

5 November 2015

Review of Iraq: Security situation in Baghdad, southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), April 2015

Prepared for the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) by Dr Alan George (King's College, University of London)

(A) Introduction

1. This review assesses the Home Office Country Information and Guidance (GID) report entitled *Iraq: Security situation in Baghdad, southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)*, dated April 2015, on the basis of instructions from the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI).

2. The invitation to tender for the contract to review this report stipulates:

Country Information and Guidance Reports aim to provide an accurate, balanced and up to date summary of the key available source documents regarding the human rights situation, with respect to the issues selected for coverage, in the country covered. The purpose and scope of the reports are clearly set out in an introductory section of the document. Reviews should evaluate the above-mentioned report in this context and seek to identify any areas where it can be improved. Specifically the review should entail:

(i) Assessing the extent to which information from source documents has been appropriately and accurately reflected in the CIG Report.

(ii) Identifying additional sources detailing the current human rights situation in the country with respect to main grounds for asylum claims (which are noted in each CIG Report).

(iii) Noting and correcting any specific errors or omissions of fact.

(iv) Making recommendations for general improvements regarding, for example, the structure of the report, its coverage or its overall approach.

3. In undertaking this Review, I have been conscious that the Home Office's CIG reports are intended to function as reference works for Home Office officials deciding asylum and humanitarian protection claims; and that these reports are focussed on particular themes and are not intended as general country of origin information reports.

(B) About the Author

4. Alan George gained his first degree, in geography, from Oxford University in 1970. He obtained his Master's degree (on Middle East geography) at Durham University in 1972, and his PhD, on Syria, also at Durham in 1978. Since 1984 he has worked as a freelance

journalist, researcher and expert witness in political asylum cases involving the Middle East. As a journalist, he contributed to a wide range of UK and international publications including the *Observer*, the *Independent* and the *Guardian*, and he frequently commentates on Middle Eastern affairs for radio and television. He is a former Head of Research at the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce and a former Assistant Director of the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU). His publications include *Syria: Neither Bread Nor Freedom* (Zed Books, London, 2003); *Jordan: Living in the Crossfire* (Zed Books, London, 2005); *Fortschritt oder Lahmung: Baschar al-Assads Syrien*, a chapter in Hartmut Fahndrich (Ed.) *Verebte Macht: Monarchien und Dynastien in der arabischen Welt*, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 2005; and *Patronage and Clientelism in Bashar's Social Market Economy*, a chapter in *The Alawis of Syria: War, Faith and Politics in the Levant*, published by Hurst & Co this year. In 2003-2013 he was a Senior Associate Member of St Antony's College, Oxford University. In November 2013 he was appointed Senior Visiting Research Fellow in the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at London University's King's College.

(C) Summary

5. Since the 2003 invasion, security conditions in Iraq have been fragile at best, reaching a nadir in the bloody sectarian civil war of 2006-2007, improving thereafter, but deteriorating again from late 2013. 2014 was another dark year, when the Islamic State (IS) militia seized most of north-central Iraq, including the country's third city, Mosul, perpetrating appalling atrocities in the process and since. The Iraqi army was routed, causing the Shia-dominated Baghdad authorities to rely increasingly on Shia militias that have become notorious for their anti-Sunni human rights violations. Baghdad's campaign to retake lost territory has scored only limited successes, and the security situation in central and north-central Iraq, including Baghdad, remains very serious. In sharp contrast, the KRI remains almost free of violence, although this relative tranquillity is threatened by local political tensions. In October 2015 security forces opened fire on demonstrators demanding political changes and unpaid wages, killing several. Outside the KRI, the only part of Iraq that enjoys relatively good security is the Shia-dominated south; but here, too, levels of violence have been rising. Against this background of multi-faceted and fast-moving conflict, *Iraq: Security situation in Baghdad, southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)* is an impressive publication, even as it stands, offering accurate and well-sourced factual information.

6. The report is, however, marred by very numerous but mostly relatively minor typographical and stylistic defects, although most of these can easily be corrected.

7. There is a clear need to standardise the style of footnotes and references (quite a number of which, in addition, are slightly incorrect). In my list of suggested changes I have not amended each and every footnote/reference. By way of example, as it stands, the first footnote on page 14 is:

5 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy Report 2014, Countries of Concern: Iraq, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/iraq-country-of-concern/iraq-country-of-concern-latest-update-31-december-2014> 12 March 2015, Accessed on 26 March 2015

This should be:

5 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Human Rights and Democracy Report 2014*, Countries of Concern: Iraq, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/iraq-country-of-concern/iraq-country-of-concern-latest-update-31-december-2014> 12 March 2015, Accessed on 26 March 2015

Quotation marks should be standardised. I note that in the Libya ethnic minorities CIG, double inverted commas are used. In the present publication, however, single inverted commas are used.

There is also a need to standardise place and other names. Iraq's largest religious community, for example, can be 'Shia', 'Shi'a' or 'Shiite'.

8. In terms of actual content, the only really significant corrective task that I have identified is a requirement to update material extracted from periodic publications such as the Institute for the Study of War's 'Control of Terrain' maps for Iraq; and to add new material from other publications issued since the CIG report was published.

(D) Suggested corrections

Preface

9. Page 2, 'Feedback': 'Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance...' The split infinitive should be corrected. **Should be:** 'Our goal is continuously to improve the guidance...'

Section 1: Guidance

10. Page 4, 1.2: 'Is the person's account a credible one?'. This is stylistically clumsy. **Should be:** 'Is the person's account credible?'

11. Page 4, 1.2: 'Are those at risk able to internally relocate?' The split infinitive should be corrected. **Should be:** 'Are those at risk able to relocate internally?'

12. Page 6, 1.3.10: The words 'relations between' appear twice. Delete.

13. Page 6, 1.3.13: 'Most violence is reportedly instigated by unknown perpetrators, therefore identifying actors and trends in violence in Baghdad is difficult'. It is therefore obvious that 'identifying actors...is therefore difficult'. The inability to identify actors has no obvious bearing on the identification of trends in violence. **Should be simply:** 'Most violence is reportedly instigated by unknown perpetrators'; and I would suggest this be relocated as the final sentence in 1.3.12.

14. Page 6, 1.3.13: 'Over 2014 and into 2015 ISIL and...' **Should be:** 'In 2014 and 2015 ISIL and...'

15. Page 6, 1.3.13: '...sectarian discord, usually targeting Shia neighbourhoods, government buildings and security checkpoints, but also included bombings of markets, restaurants, parks and places of worship (mosques / shrines)'. **Should be:** '...sectarian discord. Usual targets have been Shia neighbourhoods, government buildings and

security checkpoints, but markets, restaurants, parks and places of worship (mosques shrines) have also been hit’.

16. Page 6, 1.3.14: **Re-write thus:** ‘Baghdad governorate, which remains under the control of the GoI and the ISF supported by Shia militias, is statistically the most violent in Iraq (as well as the most populous with around 20% of total population). In 2014-2015 it witnessed a significant increase in violence compared with 2012 and, to a lesser extent, 2013, based on Iraq Body Count (IBC) and UNAMI data. Note that although the sources use different definitions, and casualties are probably under-reported, the trends in the intensity of violence are consistent between different data sources.

17. Page 7, 1.3.15: **Re-write thus:** ‘IBC documented 1,116 civilian fatalities in Baghdad governorate in 2012; 3,077 in 2013; and 2,718 in 2014. UNAMI reported 3,702 civilian fatalities in Baghdad governorate in 2014. For 2013, UNAMI has published data for the Baghdad governorate only for April-December, when there were 2,863 civilian fatalities, compared with 2,986 for the same period of 2014. UNAMI recorded 8,735 civilians injured in 2014, compared to 11,791 wounded reported by ‘Musings on Iraq’ during 2014. Both UNAMI and Musings on Iraq document similar levels of civilian casualties continuing into 2015. In January-September 2015 UNAMI recorded 2,843 civilian fatalities and 6,848 wounded in Baghdad governorate.’

18. Page 7, 1.3.16: ‘...in 2014. While Musings on Iraq data on the numbers...’ **Remove the word ‘While’** (otherwise, grammatically, it is not a sentence).

19. Page 7, 1.3.16: ‘Despite the higher levels of violence, displacement remained low (at around 60,000 persons), with the majority of those displaced (over 40,000) moving within the governorate by early 2015. Over 300,000 persons have been displaced from elsewhere in Iraq to Baghdad governorate as of March 2015’. I am unsure that a figure of 60,000 displaced persons can be described simply as ‘low’. **Re-phrase thus:** ‘Despite the higher levels of violence, displacement from Baghdad governorate since the start of 2014 was relatively low (nearly 58,000 persons), with the majority of these (over 36,000) moving within the governorate, as of October 2015. At the same date, Baghdad governorate was hosting some 541,000 people displaced from elsewhere in Iraq since the start of 2014.’

20. Page 7, 1.3.17 - 1.3.19: These paragraphs will need replacing in light of the new Iraq Country Guidance case of **AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 00544 (IAC)** promulgated on 5 October 2015. This is a task to be undertaken by Home Office decision makers.

21. Page 8, 1.3.22: ‘In 2014 there was an average of 126 persons killed per month (based on data collated by the blogger Joel Wing), a 68 per cent increase from 2013 figures and a 78 per cent increase from 2012 (based on IBC data – different reporting methodologies may apply, so comparisons should be considered a guide only).’ **Re-phrase thus:** ‘In 2014 an average of 126 persons were killed per month (based on data collated by the blogger Joel Wing), a 68 per cent increase over 2013 and a 78 per cent increase over 2012 (based on IBC data; note that different reporting methodologies may apply, so comparisons should be considered a guide only).’

22. Page 8, 1.3.22: ‘...had been cleared, with insurgents routed further north.’ **End this sentence** after ‘cleared’. The rest means little.

