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Final Report

UK Department for International Development

**EVALUATION OF DFID'S HUMANITARIAN  
RESPONSE TO TYPHOON HAIYAN (YOLANDA)**

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May 2015

# Evaluation of DFID's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)

## Final Report

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## Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ACF	Action Contre La Faim
ADB	Asian Development Bank
BDC	Barangay Development Councils
CDAC	Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities
CfW	Cash for Work
CHASE	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security
CIMIC	Civil-military Coordination
CSC	Community Score Card
CwC	Communicating with Communities
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
ESG	Evaluation Steering Group
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoP	Government of the Philippines
GSB	Gold-Silver-Bronze
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HAP	Haiyan Action Plan
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HDRP	Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Policy
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle
HRG	Humanitarian Response Group
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ITT	Invitation to Tender
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LDRRMC	Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils
LDRRMP	Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plans
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
LGU	Local Government Units
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAR	Multilateral Aid Review
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psycho-social Support
MIC	Middle-income Country
MIRA	Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoH	Ministry of Health

MTR	Mid-term Review
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NPA	New People's Army
OCD	Office of Civil Defence
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OFW	Overseas Foreign Workers
OPR	Output to Purpose Review
OT	Operations Team
PAGASA	Philippines Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
PIGD	Participatory Interest Group Discussions
PNP	Philippine National Police
PPA	Programme Partnership Arrangement
PWD	People living with disabilities
RAY	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
RDRRMC	Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils
RRF	Rapid Response Facility
RTE	Real-time Evaluation
SADD	Sex and Age-disaggregated Data
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SDS	Sustainable Development Solutions
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
TA	Transformative Agenda
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAWC	Violence against Women and Children
VAWG	Violence against Women and Girls
VfM	Value for Money
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WCPD	Women and Children Protection Desk
WFP	World Food Programme
WFS	Women Friendly Spaces
WHO	World Health Organisation
WVI	World Vision International
YRRP	Yolanda Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan

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This report was authored by the following Itad team members: Graham Walter (evaluation team leader), John Ievers (deputy team leader), Barnaby Willitts-King, Katie Tong, Mary Ann Brocklesby and Courtenay Cabot Venton. Field support in the Philippines was provided by Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS). David Fleming (project director) from Itad provided methodological guidance, quality assurance and editorial support. External quality assurance was conducted by Tasneem Mowjee and Chris Barnett. Research assistance was provided by Sarah Standley and Kate Hale.

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluation team only. They do not represent those of DFID or any other organisations mentioned in this report.

## Executive Summary

DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) commissioned Itad to conduct an evaluation of its humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda), which struck the central provinces of the Philippines on 8 November 2013. The typhoon was one of the strongest recorded typhoons to make landfall. More than 16 million people were affected and over four million displaced. The typhoon generated a global humanitarian response, with the UN declaring a Level 3 emergency activating the 2011 Transformative Agenda protocols. The UK provided £77 million in humanitarian support, making it the largest bilateral donor. In all, funding pledges from multilateral agencies and other donors totalled \$896 million. This report presents the main findings, lessons and recommendations of the evaluation, drawing on interviews and data collection with DFID and its partners at headquarter levels, and in the Philippines, including Manila and areas affected by the typhoon.

### Evaluation scope, approach and methodology

The evaluation focuses on both the initial response in the first three to four months, which constituted largely relief, and the transition to recovery during 2014. The team's approach was based on an evaluation framework designed around a core set of questions to address three evaluation objectives, with a particular focus on cross-cutting issues such as value for money (VfM), accountability, violence against women and girls (VAWG), and protection. During the inception phase, the team used a number of desk-based methods to inform the evaluation design, including a literature review, a context analysis, a stakeholder mapping exercise and an evaluability assessment. This was followed by three weeks of fieldwork in the Philippines in January 2015, focusing on semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs) and participatory interest group discussions (PIGDs) in areas affected by the typhoon where DFID had supported partner activities.

### Evaluation findings

#### Effectiveness of the DFID response

DFID provided substantial support to Typhoon Haiyan (£77m), which was well appreciated by government and partners. Partners found DFID decision making fast and flexible relative to other donors. DFID's speedy response was reported as encouraging speedy responses from other agencies and facilitating quick field activation, in particular that of its partners under the Rapid Response Facility (RRF).

Given the scale of the disaster, DFID's initial response focused on the provision of direct life-saving assistance across all major sectors, with support to protection and coordination. DFID provided support to partners for both relief and some self-recovery initiatives. However, people affected by the typhoon moved rapidly to early self-recovery and DFID's programme was slow to adapt. DFID investments in recovery were constrained by a short six-month timeframe, and partners largely programmed their recovery initiatives with alternative funding. Communities and people need sustainable shelter and livelihood recovery solutions which require longer timeframes. However, getting the recovery right is a challenging task when the team is focused on the response and there are limited pre-existing national relationships and programmes. Resilient recovery requires time, local knowledge and relationships.

DFID rapid deployments built up a capable team. Its presence during the response phase was built on tried and tested procedures and experienced staff supported by London. The DFID monitoring team operating in the Philippines from January 2014 was on the whole also perceived positively; however concerns were raised amongst some agencies about the burden of the project-level monitoring.

DFID's support was spread over a wide range of partners but focused more on programming DFID funds and monitoring partners rather than on a strategic role in influencing the humanitarian system, supporting coordination, or influencing issues such as accountability, VAWG or protection. It did not play the strategic/influencing role with donors and government it has often done in humanitarian crises – this represents a missed opportunity. DFID has influenced the increased focus on VAWG at the global level, the DFID-led Call to Action Summit on VAWG being highly influential in heightening recognition of VAWG issues,

but this failed to translate into commensurately improved quality or quantity of programming at field level in the Haiyan response.

A pre-existing presence in the area of response was a key priority for partner selection by DFID, with existing relationships, local partnerships and knowledge of the local context, disaster management laws and protocols being seen as necessary. However, a theme emerged from KIIs that some partners felt that DFID's partner selection was based more on global or personal experience with the individual or agency, which was sometimes inconsistent with their capacities. Several partners deployed many staff with experience from "failed states" who seemingly did not understand the local context.

The majority of DFID's partners take VfM into account in management and implementation, assessing cost, speed and quality as an integral part of decision making. However, this is usually done qualitatively and implicitly, rather than as part of a formalised selection and monitoring process, and with limited influence by DFID. There is some evidence that DFID funding improved the speed of response and that its flexibility resulted in VfM gains, for example joint procurement. DFID's focus on response and early recovery, rather than preparedness and longer-term resilience, was cited as having an impact on VfM by compromising the ability of agencies to invest in longer-term activities that could realise lower costs/greater gains. Cash transfer programming has been shown to result in better outcomes for beneficiaries and could be a potentially effective strategy for improving VfM. The civil-military liaison and use of military assets was instrumental in providing logistical support, enabling a speedy response, but the cost to DFID (£10m) could outweigh benefits.

### **DFID's contribution to the effectiveness of the humanitarian system**

Some improvement in leadership compared to previous L3-type disasters is evident, and is likely to be due to the Transformative Agenda (TA) protocols. But it is unclear whether agencies demonstrated learning from previous responses and whether TA encouraged learning. The TA itself did not live up to expectations and was detrimental with respect to the relationship with the national government. The Haiyan response conclusively demonstrates that a 'one size fits all' approach to humanitarian disasters without considering context and national government capacity is highly problematic. There is little evidence that DFID influenced any perceived improvement.

The TA provided some improvements in some leadership functions (surge response and HCT coordination), but the response itself was inappropriately overwhelming to the GoP, resulting in a side-lining of national capacity, national disaster response systems and sovereignty. This was a view shared by many at the global and Manila levels where a number of respondents across donors, UN and NGO partners all spoke of a need to "better calibrate" future responses based on local context, such as in middle-income countries. At local levels, there were mixed views.

The L3 response activated the UN cluster system; however such a response must include coordination with the national and local government, and outside the cluster system (e.g. the private sector). There was a general sense of a 'gung ho' attitude to establishing new processes for the response, which did not align with existing government systems and therefore by their very nature would be unsustainable. There was also evidence that the international response in general did not understand devolution as it exists within the Philippines, which further complicated coordination with government at various levels. The strength of the barangay councils was a key factor in ensuring community members felt informed and consulted during the response, highlighting that understanding of and engagement with the local governance context is critical.

### **Improving DFID and partner approaches to accountability to affected populations (AAP)**

DFID-funded agencies were only partially and inconsistently accountable to diverse interests within communities. Although partners gave priority to vulnerable groups, the evaluation found there were distinct differences in levels of consultation between communities on differential needs in designing projects, particularly for elderly women and men, and people living with disabilities (PWDs). Another key message from the PIGDs was that support for livelihood recovery was too late, too little and not tailored to meet specific needs. The timeframe for recovery was too short, a frustration echoed by a number of partner

agency key informants who argued that sustained support over a two to three year period giving time for a clearer handover to development agencies would have been more appropriate.

PIGDs also found that communities were often dissatisfied with the targeting approach, in that targeting was not aimed at ensuring inclusion of disadvantaged persons, but rather exclusion of persons from qualifying for assistance such as shelter repairs and livelihoods. Targeting was repeatedly mentioned as causing tensions in communities, which can erode social cohesion and affect future responses. Communities preferred equality of access to benefits above outsider definitions of equitable aid allocations. The impact of targeting should be considered in future responses; the costs of conducting assessments and selective distribution of resources can remove the efficiency gains from producing standard packages.

DFID's support to AAP issues at project level was valued and used by partners to improve performance, but this did not translate into a strategic influence in the response. Greater focus on accountability outcomes and strategic technical inputs to support long-term humanitarian initiatives are needed. Certain partners had well-established and institutionalised accountability mechanisms prior to the response, which increased effectiveness. The remaining partners made substantial progress in building accountability mechanisms. On the whole, the collective global focus on AAP did not translate into robust and common AAP systems and mechanisms on the ground. The AAP working group was widely praised for its rapid response to the onset of Typhoon Ruby. It is now providing a model for future disaster responses within the Philippines and globally.

### Lessons

The team derived 12 key lessons from the above findings to inform future humanitarian responses. These are presented in Section 5 of this report and summarised here.

DFID's value-added in Haiyan was very much built on the speed and flexibility of response through established partners and mechanisms, with needs and gaps informed by partners. Increased benefit would be gained from building on information from community, local civil society and government, particularly in a middle-income context with demonstrated disaster management capability.

Resilient recovery requires time, local knowledge and relations. Getting the recovery right is a challenging task when the team is focused on the response and there are no pre-existing national relationships or programmes. DFID was slow to recognise the importance of working with local government in the devolved Philippines context, and its response was short term, with a focus on relief. The six-month timeframe DFID allowed for early recovery interventions was insufficient for recovery outcomes, particularly livelihoods.

DFID's on-the-ground presence was valuable but missed opportunities for engagement. The focus was more on programming funds than on a strategic role in influencing the humanitarian system and supporting coordination, or further influencing issues such as accountability, VAWG or protection. The downside of the presence in Tacloban from January 2014 was that DFID tended to focus more on project-oriented issues to the detriment of a strategic/influencing role with donors and government. There was a gap between DFID's higher-level strategic agenda and its impact on the ground. DFID's influence on the TA L3 response was less than it could have been, in part due to lack of coherence between field-level monitoring activities and defined influence objectives.

The international humanitarian system is not engaging effectively with significant money flows from remittances and non-traditional actors such as the private sector, especially critical in middle-income countries where a collaborative approach is needed to access government and non-government resources.

AAP needs to be context-driven and adapted to the different phases of a response, with earlier and closer collaboration with national and civil society actors. This would have enabled a more nuanced and phased approach to accountability allowing an evolving process of communities' active participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of the response. Investing in a range of mutually reinforcing institutional enablers is key to effective, context-driven AAP. Current RRF requirements and reporting do not promote effective AAP implementation.



There was a stronger focus on VAWG in Haiyan than any previous emergency response, but this did not translate into worthwhile improvements in programming, and the heightened spotlight failed to influence agencies' actions on the ground.

During an emergency response phase, it is difficult to undertake detailed analysis of VfM due to the pressures to respond to the crisis. DFID could more usefully engage with partners on VfM, using either partners' frameworks or DFID's framework, in the preparedness and recovery phases, when there is time and resource to engage properly with the process.

### Recommendations

The team formulated eight recommendations relating to how DFID can improve its strategy and approach to response, its support and influence on the humanitarian system, and its accountability, VAWG, protection and VfM programming. These are presented in Section 5 and summarised here.

1. The DFID team, especially in MICs, should place greater emphasis on more collaborative and advisory roles in addition to monitoring. These should be located throughout at a strategic (national) level to influence issues in the response, complemented initially by a team of advisers in the disaster zone to support fast and flexible decision making.
2. DFID should develop a clear strategy on whether to focus only on response within a relatively short timeframe, with a clear exit strategy, or adopt a longer-term strategy supporting partners to focus and plan for recovery, investing both time and resources, and taking into account national, sub-national and community priorities.
3. DFID should invest more in sustaining a link between London-based advisers and individual action to drive agendas in accountability, VAWG and VfM.
4. DFID should clearly articulate a strategy to engage and better influence the international humanitarian architecture. The strategy should invest in three levels:
  - a. DFID should outline what change it wants to see in the international humanitarian architecture and robustly engage with that process;
  - b. DFID should outline its own internal position of working in different contexts;
  - c. DFID should ensure its maximum influence by linking its approach to specific RRF requirements for partners, thus aligning strategy and operational impact.
5. DFID should strengthen strategies, technical capacities and funding modalities for promoting AAP/VAWG practices within the global humanitarian community. In particular:
  - a. DFID should strengthen the pool of specialist technical advisers for AAP and VAWG for rapid deployment in L3 responses;
  - b. DFID should introduce incentives and conditionalities for promoting AAP and encouraging collective AAP response;
  - c. DFID should prioritise the development of a comprehensive strategy which aligns and harmonises AAP advocacy and implementation within CHASE.
6. DFID should upgrade institutional requirements for sex and age-disaggregated data and other diversity data, necessary to enable tracking of progress in socially-inclusive aid distribution.
7. DFID should engage with partners strategically on VfM in non-crisis times when partners have time and resource to engage properly with the process.
8. DFID should strengthen the VfM of response and early recovery activities through the following:
  - a. Greater investment in pre-positioning of stocks;
  - b. Allowing partner agencies more time to develop quality proposals;
  - c. Investigating the potential VfM of consortia approaches;
  - d. Building capacity for a greater use of cash where appropriate.

## 1. Introduction

DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) commissioned Itad to conduct an evaluation of its humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda), which struck the central provinces of the Philippines on 8 November 2013. The typhoon was one of the strongest recorded typhoons to make landfall, causing substantial loss of life, massive destruction to infrastructure and housing, loss of livelihoods, and disruption to communications, electricity, water systems and transportation. More than 16 million people were affected and over four million displaced, with evacuation centres supporting more than 730,000 people at the height of the disaster. The typhoon generated a global humanitarian response, with the UN declaring a Level 3 (L3) emergency activating the 2011 Transformative Agenda (TA) protocols. The UK provided £77 million in humanitarian support, making it the largest bilateral donor. In all, funding pledges from multilateral agencies and other donors totalled \$896 million.

This report presents the main findings, lessons and recommendations of the evaluation, drawing on interviews and data collection with DFID and its partners at headquarter levels, and in the Philippines, including Manila and areas affected by the typhoon.

The main internal stakeholders for this evaluation are DFID CHASE, in particular the Humanitarian Response Group (HRG) and Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Policy Group (HDRP). HRG is responsible for ensuring that findings are shared to improve performance both internally, with DFID's partners and more widely. A DFID Evaluation Steering Group (ESG), consisting of individuals within CHASE and chaired by a member of DFID's Evaluation Department (EvD), oversaw the evaluation and provided guidance to the evaluation team during the inception phase.

### 1.1 Purpose, objectives and scope of the evaluation

The evaluation has two purposes: primarily, to present evidence-based findings and recommendations to assist lesson learning for DFID's policy and response teams with a view to improving future responses; and secondly, to address issues of accountability to taxpayers and recipients of humanitarian assistance.

The Terms of Reference (ToR, see Annex 1) outlined three evaluation objectives, which the team translated into three overarching evaluation questions, as set out in the December 2014 Itad inception report:

1. To what extent did DFID response mechanisms function effectively to achieve priority outcomes? How can funding and support be made more effective in future rapid responses?
2. To what extent was the humanitarian system more effective using L3 TA protocols in saving lives, reducing suffering and maintaining the dignity of those affected by the crisis in the initial 3-4 months of the crisis and in the transition to recovery. To what extent did DFID contribute to this effectiveness?
3. To what extent did DFID and partners demonstrate effective accountability to beneficiaries/end users? How can DFID and partners improve performance and share and strengthen best practice?

The evaluation focuses on both the initial response in the first three to four months, which constituted largely relief, and the transition to recovery, including establishing the foundations for long-term recovery and building resilience against future disasters. The scope of the evaluation set out in the ToR is broad, and the inception report provided a more focused approach, with some key processes being explored in more depth to yield richer evidence. Following discussions during the ESG meeting at the start of the evaluation, it was agreed that the evaluation should clearly focus on DFID's and its partners' roles during the response, particularly in addressing question 2, rather than a broader assessment of the overall response to the disaster.

It was agreed with the ESG that the evaluation would focus on assessing partnership performance rather than partner performance, including the role and process of DFID in influencing and supporting partners in key priority areas, such as value for money (VfM), accountability and violence against women and girls (VAWG). In addition, it was agreed to focus on a selection of partners to enable a more focused evaluation –

for further detail, see Section 2.2 below. These factors are particularly relevant given that for many partners DFID provided a relatively small portion of their funds. The evaluation was not intended to assess all individual interventions supported by DFID; rather it would examine selected interventions as examples of the process of DFID engagement with the partner in the intervention, eliciting feedback from recipients and other stakeholders on its impact. It was also agreed the evaluation would not cover ground already covered by previous reviews and evaluations.

The outcome of the evaluation includes assessments of processes and interventions against all three evaluation objectives, drawing lessons learnt and proposing recommendations for future approaches and interventions, with a particular focus on VfM, accountability and VAWG. This includes an emphasis on interventions needing to take account of local context and calibrating responses to existing national and local capacities, recognising that the Philippines is a middle-income country (MIC).

An inception phase was conducted from 14 October to 11 December. This included an initial ESG meeting to plan the evaluation, a review of key documents, refinement of the evaluation framework, evaluation questions and methodology, initial consultations with DFID and Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) staff, and an ESG meeting in December to present the inception report. Preparatory work for the field phase in the Philippines was conducted during December and early January, with the evaluation team conducting field work from 11-30 January 2015. The field work included key informant interviews (KIIs) and participatory interest group discussions (PIGDs), but as noted further in Section 2 below on methodology, the papal visit to the Philippines at the time presented constraints to timing and availability of government officials and other key informants.

The evaluation's primary users will be stakeholders within DFID, particularly CHASE; however to promote lesson learning and improve transparency, appropriate findings will be shared with partners. The scope, target audience and methods for dissemination of the evaluation findings are still to be agreed with DFID. However it is likely to include both the international community interested in humanitarian response at a higher level, and those interested in learning lessons at a country level. The latter will include the Government of the Philippines, partner agencies working in the Philippines, and other interested stakeholders and aid recipients.

## 1.2 Structure of the report

Section 2 of this report sets out the evaluation approach and methodology, including the main challenges and limitations. Section 3 provides a contextual overview, recognising that the typhoon response needed to take account of the conditions in the Philippines (in particular frequency and regularity of national disasters, and national and local capacity). Section 4 presents and discusses the key evaluation findings under the three evaluation questions, while Section 5 draws lessons learnt and provides recommendations for both the United Nations (UN) system and DFID and its partners in responding to such a disaster in the future. The annexes provide key supporting information.

## 2. Evaluation approach and methodology

This section outlines the team's overall approach to the evaluation. It is based on an analytical framework (presented in Section 2.1) to ensure systematic data collection and analysis of the evidence. Section 2.2 summarises the key components of the evaluation methodology and the main stages in the evaluation process. Section 2.3 sets out the key challenges and limitations faced by the team during the evaluation, and how these were mitigated.

### 2.1 Evaluation approach and analytical framework

The evaluation design centres on an analytical framework, incorporating two key elements to ensure a robust approach to evidence assessment: (i) use of an evaluation framework; and (ii) an evidence assessment framework. The evaluation framework was designed around a core set of evaluation questions

for each of the three evaluation objectives, against which indicators of success, analytical methods and proposed data collection sources were identified (Annex 2). As discussed in the inception report, a theory-based approach to the evaluation that requires a construction of the theory of change as a basis for testing the causal links and assumptions behind DFID's intervention was not considered appropriate.<sup>1</sup> Instead, it was agreed with the ESG that the evaluation would focus on the critical assumptions underpinning DFID's humanitarian response. These were identified during the inception phase and formed the basis of the revised evaluation questions, focusing in particular on DFID's support to partners around VfM, VAWG and accountability, and the strengths of the consortium-based approach of the Rapid Response Facility (RRF).

The evidence assessment framework was developed by the team to organise and analyse the evidence gathered during the evaluation from the various data sources. The team used this during the field phase to collect evidence against each evaluation sub-question by data source, including KIIs and PIGDs. This was subsequently collated with findings from the document review and interviews conducted outside of the Philippines, and used by the team to identify where there was strong evidence to inform findings, and where evidence gaps existed that could be followed up after the field work. This tool was used to organise the presentation of evidence-based findings for the final report, and also assisted the process of triangulation of evidence. Although we do not present the completed evidence assessment framework in this report so as to protect key informant anonymity, the framework template is included in Annex 9.

Additionally, the evaluation design centred on a participatory approach in order to build a strong sense of ownership of the evaluation process and recommendations with DFID, and with the aim of maximising the utility of the evaluation for internal stakeholders. Continuous stakeholder engagement was achieved through formal meetings with key stakeholders in DFID and the ESG at critical stages of the evaluation, such as the inception ESG meeting and inception report presentation; as well as more informal email and telephone-based catch-up discussions to test emerging findings and early recommendations. It should be noted that this was done in such a way as to maintain the independence of the evaluation and its findings, and did not impinge on the team's ability to work freely and without interference.

## 2.2 Evaluation process and methodology

The evaluation methodology used a range of tools and analytical methods, involving the collection of both primary and secondary data. During the inception phase, the team used a number of desk-based methods to inform the evaluation design, identifying preliminary findings and areas of enquiry for the field phase.

- A **literature review** was carried out of a sample of reviews, studies and evaluations relating to the Haiyan response, synthesising the findings and learnings from available secondary literature. This generated initial findings that were assessed and validated as part of the more in-depth primary data collection in the field phase. It also identified major issues and gaps that were pursued through further analysis. The full literature review is included in Annex 3 of this report.
- A **context analysis** provided a detailed analysis of the operational and funding context to enable the team to identify the contextual factors that affected implementation. This was updated during the field phase and is included in Annex 4 of this report.
- A **stakeholder mapping exercise** was conducted to identify key informants for the evaluation, and initial interviews were conducted with a range of DFID and non-DFID stakeholders to inform and refine the interview guide for the KIIs and the evaluation framework.
- An **evaluability assessment** that helped clarify the purpose, scope and objectives of the evaluation (including the lesson-learning focus and need to assess/demonstrate accountability); identified constraints and limitations to the evaluation design and process; and identified data gaps and

<sup>1</sup> The Itad proposal had indicated that a theory-based approach, that would test the underlying theory behind DFID's response in the Philippines, would not be feasible for this evaluation given that the theory of change (ToC) presented in the ToR was not fully-specified but rather a re-presentation of the intervention logic contained within the Logframe, but without the assumptions. Given the short timeframe and limited resources for the evaluation the Itad proposal also indicated that it would not be feasible to reconstruct the theory of change as a basis for testing the causal links and assumptions behind DFID's intervention.

constraints to data availability which needed to be addressed through the literature review and field work, helping focus evaluation questions.

- A **partnership assessment tool** was designed during the inception phase and carried out during the field phase. The purpose was to analyse partnerships and influences that provided positive and valuable lessons, with a focus on key priority areas such as VAWG, accountability and VfM. The Itad inception report stated that the assessment will be limited to three partnerships to enable a detailed study that will generate an additional layer of nuance to existing findings, rather than attempting to cover all partnerships thinly.<sup>2</sup> Key selection criteria were:
  - Partners working on critical partnership issues for future L3 emergencies (e.g. AAP, VAWG);
  - Partners with long-term DFID funding as well as DFID funding for Haiyan;
  - Partners with significant staff and organisational commitments and investments in the chosen issues;
  - Willingness of partner to commit to a partnership assessment within this evaluation.

The team filtered partners based on these criteria. Selection was especially limited by the low level of partner organisational engagement and investments in partnership issues, especially at field level, as well as a general lack of willingness to positively participate at all levels. Partners were less willing to participate where there had been key staff turnover (thus limiting interest and institutional knowledge on the focus areas), and due to the need to commit extra time and resources. Two out of the three planned assessments were made of VAWG with UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and of accountability with Plan International.<sup>3</sup> See Annex 5 for further details. Additional brief case studies on VfM were also conducted (e.g. with International Organisation for Migration (IOM)). See Annex 6 for further details.

The fieldwork was a key element of the evaluation and was carried out with the expert support of Itad's partner Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS) and its Philippines-based consultants. The fieldwork focused on semi-structured KIIs and PIGDs in areas affected by the typhoon where DFID had supported partner activities. Interview checklists linked to the evaluation framework were developed beforehand, and were tested, validated and revised in the first days of the fieldwork. The field teams, including interpreters, were trained in the use of the data collection tools and templates, as well as approaches to ethical data collection (see Box 1), in workshops conducted by the core team in Manila and Tacloban.

Locations selected for in-depth primary data collection were based on those areas most heavily impacted by the typhoon, as well as an analysis of DFID and partner monitoring reports, ensuring that all DFID partners included in the RRF were covered, together with a good cross-section of types of projects supported under DFID financing. This included an initial focus on interviews in Manila with partners, other donors and government officials; followed by interviews with partners and government officials and PIGDs in affected communities in Leyte (Tacloban and nearby peri-urban areas, Ormoc City, and rural areas in west Leyte) and in Eastern Samar (Giporlos and Guiuan, including island communities). Interviews were also conducted in Roxas City, Panay and Estancia (including an island community), and in north Cebu. In total, over 60 interviews were conducted in Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines.

Additionally, PIGDs within communities impacted by the typhoon were a key method for data collection, and a key part of the analysis. PIGDs are a type of focus group discussion, which ensures that all different social groups affected by the typhoon, appropriate to each of the localities selected, are contacted and involved in discussions. They included use of community score cards to assess accountability of service providers by soliciting perceptions of different groups of primary stakeholders on the quality, accessibility and relevance of various public services. A total of 51 were conducted (see Annex 8 for further details).

<sup>2</sup> Itad (2014), Evaluation of DFID's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan: Inception Report, p.19.

<sup>3</sup> One of the evaluation team had worked with Plan International in the Haiyan response but precluded herself from this particular assessment so as to avoid any conflict of interest.

On returning from the fieldwork, the team conducted remaining interviews and document review; and then undertook a thorough and structured process for analysing the wealth of primary and secondary data amassed and triangulating evaluation findings, using the evidence assessment framework described above. Once the main findings were agreed, the team then used these as a basis for deriving key evaluation lessons and recommendations. These are presented in Section 5 of this report.

#### **Box 1: Approach to evaluation ethics**

The evaluation team's approach to ethics was grounded in the OECD-DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation<sup>4</sup> and the DFID Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation.<sup>5</sup> Together these informed the development of an evaluation methodology in the inception phase that ensured the team adhered to the 'do no harm' principle at all times. This was, in particular, important for the PIGDs conducted by the team during the fieldwork. An important aspect of fieldwork preparation was the community fieldwork orientation with the SDS consultants and interpreters, which was led by one of the international core team. Aside from training in the data collection tools and templates, this focused on ethical considerations when conducting PIGDs. Using the standards and principles mentioned above, the team derived a set of principles for conducting the PIGDs that took into consideration doing no harm, protecting respondents through informed consent, asking the right questions to the right people in a compassionate and respectful manner, and establishing in particular guidelines for talking to adolescents. These principles were followed by all team members throughout the PIGDs. For more details on the PIGD approach, see Annex 8.

### **2.3 Methodological challenges and limitations**

This section outlines the key biases and limitations to data collection encountered during the evaluation, their impact on the accuracy and reliability of findings, and the team's approach to overcoming these.

**Fieldwork timing:** The team's fieldwork in the Philippines coincided with the papal visit from 15 to 19 January. Although this impeded the evaluation to the extent that it was difficult to arrange meetings during the first week in Manila and the fieldwork was subsequently compressed into three weeks, the team was still able to conduct a sufficient number of KIIs and PIGDs with a range of stakeholders across multiple locations which provided a broad source of views and triangulated findings. Furthermore, the SEQAS review of the inception report raised a concern over the possible diversion of attention of those interviewed to the impact of Typhoon Hagupit (Ruby) in December 2014. However, the team believes that this did not have any significant impact on the evaluation as Hagupit, while threatening areas affected by Haiyan, in fact impacted badly only in the northern areas of Eastern Samar, areas only peripherally hit by Haiyan and thus not part of this evaluation. Those interviewed referred to their better preparedness for Hagupit following their Haiyan experience, but this was considered a benefit in that it strengthened the team's findings. For further details on Hagupit see Annex 13.

**Risk of respondent fatigue:** There was also a perceived risk of respondent fatigue due to a wealth of reviews and evaluations conducted in recent months. However, in the case of the PIGDs, the team mitigated this through selecting communities who had not been interviewed as a group by other partners or donor agencies. This was not possible in the case of many KIIs, including government, partners and NGOs; however the evaluation focus on DFID's role provided a different perspective, thus reducing the risk of fatigue in providing views to the team.

**Access to documentation:** Initial limited availability of data and documentation from DFID impeded the inception report analysis and field work planning, but this was eventually addressed thus minimising overall impact on the evaluation.

**Availability of key stakeholders for interviews:** Availability of key stakeholders for interviews was a key concern prior to the evaluation, including the fact that many staff of partners who had worked on the Haiyan response had left the Philippines. This was a constraint for some international NGO (INGO) partners, but overall the team managed to interview someone with knowledge of the intervention across all agencies.

<sup>4</sup> OECD-DAC (Guidelines and Reference Series) p.6 <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/qualitystandards.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf)

**Data availability:** As flagged in the inception report, there was limited data available that was suited to conducting a detailed analysis of both VfM and accountability. KIIs and PIGDs proved a valuable source of information for accountability, as well as the evaluation of DFID's engagement with partners on VfM, which was a key focus of the evaluation. Qualitative analysis of speed, quality and cost considerations of the response was prevalent. However, quantitative analysis of VfM of specific interventions by partners was very limited. Where examples exist, they are reported in the VfM section below (Section 4.1.5 and Annex 6).

**Partnership assessment:** The team originally planned to conduct three in-depth partnership assessments. However, as the field phase progressed, and as noted above, the team found that partnership with DFID was not a strong feature of individual partner responses to Typhoon Haiyan, thus resulting in a deficit of data and reluctance of many partners to commit the time and resources to undertake a partnership assessment. Nevertheless, two in-depth assessments were conducted with UNFPA on VAWG and Plan International on accountability, which yielded rich findings on strengthening partnership-based approaches to VAWG and accountability.<sup>6</sup> In the case of VfM, initial findings suggested there was little evidence of widespread usage of VfM as an ongoing reporting and monitoring tool, or of VfM analysis, although several agencies reported that they are now in the process of preparing their final reports. Therefore, more VfM data may be available in the coming months. The evaluation team decided that more would be gained from interviewing several agencies where there was some evidence of greater engagement with VfM frameworks and concepts (e.g. FAO, IOM), rather than one single reluctant partner.

### 3. Contextual overview

This section provides a brief overview of the contextual background to Typhoon Haiyan and the aftermath, including a summary of DFID's approach to the response and the grants it provided. The key contextual issues highlighted in this section, and their relevance to the evaluation findings, are explored in Section 4. A more detailed contextual analysis can be found in Annex 4.

#### **Contextual background**

Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda), made landfall in Guiuan in Eastern Samar in the Philippines in the early hours of the morning on 8th November 2013 and swept across the central Philippines. It was one of the strongest typhoons ever recorded, with sustained wind speeds of 250 km/hour and gusts of over 315 km/hour, and storm surges of over four metres. It left huge devastation in its wake, resulting in loss of life, massive destruction to physical infrastructure and housing, loss of livelihoods, and disruption of communications, electricity, water systems and transportation. More than 14 million people were affected, and over four million displaced, with evacuation centres supporting more than 730,000 at the height of the disaster.<sup>7</sup> The typhoon affected some of the poorest areas in the Philippines, Samar and Leyte in particular being amongst the least developed regions even before Typhoon Haiyan hit.

The Philippines is a country which experiences a high frequency of natural disasters and has a set of actors with considerable experience in disaster response within national and local government and civil society, supported by long established international organisations (UN, Red Cross and NGOs). Typhoon Haiyan exceeded this existing in-country capacity to respond, and triggered a rare request for international assistance from the Government of Philippines (GoP). However, both national and international capacities were already at full stretch when Haiyan struck. The super typhoon was only one of many major natural disasters to strike the Philippines in one year including Typhoon Bopha (Pablo) in December 2012 (also a category 5 typhoon but less destructive than Haiyan), the conflict in Zamboanga City (Mindanao) in September 2013 which displaced more than 100,000 people, and the earthquake in Bohol in October 2013.

The UN declared the typhoon a Level 3 (L3) disaster, the first of its kind since the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the UN adopted the TA, intended to make humanitarian response more coordinated,

<sup>6</sup> One of the evaluation team had worked with Plan in the Haiyan response but precluded herself from this particular assessment.

<sup>7</sup> OCHA Humanitarian Snapshot, 6 Jan 2014

more accountable and more effective. This triggered a number of internal mechanisms under the TA protocols, primarily unlocking a major surge of international capacity and resources. Response to the typhoon was an important test of the new systems designed to strengthen the system's ability to respond to major crises. This contextual point is central to the evaluation. The key contextual issues, highlighted by the analysis in Annex 4 and explored further in this evaluation, include:

1. Widespread damage which temporarily overwhelmed local capacity across a large area including inaccessible/remote areas in the poorest parts of the country;
2. An ongoing process of decentralisation and devolution under the local government code of 1991, which led to an inconsistent response from local governments, including the national and sub-national disaster risk management structures (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council – NDRRMC – and councils at local government levels);
3. A significant but parallel response through the private sector and the network of Filipinos working abroad sending funds through remittances;
4. Political complexities which are perceived to have delayed response: for example, the rival political affiliations of the Mayor of Tacloban and the national government, or at a local level between provincial authorities and local barangay captains;
5. A major international response was mounted which included the deployment of 29 foreign military contingents and a huge international civilian surge (462 staff deployed within the first 3 weeks) as a result of the UN L3 activation. This was a new approach untested for a natural disaster in a MIC, creating significant coordination challenges;
6. The need to prepare rapidly for the next typhoon season, which would potentially affect those still in temporary shelter or unable to access evacuation centres.

According to the OCHA financial tracking service, the largest donors were private individuals and organisations, providing 22.6% of all funds (excluding contributions outside their system). Overseas remittances represent about 10% of the Philippines GDP; these increase after a disaster, with money sent to communities and families from across the world, including poorly-paid maids in Lebanon and well-paid doctors in California. Remittances are directed to families as well as to community assets.

### ***UK response in context***

On 12 November 2013 the UN released a Haiyan Action Plan (HAP) requesting \$301 million (£184 million), as did the International Federation of the Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross requesting CHF 72 million (£48 million) and CHF 15 million (£10 million) respectively. On 16 December the UN appeal was superseded by the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for \$788 million (£483 million) reflecting an updated assessment of relief and early recovery requirements. The total Red Cross/Red Crescent income as of August 2014 was CHF 345.6 million (£230.4 million).

The GoP responded to the typhoon with immediate humanitarian aid and on 18 December launched the "Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY)"<sup>8</sup> strategic plan to guide recovery and reconstruction in the affected areas. The plan estimates the value of damaged physical assets, both public and private, at PHP 424 billion (£6.28bn, 3.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)), and recovery and reconstruction costs at PHP 361 billion (£5.35bn, 3.1 percent of GDP). In April 2014, the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR) finalised a Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) which sought assistance of \$8.17 billion between 2013-2017 for reconstruction and recovery.<sup>9</sup> On 4 July 2014 the government announced the end of the humanitarian phase.

Typhoon Haiyan was also the first large-scale sudden-onset emergency since the publication of the UK Government's Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) in 2011. The UK provided £77 million in humanitarian support, agreed by the DFID Secretary of State on 9 November 2013, making it the largest

<sup>8</sup> Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better, NEDA, <http://www.neda.gov.ph/?p=1921s>

<sup>9</sup> Office of the Presidential Assistant on Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR), unpublished draft - see NEDA Implementation for Results. [http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ray\\_ver2\\_final.pdf](http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ray_ver2_final.pdf)



response of the bilateral donors, contributing 14% of the reported \$896 million contributions. The majority of the £77m was allocated through UN, NGO and Red Cross partners and to HAP/SRP priorities. £10m was allocated for the utilisation of UK military assets, £6.2m for direct provision of relief goods and £1m for technical secondments to UN agencies (further details in Annex 4).

The response was led by DFID and implemented through a cross-Whitehall approach. The DFID Operations Room included liaison staff from Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), with coordination across Whitehall. The CHASE Operations Team (OT) provided its usual service of managing logistics and surge staffing to CHASE. The key contextual issue from the UK perspective was the lack of DFID presence in country. A team was deployed from London in advance of the typhoon making landfall, which was then augmented as the scale of the crisis became apparent. Significant numbers of DFID and CHASE OT staff were involved in the response, with many being subsequently re-deployed. DFID maintained a presence in the Philippines until December 2014.

