Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment

Allied Joint Publication-3.7

Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

23 February 2016

1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.7, Edition A, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR RECOVERY OF PERSONNEL IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT has been approved by the nations in the MCJSB, and is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 6511.

2. AJP-3.7, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt.

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Major General, LTUAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office
Allied Joint Publication-3.7

Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment

Edition A Version 1

Allied Joint Publication-3.7 (AJP-3.7), dated February 2016, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff.

[Signature]

Director Concepts and Doctrine
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Adopting NATO Doctrine

NATO underpins the defence of the UK and our allies, while also providing deployable, expeditionary capabilities to support and defend our interests further afield. In addition, the European Security and Defence Policy specifies that European Union-led military operations should also use NATO doctrine. DCDC plays a leading role in producing NATO doctrine; the UK holds custodianship for several NATO Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) and participates actively in producing all others.

The need to achieve maximum coherence and interoperability within, and between, our closest allies and partners is vital. NATO is the institution best placed to help us achieve this. In July 2012, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary issued clear direction on how the UK’s contribution to NATO could be further improved, stating that:

‘We should use NATO doctrine wherever we can, and ensure coherence of UK doctrine with NATO wherever we cannot.’

In response, DCDC revised the UK doctrine architecture. Our doctrine now comprises:

- NATO AJPs (may have directly replaced a JDP equivalent);
- NATO AJPs with UK caveats or supplements are necessary in the form of ‘green pages’;
- national doctrine (JDPs).

Where an AJP is adopted in lieu of a UK JDP the latter document will be withdrawn from extant UK doctrine architecture. Where necessary, the publication will also include UK text, diagrams, vignettes and photographs, all with a green background or border to distinguish the content. Such a hybrid document has a split cover
with both NATO and DCDC livery. These additions will be made when appropriate to explain a particular UK approach to operations, to aid understanding or to increase appeal/interest. No NATO text (against a white background) will be altered or removed. UK green pages take precedence over NATO doctrine where competing terms and concepts differ. This move re-enforces the UK’s commitment to NATO and gives our Armed Forces greater interoperability within the coalition than before.
# RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS

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Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
# RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATION</th>
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| DEU    | Para 2007:  
The expression “uncertain or hostile operational environment” does only cover conventional threats. CBRN threats and hazards are not covered by this expression but they could be within the JOA and have to be considered.  
Para 1008:  
Contracting personnel may be considered as civilian personnel. For the legal status of contractor personnel under international law and the resulting legal consequences the situation in the individual case considering all circumstances must be respected; in particular such as the existence of an armed conflict, the type of the conflict, the authorization by the contracting authority and the activities of the contracting company.  
Para 5012:  
"Enemy" is no NATO agreed term. AJP-3.7 does not introduce a new definition for this term. Therefore, it remains unclear who exactly will be addressed – particularly in delineation to the NATO agreed term “adversary” which has been used within the same paragraph. The term “enemy” is not appropriate and should be replaced by the term “adversary”. |
| ITA    | With reference to para. 4018, ITA considers that, in case PR activities are coordinated from an airborne platform, the Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC) is also the Mission Coordinator (MC). |
| **NLD** | According to the Netherlands, Search and Rescue (SAR) is an integral part of PR, and therefore the current version of AJP-3.7 does not cover all activities of PR. The document will be implemented according to its title "Personnel Recovery in a hostile Environment". |
| **USA** | (1) The US has reservations with numerous terms (definitions and acronyms) that do not conform to the guidance found in C-M (2007) 0023. These are shown on the accompanying comment matrix. The US reservations are withdrawn once the terms are formally agreed by NATO and reflected in the NTMS. |

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Reintegrate
Section IV – Adaptation

Lexicon
Part I – Acronyms and abbreviations
Part II – Terms and definitions
UK 0.1. UK authority for personnel recovery is owned by Director Joint Warfare and nests within the wider force protection policy. Despite a transition from the term joint personnel recovery (JPR) to personnel recovery (PR) by NATO, the abbreviation PR is potentially easy to confuse with public relations. JPR will therefore remain the extant UK terminology and for the purpose of this document should be considered interchangeable with the term PR.

UK 0.2. Specific authorities and direction for UK forces in the preparation, planning, execution and adaption phases of JPR are provided in UK Reference F and should be read alongside this doctrine.
Preface

0001. The isolation, capture and/or exploitation of NATO personnel during operations could have a significant negative impact on operational security, morale of assigned forces, next of kin and families, and public support.

0002. Member nations provide NATO with the personnel and assets necessary to carry out NATO operations, in turn, NATO must ensure that there are means available to recover the personnel under its responsibility who have become isolated, while in the same vein, troop contributing nations must ensure that their personnel have been appropriately trained and equipped to assist in their own recovery. NATO has the responsibility of establishing an architecture capable of recovering the personnel who have become isolated while participating in NATO operations.

0003. Political. It is the Alliance nations' responsibility to ensure the security of their representatives. Public opinion is therefore highly sensitive to the welfare of isolated persons. Indeed, the exploitation of an isolating event can have a major impact at the political level, either directly or indirectly, by weakening the nations' participation in ongoing operations, or by pressuring political leaders to change their priorities.

0004. Strategic. The strategic level translates political guidance/will into military objectives. This supports the process of managing risk, meeting political intent and identifying the right allocation of resources for Personnel Recovery (PR).

0005. Operational and tactical. An isolating event may require redirecting the employment of forces from important
objectives towards PR missions, and limit their actions and freedom of movement.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Section I – Aim

1001. This document provides the fundamental principles for the recovery of personnel in a hostile environment, during North Atlantic Council approved NATO operations, taking into account nation’s responsibilities and considerations where applicable.