23. Page 8, 1.3.24: ‘Displacement data shows just under half of the families displaced from Babil, 664, had relocated elsewhere in the governorate’. **Should be:** ‘As of October 2015 35,600 persons from Babil had been displaced since the start of 2014, of whom some 14,500 had relocated within the governorate’.

24. Page 8, 1.3.25 - 1.3.27: These paragraphs will **need replacing** in light of the new Iraq Country Guidance case of **AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 00544 (IAC)** promulgated on 5 October 2015. This is a task to be undertaken by Home Office decision makers.

25. Page 9, 1.3.28: ‘Quadissiya’ is **usually spelled:** ‘Qadissiya’.

26. Page 9, 1.3.29: ‘...remained relatively stable in 2014’. **Should be:** ‘...remained relatively stable in 2014-2015’.

27. Page 9, 1.3.29: ‘...recorded in 2014) – Basra and Kerbala the highest levels (with 128 and 200 fatalities respectively for the year) – out of a total population of 6.7 million for the eight governorates’. **Amend thus:** ‘...recorded in 2014), and Basra and Kerbala the highest levels (with 128 and 200 fatalities respectively for the year), out of a total population of 6.7 million for the eight governorates’.

28. Page 9, 1.3.30 - 1.3.31: These paragraphs will **need replacing** in light of the new Iraq Country Guidance case of **AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 00544 (IAC)** promulgated on 5 October 2015. This is a task to be undertaken by Home Office decision makers.

29. Page 9, 1.3.33: ‘...remained stable in 2014, with low levels of violence.’ **Should be:** ‘...remained stable in 2014-2015, with almost no violence’.

30. Page 9, 1.3.33: ‘Mass casualty terrorist attacks were rare in KRI, although in November 2014 a suicide bomber launched an attack on a government building in Erbil, resulting in approximately 10 fatalities. ISIL later assumed responsibility’. **Re-phrase thus:** ‘Mass casualty attacks are rare in the KRI, although in November 2014 a suicide bomber from the IS group attacked a government building in Erbil, killing himself and six others; and on 17 April 2015 another suicide attacker from IS detonated a car bomb outside the US Consulate in Erbil, killing three people’.

31. Page 9, 1.3.34: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘The threat from ISIL remains along the KRI borders with Ninewa and Diyala governorates. In August 2014 an ISIL offensive threatened local populations in southern Erbil, resulting in localised displacement. By the end of 2014, however, a Kurdish counter-offensive had pushed ISIL back’.

Section 2: Information

32. Page 11, 2.1.1: **Should be:** ‘Iraq remained one of the most vulnerable states in the world in 2015, ranking 12th on the Fund for Peace’s, ‘Fragile States Index’ (compared with 13th in 2014), with weak or poor scores against all twelve primary social, economic

and political indicators and the lowest possible recorded scores on ‘security apparatus’ and ‘group grievance’, the latter respectively including internal armed conflict and sectarian based conflicts.¹’.

33. Page 11, 2.1.2: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s *Conflict Barometer 2014* categorised the situation in Iraq as a “highly violent conflict”, adding: “IS and other Sunni militant groups fought the government, which was supported by Shiite militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, pro-government Sunni tribal fighters, Iran, and a US-led coalition. This conflict was given an intensity rating of 5, the highest possible. Other conflicts were less intense: that between Shia factions and the government was allocated a rating of 3; while those between the Kurdistan Regional government and the Baghdad government and a territorial dispute with Iran were each given a rating of 1.2”.

34. Page 11, 2.1.3: **Replace the map** with the latest version, dated 17 September 2015; ‘as of 12 March 2015’. Should be: ‘as of 17 September 2015’.

35. Page 11, footnotes: footnotes: footnote 1 **should be:**

1 Fund for Peace, ‘Fragile States Index 2014’,
<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>
Accessed: 23 October 2015

36. Page 11, footnotes: footnotes: footnote 2 **should be:**

2 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, *Conflict Barometer 2014*.
http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2014.pdf
Accessed: 23 October 2015

37. Page 12, footnotes: Footnote 3 **should be:**

3 Institute of the Study of War, Control of Terrain in Iraq,
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014-09-17%20Control%20Zone%20Map.pdf>
Accessed 23 October 2015

38. Page 13, 2.1.5: **Replace this with extensive excerpts from the latest such report, issued in June 2015, thus:**

‘The UNAMI/ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015*, issued in June 2015, stated:

“The on-going non-international armed conflict in Iraq continues to take a terrible toll on civilians. From 1 January 2014 through to the end of April 2015, UNAMI/OHCHR recorded at least 44,136 civilian casualties (14,947 killed and 29,189 wounded) in the armed conflict in Iraq. During the reporting period, 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015, a minimum of 10,768 civilian casualties resulted from the ongoing violence, including at least 3,345 persons killed and 7,423 wounded. Baghdad was the worst affected governorate, with a minimum of 5,724 civilian casualties (1,586 killed and 4,138

wounded) followed by Anbar and Diyala governorates.

“The hostilities continue to cause massive displacement of civilians. From January 2014 through 25 April 2015, a total of 2,834,676 persons had become internally displaced in Iraq, including an estimated 1.3 million children. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) continues to host a large number of IDPs, with 38 per cent of the total. In the rest of Iraq, Dohuk governorate hosts the largest number of IDPs displaced since the start of 2014, with 452,496, followed by Anbar with 422,586, Baghdad with 412,200, and Kirkuk with 375,120. IDPs have largely settled in private settings. However, 27 per cent of IDPs have been forced to resort to critical shelter arrangements, including unfinished and abandoned buildings, religious buildings, school buildings, and informal settlements. Only eight per cent of IDPs are residing in camps.

“UNAMI/OHCHR continued to receive reports of the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) committing violations of international humanitarian law and gross human rights violations and abuses, with an apparent systematic and widespread character. In some instances, these may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.

“In areas under its control, ISIL has directly attacked civilians and civilian objects. Certain groups of civilians have been particularly targeted. Those affiliated with or perceived to be affiliated with the Iraqi Government or security forces have been systematically killed by the group, and many have been kidnapped and subjected to other forms of ill-treatment. Professionals, including journalists and doctors, have come under attack. Those who are perceived to question ISIL authority or refuse to align themselves with the group are punished and often killed. Civilians continued to be murdered, often in grim public spectacles, and were subjected to ill-treatment (including amputations and executions) subsequent to decisions of ISIL self-appointed courts.

“Members of Iraq’s diverse ethnic and religious communities continued to suffer from a range of violations at ISIL hands. These groups, including Christians, Faili Kurds, Kaka’e, Sabaeans, Shabak, Shi’a Arabs, Turkmen, Yezidi and others, have been systematically persecuted. These acts appear to form part of an on-going policy that aims to suppress, permanently expel, or destroy many of these communities within ISIL areas of control. Women and children have also been specifically targeted. UNAMI/OHCHR continues to receive reports of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated against women, girls and boys, as well as the recruitment and use of children in military operations. ISIL and associated armed groups also murdered captured soldiers and other security forces or government personnel.

“As many as 3,000 to 3,500 men, women, and children remain in ISIL captivity predominantly from the Yezidi community but also from other ethnic and religious communities, where they are subjected to physical, sexual and other forms of violence and degrading treatment on a daily basis. UNAMI and OHCHR have grave fears for the safety and security of these individuals. Those who have managed to reach areas of safety consistently reported lack of basic necessities, such as food and sanitary items, and alleged that they were subjected to forced labour, forced religious conversions, ill-treatment, ii murder, and physical and sexual violence including sexual slavery and the trafficking of women and children.

“In its conduct of operations, ISIL continues its campaign of destruction of civilian objects and places of cultural or religious significance. Reports were received that ISIL had used chlorine gas in attacks in a number of places, such as in Duloeiyah and Tikrit, however, these claims could not be verified by UNAMI/OHCHR”.⁴’.

39. Page 13, 2.1.6: **Replace with:**

‘The same report stated: “UNAMI/OHCHR also received some reports alleging violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations or abuses committed by ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] and affiliated armed groups that occurred during the reporting period. These included air strikes, shelling and conduct of particular military operations or attacks that may have violated the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. Armed groups affiliated to or supporting the Government also carried out targeted killings, including of captured fighters from ISIL and its associated armed groups, abductions of civilians, and destruction of property.

“In a number of cases, it has been impossible to identify the perpetrators of violations and abuses committed during the reporting period. These included instances of murder, intimidation and threats, abductions, and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) and suicide bombers to target civilians or civilian infrastructure.

“There are serious concerns for the protection and welfare of members of groups at-risk, in particular those displaced or living in areas under ISIL control or areas affected by violence. Of main concern are women, female-headed households, children, people with disabilities, the elderly, and members of diverse ethnic, cultural or religious groups”.’

40. Page 13, footnotes: footnote 4 **should be:**

⁴ UNAMI/ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015*, June 2015.

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_4th_POCREport-11Dec2014-30April2015.pdf

Accessed 23 October 2015

41. Page 14, 2.1.8: This **needs updating** but Jane’s is available only on subscription, and I don’t have access!

42. Page 14, proposed new 2.1.9: I would **suggest inserting** a section 2.1.9 comprising lengthy extracts from the UN Secretary-General’s latest report on Iraq, thus:

‘UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s *Fourth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2169 (2014)*, dated 13 July 2015, states:

“2. During the reporting period, the Government of Iraq continued its efforts to counter the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, ISIL and associated armed groups demonstrated the capacity to undertake asymmetric attacks, which hindered the Government’s efforts to retake and hold territory. ISIL also continued to inflict civilian casualties, cause massive displacement and perpetrate systematic human

rights violations that may amount to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity...