The UK response was distributed across three outputs: life-saving response, protection including preventing/responding to VAWG, and improved effectiveness of the overall response. It included the deployment of significant numbers of field personnel and UK military assets, direct delivery of non-food items, technical secondments to the UN, and funding to UN, Red Cross and NGO partners. The response was carried out through a wide spectrum approach using most of the operational tools available, including the RRF for pre-qualified NGO partners – the first full test of HERR tools.

DFID's leadership of the Call to Action Summit on VAWG in November 2013, which was followed by the UN "Centrality of Protection" Statement of December 2013, had significant implications for how much protection was considered from the very first days of the response. The centrality of protection (and gender, vulnerability and accountability issues as interlinked with protection), stemming from both the Call to Action Summit and then the UN Statement, formed critical contextual parameters for DFID in developing its response.

DFID also deployed a reconstruction adviser to make recommendations on the transition from the response through recovery to reconstruction. DFID agreed a recovery and reconstruction package of £8.82m in April 2014, £5m of which was earmarked for the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for Haiyan.

## 4. Evaluation findings

This section presents the findings of the evaluation, divided into three sub-sections corresponding to the three overarching evaluation objectives. To enhance readability, the sub-questions from the evaluation framework under each evaluation objective (see Annex 2) are addressed together rather than separately. We also include a shaded box at the start of each sub-section that summarises the key findings against each of the evaluation sub-questions.

### 4.1 Effectiveness of the DFID response

**Evaluation Question 1: To what extent did DFID response mechanisms function effectively to achieve priority outcomes? How can funding and support be made more effective in future rapid responses?**

This section provides an analysis of DFID's response mechanisms, focusing in particular on DFID's strategic approach and decision making, approach to partner selection and funding, the quality of its response management, and an assessment of VfM. It also covers issues of VAWG (originally included under evaluation objective 2 (d)). Box 2 summarises the key findings.

#### **Box 2: Summary of key findings against evaluation question 1**

*a) Was DFID's strategic approach and decision making appropriate and supportive to partners, humanitarian action and resilient recovery?*

**DFID's approach was appropriate, flexible and supportive to partner actions during the response phase but less so to early recovery.** The evaluation found that, although DFID was a major contributor to the overall response, its **influence on individual partner approaches and ability to engage more strategically was limited** as its support was spread thinly across a wide range of partners that also had significant funding from multiple institutional donors. However, the wide spread of resources across many partners allowed DFID to undertake a holistic approach, engaging in many areas of support. From January 2014, DFID focused more on monitoring rather than advising or robustly engaging strategically with the response. Almost all partners noted that effectiveness of DFID investment in early recovery actions was limited by a short operational timeframe of its business plan, with communities and partners noting that people started to recover within the first months, and in March and April required longer-term recovery actions.

*b) Did DFID support the right mix of funding and partners at the right times considering in-country capacity and sustainability issues? How was the process from early support to recovery managed by DFID, and how did this influence decision making?*

**DFID's funding and partner mix was flexible, rapid and needs-based, reflecting in-country response capacity but not sustainable recovery.** Its choice of partners and delivery mechanisms was broad and appropriate for delivering the agreed strategy for the immediate response to life-saving needs. DFID balanced deployment from RRF partners with support to UN and the Red Cross, as well as deploying one of the largest international military contingents.

*c) How well did DFID manage the response programme in view of the fact there was no DFID office? What contribution to decision making did the field team have?*

**DFID did not have a pre-existing presence and office in the Philippines prior to Haiyan, but other donors and partners noted that the relatively large DFID team integrated itself into existing international response structures in Manila,** focusing on addressing priorities and needs within resource envelopes allocated by London. However, other donors and partners had a better contextual understanding, existing programmes and long-term relationships, which enabled them to better transition to recovery programming.

*d) How do Value for Money considerations affect programmatic decision making? How did DFID and partners take into account VfM in their decision making process? What is the evidence on VfM of specific partners/interventions?*

**Partner agencies assess cost, speed and quality as an implicit integral part of decision making; however, this is done with limited influence by DFID.** VfM considerations are present to some extent in decision making, however these considerations are often implicit and mostly qualitative. Some agencies have their own VfM frameworks in place, but the evaluation found very limited evidence of quantitative VfM assessments of the Haiyan response. DFID's influence was limited partly because it provided a relatively small contribution to each partner's budget, and also because it was only present for the early response and recovery phases.

**There is some evidence of DFID funding improving speed of response, and its flexibility resulting in VfM gains.** The VfM of the consortium approach was mixed, with gains but also costs. For example, joint procurement was consistently highlighted as reducing cost, but compromised speed of delivery. Cash transfer programming is a potentially effective strategy for improving VfM.

*e) Were protection and VAWG issues sufficiently addressed in the response by all partners at all levels? If not, where were the gaps?*

**DFID influenced the increased focus on VAWG at the global level, but this failed to translate into improved quality or quantity of programming at field level.** It was generally perceived that there was greater rhetoric about VAWG (Gender-based Violence (GBV)) in the Philippines during the response, and this was attributed to the Call to Action Summit. The resulting KeepHerSafe Commitments were seen to be a useful advocacy tool, particularly for donors. However, there was little impact of this at the field level and those agencies for whom VAWG/protection programming is embedded felt no extra influence from the increased spotlight. Those agencies which have a less sophisticated understanding were not positively influenced. There was no concrete evidence as to why there was limited influence but it may be that the spotlight focused on VAWG being an important issue (policy) without providing any practical guidance on what to do about it (delivery). Furthermore, there was less of an increase in VAWG in the Philippines than in disasters elsewhere, although this in no way suggests that in future emergencies VAWG should be anything less than an immediate priority for implementation.

#### 4.1.1 DFID's management approach and decision making

**Key finding 1: DFID's decision making was fast and flexible, responsive to filling specific gaps, and often based on direct one-to-one dialogue with the in-country DFID mission and partners.**

**Submissions to Ministers highlighted DFID's global ability to respond rapidly based on global partnerships and defined processes.**<sup>10</sup> On the 9<sup>th</sup> November, submissions to Ministers recommended the rapid activation of the RRF mechanism, with an initial focus on goods in kind and technical expertise. Within the initial 72-hour window, CHASE received 13 separate applications from both consortia and individual NGOs and, based on the applications and reports from DFID humanitarian advisers in the Philippines, committed a total of £8m to seven different applications. CHASE decisions were made rapidly and, by the 14<sup>th</sup> November, further submissions recommended funding initial appeals from the Red Cross (IFRC £5.9 million; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) £1.2 million) and further funds to the emerging UN Humanitarian Action Plan (£22.9m), totalling £30m.<sup>11</sup> The response provided support to partners for both relief and some self-recovery initiatives.<sup>12</sup>

**More than two-thirds of partners interviewed reported that DFID decision making was fast and flexible relative to other donors, including donors with long-term in-country presence, and that it was very responsive to gaps identified by partners and was able to make rapid changes to programming.** Partners noted that DFID made changes relatively quickly, once it understood the need to have direct dialogue and open relations with DFID representatives. As is natural, once relations were open, DFID was more responsive to filling gaps and funding initiatives. Almost all partners highlighted that proactive communication and requests were met with fast and flexible decision making. Most partners also appreciated DFID responsiveness to immediate gaps. For example, interviews with WHO highlighted gaps in cadaver management (see Box 3), mental health services and cold chain management during the course of the response, which DFID was able to support through technical placements, funding support, and delivery of solar-power refrigerators respectively. Similarly, gaps were filled in coordination and support given to promoting cash and accountability. A number of partner interviews highlighted that once dialogue was opened with DFID decision-makers, DFID was comparatively more open to changes in agreed programmes than other donors. These changes included changes to context, such as people leaving temporary camps early or issuance of no-build zone legislation.

### **Box 3: Cadaver retrieval and management**

WHO identified instances where communities were unable to return to their properties or land because they still contained dead bodies. This caused significant mental health issues which manifested as physical symptoms as people were unable to sleep or recover from the trauma. WHO was able to use DFID support to bring in cadaver-sniffing dogs to locate unburied bodies, teams with body bags to remove the bodies appropriately, and forensic pathologists to fulfil national requirements for identification of the dead. This rapidly improved the mental and physical health of the affected communities.

*Source: Interviews with WHO representatives in the Philippines*

**Key finding 2: DFID's lack of prior presence in the Philippines did not hamper its initial response. However, after the initial response, the DFID field team focused less on influencing overall humanitarian objectives and more on monitoring outputs.**

**DFID's initial presence on the ground was noted positively by most respondents in giving DFID eyes and ears on the ground to inform a well nuanced response.** DFID rapid deployments built up a capable team, and its presence during the response phase was built on tried and tested procedures and experienced staff supported by London. DFID did not have a presence in the Philippines when Typhoon Haiyan was gaining strength, but many of its partners did. As for many countries, its Conflict, Humanitarian and Security (CHASE) team in London is responsible for monitoring humanitarian crises in liaison with the Embassy where one exists. DFID had previously provided funding to Typhoon Bopha (Pablo), the Zamboanga City conflict and the Bohol earthquake noted above.

<sup>10</sup> CHASE submissions to the Minister of 9 and 14 November.

<sup>11</sup> CHASE submissions to the Minister of 9 and 14 November and Information Note of 22 November 2013.

<sup>12</sup> The HAP contribution helped fund activities such as support to WFP for life saving and food, to UNICEF for nutrition and access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), to WHO for health, as well as support to OCHA for coordination, IOM for shelter, and FAO, Save and ILO for re-establishing livelihoods and agriculture.

The deployment of an advance team of three DFID humanitarian experts two days prior to landfall, with further deployments rapidly afterwards, meant that nine DFID personnel had been deployed by 13 November, i.e. within a week of landfall. This provided DFID with a very visible presence which was at least as large as other donors, and in most cases the largest donor presence. During the initial months this presence and contributions to coordination and informal dialogue with “like-minded donors” was considered positive, informed and professional. DFID’s contributions were well regarded by a significant majority of the international community interviewed, although this was a minority view amongst those interviewed in government. This is a reflection of the limitations in collaboration between the international community and the government and is explored in further detail in Section 4.2.

**The DFID monitoring team which operated in the Philippines from January was on the whole perceived positively, but concerns were raised by many partners, both in Manila and the field, about burdensome project-level monitoring.** The monitoring focus was partly driven by the findings of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) report in March 2014 that DFID had not monitored enough,<sup>13</sup> although concerns highlighted by agencies interviewed indicate this appears to have begun from the transition to the monitoring team and move to Tacloban in January 2014. The monitoring team was relatively large compared to other funding agencies, and several interviewed (partners and government) characterised DFID as overbearing in terms of how it worked with others. However, the majority of partners were positive about the opportunity that the presence of the DFID team provided for designing programmes together, and ironing out any issues informally, as well as conducting a more flexible form of monitoring than other donors, most of whom who flew in and out.<sup>14</sup> DFID’s partners had significant numbers of donors, which in aggregate created a significant monitoring burden. One partner noted, recognising the value of planned donor missions, that during some periods they would have two or more donor missions per week.

**Concerns relating to donor involvement in clusters were raised by local and national government agencies to OCHA.** This included DFID and other donors playing too visible a role in clusters, with DFID specifically being referred to by several cluster members as turning up uninvited to some informal cluster meetings, which stifled more open discussions amongst cluster members.

#### 4.1.2 DFID’s strategic approach and funding support to partners

**Key finding 3: DFID’s strategic and decision-making approach was supportive to the response, although less so to early recovery.**

DFID’s strategic approach and decision making utilised a breadth of resources available to DFID, informed by initial needs assessments and DFID in-country presence. Recognising that, at least initially, the scale of the disaster outstripped in-country capacity for response, DFID, similar to other large donors such as EU, Australian DFAT and USAID, supported a broad range of partners and was initially flexible to changing needs and emerging gaps. DFID’s business plan, supported by submissions to ministers, stated that it would focus on the provision of direct life-saving assistance, across all major sectors, with additional support to protection and coordination.<sup>15</sup>

Utilising existing mechanisms, DFID activated the RRF, prioritising those partners with in-country experience, supported appeals from the UN, Red Cross and Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), as well as more direct in-kind assistance, and provided the deployment of military assets. Using its in-country presence and dialogue with partners, DFID was able to react flexibly to gaps in technical capacity. The initial response was similar in approach, scope and resource base to that of like-minded donors from the US and Australia, who have close, long-term ties with the Philippines. DFID also worked closely to coordinate the UK response with FCO and MoD through liaison officials in the DFID Operations Room. This, in particular, facilitated the use of the UK naval resources with their ability to access unreachable islands.

<sup>13</sup> ‘DFID did not monitor closely enough and procurement delays only came to light during our visit’. ICAI (2014), Rapid Review of DFID’s Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, p.13.

<sup>14</sup> Although some partners (e.g. ILO and IOM) reported that very little feedback was provided after the monitoring mission.

<sup>15</sup> DFID, Business case and intervention summary for an emergency humanitarian response: Response to Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines

Box 4 below presents the team's analysis of DFID's funding approach, including the effectiveness of the consortium approach and civil-military liaison.

**Box 4: An assessment of DFID's funding approach**

***Rapid Response Fund***

The initial £5 million RRF allocation provided the immediate response through NGO partners. RRF partners are well versed in the mechanism and reported through interviews that they find it rapid and flexible. It was appropriate to invite RRF proposals from all sectors given the information deficit in the early stages of the response, so that DFID's response could be based on the latest information from operational agencies. DFID's RRF activation letter for Haiyan encouraged RRF partners to form consortia to deliver assistance (although this is not a formal RRF policy). There is good evidence from KIIs that suggests that the main benefit to DFID was in reducing its transaction costs by having fewer partners to deal with, rather than other potential benefits such as joint procurement and better coordination. However, a substantial proportion of partners interviewed found the costs in terms of setup and coordination outweighed these benefits (see VfM section below). DFID seems to have taken on board the lesson already and seems less eager to have RRF partners form consortia, as evidenced by the response to Typhoon Ruby, for which consortia were not formed.

***Direct delivery of relief and logistics items***

DFID's direct delivery of stockpiled non-food items included shelter, household and WASH items as well as logistical equipment in the form of vehicles and airfield handling equipment. These interventions were widely heralded as very timely, with the first of 14 commercial relief flights departing on 10 November (three days after landfall). The system worked very well, from the pre-arranged contracting and stockpiled goods, to appropriate delivery and handover to appropriate partners on the ground. These systems offered VfM by maximising speed and quality (for further details see 4.1.4 below), while also keeping costs significantly lower than would have been the case if procuring air services a week into the response. They also supported partners in assisting with transportation of their own goods.

Philippines import regulations restricted the use of some unregistered vehicles to the emergency phase. Some of the vehicles remain warehoused as a result. There were questions raised about the longer-term appropriateness of the supply of JCB vehicles, which are not in common usage in the Philippines. This meant that operators were less familiar with them, and maintenance might prove to be more costly. However the advantages of being able to supply such vehicles rapidly for short-term debris clearance work without local procurement, and the need to provide a global capacity, outweighed such context-specific issues. There is good evidence from field-level interviews that the critical role played by DFID-supplied airfield handling equipment enabled much faster offload times at Cebu and Tacloban airports.

***Support to UK military assets – civil-military liaison***

The decision to deploy military assets – amongst 29 national military contingents – was perceived by both many DFID staff as well as most partners as being politically driven, raising questions over its VfM. The £10 million allocated by DFID to support the involvement of HMS Daring and Illustrious was argued in the Business Case as being based on the gap between humanitarian needs and civilian resources to meet them.

The evaluation did not analyse the specific costs of the UK military response or compare them with possible alternatives. However on the basis of fairly strong evidence from interviews with a number of well-informed partners, the UK military contribution did play an important part in both mapping damage through aerial reconnaissance, and in delivery of relief to harder to reach areas before commercial shipping operations were able to commence. DFID's cautious approach managed the risks of inappropriate distribution through the deployment of civil-military advisers to the Navy vessels, close coordination with Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other operational agencies, and building successfully on the DFID-MoD Memorandum of Understanding.

***Support to technical gaps***

Deployment of UK medical teams was scaled back once the needs became clearer, but the evaluation found that they had provided important surgical support, and their deployment was prudent given the potential depletion of in-country medical capacity and the high levels of trauma consistent with such natural disasters.

DFID's funding of 15 technical placements to UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), OCHA, World Health Organisation (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP) and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) filled specific gaps in capacity, ensuring key roles were deployed rapidly to enable an effective, coordinated response. Specific focus on civil-military coordination (CIMIC), Communicating with Communities (CwC) and the Cash Coordinator proved to be worthwhile investments in these areas.

**Contributions to Appeals**

DFID's contributions to UN, Red Cross and NGO partners other than through the RRF were based on the field team's analysis of needs, gaps and agency capacities. The UN HAP (Flash Appeal) produced four days after landfall was a reference document that informed the DFID response to a degree, while the SRP produced 30 days after landfall did not have any significant impact on DFID resource allocation decisions, many of which had already been made by that stage. A deliberate choice to split funding allocations between NGOs and UN maximised the delivery capacity that could be harnessed.

**The programming shift from response to early recovery was rapid in the Philippines but this was not reflected in DFID strategy, although there were adaptations during the response.<sup>16</sup> The opportunity for assisting resilient recovery, with sustainable shelter solutions and livelihoods, was an early need but requires more than a six-month programme period and commitment.** One-third of DFID's partners interviewed expressed surprise at DFID's lack of engagement on recovery programming, compared to that of DFID's engagement in response. RRF partners' longer-term programming and plans for recovery or linking to resilience was not considered at proposal stage or interim reporting.<sup>17</sup> This was driven by the 12-week duration of RRF projects and the focus on rapid delivery of relief items for immediate life-saving response. However, this process did not reflect the demand at community level for early livelihoods recovery, the capacity of many affected communities to recover rapidly, the critical gaps that still exist in support to restoring livelihoods, and the potential capacity of partners who had already been selected for their pre-existing presence and ongoing programmes in the affected communities.

DFID's recovery timeframe was not sufficient to address recovery issues. DFID's main specific interventions on recovery included £4 million towards re-establishing livelihoods and agriculture through an FAO/Save the Children/International Labour Organisation (ILO) joint venture from January-December 2014. The £5 million call for proposals in April 2014 focused on education and protection/livelihoods with a six-month timeframe for the intervention.<sup>18</sup> This is in alignment with the DFID humanitarian response funding guidelines.<sup>19</sup> The full proposal assessment criteria refer to resilience and early recovery, without specifying timelines either in terms of when recovery activity can start, the limits of resilience programming within six months, or the principles of transition to development actors. Community discussions conducted by the evaluation team in January 2015 highlighted that although people were grateful for support, they needed help in restoring sustainable livelihoods and reconstructing safe and resilient homes, including in no-build zones. Multi-year humanitarian funding that supports longer-term recovery and resilience activities can greatly enhance VfM as well.<sup>20</sup>

**Long-term presence and existing relationships influenced partners' programme approaches, especially in the recovery and reconstruction stages.** Partners have long-term relationships with the Philippines, with many partners present in communities for decades. A number of partners, such as Christian Aid and CARE, implement directly through their local counterparts who have direct links with local government and civil society organisations. Many partners and other donors such as UNICEF, WHO and most INGOs have existing programmes and long-term relationships with stakeholders such as the Department of Education (DepED), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or Ministry of Health (MoH). These relationships and existing programmes directly informed long-term disaster risk reduction and resilience programmes after Haiyan, and other disasters. Partners defined their recovery approaches either with other donors or with their own donated organisation funds once it was evident that DFID was not prioritising funding to recovery

<sup>16</sup> According to interviews with Government of Philippines and other KIIs/PIGDs.

<sup>17</sup> DFID interviews, proposal/reporting guidance

<sup>18</sup> DFID also provided £8.82 million to help support recovery and reconstruction on 14 April 2014 includes: a £5m contribution to a multi donor trust fund (MDTF) to provide technical assistance to GoP; £820,000 to support an enhanced partnership between the UK Met office and the Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) to improve the early warning of extreme weather events; and a £3m contribution for promoting catastrophe insurance market development in the Philippines

<sup>19</sup> Humanitarian Response Funding Guidelines for NGOs, DFID, May 2013

<sup>20</sup> Cabot Venton (2013). "Value for Money of Multi-year Approaches to Humanitarian Funding." DFID, UK.

programmes identified in the government's RAY and the UN recovery strategy and plan.<sup>21</sup> Resilient recovery in the Philippines also depends significantly on the private sector and the flow of overseas remittances to affected communities. DFID was not closely engaged in understanding these linkages or exploring ways in which it could support or facilitate them in order to strengthen the recovery phase.

#### 4.1.3 DFID's approach to partner selection

**Key finding 4: The RRF mechanism allows DFID to look globally at key partners but adapt to partners' presence, capacity or strategy in individual countries. However, DFID's approach to partner selection placed greater emphasis on its partners' global reputation and capacity to deliver outputs, rather than their capacity to work in a MIC and achieve outcomes.**

The flexibility of the selection mechanism is beneficial to outcomes, especially in MICs in Asia, where existing relationships, local partnerships as well as knowledge of the local context and disaster management laws and protocols are complex and needed. However, DFID's partner capacity was largely assessed from partners' global relief capacity. This was assessed through centralised assessments, particularly the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) for multilateral partners, and the Rapid Response Fund assessments for NGOs.<sup>22</sup> In-country partner capacity was informed by recent DFID responses (Typhoon Pablo and the Bohol earthquake) as well as the expertise of DFID's Humanitarian Team who had been based in the Philippines for two years. The MAR rating did not automatically over-ride local assessments: for example, the funding of ILO (which received a low MAR rating) as part of a joint venture with FAO and Save the Children was based on field consultations to manage risk.

**Pre-existing presence in the area of response was a key priority for partner selection** (either directly or through local partners), to ensure that partners would already have experience in working with affected communities and local authorities.<sup>23</sup> In practice, the partners funded were all the traditional partners of a major humanitarian response, including the UN humanitarian agencies, IOM, international NGOs, and the Red Cross movement. Partners were generally funded in areas in which they had a comparative advantage.<sup>24</sup>

However, despite this pre-existing local presence and capacity criteria, organisations expanded rapidly, deploying management external to the Philippines and hiring large numbers of new staff. For some organisations this resulted in a dilution of local expertise, relationships and thus advantage, although many organisations worked through local partners and retained the advantage of a local presence. Many partner management staff, including NGOs, were new to the Philippines but had significant global experience, although often not in a MIC such as the Philippines. However, more than two-thirds of KIIs with partners with long-term Philippines experience, and almost all government informants, noted that the response deployed many staff with experience from "failed states", who did not necessarily understand the context and lacked the experience of working with government structures experienced in managing disasters. For a MIC such as the Philippines, partners' understanding of context is important.

**An existing in-country presence with established programmes and relationships with civil society and government, an understanding of the complex institutional and legal structures in a MIC, and a good reputation, contribute substantially to facilitating better outcomes.** Many organisations were able to link their recovery programmes to existing disaster risk reduction, climate change or sectoral strategies and programmes, mostly pre-existing donors with a longer-term presence in the Philippines, such as Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The relief and recovery programmes of organisations working with local partners, such as CARE, or with programmes with government, such as the UN, reflected local knowledge, relationships and expertise.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Reconstruction Assistance to Yolanda (RAY); UN early recovery, livelihoods and agriculture plan, Feb 2014

<sup>22</sup> DFID, Business Case.

<sup>23</sup> RRF activation email and guidelines

<sup>24</sup> e.g. sector: Oxfam for WASH, Action Contre La Faim (ACF) for nutrition); geographical reach (e.g. Red Cross).

<sup>25</sup> A DFID-funded project that provides an example of how existing organisational and individual relations can provide the opportunity for an innovative and successful project is the Pamati Kita project, a field-driven accountability project rather than one based on strategic alignment or approaches (see Annex 5 for more details on how this project was developed).

It should be noted that following Typhoon Ruby in December 2014, the government did not ask internationally for external assistance but welcomed and called for support from organisations with in-country resources (international and local).

#### 4.1.4 DFID's influence on partner approaches

**Key finding 5: DFID had little influence on partners' strategic programming including approaches to VfM, accountability and VAWG.**

**DFID, a large overall contributor to the response, spread its resources widely, with little direct influence on partner programmes.** In February 2015, OCHA reported that DFID was the largest government donor to the response phase, with £77 million or 14.5% of the total<sup>26</sup>, a greater proportion than the 10% that DFID has reported as a guide for its allocation to its responses.<sup>27</sup> This funding was broadly distributed amongst over 20 partners/consortia, some of whom had larger overall programmes encompassing both response and recovery. Partners engaged with DFID as one of many of their donors but one without a long-term in-country presence as a donor, or established in-country influence. In the initial stages the UK Embassy played a key role in contacts with the government, UN and other partners, drawing on its established relations, including high-level contacts with the office of the President and the military. DFID drew on these contacts, given its lack of partner and donor contacts in the field.

**Partners developed their own multi-year relief and recovery programmes with a relatively small and short-term contribution and influence from DFID, which focused mostly on the response.** Partners, for example the Red Cross, developed a multi-year programme with a total value of CHF 320 million or £226 million, of which all governments and government institutions contributed only 18% (DFID's contribution was less than 3% of the total).<sup>28</sup> Much of this funding is not earmarked.

**Few partners reported that DFID influenced their strategy, decision making, or core areas of influence such as VfM, VAWG and accountability, during the Haiyan response.** Partners invest in traditional areas of core competence, which define their approaches. Most partners have established, and often sophisticated, policies and mechanisms relating to VfM, VAWG and accountability. Most partners interviewed in both the Philippines and the UK did not report a significant influence from DFID on these policies and approaches as a result of the response. Few reported technical discussions with DFID on either programme strategies or these three key influence areas. A number of partners noted that they and DFID share similar priorities in these areas, as embodied in long-term like-minded relationships. More detail on approaches to VfM, accountability and VAWG programming are provided in sections 4.1.5, 4.1.6 and 4.3. Box 5 below presents a summary of the team's findings of the partnership assessment. A more detailed analysis is presented in Annex 5.

##### Box 5: Summary of findings of the partnership assessment

RRF, UN and Red Cross partners perceive 'partnership' with DFID in different ways, often varying more within the organisation than between organisations. Perceptions ranged from DFID 'partnership' being: a) an un-earmarked contributor to an individual organisation appeals/funding window; or b) a contractor relationship; or c) a long-term global partner and a fellow humanitarian advocate. In the project areas DFID was perceived as a flexible funder that understood changes relating to the project, but DFID's organisational culture promoted more of a contractor relationship, through output monitoring and checking-up on organisations rather than collaboration (partnership) on specific issues such as no-build zones, involving local government or promoting specific issues such as accountability or VAWG. At national level, especially in the initial months, DFID was noted as one of a number of like-minded donors collaborating with the (international) Humanitarian Country Team, but not a long-term donor linking with the RRF and UN partners' national strategies and objectives. RRF and UN national-level partners had divergent views of DFID, some indicating that DFID intruded in areas outside their role, such as in some of the cluster meetings, and were overly assertive in some monitoring activities; others noting that longer-term in-country donors were relatively more strategic than DFID with longer-term interests often based on existing relationships and programmes. Both local and national

<sup>26</sup> See OCHA financial tracking system, Total Humanitarian Assistance per Donor (Appeal plus other) as of 06-February-2015 at [fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha\\_R24\\_E16439\\_1502060301.pdf](https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R24_E16439_1502060301.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> DFID interviews

<sup>28</sup> Exchange rate of 1.41CHF to £1, valid on 5 February 2015



government had limited knowledge of DFID and their actions, which was most apparent with key government planning and coordinating agencies. A number of partners at national level highlighted the importance of other non-Haiyan/Yolanda funding for their organisation. At a global headquarters level, this long-term funding relationship was more apparent. Similarly and naturally, the London-based organisations perceived DFID as a long-term advocate, funding source and influencer for common agendas such as humanitarian reform, VAWG or accountability as well as a source of funding for specific emergencies.

#### 4.1.5 Value for Money assessment

DFID assesses VfM using the 3Es – economy, efficiency and effectiveness. However, in rapid response settings, a focus on cost, speed and quality of response is used by CHASE as it is considered more appropriate and feasible. The evaluation looked at two key aspects of VfM: (i) how did DFID and partners take into account VfM in their decision-making process;<sup>29</sup> and (ii) the evidence on VfM of specific partners/interventions (with a focus on case study examples). The VfM assessment was undertaken by reviewing DFID and partner reports for VfM evidence, systematic data gathering on VfM through KIIs, as well as targeted interviews to key partner agencies for more detailed data. Annex 6 provides a more detailed VfM assessment, and is summarised here. Annex 7 includes a summary of VfM evidence specifically contained in mid-term and final reviews and reports; this complements the VfM evidence from KIIs contained in the evidence framework.

**Key finding 6: Partner agencies assess cost, speed and quality as an integral part of decision making, but usually this is qualitative and implicit, rather than part of a formalised selection and monitoring process. DFID has had limited influence on VfM reporting.**

Speed, cost and quality metrics are reported on by partners qualitatively. This approach was considered to be the most appropriate in the context of a rapid response where formalised processes for determining these metrics would be inappropriate in the early stages. KIIs with partner agency staff at HQ level, and most interim reports, provide some evidence of cost, speed and quality considerations, typically emphasizing where cost efficiencies were made.

Some agencies referred to having their own VfM frameworks in place, but the evaluation found very limited evidence of actual VfM assessments of the Haiyan response. For example, Christian Aid developed guidelines on VfM in 2012 based on the 4Es (the fourth E being equity) and with a strong emphasis on effectiveness; although they were also clear that in the Philippines they have not actually applied this.

Unfortunately, despite numerous requests, the evaluation team received limited feedback from partners on the utility of the balanced scorecard approach used by DFID during the response. One partner, however, pointed out that although the model is a good one, and the language and matrix-based approach is new, VfM is already a part of the team's thinking with a similar process already in place to assess VfM.

Agencies were largely focused on using their own approaches to VfM and were not interested in more guidance from DFID. DFID contributed a small percentage to partners' overall funding and focused more on monitoring rather than engaging strategically. As a result, DFID influence on VfM reporting was minimal.

**Key finding 7: DFID funding improved the speed of response but sometimes with an impact on cost and quality.**

Agencies interviewed in the field, including IOM, UNICEF, FAO and Plan, cited that funding provided directly to them or through the RRF, combined with the availability of pre-positioned goods, allowed for a much faster response. However, despite repeated attempts to gather data on changes in speed of response, very little actual evidence was available. Again, qualitative statements were prevalent, with little concrete evidence to back this up.

<sup>29</sup> The evaluation explicitly did not aim to assess specific partners and their interventions; the VfM assessment thus does not seek to compare across partners or intervention types, but rather uses examples where they were available to highlight findings on the VfM of the overall response.

The use of the military improved speed but also increased costs. Use of the ships/aircraft was costly, raising concerns over VfM. For example, commercial air transport from the UK to Cebu costs £1,614 per metric tonne. Transfer of the same by C14 (military aircraft) costs £9,090, although 55% of this cost was rebated by the EU Civil Contingencies Fund, resulting in a direct cost to DFID of approximately £5,000, 3 times the cost of commercial air transport.<sup>30</sup> However, this has to be balanced with the fact that the use of military assets was identified by many as crucial to saving lives. Because of the geography of the Philippines, supplies via commercial transport were not an option until two weeks into the crisis. Hence military assets were necessary for early response.

A lack of pre-positioned stocks compromised VfM. Where they did exist, the DFID RRF was cited as being very effective for rapid deployment; however, stocks were not sufficient. DFID approaches mixed speed and flexibility with need for in-depth reporting and accountability. However several agencies felt strongly that DFID monitoring and reporting was onerous compared to other donors, in particular because DFID required much more frequent reporting (every 3 months). If DFID reporting requirements lead to better programming, then more frequent reporting may be justified, particularly where reporting is targeted on projects that are higher risk or more expensive. However, it would be very difficult to determine whether the level of reporting did indeed result in better outcomes, and this type of assessment was outside the scope of this study.

A key intended benefit of the consortium approach was greater facilitation of joint procurement,<sup>31</sup> which was cited by some agencies as effective for bringing down costs by allowing agencies to standardise kits resulting in cost efficiencies for bulk procurement. Plan estimates that bulk procurement brought cost savings of £155k. IOM used bulk procurement for shelter supplies and estimates that it was able to save £188k (see Box 12 in Annex 6 for more detail).<sup>32</sup> However, supply challenges limited the actual benefits accrued, and these were often outweighed by the increased resources needed to work through a consortium (see Box 4 in Section 4.1.1). These findings are consistent with the DFID briefing note on VfM of consortium approaches under the RRF in the Philippines and India, which showed positive gains on costs, but negative effects related to speed and quality.<sup>33</sup>

The impact of targeting on VfM was mixed, and should be considered in future responses. Targeting is expensive – it requires assessments to identify the poorest, selectively distribute resources, and can remove some of the efficiency gains from producing standard packages where those need to be differentiated. Further to this, targeting was repeatedly mentioned in PIGDs as causing high levels of tension in the communities, which can erode social cohesion and affect future responses. While there was not any concrete evidence, the trade-offs between targeting and blanket distribution would merit further investigation.

#### **Key finding 8: DFID's short-term presence compromised VfM of the response.**

Several agencies (e.g. ILO, FAO, NEDA and DSWD) and some NGOs commented that the overall quality of the DFID response would have been improved by having longer-term funding. The DFID short-term perspective did not lend itself to transition. Further to this, because DFID was only present for the early response and recovery phases, this limited the ability of DFID and its partners to engage more fully in quantitative and robust VfM assessment. Preparedness and planning activities offer an ideal entry point for further engagement on VfM, and this was a key constraining factor for DFID's influence on VfM.

Two other programming factors were raised in interviews as influencing VfM. First, as markets began to recover, many agencies shifted to cash programming and this was widely cited as beneficial. One of the only VfM studies of the response in the Philippines is a VfM assessment of cash programming in the Philippines (see Box 13 in Annex 6). This assessment found that cash was good VfM; the study found that one of the

<sup>30</sup> Personal communication, Andrew Hill, Civil-Military Advisor, CHASE, DFID, April 1 2015

<sup>31</sup> RRF funding was made available to NGO consortia formed for the response, led by Plan International, Oxfam and Christian Aid.

<sup>32</sup> Personal Communication, Manuel Pereira, IOM, Feb 13 2015

<sup>33</sup> "The Value for Money of RRF Consortium Arrangements: Evidence from NGO partners in India and Philippines". July 2014

strongest indicators of the VfM of cash transfers was that beneficiaries used the cash to purchase diverse goods that would have been impossible, or very impractical, for aid agencies to provide. While cash programming is not a panacea, it certainly merits greater investigation and preparedness work as a potential approach to maximise VfM.

#### 4.1.6 Focus on protection and violence against women and girls (VAWG)

**Key finding 9: DFID influenced the increased focus on VAWG at the global level, but this failed to translate into commensurately improved quality or quantity of programming at field level.**

From the initial interviews and literature review it was clear that protection and VAWG issues were given a higher prominence than within previous disasters. It was unclear what, exactly, this was attributed to, and whether it was due to any one of or a combination of the following: (a) a general evolution of humanitarian action to an understanding of the importance of protection; (b) the TA pillar of accountability (to affected populations) promoting better inclusion and protection; (c) the DFID-led VAWG Call to Action Summit in November 2013 and the resulting KeepHerSafe Commitments; and/or (d) the IASC Statement on the Centrality of Protection in December 2013. It is secondly unclear whether the heightened prominence given to protection issues within documentation and planning actually translated to practical action in the field as envisioned. The field data collection phase concentrated on these two issues of attribution and translation into practice.

**The DFID-led Call to Action Summit on VAWG was highly influential in heightening recognition of VAWG issues.** There were some clear views from the UN and other donor key informants in the field that the Summit was more influential than the IASC Centrality of Protection Statement in December 2013, and that DFID can take credit for the “spotlight” brought to this issue, which also aligned with the generally increased focus that came with the accountability pillar of the TA. Other donors also mentioned the usefulness of the Summit in relation to ensuring engagement from ambassador-level functions within their own Governments. There was a sense across UN agencies and international NGOs that while the VAWG issue being put on the agenda in such a substantial manner was positive (particularly within a context where protection is less instinctive than some other contexts), this might have been to the detriment of other protection issues such as mental health and psycho-social support (MHPSS), or at least disproportional.

**However, a disconnect was observed on the ground by INGOs between the high-profile Summit and how this translated into specific funding and programmatic response, resulting in a missed opportunity to use the momentum of the Summit to full effect.** Those agencies for whom VAWG / protection is embedded (also those for whom AAP is embedded) felt that there was little influence from the increased spotlight on their programmes on the ground. There was little evidence found that other agencies, which have a less sophisticated understanding of protection and accountability, were positively influenced by the spotlight on VAWG.

**There was less of an increase in VAWG issues than often seen in post-disaster environments, but it must be understood that the lack of reporting of VAWG incidences in no way provides evidence that in future emergencies protection is anything less than an immediate priority for implementation.** This was clear from the Community PIGDs. While, generally, men and boys/young men reported a higher satisfaction with feeling safer than women and girls did (an expected result), there was little reporting of VAWG across all four groups and that was both in relation to incidences within their communities and any that they had heard about in other areas (see Annex 8 for a more detailed PIGD report).

When asked about feelings of safety and security both female and male groups consistently referred to: (a) escaped prisoners (approximately 300 prisoners escaped from Leyte Provincial Prison near Tacloban which was damaged in the typhoon – they were mostly either caught or turned themselves in within a month); (b) the NPA (New People’s Army); and (c) the Bajao – an indigenous population. All groups that reported feeling scared due to these three populations also reported that this was based on rumours and nothing transpired.

