



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 - REQUEST REF: FOI-0909-16

Thank you for your email of 27 September 2016 asking for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000. You asked:

"I am writing to request:

- (i) a copy of David Reddaway's minutes from a G8 donors conference in Geneva in April 2002 and or*
- (ii) a copy of the e-grams David Reddaway sent from a G8 donors conference in April Geneva in 2002."*

I can confirm that, upon inspection of our records, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) may hold some information relevant to your request.

We do not hold the information relevant to the first part of your request regarding Sir David Reddaway's minutes from the G8 conference in April 2002, Geneva.

The FCO has interpreted your question in part ii) to include diplomatic telegrams sent regarding the G8 donors conference rather than specifically sent by Sir David Reddaway himself. Inspection of our records has found diplomatic telegrams sent after the G8 Donors conference, in Geneva in April 2002, summarising its events. Please see Annex 1 and 2.

Some of the information within the scope of your request is exempt under Sections 27(1)(a), which recognises the need to protect information that would be likely to prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and other states if it was disclosed. In this case, the release of information relating to internal discussions within the Afghan political system could harm our relations with the current Afghan government. This would reduce the UK government's ability to protect and promote UK interests through its relations with Afghanistan, which would not be in the public interest. For these reasons we consider that, the public interest in maintaining this exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing it.

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Yours sincerely,

Open Government Liaison Officer

Annex 1.

PART ONE OF TWO

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: GENEVA MEETINGS, 2-3
APRIL

SUMMARY

1. Agreement on lead nations for the various security sector reform strands. US will lead on the National Army; Germany on police; Italy on judicial system; UNDP (with IOM assistance) on demobilisation. UK accepts the lead on counter-narcotics.
2. US seeking additional \$278m from Congress for Afghanistan. Other nations (notably Iran and Pakistan) offer training and equipment support. Few firm cash pledges, but acknowledgement that the Interim Administration and the international community will need to find creative ways of paying for the army if the huge overall investment in Afghanistan is not to go to waste.

DETAIL

3. Sinclair (Canada) chaired a G8 meeting on security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan in Geneva on 2 April. Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah and the UNSG's Special Representative for Afghanistan Brahimi also attended. Dobbins (US) and Brahimi co-chaired a wider SSR donor meeting on 3 April. Reddaway (UK Special Representative for Afghanistan) led a joint FCO/MOD/DFID delegation.

G8 MEETING, 2 APRIL

4. Abdullah circulated an Interim Administration (IA) paper on SSR, drawn up with the help of the UN and ISAF. He noted that differing views within the IA on the requisite size of the Afghan armed forces had coalesced around a figure of 80,000 (60,000 army; 12,000 border guard, including counter-narcotics units; 8,000 airforce). The IA accepted that this was as much as the market would bear (and could be paid for). All ethnic and regional groups would be represented; selection would be transparent. Members of existing armed factions would be integrated into the National Army or demobilised. A National Defence Council would be established under Karzai to take this forward.
5. Brahimi stressed the vital importance of SSR to the wider political process. Sorting this out was "the first reconstruction project": without it, the rest could unravel. The 80,000 figure was realistic. Since military assistance could not be channelled via the World Bank Trust Fund, the UN would set up a separate Trust Fund to receive resources earmarked for this sector. Recurring annual costs for the armed forces were likely to come out at around \$90m. Brahimi added that the UK (sic) had made an excellent start in training up, the first battalion

of the Afghan National Guard: he hoped we would remain firmly engaged after we handed over the ISAF leadership.

NATIONAL ARMY

6. The US (DOD) briefed on plans to train up 600-man light infantry battalions and 300-man border guard battalions. They hoped to have trained a National Army of around 14,000 men by end 2003, making it the largest armed group in Afghanistan. Thereafter, the baton would pass to Afghan trainers, whom the US would train up in parallel. But there were gaps in the US programme which they hoped coalition partners would fill. For example, training in special equipment; logistics; leadership; mechanised infantry; engineering; and medical support. Cash and equipment were also needed. Contributions from other nations should be channelled via CENTCOM liaison officers in Tampa or through the Office of Military Cooperation in the US Embassy in Kabul. (Brahimi commented wryly that non-coalition nations might find it easier to go through Washington.)

7. Dobbins said the US had just sent Congress a supplemental budget of \$278m for Afghanistan. This included \$50m for training and equipping the army; \$20m for budget support for army salaries; \$30m each for police and counter-narcotics and \$80m for general budget support which could be used for demobilisation.

8. Reddaway welcomed the more realistic IA numbers. A clear message should go back from Geneva to all parts of the IA that the international community would not support a larger force. But the importance of getting SSR right should not be underestimated: without it, the rest of the international community's investment in Afghanistan would be wasted. And while offers of training were very welcome, there was no point in training an army if it was not also paid and equipped. Since some donors had difficulty in funding military salaries, there would need to be the clearest possible separation of budgets (the demobilisation costs, for example, would be considerably easier to resource), and flexible use of IA resources (others might consider underwriting IA reserves to free up funds). The IA might consider setting up a reconstruction organisation to bring demobilising soldiers under a civilian budget. Nationally, we would see what more we could do to help in niche areas, including perhaps with restructuring the Afghan MOD. [REDACTED]

Meanwhile, it was important to bolster the IA's authority and discourage adventurism by dissuading the neighbours from channelling military and other resources direct to the regions.