“... 18. The security situation in Iraq remained highly volatile throughout the reporting period. The conflict and armed violence were largely concentrated in contested areas in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates. Initially, the Government’s nationwide military operations focused on consolidating territorial gains already made against ISIL and on gradually recovering additional areas. In Anbar, pro-Government forces continued their operations to dislodge ISIL from contested areas or those under ISIL control, mainly in and around Ramadi, Fallujah and Garma. On 13 May, ISIL launched a renewed offensive on Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, taking full control on 17 May. On 24 May, ISIL expanded its offensive, launching a series of attacks on Iraqi security force positions in Haditha and al-Baghdadi. On 28 May, ISIL made further territorial gains in Anbar when it took control of the Al-Waleed Iraqi-Syrian border crossing, a week after it had seized control of the Al-Tanaf crossing on the Syrian side of the border. On 26 May, the Government of Iraq announced that the Iraqi security forces would begin a counteroffensive to retake Ramadi. In an attempt to hinder the counteroffensive, ISIL attempted to cut off water supplies to the Khalidiyah and Habbaniya areas to the east of Ramadi by closing the Ramadi Warrar Dam gates on 2 June.

“19. In Salah al-Din, armed clashes between pro-Government forces and ISIL intensified throughout the reporting period but no significant territorial gains were made by either side. Pro-Government forces retained control of the city of Tikrit and surrounding areas. Between 28 May and 2 June, ISIL conducted daily attacks against pro-Government forces in the south-west of Samarra and in the vicinity of areas under Government control between Balad and Tikrit. On 30 May, pro-Government forces launched a ground operation to expel ISIL elements from the perimeter of the Baiji refinery and surrounding areas, registering successes. However, ISIL continued to maintain control over supply routes from unliberated areas of Salah al-Din to Mosul and other areas in northern Iraq.

“20. Peshmerga forces, supported by popular mobilization forces and international coalition air assets, maintained pressure on ISIL positions in Sinjar, Ninewa, and across the north-west of the governorate. In southern Kirkuk, the Peshmerga maintained control over areas recaptured from ISIL, including the Khabaz oilfield and strategic road junctions.

“21. During the reporting period, Baghdad continued to be afflicted by acts of terrorism, such as targeted killings and kidnappings, sectarian violence and the use of improvised explosive devices against civilians. On 8 May, a car bomb explosion and four improvised explosive devices killed 24 civilians and wounded 67 around Karrada district. Among the casualties were Shi’ite pilgrims preparing for the commemoration of the death of Imam Mousa al-Kazim. On 14 May, riots in the district of Adhamiya resulted in the Sunni Endowment building being set on fire. Resolute action by the Government prevented further escalation. On 28 May, vehicle-borne and suicide bomb attacks on the Sheraton and Babylon Hotels in Karrada killed 12 civilians and wounded 27. The month of May witnessed a total number of five clashes between the Iraqi security forces and ISIL in Baghdad. During the month of June, a total of 11 clashes and nine car bomb explosions were recorded in several areas of the city.

“22. During the reporting period, the international coalition continued to support the Government’s military campaign against ISIL. Its air strikes targeted ISIL positions

around Mosul and surrounding districts, Mount Sinjar, south of Kirkuk city, and around Baiji in Salah al-Din. International coalition air strikes in Anbar increased in mid-May following the fall of Ramadi to ISIL. The United States of America also announced that it would send up to 450 military advisers to Iraq to strengthen the training and equipping of local forces fighting ISIL, notably in Anbar.”7’.

43. Page 14, proposed **new section** 2.1.10: This would be a continuation of the excerpt from the UN Secretary-General’s latest report, thus:

“43. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of the ongoing armed conflict in Iraq and to be subjected to acts of violence and terrorism. Since my previous report, from 1 May to 27 June, UNAMI recorded a minimum number of 3,268 civilian casualties (1,158 killed and 2,110 wounded), bringing total civilian casualties in 2015 to at least 11,996 (3,823 killed and 8,173 wounded).

“44. UNAMI continues to receive numerous reports of violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated against civilians in an apparent widespread and systematic manner. The reports describe attacks directly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, extrajudicial killings, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, forced recruitment of children, wanton destruction and looting of civilian property, and denial of fundamental rights and freedoms. Vulnerable groups continue to be subjected to gross violations of their basic human rights. Approximately 3,500 women and children, and some men, predominantly from the Yezidi community but also from other minority ethnic and religious communities, continue to be held in captivity by ISIL...

“...46. Freedom of expression remains under threat owing to many factors, including the lack of security for journalists. In this regard, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) signed an agreement with the Iraqi Journalists’ Syndicate on 3 May on the occasion of the celebrations of World Press Freedom Day in Baghdad to enhance the capacities of Iraqi journalists in conflictsensitive reporting.

“47. Following the fall of Ramadi in May, reports were received alleging the abduction and killing of a significant number of civilians and members of the Iraqi security forces. On 24 May, ISIL murdered between 16 and 19 tribal members in Haditha, western Anbar, because of their purported cooperation with Iraqi security forces. Such reports conform to ISIL’s pattern of targeting persons suspected of being allied with the Government of Iraq or perceived to be opposed to its ideology. On the same date, a wave of explosions struck Baquba City and Baladruz, in Diyala governorate, causing a number of civilian casualties. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attacks in Baladruz, which targeted the Shi’ite community.

“48. With the security situation deteriorating throughout Iraq, particularly in Anbar governorate, grave violations against children continued to be documented. The Task Force on Children and Armed Conflict, co-chaired by UNAMI and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), documented 15 incidents of violations against children in May and June, with the caveat that the United Nations has noted a decrease in the number of reported incidents owing to lack of access to affected populations and increased displacement. Killing and maiming continued to be the most documented violation (7 out of the 15 documented violations), with 10 cases of child casualties (6 killed and 4

wounded).

“49. Forced recruitment by ISIL, particularly of children, appears to have increased during the reporting period. On 11 May, ISIL fighters visited secondary schools in eastern Mosul, instructing pupils to pledge allegiance to the group. On 23 May, ISIL announced at schools and universities that all male students were to join ISIL after the completion of their exams. Reports also indicate that ISIL forcibly recruited significant numbers of children in Anbar governorate. Reportedly, children also continue to be within the ranks of the popular mobilization forces in conflict areas, as well as in Baghdad and Basra.

“50. The ability of civilians to access safety and humanitarian assistance continues to be of grave concern, particularly in areas under ISIL control. Civilians are severely punished for attempting to flee ISIL territory. On 7 May, a 31-year-old man was shot in the head in Mosul for allegedly having forged documents to assist residents to leave the city. The next day, a 24-year-old Yezidi woman was killed by ISIL while trying to escape captivity in Sinjar district, Ninewa. On 23 May, ISIL ordered that no residents be permitted to leave Mosul.

“51. Basic and fundamental freedoms continue to be restricted by ISIL. In mid-May, ISIL issued rules for residents of Mosul to follow during the month of Ramadan, including a restriction on women leaving their homes between dawn and sunset. On 17 May, the male residents of Mosul were instructed to grow beards and shave moustaches. Later in May, they were reportedly told to adopt an Afghan-style of dress (shalwar kamiz). It appears that the purpose of these measures is to make it more difficult to distinguish ISIL combatants from civilians.

“52. UNAMI also continued to receive reports alleging that pro-Government armed groups and militias are perpetrating violations and abuses of human rights. Since the beginning of May, Shi’ite militias have been establishing checkpoints in the area, harassing and assaulting Kurdish drivers and passengers. On 5 May, three Kurdish lorry drivers were killed at a checkpoint manned by Shi’ite militias in Khanaqin district, Diyala governorate. In early June, a video was posted on social media purporting to show members of a Shi’ite militia (Imam Ali Brigades) in Garma, north-east of Fallujah, burning the body of a man hanging by his feet, who had been accused by the perpetrators of being a member of ISIL.

“53. Diyala governorate has seen a steady increase in attacks targeting members of the Sunni Arab community. May marked the height of such attacks, with at least 22 separate verified incidents, including at least 28 killings and 13 abductions. In the majority of incidents, perpetrators remain unidentified and no arrests have been made. On 11 May, at least 20 Sunni Arab residents of Baladruz subdistrict, Diyala, were detained by armed men, some of whom are believed to be members of the Iraqi security forces and militia groups. The vehicles used by the perpetrators appeared to be the same as those previously used by pro-Government forces in the area, mounted with loudspeakers through which Sunni residents were warned to leave. At least 10 bodies were later found in Muqdadiya, Diyala, reportedly including some of those who had been taken from their homes. During May, a well-known Sunni businessman was abducted by unidentified gunmen in the city of Baquba and an adviser to the Minister of Defence was killed after unidentified gunmen attacked his car.”7’

New government and policies

44. Page 14, 2.2.1: **Replace with:** ‘Following the national elections in April 2014, the incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law bloc was the dominant political group. A Congressional Research Service report, however, stated: “Maliki’s route to a third term was upended by the June 2014 IS-led offensive, which U.S. officials publicly blamed on Maliki’s efforts to marginalize Sunni leaders and citizens...Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani appeared to undermine Maliki by calling for an inclusive government that ‘avoids mistakes of the past.’”⁷. A UNAMI report covering events between 11 September and 10 December 2014, stated:.....’

45. Page 14, footnotes: If my recommendations concerning new sections 2.1.9 and 2.1.10 are accepted, **a new footnote 7** will need to be inserted (and of course the numbers of all subsequent footnotes would need to be amended accordingly). The new footnote 7 would be:

⁷ UN Secretary-General, *Fourth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2169 (2014)*, 13 July 2015.

[http://www.uniraq.org/images/SGReports/N1521149%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.uniraq.org/images/SGReports/N1521149%20(2).pdf)

Accessed 23 October 2015.