1002. The troop contributing nations may have differing Personnel Recovery (PR) philosophies, policies, priorities and capabilities. In a multinational force, an overarching PR doctrine is required in order to facilitate unity of effort and enhance PR measures.

Section II – Scope

1003. PR is a joint responsibility which embraces a wide range of situations requiring different levels of responses.

1004. This document applies to operations, which encompass military, civilian and contractor personnel deployed in support of a NATO operation.

Section III – Limitations

1005. Nations are responsible for recovery of personnel over their territory in accordance with international agreements. Search And Rescue (SAR) is a national responsibility and is out of scope of this document. NATO will provide recovery capability for its forces.
1006. While PR and Hostage Release Operations (HROs) are linked, NATO has doctrinally separated HRO from PR and made it part of Special Operations Force (SOF) doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures. NATO SOF, along with a variety of NATO forces, may be involved in an HRO.

Section IV – Definitions

1007. **Personnel recovery** (PR). The sum of military, diplomatic and civil efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. (This term is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)

1008. **Isolated personnel** (ISOP). Military or civilian personnel who are separated from their unit or organization resulting in a loss of positive and/or procedural control, that may require them to survive, evade, resist exploitation, and either have to make their way back to friendly control or require assistance to do so. (This term is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)

UK 1.1. Isolated personnel are described as military or civilian personnel who are separated from their unit or organization through a loss of positive or procedural control and may be required to survive, evade, resist exploitation, or facilitate their own extraction.¹

¹. UK Reference F.

1009. **Survival, evasion, resistance and extraction (SERE)**. A set of tactics, techniques, and procedures that is intended to give isolated personnel the skills to survive in any environment and to evade capture. Failing that, to resist exploitation by captors and, if the situation permits, escape captivity to finally
support their own or assisted recovery and return with dignity. (This term modifies an existing NATO Agreed term and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)

1010. **Reintegration.** The operational process of providing medical and psychological care to personnel recovered from isolation, and debriefing them for intelligence and lessons learned purposes. (This term is a new term and definition and may be processed for NATO Agreed status.)

UK 1.2. Current UK policy describes reintegration as the process of providing medical and psychological care to personnel recovered from isolation and debriefing them for time-sensitive intelligence and lessons identified purposes. Reintegration aims to return personnel to full duty status, the responsibilities for which are detailed in Annex F at UK Reference F. This process was known as ‘care after recovery’ in previous UK doctrine.²

CHAPTER 2 – PERSONNEL RECOVERY SYSTEM

Section I – General description

2001. Personnel Recovery (PR) is a joint responsibility which should also be addressed at component command level and below. The operation's joint force commander (JFC) and staff must conduct a thorough mission analysis that considers all available PR options and capabilities to successfully plan recovery operations within the Joint Operation Area (JOA). PR involves a balance of activities between the three elements of the PR system: commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel. This includes commanders and staffs trained to integrate and synchronize PR planning and operations into all operational activities, and recovery forces manned, trained and equipped to exercise and execute PR missions.

2002. Personnel recovery is conducted in four phases:

a. **Preparation.** In PR, a key to success is the proper organization, training, equipment, and employment of the involved forces so as to gain and maintain the ability to process relevant information and to take appropriate action.

b. **Planning.** Commanders and staffs must consider all available PR options and capabilities to successfully plan PR operations within their areas of operations. Options to recover isolated personnel include military, diplomatic, or civil options, or a combination thereof.

c. **Execution.** The PR system is centred around five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. Along with these tasks are the supporting
activities required in the case of an isolating event. The ability to complete these tasks is not the work of a single entity, but rather the collective and concerted efforts of the command and staff elements, forces, and isolated personnel. The PR method used for this execution task depends on a number of factors.

d. **Adaptation.** Adaptation results from the continuous analysis of all aspects related to PR during preparation, planning and execution leading to improvements of and changes to the PR system when and where needed.
Figure 3.1 – Personnel recovery system

PR is a system that combines options, methods and elements, and is based on appropriate education and training. The PR system comprises four phases which prepares three elements through education, training and equipping to plan and execute PR. Planning and execution considers three recovery options: diplomatic, civil and military across all phases of operation. Commanders should know the PR capabilities available to maximize unified action, achieve economy of force, and enhance situational awareness to enable those most capable of executing the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. The entire system continually improves and learns from mistakes and successes through adaptation.
UK Figure 2.1 note. It is often confusing to the reader of this model that survival, evasion, resistance and extraction (SERE) appears in the execution phase of the model, yet is also a training activity. During the preparation phase, the education and training that applies to personnel is SERE training. During the execution phase, isolated personnel may be required to employ the tactics, techniques and procedures of SERE to promote their own recovery.
Section II - Personnel recovery elements

2003. PR involves a combination of activities between the three elements of the PR system, as depicted in Figure 2.1: commanders and staffs, the recovery forces and the personnel at risk of isolation:

a. **Commanders and staffs** trained to integrate and synchronize PR planning and operations into all operational activities.

b. **Recovery forces** manned, trained and equipped to plan, exercise and execute PR missions. The nature of the required recovery force varies in line with the demands of the task.

UK 2.1. The UK has no aspiration to develop a dedicated combat search and rescue (CSAR) force. The UK already possesses force elements capable of recovering isolated personnel from high threat areas. Previous examples include:

- quick reaction forces (Northern Ireland), (standard for all operations to deal with ‘man away’ incidents);
- immediate response teams (Bosnia); and
- airborne reaction forces (Afghanistan).

