



# **Monitoring and Evaluation for the DFID Somalia 2013-2017 Humanitarian Programme**

## **A Catalyst for Change and Results?**

### **DFID's Approach to the 2013 – 2017 Humanitarian Programme in Somalia**

**Final Report (Draft)**

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## Abbreviations & Acronyms

<b>ACF</b>	Action Contre Faim	<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring & Evaluation
<b>BRCiS</b>	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia	<b>MEAL</b>	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability & Learning (SNS M&E Model)
<b>D&amp;A Report</b>	Data and Analysis Report	<b>MoH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>Business Case</b>	The Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 7	<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>CAP</b>	Consolidated Appeal Process	<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>CAS</b>	Complex Adaptive Systems	<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>CESVI</b>	Cooperazione e Sviluppo Onlus	<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>CERF</b>	Central Emergency Response Fund	<b>PoP</b>	Principles of Partnership
<b>CHF</b>	Common Humanitarian Fund	<b>Programme</b>	Somalia Humanitarian Programme 2013 – 2017
<b>CMU</b>	Consortium Management Unit	<b>RME</b>	Research, Monitoring & Evaluation
<b>CSI</b>	Coping Strategy Index	<b>RTE</b>	Real-time Evaluation
<b>DAC</b>	Development Co-operation Directorate (OECD)	<b>SAM</b>	Severe Acute Malnutrition
<b>DFID</b>	The United Kingdom Department for International Development	<b>SES</b>	Social Ecological Systems
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo	<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual Gender Based Violence
<b>EC</b>	European Commission	<b>SomReP</b>	Somalia Resilience Programme
<b>EQs</b>	Evaluation Questions	<b>SNS</b>	Strengthening Nutrition Security in South Central Somalia (Nutrition Consortium)
<b>FAO</b>	The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation	<b>Transtec</b>	Third party contractor charged with leading independent suite of M&E services
<b>FCS</b>	Food Consumption Score	<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>FEWS NET</b>	Famine Early Warning System Network	<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>FSNAU</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia	<b>UIC</b>	Union of Islamic Courts
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>HCT</b>	Humanitarian Country Team	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>Humanitarian Programme</b>	Somalia Humanitarian Programme 2013 – 2017	<b>UNOSOM</b>	United Nations Operation in Somalia
<b>IASC</b>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross	<b>UNICEF</b>	The United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People	<b>VfM</b>	Value for Money
<b>IEG</b>	Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)	<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
<b>ICT</b>	Information Communications Technology	<b>WFP</b>	The United Nations World Food Programme
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Governmental Organisation	<b>UNJSR</b>	United Nations Joint Strategy for Resilience
<b>IRF</b>	Internal Risk Facility	<b>USA</b>	United States of America

## 1. Executive Summary

The United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development's (DFID) has conducted an initial programmatic evaluation of the Somalia 2013 – 2017 Humanitarian Programme. The scope of this Evaluation is from the establishment of DFID's Business Case to December 2014. While originally conceived as a "Real time Evaluation" in the Terms of Reference, the Evaluation went beyond this scope in the data collected, its analysis, and how these pinpoint issues for both short-term and long-term programming.

The Evaluation's objective is review how DFID has designed and established the Programme and how partners have worked together (and with DFID) to develop designs and activities. This is important given that many partners have come together specifically as part of DFID's multi-year funding approach, specifically the Strengthening Nutrition Security in South Central Somalia (SNS), Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) consortium, and the United Nations Joint Resilience Strategy that includes FAO, UNICEF and WFP. These and related activities, especially regarding partnership, knowledge sharing, flexibility and adaptability, and other organisational dynamics have a direct influence on how partners work individually and collectively toward results. The Evaluation focuses on the the following primary evaluation questions:

- ✓ Is the programme approach relevant given the humanitarian needs and context in Somalia? (Relevance)
- ✓ How coherent are the programmatic elements of the portfolio? (Coherence)
- ✓ Do activities, projects and expected outputs adequately address longer-term humanitarian, governance, and partnership issues within Somalia? (Connectedness)
- ✓ Is the work on value for money by partners sufficient for achieving economy, effectiveness and efficiency going forward? (Efficiency)
- ✓ To what extent does multi-year humanitarian funding improve outcomes for those in need of humanitarian assistance? (Effectiveness)

Answering these and related sub-questions<sup>1</sup> provides the basis for analysing programmatic processes and how they relate to partner performance. This Report compares different data sets to establish trends based on what can be demonstrated from relevant evidence and from what can be presumed given comparative analysis and subject matter expert opinion.

The DFID Somalia Business Case 2013 – 2017 reflects the convergence of issues related to how humanitarian aid was delivered prior to, during and after the 2011 – 2012 famine In Somalia. It reflects a new UK policy approach that includes anticipation, resilience, innovation, leadership, accountability, partnership, and the need to maximise the limited humanitarian access that exists in Somalia. It intends to serve the people most in need in Somalia, to use resilience to bring them out of chronic need, and to do so while altering the way humanitarian action is done.

