain or infrastructure. However, it will be vital to strike the right balance in the use of force for the population to be convinced that their security needs can be adequately met. During secure violence may spike. The military will need the full support of all inter-agency partners to wrest the security initiative. Secure may not be quick. The tactical aspects of secure are covered in Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, Counter-insurgency Operations.

Focus on the Population

1121 Securing vital national infrastructure and implementing measures to re-establish and maintain control of key populations, such as significant ethnic minorities, through the provision of rule of law and basic public services, is central to legitimacy. Securing an environment that provides populations with the opportunity to go about their daily lives without the fear of violence is paramount. The goal must be pragmatic, not a complete absence of violence, but its reduction to levels containable by indigenous forces and where normal life can be resumed. It may even be possible to secure an area without force, through implementing economic and governance measures.

1122 Measures to Control the Population. In order to separate the adversary from the population, the commander may introduce control measures, temporarily restricting some freedoms. This will have an influence upon perceptions of the government and the security forces. The commander may risk resentment and alienation in the short term in order to isolate the adversary and deliver better security in the mid term, or continue to allow the adversary access to the population. Measures therefore need to be applied with care and coordinated with an active information operation that explains the situation. Control measures include:

- Curfews. A curfew can constrain adversary freedom of movement and temporarily quells civil unrest. It can be employed as an economy of force measure. It must not be used for collective punishment; this is against international law.
- Barriers and Check Points. Barriers and check points control and canalise movement, protect property and help isolate adversaries. In many circumstances, adversaries rely on vehicles to transport weapons and munitions. Check points and barriers may be used to enhance the physical security of certain vulnerable locations, such as markets and government offices.
- Establishing Who is Who. The key to operating effectively amongst the people is knowing who is who. Population censuses, public records such as ration records or identification cards, network analysis, biometric data and evidence collection all combine to deny the adversary the anonymity on which he depends. This is a major organisational task and needs the cooperation of the government.

The Use of Force

1123 Striking the Balance. Militaries have a bias for high-tempo, kinetic operations to defeat the enemy. Such approaches, critical to success in war, can be counter-productive in stabilisation. Properly applied force, however, can gain moral and physical ascendancy over an adversary. As operations to secure the support of the people must necessarily be conducted amongst them, risk that would normally be mitigated by the use of force may be unavoidable. The consequences of collateral damage can erode any advantage gained by a military strike against a hostile group.
Commanders will need to manage this risk by balancing three competing demands: limiting military casualties by standoff and high levels of force protection; engaging with the population in order to develop understanding and trust; and implanting in the mind of the adversary a sense of personal risk and uncertainty.

1124 Considerations for the Use of Force. The right to use force is covered by UK law and will be supplemented on operations by a mandate, ROE and, if the offensive use of force has been authorised, a Targeting Directive. These set the boundaries and policy for the use of force, but the general principle should be to use the minimum, but not minimal force. Consider:

- It is better to modify behaviour by coercion than by using force. This needs a subtle combination of threats and incentives that allows the commander to retain control without losing the initiative or public support. Demonstrations of force, without resorting to its use, can also have a powerful deterrent effect. This may allow us to secure areas without fighting.
- The minimum amount of force is that force commensurate with the task, which may still include a significant range of fires to achieve the aim. It should not be confused with minimal force; this is the smallest amount of force that can possibly be used and may not enable the task to be achieved.

1125 Recording the Use of Force. Adversaries seek to undermine the public’s confidence in the security forces by propaganda or the spread of misinformation. The government and security forces ideally should be first with their message. Where they are not, they must be able to challenge and refute the adversary’s version, particularly when lethal force has been used. Fires and outcomes ideally should be recorded, providing operational verification, which promotes credibility.

Influence Through a Show of Force
– Sierra Leone 2000

Following the ceasefire between the Sierra Leone Government and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) UK joint forces, primarily from the Amphibious Ready Group, conducted a demonstration at Aberdeen Beach near the capital, Freetown.

The demonstration provided a timely reminder to the RUF and underscored the UK’s support for a stable, democratic Sierra Leone. The clear message to the rebels was: ‘it would not be to your advantage to break the ceasefire’.

9. It is important to note that the policy will depend on whether a state of conflict exists or not. This decision is made at government level. The required direction is given to the commander via Chief of Defence Staff’s Directive.
Rules of Engagement

Considerations. ROE are directives that set out the circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be applied to achieve military objectives for the furtherance of government policy. Although focused on the physical domain, they may also cover activity in such areas as the electromagnetic spectrum and the virtual domain. While not in themselves law, ROE must be consistent with it. A bespoke set of ROE, known as the ROE Profile, will be generated for each operation. This ROE Profile will be shaped by the force’s mandate as well as by the legal framework within which the force is to operate. ROE for UK forces will be developed by the MOD ROE Committee and issued only after formal agreement by the Minister. Additional considerations for operating under ROE are:

- UK forces will be bounded by the specific national ROE Profile developed for the mission, as well as by any applicable coalition ROE. Each force contributing nation will usually develop its own or variations of coalition ROE so that they conform to their own national legal framework. National contingents will need to pay particular attention to this when operating outside their own mandated areas or when operating across boundaries. This aspect may have particular implications for air/land integration, where other nation’s close air support may be operating under tighter or looser ROE; the integration of coalition forces coming under UK command; and UK personnel embedded in coalition posts.

- Although a commander may take unilateral action to make the ROE more restrictive than originally intended, he may not make them more permissive without consultation with the issuing authority. A commander may also choose to delegate authority for some ROE to a subordinate, while retaining authority over others himself. In addition, where UK and coalition ROE exist side-by-side, the most restrictive elements will apply to UK forces.

- As well as understanding the mandate, the Targeting Directive (if applicable), his own national ROE, and those of the coalition and other partners, the commander should also constantly monitor the validity of the ROE. He should know how and when to request changes to them, if and when circumstances change. Joint Service Publication JSP 398 provides clear guidance on the process to be followed when submitting a ROE Request.

- The commander should also be aware of any host nation ROE, and any constraints that they may place on the employment of UK forces operating under national ROE. If necessary, assistance should be offered to the host nation to develop its own ROE Profiles. However, it must be remembered that that ROE are based, in part, on national law, and that UK forces are unlikely to have the required understanding of host nation law to make a full contribution to this process.

- Detention. The UK may not wish to conduct detention operations, but where the host nation lacks the capacity, there may be no alternative. The authority and the extent of any powers granted to the commander will rest with Whitehall under an agreement with the host nation. Well-run detention operations can be highly effective in disrupting the adversary’s flow of men, materiel and funds. Consider:

  - Detention may be a cyclical as it involves the following steps: Capture-Detention-Release-(and possible) Recapture. The cycle is fed by the conduct of other security operations and is refined by the ever-increasing and accurate intelligence picture that the process generates.
  - All internees and detainees must be handled strictly within UK policy guidelines, the rule of law, and in accordance with international norms by appropriately trained personnel. Poorly conducted detention or interrogation will damage campaign authority and may lead to large numbers of neutrals choosing to support the adversary. The interrogation and detention system must be capable of correctly handling and segregating detained persons. For example, attempting to identify and separate the hard-core insurgent from the petty criminal, and this will help manage the risk that detention centres become insurgent universities.
  - Detention is manpower intensive. The facility must be properly resourced. In Iraq, where the US ran a
Isolate and Neutralise the Adversary. This is a principle for the military contribution covered in Chapter 4. By attacking adversaries' critical requirements (Annex 8B) they can be isolated and neutralised. Generally, the goal is to neutralise, rather than kill, and to make him irrelevant in security and political terms. Some considerations:

- Population control measures help shape and set the conditions for isolation.
- Framework operations deter and disrupt the adversary, forcing him into the open.
- Intelligence-led strike operations cause attrition and fracture leadership.
- Rapid material and personnel exploitation can generate tempo.
- Use of the judicial system and detention helps demonstrate effective host nation Rule of Law.
- Measures are needed to isolate the Joint Operations Area and secure the country's borders.
- Adversary lines of communication should be placed at risk.
- Cross-government and multinational mechanisms deny financial support.
- An information operations campaign disrupts adversary influence mechanisms.
- Measures of effectiveness should guide the campaign.

Detainees and Internees

The term detention is often used to describe imprisonment of those who oppose the government or international forces. During hostilities not amounting to international armed conflict, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10 Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees, makes it clear that there are two categories of captured or detained persons:

- **Internees.** UK Forces operating abroad may have the power to intern civilians under the host nation's law where they pose an imperative threat to the security of the force; such power may derive from the host state's own domestic law or from a UN Security Council Resolution. Internees may be disarmed, but must be allowed to keep all of their personal property (unless it is of evidential value or must be confiscated for security reasons) and steps should be taken to establish their identity. Internees must be treated humanely. The basis upon which individuals are interned must be made subject to periodic review.

- **Criminal Detainees.** UK Armed Forces operating abroad may have the power (derived from the host nation's own domestic law) to participate in the arrest of criminal suspects, or may assist the host nation's authorised personnel in the arrest of persons. In the case of criminal suspects or indicted persons, they should be handed over to the appropriate local authorities at the earliest opportunity, provided that there is no reason to believe that they will suffer torture or summary execution. Criminal detainees must be treated humanely. They may be disarmed, but must be allowed to keep all of their personal property (unless it is of evidential value or must be confiscated for security reasons) and steps should be taken to establish their identity.

11. In accordance with both UK domestic law and the UK's interpretation of International Law.
12. This is to include an understanding of any national caveats (sometimes referred to as 'red cards') that may apply to national contingents. This may be difficult to achieve, as most ROE is highly classified.
Targeting and Influence

1129 The Targeting Process in Stabilisation. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities, and is detailed in JSP 900 UK Joint Targeting Policy. It provides an iterative methodology for the development, planning, execution, and assessment of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. It relies on the effective coordination of activity by numerous organisations across different LoOs. The selection, authorisation and prioritisation of targets requires the personal involvement of the commander. The aim is to generate a specified effect.

• **Focus.** The focus of targeting in stabilisation is on people, neutral and friendly groups as well as adversaries. Targeting identifies the options, both physical and psychological, to create effects that support objectives. Some targets are best addressed using activities with a primarily physical effect, while other targets are best engaged using psychological effects such as Civil-military Co-operation; information operations; direct engagement; negotiation; and political, economic and social programmes.

• **Consequences.** In a crowded operating space the impact of poor targeting or unintended collateral damage can be severe. Successful targeting requires:
  - Clear understanding of the effects sought and their consequences.
  - Prioritisation and sequencing to balance demands and resources.
  - Balancing short-term impact against longer term considerations.
  - Established, and proven measures of effectiveness.
  - The management of unintended consequences.

1130 **Collateral Damage.** Collateral damage could adversely affect public confidence, support from the home base and campaign authority. Adversaries will often use sensitive, cultural or religious sites to carry out attacks. When responding, the precise use of force may minimise collateral damage. Adversaries may try to:
  - Goad security forces into overreaction.
  - Lead them into sensitive areas where fires may cause civilian injury and collateral damage.
  - Deceive the security forces into believing civilian areas or sensitive sites are harbouring adversaries, when they are not.
  - Make the international forces so concerned about collateral damage that they cede the initiative.
SECTION III

HOLD

Likely Context in which to Hold

- Losses suffered by the adversary could force him to move, thereby displacing and disrupting him. However, borders and rigid boundaries offer the adversary the possibility of re-establishing elsewhere.
- As the adversary’s influence is diminished, the balance of the initiative begins to swing away from him in areas that have been secured, he will be increasingly compelled to act against the seams of the UK’s inter-agency and multinational effort, attacking civilian partners and discrediting their gains.
- The adversary will undermine any host nation economic or government development successes. In its early stages, progress made by these programmes may be fragile.
- He will be forced into a more covert stance and may switch focus to terrorism.
- He may ask to talk, possibly to buy time to re-group, especially if his goal is to husband resources for a subsequent, longer term internal power struggle.

