Joint Doctrine Publication 05
Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution

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Director Concepts and Doctrine

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Abstract

Purpose

1. The purpose of Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 05, *Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution* is to provide context and guidance on how, and why, the military instrument of power can be used in support of national strategies for addressing instability, crisis and conflict overseas.

Context

2. JDP 05 outlines how the UK seeks to help shape a more stable world as part of our national strategy and examines the military role within this. This publication recognises the deliberate shift away from recent campaigns towards a more forward leaning and engaging approach. The need for cross-government cooperation and understanding as part of an integrated approach is fundamental.

Scope

3. JDP 05 seeks to bridge the gap between JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* and the new *UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation*. The primary focus of JDP 05 remains stabilisation (responding to situations of conflict and instability). However, this publication also considers the wider subject of stability.

4. In producing JDP 05, we consulted with a variety of stakeholders including: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the Department for International Development; the Ministry of Defence; and the Stabilisation Unit. Additionally, we received advice and input from a range of sources both inside and outside the military. However, it is important to understand that this is principally a military publication intended for a military audience. JDP 05 is both consistent and coherent with the position of other stakeholders and, in particular, with *The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation* produced by the Stabilisation Unit.

5. JDP 05 has been developed concurrently with several new doctrinal and other, related publications. In order to allow for a coherent transition, JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* will be retained within the current doctrinal architecture for a further 24 months as a subordinate (supporting) publication to JDP 05. This will ensure that valuable knowledge remains accessible to the user community during this transition. In 2018, JDP 05 will be reviewed, consolidated and merged with JDP 3-40 together with a number of related Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs).

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Audience

6. The primary audience for JDP 05 is military commanders and their respective staffs who are (or will become) involved in military operations that contribute to stability through the mechanism of stabilisation operations. The secondary audience is members of other government departments, related non-governmental organisations and the private sector, whom the military are likely to work with as part of an integrated approach.

Structure

7. JDP 05 consists of four chapters.

a. Chapter 1 – Context introduces stability and stabilisation including the related national strategies. This chapter also provides definitions and linkages to related doctrine (both national and NATO). Chapter 1 introduces the UK approach to stabilisation and the associated principles.

b. Chapter 2 – Understanding stability and instability examines the topics of stability/instability to provide a contextual basis for better understanding the challenges for any military contribution. There is also an examination of the causes of violent conflict and how these can be mitigated or negated. The nature of this subject matter lends itself to a more academic style of prose and, consequently, Chapter 2 has been written in a way that does not conform to doctrinal norms. This is deliberate and provides the necessary background to help the reader relate to the rest of the publication.

c. Chapter 3 – Ends, ways and means focuses on the key policies and strategies related to stabilisation and considers how they can be delivered by the military as part of an integrated approach. This chapter considers the main instruments of national power, some of the key organisations involved with stabilisation and how stabilisation activities are resourced.

d. Chapter 4 – The military contribution focuses on the military contribution to help shape a stable world. The chapter covers generic military activities (including influence) before looking in turn at the three main components of the new stabilisation approach (protect, promote and prepare).

Linkages

8. JDP 05 is a thematic keystone doctrine publication that sits below JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine and alongside JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine. There are also
links to a number of other national and NATO doctrine publications and these are
explained in Chapter 1.

9. DCDC welcomes your feedback on this publication or any of our other
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Contents

Abstract ......................................................... iii

Chapter 1 – Context ............................................ 1

Chapter 2 – Understanding stability and instability ............. 31

Chapter 3 – Ends, ways and means ............................. 55

Chapter 4 – The military contribution ........................... 81

Annex A – Defence Engagement inputs/activities categorisation . . 123

Annex B – The UK’s principles for stabilisation operations and programmes ......................... 127

Lexicon .......................................................... 129
Chapter 1 introduces stability and stabilisation including the related national strategies. This chapter also provides definitions and linkages to related doctrine (both national and NATO). Finally, this chapter introduces the UK approach to stabilisation and the associated principles.

Section 1 – Introduction ................. 3
Section 2 – Strategies related to stability .... 5
Section 3 – Defence doctrinal structure
    for stabilisation ..................... 13
Section 4 – Definitions and descriptions .... 16
Section 5 – The principles of stabilisation. .... 26
The prudent use of military force has been a central contributor to the peace in Europe for seventy years, both in a deterrent capacity and playing a constructive role in countries from Bosnia to Mali. The UK can contribute significantly to restoring stability.

House of Commons Defence Committee Tenth Report of Session 17 March 2015

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War
Chapter 1 – Context

‘Our vision is for a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence. Everything we do in the UK and around the world is driven by our determination to protect our people and our values, and ensure that our country prospers.’

The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

Section 1 – Introduction

The importance of global stability to the UK

1.1. The UK’s ambition to contribute to a more stable world is articulated in a number of policies and strategies including:

- The National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015;¹
- the tri-departmental Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS);² and
- the Government’s International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES).³

The UK’s primary national interests are listed within the NSS as:

- security;
- prosperity; and
- freedom.

1.2. These interests are interconnected and mutually supportive. Security, prosperity and freedom form a virtuous circle – without security and the ability of UK citizens to live their lives freely, the foundations of prosperity and freedom would be undermined. While the ability for the UK to engage across the world brings opportunities, it also makes the country potentially vulnerable to overseas

³ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-defence-engagement-strategy
events. This could include distant conflicts that threaten to disrupt the UK’s trade and investment opportunities. The national interest is best served by: a secure and resilient UK; and helping to shape a stable world.

1.3. Balancing the nation’s security risks and its values presents a constant challenge for our Government as it decides how, when and where to tackle instability at source. These competing interests are not mutually exclusive, however, there may be instances where one outweighs the other. Protecting the UK’s security may sometimes necessitate working with countries who do not share the same values and standards.

1.4. Any UK response will usually be part of a wider international effort intended to shape the global environment and address both potential and actual threats at source. Our Government recognises that this approach will require a variety of different actions as part of an integrated response to restore, develop or sustain stability. For Defence, this can be a combination of routine and responsive Defence activities. Consequently, the UK must be able to respond to instability across the full range of potential intervention scenarios ranging from early conflict prevention through to post-conflict stabilisation and subsequent activities. Critical to this is an understanding from the outset that stabilisation is inherently a political process. The military will often have a significant contribution to make, but this will almost always be in a supporting or enabling capacity.

1.5. In a globalised, competitive world, states will legitimately set out to secure their own national security and achieve influence. Our national strategy will be contested across the diplomatic, economic, military and informational contexts. Therefore, formulating and executing national strategy (and thus, military strategy) is both dynamic and iterative. This demands that we are inherently flexible – ready to react, both conceptually and physically, to change.

1.6. One of the key UK policy priorities is to prevent conflict or other crises from developing. A crisis ordinarily marks the point beyond which the state’s ability to control and improve a situation is compromised. The term crisis is also used to indicate a period of extreme instability. Effective crisis management comprises:

- horizon scanning to help anticipate potential crises;
- the process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict;
- planning for possible escalation; and
- addressing the underlying causes.
1.7. This does not imply that all crises can be managed. Their characteristics are likely to change, not least in response to any military or other intervention, and not always in the ways envisaged. The costs to the international community of managing violent conflict, together with the related effects and consequences, are extremely high. BSOS identifies that it is more cost-effective to invest in conflict prevention and de-escalation than to pay the costs of responding to violent conflict once it occurs.

Section 2 – Strategies related to stability

1.8. Our capstone Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* explains national, defence and military strategy. National strategy ‘coordinates the instruments of national power in pursuit of national policy aims to secure our interests’. The UK’s national strategy is the responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, with advice from the National Security Council (NSC). The Government’s political intentions may be articulated as a national strategic aim, or end-state, and will be supported by strategic objectives.

**National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review**

1.9. Our Government has committed to producing a new NSS and SDSR every five years. Previously, these had been produced as separate (but related) documents but in 2015 these were amalgamated into a single publication. Informed by the Global Strategic Trends (GST) programme and Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/14, *Defence Joint Operating Concept*, the NSS is founded on an analysis of the strategic global context, along with an assessment of the UK’s place in the world. Based on a strategic security risk analysis, the NSS describes the strategic posture we should adopt and sets out three core National Security Objectives (NSOs).

a. **National Security Objective 1 is to protect our people** – at home, in our Overseas Territories and abroad, and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life.

b. **National Security Objective 2 is to project our global influence** – reducing the likelihood of threats materialising and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners.

c. **National Security Objective 3 is to promote our prosperity** – seizing opportunities, harnessing innovation to strengthen our national security, and working with industry to ensure we have the capabilities and equipment that
we need. Our economic and national securities go hand-in-hand. Our strong economy provides the foundation to invest in our security and global influence, which in turn provides more opportunities at home and overseas for us to increase our prosperity. A growing global economy helps to reduce poverty and build security for all.

Challenges and risks

1.10. The NSS identifies and explores four particular challenges that are likely to drive the UK’s security priorities for the coming decade.

   a. The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability.

   b. The resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition.

   c. The impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and wider technological developments.

   d. The erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats.

1.11. The NSS is informed by the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) which seeks to categorise the domestic and overseas risks faced by the UK into three tiers. The most significant (Tier One) risks over the next five years are judged to be the following.

   a. **Terrorism.** This will remain the most direct and immediate threat to our domestic security and overseas interests. Daesh, Al Qa’ida and affiliates remain committed to attacking UK and Western targets.

   b. **Cyber.** The cyber threats to the UK are significant and varied. They include cyber terrorism, fraud and serious and organised crime, espionage and disruption of critical national infrastructure as it becomes more networked and dependent on technology, including networks and data held overseas. Cyber risks underpin many of the other risks we face.

   c. **International military conflict.** The risk is growing. Although it is unlikely that there will be a direct military threat to the UK itself, there is a greater possibility of international military crises drawing in the UK, including through our treaty obligations. Our ability to respond effectively will be made harder
by the growing use of asymmetric and hybrid tactics by states, combining economic coercion, disinformation, proxies, terrorism and criminal activity, blurring the boundaries between civil disorder and military conflict.

d. **Instability overseas.** Since 2010, instability has spread significantly, especially in our extended neighbourhood, to the south in the Middle East and northern Africa and to the east in Ukraine.

e. **Public health.** Disease, particularly pandemic influenza, emerging infectious diseases and growing antimicrobial resistance, threatens lives and causes disruption to public services and the economy. The UK’s vulnerability is increased by our large population and open society.

f. **Major natural hazards.** Events such as severe weather and major flooding can cost lives, cause disruption to critical national infrastructure and provision of essential services, and have a significant economic cost.

1.12. The NSS also identifies the following continuing risks:

- civil emergencies;
- major natural disasters;
- energy security;
- the global economy; and
- climate change and resource scarcity.

1.13. The 2015 SDSR sets the Armed Forces eight missions in support of the NSS. Routinely the Armed Forces will be required to do the following.

a. **Defend and contribute to the security and resilience of the UK and Overseas Territories.** This includes deterring attacks; defending our airspace, territorial waters and cyber space; countering terrorism at home and abroad; supporting the UK civil authorities in strengthening resilience; and protecting our people overseas.

b. **Provide the nuclear deterrent.** The UK’s independent nuclear deterrent will remain essential to our security today, and for as long as the global security situation demands. It has existed for over 60 years to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life, helping to guarantee our security, and that of our allies.
c. **Contribute to improved understanding of the world through strategic intelligence and the global defence network.** This includes close and enduring work with our allies and partners during peace and conflict.

d. **Reinforce international security and the collective capacity of our allies, partners and multilateral institutions.** This includes work to help shape the international security environment, and to strengthen the rules-based international order through conflict prevention, capacity building and counter proliferation.

1.14. Our Armed Forces will also contribute to the Government’s response to crises by being prepared to:

- support humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and conduct rescue missions;
- conduct strike operations;
- conduct operations to restore peace and stability; and
- conduct major combat operations if required, including under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5.

**International Defence Engagement Strategy 2013**

1.15. The NSS states that we must use our national capabilities to promote our prosperity, extend our influence in the world and strengthen our security. Defence Engagement is the means by which we use our defence assets and activities, short of combat operations, to achieve influence without using or threatening force. The IDES provides the framework within which Defence can, in partnership with other government departments, set geographical and thematic priorities for Defence Engagement. The UK’s interests will continue to shift geographically, as will our ability to use long-standing relationships and the traditional institutions of global governance.

1.16. There are a number of policy goals for Defence Engagement. The IDES works towards policy end-states through four activities:

- security and non-combat operations;
- Defence diplomacy;
- Defence and security exports; and
- regional stability, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation.

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See Joint Doctrine Note 1/15, *Defence Engagement.*
1.17. The IDES has been developed, in conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), to bring together all the levers available to Defence to deliver the relevant NSS objectives including:

- treaties and alliances;
- senior-level visits;
- the Defence Attaché network;
- capacity building;
- civilian Defence advisers;
- loan-service personnel;
- overseas exchange and liaison officers;
- overseas training advisers;
- security sector reform;
- International Defence Training;
- conventional deterrence and reassurance;
- overseas joint exercises;
- ship, unit and aircraft visits; and
- Defence sales and Defence industry cooperation.

More detail can be found in the Defence Engagement taxonomy at Annex A.

**Building Stability Overseas Strategy**

1.18. BSOS is an integrated strategy for conflict prevention, which sets the strategic framework for the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). BSOS outlines the three main, mutually-supporting, pillars of the Government’s stability strategy as being: **early warning; rapid crisis prevention and response;** and **upstream conflict prevention.**

a. **Early warning.** The early warning system takes a global view of countries in which political, economic and security shocks over the next 12 months could trigger violence. This is underpinned by all-source analysis from the Cabinet Office, FCO, Department for International Development (DFID), MOD and external experts, and is summarised annually. Drawing on the annual review of the Countries at Risk of Instability report, an internal ‘watch list’ of fragile countries is produced, in which our Government assesses the risk of conflict and insecurity through analysing that state’s resilience to a shock event, particularly where the UK has interests at stake.

b. **Rapid crisis prevention and response.** The funding mechanisms to support an agile response will be delivered through the Conflict, Stability and Security...
Fund. Rapid crisis prevention and responses may include the expeditionary diplomacy, stabilisation response teams and humanitarian action. These are likely to be the focus for military activity.\(^8\)

1. **Expeditionary diplomacy.** Rapid diplomatic efforts to build consensus for action to prevent conflict or to de-escalate crises are critical. British expeditionary diplomacy has played a central role in responding to crises and shaping their future development. However, cognisant of the effectiveness of a collective international approach in tackling crises, the UK will continue to build coalitions with allies and international organisations including the United Nations (UN), NATO and the European Union (EU).

2. **Humanitarian action.** When crises create a humanitarian emergency, humanitarian action is a crucial part of the UK’s response. The humanitarian space needs to be protected and expanded, including in fragile and conflict-affected states. Humanitarian access is fundamental to ensure that those affected by disasters are protected and assisted. This area is a primary focus for DFID.\(^9\)

c. **Upstream conflict prevention.** Work to prevent conflict is most likely to succeed when it aligns diplomatic efforts with development programmes and Defence Engagement as part of a shared and integrated strategy. Homeland peace and stability within the UK is the result of the combined work of diplomats building influence, a strong economy and using our Armed Forces in deterring and, where necessary, overcoming threats. Deterrence and coercion are crucial parts of the UK’s military strategy and are described in more detail in JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*.

1.19. Support to building legitimate governmental institutions in fragile states is a key priority for our Government and the wider international community. The Government’s support to fragile and post-conflict countries may include:

- building civilian leadership capacity;
- developing policy and strategic planning;
- human resources; and
- public communications.

The Government is also increasingly required to provide governance expertise (including advice on anti-corruption and transparency through the Building Integrity UK Programme) to help build stability overseas.

\(^8\) As articulated in Chapter 4.

\(^9\) Further detail on the military involvement in humanitarian action can be found in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Support to Peace Support*. 
Countries at Risk of Instability report

1.20. The Countries at Risk of Instability (CRI) report is an analytical risk product for policy-makers that can be used to inform decisions around resources and priorities. CRI is a Cabinet Office-led cross-government assessment of the risks of instability in fragile states. Initial assessments are moderated by Departmental geographic sections. The process is run annually to provide a one-year and five-year risk assessment by subject matter experts from the Cabinet Office, FCO, MOD, DFID, security and intelligence agencies, Home Office and National Crime Agency. The risk assessment of instability in overseas countries is based on a statistical model which examines the strength of a country’s formal economic, political and social structures (its resilience), and the demands for change to these structures (pressure). This is designed to provide policy-makers with a broad measure of risk that is agreed by all government departments and approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The CRI is a vital part of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund prioritisation process. The criteria considered and frequency of assessment makes this a powerful tool for highlighting trends and comparisons between countries.

1.21. The CRI has been an influential tool in National Security Council (NSC) discussions, in particular around prioritisation. However, the timings of the CRI fall short of Whitehall’s increasing need to respond to emerging risks and crises. Consequently, some new products have been developed to be more responsive, within shorter time-scales. They have been designed in consultation with departments across Whitehall, including DFID, and tested with some of the NSC Regional Boards.
New cross-Whitehall early warning products

1.22. The Joint Intelligence Organisation in the Cabinet Office have launched a new set of early warning products for use across Whitehall to provide more regular tracking and monitoring of instability. These products are designed to complement the annual Countries at Risk of Instability report, and are intended to link in with the NSC and NSC Regional Boards. There are two new products.

a. **Quarterly CRI tracker** – the quarterly CRI tracker provides detailed trend assessments on 50 countries deemed a priority by NSC Strategy Boards. It draws on CRI annual assessment and integrates with other periodic warning assessments from across government and open source. It focuses on the risks to stability from a range of political, economic, social and international drivers. The assessment goes to NSC Regional Boards’ quarterly meetings and the NSC (Officials) group.

b. **Instability alerts** – these alerts are intended to be fast turn-around assessments that respond to ground swells of instability risk that are not captured as part of the quarterly CRI tracker, or annual CRI reports. The alert highlights the most likely trajectory and key factors to monitor more closely.

Cross-Whitehall coordination

1.23. The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Joint Secretariat continue to act as the central coordination function for early warning across Whitehall. It is their responsibility to ensure alerts reach the right board, and to monitor and track any actions that are taken as a result.

The Register of British Interests

1.24. The Register of British Interests is intended to provide a basis for understanding which countries objectively matter most to the UK. It provides an evidence-based starting point, from which policy-makers can make judgements about prioritising and allocating governmental effort and resources. The register does not include any judgements about political interests. Its primary function is to provide a filter for the Countries at Risk of Instability report. The register attempts to recognise the diverse range of UK interests, grouping them into four categories:

- security threats;
- economic and commercial;
- allies and influencers; and
- people and communities.
1.25. Data is collected on a range of measurable factors under each domain. This data allows countries to be given an index score and to be categorised as very high interest, high interest, medium interest, low interest or minimal interest. The register is updated annually by the Early Warning Team within the Cabinet Office.

Section 3 – Defence doctrinal structure for stabilisation

1.26. Figure 1.1 is an extract from the UK Joint Defence Doctrine Architecture. This illustrates where JDP 05 sits within the broader (and related) architecture.

Figure 1.1 – UK doctrine architecture for stabilisation
1.27. **JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine**\(^{10}\) outlines the broad philosophy and principles underpinning the employment of the UK’s Armed Forces. This provides the basis from which all other subordinate national doctrine is derived and describes in detail how operations are directed, mounted, commanded, executed, sustained and recovered.

1.28. **JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine**\(^{11}\) provides a bridge from UK to NATO operational-level doctrine, thereby framing NATO doctrine in a national context to ensure its utility for a UK Joint Force Commander and their staff. JDP 01 does not duplicate existing operational-level doctrine, but signposts the appropriate NATO publication. This publication also fills the gap in those planning and operations doctrine areas which are not fully addressed in existing NATO publications, or where we have a unique and relevant doctrinal or philosophical approach which must be retained. *UK Joint Operations Doctrine* also provides the strategic context for national and coalition operations, explaining:

- how our national military instrument works alongside other levers of national power when pursuing policy objectives;
- our structures and processes for formulating strategy and for crisis management; and
- how to bridge the gap between UK and NATO processes.

1.29. **JDP 05** does not duplicate information that is already contained within the extant national or NATO doctrine. Further information can be obtained, where necessary, from the appropriate JDP or Allied joint publication (AJP).

1.30. **JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution** published in 2009, is almost exclusively focused on stabilisation-based experiences gained in Iraq and Afghanistan. JDP 3-40 will remain part of the doctrinal architecture for the near-term noting that it is subordinate to JDP 05. In the medium-term, it will be removed and any essential detail will be subsumed within a revised JDP 05.

1.31. **Tactical doctrine** – the UK Land tactical-level doctrine is covered in Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 9, *Tactics for Stability Operations*.\(^{12}\) This publication provides guidance for planning and conducting stabilising operations. It is a commander’s guide to the tactics, techniques and procedures used when conducting military operations in support of political stabilisation aims as part of the UK approach.

\(^{10}\) JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine.  
\(^{11}\) JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine.  
\(^{12}\) http://akx.landforces.r.mil.uk/baebb/admin/DocLib%20%20Doctrine/20131024_AFMVol1Pt9StabOps_DLWPubs_P_R.pdf Only available on Dii systems.
1.32. **JDN 1/15, Defence Engagement** sets out the intellectual and policy framework within which the UK conducts Defence Engagement, providing guidance to personnel from MOD Head Office, the Services, Defence Engagement practitioners or the wider Whitehall community. JDN 1/15:

- defines the roles and responsibilities for each level of Defence Engagement planning;

- explains how the priorities are set;

- provides direction to the top-level budget holders; and

- articulates how performance is measured against both Defence and national objectives.