46. Page 14, footnotes: footnote 7 **should be:**

⁷ Congressional Research Service, *Iraq: Politics, Security, and US Policy*, 16 September 2015.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

47. Page 15, 2.2.2: **Replace entirely** with: ‘The Congressional Research Service observed:

“The Abbadi cabinet, which was confirmed on September 8, appeared to satisfy U.S. and Iraqi demands for inclusiveness. Factional disputes caused Abbadi to avoid naming choices for the key security posts of Defense and Interior ministers, and agreement on the two posts was not achieved until October 23, when the COR confirmed Mohammad Salem al-Ghabban as Interior Minister and Khalid al-Ubaydi as Defense Minister. The selection of Ghabban drew criticism from many Sunni figures because he is a leader of the Badr Organization (see above). Ubaydi, a Sunni, was an aircraft engineer during the rule of Saddam Hussein, and became a university professor after Saddam’s downfall.

“A major feature of the Abbadi government is that incorporated many senior faction leaders, although some posts lack significant authority. At the same time, it gave enhanced security details and prestige and influence to some figures that might represent challenges to Abbadi’s authority, particularly Maliki.”⁹.

48. Page 15, 2.2.3: **Replace entirely** with: ‘The new government’s policies have attempted to address some of the Sunnis grievances, the Congressional Research Service report stating:

“U.S. officials say that Abbadi is attempting to win back Sunni support through steps such as ordering the ISF to cease shelling Sunni-inhabited areas controlled by Islamic State forces and abolishing the ‘Office of the Commander-in-Chief.’ In November 2014, he replaced 36 Iraqi Army commanders and 24 Interior Ministry officials. Abbadi has also sought to publicly disclose significant instances of corruption; he announced in November 2014 that 50,000 ISF personnel on the payrolls were not actually performing military service. In February 2015, the Cabinet approved an amendment to the ‘de-Baathification’ laws...to further re-integrate former members of Saddam’s Baath Party into the political process and presumably reduce Sunni resentment of the government.

“Abbadi also has sought to establish a ‘National Guard’ force based on locally recruited fighters, reporting to provincial governments, to protect their home provinces from the Islamic State. The program appears mostly intended to entice Iraq’s Sunnis to resist Islamic State influence - an apparent attempt, in part, to revive the concept of the earlier U.S.-led ‘Awakening’/Sons of Iraq program. The announced program received Cabinet approval in February 2015 but has remained stalled in the COR, where the dominant Shiite factions apparently do not want to arm Sunni fighters extensively. The program is planned to also apply to Shiite militias who want to secure Shiite areas. However, that effort, including an effort to offer amnesty to those who served in the Saddam Hussein regime, has also been stalled by the COR and by objections raised by Iraqi courts to whom the issue has been referred...

“... On the other hand, continued Sunni mistrust of Baghdad appears to be slowing any broad Sunni shift to cooperate with the government against the Islamic State. Abbadi’s visits to Iran (October 2014 and June 2015) continue to fuel Sunni suspicions that Abbadi is susceptible to arguments from some Iranian leaders not to compromise with Sunni factions. The Iraqi decision in late March 2015 to move forward with an attempt to take back the city of Tikrit with Shiite militia and Iranian advisory help - rather than the assistance of the U.S.-led coalition - caused many experts to assess that Abbadi remains dependent politically and militarily on the Shiite militias. Abbadi addressed this perception in an April 3, 2015, interview in the German newspaper Spiegel by indicating that “[the militias] are very powerful because they are ideologically motivated. Honestly, it would be a challenge to deal with this.”¹⁰.

49. Page 15 footnotes: footnote 8 **should be:**

8 UNAMI, *Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December 2014*, February 2015.

http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&task=download&id=1045_891d38eb9b9510053f5424cab2b286ba&Itemid=650&lang=en

Accessed 23 October 2015.

50. Page 15 footnotes. Footnote 9 **should be:**

9 Congressional Research Service, *Iraq: Politics, Security, and US Policy*, 16 September 2015.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

Recent trends in violence in Iraq

51. Page 16 footnotes. Footnote 10 **should be:**

10 Congressional Research Service, *Iraq: Politics, Security, and US Policy*, 16 September 2015.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

52. Page 16, footnotes: link access dates for footnotes 11 and 12 **should be changed to** 23 October 2015.

53. Page 16, footnotes: footnote 12 **should be corrected to:**

12 Iraq Body Count, 'Iraq 2014: Civilian deaths almost doubling year on year', 1 January 2015.

<https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2014/>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

54. Page 17, 2.3.4: **Update the table** to include the April - September 2015 data:

Month	Killed	Injured
September 2015	537	925
August 2015	585	1103
July 2015	844	1616
June 2015	665	1032
May 2015	665	1313
April 2015	535	1456

55. Page 17, footnotes: footnote 13 **should be:**

13 UNAMI, *Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December 2014*, February 2015.

http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&task=download&id=1045_891d38eb9b9510053f5424cab2b286ba&Itemid=650&lang=en

Accessed 23 October 2015.

56. Page 18: This page, comprising an extensive quotation from the Musings on Iraq blog, can remain unchanged, except that the following **two paragraphs should be inserted** towards the bottom of the page (after '...shared by the authorities'):

“The ISF was a large cause of casualties with its indiscriminate shelling and air strikes. Most of this occurred in Anbar, and especially in Fallujah, which was taken by insurgents in December 2013. In that governorate 1,688 people were killed and 4,124 wounded by government artillery, and another 67 died and 124 were injured by aircraft. That accounted for 35% of the total dead and a whopping 61% of the wounded. Artillery was also used against civilians in Salahaddin, 90 killed and 104 wounded, to a lesser extent in Kirkuk, 6 dead and 9 wounded, and Babil, 3 dead and 12 injured. Air strikes were deployed more in Salahaddin, 176 fatalities and 132 wounded, and Ninewa, 140 dead and 194 injured, and Kirkuk, 76 dead and 116 wounded, along with Babil 39 dead and 6 injured, and Diyala, 7 fatalities. The Iraqi government was roundly criticized for these

tactics, because much of it was indiscriminate and killing innocents. Prime Minister Haider Abadi twice said that these practices would end, but it never did and continues to the present day.

“The U.S. led coalition and the Syrian Air Force also killed a number of people in Anbar and Ninewa from October to December. In total 55 died in Anbar and another 24 in Ninewa with 108 wounded and 13 injured in those two provinces respectively. In July, the Syrian government twice bombed targets along the Anbar border with 13 fatalities and 17 injured. “Vehicle borne improvised.....”

57. Page 18, footnotes: footnote 14 **should be:**

14 UNAMI, ‘UN Casualty Figures for the Month of September 2015, 1 October 2015. http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=4344:un-casualty-figures-for-the-month-of-september-2015&Itemid=633&lang=en Accessed 23 October 2015.

58. Page 19, 2.3.6: The heading is missing from the first chart. It **should be:** ‘Chart 1 - Security Incidents In Iraq By Province 2014’

59. Page 19, 2.3.6: The column headings (‘Jan’, ‘Feb’ etc) **should each be shifted** one column to the right!

60. Page 19, footnotes: link access dates for these two footnotes **should be** 23 October 2015.

61. Page 20, 2.3.6: The table heading **should be:** ‘Chart 3 - Wounded in Iraq By Province 2014’.

62. Page 20, footnotes: link access dates for this footnote **should be** 23 October 2015.

63. Page 21, 2.3.7: ‘Joel Wing in Musings on Iraq, collated media reports on the number of incidents and casualties across Iraq by week from June 2014 to February 2015. The number of incidents in March 2015 (616) was broadly similar to those in February 2015. The number of incidents and casualties were highest in the summer of 2014 and gradually decline to early 2015.’ **Amend this**, and replace the existing table with the equivalent table for 2015, thus:

‘Joel Wing in Musings on Iraq, collates media reports on the number of incidents and casualties across Iraq by week, the most recent figures being for the week of 9-14 October 2015 (see following table). The blog comments: “Casualties have remained relatively stable the last several months. During the second week of October there were 254 deaths and 388 injuries in the press... Casualties are no longer a good measure of security in Iraq however, because the government is actively suppressing the numbers. For example, despite constant fighting in Anbar and Salahaddin with the on going security operations there officials rarely mention any losses”¹⁸’.

Violence In Iraq By Week 2015

Date	Incidents	Dead	Wounded
Jan 1-7	189	466	464
Jan 8-14	172	733	518
Jan 15-21	189	403	528

Jan 22-28	195	492	899
Jan 29-31	91	306	568
JAN	836	2,400	2,977
Feb 1-7	155	408	688
Feb 8-14	177	443	566
Feb 15-21	169	592	383
Feb 22-28	171	391	705
FEB	672	1,834	2,342
Mar 1-7	176	373	595
Mar 8-14	137	398	656
Mar 15-21	146	1,304	505
Mar 22-28	174	273	406
Mar 29-31	72	205	219
MAR	705	2,553 + 4	2,381 + 150
Apr 1-7	127	218	422
Apr 8-14	137	676	542
Apr 15-21	172	729	717
Apr 22-28	163	497	483
Apr 29-30	50	162 + 7	182 + 299
APR	649	2,282	2,346
May 1-7	154	627	450
May 8-14	154	420	549
May 15-21	124	963	387
May 22-28	108	341 + 1,499	348
May 29-31	38	66	164 + 646
MAY	578	2,417 + 1,499	1,898 + 646
Jun 1-7	132	431	476
Jun 8-14	126	522 + 405	394
Jun 15-21	141	365	373
Jun 22-28	162	306	474
Jun 29-30	61	122	189
JUN	622	1,804	2,012
Jul 1-7	161	435	719
Jul 8-14	140	384	570
Jul 15-21	109	359	597 + 4,024
Jul 22-28	145	527	590
Jul 29-31	53	453 + 8	603
JUL	608	2,166	3,079 + 4,024
Aug 1-7	154	650 + 760	298
Aug 8-14	133	756	640
Aug 15-21	135	345	354
Aug 22-28	136	342	296
Aug 29-31	59	112 + 5	169
AUG	617	2,205 + 760	1,757
Sep 1-7	139	285	352
Sep 8-14	144	368	394
Sep 15-21	123	323	488
Sep 22-28	128	190	258
Sep 29-30	39	106 + 19	147 + 8
SEP	573	1,291 + 314	1,647 + 3,003
Oct 1-7	105	291	398
Oct 8-14	145	254	388

64. Page 22, footnotes: footnote 18 **should be:**

18 ‘Iraq Forces Make Major Advances In Baiji Area’, 20 October 2015.