The Purpose of Hold

Hold – of a secured area – is about demonstrating commitment and establishing the conditions for civilian-led development. Once achieved, it must not be lost. It is also about developing hope. To hold what has been secured is so fundamental that in some frameworks it is subsumed into the term Secure. Hold can be considered to be a pivot on which campaign progress is balanced and the point at which progress can be most readily assessed. During this stage the emphasis of supported shifts from military to civilian organisations. Any failure to hold after secure will cause the government and security forces to lose credibility. 

- Focus on Policing. It is possible during Hold that the transition to an indigenous security force lead on policing may begin. It will have been necessary to develop sufficient mass for this through capacity building and SSR conducted in areas that have already undergone Shape-Secure-Hold-Develop. Ideally, indigenous police forces, possibly paramilitary ones, will have been developed at this stage. If not, it will be necessary for other forces to fill the gap. Since not all armed forces have a mandate to police, some enabling legislation may be needed. International forces must live among the population and partner indigenous forces if they are to establish effective security and a policing function that serves the population. This not only further erodes the power base and freedom of action of the remaining adversarial groups, but information gained from the population by holding an area can be exploited to influence or inflict further damage against adversaries.

Mobilising Inter-agency Action for Security Effect – UK Brigade Commander, Iraq, 2008

“The Corps sent us a CMOC [Civil Military Operations Centre], which had ready access to money, which in turn required only minimal process to be released. When an operation was being run, CMOC would talk to the local people, find out what they needed (if they wanted the street cleared of rubbish, they would tell them to get fifty people together and, once they had, pay them there-and-then to clear the streets). This bought short term consent…short term action provides the preconditions for long term development. Security depends on it; it is suppression by other means; and CMOC gave us the ability to do it.”

- Synchronising Comprehensive Measures. While an effective security force presence must be retained, the decisive factor will be the speed of governance initiatives and economic progress. A sense of security cannot be maintained by military action alone since it is bound into the wider concept of Human Security and improving governance. The aim therefore is not merely to deliver freedom from persecution, want and fear, but simultaneously to provide essential commodities such as water and food and get society to function again at the local level. This means going with the grain, such as working with tribal structures, while simultaneously enabling the central government to re-connect (or connect) with its people. Wherever possible, projects should be linked to longer-term priorities on the economic and governance LoO. However, the imperative is to demonstrate short-term human security effect.
SECTION IV
DEVELOP

Likely Context in which to Develop

• The adversary may continue to disrupt our efforts at long-term development. However, as his security deteriorates, he will find it more difficult to offer a convincing alternative.
• His behaviour could become increasingly extreme. He may reframe his concepts of victory and defeat, arguing that he can win merely by not losing.
• Adversaries are likely to target host nation vulnerabilities, recognising that in Develop, most activity will have an overtly civilian lead.
• He will tell the population that the international forces’ security is transient, and state that he will be there, amongst them, long after we have gone.
• As government measures gain greater traction, some adversaries may become more open to the suggestion of reconciliation. His structures may fracture.

The Purpose of Develop

1132 In Develop, comprehensive measures are implemented to build organisational capacity and stimulate the economy. This enhances government credibility and delivers on the promise of increasing prosperity. Success should further erode the support base of adversarial groups and create the conditions for a political settlement. Concurrent, early investment in both short and long-term projects will be required. Develop comprises a mix of political and economic development, capacity building and SSR. The goal is for the development effort to be coordinated through the host government. Local governance structures should be used to create a dialogue with the population in order to give them a stake in their future, a sense of ownership, and to ensure that effort is clearly prioritised. Economic and political aspects of Develop are not primary military business; the military are still likely to be needed in a supporting role. The commander should engage in and influence these processes and may need to use military capability to plug gaps, without becoming fixed.

Training Indigenous Forces

1133 SSR is one of the key outputs of building capacity. The goal is effective, accountable and non-predatory security forces that serve the population and the nation. This endeavour is likely to constitute a principal element of the military contribution to stabilisation. Generic guidance is contained at Annex 1A. Some Develop activity needs to occur while the operation more generally is conducting Shape and Secure to ensure indigenous forces are generated in time to support Secure, Hold and other Develop activity.

Governance

1134 As was highlighted in Chapters 5 and 6, SSR is broader than the training of indigenous security forces. Recent insights from a military commander are opposite:

Likely Governance Tasks. Governance will be defined at the strategic level and coordinated with civilian partners. Military involvement will depend on the level of security. At first, tasks may include the identification of key leaders and government officials and the measures to support and empower their offices. There may be relevant skills in, for example, national and local governance and utility management, within regular forces and sponsored reserves. As governance structures and processes grow, they should become responsible for the delivery of public services and budgets. At this stage they can take on the mantle of the military-run security committee architecture, further linking governance and security.

Economic Development

1136 Likely Economic Tasks. The long-term development of the economy will be led by Other Government Departments (OGDs) and international organisations, but an early assessment of what needs to be done will be necessary. Military presence on the ground ahead of other organisations and agencies will enable them to contribute to any assessment. Specialists, particularly from the Reserve, with their civilian skill-sets, can assist.
This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

SSR – 10 Top Tips From UK Military Commanders

- **Non-Discretionary.** SSR is a non-discretionary task; the later it is started, the longer the intervention.
- **Consultation, consultation, consultation.** Creating forces that look like your own is one of the biggest mistakes that you can make. You need to go with the grain but equally you need to apply standards that create real capability. Be realistic; some things just cannot be achieved because of cultural resistance. Consultation and coordination with all the partners is essential. SSR involves lots of players; many of the problems are because not everyone is on the same page. Some resist coordination. There is an extensive body of international expertise on SSR – use it.
- **Organisation.** Train, Equip, Mentor and Organise are good headings. Expect to create new structures in your own organisation. And you will need to find qualified, talented people. Equally, you may have to work with, not around, existing local security structures. SSR makes strange bedfellows: tribes and militias may enjoy broad support or have utility. If so, use them, but plan their future concurrently.
- **Ministries.** Creating fighters at the execution end of SSR but ignoring the policy end will undo any progress you make. Local ministries are rife with power struggles: once started they are difficult to control. Reforming ministries requires civilian and military experts – the A Team you find in the busy parts of MOD Main Building.
- **Prioritisation.** You will be tempted to focus on the military. But treating the police and justice system as afterthoughts can lead to mission failure. None of this is sequential, it must be concurrent.
- **Embedding.** Embedding is risky, but it is right at the heart of effective mentoring and training. We have to live and serve alongside the locals if we are to lead by example. To be more than ‘goons with guns’, local forces must be accountable – to their internal disciplinary system, their civilian leaders, and the population.
- **Vacuums.** Conflict breaks down any system that may have been there. Criminality, militias and warlords will fill the vacuum. Your goal is to dominate these vacuums. SSR allows you to transition that dominance to local partners.
- **Patience.** Accept that creating effective local forces takes time, patience and sustained commitment. Poor decision-making, such as going for mass over quality at first, haunts you. Even the best plan may not get it right first time; you may need to go back, test and adjust to get the forces you (and they) need.
- **Balance.** Getting the balance right between training them too quickly (to get them into the fight) or training them too slowly (to make them fully qualified) is difficult. If you drive them too quickly they unravel when pushed; drive them too slowly and they fail to have impact. Mentoring and close-marking helps.
- **The Basics.** If paid and fed, the locals are more likely to fight. If not, they become predators. Getting the basics of administration right cuts out cronyism and corruption; you get real capability, not ghost soldiers.

**Transitions**

**The Use of Transitions.** Achieving objectives is likely to be incremental. Transition describes the transfer of authority and responsibility for the delivery of pre-defined, discrete functions between one set of empowered, legitimate actors and another. This process is often two-way: at first, local agencies may be overwhelmed so requiring external support from international forces – this may be the first transition. Then, as capacity builds, responsibility will be handed back incrementally to the appropriate local authorities until they have restored full indigenous control. As with all transitional phases, such as a rearward passage of lines, the force will be off-balance.

**Planning Transitions.** The campaign will mature in stages. Transitions may be constrained by the different national strategies and local imperatives, such as elections or the fall of a government. There may also be sensitivities over control and timing. Transitions alter the balance of supported/supporting relationships. Smooth transition may be enabled by the creation of Military-to-Civil Transition Teams. The rate of transition is often used as an indicator of campaign effectiveness, so the commander should expect to come under pressure to accelerate.

**The Link between End-states and Transitions.** The end-state should be expressed as the achievement of defined levels of political and economic stability within a self-sustaining security environment. Activity on all LoOs will transition to a host nation lead, either at a localised level or as part of a larger, national process of transition. Early in planning, the conditions required for them (particularly the final ones that allow the force to redeploy) are identified and resourced.
The adversary tracks campaign progress and may even use similar tools to our own. This shows al-Qaeda in Iraq’s pictorial view of their operations and progress in a one week period 2-8 March 2007. It illustrates that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)\textsuperscript{15} considered they had a large part of the country, including Baghdad the strategic centre of gravity, completely or partially under control. It also highlights that this was their ‘high water mark’, and since that time they have suffered a major reversal, not least due to adaptation in the coalition campaign plan.

\textsuperscript{15} ISI is an umbrella organisation of a number of Iraqi insurgent groups established in 2006.
**Conditions.** There will be a debate about whether transitions should be time or conditions-based. Time-based conditions set clear benchmarks and can galvanise the effort (including the host government). However, they risk handing the initiative to the adversary by laying out the limits of our commitment, or to opportunists who benefit from the conflict. Conditions-based transition planning is also problematic because they appear open-ended. Achieving conditions identified in the plan can take far longer than first anticipated. Setting *good enough* conditions, and then assessing them objectively are essentials of a conditions-based strategy. In practice, the approach is likely to be constrained by an un-easy amalgam of these approaches, as they represent the political reality. One external indicator is the behaviour of certain NGOs such as International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières. Their withdrawal to other higher priority areas may be indicative that the crisis has passed. This may support or act as a check to any military assessment of the suitability for transition. Where the decision to amend or ignore certain conditions is not in the commander’s gift, he should robustly explain the consequences.

**Risks.** Possible risks involved in transitions include:

- **Mal-alignment of Authority and Responsibility.** Transitions that involve the migration of authority but not responsibility, should be avoided, for example, where security operations in an area are transitioned to local command, but remain reliant on the international forces’ military capability and hence they carry the risk.

- **Progressive Loss of Situational Awareness.** As international forces hand over more responsibility, they risk campaign blindness and an intelligence void. It is at this precise moment that the need for situational awareness is at its greatest. This can be ameliorated, for example, by increasing embedded mentors and stand-off surveillance. However, this is likely to coincide with a desire to reduce the military footprint, rather than to increase it in any way.