This does not suggest that certain VAWG issues – such as domestic violence, for example – are not prevalent within the Philippines context. Rather, it suggests that there was not enough of an increase in this in the

post-typhoon situation for people to feel that it was something to be reported rather than normalised behaviour. However, it is also true that the Philippines is a gender-benevolent country in many ways with embedded national systems such as the WCPD (women and children protection desk) within the Philippines National Police Force and a high level of knowledge amongst women and girls as to where they can go for assistance if necessary. There were also consistent reports from rural barangays of night patrols by both male and female barangay officials and from urban barangays of female and male police officers patrolling.

**Sex and age-disaggregated data (SADD) was not collected in a consistent or useful manner, representing a significant missed opportunity.** It also raises the question of when, if ever, SADD will be collected if it cannot be managed in the Philippines context. There has been an increasingly comprehensive global focus on SADD over the past few years, from the 2011 “Sex and Age Matter” OCHA/CARE report<sup>34</sup>, to the revised Sphere Guidelines of 2011 and the IASC Centrality of Protection. Nevertheless, even in the most benign of contexts – such as the Philippines with no security issues or other complex factors to complicate matters – there is still a collective failure to properly collect and then utilise SADD. Within the context of Typhoon Haiyan the lack of SADD and the corresponding lack of VAWG focus translating into practical programmatic improvements across the board had little impact given the particular context. However in many ways that was a fortuitous coincidence and if the situation had been less benign then the impact of failure would have been dire.

One further issue raised by GBV-implementing UN agencies in relation to VAWG in the Philippines was the subject of terminology. There has been significant ongoing global debate around the use of VAWG and GBV, not just relating to the terminology used but also the implications for how male victims of GBV are included in both prevention and response programming. In the context of the Philippines, national programming references VAWC (violence against women and children) which was helpful with some of the issues raised, particularly the well-documented issue of a male minor survivor of sexual assault in one of the evacuation centres in Tacloban in the early days after Yolanda. However, questions were raised by GBV-implementing agencies about the appropriateness of the DFID terminology of VAWG and whether it serves to be excluding male survivors who require assistance.

This issue was also raised within the partnership assessment with UNFPA and in the future could be clarified between DFID and partners, and made clearer in partnership agreements.

## 4.2 DFID's contribution to the effectiveness of the humanitarian system

**Evaluation Question 2: To what extent was the humanitarian system more effective using L3 Transformative Agenda protocols in saving lives, reducing suffering and maintaining the dignity of those affected by the crisis in the initial 3-4 months of the crisis and in the transition to recovery. To what extent did DFID contribute to this effectiveness?**

This section provides an analysis of the extent to which the humanitarian system was effective in delivering reduced suffering and transition to recovery in an L3 context, but with a specific focus on DFID's and its partners' role within this context, as well as DFID's influence on the international humanitarian system. Issues covered include DFID's influence on improved leadership under the UN, and DFID's contribution to improved coordination, in particular between the international humanitarian response system and the GoP. Box 6 summarises the key findings.

### Box 6: Summary of key findings against evaluation question 2

*a) Leadership – did the UN successfully achieve the speed improvements in leadership envisaged through the TA process?*

**While there was some improvement in leadership compared to previous L3-type disasters, Typhoon Haiyan conclusively demonstrated that a 'one size fits all' approach to humanitarian disasters without considering context and national government capacity is highly problematic.** It was felt that the limited improvement in leadership

<sup>34</sup> Mazurana, D. et al. (2011) *Sex and age matter: improving humanitarian response in emergencies*, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

compared to previous disasters was due to the TA. There was little evidence that DFID influenced any perceived improvement in leadership overall, but strong recognition that DFID was quick to make placements in strategic positions (such as within WHO and OCHA).

*b) Coordination – did the L3 configuration of coordination, partnerships and relationships contribute to a more effective response that met the needs of the affected population?*

**There was some improvement in coordination under the auspices of the TA but the improvement was not as great as originally envisaged.** Significant challenges existed in relation to coordination with the GoP due to the lack of calibration of the L3 response protocols to the specific Philippines middle-income context. Furthermore, little coordination with private sector or non-traditional actors occurred. There was little evidence that DFID influenced any perceived improvement in coordination.

*c) Did DFID partners adhere to agreed humanitarian principles, standards and behaviours?*

**Sphere remains the go-to reference point as far as standards are concerned.** The UN cluster system within this response was generally successful in ensuring standardised packages and harmonising standards in line with Sphere. There was little evidence to suggest that DFID influenced their partners to adhere to those standards and no evidence to suggest that partners required any additional motivation to use Sphere.

*d) How have agencies demonstrated learning from this and previous rapid responses, and do the TAL3 protocols encourage useful learning?*

**It was unclear as to how agencies have demonstrated learning from previous responses and it is too early to determine whether Transformative Agenda L3 (TAL3) protocols encourage useful learning.** However, learning from the Philippines TAL3 experience in Yolanda has been highlighted by Ruby (Typhoon Hagupit: December 2014) – see Annex 13.

*e) Was the Government of the Philippines adequately supported and empowered by DFID and partner actions, or were there specific actions that worked to undermine local structures? What impact did this have on sustainability?*

**The GoP was not adequately supported or empowered by the international response system.** The ‘one size fits all’ approach had negative and detrimental effects which had a long-lasting impact, as evidenced by the Philippine Government attitude towards the international system during its response to Typhoon Hagupit (Ruby) in December 2014. There was limited evidence as to the influence DFID had on both the positive and negative aspects of how the international humanitarian system interacted with the GoP.

### **Key finding 10: DFID had limited influence on any perceived small step improvement of UN leadership under the auspices of the TA, which itself did not live up to expectations and was detrimental with respect to the relationship with the national Government**

The TA provided some improvements in certain leadership functions – such as the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and surge capacity – but the response itself was inappropriately overwhelming to the GoP, resulting in a side-lining of national capacity, national disaster response system, and sovereignty. This was a view shared by many at the global and Manila levels where a number of respondents across donors, UN and NGO partners all spoke of a need to “better calibrate” future responses based on local context, such as fragile states compared to MICs. It is a view also reflected in the inter-agency humanitarian evaluation (IAHE), which speaks of the “side-lining” of national government as parallel systems were established by the inter-agency response, and the need to better understand the “complementary role” of the humanitarian system in a MIC.<sup>35</sup>

A small number of informants pointed to a misunderstanding around the terminology used, and particularly the “L3” designation which was intended as an internal UN mechanism, which allowed release of personnel for surge capacity where necessary but was understood by the GoP to apply to failed states and so was found to be relatively insulting. This view was backed up by the repeated requests from various respondents that personnel from failed states should not be sent or ‘surged’ to middle-income disaster contexts such as the Philippines. This was also reflected in the IAHE, which found that in some cases international surge personnel did not seek to understand local systems or capacity and instead simply bypassed them.<sup>36</sup> This would seem to speak less to the technical skill sets of surge personnel and more to the relatively rigid

<sup>35</sup> Hanley, T. et al. (2015) *IASC Interagency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*, p.xii.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p.45.

international system that forces a 'one size fits all' approach and does not allow personnel the space to calibrate a response to the contextual state capacity. There was some, albeit weaker, evidence that this perspective was echoed at the field level, particularly with some local government units (LGUs), speaking to the establishment of parallel systems by the international response without seeking to understand what national systems were already in place.

However, there is also a storyline emerging from the field-level interviews which reveals differing perspectives on different levels. From more localised perspectives – LGUs and communities – there was a sense of gratitude towards the speed of the international response compared to the perceived slowness of the national government response. One key UN respondent also spoke with regard to the fact that the international system is not there to support the national government but rather to reduce excess mortality and morbidity in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. In this respect, given that the national capacity in the early days was both devastated and traumatised, the response as it stood was "entirely appropriate". This was said to be reflective of an understanding at the highest UN levels of the system-wide reputational risk of not having a strong, visible international response to the Typhoon and the fact that this reputational risk outweighed any GoP sensitivities.

**For all of the above there was limited evidence of DFID influence over the system in relationship to leadership issues.** DFID contributed funding to surge personnel at the UN coordination level that was seen to be flexible and "creative"<sup>37</sup>. There was no perceived DFID influence on other TAL3 leadership products and protocols such as the HCT and the SRP.

**Key finding 11: DFID had limited influence on the improved UN *coordination* mechanisms under the auspices of the TA, which were praised by various respondents in relation to UN and NGO coordination, but proved challenging in relation to both respecting the national Government and including non-traditional actors.**

Specifically within the UN-led international response system, coordination was generally perceived to have improved compared to previous disaster responses. While there was evidence from interviews in Manila and the literature review that the UN cluster system continued to be time-consuming and unwieldy, there was also general consensus that clusters operated largely in the way they were supposed to and provided a platform for coordinated sector responses operating to minimum standards that were harmonised within the cluster system.<sup>38</sup> However, it is clear that coordination is a much broader concept than that covered within the cluster system and must include coordination with the national government and coordination outside of the cluster system, for example with non-traditional actors such as the private sector.

As referenced above, evidence from interviews and the literature review showed that there was not always an international surge understanding of – or even an attempt to understand – existing systems (whether they were fully operational or latent pre-Yolanda). One informant referred to a 'gung ho' attitude to establishing new processes for the response which did not align with existing government systems and therefore by their very nature would be unsustainable. There was also evidence that the international response in general did not understand devolution as it exists within the Philippines which further complicated coordination with government at various levels. Box 7 provides an example of good coordination practice found by the evaluation team.

**Box 7: Example of good coordination practice**

Evidence emerged from the Philippine National Police force (PNP) and DSWD with regard to the longer-term benefit provided by the GBV sub-cluster / AoR in Tacloban, highlighting that when clusters work well there is the potential for sustainable resilience-building assistance to be provided within the context of supporting and building the capacity of local systems. In the initial response the GBV sub-cluster in Tacloban sought to rapidly establish referral systems for VAWG/GBV issues. There were existing referral pathways within government structures although they had not been fully functioning in Tacloban or across Leyte or Samar even before Yolanda. The GBV sub-cluster, co-led by DSWD and a

<sup>37</sup> OCHA, Manila

<sup>38</sup> The IAHE also concluded that cluster coordination was well-managed. Hanley, T. et al., p.viii.

GBV RRT member (operating under UNFPA), operationalised these government-stipulated referral pathways, with the support of the GBV sub-cluster, providing DSWD and PNP with the tools and technical expertise to moderate and update the referral pathways to ensure usability. In January 2015, 14 months after the typhoon struck and long after the clusters were disbanded, these referral pathways are still fully functioning.

*Source: Interviews with PNP and DSWD.*

There was also limited system-wide coordination with non-traditional actors such as the private sector. Interestingly, communities in one area in northern Cebu Island referenced assistance they received from local resorts which came quicker and in more quantity than either government or international assistance. Other communities across Leyte and Samar referenced remittances from overseas foreign workers (OFW) both in terms of personal aid to individual households and in terms of larger funds being collected by OFW to be provided to whole barangays for repairs and recovery. However, there was limited evidence that within NGO or UN agencies this was considered other than a rather crude distinction between households with or without an overseas worker. In many cases those with an overseas worker were excluded from aid, regardless of whether that worker was a construction labourer in Qatar earning a living themselves far below the poverty line, or an educated overseas worker in Hong Kong or elsewhere.

**For all of the above there was limited evidence of DFID influence over the system in relationship to coordination issues.** DFID's contribution to the surge capacity was praised both for the leadership and coordination support this provided. However, there was no evidence of DFID influence over other coordination TAL3 mechanisms such as the Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), which was generally considered to be unhelpful (MIRA I), and certainly had no consideration of either gender or protection issues, which could have been areas in which strategic DFID influence might have advanced DFID VAWG priorities.

**Sphere remains the go-to reference point as far as standards are concerned.** Clusters were considered to be useful for harmonising standards – according to Sphere. Evidence from the literature review suggested that the high level of new staff being hired lacked exposure to common humanitarian standards and, while keen to improve, lacked commitment from senior management to increase knowledge of standards.

The Operational Peer Review noted that there were various targeting methodologies used and no one standard that all agencies agreed upon. As a result, some agencies were working to a loss-based targeting system, while others were ensuring a needs-base, and some – mainly through cash-for-work (CfW) schemes – were operating a 'turn-based' targeting system. From the community discussions evidence arose that a number of people were either confused by or did not understand the targeting systems applied, both substantiating the Output to Purpose Review (OPR) finding that inconsistent standards were applied and suggesting that provision of information (an accountability function) was inconsistent. **There was no evidence from any agency that DFID influenced adherence to standards or otherwise.**

**It is too early to determine whether TAL3 protocols encourage useful learning.** There is some evidence – grounded in Typhoon Hagupit in December 2014 – that Philippines-specific learning from Typhoon Haiyan had been internalised and applied around working with LGUs, as well as preparedness (such as evacuation procedures and pre-positioning of stocks). However, further evidence suggests a complacency of continued learning – more applicable to the GoP than UN and NGO agencies – in Tropical Storm Jangmi which hit on 29<sup>th</sup> December 2014. Jangmi (local name, Senyang) resulted in 55 deaths partially because there was too much focus on wind speed, failing to inform the public of the effects of high volume of rainfall. However, the evidence of learning which was identified (a) only related to the specific Philippines context – there was no knowledge on the part of informants as to whether that had translated into organisational or institutional learning; (b) is not linked to TAL3 protocols; and (c) is not linked to any DFID influence.

### 4.3 Improving DFID and partner approaches to accountability to affected populations

**Evaluation Question 3: To what extent did DFID and partners demonstrate effective accountability to beneficiaries/end users? How can DFID and partners improve performance and share and strengthen best practice?**

This section provides an assessment of the effectiveness of DFID and its partners' mechanisms for ensuring AAP. It draws on extensive field-level interviews and PIGDs with affected communities. The findings reveal factors that contributed to both more and less effective accountability mechanisms, as well as a number of key lessons on improving performance and better mainstreaming accountability practice within response structures. Box 8 summarises the key findings.

#### Box 8: Summary of key findings against evaluation question 3

*a) Were all agencies funded by DFID sufficiently accountable to the diverse interests within communities?*

**DFID-funded agencies were only partially and inconsistently accountable to diverse interests within communities.** In general, the evaluation found that men and boys reported higher levels than women and girls of participation in, and satisfaction with, consultation, decision making and feedback processes. Livelihoods recovery was a major unmet demand and the evaluation found evidence that certain social groups' needs were not met, e.g. the Bajao, (indigenous group), people living in no-build zones and coconut farmers.

*b) What factors or inputs (if any) made certain partners more accountable to their end users than others?*

**A range of inter-related and reinforcing enablers are needed to promote effective AAP.** A committed leadership was critical for strong AAP approaches on the ground. A range of other factors were found by the evaluation to be key enablers for AAP include: involving national actors from the start, and organisations having pre-existing systems and approaches.

*c) Were certain partner groups more effective than others in building accountability mechanisms and using findings from this dialogue to improve performance?*

**Certain partners had well-established and institutionalised accountability mechanisms prior to the response, which increased their effectiveness. The remaining partners made substantial progress in building accountability mechanisms. Findings from this dialogue were used by partners to improve performance.** There was clear evidence of adjustments to project targeting, timing, numbers of beneficiaries and location by the majority of partners in response to field realities, and to some extent (though not always documented) feedback from affected communities. However, the evaluation found limited evidence of substantive redesign of programmatic interventions in response to community dialogue.

*d) How could DFID have better promoted accountability outcomes and, in future, better mainstream accountability practices within DFID response structures?*

**Greater focus on accountability outcomes and strategic, technical inputs to support long-term humanitarian initiatives are needed to improve AAP.** There were missed opportunities by DFID to promote better accountability mechanisms related to: the absence of an overarching AAP strategy; insufficient AAP technical expertise within the DFID monitoring team; and limited focus on influencing government and response agencies, including partners, on strategy and common outcomes for AAP.

*e) Was corruption considered an issue and if so how was this tackled by partners?*

**There was no evidence of corruption within projects.** Partners' complaint and feedback mechanisms dealt with allegations of corrupt practices (unfounded) when they arose. These were mainly in relation to targeting and delays in payments under CfW schemes.

#### 4.3.1 DFID and partner accountability to communities

**Key finding 12: Although basic needs were met and significant progress was made in harmonising approaches, partners recognise that they could have done better with their accountability programming. On the whole the collective global focus on AAP did not translate into robust and common AAP systems and mechanisms on the ground.**



**Communities were satisfied with emergency “blanket” distributions but questioned whether specific needs and perspectives of all segments of affected communities were addressed in the response.**

Participants in the PIGDs reported satisfaction with the emergency support they received to meet their basic needs but questioned the way their needs were identified and acted on. Once emergency distributions transitioned into recovery support, consultations centred on targeting specific groups for project support and not, as communities perceived it, understanding differential needs and exploring with communities how these different needs could be met. All groups consulted in the PIGDs observed that response consultations had initially focused more on identifying beneficiaries, which included discussions on vulnerable groups and ensuring that recipients met the selection criteria. Consequently, there were perceived to be major unmet needs. All community members consulted were critical of, and frustrated by, the slowness of the response in providing support for permanent shelter and livelihood recovery. People with no secure access to land, such as the Bajao and those living in the “no-build zones”, still remain at risk of missing out on permanent housing.<sup>39</sup> Key informants highlighted that there was a lack of consistency between agencies in ensuring that special measures were in place (separate queues, targeted information, practical support) for vulnerable groups, such as people living with disabilities (PWDs), pregnant women and the elderly, to be prioritised in distributions or during consultations.

**Despite high-level commitments and a strong enabling environment, AAP programming in the response was considered less than optimal.**

The response to Typhoon Haiyan was the first L3 emergency to have a major focus on accountability. The early and continued deployment of TA for AAP-Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA)<sup>40</sup> led to the establishment of the AAP-CwC working group (AAP-WG), which from January 2014 onwards coordinated an evolving process of developing common approaches to communicating with communities, targeting and mechanisms for gathering feedback from communities. These initiatives took place within a highly receptive context for promoting stronger AAP. The GoP had, since 2011, been active in promoting greater accountability and in combatting corruption developmentally, a process showing positive trends.<sup>41</sup> In addition, there was substantial experience within the Philippines in applying AAP/CwC mechanisms in disaster response. DSWD, OCHA, IOM and DFID partner agencies such as Save the Children and World Vision had all, previously, used a range of CwC technologies (e.g. radio messaging, hotlines, complaint/suggestion boxes) in the response to Typhoon Pablo and the Bohol earthquake. However, there is limited evidence to suggest that AAP/CwC mechanisms substantially closed the feedback loop between agencies and communities. Consolidated feedback was shared with government officials but findings from the literature review and the PIGDs highlighted high levels of dissatisfaction within communities with feedback to complaints. Key informants also highlighted that within the AAP-WG more attention was given to the mechanisms of CwC and obtaining feedback than to either strengthening participation of community members or improving social inclusion of marginalised groups.

**But there was progress: common approaches to accountability were strengthened through the AAP-WG.**

The AAP working group was initiated by OCHA in November 2013 bringing together CwC and AAP personnel in order to coordinate and harmonise agency communication approaches. The group provided training to participating organisations on CfW and the use of accountability tools for closing the feedback loop between agencies and affected communities. It also coordinated agency responses to targeting, feedback and messaging. One strength of the AAP-WG was a growth in common understanding between agencies about the interdependence of CwC and AAP mechanisms in promoting better accountability outcomes. By January

<sup>39</sup> The December 2013 plan to observe 40metre No-build zones added to the further marginalisation of landless people left without housing in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. The planned relocation of over 200,000 families living in unsafe coastal areas also remains a major challenge given the lack of available land, low local capacities and limited resources now the response draws to a close See <http://www.unocha.org/aggregator/sources/120> accessed 15<sup>th</sup> February 2015. In Guiuan Municipality, where there is no alternative land sites available land, rebuilding in non-safe zones is permitted to a minimum safe standard.

<sup>40</sup> AAP-PSEA Interagency Coordination to the Haiyan Typhoon Response. End of First Mission Report Nov 16 – Dec 18 2014.

<sup>41</sup> For, example, Citizen Charters’ for key services – Education, Health and Social Welfare and participatory open budgeting in Municipalities and Barangays implemented through the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. The Philippines ranked 85/175 in the Transparency International corruption perception index in 2013 compared to 129/183 in 2011

2014, these two work strands had been merged with a clearer understanding that together they combined to address the five accountability commitments of the IASC AAP task force framework.<sup>42</sup>

**However, respondents reported that the terminology used in CwC and AAP was a barrier to shared understanding** by non-AAP/CwC personnel who, in some cases, perceived the approaches as an added burden. Using language related to quality programming – listening to what people want, thinking about interventions, what worked and what did not work and then changing the programme – makes more sense to humanitarian assistance (HA) staff on the ground. As one key informant observed:

*“We didn’t do ourselves any favours about how we talked about AAP and CwC. It was all too theoretical. In an emergency, nobody has any time to care about anything that isn’t pragmatic and moving us forward. We needed to talk more about the nuts and bolts of AAP. How to do it and what the benefits are.”*

**Nevertheless, the AAP-WG is widely seen as a success by the humanitarian community.** It remains active in the Tacloban area and on Panay Island hubs. Unlike the clusters, the AAP-WG evolved to include the active participation of local NGOs and became an established community of practice. It has become a vehicle for both coordinating AAP mechanisms and embedding emerging lessons into Philippines structures for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM). Evidence of its comparative strength is the significant role it is playing in disaster preparedness.<sup>43</sup> The AAP-WG was widely praised for its rapid response to the onset of Typhoon Ruby. It is now providing a model for future disaster responses within the Philippines and globally.

**Key finding 13: Although all partner agencies gave priority to designated vulnerable groups, the evaluation found little evidence that assistance had been tailored to encompass differential needs.**

**There were distinct differences between communities from what appeared to be very good consultation to none at all.** Many community members, both women and men, reported that the household profiling surveys had been conducted on them rather than with them. They felt there were too few opportunities for them to air their views and make suggestions. Systematic community consultations were perceived to have started too late in the response for all segments of communities to feel confident that agencies were listening to them and adjusting projects in the light of complaints and feedback. There was no evidence to indicate that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people had been systematically included in community consultations, although there was evidence from key informants that in communities where a LGBT person had raised a concern, agencies adjusted their interventions. There was also evidence from the PIGDs that adolescents, especially girls, did not feel fully consulted and included as individuals in their own right in recovery assistance, particularly in relation to housing and livelihoods recovery.

**The evaluation found that communities were on the whole dissatisfied with the targeting approach.** Both the literature review<sup>44</sup> and the PIGDs highlighted that communities in the typhoon area were unhappy with and confused by targeting. Evidence from the PIGDs across all groups consulted, indicated that it was not targeting per se, that was problematic. Both women and men consulted observed that it was right that vulnerable members of communities, such as the elderly, people living with disabilities, the chronically sick and very poor should be supported. However, it was the way in which targeting was applied that caused dissatisfaction. Those not receiving benefits, particularly around livelihoods and housing support, perceived targeting as exclusionary, lacking in transparency and undertaken with little accountability to the whole community in terms of how and why selection decisions were made. In addition, culturally, communities preferred equality of access to benefits above outsider definitions of equitable aid allocations. That is fairness was not understood as only the poor and vulnerable being targeted for support during recovery, but in terms of all of the community being supported according to need.

<sup>42</sup> Leadership and governance; transparency; feedback and complaint; participation and design, monitoring and learning.

<sup>43</sup> The AAP WG held three rounds of community consultations between July 2014 and January 2015 with the feedback being used to strengthen local Disaster preparedness plans.

<sup>44</sup> In particular the DFID MTR of Support to the Haiyan Humanitarian response (2014) and the VALID (2014) Interagency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response highlighted community dissatisfaction with targeting.

*“We were all affected; we should have been treated equally. They (aid agencies) came and took photographs of our houses but didn’t ask us who needed help”* Adult women Tacloban PIGD.

As Box 9 illustrates, some survivors of Typhoon Haiyan were excluded from housing assistance because selection criteria was too blunt to take account of the differential impact of a disaster on different groups. Families who went into debt to carry out early repairs on their house, with a salaried or overseas worker within the household, were excluded without assessment of their actual capacities to rebuild and fortify their house against future disaster. Furthermore, participants felt that opportunities to voice complaints when they did not meet the targeting criteria were limited. However, by February 2014, through the AAP working groups, attempts were made to coordinate around targeting but this was not uniformly adhered to, coming too late for agencies to radically alter their procedures (Valid 2014, KIIs).

**Box 9: Missing the newly vulnerable**

One issue raised during the PIGDs was that of households excluded from aid due to having an OFW within their family. One story highlighted the inequality of this: a woman with two young children under the age of three (one small infant at the time of the typhoon) was excluded from any assistance after the initial blanket food distribution due to her husband being an OFW. However, she explained that he was working in construction in Qatar at such a minimal wage that he could not send extra money home after the typhoon as his remittances, small as they were, were fixed. She also explained that due to being excluded from the assistance because of the OFW status, her toilet is still not functioning. Combined with other stories of exclusions with regard to OFWs, it seems there was no nuanced differentiation made through consultation with OFWs, and the wider community, in terms of those that were professionals overseas and those that were minimum wage construction workers (or others) and this was perceived as an unfair exclusion.

*Source: PIGD interview with woman survivor*

**There was limited evidence that projects had been designed in conjunction with vulnerable groups to meet their specific needs, particularly elderly women and men and PWD.** All partner agencies gave priority to designated vulnerable groups and this was understood by community members to mean the elderly, PWD and single parents. As Box 10 below illustrates, there were examples of transparent and inclusive targeting aimed at supporting the needs of the poorest and highly vulnerable individuals and households. Nevertheless the overall message from communities was clear: more consistency and transparency across the whole response in addressing vulnerabilities and reaching vulnerable groups was needed. From the community perspective there was limited discussion of differential perspectives and needs within communities, which may have given agencies a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability and the differential impacts of the disaster on community members. Several key informants from partner organisations noted that once the project had secured funding, there are few institutional incentives, and significant barriers (perceived and real), within aid agencies to make fundamental changes to projects, even if it would ensure greater social inclusion, or increase the voice of more marginalised social groups, and thereby fit better with aid recipients’ stated preferences. The time and resources required to radically redesign and resubmit is seen, during an emergency response, as too great a burden on already stretched capacities. Thus, despite DFID’s stated intention to be flexible to agency requests for changes in project design, the changes requested during the Haiyan response remained adjustments rather than substantive redesign.<sup>45</sup>

**Box 10: Meeting the needs of highly vulnerable households and individuals**

UNICEF’s unconditional cash transfer (UCT) project supported by DFID and reaching 10,000 families was one example of a targeted intervention, based on globally established good practice, which was socially inclusive and respected by communities. Targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable households identified through community-based targeting – unsupported elder people, PWD, households with a high dependency ratio and those without remittances or other forms of external support – the project aimed to build the resilience of these households against future disaster through savings, skills development and linking into longer-term development programmes once recovery support had ended. The UCT project was implemented in conjunction with local government and ACF. While based on the

<sup>45</sup> The one exception was a complete change of approach by an agency without a prior presence in the Philippines. The redesign was perceived as recognition of, and adaption to, field realities by the agency.

government's own P4s<sup>46</sup> poverty targeting criteria, the targeting approach was modified to be more socially inclusive. Community-based targeting was used to re-verify the initial selection and ensure there was complete transparency and ownership by the community in the selection process. The whole targeting and selection process took up to a week and a half in each community to implement.

The original intention of the project was to have two tranches of cash transfer over a 12 month period with an option to continue for 18 months. UNICEF recognised that investing in the poorest required a long time. This is because for the poorest families initially cash transfers would be used to cover urgent family needs of food, clothes, medicines etc., and that savings and skills development could only be introduced after four to six months when families felt secure and confident enough to begin to plan for the future. The second tranche of cash transfer was to be focused on income-generating initiatives identified by the families themselves and supporting families to transition to broader based development support from local government and its partners. However, the second tranche did not materialise because there was no funding available to extend the project beyond the early recovery period. For UNICEF, the potential positive outcomes of the intervention were seriously compromised by the lack of donor support to aid transition to full recovery.

*Source: Key Informant Interview*

**Communities' expectations of long-term support for livelihoods were not met.** The key message from the PIGDs was that for all community members, support for livelihood recovery was too late, too little and not tailored to meet their specific needs. Available evidence suggests that livelihoods have only recovered to between 15-50% of pre-Haiyan levels with women and the poorest remaining the most disadvantaged (Valid 2014; ADB 2015). Women, older people and coconut farmers lacking security of land tenure have all reported the need for longer-term and sustained livelihoods support. In PIGDs, all groups voiced their aspirations for a "better life" after Haiyan, and the support offered under Haiyan in the form of CfW while appreciated did not meet expectations of being supported to develop sustainable livelihoods. The timeframe for recovery was too short, a frustration echoed by a number of partner agency key informants who argued that sustained support over a two to three year period giving time for a clearer handover to development agencies would have been more appropriate. Key informants also highlighted the lack of a shared and early comprehensive livelihoods assessment,<sup>47</sup> which assessed differential needs as well as addressing underlying structural barriers to building back sustainable livelihoods such as land tenure. It was perceived as a significant gap which undermined collective and coordinated responses to livelihood recovery.

**Key finding 14: Progress was made in strengthening common approaches to feedback and complaints, but there were stark differences in levels of participation and inclusion. Women and adolescent girls and community members in rural areas were more likely to feel disconnected from formal accountability mechanisms. Overall, community members preferred face-to-face contact to technology-based feedback mechanisms.**

**In general, men and adolescent boys reported being more satisfied in relation to receiving information and having access to formal feedback mechanisms than women and adolescent girls.** This is a reflection of continuing gender disparities in access to information and feedback mechanisms even in more gender-benevolent contexts, such as the Philippines. For feedback mechanisms, some community members, particularly adolescents, reported that hotlines for text messaging are the preferred option to suggestion boxes. The majority of PIGD participants, both men and women, reported that they would have appreciated more face-to-face mechanisms, referring to suggestion boxes and hotlines as "impersonal", and that while these mechanisms had been provided they did not always want to use them.

Radio contact was appreciated across all communities consulted. However, there was a rural/urban divide. All community members relied heavily on face-to face informal information flows. Urban communities reported a higher degree of connection to formal communication mechanisms (e.g. hotlines) and the ability to complain or give feedback than their rural counterparts. In some rural areas visited during the evaluation,

<sup>46</sup> The 4Ps or Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program was the pre-existing government social protection programme for poor households implemented through DSWD.

<sup>47</sup> It was noted by several Key informants that the RAY focused on infrastructure rather than issues relating to protecting and building the resilience of poor people's livelihoods, especially women.

mobile phone signal was difficult even before Haiyan, which meant post-Haiyan using hotline numbers for feedback and questions was problematic, especially for women. Although, as Box 11 describes, young women were able to be proactive in getting information in and out of their barangay.

**Box 11: Connecting to information**

In the aftermath of Haiyan, different groups within communities found different ways to access information. Young women and men in urban areas talked of walking through the debris to find a generator to connect their phones so they could send and receive texts. Young women, in a rural barangay, told of climbing coconut trees to get a mobile signal for face book and a connection to the outside world. For women with dependents and the elderly, families and friends were vital for keeping them informed. In barangays, in disarray, where trust was broken, or families had been separated from their neighbours and friends, word of mouth was their most important information source.

*Source: PIGDs*

**The strength of the barangay councils was a key factor in ensuring community members felt informed and consulted during the response.** Many groups consulted reported having extremely well-functioning barangay mechanisms for cascading information throughout the barangay and getting suggestions and information back to responders. However, evidence from the PIGDs suggested that such social cohesiveness was much higher in rural than urban barangays.<sup>48</sup> A minority of groups reported no such mechanisms and that, for example, in light of the lack of INGO and/or UN information mechanisms, people only knew there was a distribution when trucks appeared, or they knew by word of mouth or other informal processes. Well-functioning barangays continued to play a critical role in ensuring communities were informed and consulted during the transition to recovery and afterwards. In situations where there were political differences, disputes or low capacities with the barangay, information flows were likely to be fractured and community members reported low levels of trust in formal feedback mechanisms.

*“Why make a complaint, nobody listens to us.”* Woman PIGD participant, Tacloban

**Understanding of and engagement with the local governance context is critical to accountability.** It was widely understood that in a middle-income context such as the Philippines, the response needed to engage actively with local government systems in order to ensure accountability was sustained throughout and after the response had closed down activities. Most agencies had strategies in place to work through Barangays, municipalities and local government departments such as DSWD and Department of Education. However, there was a high degree of variation in how partners engaged. Local government, Mayors and Barangay informants consistently reported that international agencies “passed through them rather than worked with them”. Agencies which interacted, reported taking time to understand and adapt their strategies to the distinct power relationships shaping each of the municipalities or barangays in which they worked. They invested in relationships as well as accountability tools. Partners who built up strong relationships with local government actors and communities, not just aid recipients, were more able to: a) work inclusively in communities where trust levels were low; and b) deal with critical feedback. Key factors in building trust included: continuous field presence, sustained dialogue and continuous sensitisation of communities to AAP tools, transparent targeting procedures with information circulated in a range of ways<sup>49</sup> (e.g. face-to-face, radio, newspaper, noticeboard), ongoing clarification of procedures, and immediate rectification of mistakes, mispayments or delays.

### 4.3.2 Lessons learnt for better mainstreaming and promoting accountability

**Key finding 15: DFID’s support to AAP issues at project level was valued but did not translate into a strategic influencing of AAP in the Haiyan Response. Greater focus on accountability outcomes and strategic technical inputs to support long-term humanitarian initiatives are needed to improve AAP.**

<sup>48</sup> This was true for all urban/rural areas consulted during the PIGDs. However, the sample size is too small to make a definitive statement about geographical differences in community social cohesion. Further investigation is necessary.

<sup>49</sup> Save the Children, for example, sent monthly letters to Mayor, the DoE, provincial government as well as regular up-date discussions with local government staff and Barangay captains in addition to on-going structured discussions and FDGs with KIs and aid recipients within their target communities.

**Opportunities were missed by DFID to provide strategic support and direction to AAP implementation by partners and other stakeholders.** As set out in the Business Case, promoting AAP was a significant element of DFID's response. Guidance on AAP in the early stages of humanitarian response based on the HAP standards was provided to partners, and screening on partners' accountability mechanisms was part of the RRF pre-qualification. Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) technical experts were seconded to OCHA; and Internews was funded to setup a community radio station, Radyo Bakdaw, to relay information to affected communities. Additionally in July 2014, DFID provided extra funding for a common services project<sup>50</sup> aimed at strengthening coordination of humanitarian agencies' community feedback mechanisms and responsiveness and increasing affected communities access to information during the typhoon response. These interventions were viewed positively by all partners who valued DFID's role in promoting the AAP agenda. Nonetheless, for most respondents DFID was seen to have little influence on AAP operationally. DFID's AAP guidelines apply to emergency responses and not a longer-term application, whereas most partner agencies had a longer timeframe for AAP implementation. Moreover, all partners adhered to HAP and Sphere standards or had integrated international AAP standards into their systems and processes for working with affected communities (such as Save the Children and World Vision).

**DFID underestimated the variation in partner capacities to implement AAP during the response.** While there were significant variations in the capacity of DFID partners to implement AAP effectively, partners such as Save the Children and World Vision had extensive experience and accountability systems in place from the start of the emergency. It was not clear from discussions that DFID staff fully understood the differential capacities of its partner agencies. There is little evidence from the monitoring reports or from discussions with DFID staff to show that they had capitalised on opportunities much earlier on in the response for proactively harnessing partners' knowledge and expertise in order to influence humanitarian practices.

**There was an over-emphasis on outputs – the tools and mechanisms – at the expense of accountability outcomes – improvements in levels of voice, participation and aid recipient satisfaction in projects.** Key informants highlighted that DFID focused on the tools and mechanisms of accountability rather than the impact the tools had on the quality of programming and on levels of active participation by affected communities in projects. For some agencies they felt they were being monitored for compliance in terms of whether they had complaint mechanisms in place or how long they took to respond to complaints on a case by case basis. They reported much less focus or discussion around the quality of their AAP programming overall or what they could do technically to improve the outcomes of their AAP work. DFID's lack of AAP technical expertise is likely to be a key determinant of this gap.

**DFID had limited capacity to influence the wider accountability agenda in the response.** Several key informants noted that DFID did not have technical accountability expertise within its monitoring teams. This was perceived as a gap. It limited the usefulness of the advice and support given for strengthening approaches to AAP particularly at a strategic level within the UN and government in Manila. It was also suggested that there was not enough understanding within DFID of what types of investment and engagement was needed to influence humanitarian practices on AAP. Key informants in Manila and government reported that DFID was not viewed as a key player for AAP and that they had limited engagement with DFID on AAP issues, throughout the response. The opportunities missed under the Haiyan response to influence the global AAP agenda were due in large part to the absence of a coherent strategy linking policy with practice and giving strategic direction to AAP implementation on the ground. The development of the common services project, for example, was perceived as seizing a valuable opportunity to support an existing initiative rather than proactively scoping and identifying strategic entry points for influencing the AAP agenda. Nevertheless, DFID's support on the ground was highly valued. Several key informants noted that DFID's physical presence at a number of AAP working group meetings in Tacloban was

<sup>50</sup> *Pamati Kita* (Let's Listen Together) Project: An Accountability to Affected Populations and Communicating with Communities Common Services Project. The project has a learning and research component to ensure lessons are learnt and widely disseminated in the Humanitarian community.

refreshing. For example, local NGOs were able to gain direct contact with a donor, a rare event and a strong indicator of DFID's intention to support and influence AAP.