<http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/iraq-forces-make-major-advances-in.html>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

65. Page 22, 2.3.8: ‘The Iraq Body Count indicated that it was difficult to identify the perpetrators of violence in Iraq in 2014. 19 The IBC source observed:’ **Re-phrase thus:** ‘Iraq Body Count noted that it was difficult to identify the perpetrators of violence in Iraq in 2014.19:

“Among the 17,049...”

66. Page 22, 2.3.10: **Amend this** as follows:

‘Musings on Iraq data for 2014 showed a marked decline in car bomb attacks throughout the year, from an average of 91.6 per month in January-May to 53.1 per month in June-December. As car bombs are favoured by IS, the blog suggested that the decline might indicate that IS’s capacity to launch such attacks had been reduced. 22 The 2015 figures, however, belied any such interpretation. On 20 October 2015 the blog reported:

“Finally, IS continued with its car bomb campaign, which began in July. During the second week of October there were a total of 51 VBIEDs [Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices] compared to 18 the week before. Of those 51, only 6 hit their targets, while the other 45 were destroyed. .. These attacks will likely remain at this pace for the next several months”23’.

67. Page 22, footnotes: **insert a new footnote 23**, and amend the numbers of all subsequent footnotes accordingly. The new footnote should be:

23 ‘Iraq Forces Make Major Advances In Baiji Area’, 20 October 2015.

<http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/iraq-forces-make-major-advances-in.html>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

68. Page 22, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 23 October 2015.

Non-state armed groups

69. Page 23, 2.3.12: **Correct this** as follows: ‘Although the Islamic State (IS, formerly calling itself Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL]) remained the main insurgent group in Iraq, other Sunni anti-government groups included Jaysh Rijal-al Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN) and the closely-related General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries and Iraqi Ba’ath Party; the Fallujah Military Council; the Council of Revolutionaries of the Tribes of Anbar; the 1920 Brigades; the Islamic Army of Iraq; Jaysh al-Mujahidin; and Ansar al-Islam.24’.

70. Page 23, 2.3.13: ‘There are estimated to be 100,000 in the Shiite militias mobilised in the defence of Baghdad.26’. **Change this to:** ‘A September 2015 Congressional Research Service report states: “Current estimates of the total Shiite militiamen in Iraq number about 100,000”.26’.

71, Page 23, footnotes: footnote 24 **should be:**

24 Institute for the Study of War, *Beyond The Islamic State: Iraq's Sunni Insurgency*, October 2014.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sunni%20Insurgency%20in%20Iraq.pdf>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

72. Page 23, footnotes: **footnote 26 should be:**

26 Congressional Research Service, *Iraq: Politics, Security, and US Policy*, 16 September 2015.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

Displacement

73. Page 23, 2.4.1: **Amend as follows:** ‘In the period January 2014 until end-September 2015 the International Organisation for Migration recorded 534,456 families, comprising 3,206,736 individuals, as being newly internally displaced in Iraq, divided between 3,476 separate locations.²⁸ The following map shows the internally displaced by category of location:’

74. Page 23, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

75. Page 24, 2.4.1: **replace the map** with the equivalent map for October 2015 at

<http://iomiraq.net/file/2146/download>

76. Page 24, footnotes. A new footnote 28 is required (and all subsequent footnotes will need to be renumbered accordingly). The new footnote **should be:**

28 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, IDP Crisis - January 2014-29 September 2015.

<http://iomiraq.net/file/2148/download>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

77. Page 24, 2.4.2: **Change, as follows:** “The International Organisation for Migration also reported that: “As of 29 September 2015, seven governorates host 82% (2,638,566 individuals) of the total identified IDP population. Anbar hosts 18% (583,050 individuals), Baghdad 18% (577,584), Dahuk 13% (426,966), Kirkuk 13% (401,280), Erbil 9% (284,310), Ninewa 6% (203,652) and Sulaymaniyah 5% (161,724). Central North Iraq hosts 68% of the IDPs (2,162,772 individuals), the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) hosts 27% of the IDPs (873,000 individuals) and South Iraq hosts 5% of the IDPs (179,964 individuals).”²⁹’

78. Page 24, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

79. Page 24, footnotes: footnote 29 **should be:**

29 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round XXX October 2015.

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20151013_IOM_DTM_RoundXXX_Report_October2015.pdf

Accessed 26 October 2015.

Sectarianism

80. Page 25, 2.5.1: **Re-phrase as follows:** ‘Sectarian tensions have escalated with the increased violence in 2014-2015, and these tensions affect civilians of *all* ethnic and religious backgrounds. In a report dated October 2014 OCHA also noted that ‘protection concerns are equally faced by groups who are now in the minority in the areas of displacement, including those from Shia and Sunni communities.’³⁰’.

81. Page 25, 2.5.2: **Re-phrase as follows:** ‘In 2015 sectarianism persisted as a driver of violence, with ISIL adapting its political and military strategy, for example by targeting Shia civilians in Baghdad, to provoke a sectarian response from the Iraqi government ³¹; and with government-allied Shia militias targeting Sunnis. In January 2015, for example, at least 72 people from the majority Sunni village of Barwanah in Diyala governorate were singled out and killed by Shia armed groups. The *New York Times* reported that witness accounts suggested militiamen called out individuals’ names prior to the mass execution. Intense clashes had occurred around Barwanah in the preceding days, and internally displaced persons hosted by Barwanah in recent months had included some from the nearby village of Sinsil, an IS stronghold.³²’.

82. Page 25, 2.5.3: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘In a late January 2015 speech at a security summit in Baghdad, Prime Minister Al-Abadi, apparently referring to the atrocities in Barwanah [see above], declared that government or militia fighters who took part in serious criminal behaviour should be regarded as “outlaws” and were “no less dangerous than terrorists”.³³’.

83. Page 25, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

84, Page 25, footnotes: **amend footnote 30, thus:**

³⁰ OCHA, *2014/2015 Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overview: Summary*, October 2014.

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/HNO_2014-2015_Iraq.pdf

Accessed 26 October 2015

Security situation by governorate

85. Page 26, 2.6.1: **Amend and insert new quotation, thus:** ‘The governorate is divided into districts although different sources give different numbers of districts, depending on definitions. The UN’s Joint Analysis Unit stated that there were ten: Abu Ghraib....Sader/2. 35....A report dated July 2015 from the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq also gave a population for the governorate of 6,696,596 but stated: “The governorate is divided in 14 districts. The districts of Adhamiyah, Karkh, Karadah,

Kadhimyah, Mansour, Sadr City, Al Rashid, Rusafa and 9 Nissan are part of Baghdad city, while the districts of Al-Mada'in, Taji, Tarmiya, Mahmudiya and Abu Ghraib comprise the rest of the governorate”³⁶’.

86. Page 26, 2.6.1: **Delete:** ‘Neither source takes into account movements into and out of the governorate during 2014 and 2015’.

87. Page 26, 2.6.3: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘For background information on the ethno-religious demographic changes in Baghdad, compare the series of maps of ‘ethno-religious neighbourhoods’ of Baghdad between 2003 and 2009. 38. Joel Wing discusses these maps in an entry dated November 2009 in his ‘Musings on Iraq’ blog, noting the increasing concentration of Sunnis in western Baghdad, with enclaves in the south and centre; and the parallel concentration of Shias in other parts of the city. 39’.

Control of territory

88. Page 26, 2.6.4: **This needs updating, as follows:** ‘The Institute for the Study of War (ISW’s), Control of Terrain map, dated 20 July 2015, showed Baghdad governorate under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces.⁴⁰ The ISW’s ‘ISIL Sanctuary Map’, as at 15 September 2015, showed ISIL attack and support zones, including all of Baghdad governorate.⁴¹’.

89. Page 26, 2.6.5: line 6: **‘to’ should be ‘the’.**

90. Page 26, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

91. Page 26, footnotes: **Replace footnote 35 with:**

UN Joint Analysis Unit, Baghdad governorate profile 2013, February 2014.

<http://www.iau-iraq.org/documents/475/GP-Baghdad%202013.pdf>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

92. Page 26 footnotes: **Insert new footnote 36** and re-number all subsequent footnotes:

³⁶ *Baghdad Governorate Profile*, NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq, updated July 2015.

<http://www.ncciraq.org/images/infobygov/BaghdadGovernorateProfileNCCI.pdf>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

93. Page 26, footnotes: **Delete** existing footnote 38. Replace with:

³⁸ <http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

94. Page 26, footnotes: **Change footnote 40 to:**

⁴⁰ Institute for the Study of War, ‘Control of Terrain in Iraq’, 20 July 2015.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Control%20Map%202015-7-20.pdf>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

95. Page 26, footnotes: **Change footnote 41 to:**

Institute for the Study of War, 'ISIL Sanctuary Map', 15 September 2015.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-september-15-2015>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

96. Page 27, 2.6.8: 'potential' **should be** 'potentially'. It's unclear to what the two acronyms refer. Replace with 'suicide bombers, whether using cars or on foot, wearing explosive vests'.

97. Page 27, 2.6.9: **Re-phrase thus:** 'An October 2014 ISW report noted that other Sunni factions the General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries, Ansar al-Islam, Jaysh al-Mujahidin and the 1920 Brigades were also operating in the 'Baghdad Belts region.⁴⁹'.

Fatality trends

98. Page 27, 2.6.11: **Re-phrase thus:** 'Different sources compile data on fatalities and injuries using different methodologies, so datasets are not directly comparable. They can nevertheless indicate trends'.