- **Set-backs.** Transitions may not work. The strategy should consider the potential to re-assume a *Hold* posture if, after a trial period, security conditions are not sustained. The force may be asked to re-engage to prevent collapse.

  Before transitioning, the commander should establish the policy parameters.

- **Loss of Control.** As responsibility is progressively transferred, the international community gradually loses control. Influence and negotiation become the primary tools for the commander, in place of direct action.

**Reconciliation**

*There are no specific formulas for reconciliation.*

Carlinda Monteiro, Accord Issue 15 2004, Peace and Reconciliation

**Understanding Reconciliation.** Reconciliation has to be lasting and self-sustaining and depends upon the viability of the political settlement previously described in Chapter 1. The military contributes by creating the right conditions and usually focus on SSR and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR):

- Providing a secure environment for meetings between protagonists.

**Reconciliation Case Study – Sierra Leone**

The UK’s military contribution to reconciliation was important in a number of ways:

- It provided the overarching framework in which reconciliation took place. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and its predecessors were so fragmented that, without the UK military involvement, they may have remained a serious obstacle to reform. The UK military designed and maintained the first functioning command structure for some time. In the early days advisers took on direct command roles.

- The UK military played a critical role in the DDR process, by running the absorption of former combatants into the new military and retraining the RSLAF.

- The continuing UK presence meant that the RSLAF remained relatively non-politicised, playing a role as both catalyst and conscience.

- The persistent presence of UK advisers increased societal confidence and reconciliation and curbed the political activities of senior RSLAF officers.
MEASURING CAMPAIGN SUCCESS

SECTION V

ASSESSMENT

Achieving and Measuring Effects. There are two factors to consider in the design of campaign assessment. First, determine the effects (outcome) of activity and their impact on the wide range of audiences. Second, the time-lag between cause and effect. The rush to measure the outcome of activity before its effects can be determined can distort decision-making. Some of the effects, particularly the most important ones which are designed to affect people’s perceptions, may take considerable time to mature. Assessment is a feature of military campaigning and has a role to play both in making better sense of the chaos of a state in crisis and justifying resources. However, at worst it has driven pointless tactical activity simply to feed that process - or what is known as feeding the beast.

Assessment - a Combination of Art and Science

Sometimes unorthodox methods of analysis yield the most valuable answers. When a French doctoral student, Bernard Fall, went to Vietnam in 1953, the French authorities claimed that the war was going well, and showed maps and statistics indicating that they controlled a large proportion of the territory. But Fall soon realised that French claims about the amount of territory they controlled were exaggerated, or at least lacked real meaning as far as the conduct of government was concerned. He reached this conclusion both by visiting Vietminh-held areas and by inspecting tax records in supposedly government-held areas; these later showed a dramatic collapse in the payment of taxes, and thus indicated a lack of government control.

In Afghanistan, payment of taxes, or rather the absence of payment, also works as a measure of government control. Data shows that taxation constitutes a uniquely small proportion of the national budget; in 2005 it was only 8% of all estimated income.

Metrics and their Interpretation. Over time, metrics allow an assessment of campaign progress. Metrics are the pieces of information that, when considered collectively, generate the operating picture. They can be analogous to the pixels on a television screen. Metrics may be unique to each operation, difficult to define, and possibly difficult to collect, but must cover the political, security, economic and social aspects of any activity. They will usually be defined by the senior coalition partner. They should be: mission related; comprehensible; meaningful; measurable (to include perceptions); timely; cost effective to obtain; and appropriate to cultural norms and expectations. As with any statistical analysis, the process is open to different, albeit apparently coherent, interpretations. They allow a test to be applied to the theory of change – the campaign big ideas, but in trying to ascertain ground truth it is commander’s judgement that is critical. To test the hypothesis, a Red Team can be used to explore different interpretations of the accepted operating picture. This will avoid the pit-falls of group-think. This approach links with the ability of the force to anticipate, learn and adapt – qualities that give an agile organisation its edge.

Consistency and Credibility. Discipline and consistency in the use of metrics is essential. The Commander’s personal credibility will be damaged if data, for instance on attack statistics or what is defined as a significant act, can be made to appear contradictory or misleading. For example, a multi-barrel mortar attack can be recorded and...
reported as one incident, or several. The media will be quick to exploit apparent inconsistencies, as will adversaries.

Designing Assessment. Traditionally J5 designs and implements assessment to inform campaign progress. However, as stated in Chapter 10, a separate cell within the headquarters may be required to provide a shared, comprehensive assessment of campaign progress. There is a significant difference between measurement and assessment; the first indicates, for example, 'how much?' but the second addresses the 'so what?' Measurement itself requires diligent consideration to ensure consistency of results against an agreed standard, thus allowing reliable comparative evaluation of performance and progress over time.20 However, planning a campaign based on assessment is like driving with both eyes on the rear-view mirror. Even given a high degree of confidence in the validity of assessments, they represent a historical snapshot and do not forecast the future. The principle for the design of assessment conducted at the campaign level should be to record tidal movements, not wave patterns. These movements have to be selected in advance, and studied for long enough to derive strategic patterns; yet the leadership will wish to set new questions as the situation evolves. Nor is it the case that once objectives are met that they will necessarily endure without allocation of effort.

A Key Metric – Civilian Deaths20
"...We will know by August if this is working. An increase in the death rate will mean little. With 26,000 new troops in country, violence is bound to spike – whether we are winning or losing – simply because more troops are fighting and reporting. The measure of success is not whether the military can kill the Taliban but whether it can protect the population from them. The question to ask is not how many Taliban have we killed? but ‘do civilian officials and members of the community feel safe in this area’. Afghan civilian casualties, however, will be an especially telling measure. Our central goal is to make Afghans feel secure enough to engage in peaceful politics and so marginalise the Taliban and other illegal armed groups. Killing non-combatant civilians fundamentally undermines this goal."20

Assessment Categories
1148 Categories. There are three broad categories of assessment which should produce the answers to the following three questions, first, did we do properly, the things that we set out to do; second, was what we set out to do, the right thing, and finally, is the combination of things that we are doing getting us to where we want to be?

• Answers to the first are provided by Measurement of Activity (MOA). MOA is defined as ‘assessment of task performance and achievement of its associated purpose.’21 It is an evaluation of what actions have been completed rather than simply what has been undertaken. For example, in an attack on a command and control installation, MOA would be concerned with the level of damage done to the facility, not the number of sorties flown. It may give an approximation of the outcome of the act. MOA informs decisions on whether activity should be repeated or altered. MOA is reviewed within the daily campaign rhythm led by the J3.

• Answers to the second are provided by Measurement of Effect (MOE). MOE is ‘the assessment of the realisation of specified effects.’22 It is concerned with effects, both intended and unintended. Drawing on various measurements and perspectives, it assists progress measurement, highlights setbacks and supports planning. The effects review battle-rhythm may be daily, but is more likely to take place over more protracted periods, and is conducted by all cells and coordinated by J3S or, for longer term issues, by J5.

• Finally, answers to the third are provided by Campaign Effectiveness Assessment (CEA). CEA is ‘evaluation of campaign progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making’.23 It is concerned with the timely progress of the campaign, and is predominantly the concern of the commander. Supplementing daily assessment (such as the battlefield update assessment process used in US headquarters), due to the planning and assessment effort necessary to review campaign progress properly, CEA is conducted to a timetable that best meets the commander's needs, based on the scale, complexity and tempo of operations. CEA is likely to occur on a monthly (or longer) basis,24 and all branches and cells will contribute towards it. It is a formal, structured process, normally led by J5 or, in the case of more demanding campaigns, by a specially constituted assessments cell overseen by the Chief of Staff or Deputy Commander.

18. The Red Team should enjoy a degree of autonomy. Answering to the chain of command, its membership should be separate from it. It should be made up of both civilian and military planners/analysts, and report to the mission lead.
19. A structured trial in gathering stabilization data was conducted during Operation HERRICK 7 in Helmand using the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework, a systematic questionnaire scheme aimed at tracking local perceptions on a wide variety of issues over time.
22. JDP 01 (2nd Edition) Measurements of Effect (MOE) are most often developed for supporting effects. Decisive conditions are then monitored through the aggregation of MOEs related to their subordinate supporting effects. The commander may elect, however, to assign MOE specific to a decisive condition.
23. JDP 01 (2nd Edition).
24. During Operation TELIC 1, a daily campaign review cycle was employed initially. ISAF IX reviewed the campaign every 2 months.
Campaign Assessment Hierarchy. There is a hierarchical relationship between campaign objectives, decisive conditions, supporting effects and activities. Figure 11.3 shows how the three categories of assessment relate.

Assessment Planning. As decisive conditions, supporting effects and activities are derived, assessment measures must be simultaneously developed for each. Consideration should also be given to the identification of unintended effects and the development of appropriate measures to capture them. Planning for evidence gathering (what is to be gathered, when, by whom and for what purpose) is conducted collaboratively, and an assessment framework could be used (see below). Assessment includes operational analysis to evaluate, develop and incorporate lessons identified. A Red Team can help to refine the understanding of what has been achieved.

Assessment in all the Domains. Evidence across the physical, virtual and cognitive domains is needed. Results of activities conducted in the physical domain will generally be easier to measure, but in stabilisation, measuring psychological effects in the cognitive domain may deliver greater insights. How people feel and what people think, for example, will be vital indicators of campaign progress. Much evidence for physical MOE can be obtained from routine J2, J3 and J9 reporting. Virtual domain information may be obtained from media output analysis, including internet and on-line sources along with analysis of the more traditional broadcast and published media. Insights into the cognitive domain may be obtained from HUMINT, Signals Intelligence and wider human factors research. In stabilisation, the need to understand the perceptions of target groups places a premium on representative material gathered by opinion polling and focus group engagement, for example.
Campaign Assessment Framework
– an Example from Afghanistan, 2009
The Campaign Assessment Framework (CAF) reflects the Commander’s Intent and the conditions that enable success. The framework is nested within Joint Force Commander-Brunssum’s (JFC-B) campaign framework. All operation plans are synchronised and linked to the NATO End-state. The CAF reflects the LoO set by the Afghan National Development Strategy, which is owned by the Government of Afghanistan. The specific LoO are: Security, Governance and Development, each of which has to achieve specified enduring effects to achieve the Commander’s Intent.

Looking Beyond Military Activity. The risk is that assessment will be conducted by government departments to validate their own activities. While not entirely nugatory, it may provide different departments with differing understanding of overall progress. What may be deemed good progress by one could be perceived as a setback by another. For this reason, CEA should link into a broader assessment process that is designed to capture and, at the highest level, provide a unified indication of campaign progress. There is currently no cross-Government or multinational stabilisation assessment methodology, and therefore this will demand a high level of information sharing and collaboration.

Integrating Non-Military Evidence. Evidence should not be limited to military sources. OGDs can provide useful information, often through departmental assessments such as Diplomatic Telegrams and Stabilisation Unit Stability Assessments. The headquarters should use its access with imagination, for example, data on attendance at health clinics. Visits to a clinic may be discretionary, for instance for routine treatment, or non-discretionary, for life-saving intervention. If the security situation is poor, the number of discretionary visits will drop. If they rise, it may be that the population perceive an improvement in their security, and feel more confident about venturing out. By examining the reasons for attendance, an indirect assessment of perceived security is obtained. Where raw data is provided from non-military or governmental sources, such as from an NGO, care must be taken to ensure consistency of reporting criteria, to avoid slewing comparative results over time if the data set is modified.
Evaluating Evidence in Assessment

Reducing Bias. Evidence must be evaluated before it can be used to support decision making. Noting human vulnerability to intentional deception, unintentional bias and groupthink, objectivity and moral courage are essential.