1.33. **The NATO Allied Joint Publication-3.4 series** also includes a number of thematic publications that relate, in varying degrees, to stabilisation and stability. These AJPs are:

- AJP-3.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*;\(^{13}\)
- AJP-3.4.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*;
- AJP-3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*;
- AJP-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance*;
- AJP-3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency*;
- AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction*;
- AJP-3.4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*;
- AJP-3.16, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance*;\(^{14}\) and

1.34. **Other NATO doctrine** contains guidelines on operations and planning. Where necessary, any specific UK national differences are added to the AJP in the appropriate place as text with a green background (known as ‘green pages’).

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\(^{13}\) AJP-3.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* may be removed from the NATO architecture.

\(^{14}\) The doctrine on security force assistance (SFA) is being developed and has not yet been published. It will describe how NATO may assist a host nation in developing a sustainable capability that is able to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability and security. SFA can be delivered during any phase of an operation and across the full range of military operations. SFA actions are conducted with, through, and by local forces to both develop and improve their capacity and capabilities through generate, organize, train, equip, advise and mentor (GOTEAM) activities.
Stability should be viewed as an evolving process that includes short-term, medium-term and long-term objectives.

Section 4 – Definitions and descriptions

Key differences and inconsistencies

1.35. There are a number of known (and accepted) inconsistencies between JDP 05 and other related doctrine. The key inconsistencies are as follows.

   a. **NATO doctrine.** NATO doctrine explicitly links stabilisation with reconstruction which the UK does not.\(^{15}\)

   b. **US doctrine.** The US has historically viewed stabilisation as being a subset of counter-insurgency and their doctrine reflects this.\(^{16}\)

Structural stability

1.36. Structural stability is a long-term goal described in the BSOS as being, ‘political systems which are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all’.\(^{17}\) The BSOS commits the UK to engaging in a variety of activities including:

   • humanitarian action;
   • diplomacy;
   • Defence Engagement; and
   • development and trade.

1.37. Structural stability exists within states that are built with the consent of the population, are resilient and flexible in the face of shocks, and able to evolve. The structural stability sought by the UK reflects a long-term process developed over time, where the degree of stability increases as changes take effect. Stability should be viewed as an evolving process that includes short-term, medium-term and long-term objectives. Focusing on short-term stability objectives that do not contribute to an enduring political strategy is unlikely to succeed in achieving the desired long-term outcome.

\(^{15}\) See AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, for further details.


\(^{17}\) *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, 2011, page 5.
1.38. The UK’s perception of what constitutes stability may not always reflect the views or desires of other actors. Some states or actors achieve stability by suppressing social unrest, restricting human rights and imprisoning political opponents as a way of preserving power. Such approaches are not supported by the UK.

1.39. The extent to which the international community (or the UK) is able to influence other states or actors to engage in political and social change is based on a combination of soft and hard power.\(^\text{18}\) The degree and level of engagement will depend on the national interests of the intervening bodies concerned. Engagement may be more willingly received when a government is faced with crisis and is therefore required to rely on support from external actors. In such cases, the degree of influence or assistance accepted may wane as a crisis is resolved or averted and the situation improves. Maintaining the impetus and consensus among a state’s leadership to pursue long-term stability outcomes is one of the main challenges facing the international community.

1.40. The UK aims to work in partnership with states to develop stability. However, there may be instances when a state’s actions, or inactions, may prompt the international community or a coalition of nations to intervene in the interests of international peace and security. Such interventions may not always be consistent with the wishes of that state. An uninvited response by members of the international community could undermine a state’s sovereignty, or the regional balance of power which could lead to increased instability in the short to medium term. While this may seem counter-intuitive, structural stability remains the longer-term objective.

1.41. In parallel with globalisation, and the international outcry following the atrocities witnessed at the end of the 20th Century in places such as the Balkans and Rwanda, a new international consensus arose placing the individual at the heart of the security debate. This resulted in an evolution of the so-called right of humanitarian intervention to a new concept known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 in 2005, the R2P reaffirms state sovereignty by recognising the state’s primary duty to protect its population from the commission of certain defined atrocities. The R2P then goes further to place a responsibility on the international community to assist individual states to meet their obligations and, in extremis, with the authority of a UN Security Council mandate or the consent of the host nation, to intervene including by the use of military force. Such intervention is considered to constitute the last resort where the host nation proves unwilling or unable to meet its responsibility. Whilst the R2P has been invoked in a number of UN Security Council Resolutions, military action has only been authorised once in respect of the situation in Libya in 2011. Whilst the principles enshrined in the R2P may be seen as universal, action taken in furtherance of them and in particular the

\(^\text{18}\) For more on soft and hard power see JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine.
use of military force has proved controversial. The situation is further complicated as the R2P has proved open to misuse being invoked by some regional powers to claim legitimacy for their interventions into sovereign states, as seen in Russia’s involvement in Ukraine.

Stabilisation

1.42. The term stabilisation has varying meanings and connotations depending on different perspectives within national and international communities. Military and civilian interpretations of the meaning of stabilisation can differ. Where our shared interests and values coincide, we will act with others using NATO doctrine as a common reference. Therefore the definition of stabilisation for all UK military doctrine should be consistent with that used within AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO definition (military)</th>
<th>UK national perspective</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization is an approach used to mitigate crisis and promote legitimate political authority, using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, end social, economic, and political turmoil, and set the conditions for long-term stability.</td>
<td>Stabilisation is one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.</td>
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</table>

1.43. Stabilisation is not an end in itself. To successfully bring about structural stability, stabilisation needs to be applied with other approaches, including longer-term state-building and peace-building as described by DFID. The stabilisation approach is intended to provide sufficient stability to initiate an inclusive political settlement and begin to address the primary drivers of violent conflict. Stabilisation is the first step towards progress on state-building and peace-building in very insecure environments.

1.44. Stabilisation is applied in politically difficult and complex environments in which the state is not necessarily the legitimate political authority. The state may be

19 NATO spells stabilization with a ‘z’, this publication will use the English spelling throughout (except when quoting NATO).
20 AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction*.
21 The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation, 2014.
23 Ibid., page 36.
only one of several groups of actors which uses force. In some cases, the state may be an active cause and driver of the conflict (for example, the recent events in Syria). The political settlement may be contested, or absent altogether. Legitimate political authority cannot be projected effectively in the face of high levels of violence.

1.45. In such situations, there is a strong political imperative to persuade key stakeholders to reduce violence. Identifying which political players are best-placed to provide transitional leadership and authority, albeit with significant external assistance, requires careful political analysis, engagement and understanding. This will be done alongside other government departments as part of the integrated approach.

1.46. External support alone cannot create legitimate political authority. Although such backing can provide initial credibility and legitimacy, it can also damage these, for example, if a domestic political actor is seen to be too close to foreign governments, at the expense of its own citizens. The foundations of an inclusive political settlement must be built from the outset, while continually analysing and responding to changes in the political context.

1.47. Stabilisation is an organising approach rather than a goal and, as such, it sits above, and alongside, a wide variety of other activities and/or operations. The key point is to recognise that other types of military activity may contribute positively or negatively to a stabilisation approach; whether by deliberate design or, in some cases, as an unintended consequence. Stabilisation is inherently messy and complicated and will be affected by a wide range of factors and considerations as illustrated in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2 – The complexity of stabilisation
Building stability

1.48. The UK’s political focus is directed towards building stability as exemplified in the NSS and BSOS. Structural stability is the desired end-state and stabilisation is one of the processes (ways and means) that can help attain the desired end-state. The Defence contribution to stabilisation is foremost an enabling (or supporting) one – noting that in crisis and conflict, security will always be a significant factor. However, security will be less relevant in mitigating other non-violent causes of instability such as natural disasters.

The stabilisation approach

1.49. The UK stabilisation approach has four underlying facets.

a. Any stabilisation action will be planned and implemented with an overtly political objective in mind. Ideally this should be with a means of identifying success and a process of transition to a longer-term approach.

b. The stabilisation approach must be an integrated, civilian-led approach which unifies effort across government. Even when there are military-led and implemented tasks in stabilisation (such as using patrols to bolster local security), they should occur in the context of an operationally civilian-led, politically-engaged stabilisation approach. Civilian actors will lead in other areas of security, as well as justice, governance and development activities – all of which may be applied within the stabilisation approach.

c. The stabilisation approach is both flexible and targeted. This can apply in a state, or part of a state, which is affected by violent political conflict, or a region, that undermines local and/or regional stability. Stabilisation is frequently applied at a sub-national level – for example, in a discrete province or border region. Crucially, local-level stabilisation should be planned and implemented to meet the requirement to promote the wider political settlement without becoming overly focused on tactical gains.
d. Although transitory, stabilisation cannot afford to be short-term in outlook or objectives. It must be planned and implemented with reference to other parallel, or future longer-term engagement. For example, it may be necessary to strike a pact over security arrangements in the short-term, but these should have review mechanisms built into them to ensure that they do not become permanent without wider consultation. Opportunities to build local capacity and promote local ownership during stabilisation interventions can bring clear advantages post-transition and must not be ignored.

1.50. Core components. The UK approach identifies three core components of stabilisation:

- protect political actors, the political system and the population;
- promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes; and
- prepare for longer-term recovery.

Figure 1.3 illustrates the relationship between stability and stabilisation. In particular, this shows how the stabilisation approach is one of the components that may contribute towards stability. Note that the principal military involvement will occur both as part of stabilisation and also within the ‘upstream’ area in the form of Defence Engagement.

Figure 1.3 – Factors contributing to stability
The ability to generate security is a key enabling factor for stabilisation.

1.51. **The core components of stabilisation/the 3Ps framework.** *The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation 2014* outlines three mutually reinforcing components of stabilisation. There are referred to as the ‘3Ps framework’. The framework is used in Chapter 4 to illustrate military involvement in specific areas.

a. **P1 – Protect political actors, the political system and the population.** In fragile and conflict-affected states, as in all states, power is established and protected through force and the threat of force. The UK’s stabilisation approach explicitly enables the deployment of external military force to manage existing violence and deter further outbreaks. This may, or may not, involve UK forces in direct combat activities. More likely, the UK would be playing a supporting role as part of an internationally-mandated force. The ability to generate security is a key enabling factor for stabilisation.

b. **P2 – Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes.** In stabilisation contexts, a political settlement will be lacking, nascent or rudimentary and considerable efforts will be required to foster or develop it. Where a settlement does exist, it will often be inherently fragile and unconsolidated, may have limited endorsement from those on the ground and will often be contested. The political arena is likely to be militarised and characterised by significant fragmentation and factionalisation. Therefore, appreciating how political outcomes will affect security is critical because institutions and communities are likely to be polarised and aligned with armed groups. In such contexts, stabilisation can support interim political arrangements and lay the foundations for a fuller and more enduring political settlement to take shape. If a settlement has already been negotiated, stabilisation can support political processes to consolidate a nascent political settlement.

c. **P3 – Preparing for longer-term recovery.** Stabilisation alone will not be able to foster strong state-society relations or address the underlying causes of conflict as these can only be achieved through longer-term peace-building and state-building. However, from the outset, the stabilisation approach should be based on an understanding of the conflict dynamics and their impacts on the population. The approach should also incorporate planning for transition. Successful recovery will enable broader government engagement in a country by the FCO, MOD and DFID.

1.52. **Shifting emphasis.** Figure 1.4 depicts how the emphasis on protection is a major driver at the beginning of a campaign. However, later (after the environment has stabilised) the overall emphasis has shifted towards preparing mechanisms for the future. This illustrates how protect, promote and prepare are not a linear
development but that they represent a holistic approach to conflict resolution objectives. Adopting this concept in an integrated manner by the whole of government exemplifies how our Government will engage and address issues of upstream conflict prevention, or downstream peace-enforcement, stabilisation, recovery and reconstruction operations.

1.53. **Conflict prevention** involves applying structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra- or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should be structured on early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict.\(^{24}\) When a crisis builds between two or more parties, external diplomatic, economic and military pressure (possibly including military intervention) is brought to bear in an effort to deter or contain conflict. If this pressure succeeds, the crisis will abate and a degree of stability will return. If it fails there may be a full-blown conflict. When the fighting stops – often with a truce leading to a more permanent peace agreement – external military forces may intervene (if they haven’t already) to enforce, and subsequently to keep the peace. The level of any coercion applied by external forces should decline as the situation stabilises until, eventually, the peacekeepers withdraw. The main focus of prevention is, therefore, on developing potent ‘upstream’ diplomatic, economic and military actions to keep the situation below the crisis line. Military action can be seen as following the sequence of ‘shape, deter, coerce and intervene’ as the crisis escalates; in other words, the use of force becomes more overt as the situation worsens.

\(^{24}\) *UN Peacekeeping Operations – principles and guidelines.*
Current government policy is to focus on early engagement to prevent a fragile situation deteriorating into violent conflict. This is, however, the ideal. The reality is that the UK and wider international community are often unable to prevent a country from deteriorating into conflict. Stabilisation is a critical approach for engaging in conflict with the aim of promoting a longer lasting, politically sound outcome which promotes international stability.

Additional definitions and descriptions

1.55. There are a number of other related terms and their definitions/descriptions that should be understood.

a. **Reconstruction.** The NATO definition of reconstruction used within AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stabilization and Reconstruction* is: the process of developing or redeveloping structures that permit sustainable self-government, social and economic development, and security.

b. **The state.** The state is the principal unit for exercising public authority in defined territories in modern times. It is also the central structure in international relations. The state consists of several components.

   (1) Firstly, there are institutions or rules which regulate political, social and economic engagement across a territory and determine how public authority is obtained and used (for example, constitutions, laws, customs). These may be formal or informal.

   (2) Secondly, there are organisations at the national and the sub-national level which operate within those rules (for example, the executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, ministries, military, tax authorities).

c. **Government.** A government refers to the specific administration in power at any one moment (the governing coalition of political leaders), while the state is the basis for a government’s authority, legality, and claim to popular
support. The state provides the structure within which a government can operate.27

d. **Peace-building.** Peace-building aims to establish peace, characterised by social harmony, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. This is supported by political institutions that are able to manage change and resolve disputes, without resorting to violent conflict and avoiding a relapse back into conflict.28

e. **State-building.** State-building is concerned with the state’s capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and with the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations. This is a long-term, historically rooted and internal process, driven by a wide range of local and national actors. In fragile contexts, it often reveals tensions between state and non-state actors, with each wanting to exert influence and establish a dominant position.29

f. **Counter-insurgency.** Counter-insurgency is a comprehensive civilian and military effort made to defeat an insurgency and address any core grievances.30 Further details on counter-insurgency can be found in AJP-3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency*.

1.56. **Key international stakeholders.** Stabilisation operations are usually conducted in complex environments. Within this space, military actors (and their activities) will impact on, and be affected by numerous international actors.

a. In many instances, the multilateral and bilateral actor’s mandates and objectives will overlap, causing duplication. It is paramount that the military commander understands which international organisations are present in theatre, what their mandates are and how best to work with them.

b. Many, if not all, of the following agencies and programmes will be present or have a stake in stabilisation outcomes and effects. These include the: UN; NATO;31 EU; Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; African Union; the World Bank; and a variety of other bilateral diplomatic and development programmes.

c. The UN will have a wide range of operations and agencies present, which may include: a peace support operation; UN High Commissioner for

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.
31 Refer to NATO doctrine – AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. 
Context

Refugees; UN Development Programme; UN Police Component as part of the peace support operation; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; or the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Not all of these will necessarily be subordinated to the peace support operation and many will have separate reporting chains. Particular care and sensitivity will be required when engaging with humanitarian agencies when military actors are pursuing a stabilisation agenda which is overtly political.

d. The EU is likely to also have a range of operations and instruments in theatre, including a Common Security and Defence Policy operation, an EU military mission, a Commission-funded development programme and financial programmes.

e. In the European context, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe may be deployed, for example, to conduct the monitoring of a cease-fire or electoral observation.

Section 5 – The principles of stabilisation

1.57. Stabilisation principles provide a framework to assist with understanding, planning and implementing a stabilisation intervention. Within the UK approach to stabilisation there are two separate (but closely related) sets of principles. They are the:

• UK principles of stabilisation (as articulated by the Stabilisation Unit and representing the integrated government view), included at Annex B; and

• security principles of stabilisation, which are more military specific and are listed at Figure 1.5.

Although plainly two different lists, there are areas of overlap and in each instance the underlying intents are coherent.

1.58. Stabilisation security principles apply specifically to the military context and, although similar to the national principles, are more geared towards the military contribution. Figure 1.5 lists the stabilisation security principles.
**Context**

**Stabilisation security principles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primacy of political purpose</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political aims dictate the desired outcome and drive the planning and conduct of the campaign.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Unity of effort</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military force is only one element required to deliver security and stabilisation. The collective contribution of all actors is required and must be coordinated to ensure unity of effort is achieved in every facet of the mission.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understand the context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A shared understanding of the context within which insecurity and instability has arisen, between the UK military and their immediate partners, is essential to provide a basis for focused and coordinated action.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Focus on the population; including their security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The population’s needs, whose expectations will vary, must be met to promote human security and encourage support for the (desired) political settlement.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foster host nation governance, authority and indigenous capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host nation ownership of, and responsibility for, security and stabilisation requires developing sufficient governance, authority and indigenous capability.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Neutralise malign actors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By isolating malign actors (including those who violently oppose the government) from the source of their support, they can be made irrelevant. Note, however, that in some instances, a sustainable political settlement may require the inclusion of irregular actors or ‘spoilers’.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Gain and maintain popular support</th>
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<tr>
<td>Support the local government to gain and maintain legitimacy. Credibility must act as a lever to shift tacit consent into active support for the campaign. UK forces must be perceived to be legitimate and credible, both regionally and locally (especially amongst opinion-forming elites).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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32 Noting that we may not always be supporting the extant government (for example, Libya, Syria).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stabilisation security principles (continued)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prepare for the longer term</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilising a failed or failing state will often take a long time. This will require providing significant cross-government resources, immersion in the problem, and demonstrating resilience in the face of (almost inevitable) short-term setbacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anticipate, learn and adapt</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex, uncertain and dynamic operating environments demand anticipation, learning and adaptation (without detrimentally affecting the maintenance of the aim). Adversaries will adapt; so must the UK forces if these adversaries are to be outwitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operate in accordance with the law</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable laws on operations will be unique and are dependent on the mandate. However, UK Forces are always bound by our own national law and applicable policies and the UK Government interpretations of International Law (and International Human Rights Law). Host nation law should be respected where it is not incompatible with our own laws. Further guidance may be in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or be provided by a legal adviser. The strategic consequence of ‘not’ operating in accordance with the law in a stabilisation context undermines legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.5 – The stabilisation security principles
Context

Key points

• Our national interest is best served by a secure and resilient UK and shaping a stable world.

• Any UK response will usually be part of a wider international effort.

• Our response to instability and conflict is to apply the instruments of national power – economic, military and diplomatic, underpinned by information.

• We must use our national capabilities to build our prosperity, extend our influence in the world and strengthen our security.

• The three main, mutually-supporting, pillars of the Government’s stability strategy are: early warning; rapid crisis prevention and response; and upstream conflict prevention.

• Structural stability exists within states that are built with the consent of the population, are resilient and flexible in the face of shocks, and are able to evolve.

• Stability should be viewed as an evolving process that includes short-term, medium-term and long-term objectives.

• Stabilisation is applied in politically difficult and complex environments in which the state is not necessarily the legitimate political authority.

• Stabilisation is an organising approach rather than a goal and as such it sits above, and alongside, a wide variety of other activities and/or operations.

• Any stabilisation action will be planned and implemented with an overtly political objective in mind.

• The stabilisation approach must be an integrated, civilian-led approach which unifies effort across government.

• The stabilisation approach is both flexible and targeted.

• Although transitory, stabilisation cannot afford to be short-term in outlook or objectives.
Understanding stability and instability

This chapter considers the role and legitimacy of the state in maintaining its own stability within the wider context of the international system and the challenges to this. This includes examining the elements of a stable state and what causes them to break down. The final section discusses how instability can lead to violent intra-state conflict and the need to understand the causes to frame a successful intervention.

Section 1 – The role of the state in maintaining stability .................................. 33
Section 2 – Legitimacy .................................................................................. 37
Section 3 – The elements of a stable state .................................................... 38
Section 4 – Instability and violent conflict .................................................... 47
Now there is a requirement to support stability in a dozen different theatres simultaneously, and to engage with both unconventional and conventional threats. The first task for the UK is to ensure that it is able to engage as part of a broad coalition or alliance in tackling these threats (which are beyond the scope of any one country). In particular, the UK must build on its strong alliance with the United States, and ensure that European NATO allies are operating at maximum effectiveness. It must use its leadership position in NATO to ensure that NATO has the full spectrum of conventional forces, trained, exercised, and psychologically prepared to defend the European order against a conventional threat.

House of Commons Defence Committee Tenth Report of Session 17 March 2015

People respond in accordance to how you relate to them. If you approach them on the basis of violence, that’s how they’ll react. But if you say, ‘We want peace, we want stability’, we can then do a lot of things that will contribute towards the progress of our society.

Nelson Mandela
Chapter 2 – Understanding stability and instability

Section 1 – The role of the state in maintaining stability

2.1. Crises and conflicts between states have, through recent history, been addressed through an international system based on the centrality of the state, set and codified through the United Nations (UN). The post-1945 international organisational structure was designed primarily to address inter-state challenges and disputes but this construct has struggled to deal with the complexity of intra-state violence and instability – particularly in instances where a state was unwilling or unable to manage its own internal conflict.