Retaining and developing this UK combat recovery capability will preserve the UK’s strategic freedom of action and operational effectiveness. A combat recovery capability will serve to maintain morale and meet the expectations of the public, media and next-of-kin.
Section III – Personnel recovery options

2004. The recovery of isolated personnel includes military, diplomatic and civil options, or a combination thereof:

a. Military. The military option includes the preparation, planning, execution and adaptation of activities by commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate isolated/evading personnel.

b. Diplomatic. National governments are the lead for all diplomatic activities to prepare for, support and possibly execute the recovery of isolated personnel.

c. Civil. Civil organizations, such as governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and international organizations, civil authorities and private citizens could play an important role in securing the release of captured and detained personnel.

2005. Although civil and diplomatic options are not under the command of the operation's JFC, they should be considered during the preparation, planning and execution phases of PR.
UK 2.2. This doctrine is concerned with joint personnel recovery (JPR) through military means only. However, it should be noted that recovery through other means (diplomatic and civil) is possible. Commanders should consider all options and JPR planners and staff should be aware of methods of accessing these channels, should the need arise. Civil methods are often difficult for the military to access as organisations may not wish to engage in dialogue with the military. On such occasions, other government departments may be able to engage. Military commanders will normally have no authority over diplomatic or civil recoveries; however, they may be called upon to support their efforts. Notable examples of diplomatic and civil recoveries are below.

a. **Diplomatic.** Recovering 15 sailors and Royal Marines from HMS Cornwall detained by Iranian forces in 2007 achieved through diplomatic channels.

b. **Civil.** In 1984, Terry Waite (the Archbishop of Canterbury’s envoy) successfully negotiated with Colonel Gaddafi for the release of four British hostages held in Libya.

**Section IV – Operational environment**

2006. Joint forces may conduct a wide variety of activities from combat to humanitarian assistance within the JOA. Experience demonstrates that a wide range of military activities will be required simultaneously, rather than single focus activities.

2007. Alliance forces will be required to deal with a complex and diverse range of risks, situations and demands to manage the crisis through military operations, and personnel may encounter a wide range of potential situations when
conducting operations. These situations could range from a permissive to an uncertain or hostile operational environment with the expectation of engagement by adversary forces.

2008. The development of proper plans will depend on the ability of the designated commander and principal staff officers to observe and accurately assess conditions within the JOA.

2009. Regardless of the operational environment, forces must be trained and ready to respond to isolating events across the operational spectrum.

2010. Commanders should be aware of the pertinent conditions prior to execution of any mission. Additionally, isolated personnel may encounter different levels of exploitation if captured and must be trained appropriately.

Section V – Personnel recovery methods

2011. To accomplish a recovery, the commander may choose various recovery methods related to risk, complexity of operation, scale, environment, etc., such as Combat Recovery (CR), Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR), Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) or Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These methods are briefly described in Lexicon, Part 2. This doctrine only uses “PR methods” as a term to describe recovery methods.
UK 2.3. To assist a commander’s understanding of the full spectrum of JPR missions, they need to be aware of the different activities.

a. **Search and rescue.** Search and rescue (SAR) refers to the location and recovery of persons in an environment where hostile interference is not expected. Deployed SAR (DSAR) is the recovery of isolated personnel, in support of deployed operations and exercises, where no threat is posed by hostile interference. This is a UK doctrine term acknowledged by, but not used by, NATO/US.

b. **Combat recovery.** Combat recovery is the recovery of isolated personnel from a situation where hostile interference may be expected.

c. **Combat search and rescue.** Combat search and rescue (CSAR) is the application of specific tactics, techniques and procedures by dedicated forces to recover isolated personnel in distress, who themselves are trained and equipped to receive this support, from a situation where hostile interference may be expected.

d. **Non-conventional assisted recovery.** Non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR) involves using non-conventional forces or other types of assistance when conventional means are not suitable. NATO nations may conduct NAR using special forces or other surrogate/indigenous forces trained to assist in moving isolated personnel through a network that returns them to the safety of Allied forces.
UK 2.4. UK Figure 1 explains the military JPR recovery methods available to a commander at increasing levels of threat and risk.

**UK Figure 1 – Summary of JPR spectrum**
CHAPTER 3 – GUIDING PRINCIPLES

3001. **Principles.** Any ground or maritime unit, aircrew, agency, or individual observing an isolating event, making contact with isolated personnel, or recognizing a potential isolating event is about to occur should immediately notify their appropriate Command and Control (C2) elements. Ideally, the recovery should be effected by on-scene or nearby assets wherever possible. All operations should include recovery procedures planning. Once personnel become isolated and immediate recovery is not possible by on-scene assets, the requirement will be passed through appropriate channels to Personnel Recovery (PR) C2 nodes. Depending on the force posture, forces may be designated or dedicated for specific PR missions and maintained at a high degree of readiness, or they may be dual tasked while conducting other missions.

3002. **Early deployment.** From the onset of a mission, personnel may become isolated. For deployed operations, early deployment of a PR capability is an important element of the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) operational capability.

3003. **Preparedness.** JFCs will define the parameters required for recovery operations. PR staffs should be engaged in the operations planning process at the earliest possible time. Before entering the Joint Operations Area (JOA), all participating forces should be trained, equipped and prepared to meet the theatre entry requirements for PR.

3004. **Civil organizations.** Civil organizations, especially lead/coordination agencies, operating in the JOA could be invited to attend the planning process as they hold invaluable information and contribute to the coordination required for PR. Moreover, this facilitates the establishment of contacts
and allows for the start of further coordination. The JFC should emphasize to those representatives the mutual benefit of this coordination with NATO forces, respecting the independence of civil organizations and their personnel. Those agreements, procedures, or information sharing activities should significantly mitigate negative impacts for the operations at every level, and facilitate military PR operations.

3005. **Time.** Expediency is required to prevent exploitation by an adversary, meet urgent medical needs, and limit exposure to extreme environments. A timely response may also be required to defeat the adversary’s decision cycle. Similarly, there may be preferred periods to execute a recovery (e.g. at night) or specific times when the isolated personnel will be contactable or available for recovery. PR assets must remain flexible and able to react rapidly when required.