Integration. In Iraq following the 2007 Crocker/Petraeus review, an integrated assessment staff was assembled, the Joint Strategy Plans and Assessments team. This enabled comprehensive review and adjustment to an integrated plan. It encompassed all LoG, tracking for example, take-up of small business micro-loans.

Integration in Action – an Example from Afghanistan

In December 2008, the Afghan Assessment Group (AAG) formed in Headquarters ISAF to institutionalise and lead a process of integrated assessment that combined products from the Afghan Government, UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan, embassies, NATO and other campaign partners. The AAG consists of a leadership and integration element and two assessment branches: the Operations Analysis Branch; and the Lessons Learned Branch. In addition, the AAG is capable of drawing upon wider analysis through reach-out. The AAG enables transparent sharing of information between the wider community, both horizontally and vertically, to form an integrated picture of overall campaign progress.

Using Assessment to Support Decision Making

In December 2008, the Afghan Assessment Group (AAG) formed in Headquarters ISAF to institutionalise and lead a process of integrated assessment that combined products from the Afghan Government, UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan, embassies, NATO and other campaign partners. The AAG consists of a leadership and integration element and two assessment branches: the Operations Analysis Branch; and the Lessons Learned Branch. In addition, the AAG is capable of drawing upon wider analysis through reach-out. The AAG enables transparent sharing of information between the wider community, both horizontally and vertically, to form an integrated picture of overall campaign progress.

Westmoreland (Blame the Soldier). According to General Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, the answer could be found by the solution to a simple equation: take the total number of communist troops estimated in-country, and subtract those killed or captured during military operations to determine the ‘crossover point’ at which the number of those eliminated exceeded those being recruited or replaced. In an address to the National Press Club on 21 November 1967, Westmoreland reported that, as of the end of 1967, the Vietcong was “unable to mount a major offensive...I am absolutely certain that, whereas in 1965, the enemy was winning; today, he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.” As if to prove him wrong, the Tet Offensive began five weeks later.

McNamara (Blame the Politician). ‘Critics point to the use of body count as an example of my obsession with numbers. “This guy McNamara”, they said, “he tries to quantify everything.” But things you can count, you ought to count. Loss of life is one when you are fighting a war of attrition. We tried to use body counts as a measurement to help us figure out what we should be doing in Vietnam to win the war while putting our troops at the least risk. Every attempt to monitor progress in Vietnam during my tenure as Secretary of Defense was directed towards those goals, but often the reports were misleading.”
ANNEX 11A
DEVELOPING INDIGENOUS FORCES

Introduction

11A01 A key military contribution to Security Sector Reform (SSR) is assisting in the development of indigenous security forces. This is about developing indigenous forces so that they are capable of delivering the nation’s long-term security needs without over reliance on outside assistance. In the short-term the process will also create sufficient mass to assist in stabilisation and begin the process of transition. Although it is part of Develop in the stabilisation activity framework, in order for it to contribute effectively to Secure and Hold, it will usually need to begin early in the campaign. This must be reflected in the analysis and planning cycles. In most cases, the commander should only be expected to be tasked with training the military elements of the host nation security forces. Other Government Departments (OGDs), Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and others should take responsibility for the development of other elements of the security infrastructure, although this will depend on circumstances. Whatever the overall allocation of responsibilities, it is key that the development of the indigenous security force is considered as an integrated whole. Although this initially increases the size of the challenge, it is a necessity to avoid the creation of costly imbalances that will ultimately delay effective development.

Planning

11A02 Scope of the Plan. In a situation in which a force has been invited to assist a host nation government in training their forces, there should be ample time to prepare before any deployment. In alternative scenarios, for example where the need occurs immediately following a warfighting intervention, a comprehensive plan should already have considered the need for such development. If it is to be effective any such plan must include the allocation of sufficient funds and specialist personnel for the task.

11A03 Scope of the Task. Usually a commander is given the task of taking existing weak indigenous security forces and transforming them into a more effective body rather than building a force from scratch. This task will often be made more difficult because the in-situ organisations may be corrupt and incompetent; they may also have lost the confidence of the population. Clearly, it is important that any comprehensive training plan deals with all these aspects, but it must also ensure that the process does not undermine the host nation government’s ownership or authority.

Assessment

11A04 Assessment. When beginning to consider the nature of the problem, it is helpful to determine the framework within which the task must be carried out. Addressing the following questions is a useful start:

• “What do we need the indigenous security forces to do?” Articulate the tasks required of the indigenous security force, taking into account the host nation’s own long-term security needs and objectives. Special consideration should be given to the long-term sustainability and affordability issues that will be left to the host nation to deal with.

• “What additional capabilities do they require in order to be able to operate on their own?” Define the level of capability required of an indigenous security force if it is to carry out operations independently.

• “What J1-J9 capacity do they need for the long-term?” Define what organisational and institutional capacities are required for the enduring sustainability of the new force.

• “What can they do now and what changes will be required if they are to sustain security in the long-term?” Establish the degree of political/legal mandate at the point of intervention.

Key Factors

11A05 The following factors should be considered:

• Funding. Involvement of OGDs in planning and guiding military capacity building is essential if funds are to be mobilised quickly. This is the most effective way of ensuring adequate resources are made available to military commanders who will provide the lead for such activity.

• Non-military expertise. Civilian security experts may
provide commanders with a broader understanding of the longer-term training and implementation considerations involved in developing host nation security capacity. This may be particularly valuable in those parts of the sector that are outside the immediate expertise of the military. As the military has limited policing, legal and penal sector resources, OGDs, PMSCs and other agencies can assist by providing deployed expertise.¹

- **Risks.** When the security environment is hostile, there is often an imperative to build indigenous military and policing capacity quickly. However, experience shows that there are significant risks in any rapid development programme. Some recent examples are:
  - A development programme that is too rapid may compromise the recipients’ training and fitness for role. For example police with little training or competent leadership are likely to be ineffective, corrupt and potentially hostile to the population.
  - Early development of a reformed security sector using indigenous tribal structures may seem to offer a quick solution. However, although it may be superficially attractive and deliver some short-term security, in the longer-term it may prejudice the more enduring aspirations for impartiality and independence.
  - Insufficient or inadequate security vetting of recruits for the sector, usually conducted against time pressures, is likely to lead to a high proportion of corrupt or criminal elements within security forces.

**Embedding Policy.** The commander should carefully consider the policy guidance that he receives regarding the embedding of UK mentors and trainers in the nascent indigenous force. Clearly, there are advantages to allowing embedding into the structures of indigenous units, however there are disadvantages and risks that will need to be considered too. As the policy guidance covering each circumstance will be different, so the commander must consider his own case, and make recommendations to the chain of command as appropriate.

**Early Implementation**

- **Impact of Environment.** Initially, military capacity building tasks will focus on creating sufficient indigenous capability to contribute to maintaining security. However, at this stage the environment may still be non-permissive and OGD deployment constrained. This complicates the delivery of early capacity building, as the commander may have to take responsibility for the delivery of all security force capacity building activities, many of which are outside the core expertise of his force.

**Benefits of Successful Capacity Building.** Initial capacity building should be aimed at:
- Developing an initial indigenous capability and increasing their numbers by focusing on raising and training military forces.
- Reinforcing, and ultimately replacing, intervention forces on the ground and contributing to the establishment and maintenance of law and order.
- Improving our own situational awareness through intelligence gathering and shaping operations, and through better cultural understanding and engagement. Local forces provide an ideal channel for focussed messaging to their wider family groupings and the population they interact with.
- Delivering mutual benefit through combined operations with indigenous forces.

**Sustained Development**

- **Training.** Initially, basic training is the priority and should focus only on essential skills. Specialist skills can be developed once there is sufficient confidence to progress and a suitable infrastructure is provided. Indigenous security forces are unlikely to have the technical skills, equipment or budget to maintain high technology capabilities which would soon become unserviceable. Collective training will be necessary to prepare indigenous units to assume the greater responsibilities that will lead to transition. Any programme of exercises should be progressive and test all levels of command, ultimately including political-military decision makers. A programme of education will be required to ensure that indigenous security forces understand their new role, responsibilities and relationships across the sector and the community.

- **Mentoring.** Mentoring will usually focus on assisting the indigenous military forces to improve their own systems and processes. Depending on policy, it may also involve UK mentors embedding with indigenous units. In this respect, mentors and trainers provide the essential link between both the indigenous and the intervention forces, and have a significant role to play within the transition process. The integrated headquarters should have a dedicated staff branch dealing with SSR¹ that maintains close links to the corresponding host nation government departments.

Experience from recent operations suggests the following:
- Mentors should be carefully selected to cope with the inevitable frustrations of dealing with poorly trained forces. They will require more extensive pre-deployment training than those involved in other roles.
- Continuity of personnel and a consistent approach is
JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

required if mentoring is to progress smoothly. Tour lengths for mentors should be long enough for relationships to be forged and for a deep understanding of how best to develop the indigenous force.

• The nuances of language, culture and behaviour must be addressed, either through formal training or through dedicated interpreters.

• The structure of the mentoring organisation should be adaptable so that it is the best possible fit with the indigenous units it is supporting. This may have to be continuously reviewed, particularly as indigenous capacity is progressed.

• Mentors embedded at various levels, from government ministries to tactical units, need to have ready access to each other. This allows them to monitor and influence decisions made across host nation forces and, where necessary, inform both those involved in the SSR process and the higher military chains of command.

Coalition Naval Advisory Training Team, Iraq

Stabilisation is a process that must be tailored to suit the local circumstances that exist at any one time. A fundamental aspect in the economic Line of Operation, in southern Iraq post-2003 was the revitalisation of the offshore oil fields and maritime trade. In support of this, coalition forces were responsible for developing an Iraq force capable of protecting these vital interests from internal and external threats. In 2009 the Royal Navy (RN) was leading the continuing commitment to a Coalition Naval Advisory Training Team (CNATT) based within the Iraqi Naval Base at Umm Qasr. Mentoring the Iraqi Navy, including 2 Marine Battalions, the CNATT was conducting basic, advanced and operational training with embedded Royal Marines, US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Coast Guard and British Army teams. Along with CTG Iraqi Maritime they generated the skills required to integrate Iraqi personnel fully into the Coalition structure. Considered an enduring commitment, tasks included the defence of 2 strategically vital oil platforms, which generate over 90% of Iraq’s revenue, as well as patrolling the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and delivering port security at Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr.

Additionally, the RN was leading the Maritime Strategic Transition Team in Baghdad, mentoring the Head of the Iraqi Navy and supporting his staff in procurement, force generation and personnel planning.

11A11 Monitoring. Defined as ‘stand back and observe; only advising in particular circumstances’; this normally includes measuring progress against prescribed objectives at set intervals. Monitoring is usually conducted through the partnering of intervention and host nation units, and this approach can be beneficial, particularly during transitions. Partnering arrangements can cover both training and the conduct of operations. The longer such arrangements are in place, the greater the benefit to the indigenous force.

11A12 Monitoring, Mentoring and Training. Monitoring, mentoring and training (M2T) is a generic term used to describe military support to indigenous armed forces during the development of local capacity and its subsequent transition to host nation security responsibility. This term is used to describe both Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) in Afghanistan.