2.2. Globalisation is an accelerating process that projects social, political and economic activities across frontiers, and from one region to another. In so doing, it accelerates the flow of ideas and information, goods, capital/finance and populations. Essentially globalisation is the process of extending a matrix of social relations – of production, commerce, communication, culture and ideology, legislation and jurisdiction, organisation and the ability to project power across international borders. The effects of globalisation on instability can be both positive and negative. While not a cause of conflict in itself, globalisation brings:

- increasingly contested legal authority between sovereign and non-state bodies;
- ubiquitous access to information;
- increased population migration, widespread proliferation of weapons, together with virtually untraceable financial flows, which can provide non-state actors with a destructive power and reach approaching that held by some smaller ‘traditional’ states; and

‘The state is the principal unit for exercising public authority in defined territories in modern times. It is also the central structure in international relations. The state consists of: institutions or rules which regulate political, social and economic engagement across a territory and determine how public authority is obtained and used (for example, constitutions, laws, customs) and organisations at the national and the sub-national level which operate within those rules (for example, the executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, ministries, army, tax authorities).’

Building Peaceful States and Societies
Department for International Development (DFID)
complex networks connecting diasporas and communities of interest that cause local shocks or events to reverberate and multiply rapidly at the global level and influence local events elsewhere.

Globalisation makes the possibility of discrete, localised conflict increasingly unlikely. Instead, globalisation can result in a plethora of complex, inter-connected threats involving a range of state and non-state actors.

2.3. In parallel with globalisation, a new international emphasis relating to the primacy of human security led to the UN’s adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. This allows the international community to overrule the principle of state sovereignty to prevent gross breaches of human rights, such as the threat to the population of Benghazi and Eastern Libya posed by Gadhafi in 2011. However, this principle can itself challenge stability, by providing the opportunity for regional powers to claim legitimacy for interventions in other states, such as Russia’s involvement in Ukraine.

2.4. Beyond the direct control of a state but impacting upon its stability, are the geopolitical factors of the region, which include:

- freedom of movement;
- trade;
- availability of resources;
- regional stability; and
- the activities of neighbouring states.

It is not uncommon for neighbouring states or groups to provide financial and materiel support to local non-state armed groups, either to secure regional strategic advantage or deflect threats to themselves. The overspill of violence and mass migration of refugees from regional conflicts can create or exacerbate internal tensions and further stretch a state’s security sector. Transnational criminal groups, such as drug cartels, also seek to exploit insecurity. A state’s inability to manage these types of external pressures can accelerate its downward spiral towards instability. It follows that analysing a region’s geopolitics will often help intervening bodies understand the different political interests and frictions within the conflict area.

2.5. Within the constraints of these external factors, the stability of a state stands in direct proportion to the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the
government. The degree of actual control exercised by a government over its institutions and organisations can vary significantly across different countries and governance can be particularly complex in fragile and conflict affected states. An important element of a government's behaviour is the way in which it uses state institutions and organisations to exert control. The extent to which this behaviour is viewed as legitimate by other elites, and the wider population, is critical for stability. Predictable and equitable use of power will tend to gain support whereas arbitrary manipulation of access to justice and formal governance can be used as a tool to apply pressure to sections of a population in a manner which fosters grievance.

2.6. Deficits in perceived legitimacy and effectiveness will create varying degrees of instability that give space for both internal and external political, economic and ideological spoilers. Figure 2.1 shows this stability spectrum.\(^{33}\)

2.7. Populations have historically accepted the state’s right to exert a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in return for providing security and justice.\(^{34}\) This obligation has driven the state’s need and right to tax its population. This process is a


key part of developing the inclusive political representation of the population\textsuperscript{35} from which the Western democratic model of legitimacy is derived.

2.8. In fragile states, such as Afghanistan, leaders may have access to non-tax based revenue streams. These may be derived internally from primary commodities and illicit goods as well as externally from international aid, support for proxy wars by regional and international actors and ideologically driven funding. These rents have reduced the need for governments to develop systems of taxation and therefore develop accountable and representative political relationships with the population they claim to govern.

2.9. Some states, Gadhafi’s Libya for instance, achieve stability through ruthless oppression combined with state subsidies, nepotism\textsuperscript{36} and patronage. In such states, stability is usually reliant on individuals rather than institutions, lacks resilience and is vulnerable to corruption and exploitation by powerful actors. However, where oppressive states have access to sufficient resources, they may prove to be long-lasting, as they are able to offset the high transactional costs imposed by their relative illegitimacy. It follows that malign actors, who challenge the state and its associated apparatus, may be motivated by the desire for redress in resource distribution or the simple capture of power.

2.10. Our Government recognises that the existence of an effective state system is integral to international stability. However, the state as a specific entity can sometimes present a particular issue for UK engagement because certain regimes may pursue political agendas which are not compatible with international standards or UK national interests and expectations. An example of this is the Syrian regime which, together with supporting elites, declared an overt interest in preserving ‘stability’ while simultaneously employing seemingly indiscriminate violence against significant portions of its population. Conversely, in some very fragile situations (for example, Somalia), the absence of a functioning regime (even a repressive one), has resulted in a total failure of the state. In such circumstances, even a regime that maybe does not match the UK’s expected standards of governance may be better than nothing. Any stability created in the absence of a broader political system and under-pinning state structure is likely to be only temporary. However, it may still be a worthwhile short-term objective to set the conditions for a better long-term goal.

\textsuperscript{35} Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), \textit{The Social Contract}; see also Thomas Hobbes (1651), \textit{Leviathan} (for a rather bleaker view of the role of the state and elites); Charles Tilly (1992), \textit{Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992}, (Blackwell; Oxford).

\textsuperscript{36} Nepotism is defined as: the favouring of relatives or friends, especially by giving them jobs. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2011.
Section 2 – Legitimacy

Legal requirements

2.11. Strictly adhering to the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (military necessity, humanity, distinction (or discrimination) and proportionality) is essential to promote legitimacy in stabilisation campaigns. Applicable human rights laws and UK policy must also be adhered to. There may also be good political or military reasons for exercising a greater degree of self-restraint in the use of force than is legally required.

2.12. Corruption. Corruption can be described as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain and can take many forms, ranging from demanding bribes for safe passage on the streets to non-meritocratic awards of jobs. Corrupt practices in defence and security institutions are particularly harmful, as they affect institutions which are mandated to provide security and which should have the monopoly on the use of force. Corrupt defence forces can contribute to insecurity instead of tackling it, and can prey on the population they are supposed to protect. Institutional structures weakened by corruption might not withstand the challenges of insecurity, which then progressively undermines the domestic legitimacy of indigenous defence forces. Perceptions of international troops, if they work with such forces, can be adversely affected by association and their ability to achieve stabilisation goals might be diminished. The presence and actions of international forces can also have unforeseen consequences and provide opportunities for corruption, for example, by providing a security umbrella under which corrupt activities are conducted. Association with corrupt institutions can undermine domestic support for the mission within contributing states.

2.13. The mandate. The mandate provides the legal framework to conduct operations. It also provides direction on freedom of action and constraints. Commanders may find it helpful to list the activities that they intend to conduct and consider whether the mandate they have to operate under supports them. Where it does not, they should seek amendments to increase their freedom of action, while limiting that of the adversary.

2.14. Status of the force. The legal responsibilities for the force must be established to ensure rapid, transparent measures are in place to deal with adverse incidents. Any perception that international forces are above the law and can act with impunity will erode legitimacy, both in the eyes of the host nation and the international community, and promote the wrong attitude among troops in theatre. Thus, the
legal status of coalition forces and relationships with indigenous military and police forces and the host nation legal system is vital. Such legal status must also be clearly established at all levels from governmental to tactical. Recognition of where primacy in law enforcement rests is critical, as is keeping interested parties informed of any actions taken, while maintaining an understanding of the local legal system. Wherever possible, UK actions must support the host nation rule of law and legal system. UK support should be conditional upon adhering to accepted norms and encourage the host nation to abide by, and enforce, its international obligations.

The authority of the host government

2.15. To alter the conflict relationship in favour of the host government, that government must establish and sustain authority and legitimacy. This authority – sometimes referred to as ‘campaign authority’ – is dependent upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of four factors.37

a. **Mandate.** The perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes a state authority, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, or a recognised and accepted caste/tribal model.

b. **Manner.** The perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively.

c. **Consent.** The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, may range from freely given support, through unwilling compliance, to active resistance.

d. **Expectations.** The extent to which the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or are met by those exercising the mandate.

Section 3 – The elements of a stable state

2.16. Within the international and regional context, our Government has described structural stability in a state as having ‘political systems which are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict, change and other pressure (both internal and external) peacefully. This means societies in which human rights and rule of law

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2.17. Security, governance and the rule of law, and social and economic development are inextricably linked – stability is generally determined by how they interact. Critically, this interaction is held together by societal relationships, influenced by regional and external factors and enabled by an overarching political settlement.\(^{39}\) Figure 2.2 illustrates this relationship.

2.18. **Security** has been shown to be a primary factor in forming and maintaining a state’s legitimacy.

a. Within democratic states, human security, which requires meeting the legitimate political, economic, societal and environmental needs of individuals and groups,\(^{40}\) is equally important to protecting the state from both external and internal threats, in pursuit of national security.\(^{41}\)

b. Other security models do exist. One of the most common is the autocratic model, in which the state ruthlessly uses the security sector simply to protect its interests. In these cases, the government will often be the perpetrator of significant violence against its own people and will invariably fail to deliver some aspects of human security. This may fuel discontent but, with a compelling narrative and sufficient resources, may still achieve a degree of legitimacy.

In either model, a viable security sector is crucial to sustain effective governance, and maintain law and order. A poorly managed or dysfunctional security sector hampers development, discourages investment and may perpetuate poverty.

2.19. One of the defining features of state fragility is a breakdown in security, with failure of the security sector and loss of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In such circumstances, malign actors may exploit insecurity, by:

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39 This relationship is covered in the final part of this section.
40 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, paragraphs 1.2 – 1.4.
41 Ibid., paragraph 1.1.
Understanding stability and instability

- inflicting further violence;
- establishing parallel security and governance structures; or
- undertaking widespread criminal activity.

These activities can undermine the confidence of the population in the government’s ability to protect and sustain them.

2.20. **Governance and the rule of law** requires an effective and responsive governance structure that can manage how public services are delivered, permits the peaceful resolution of internal contests for power and resources, civil disputes and ensures fair access to justice.

a. Stable governance can only endure when there is sufficient security and, in general, where influence is exercised over a population and territory. The methods used to achieve such influence must be viewed as sufficiently legitimate by a significant majority of those being governed.

b. Some version of a rule of law is fundamental to stability but the form will vary depending upon the social, cultural and political context of a particular society.\(^{42}\) Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population, based on their perception, expectations and experiences, rather than by externally imposed criteria.

c. Areas outside the reach or control of state authorities can be havens for malign activity. Spoiler groups seek to exploit weak governance so they can establish their own governance and, sometimes arbitrary, systems of justice. They do this to enhance their own legitimacy as well as their political, ideological or criminal activities.

d. In many states, corruption among government officials is endemic, due to greed, need or under the influence of powerful political or non-state actors. Corruption can be political, underpinning the overall distribution of power and resources within a state and empowering some groups at the expense of others. This is often a cause of instability which can undermine the economy and the trust in government. Attempts to tackle corruption often encounter resistance and will require a properly integrated civil-military approach.\(^{43}\) In cases where corruption is prevalent this does not indicate widespread acceptance among the population and it must be tackled. Corrupt practices,

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43 The Building Integrity UK Programme seeks to reduce this impact by working in partnership with Transparency International.
forced by circumstances, frequently remain unpalatable to those affected by, or even engaged in them: for example, being regularly forced to pay bribes at police checkpoints does not make the practice any less humiliating over time.

2.21. **Social and economic development** is fundamental to stability. All states experience economic problems from time to time but the effectiveness of the state in managing these problems, keeping pace with societal demands and avoiding perceptions of discrimination will help determine the perceived legitimacy of that government in all societies.

a. Many so-called ‘developing states’ are confronted by semi-permanent economic problems. These are problems in which unemployment, inflation and competition for resources provide a breeding ground for conflict. They are, therefore, vulnerable to economic shocks.

b. In such states, unemployment and underemployment are likely to be high and the basic functions normally provided by the state may depend upon substantial international aid. Such aid can be both financial and functional, with international and non-governmental organisations directly delivering public services which, wrongly presented, can further degrade the legitimacy of the state.

c. Rents from rich primary resources can be a source of motivation for state and non-state actors, both internal and external, who seek to control potential revenue. For example, the trade in diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola.

d. Economic development and aid can also be a source of instability as it will invariably benefit some regions and individuals who are best placed to take advantage of it rather than those in greatest need. This can be exacerbated by the perception, or reality, of corruption and discriminatory economic systems, which often exist in fragile states.

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44 Note that in many conflict affected states the expectation of what constitutes ‘basic functions’ will be significantly lower than for Western norms.


2.22. Economic collapse can cause, or be caused by, breakdown in other elements of a stable state and will be marked by:

- infrastructure failure;
- no effective taxation by the state;
- increasing reliance on international aid;
- rising unemployment; and
- increasing vulnerability to natural disasters.

2.23. **Societal relationships.** As well as the functional elements, it is important to recognise that most states are held together by social, cultural and ideological factors. These factors, such as identity, symbolism, ethos and culture, are less tangible but changing perceptions of these popular understandings may be a key to maintaining or breaking a state.

a. In a stable state, nationalism or ethnic, tribal, caste and sectarian solidarity can evoke compassion, pride and a sense of loyalty and shared identity. Such responses serve as a positive force for human cooperation, tending to be broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain the population’s consent.

b. Conversely, these factors can foster ethnic tensions and create divisions between groups. In a failing state, perceived economic inequalities as well as ethnic, tribal and ideological discrimination will breakdown societal relationships. In parallel, group identities can provide an organisational framework for mobilising individuals towards violence.

2.24. **Gender perspectives.** Conflict affects women, men, girls and boys differently. It is important to analyse the implications of conflict and stabilisation activities in each specific context. In some societies or countries, females may be particularly vulnerable to abuse, gender specific corruption, exploitation and exclusion. This can be exacerbated in fragile and conflict-affected states,
where: key infrastructure has been destroyed; existing (often limited) protective legislation and social networks are disrupted; and insecurity or societal tradition limits female participation in decision-making forums.

a. When attempting to build stability, it is important to understand the particular viewpoints, needs and challenges of women and girls. Wherever possible, these should be taken into consideration throughout.

b. The UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security states that: ‘women’s participation is needed to make and build peace and prevent conflict breaking out’. The plan recognises that sometimes women and girls suffer from specific forms of violence in conflict and emergencies which will need to be addressed as part of any stabilisation effort. The four pillars of the UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security are:

- participation of women in peace processes and decision-making;
- prevention of conflict and violence against women and girls;
- protecting the human rights of women and girls; and
- addressing women’s and girls’ need in relief and recovery.

Our Government has placed particular emphasis on the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative which seeks to eradicate gender-based violence within conflicts. The positive significance of women filling key roles throughout society should also be taken into consideration.

The importance of the political settlement

2.25. A critical component for any stable state is an effective political settlement in which the legitimacy of the state is sufficiently accepted to avoid violent conflict. Legitimacy can arise from: the performance of institutions; character (and especially the perceived fairness and predictability) of their decision-making and selection processes; or their conformity with a community’s wider religious or social values.

a. The Department for International Development (DFID) describe political settlements as ‘the expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites, ...'

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about how power is organised and exercised.\textsuperscript{48} This is essentially a ‘horizontal’ bargain between elites over access to power and resources, which will be a product of the local political economy.\textsuperscript{49}

b. In environments where state security organisations are weak and incapable of exercising a monopoly of legitimate force, bargains between the state and elites are often central to maintaining order.

c. While formal and informal power-sharing mechanisms can make an important contribution to ending conflicts and short-term stability, they can move power away from formal, democratic institutions into arrangements which are less accountable and potentially divisive.\textsuperscript{50}

2.26. To achieve greater resilience, settlements need to be open to, and inclusive of, wider society. In other words, a ‘vertical’ settlement between the government and institutions of state and wider society, about the responsibilities of the state, and the scope and limits of its power. Open political and economic institutions associated with vertical settlements are generally considered as central to economic development and prosperity (and hence long-term stability).\textsuperscript{51} Their contribution to short-term resilience, and more narrow understandings of stability (for example, containing violence), however, is less clear. Evidence of their importance for security and stability is sketchy, though their potential importance is underlined by the character of the protests during the Arab Spring.\textsuperscript{52}

2.27. It is useful to consider how each of the main groups considered previously relate to stability. These groups are not discrete entities and individuals can be part of more than one group. Equally, the groups are not homogeneous and may comprise a mix of genders, ages, religions and ethnicity, caste, tribal and social identities.

2.28. Figure 2.3 shows that the political settlement can be seen as a function of the connections between key actors and the degree to which the various groups within the elites and population confer legitimacy on the regime and state institutions to govern their lives. Creating such connections is not easy, but once made, these connections do create and help maintain stability.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} DFID, \textit{Building Peaceful States and Societies: a practice paper}, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Essentially the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Dennys C, Pounds N, and Zaum D: HPRT Transition Lessons Study: Stabilisation Unit, 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Arab Spring refers to the democratic uprisings that arose independently and spread across the Arab world in 2011. The movement originated in Tunisia in December 2010 and quickly took hold in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
\end{itemize}
2.29. **State resilience.** One of the key indicators of a genuinely stable state is the ability to avoid, and deal with, strategic shocks – in other words, its level of resilience. Shocks could come about through events such as:

- violence (either from within that state itself or from external intervention/contagion);
- as the result of a major natural disaster;
- mass inflows of refugees;
- economic downturns; or
- contests for the transition of power.  

Shocks can result in the degradation or collapse of one, or more, of the elements required for stability. Weakness in any one element could lead to the erosion and subsequent failure of another. Where insecurity and conflict are not already present, this erosion can set the conditions for it to occur and may result in a fracture of the political settlement that regulates key societal and state relationships. Contextual variations notwithstanding, a fragile state could rapidly break down as shown in Figure 2.4.

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Conflict is a normal part of human interaction, the natural result when individuals and groups have incompatible needs, interests or beliefs. The challenge we need to address is the violent conflict that emerges when these underlying incompatibilities are badly managed.
Section 4 – Instability and violent conflict

2.30. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* classifies the relations between factions within a state, and between state and non-state actors as being cooperation, confrontation or conflict.\(^5^4\) In stable, resilient societies, discord is normally managed through formal and informal institutions:

- elections may be used to determine the outcome of political argument;
- courts settle legal disputes;
- social norms and the state's monopoly on using force, prevent disagreements between neighbours escalating into violent conflict; and
- religious and civil institutions or leaders can also shape how societies behave and react.

These mechanisms both address and resolve disputes thereby avoiding recourse to violence and facilitating positive change.

2.31. By contrast, in fragile states or systems, which are often weak and perceived as illegitimate or inherently dysfunctional, cooperation will breakdown, leading to confrontation and, if not contained, to conflict. In this circumstance, the ability of non-armed civil groups to act is constrained and violence becomes a rational course of action to resolve disputes and gain control of resources.\(^5^5\)

2.32. The motives for committing violent acts often include irrational, cultural or ideological factors. Such factors, however, cannot explain all of the social dynamics involved in the insurgents’ decision-making process.\(^5^6\)

2.33. A successful insurgency or terrorist campaign demonstrates through violent action the failure of the state it opposes, without alienating either its core or potential supporters. The failed insurgency fades into obscurity when the violence committed by its supporters alienates the population and increases support for the beleaguered regime.\(^5^7\) Equally, inappropriate or excessive use of force by the state will further

\(^{54}\) JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*, paragraph 1.48.
\(^{55}\) Cramer C, *Civil War is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries* (London: Hurst), 2006.
\(^{57}\) Bagwell M, Dudin S, *Discretion Analysis*, DSTL/CR67014v3.0 (R), 2012.
undermine perceptions of its legitimacy both internally and externally and fuel violence. The recent actions of the regime in Syria are a good example of this.

Causes of violent conflict

2.34. Containing confrontation and preventing conflict is an integral part of crisis management. To achieve this successfully, a clear understanding of the causes of violent conflict is required. Conflicts can sometimes be categorised into specific ‘type’ and given titles such as: state-on-state, intra-state, proxy or hybrid. But this approach can be misleading. The causes of intra-state violent conflict are rarely straightforward but in general they can be divided into two broad groups:

- **underlying structural** causes which create the conditions for conflict; and
- **dynamic or proximate** causes which trigger violence.

2.35. Underlying causes will generally relate to issues such as, ‘social, political or economic exclusion based on ethnicity, religion or gender or unequal power relations between the centre and periphery’ or cross-border influences. Conflict is most likely to escalate to violence where political elites are vulnerable, group histories are antagonistic and domestic economic problems are mounting, with the majority of internal conflicts triggered by internal elite-level factors. There are three main types of internal elite-level factors:

- ideological (to change the state);
- criminal assaults on state sovereignty (primarily driven by economic motivation); and
- power struggles (driven by personal political motivations or a desire to control and allocate resources).