3006. **Information sharing.** In order to share knowledge and tactics, techniques and procedures among participating nations and relevant agencies, the security classification of PR documents and associated information should be accessible, but appropriately classified.

3007. **General risk-related principles.** PR is subject to high visibility and cost/benefit considerations. The risk analysis is conducted in the same manner as other military operations, taking into consideration that typical PR missions are executed at the tactical level, but may have operational or even strategic impacts. In addition, the psychological impact of an isolating event on personnel should be weighed against the risk to PR resources and the effect of diverting resources from the ongoing combat effort.
Therefore, the JFC must weigh courses of action against desired outcomes and potential effects on the overall operation. Recovery missions should aim to:

a. Recover all isolated personnel.

b. Minimize risk to isolated personnel.

c. Minimize risk to recovery forces.

d. Be executed within the JFC’s priorities and apportionment.

e. Seek to prevent escalation of the overall military situation.

f. Be separate to the wider campaign end state to prevent mission creep.

UK 3.1. The checklist below may assist commanders by providing a list of considerations to support a go/no go decision. The list identifies a number of the factors required by a commander to assess the level of risk for a personnel recovery mission.

- Initial position of personnel to be recovered.
- Ability to authenticate position information.
- Access to supporting intelligence.
- Planning capacity.
- Available assets (and capabilities).
- Risk analysis.
- Risk level/appetite.
- Cost analysis.
- Other means – diplomatic, external support?
CHAPTER 4 – MILITARY PERSONNEL RECOVERY ARCHITECTURE

Section I – Personnel recovery responsibilities

Strategic level

4001. At the strategic level, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of higher policy and plans for the recovery of isolated personnel. SACEUR is responsible for planning and setting the conditions for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to successfully prepare for, plan and execute Personnel Recovery (PR). SACEUR, in coordination with the operational-level Headquarters (HQs) and force providers, establishes levels of risk of isolation associated with location, mission, or other criteria.

4002. Nations with higher PR requirements might deploy their own additional personnel and assets to achieve their desired PR standard.

4003. Strategic Communications (StratCom) efforts should be coordinated and conducted at the strategic level and should support PR efforts.

Operational level

4004. The operation’s JFC prepares for, plans and executes PR within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The JFC establishes a PR architecture within the JOA, command relationships and procedures for PR operations, and the identification of intelligence requirements for PR, and assures that PR is an integral part of planning and training.
4005. The JFC and troop contributing nations identify personnel to receive the appropriate levels of PR training commensurate with SACEUR’s identified operational requirements. The operation’s JFC gives PR guidance in the PR annex of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and theatre PR standing operating procedures.

4006. The JFC has overall responsibility for PR in the JOA. He exercises his PR responsibility through the **Joint Personnel Recovery Centre (JPRC)**, staffed by appropriately PR trained personnel, embedded in the joint staff (usually in the joint operation centre) or by designating a component commander’s Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell\(^1\) (PRCC) to function as the JPRC.

4007. Once established, the JPRC is involved in the full spectrum of all PR operations. Its responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

a. Update the PR annex of the JFC’s OPLAN.

b. Update and disseminate the PR guidance.

c. Serve as central point for all information and analysis related to isolated personnel and recovery efforts.

d. Monitor and support PR operations.

e. Coordinate and deconflict PR operations between components and other forces/organizations.

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\(^1\) PRCC is defined in paragraph 4008.
UK 4.1. The Defence SERE Training Organisation (DSTO) provides joint personnel recovery training for UK personnel. A senior commander’s briefing package is provided on a bespoke basis through a mobile training team and a basic joint personnel recovery (JPR) awareness course for watch keepers and operations officers is also available. The appropriate qualifications required to staff a JPRC or personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) (and recommended for personnel recovery officers) is the US personnel recovery plans and operations (PR301) course. This course also allows for interoperability with US forces.

**Tactical level**

4008. **Component commands.** Component commanders plan, coordinate, conduct and control PR operations in assigned areas of operations. The component commander exercises his PR responsibility through the **Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell** (PRCC), staffed by appropriately PR trained personnel, embedded in the staff. If designated by the JFC, one of the component commanders may have to establish a JPRC on his behalf. Even if a component commander conducts a PR mission with his own capabilities, he should notify the JPRC for deconfliction and oversight.

UK 4.2. Commanders should understand the importance of frequent, early communication in JPR events. Declaring a JPR event allows the JPRC, which represents the JFC, to support a JPR event by allocating theatre wide assets. Historical events have shown that the greater the delay in declaring a JPR event, the less chance of the event being resolved successfully. The declaration of a JPR event does not limit a commanders freedom of action. If appropriate, the JPRC will inform the PRCCs of the
supported/supporting relationship to provide assets in support, or to allow operation outside of their own assigned battlespace.

4009. Once established, the PRCC is involved in the full spectrum of all PR operations. Its responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

a. Develop and maintain component PR plan supporting the JFC’s PR annex.

b. Update and disseminate the PR guidance.

c. Monitor all PR missions prosecuted by component forces and remain ready to assist other components as directed by the JPRC.

d. Coordinate and de-conflict PR operations within the component.

UK 4.3. The PRCC should also consider the following actions.

a. Produce a JPR standing operating procedures (SOP) for the area of responsibility.

b. Produce isolated personnel guidance.

c. Provide specialist survival, evasion, resistance and extraction (SERE) input to unit SERE instructors and SERE officer.

d. Provide oversight to evasion plan(s) of action.

e. Manage isolated personnel reports (ISOPREPs).
f. Conduct regular JPR rehearsals.

g. Produce a JPR battle drill for all staff sections.\(^4\)

3. Individual units should retain responsibility for ISOPREPs, however, the PRCC should manage a system that allows an ISOPREP to be received by the PRCC within ten minutes of an event being declared.