Supporting Issues

11A13 Infrastructure Support. In addition to the capability to conduct operations, military capacity building must include basic administrative support and the development of a functioning Defence Ministry and chain of command structure. A coherent programme should focus on the provision of training and mentoring teams; 4 simultaneous delivery of equipment logistic support and infrastructure, and delivering financial and managerial support for the security forces.

11A14 Moves Towards Transition. As indigenous forces progress towards transition of security responsibility and authority, there will need to be even closer relations with host nation staffs. This will enable mutually planned and run operations to be carried out and a well-defined handover to take place. A clear understanding of the command relationship and responsibilities between our own and indigenous forces will be critical to the successful transition of authority. 5 This should include information operations promoting the indigenous forces, as they are unlikely to have their own capability.

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1. In some cases, where there is no capacity to provide trainers, then contracted experts may be employed, who are often retired personnel from the UK or other nation’s Police, Judiciary or Prison Services.

2. Often, the J7 branch is re-rolled and augmented to be the staff focus for Security Sector Reform (SSR). The formation Deputy Commander or a suitable senior officer may provide the high level focus for such activity.

3. Land Warfare Centre Information Note 08/08 – Developing Indigenous Forces – ACT and Associated Nomenclature

4. There are several ways of delivering training teams, the most popular being dedicated mentoring teams, or through Provincial Reconstruction Teams that link SSR to wider reconstruction and governance.

5. For example, it is likely that senior officers of the intervention force would wish to retain control over the selection of key indigenous appointments until late in the transition process.
Vetting. Plans to build and train an indigenous military force require transparent and fair systems for vetting personnel, particularly in the case of officer applicants. The vetting process needs to include an examination of the applicant’s background, previous record and, possibly, political affiliations. The standard for officers should be set higher than for others, even if this slows the process of building the force. There may be a requirement to develop and/or accredit the host nation’s security vetting process to ensure that it is fit for purpose. This will help to build trust between the host nation and the intervention forces, which in turn will facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence as a part of force development and contribute to successful transition.

Relationships with the Local Community. In stabilisation it is crucial to engender trust between host nation security forces and the people. Measures must be put in place that prevent the growth of self-serving, predatory security forces. As indigenous forces become increasingly active, they will be tested by a hostile security environment and exposed to the population, possibly for the first time. They must be seen to be providing impartial security on behalf of the state and their actions must be deemed legitimate by the local population. This will form the basis of their long-term effectiveness.

Local Militias. When a nation is faced with instability and disorder, there is a tendency amongst the local population to establish their own militias and cadres for security purposes. This reality cannot be ignored as the issue of local militias is based on the natural desire for local security. The issue, therefore, is one of managing the process through integration or Disarmament, Demobilisation or Reintegration.

Wider Aspects of Security Sector Reform. Military personnel involved in developing indigenous military forces should understand how their mission integrates with other aspects of the security sector. The commander must be ready to assist in some of the wider aspects of SSR should circumstances demand it. The extent of military involvement in these areas cannot be predicted, but may include police reform, support to judicial reform, the establishment of effective border control forces, and intelligence and security services. These are covered in Chapter 5.

Alignment of Coalition Approaches. In a large scale capacity building endeavour, it is likely that a number of different nations will contribute to the overall process. While this effectively spreads the burden, it can create weak seams between contributors. It is therefore important to align the various coalition approaches in order to ensure that these potential weaknesses are prevented.

International Military Advisory and Training Team (Sierra Leone)
The Sierra Leone Army numbered 16,000 at the height of the conflict. The new Army numbers 8700, including 2600 former members of various rebel and militia groups under a military re-integration programme. Downsizing was done through retirement, including senior officers, using severance payments largely contributed by the UK. SSR saw the establishment of the Office of National Security, responsible for co-ordinating the activities of Sierra Leone’s security agencies. It sponsors regional forums that bring together primary security players, local government and civil society representatives, as well as traditional leaders, to encourage the participation of the local community in dealing with security as it affects them. The moral component remains the main effort for IMATT (SL), particularly professional integrity - the emphasis on ‘thinking’ not ‘things’, and transferring the attitude that having the moral courage and integrity to make the right choices is paramount.
“Originality is the most vital of military virtues as two thousand years of history attest. In peace it is at a discount, for it causes the disturbance of comfortable ways without producing dividends, as in civil life. But in war, originality bears a higher premium than it can ever do in civil professions.”

Sir Basil Liddell Hart
To Anticipate
1203 A force which is able to anticipate is better prepared than one which is simply responsive. Anticipation involves looking ahead and predicting what may happen in the future, and then instigating pre-emptive measures to shape and exploit events; it is key to seizing and maintaining the initiative. This requires a sophisticated understanding of the operational environment and competing groups. The aim is to derive a position whereby it is possible to assess how these target groups are likely to react to a given situation. Anticipation is an attribute that should be common in all military thinking and present from pre-deployment planning to tactical action. To achieve it, commanders will need to apply a continuous process of learning and a refinement of understanding.

To Learn
1204 Challenges to Learning. Although learning is a collective activity, individual leaders can play a crucial role in its development. The responsibility for learning rests with commanders, who will need to drive the process and overcome institutional inertia to it. To overcome this, innovation should be instilled into all officers through education, training and through the conduct of operations.

The essential qualities required by all commanders if they wish their force to become one which can learn and adapt include:

- Among other duties, the duty of generals is to observe, to think and to listen even to majors and colonels. Break down the compartments, wherever they exist, of service parochialism, of 'turf' or hierarchical layering. Let insight evolve from an atmosphere of open, shared thought... from a willing openness, from continuous evaluation and discussion, from the review of assumptions, from listening to the views of outsiders, from the study of history and from the indispensable ingredient of humility'.

- Measurement of Effect. The ability to learn within a military organisation is tightly linked to the Measurement of Effect (MOE) process— to act, to measure, to learn. Within stabilisation, the desired effects are principally focused on changing the perceptions of target audiences. The identification of assessment criteria is essential and requires a balance of judgement and empirical evidence supported, but not driven, by statistical evidence. Traditional MOE such as equipment destroyed or enemy dead is unlikely to be appropriate within a stabilisation environment. More detail on MOE is given in Chapter 11 and JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition) Campaign Planning.

To Adapt
1206 Enhancing the Ability to Adapt. In order to become adaptive, it is necessary to develop the organisational structures, mechanisms and procedures that facilitate rapid conceptual and physical modification, and innovation. The challenge this poses for the armed forces of a western democratic state are significant. While a non-state adversary’s primary focus is only the current conflict at hand, UK Armed Forces are also prepared and structured for a range of other tasks. The traditional focus on inter-state warfighting, combined with the level of political and procedural accountability involved in major conceptual or structural change can restrain adaptation.

Learning and Adapting – Decentralisation. In Afghanistan, the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) held responsibility for the High Density Airspace Control Zones over the Task Force Helmand area. But, initial attempts to enforce higher level control by using A10 and then airborne early warning and control aircraft failed. Recognising that air-land situational awareness in the Task Force operations room was better than elsewhere, the CAOC adapted its processes and delegated authority to Task Force Helmand. The result was successful high tempo, 24/7 close air support for three days, peaking at forty-three aircraft, and precision artillery being used at the same time in a single kill box.

1207 Timely Adaption. The fostering of an adaptive environment is not risk-free. By constantly seeking change, the need for persistence becomes neglected. Judgement is needed to weigh up potential risks before implementing change.

- Adaptation v Persistence. To maintain pressure on the enemy, and to achieve military objectives, there will be moments when the commander may judge that more time is needed for the effects of a particular activity to be realised – to persist. Just because there are high levels of violence and casualties does not necessarily mean the mission is failing. In such cases, changes should be delayed and the commander must ensure that this need to persist is clearly articulated and understood within and outside the military.
• **Timely and Appropriate Implementation.** Major adaptations, for example to reorganise or retrain the force, take time. They are even more demanding when forces are heavily engaged in operations. Ideally, windows of opportunity will be identified in which to make changes, but it is more probable that the need for change will only be identified after forces have been heavily committed. Adaptation in such a case may carry significant risk and may only be achievable by withdrawing elements of the force from contact. Where this entails giving ground, the commander will need to articulate the risks and benefits of maintaining the current approach against instigating the necessary changes.

**Anticipation – Slim in Burma.** Field Marshal The Viscount Slim, when commander of the 14th Army in Burma in 1942, realised that his force, at that time optimised for fighting in close jungle in the north of the theatre, was not correctly trained or configured to exploit the situation when he broke out into the open plains of the south. Months before he would achieve this breakout he re-organised and trained his Army for the demands of mobile warfare to exploit the future situation.

**The Physical Ability to Adapt.** In addition to an intellectual quality, there must be the physical ability to instigate change across the Defence Lines of Development in a pre-emptive and agile manner. Such agility will be underpinned by retaining sufficient breadth of expertise within Defence, which can be rapidly exploited to meet the demands of a specific situation. A commander will be focused on his ability to adapt existing capabilities to meet the requirements of the theatre. This will often require new and novel approaches, and the development of new technologies, to then be inculcated into the force through training. Such developments may impact on investment priorities in the equipment and force preparation programmes. Gaining the authority, budgets and physical means to instigate change are pre-conditions to adaptation. A key policy decision will be whether the UK is embarking on a short-term intervention operation or a campaign. This will set the tone for the level of pan-Defence investment and commitment. A campaign footing will be required as soon as transition to an enduring operation becomes clear. But this is a difficult judgment to make. Moreover, it is a political decision rather than a military one. Although the decision to move to a campaign footing may trigger the necessary investment, such as theatre specific training teams and infrastructure, it is likely to be at an opportunity cost for the government or even Defence, and might entail losing, or re-prioritising other capabilities and programmes.

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3. For example: linguistic skills, cultural knowledge or niche capabilities (the current expansion of Weapons Intelligence and Improvised Explosive Device measures in Iraq and Afghanistan were built on Northern Ireland expertise).
4. Operation BANNER (Northern Ireland) was allocated its own budget and staff within the Equipment Programme in order to pre-emptively develop and bring into service theatre specific equipment.
SECTION II
LEARN AND ADAPT CYCLES

1209 Levels of Anticipation, Learning and Adaptation. Anticipation, learning and adaptation are relevant at all levels of command. At the strategic level, the end state and campaign objectives are defined within the wider comprehensive plan – these may need to be revised if earlier assumptions are disproved. At the operational level, as commanders learn more about the environment and their own force’s effectiveness within it, the campaign objectives may need adapting. Within the force, commanders must establish responsive mechanisms that not only encourage and facilitate learning at the operational and tactical levels, but also adaptation at the necessary tempo. Examples are in-theatre induction and refresher training or Counter-insurgency (COIN) Academies used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commander must ensure that an atmosphere of learning exists within the entire force. Confidence in this can only be provided by the continuous, honest and aggressive extraction of lessons and their incorporation into the campaign design. Commanders should ensure that the mechanisms to question assumptions and to share best practice are established, not only between levels of national command, but also across levels of command at both the multinational and inter-agency levels.

