We need a strategy to handle the Review and to handle what next. Our aim should be to get the Kosovans to the point where the Review can legitimately be described as positive. But this may not be possible. In that event, we will need contingency planning to cope with disruption, including violence, arising from frustrated hopes: NATO and the UN will need to do this.

If the Review is positive, then as indicated by the UN Security Council last December, it will allow us to initiate the process that leads to final settlement. How fast we move at this point will depend on just how much progress was made on the minimum standards, and on the overall level of commitment of the leadership in Kosovo. It would be sensible to deal with this incrementally – appointing a high level envoy say to prepare the ground for status talks with both sides (this should be a formal role – unlike the shuttle diplomat – but should not be the SRSG). Kai Eide would be a good choice for this role). The preparations could include elaborating a set of guiding principles, akin to the Venice declaration of 1980, or some other guidance set down by the Security Council. A timetable for settlement talks to begin should be elaborated contingent on further progress on the minimum standards.

In parallel with the minimum standards we also need to develop the role of the KPC and security sector reform, recognising that the KPC will have some role in indigenous security and law and order capacity (though possibly desegregated into different agencies, with provisions for minority representation). We should be mindful however of the leverage the future of the KPC offers.

We need to consider the public message to the Kosovans on status. We should make clear that the logical destination of Kosovo is independence, within the context of Europe and with proper protection for minorities. The timetable for independence would be dictated by implementation of the key standards. The international community would devise a strategy to move Kosovo along that path but it would be clearly on the basis of the minimum standards being fully achieved, hence conditionality would be maintained. Once independence had been established, there would be a likely need for the first few years for international civilian and military presences to oversee implementation of a peace settlement and provide regional and minority reassurance. A complementary strategy to move a constructive Belgrade closer to Europe would also be needed in parallel.

The timing of such a message on status deserves further consideration. There is a case for making this clear at the time the minimum standards are elaborated, as an incentive to implement them. (This might also be useful in the context of the October elections)... Another point would be at the time of the Review itself. The key will be to keep

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1 At the point at which a high level envoy was appointed, the need for private diplomacy would have fallen away; so rather than a plethora of senior figures, we'd envisage only one at any given time, in addition to the SRSG).