4. An example of a basic battle drill can be found at UK Annex A.

4010. **Special Operations Component Command (SOCC).** The commander of the SOCC is responsible for **Unconventional Assisted Recovery** (UAR – special operations recovery missions using unconventional tactics and techniques) through his PRCC. If the **Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery** (NAR – non-conventional forces assistance or other types of assistance) capability exists, he coordinates, synchronizes, and de-conflicts NAR through an **Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell** (UARCC), when required. This cell resides within the SOCC's PRCC.

4011. **Units.** Unit commanders recover their own personnel with their own assets, whenever possible. Units also plan, prepare and train for an isolating event involving their personnel. Units appoint a **PR officer\(^2\)** to coordinate with the PRCC and/or JPRC on all PR-related issues. The PR officer coordinates all PR documentation, such as identification documents, plans, etc. The PR officer assists in the deletion and protection of personal data collected with every Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP). The JFC is responsible that ISOPREP data will be completely deleted once this data is no longer needed or the legal justification for data processing no longer exists.

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\(^2\) “PR officer” is a function which may be fulfilled by an officer or a non-commissioned officer.
4012. **All personnel.** All personnel within the JOA have three main obligations:

a. Report any event that would alert the command and control (C2) on the isolation of a personnel or that would help the recovery mission.

b. Limit exposure within one's ability to the risk of isolation.

c. Prepare for potential isolation in accordance with the education and training received, theatre PR procedures, and issued equipment.

**Section II – Personnel recovery command and control architecture**

4013. PR operations are usually conducted following the normal chain of command from the JFC to the component commands and units, as depicted in Figure 4.1. PR C2 nodes normally have direct liaison authority with each other, and with other appropriate organizations (such as host nation rescue coordination centres), to facilitate pro-active planning for PR and create situational awareness.
UK 4.4. Although doctrinally correct, component-based JPR command and control will not always be the norm. During operations in Afghanistan, the joint operations area was divided geographically into regional commands, with each responsible for establishing a PRCC. The Consolidated Personnel Recovery
Centre-Afghanistan acted as the JPRC for Afghanistan, which in turn was subordinate to the US CENTCOM JPRC.

4014. Within the JOA, the C2 structure will be tailored to meet the characteristics and needs of the operation and environment and may thus deviate from the structure in Figure 4.1. In such case, the PR organization is modified accordingly.

4015. **Mission Coordinator** (MC). The MC is responsible for coordinating PR activities, supporting the on-scene commander and the recovery force in conducting their primary tasks, and for guiding the mission. (This term is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)

4016. **Rescue Mission Commander** (RMC). The RMC is responsible for the tactical planning and execution of the PR mission. He will be appointed by the appropriate level commander, through the JPRC/PRCC.

4017. **On-Scene Commander** (OSC). The OSC directs operations in the vicinity of the isolated personnel until arrival of the recovery force.

4018. **Airborne Mission Coordinator** (AMC). The AMC is a mission coordinator operating from an airborne platform.

4019. **Personnel Recovery Task Force** (PRTF). A PRTF is a task force organized to execute a specific PR mission. It locates and authenticates isolated personnel, protects isolated personnel from adversary threats, provides force protection for itself and mission C2 systems support, and recovers isolated personnel. A PRTF is tasked when needed by the JFC and can be:
a. Dedicated, i.e. specifically trained and equipped for PR as its primary mission.

b. Designated, i.e. used where PR is not its primary mission.

Section III – Civil/diplomatic considerations

4020. NATO commands should maintain awareness of civil and diplomatic efforts. While military commanders may have little or no control over these efforts to locate, support and/or recover isolated personnel, the operation's JFC may be able to offer guidance, and should be prepared to assist, if necessary and feasible. While these situations are difficult to predict or direct, deliberate planning and coordination procedures may facilitate successful outcomes.

4021. In the case of civil assets, a useful Point Of Contact (POC) is the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) cell (J-9) in the HQ. In the case of diplomatic assets, the POC should be the local embassy, consulate or national liaison.
CHAPTER 5 – PERSONNEL RECOVERY PHASES

Section I – Preparation

Risk

5001. During operations, NATO personnel are identified as being at risk of becoming isolated. They are categorized as:

a. Low Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation (LRIE).

b. Medium Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation (MRIE).

c. High Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation (HRIE).

UK 5.1. The UK terminology associated with risk of isolation is medium risk of isolation (MRI) and high risk of isolation (HRI). Operational risk is owned by the operational commander, normally Commander Joint Operations, and managed by Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) SO1 J3 Force Protection. Elevated levels of risk of isolation entitles UK personnel to either level B or level C survival, evasion, resistance and extraction (SERE) training. This information is captured through the operational requirement for SERE training (ORST) working group and manifested in the prone to capture and exploitation (PTCE) list. SERE level B can be delivered at unit level; however, only the Defence SERE Training Organisation (DSTO) is authorised to deliver SERE level C.

UK 5.2. JPR planner and controller training for commanders and staffs can be accessed through the DSTO who deliver the US Department of Defence PR301 course bi-annually at RAF St Mawgan. Access to the PR301 course is identified through the annual SERE training Defence instructions and notices (DIN).
UK 5.3. Training requirements for military personnel, MOD civilians and contractors deployed on operations can be found at Annex D to UK Reference F. Requirements to undertake joint and collective joint personnel recovery (JPR) training and to provide suitably qualified and experienced personnel for JPR roles can be found at Paragraph 12 and Annex D to UK Reference F.