2.36. Conflict will sometimes occur between easily identifiable and clearly defined sides but will more likely be part of a complex network of indistinct groups, each driven by a disparate variety of goals, methods and tactics. Boundaries between different groups are usually blurred by fluid membership and multiple allegiances which may not be overtly aligned with national boundaries. Sometimes, even members of the extant government may transition into, and out of, irregular...

groups thereby confusing linkages between political power and illicit activity and undermining effective governance and the rule of law. Causes and motivations will vary considerably. Some may be truly political, altruistic and positive, while others will be the result of resentment, victimhood, clan loyalty, ideology or criminality. These latter causes will invariably be both negative and destabilising.

2.37. States tend to enter into war for their own reasons (interests) rather than on behalf of their citizens. Although many states do ostensibly align themselves to global security issues, such as climate change, poverty and energy shortages, it is more likely that any interaction outside their own borders will be guided by realpolitik\textsuperscript{61} and strategic national interests. The process by which decision-makers assess the necessity of conflict is subjective, difficult to predict, and governed by a range of complex political, organisational and psychological factors. One of the key constraints on a leader’s perceived discretion is the belief that a state must uphold its self-professed image as a ‘player’ in a region or conflict. These can lead decision-makers to believe that conflict is unavoidable when, in fact, alternatives do exist, or when military action is not the optimal approach.\textsuperscript{62}

Conflict analysis

2.38. No two conflicts are the same and interactions between the key groups will vary from country to country and in different environments. The degree of relevance, or influence of, a particular group towards creating stability will also vary. For example, considerations about the overriding need for elite deals in Helmand in Afghanistan, rather than attaining the broad-based consent of the population may not necessarily be applicable to Egypt. Consequently, it is not possible to argue each stabilisation intervention should have an exclusively population, state or elite-centric focus and therefore approaches to stabilisation must be tailored to the context. Decisions on the appropriate ways to approach such crises will be political but the military must understand and engage in integrated analysis which will likely determine whether, or not, a particular strategy will succeed.

\textsuperscript{61} Realpolitik is defined as: politics based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2011.
\textsuperscript{62} Op. Cit., Bagwell M, Dudin S.
2.39. Shared understanding is the key. This can only be realised through a detailed examination and analysis of the specific context and the main contributing factors.63

a. It is vital to look not only at the immediate or ‘presenting’ problem, but also at underlying issues and at the structure of relationships within the society. In other words, an intervening force needs to address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility and this will require an integrated approach.64

b. There are a number of models that can assist us to understand the context but the primary tool employed across our Government is the Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability. This cross-government approach aims to build consensus on a shared understanding of the conflict drivers and provide a base for integrated planning, policy and resource allocation. The hub for the Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability is the Stabilisation Unit.

2.40. As well as being varied, environments affected by violent conflict will transform over time because conflict is a dynamic process, in which the original intentions of the actors involved are shaped by their own activities and, equally importantly, those of their adversaries.65 It follows that integrated analysis of a conflict must be regularly revisited.

Conflict resolution

2.41. As stated previously, an inclusive political settlement is required to build and maintain stability.

a. When attempting to move from a situation of armed conflict towards a non-violent political alternative, elites are a critical component for securing agreement.

b. Deliberately excluding elites is unlikely to produce a successful or sustainable political process. The likelihood of violence reoccurring will be high.66

c. Any stabilisation plan must recognise the importance of including relevant elites. It should be acknowledged, however, that some of the elites involved may have interests or objectives that do not necessarily align with those of the UK or our allies.

d. Shared understanding of what can, and cannot, be compromised must be established before negotiation begins.

2.42. **Narrative.** Competing elites will often seek to adopt persuasive causes, based on the real, underlying problems or unresolved contradictions that are inherent within most societies to mobilise support. They will try to situate their activities within a compelling narrative that attempts to explain and justify their actions while simultaneously de-legitimising the motivations and behaviours of their opponents. Creating a complex and convincing narrative often involves manipulating their identity to create belief in an ‘us versus them’ situation. The government’s narrative must, therefore, be demonstrably consistent with the aspirations of the population and, crucially, it must also be more compelling than that of competing actors. Most importantly, it must be enacted, and be seen to be enacted; word and deed must be overtly and unambiguously aligned both by government organisations and any external security force operating to support a host government.

2.43. Finally, a successful political settlement needs to be institutionalised in some form of political organisation that has the capacity both to:

- ensure that the state (or more precisely the government) upholds the rules of the settlement and does not turn on or exclude individual members; and
- prevent defections and cheating.

When this does not happen, violent conflict will quickly re-emerge.67

Key points

• Globalisation makes the possibility of discrete, localised conflict increasingly unlikely. Instead, globalisation can result in a plethora of complex, inter-connected threats involving a range of state and non-state actors.

• The stability of a state stands in direct proportion to the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the government.

• Strictly adhering to the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (military necessity, humanity, distinction (or discrimination) and proportionality) is essential to promote legitimacy in stabilisation campaigns.

• Security, governance and the rule of law, and social and economic development are inextricably linked – stability is generally determined by how they interact.

• A viable security sector is crucial to sustain effective governance, and maintain law and order.

• A critical component for any stable state is an effective political settlement in which the legitimacy of the state is sufficiently accepted to avoid violent conflict.

• One of the key indicators of a genuinely stable state is the ability to avoid, and deal with, strategic shocks – in other words, its level of resilience.

• Conflict affects women and men differently so it is important to analyse the implications of conflict and stabilisation activities in each specific context.

• The causes of intra-state violent conflict are rarely straightforward.

• No two conflicts are the same and interactions between the key groups will vary from country to country and in different environments.

• Any stabilisation plan must recognise the importance of including relevant elites.

• The government’s narrative must be demonstrably consistent with the aspirations of the population and, crucially, it must also be more compelling than that of competing actors.

• A successful political settlement needs to be institutionalised in some form of political organisation.
Notes

Understanding stability and instability
Chapter 3 focuses on the key policies and strategies related to stabilisation and considers how they can be delivered by the military as part of an integrated approach. This chapter considers the main instruments of national power, some of the key organisations involved with stabilisation and how stabilisation activities are resourced.

Section 1 – Ends. ............................. 58
Section 2 – Ways ............................. 60
Section 3 – Means ............................. 68
Section 4 – The UK Government’s integrated planning mechanisms ............................. 77
All this will, in turn, require a much deeper understanding of alien political contexts, effective defence relationships with host governments, and the knowledge and confidence to respond rapidly and precisely to prevent an escalation. The new Force Structure will have to reflect this in education and training, the relationship with other government departments, a new appetite for uncertainty and risk, and the use of conventional military power not as an alternative to but as a support for political solutions.

House of Commons Defence Committee Tenth Report of Session 17 March 2015

Democracies are expense-averse and they think in terms of short-term, political interests rather than a long-term interest in stability.

Samantha Power
US Ambassador to the UN
March 2015
Chapter 3 – Ends, ways and means

3.1. The UK’s response to global instability and conflict is to consider and apply, where appropriate, all of the instruments of national power to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source. This may require overseas military operations and recognises that security is often a prerequisite for political and economic progress. Therefore, the UK, often alongside international partners, maintains the ability to respond swiftly and decisively across a full range of intervention scenarios. This includes being required to:

- prevent or mediate violent conflicts;
- help stabilise states emerging from violent conflicts; and
- support subsequent recovery and reconstruction.

3.2. Policy is a statement of intent, or a commitment to act. Policy describes what we need to achieve (the ends). Strategy describes how we will do this (the ways) and what resources we will need (the means).
3.3. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine,\textsuperscript{68} outlines the UK’s strategic structures and mechanisms for Defence decision-making. JDP 01 also introduces planning and decision-making as the elements that contribute to operations design.

3.4. Political end-state. The political end-state is quantified by national and coalition goals. The ends articulate the political intentions of the UK Government for any specific campaign, expressed as outcomes and strategic objectives. Stability-related ends could include outcomes that seek to: stop extensive human suffering; end state repression; or reduce mass-effect weapons proliferation. However, providing precise outcomes in times of crisis is likely to pose a challenge for key decision-makers for a variety of reasons.

a. Incomplete information and intelligence. Decision-makers are unlikely to have all the information necessary to make fully-informed decisions. The significant amount of information that is available also adds to the pressure as decision-makers must quickly determine what is, and is not, relevant.

b. Time pressure. Key stakeholders will require quick decisions to inform subsequent planning. This may mean decisions have to be made without the benefit of detailed analysis and consultation.

c. Short-term vision. Attention may sometimes be focused predominantly on short-term objectives that meet the immediate needs in response to a crisis, rather than focusing on the long-term requirements. Some short-term activities may have long-term unintended consequences if not considered as part of a prolonged solution.

Disbanding the Iraqi Army
In Iraq, the short-term decision to disband the Iraqi Army after the US-led invasion in 2003 meant that large numbers of previously enfranchised Sunnis at senior and junior levels now had no role in the new Iraqi state. This actively contributed to the deteriorating security situation, hampered political progress and was a factor leading to the subsequent insurgency, to which these former military personnel provided weapons, manpower and expertise.
3.5. **National security objectives.** The National Security Council (NSC) sets our Government’s national security objectives in accordance with the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and directs how they should be delivered. It provides top-level integration across the departments of state and other stakeholders that contribute to national security. More detail can be found in JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*.

3.6. **Initial response.** The NSC is the appropriate forum to address crisis response. However, the complexity of any crisis may hinder early decisions. New information and political direction will become apparent as a crisis evolves meaning that initial intentions and objectives may develop, or change completely, as we establish:

- a better understanding of the outcomes we wish to achieve;
- the extent of our legal authority to act;
- the means available to achieve the desired outcomes; and
- whether the UK intends to act unilaterally or, more likely, as part of an international response.\(^{69}\)

3.7. **National goals.** Whether operating in a coalition or UK-only campaign, there should be a single overarching governmental integrated campaign plan which defines the UK’s strategic objectives. These will be guided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) foreign policy, informed by strategic all-source assessment, and set at the highest level within the NSC. These objectives must include the campaign requirements for the MOD, as well as other government departments. The host nation’s goals must also be considered to inform the UK’s plan.

\[^{69}\text{This could be bilateral or multinational.}\]

‘In multinational operations, nations have to balance the collective objectives of the alliance or coalition with their own respective national goals.’

*JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine*
3.8. **Coalition goals.** When acting in a coalition, our Government’s campaign plan should be consistent with the strategy and plan of the coalition. There will be occasions when the UK will have specific requirements that are not incorporated within those of the coalition. This is particularly likely in coalition stabilisation campaigns where complete unity of effort between participating nations may be unachievable. Agreeing common ends with a coalition of states is likely to be both difficult and time consuming and will inevitably require extensive negotiation and compromise. This will be particularly true during the early stages of a crisis due to the uncertainty of the situation. As a situation evolves, the UK’s original intent may be adapted to broaden support amongst the international community. Military commanders should acknowledge the dynamic nature of setting political ends and expect their own planning to take place under uncertain conditions. This will require a flexible approach within a dynamic and evolving process.

3.9. **Strategies.** For countries in which the UK has an interest because of conflict, stability and security issues, there should be an extant government NSC-endorsed strategy. This will lay out our Government’s overarching objectives in those countries and will include input from all departments represented at the NSC. While strategies do evolve, particularly in response to emerging crises, it is important that the military campaign is consistent with, and supports, the wider governmental objectives.

### Section 2 – Ways

‘To deliver this strategy we will enhance our national security structures which will promote our further integrated, whole-of-government approach.’

‘We aim to be the leading soft power nation, using our resources to build the relationships that can project and enhance our influence in the world.’

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3.10. The ways seek to map a path from the current position to the desired political outcome. This will identify the specific strategic objectives that need to be met to facilitate the requisite change. The ways available to our Government to address instability will be varied and must take into account the resources available, and reflect the nature of the crisis or situation. Each situation will be different and context specific. There is no ‘templated’ solution that will fit every eventuality.
3.11. Some specific types of military operations that could be applied alongside civilian activities to address instability include:

- conflict prevention;
- peace support;
- stabilisation;
- counter-insurgency; and
- security force assistance.

More detailed information on each of these can be found in the respective North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied joint publications which are listed in Chapter 1.

**Integrated approach.**

3.12. JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* explains how the military instrument often plays a decisive role in providing or building a secure environment. However, crisis management cannot succeed without active cross-government and inter-agency cooperation. Effective inter-agency relationships need more than simply harmonising processes. Relationships work better where people value the different cultures involved and show patience and understanding when required. Building relationships benefits from regular and routine interaction.

3.13. In a national context, an integrated approach requires clear national objectives, strong political leadership and collaboration across departments to ensure the UK’s national power is coherently applied. A national approach will usually be framed within a broader multinational response, involving many actors including allies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. As nations and organisations may have competing aims and agendas, achieving coherence in a multinational context is likely to be more challenging than it is in a national context.

3.14. In complex multi-agency situations involving civilian organisations and a civilian head of mission, military activity
may only address part of the desired outcome. While it is unlikely that absolute consistency will be achieved between civilian and military activities, commanders are to both promote, and support, an integrated approach. An integrated approach comprises four guiding principles.

a. **Proactive engagement between all entities**, ideally ahead of a crisis, enables a more cohesive response to complex situations. To increase the time available for reaction, a shared approach to collecting and interpreting crisis indicators is necessary.

b. **Shared understanding** brings distinct professional, technical and cultural disciplines together, albeit with unique values and perceptions. Understanding helps to meld different capabilities, gives extra perspectives and may enhance resilience. Between crises, a shared understanding can only be built through cooperative working practices, liaison and education.

c. **Outcome-based thinking** requires all participants to base their thinking on the outcomes required to deliver a favourable situation. Cohesion and coherence, delivered by good leadership, will help all entities to work towards agreed outcome-based objectives that are consistent with the national strategic aims.

d. **Collaborative working** enhances the trust that underpins productive relationships. Integrated information management, infrastructure and connectivity, which support common working practices, generate a more collaborative ethos.

From a UK perspective, the ‘integrated approach’ has replaced the term ‘comprehensive approach’ as we have achieved greater coherence in ways of working between government departments. The term was first introduced into our lexicon in the 2010 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (SDSR). However, NATO, the European Union (EU) and other international organisations still use the term comprehensive approach which denotes coordinated collaborative working across departments and organisations where the high level of integration achievable in a national operation may not be achievable during coalition operations for organisational and political reasons. This publication will use integrated approach but it is accepted that other terms such as ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of government plus’ are commonly used by our allies and partners. An awareness and understanding of these different terms is vital for those working in this environment.
3.15. **Enabling the integrated approach.** Applying the integrated approach requires a constant level of collaboration between departments and a firm understanding by staff of departmental purposes, priorities, cultures and ways of working; how these differ and how they can complement each other. The principles of the integrated approach are enabled by the cross-government crisis management machinery, at the centre of which is the National Security Secretariat supporting the NSC. Departmental assets are pooled and coordinated to develop and deliver integrated planning and outputs through existing mechanisms. Further details on this are contained in JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*.70

One commentator observed that in a recent example of stabilisation operations (Iraq), “Britain seems to have suffered a wider failure of the government system, with politicians, senior military officers and civil servants all playing their part. Politicians and civil servants did little to ensure that military action supported political aims (conscious of the close military press relationship). [This was compounded with] some senior officers [showing] little appreciation of the political impact of military action, while others felt their role was principally to support the institutional interests of their branch of the armed forces. These problems were the result of a situation in which there was no well understood model for how ministers, senior military officers and civil servants should work together. [The government] must ensure that its use of military force properly supports its political aims and is better integrated with the other levers of national power. The government should make its decision-making process on the use of force subject to a formal code, approved by parliament. This code should define the process through which decisions are taken, and the roles and responsibilities of those involved.”71 This experience provides a salutary lesson in the importance of adopting a truly integrated approach.

In comparison to the Iraq experience, previous ‘successful’ operations, such as the Malayan Emergency and, more recently, the intervention supporting the United Nations (UN) Mission in Sierra Leone, appear to demonstrate true unity of civil and military purpose and effort. Closer inspection of both examples, however, provides more nuanced insights regarding the importance and context of the civil-military coordination of effort, and the risks attached to a lack of collaboration.

**Multinational approach**

3.16. Although the UK may be required to act alone, in most cases our Armed Forces are likely to operate in partnership. This may be as the lead or as a contributing nation in a NATO operation, with other established allies and partners, or as part of

70 JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*, Chapter 2, Section 3.
an *ad hoc* coalition. The aim of most multinational responses will be set out as a UN Security Council Resolution or as part of a ceasefire or treaty settlement. Before any national commitment to participate can be made, diplomatic engagement is required to formulate both the multinational aim and the character of the multinational response.

3.17. Just as individual Services bring different attributes and limitations to joint operations, allies and coalition partners will do the same on multinational operations. Understanding other nations’ military capabilities and the ability to merge these into a cohesive force, underpins the conduct of multinational military operations. Our ability to operate with other nations requires flexibility and interoperability. However, working together, in either an integrated or multinational capacity, may confer or generate extra responsibilities for communication and de-confliction. Multinational operations may also generate extra force protection and sustainment requirements.

3.18. When working together, good ‘followership’ is as vital as strong leadership. Military commanders must recognise and promote the benefits of cooperation to achieve unity of effort, while not necessarily enjoying unity of command. Where a common approach may not be possible owing to national and organisational sensitivities, commanders should seek as inclusive an approach as possible. Effective collaboration requires flexibility, openness and sensitivity towards all stakeholders.

**Regional approach**

3.19. Building stability must include a regional dimension. Instability may be exported from neighbouring fragile states and, consequently, threaten regional security. Neighbouring states will usually have some political, security, economic and social influence on the affected state and this can be either positive or negative. Securing their active support for any political settlement will be advantageous and should ideally take place as a preventative measure, thereby avoiding the need for intervention. A regional approach could include:

- protecting international borders;\(^\text{72}\)
- denying safe havens for irregular groups;
- supporting humanitarian assistance; and
- garnering support for wider, regional security initiatives.

\(^{72}\) Including protection from corruption, such as bribes at border crossings.
3.20. In certain circumstances, a regional security consensus will be required that is capable of integrating the host nation within a regional context. An international force may need to align its area of influence with its area of interest – greatly increasing the area of operations. Regional engagement can then be used to restrict the flow of money, personnel and materiel to support local irregular actors. Conversely, failure to engage with the wider region will almost certainly increase regional instability and may result in an unachievable campaign plan.

Instruments of power

3.21. JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine,73 explains that national strategy directs the coordinated application of the three instruments of national power: diplomatic; economic; and military. These three instruments of power are underpinned by information and understanding.

3.22. The diplomatic instrument. For the UK, diplomacy is key in understanding different conflicts and bringing parties together. The diplomatic process is a continuous one that can be applied before (prevention), during (mediation) and after (peace-building) a conflict. We conduct diplomacy at a variety of levels, ranging from junior to the most senior diplomats and the level of engagement used can often send an important message. Diplomacy can be used as either a ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’. For example, by engaging with belligerents in the diplomatic process or isolating them from a position of influence. This instrument is an essential component of the ways and means required to exert influence and pressure as part of the integrated approach. Although diplomacy can be used unilaterally, the effect can be greatly enhanced by working as part of a multinational effort (for example, with the UN, NATO, EU and so on). Diplomacy can help determine the level of response including imposing sanctions through to authorising the use of force.

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73 JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, Chapter 1, Section 4, page 12.
3.23. **Diplomacy is about managing international relations.** Successful diplomacy depends on the power of persuasive negotiation, reinforced by capable and credible hard power (both military and economic sanctions). Diplomacy is enhanced by a combination of reputation and integrity, the skilful interplay of the other instruments of power and effective communication. While diplomacy has traditionally been regarded a state-to-state activity, it has evolved to incorporate other opinion-formers, power-brokers and third parties.

3.24. **The economic instrument.** Overseas investment, international flows of capital and trade, and development assistance provide scope for exerting economic influence. The UK uses a range of economic incentives, boycotts, tariffs and sanctions to influence decisions and shape behaviour. The potential influence of economic measures can be affected by the degree of economic integration and the political character of recipient countries. This is also complicated by the interplay between public and private influences, the operation of market forces and the complex relationships between global and national rates of growth and economic activity. In some circumstances, military activity will support the economic instrument (for example, through embargo operations). Placing military equipment contracts or reforming indigenous military structures in a foreign country may foster other positive economic outcomes, but care must be taken to mitigate the potential longer-term risk of corruption.

3.25. **The military instrument.** Military power is the ultimate instrument and expression of national power. Activities can range from deterrence and coercion through to deliberately applying force to neutralise a specific threat. Although most effective when employed alongside the other instruments to achieve national objectives, the military instrument can be a decisive factor. In difficult negotiations with intractable opponents, diplomacy may only be successful if backed up by the credible prospect of force. Therefore, the military instrument has both a cognitive and physical effect. The military instrument’s unique contribution is to threaten, or apply, legitimate force to ensure our nation’s security and defend national interests. Defence Engagement aims to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in developing responsible, competent and democratically accountable forces. It may also facilitate other UK military activities, for example, by setting the conditions for overseas-basing, access or over-flight, and cooperation with allies and partners. Defence Engagement is conducted by a variety of actors. Some of these are part of the permanent Engaged Force, such as the overseas network of Defence Attachés, whereas others will join the Engaged Force for shorter periods of time. For example, a short-term training team could be generated from the Adaptive Force for a six month deployment, or a warship deployed as part of the Committed Force could conduct a visit to a priority country for a few days. More detail on the use of the military instrument in stabilisation operations is in Chapter 4.
Policy choices for a military response

‘Future conflict will blend the lethality traditionally associated with state conflict and the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular warfare.’