9. Kabulov (Russia) said Russia was already in discussion with the IA on training and equipment support, but they were happy to bring this within an international framework. Du Laurens (France) repeated the French offer to train up two army battalions. (He later made clear that this would be coordinated with the US programme.)

POLICE

10. Muetzelburg (Germany) outlined German plans to train 3,200 police constables (100 from each of the 32 provinces) in Kabul. The aim was to build a single, 50,000-strong police force under the Interior Ministry. The next steps were to identify and register serving officers; develop a police management concept for dividing power between the centre and the provinces; and ensure proportional ethnic and regional representation and the inclusion of women. 100 international trainers would be needed in the first phase, and some \$180-200m annually for uniforms; personal equipment; telecommunications; vehicles; refurbishing the police academy and renovating police stations. Some 1200 officers should have been trained by the summer. Training might move to the regions in due course if the IA was content. (Abdullah said they were).

11. Reddaway drew attention to the UK contribution of police equipment and our plans to provide counter-narcotics training. The Japanese and the Commission reiterated their difficulty in funding military assistance but offered support with policing and (in the case of the Commission, who spoke of 70 meuros unprogrammed this year) crop substitution.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

12. De Maio (Italy) said the IA had now accepted that Italy should lead. UNDP were preparing a detailed paper on the judicial system as part of their support to the IA in setting up the (Bonn) Judicial Commission. The Italians planned to start small, by refurbishing the Ministry of Justice and some Courts and training judges. They were sending a needs assessment mission to Afghanistan within the next fortnight.

13. Reddaway and Dobbins urged speed. Italy needed to identify requirements, in consultation with the IA, so that others could see where they might help. Reddaway stressed the importance of progress in this area to bolster investor confidence and to address potential legal disputes as refugees/IDPs returned to reclaim their homes.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS

14. Reddaway outlined UK efforts to support the IA in dealing with the current opium crop. (Abdullah intervened to stress the IA's gratitude for the persistence of UK efforts in Kabul and the regions.) Cash would be needed to pay farmers. The regional dimension was important too: Afghanistan's neighbours should be encouraged to strengthen border controls. The US said they were re-programming funds to provide alternative livelihoods. Germany recalled that they had sent 2 experts to the Interior Ministry drugs control unit to assess equipment needs and offer advice on intelligence-sharing.

END OF PART ONE

Annex 2.

PART TWO OF TWO

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: GEVEVA MEETINGS, 2-3 APRIL

WIDER DONOR MEETING, 3 APRIL

15. Abdullah, Brahimi and the lead nations ran through similar presentations at the wider (35-nation) donor meeting the following day. At Dobbins' request, Reddaway introduced discussion of counter-narcotics. He welcomed the IA's determination to deal with this year's crop (recent Kabul tels refer). This was a brave and important step. The international community needed now to help the IA compensate farmers who were eradicating their opium. The UK was making a significant contribution in this area and urged others to do the same.

16. UNDP gave a short presentation on demobilisation. (Comment: Brahimi told G8 delegation heads privately that UNAMA have now assumed the lead on this item, with IOM playing a supporting role in identification, registration and referral.)

17. Following is a summary of the main non-G8 pledges (although others said they were still considering contributions):

Army

- Pakistan: a significant package of training in Pakistan and Afghanistan in native languages;
- Iran: training, reconstruction of military installations; equipment repair;
- Bangladesh: military and demining training in Bangladesh;
- India: military training in India and Afghanistan;

Police

- Pakistan: training in Pakistan;
- Bangladesh: training and provision of equipment and uniforms subject to agreed financing (ie. if others pay);
- China: provision of equipment/uniforms;
- India: unspecified assistance;
- Iran: training in Iran; provision of uniforms and personal equipment; payment of 1,400 police salaries for a year;

Counter-Narcotics

- Iran: \$6m for crop substitution; judicial system
- India - unspecified assistance.

NATIONAL LEADS

18. Summing up, Dobbins proposed (and the meeting agreed) the following national leads:

Army: US
Police: Germany
Judicial System: Italy
Counter-Narcotics: UK

Brahimi offered UN assistance with coordination across the board.

G8 WASH-UP

19. A short G8 wash-up meeting later on 3 April confirmed the national leads (comment: the Germans seemed content to hand over the counter-narcotics portfolio to the UK, saying to us that there was plenty of work to go round). It was agreed that the lead nations would act as clearing houses; identify gaps; follow up on pledges and disbursement; and ensure deconfliction. All agreed (although the Italians needed considerable encouragement) to produce short papers on their respective areas, in consultation with the IA, for circulation in advance of a further set of G8/wider donor meetings in the first half of May. (Comment: there was some talk of holding these in London, but Geneva or New York probably makes more sense. Reddaway will discuss with Sinclair.)

COMMENT

20. A productive set of meetings. The G8 and wider donors are now focussed on the imperative of making SSR work, including raising the necessary funds (Rodman's comment in para 11 of Washington telno 460 notwithstanding), and know that the May meeting is intended to be an occasion for confirming commitments. The UK contribution to Afghanistan so far; our willingness to consider further SSR support; and our agreement to lead on counter-narcotics were much appreciated, in particular by the US, Brahimi and Abdullah. There was also recognition of the need for an overarching SSR framework, as a vital ingredient of the international community's military and financial exit strategy from Afghanistan. We will help steer this in the right direction by offering comments on the IA SSR paper, and through further contacts with the key players. We are also considering how best to focus further national contributions to SSR, including from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool.

END OF PART TWO