99. Page 27 footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

100. Page 27 footnotes: **Replace** footnote 49 with:

49 Institute for the Study of War, *Beyond The Islamic State: Iraq's Sunni Insurgency*, October 2014.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sunni%20Insurgency%20in%20Iraq.pdf>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

101. Page 28, 2.6.12: **Change/amend table entries** as follows:

Civilians killed:^{51, 52}

Iraq Body Count (IBC) reports that between March 2003 and September 2014 64,805 civilians were killed in Baghdad governorate - a monthly average of 470.

2012: 93 civilians killed per month (IBC).

2013: 256 civilians killed per month (IBC).

2014 (until September only): 339 civilians killed per month (IBC)

UNAMI documented 3,702 civilians killed in Baghdad governorate in 2014, IBC reported 3,050 civilians killed in January-September 2014.

Civilians injured

8,375 civilians were injured in Baghdad governorate in 2014 - a monthly average of 698 (UNAMI). In January-September 2015 UNAMI recorded 6,848 wounded.

Numbers displaced

As of 29 September 2015 96,264 families internally displaced since the start of 2014 were being hosted in 604 locations in Baghdad governorate. ⁵³

As of the same date, 57,564 people had been displaced from locations in Baghdad governorate, the majority of whom had relocated elsewhere in the governorate. As of 29 September 2015, people displaced from Baghdad since the start of 2014 accounted for 2 per cent of the Iraqi total of 3.2 million.⁵⁴

102. Page 28, 2.6.13: **Re-phrase as follows:** ‘The following monthly data for civilian fatalities in the 2010 - September 2014 period is from the Iraq Body Count (IBC) data base, analysed for ‘any perpetrators, in Baghdad province, any weapons, killing 1 or more’. Note that IBC’s data is derived from media reports and may include civilians killed for criminal and other non-conflict related reasons:’

103. Page 28, footnotes: access dates for all links **should be** 26 October 2015.

104. Page 28, footnotes. These need re-organising, with appropriate numbering changes. **The footnotes on this page should be:**

51 Iraq Body Count, <https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

52 UNAMI, Civilian Casualties.
http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3141:un-casualty-figures-for-december-2014-deadliest-since-2008-in-iraq&Itemid=633&lang=en
Accessed 26 October 2015.

53 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, IDP Crisis - January 2014-29 September 2015.
<http://iomiraq.net/file/2148/download>
Accessed 23 October 2015.

54 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round XXX October 2015.
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20151013_IOM_DTM_RoundXXX_Report_October2015.pdf
Accessed 26 October 2015.

105. Page 30, 2.6.13: Data for the period up to September 2014 **should be added** to the table.

106. Page 30, 2.6.14: This table can be **updated** to September 2014.

107. Page 30, footnotes: access dates for all links **should be** 26 October 2015.

108. Page 30-31, 2.6.15: This table can be **updated** to include data for the period up to September 2015.

109. Page 31, 2.6.16: **Insert** ‘figures’ after ‘UNAMI’.

110. Page 31, footnotes: footnote 59: **Should be** ‘UNAMI’ and not ‘UU. Access date should be 26 October 2015.

111. Page 32, 2.6.16: The graph should be **updated**.

112. Page 32, 2.6.17: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘The Musings on Iraq blog collated the following figures for security incidents in Baghdad, based on media reports:’.

113. Page 32, 2.6.17: This table should be **updated** to mid-October 2015.

114. Page 32, 2.6.18: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘For information on trends in violence in 2014-2015 see Musings on Iraq, ‘2014: Deadliest Year in Iraq Since Civil War Period’, 6 January 2015; ⁶⁰ and ‘Iraq Forces Make Major Advances In Baiji Area’, 20 October 2015.⁶¹’.

115. Page 32, footnotes: footnotes 60 and 61 **should be:**

⁶⁰ ‘2014: Deadliest Year in Iraq Since Civil War Period’, 6 January 2015
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.fr/2015/01/2014-deadliest-year-in-iraq-since-civil_6.html
Accessed 23 October 2015.

⁶¹ ‘Iraq Forces Make Major Advances In Baiji Area’, 20 October 2015.
<http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/iraq-forces-make-major-advances-in.html>
Accessed 23 October 2015.

Security incidents in Baghdad

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) related attacks

116. Page 33, 2.6.19: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘Baghdad remained a centre of frequent mass casualty attacks, predominantly, although not exclusive in Shia neighbourhoods.⁶³ The blogger Joel Wing has observed that Baghdad has always been a target for insurgents intent on stoking sectarian tensions and undermining the government. ⁶⁴’.

117. Page 33, 2.6.20: **Rephrase thus:** ‘ISIL was responsible for repeated attacks deliberately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. On 25 August 2014, for example, IS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing on a Shia mosque in New Baghdad, reportedly in retaliation for an attack on Sunni worshippers in Diyala province a few days before.⁶⁵ On 18 July 2015 IS claimed responsibility for a car bombing in the mainly Shia town of Khan Bani Saad, north of Baghdad that killed 120 people and injured at least 130 at a busy market.⁶⁶ On 14 August 2015 an IS truck bomb killed at least 67 people at the Jameela market in the predominantly Shia district of Sadr City.⁶⁷ On 18 September 2015 IS perpetrated two suicide bombings in Baghdad markets, killing at least 23 people and wounded more than 60.⁶⁸’.

118. Page 33, 2.6.21: If acronyms are going to be used, they must be explained. After ‘SVBIED’ **should come, in square brackets,** ‘suicide car bombs’.

119. Page 33, 2.6.21: **Re-phrase the Musings on Iraq material, thus:** ‘Musings on Iraq data for 2014 showed a marked decline in car bomb attacks, from an average of 91.6 per month in January-May to 53.1 per month in June-December. The blog suggested that this might indicate that IS’s capacity to launch such attacks had been diminished. 68 The decline did not continue into 2015, however, and on 20 October 2015 the blog reported: “Finally, IS continued with its car bomb campaign, which began in July. During the second week of October there were a total of 51 VBIEDs [Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices] compared to 18 the week before. Of those 51, only 6 hit their targets, while the other 45 were destroyed... These attacks will likely remain at this pace for the next several months”69’.

120. Page 33, 2.6.22: footnotes: **delete** existing footnotes 62 and 65. They are now redundant. Renumber subsequent footnotes. Link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

121. Page 33, footnotes: **new footnote 66:**

66 ‘Iraq violence: Car bomb kills scores in mainly Shia town’, BBC website.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33577817>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

122. Page 33, footnotes: **new footnote 67:**

67 ‘Iraq truck bomb kills dozens at Baghdad market’, BBC website.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33901796>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

123. Page 33, footnotes: **new footnote 68:**

68 ‘Iraq: Baghdad market bombings kill at least 23’, BBC website.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34277021>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

124. Page 33, footnotes: footnote 67 **should be:**

67 Institute for the Study of War, *ISIS Battle Plan for Baghdad*, 27 June 2014,
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS-not-culminated.pdf>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

125. Page 33, footnotes: **Insert a new footnote 68**, and amend the numbers of all subsequent footnotes accordingly. The new footnote should be:

68 ‘Iraq Forces Make Major Advances In Baiji Area’, 20 October 2015.
<http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/iraq-forces-make-major-advances-in.html>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

126. Page 36, 2.6.26: I would suggest inserting the following **new Paragraph 2.6.27:**

‘UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s *Fourth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2169 (2014)*, dated 13 July 2015, states:

“During the reporting period, Baghdad continued to be afflicted by acts of terrorism, such as targeted killings and kidnappings, sectarian violence and the use of improvised explosive devices against civilians. On 8 May, a car bomb explosion and four improvised explosive devices killed 24 civilians and wounded 67 around Karrada district. Among the casualties were Shi’ite pilgrims preparing for the commemoration of the death of Imam Mousa al-Kazim. On 14 May, riots in the district of Adhamiya resulted in the Sunni Endowment building being set on fire. Resolute action by the Government prevented further escalation. On 28 May, vehicle-borne and suicide bomb attacks on the Sheraton and Babylon Hotels in Karrada killed 12 civilians and wounded 27. The month of May witnessed a total number of five clashes between the Iraqi security forces and ISIL in Baghdad. During the month of June, a total of 11 clashes and nine car bomb explosions were recorded in several areas of the city.”^{xx}

127. Page 36, footnotes: the new footnote ‘xx’ related to my proposed new paragraph **would be:**

^{xx} UN Secretary-General, *Fourth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2169 (2014)*, 13 July 2015.

[http://www.uniraq.org/images/SGReports/N1521149%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.uniraq.org/images/SGReports/N1521149%20(2).pdf)

Accessed 26 October 2015.

Kidnappings, abductions and extra-judicial killings

128. Page 37, 2.6.27: **Correct as follows:** ‘There were cases of abductions, kidnappings and forced evictions in Baghdad carried out by armed groups affiliated to or supportive of government forces, as well as clashes between ISF and non-state armed groups and between Shia armed groups. On 22 July 2014, for example, armed groups driving civilian vehicles without number plates and accompanied by ISF vehicles entered the majority Sunni area of Daria, in south east Baghdad, and threatened the residents, claiming they were affiliated to ISIL. After the incident reportedly 50 families left to relocate to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.’⁷³

129. Page 37, 2.6.27: As a result of the deletion of the first ‘example’ in this section - because it is repeated at 2.6.30 - its **footnote must be deleted** and subsequent footnotes must be renumbered.