### 4.3.3 Approaches to tackling corruption

**Key finding 16: The evaluation found that corruption was not an issue within partners' projects.**

**No agency reported cases of corruption within their projects.** Key informants made a clear distinction between petty fraud within projects and larger-scale corruption, outside the control of individual agencies. DFID partner agencies all had internal systems in place to monitor for corruption and misappropriation of funds which included real-time evaluations and micro-assessments such as spot checks and community monitoring. There was no evidence of petty fraud within DFID's partner agencies. However, communities consulted perceived biases and corrupt practices in relation to targeting and CfW allocations. When these incidents arose they were dealt with through the established complaint and feedback mechanism.

**Perceptions of corruption by communities varied across PIGD locations, rather than partners,** appearing to correlate with levels of trust that community members had in the barangay captain and local government officials. High levels of trust were a critical indicator of levels of satisfaction and belief in external agencies/local government willingness to deliver on promises or be held to account.

## 5. Lessons learnt and recommendations

In this section, we firstly present the key lessons learnt from this evaluation. These derive from the summary of findings and evidence presented in Section 4 and should be taken on board by DFID and its partners for future humanitarian responses. This is then followed by the evaluation team's main recommendations and sub-recommendations, which have been derived from the lessons learnt. Recommendations have been formulated so as to be clear, focused, targeted at specific users and, most importantly, implementable.

### 5.1 Lessons learnt

#### *Lessons relating to DFID's strategy and approach to response*

**Lesson 1 – DFID's investments benefited from its fast and flexible mechanisms with needs and gaps informed by partners, and would benefit further from more robustly building on information from community, local civil society and government in a MIC.**

DFID's value-added in Haiyan was very much built on the speed and flexibility of response through established partners and mechanisms, with a breadth of response through different tools that allowed gaps to be filled rapidly and appropriately. The Philippines is a MIC with significant national and devolved local capacity. This (government, private and non-governmental) capacity was over-stretched and the international community led rather than collaborated on the response. The necessary influence and resources of the government and community – for DFID-funded programmes – were limited in part by this divide, but also in not allowing space for voice in identifying gaps and needs in DFID and its partner programmes. DFID's flexible structure did not demand this change from partners. Lessons 7, 8, 9 and 10 explore lessons on how DFID and partners could more robustly build on information from community, and local civil society.

**Lesson 2 – Resilient recovery, especially in a middle-income context, requires time, local knowledge and relationships.**

Getting the recovery right is a challenging task when the team is focused on the response and there are no pre-existing DFID national relationships or programmes. DFID was slow to move its focus towards early and long-term recovery (with a separate business case) and slow in recognising the importance of working with local government in the devolved Philippines context. The six-month timeframe DFID allowed for early recovery interventions was insufficient for recovery outcomes which communities needed at that time, and continue to need, particularly around livelihoods. Supporting resilient recovery requires more than six months of investments with many partners, government and the UN planning over a four to five year period. Other donors, without a country presence, make a two-year commitment with partners to allow space for resilience building, but initially require only a six-month plan, accepting that the context will be dynamic, and addressing issues such as land rights and no-build zones take time. Better preparedness would involve planning for response in closer alignment with LGUs, and understanding the capacities for recovery of livelihoods, building resilience and reducing risk that exist within communities well versed with the impacts of recurrent disasters.

Local knowledge and experience is invaluable for improved outcomes. The relief and recovery programmes of organisations working with local partners, such as CARE, and with government on existing programmes, such as the UN, reflected local knowledge, relationships and expertise. DFID's selection criteria for partners should give emphasis to a pre-existing presence with local knowledge, capacity and expertise, as well as established relationships with local and national organisations.

**Lesson 3 – DFID's on-the-ground presence was valuable but missed opportunities for engagement in key areas of strategic influence.**

Careful thought is needed on the *composition, focus and location* of the DFID field team. DFID invested in a highly skilled team, which was relatively larger than other donors. In hindsight the team's composition and location could have been managed differently. The initial team was located in Manila for longer than



desirable: initially due to concerns or at least uncertainty about security in Tacloban, and a desire not to detract from the operational response by occupying seats on aeroplanes or in accommodation which would be better used by operational agency staff; and then the pressure of competing priorities in managing such a large response. This detracted from the reality check of part of the team being based in the field.

Despite this presence in Manila, the focus was more on programming DFID funds than on a strategic role in influencing the humanitarian system and supporting coordination, or further influencing issues such as accountability, VAWG or protection. The downside of the presence in Tacloban from January was that DFID tended to focus even more on project-oriented issues and was not perceived as playing the strategic/influencing role with donors and government it often does in humanitarian crises. This created a gap between DFID's higher-level strategic agenda and its ability to have impact on the ground and make measurable changes beyond financial inputs. The duration of the monitoring team's presence in Tacloban appeared to be driven by accountability concerns related to the significant volume of humanitarian funding. A smaller footprint in Tacloban would have been justified given the relatively benign operating environment and large number of trusted partners with their own monitoring systems. Underperforming partners could have been monitored and supported by the team in Manila without such a heavy footprint.

### ***Lessons relating to DFID's support and influence on the international humanitarian system***

#### **Lesson 4 – The international humanitarian system is not engaging effectively with large and significant money flows from remittances and non-traditional actors such as the private sector, especially critical in MICs.**

According to the OCHA financial tracking service, the largest donor was private (individuals & organisations) with 22.6% of all funds, not including contributions outside the system. The UK is ranked second with 14.5%. Documents used to design recovery programmes reflect market analysis, but do not indicate robust engagement with the private sector, most notably in livelihoods, especially the creation of sustainable employment. Importantly, communities highlight the importance of livelihoods and sustainable employment, as well as contributions from OFWs, to both individual families and through fundraising communities. According to the World Bank, remittances account for about 10% of the GDP of the Philippines. Targeting criteria from the international community often excluded households with OFWs without distinguishing between remittances from a maid in Lebanon or a doctor in London. Engagement with the private sector and investment in understanding the nuances of remittances, the biggest donor in the emergency, is critical to avoid duplication of efforts and fine-tuning of targeting criteria.

#### **Lesson 5 – MICs require investment in a collaborative approach to access government and non-government resources in country.**

The Philippines is a MIC with decentralised governance arrangements. Philippine government, civil society and the private sector have considerable experience with natural disasters. At the time of Haiyan, the Philippines was responding to multiple emergencies and did not react at the scale and speed expected and needed by the people. The international system focused resources on service delivery as well as leadership and coordination for the international response. However, the international and national systems were not identical with some differences, for example, in cluster leadership and coordination structures. Robust collaborative efforts to utilise shared resources for Haiyan and future level three disasters is needed

#### **Lesson 6 – DFID's influence on the TA Level 3 response was less than it could have been, in part due to lack of coherence and linkages between field-level monitoring activities and strategic areas DFID would like to influence, such as VAWG, VfM and accountability.**

The TA brought improvement in leadership and coordination to the humanitarian system but not as much as initially envisaged, and there were many disadvantages to the new system highlighted within the Haiyan response. The DFID field-level team focused on monitoring projects and relationships with partners, but not on how project-level actions might inform the TA. DFID provided support to OCHA in terms of secondments but did not expressly seek wider influence or change objectives. An improved response would see DFID linking global-level policy priorities – such as VAWG, VfM and accountability – with more practical, strategic

guidance to partners at the field level, rather than generalist project monitoring, thus ensuring coherent influence from field to national to global levels.

### ***Lessons relating to accountability, VAWG and protection***

#### **Lesson 7 – AAP needs to be context-driven and adapted to the different phases of a response.**

In the context of the Philippines, a common services approach made sense where earlier and closer collaboration with domestic national and civil society actors would have greatly enhanced AAP implementation. Partner agencies recognised that this would have enabled a more nuanced and phased approach to accountability allowing an evolving process of communities' active participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of the response. Looking forward, context matters and will be a determining factor as to whether to adopt a common services approach. Nevertheless, lessons from the Haiyan response highlight that there are three distinct phases to any response each requiring different types of mechanisms and tools:

- **Emergency relief – early messages to save life.** During this phase hotlines, radio and other technology-based accountability mechanisms are important to get messages out and open up spaces for dialogue with affected communities.
- **Recovery.** Continuous sensitisation of communities to feedback mechanisms is needed to encourage their use and to establish trust that the feedback loop will be closed. In tandem, increased and focused dialogue with communities is needed, involving local officials and community leaders around the design and monitoring of interventions to build up trust and transparency in interactions. In addition, informal and regular conversations with women, adolescents, PWDs etc. about what is working and not working are valued by community members because they increase confidence in the willingness of agencies to be continually responsive to the suggestions and changing needs of those affected.
- **Transition to development.** More intense and long-term interaction, where applicable, through capacitated local government with the resources to respond effectively to the demands of local communities.

#### **Lesson 8 – Investing in a range of mutually reinforcing institutional enablers is the key to effective, context-driven AAP.**

Partners that were more effective in implementing AAP had in place a number of institutional enablers that made them more accountable to their end users than others. A key lesson from the Haiyan response is that these included the following:

- Leadership at field, country and HQ levels committed to AAP prior to Haiyan response;
- A rights focus in approach and programming resulting in accountability being an essential part of fulfilling the rights of AAP;
- An institutionally-embedded understanding of what AAP means and how it is done on the ground, within the context of the response, so that inconsistencies in implementation are minimised during the surge as well as staff turnovers – organisations such as World Vision and Save the children did have a systemic approach to AAP but they were the exception rather than the rule amongst DFID partners;
- Internal AAP policies, guidelines and strategies that are linked to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and learning; are understood in the organisation as integral to quality programming; and are resourced and mainstreamed into all aspects of programming. Agencies with good monitoring and programming on the ground were those that were committed to building local capacities for AAP;
- Dedicated AAP staff at HQ and field level with field AAP personnel deployed during emergency as part of overall deployment and AAP staff positions remained throughout the response such as demonstrated by World Vision and Save the Children;

- A range of mechanisms and tools (hotlines, suggestion boxes, help boxes, face-to-face approaches) adapted to context, and phase of response, giving choices to end users as to how and when to provide feedback.

### **Lesson 9 – Current RRF requirements and reporting do not promote effective AAP implementation.**

A lesson for DFID is that its current funding modalities and proposal guidelines do not allow it to identify which partners will have the in-country capacities and enablers to implement AAP work effectively in any given context for the duration of the whole response. RRF contracts are made at head office level, without DFID necessarily knowing the strength of in-country capacity to implement AAP. DFID should consider making it a requirement for partners to clarify what systems, staff and resources it will deploy, at HQ and in country, to effectively implement AAP in relation to the particular country context in which the disaster occurred. The absence of this data during the Haiyan response meant that DFID did not have a baseline or sufficient information through which it could properly track and support the AAP work of its partners. Looking forward, a better understanding of: a) who the strong AAP actors are on the ground; and b) the specific contextual factors with the potential to influence AAP implementation, will enable a preparedness/response strategy into which AAP is mainstreamed and stronger partners are supported in taking a leadership role in promoting a common services approach.

### **Lesson 10 – Stronger and enforceable systems are needed to institutionalise SADD and diversity data in emergency responses.**

SADD and diversity data remain crucial to ensuring quality programming and are recognised as a necessary foundation for protection programming.<sup>51</sup> Lack of SADD and diversity data does not just prevent best practice programming and most effective outcomes; when we are not able to track inclusion in accessing aid interventions we risk increasing the comparative vulnerability of certain groups. The Philippines was an easy environment within which to ensure that SADD and diversity data were collected and used, and yet the international system still failed to collect and use SADD appropriately. This suggests that an increased effort to enforce the use of SADD and other diversity data is required by aid agency managers and donors.

### **Lesson 11 – The increased focus on VAWG in Haiyan did not translate into better programming.**

There was a stronger focus on VAWG in Haiyan than any previous emergency response, but this did not translate into worthwhile improvements in programming and the heightened spotlight failed to influence agencies' actions on the ground. Agencies' actions were instead influenced by how institutionalised VAWG / protection principles were. The global momentum on VAWG gained from the increased focus in the Haiyan response is critical but more must be done to translate this into practical improvements for protection for women and girls in the field.

### ***Lessons relating to VfM approaches***

#### **Lesson 12 – VfM can be enhanced by DFID engagement in the preparedness and recovery phases.**

Many of the issues around VfM that came up in the evaluation can be usefully addressed in the preparedness and recovery phases.

- How can DFID and partners improve the use of VfM for effective decision making? DFID can usefully engage with partners on VfM, using either partners' frameworks or DFID's framework, in the preparedness and recovery phases when VfM can have the greatest influence on decision making, and there is time and resource to engage properly with the process. This should enhance the uptake and usefulness of DFID guidance on VfM.
- How can the VfM of specific interventions be improved? While it is acknowledged that its role was not a long-term one, DFID can usefully engage in activities that can enhance the VfM of response.

<sup>51</sup> See for example WB (2012) Gender Equality and Development World Development Report 2012 World Bank Washington USA, Mazurana, D. Benelli, P. Gupta, H. And Walker, P. (2011) Sex and Age Matter. Improving Humanitarian Response in Emergencies. Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University August 2011 USA

Issues to consider include: investing in greater pre-positioning of stocks; greater use of cash programming; and improving the effectiveness of targeting (see recommendations below for more detail).

## 5.2 Recommendations

### *Recommendations relating to DFID's strategy and approach to response*

**Recommendation 1 – The DFID team, especially in MICs, should place greater emphasis on more collaborative and advisory roles in addition to monitoring. These should be located throughout at a strategic (national) level to influence issues in the response, complemented initially by a team of advisers in the disaster zone to support fast and flexible decision making.**

DFID invested heavily in its own team and has a global position as a leading donor. Similarly, DFID engagement at a national level was appreciated by the international community, but there was a missed opportunity to robustly influence policies and structures of both the middle-income Philippines context as well as the international system in key issues such as accountability, VAWG and VfM. To do so, DFID should invest in advisers and advocates based at the strategic national level, advocating on behalf of DFID. These advisers and advocates should have dual objectives to advocate for specific issues and changes to the response and recovery (such as collaboration with government), as well as to directly promote and derive learning for its global agendas in issues such as accountability, VAWG and VfM.

**Recommendation 2 – DFID should develop a clear strategy on whether to focus only on response within a relatively short timeframe, with a clear exit strategy, or adopt a longer-term strategy supporting partners to focus and plan for recovery, investing both time and resources, and taking into account national, sub-national and community priorities.**

DFID should be clear on the nature of its strategic approach to recovery after natural disasters, and communicate this clearly to partners and national and local governments. Depending on context – such as whether there is an existing DFID presence and the likelihood of this continuing – this would include either: i) focusing more clearly just on immediate response, and establishing clear criteria and processes for exit with government and partners; or ii) starting to engage with recovery immediately after a natural disaster with appropriately skilled advisers, using local expertise and trusted partners to identify and deliver recovery outcomes, with existing structures and communities. This requires ensuring and supporting the space for partners to design recovery programmes with people and local institutions, and thus the flexibility to fund for longer periods (two years or more). VfM will be greatly enhanced by a strong focus on preparedness and recovery, both in terms of engagement with partners on VfM for decision making, as well as enhancing VfM of specific interventions.

**Recommendation 3 – DFID should invest more in sustaining a link between London-based advisers and individual action to drive agendas in accountability, VAWG and VfM.**

DFID finances a broad portfolio of actors and actions but could have a greater influence on the approaches and agendas of the humanitarian sector and its actors. DFID and some partners support and invest in agendas such as accountability, VAWG, VfM and the wider TA. A natural disaster in a MIC and enabling context like the Philippines is an opportunity to engage and further that agenda. If DFID is to have greater influence on outcomes of investments in these areas it needs to invest in, clearly communicate and sustain a link between field advisers and UK-based leadership and institutional expertise. Currently, the lack of influence in the field of these key issues highlights a gap between stated policy and links to programmes.

### *Recommendations relating to DFID's support and influence on the international humanitarian system*

**Recommendation 4 – DFID should develop a strategy to engage and better influence the international humanitarian architecture.**

The international humanitarian architecture, including the TA, needs to and is evolving. Typhoon Haiyan highlighted the need for this architecture to adapt and collaborate better with MICs. DFID supported

technical and coordination resources but is well placed to influence the system more robustly. However, this evaluation did not find evidence of robust influence, expected from the largest international government donor, during the initial response. DFID is well placed to further influence the system through a change strategy. This strategy should simultaneously strengthen DFID's influence on the international humanitarian architecture at a global level, while ensuring internal response mechanisms that underscore DFID's leadership by example. The strategy should invest in three levels:

- **DFID should outline what change it wants to see in the international humanitarian architecture and robustly engage with that process.** Key learning from this evaluation highlights the need for *better calibration of the system to national context*, especially evolving towards a **cooperative model** with MICs<sup>52</sup> with a *better understanding of non-traditional actors* such as the private sector, and family remittances. The response, especially in a country with frequent disasters, should be more supportive of, and collaborative with, national government capacity. It should be respectful of sovereignty, more accountable to affected populations, and more sustainable in relation to building resilience.
- **DFID should outline its own internal position of working in different contexts** – for example MICs where there is not a DFID office, compared to MICs where there is a DFID presence, fragile states and other contexts. This should be a clear strategy in relation to context and actors – including the private sector – which could align with DFID's influencing of the global system.
- Once DFID has developed and agreed internally how it should respond in different contexts, **DFID should ensure its maximum influence by linking that approach to specific RRF requirements for partners**, thus aligning strategy and operational impact.

#### ***Recommendations relating to accountability, VAWG and protection***

#### **Recommendation 5 – DFID should strengthen strategies, technical capacities and funding modalities for promoting AAP/VAWG practices within the global humanitarian community.**

Under this recommendation there are inter-related proposals which combine to enhance internal (DFID) and external (partners and HA actors) capacities to implement global commitments on AAP. Furthering DFID's AAP commitments will require proactive facilitation at every level from the global humanitarian community, through partner agencies and with actors on the ground during emergency responses.

- **DFID should strengthen the pool of specialist technical advisers for AAP and VAWG for rapid deployment in L3 responses.** Currently the lack of specialist advice, especially AAP TA, is reducing DFID's effectiveness in the field. Specialist advice is needed in order to:
  - Engage effectively during an emergency response with all key actors to support partner agencies and influence implementation strategies at all levels of the response;
  - Retain in CHASE a robust operational knowledge and learning base for AAP/protection that can be fed across into AAP/VAWG policy and advocacy work.
- **DFID should introduce incentives and conditionalities for promoting AAP and encouraging collective AAP responses.** DFID should consider using both conditionalities and incentives to further the AAP agenda. The aim would be to influence the quality of programming and implementation. Further review will be necessary to assess the VfM and effectiveness of potential incentives. Measures to be considered include:
  - Making it a condition of funding that all partners have designated AAP staff that are deployed in the immediate emergency response, and that the staff positions are retained throughout the response;

<sup>52</sup> This is in line with the 4C's model which outlines four approaches – comprehensive, constrained, collaborative and consultative – that calibrates international humanitarian responses to differing contexts depending on the strengths and needs of the national Government. See <http://www.alnap.org/blog/120.aspx>

- Withholding a percentage of allocated funds for early and livelihood recovery until agencies provide a revised set of plans based on fully documented community consultation with a diverse range of aid recipients appropriate to the emergency context;<sup>53</sup>
- Establishing a **programme quality and performance fund** that RRF partners can access 3-6 months into an emergency if they can demonstrate progress towards agreed AAP outcomes, on the basis of aid recipient satisfaction and other measures of active participation in design and implementation. The aim of the fund would be to encourage innovation and collective working with national/local actors. Possible projects might include: a new project to meet the identified needs of marginalised or hard to reach groups in target communities or the response area; testing of innovative methods for socially-inclusive AAP, with the potential to improve quality of programmes within a specific cluster.
- **DFID should prioritise the development of a comprehensive strategy which aligns and harmonises AAP advocacy and implementation within CHASE.** The lessons learning exercise being conducted under the common services/*Pamati Kita* project provides an excellent basis from which to develop a strategy, although it will not be sufficient. Further learning from and consultations about other emergency contexts (e.g. Sierra Leone, Syria) with partners/humanitarian actors through extant networks (e.g. DFID's Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA) beneficiary feedback working group) will be necessary.

**Recommendation 6 – DFID should urgently upgrade institutional requirements for SADD and other diversity data.**

SADD and diversity data are fundamental to tracking all aspects of AAP including meeting needs and protection issues. This is not just a question of good practice; lack of SADD undermines progress towards socially-inclusive aid distribution. Gender-disaggregated data specifically are a legal requirement within the UK.<sup>54</sup> More rigorous procedures, including penalties, are needed to hold partner agencies to account to UK and international commitments, under the TA, to equitable access to HA benefits and services.

***Recommendations relating to VfM approaches***

**Recommendation 7 – DFID should engage with partners strategically on VfM outside of crisis times.**

Additional tools and resources are not required – this was not considered to be a blockage. Rather, there was very limited influence by DFID on VfM, in large part because DFID was only engaging during the crisis and recovery phases. The benefits of engaging outside of crisis times are two-fold. First, partners are more likely to engage with VfM as part of preparedness when they have the time and resources to address VfM in a way that influences decision making. This will enable DFID and potential partners to engage on a clear consensus about what VfM analysis should look like in a humanitarian context. Second, the evaluation highlighted numerous ways that VfM could be enhanced by engaging with partners in the preparedness phase (e.g. pre-positioning stocks, building capacity for cash, designing longer-term recovery strategies, and designing cost-effective targeting protocols). DFID should agree with partners on what tools and indicators should be used in VfM monitoring and assessment.

**Recommendation 8 – Enhance VfM of response and early recovery activities through the following specific activities:**

- **Invest in greater pre-positioning of stocks.** It was very clear from the evaluation that speed of response was enhanced by the RRF; however, this was particularly true where goods were pre-positioned and could be locally procured. Therefore preparedness measures such as pre-positioning are key to ensure that rapid response funding can be supported logistically. This evaluation strongly supports the finding of the MTR for **DFID to advocate for partners to establish framework agreements with suppliers/service**

<sup>53</sup> Determining what constitutes appropriate disaggregated data requires initial screening at project appraisal and review in the light of aid recipient participation in needs assessment.

<sup>54</sup> The International Development Gender Equality Act (2014).

**providers to enhance preparedness for future responses** as a key mechanism to ensure pre-positioning and other preparedness measures that facilitate a fast response.

- **Allow partner agencies more time to develop quality proposals.** Clearly, this has to be balanced with the need to act quickly and get funding to partners. But more time would have allowed partners to develop higher quality proposal for the recovery period.
- **Investigate the potential VfM of consortia approaches.** Qualitative evidence pointed to potential cost savings as a result of consortia, but this was offset by slower start-up times. The characteristics and context in which consortia can bring VfM gains needs to be investigated to inform future programming.
- **Build capacity for a greater use of cash.** More cash could have been provided as an alternative to food aid, and it could have been provided sooner. It is critical that preparedness measures for cash are in place, and that the capacity for a cash response exists so that it can be used quickly. Cash is not a panacea, but given there is scope to enhance VfM by increasing the use of cash, DFID can usefully engage in i) preparedness work around local context, user preferences, markets, etc to determine where greater use of cash may be appropriate; and ii) building the capacity of local actors where appropriate for rapid scale up of cash programming in a crisis.

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### Introduction

#### DFID

1. The role of Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) is to tackle humanitarian, conflict, fragility, security and justice issues that underpin poverty in some of the most vulnerable communities around the world.
2. We fund and advise partners and develop and influence policy to work towards our goal of preventing violent conflict, building peace and security and reducing loss of lives and livelihoods in humanitarian emergencies. We work closely with other government departments, DFID country offices and multilateral organisations.
3. CHASE's goal is to prevent conflict and reduce poverty in fragile states, deliver world class humanitarian assistance, help poor countries be more resilient to disasters and support justice and freedom from violence, particularly for women and girls.

#### Humanitarian Response Group

4. Rapid response to humanitarian disasters is the responsibility of the Humanitarian Response Group (HRG). This Group's objective is to help improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian system in responding to humanitarian crises and provide an effective UK bilateral response if necessary. Current priorities are to manage appropriate, timely and effective assistance to rapid onset disasters, emergencies and crises (including in some cases providing surge capacity to other DFID departments or the international humanitarian system); and to provide oversight of civil-military issues and effective ongoing programme management of crisis-response programmes.

#### Areas of work

- Humanitarian response operations, particularly for rapid onset situations
- Monitoring global humanitarian crises 24/7
- Managing humanitarian preparedness relations with key stakeholders, including DFID Country Offices
- Maintaining the UK Government's international response capability and cross-Whitehall standard operating procedures (including management of CHASE Operations Team (Crown Agents)).
- Humanitarian programme management guidelines across DFID
- Design and management of DFID's global humanitarian risk register
- Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) implementation
- Relationship lead for NGOs, Private Sector and other Government Departments in humanitarian response.

#### Philippines Response

5. Typhoon Yolanda (internationally known as Haiyan), was the strongest typhoon ever to hit the Philippines. It made landfall in Central Philippines on Friday, 8 November 2013, with winds of up to 235 kph and gusts reaching 275 kph. Initial landfall was in Guiuan (Eastern Samar), cutting across Visayas, Leyte, Cebu, Bantayan, Panay and northern Palawan, before heading out to sea, west of the Philippines. A combination of powerful winds, heavy rain and storm surges severely damaged a number of coastal towns and cities, most notably Guiuan, Tacloban and communities along the coast south of Tacloban on Eastern Leyte. Access to the worst-affected communities proved near impossible in the first week following the disaster.



6. The humanitarian impact of the typhoon has been extensive, with over 4.1 million people displaced from their homes, and more than 14.1 million people in 36 provinces affected. An estimated 102,000 people were moved to evacuation centres and more than 1.1 million houses were damaged, about half of these completely destroyed. As of January 7th 2013, the confirmed death toll was 6,183 (NDRRMC 2014/01/07, OCHA 2013/12/30).
7. A low middle-income country, the Philippines ranks as one of the most disaster prone countries based on the number of disaster events in 2010. It is amongst the top ten countries in terms of victims of disasters (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters) and is ranked by the DFID Risk Register as a high humanitarian risk context. Although the Government of Philippines (GoP) is experienced in handling disasters and has established early warning and response mechanisms, recent events (Typhoon Pablo, the Bohol earthquake and ongoing conflict in Zamboanga) combined with the unprecedented severity of Haiyan has resulted in needs outstripping the capacity of the GoP to respond. On 9 November the GoP announced it would accept international assistance and declared a national state of calamity on 11 November.
8. On 12 November 2013, the UN launched a \$301 million flash appeal, covering an initial period of six months. In mid-December, the UN launched a one-year Strategic Response Plan of \$788 million (of which 42% has been funded as of January 2014) from November 2013 to October 2014, in support of the Government's strategic plan.
9. The UK provided £62m in funding in November 2013, with a further £15m added to support early recovery activities in March and May 2014. Overall funding provision is as outlined in the table below

#### Breakdown/activity: Humanitarian assistance provided by DFID

Implementing Partner	Activity/Sector of intervention	Amount
<b>Life-saving activities</b>		
<b>RRF</b>		
Plan led consortium (with Oxfam and CAFOD)	Emergency WASH assistance - (including NFIs)	£2,000,000
CARE-led consortium (with Action Against Hunger, Merlin and Save the Children)	Shelter and NFIs/ Food security WASH/ Health (primary health services )	£1,971,248
Christian Aid led consortium (with World Vision, Habitat for Humanity and Map Action)	Food/ NFIs/Shelter.	£1,698,594
Save the Children	WASH/ Shelter & NFIs/ Health/ Child Protection	£1,225,943
HelpAge	Food and non-food items/ Shelter/ Protection and psycho-social support	£480,000
Handicap International	Logistics/ NFIs/ Shelter/ Transports	£324,215
International Health Partners	Health (provision of essential supply)	£300,000
<b>Disaster Emergency committee</b>		
DEC	Matching fund – DEC appeal	£5,000,000
<b>Red Cross Movement</b>		
ICRC	Support to ICRC appeal (in conflict-affected areas)	£1,200,000

IFRC	Support to IFRC appeal	£5,900,000
<b>Priorities identified in the UN Appeal Action Plan and the SRP</b>		
WFP	Life-saving and early recovery food assistance	£3,525,000
UNICEF	WASH	£2,500,000
UNICEF	Nutrition	£2,000,000
WHO	Health	£3,000,000
ACTED	Shelter	£40,000
IOM	Shelter (including in-kind supplies)	£8,060,000
Save the Children	Education	£500,000
UNICEF	Education	£400,000
FAO	Livelihoods and agriculture	£7,500,000
Save the Children	Livelihoods and agriculture	£1,000,000
ILO	Livelihoods and agriculture	£1,000,000
Internews	Communication with disaster affected communities	£175,000
<b>UK MED</b>		
UK International Emergency Trauma Register (UKIETR)	Deployment of a 1 <sup>st</sup> team of 12 medical practitioners, followed by a team of 6.	£300,000
<b>Protection</b>		
UNHCR	Protection	£1,000,000
UNICEF	Protection	£1,200,000
UNFPA	Reproductive health	£183,000
UNFPA	Protection/GBV	£617,000
<b>Support to overall humanitarian response</b>		
OCHA	Coordination	£1,500,000
UNHAS/WFP	Logistics	£1,000,000
DFID	Technical secondments into the UN and IFRC	£1,000,000
<b>Cross-cutting actions</b>		
DFID	Direct provision of relief goods and supplies	£6,200,000
DFID	Response operational costs, monitoring & evaluation	£1,800,000
MoD	Logistics	£8,950,000
<b>NGO Allocation April 2014</b>		

Save the Children	Education	£550,147
Save the Children	Livelihoods/protection	£608,209
Christian Aid	Livelihoods/protection	£993,949
Solidarités	Livelihoods/protection	£901,106
Plan	AAP/CwC	£456,000

### Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

10. The purpose of this evaluation is two-fold. The primary focus of the evaluation is to assist DFID CHASE (both the Response and Policy teams) learn lessons with a view to improving performance in future responses. Key to the evaluation is to learn how well our partners (and through them DFID) performed, what can be done better next time, and what comparative value for money and added value our partners provide. The secondary aim is to assist accountability issues, both to the taxpayer but equally importantly down to end users.
11. Lesson learning will primarily be to inform DFID how future responses can and should be improved. As such the primary stakeholders will be internal. However both for issues of transparency and to promote lesson learning, where possible, relevant and appropriate finding will be shared with partners. The format of this is still to be decided, consisting as a minimum of a PowerPoint presentation and discussion, and possibly a one day workshop.
12. Finding should be shared with partner agencies in London, in Geneva and ideally the Philippines.
13. With this in mind, objective one seeks to assess the quality and relevance of direct response activities funded by DFID, while objective two reflects a need to understand how well the overall response was managed and resourced, and areas requiring improvement. The final objective looks at issues of accountability to beneficiaries on the part of DFID and partners and how accountability and feedback systems informed and improved programming.
14. The evaluation criteria selected are based on the OECD-DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance. In particular the evaluation team should consider issues of relevance, effectiveness, coverage and coherence when undertaking their study. Efficiency issues will be harder to consider, but should be assessed where possible.
15. Throughout the evaluation it is expected that issues of gender will be assessed and reviewed where appropriate, in particular with regard to issues of protection of vulnerable groups. Likewise the evaluators will be expected to consider issues of value for money where this can be effectively and appropriately assessed. See the next section for further information.
16. The evaluation will focus on the following :
17. *Objective 1.*

*To review the extent to which DFID response mechanisms functioned effectively to achieve the priority outcomes (of ensuring good quality and timely assistance was provided, basic protection and physical needs were met appropriately and that recovery was begun as soon as possible) and identify how funding and support can be made more effective in future rapid responses, with particular stress on the initial 3-4 month stage of response*

18. *Objective 2.*

*To determine to what extent the humanitarian system was effective in saving lives, reducing suffering and maintaining the dignity of those affected by the crisis, in the initial stage 3-4 month period, in particular with regard to building in early recovery from the start, and Transformative Agenda issues of deploying adequate leadership, putting in place appropriate coordination mechanisms and ensuring clear accountability.*

19. *Objective 3.*

*To review the extent to which DFID and partners demonstrated effective downward accountability to beneficiaries/end users, and how best DFID and partners can improve performance, share and strengthen best practise in this regard.*

20. The evaluation will focus on the initial life-saving period of the emergency prior to the transition into the early recovery phase. While there is no hard and fast date for this (and will vary between agencies), this can be taken to cover approximately the first 16 weeks of the response, i.e. to March 2014.
21. However – with regard to objective three, it will be appropriate to focus on interventions beyond only the first 3-4 months of response, as substantial support and funding was provided to accountability initiatives post March 2014, and substantial funding was provided for NGO accountability mechanisms to cover the period May – December 2014. If appropriate significant learning points from this programme should be reviewed and captured.
22. It should be noted that DFID is aware of a number of reports and evaluations now emerging from a variety of donors and UN bodies, as well as having itself conducted a mid-term review of the response in May and prior to this an ICAI report in February. It is not expected that this evaluation will cover the same ground as these, but can complement and accompany these existing studies. However there will inevitably be some overlap, and opportunities to go into aspects in more detail.
23. The ICAI report was the first opportunity to conduct an ICAI review of a large-scale humanitarian response. Its aim was to assess and provide prompt and timely feedback on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the UK Government's response to Haiyan. The team found that the UK's response to Haiyan was successful: DFID was well prepared to act swiftly and decisively. It mobilized quickly and provided a multi-sector response which met the real and urgent needs of affected communities. The UK was widely praised for its speed, flexibility and expertise. However it is recognised that this was a quick and limited process that took place only three months (February) into the response, and inevitably this has implications with regard to what could be assessed and reviewed.
24. The DFID May 2014 review was similarly a light-touch process focusing primarily on specific aspects of activities within the logframe, principally around the use of cash programming, issues of accountability, and support to the enabling environment. This report can be made available to the evaluators.


## Recipient

25. DFID CHASE, in particular the Humanitarian Response Group (HRG) and Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Policy Group (HDRP), are the commissioners of this evaluation and are considered to be the main internal stakeholders. Learning with regard to the performance of the UN and the Red Cross will be used by the DFID Humanitarian Policy Response Team to help drive performance and inform discussions with UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR and OCHA, as well as with Red Cross (IFRC and ICRC) partners. The Humanitarian Response Group (HRG) will be responsible for ensuring findings with regard to the delivery of the response are utilised and shared to drive performance improvement with NGO partners and internally.

## Scope

### The Theory of Change

26. As outlined in the Business Case the theory of change for the intervention is as follows;



27. Outputs one and two reflect the first objective of the evaluation, while objective two reflects the third output in the theory of change. Issues of accountability reflected in objective three are implicit in all three outputs.
28. The key issue for the evaluators to determine therefore is whether DFID inputs were appropriate and timely in effectively achieving this outlined change (as part of the wider efforts of the humanitarian community) and what can be improved in future similar responses to further improve our life-saving activities.

**Evaluation Key Issues and Questions**

29. The issues raised in the DFID mid-term interim report should act as an indication of current DFID thinking, and should guide the evaluation team in developing areas for further investigation. This will be made available to the evaluation team.

In addition below are a number of sample questions to illustrate the issues that CHASE is interested to cover under each objective.

30. In relation to objective one (whether DFID response mechanisms were effective and how these can be improved) the team should consider :
- a) *Was the theory of change appropriate and achievable*
  - b) *Were DFID funding mechanisms sufficiently flexible and speedy?*
  - c) *Did DFID provide the right mix of assessment, monitoring and programme support to partners post funds disbursement?*
  - d) *Did DFID provide the right mix of funding to the most appropriate and effective agencies?*
  - e) *Were there sectors or partners who on reflection DFID should have supported but did not?*
  - f) *Was the use of cash programming sufficiently considered and appropriate to the circumstances?*
  - g) *How well did DFID manage the response programme in view of the fact there was no DFID office; was process of scale up, disbursement of funds and partner selection well managed?*
31. In relation to objective two (effectiveness of the overall response provided by the UN in light of Transformative Agenda issues) it should be noted that Haiyan was the first real test of the investments made in the UN system through the Transformative Agenda. With this in mind, key questions to be considered include:
- h) *Did the UN successfully achieve the speed and quality improvements in leadership and coordination envisaged through the Transformative Agenda process?*
  - i) *Did UN bodies' coordination and management activities result in more effective coordinated responses that met the needs of, and were accountable to, affected populations?*
  - j) *Did agencies demonstrate understanding of DFID value for money requirements? If so are these sufficiently robust and comparable?*
  - k) *Was the response sufficiently timely and appropriate?*
  - l) *Were agreed humanitarian principles, standards and behaviours adhered to?*
  - m) *How have agencies demonstrated learning from this and previous rapid responses (need to better formulate)*
  - n) *Was protection and VAWG issues sufficiently responded to in the response?*
  - o) *Was the Government of the Philippines adequately supported and empowered by DFID and partner actions?*
  - p) *Were environmental issues sufficiently considered by partner agencies in their response, and were mitigation efforts effective?*
32. In relation to objective three (the quality of DFID and partners accountability mechanisms) it should be noted that accountability issues have been at the forefront of the HERR reforms. Questions should include:
- q) *Were all agencies funded by DFID sufficiently accountable to communities?*
  - r) *What factors or inputs (if any) made certain partners more accountable to their end users than others?*
  - s) *Were certain partner groups more effective than others in building accountability mechanisms, and using findings from this dialogue to improve performance?*
  - t) *Was DFID sufficiently accountable to its partner agencies?*
  - u) *How could DFID have better promoted accountability outcomes?*
  - v) *How can accountability practice be better mainstreamed within DFID response structures?*

w) *Was corruption considered an issue and if so how was this issue tackled by partners?*

33. With regard to this last objective – it will be appropriate to focus on interventions beyond only the first 3-4 months of response) as support and funding was provided to accountability initiatives post March 2014, and substantial funding was provided for NGO accountability mechanisms in May 2014.