1211 Learn and Adapt Cycle. The most successful examples of adaptation use a simple 3-step cycle, driven by constant review of the operational environment and the military capability required. The first step in the cycle is to identify the lesson and determine the change in approach necessary – perhaps through practical experience, applied research or drawing on intellectual or innovative thinking. Then, a decision about the change of approach should be made and codified through either policy, the campaign plan, doctrine, Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) or Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). Finally, not only should the change be inculcated into the organisation, primarily through education and training, but also through organisational changes and the employment of new technologies and equipment, in order to alter practice. This is shown graphically in Figure 12.1.

1212 Increasing the Tempo. Any system for capturing lessons needs to be supported by evidence for analysis. The commander has an important role in ensuring honest and open reporting, which may reveal poor performance or lack of success. The UK derives lessons from many routes including:
- Lessons identified in post-operational reports and theatre headquarters.
- Post-tour debrief of commanders and senior staff at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).
- Post-operational interviews conducted by single-Service warfare centres.
- Operational Experience Groups at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCCD).
- Directorate of Operational Capability audits tasked by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS).

Because our forces are not optimised for stabilisation, the tempo and coverage of these processes should be monitored for their sufficiency to complete the learn and adapt cycle. To achieve this, the three step learn and adapt cycle needs to be conducted at two levels. They are intrinsically linked, but necessarily revolve at different speeds.

1213 Strategic Level. At this level, the cycle is concerned with institutionalising patterns of practice, organisational structures and equipment procurement. This provides the foundation for operational capability. It is enacted via the array of organisations which are responsible for extracting lessons and developing concepts and ideas. Necessary changes may be captured, for example, in revised policy, or changes to the equipment programme or codified within UK and NATO doctrine, and implemented through appropriate education and courses within training establishments. This process is slow as it needs to not only gain wide consensus...
Before change is accepted but also, it should balance the requirements across the span of military tasks; both now and in the future. The commander has a role in influencing and accelerating this cycle.

Theatre Level. The theatre level is concerned with the specific requirements of the campaign. At this level the cycle must be quick enough to maintain the initiative. The process will be driven by the commander, who can codify new approaches through the production of local doctrine, and by changing the structure of the force. This will require both new organisations and processes, and existing ones to be bent out of shape. For example, a decentralised approach to stabilisation will require intelligence processes that are sufficiently de-centralised to work out how a network of adversaries both links with other networks and with the population; the emphasis shifting from finding to understanding. Similarly, it will be necessary to design and implement at high tempo an information effort that will resonate with locals, rather than rely on over-centralised Information Operations approaches. Local doctrine can take the form of commander’s guidance notes, an operational handbook, headquarters’ SOPs or unit TTPs. Whatever its form, the commander should have the resources to inculcate it rapidly into the force through the adaptation of organisational structures, leadership and training, either as an aspect of in-theatre continuation training or as part of pre-deployment training.

After a period of theoretical and doctrinal adaptation, with limited training to confirm it, Israel attempted to fight a short war on its own terms in the Lebanon in the summer of 2006. It is debateable whether the lessons demonstrated a failure to adapt correctly, or a case of over-adaptation, trying to be too radical. Either way, a number of strategic and operational weaknesses were highlighted by the Winograd commission, which was scathing in its criticisms:

“The IDF did not demonstrate creativity in proposing alternatives…, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and authorised activity, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilisation of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation was required.”

Even after leaders knew these facts, they failed to adapt the military’s objectives and execution of the operation to the reality in the field. Indeed, although the declared goals were too ambitious, it was publicly stated that fighting would continue until they were achieved, an impossibility given the scope of authorised military operations.

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5. JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition) Campaign Execution, Chapter 4.
6. Government commission of inquiry headed by Dr Eliyahu Winograd, former president of the Tel Aviv District Court. Other appointees were Professor Ruth Gavison of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, political scientist Professor Yehezkel Dror, and retired Army generals Manahem Einan and Chaim Nadel.
Releasing the Potential. In-theatre mechanisms, supported by staff capacity, are needed to allow the force to learn and adapt quickly. This is done by sharing experience, identifying best practice, and codifying them. Simple techniques such as in-theatre training camps and the use of units with recent experience to train incoming ones are effective. Mission command and decentralised control must underpin a force’s ability to learn and adapt, and an open atmosphere must be developed with an institutional understanding to operate across, if not break down hierarchical layering. Allied with Communications and Information Systems (CIS), opportunistic networks can be established to exploit the experience and initiative of individuals at all levels, and allow them to adapt. The use of these emerging media needs careful management to ensure that bad practices are not spread as well as good, but their potential for positive effect is significant. For example, NATO’s Civil-Military Overview website that covers theatre level knowledge management and lessons for Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa: https://cmo.act.nato.int/Pages/Login.aspx.

Completing the Loop. Effective concepts that have been proved effective on operations should be codified and incorporated into doctrine. This will ensure

Networks via Reachout. Tapping the expertise that exists in the home-base may be achieved by linking the commander to a network of experts in UK (or wider) through a single point of contact. This spiders-web of contacts and subject-matter experts might be coordinated through, for example, the Operational Team at PJHQ, to deliver tailored responses to questions for which the expertise is not available in theatre. This approach may be used to develop understanding about the motivations of interlocutors, or finding a wider range of potential levers to influence host nation leaders. This might work as shown in Figure 12.2.

Operational Lessons Teams can be deployed quickly to focus on key issues related to the effectiveness of current training, equipment, doctrine or interoperability to match the demands of current operations. An example early in 2009 examined the delivery of joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability to Helmand. The UK Joint Lessons Reference Group directs short deployments into theatre. Deployed teams, typically led at OFS, work with deployed headquarters and partner agencies and nations to an agenda set by the reference group.
that such enduring lessons are inculcated through training and education into future generations. It is important that organisational structures and mechanisms are continually assessed to ensure best practice. The deployment of operational lessons teams into theatre, to hunt for lessons and to advise on priorities in order to effect the necessary changes in Defence is an important mechanism in the UK’s ability to anticipate, learn and adapt.

Adaptive Employment. Bespoke capabilities are needed to conduct stabilisation. These range from high-end combat capabilities optimised for precision strike, through the training of indigenous forces, to the support of indigenous governance. None is likely to possess sufficient skills or experience to do them all well. Some tasks require specialist preparation, and certain appointments need the right individual, with continuity of appointment often being critical. To achieve this, commanders need to allocate unit tasks, and appoint individuals selectively on their merits. This requires adaptive force generation and manning policies. Commanders will need to shape force generation processes, and influence personnel selections for critical tasks.

Total Immersion. Understanding local conditions and culture is always challenging for those who are deployed for the short term. Some states, and regions within them, may merit the employment of military officers who become specialists in the personalities, culture and geography of a region through immersion and repeated tours. These can develop personal relationships and the local awareness that may provide the means to enable deployed task forces to anticipate events and adapt to local conditions.

Understanding from Total Immersion.

When General Casey assumed US military command in Iraq, he summoned Derek Harvey, a retired army colonel and Foreign Area Officer to brief him on the insurgency. In the 1980s Harvey had travelled extensively through Iraq by taxi, sharing living quarters with locals. His analyses presaged the survival of Saddam Hussein after the 1991 Gulf War and the threat that Iraq and Afghanistan would later become. After the invasion in 2003 Harvey spoke to tribes and Baathist regime leaders, and he studied documents and letters seized by the US military. He determined that the old regime elements had plans to create a violent, hostile environment and that the developing insurgency was based on the old trust networks of professional, tribal and family relationships. He also discovered that guidance instructions and exhortation were often written in the language of holy war. Casey asked Harvey what was really going on in Iraq.

“The Sunni insurgency is growing and getting worse...It’s organized. It’s coherent. And its members have a strategy.” Harvey said the Americans must learn to operate with humility, partly because... “We don’t understand the fight we’re in”. When violence erupted around the end of October 2004 and daily attacks doubled from 70 to 140, Harvey’s assessment seemed prescient.

Harvey was summoned to brief Rumsfeld. He said they were doing the wrong things – underestimating the violence and failing to engage with the tribes. He was sent to brief Rice; he told her that money was being invested in the wrong areas, that it needed to go to areas of high unemployment where people felt disenfranchised, not just the areas that were judged safe. In December, he briefed President Bush and the CIA Director: “Who are you? What’s your experience on Iraq? And why should I believe what you’re saying?”, the President asked.

“I’ve spent nearly 20 years working in the Middle East...I have advanced degrees. I’ve spent the last 18 months working, travelling, talking with insurgents, sitting in interrogation rooms.” He described going into Fallujah in the middle of the uprising without armed escort and spent the night talking with Abdullah al-Janabi, one of the clerics leading the insurgency. “We label him a religious extremist,” Harvey said. “He’s a Baathist who’s very angry, has lost family members, okay? Drinks Johnnie Walker Black Label.” “Okay”, Bush said, “let’s go on.”

Derek Harvey’s assessment won over the CIA Director, against his own Agency advice. His deep cultural understanding proved instrumental in US decision making at the highest levels and helped shape the outcome of the campaign.
The following list provides some guidance to commanders on activity to enable organisational anticipation, learning and adaptation:

**Anticipation:**
- Develop an in-depth understanding of the operating environment in order to recognise patterns and the significance of fragmented activity. Make plans based on this knowledge enabled by commanders having the opportunity to think and reflect.
- Gain an understanding from multinational, inter-agency and joint sources of how target groups are likely to react to a given situation and prepare for it in advance.

**Learning:**
- Consult widely to understand local political, cultural and social dynamics outside the military’s traditional field of expertise.
- Coordinate closely with governmental and non-government partners at all levels of command.
- Develop a military culture that challenges institutional assumptions of the situation, both formally and informally.
- Foster open communications between senior officers and their subordinates.
- Be open to solutions suggested from the field.
- Solicit the understanding of local people (hostile and friendly) and be sensitive to their evaluation of the situation in the conflict zone.

**Adaptation:**
- Establish rapid mechanisms to disseminate lessons.
- Develop doctrine and practices locally.
- Establish in-theatre training facilities (for national and indigenous forces).

**Meeting Capability Shortfalls.** The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) is an important tool in every commander’s set to rectify lessons identified. The UOR process exists to address capability shortfalls on current, or imminent, operations. Funded by the Treasury, they are regulated by tight timelines – 18 months from statement to employment within theatre, often much less. Each theatre will have an equipment capability branch. They assist in writing Urgent Statements of User Requirement and subsequent fielding. Key to a successful urgent statement of user requirement is that it addresses a capability shortfall specific to that theatre and it is essential to operational success. The imperative to urgently satisfy the operational capability gap is balanced against greater risk against meeting cross-DLoD requirements.

**Analysis at Pace.** Deployed operational analysis teams can provide rapid evidence to support headquarters. Operational analysis tools and scientific advisers, supplemented by accessing broad analytical expertise through reach-out, can be used to assess plans and wargame scenarios. Such expertise can provide critical evidence to support key decisions. Rock drills, scenario based seminars, wargames and BOGSAT are examples of activities that will be enhanced by engaging analysts to supports their design and execution.
‘The good fighter of old first puts themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.’

Sun Tzu – The Art of War

ANNEX 12A
FORCE PREPARATION

The Requirement

12A01 Maintaining the Edge. Force preparation must not become separated from the operational environment; it must replicate the complexity and challenges that are likely to be demanded. The increasing complex demands of the operational environment and the growing range, reach and adaptability of adversaries requires an agile, adaptive approach. Anticipation and learning is necessary to prepare and adapt the force accordingly – conceptually, physically and morally – in order to identify and respond to emerging threats as well as exploit opportunities. Early investment will be essential for Defence to make the decisions necessary to equip commanders and trainers with the resources required in time.