5002. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) provide isolated personnel guidance for the Joint Operations Area (JOA), which may be singular or scaled with risk, and may include training and/or equipment requirements. Risk of isolation/exploitation of deployed personnel must be communicated to troop contributing nations in an advanced and timely manner in order for them to provide the congruent level of training and equipment to personnel prior to entering the hostile environment. Based on this risk, the pre-mission preparation may include documents to be able to formally identify personnel, such as an Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP), or prepare for evasion, such as an Evasion Plan of Action (EPA).

Education and training

5003. Commanders and staffs, and recovery forces fulfilling specific Personnel Recovery (PR) roles within the JOA must be appropriately trained. The chances of a successful recovery of isolated personnel in the JOA can be significantly increased if they have been appropriately educated, trained, equipped, mentally prepared and properly documented for PR prior to the start of their mission. Preparation for a potential isolating event is conducted in four consecutive steps:
a. **Education.** Doctrinal, functional and professional education is a national responsibility and should include basic knowledge of PR.

b. **SERE training.** Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) training is a national responsibility and is provided to personnel commensurate with the perceived risk of isolation and/or exploitation.

c. **Pre-deployment training.** Before entering the JOA, personnel should be trained to use current PR procedures depending on their risk of isolation. Minimum standards of training and equipment to be carried will be identified in the PR annex of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). This training is typically a national responsibility.

d. **In-theatre training.** During operations, Commanders, staffs, units and personnel need to regularly train in PR to ensure that they are familiar with PR procedures within the JOA. Unit commanders are responsible to ensure that their personnel are adequately trained in PR.

5004. **Levels of SERE training.** NATO has identified three levels of SERE training:

a. **SERE level A** (basic). SERE level A should include a minimum of theoretical training.

b. **SERE level B** (intermediate). SERE level B should include a minimum of theoretical and practical training.

c. **SERE level C** (advanced). SERE level C should include a minimum of theoretical and practical training. This level
should also include realistic practical evasion, resistance and extraction training.

5005. **Levels of PR training for units deployed into the JOA.** The JFC defines required training levels for units. These directions are stated in the PR annex of the OPLAN. Nations may, but should not, deviate from these requirements through the use of formal “national caveats”.

**Equipment**

5006. The capability to survive, evade, and be recovered is enhanced by providing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products, some of which may be theatre- or environment-specific.

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**UK 5.4.** The JPR Working Group supports the 1* Force Protection Coordination Group, thorough the management of JPR policy and the staffing of advice and all JPR-related matters. The JPR Working Group is responsible for setting the requirements for JPR equipment such as promissory notes, gold, evasion maps and escape kits.

**Section II – Planning**

5007. PR has to be considered from the start of the operational planning process. The PR annex of the OPLAN should include, but is not limited to:

a. Situation as relevant to PR (e.g. adversary forces, environment, threat, etc.).

b. JFC’s PR mission.
c. PR operational design.

d. Execution tasks (e.g. dedicated/designed PR forces, specific rules of engagement, etc.).

e. Service support (e.g. management of ISOPREPs, EPAs, evasion aids, etc.).

f. Command and signal (e.g. general PR organization, launch/execute authority, etc.).

Section III – Execution

Report

5008. **Initial notification.** Timely notification is essential for a successful recovery. Initial notification can come from any source, e.g. survival radio activation, overdue action, unit, or eyewitness reporting.

5009. **Initial response.** Once an initial report has been received, validation of the incident is of the utmost importance. Other PR nodes should be notified of the initial report as soon as possible to provide them the necessary situational awareness and enable them to assist in the validation of the incident, if applicable. Once the incident has been confirmed (i.e. it is not the result of misreporting or an attempted deception by the adversary), a PR incident has to be declared, and the chain of command and other PR nodes informed.
Locate

5010. **Location verification.** Following notification, the priority is to locate the isolated personnel. Verification of the location information is of utmost importance. Time, effort and lives can be lost if this is not accomplished. To locate isolated personnel, all available resources should be used as required (e.g. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR], self-reporting, or eyewitness reports). Some of these capabilities are nationally controlled; procedures to activate, coordinate, and pass information should be established and rehearsed prior to requesting support for an actual PR event. In addition, the location methods should be decided following consideration of the level of threat and, if recovery is not imminent, the isolated person’s position should not be compromised.

5011. **Authentication.** Even with precise coordinates that pinpoint the isolated personnel’s location, recovery forces still have to authenticate the isolated personnel prior to a recovery. An effective authentication system is essential to prevent the compromise of vital information and minimize risk to isolated personnel and the recovery force. This holds true because personnel recovery task force assets are extremely vulnerable during the actual recovery. Accordingly, isolated personnel and recovery forces should take extreme care not to compromise authentication information. Authentication methods should be described in the PR annex of OPLAN and PR SOP. It is important that the Joint Personnel Recovery Centre (JPRC) actively tracks the use and/or compromise of authentication means in order to promulgate required changes.
Support

UK 5.5. Operational commanders are to ensure that an isolated person is supported as best as possible, whilst planning for their recovery. It is a Front Line Command responsibility to ensure that appropriate physical and psychological support is made available for an isolated person’s family, friends and home unit. Further guidance can be found in UK Reference F.

5012. **General.** Support to the isolated personnel may include establishing two-way communications, providing morale building support, resupply, or escort to a cache. Support may also encompass the suppression of enemy threats to the isolated personnel. This may preclude capture of the isolated person and disrupt the adversary’s response to PR efforts. If required, extraction forces and/or equipment may be pre-positioned to support the isolated personnel before the recovery phase.