130. Page 37, 2.6.29: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘In October 2014 Amnesty International documented the fates of four Sunnis who were abducted and killed, reportedly by Shia militias⁷⁶, and of a further six individuals who were abducted and were still missing.⁷⁷ The same report quoted a member of AAH, on duty at a checkpoint north of Baghdad, as stating: “if we catch ‘those dogs’ [Sunnis] coming down from the Tikrit area we execute them; in those areas they are all working with DA’ESH [IS’s acronym based on its Arabic former name]. They come to Baghdad to commit terrorist crimes. So we have to stop them”.’⁷⁸

131. Page 37, 2.6.30: **after ‘AAH’ insert:** [Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq ; ‘League of the Righteous’]

132. Page 37, 2.6.30: at the end, **there should be a footnote reference**, which will be numbered 78 but will be the same as the existing footnote 73.

133. Page 37, footnotes: **Re-organise footnotes:** delete 73...74 becomes 73 etc. Date of access to all links should be 26 October 2015.

134. Page 38, 2.6.32 - 2.6.33: I would propose **adding a new paragraph** 2.6.33, with more recent material. It might read: ‘*Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015*, published jointly by UNAMI and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and issued in June 2015, recorded:

“Several reports were received concerning the killing and abduction of individuals displaced from Anbar into Baghdad. For instance, on 29 April, Iraqi Police found the remains of two males who died from gunshot wounds: one in Amil, south-western Baghdad, and another in Bayaa, eastern Baghdad. The victims were reported to have been IDPs from Anbar and it was alleged that they had been killed by a Shi’a militia. A source reported to UNAMI/OHCHR that Shi’a militias in Amil threatened Anbar IDPs that they would be killed if they did not leave. Such threats were reportedly not issued to members of the Sunni community normally resident of the area.”^{xx}’.

135. Page 38, footnotes: A **footnote should be included** for the proposed new 2.6.33 (see above), thus:

^{xx} *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015*, UNAMI and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), June 2015.

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_4th_POCReport-11Dec2014-30April2015.pdf

Accessed 26 October 2015.

Babil

Control of territory

136. Page 38, 2.6.34: **Correct, thus:** ‘The Institute for the Study of War’s (ISW’s) ‘Control of Terrain’ report, dated 20 July 2015, showed Babil’s capital, Al-Hillah, to be under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces, but noted that Yusufiyah, in the north of the governorate, was an area that ISW was watching because of a risk of conflict or a change of control.⁸¹’

137. Page 38, 2.6.35: **Update and correct the table as follows:**

Population 1,820,673 (est for 2011) 82 83

Civilians killed 84 85

Iraq Body Count (IBC) reports that between March 2003 and September 2014 7,535 civilians were killed in Babil (or Babylon) governorate - a monthly average of 54.

2012: 28 civilians killed per month (IBC)

2013: 45 civilians killed per month (IBC)

2014 (until September only): 58 civilians killed per month (IBC)

The Musings on Iraq blog reports 1,507 people killed (both civilian and military) in 2014 - an average of 126 per month.

Numbers displaced

As of 29 September 2015 10,195 families internally displaced since the start of 2014 were being hosted in 333 locations in Babil governorate. ⁸⁶

As of the same date, 35,634 people had been displaced from locations in Babil governorate since the start of 2014, the majority of whom had relocated elsewhere in the governorate and to Baghdad and Sulaimaniya. Also as of 29 September 2015, the displaced from Babil accounted for 1 per cent of the Iraqi total of 3.2 million.⁸⁷

138. Pages 39, 2.6.36: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘The following graph, based on Iraq Body Count data, shows fatality trends in Babil between March 2003 and September 2014’.

139. Page 39, footnotes: footnote 81 **should now be:**

81 Institute for the Study of War, ‘Control of Terrain in Iraq’, 20 July 2015.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Control%20Map%202015-7-20.pdf>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

140. Page 39, footnotes: footnote 84 date of access **should be** 26 October 2015.

141. Page 39, footnotes: footnote 85 **should be:**

85 ‘2014: Deadliest Year in Iraq Since Civil War Period’, 6 January 2015

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.fr/2015/01/2014-deadliest-year-in-iraq-since-civil_6.html

Accessed 26 October 2015.

142. Page 39, footnotes: footnotes 86 and 87 **should now be:**

86 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, IDP Crisis - January 2014-29 September 2015.

<http://iomiraq.net/file/2148/download>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

87 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round XXX October 2015.

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20151013_IOM_DTM_RoundXXX_Report_October2015.pdf

Accessed 26 October 2015.

Security incidents

143. Page 40, 2.6.36: **update** the graph.

144. Page 40, 2.6.37: The word ‘of’ is **missing** from ‘significant levels civilian displacement’. The word ‘could’ is missing from ‘indicated it be 8-10 months’.

145. Page 40, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

146. Page 41, 2.6.41: **Re-phrase, adding a report** of a more recent incident, thus: ‘More data on incidents is available on the blog, Musings on Iraq.⁹⁵ On 20 October 2015, for example, the blog stated: “IS operations in Babil have been at a very low level since it lost its base in Jurf al-Sakhr at the end of 2014. During the week however a car bomb went off in Mahmudiya that killed 3 and wounded 17”.⁹⁶’.

147. Page 41, 2.6.42: **Re-do, and add footnote, thus:** ‘

For general background information on Babil see Joint Analysis and Policy Unit, *Babil Governorate Profile*, October 2015.⁹⁷’.

Southern governorates of Basrah, Najaf, Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Missan, Quadisiya and Wassit

Control of territory

148. ‘Quadisiya’ in the sub-heading **should be** ‘Qadisiya’.

149. Page 41, 2.6.43: **correct, thus:** ‘The Institute for the Study of War’s (ISW’s) ‘Control of Terrain’ report, dated 20 July 2015, showed the southern governorates of of Kerbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Basrah, Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadisiya and Wassit to be under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces.⁹⁸’.

150. Page 41, footnotes: footnotes: the following **new footnotes** 96 and 97 are required, and will mean that all subsequent footnotes must be renumbered:

96 ‘Iraq Forces Make Major Advances In Baiji Area’, 20 October 2015.

<http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/iraq-forces-make-major-advances-in.html>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

97 Joint Analysis and Policy Unit, *Babil Governorate Profile*, October 2015.⁹⁷

<http://www.iau-iraq.org/gp/print/GP-Babil.asp>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

151. Page 41, footnotes: **replace** existing footnote 96 with:

98 Institute for the Study of War, ‘Control of Terrain in Iraq’, 20 July 2015.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Control%20Map%202015-7-20.pdf>

Accessed 26 October 2015.

Fatality trends

152. Page 41, 2.6.44: the table starting on page 41 and going over to page 42 **should be updated thus:**

Population 6,719,414 ^{99 100}

Civilians killed ^{101 102}

Iraq Body Count (IBC) reports that between March 2003 and September 2014 13,887 civilians were killed in the eight above referenced southern governorates - a monthly average of 100.

Muthanna and Missan recorded the lowest fatality rates between 2003 and 2014, with an average of 2 and 3 persons killed per month, respectively. At the other extreme were Basra with an average of 35 civilians killed per month, followed by Wassit, with 17. (IBC)

2012: 29 civilians killed per month (IBC)

2013: 30 civilians killed per month (IBC)

2014 (until September only): 18 civilians killed per month (IBC)

The Musings on Iraq blog reports 427 people (both civilian and military) killed in 2014 in the eight southern governorates - an average of 36 per month.

Numbers displaced

As of 29 September 2015 39,889 families, comprising 228,486 persons, displaced since the start of 2014 were being hosted in 1,176 locations in the eight southern governorates. ¹⁰³

IOM's 'Data Tracking Matrix' did not show data for IDPs displaced from the southern governorates of Kerbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Basrah, Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadissiya and Wassit. ¹⁰⁴

153. Page 41, footnotes: footnotes 97 and 98 **become** 99 and 100.

154. Page 42, 2.6.45: **Re-phrase, thus:** 'The following graph, based on Iraq Body Count data, shows fatalities in the governorates of Kerbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Basrah, Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadissiya and Wassit between March 2003 and September 2014. Again, decision makers should be aware of the differences in data recording between sources:'

155. Page 42, footnotes: 99 and 100 **become** 101 and 102, thus:

¹⁰¹ Iraq Body Count database
<https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>
Accessed 26 October 2015.

¹⁰² '2014: Deadliest Year in Iraq Since Civil War Period', 6 January 2015
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.fr/2015/01/2014-deadliest-year-in-iraq-since-civil_6.html
Accessed 26 October 2015.

156. Page 42, footnote 101 **is deleted**.

157. Page 42, footnotes: footnotes 103 and 104 **become:**

103 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, IDP Crisis - January 2014-29 September 2015.

<http://iomiraq.net/file/2148/download>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

104 International Organisation for Migration, 'Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round XXX October 2015'.

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20151013_IOM_DTM_RoundXXX_Report_October2015.pdf

Accessed 26 October 2015.

158. Page 43, 2.6.46: **Re-phrase thus:** 'The following graph shows fatalities in the governorates of Kerbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Basrah, Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadissiya and Wassit during 2014, based on data recorded by Joel Wing on his Musings on Iraq blog. Decision makers should be aware that the blog's data definitions differ from those of other sources such as Iraq Body Count.'

159. Page 43, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 26 October 2015.

Security incidents

160. Page 44, 2.6.47: **Rephrase, thus:** 'Civilian casualty figures from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) focus on governorates significantly affected by violence - mainly those in contested areas of northern and central Iraq, including Baghdad.10'.

161. Page 44, 2.6.48: **Rephrase thus:** 'In early July 2014 up to 45 people were killed in Kerbala in clashes between state security forces and followers of anti-government Shia cleric Mahmoud al-Sarkhi. The violence was sparked by his arrest days after he published a letter criticising [Grand Ayatollah] Sistani's decree for Iraqis to fight alongside the ISF against Sunni insurgents.108 The Musings on Iraq blog said that the violence also affected Qadissiya governorate and that at least 160 of Al-Sarkhis's fighters had been killed or wounded.109'

162. Page 44, 2.6.49: 'The OHCHR/UNAMI, 'Report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in Iraq: 6 July to 10 September 2014'. **Should be:** 'The OHCHR/UNAMI, *Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July to 10 September 2014*'.