12A02 Balance of Preparation. Only limited components of UK’s military force structure is likely to be optimised for the demands of stabilisation. Therefore tailored individual, collective and mission specific preparation is required. There are three broad areas of force preparation:

• Mindset. Establishing the culture and mindset within a force for security and stabilisation.

• Education and Training. Developing the education and training mechanisms to plan and execute comprehensive activity. These should include a deep understanding of the utility of force and alternative methods of realising security effects. Additionally, a greater emphasis on intelligence preparation and the gathering and exploitation of actionable intelligence from a wider variety of sources will be required, underpinned by effective information management.

• Tactics. The inculcation of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to conduct the range of military operations and activities within a complex stabilisation operation.

12A03 Education and Training. Education develops mental power and understanding; training prepares people, individually or collectively, for given tasks in given circumstances; train for what is known, educate...
for the unknown. Operations will always be uncertain. Notwithstanding efforts to anticipate, it is impossible to predict, or plan for all eventualities. Therefore, there must be a degree to which the military react to events. Education provides a flexible and resilient foundation upon which to build the training. To be effective, professional stabilisation education will need to be conducted at a lower level than it has been previously to develop the understanding required early enough to be of real value. Additionally, revisions to professional military education should give greater emphasis to inter-agency and multinational integration.

Self-Education. Self-education is an essential part of building wider expertise. Commanders and staffs now have to be capable of much more than the professional management of military force. Acknowledging the vast and varied nature of writing on this subject, the selective Reading List at the Annex 12B is intended as a guide. Additional material, some of which was drafted in support of this publication is available on the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Internet and Defence Intranet sites.

Effective Preparation

Warfighting Ethos. Preparation must maintain our ability to succeed in a violent and austere environment. This will establish and strengthen the common standards of conduct and achievement to create trust and understanding that enables the integration of joint activity. The assumption that readiness for warfighting alone will provide the necessary qualities and expertise to conduct stabilisation missions with limited additional preparation is incorrect. Instead, the development of sufficient stabilisation understanding and expertise, and the right mindset within the force, during both generic and mission specific preparation will be vital.

Preparing for Stabilisation. Stabilisation requires appropriate force structures, doctrine and experience to operate effectively with a wide spectrum of multinational, inter-agency and indigenous partners. Additionally, the requirement to influence the population, provide security and develop host nation capability is likely to be manpower intensive. Organisations solely based on lean warfighting structures are likely to be inadequate without significant augmentation and preparation. This is relevant to Maritime, Land and Air formations and force generation must take this into account.

Train as Intended to Operate. All stabilisation forces should train as they intend to operate in order to develop the teamwork, understanding and procedures that will be needed for a specific operation. This will require units to gain increased exposure to a wide range of military, civilian and multinational capabilities during preparation so that dispersed individuals and units are able to function as an effective network. This will challenge traditional models of force generation where Joint and Multinational preparation is reserved for the final stages only. In order to operate as a network, greater Joint, inter-agency and multinational integration will be required at lower tactical levels. Stabilisation requires greater emphasis at lower command levels in the use of Command and Control (C2) applications, exploiting information, conducting engagement and controlling organic and Joint fires. Additionally, training as forces intend to operate should not be interpreted as advocating rigid force structures. The stabilisation environment will require the ability to force package in a more dynamic comprehensive manner and decentralise decision making.

“Lieutenant General Stan McChrystal had it right when he said; to defeat a network, you have to be a network. In our case the network of which I speak is the network of Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental and Multinational partners”

General Dempsey (CG TRADOC), Joint Warfighting Conference – 12 May 2009

Replicating the Operating Environment. Training and exercises need to be conducted in the conditions and environments that most closely represent the complexity, intensity and scale that might be expected on operations. Training must develop familiarity and proficiency in operating with coalition forces, resulting, as far as possible, in cultural
understanding, interoperability and procedural alignment to develop the cohesion required. In particular, it is essential that personnel be exposed to training that as closely as possible reflects the sights, sounds, sensations and decision making challenges that will be encountered on operations. This includes the need to give commanders experience during training that will allow them to develop an understanding of the different levels of the operation.

12A09 Exploiting Technology. Technology and networked capabilities should be exploited to enable dispersed civil-military elements to train together from home locations as well as to simulate the complexity of, and interaction necessary in, the operating environment. Whenever possible, systems and data used in simulations and synthetic training should be the same as are being used for real. This demands ready access to the relevant data sets and systems to enable the physical and cultural characteristics of the operational theatre to be represented. Additionally, a networked deployable capability will enhance in-theatre training whilst exploiting Home Base resources through reachout. This can support connectivity and information sharing between those about to deploy, those in theatre and those with recent operational experience. These networks are commonly known as communities of practice. 11

12A10 Preparing the Home Base. The UK Armed Forces, in conjunction with Other Government Departments, will need to develop and implement methods that allow access to the resources of the Home Base in support of comprehensive stabilisation activities. Direct support will typically include: access to UK based Reserve, Specialised and Contractual capabilities; and resort to the resources and capacity of both state and commercial sectors, such as the provision of medical care. At the same time, it may be necessary to put in place measures to safeguard the Home Base and lines of communication in the event of an attack or threat.

12A11 Medical. Confidence in the effectiveness and availability of medical provision and services will be a critical factor in supporting the Moral Component. For short-notice operations that take place outside temperate zones, consideration will have to be given to the scale of prophylaxis and medical preparation required. Similarly, time may need to be allocated for acclimatisation and conditioning when operating in unfamiliar, challenging conditions.

12A12 Infrastructure. The provision of appropriate training infrastructure is an essential requirement for effective individual and collective preparation. Adequate infrastructure must therefore be developed to enable the education and training of individuals and units to support stabilisation. A balance will need to be struck between long-term investment in fixed infrastructures and more modular and deployable assets to enhance flexibility.

12A13 Welfare Support. Sufficient camp infrastructure and welfare support must also continue to be developed for deployed forces and, equally importantly, for their families and the units left behind. This must increasingly be provided throughout the UK and elsewhere as Service personnel settle their families away from military bases. Such welfare support must also include the ability to manage the media and protect families from intrusive reporting.

12A14 Acquisition Cycle. For equipment to be successfully exploited on operations, it must be introduced in such a way as to allow the necessary training prior to operational employment. This will require sufficient equipments to be held to enable both preparation for and concurrent engagement on operations, and means that the supporting capabilities required for preparation should be accounted for in acquisition decisions.

4. Kisely, Li Gam S. 2006, Learning about Counter-insurgency. RUSI Journal, December 2006. 'Small wars cannot be fought by big war methods...in the eyes of the warrior insurgency calls for some very un-warrior qualities, such as emotional/intelligence, empathy, subtlety, sophistication, nuance and political adroitness'.
6. Maritime – inter alia, Maritime Security Operations, Capacity building, Regional Engagement, the requirement will exist to provide boarding parties, medical support, training teams from lean manned ships and the capability to conduct shallow-water and riverine operations.
7. Land – infantry units possess the most appropriate core skills, force structure and manpower for this role but still require additional training. Converting armoured, combat support and combat service support units is likely to pose greater challenges due to the nature of the core skills of these units, the generally smaller order of battle that consist of a greater proportion of technical personnel compared to infantry units.
8. Air – Intelligence, Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance to strike platform relationship, ordnance and persistence required.
9. The will need to include the development of realistic exercise adversaries (OPFOR) to reflect the increasing range of likely threats and challenges, including those within civilian populations to replicate operations ‘amongst the people’.
10. Through the appropriate alignment of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures which will be practiced during Joint Training.
11. The British Army have developed a community of practice for company level commanders called ’Vital Ground’ on www.armynet.mod.uk.
12. In 2008 Parvez Khan, from Birmingham, was sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting to kidnap and behead a British Muslim soldier at home on leave.
13. Centres of excellence, training support teams, equipments and simulation, real estate and logistic support.
Reading Lists. Self education is an essential part of building a new, broader and more demanding expertise. Commanders and staffs now have to be capable of much more than the professional management of force. Acknowledging the vast and varied nature of writing on this subject, the following list of suggested reading is intended to provide a broad spectrum – it is not exhaustive. As this must be considered in context, the list has been broken down into sections:

Character of the Situation:

Environment:
- Betz, Dr David, Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People, Contemporary Security Policy Volume 28, August 2007.
- Mackinlay, John, Defeating Complex Insurgency, RUSI Whitehall Paper No 64, 2005.

Opponents:
JDP 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

- Kilcullen, Dr David, Countering Global Insurgency, Version 2.2, 30 November 2004

Allies, Partners and Other Agencies:

- Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.4, COIN (being produced in parallel with JDP 3-40).
- AJP-3-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.
- Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.2.1.1, Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks.

Culture and History:

- Kilcullen, Dr David, Countering Global Insurgency, Version 2.2, 30 November 2004
The Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions relevant to JDP 3-40, but is not intended to be exhaustive. For fuller reference to extant terminology see the current edition of JDP 0-01.1 The UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions.

### PART 1

#### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAG</td>
<td>Afghan Assessment Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADZ</td>
<td>Afghan Development Zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Force</td>
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<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAC</td>
<td>All Source Analysis Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDD</td>
<td>British Defence Doctrine</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLUA</td>
<td>Battlefield Update Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Campaign Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Campaign Effectiveness Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (US)</td>
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<td>CHASE</td>
<td>Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
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<td>CivSec</td>
<td>Civil Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COED</td>
<td>Concise Oxford English Dictionary</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoG</td>
<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMISAF</td>
<td>Commander International Stabilisation Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVAD</td>
<td>Development Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DfS</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Staff</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
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<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
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<td>GEOINF</td>
<td>Geospatial Information</td>
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<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>Geospatial Intelligence</td>
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<td>GOVAD</td>
<td>Governance Adviser</td>
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<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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This publication was replaced by:
Shaping a stable world: The Military contribution (JDP 05)
published by DCDC in March 2016

This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>JARC</td>
<td>Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre</td>
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<td>JDN</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine Note</td>
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<td>JDP</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<td>JIAFF</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency Task Force</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Service Publication</td>
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<td>Joint Stabilisation Assessment</td>
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<td>JSAT</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Assessment Team</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>JTFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>JWP</td>
<td>Joint Warfare Publication</td>
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<td>KLE</td>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
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<td>LEGAD</td>
<td>Legal Adviser</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Communication</td>
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<td>LoO</td>
<td>Line of Operation</td>
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<td>MASINT</td>
<td>Measurement and Signature Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>M2T</td>
<td>Monitoring, Mentoring and Training</td>
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<td>MITT</td>
<td>Military Transition Teams</td>
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<td>Multinational Corps-Iraq</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Force-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Measurement of Activity</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measurement of Effect</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPE</td>
<td>Materiel and Personnel Exploitation</td>
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<td>MTA</td>
<td>Military Technical Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NI</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Cell</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Information Strategy</td>
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<td>National Security, International Relations and Development</td>
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<td>OGD</td>
<td>Other Government Departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>OISG</td>
<td>Operational Intelligence Support Group</td>
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<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>OOB</td>
<td>Out of Bounds</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operations Security</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open-source Intelligence</td>
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<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<td>PMSC</td>
<td>Private Military and Security Company(ies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Policy Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
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<td>RCDGS</td>
<td>Royal College of Defence Studies</td>
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<td>RFI</td>
<td>Request for Information</td>
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<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>ROLAD</td>
<td>Rule of Law Adviser</td>
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<td>RSLAF</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces</td>
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<td>RUUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sultan's Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>Secret Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<td>Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>Status of Forces Agreements</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard/Standing Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>STABAD</td>
<td>Senior Stabilisation Adviser</td>
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<td>TECHINT</td>
<td>Technical Intelligence</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command (United States Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTPs</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<td>UAS</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Systems</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WME</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Effect</td>
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</table>
PART 2
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Agency
A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JDP 0-01.1)