Figure 3.1 – Fusion of military activity – the conflict mosaic

3.26. Historically, the UK military has referred to a ‘spectrum of conflict’, ranging from stable peace through a variety of other activities (including peace support operations and counter-insurgency) to general war. This binary, linear and sequential view overlooked the inevitable concurrency and unique challenges posed by conflicts that have different characteristics. In the modern world, previously discrete operational themes now routinely overlap and merge. In one model this is represented by a fractured spectrum of concurrent missions in which all types of conflict are shown to exist simultaneously, each coming to the surface at certain times. Even this is inadequate to fully describe the contemporary character of conflict. Today’s reality sees an increased blurring of the distinctions between adversaries and the way they use force to achieve political goals.

3.27. This complexity requires an alternative, non-linear model which is the conflict mosaic as illustrated in Figure 3.1. This mosaic fuses operational themes into a combination of sequential and concurrent activities.

3.28. Building stability does not stand alone as a discrete type of operation; it is organic to almost all military operations. The concept is similar to (but much wider than) Krulak’s description of the Three Block War\(^75\) in which combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance all take place simultaneously, in close proximity and require the Engaged Force to show agility by transitioning between these activities at high tempo. This is reinforced in the concept of building stability overseas, which provides an overarching context for subordinate thematic operations, such as security force assistance, peace support and counter-insurgency.

3.29. **Policy choices – the range of national response.** The UK’s contribution to building stability will be determined by national interests, obligations (including commitments to international development goals) and national security imperatives. These policy choices will primarily be made outside the MOD. Defence’s principal contribution will be to articulate the range of alternative contributions that the military could potentially make. The integrated approach to strategic planning for fragile states provides this mechanism and the options will be dependent on the time-frame. Early on, routine regional engagement or international Defence Engagement, in the form of security force assistance or other military capacity building, may help a state to avoid instability. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to deploy a force to deter sponsors of instability, or contain the export of threats from one country to another. In the worst case, where instability and insecurity has taken hold, it may be appropriate to deploy a joint force to intervene. The preferred option will almost always be small-scale early engagement to prevent a fragile environment from deteriorating and escalating into full blown instability and conflict. Effective early intervention will almost invariably save lives and money.

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**Section 3 – Means**

3.30. **The role of the military.** In support of national security objectives, and invariably within a wider cross-government approach, our Armed Forces provide critical capabilities that can support stability, tackle threats at source and respond to crises overseas before they impact on our national security.

    a. **Regional and international security cooperation.** In many circumstances, instability within a state or region can be reduced by host governments and regional organisations with limited external support from the wider international community. In such a scenario, the UK may choose to contribute to a limited-objective international security cooperation initiative, such as arms

control, counter-narcotics operations, military capacity building or security sector reform. An example is Operation BASILICA in 2000, which involved retraining and re-equipping Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces.

b. **Counter weapons of mass effect proliferation.** In some cases, instability may be the catalyst for weapons of mass effect\(^\text{76}\) technology to fall into the hands of either belligerent states or armed non-state groups, such as Al-Qaeda. In this scenario, it is likely that UK national security interests and imperatives will be engaged within a counter-proliferation operation.

Amid the instability of the Middle East in the early 21st Century, one of many serious incidents was the use of sarin by the Assad regime in Damascus in August 2013. This caused some 1400 deaths, mainly civilians. But, largely as a result of this action, the international community has been able to achieve one undoubted success: the destruction of Syria’s declared chemical weapons programme. In less than 12 months, of the 1300 tonnes of chemical weapons that Syria admitted to possessing, more than 97% was destroyed, as well as the associated munitions and production equipment. This has reduced the risks that these weapons will be used again to cause large-scale casualties in the region and has further strengthened the international ban on chemical weapons.

c. **Deterrence or containment.** Instability within a state may provide a haven for non-state actors intent on attacking the UK, its allies or its interests. Where this threat may be effectively deterred or contained, the UK may choose to participate in international operations designed to reduce the impact of the activities of these groups. For example, air and maritime operations in the Arabian Gulf and Horn of Africa region have been used to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters between unstable states.

d. **Building stability in support of wider state-building.** In some circumstances, state instability engages the UK’s interests or obligations to such a degree that deterrence alone will be ineffective. Here, the ability to conduct a spectrum of intervention operations up to, and including, high-intensity war-fighting (usually as part of a coalition) may be required. The International Security Assistance Force operation, conducted by NATO as part of wider stability and state-building initiatives within Afghanistan, is an example.

3.31. **Graduated response.** This variety of roles and capabilities offers the UK Government choices for how to use the military instrument of power in support

\(^{76}\) Weapons of mass effect is referred to within NATO as weapons of mass destruction.
of national security objectives. The scale of military commitment can range from providing a solitary adviser, a single unit, an aircraft or a ship to conduct international security cooperation, to deploying a sizeable joint force (see Figure 3.2). A regional military presence can be used in support of all levels of commitment within the affected country and, in some circumstances, can be applied as the only military activity in support of diplomatic efforts to prevent violent conflict. Clearly, an early commitment to help prevent a downward spiral in a fragile state will be considerably less onerous for intervening forces than the scale necessary to facilitate restoration. The least intrusive form of response, consistent with achieving national objectives and policy imperatives, should be the goal. Intervention operations requiring significant resources and persistence will invariably be the last resort. In some instances (for example, Sierra Leone in 2000) all of these elements may be present simultaneously.

Figure 3.2 – The graduated range of military commitment

3.32. **Defence’s role within an integrated approach.** An integrated approach is broader than a cross-government approach as it will often be both multi-agency and multinational. Mutually-supporting cross-departmental and multi-agency effort should enable comprehensive tactical activity to create campaign effect. Defence will enable the security conditions and, within the overall civilian-led framework, may lead on specific aspects of security sector reform (including security sector stabilisation) such as military capacity-building. The majority of other activities will be civilian led including:

- governance (including counter-corruption, accountability and transparency);
- political processes, including reconciliation;
- police and justice sector reform;
- restoring basic services and infrastructure;
- economic and financial development; and
- longer-term social and infrastructure development.
Some of these may require a supporting contribution from the military, such as restoring essential services in a non-permissive (conflict) environment.

‘The nature of the operating environment requires Land Forces to contribute to a whole-of-government approach (increasingly coordinated with the private sector). There is also an emphasis on the need for persistent engagement overseas with complementary activity in the UK.’

Commander Land Forces’ Directive, May 2014

3.33. **Shared endeavour.** Our opponents understand the importance and the fragility of any comprehensive or integrated approach and, therefore, are likely to use tactics that deliberately target and drive away vulnerable civil actors. The notion of impartiality or neutrality has limited relevance in this context. Civilian participants will automatically become part of the conflict. By exploiting this potential fracture-point, adversaries can undermine the collective will and perseverance of the coalition. Reducing the creation of integrated effect will allow opponents freedom of manoeuvre while concurrently spoiling the authority and credibility of the host nation and supplanting it with their own. This should be countered by reinforcing the notion of a shared endeavour between the military, other government departments, non-governmental organisations and multi-agency partners.

**Key contributors – The Stabilisation Unit**

3.34. The Stabilisation Unit is an operational agency whose purpose is to help Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) respond to crises and address the causes of instability overseas. It is a uniquely integrated civil-military operational unit, with core staff members from ten government departments, plus serving military and police officers. It is the government’s centre of expertise and best practice for stabilisation, conflict, security and justice, and is designed to be agile, responsive and well-equipped to operate effectively in high-threat and high-risk environments. It supports NSC departments but does not take ownership of individual crises or policies. Humanitarian and consular crises remain the preserve of the Department for International Development (DFID) and the FCO respectively. The Stabilisation Unit is funded by the government’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, and is answerable to the NSC (Officials).

3.35. *The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015* recognises the Unit’s role in supporting more effective cross-government crisis
response, stabilisation and conflict prevention in fragile states. In this capacity, the Stabilisation Unit may engage in:

- a rapidly evolving crisis (for example, Libya and Syria), where the NSC and Cabinet Office is driving coordination and the pace of activity is frenetic;

- an ongoing crisis (such as Afghanistan or Somalia), where our Government’s activity, though high profile, is at a more normal pace or until central coordination mechanisms are established; or

- upstream prevention, in respect of ‘watch-list’ type countries, where there is cross-departmental interest and the potential for focused support.

3.36. The Stabilisation Unit supports an integrated cross-government approach to stabilisation, conflict and instability in a number of different ways.

a. **Analysis.** Supporting our Government’s analysis at a regional, national or sub-national level (including joint analysis of conflict and stability).

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Core staff support stabilisation operations and programmes in a number of different ways
b. **Crisis planning and developing strategy.** Participating in crisis planning processes and developing response strategies.

c. **Programme development, review and evaluation.** Supporting programme development, scoping, review and evaluation. Where strategically important and practically feasible, conducting detailed programme and project design.

   (1) **Technical assistance.** Providing direct support to government officials or key multilateral partners. This includes being the UK’s hub for international policing support to fragile and conflict-affected states.

   (2) **Deployments.** Finding the right people, with the right experience, and deploying them safely, with the right equipment, to the right place at the right time.

d. **Lesson learning and knowledge.** Capturing, analysing and sharing across government evidence of what works, to inform future conflict and stabilisation planning and response.

e. **Training.** Delivering cross-government training on: conflict, stability and security; security and justice; and women, peace and security. Participating in departmental/military training courses and exercises.

f. **Surge capacity.** Providing surge capacity and backfilling support to departments working in, or on, fragile and conflict affected states.

3.37. The Stabilisation Unit also controls the Civilian Stabilisation Group – a pool of over 1,000 civilian experts drawn from the public and private sectors. The Civilian Stabilisation Group has experts in stabilisation, governance, rule of law, livelihoods, communications, infrastructure, public finance, security sector reform and a myriad of other critical areas who work with local partners to assist a country’s recovery. The Group is made up of some 800 independent consultants (deployable civilian experts), as well as over 200 civil servants, from over 30 departments, across all grades. The Stabilisation Unit can also call on a pool of serving police officers when required.

3.38. At any one time the Stabilisation Unit is typically supporting around 180 deployed personnel in the field, in around 20 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and wider Europe.
3.39. Formerly known as the Security Assistance Group (SAG), 77 Brigade is a 1* formation created to enhance and integrate information activities and outreach capabilities in Defence. By merging the Military Stabilisation Support Group, Security Capacity Building Team, 15 Psychological Operations Group and the Army’s Media Operations Group into a single entity, it achieves synergy across these capability areas and provides the basis for transformative change in their employment and future development. As a key Defence partner with the Stabilisation Unit, 77 Brigade contributes to analysis and planning at all levels and cross-Whitehall. The Brigade contributes to contingent capability by supporting formation headquarters. This is primarily in the land environment but also applies to Joint Forces Command and the other Services where required.

3.40. The 77 Brigade partnership with the Stabilisation Unit places it on the interface with broader cross-government efforts to address the causes and consequences of instability. Through early engagement in planning and analysis, it helps to shape the conditions for an effective integrated and inter-agency approach, and ensures effective use of scarce resources. Underpinned by robust audience, actor and adversary analysis, the 77 Brigade contribution seeks to reinforce the centrality of influence with an imperative to focus activity and effects on achieving genuine and lasting behavioural change.
3.41. 77 Brigade is an enabler of, and contributor to, persistent overseas engagement and capacity-building efforts to prevent or resolve crisis without the requirement for military intervention. This includes providing a range of civil-military cooperation and thematic experts able to integrate military support and, where required, augment civilian capacity. The Brigade provides security expertise and a focus for the military contribution to cross-government security capacity-building and support to military-led capacity building, including training. A light footprint means that individuals and specialist equipment can be deployed rapidly over long distances to achieve pre-emptive or early effect. 77 Brigade contributes to overseas engagement and capacity building in a variety of ways.

a. Providing thematic experts to support the Permanent Joint Headquarters’ operational liaison and reconnaissance teams (OLRT) and missions led by the Stabilisation Unit or another government department.

b. Providing civil-military cooperation experts to integrate military support to other government departments or non-government organisation-led missions, including for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

c. Supports UK humanitarian assistance and disaster relief through liaison and planning and providing rapid needs assessments.

d. Specialist support to military-led overseas engagement and capacity building.

e. Specialist support to other force elements preparing for capacity-building tasks.

3.42. 77 Brigade contributes to contingent capability across the spectrum of operations by augmenting core formation headquarters staff and providing specialist information activities and outreach capability where required. Wherever possible, habitual relationships developed during training will be maintained at readiness and on deployment. The persistent 77 Brigade presence helps integrate other government departments and other agencies from the outset of contingent activity and provides continuity from planning, through execution and into an enduring operation. 77 Brigade helps to deliver an integrated approach set in the context of a shared strategic narrative. Supported commanders will be better able to: manage the civil-military interface; ensure that representatives and staff from other government departments, non-governmental organisations and other civilian agencies are properly integrated; and integrate and synchronise military with civilian-led activity.

77 Manpower for an OLRT may come from either the Joint Force Headquarters or Joint Forces Logistic Component or the High Readiness Headquarters.
3.43. **Civil-military cooperation** is an enduring staff function. It is defined as: the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.\(^78\)

3.44. **Military assistance to civil effect** provides a mechanism to harness military capability to build confidence and support for an enduring peace, focussing on the survival functions of a state – public order and the rule of law, basic public services and economic stability. Military assistance to civil effect can plug gaps and build institutional capability when indigenous agencies, other government departments or non-governmental organisations are unable to do so. Military assistance to civil effect is heavily reliant on Reserve personnel with thematic competences not routinely found in the military (for example, agriculturalists, power engineers, economists and public administrators).

**Resourcing stabilisation – The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund**

3.45. In April 2015, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund replaced the Conflict Pool and provided £1.033 billion of new and existing cross-government conflict prevention and security resources. The Fund is shaped by a reformed strategy and prioritisation process which produces a more streamlined, less layered, structure with a clearer line of sight from NSC decisions and to programme priorities, and greater alignment between UK security interests and conflict prevention goals.

3.46. Like the Conflict Pool, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund will contain a blend of official development assistance\(^79\) funding and non-official development assistance resources. These programmes can fund a range of activities, from security sector reform and training\(^80\) to projects implemented by grassroots non-government organisations and civil society organisations as long as they are aligned with an NSC strategy.

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78 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
79 Official development assistance funding must meet certain criteria set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; principally, that funding is focused on poverty reduction in specific, official development assistance-eligible countries. The UK has committed to providing 0.7% of gross domestic product for official development assistance funding.
80 For example, building integrity to reduce the risk of corruption and promote transparency and accountability.
3.47. **National planning principles.** The need for our Government to be more integrated was introduced in the 2010 SDSR and re-inforced in the 2015 SDSR. There are a number of joint strategies across government, including the *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, *International Defence Engagement Strategy*, *Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (CONTEST), the *Organised Crime Strategy* and the *Cyber Crime Strategy*. Joint planning is also essential as a shared analysis of the situation, efficient decision-making/coordination, and adequate resourcing, are key to a successful response. These strategies are intended to enable effective prioritisation and synchronisation. Ideally, the goal in any conflict-affected environment is to achieve an inclusive political settlement that creates the conditions for sustainable peace and a functioning state. Recognising the limitations on UK resources and leverage in different countries, our Government is likely, in many cases, to operate in concert with like-minded countries or in the context of a wider multilateral effort. Applying the following planning mechanisms helps our Government to think through its priorities, level of ambition and how best to engage in a given country, as well as ensure value for money (economy, efficiency and effectiveness).

3.48. **Joint analysis of conflict and stability.** A key tool for supporting the integrated approach is the joint analysis of conflict and stability (JACS). This can help build a shared, cross-government understanding of the context and basic drivers of the conflict and instability in a particular country. This enables our Government to develop a coherent, integrated strategy that draws together Defence, diplomacy and development tools. This integrated analysis of conflict and instability, always focused at the strategic level, also provides an opportunity to raise the profile of key issues, both with interlocutors in country including the diplomatic, Defence and donor community, as well as international partners and within the UK Government.

‘We will introduce a new cross government strategic conflict assessment. This will be used in conflict affected and fragile states to identify the situation specific interventions that will be most likely to succeed in helping to prevent conflict and build stability.’

*Building Stability Overseas Strategy*[^81]

3.49. **Military operational planning.** Operational-level planning is covered comprehensively in other publications.

a. JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine* – Chapter 2 addresses planning and managing the military contribution to multinational, multi-agency and national operations.

Key points

• The UK’s response to global instability and conflict is to consider and apply, where appropriate, all of the instruments of national power to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source.

• The UK, often alongside international partners, maintains the ability to respond swiftly and decisively across a full range of intervention scenarios.

• When crises emerge we will act to deliver rapid crisis prevention and response, improving our ability to take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating or spreading.

• The military instrument often plays a decisive role in providing or building a secure environment. However, crisis management cannot succeed without active cross-government and inter-agency cooperation.

• An integrated approach requires clear national objectives, strong political leadership and collaboration across departments to ensure the UK’s national power is coherently applied.

• National strategy directs the coordinated application of the three instruments of national power: diplomatic; economic; and military. These three instruments of power are underpinned by information and understanding.

• Diplomacy is key in understanding different conflicts and bringing parties together.

• Successful diplomacy depends on the power of persuasive negotiation, reinforced by capable and credible hard power.

• The military is the ultimate instrument and expression of national power.

• Building stability does not stand alone as a discrete type of operation; it is organic to almost all military operations.

• The preferred option will almost always be small-scale early engagement to prevent a fragile environment from deteriorating and escalating into full blown instability and conflict. Effective early intervention will almost invariably save lives and money.

• In support of national security objectives, and invariably within a wider cross-government approach, our Armed Forces provide critical capabilities that can support stability, tackle threats at source and respond to crises overseas before they impact on our national security.

• The least intrusive form of response, consistent with achieving national objectives and policy imperatives, should be the goal.
This chapter will look more closely at the military involvement in shaping a stable world. We will initially consider influence and understanding before looking at generic military activity and conclude by considering specific military contributions across each part of the 3Ps (protect, promote, prepare) framework. As outlined previously, it is important to understand that any military involvement will be part of the wider integrated approach.

Section 1 – Understanding and influence. 83
Section 2 – Generic military involvement. 89
Section 3 – Specific military activity in the 3Ps framework. 98
“In the days of Waterloo, the army was all about war fighting. Today we expect our army and our soldiers to be frontline ambassadors as well as fighting forces, wielding soft, smart as well as hard power...Better to reap the reward of early defence engagement than the whirlwind of later conflict.”

Secretary of State for Defence
RUSI Land Warfare Conference
1 July 2015

“Once you’ve identified the outcome that you’re seeking to achieve, you then go through a process of analysing the audiences that are relevant to the attainment of that objective, whether they’re actors, allies or adversaries. You then take a view on what effect you need to achieve on those various actors. Then you look into your locker of methodologies, which will arrange all things from soft through to hard power, and you work out the best method of synchronizing and orchestrating those range of effects to impart effect onto audience, to achieve the outcome.”

Chief of the General Staff
Chatham House
17 February 2015
Chapter 4 – Operational considerations and the military contribution

Section 1 – Understanding and influence

Understanding

4.1. Understanding provides the context for the decision-making process which informs the application of national power. The purpose of understanding is to equip decision-makers at all levels with the insight and foresight required to make effective decisions as well as manage the associated risks and second and subsequent order effects. Understanding is defined as: the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context. It is developed from all forms of information, some of which is regulated and analysed, like intelligence and Government papers, and some is unregulated, such as social media. Understanding in the context of our national interest:

- informs choice on developing state policy and strategies; and
- supports the application of national power to achieve influence.

4.2. Understanding is a critical component of stabilisation activities. As a global actor, we interact with different cultures, ethnic groups and races. It is crucial that we develop and maintain an understanding of those we wish to influence. Understanding may also help us to avert crises through applying soft power early on. Therefore, while Defence will develop understanding, it must not be in isolation and should interconnect with the other instruments of national power. Attempts to solve major security issues by military means alone seldom succeed in the long term (even if initially enjoying apparent success). Only by understanding a situation or crisis can the appropriate range of responses be planned and orchestrated. Responses may involve a variety of participants, including:

- other government departments;
- international organisations;
- non-governmental organisations;

82 See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04, Understanding.
Operational considerations and the military contribution

- other governments;
- academia and think-tanks;
- private and commercial actors; and
- local and regional populations.

4.3. Understanding must be built on up-to-date information, self-awareness, critical analysis, collaboration and creative thinking. Furthermore, building understanding is a collaborative process which requires cross-departmental analysis.\(^{83}\)

**Influence**

4.4. All activity, military and civilian, kinetic or non-kinetic can have influence. Based on an understanding of target audiences, influence activity should be focused towards creating effect. Military action should be assessed by its contribution towards influencing the key conflict relationship and achieving the eventual end-state.\(^{84}\)

\['You may not like what he is saying. You may abhor everything he stands for. But you are listening. The truth is that Osama bin Laden is very good at what he does. He is one of the great propagandists. He has an awesome understanding of the holy triumvirate of political communication: the power of the image, the message and the deed. And he understands how they work together.'\]

Jason Burke, *The Observer*\(^{85}\)

4.5. The desired outcome of cross-government activities is to change, or maintain, the character or behaviour of agreed audiences through physical and behavioural means. All multi-agency capabilities can contribute to this process. To achieve the desired outcome, activities need to be coordinated and focused. Operations in the information environment on approved target audiences, coordinated with the full spectrum of military capability, are likely to be the lasting and decisive element of a stabilisation campaign. Human beings are neither benign nor passive; they will respond to influence activity in different ways. The inherent risk is that we cannot control how actions, words and images are received and processed. Effective analysis and developed understanding will mitigate or reduce this risk.