## Requirements

### Methodology and Fieldwork

34. The evaluation team will be expected to design and justify a suitable robust methodology using primary and secondary sources including a description of data collection and analysis methods, indicators, tools,. It is envisaged that this will include the following components:

- Detailed literature search
- Identification of key partners; correspondence, analysis of documents, monitoring data and meetings held prior to field work.
- Extensive field work; including meeting with partners and key informants in Manila, field hubs and project sites.
- Interviews with all relevant stakeholders – to include
  - End users in a substantial number of selected sites.
  - DFID staff in UK and Philippines,
  - Consultants deployed as part of monitoring team.
  - Local Govt and national Govt officials

35. The team should also identify risks to successful execution, and how these will be mitigated.

36. The evaluators may also wish to contact partners who were not successful in their funding applications through the RRF and other humanitarian funds.

37. The evaluators should not underestimate the methodological challenges inherent in evaluating a programme with so many different grants and grant recipients, and a wide range of sectors: the evaluation team should propose what sampling methodology will be used to select projects and partner interventions. This will be discussed and refined in the inception phase.

38. The evaluation team are expected as part of the Inception phase to synthesise the major issues arising in the different evaluations and reviews conducted by DFID partners and other agencies to date. The evaluators are therefore required to indicate imaginative means for capturing and synthesising learning from these documents.

39. The evaluation team should undertake and present an 'evaluability assessment', based on initial discussions with DFID, UNOCHA and partner agencies and the team's literature review. This assessment should cover such issues as the reliability of both quantitative and qualitative data and the extent to which claims made in agencies' reports (e.g. on numbers of people 'covered') can be verified. This same assessment should address the legitimate concerns raised in the ToR about the extent to which data can be disaggregated. This should be part of the inception report.

40. Data gathering instruments and methods developed should ensure that data can be disaggregated to allow for analysis of cross-cutting issues (gender, age, disability in particular).

41. Prospective evaluation providers should outline how their proposed methods:

- Are consistent with OECD-DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, and with DFID's policy on evaluation
- Involve beneficiaries, including vulnerable groups such as girls and women and the disabled and elderly as well as implementing agents and government counterparts and ensure that beneficiary feedback is built into the evaluation programme.
- Do No Harm
- Are ethical

## Key Documentation

42. Core documentation includes the DFID Business Case and Logframe. In addition each response project has a concept note and monitoring documentation, along with partner and DFID end of project documentation and analysis. The ICAI report is available on the web. A mid-term review report (May 2014) has also been undertaken. These will be made available to the evaluators.
43. In addition internal documentation may be available from funded partner agencies.

#### **DFID Coordination and Management Arrangements**

44. A planning meeting will be held with the DFID Evaluation Steering Group (ESG) early in the contract.
45. Opportunities for commenting on and agreeing the proposed work will be done in the first phase of the contract, and will be included in the inception report.
46. The evaluation team leader will be responsible for the quality of the evaluation conducted by the team.
47. DFID will appoint an evaluation manager assisted by a programme manager. They will be the main point of contact for the evaluation and will ensure consistency throughout the evaluation process, from drafting the Terms of Reference to the dissemination of the report. The evaluation manager will also be the contact person for administrative and organisational issues and will coordinate activities of the different stakeholders involved in the evaluation
48. An evaluation steering group (ESG) consisting of the above individuals and the head of CHASE HDRP, the head of CHASE HRG, the CHASE evaluation adviser, the CHASE OT Deputy Director for Resilience and Learning, and the CHASE OT Humanitarian Lessons Learning Adviser will be established. This will be chaired by a member of the DFID EvD department. The ESG will steer the evaluation and provide direction for the evaluators. The evaluation provider will report over the 12 weeks on a 4 weekly, milestone basis, which will trigger the release of monthly tranches of funds, based on the quality of the reporting and subject to agreement in the process and products delivered. The end of the first period of work will result in an inception report and findings from a desk review, UK-based consultation with stakeholders and an agreed plan for the rest of the contract.
49. Regular short verbal and written update reports will be provided to the evaluation manager tracking progress and flagging issues. The final report will be provided to the evaluation manager for comment and feedback within three weeks of completion of fieldwork. DFID will comment on this draft within a one week period, and a final draft completed within one week of this feedback.
50. The evaluation team will present their findings to DFID CHASE in London in an interactive forum, the details of which will be finalised in due course.

#### **Logistics and procedures**

51. All transport, and logistical support, office space and Insurances will be the responsibility of the evaluation providers.
52. The evaluators are expected to consider aspects of coordination and information management, the quality of delivery and issues of accountability, and should consider how and where they will undertake field visits in light of this. The choice of field location visited and the rationale for their selection will be discussed and agreed with the evaluators in the inception phase.
53. The team should include consultants with previous experience of disaster responses and research at community level in the Philippines. The evaluators will be responsible for selecting and training local staff to assist the evaluation if required. In addition the evaluators will identify ethical risks and present a plan for how these and related issues will be mitigated and addressed during the inception phase.

#### **Evaluation Team Requirements:**

54. The team will demonstrate the following:
- Demonstrable track record of quality evaluations of rapid onset crises
  - Proven track record in conducting cost-effective and value for money evaluations.
  - Experience of working in the Philippines.
  - Extensive experience and understanding of multi-sector rapid response programmes.



- A range of skills as appropriate to this evaluation, including competencies within the team to review and evaluate relevant funded sectors including shelter, WASH, protection livelihoods and early recovery programming ; gender and accountability expertise; demonstrated competencies in community surveys; knowledge of UN L3 response structures and performance; Knowledge of Red Cross (IFRC and ICRC) operational modalities, and other skills as deemed appropriate.
- Experience with and institutional knowledge of UN and NGO actors, the inter-agency mechanisms headquarters and in the field and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).
- An understanding of the DFID approach to assessing value for money in rapid onset crises.
- A gender balance reflected in the team membership.

### Outputs and Deliverables

55. DFID will have access to all material produced or gathered by the evaluation team, and this will be made available to DFID prior to completion of the consultancy. This will be made available in electronic form.

### Inception Report

56. The Evaluation Team will produce a short inception report which will be presented to and discussed with the ESG within 3 weeks of the start of the evaluation, prior to the field based data gathering. This will include:

- A desk review of the various evaluations, reviews and studies of the response currently in development by various UN NGO and donor agencies, along with findings from interviews with key non-Philippines based stakeholders.
- A synthesise of the major issues arising in the different evaluations and reviews conducted by DFID partners and other agencies to date.
- An assessment of how different partners have adjusted their programming in light of these exercises – particularly real-time evaluations.
- An 'evaluability assessment', based on initial discussions with DFID, UNOCHA and partner agencies and the team's literature review.
- A statement of the evaluation teams understanding as to the DFID funding context, and the wider operational context within which partners were working (and in some cases are continuing to work).
- An outline of the team's focus for the evaluation, key follow-up questions within each objective.
- Suggested alterations / additions to the ToR emerging from initial consultations.
- A detailed evaluation framework and methodology, including initial visit schedule and list of planned interviews, and overall workplan.
- Data collection tools including questionnaires, identification of indicators against which activities will be assessed against each question etc.
- An outline of assumptions and potential risks, and how these will be mitigated.
- Clarity as to how VfM considerations will be assessed.
- A draft dissemination strategy for sharing of findings – both in country and in the UK.

### Evaluation Report

57. The Evaluation Team will produce a single report, written in good English. This will be comprised of a main report and annexes to include :

- Executive summary;

- List of acronyms;
- Table of contents;
- Findings
- Recommendations
- Detailed Methodology including list of persons met and itinerary

### Summary report

58. A short (maximum 10 pages) externally facing summary report accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation for sharing with partner agencies, the Philippines Government and the wider humanitarian community. This report should summarise the key findings and recommendations of the evaluation, particularly with respect to objectives two and three (the effectiveness of the overall response provided by the UN and accountability mechanisms.).

### Interim Reporting

59. Regular updates will be provided, the exact format of which is to yet be finalised. It is envisaged that these may be a combination of brief verbal and email updates along with short written summaries of activities and progress identifying whether above or behind schedule, key issues emerging and deviation.

### Dissemination of final report

60. The evaluation team should include a dissemination strategy in the methodology. At a minimum this should include a dissemination event for DFID London. A presentation for field based partners at the end of the field trip should be undertaken. A presentation to New York or Geneva based UN and partner bodies may be required. This should be budgeted in an annex to the overall budget.

### Timeframe with outputs/ deliverables:

61. The overall consultancy will take 12 weeks. It is envisaged that the evaluation will commence early October

<b>Inception</b>	<b>Week</b>
Commencement of evaluation and initial contact with stakeholders. Desk review	1-2
Presentation of inception report	3
QA and agreement of Inception report	3
<b>Data Collection and Field work</b>	
Preparation/ training for field based collection of data begins	4
Field based collection of data finalised	7
<b>Reporting</b>	
Draft final report presented	10
QA of draft report	11
Final report shared for comment	12
<b>Dissemination</b>	
Presentation to DFID London	12
Presentation externally to DFID partners	12

### Budget

62. A detailed budget should be presented breaking down all major costs. The DFID humanitarian budget format should be used. As an indication, proposals with budgets over £300,000 will not be considered.

### 63. Mini-Competition Evaluation:

**Eligibility:** Only pre-qualified providers identified under the Global Evaluation Framework Agreement – **Thematic Group (Humanitarian)** are only eligible to bid. However, if any of them is part of the implementation of this programme, they will be precluded from participation in this bid. Service Providers are also required to declare any conflict of interest with relevance to Clause 15 of the Invitation to Tender (ITT) Instructions.

This mini competition via the above stated framework will be evaluated on the basis of a Technical 60% and Commercial 40% split. Sub Criteria questions and weightings are detailed below for your reference. Please ensure that responses are consistent with the criteria numbering below in your submissions.

Bids from the pre-qualified providers will be evaluated against the following weighted criteria:

Main Criteria	Sub Criteria	Weighting
Quality and availability of Personnel - 10	The provider will need to demonstrate that it has sufficiently skilled staff to undertake all aspects of the programme. This should include CVs of the key staff involved in delivering this programme, specifying their base, input days, percentage time dedicated to the DFID programme, and specific role.	10
Methodology - 50	Methodology for collecting, analysing synthesising and presenting the desk review of the various evaluations, reviews and studies of the response currently in development by various UN NGO and donor agencies, along with findings from interviews with key non-Philippines based stakeholders, as required by the inception report, prior to field visit.	10
	Methodology for determining the extent to which DFID response mechanisms functioned effectively to achieve the priority outcomes (objective 1)	10
	Methodology for determining to what extent the humanitarian system was effective in saving lives, reducing suffering and maintaining the dignity of those affected by the crisis (objective 2)	10
	Methodology for determining the extent to which DFID and partners demonstrated effective downward accountability to beneficiaries/end users, and how best DFID and partners can improve performance, share and strengthen best practise in this regard. (objective 3)	5
	Methodology for undertaking field based assessments of a representative sample of	5

Main Criteria	Sub Criteria	Weighting
	DFID-funded partner projects.	
	Methodology for identifying, contacting, interviewing and evidencing findings in relation to partner agencies.	5
	Methodology for ensuring that beneficiaries have the opportunity to feed their views into evaluation.	5
Commercial - 40	Competitiveness of fees and expenses in relation to market.	30
	Methodology and benchmarking of rates.	2
	Approach and methodology to deliver output based deliverables and value for money over the life of the contract.	2
	Clear & effective Financial Plan.	2
	Methodology for ensuring the Requirement will be delivered on time and in line with agreed costs; financial risk/ contingency incorporated into costs.	2
	Payments linked to clear outputs.	2
<b>Overall Total</b>		<b>100</b>

#### 64. Duty of Care

DFID has launched the 'Duty of Care to Suppliers' policy. This policy aims to clarify DFID's position in relation to Duty of Care (DoC) and how it will be addressed as part of our risk management and procurement processes. The policy has a particular focus on Suppliers who will be operating in dangerous environments. Further information on this policy and how it will be applied to DFID's procurement processes can be found at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/Procurement/Duty-of-Care-to-Suppliers-Policy/>.

The services required by this contract include a short-term (less than 3 weeks) deployment to rural areas of the Philippines (to be determined by SP – but likely to be in Leyte, Samar and Panay) . The rest of the time will be spent in the UK or Manila. **The risk rating is assessed as low.** The project will be implemented subject to the usual restrictions and timing constraints that events such as elections, national/religious holidays, stakeholders' availability, cross-working with other implementing partners or donors, security or transport restrictions may pose.

If at a subsequent stage the risk assessment escalates to 'medium' or 'high', then the programme team will conduct a risk assessment at that stage and share it with the service provider and satisfy themselves that they can manage the DoC in the revised environment.

If at any stage there are concerns that the service provider cannot manage DoC for a particular region, they may be precluded from operating in that region. However this is viewed as unlikely given the benign operating environment. The ability of the Supplier to manage DoC will be a pre-condition of the contract.

The Service Provider is responsible for the safety and well-being of their personnel and third parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

DFID will share available information with the SP on security status and developments in country where appropriate. All SP personnel must register with their respective embassies to ensure that they are included in emergency procedures.

The SP is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their personnel working under this contract. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website. The SP must ensure they (and their personnel) are up to date with the latest information.

The subjective assessment for the area of Leyte and around is provided in the annex to this ToR.

## SUMMARY RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX -

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

### DFID Overall Project/Intervention

#### Summary Risk Assessment Matrix

**Project/intervention title: Evaluation of DFID's humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan**

**Location: Philippines**

**Date of assessment: 17 July 2014**

Theme	DFID Risk score	DFID Risk score
	Leyte, Panay, Samar	Other Parts the Philippines. Manila
<b>OVERALL RATING<sup>55</sup></b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
FCO travel advice	2	2
Host nation travel advice	Not available	Not available
Transportation	1	1
Security	2	2
Civil unrest	1	1
Violence/crime	2	2
Terrorism	1	2
War	1	1
Hurricane	3	3
Earthquake	3	3
Flood	3	3
Medical Services	1	1
<b>Nature of Project/ Intervention</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

1 Very Low risk	2 Low risk	3 Med risk	4 High risk	5 Very High risk
<b>Low</b>		<b>Medium</b>	<b>High Risk</b>	

<sup>55</sup> The Overall Risk rating is calculated using the MODE function which determines the most frequently occurring value.

## Annex 2: Evaluation Framework

The framework below was developed and finalised by the evaluation team during the inception phase and presented in the inception report. It should be noted that, for the purpose of a more logical presentation of findings in this report, the findings for evaluation question 2d were addressed as part of evaluation objective 1.

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators and Judgement Criteria	Analysis and Sources
<b>1. To what extent did DFID response mechanisms function effectively to achieve priority outcomes? How can funding and support be made more effective in future rapid responses?</b>		
a) Was DFID's strategic approach and decision making appropriate and supportive to partners, the humanitarian action and resilient recovery?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that DFID's approaches adapted to critical gaps and moments, especially transition to recovery and resilience considering VAWG &amp; VfM</li> <li>Evidence that DFID's comparative advantage informed decision making and strategic formulation, including DFID's role in civil-military coordination and as a network enabler</li> <li>Evidence that DFID supported or influenced partner actions to focus on priority concerns including transition, VAWG and VfM considering existing capacities and sustainability in the Philippines and (ASEAN) region</li> <li>Evidence of DFID's influence on partners' actions from different levels of relationships</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of comparative advantage and contributing factors to decision making through interviews with DFID field team, other humanitarian actors (local, national and international), as well as document review and the partnership assessment tool</li> <li>Analysis of changes to partner actions and DFID's influence to make those changes derived from document review, KIIs at different levels as well as the partnership assessment tool</li> <li>Analysis of changing priorities (for large-scale disasters) for Yolanda as well as for middle-income countries in the region, considering changes in DRM/DRR enabling environment funding profiles. To be informed by data sources such as national and regional DRM frameworks, KIIs at different levels as well as the partnership assessment tool</li> </ul>
b) Did DFID support the right mix of funding and partners at the right times considering in-country capacity and sustainability issues? How was the process from early support to recovery managed by DFID, and how did this influence decision making?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that DFID selected partners considering comparative advantages, funding profiles, humanitarian gaps and priorities including resilience, protection and VAWG</li> <li>Evidence that DFID supported gaps in coordination and capacity including L3 surge capacity, transition to resilience recovery and civil-military liaison</li> <li>Evidence that partners are aware of DFID approaches and priorities including that of network enabler</li> <li>Evidence of DFID decision-making processes to inform the shift from early support to recovery</li> <li>Evidence that lessons were learnt in partner selection and program intervention choice during implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of DFID's comparative advantage and contribution to wider funding requirements, levels and plans over the time period using review of DFID documents and field-level interviews</li> <li>Analysis of DFID partner selection process, including capacity assessment, and factors affecting non-selection, using review of DFID documents and KIIs, including with RRF partners which did not receive funding</li> <li>Analysis of major funding commitments, changing priorities and plans over time derived from documents review and KIIs</li> <li>Analysis of critical criteria such as: allowed timeframe, rate of spend, available money, and available information – i.e. criteria which influenced decision making, using KIIs</li> </ul>
c) How well did DFID manage the response programme in view of the fact there was no DFID office? What contribution to decision making did the field team have?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that DFID proactively identified and managed capacity gaps and requirements during scale up and transitioning of programs</li> <li>Evidence that the field team contributed analysis, adaptation and communication between and with partners on strategic priorities including VAWG and resilience building</li> <li>Evidence of communications and analysis with key government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of the perceived value-added of the field team and its link to decision making derived from document analysis and KIIs at various levels</li> <li>Analysis of influencers on decision-making processes derived from KIIs, and decision making references in review of management related documentation</li> </ul>

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators and Judgement Criteria	Analysis and Sources
	<p>and non-government stakeholders for long-term interventions in the Philippines</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that assessments, monitoring and support by the field team considered partners' capacities, previous performance and sustainability</li> </ul>	
<p>d) How do value for money considerations affect programmatic decision making? How did DFID and partners take into account VfM in their decision making process? What is the evidence on VfM of specific partners/interventions (note that this will focus on case study examples)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of a shared understanding of VfM between and amongst partners</li> <li>Evidence that VfM (speed, quality and cost) thinking influenced partners' strategic decision making and partnership decisions</li> <li>Evidence on speed, quality, cost considerations for a subset of partners/interventions</li> <li>Evidence of gains in the 3Es, both qualitative and quantitative (note that this will likely be in the form of case studies, subject to partners having collected data and done such analysis)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Perception analysis of VfM across partners through KIIs, KAP survey or a structured survey of perception</li> <li>Analysis of tools and their consideration/calculations of speed, quality and costs / 3Es from KIIs and project documents</li> <li>Detailed cost and outcome analysis where available, using interviews with partners, and review of project documentation</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. To what extent was the humanitarian system more effective using L3 Transformative Agenda protocols in saving lives, reducing suffering and maintaining the dignity of those affected by the crisis in the initial 3-4 months of the crisis and in the transition to recovery and to what extent did DFID contribute to this effectiveness?</b></p>		
<p>a) Leadership: did the UN successfully achieve the speed improvements in leadership envisaged through the Transformative Agenda process? Were agencies more accountable, as envisaged in the TA?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of DFID contribution to supporting role of HC/RC</li> <li>Evidence of effectiveness of personnel surge, as supported directly by DFID</li> <li>Evidence of accountability to UN, other agencies and recipients of humanitarian assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of DFID's contribution to, and support of, TA L3 pillar 1 leadership such as the rapid deployment of surge personnel and how this added value to the response, using literature review and follow-up KIIs during field work. (Questions designed around: (i) gaps/inconsistencies/themes from the literature review and (ii) key informants' understanding of DFID's particular contribution to the improvements in leadership under TA pillar 1)</li> </ul>
<p>b) Coordination: did the L3 configuration of coordination, partnerships and relationships contribute to a more effective response that met the needs of affected populations?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of contribution to improved coordination from DFID deployments, secondment of technical expertise, and influencing activity at field/HQ level</li> <li>Evidence of effectiveness of partnerships and relationships in delivering programs</li> <li>Evidence of DFID contribution of key monitoring and learning stages related to the TA</li> <li>Evidence of DFID contribution to identified capacity gaps in civilian, government and international response</li> <li>Evidence that assessments, monitoring and programming encouraged and reacted to beneficiary dialogue</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of DFID's contribution to, and support of, TA L3 pillar 2 coordination such as strategic use of clusters and strengthening NGO representation in HCT, using literature review and follow-up KIIs during field work. (Questions designed around: (i) gaps/inconsistencies/themes from the literature review, and (ii) key informants' understanding of DFID's particular contribution to the improvements in coordination under TA pillar 2)</li> <li>Consultation with beneficiaries and national actors around whether they perceived the response as well coordinated</li> </ul>
<p>c) Did DFID partners adhere to agreed humanitarian principles, standards and behaviours?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of DFID partners' adherence to agreed humanitarian principles, standards and behaviours</li> <li>Evidence of DFID contribution towards adherence of agreed humanitarian principles, standards and behaviours</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Light-touch analysis of standards as cited/referenced through document review triangulated with interview findings</li> </ul>

Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators and Judgement Criteria	Analysis and Sources
d) Were protection and VAWG issues sufficiently addressed in the response by all partners at all levels? If not, where were the gaps?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of increased focus on protection, GBV and VAWG</li> <li>Evidence of some operational and programmatic implementation of KeepHerSafe Commitments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of how KeepHerSafe Commitments led to increased focus on protection, GBV and VAWG issues in the response and an increased protective environment with typhoon-affected communities. To be analysed through documentation mapping of activities against the KeepHerSafe Commitments, interviews with GBV AoR and the GBV RRT; FGDs and community-based perception surveys</li> </ul>
e) How have agencies demonstrated learning from this and previous rapid responses, and do the L3 TA protocols encourage useful learning?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of shared common learning of lessons identified by stakeholder group</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited review, drawing only on views from stakeholder groups. And learning reviews, as well as use of learning reviews by partners</li> </ul>
f) Was the Government of Philippines adequately supported and empowered by DFID and partner actions, or were there specific actions that worked to undermine local structures? What impact did this have on sustainability?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of DFID and partner commitment to supporting identified capacity gaps at various levels of Government for this and future responses</li> <li>Evidence that interventions changed the resilience levels of government and other Filipino institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partner assessment and context analysis, using in-depth open-ended structured interviews with GoP staff members at multiple levels</li> </ul>
<b>3. To what extent did DFID and partners demonstrate effective accountability to Beneficiaries/end users? How can DFID and partners improve performance and share and strengthen best practice?</b>		
a) Were all agencies funded by DFID sufficiently accountable to the diverse interests (women, poor disabled etc.) within communities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that funded agencies have identified and engaged with the key different interest groups in the communities in which they worked</li> <li>Evidence of managed, flexible and adapted mechanisms of accountability used to reach diverse interest groups within communities including women, poor and marginal people</li> <li>Evidence that funded agencies managed responses to end user/aid recipient's claims, complaints and suggestions consistently, transparently and without discrimination</li> <li>Evidence of how agencies managed and consistently delivered informed responses to suggestions/complaints made by community members (disaggregated by sex, age and poverty status –if data available)</li> <li>Evidence that accountability systems, mechanisms and processes incorporated attention to PSEA/VAWG issues</li> <li>Evidence of end user trust in partners to be accountable to end users/aid recipients (disaggregated by sex, age, poverty status etc.)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of information flows and gaps between: a) selected agency HQ and Field staff and b) field staff and end users/aid recipients (disaggregated by sex, age, poverty status including differently-abled people), using KIIs with selection of DFID recipient and non-DFID recipient (for comparison) agencies</li> <li>Assessment of usability and effectiveness of accountability mechanisms (SMS, complaint/suggestion boxes; radio etc.) in reaching diverse interest groups in communities, using KIIs with selection of DFID recipient and non-DFID recipient (for comparison) agencies</li> <li>Perception analysis through community score cards in FGDs with end users/aid recipients (disaggregated by sex, age, poverty status including differently-abled people)</li> </ul>
b) What factors or inputs (if any) made certain partners more accountable to their end users than others?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that partners had addressed: (i) making staff within partner agencies aware of policy/best practice with regard to being accountable to all people within affected populations; (ii) ensuring access to information about interventions and how to hold agencies to account for all end users; (iii) how to target and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local context analysis in surveyed sites to identify opportunities for, and barriers against embedding accountability within the response, using KIIs and FGDs with partners, local NGOs and CBOs, and end aid recipients (disaggregated by sex, age, poverty status including differently-abled people)</li> </ul>



Core Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	Indicators and Judgement Criteria	Analysis and Sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>managed institutional responses to end user/aid recipients claims and complaints and (iv) PSEA/VAWG issues incorporated into accountability mechanisms/processes</li> <li>• Evidence of flexible and adapted responses to local context and in response to feedback from different interest groups within communities</li> <li>• Evidence of organisational structures that allow for accountability to be central to process of delivery and not marginalised</li> <li>• Evidence of timeliness and transparency of partner response to demands, suggestions and complaints by different interest groups within communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Light-touch audit of policies, structures and processes used by agencies to promote downward accountability during the response, using KIIs and FGDs with partners, local NGOs and CBOs, and end aid recipients (disaggregated by sex, age, poverty status including differently-abled people)</li> <li>• Timeline charting adaptations and changes in response, if any, to changing context and demands, claims and feedback from end aid recipients</li> </ul>
<p>c) Were certain partners more effective than others in building accountability mechanisms, and using findings from this dialogue to improve performance?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of presence/absence of organisational systems and mechanisms and processes for enforcing accountability policies</li> <li>• Evidence of engagement, feedback and enforcement mechanisms being used in supported communities</li> <li>• Evidence of tailored agency responses to the demands/suggestions/complaints of different interest groups (sex, age, poverty status) within communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Light-touch audit of policies, structures and processes used by agencies to promote downward accountability during the response, using KAP survey with DFID partners</li> </ul>
<p>d) Was corruption considered an issue and if so how was this issue tackled by partners?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of policies, systems, mechanisms and processes in place for responding to corruption issues if and when they occurred</li> <li>• Evidence of transparent and accessible information systems/mechanisms about how to report corruption issues being circulated in affected communities</li> <li>• Evidence of end user trust in/satisfaction with partners' approach to tackling corruption if and when occurred</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perception analysis through a community score card approach in FGDs with end users/aid recipients (disaggregated by sex, age and poverty status etc.)</li> <li>• Light-touch audit of policies, structures and processes used by agencies to combat corruption during the response, using KIIs with DFID and partners</li> <li>• Rapid review of partner agency monitoring mechanisms and systems of redress for cases of reported corruption</li> </ul>
<p>e) How can accountability practice be better mainstreamed within DFID response structures?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lessons learnt relating to embedding good practice in response structures and mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This will be based on methods and tools used in a)-c) above</li> </ul>
<p>f) How could DFID have better promoted accountability outcomes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lessons learnt relating to management, adaptability, and flexibility of response</li> <li>• Lessons learnt relating to processes and mechanisms for engaging with partners on accountability issues during response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This will be based on methods and tools used in a)-c) above</li> </ul>

## Annex 3: Literature Review

The following literature review was researched and produced during the inception phase, and as such was presented as part of the inception report. It is reproduced here given its relevance to the findings presented in Section 4 of this report.

### (1) INTRODUCTION

As part of the inception report process for the evaluation of DFID's humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan we have conducted a literature review of a sample of documentation relating to the response. This review has synthesised the findings and learnings from various assessments, reviews and evaluations conducted on the response to Haiyan to date, and it provides a platform for the more in-depth primary assessment as part of this evaluation.

Due to time constraints and also the narrow breadth of available literature we designed an approach that built on the revised overarching evaluation framework and have reviewed secondary sources against a consistent and structured set of questions derived from this framework [see Appendix A].

The literature review provided some initial questions to be incorporated into the initial KIIs. This in turn will provide further questions to be incorporated into the primary field work data collection to be undertaken during the next stage of the evaluation.

### (2) METHODOLOGY

To avoid selection bias in the identification of secondary sources and to ensure all existing studies are included, the evaluation team built upon a) their own knowledge; b) the ESG's guidance; and c) web-based searches. An initial mapping of 30 documents was completed, out of which 25 have been reviewed.

Of the 30 documents originally identified in the mapping exercise, a total of 545 pages of 25 documents were reviewed including various analyses, assessments, evaluations, monitoring reports, needs assessments, response plans, reviews and statements. These were authored by consortia, donors, GoP, HCT, IASC and NGOs.

We followed a systematic and structured process for retrieving, screening and analysing the evidence presented in each study. Each individual document reviewed was summarised within a template designed to capture the specific evidence relating to each of the three evaluation objectives. In turn, the summarised information was transferred into a synthesis tool which allowed the extraction of trend analysis across each of the sub-Evaluation Questions. These templates are available on request.

### (3) OVERVIEW

From the literature review a number of overarching recurring themes and trends emerged which will be investigated in more depth during this evaluation. The three primary trends are loosely related to the three evaluation objectives.

#### Evaluation Objective One

In relation to both evaluation objective one – the overall DFID response to Typhoon Haiyan – as well as objective two – the overall international humanitarian community – an issue with regard to the balance between speed and flexibility vs depth and accountability arose. Within this context, accountability related to the notion of good stewardship and anti-corruption measures as opposed to AAP. In general, DFID was considered to have achieved a good balance in this regard yet the SRP was widely criticised for having a lack of balance, foregoing speed and flexibility.

#### Evaluation Objective Two

While there was overall general consensus that the humanitarian response was an improvement on previous responses (such as Haiti), there was also overall general criticism of the TAL3 products and the focus placed on products and processes which hindered the response. A general emerging theme is that many of these

products were conceptually well placed but in terms of implementation translated into resource-heavy and process-focused working methodologies that were not helpful.

### Evaluation Objective Three

An overarching theme emerging from the literature review in relation to the third evaluation objective was the myriad of different uses of the word “accountability” throughout the documentation. It is clear that different actors, agencies and organisations use the term in different ways and oftentimes interchangeably to refer to AAP, transparency, good stewardship, responsible management of resources and anti-corruption. This perhaps contributes to a general lack of common understanding of AAP.

Document	“Accountability” reference
ICAI Review	This document references accountability in relation to the DFID Business Case, and the balance between flexibility and accountability – meaning good stewardship
Actionaid Review	References accountability in relation to corruption
OPR	References accountability in relation to transparency
SPR	References accountability in relation to “weak accountability system” – also in relation to corruption / good stewardship of funds

A secondary emerging theme from the literature is that various reports and evaluations state that the evaluation had taken a “beneficiary-centric approach”, although it was difficult to identify any discernible difference between those reviews that took a “beneficiary-centric approach” and those that did not.

#### (4) DETAILED REVIEW

##### Evaluation Objective One

**To what extent did DFID response mechanisms function effectively to achieve priority outcomes? How can funding and support be made more effective in future rapid responses?**

Ten out of 23 documents reviewed referenced DFID response mechanisms either specifically or tangentially. Three documents reviewed focused on the DFID mechanism as their primary purpose.

The UK response was substantial, at approximately £77 million. It was the first time the UK adopted the Gold-Silver-Bronze (GSB)<sup>56</sup> management system<sup>57</sup> for such a large-scale response and so there were some management lessons with regard to the use of this system. However, in general there was unanimous approval for the speed, flexibility, leadership and expertise. Operation Patwin – the UK military response – was generally seen as extremely successful and “significantly shaped the UK’s ability to help those worst affected by the typhoon” – MoD review.

#### **EO1 a) Was DFID’s strategic approach and decision making appropriate and supportive to partners, the humanitarian action and resilient recovery?**

The general impression of DFID’s response was very positive. In relation to the balance between flexibility / speed and depth / accountability the DFID lessons learnt review found both positive and negative responses but the ICAI review was overwhelming positive. Indeed, the ICAI review found that DFID had been particularly good at utilising and applying HERR learning to great benefit in the Haiyan response resulting in effective and timely decision making which allowed DFID to be one of the fastest responding agencies. This in turn led to DFID assuming an influential leadership role within the donor community.

<sup>56</sup> A gold-silver-bronze command structure is used by the UK emergency services to establish a hierarchical framework for the command and control of major incidences. Gold is Strategic responsibility; Silver is Tactical responsibility; and Bronze is Operational responsibility.

<sup>57</sup> DFID Lessons Learnt Review

“The UK was widely praised for its speed, flexibility and expertise” – ICAI Report

**EO1 b) Did DFID support the right mix of funding and partners at the right times considering in-country capacity and sustainability issues? How was the process from early support to recovery managed by DFID, and how did this influence decision making?**

In relation to sub-question b, the literature review reveals two broad primary areas of interest. The first is in relation to the **civ-mil liaison**, noting that within this response there was a substantial utilisation of MoD assets. There was both positive and negative feedback on the military aspect, with some evidence suggesting that the high cost and time-consuming management of the use of military assets should be considered and weighed against the benefit (a clear VfM issue). One NGO key informant noted that DFID’s civ-mil coordination was excellent and should be replicated. The MoD review itself noted that the civ-mil “C2 [control and command] construct proved to be one of the most challenging aspects”. It also noted familiar problems of understanding with some NGOs but says this was in fact mitigated by a strong DFID lead.

The second area of interest is the use of the **RRF**. In the DFID lessons learnt review this was seen as an area requiring further review, specifically in terms of primary data collection from key informant RRF partners. Overall the literature review suggests that as a mechanism for the immediate disbursement of funds it worked exceptionally well. However, cost-benefit of the consortium structure was questioned (although the reasoning behind the questioning was unclear).

**EO1 c) How well did DFID manage the response programme in view of the fact there was no DFID office? What contribution to decision making did the field team have?**

This was an area that arose in the three pieces of literature reviewed relating specifically to the DFID response – the DFID lessons learnt review, the ICAI rapid review and the DFID mid-term review (MTR). In general the overview is that the immediate emergency response programme was excellent despite the fact that there was no DFID office. This included the intra-departmental coordination between DFID and other UK Government departments, including the MoD for civ-mil coordination and the FCO. However, the question arose as to how the transition to recovery would be managed with no DFID office. In fact, this was the one area of the ICAI review graded at green/amber rather than green and the ICAI review suggested that DFID should develop a strategy for their humanitarian response in countries where there is no existing DFID presence. This is echoed within the DFID MTR with specific respect to DFID and FCO working on joint strategies for responses where there is no DFID presence. Overwhelmingly, this literature review suggests that the lack of presence in immediate relief response was not a hindrance, but the literature questioned whether it would become a hindrance as relief transitioned to recovery.

**EO1 d) How did value for money considerations affect programmatic decision making?**

There was very little specific reference within the literature review to VfM considerations. This is in itself an interesting finding.

In the DFID MTR there is reference to identified good and bad practice (while not elaborated upon) and this also suggested that the level of understanding of VfM amongst partners was mixed. There was also reference within this to how well DFID themselves followed VfM guidelines, suggesting that the guidelines were not followed as much as they could have been, and VfM was not always considered as part of the project selection criteria. Reference was also made to the issue of having extremely short turn-around times for proposals to be submitted during the recovery period – a specific example of agencies having one week to submit proposals which was over the Easter weekend and therefore agencies struggled to submit quality proposals within the timeframe allowed.

Specifically in relation to the use of military assets, the MoD review commented that there was a level of uncertainty around costings and in future a “price list” should be readily available for DFID when MoD support is requested at the beginning of a large-scale emergency response. The review also noted different approaches between MoD and DFID which would have an impact on overall VfM and cost-benefit analysis: this observation was that while MoD generally defines the desired effect and then identifies an asset or

resource most likely to achieve that effect, it was perceived that DFID utilises whatever asset is immediately available and then seeks to create as much of the desired effect as possible.

Furthermore, it should be noted from a VfM perspective (although not necessarily a DFID perspective) that the re-tasking of military assets is not “without penalty”, referencing the example of HMS DARING which was re-tasked from an exercise involving other regional partners resulting in both financial and diplomatic disadvantages.

### **Evaluation Objective Two**

**To what extent was the humanitarian system more effective using L3 Transformative Agenda protocols in saving lives, reducing suffering and maintaining the dignity of those affected by the crisis in the initial 3-4 months of the crisis and to what extent did DFID contribute to this effectiveness?**

Only four of the 23 documents reviewed failed to reference the TA either specifically or tangentially, highlighting the importance of the revised response protocols and the first instance of implementing them to a wide range of actors. The general consensus seems to be that there was an overall robust system-wide response to Typhoon Haiyan – a “remarkable improvement” on the last L3-size response to the Haiti Earthquake in 2010, and a response underscored by a “strong sense of collective responsibility” [14].

However, this generally positive commentary on the improvement in overall response was balanced by consistent criticism from across the board in relation to the TAL3 products, both in relationship to the products themselves and the to the emphasis placed on producing them leading to resource-heavy and process-oriented approaches that detracted from the operations of the response.

#### **EO2 a) Leadership: did the UN successfully achieve the speed improvements in leadership envisaged through the Transformative Agenda?**

Within this area of review substantial reference was made throughout the literature to:

(1) The SRP

Unanimously across the literature, the SRP was considered to be too process-heavy, not achieving the right balance between speed/flexibility and depth.

(2) The surge capacity

The surge capacity of experienced humanitarian personnel under the auspices of the TA was both lauded and criticised at the same time. It was considered to have worked very well with highly experienced personnel being deployed in a timely manner which made a significant difference to the speed of the response. However, no document reviewed attempted to quantify exactly the cost-benefit of the ‘faster’ response, or what this meant in real terms for affected populations. The ‘no regrets’ pre-deployment of staff was also praised, although numerous pieces of literature made reference to the lack of a ‘no regrets’ pre-deployment strategy for supplies and operations which would have also been helpful. However, the surge was also criticised in two ways. Firstly, the minimum deployment length of three months as envisaged under the TA protocols was not adhered to resulting in a high turnover of staff that hindered smooth operations. Secondly – and more substantially – the surge was considered by most respondents to be overwhelming to and overshadowing of national response efforts.