5013. **Sustainment.** Support is the effort necessary to ensure the physical and psychological sustainment of isolated personnel and the morale of their next of kin and families, and of their unit. Successful support relies on measures taken before an individual becomes isolated. This includes home-station arrangements, training and equipping personnel prior to entering a specific JOA, and the establishment of the JOA PR architecture and theatre PR SOP.

5014. **Physical and psychological assistance.** Besides support to the isolated personnel, support includes physical and psychological assistance to the isolated personnel’s family and unit. Support to the isolated personnel’s next of kin and
families is a national responsibility. However, this process may be initiated by the JPRC through established channels.

5015. **Next of kin and families.** The behaviour and statements made by next of kin and families may seriously endanger personnel that have become isolated or captured. Proper support, especially physical and psychological, to the next of kin, families and unit may have a positive effect on the recovery of the isolated personnel. It is a national responsibility to prepare personnel, next of kin and families alike for do’s and don’ts in an isolating event, in particular with regard to the media.

5016. **Other considerations.** Isolating events tend to generate a lot of press inquiries regarding the isolated personnel and the next of kin and family. Public Affairs office's response to an isolating event should therefore be taken into consideration by all PR command and control nodes, and should be carefully planned and executed.

**Recover**

5017. The recovery task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. Once in custody, the recovery force will normally perform one last authentication. Isolated personnel have a significant responsibility in the recovery process. The force designated to perform the recovery task may range from a single recovery vehicle to a complex task force, and may be dedicated or not.

5018. Units should always attempt to resolve isolating events as quickly as possible while concurrently informing the
Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) at the earliest opportunity; if recovery cannot be resolved at unit level, responsibility continues to the PRCC to coordinate. The responsible PRCC will attempt to recover the isolated personnel utilizing available (organic) PR capabilities, and notify the JPRC. If the PRCC determines it is unable to accomplish the recovery with its own resources, the JPRC will coordinate with other PRCCs to gain an initial assessment on the capabilities within each component command and feasibility of component courses of action.

UK 5.6. While a combat recovery capability is required for the larger-scale UK deployments, it may be more appropriate for smaller scale operations to adopt diverse recovery methods. For example, the size of the African continent means it would not be possible to provide a full combat recovery or combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability. Providing capability where traditional options are limited means developing novel solutions to deliver the recovery element of the JPR system. This could include: using agreements with partner nations; developing agreements with host nations, both from a civilian and military perspective; and using government inter-agencies.

Reintegrate

5019. The reintegration task begins when physical control of recovered isolated personnel is relinquished to a designated team member or organization in the reintegration process. As part of reintegration, perishable essential intelligence and SERE information is collected while, at the same time, tending to the physical and psychological welfare of recovered isolated personnel. Reintegration of isolated personnel is a national responsibility and should be
conducted by national representatives. Reintegration by other nations or organizations will require national consent.

UK 5.7. UK forces operating in coalition will always maintain the right to conduct reintegration and debriefing of our own isolated personnel. Commanders and JPR planners must scrutinise JPR standing operating procedures to ensure that they do not indicate otherwise.

Section IV – Adaptation

5020. The entire PR system needs to continually improve and learn from its successes and mistakes through adaptation. Adaptation is most effective when it is an integral part of all decision-making processes.

5021. Adaptation results in improvements and/or changes and can be done through three processes: anticipation, improvisation and lessons learned, which intervene at different moments of the mission:

a. **Anticipation.** Prior to the mission, anticipation consists in the continuous analysis of the environment and collection of related information in order to adapt the PR system.

b. **Improvisation.** During the mission, improvisation may be necessary to adapt to the changing and unpredictable nature of the mission’s environment.