4.6. Misunderstanding can lead to mistrust and increased tension. Deployed cultural advisers and locally employed civilians can provide invaluable advice and the skills to

\(^{83}\) More detail on understanding can be found in JDP 04, *Understanding*.

\(^{84}\) For more on influence and information activities, see Allied Joint Publication-3.10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.

\(^{85}\) *The Observer*, 31 October 2004.
decode and understand cultural nuance. Messages delivered by foreign spokesmen typically lack credibility and, regardless of content, are not as well received as those from familiar, trusted sources. International forces should seek to use established channels for messaging. Where these are absent or insufficient, they will need to build relationships with key leaders and the population to establish viable channels.

4.7. Influence is achieved when we change the behaviour of the target audience. It is not just about messages or media, but about how the combination of the word and the deed are portrayed, interpreted and understood by audiences when viewed through a lens of their own culture, history, religion and tradition. Influencing is challenging, and requires an understanding of target audiences that is difficult to achieve. It will be contested with adversaries who may have a significant cultural advantage.

4.8. Adversaries usually have a comparative advantage over intervening forces and agencies because they share religion, ethnicity, culture, history and geography with the population. Even in Northern Ireland where UK forces shared a common language and ethnicity (allowing every member of a foot patrol to read the graffiti, talk and listen to the population) the culture of the Republican movement was still not well understood. This is made much harder where we do not share a language and nearly all communication with the population has to be conducted through an interpreter.

Narratives

4.9. As a key element of the strategic communications plan, the narrative seeks to explain the actions of the main protagonists. The military will use a narrative to explain the purpose of their presence in theatre, and develop an appropriate and coherent narrative for each audience. The narratives that resonate best are those which embrace the concepts and language of target audiences, known as the

‘I am determined that we inculcate the idea of a ‘people-centric approach’ into our thinking – it is the orchestration of soft and hard levers aggregated to achieve ‘smart’ effect on a range of audiences that is decisive when applied at the right point in time and place.’

Commander Land Forces’ Directive, May 2014
‘stickiness’ of the message. All actions should be planned and executed to support this narrative – and not the other way around.

4.10. Narratives should be flexible so that they are not undermined by local messages designed to respond to current events. They should also be consistent with both the cross-government information strategy, any strategic communication strategy and, where possible, narratives of the host nation government. Strategic-level narratives set out broad themes which are reinforced by tailored, flexible local messages, creating a hierarchy of related messages. They should be:

- clear, credible and explain the campaign;
- acceptable to all intervening parties and the host government;
- linked to the UK’s political objectives;
- able to support local messaging;
- able to be backed up by coherent physical activity and imagery; and
- have a positive impact on a variety of target audiences.

In short, to make a compelling and persuasive case we need to align our words, images and actions to influence key decision-makers and their people for strategic effect. They must also be realistic and coincide with peoples’ expectations – this involves everyone, not just communicators. It will be better to under-promise and over-deliver, than over-promise and be seen to fail.

Military influence tools

4.11. The military will create the effects necessary to achieve influence, then derive the information activities required to realise those effects and subsequently orchestrate them during execution.\(^87\) Activities will be organised by type. All capabilities and types of activity are considered and, where appropriate, employed to create both physical and psychological effects in the most efficient and effective manner, although such effects are not mutually exclusive. Fires and manoeuvre, for example, clearly achieve psychological, as well as physical effects. Additionally, (although not exclusively) the military has a range of non-lethal tools specifically tailored to manage perceptions of information once it has been received. These include:

- information operations;
- media operations; and
- civil-military cooperation.

\(^87\) Op.Cit., JDP 3-00, Chapter 3 gives more detail on joint action. Land forces need a doctrine that is compatible with joint action yet adjusted for the characteristics of tactical land operations. This is integrated action. (More information can be found in Doctrine Note 15/01, Integrated Action, Director Land Warfare).
During planning, these tools should be fused together to form part of a coherent approach.

4.12. Any action must be accompanied by continuously assessing the transformative effects (planned and unplanned) of stabilisation activity and programmes and approaches must be adapted to manage risks and unintended consequences. Figure 4.1 illustrates how joint action enables the military commander to influence the target audience both at the strategic and operational levels.

Joint action – The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to effect an actor’s will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve influence.

(JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition, Change 1)

Figure 4.1 – The commander’s joint action tools: aligning actions, words and images in time and space

Deterrence and coercion

4.13. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine covers deterrence and coercion in detail. Deterrence and coercion strategies aim to counter threats to the UK’s security by communicating the consequences. The threat of a military

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88 JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, page 62.
response can influence an adversary’s calculation of risk during confrontation and opponents must be convinced that the potential consequences (the military, economic and diplomatic reaction) of their actions will outweigh any possible benefits. Deterrence and coercion strategies differ:

- deterrence aims to **dissuade** a course of action; and
- coercion aims to **encourage** a course of action.

4.14. Reassurance is a further facet of deterrence. Incentives (including financial incentives) may shape behaviour both before, and after, any threat of force. Incentives work well in tandem with threats. For this reason, deterrence and coercion strategies should consider all available national instruments combined – in other words, by adopting an integrated approach. Deterrence and coercion strategies are only viable if the threat of sanction is both credible and deliverable. Apparent weakness, or lack of resolve, will fail to deter threats.

4.15. In strategic terms, deterrence and coercion are ways by which the government might seek to secure its policy ends. Deterrence is broader than the UK’s nuclear capability; the nuclear deterrent is only one of the ways the UK deters threats and aggression. Deterrence and coercion is also achieved through conventional means and a wider, more flexible range of postures and responses with the associated levels of military and political risk.

4.16. Viable deterrence and coercion strategies depend on an opponent deciding that their interests are too valuable to risk. Deterrence and coercion strategies will be contested and commanders must understand the weight of effort an opponent will apply to achieve their aims. Opponents will assess:

- how they value the interests of their state or group;
- their perception of the balance of power;
- the bargaining space;
- the alternatives that they may consider to using force; and
- their expected gains and losses.

4.17. Therefore, a detailed understanding of the context, including the cultural aspects and the prevailing political, economic and strategic situation – as an opponent perceives it – is crucial. Deterrence and coercion strategies will only succeed if an opponent understands that the threats (or incentives) are credible. Effective deterrence and coercion strategies comprise four principles.89

- **Credibility**;

89 Further details can be found in JDP 0-01, Chapter 3, Section 3.
Section 2 – Generic military involvement

4.18. This section looks in more detail at how the military engages with building stability, and how this interacts (in a predominantly supporting way) with the civilian community, including national, international and indigenous civilian actors. Acknowledging the existence of discrete military activity, such as counter-insurgency, peace support operations and security force assistance, this section explores the escalating role of the military in preventing instability. The key function is to enable stability through providing a safe and secure environment for other (predominantly civilian) actors to operate within. The military will often play a substantial role in building and/or enabling stability. Within this context, the military will primarily engage with other security and insurgent forces, but may also be involved with economic, cultural and socio-political aspects.

Generic military functions

4.19. Providing a safe and secure environment. The primary, and often immediate, role of the UK military will be to contribute to providing security. This will include reducing or preventing violence, and protecting people and vital infrastructure. This will depend on the permissiveness of the operating environment and capabilities of the indigenous security forces (if the intervening external forces are there to support the host nation government). Military involvement may contribute to all the 3Ps (protect, promote, prepare), depending on the nature and stability of the state in question, however, the principal focus will usually be linked to the protect function. Wherever possible, the focus should be in assisting or supporting the host nation security forces to establish security rather than doing it for them.

‘Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.’

TE Lawrence

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91 Twenty Seven Articles, 1917.
4.20. **Extent of military involvement.** Stabilisation operations require multiple lines of activity, only some of which are suited to military leadership and implementation. A non-permissive environment may mean that the military are sometimes the only option for delivering certain activities; even those they would not normally conduct (for example, acting in the absence of civilian policing and governance). The potential risks of military involvement must be carefully considered and the starting point should be a deep understanding of the nature of the evolving political settlement. An integrated civilian and military effort will usually provide the best solution with military forces focussing on security and civilian actors leading on governance and development activities. Depending upon the situation, the military might be required to either:

- deliver in all environments;
- assist in delivering in a semi-permissive environment; or
- help enable in a non-permissive environment.

4.21. **Permissiveness.** The intensity of the contest for security will dictate permissiveness, which should improve over time. Within a permissive environment, the military will normally focus on its core roles. However, in non-permissive areas, the military contribution may have to be wider. In addition to establishing a robust security framework, the military may (in non-permissive circumstances) be required to contribute to wider stabilisation activities. Every effort should be made to obtain multi-agency support.

4.22. **Establishing human security.** Where a state lacks the capability or will to meet basic human security needs, individuals may transfer loyalty to any group that promises to do so, which may include adversarial groups. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services and sometimes even a crude form of justice. Therefore, winning the contest for human security is fundamental to developing host-nation government authority and, ultimately, state security. Human security may include protecting from deprivation and disease, as well as violence. Conflicts can cause large population migrations which may, in turn, trigger a famine or epidemic. On occasion, military forces may need
to provide emergency shelter, medical or food aid within the limits of their existing capacity. However, UK Armed Forces should only undertake humanitarian assistance in close consultation with the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), or with international organisations working through these departments.

4.23. **Countering adversaries and using force.** Direct military action against adversaries may be a central component of a stabilisation campaign. In this case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement will entail breaking the ideological, financial or intimidatory links within, and between, different adversarial and belligerent groups (as well as between them and the broader population). In some cases, operations may be required to seize the initiative from an insurgent. This will require using force, particularly where resistance comes from committed, irreconcilable and well-organised adversaries. There may be a fierce contest for the initiative, freedom of movement, authority, security provision and the support of the population. Failure to seize the initiative may fatally undermine a campaign. Using offensive air, land, maritime and special operations in a targeted, measured and highly discriminate manner may be required. Such operations may be intended to:

- decapitate adversarial command structures by killing or capturing key leaders;
- defeat adversarial armed groups where they hold something that has particular operational or political significance;
- disrupt or destroy adversarial offensive, support and propaganda capabilities; and
- deny adversarial groups safe havens from where they may launch attacks or challenge legitimate governance.

4.24. **Minimising damage.** Offensive operations must minimise civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure otherwise they risk undermining the broader influence effort and breaching international law. An operation that kills five low-level adversaries is counterproductive if the associated collateral damage leads to recruiting many more. The dilemma is that adversaries will often choose to fight among the people for just this reason. Since a contest of force should play to our advantage, creating the opportunity to use force decisively and minimise collateral risk will be a key challenge. There is always a risk that operations to secure an area will simply displace an adversary to a new safe haven beyond the commander’s control. If this happens, they may regroup, gain strength and strike where the host government and international forces and agencies are less able to respond. An alternative
Operational considerations and the military contribution

approach may be to isolate adversarial groups, gain information and disrupt their activities. In some circumstances it may be better not to strike at all but instead to gather intelligence for later decisive actions.

4.25. **Detention.** Wherever possible, any arrest, detention, trial and imprisonment of an individual should be carried out by the host nation. In exceptional circumstances where the host nation government lacks an effective police force, an independent judiciary or an effective penal system, it may be necessary for the military to conduct limited detention operations. Where the military are required to conduct limited detention operations, this must be done by appropriately trained and qualified individuals. The authority to conduct detention operations may be established by agreement with the host nation or a mandate provided by the United Nations Security Council and such operations should be short lived. Where permitted, tactical questioning and interrogation may provide a valuable source of actionable intelligence. This, in turn, enables more precise targeting and promotes the perception of progress, restraint and legitimacy.\(^{92}\)

**Engaging with the security and justice sectors**

4.26. **Security sector capacity building.** Security is a key enabler, without which other vital development cannot take place. Security capacity-building includes military, border, police and other internal security forces as well as their supporting institutions, together with non-state actors and civil society. Pre-conceived ideas about what affects security should be avoided; for example, in some countries agriculture and fisheries will be significant. These local forces must ultimately assume responsibility for security of the host nation and this may mean containing, and subsequently neutralising, irregular groups that threaten effective national governance. Therefore, building these units may demand emphasis that matches, or even exceeds, that devoted to directly defeating an adversary. Indigenous security capability will only be effective if underpinned by strong security institutions, such as a capable ministry of defence, together with responsive planning, personnel and procurement processes. There must be a balance between leading and supporting security sector and capacity building operations.

4.27. **Security sector reform.**\(^{93}\) If a country’s capacity for facilitating and protecting its own economic activities is compromised, either through conflict or natural disaster, the military may be used to help re-establish these. Security sector reform may help restructure a state’s military force, instil democratic principles and disband paramilitary organisations. Capacity building and training support will help to make the host nation’s forces more effective and efficient. Any military contribution to

\(^{92}\) Further detail on captured persons activities can be found in JDP 1-10, *Captured Persons.*

\(^{93}\) Security sector reform is sometimes referred to as security systems reform.
security sector reform will always be part of a bigger, civilian-led integrated approach. Security sector reform programmes are intended to establish a secure environment based on development, the rule of law, good governance and local ownership of security. Security sector reform is holistic in its approach to the security sector and includes all relevant actors in the process of either transforming an existing, but dysfunctional, security sector or establishing a new one. These programmes will include the host nation’s security services and should be tailored to address the specific environment.

4.28. **Security sector reform planning.** Strategic planning is important in supporting security sector reform activities to delineate responsibilities between civilian and military actors and to ensure that resources (financial, personnel and expertise) are managed effectively. A common understanding between contributing nations about levels of participation, resource allocation and national objectives is required to ensure a coherent and viable approach. Responsibilities for coalition or alliance partners should be integrated into a single campaign plan, developed at the national and military-strategic level and designed to support an integrated approach.\(^{94}\)

4.29. **Security sector reform programmes.** The military may support security sector reform programmes in both permissive and non-permissive environments. This could include using military subject matter experts (for example, military police and service legal advisers). Typical tasks may include:

- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration\(^{95}\) of former combatants, including child and female soldiers;
- combating small arms and light weapons proliferation;
- transitional justice;
- strengthening the rule of law;
- counter-corruption and building integrity;
- de-mining; and
- countering human, weapon and drug trafficking.

\(^{94}\) For NATO this would be a ‘comprehensive’ approach.

\(^{95}\) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is sometimes expanded to include ‘reinsertion’ thereby becoming disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration.
4.30. **Security sector stabilisation.** Because implementing security sector reform can take considerable time, it may be necessary to conduct a short-term activity as a stop gap. Security sector stabilisation seeks to enable essential and minimum security and justice to protect and promote a legitimate political authority and help prepare the foundations for transition to longer-term security sector reform. Although challenging to implement, security sector stabilisation can provide time and space for a political authority to gain legitimacy or acceptance, thus consolidating the process of achieving a political settlement. Security sector stabilisation is intimately connected with, and dependent on, political and governance stabilisation activities. Effective security sector stabilisation may provide a basis for other stabilisation activities and a bridge towards longer-term recovery, including security sector reform. The latter needs a political settlement and sufficient government capacity to undertake holistic reform – such conditions may not exist early on in stabilisation environments.

4.31. **Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.** Disarmament, demobilisation, (reinsertion) and reintegration programmes aim to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments to enable recovery and development. This is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. These programs deal with the post-conflict security problems that arise when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching between conflict, peace, recovery and development. A successful disarmament, demobilisation, (reinsertion) and reintegration programme will help to establish a sustainable peace, while failed efforts will disrupt security sector reform, prevent peace processes and destabilise communities. The primary attributes of such programmes include the following.

‘Security can’t wait for Security Sector Reform. [There is] an increasingly relevant realisation from fragile and conflict affected states that although the establishment of state wide capable, accountable and responsive security and justice institutions is the only sustainable solution, this requires a stable but possibly elusive political settlement as well as substantial long term reform and capacity building. In the meantime, it is critical to respond to security needs now. A two speed approach is therefore required which stabilises the security situation in the short term principally through local actors whilst creating the conditions for longer term security sector reform.’

Stabilisation Unit

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a. **Disarmament** is the management of arms that may include the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants, including civilians. It also includes developing arms management programs.

b. **Demobilisation** is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.

c. **Reinsertion** is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation to return to society, but prior to the process of reintegration.

d. **Reintegration** is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.

4.32. **Security transitions.** Wherever possible, the host nation should have primacy for security. In some cases, however, a transition of authority may be necessary. Once a secure environment has been established and public order restored, the international military force commander must transfer operations to an indigenous lead as soon as possible. This will be a political judgement, informed by security considerations, and may be a transition to either an indigenous civil police lead (police primacy) or the host nation’s military. Transition occurs when either the mission has been accomplished in accordance with a transition plan, or when the coalition partner governmental officials direct certain activities/missions to end.\(^{97}\) Successfully transferring functions, duties and responsibilities from military forces to non-military or other military forces involve a number of key activities which include:

- conducting early\(^{98}\) planning with the host nation, international organisations and non-governmental organisations;

- establishing workable objectives, goals and end-states;

- providing for adequate intelligence and communications to all agencies involved in the transition;

- ensuring unity of effort;

- harmonising the civil with the military effort; and

- establishing the appropriate command and control to manage the transition.

\(^{97}\) Further detail on transitions can be found in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/11, *Partnering Indigenous Forces*.

\(^{98}\) Noting that, for example, the effective training of a police force can take several years.
Military involvement in conflict prevention

4.33. **Rapid response to conflict prevention and escalation.** As outlined in Chapter 1, preventing conflict will invariably be preferable to countering it once it has started. An integral part of crisis management is preventing armed conflict by containing confrontation and preventing its escalation or expansion. Situations are usually easier to stabilise when an intervention occurs quickly, thus reducing the likelihood of escalation. Given sufficient political will, the military can respond rapidly, either in isolation, or as part of a wider effort, to an area of unrest. Our Government will seek to prevent conflict through persistent modulated engagement using soft power for soft effect and reverting to hard power, where necessary, as a last resort.

4.34. **Re-establishing enduring stability.** Often the root causes underlying crises can only be addressed effectively at the strategic level, through diplomatic and economic means, although this can be augmented by an implicit threat of military activity. Consequently, crisis management and re-establishing enduring stability will demand an integrated, rather than simply a military, response. The military's capacity, expedience and firepower provides diplomats with added leverage to strengthen their influence over the protagonists. Defence's contribution to preventing and reducing violence is potentially considerable, and is an area in which the military could have primacy over civilian actors. Specific roles for the military may include the following activities.

a. **Defence Engagement.** Defence Engagement is the military contribution to soft power. It may reduce or negate the need for military intervention to deal with emerging crises, develop an understanding of emerging threats or provide broader humanitarian assistance. Defence exports, key leader engagement, capacity building through establishing training teams, delivering exercise programmes and arms control engagement can all help promote regional stability and reduce the risk of conflict. However, conflict prevention is not confined to sequential activities pre-conflict. While early Defence Engagement can reduce the likelihood of prolonged instability and prevent the need for more expansive and expensive military intervention, conflict prevention activities should also form part of any enduring campaign to reduce the possibility of escalation and to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace post-conflict. Military intervention, or the threat of it, is hard power which may be used to achieve peace enforcement or prevent a crisis from escalating and spreading. Preventing conflict is a key focus for our Armed Forces involved in Defence Engagement. The success, or not, of this approach will often depend upon the level of understanding accrued by our forces. As the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Ray Odierno noted:
“We have learned many lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that – whether you are working among citizens of a country, or working with their government or Armed Forces – nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values.”

b. The overseas network. The UK’s network of Defence Attachés ensures that our Armed Forces and MOD are represented overseas with Defence Attachés having an integral role in our Government’s coordinated effort abroad, facilitating Defence relationships and enabling delivery of the International Defence Engagement Strategy and Defence operations. Working in Embassies and High Commissions, they are the Chief of the Defence Staff’s representative and Head of the Defence Section working in support of Her Majesty’s Ambassador or High Commissioner. They work to deliver our Government’s foreign policy priorities, which are complemented by MODs regional and sub-regional strategies. They have a broad remit including, but not limited to:

- influencing in support of national objectives through developing close and effective bilateral relationships and regional awareness;
- promoting and protecting UK prosperity;
- supporting UK current and future contingent operations;
- promoting UK Defence credibility and capability;
- building international capability and capacity through security sector reform, arms control engagement, regional stabilisation and maritime security; and
- enduring insight and influence.

In addition, there are approximately 250 personnel deployed as part of Loan Service Teams in 18 countries. Their roles are broad, depending on the requirement of where they are employed and can cover capacity building, advisory and mentoring roles, training delivery, technical support and expertise, support to staff colleges and undertaking executive roles in headquarters. Some are host nation funded and will specifically support that country and its requirements while others may have a wider regional remit.

Security force assistance. Security force assistance (SFA) aims to improve the capability and capacity of a host nation or regional security organisation’s security forces and their supporting institutions. Security force assistance will normally be part of a wider security sector reform programme (described previously) and can occur across the full range of military operations. While security force assistance is primarily intended to help partner countries defend against internal and transnational threats, it may also involve assistance in countering external threats or enable participation in multilateral operations. Ideally though, security force assistance should be engineered to prevent crisis and conflict by providing the host nation with sufficient capacity to act alone in denying potential threats. Security force assistance activities occur to support achieving specific objectives shared by our Government. The purposes of such activities are to create, maintain or enhance a sustainable capability or capacity to achieve a desired end-state.

Section 3 – Specific military activity in the 3Ps framework

4.35. The remainder of this chapter explains how the military contribution to building stability fits within the 3Ps framework. This section uses a descriptive approach and attempts to give examples of the 3Ps activities, noting that these will often complement and overlap with each other.