(3) The format and leadership structure of the HCT

Under the TA leadership pillar it was envisaged that the HC would have empowered authority to make decisions when the HCT could not come to a joint decision to prevent blockages and this was not found to have worked as well as originally intended. There were reported issues of the HCT not necessarily following the HC’s decisions where consensus could not be met and these led to certain challenges. Examples provided were a lack of a strong agreed HCT position on bunkhouses and a lack of resolution of the management issues within the Early Recovery and Livelihoods cluster.

The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator was seen to have been a good position but it was felt that this position should have been based in Tacloban rather than in the field and been in place for at least three months.

The MoD review noted that the civ-mil coordination leadership offered by OCHA in relation to the UK military was “immature” but conceded that this may well have been due to the relative inexperience of the two entities working together.

**EO2 b) Coordination: did the L3 configuration of coordination, partnerships and relationships contribute to a more effective response that met the needs of affected populations?**

Various themes emerged from this area of review. Firstly, the cluster system was generally found to have worked well but various references were made to uneven funding between clusters; the issue of activities falling outside of the SRP; and during the transition period, the lack of clarity for clusters as to whom to hand over coordination roles to as clusters deactivated. There was also specific reference made to the “Tacloban Effect”. Given the media attention concentrated on Tacloban, there appeared to be more actors trying to work there rather than other affected areas which gave uneven geographical coverage. Another issue with regard to funding coverage was in relation to new actors arriving in country and a question, perhaps for further review, as to whether these new actors should cede funding to partners already in country (DEC Review).

The MIRA was a topic of substantial interest throughout the literature review. Much like the SRP, it was generally considered to unhelpful, process-heavy and a waste of resources leading only to “learn what we already know” (DFID MTR). The ICAI report summarised that “the MIRA concept was strong, but didn’t deliver in practice”. Neither the ICAI nor any other report provided information on the final cost of the MIRA.

**EO2 c) Were agreed humanitarian principles, standards and behaviours adhered to?**

Across the Actionaid Real-time Evaluation (RTE) and the Lutheran World Relief quality reports there is a sense that there was a general lack of knowledge on standards such as Sphere and HAP. It was reported that many NGOs were hiring a large number of new staff who lacked exposure to common humanitarian standards and self-reported that they were eager to improve but lacked the commitment from senior management. Certainly protection principles were unknown by many front-line staff despite encountering various protection issues in the course of their work.

The OPR noted varied and inconsistent targeting methodologies – while some agencies were working with loss-based targeting others were ensuring needs-based, and some through CfW schemes were operating on a ‘turn-based’ targeting system.

**EO2 d) Were protection and VAWG issues sufficiently addressed in the response by all partners at all levels? If not, where were the gaps?**

In general it is clear from the literature review that protection and VAWG issues were given a higher prominence than within previous disasters. It is unclear from the review what, exactly, this can be attributed to, and whether it is due to any one of or a combination of the following: a general evolution of humanitarian action to an understanding of the importance of protection; the TA pillar of accountability (to affected populations) promoting better inclusion and protection; the DFID-led VAWG Call to Action Summit in November 2013; and/or the IASC Statement on the Centrality of Protection in December 2013.

It would, secondly, appear that the prominence given to protection issues within documentation and planning did not properly translate to practical action in the field as envisioned, and any actual implementation was extremely inconsistent across clusters. These two issues of attribution and translation into practice should be the basis of further review.

NOTE: SADD and more generalised gender considerations are both crucial foundations to protection programming as well as to accountability and inclusion programming. Gender and SADD are discussed within this review, under EO3 – Accountability.

**EO2 e) How have agencies demonstrated learning from this and previous rapid responses and do the L3 TA protocols encourage useful learning?**

Various lessons learnt can be inferred from the literature review although very little is stated clearly. Themes that arose included lessons in relation to consortium approaches – which in general are felt to work well, but less so when some of the partners are inexperienced (the DEC Review) and cost-benefit analysis should be more clear.

Interestingly, RAY was very strong on stating implementation of recovery would be based on lessons from previous disasters and outlined an approach of strong central coordination and oversight with flexible implementation at local level to ensure lessons learnt from other disasters could be adapted to the specific contextual specifics.

**EO2 f) Was the Government of the Philippines adequately supported and empowered by DFID and partner actions or were there specific actions which worked to undermine local structures – and what impact did this have on sustainability?**

The relationship between the GoP and the Humanitarian System – particularly under the TA protocols – was the subject of significant analysis throughout the literature reviewed. The general consensus was that there were many issues caused by the TA protocols which led to the ‘side-lining’ of the GoP. It was noted that the “L3 architecture was heavy and worked to a ‘one size fits all’ approach” (DFID MTR), which perhaps also caused the challenges given that the GoP was not necessarily recognised as a strong democratic MIC with significant disaster response expertise and, while requesting the assistance of the humanitarian community, should have been respected more as the primary responders.

There was some criticism of RAY, in terms of it being “ambiguous, long on analysis but short on practical suggestions or new thinking” (Actionaid RTE). Interestingly, this was similar to the criticism levelled at the SRP. Further criticism (directed towards the humanitarian community) was that the SRP was not aligned with RAY and in fact went as far as to undermine RAY, being as it was released before RAY.

Some reports remark that the government provided an “enabling environment” (OPR) for the humanitarian community and that due to pre-existing structures (in light of the Bohol Earthquake and Typhoon Pablo and the humanitarian architecture remaining from those responses) the relationships between international actors and national entities were “unprecedentedly good”. However, the general sense from the documentation was of a national government overwhelmed by a massive (“excessive” – ICAI Report) humanitarian response.

In terms of the SRP, there is a clear lack of consistency across clusters in terms of following the lead of the government. The SRP introduction states that its purpose is to support RAY following GoP identified priorities and that clusters should plan responses that fill in the gaps and complement national response plans. However, this translates in different ways in cluster specific plans: the education cluster’s SRP was based on the fact that “DepEd has a four-phase plan which provides the framework for the education cluster”, and protection was stated to be “under the direct leadership of DSWD”. However, for other clusters the linkages were more that plans would be “aligned to” or “in support of” the relevant line ministries while others still make no mention of national counterparts.

Two issues that arose specifically in terms of vulnerability: the vulnerability criteria adopted by the protection cluster and disseminated as the criteria for the system-wide response to work to was the criteria as defined by the GoP. This was seen to be a positive step in relation to support of, and leadership by, the GoP. However, in some cases it was found that this was taken a step further and cash transfer beneficiaries were targeted using the GoP 4P social protection scheme data, even though in terms of the needs post-typhoon the 4P-eligible households were not necessarily the most vulnerable after the typhoon (having had access to social protection pre-typhoon).

An interesting observation was made by the MoD review –

“the significant capabilities of the Philippine civilian and military agencies, although swamped by the scale of the disaster, presented an intriguing coordination challenge for international humanitarian relief efforts...Effect Philippine structures, such as the NDRRMC, were not initially recognised by some international agencies”.

### Evaluation Objective Three

**To what extent did DFID and partners demonstrate effective accountability to beneficiaries/end users?  
How can DFID and partners improve performance and share and strengthen best practice?**

Only two out of 24 documents reviewed failed to reference AAP, which in itself is a remarkable and startlingly positive indication of the focus given to AAP (and CwC) within this response compared to previous responses. However, while it is clear from the literature reviewed that there was a high-level focus on accountability and a greater “collective attention placed on AAP and CwC” [29] than we have ever seen before, it was less clear how this translated into practical action on the ground. The general consensus appears to be that there was a missed opportunity whereby the high-level commitments did not translate into practical action and in fact AAP work on the ground only occurred in a “patchy, inconsistent manner” (27).

While much of the literature referenced the notion that gender, SADD and accountability did not work as well as envisioned within the TA or as well as it should have done, translating to real benefit to affected populations, none of the documentation offered concrete evidence for why this was so.

### Comments with regard to AAP

“The Haiyan AAP Framework needs to be more operationally relevant” – the OPR

The AAP Framework is “yet to be transformed into practice on the ground by all cluster members” – UNICEF RTE

“..unfortunately the general picture is that AAP remained well-developed at a conceptual level, without filtering down to the field activity level – and therefore did not achieve the expected impact” – DFID MTR

### Gender, Inclusion and SADD

Throughout the reviews, evaluations, and assessments there was a high level of reference to gender and SADD. While this relates somewhat to protection and VAWG issues (an EO2 sub-question) it is felt that this fits better as an extra section to accountability as SADD goes beyond gender and incorporates age, and these two universal determinants link to broader issues of inclusion (disability etc.) which are a fundamental aspect of AAP.

Overall the literature review suggests that SADD was not collected in a consistent or useful manner and this represented a quite significant and disappointing missed opportunity. Accountability is a key pillar of the TA and ensuring the often disparate needs of men, women, boys and girls are addressed is only possible when needs assessments utilise SADD. This was highlighted in a 2011 OCHA report “Sex and Age Matter” and there was a general sense throughout the literature that the humanitarian system could have and should have done better. The MIRA report revealed inconsistencies with regard to the collection of SADD while the SRP acknowledged that “due to limited gender and social data in initial assessment...partners have insufficient gender and social data to inform projects”. The UNICEF RTE, the Actionaid RTE and the OPR all referenced the lack of SADD and the detrimental effect this had on the overall response. RAY recognised the differential “recovery starting points” of women, men, boys and girls and committed to ensuring gender and other inclusion issues were mainstreamed throughout the response and recovery but failed to demonstrate exactly how this would be done. This seems to reflect similar issues within the international response in terms of the fact that there were high-level documented commitments to SADD and gender but this was not translated into practical action.



**EO3 a) Were all agencies funded by DFID sufficiently accountable to the diverse interests (women, poor, disabled etc.) within communities?**

The DEC report stated that all DEC members prioritised the most vulnerable, without clear evidence to back up this claim. It was not possible to truly understand if all agencies funded by DFID were sufficiently accountable to the diverse interest groups and this is an area to be followed up more intensely within the primary data collection.

**EO3 b) What factors or inputs (if any) made certain partners more accountable to their end users than others?**

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) within communities found that many had found the way agencies targeted beneficiaries was unfair. Communities said that there needed to be more transparency around the assessment processes and more communication about how particular households were being targeted for aid (DEC Review). It was unclear from the literature review what factors or inputs made certain partners more accountable to their end users than others and this is an area to be analysed more carefully during the field work stage of this evaluation.

**EO3 c) Were certain partner groups more effective than others in building accountability mechanisms and using findings from this dialogue to improve performance?**

As above, it was not possible to answer this question through the literature review and this will be considered in much more detail during primary data collection.

**EO3 d) How could DFID have better promoted accountability outcomes?**

As stated above, only two of 24 documents reviewed did not mention AAP. Therefore at least at a conceptual level accountability outcomes were more highly promoted than in any previous disaster. However, the question that arises throughout the literature review is how – or if – this translated into practical action on the ground; and how DFID might be placed to better promote translation of accountability promises into practical impact for communities. The HCT acknowledged that they did not fully utilise the Haiyan AAP Framework as best they could have done (OPR), and this is perhaps an area where DFID's leadership within the donor community could promote better translation of words to action in the next L3 response.

Radio Backdow (DFID-funded) and other humanitarian radio stations were highly praised by NGO staff and communities alike, and this type of funding should continue in future. Furthermore, it was noted in the DFID MTR that while AAP and CwC are still considered separate functions (both of which functions have been funded by DFID) this is for “historical reasons that no longer make sense” and actually silos interventions having a very negative effect on impact. There should be a movement to clarify and align accountability work.

**EO3 e) How can accountability practice be better mainstreamed within DFID response structures?**

There was nothing within the literature review of particular relevance to this question and the primary data collection will seek to extract evidence against this question.

**EO3 f) Was corruption considered an issue and if so how was this issue tackled by partners?**

According to Actionaid “accountability and corruption is a major concern for all humanitarian actors and donors” but without further evidence to back this up further investigation will be necessary.

## Appendix A: List of documents gathered and reviewed

No	Document Title	Author / Agency	Date	Review Y/N
01	DFID Lessons Review	DFID	Mar-14	Y
02	DEC Response Review	DEC	Apr-14	Y
03	WV CFS Evaluation Report	World Vision	Mar-14	N
04	IASC Centrality of Protection Statement	IASC	Dec-13	Y
05	RAY	GoP	Dec-13	Y
06	AA RTE	Actionaid	Mar-14	Y
07	MIRA	OCHA	Nov-13	Y
08	UNICEF RTE	UNICEF	Jul-14	Y
09	OCHA Periodic Monitoring Report	OCHA	Apr-14	Y
10	ICAI Inception report	ICAI	Mar-14	Y
11	ICAI Review	ICAI	Mar-14	Y
12	ACF RTE	ACF	Dec-13	N
13	Final Puzzle piece Commitments (VAWG Call to Action Summit)	Various	Nov-13	Y
14	OPR Summary	OCHA	Jan-14	Y
15	BRC Review	British Red Cross	Oct-14	N
16	Vulnerable Person and Inclusion Messaging	Handicap Intl	Nov-13	Y
17	Vulnerability Criteria	Protection Cluster	Mar-14	Y
18	Save the Children Review	Save the Children	Feb-14	Y
19	SRP	OCHA / HCT	Dec-13	Y
20	Rapid info, comms and accountability assessment	CwC WG	Jan-14	Y
21	Multi-cluster needs assessment	OCHA	Dec-13	N
22	Affected communities consultations	OCHA	Nov-14	Y
23	Quality and accountability in Yolanda	LWR / CWS-A/P	Feb-14	Y
24	EDGs AAP Plan of Action	HCT		Y
25	New Approach to Emergency Response fails women and girls	Refugees Int	Jun-14	Y
26	MoD Review	MoD		Y
27	DFID MTR	DFID		Y
28	IAHE	IASC		N
29	OPR Full Report	Various		Y
30	UKMed Report			N



The DRRM system in the Philippines is defined by a 2009 law<sup>61</sup> which sets out a framework and plan covering national and local levels. Its key element is the NDRRMC. This is headed by the Secretary of National Defence as Chairperson, with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Preparedness, the Secretary of the DSWD as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Response, the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, and the Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery. Members include most government department heads including the Administrator of the Office of Civil Defence (OCD), and representatives from the Red Cross, community organisations and the private sector. The OCD is tasked with providing leadership and the continuous development of strategic and systematic approaches to disaster risk management; the OCD Administrator is the Executive Director of the NDRRMC.

The 2009 law and its institutions reflect the decentralised nature of the Philippines administrative system<sup>62</sup>. Thus, sub-national DRRM Councils in provinces and municipalities are critical for success. Under the law, Local DRRM Councils/Offices (LDRRMC/Os) are charged with preparing Local DRRM Management Plans (LDRRMPs) that take into account local development and land use plans. Regional DRRM Councils (RDRRMCs) oversee the activities of the LDRRMCs. Barangay Development Councils (BDCs) serve as the LDRRMCs in every barangay. The Philippines has 81 provinces, 144 chartered cities, 1490 municipalities and 42,028 barangays<sup>63</sup>; the tiered structure of the DRRM system, reflecting the LGU structure, is designed to facilitate coordination and assistance when a disaster occurs, with clear lines of responsibility set out in the laws; however coordination remains a challenge.

The GoP, with the assistance of the UN, NGOs and other in-country humanitarian actors, has responded to a number of significant disasters in recent years. In 2013, relief web reported eight significant disasters, including an earthquake in Bohol affecting over 1.2 million people<sup>64</sup>. An additional three typhoons and one event causing floods and landslides affected a combined total of over a million people<sup>65</sup>. Adding stress to the system, resources were also focused on people displaced by a long-running conflict in the southern island of Mindanao.

### ***Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) and its aftermath***

Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda), struck central Philippines on 8 November 2013, inflicted severe damage on the social and economic fabric of the Visayas and northern Palawan. More than 16 million people were affected and over 4 million were displaced, with over half a million houses destroyed<sup>66</sup>.

According to a 2014 World Bank report, the loss of capital and assets, and disruption in electricity and irrigation services, have led to the collapse of local economies in the severely affected areas. The long-term risks include an increase in unemployment and underemployment, a rise in poverty levels, and deterioration in human capital indicators. The scale of potential job losses is significant: around six million workers were affected by the typhoon, of which around 2.6 million are vulnerable workers. Eastern Visayas, where the entire population was reported to have been affected by the typhoon, has one of the highest poverty incidences in the country, at around 45 percent<sup>67</sup>. An ADB poverty impact assessment estimates that an additional 1.5 million persons may fall into poverty in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon. This represents a 24% increase in the number of impoverished persons in Visayas and a 7.1 % increase in the

<sup>61</sup> Republic Act 101211, 27 July 2009

<sup>62</sup> Local Government Code of the Philippines, 1991

<sup>63</sup> DILG July 2014

<sup>64</sup> <http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/bohol-philippines-earthquake-2013>

<sup>65</sup> <http://reliefweb.int/disasters?country=188&date=20130101-20140101#content>

<sup>66</sup> World Bank Report No. 83315, Philippine economic update - pursuing inclusive growth through sustainable reconstruction and job creation, March 2014

<sup>67</sup> World Bank Report No. 83315, Philippine economic update - pursuing inclusive growth through sustainable reconstruction and job creation, March 2014

total number of poor persons in the Philippines, threatening to cancel out the country's gains in poverty reduction in the last four years.<sup>68</sup>

On 13 November, the UN activated a TA Level 3 emergency response based on assessment of the scale, urgency, complexity, capacity and reputational risk of the crisis. On 15 November, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator stated that a disaster of this magnitude called for a massive response and that “the humanitarian situation in the areas devastated by Typhoon Haiyan is catastrophic”. This was the first L3 response to a natural disaster in a MIC. Encouraged in part by the TA protocols, the international humanitarian system deployed significant financial, human and other resources. Resources were deployed from ongoing emergencies in the Philippines as well as internationally.

### Challenges of coordination

Following the protocols set out in the NDRRM Plan, the national and local governments, activated its eight response clusters<sup>69</sup>, and incident command systems, mostly before Yolanda made landfall. The international community, through the HCT also formed its clusters (which do not dovetail completely)<sup>70</sup>, and invested heavily in importing coordination resources.

The task of coordination was formidable. By 28 December 2013, the OCD<sup>71</sup> recorded contributions from 191 countries, UN organisations and INGOs. On its own, foreign military contributions came from 57 different countries with 29 military contingents and 15,400 multinational military personnel.

### Size of response and role of actors and DFID

On 12 November the UN released a HAP requesting \$301 million (£184 million), as did the International Federation of Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross requesting CHF 72 million (£48 million) and CHF 15 million (£10 million) respectively. On 16 December the UN appeal was superseded by the SRP for \$788 million (£483 million) reflecting an updated assessment of relief and early recovery requirements. The total value of appeals for humanitarian response and early recovery totals £541 million (15 January).

The government responded to the typhoon with humanitarian aid and preparing the RAY, a strategic plan to guide recovery and reconstruction in the affected areas. All stakeholders and reports noted that the three phase implementation of the plan was slow. The plan estimates the value of damaged physical assets, both public and private, at PHP 424 billion (3.7 percent of GDP) and recovery and reconstruction costs at PHP 361 billion (3.1 percent of GDP), of which around PHP 125 billion (1.1 percent of GDP) would be borne by the government in 2013 and 2014. This initial estimate of recovery and reconstruction costs is likely to increase, as it covers only 85 percent of the estimated damage, whereas a “build back better” strategy suggests that recovery costs could be 30 percent higher than the estimated total damage<sup>72</sup>. The government's Yolanda recovery and rehabilitation plan (YRRP) has identified appropriate actions needed to restore livelihoods and lift most of the 1.5 million new poor out of poverty. The YRRP covers the following five priority areas with specified broad interventions and designated agency responsibilities: (i) shelter and reconstruction of houses; (ii) power restoration; (iii) livelihood and employment; (iv) resettlement and psycho-social care; and (v) environmental protection. The YRRP will be implemented in three sequential phases from December 2013 to December 2017. The first phase from December 2013 to March 2014 will provide immediate humanitarian needs to victims. The second phase, from December 2013 to December 2014, will focus on

<sup>68</sup> ADB, 2014 - poverty impact assessment post Yolanda - Emergency Assistance for Relief and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda (RRP PHI 47337)

<sup>69</sup> FNI (food and non-food), Health (WASH, nutrition, Psychological Services), PCCM (protection, camp coordination and management), logistics, emergency telecommunications, education, SRR (search, rescue, retrieval), and MDM (management of the dead and missing).

<sup>70</sup> WASH, Protection, Nutrition, Education, Early Recovery, Emergency Shelter, Camp Management, Health, Emergency Telecommunications and Logistics.

<sup>71</sup> the executive arm of the national disaster risk reduction and management council,

<sup>72</sup> World Bank Report No. 83315, Philippine economic update - pursuing inclusive growth through sustainable reconstruction and job creation, March 2014

short-term recovery and rehabilitation of affected areas, housing and livelihoods, and providing social assistance and care. The third phase, from January 2015 to December 2017, will focus on larger and more complex reconstruction investments<sup>73</sup>.

Although not fully quantified, non-tradition DRM actors also played a significant role, similar to other emergencies in the Philippines. Communities stress the importance of remittances from OFWs in helping families and communities recover. Remittances can come from both wealthy professional level workers as well as most modest overseas workers in unskilled low paid work. The World Bank estimates that personal remittances in the Philippines account for 9.8% of GDP. The private sector and churches provided substantial responses to the typhoon impact and recovery.

The Secretary of State approved DFID Business Case for £77 million humanitarian and early recovery support. The Business Case highlighted three output areas (life-saving assistance; improved protection to affected persons, including VAWG; improved effectiveness of the humanitarian response) with an estimated 3,000,000 interventions. Activities included shelter, WASH, food, health, nutrition, education, livelihoods and protection. DFID supported a range of actors within the RRF, Red Cross, DEC, UK medical teams, provided the use of UK military assets as well as technical support to the UN.

**Table 1: Summary of DFID grants made under the response**

Agency	Total
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	£5,900,000
International Committee of the Red Cross	£1,200,000
Christian Aid consortium with World Vision, Habitat for Humanity and MapAction	£1,698,594
Handicap International	£324,215
Plan consortium with Oxfam and CAFOD	£2,000,000
Care consortium with Action Against Hunger, Merlin and Save the Children	£1,971,244
Save the Children	£1,225,943
Save the Children	£500,000
Save the Children	£1,000,000
HelpAge	£480,000
International Health Partnership	£300,000
Disasters Emergency Committee	£5,000,000
International Organisation for Migration	£1,560,000
International Organisation for Migration	£400,000
ACTED	£40,000

<sup>73</sup> ADB, 2014 - poverty impact assessment post Yolanda - Emergency Assistance for Relief and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda (RRP PHI 47337)

United Nation Children's Fund	£2,000,000
United Nation Children's Fund	£2,500,000
United Nation Children's Fund	£1,200,000
United Nation Children's Fund	£400,000
World Health Organisation	£2,000,000
World Food Programme	£2,500,000
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations	£2,000,000
International Labour Organisation	£1,000,000
Internews	£175,000
UN High Commission for Refugees	£1,000,000
UN Population Fund	£617,000
UN Population Fund	£183,000
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	£1,000,000
UN Humanitarian Air Service	£1,000,000
Secondment of 15 technical experts to the UN	£1,000,000
Direct provision of relief goods and supplies	£6,200,000
Utilisation of military assets	£10,000,000
Secondment of UK medical teams	£300,000
Strategic Response Plan funding prioritization	£1,525,000
Strategic Response Plan allocations for early recovery phase	£15,000,000

### Long-term recovery Business Case

Additionally, the UK approved £8,820,000 to help support recovery and reconstruction. The UK contribution will fund technical expertise to mainstream disaster resilience into the design and implementation of the GoP reconstruction plans. The package includes:

- a) A £5m contribution to an MDTF to provide technical assistance to GoP;
- b) £820,000 to support an enhanced partnership between the UK Met office and the PAGASA to improve the early warning of extreme weather events;
- c) A £3m contribution for promoting catastrophe insurance market development in the Philippines.

The Secretary of State approved the Strategic Case for this support on 14 April 2014, complementing the £77m humanitarian and early recovery support covered by Business Case 4359351.

## Annex 5: Partnership Assessment

The following annex presents the findings of the team's partnership assessment case studies which focused on DFID's relationships with two partners: UNFPA and Plan International. These partners were selected because each was working on a specific and critical partnership issue for future L3 emergencies: VAWG in the case of UNFPA; and AAP in the case of Plan. Additionally both partners had long-term funding relationships with DFID as well as specific support during the Haiyan response, had significant staff and organisational commitments and investments in the selected focus issues, and were willing and committed to the extra layer of involvement in the evaluation that the assessment required.

The aim of the partnership assessment was to assess in-depth formal and informal relationships and influences on these two key DFID priority issues by highlighting strengths, challenges and opportunities on specific critical areas of key partnerships. The following framework of analysis, comprising four inter-related components, was used to guide the assessment for both partners. This was done in order to ensure that a comparative analysis could be undertaken and integrated into the main evaluation.

- Policies, systems and structures – investigating actual organisation commitment and investment on the priority partnership issue;
- Mechanisms and event/field levels – investigating how these partnership issues were prioritised in response to typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan;
- Processes and engagement – investigating direct, indirect formal and informal processes of sharing in the partnership;
- Perceptions within the partnership – investigating differences in understanding and perceptions within the partnership in relation to the priority issue at the different levels of partnership engagement.

The Itad inception report proposed to produce three case studies for the evaluation. However, it was only possible to produce two for the following reasons, which were found by the evaluation team during the field phase:

- i. Partnership with DFID was not a strong feature of individual partner responses to Typhoon Haiyan resulting in a deficit of data to effectively assess the partnership. This issue is addressed fully in the main report; and
- ii. As a consequence, few partners were willing to commit the time and resources to undertake a partnership assessment. Both UN and RRF partners, including consortium members, were approached at a number of levels.

### Case Study 1: UNFPA and VAWG

#### MAIN MESSAGE

*In Haiyan there was a disconnect observed between the high-profile global London Call to Action Summit and how this translated into specific funding and programmatic response in the field resulting in a missed opportunity to use the momentum of the Summit to full effect. This is a reflection of the overall response, while also being particularly relevant to DFID as the lead convenor of the Summit.*

#### ***Policies, systems and structures***

Respondents both within and outside of UNFPA noted a tension between the coordination and implementation roles of UNFPA. This tension played out in various ways. Firstly, the coordination and implementation roles within UNFPA should be single-hatted and this is stated in new minimum standards being developed within UNFPA even if it is not currently the norm. Within this tension there is also a question of UNFPA credibility when they are the coordinating body but have not received as much funding as other partners for implementing activities, not to mention the potential conflict of interest of the two roles where limited funding is available. It was noted by some within UNFPA that donors, including DFID,



should make it a requirement of funding to attend GBV cluster meetings and ensure information about activities is shared.

Secondly, there was a question in the Philippines as to how strong coordination should be pushed via UNFPA in respect to the lead that DSWD took in this area. The GBV sub-cluster probably worked with government better than many of the other clusters but there were still some tensions as to how strongly UNFPA should coordinate at the different levels of national and local and calibrate this coordination role to the strengths and capacities of DSWD at those different levels.

Thirdly, there was an issue of inter-coordination in addition to intra-coordination - i.e. coordination of mainstreaming protection into other sectors beyond coordination of protection actors themselves. While there was some concern within UNFPA that this requires just as much resourcing as the vertical stand-alone programmes, and the coordination of such, there is also a sense that within the first phase of an emergency protection mainstreaming tends to fare better, faster, than vertical programmes and so a push towards coordination of this mainstreaming would be welcome and useful.

### ***Mechanisms and events / field levels***

There is significant information about the field-level programming of GBV activities and mainstreaming in the Haiyan response – too much to delve into within this partnership assessment. One issue that did come up and which aligns with the above issue of coordination is that of alignment of GBV activities with other activities. Specifically, an issue came up with respect to the integration of GBV and SRH (sexual and reproductive health). One respondent felt that there was a missed opportunity for GBV and SRH integration which would have constituted good VfM and cost-effectiveness and been beneficial for both sectoral areas and women alike. This reflected the issue raised more broadly on inter-coordination and the value of coordinated and integrated programming.

There was evidence from UNFPA that the initial planning had included integration around the specific medical intersection of GBV and SRH (provision of care for survivors of sexual violence) although due to various issues this may not have rolled out in the field exactly as the original design envisaged. However, it is also clear that this integration – while valuable – reaches limited population segments and addresses limited areas of GBV. In effect, the GBV-RH intersection reaches Women of Reproductive Age (generally defined as girls and women 15-49) and provides medical assistance and response to survivors. It does not reach further populations (men and boys, the elderly, LGBT communities) and does not speak to broader prevention activities.

This also opened up an issue with regard to terminology and VAWG rather than GBV. There was some sense from within UNFPA with regard to uncertainty as to which other populations should be reached and how much emphasis should be put on reaching other vulnerable populations (outside of the women and girls mandate of UNFPA). This seemed to be an issue to be clarified both between UNFPA and DFID, and made clearer in partnership agreements, and within UNFPA itself.

However, the terminology is not the most critical or pressing issue, and certainly not as much as how implementation strategies affect *'what it looks like'* on the ground. For example, when programming for prevention and response activities and doing so through mechanisms such as Women Friendly Spaces (WFSs) – which were used extensively in the Haiyan response in the Philippines – men and boys are quite clearly excluded. However, the WFSs must provide a space for potential survivors away from their potential perpetrators in order to be effective. UNFPA were also clear that the most critical challenge that comes from front-line staff in all disasters – including Haiyan – is the lack of services for women and girls and therefore UNFPA strategy is designed around the challenge as stated by front-line staff. Interestingly this could raise further issues of reporting rates between different sexes with regard to GBV and protection issues but ultimately it also demonstrates that the issue is not terminology but programming choices.

### ***Processes and engagement***

There was a big disconnect seen by all between the 'big expensive London Summit' and the lack of immediate funding for GBV field-level activities on the ground in the Philippines<sup>74</sup>. Different perspectives have been offered as to why this was the case, with the general sense being that it did not reflect a lack of commitment to VAWG / GBV on the part of DFID, but rather reflected either an inability to see what were considered to be 'good' proposals to fund, or a lack of trust in the capacity of UNFPA or other partners to respond effectively. It is possible these two issues are connected: GBV needs assessments and programme design and development necessarily make assumptions about GBV trends and require funding to commence activities before any 'evidence' of GBV can be ascertained. It is not ethically or morally acceptable to gather information about GBV trends before services are available through which to refer survivors of sexual violence and abuse. As services are available and become more trusted, reporting of GBV will increase but the funding must come first. It is possible that donors – not only DFID, but including DFID – struggled to reconcile proposals with limited verified information evidencing why this is a life-saving intervention with the requirement to fund GBV emanating from the very public commitments made by numerous donor Governments at the Call to Action Summit. This perhaps also reflects a disconnect between policy on stated commitments to VAWG programming and strategic delivery guidance on how to implement VAWG programming.

The Summit was used by UNFPA in the Philippines to pressurise all donors (not just DFID) to live up to the commitments made at the Summit and in this way was considered to be a useful advocacy and accountability tool – resulting in more funding than would be usual for GBV activities, but less than what was hoped for. However, the Summit was seemingly not used by DFID and other donors in the same manner – for example, it has been questioned why DFID did not push for more protection and GBV reference within the MIRA, under the auspices of the commitments made in London.

There was general consensus that the momentum gained by the Call to Action Summit did not translate into commensurate increased or improved activity at the field level. However, this was well-recognised and in fact led to further discussion and the positive consequence of integrating new GBV indicators into the HPC (Humanitarian Programme Cycle) tools, strengthening *systems* and ensuring that in future form and function align with advocacy.

### ***Perceptions within partnerships***

There is a perception within UNFPA that – as stated above – hesitation on funding GBV activities in Haiyan had less to do with any lack of commitment to VAWG / GBV on behalf of DFID and more to do with a lack of trust in the capacity of UNFPA to deliver. It is felt – on both sides of the partnership – that DFID's perception of UNFPA's humanitarian response capability is less positive than it is with many other partners. It is possible that this perception is one that is lagging behind the evolution that has occurred within UNFPA over the last decade, but it is also clear and well-noted by UNFPA that they have not necessarily been able to communicate that evolution effectively externally. So a number of internal changes – a doubling of the internal emergency fund, changes made for fast-tracking processes and procedures, and emerging internal UNFPA minimum standards for GBV in emergencies – have not necessarily been observed by the wider outside world. Additionally, as UNFPA has been evolving and increasing its capacity to respond to humanitarian disasters, humanitarian disasters themselves have become bigger, more frequent and more complex – thus leading to a game of continuous catching up.

This perception differential is perhaps reinforced because DFID does not appear to UNFPA as a donor who engages in their humanitarian efforts more than the provision of funding and perhaps until UNFPA reach a critical mass of credibility this may remain the case.

However, there are examples – within Haiyan and from elsewhere – as to where UNFPA and GBV programming speaks both to the VAWG aspect of a DFID focus but also to a VfM aspect of a DFID focus. It is

<sup>74</sup> UNFPA GBV funding from DFID was verbally committed in November but only signed in February – this was the same for UNICEF Child Protection funding, meaning the two sectors that most align with the VAWG call were the two sectors for which DFID signed agreements last.

perceived that small amounts of funding for GBV programming can raise the visibility and leverage further funding and therefore constitute a cost-effectiveness that does not work so well in other sectors. DFID were felt to be quite catalytic in this respect in Haiyan given the funding they did commit for GBV activities.

There are also some longer-term benefits of GBV interventions that UNFPA can observe as VfM and linking humanitarian, development and building resilience. Colombia and Nepal both use GBV IMS (information management systems) established by the GBV sub-cluster during humanitarian response work as their national mechanism for collecting GBV data and statistics. In Haiyan the referral mechanisms which were functionalised by the GBV sub-cluster are still in place and functional in January 2015 long after the DFID presence disappeared [PNP interview, Tacloban, January 2015]. This is an area that DFID and UNFPA could move forward with together in relation to the sustainability of mechanisms supported by DFID via UNFPA and the GBV sub-cluster.

## Case Study 2: Plan International and accountability to affected populations

### Main message

Although both DFID and Plan International have stated commitments to AAP, their engagement around AAP at policy level and on the ground is largely ad hoc and informal. Plan International is more influenced by INGO alliances and fragmented guidance through HAP, SPHERE and People in Aid, as well as the emerging core humanitarian standards, than by DFID. The jointly developed, common services project (*Pamati Kita*) initiated during the Haiyan response was opportunistic rather than strategic. However, the learning component of the project is potentially an enabler for more strategic engagement at policy level and in future L3 emergencies. As explored in the recommendations, DFID could be more engaged and supportive of partners to incorporate accountability into their programme design, implementation and learning.

### The AAP Global Context

Accountability has emerged as an important part of the international humanitarian agenda.<sup>75</sup> The IASC lists AAP, including PSEA as one of its five priorities for 2014-2015.<sup>76</sup> The IASC Task Force on AAP was created by the IASC in July 2012. It is chaired by WFP and World Vision International (WVI), with steering group members comprising ALNAP, FAO, Ground Truth, HAP, ICVA, IOM, OCHA, OXFAM, Sphere, UNICEF, WFP and WVI. During the initial stages of the emergency, WFP seconded an AAP coordinator to OCHA. This was a key position, in part driven by the Transformative Agenda, which facilitated having accountability as a humanitarian priority. DFID later funded the OCHA Inter-Agency AAP coordinator. A number of RRF organisations invest in accountability in humanitarian situations, including Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children and WVI IOM and Plan. WVI and Save the Children are particularly strong, having institutionalised systems and mechanisms for AAP. WVI, for example, have consistently invested in AAP since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

### Policies, systems and structures

Plan International, one of the world's largest NGOs with 51 country offices and 20 members, is a relatively new actor for humanitarian accountability although is globally recognised for the strength of its accountability programming in development.<sup>77</sup> It is actively engaged in reform of the core humanitarian standards through the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR).<sup>78</sup>

Plan has committed leadership for accountability, through its Program Quality Team, and has policies for accountability for its development work, but currently has no specific policies or strategies for AAP during humanitarian responses. However, it is currently reviewing its approach and framework for accountability in

<sup>75</sup> A number of other entities influence humanitarian accountability including, among others, HAP, People in Aid and Sphere.

<sup>76</sup> <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pagelader.aspx?page=about-default>

<sup>77</sup> <http://plan-international.org/about-plan/how-we-work/accountability-1/accountability/?searchterm=Accountability>

<sup>78</sup> The SCHR actively engaged in the 2005 UN-initiated Humanitarian Reform as a standing invitee at the Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC). More recently, SCHR has been supporting the IASC's Transformative Agenda's expected outcomes. In 2008-2010 the SCHR reviewed how SCHR members dealt with the issue of accountability to affected populations

all its programmes including humanitarian programmes, with the intention of establishing an overarching framework for all its work where accountability will be integrated into M&E and learning systems.

DFID has high-level commitments to accountability including AAP. However, while DFID does employ the Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness framework<sup>79</sup> in CHASE, but does not have a specific humanitarian accountability strategy. It does have four point guidance on AAP in the early stages of humanitarian response<sup>80</sup> based on the HAP standards which is provided to partners, and screening on partners' accountability mechanisms is part of the RRF pre-qualification. Throughout the Haiyan response DFID monitored partners for compliance to the guidelines.