Analysis
1. The examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))
2. In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. (AAP-6)

Area of Operations
A geographical area, defined by a Joint Force Commander within his Joint Operations Area, in which a commander designated by him (usually a Component Commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. See also Joint Operations Area. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Area of Interest
The area of concern to a commander, relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his Joint Operations Area/Area of Operations and adjacent areas. See also Joint Operations Area and Area of Operations. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Battlespace
All aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which military activities take place subject to Battlespace Management. See also Battlespace Management and Joint Operations Area. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Battlespace Management
The adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity. (JDP 3-70)

Campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a given timeframe and geographical area, which normally involve Joint forces, frequently in concert with other instruments of national or multinational power. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Campaign Authority
The authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Note:
It is an amalgam of 4 inter-dependent factors: the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action; the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively; the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate; and the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

Campaign Design
Campaign Design develops and refines the commander’s (and staff’s) ideas to provide detailed, executable and successful plans. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Campaign End-State
The extent of the Joint Force Commander’s contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Campaign Effectiveness Assessment
Evaluation of campaign progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision-making. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Campaign Management
Campaign Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Campaign Objective
A goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Campaign Rhythm
The regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a Joint force, to regulate and maintain control of a campaign. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Close Air Support
Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (AAP-6)

Civil-Military Cooperation
The process whereby the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed, with the aim of enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or international objectives. (JDP-01.1)

Centre of Gravity
Characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))
Coalition
An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JDP 0-01.1)

Collation
In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which the grouping together of related items of information or intelligence provides a record of events and facilitates further processing. (AAP-6)

Collection
The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. (AAP-6)

Combat Support
Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (AAP-6)

Combat Service Support
The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. (AAP-6)

Command
The authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Note:
It comprises 3 closely inter-related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control.

Commander’s Intent
A concise and precise statement of what a JFC intends to do and why, focused on the overall effect the Joint Force is to have and the desired situation it aims to bring about. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Comprehensive Approach
Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Contingents
Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Contingency Plan
A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6)

Contingency Planning
Planning, in advance, for potential military activity in the future. (2nd Edition)

Control
The coordination of activity, through processes and structures that enable a commander to manage risk and to deliver intent. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Counter-Intelligence
Those activities that are concerned with identifying and countering the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services and organisations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, extremism and other non-traditional threats, including organised crime and unauthorised disclosure. (JSP 440)

Counter-insurgency
1. Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat or contain insurgency, while addressing root causes. (JDP3-40)
2. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. (AAP-6)
3. The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities required to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. (AJP-3.4.4 – Proposed modification to AAP-6 definition)

Countering-Irregular Activity
The coordinated measures, incorporating military activity with the other instruments of power within a Comprehensive Approach, that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and authority and addressing the underlying causes. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Crisis Management
The process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for possible escalation. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Crisis Response Planning
Planning, often at short notice, to determine an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis. (JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition))

Decisive Condition
A specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Directive
A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (AAP-6)

Domain
There are 3 Domains:
1. Physical Domain. The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated are upon capability.
2. Virtual Domain. The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information. The principal effects generated are upon understanding.
3. Cognitive Domain. The sphere in which human decision-
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making occurs as a result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The principal effects generated are upon will and understanding. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Note: The internet is part of the virtual domain.

Failed State
A failed state is where remnants of a host nation government, or some form of potential host nation government, may still exist. (JDP 3-40)

Note: However, in such states, the government does not have a monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide security or simple basic services, and is not sufficiently legitimate or effective to protect its borders, citizens, or even itself. It may exert a very weak level of governance and rule of law in all or part of the state but, overall, the mechanisms and tools of governance have largely collapsed.

Force Density
The ratio of security forces involved in securing and controlling the population, to that population. It is usually expressed as a figure per 1000 head of population. Security forces include multinational, UK and indigenous military and police, including any tribal security forces that are raised or sponsored by the host nation government.

Force Protection
Measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness. (AJP-3.14)

Force Ratio
The qualitative and quantitative ratio between friendly and hostile forces at a specific time and location. (AAP-6A)

Fires
The deliberate use of physical means to support the realisation of, primarily, physical effects. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Fragile State
A fragile state still has a viable host nation government, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention, it is likely to become a failed state. (JDP 3-40)

Framework Nation
Forces generated under a ‘framework nation’ are commanded by an officer from that nation which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the headquarters. (JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition))

Note: The framework nation is also likely to dictate the language and procedures adopted.

Fratricide
The accidental death or injury which occurs when friendly forces engage their own forces believing either them, or their location, to be an enemy target. (JDP 3-62)

Geospatial Information
Facts about the Earth referenced by geographical position and arranged in a coherent structure. (JDP 3-70)

Note: It describes the physical environment and includes data from the aeronautical, geographic, hydrographic, oceanographic and meteorological disciplines.

Geospatial Intelligence
Intelligence derived from the analysis and exploitation of geospatial information and imagery to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities of intelligence interest. (JDP 3-70)

Human Intelligence
A category of Intelligence derived from information provided by, or collected on, human sources and individuals of intelligence interest, as well as the systematic and controlled exploitation, by interaction with, or surveillance of, sources or individuals. (JDP 3-40)

Human Factors
The study of how humans behave physically and psychologically in relation to particular environments. (JDP 3-02)

Human Security
Human Security is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear, adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance is a secondary Military Task, which is the provision of relief aid by military forces conducting operations other than Disaster Relief Operations. (JDP 3-52)

Imagery Intelligence
Intelligence derived from imagery acquired by sensors which can be ground based, sea born or carried by air or space platforms'. (JDP 0-01.1)

Influence Activities
The capability, or perceived capacity, to affect the character or behaviour of someone or something. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Information Management
The integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JWP 01 (2nd Edition))

Information Strategy
Coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences in support of policy objectives. (JWP 3-45.1)

1. Detailed doctrine on this subject is to be developed in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 2-10.1 Human Intelligence, due for publication late 2009.
Information
Unprocessed data of every description that may be used in the production of intelligence. (AAP-6)

Intelligence
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity. (AAP-6)

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
The prioritised integration, coordination and synchronisation of capabilities and activities to acquire, process and disseminate information and intelligence, to support the planning and execution of operations. (JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition))

Inter-governmental Organisation
An organisation that may be established by a constituent document such as a charter, a treaty or a convention, which when signed by the founding members, provides the organisation with legal recognition. (AJP-3.4.1)

Interoperability
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (AAP-6)

Irregular Activity
The use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Insurgency
1. An organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority. (JDP 3-40)
2. An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (AAP-6)

Joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6)

Joint Action
The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on other actors’ will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Joint Commander
The Joint Commander, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Enablers
Operational activities that do not have an end unto themselves and are likely to be discrete lines of operation in achieving the end-state. Their principle purpose is to enable other activity to take place. (JDP 3-70)

Joint Force Planning Group
The Joint Force Planning Group, attended by the Joint Force Commander and normally chaired by his COS, is the forum where progress against the Campaign Plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or indeed help to offset or overcome setbacks. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Force
A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Force Commander
A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a Joint force. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Operations Area
An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

Lead Nation
Forces generated under a ‘lead nation’ are commanded by an officer from that nation, from his own Joint Force Headquarters (augmented with Liaison Officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute National Contingents and National Contingent Commanders. (JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition))

Lines or Groupings of Operation
In a campaign or operation, a line or grouping linking Decisive Conditions, and hence Campaign Objectives, in time and space on the path to the Campaign End-state. (JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition))

Main Effort
The concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))
Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender, to facilitate the latter's measurement and identification. (AAP-6)

Manoeuvre
Coordinated activities necessary to gain advantage within a situation in time and space. (BDD (2nd Edition))

Manoeuvrist Approach
An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1)

Mass
The concentration of combat power. (AAP-6) Interpreted in JDP 3-40 as the size of the international force deployed. It is a combination of the force's mass and its capabilities that provides momentum to change the dynamics of security. Capabilities include not only the technical skills and equipment of the force, but also its ability to interact with the indigenous population, to implement population control measures, and other factors such as the use of money for security effect. (JDP 3-40)

Materiel and Personnel Exploitation
The systematic collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence obtained as a result of tactical questioning, interrogation and the extraction of data from recovered materiel. (JDP 3-40)

Measurement of Activity
Assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Measurement of Effect
Assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Measurement and Signature Intelligence is scientific and technical intelligence derived from the analysis of data obtained from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender, to facilitate the latter's measurement and identification. (AAP-6)

Media Operations
That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate, and effective provision of Public Information (P Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment, whilst maintaining OPSEC. (JDP 0-01.1)

Military Risk
The probability and implications if an event of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences taking place. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Military Strategic End-State
The extent of the Military Strategic Commander's contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim, reached when all the Military Strategic Objectives have been achieved. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Military Strategic Objective
Goals to be achieved by the military in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Mission Command
A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1)

Multi-agency
Activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. See also Joint. (JDP 0-01.1)

National Security
The traditional understanding of security as encompassing the safety of a state or organisation and its protection from both external and internal threats. (JDP 3-40)

National Strategy
The coordinated application of the instruments of national power in the pursuit of national policy aspirations. (BDD (3rd Edition))

National Strategic Aim
The Government's declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

National Strategic Objective
A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Non-governmental Organisation
A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission. (JDP 0-01.1)
Situational Awareness
The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1)

Stabilisation
The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence, protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development. (JDP 3-40)

Strategic Objective
A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. See also National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Supporting Effect
The intended consequence of actions. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Supported Commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority. See also Supporting Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Supporting Commander
A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. See also supported commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (AAP-6)

Sustainability
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6)

Sustainment
The activity and resources necessary to sustain a force. (JDP 4-00 (3rd Edition))

Target
The object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation, neutralisation or destruction by military forces. (AAP-6)

Target Acquisition
The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective implementation of Fires or Influence Activities. (JDP 2-00 (3rd Edition))

Targeting
The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. See also Joint Action. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Notes:
1. Targeting is an integral part of Joint Action.
2. It underpins the use and orchestration of all capabilities and activities (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre) to ensure that they are focused on realising intended effects.

Technical Intelligence
Technical intelligence concerns foreign technological developments, and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes. (AAP-6)

Tempo
The rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operation of war to another. (JDP 0-01.1)

Theatre of Operations
A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the Joint Operations Area), within which he conducts operations. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition))

Thresholds
Criteria identifying progress. (JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition)).

Note: They may be used to identify ‘milestones’ in the realisation of effects and include both subjective statements and/or metrics.

Time Sensitive Targets
Time sensitive targets are those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high payoff, fleeting targets of opportunity. In practice, time sensitive targets are specific target sets designated by the Joint Task Force Commander (JTF). (JDP 0-01.1)
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