P1 – Protect political actors, the political system and the population

Where violence persists, a minimum precondition for stability is providing sufficient security for the population to go about their daily lives and for the host nation government to function.

4.36. Establish security. Within a security sector, the initial response by military forces is to establish a safe environment, provide security and help facilitate stability during and after an armed conflict or a disaster. The military may enforce cessation of hostilities and monitor ceasefires and peace agreements. Military forces also work to establish the conditions necessary to begin disarmament, demobilisation, (reinsertion) and reintegration activities.

100 More detail on security force assistance is available in AJP-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance.
4.37. **Protection options.** A commander can employ a range of techniques (some of which may be contentious) including:

- static protection of key sites, for example, market places and refugee camps;
- persistent security in areas secured and held, for example, intensive patrolling and check points;
- targeted action against adversaries, for example, search or strike operations; and
- population control, for example, curfews and vehicle restrictions.

4.38. **Protection and support.** Military forces may also provide protection and support to key civilian personnel to ensure their continued contribution to the overall stabilisation operation, as well as protecting and maintaining critical infrastructure until the host nation can assume these responsibilities. Military personnel may be required to:

- protect government-sponsored civilian reconstruction and stabilisation personnel and resources;
- protect contractor and civilian reconstruction and stabilisation personnel and resources;
- provide emergency logistic support;
- protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries and property ownership documents;
- protect and secure strategically important institutions (such as government buildings, medical and public health infrastructure, the central bank, national treasury, integral commercial banks, museums and religious sites); and
- protect and secure military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps and means of communication.
Explosive hazards, such as minefields and unexploded ordnance, inflict stress on the population while restricting freedom of movement, hindering international trade and distracting from the ability of the fragile state to secure its borders and boundaries. Removing these hazards improves the safety, security and well-being of the local population while promoting the free movement of people and materials within the host nation.

4.39. **Secure and serve the population.** The indigenous people are the decisive ‘terrain’. Together with host nation partners, the military will work to provide the people with security, give them respect and gain their support. They also facilitate establishing local governance, restoring basic services and reviving local economies.

4.40. **Hold areas that have been secured.** Once an area has been secured, it should be held. The local people will need to believe that they will not be abandoned by either the international security forces or their indigenous partners. A reduction in force numbers and overall presence should be done gradually; rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. A degree of situational awareness should be retained after the transfer of responsibility to local security forces.

4.41. **Situational awareness to inform protection of people and assets.** With its ability to access even the most remote areas, air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is often vital for providing timely situational awareness in unstable regions. This may be a precursor to deploying joint forces or possibly informing the global community which can help clarify the situation on the ground. Air (and space) surveillance may act as a restraint in developing conflict situations by exposing the actions of those involved to international scrutiny. If stabilisation operations are well-established, air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are likely to lie at the heart of intelligence gathering efforts across a broad spectrum of activities.

4.42. **Providing humanitarian assistance.** In extreme situations where development or humanitarian agencies are absent, international military forces may be required to provide a limited amount of essential services including emergency shelter, medical or food aid. However, the military delivering such aid may further politicise humanitarian assistance and will not always be welcomed by external agencies. Further detail on humanitarian assistance can be found in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance*.

4.43. **Developing secured areas.** As well as isolating the adversary from the population, securing key areas helps to support economic activity, enable major infrastructure projects and encourage effective governance and rule of law. Once the situation allows, such areas should be consolidated and expanded. It will be
critical to bring the weight of the integrated approach to bear at the right time and place. Concepts such as secured development zones can provide a focal point by concentrating security, local governance and development effect and so enable them to be mutually reinforcing. Rapidly integrating local government apparatus, including security committees, together with initiatives that generate local employment and economic growth will be critical to maintaining security and stability.

### Kosovo 1999

In 1999, the United Nations (UN) Security Council authorised the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to protect the population in Kosovo. Robust military intervention improved physical security for much of the population, including the Serb communities. Improving physical security did enable progress on immediate stabilisation objectives, such as creating a stable civilian police force and the Kosovo Protection Corps. This also enabled progress on longer-term state building objectives, such as institutional reform of the security and justice sectors. However, because the improvement in security was not matched by political progress on the status of Serb enclaves in Kosovo, there was no prospect of drawing down KFOR because lack of external protection could well lead to a resumption of violence.

#### 4.44. Border control.

A central component of civil security is the ability of the host nation to monitor and regulate its borders. Border controls are necessary to regulate immigration, control the movement of the local population, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling and control the spread of disease. As with other areas, the personnel used for these roles must be identified and vetted to ensure that potential adversaries do not inadvertently reintegrate into society where they could potentially plant the seeds for future adverse activities against the host nation’s government and its agencies.

#### 4.45. Economic stimulation.

Providing protection for the population stimulates economic activity and supports longer-term development and governance reform. Importantly, it also generates confidence in local people about their own local security situation – their collective human security – and an economic interest in ongoing stability. This also denies adversarial groups one of their principal strategies for expanding their support base.
P2 – Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes

‘The central challenge of stabilisation is to bring about some form of political settlement in a pressured and violent context.’

4.46. As already explained, much of the military contribution across the 3Ps will overlap. In particular many of the activities outlined within this section that relate to the security and justice sectors will also be very relevant to the subsequent section on preparing for the longer-term recover (P3).

Helmand, Afghanistan 2008-14

In Helmand, Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Team supported District Community Councils in seven districts. These councils applied a modified election/selection process in-line with the tribal structures in Helmand that remain a key component of both formal and informal governance. Since 2011, the councils were re-elected and the number of local people participating in the election process has increased.

There have also been notable shifts regarding the elders who are elected, meaning that more significant elders are becoming involved, including in areas within districts where communities had been less connected to government and had chosen not to be represented in the earlier elections. These councils bolstered the executive branch of government in Helmand by reaching out to communities and by addressing security and justice issues. They became the Provincial Government’s first port of call when dealing with disputes in districts. Importantly, these councils not only articulated their districts’ priorities for development they operated sub-committees formally tasked with holding local security and justice actors to account (and provided an accountable mechanism for operating informal justice mechanisms).

These relationships in particular provided an important stabilisation effect as central Helmand emerged from overwhelming violent conflict. Furthermore, the provincial approach meant that coordination was necessary with DFID-supported national programmes to ensure that the councils helped promote state building in the province, linked to national processes. The initial stabilisation activity has now become a longer term, more sustainable, state-building approach.

4.47. The military contribution to political processes. There are identifiable military tasks in supporting political processes. Whichever activities are undertaken, the primacy of civilian leadership in this area is paramount and due care and attention must be given to ensuring that military and civilian actors have frank and open channels through which to decide how and when to ask military personnel to support

101 The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation 2014.
political processes. This is particularly important in hostile environments where civilians may not have the level of access and freedom of movement that military personnel have. Military tasks are likely to include facilitating freedom of movement (for specific actors), identifying interlocutors and spoilers to political processes, protecting political systems, infrastructure and individuals and monitoring nascent and actual peace agreements (such as ceasefires or non-escalation pacts).

4.48. **The military contribution to governance.** Determining the military contribution to governance will require an understanding of what constitutes ‘good enough’ governance in context. Local security levels will affect the capacity of international forces to contribute to wider governance. Given limited resources of time, money, troops and organisational capacities, prioritising those tasks that may fall to the military will be essential. Where possible, governance activities should be implemented by international civilian agencies and enabled, only where necessary, by the military. In non-permissive environments, civilian access will be limited. However, security is usually conditional on a degree of popular consent and this, in turn, may be conditional on restoring basic governance. Accordingly, military forces may be drawn into those governance areas essential for early progress. Military substitution for absent civilian actors should be temporary and civilian expertise must be integrated into planning from the outset.

4.49. **Demonstrating progress and legitimacy.** Those opposing the government will exploit perceptions of injustice by depicting the state as ineffectual and corrupt, and international forces culpable by association. Consequently, for the stabilisation campaign to succeed, it will be essential to show progress towards a security sector that is effective, legitimate, transparent, accountable, just and subject to the rule of law. The UK contribution is likely to be determined by a team drawn from DFID, FCO, MOD and the Home Office, and may range from providing temporary training teams to rebuilding whole areas of defence and national security. Societal conflicts create ideal conditions for the proliferation of predatory armed groups, criminal networks and an increase in opportunistic crime. For many, conflict and criminal activity becomes their livelihood. In turn, the population’s experience of state security forces can be extremely negative including security forces that perpetrate human rights abuses or weak and corrupt judicial systems.

4.50. **Planning assessments.** One of the key starting assumptions for any planning should be considering the nature of the political settlement and the incentives and calculations of key political figures in relation to the security and justice sectors. The security environment may inhibit the ability of civilian actors to operate and, in the absence of indigenous and international civilian agencies, the commander may need

102 Military commanders should have an understanding of the local power brokers to try and ensure that one group is not adversely affected by sponsoring another.
to conduct a pre-assessment based on assumptions. A full assessment should follow as soon as possible. The assumptions may include:

• the likely role, size, structure and budget of the military and police forces, judiciary and penal systems;

• priorities for early capacity building (for example, whether the military or police take priority) and within this, what security capabilities are needed first, and at what scale, to support this campaign; and

• the need for immediate disarmament, as a security imperative, ahead of any full disarmament, demobilisation, (reinsertion) and reintegration programme.

4.51. **Host government ministry reform.** UK military and MOD civilians may provide advice to host government officials within a range of ministries. Assistance may include advice on policy, strategy, risk assessment, capability development, budgets, resource management and procurement.

4.52. **Governance tasks.** Local confidence is likely to be enhanced by demonstrable participation of host nation authorities. International forces should work through government agencies to generate local capacity and influence. We must be prepared to become involved in tasks for which we have to carry out much of the planning and delivery, but for which ultimate responsibility lies with local authorities. Stabilisation and reconstruction teams are examples of integrated civil-military organisations that enable governance and reconstruction activity to be coordinated where the security situation prevents civilians from working freely. Tasks in which the military may find themselves involved (as enablers) could include restoring judicial institutions or reforming the security and justice sectors.

4.53. **Restoring judicial institutions.** In many developing states, the primary sources of justice are traditional ones. These include tribal elders, religious authorities and informal local courts administering long-held rules and customs. During the initial stages of a campaign, military forces may be involved in identifying local key leaders and any informal justice mechanisms to help incorporate them into the reform process. International forces may also be required to start refurbishing or reconstructing facilities, possibly including court houses, police stations and prisons.

4.54. **Reforming the security and justice sectors.** Figure 4.2 shows that the security and justice sectors deliver a fundamental function of government (second only to defending borders) and help form a cornerstone of state sovereignty and the rule of law. In addition to military forces, intelligence services, militia and police, the security and justice sectors also include:
When functioning effectively, the security and justice sectors contribute to a generally safe environment for the population. These sectors also contribute to wider regional security, for example, through effective coastal and border protection.

4.55. **Challenges to reform.** Ideal preconditions for reform will rarely exist because justice and security underpin a country’s balance of power and, in some circumstances, the fragile political settlement from which a government’s authority is derived. Attempts at reform may challenge vested interests and upset existing power relationships. Therefore, reform is primarily a political undertaking and not simply a technical activity.

4.56. **The military contribution to reform.** Opportunities to drive through change may result from the negotiations leading to a political settlement, for example: on the back of initiatives to demilitarise society; as clauses within formal peace agreements; as conditions attached to foreign aid; or following elections. If possible, the security sector reform analysis to establish the scope of the reform programme – and by
implication the military contribution – would result from a full assessment involving both the host nation government and international partners. It would include:

- the priorities of other nations involved in providing equipment, training and infrastructure;
- an estimate of the pace and cost of reform;
- an agreement with the host nation government regarding the size, shape, role, governance arrangements (including transparency and accountability) and priorities for its security and justice sectors; and
- an agreement on the broad structures of the security and justice sectors and their impact on society.

4.57. Security force capacity building. As explained previously, security sector reform will be an important part of stabilisation across several areas. The number of forces required to carry out security tasks in stabilisation may exceed those needed during conventional combat operations. There are hard choices to be made between allocating UK troops for concurrent capacity building and allocating them for operations to isolate and neutralise adversaries, recognising that the demands of these separate tasks require different skills and structures. Ultimately, success will involve recruiting, training and possibly equipping indigenous security forces and embedding with them. Today, when UK and other allied nations have fewer forces than in the past, investment in capacity building is ever more important and the long-term sustainability of effective host nation forces will be essential to maintain security.103

4.58. Police transition. Once an acceptably secure environment is established and public order restored, the commander should consider moving from an international military security lead to an indigenous lead. This will be a joint political and security judgement. There are at least two options:

- transition from international forces to an indigenous military security lead;
  or
- transition direct to a civil (police) lead – police primacy.

In either case, the international community is likely to be asked to assist the host nation government to generate basic policing capacity so that the rule of law can be seen.104

103 More detail can be found at Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance.
104 More detail can be found at AJP-3.2.3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police.
4.59. **Police primacy.** In the majority of cases, police primacy should be the ultimate goal as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. This also demonstrates the host nation government’s commitment to governing through the rule of law. Effective police primacy may be unachievable until relatively late in the campaign and attempts to establish police primacy prematurely can be counterproductive. Coalition military forces will eventually hand over their responsibilities to other military forces. These could be under the control of NATO, the UN or the host nation. The ultimate goal of transition is to transfer all functions performed by coalition military forces to host nation control. Since the UK has no equivalent of a gendarmerie, military commanders may become involved in policing and interior security matters. Commanders may need to improvise using military police and other re-roled forces, augmented with any deployable police specialists that are available from contributing nations. Host nation police primacy should always be the ultimate goal.

4.60. **Developing indigenous police services.** Where possible, the responsibility for ongoing internal security should be taken by a non-military police force with a mandate for law enforcement and strong links to the judiciary. Ideally, this involves creating a community-based police service, with a clear separation between the roles of the police and the military. However, while police primacy for internal security remains the goal, community policing models assume a level of consent which is unlikely to be achievable in the midst of violent conflict. The policing model must be realistic and care must be taken to ensure that it does not undermine any longer-term police development. Military support to the police should take place under civilian/policing leadership. Coalition security forces may need to lead on police basic training, leaving specialist training, such as evidence handling and forensic investigation, to others who may be private contractors.¹⁰⁵

4.61. **Developing resilience.** The purpose of capacity-building is to build the legitimacy of the fragile state which then ensures resilience. Achieving security is fundamental, but that activity must be connected to realising the strategic purpose. To build legitimacy and resilience, international partners also need to assist the

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¹⁰⁵ Further detail can be found in the Stabilisation Unit paper, *Policing the context: Principles and guidance to inform international policing assistance*, March 2014.
fragile state to build, and pay for, its own reliable police and armed forces. Properly organised and trained, local police and military are key to securing public support, gaining intelligence and maintaining security.

4.62. **Border forces.** Effective border control is essential to combat regional criminality and prevent foreign fighters from moving freely. Customs and immigration duties are also often a major source of government revenue where there is no significant natural resource. International forces may be tasked to patrol borders and mentor customs, immigration and border control agencies.

The British-led International Military Assistance and Training Team in Sierra Leone is another good example of how a sustained training effort can deliver a capability for continental peacekeeping. Ten years after the bloody civil war in 2002, 1000 members of the Republic of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces completed training prior to joining the African Union Mission in Somalia. This is a good example of partner nations taking a more prominent role in providing security in their regions. This may also have a stimulating effect on neighbouring states who witness progress and development.

4.63. **Intelligence and security services.** Intelligence and security services are normally located within central government, reporting directly to senior decision-makers. In conflict-affected countries, intelligence and security services are routinely misused, often acting as a repressive arm of the state. There may also be rivalry between the intelligence and security services and the armed forces which should be monitored.

4.64. **Building capacity to contribute externally to international security.** When working with a country’s armed forces, the aim is not only to build their internal capacity, but to enhance their support to international peacekeeping missions. For example, British Peace Support Teams in South Africa and Kenya support the training of the Regional African Standby Forces.

4.65. **Sustainable capacity.** Building and deploying credible forces for international security builds trust and pride among the domestic population. Creating professional and capable forces will ultimately reduce the need for future UK interventions. This also enhances the legitimacy and resilience of peacekeeping missions. The system of UN reimbursement for mandated operations allows a state to maintain security capability without it being a fiscal drain on precious national resources. Although peacekeeping soldiers are paid for by their own government, the UN reimburses member states that provide equipment and support services to peacekeeping operations.
4.66. **Engagement and conflict resolution.** Societal conflicts are rarely resolved quickly or decisively – negotiated settlements are usually necessary locally and nationally. International forces are likely to be involved in negotiations that help communities connect with the government. Typical tasks may include:

- providing a secure environment for negotiations;
- direct and regular engagement with key elites and government authorities;
- settling disputes, for example, over land and property seizure;
- public outreach and information programmes; and
- enforcing ceasefires and support to transitional justice arrangements.

4.67. **Supporting elections.** Fair and secure elections can be useful political processes. However, if elections are conducted too early they may provoke an increase in violence. The commander should assess their likely impact on security and advise the host nation government and international agencies accordingly. Considerations include:

- how local elites, government authorities and international organisations are perceived locally and nationally will impact the plan for delivering an election;
- where possible, elections should be implemented by the host nation government; and
- whether international authorities may be required to deliver the election where local authorities generate feelings of intimidation and insecurity.

4.68. **The effect of money on security.** Money can have an immediate impact upon security and this can be either positive or negative. Money can be used for direct security programmes such as funding indigenous forces, or indirect consent-winning initiatives such as settling specific grievances before they become sources of disaffection and resentment. Conversely, large influxes of money into
4.69. **Corruption.** The ability of the armed forces to achieve mission goals – be that in defence capacity-building or military operations in complex environments – can be fatally undermined by corruption if the threat it poses is not recognised and counteracted. Training and capacity building which are usually part of upstream conflict prevention are at risk of failure if corruption and weak management hollow out the cohesion, capacity and legitimacy of indigenous forces. Corruption in recruitment and promotion, for example, can reduce the effectiveness and sustainability of training if the wrong people are nominated to attend courses. (This was the case in Mali, where the US and France provided training.) Corruption within the supply chain can divert vital resources which will, in turn, limit the capability even of well-trained forces to achieve a meaningful effect. While capacity building in the defence sector is increasingly likely to occur as part of an integrated approach within the Defence Engagement framework, it will still retain a large element of military-to-military activity. Therefore, the military must be able to identify corruption and recognise the adverse effects it can potentially have on their mission.

4.70. Stabilisation operations, may inadvertently exacerbate corruption levels through unintended support for malign local actors, which in turn can fuel the growth of criminal or terrorist networks. Injecting significant resources into the operational environment (for example, through contracts or military assistance projects), combined with a lack of effective monitoring, can result in wasting scarce resources if project implementation is not verified. This can also create opportunities for corrupt practices. In Afghanistan, a lack of accountability within some military supply chains led to the armed forces’ resources being redirected to the insurgents and directly strengthening those opposing the NATO International Security Assistance Force forces. Such instances will likely lengthen the duration of a campaign and cost more lives. Consequently, countering corruption should be an essential component of planning at all levels for the military contribution to stabilisation.

4.71. **Anti-corruption.** Anti-corruption measures can directly affect those elites on which a political settlement depends and stabilisation missions will often encounter resistance. International forces may need to support anti- and counter-corruption measures, including:

- integrating coalition efforts to reduce the threat that corruption poses to mission success;

- developing and promoting norms of conduct for indigenous security forces and governments;
• establishing and promoting procedures and arrangements supporting the norms of conduct and including anti-corruption safeguards such as whistle-blower protection;

• ensuring security forces are properly paid and that those funds are accounted for to reduce opportunities for corruption;

• training security forces to manage corruption threats and monitoring their effectiveness;

• protecting and supporting key rule of law actors, including police, prosecutors and the judiciary;

• tracking the movement and destination of aid (such as food and clothing) and weapons;

• overseeing contract implementation and management procedures, for example, in channelling reconstruction funds to local suppliers;

• monitoring contract implementation to ensure delivery and reduce opportunities for diversion of resources; and

• tasking intelligence cells to focus on corruption mapping during planning to ensure that the actions of the force do not inadvertently increase the risk of corruption.

Collectively, these measures can help international forces ensure that their actions do not exacerbate corruption threats and will help develop legitimate, accountable, and ultimately more effective indigenous forces. We should expect resistance to the notion of public accountability at first. Ultimately, if corruption threatens campaign progress, then international partners may need to make their support conditional upon host government reform.

4.72. Non-state governance. Where local institutions are absent or ineffective, then alternative forms of non-state governance may exist based on a mix of coercion and local incentives. In such instances, there may be no choice but to create new authorities from scratch. Local knowledge and an assessment about who wields local influence will be critical in determining what is likely to work. New institution-building initiatives could make matters worse by eroding the local, informal capacity, in which case strengthening local forms of governance may be a better option.
Operational considerations and the military contribution

Local capacity-building guidelines for the military commander

Consult widely. Develop relationships with a broad set of indigenous actors. It is dangerous to select or empower local leaders, not least due to the risk of misjudging the ability of local elites to gain the confidence of the population. Take an inclusive approach and work with a broad spectrum of indigenous actors.

Foster local ownership. Prioritise tasks so that we concentrate on delivering what people really want according to their circumstances (for example, demands will differ between urban and rural areas) and avoid supply-driven initiatives dominating the agenda. Encourage locals to take the lead.