c. **Lessons learned.** After the mission, regardless of its rate of success, a proper evaluation of the associated preparation, planning and execution will provide lessons identified that should be processed into lessons learned. To
this end, all related information (PR after-action reports, PR mission logs, etc.) need to be collected and properly archived.
# UK Annex A – Joint personnel recovery battle drill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Point of contact/authorising officer</th>
<th>Output/result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel recovery coordination cell</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notify Joint Personnel Recovery Centre (JPRC) and other Personnel Recovery Coordination Cells (PRCCs)</td>
<td>JPRC, PRCCs</td>
<td>JPRC and PRCCs notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gather all available information and meet with the senior watch officer (SWO) for joint personnel recovery (JPR) huddle</td>
<td>SWO, PRCC, Chief Current Operations (CCO)</td>
<td>JPR event declared or not declared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain isolated personnel report (ISOPREP)</td>
<td>Unit personnel recovery officer (PRO), PRCC</td>
<td>Hard copy ISOPREP, electronic copy sent to JPRC, if required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain evasion plan of action (EPA)/personnel recovery plan</td>
<td>Unit PRO, PRCC</td>
<td>Hardcopy EPA/PR plan, electronic copy sent to JPRC as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmit search and rescue incident report (SARIR)/personnel recovery incident report (PRIR)</td>
<td>PRCC</td>
<td>SARIR/PRIRs sent to all PRCC’s and JPRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Responsible Party</td>
<td>Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate LAUNCH authority as required</td>
<td>SWO, CCO, PRCC</td>
<td>Personnel recovery capability launched for recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate EXECUTE authority as required</td>
<td>SWO, CCO, PRCC</td>
<td>Execute authority is passed to recovery asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmit search and rescue situation report (SARSIT) as required</td>
<td>PRCC</td>
<td>SARSITs sent to all PRCC’s and JPRC when JPR event updated or terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate reintegration as required</td>
<td>JPRC, PRCC, Medical command</td>
<td>Returnees commence reintegration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Senior watch officer**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Action</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notify CCO</td>
<td>CCO</td>
<td>Notification/situational awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confer with PRCC for personnel recovery event declaration</td>
<td>RCC, SWO, CCO</td>
<td>Authorise release of the SARIR passed to PRCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate cross-boundary authorities</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>Cross-boundary coordination is completed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**J1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gather information on isolated personnel (ISOP)</td>
<td>J1, PRCC</td>
<td>If able, information regarding ISOP passed to PRCC and MCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain information on contractors.</td>
<td>J1, contracting program managers</td>
<td>Information on contractor passed to PRCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate intelligence, surveillance</td>
<td>J2, Unit, PRCC</td>
<td>ISR assets</td>
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<td>and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>coordinated and</td>
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<td>- Organic</td>
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<td>- Theatre</td>
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<td>- National</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Non-traditional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formulate collection plan in support of</td>
<td>J2, PRCC</td>
<td>Collection plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>recovery operations</td>
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<td>using all</td>
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<td>intelligence</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>disciplines</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>is constructed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Be prepared to provide threat for</td>
<td>J2, Unit</td>
<td>Threat brief for</td>
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<tr>
<td>recovery operations</td>
<td>liaison officers</td>
<td>recovery forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(LNOs), PRCC</td>
<td>is completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fires</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate control measures</td>
<td>Current fire,</td>
<td>Required control</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRCC</td>
<td>measures placed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>over ISOP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate fire support</td>
<td>Current fire,</td>
<td>Required fire</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PRCC</td>
<td>support for</td>
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<td></td>
<td>recovery forces</td>
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<td>is coordinated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground watch officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine closest ground forces with</td>
<td>Ground watch</td>
<td>Location and</td>
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<tr>
<td>ability to recover ISOP</td>
<td>officer (GWO),</td>
<td>feasibility of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PRCC</td>
<td>closest ground</td>
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<td>units passed to</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PRCC</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current air</strong></td>
<td><strong>Determinant ability for aviation assets to assist in recovery or provide command and control or observation</strong></td>
<td>Current air, PRCC</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alert recovery assets</strong></td>
<td>Current air, SWO, PRCC</td>
<td>Recovery asset alerted or launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J4</strong></td>
<td>Coordinate clothing, feeding and accommodation for ISOP</td>
<td>J4, PRCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J6</strong></td>
<td>Consider OP MINIMISE as appropriate</td>
<td>J6, PRCC, SWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J9</strong></td>
<td>Determine ability of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and other government department (OGD) personnel to assist in recovery of ISOP</td>
<td>J9, PRT LNO, PRCC, OGD representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Adviser</strong></td>
<td>Determine rules of engagement (ROE)</td>
<td>Legal adviser, GWO, PRCC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UK A-4**
Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements
### Media Communications Officer/information operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determine public affairs information operations ability to support to recovery efforts</th>
<th>Public affairs, information operations, WO, RCC</th>
<th>Themes and messages to assist in recovering ISOP promulgated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Valuation of recovery story for PA officer integration</td>
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</table>

### Medical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinate personnel recovery reintegration / medical treatment</th>
<th>Medic, PRCC</th>
<th>Medical treatment/ reintegration is coordinated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Special Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determine Special Forces ability to recover ISOP</th>
<th>Special Forces LNO, PRCC</th>
<th>All Special Forces personnel accounted for; capability and feasibility of Special Forces personnel to recover ISOP passed to PRCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
LEXICON

PART 1 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAP  Allied Administrative Publication
AJP  Allied Joint Publication
AMC  Airborne Mission Coordinator

C2    Command and Control
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
COPD allied Command Operations comprehensive operations Planning Directive
CR    Combat Recovery
CSAR Combat Search And Rescue

EPA  Evasion Plan of Action
HQs  HeadQuarters
HRIE High Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation
HRO  Hostage Release Operation

ISOP  ISOlated Personnel
ISOPREP ISOlated Personnel REPort
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JFC  Joint Force Command/Joint Force Commander
JPRC Joint Personnel Recovery Centre
JOA  Joint Operations Area

LRIE Low Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation

MC  Mission Coordinator
MCJSB Military Committee Joint Standardization Board
MRIE Medium Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation

NAR Non-conventional Assisted Recovery
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSO NATO Standardization Office

LEX-1
Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation PLAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>On-Scene Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Point Of Contact</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
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<td>PRCC</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell</td>
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<td>PRTF</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Task Force</td>
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<td>RMC</td>
<td>Rescue Mission Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander EURope</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search And Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCC</td>
<td>Special Operations Component Command</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>STANAG</td>
<td>NATO STAndardization Agreemnt</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>STRATegic COMmunications</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>Unconventional Assisted Recovery</td>
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<td>UARCC</td>
<td>Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell</td>
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PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

combat recovery (CR)
A method to recover isolated personnel from a situation where hostile interference may be expected, and either the recovery force, or the isolated personnel, or both, have not been trained in combat search and rescue. (This term is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)

combat search and rescue (CSAR)
The detection, location, identification and rescue of downed aircrew in hostile territory in time of crisis or war and, when appropriate, isolated military personnel in distress, who are trained and equipped to receive combat search and rescue support. (NTMS – NATO Agreed.)

evasion plan of action (EPA)
A course of action, developed prior to executing a combat mission, that is intended to improve a potentially isolated person’s chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing the recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader’s action and movement. (This term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)

isolated personnel report (ISOPREP)
A document containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an isolated person. (This term and definition are applicable in this publication and may be processed for NATO Agreed status.)

non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR)
A recovery method used to deal with situations that may need the assistance of non-conventional forces or other types of assistance when conventional means are not suitable. (This term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)
unconventional assisted recovery (UAR)
A recovery method conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to alliance security from contested or adversary controlled areas. Special operations recovery missions are characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. These operations employ unconventional tactics and techniques, discreet search, and the frequent use of ground combat elements. (This term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)
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