### **Mechanisms/Events**

Plan started focusing on AAP at a high level early on in the response. At both headquarters and country level, the Haiyan response was seen as an opportunity to a) strengthen its approach and systems for AAP on the ground; and b) its strategic engagement with global efforts to enhance AAP in emergency responses. From late November onwards the country response team proactively connected with the OCHA AAP team and through its Director of Programme Quality, in January 2014, submitted an accountability project proposal to the UN CAP Appeal. IOM had submitted a similar one at the same time. These project proposals were the embryo of the later DFID-funded *Pamati Kita* project. These innovative proposals, although initially championed, were not funded and thus delayed. Those interviewed were not certain of reasons why the proposals were not funded but indicated that this was due to key staff turnover.

Subsequently, in late March, Plan informally approached DFID for funding for their accountability project, which had the aim of supporting local and international NGOs to develop capacities in implementing AAP. Perceptions differ on whether DFID facilitated the merging of a partnership between Plan, IOM and later WV or if the partners came to DFID with a predefined consortium. The project was an initial four-way collaboration on accountability between DFID and the three partners. The final proposal, *Pamati Kita* (Let's Listen Together) Project: An Accountability to Affected Populations and Communicating with Communities Common Services Project, was agreed in July 2014. It aimed to increase:

- Coordination of humanitarian agencies' community feedback mechanisms and responsiveness through capacity building of NGOs and the development of a common basket of best practice tools and processes for engaging with affected communities implemented; and
- Access by affected communities to information on the typhoon response by closing the feedback loop for recording, collating, consolidating, categorising, analysing and tracking feedback and referral for action.

Given the challenges in forging the consortium and recruitment of project staff, *Pamati Kita* only began implementation in September 2014, some ten months after the typhoon hit, and in a greatly changed context. No attempt was made to redesign the project in the light of the changed context and a considerably reduced implementation timeframe from one year to six months.

### **Processes and engagement**

Plan International was not the strongest agency with regard to AAP practices during the Haiyan response. Key Informants acknowledged that the use of AAP mechanisms and tools was not consistent. An internal audit conducted seven months after the typhoon hit indicated that: helpdesks were not always in place during distributions, suggestion boxes were not always placed in communities or regularly emptied, and there was no consistency in categorising complaints received or responding to feedback. It did not have a separate hotline as by the time it was ready to do so Plan was already working on *Pamati Kita* and working towards installing a common hotline with partners. Nevertheless, its institutional commitment to

<sup>79</sup> DFID, 2006 White Paper – Making Governance work for the Poor

<sup>80</sup> DFID (n.d.) RRF prequal accountability guidance “Accountability to Affected Populations: Early stages of an humanitarian response”

accountability meant that its approaches evolved and strengthened as it monitored and applied lessons learnt continuously over the lifetime of the response.

During the Haiyan response, DFID and Plan partnership engagements in relation to accountability focused entirely on the *Pamati Kita* project which was only a small part of its in-county AAP activities and was seen as more strategically important to its HQ than its country team. Moreover, since neither Plan nor DFID had an AAP strategy guiding their practice, the level of engagement was intermittent and pragmatic. Moreover, *Pamati Kita* was a very small part of Plan's overall response funding. It represents less than one-third of one percent of Plan's Haiyan budget of \$50million (taking into account the three-way split with IOM and WVI), with significant management transaction costs associated with a consortium. Additionally, the time burden placed on the project manager and the whole of the response management team limited the level of engagement that it could give to furthering any strategic aims of *Pamati Kita*. An international consortium leader with AAP technical expertise proposed in the original proposal was not in the event hired. The project is managed, along with larger projects, by a highly experienced Plan staff member with extensive M&E experience but limited AAP expertise. The innovative programme was designed to improve performance across the board but Plan management used it internally to improve some input rather than informing strategic programmes.

### ***Perceptions within the Partnership***

Plan International was not the most strategic choice as consortium leader. WVI, for example, had a longer track record in implementing AAP in L3 emergencies and already had robust systems, mechanisms and processes in place, including a dedicated AAP team deployed from the start of the emergency. In hindsight, it was the proactive willingness of Plan to seek out funds and push the AAP agenda that made it a pragmatic choice as consortium leader for *Pamati Kita*. From Plan's perspective, DFID is seen as a key donor with the potential to drive substantive reform with the Humanitarian sector. Partnership, of any kind, has in this context strategic currency, since both Plan International and DFID at a global level have shared interests in promoting AAP reforms within humanitarian aid.

However, in the context of the Haiyan response, DFID funding of *Pamati Kita* was perceived, by government and other key stakeholders during the response, as seizing a valuable opportunity to support an existing initiative rather than proactively scoping and identifying strategic entry points for influencing the wider national and global AAP agenda. There was also limited evidence of DFID engaging systematically in dialogue with Plan at country level, or globally, for wider strategic changes either to influence each other's policies or emerging policies on AAP. The engagement, as acknowledged by a DFID key informant, was around *Pamati Kita* as a project and project management rather than a wider AAP agenda. As this evaluation ended its field phase and the research element of *Pamati Kita* was starting, it was designed to influence wider global issues in accountability. Where dialogue occurred, key informants recognised that joint dialogue and engagement was ad hoc and informal based around opportunistic meetings at events rather than scheduled and ongoing. At the country level, there was acknowledged to be very little engagement or dialogue around strategic issues. The focus was on project implementation and meeting outputs.

Nevertheless, an innovative and distinctive aspect of *Pamati Kita* is the learning and research component, involving an external research team. This aims to identify lessons learnt within the project and the wider Haiyan response with regard to AAP and share these lessons with the global humanitarian community. The inclusion of this component within the project indicates a shared ambition of all the partners, including DFID and Plan International, to influence implementation practices for AAP across a broad range of stakeholders including governments, the UN and NGOs internationally.

## Annex 6: VfM assessment

### Introduction

DFID assesses VfM using the 3Es – economy, efficiency and effectiveness. However, in rapid response settings, a focus on cost, speed and quality of response is used by CHASE as it is considered more appropriate and feasible.

The evaluation looked at two key aspects of VfM:

- How did DFID and partners take into account VfM in their decision making process?
- What is the evidence on VfM of specific partners/interventions (with a focus on case study examples)?

A good deal of qualitative information around consideration of speed, quality and cost was available and is summarised below. However, an initial review of the evidence, in particular the DFID MTR as well as the DFID upcoming paper comparing VfM of humanitarian transfers in Philippines, demonstrated that very little quantitative data is available on VfM. This is true for a variety of reasons, as discussed in greater detail below, including:

- Because of the rapid onset of the event, partners focused on qualitative assessment of VfM factors rather than quantitative.
- Partners reported that they were only just starting or in the midst of their own internal evaluations, and therefore more systematic evidence on VfM had not yet been assessed.
- While VfM was a part of the decision-making process, it was not a key focus for agencies, and DFID spend per partner was relatively small. As a result, DFID influence on VfM reporting was minimal.

A full document review as well as consultation in country with relevant stakeholders was used to augment this information and gather any additional evidence that could be used to construct a VfM assessment of cost, speed and quality.

The evaluation explicitly did not aim to assess specific partners and their interventions; the VfM assessment thus does not seek to compare across partners or intervention types, but rather uses examples where they were available to highlight findings on the VfM of the overall response.

### Key Findings

**Key Finding 1: Partner agencies assess cost, speed and quality as an integral part of decision making, but usually this is qualitative and implicit, rather than part of a formalised selection and monitoring process.**

Interviews with all partners indicate that value for money considerations are present to some extent in decision making. Speed, cost and quality metrics are reported on qualitatively. This approach was considered to be the most appropriate in the context of a rapid response where formalised processes for determining these metrics would be inappropriate in the early stages. Annex 7 provides a summary of VfM evidence provided by implementing partners, taken directly from early and final monitoring reports. It provides many examples of the ways in which partners are considering and reporting on cost, speed and quality, but also demonstrates that reporting is consistently qualitative and high level.

Some agencies referred to having their own VfM frameworks in place, but the evaluation found very limited evidence of actual VfM assessments of the Haiyan response. Many of the early monitoring reports allude to issues around cost, speed and quality, but little quantitative or comparative analysis is provided; where they did refer to VfM metrics, it was almost always in reference to qualitative aspects with little to no supporting documentation. At the time of this evaluation, several partners reported that they were in the process of doing their own internal final reporting on their response, which would include VfM metrics – thus more evidence should become available, together with different approaches to VfM.

KIIs and final reports provide some evidence of cost, speed and quality considerations, and the various factors that had to be weighed up throughout the response. However, the level of information and analysis differs by agency, suggesting that some agencies are simply meeting reporting requirements while others embed the analysis more fully in their reporting. Most report on costs, and where cost efficiencies were made, as well as providing monitoring data related to quality based on interviews with beneficiaries. Some agencies have conducted more detailed analysis, as reported below, although quantitative or comparative evidence on VfM is still scarce.

**Key Finding 2: DFID had very limited influence on VfM reporting.**

First, many partners reported that they integrate VfM into their decision making using their own protocols, and that this was largely focused on qualitative assessments of speed, quality and cost (as evidenced in Annex 7). Some partners have their own methodologies. For example, Christian Aid developed guidelines on VfM in 2012 based on the 4Es framework and with a strong emphasis on effectiveness; although they were also clear that in the Philippines they have not actually applied this. Others reported they knew little about VfM or DFID's approach, although six of the larger agencies interviewed referred to the DFID monitoring team discussing VfM with them as part of DFID's own monitoring, following the format of speed, cost and quality. These agencies reported that they focused on using their own approaches to VfM, suggesting they were not interested in more guidance from DFID. DFID contributed a small percentage to partners' overall funding and focused more on monitoring rather than engaging strategically. As a result, DFID influence on VfM reporting was minimal.

Unfortunately, despite numerous requests, the evaluation team received limited feedback from partners on the utility of the balanced scorecard approach used by DFID during the response. One partner, however, pointed out that although the model is a good one, and the language and matrix-based approach is new, VfM is already a part of the team's thinking with a similar process already in place to assess VfM.

**Key Finding 3: DFID funding improved speed of response but sometimes with an impact on cost and quality.**

**Agencies consistently cited that funding under the RRF, combined with the availability of pre-positioned goods, allowed for a much faster response.** KII evidence (summarised in the evidence framework) suggests that DFID funding for life-saving distribution started earlier than for most partners – approximately five days in. IOM described how DFID NFIs were very timely and appropriate, arriving while others were only gearing up procurement. However, despite repeated attempts to gather data on changes in speed of response, very little actual evidence was available. Again, qualitative statements were prevalent, with little concrete evidence to back this up.

**The use of the military improved speed but also increased costs.** There was both positive and negative feedback on the involvement of the military, with some evidence suggesting that the high cost and time-consuming management of the use of military assets should be considered and weighed against the benefit (a clear value for money issue). Use of the ships/aircraft was costly, raising concerns over VfM. For example, commercial air transport from the UK to Cebu costs £1,614 per metric tonne. Transfer of the same by C14 (military aircraft) costs £9,090, although 55% of this cost was rebated by the EU Civil Contingencies Fund, resulting in a direct cost to DFID of approximately £5,000, 3 times the cost of commercial air transport.<sup>81</sup>

However, this has to be balanced with the fact that the use of military assets was identified by many as crucial to saving lives. Because of the geography of the Philippines, supplies via commercial transport were not an option until two weeks into the crisis. Hence military assets were necessary for early response. There were some questions around whether the choice of military assets was the most effective, and whether smaller/more efficient ships may have been optimal. However, this has to be balanced with other considerations. For example, it was also noted that the re-tasking of military assets is not without penalty,

<sup>81</sup> Personal communication, Andrew Hill, Civil-Military Advisor, CHASE, DFID, April 1 2015

referencing the example of HMS DARING, which was re-tasked from an exercise involving other regional partners resulting in both financial and diplomatic disadvantages.

The MoD review commented that there was a level of uncertainty around costings and in future a “price list” should be readily available for DFID when MoD support is requested at the beginning of a large-scale emergency response. While this would certainly be useful, the re-tasking of military assets is highly sensitive to a whole variety of factors that have to be balanced with these costings. Further, the trade-off of not re-tasking military assets in the case of the Philippines would have resulted in numerous islands receiving no help for up to two weeks, and a VfM analysis of the trade-off between lives lost and cost of military assets is untenable.

The review also noted different approaches between MoD and DFID which would have an impact on overall VfM and cost-benefit analysis. The observation was that while MoD generally defines the desired effect and then identifies an asset or resource most likely to achieve that effect, it was perceived that DFID utilises whatever asset is immediately available and then seeks to create as much of the desired effect as possible. Based on consultation for this evaluation, it was clear that a process of identifying all possible military assets and weighing up the pros and cons of each was undertaken to identify the most appropriate options for a rapid response. It was therefore perceived that DFID was using the most appropriate asset given a wide range of factors that had to be considered.

**A lack of pre-positioned stocks compromised VfM.** Cost, speed and quality were all affected by shortages of pre-positioned stocks. Where they did exist, the DFID RRF was cited as being very effective for rapid deployment; however, stocks were not sufficient. For example, Plan had pre-positioned water and hygiene kits in Eastern Samar, but the quantity (2000) was highly insufficient for the response and it was not possible, due to logistic challenges, to quickly increase the supply in the first few days. CAFOD/CRS made good use of pre-positioned stocks shipped over from Dubai, although compared to the needs, the stock was insufficient. Oxfam relied partially on a list of local suppliers that were also affected by the typhoon and, therefore, in some cases and for some items, the supply of materials was slow.

**Reports on DFID's accountability requirements were mixed.** On the one hand, several agencies noted that DFID was flexible and quick, particularly as a result of the RRF. The general impression from these actors was that DFID had a good balance between speed and flexibility, and depth and accountability. At the same time, several agencies felt strongly that the DFID monitoring and reporting burden was onerous compared to other donors. For example, one agency explained that the DFID requirement for multiple reporting via quarterly reports is a disadvantage to receiving DFID funding. If DFID reporting requirements lead to better programming, then more frequent reporting may be justified, particularly where reporting is targeted on projects that are higher risk or more expensive. However, it would be very difficult to determine whether the level of reporting did indeed result in better outcomes, and this type of assessment was outside the scope of this study.

**Short turn-around times compromised ability to develop quality proposals.** References were made to the issue of having extremely short turn-around times for proposals to be submitted during the recovery period – a specific example of agencies having one week to submit proposals which was over the Easter weekend and therefore agencies struggled to submit quality proposals within the timeframe allowed, which was anticipated in turn to affect the quality of programming.

**The consortium approach brought both gains and costs.** Views on the VfM of the consortium approach were mixed. For the Christian Aid/World Vision/Habitat for Humanity consortium benefits are reported as limited (World Vision reported that the consortium approach did not lead to reduction in prices), while FAO-ILO-Save the Children anticipated synergies to arise from their coordination (though these had not been realised thus far). Help Age International found that co-funding allowed cost sharing across personnel, transport and logistical support needs, which meant in turn that more of the DFID grant could be used on direct relief support for the affected communities. Furthermore, having three partners tied in together (in addition to their government counterparts), has led to slower start-up as compared to their operations when acting independently (e.g. Habitat field staff being less clear on technical standards of CI sheets). These



findings are consistent with the DFID briefing note on VfM of consortium approaches under the RRF in the Philippines and India, which showed positive gains on costs, but negative effects related to speed and quality.<sup>82</sup>

**Joint procurement brought gains on cost, but may have compromised speed of delivery.** One key benefit of the consortium approach was greater facilitation of joint procurement. Joint procurement was cited by multiple agencies as very effective for bringing down costs, by allowing agencies to standardise kits resulting in cost efficiencies for bulk procurement. For example, Plan estimates that bulk procurement brought cost savings of £155k. IOM used bulk procurement for shelter supplies and estimate that they were able to save £188k (see Box 12 for more detail).<sup>83</sup> However due to the scale of procurement and demands in the market/availability of supplies, the large-scale procurement resulted in some delays in the timelines of the delivery of supplies. The Christian Aid consortium specifically highlights how they were also able to use local government trucks and other infrastructure to transport goods free of charge, contributing to cost savings, and citing that these factors allowed them to extend the project by 67%, reaching an additional 3,350 households.

**Box 12: IOM case study on VfM**

IOM has played a key role in providing shelter and highlighted the following points in relation to the VfM of its response:

- **Quality** – during anecdotal conversations with beneficiaries, they said that they preferred the IOM shelter kits because they felt that they were better quality than what they would have purchased in the local market.
- **Cost** – all components of the kit are purchased centrally in bulk. So far cost savings from bulk procurement are reported at 6% of total cost, or £188k). IOM estimate that this allowed them to an additional 6,000 families under DFID funding.
- **Outcomes** – IOM acquired all of its wood directly in the local market, either via local farmer's associations, or via debris-to-shelter programmes. By sourcing from multiple actors, the programme was able to guarantee that there was enough wood to meet deliverables on time and with quality.
- Further to this, the flexibility of DFID funding has allowed IOM to tailor the response to the needs of specific areas, which is very likely to result in VfM gains. The specific example was given of the programme in Panay, where UNDP cuts to an agency facilitating supply of wood compromised the functioning of the debris-to-shelter model. IOM was able to propose re-directing DFID funds to purchase chainsaws to ensure that supply would continue.

*Source: Personal Communication, Manuel Pereira IOM*

**The impact of targeting on VfM was mixed.** In both KIs and PIGDs, the issue of targeting was frequently raised. Targeting is expensive – it requires assessments to identify the poorest, selectively distribute resources, and can remove some of the efficiency gains from producing standard packages where those need to be differentiated. Further to this, targeting was repeatedly mentioned as causing high levels of tension in the communities, which can erode social cohesion and affect future responses. While there was not any concrete evidence, the trade-offs between targeting and blanket distribution would merit further investigation.

**Key Finding 4: DFID's short-term presence compromised VfM.**

Several agencies commented that the overall quality of the DFID response would have been improved by having longer-term funding. Other donors were seen to take a longer-term view and as a result agencies were able to focus not just on relief but also on livelihoods restoration, DRR and WASH measures (for example). One agency described how longer-term programming was needed to provide seeds for agriculture/livelihood restoration and this did not fit within the DFID 6-month window. The DFID short-term perspective did not lend itself to transition. It was also described that a longer DFID field presence would have helped to reinforce the need for longer-term programming, and this longer-term presence is particularly important given the frequency of natural disasters.

<sup>82</sup> "The Value for Money of RRF Consortium Arrangements: Evidence from NGO partners in India and Philippines". July 2014

<sup>83</sup> Personal Communication, Manuel Pereira, IOM, Feb 13 2015

DFID reporting at a global level has shown that a longer-term focus on recovery and resilience measures delivers significant VfM. For example, a DFID study on the Economics of Early Response and Resilience showed that resilience-building measures in five countries yielded between £2 and £13 of benefit for every £1 spent.<sup>84</sup>

While evidence on the VfM of recovery and resilience programming was limited in the Philippines, FAO implemented a fisheries project to restore livelihoods in response to Haiyan, and documented the return on investment of the project. Benefits were quantified according to the expected income that fisheries equipment would deliver through the project. The return on investment is estimated at \$1.365m, clearly justifying the VfM of investing in the approach.

**Key Finding 5: Cash transfer programming can be an effective strategy for maximising VfM.**

**A move to cash transfer programming in the recovery phase was cited as beneficial.** As soon as markets began to recover, many agencies shifted to cash programming and this was widely cited as beneficial. One of the only VfM studies of the response in the Philippines is a VfM assessment of cash programming (see Box 13). This assessment found that cash was good VfM and that more could have been provided. On the one hand, in the case of the CARE cash response (which was not DFID-funded, but is a useful illustration) the economy of cash is similar to in-kind transfers. However, based on effectiveness, the study found that one of the strongest indicators of the value for money of cash transfers was that beneficiaries used the cash to purchase diverse goods that would have been impossible, or very impractical, for aid agencies to provide. While cash programming is not a panacea, it certainly merits greater investigation and preparedness work as a potential approach to maximise VfM.

**Box 13: VfM of Cash Transfers in the Philippines**

Only one example was provided by an aid agency that directly compared the cost of cash and in-kind aid. In Capiz province in Panay, CARE provided 500 beneficiaries with cash and 4,591 with food aid. When all costs were considered (including the transfer), it cost \$1.09 to provide a dollar through cash transfers and \$1.21 per dollar of food aid.<sup>85</sup> Using this Total Cost to Total Transfer Ratio cash was 11% more efficient. However, the retail price of food in the local markets frequented by beneficiaries was 10% more expensive than the price that the aid agency paid wholesale. If the fact that 10% more cash is needed to purchase the same food transfer (e.g. \$11 to buy a \$10 food ration), then the overall efficiency of the cash transfer and the in-kind rations as a means to increase access to food would be nearly equal. An efficiency comparison with a food ration does not reflect that beneficiaries purchase items other than food.

*Source: Bailey (2015). VfM of Cash Transfers in the Philippines. DFID*

**VfM Recommendations**

**1. Engage with partners strategically on VfM outside of crisis times.** While agencies are clearly considering speed, quality and cost factors as part of their decision making in the early stages of a crisis, at this point there are only a few options available for response in any case, limiting the ability of agencies to maximise VfM. Preparedness and planning activities, however, offer an ideal opportunity for DFID's VfM guidance to be put to good use. It also allows DFID partners the time and space to work through a consistent VfM framework with partners.

The benefits of this are two-fold. First, partners are more likely to engage with VfM as part of preparedness when they have the time and resources to address VfM in a way that influences decision making. This will enable DFID and potential partners to engage on a clear consensus about what VfM analysis should look like in a humanitarian context. Second, the evaluation highlighted numerous ways that VfM could be enhanced by engaging with partners in the preparedness phase (e.g. pre-positioning stocks, building capacity for cash, designing longer-term recovery strategies, and designing cost-effective targeting protocols). DFID should agree with partners on what tools and indicators should be used in VfM monitoring and assessment.

<sup>84</sup> Cabot Venton et al (2013). "The Economics of Early Response and Resilience." DFID, UK.

<sup>85</sup> A CARE partner delivered both cash and food transfers at different stages of the response. The food distribution was implemented for 4500 households between November and January, the cash transfer was distributed to 500 households in February 2014

Additional tools and resources are not required – this was not considered to be a blockage. Rather, there was very limited influence by DFID on VfM, in large part because DFID was only engaging during the crisis and recovery phases. While it is understood that this is the way that DFID needs to operate in a scenario where there is no permanent DFID presence, if DFID wants to strategically engage on VfM this needs to happen outside of the crisis period.

**2. Invest in greater pre-positioning of stocks.** It was very clear from the evaluation that speed of response was enhanced by the RRF; however, this was particularly true where goods were pre-positioned and could be locally procured. Therefore preparedness measures such as pre-positioning are key to ensure that rapid response funding can be supported logistically. This evaluation strongly supports the finding of the MTR for **DFID to advocate for partners to establish framework agreements with suppliers/service providers to enhance preparedness for future responses** as a key mechanism to ensure pre-positioning and other preparedness measures that facilitate a fast response.

**3. Allow partner agencies more time to develop quality proposals.** Clearly, this has to be balanced with the need to act quickly and get funding to partners. But more time would have allowed partners to develop higher quality proposal for the recovery period.

**4. Investigate the potential VfM of consortia approaches.** Qualitative evidence pointed to potential cost savings as a result of consortia, but this was offset by slower start-up times. The characteristics and context in which consortia can bring VfM gains needs to be investigated to inform future programming.

**5. Build capacity for a greater use of cash.** More cash could have been provided as an alternative to food aid, and it could have been provided sooner. It is critical that preparedness measures for cash are in place, and that the capacity for a cash response exists so that it can be used quickly. Cash is not a panacea, but given there is scope to enhance VfM by increasing the use of cash, DFID can usefully engage in 1) preparedness work around local context, user preferences, markets, etc to determine where greater use of cash may be appropriate and 2) building the capacity of local actors where appropriate for rapid scale up of cash programming in a crisis.

## Annex 7: Summary of evidence on VfM from monitoring reports

The following table is a summary of evidence on VfM taken directly from DFID and partner early and final monitoring reports. In most cases, the text is directly lifted from the reports, in order to demonstrate the type of information that is being reported in relation to VfM (in some cases it has been summarised due to length). The table also indicates those partners that used the balanced scorecard to assess speed, quality and cost considerations as part of their VfM assessment. These scorecards followed the DFID format.

Partner	Early Monitoring Reports	Final Monitoring Reports	Scorecard?
CARE/ ACF/ Save	Procurement was a key operational issue. Initially, Christian Aid thought that a centralised procurement system would speed up the process but it did not work. Markets were stressed by the demand for the same items and often there was only a single supplier for a specific item. World Vision – procurement lead for this consortium advised that the consortium process did not lead to reduction in prices.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Measuring value for money still remains a challenge, aside from unit cost analysis, which fails to consider less tangible returns on investment.</li> <li>VfM could be better realised by conducting both quantitative and qualitative value for money assessments. This will ensure that all programmes are delivering qualitative as well as quantitative long-term outcomes.</li> <li>For example, nutritional impact of distributed food items is difficult to measure in the short term; participants' satisfaction as expressed through PDM may be a more immediate indicator.</li> <li>As previously described regarding procurement, the need to make quick decisions in a rapidly changing environment can also have consequences and pose challenges for achieving VfM.</li> </ul>	Yes – referred to but we do not have (“Note – the DFID monitoring report states that this will best be completed once full data is reported by the consortium”)
Christian Aid/ WV/ Habitat	<p>CA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>77% of Christian Aid stock went out in the first 6 weeks. 6000 beneficiaries were reached in the first six weeks.</li> <li>CA is generally demonstrating good value for money through this grant, supporting a relatively large number of beneficiaries.</li> </ul> <p>Habitat: Delays encountered during intra-consortium</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><u>Joint procurement</u> has been successful given the massive scale across the relief spectrum with standardisation in the kits and the specifications resulting in competitive pricing (even though there was a hike in price for commodities in the local market) and VfM.</li> <li>However due to the scale of procurement and demands in the market/availability of supplies in bulk the large-scale procurement resulted in some delays in the timelines of the delivery of supplies.</li> </ul>	Yes (for all three agencies)

	<p>negotiations, while only a week, occurred at a crucial time such that availability of materials in local markets were purchased by other organisations.</p> <p>Habitat's in-country staff did not have a technical understanding of the difference between a gauge 26 and 2mm, 3mm, 4mm, were not aware of the shelter standards, did not conduct quality checks at the time of receipt of items, and did not require the supplier to demonstrate quality of the product. Were they able to deploy earlier, DFID field monitoring teams may have picked this up earlier. Important lesson for DFID. VfM requires regular field presence from an early stage. Partners need to be clear on the cluster standards, and ensure their field staff are aware too.</p> <p>World Vision: In the context of the Philippines, given multiple suppliers available in geographically dispersed and logistically challenging and fragmented environments, (islands), the added value of consortia remains unclear. Individual contracts between partners and one or more suppliers would have led to speedier and more effective responses. Given that World Vision beneficiaries are not in far flung and remote locations, speed and appropriateness may have been stronger in the form of cash.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Coordination</u>: The consortium members coordinated with other humanitarian agencies responding to the areas to avoid any duplication of response.</li> <li>• <u>Cost savings</u> were made in transportation of materials thanks to the donation of trucks and drivers at no charge from the LGU and Globe Telecom. In addition, the government's intervention to ensure that market prices of materials did not rise too high meant that our contingency funding was not used.</li> <li>• The provincial gymnasium of Borongan City was used as the RRF warehouse and logistics centre with 24/7 security from the Armed Forces of the Philippines at no cost to the project after series of coordination meetings with the provincial government.</li> <li>• The cost of transporting the relief goods to the Guiuan and Estancia islands was reduced after using the boats offered by the partner LGUs and the Philippine Navy.</li> <li>• Partner NGOs in Eastern Samar allowed Christian Aid to co-locate, at no cost to the project, in the Knowledge Management Centre of the Provincial Social Welfare Office in Borongan City, Guiaun Development Foundation Inc office in Guiuan, and Municipal Hall of Lawaan.</li> <li>• The consortium approach on <u>targeting the most vulnerable</u> and needy people in the targeted area resulted in best use of the supplies and materials provide under DFID RRF support. The consortium managed to reach the communities within a short time, beginning three weeks after the emergency to reach communities with RRF funding.</li> <li>• <b>These factors allowed us to extend the project by 67%, reaching a further 3350 households.</b></li> </ul>	
Handicap	<u>Speed</u> : HI Panay appeared to have distributed the	HI attributes a fast response to their preparedness –	Yes

International	<p>tents faster than HI team in Eastern Samar. The tent distribution was completed 4 December 2013. HI reached the visited remote inland community of Akapasco third week of November and distributed the 47 tents by 3 December 2013.</p> <p><u>Quality:</u> Beneficiaries interviewed expressed happiness with the tents and most of them were still using them. HI tents: · Positive: tents are still standing and have apparently survived the recent storms and rains and continue to be used. The tents have screened doors allowing ventilation. According to the beneficiaries they were easy to set up and orientation and instructions were provided.· Negative: similarly to the DFID tents they require somewhat large space to set up</p> <p><u>Cost:</u> Financial details/information was not really discussed during this week. HI Panay to send cost for the HI tent unit to compare it with the cost of i.e. DFID tents.</p>	<p>having needs assessments and logistics structures in place, and working with local authorities, to be an early responder. This allowed us to gain speed in making effective distributions, as well as quality in the identification of the most-needy populations. It also allowed better acceptance by the municipalities of HI in the areas of intervention, as well as ensuring a capacity building approach of the municipalities in emergency response and targeting of the most vulnerable people.</p> <p>However, on the other side, to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of the response, we have had to monitor closely distribution, to ensure right delivery of aid through a transparent and adequate targeting of beneficiaries. This has implied deployment of more expatriates than foreseen. Also, the logistical constraints encountered at the very beginning of the operations (in Cebu, as well as Tacloban and Panai), has obliged us to reinforce our logistics team in view to ensure timeliness of distributions. Without such supplementary investments and flexibility in the budget, our intervention would not have been as reactive as required by the level of emergency and needs of the beneficiaries. Thanks to those efforts, HI was the first organisation operational in Tacloban city, for example. Also, even though the Philippines is a country where national human resources have high educational and technical levels, and where it is quite easy to nationalize some positions, this is not true while implementing emergency activities: implementation and training in an acute crisis context are not time-compatible. Therefore, some positions which will be nationalized in the next weeks or months have been taken by expatriates in the emergency phase.</p>	
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<p>Plan International</p>	<p><u>Speed:</u> Magazo: DFID tarp distribution started 25 November (17 days after the typhoon). Hygiene kits were distributed 7 December. Villarosa: DFID tarp distribution started 27 November. Barangay secretary stated that they should have been delivered faster.</p> <p><u>Quality:</u> Based on visual inspection the tarps and salvaged coco lumber serve the purpose of emergency latrines. In terms of long-term durability the latrines they would probably not survive i.e. another strong typhoon. In Magazo, barangay captain stated that the quality/content of the NFIs was good and although malongs were not previously used they are now used.</p> <p><u>Cost:</u> According to informal data received from Plan here are some costs: - Latrine for individual households. 66.44 USD per households. These reached 2399 households. Coco lumber was procured locally (barangay level); therefore it is an additional cash injection in local economy. - Hygiene kit for pupils. 4 USD per kit containing one toothbrush, toothpaste, soap and one comb. 6511 kits distributed in 54 barangays in the 4 RRF targeted municipalities. - Latrine rehabilitation. Total cost of around 8,000 USD for 50 latrine units. This gives an average unit cost of 141 USD; however repair needs varied a lot, so unit costs might not be fully relevant (some needed only minor repairs). - Water systems rehabilitation. Total cost of around 42,000 USD for 23 water systems. Average of around 2,000 USD per water system.</p>	<p>Due to the natural disaster prone nature of the country, a recommendation would be to have a larger contingency of pre-positioned stocks of WASH materials to intervene in more timely and effectively manner whenever required (natural disaster, outbreaks...). For example, Plan had pre-positioned water and hygiene kits in Eastern Samar, but the quantity (2000) was highly insufficient for the response and it was not possible, due to logistic challenges, to quickly increase the supply in the first few days. CAFOD/CRS made good use of pre-positioned stock shipped over from Dubai, although compared to the needs, the stocks was insufficient. Oxfam relied partially on a list of local suppliers which was also affected by the typhoon and, therefore, in some cases and for some items, the supply of materials was slow.</p> <p>A clear trade-off between standardisation and cost saving versus speed became apparent in the project. Consortium agencies were satisfied with the choice made, with bulk procurement conducted by one partner for the whole consortium. This allowed us to ensure higher standardisation of kits and reduced costs. However this choice may have slightly impacted on speed. In the initial days, the consortium partners had to agree on the standardised package for the kits. This included discussions and agreements on the content of the kits and the branding to be included on the kits. Also, the final order was a larger order for one supplier to</p> <p>In the budget excel sheet it also indicates that bulk procurement allowed them to save GBP 155k.</p> <p>Consortium agencies agreed, at the project design stage, to jointly procure water and hygiene kits. This proved to</p>	<p>No</p>
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		<p>be a good strategy in maximising value for money. However, high demand of materials and transportation meant that procurement was slow and many key materials, such as latrine construction supplies, were not delivered until early January 2014. These delays put additional pressure on an already tight implementation timeframe.</p> <p>Considering the scale of providing hygiene promotion interventions to more than 200,000 people, the mobilization and training of the Municipal and barangay health workers has been an efficient and very cost-effective strategy.</p>	
Save the Children	Save the Children have unparalleled speed and coverage and quality of programming. In terms of attention to detail, they appear to leave no stone unturned.	<p><b>Value for Money</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Timeliness:</i> Save the Children used DFID RRF funding to rapidly deploy pre-positioned stocks. The stocks were instrumental in enabling Save the Children to rapidly begin distributions and scale up in multiple sectors reaching a large number of beneficiaries within the first 2-3 weeks. The pre-positioned stocks (and the goods in kind that were provided by DFID alongside RRF funding) ensured good value for money not only in terms of economy but also efficiency and effectiveness.</li> <li>• <i>Cost:</i> The majority of stocks were internationally procured, while more expensive than locally procured items, this proved essential to ensuring timeliness at the onset of the response.</li> <li>• <i>Quality:</i> The quality of relief items was assessed during the procurement stage, with all materials checked for quality by programme teams. PDM was conducted after distributions and these incorporated a focus on quality; PDM respondents reported that items were of a good quality.</li> <li>• Measuring value for money still remains a challenge,</li> </ul>	Yes



		<p>aside from unit cost analysis, which fails to consider less tangible returns on investment. Save the Children believes that it could better realise VfM by conducting both quantitative and qualitative value for money assessments, to ensure there is not an over reliance on unit cost analysis. This will ensure that all programmes are delivering qualitative as well as quantitative long-term outcomes.</p>	
IOM	<p>Higher costs could be justified by the added advantages of the IOM programme including CfW for the log clearing activities and sawmilling operations in Guiuan, as well as the higher costs for log clearing in less accessible areas.</p>	<p>The shelter programme in the Philippines is able to provide good VfM. IOM's intervention strategy is to identify the minimum external input required to catalyse self-recovery through support with materials (both purchased as well as recycled), training, and assistance for vulnerable groups. Due to the economy of scale of IOM's shelter programme, savings are incurred and quality is ensured for shelter materials, specifically through bulk procurement and rigorous quality control measures. IOM Manila hosts IOM's global procurement unit, which enables the organisation to consistently ensure high quality materials at a lower price point. In terms of efficiency, IOM's nature is projectised, including staff whose costs are shared amongst multiple donors. This along with supply chain management promotes optimal use of resources in a timely manner. As the program is heavily participatory, there are also benefits in terms of effectiveness as households and communities are not merely recipients of aid, but rather active participants in the recovery process, using external assistance to facilitate and drive recovery in their communities. Individually tailored solutions are identified for those who cannot self-recover focusing on the identification of durable solutions for the most vulnerable. Moreover, IOM works directly with LGUs in the implementation promoting their participating in the</p>	No

		<p>shelter distribution activities, namely beneficiary selection, organisation of distribution and more importantly through knowledge transfer through the DRR technical trainings. All these activities aim at promoting the ownership of beneficiaries and LGU in the process of building safer shelters, while improving their resilient to future disaster events.</p> <p>In terms of the cost element of VfM, this phase of the project aims to reach 30,321 households with each of the four elements of the shelter programme. In terms of cost per beneficiary, that works out to £265.82. The Shelter Cluster Technical Guidelines estimate the costs of a SRK including CGI and coco lumber from PHP 5,000-10,000 + 10-20% technical assistance = PHP 5,500-12,000 (£74-161). Needless to say, these estimated costs are limited to materials and training/monitoring only and do not include the costs of lumber clearing, milling and distribution costs nor cash components which are included in the IOM project. By comparison, IOM's ECHO funded transitional shelters project costs £1187.63 per beneficiary household. Though the two approaches are different, it has been shown that many (or perhaps most) households are able to use material distributions such as the kits in this project to contribute to their self-recovery. The price of CGI sheets represents a good example of cost savings as a result of bulk purchases from outside typhoon-affected areas. The cost per sheet under this project is approximately £4.5, procured in bulk from the manufacturers themselves in Manila. By contrast, CGI sheets with identical specifications procured locally in Guiuan cost £5.11. The total savings as result of bulk orders directly from manufacturers is approximately £221,949.72. Other items procured in bulk directly from</p>	
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		manufacturers show similar levels of savings. Additionally, IOM is able to ensure consistency and high quality of materials due to arrangements with manufacturers and systematic quality control mechanisms put into place through IOM procurement systems. Finally, IOM's very high operational and logistical capacity, combined with longstanding and productive working relationships with national government and local governments serves to increase the speed of the interventions.	
Help Age International	Speed : slow – still distributing cash Quality: good – cannot go wrong with cash. But 5 kg of rice represents poor VfM and of little benefit to beneficiaries Setting up the helpdesk at the District Hospital in Ormoc City assisted over 700 outpatients from five municipalities. This appears an effective response to changing context – well targeted with broad outreach. Cost: 5kg of rice represents poor VfM given administrative and logistics costs. 5kg of rice is of little use to people in need of food aid.	It was recognised that distribution of shelter materials and direct food distributions was no longer a cost-effective mechanism to deliver essential relief support. A more cost-effective method to provide relief support was adopted using a cash transfer distribution system. Co-funding with AA (HelpAge Deutschland) allowed cost shares across personnel, transport and logistical support needs. This meant more of the DFID grant could be used on direct relief support for the affected communities.	No
IHP	In terms of <u>programme</u> quality, only 7% of drugs as supplied under phase 1 were used in the initial 3 month response, seriously affecting impact of the project.		Yes
ACTED		<b>Speed:</b> Items were distributed rapidly employing a 'rolling warehouse' to facilitate this (also avoiding additional warehousing costs.) Distributions were completed ahead of schedule <b>Quality</b> - Standard DFID goods in kind as supplied. <b>Cost</b> - rolling warehouse (on trucks) eliminated	Yes (but by DFID, not Acted?)

		warehousing costs. Tents: 1,269 tents (households) distributed at £9.00 per unit (total £11,423); Plastic sheeting: 7,748 households reached at £3.69 per household or £2.85 per unit (total £28,577); A comparative VfM analysis against for example, RRF shelter distributions would be informative at project completion review stage.	
CAFOD	<p>According to CAFOD/CRS the consortium arrangement made it slower to procure items since procurement was consolidated through Oxfam and therefore somewhat delayed the delivery of the assistance.</p> <p>According to CAFOD, a positive thing about operating in a consortium was that it allowed consolidation of standards and quality for the activities implemented with this grant.</p>		No
FAO	<p>FAO is currently developing a methodology for the standard calculation of VfM to capture economy and efficiency, which is consistent with the DFID VfM framework in humanitarian programming.</p> <p>Measurement of effectiveness is taken into strong consideration in the development of indicators as articulated in the logical framework. The FAO methodology will identify project production inputs and activities, to arrive at a certain cost production, net generated value per household, cost-benefit analysis per household, and benefits generated for every USD 1 of DFID/FAO support.</p> <p>Technical specialists are in the process of validating the activities and costs in the templates to reflect accurate VfM calculations. Prices (e.g., equipment, fingerlings, material, etc.) will be based on government data and/or the result of FAO</p>		

	<p>assessment surveys to reflect current market prices.</p> <p>VfM calculations that look at the potential return from the project investments in the various components is indeed an important gauge of the project's efficiency and effectiveness. However, the nature of this project is to provide opportunities for the early recovery of livelihood of fishers' families whose lifetime possessions and assets were decimated by typhoon Haiyan. In this light, the project investment should be considered not only from a financial perspective but also from a human development perspective.</p>		
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## Annex 8: Participatory Interest Group Discussions Report

The following report sets out the evaluation team's approach to and findings from the PIGDs carried out during fieldwork in the Philippines in January 2015.