Look beyond the state. Important capacities exist outside state institutions – within civil society; tribal groups; religious organisations; and the private sector. These capacities will be crucial gap-fillers in the short term, and even when formal state institutions strengthen, they are likely to remain a source of local influence and parallel capacity.

Balance effort. Improved stability requires a balance of effort between capacity-building initiatives and those activities that are aimed at stopping the violence.

Aim for transition from the start. Plan for transition to international civilian or host government agencies to help manage local expectations about ongoing external support. This keeps the imperative for indigenous self-reliance at the forefront of measuring campaign success. Transition planning should be based on realistic benchmarks being met, balanced with time imperatives.
P3 – Preparing for longer-term recovery

‘Stabilisation, state building and peace building together combine short-term actions to establish good enough security and stability with actions to address the structural causes of conflict, poverty and instability over the medium to longer term. This enables us to engage earlier (e.g. pre-peace process) and more effectively in an ongoing conflict. And it helps us to fill the gap between violent instability and the establishment of normal diplomatic, development and security relations.’

*Building Peaceful States and Societies*¹⁰⁶

‘Even the fastest-transforming countries have taken between 15 and 30 years to raise their institutional performance from that of a fragile state.’

*World Development Report 2011*¹⁰⁷

4.73. **Sustained systemic effort.** The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has determined that government transformations can take 30-40 years which illustrates the need for a long-term approach. Experience has shown that ‘train and equip’ initiatives are often both ineffective and unsustainable unless they are linked with more far-reaching governance reforms. There is no ‘quick-fix’ for fragile states and sometimes aid flows in at a rate beyond a state’s capacity to absorb it.

4.74. **Developing internal capacity.** The physical security of the state and its citizens is recognised as a cornerstone of sustainable economic and social development. Capacity development is a major and complex challenge. Despite substantial donor funds dedicated to building capacity over the past decades, the lack of sustainable country capacity remains one of the main reasons why many developing countries are failing to meet their development goals. Capacity development refers to the ability of people and organisations to define strategies, set priorities, solve problems and achieve results and is, therefore, a much broader concept than training and technical assistance.

4.75. **The military contribution to development.** There are fundamental differences in both approach and time frame between stabilisation and development. Development activity focusses on reducing poverty, which in a fragile state usually centres on addressing long-term structural causes of conflict and instability. In contrast, stabilisation activity focuses on the much more immediate task of creating

¹⁰⁶ DFID, *Building Peaceful States and Societies*, page 37.
an environment within which political resolution and longer-term processes (such as development) might eventually occur.

4.76. Conflict can be a driver of poverty and vice versa. UK forces will often find themselves working overseas alongside targeted development programmes. The key UK Government stakeholder delivering overseas development assistance is DFID. The military commander should therefore understand the drivers underlying the DFID approach to enable effective cooperation. DFID is responsible for managing our Government’s aid to developing countries and supports longer-term programmes to help tackle the causes of poverty, such as conflict and state fragility. This work forms part of a global promise to support progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals. DFID is required by law to comply with the International Development Act (2002) which stipulates that funds must not be spent on military equipment and that expenditure must contribute to the overall goal of reducing poverty.

4.77. Working with DFID and other development actors. At the strategic level, cooperation between DFID and the military may involve integrated assessments and developing shared objectives. At the operational level, it will require cooperative implementation planning or pre-deployment training. At the tactical level, it could involve the secondment of DFID development advisers into deployed military headquarters or the military delivering DFID-funded projects. In addition to DFID, there could be an array of development organisations within the area each with their own aims and objectives. Commanders should seek to build relationships with the more significant of these organisations. They should assess the potential effects these projects could have on stability within the region, as well as on their own security operations. Commanders should seek to coordinate their activities with those of the host nation and development agencies, ideally within a single, integrated theatre plan.
4.78. **Protecting development.** In a permissive environment, the military contribution to economic and infrastructure development will be minimal and based on maintaining security. In volatile environments, adversaries may target development workers, be they government or non-government, indigenous or intervening, military or civilian. Commanders should be aware of the potential risks development workers face within their area of operation and consider what priority should be afforded to their protection. In circumstances where civilian agencies are unable to deploy, international forces may be requested to initiate specific, high priority, localised development tasks. These may include:

- generating employment opportunities;
- infusing money into local economies;
- restoring and protecting essential infrastructure; or
- supporting the restoration of market activity.

4.79. **Harnessing local resources.** The commander should, where feasible, use local knowledge, skills, manpower and materials as well as link local development initiatives to national priorities, programmes and structures. The military presence may have a significant impact on local economies and the advice of civilian specialists will be vital.

4.80. **Restoring essential services.** Local services, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter and medical care all contribute to human security. These may have deteriorated over time or been destroyed through violent action. Essential services may need to be restored at the outset when the security situation is weakest. The military contribution will support local and international humanitarian and development organisations to expand their footprint. Where these agencies cannot operate, the military contribution will be limited, but could include:

- restoring potable water supply and sanitation – while respecting local customs (for example, Afghan women may only have the opportunity to socialise outside their homes at the local well);
- enabling power and fuel provision;
- assisting local authorities to reopen markets; and
- restoring local hospitals, schools and clinics.

4.81. **Growth requires a stable and secure environment.** In helping to deliver a stable and secure environment, the military will always have a significant, if indirect, contribution to make. There may also be times when more direct military
Operational considerations and the military contribution

Involvement in economic development will be necessary, as discussed previously. Although security and governance reform remain priorities, early attention to economic growth increases the likelihood of success. While economic measures and reconstruction are not a panacea for stability, they can make a contribution. Priorities for international agencies include measures designed to:

- stabilise the economy, protect and reconstruct critical economic infrastructure;
- generate employment; and
- address any underlying economic drivers of conflict.

4.82. **Infrastructure repair.** The military has limited capacity and expertise to undertake civil infrastructure repair. Military engineers may be used but, wherever possible, commanders should encourage using local resources and skills. Long-term infrastructure development is the responsibility of the host nation ministries or departments; supported by specialist contractors and development agencies. The aim must always be to work in close conjunction with host nation and civilian agencies.

4.83. **Reconstruction and development.** Infrastructure is fundamental to economic recovery, for example:

- transport networks allow freedom of movement, trade and social interaction;
- telecommunications systems support every element of society; and
- power generation facilities are vital for economic production.

The military contribution to infrastructure development is likely to be an enabling one. However, in environments where civilian agencies are absent or unable to move freely, the military contribution could include:

- as a priority, repairing and protecting, national transportation infrastructure (airports, roads, bridges, railways, ports);
- restoring and protecting essential telecommunications infrastructure;
• repairing and protecting important commercial facilities and key assets associated with economic production, import and export (vital for revenue generation);

• repairing and protecting key power generation facilities and distribution systems; and

• training and developing indigenous expertise.

4.84. **Local civil development.** Some level of local security, rule of law and national governance are the necessary conditions for re-developing indigenous economic and institutional capacity. The US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction identified five principles of reconstruction.\(^{108}\)

a. Security is necessary for large-scale reconstruction to succeed.

b. Developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as bricks and mortar reconstruction.

c. Soft programmes (governance and economic development) serve as an important complement to military operations in insecure environments.

d. Programmes should be geared to indigenous priorities and needs.

e. Reconstruction is an extension of political strategy.

4.85. **Prioritising projects.** When prioritising and sequencing infrastructure projects, it is useful to distinguish between infrastructure associated with essential government services such as hospitals, schools, water, power generation and sanitation, and infrastructure associated with the country’s economic capacity such as transport links, telecommunications and significant commercial facilities. Whilst both are important, the former are associated with the immediate well-being of the population while the latter are essential for economic recovery.

4.86. **Sustainable projects.** Although airports, railways, ports and communications facilities may represent iconic projects, if they are not manned by air traffic controllers and ground crew, train drivers, shipping masters and engineers to maintain them, they are unsustainable. One damaging aspect of long-term conflict is that highly trained people, critical to the economy, leave the country and do not return. This means there is a need to train a new generation – something that takes significant time and effort.

4.87. **Economic considerations.** Monetary policy is fundamental to stabilising an economy. Military involvement is likely to be limited to enabling the safe passage of World Bank or International Monetary Fund officials to key ministries and meetings, and ensuring the security of critical financial institutions, infrastructure and stockpiles. The international force should also be careful not to undermine monetary policy by, for example, making large cash payments in foreign currency and should instead reinforce currency stabilisation initiatives by making payments to legitimate contractors in the local currency at local rates. Economies cannot stabilise until levels of violence begin to fall, allowing local people to re-establish normal patterns of economic life.

4.88. **Encouraging growth.** While reducing violence is likely to stimulate restoring normal economic activity, local growth may depend on targeted international development assistance. If international interventions are successful, growth will be self-sustaining. Consequently, successful businesses expand and begin making longer-term investments, entrepreneurs reappear and locally financed reconstruction can resume. Fluctuating violence will have an effect on local economic conditions. Once areas have been secured, they have the potential to become important centres of economic recovery. Plans should identify mechanisms for accessing development funds and channelling them into areas that are held at the necessary tempo. When international forces and agencies occupy an area they stimulate economic recovery through increased demand for goods and services as well as targeted development initiatives. In some circumstances, international forces and agencies may sponsor large-scale employment programmes (cash for work programmes) as a temporary solution to mass unemployment. These are often low-wage job opportunities for unskilled workers and are designed to minimise interference with more traditional and profitable sectors. Such initiatives, however, should be translated into sustained employment prospects based on traditional transactions among the local population.

4.89. **Supporting specific economic sectors.** The agricultural and fishing sectors are often central to the well-being of the population. Commanders should familiarise themselves with local crops and seasonal cycles and understand how these are used by adversaries to generate funds and how they may relate to surges in the level of violence. The location of markets, areas of primary production which support them, and the transport routes and storage facilities *en-route* are all critical components of the sector. The commander may be required to ensure safe access from the farm gate to market and security for local consumers. In some circumstances, direct assistance to producers will be required to accelerate both the recovery of agricultural and fisheries production. Possible military tasks include:
• repairing the enabling agricultural and fisheries infrastructure (irrigation systems, power generation and distribution systems, fishing vessels and so on);

• providing supplies, including an adequate supply of fuel;

• protecting post-harvest storage facilities; and

• providing mediation for land or fisheries disputes.

4.90. **Local labour.** While hiring local labour and issuing contracts boosts incomes and generates broader economic growth, care should be taken to minimise potentially disruptive effects on local labour markets, in particular, pay scales. International forces should seek to avoid creating large disparities in wages between that which can be earned on the local market or working for the host government and that which is possible working for international forces and agencies. Commanders usually need to remunerate local staff at higher levels to attract quality personnel and compensate for added risks associated with supporting international forces. However, salaries should not be so far above local market rates that they entice skilled workers or professionals to leave important jobs in the community for less important, but better paying, jobs working for international actors. It is particularly important to get this right with respect to security force wages. Local personnel working for international forces should not make more money than those working for the indigenous army or police.

4.91. **Risks and benefits of development.** The commander should consider who benefits and who risks exclusion from development initiatives and programmes, and the potential negative effects. A particularly useful tool is the Red Cross Better Programming Initiative. This explores the potential impact of development programmes on the connectors and dividers between people, allowing planners to gauge more accurately the likely effects of programmes and projects on conflict dynamics. Experience shows that delivering aid may exacerbate the conflict by having the following unintended consequences. It may:

- be misappropriated by adversaries;

- distort local markets;

- benefit some groups and not others, causing further tension;

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Experience shows that delivering aid may exacerbate the conflict by having unintended consequences.

• substitute for local resources, freeing them up for further conflict; and/or

• legitimise the cause of competing factions and adversaries.

4.92. In a stabilisation context in particular, any external (including military) development-related activity must be guided by consideration of how it might impact on the legitimacy of the state and/or local authorities. For example, substituting state service delivery is unsustainable and may directly undermine the legitimacy of the state/local authorities. As a minimum, ensure that the authorities are seen to be planning, coordinating and monitoring delivery by third parties; specifically, they are in charge and responsible for delivery, even if not actually delivering themselves. Likewise, it should not be assumed that simply by delivering projects that the area will become more stable. The way in which such initiatives are implemented is what is key; do they bring communities, local leaders and authorities together in a way that builds relationships, improves state-society relationships and strengthens the legitimacy of local authorities and the state? When in doubt, we should be guided by the ‘do no harm’ principle. 110

4.93. **Quick impact projects.** Quick impact projects (QIPs) are characterised as short-term, small-scale, low-cost and rapidly implemented initiatives that are designed to deliver an immediate and highly visible impact, generally at the tactical level. Their primary purpose is to generate consent for the presence of military forces (both host nation and international) and, where possible, to generate confidence in the host government. Local measures to reinforce security effect may sometimes be possible through such projects. For UK Armed Forces, sources of funding include the centrally funded Conflict, Stability and Security Fund – most likely to be approved at the country level – or funds made available by MOD. It is essential that QIPs are consistent with local needs and priorities and adhere to Stabilisation Unit guidelines. It should be noted, however, that the value of QIPs is contested. Unless they are part of a carefully coordinated and integrated approach, they can frequently be destabilising and create divisions within and between communities.

110 ‘Do no harm’ is one of the United Nation’s humanitarian principles.
Key points

- Any military involvement will always be part of the wider integrated approach.

- Understanding is a critical component of stabilisation activities.

- The primary, and often immediate, role of the UK military will be to contribute to providing a safe and secure environment.

- Stabilisation operations require multiple lines of activity, only some of which are suited to military leadership and implementation.

- Security is a key enabler, without which other vital development cannot take place.

- If a country’s capacity for facilitating and protecting its own economic activities is compromised, either through conflict or natural disaster, the military may be used to help re-establish these.

- Defence Engagement is the military contribution to soft power. It may reduce or negate the need for military intervention to deal with emerging crises, develop an understanding of emerging threats or provide broader humanitarian assistance.

- All actions should be planned and executed to support the narrative.

- The indigenous people are the decisive ‘terrain’. Together with host-nation partners, the military will work to provide the people with security, give them respect and gain their support.

- The central challenge of stabilisation is to bring about some form of political settlement in a pressured and violent context.

- Once an acceptably secure environment is established and public order restored, the commander should consider moving from an international military security lead to an indigenous lead.

- Even the fastest-transforming countries have taken between 15 and 30 years to raise their institutional performance from that of a fragile state.

- UK forces will often find themselves working overseas alongside targeted development programmes.
### Annex A – Defence Engagement inputs/activities categorisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Activity type</th>
<th>Sub activity type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visits (inwards/outwards)</td>
<td>High-level international engagement (HLIE), including inward visits</td>
<td>Ministerial visit¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of Staff visit²</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top official visit³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working-level international engagement, including inward visits and work of Foreign Liaison Staff</td>
<td>Conference/seminar⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2* visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff talks and visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ship visit⁵</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unit visit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft visit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sport visit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ceremonial/musical visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conference/seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Foreign Defence Attachés in UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other working-level international engagement⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. UK ministers outbound, foreign ministers inbound.
2. CDS, CNS, CGS, CAS, CJFC, VCDS, PUS (4* military and civilian).
3. 3* military/civilian.
4. Includes financing, sponsoring, hosting and attending inbound, outbound and third party conferences and seminars.
5. Includes visits in support of Defence exports.
6. Including work with think tanks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Activity type</th>
<th>Sub activity type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK presence in host nation (under UK Embassy)</td>
<td>Defence section</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Resident Defence Attaché</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional conflict advisers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Civilian defence adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other presence in host nation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Embedded personnel</td>
<td>Loan service personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange officers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to multilateral organisation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other embedded personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign embed in UK post</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK resources and enablers</td>
<td>Provision of UK facilities and infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of UK intelligence/information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of UK logistic/engineering support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of access, basing or overflight (ABO) rights in UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK involvement in joint projects (including science and technology)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other UK resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International agreement/memorandum of understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Defence exports</td>
<td>Participation in trade/air show</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment demonstration</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence and security industry day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence section support to exports</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other export activity or support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Activity type</td>
<td>Sub activity type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Training and education | Routine training/education | International Defence Training (IDT)  
- Tier 1<sup>7</sup>  
- IDT – Tier 2<sup>8</sup>  
- IDT – Tier 3<sup>9</sup>  
- UK places on foreign course  
- Masters programme  
- English language training  
- Other courses  
|                   |                            | Regionally Embedded Training Team<sup>10</sup>  
|                   |                            | Short Term Training Team (STTT)<sup>11</sup>  
|                   |                            | Training for UK Forces by host nation  
|                   |                            | Training for UK Forces by UK  
|                   |                            | Adventure training  
|                   |                            | Other short-notice or bespoke training  
| Exercises and operations | Defence exercises         | Combined bilateral exercise in host nation  
|                   |                            | UK support to host nation exercise  
|                   |                            | UK exercise in host nation  
|                   |                            | Training for UK forces by UK (for example, BATUK or BATUS)  
|                   |                            | Foreign observers at UK exercise  
|                   |                            | Multinational exercise  
|                   |                            | NATO exercise  
|                   |                            | UK observers at a foreign exercise  
|                   |                            | Other exercise  
| Operations        | Partnered operation        |  
|                   | UK operation               |  
|                   | Enabling support to UK-led operation |  
|                   | Other operation            |  

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7 Education and training courses ‘that are considered to be of the highest security cooperation value and are regularly over-subscribed’. (Joint Service Publication (JSP) 510, International Defence Training, paragraph 0504). It covers key officer career courses and initial officer training.

8 ‘Courses of international security cooperation value, where demand for places does not normally exceed capacity.’ (JSP 510, paragraph 0507.)

9 ‘Courses of lesser or no international security cooperation value.’ (JSP 510, paragraph 0508.) Can include Cranfield University and Defence Academy courses.

10 For example, permanently based overseas and established (can be international) for example, BMATT, BPST(EA), IMATT – training is bespoke.

11 Majority operating abroad, wide range of potential activities, organised as a response to a need.
Establishing ways of working more closely with other international actors is important.
Annex B – The UK’s principles for stabilisation operations and programmes

Cluster 1: The central element – the primacy of politics (Principles 1 and 2)

1. Work within the political context.
2. Ensure local political sustainability.

In-line with the UK approach to stabilisation, the ‘principles’ start with the ‘primacy of politics’. Without a full understanding and consideration of the local and national political context and its dynamics, stabilisation interventions will have little chance of success. This cluster makes clear that the UK Government is a political actor, working in complex political contexts, to achieve a political end, and always needs to consider its own role within these dynamics. It reiterates the need to ensure that any longer-term solution needs to be grounded in local political sustainability.

Cluster 2: Success factors – minimise internal obstacles (Principles 3 and 4)

3. Enable strong leadership and management.
4. Integrate and coordinate appropriately.

As a political actor, the UK Government is primarily concerned with maximising its impact on a situation. The complexity of stabilisation environments means that there are invariably significant external challenges to contend with, over which we often have limited influence. Working together effectively as one Government, however, is within our control, and likely to lead to a greater overall UK impact. This does not mean endless navel-gazing, but means: engaging across Government to identify common interests; effective leadership in setting objectives, and continually testing them in the light of changing circumstances; coherent and integrated delivery mechanisms; and efficiently managing resources to deliver defined priorities. Beyond our Government, establishing ways of working more closely with other international actors is also important.
Cluster 3: Success factors – flexible and responsive engagement (Principles 5, 6 and 7)

5. Plan iteratively.
6. Analyse continually.
7. Deliver contextually.

Stabilisation contexts are often rapidly shifting, which means that what is appropriate or feasible often changes and needs to be constantly reviewed. For stabilisation activities to make an effective contribution to the overall goal, there needs to be an ongoing process of analysis, planning and evaluation. This gives our Government the scope to adapt and respond to the changes in the environment.

Cluster 4: Success factors – relationship management (Principles 8 and 9)

8. Engage broadly.
9. Communicate coherently.

Stabilisation interventions are necessary when the political structures for managing competing relationships and interests have broken down and violent conflict has broken out. Interventions, therefore, require us to operate outside normal channels and think through how to engage with those outside established state structures. This cluster reflects the need to engage with non-state actors, including armed groups, and promote the participation of marginalised groups to create the foundations for stability. Stabilisation environments are often plagued with misinformation and rumour which can inhibit stabilisation activities and undermine impact. Stabilisation practitioners should therefore be aware of how the wider population perceives developments and ensure that these stakeholders are aware of activities being undertaken and the rationale behind them. Effective two-way communication is part of the political dialogue that will determine the impact of stabilisation.

Further detail on the UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes can be found in the Stabilisation Issue Note (SIN) dated October 2014.¹

¹ http://www.sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications/stabilisation-series
## Lexicon

### Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied administrative publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chief of the Air Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJFC</td>
<td>Commander Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Chief of the Naval Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>Countries at Risk of Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSF</td>
<td>Conflict, Stability and Security Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDES</td>
<td>International Defence Engagement Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDT</td>
<td>International Defence Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>JACS</td>
<td>joint analysis of conflict and stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCN</td>
<td>joint concept note</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDN</td>
<td>joint doctrine note</td>
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<td>JDP</td>
<td>joint doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>joint service publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Security Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSRA</td>
<td>National Security Risk Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLRT</td>
<td>operational liaison and reconnaissance team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUS</td>
<td>Permanent Under Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>quick impact project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIN</td>
<td>Stabilisation Issue Note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCDS</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stability is the end-state: stabilisation is one of the approaches used to get there

Stabilisation is inherently political

Where possible the host nation should have primacy

The UK contribution to stabilisation is civilian-led

Understanding will be key

The military role in stabilisation will be an enabling or supporting one

The integrated approach is fundamental to stabilisation

Stabilisation is ambiguous, messy and complex