163. Page 44, footnotes: all footnotes **should be** standardised, and the date of access to all links **should be** 27 October 2015.

164. Page 44, footnotes: footnote 109 is incomplete. **It should be:**

109 July 2014 Over 5,000 Casualties In Iraq', *Musings on Iraq*, 1 August 2014.

<http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.fr/2014/08/july-2014-over-5000-casualties-in-iraq.html>

Accessed 27 October 2015.

165. Page 45, footnotes: all footnotes **should be** standardised, and the date of access to all links **should be** 27 October 2015.

166. Page 46, 2.6.53: **Re-phrase thus:** ‘According to Joel Wing’s blog, ‘Musings on Iraq’, in 2014 Basra suffered 119 violent attacks, ranking sixth amongst Iraq’s governorates in terms of the number of attacks. The blog noted that whilst ISIL launched some car bomb attacks in the governorate, there was much other violence perpetrated by gangs and militias.’¹¹⁶

167. Page 165, new 2.6.54 and 2.6.55: I would **propose inserting** two new paragraphs with extracts from the UNAMI/OHCHR’s *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015*, published in June 2015. The new paragraphs would read:

‘UNAMI/OHCHR’s *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015* stated:

“In Basra, on 3 February, unidentified gunmen killed a 30-year old woman in al-Nasir village in al Dear district, north of Basra. The victim was shot in the back three times and died in front of her house. The attack was reportedly an honour killing. And on 17 April, in al-Sankar village of Abu alKhaseeb district, a Sunni sheikh from al-Ghanim tribe was shot dead in front of his house. The sheikh was a prominent community member and had reportedly served in the intelligence services during the Saddam Hussein regime”^{xx}

and:

‘The same UNAMI/OHCHR report noted:

“IED attacks also caused death and injury across other parts of Iraq. In Basra, on 18 March, a trailer laden with explosives was reportedly detonated at al-Taheer gate outside the Um Qasr Port, southwest Basra, killing five civilians and wounding several others. Civilian property was also damaged, including nearby trucks.”^{xx}

Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Erbil, Dahuk and Sulamaniyah governorates

Control of territory

168. Page 46, sub-heading: ‘Sulaimaniya’ is a more usual **transliteration** of this name.

169. Page 46, 2.6.54: **Rephrase and correct, thus:** ‘The Institute for the Study of War’s (ISW’s) ‘Control of Terrain’ report, dated 20 July 2015, showed Erbil to be under the control of Kurdish peshmerga forces.¹¹⁷ None of the three Kurdish-controlled governorates was listed as being an area of potential conflict. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s website affirmed that the KRI comprised parts of the governorates of Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dahuk.¹¹⁸

170. Page 46, 2.6.55: the table starting on page 46 and going over to page 47 **should be updated thus:**

Population 2,861,701 ⁹⁹ 100

Civilians killed ¹⁰¹ 102

Iraq Body Count (IBC) reports that between March 2003 and September 2014 731 civilians were killed in the KRI (Erbil, Sulaymaniya and Dahuk governorates) - a monthly average of 5.

2012: 5 civilians killed per month (IBC)

2013: 3 civilians killed per month (IBC)

2014 (until September only): 2 civilians killed per month (IBC)

The Musings on Iraq blog reports 10 people (both civilian and military) killed in Erbil in 2014 - an average of 0.8 per month. It did not provide data for the other two Kurdish governorates.

Numbers displaced

As of 29 September 2015 145,000 families, comprising 873,000 persons, who had been displaced since the start of 2014 were being hosted in 479 locations in the three Kurdish governorates. ¹²³

40,038 people had been displaced from Erbil, almost all of whom had relocated elsewhere in the governorate. IOM's 'Data Tracking Matrix' did not show data for IDPs displaced from Sulaimaniya or Dahuk governorates. ¹²⁴

171. Page 46, footnotes: new footnotes should be inserted as follows for the suggested two new paragraphs new 2.6.54 and 2.6.55, as follows:

^{xx} UNAMI/OHCHR, *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015*, June 2015.

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_4th_POCReport-11Dec2014-30April2015.pdf

Accessed 27 October 2015.

172. Page 46, footnotes: **replace existing footnote 117 with:**

¹¹⁷ Institute for the Study of War, 'Control of Terrain in Iraq', 20 July 2015.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Control%20Map%202015-7-20.pdf>

Accessed 27 October 2015.

173. Page 47, 2.6.56: **Re-phrase thus:** 'The following graph shows fatalities in the KRI (governorates of Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dahuk) between March 2003 and September 2014:'.

174. Page 47, footnotes: footnote 121 **becomes:**

¹²¹ Iraq Body Count database

<https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>

Accessed 27 October 2015.

175. Page 47, footnotes: **delete footnotes** 122 and 123. They are irrelevant, as UNAMI data does not feature in the table. Re-number footnotes accordingly.

176. Page 47, footnotes: new footnote 122 **should be:**

122 '2014: Deadliest Year in Iraq Since Civil War Period', 6 January 2015

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.fr/2015/01/2014-deadliest-year-in-iraq-since-civil_6.html

Accessed 27 October 2015.

177. Page 47, footnotes: footnotes 124 and 125 **become:**

123 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, IDP Crisis - January 2014-29 September 2015.

<http://iomiraq.net/file/2148/download>

Accessed 23 October 2015.

124 International Organisation for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round XXX October 2015.

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20151013_IOM_DTM_RoundXXX_Report_October2015.pdf

Accessed 26 October 2015.

178. Page 47, footnotes: link access dates for all **should be** 27 October 2015.

179. Page 48: **update** the graph.

Security incidents

180. Page 48, footnotes: link access dates for all **should be** 27 October 2015.

181. Page 49, 2.6.59: no need to repeat the date of the attack in the body of the text.

Should be: '...same day that the influx...'

182. Page 49, 2.6.60: **amend thus:** 'ISIL threatened KRI territory into mid-2014. In August 2014 ISIL advanced north into the Ninewa Plains and Shirkhan District, as far as Makhmour on the southern edge of Erbil governorate.¹³⁵ By year's end, however, Kurdish forces had driven them back from northern Ninewa into Sinjar and clearing the north east of Diyala province, in the Jalawla and Sadiya areas.¹³⁶ The latest Institute for the Study of War (ISW) 'Control of Terrain' map shows Bashiqa, Qaraqoush, Tilkif and Wana in Ninewa governorate as contested areas.¹³⁷'

183. Page 49, 2.6.60: **Insert a new paragraph** 2.6.61 with updated information, thus:

'In June 2015 UNAMI/OHCHR's *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015* reported:

“On 17 April [2015], a vehicle laden with explosives was detonated in front of the United States Consulate in Erbil, Erbil governorate. Two civilians sitting in a café opposite the site of the detonation were killed and eight more were wounded. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack on social media’.xx’.

184. Page 49, 2.6.61: **insert** a new paragraph 2.6.61 with recent information, thus:

‘On 12 October 2015 *Iraq Oil Report* reported that at least six people had been shot dead by security forces in Sulaimaniya governorate during protests over economic and political grievances. The journal stated:

“Protests around Sulaimaniya erupted into violence over the weekend, resulting in at least six deaths and fueling an escalation of the political conflict surrounding Massoud Barzani's claim to continue functioning as president.

“Unarmed but violent protesters attacked around a dozen offices of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), setting fire to at least six of them. In many cases, guards shot at protesters; at least five protesters were killed and more than 30 injured; one guard was killed and several more were injured.

“The incidents prompted the KDP - led by Barzani, who has continued acting as president amidst a political stalemate, after the Aug. 19 expiration of his term - to unilaterally expel the Gorran party from a nominal unity government, deepening a political crisis that now threatens to tear open old wounds that once divided eastern and western Kurdistan into warring cantons.

“Protests and strikes have gradually spread across Sulaimaniya province over delays to salary payments for government workers. Demonstrators have also complained more generally about the failure of government leaders to resolve a political crisis resulting from Barzani’s decision to remain in office”.xx’.

184. Page 49, 2.6.61: The profile dates for Erbil and Sulaimaniya **should be revised** to ‘May 2015’; and that for Dahuk to ‘April 2015’. Appropriate footnotes xx and xx **should be added**.

185. Page 49, footnotes: link access dates for all footnotes **should be** 27 October 2015.

186. Page 49, footnotes: footnote 137 **should be**:

137 Institute of the Study of War, Control of Terrain in Iraq,
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014-09-17%20Control%20Zone%20Map.pdf>
accessed 27 October 2015

187. Page 49, footnotes: **insert a footnote** relating to the proposed new paragraph 2.6.61 (see above), as follows:

xx ‘Violent protests threaten Kurdistan’s stability’, *Iraq Oil Report*, 12 October 2015.
<http://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/violent-protests-threaten-kurdistans-stability-16706/>
Accessed 27 October 2015.

188. Page 49, footnotes: **insert a footnote** relating to the proposed new paragraph 2.6.60 (see above), as follows:

xx UNAMI/OHCHR, *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 to 30 April 2015*, June 2015.

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_4th_POCTReport-11Dec2014-30April2015.pdf

Accessed 27 October 2015.

189. Page 49, footnotes: **insert a footnote** relating to 2.6.61 (see above), as follows:

xx International Organisation for Migration, *Erbil Governorate Profile, May 2015*.

<http://iomiraq.net/reports/erbil-governorate-profile-may-2015>

Accessed 27 October 2015.

xx International Organisation for Migration, *Dahuk Governorate Profile, April 2015*.

<http://iomiraq.net/reports/dahuk-governorate-profile-april-2015-0>

Accessed 27 October 2015.

xx International Organisation for Migration, *Sulaymaniya Governorate Profile, May 2015*.

<http://iomiraq.net/reports/sulaymaniyah-governorate-profile-may-2015>

Accessed 27 October 2015.