### Methodology Used

We used an adapted PIGD Community Score Card (CSC) (participatory interest group discussion; community scorecard) approach. The PIGDs are strictly gender and age-disaggregated FGDs (hence "interest groups"). In many cases other disaggregation can occur (living with disabilities; socio-economic groupings, or ethnic groupings as examples) but for the Philippines work consultation with SDS (our local research consultancy partner) determined that four groups based on gender and age were appropriate. Based on the differing levels of child protection experience that would be necessary to interact with younger children we agreed the minimum age for participation would be 15 and created a youth group (15-25 as per UN definitions) and hence established groups as

1. Women over the age of 25
2. Older adolescent girls and young women 15-25
3. Men over the age of 25
4. Older adolescent boys and young men 15-25

The CSC is an interactive monitoring tool usually used to increase accountability of service providers by soliciting perceptions of different groups of primary stakeholders on the quality, accessibility and relevance of various public services. For this evaluation, the CSC was adapted to ask questions related to DFID-funded/supported agencies and focusing on issues of access, including access to information, targeting, inclusion, participation accountability etc.

The CSC is described as a "mixed method" tool because it generates both quantitative and qualitative data and analysis. The quantitative data comprise perception scores against each of the questions (as below) scored on a 5 point scale. The crucial point is that qualitative data and analysis are also elicited during the PIGD.

We initially tested the quantitative / qualitative mix in various ways, and settled on having the full discussion first against the question framework with the scoring conducted at the end. To ensure a minimal degree of peer pressure when scoring we created a 'game' for scoring; having participants close their eyes and hold up fingers to score. We then informed the participants of the average score, without identifying any individual against their particular score.


The questions used were:

1. Were your most important needs fully addressed? (An introductory question).
2. Did the right people benefit? – Did everyone in the community benefit equally? – did more powerful people benefit more? – did some people who required assistance get left out? (EO3 – Accountability in relation to Inclusion).
3. Were you asked your opinions on the agencies' support to your community? Did you have sufficient information about assistance being given? Were you consulted? Were you aware of complaints / feedback mechanisms? Did everyone in the community have access to the feedback mechanisms? – Was everyone equally able to influence the projects? (EO3 – Accountability).
4. Did you feel safe from violence or harm? (VAWG).
5. Do you have any recommendations for the future? (A non-scoring closing question).

### Challenges / Limitations

We faced various limitations in conducting the PIGDs. Firstly, we did not have gender-balanced teams in all places, although we were very strict with male team members conducting discussions with men and boys and female team members conducting discussions with women and girls. This means that we did not interview all four groups in all areas. Secondly, communities did not all understand or interpret the questions in the same way. For example, some groups (predominantly men) wanted to score government assistance and NGO assistance separately, which we recorded as such.

### General findings



Key – 1 = low and 5 = 5

### Emerging themes

#### Question 1 – were key needs met?

Overall, responses seemed to indicate that people felt the government was slow and late to respond. This was despite many groups reporting that their first aid was from DSWD; the overall impression was that people were grateful to the international NGOs and UN Agencies that responded and felt their help and assistance was more important than the government's assistance. Notwithstanding the potential bias of normative responses to questions from an evaluation team for a foreign donor, the general community perception of the international system is one at odds with the assertion that the TA L3 response overwhelmed a capable national government, and instead tells a story of millions of affected people who felt needs were only met due to the support from the international system.

Women and girls / young women were overall slightly more satisfied with their overall needs being met than the male groups were; however, it is uncertain whether this is due to needs being better met or expectations generally being lower. There were very clear responses from those that lived in the no-build zone that shelter assistance had been unfairly withheld from them due to lack of decision on the part of the national government around resolving the no-build zone issues. There were also some comments from various locations that priority had been given to Tacloban given the media attention there. Interestingly, those in Tacloban believed that aid had been unfairly deprioritised in Tacloban city due to political tensions between the Mayor of Tacloban and the President.

In general people were happy with the aid that was received but overwhelming spoke of the lack of livelihood support and the problem with not being 'back on their feet' even over a year later.

#### Question 2 – inclusion (equality and equity)

Equality was overwhelming more important to all groups than equity. There were many comments across all four demographic groups with reference to the fact that everyone was equally affected and so everyone should receive equally. When asked about vulnerable people most groups responded by defining vulnerable groups as the elderly, PwD, and single parents. No voluntary mention of LGBT or indigenous groups was made. There was an understanding that some of the CfW and livelihood assistance favoured the more vulnerable and across different areas some felt this was fair and some did not. It might be that those to whom the targeting was more carefully explained felt it was fairer than others.

The most consistent complaint with regard to equality was in relation to permanent shelter assistance. Across the board groups reported that surveys were conducted (not with them, but with teams from different INGOs coming in and taking photos of their houses) and then household profiles of totally damaged or partially damaged were given to the barangays. Permanent shelter assistance in many places seemed to be given only to those households that were totally damaged and across the board this was felt to be unfair.

One particular issue raised was that of households excluded from aid due to having an OFW within their household. One particular story highlighted the inequality of this: a woman with two young children under the age of three (so one small infant at the time of the typhoon) was excluded from any assistance after then initial blanket food distribution due to her husband being an OFW. However, she explained that he was working construction in Qatar at such a minimal – practically slave labour – wage that he could in no way send extra money home after then typhoon as his remittances, small as they were, were fixed. She also explained that due to being excluded from the assistance because of the OFW status, her comfort room (toilet) is still not functioning. Combined with other stories of exclusions with regard to OFWs, it seems there was not any sophisticated differentiation with OFW in terms of those that were professionals overseas and those that were minimum wage construction workers (or others) and this became then an unfair exclusion to make.

Interestingly, the younger groups of both sexes were less satisfied with the overall inclusion of the response than the older groups, and had more sophisticated perspectives on equity issues – such as those more vulnerable requiring specific assistance – than the older groups. This potentially reflects a generally increased understanding of differing vulnerabilities in a younger generation with increased access to education and information through technology and a better understanding of the different needs of different people within and between communities.

### ***Question 3 – accountability – information and feedback mechanisms***

As above, many groups reported that the household profiling survey was conducted on them, rather than with them. There were also many reports of being promised relief items – particularly in relation to shelter assistance – and then the INGO staff not returning. Many recommendations across all demographic groups were in relation to “they should give us what they promised”.

Aside from that, there were varying responses in relation to information, consultation, and feedback mechanisms and mostly the PIGD discussions showed the inconsistency across geographical areas in these areas.

In general, men and boys / young men reported being more satisfied in relation to accountability – receiving information and having access to feedback mechanisms – than women and girls / young women. This most unfortunately reflects an ongoing historical issue with ensuring women and girls are included and able to fully participate in humanitarian response interventions. It also highlights that even in the most gender-benevolent of contexts such as the Philippines there is still a stark difference in the ability of people to access information and participate based upon gender. This highlights the continued need for improved gender mainstreaming in all aspects of humanitarian response.

In relation to information, many groups reported having extremely well-functioning barangay mechanisms for cascading information throughout the barangay. Others reported no such mechanisms and that, in light of the lack of INGO and/or UN information mechanisms, people only knew there was a distribution when trucks appeared, or they knew by word of mouth and other informal mechanism.

In relation to consultation, again there were stark differences between groups from what appeared to be very good consultation to none at all. Overall people did appear to remember all the different agencies and what they provided and when, which was very impressive.

For feedback mechanisms, some reported that hotlines for text messaging would have been the preferred option but more reported that they would have appreciated more face-to-face mechanisms, referring to



suggestion boxes and hotlines as “impersonal” and that while these mechanisms had been provided they did not want to use them.

**Question 4 – VAWG / protection**

While generally men and boys / young men reported a higher satisfaction with feeling safe than women and girls did (an expected result), there was little reporting of VAWG across all four groups and that was both in relation to incidences within their communities and any that they had heard about in other areas. One girl in a Tacloban urban area reported that her sister (15 at the time) had been inappropriately touched in Robinsons shopping centre by someone who was considered to be ‘mentally affected’ by the typhoon.


***It should be noted that the lack of reporting of VAWG incidences in no way provides evidence that in future emergencies protection is anything less than an immediate priority for implementation.***

When asked about feelings of safety and security both female and male groups consistently referred to: (a) escaped prisoners [approximately 300 prisoners escaped from Leyte Provincial Prison near Tacloban which was damaged in the typhoon – they were mostly either caught or turned themselves in within a month]; (b) the NPA; and (c) the Bajao – an indigenous population (see Box 14). All groups that reported feeling scared due to these. Three populations also reported that this was based on rumours and nothing transpired.

**Box 14: A case in point with regard to inclusion**

The Bajao are a generally sea-living indigenous group (often referred to as “sea gypsies”) who appear to have a reputation for looting and petty theft. Many communities felt fearful of the Bajao in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon, although this could have also been in reference generally to any ‘outsiders’. A local NGO (RAFI) working with a community of Bajao in Cebu city (who were not personally affected as Cebu was not within the Yolanda path) that even within Cebu the local Bajao population were only very recently beginning to get registered and therefore Bajao populations across Leyte and Samar were unlikely to have received any assistance, or in fact been included within mortality statistics.

**Urban / Rural Differences**



Some of the most prominent urban / rural differences:

Rural women tended to see their needs being met and aid being more inclusive than urban women did. Some of the strong opinions from urban women came from those who reside in no-build zones and to date, still have not received shelter assistance or finalised information from the government about relocation; this very much coloured their responses. There was also a big difference in terms of the cohesiveness of the rural barangays compared to the urban ones. Urban women spoke of confusion immediately after the typhoon meaning people from different barangays came and received aid in their community and there were many instances of some people lining up twice or more to receive extra aid. This was not reported in rural barangays where everyone knew each other very well and it appeared aid was more ordered and everyone within the barangay received equally.

However, urban women report a higher degree of accountability and ability to complain or give feedback than rural women did. In many of the rural barangays we visited cell phone signal was problematic even before Yolanda hit: many organisations provided a hotline number for feedback and questions but rural women were less able to avail of this than their urban counterparts.

Rural girls and young women reported a higher feeling of safety than their urban counterparts. As discussed above, there was very little reporting of VAWG incidences, while across the board there were reports of feeling unsafe due to the elements and their open / damaged homes; escaped prisoners; the NPA; and the Bajao. Rural girls and young women reported feeling safe because they were still within their community where they knew each other, while urban girls and young women had been in evacuation centres where there were more than one community so they did not know everyone, and there seemed to be more general movement between barangays in the urban areas.

The scoring by men reflected that of the girls and young women in that rural men scored higher for safety than the urban men. This was also true for boys.

## Annex 9: Evidence Assessment Framework Template

Below we provide an extract of the evidence assessment framework used by the team for the systematic collation and analysis of evidence gathered from the desk-based and field-level data collection. To protect the anonymity of key informants we do not reproduce the completed framework in this report.

Core Evaluation Questions and Sub-Questions	Indicators and Judgment Criteria	Data Sources					Emerging Findings
		PHL interviews	PHL FGDs	non-PHL interviews	Lit review	Partnership ass.	
<b>EQ1. To what extent did DFID response mechanisms function effectively to achieve priority outcomes? How can funding and support be made more effective in future rapid responses?</b>							
a) Was DFID's strategic approach and decision making appropriate and supportive to partners, the humanitarian action and resilient recovery?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that DFID's approaches adapted to critical gaps and moments, especially transition to recovery and resilience considering VAWG &amp; VFM</li> <li>Evidence that DFID's comparative advantage informed decision-making and strategic formulation, including DFID's role in civil-military coordination and as a network enabler</li> <li>Evidence that DFID supported or influenced partner actions to focus on priority concerns including transition, VAWG and VFM considering existing capacities and sustainability in the Philippines and (ASEAN) region</li> <li>Evidence of DFID's influence on partners' actions from different levels of relationships</li> </ul>						
b) Did DFID support the right mix of funding and partners at the right times considering in-country capacity and sustainability issues? How was the process from early support to recovery managed by DFID, and how did this influence decision-making?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that DFID selected partners considering comparative advantages, funding profiles, humanitarian gaps and priorities including resilience, protection and VAWG</li> <li>Evidence that DFID supported gaps in coordination and capacity including L3 surge capacity, transition to resilience recovery and civil-military liaison</li> <li>Evidence that partners are aware of DFID approaches and priorities including that of network enabler</li> <li>Evidence of DFID decision-making processes to inform the shift from early support to recovery</li> <li>Evidence that lessons were learnt in partner selection and program intervention choice during implementation</li> </ul>						
c) How well did DFID manage the response programme in view of the fact there was no DFID office? What contribution to decision making did the field team have?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence that DFID proactively identified and managed capacity gaps and requirements during scale-up and transitioning of programs</li> <li>Evidence that the field team contributed analysis, adaption and communication between and with partners on strategic priorities including VAWG and resilience building</li> <li>Evidence of communications and analysis with key government and non-government stakeholders for long-term interventions in the Philippines</li> <li>Evidence that assessments, monitoring and support by the field team considered partners' capacities, previous performance and sustainability</li> </ul>						
d) How do Value for Money considerations affect programmatic decision-making? How did DFID and partners take into account VFM in their decision making process? What is the evidence on VFM of specific partners/interventions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of a shared understanding of VFM between and amongst partners</li> <li>Evidence that VFM (speed, quality and cost) thinking influenced partners' strategic decision-making and partnership decisions</li> <li>Evidence on speed, quality, cost considerations for a subset of partners/interventions</li> <li>Evidence of gains in the 3Es, both qualitative and quantitative (note that this will likely be in the form of case studies, subject to partners having collected data and done such analysis)</li> </ul>						

## Annex 10: Persons interviewed

<b>Manila</b>		
<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Vilma Cabrera	Assistant Secretary - reports to Corazon (Dinky) Soliman)	DSWD
Remedios Endencia	Regional Planning Director (in charge recovery and rehabilitation)	NEDA
David Carden	Head of Office	OCHA
Fe Kagahastian	Cash Coordinator	OCHA
Rowena Dacsig	Gender focal point	OCHA
Ms Amor Dela Cruz	Staff	OCD, NDRMMC
Maria Moita	Shelter Programme Officer	IOM, Manila
Eilish Hurley	Assoc. Protection Officer	UNHCR
Lotta Sylvanda	Head of Office	UNICEF
Anthea Moore	Reporting specialist	UNICEF
Klaus Beck	Head of Mission	UNFPA
Julie Hall	Representative	WHO
Dr. Lester Geroy	Head Cebu Office; Head Policy	WHO
Martin Bettelley	Deputy Country Director	WFP
Praveen Agarwal	Country Director	WFP
Justin Morgan	Country Director	Oxfam
Asif Ahmad	Ambassador	UK Embassy
Trevor Lewis	Deputy Head of Mission	UK Embassy
Richard Edwards	UK representative/Director	Asian Development Bank
Richard Bolt	Country Director	Asian Development Bank
Christopher Wensley	ADB Consultant on Haiyan	Asian Development Bank
Anne Orquiza	Portfolio Manager	DFAT
Luke Myers	Head, bilateral programme	Embassy of Canada
David Sevcik	Head of Office	ECHO
Donna McSkimming, Karl Isomaa, Lou Talamayan	Staff Phil Red Cross	Red Cross – IFRC, BRC
Jerome Lanit	Region 8 Coordinator	CARE
Ted Bopin	DRM specialist	Christian Aid
Ned Olney	Country Director	Save the Children
Jonathan Price	Chief Technical Adviser	ILO
<b>Tacloban and Haiyan-affected areas</b>		
Kasper Engborg	Former Head of Office	OCHA Tacloban, Guiuan
Christie Bacal	AAP specialist	OCHA, Tacloban
Sylvie Hall	CP Coordinator	UNICEF Ormoc
Maulid Warfa	Head of Office	UNICEF, Tacloban
Simone Klawitter	WASH team leader	UNICEF, Tacloban
Becca Pankhurst	Head of Office	UNICEF Mindanao Office
Manuel Pereira	Deputy Country Manager, Shelter	IOM, Tacloban
Conrad Natividad	National Officer, CCM	IOM Tacloban
Connie Tangara	Ops Coordinator, CCM	IOM Tacloban
Brad Molliker	Regional Coordinator	IOM, Guiuan
Arshad Raja Hashid	Head, sub-office	IOM Roxas City
Dr. Lester Geroy	Head	WHO Cebu City

Dr. Deith Santos, Dr. Pat Angos, Dr. Beth Espinosa, Ms Josephine Montecillo	EINSC training group	WHO, Cebu City
Allison Gocotano	National Officer, regional team lead	WHO Tacloban City
Gustavo	FSL Programme Manager	Save the Children, Tacloban
Marissa Mongue	Protection Officer	PNP Women and Children Protection Desk, WCPD, Tacloban
Danielle Lustig	Humanitarian Programme Director	Oxfam, Tacloban (and Quezon City)
Catherine Green	Accountability Manager	World Vision, Tacloban
Bernadetta Anzale-Tejada	Programme Manager	World Vision, Estancia Office
Rey Gozon	Asst Regional Director	RDRRMC, Tacloban
Arvin Monge	PDRMCO	PDRMC, Palo Leyte
Felipe Padual	DRRM Officer	Guiuan Municipality
Vivian	Administrator/Accountant	DRRM Roxas City
Emma	Training Coordinator	DRRM Roxas City
Ciriaco Tolibao	Haiyan Disaster Coordinator	DRRMO, Ormoc City
Baltz	Provincial DRRM Officer	PDRRMO, Cebu City
Gloria Enriquez-Fabrigas	OIC	Tacloban City Social Welfare Dept.
Dr. Ophelia Absen	Provincial Health Officer and Head Leyte Provincial Hospital	Palo, Leyte Provincial Hospital
Anna Gacita	OIC, DSWD; Assistant to Mrs Cunanan, DSWD Head Field office	DSWD Field Office, Guiuan
Rene S. Cordero	Mayor	Office of the Mayor, Estancia
Jenifer Furgay	Area Coordinator	CARE, Tacloban
Melanie Hargreaves	Emergency project officer	Christian Aide, Leyte
Alex Sasha	IOC and Shelter Delegate	IFRC, Tacloban
Richard Sandison	Emergency Programme Manager	Plan International, Tacloban
Katie Tong	Former staff	Plan International, Borongan
Reuben (with Jay, Comms Mgr, Jasmine , grant administration)	Acting Office Manager and Field Coordinator	Save the Children, Estancia
Nicolas Moran	Programme manager	Solidarities, Tacloban City
Mark Peter Francisco	Coordinator	Solidarities, Roxas City
Isabelle Ordonez	Head of Office	ACF Roxas
Irene Cabrera and Jesus	staff	ACF Tacloban
Teresita Garcia	Barangay Captain	Barangay 59 Tacloban
Noel Martinez	Barangay Captain	Brgy 52, Magallnes, Tacloban
Mark Gonzales	Pres Assoc Brgy Captains (assistant to Mayor Christopher Sheen Gonzales)	Mayor's Office, Guiuan
Noel Pablito	Barangay Captain	Brgy 2 Giporlos, E Samar
Eduardo Nazario	Barangay Captain	Caguhangin, Ormoc
Bidua	Barangay Captain	Brgy 78, Marasbaras , Tacloban
Julien Bonito, Dynasty Are; Jasra Narzico	Barangay Councillors and Secretary	Nipa Concepcion Municipality, Panay
<b>INGO and Consortium HQ Interviews</b>		
Robert Cruickshank	Regional Emergency Coordinator	CAFOD
Solitaire Morton	Humanitarian Programme Coordinator	CARE Int. UK

Coree Steadman	Reg Emergency Mgr, Asia	Christian Aid, London
Louisa Woollen	Programme Officer	Handicap International, UK
Adam Komorowski	Commercial Director	Mines Action Group (not RRF)
Ross O'Sullivan	Sr. Humanitarian Adviser	Concern (not selected RRF)
Nick Ward	Programme Funding Officer	Oxfam
Savila Garg	Consortium lead	Plan International
Paul Godfred	Regional program, Thailand	HelpAge Int. (not RRF)
Lucy Brockie	Humanitarian Response Officer	Save the Children
Teresa Hanley	Team Leader	VALID International
Mark Bulpitt	Head, Hum'nitarian & Resilience Team	World Vision
<b>DFID and CHASE</b>		
Alison Girdwood	Evaluation Adviser, Head of ESG	DFID
Kate Foster	Deputy Director CHASE OT	CHASE
Dylan Winder	Head CHASE response	CHASE
Jack Jones	Humanitarian Response Manager	CHASE
Andy Wheatley	Humanitarian Adviser	CHASE
Kate Hart	Humanitarian Adviser	CHASE
Fergus McBean	Preparedness and Response Adviser	CHASE
Peter D'Souza	Economics Adviser; VfM specialist	DFID
Jo Philipot	Humanitarian Adviser	CHASE
John Adlam	Head, CHASE Operations Team	CHASE
Claire Devlin	Learning Adviser	CHASE
Andrew Jordan	Program Mgt HRG	CHASE
Rob Whitby	Reconstruction Adviser	DFID
<b>Participatory Interest Group Discussions (PIGDs)</b>		
As discussed in Annex 8, 51 PIGDs were conducted, covering urban and peri-urban barangays, rural barangays, coastal barangays and two island barangays. These included barangays affected by the storm surge as well as those affected only by the super typhoon strength winds and rain.		

## Annex 11: Documents consulted

No	Document Title	Author / Agency	Date
<b>A. From Inception Phase Literature Review</b>			
01	DFID Lessons Review	DFID	Mar 2014
02	DEC Response Review	DEC	Apr 2014
03	WV CFS Evaluation Report	World Vision	Mar 2014
04	IASC Centrality of Protection Statement	IASC	Dec 2013
05	RAY	GoP	Dec 2013
06	AA RTE	Actionaid	Mar 2014
07	MIRA	OCHA	Nov 2013
08	UNICEF RTE	UNICEF	Jul 2014
09	OCHA Periodic Monitoring Report	OCHA	Apr 2014
10	ICAI Inception report	ICAI	Mar 2014
11	ICAI Review	ICAI	Mar 2014
12	ACF RTE	ACF	Dec 2013
13	Final Puzzle piece Commitments (VAWG Call to Action Summit)	Various	Nov 2013
14	OPR Summary	OCHA	Jan 2014
15	BRC Review	British Red Cross	Oct 2014
16	Vulnerable Person and Inclusion Messaging	Handicap Intl	Nov 2013
17	Vulnerability Criteria	Protection Cluster	Mar 2014
18	Save the Children Review	Save the Children	Feb 2014
19	SRP	OCHA / HCT	Dec 2013
20	Rapid info, comms and accountability assessment	CwC WG	Jan 2014
21	Multi-cluster needs assessment	OCHA	Dec 2013
22	Affected communities consultations	OCHA	Nov 2014
23	Quality and accountability in Yolanda	LWR / CWS-A/P	Feb 2014
24	EDGs AAP Plan of Action	HCT	
25	New Approach to Emergency Response fails women and girls	Refugees Int	Jun 2014
26	MoD Review	MoD	
27	DFID MTR	DFID	
28	IAHE	IASC	
29	OPR Full Report	Various	
30	UKMed Report		
<b>B. Other Documents</b>			
31	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) final – Build Back Better	NEDA, GoP	Dec 2013
32	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda – Implementation for Results	NEDA, GoP	August 2014
33	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment	OCD, GoP	April 2014
34	Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP)	OPARR, GoP	August 2014
35	The Philippine Development Plan 2011 – 2016 – mid-term update	NEDA, GoP	August 2014
36	The Local Government Code of the Philippines	GoP	1999
37	Republic Act 101211 – Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System	GoP	27 July 2009
38	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR)	DFID	March

			2011
39	DFID's Approach to Value for Money	DFID	July 2011
40	Value for Money in Humanitarian Programming	DFID CHASE	?
41	Humanitarian response funding guidelines for NGOs	DFID	?
42	Rapid Response Facility Guidelines	DFID	?
43	Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan response	Valid International	Oct 2014
44	Business Case and Intervention Summary for an emergency humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan	DFID	Nov 2013
45	CDAC Network: Typhoon Haiyan Learning Review	CDAC Network	Nov 2014
46	Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Bulletin January – June 2014	OCHA	June 2014
47	Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Bulletin September 2014	OCHA	Sept 2014
48	Real-time evaluation of UNICEF's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines	UNICEF	July 2014
49	UNICEF Evaluation Brief 2014/4	UNICEF	Sept 2014
50	One Year After Typhoon Haiyan	UNICEF	Dec 2014
51	British Red Cross: Typhoon Haiyan response and Recovery process Review	British Red Cross	October 2014
52	Improving Impact: Do accountability mechanisms deliver results	Christian Aid and Save the Children	June 2013
53	Recovery Shelter support for Affected Populations by Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) – interim report to DFID	IOM	31 July 2014
54	Monitoring results from EMOP 200631: Assistance to the people affected by Super Typhoon Haiyan	WFP	2014
<b>C. DFID Monitoring Reports</b>			
55	CARE-led consortium, with Save, AFC and Merlin. Monitoring Report 1.	CARE	Dec 2013
56	RRF CARE international. Annex C -Real-time results report; Annex D Final Report	CARE	Dec 2013
57	Rapid Emergency Assistance to Typhoon Haiyan-Affected Communities and Vulnerable Groups In Eastern Samar, Leyte, and Palawan Through Cash Programming Linked To Livelihoods Restoration – mid-point report	Christian Aid	15/16 Sept 2014
58	Rapid Emergency Assistance to Typhoon Haiyan-Affected Communities and Vulnerable Groups In Eastern Samar, Leyte, and Palawan Through Cash Programming Linked To Livelihoods Restoration – Intervention Review Sheet	Christian Aid	June 2014
59	Rapid emergency assistance to typhoon-affected communities in Samar & Panay Islands, Philippines – monitoring report	Christian Aid	Feb 2014
60	Emergency and recovery support to restart fisheries, aquaculture and post-harvest livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency, and to build the resilience of small-scale fisherfolk in Regions severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan – mid-term report	FAO	Sept 2014
61	Emergency support to promote household food security and early recovery of sustainable livelihoods of small-scale coconut farmers severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan – mid-term report	FAO	Sept 2014



62	Rapid emergency assistance to typhoon-affected communities in Samar and Panay Islands	Habitat for Humanity	Feb 2014
63	Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda emergency response – monitoring report	Help Age	Nov 2013
64	IOM Shelter Yolanda Response – routine mid-point monitoring report	IOM	June 2014
65	IOM Shelter Support for Affected Populations of the Typhoon Haiyan – Interview Review Sheet	IOM	June 2014
66	IOM Shelter region 6 - routine monitoring report	IOM	Sept 2014
67	Emergency Assistance to Cyclone Haiyan/Yolanda affected communities – monitoring report	Oxfam	Nov 2013
68	Plan International, World Vision International, and International Organisation for Migration and UNOCHA - <i>Pamati Kita</i> (Let's Listen Together) Project: An Accountability to Affected Populations and Communicating with Communities Common Services Project- mid-point report	PLAN	Sept 2014
69	Emergency Education Provision for children and families affected by Typhoon Haiyan in Leyte Province, Philippines. Mid-point Report	Save the Children	June 2014
70	Supporting resilient children in school: Child Centred PSS and DRR Education in Panay – mid-term monitoring report	Save the Children	9 Sept 2014
71	Supporting resilient children in school: Child centred Psycho-social Support and Disaster Risk Reduction Education in Panay – mid-term review	Save the Children	30 Sept 2014
72	Supporting Food Security and Livelihood needs of households affected by Typhoon Yolanda in Leyte. Mid-point Report	Save the Children	15 Sept 2014
73	Early Recovery and Livelihood activities in inland municipalities of Leyte Province, region VIII, Philippines – mid-term monitoring report	Solidarities	Sept 2014
74	UNHCR Protection Cluster Coordination and Emergency Protection Assistance for People Affected by Typhoon Haiyan - Final Monitoring Review	UNHCR	July 2014
75	(i) Access to Quality Education for Children affected by Typhoon Haiyan (ii) Provision of Critical Preventive and Life-Saving Nutrition Interventions to Nutrition Vulnerable Populations affected by Typhoon Haiyan; (iii) Ensuring Access to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Children and Families affected by Typhoon Haiyan	UNICEF	March 2014
76	Essential Health Care Delivery to the Population Affected by Typhoon Haiyan – mid-point review	WHO	July 2014
77	Rapid emergency assistance to typhoon-affected communities in Samar & Panay Islands – monitoring report	World Vision	Feb 2014
78	RRF interim reports and monitoring follow-up	All RRF agencies	Jan 2014

## Annex 12: Fieldwork Itinerary

The following table sets out the evaluation team's field itinerary for fieldwork conducted between 11 and 31 January 2015.


<b>Sunday 11 January</b>	<b>Monday 12 January</b>	<b>Tuesday 13 January</b>	<b>Wednesday 14 January</b>	<b>Thursday 15 January</b>	<b>Friday 16 January</b>	<b>Saturday 17 January</b>
Team arrives Manila	Team meeting on study instruments.	KII Meeting UK Embassy – Deputy Head of Mission. Team meeting finalising study instruments.	KII Meetings Manila – DFAT (AusAID); OCHA; WHO; Christian Aid; UNFPA; Save the Children;	Meetings not possible – public holiday due to Papal visit	KII Meetings Manila – Oxfam; UNICEF; UNHCR	Team discussions
<b>Sunday 18 January</b>	<b>Monday 19 January</b>	<b>Tuesday 20 January</b>	<b>Wednesday 21 January</b>	<b>Thursday 22 January</b>	<b>Friday 23 January</b>	<b>Saturday 24 January</b>
Travel to Tacloban. Team logistics	KII Meetings in Tacloban – OCHA; IOM (accountability); IOM (CCM); UNICEF (Cebu Child protection Office); Christian Aid;	KII Meetings in Tacloban – WHO; CARE; PNP - Women Protection Unit; IFRC;	KII Meetings in Tacloban – Provincial Dept Health, Palo, Leyte; Sagkahan Elementary School; INGO -Solidarities; Oxfam;	KII Meetings in Tacloban – IOM (Shelter; distribution); UNICEF (WASH); Plan International	KII Meetings in Tacloban – Regional OCD (RDRRMO); Prov DRRMO; World Vision; ACF; Save the Children (VfM); City social welfare Dept.	KII – DRRM Ormoc (Haiyan Response Coordinator)
Team orientation on Study Instruments			PIGDs and KIIs - Save the Children project site, Alang Alang	PIGD and KII - IFRC project site. Brgy. Pongso, Barugo, Tacloban City;	PIGD and KII - WHO site barangay 1 Magallanes 52, Tacloban City	PIGD and KII - CARE project site, food and emergency shelter, Cagbuhangin , Ormoc; IOM site, b'gy 59, Tacloban

<b>Sunday 25 January</b>	<b>Monday 26 January</b>	<b>Tuesday 27 January</b>	<b>Wednesday 28 January</b>	<b>Thursday 29 January</b>	<b>Friday 30 January</b>	<b>Saturday 31 January</b>
Team travel to various sites – Ormoc, Roxas, Tacloban, Manila	Travel to Guiuan; Cebu; Estancia. KII Meetings – Guiuan municipality; Estancia – LGU, World Vision. Solidarities, Roxas City.	KIIs –Roxas City - ACF, DRRM, IOM. Cebu Provincial DRRMO.	KII Meetings Guiuan – Municipality, MSWD; Barangay Captains; IOM. Estancia - Save the Children	KII Meetings Tacloban - ADB	Team Meeting at SDS Office	Team departs Manila
PIGDs and KIIs - Christian Aid project site in Maricom, Dulag Leyte; WHO project site b'gy 78, Marasbaras, Tacloban	PIGDs and KIIs – Save the children site, Tabanok, Villaba, Ormoc, west Leyte.	PIGDs and KIIs – B'gy 3, Giporlos E Samar; B'gy Trinidad Guiuan (island).	PIGDs and KIIs – Bgy Nipa, Estancia, Iloilo; Bantayan, north Cebu; San Remigio, north Cebu		PIGDs and KIIs – barangay Dalipdip, Altavas, Aklan; IOM project b'rgy Altabas, Katiklan, Iloilo	PIGDs and KIIs – SCI project b'rgy Lantangan, Gigante island, Iloilo;
		KIIs Manila – IOM (shelter); NEDA;	KIIs Manila – WHO; Canadian Aid; IFRC/PRC/BRC; WFP.OCHA, CARE	KIIs Manila – ECHO; OCHA ; OCD -NDRRMC	KII DWSD Quezon City; Tel KII ILO	

## Annex 13: The Ruby Epilogue – a spin on learning

Typhoon Hagupit (locally known as Ruby) made landfall over the northern half of Eastern Samar on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2014, killing 18 people and causing widespread damage but without reaching anywhere near the devastation caused by Yolanda. The path of Hagupit was north of the Haiyan path so while some communities were hit by both others remained on the outskirts of the corridors of either.

**Figure 2: Map of the path of Typhoon Hagupit**



There were some clear consequences – both positive and negative – from Haiyan that became apparent in Hagupit. As discussed in the analysis under both evaluation questions 2 and 3, there was a distinct difference in response to the threat of Typhoon Hagupit with those in the potential target line being more prepared to evacuate when requested by local authorities, particularly from low lying areas where in the past residents had not evacuated as they did not perceive the danger was real enough, even though warned. In addition, both the local governments and private households were better prepared with stocks of food and other necessities (cell phones fully charged, batteries, tarps etc.).

On the negative side, however, as discussed under evaluation question 2, the experience of the national government in the L3 response to Haiyan in being sidelined and bypassed, was clearly if silently articulated when the government ensured that absolutely all control over Hagupit – both actual and in terms of visibility – was retained by the government. Requests for assistance were both extremely limited and specific. According to UNICEF, WFP was asked for logistics assistance but not food; UNHCR was asked for limited relocation assistance; and WHO was asked for limited commodity assistance. Respondents reported that the government wanted to both be in control and to be seen to be in control, by Filipino people and international partners alike. Some view the government refusal to ask for assistance as an absolute that is unlikely to change in the future except for the most dire and devastating of disasters, and that this is a direct consequence of the treatment the government felt they received during Haiyan. This potentially introduces a challenge of when the international system might force assistance onto a MIC government that is reluctant to accept it, irrespective of local capacity and how that might play out.

In contrast, a very positive outcome of the Haiyan experience was seen through the lasting effects of the AAP/CwC processes. This in fact was likely possible only due to the fact that AAP/CwC is not a cluster and operated instead as a working group. This meant that when clusters were deactivated and disbanded, the AAP/CwC working group as a community of practice remained and continued to meet. Ironically, the continued success of AAP could potentially lead to formalising the AAP modalities, such as into a cluster, at

which point future disasters would no longer reap the longer-lasting benefits of more informalised WG mechanisms which remain after formalised clusters are deactivated. In the initial 48-hour period after Hagupit, the AAP/CwC working group was said to be the only international form of coordination, given that there was no request for assistance from the government. This working group was activated in both Tacloban and in Borangan, which was near to the typhoon landfall, and used as a coordination and information hub for international actors and local government actors alike.