The Somalia 2013 – 2017 Humanitarian Programme commits to multi-year funding and the new approach encapsulated in the Business Case. 32% of its support is committed to resilience programming. 42% is committed to consortia of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and United Nations (UN) organisations with a balance between resilience and life saving activities. It includes an Emergencies and Rapid Response Facility of over £11 million that provides early funding to stave off the worst aspects of an emergency. It includes 3.8% of the overall Programme value invested into a suite of monitoring and

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<sup>1</sup> All evaluation questions are included in the Annexes.

evaluation approaches and tools, including mobile data collection technology and on-line platform for monitoring analysis and decision-making. The Programme is nothing short of ambitious. It combines different programming approaches, funding periods, and accountability standards that should enable partners to work more effectively.

### *Relevance*

The Business Case reflects the context and needs in Somalia and stands as a relevant case for changing the way humanitarian aid is delivered to the most vulnerable Somalis. However, the intervention logic associated with the Theory of Change does not adequately reflect the context in Somalia and the expectations associated with new UK policies and guidance for humanitarian action.

Partners are positive about the relevance of the Humanitarian Programme. They see it as relevant to improved delivery times, partnerships, targeting, innovation, adaptive/responsive project management, policy leverage, and links to government. Community engagement and long time experience in Somalia are also noted as points of relevance for partner programmes.

### *Coherence*

Policies, procedures, and approaches are largely complementary. The INGO consortia have done joint planning and are required to have a single budget. For UN organisations, constraints are noted for planning and reporting although there is a growing coherence between them and how they work together.

Most partners state that procedures for budgeting, planning, monitoring, evaluations and reporting are complementary amongst themselves and with DFID. Through the work of the third party contractor, there is also an emerging coherence across monitoring definitions, data collection standards, and analytical approaches.

There is a fairly standard way that partners define resilience that includes how individuals, households and communities anticipate, withstand and recover from climatic and conflict-based shocks. This is substantively the same as how DFID defines resilience in the context of disasters.

Other cross-cutting issues do not have the same level of coherence/consistency. Gender equality, while addressed in most project designs, does not include a clear, common definition. Nor is there consistent use of the Gender Marker or other common tools. Community engagement is so loosely defined as to include nearly any engagement with individuals, households, and communities. While not a prominent feature of programme designs, climate change and the environment also lack common definitions.

### *Connectedness*

The Humanitarian Programme includes inherent connectedness given how resilience programming is interwoven into different consortia approaches and how these link to immediate life-saving activities. The Programme thus has diverse approach to how life-saving activities interlink with resilience given different programme approaches, locations, and populations. Connectedness to other actors, such as the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) or to civil society and local and federal government are less distinct. Making such links may be premature. The Programme represents innovative ways of combining different actors and programme approaches. The possibility for demonstrating the effectiveness of these approaches could be compromised by making links to other complicated systems, like those associated with the HCT,

and with other local and federal government actors who are not yet fully sustainable in the context of Somalia.

### *Efficiency*

DFID's general approach to Value for Money (VfM) for the Humanitarian Programme is grounded in practical approaches to economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness. It seeks a limited number of discrete indicators for overall VfM. While this is limited analytically it is probably what is most feasible given partner resources and commitments.

Partners express satisfaction with how DFID has worked with them to incorporate VfM principles, approaches and tools into their work. They appreciate how DFID's approach is complementary to their own, even if they don't always fit. Many respondents directly involved in VfM demonstrate knowledge of how economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness support programme outcomes.

The complexity of humanitarian programming, especially resilience, requires a more systemic approach to measuring the cost effectiveness. There are ample models and they could be adapted for the Programme.

### *Effectiveness*

Effectiveness includes issues that can support or constrain expected results. This includes the design and coordination of programmes, projects and activities, the partnerships that support these, how partners work with DFID, and how DFID's support to monitoring and evaluation may lead to increased responsiveness, more informed decision making, and better results overall. Importantly, effectiveness should be enhanced by opportunities associated with DFID's multi-year funding approach.

Programme designs largely include approaches and activities that can be found in most humanitarian programming. At this stage, there does not seem to be any distinct features that represent the opportunities associated with four-year programming. The INGO nutrition consortium does aim to research the underlying causes of malnutrition in Somalia and yet this is not wholly different from what they do elsewhere. In the UN Joint Strategy for Resilience, partner designs are only integrated in that they operate in the same geographic areas (although even here this is not always the case). There is little indication that these programmes have any designs or approaches that capitalise on multi-year funding. The INGO resilience consortium approaches combines different activities in novel ways and based on a four-year term. Yet, the elements, the actual activities, are largely the same as they would be in other programmes.

Partners say that multi-year funding supports different approaches to community engagement. Yet, community engagement is essential to most approaches and designs, multi-year funding or not. It is prevalent in humanitarian activities globally. This is not a valid difference. It may be that partners are doing more community engagement than would be possible normally yet the impact of this, if true, is unclear at this point.

Multi-year funding has increased opportunities for partnership, especially in the consortia. While linking partnership to results remains uncertain, there is enough promise to expect that partnership will have a positive impact. There does not seem to be, at this early phase of the Programme, much cross-partnership between the consortia or other organisations who are part of the Humanitarian Programme.

The Emergencies and Rapid Response Facility stands as an innovative approach for ensuring that funding is available prior to when an emergency reaches maturity. This is important in the context of Somalia. The

delays in responding to early warnings, amongst other things, led to the 2011 - 2012 famine and 260,000 deaths. This Facility seeks to remedy this by providing an allocation of funds that can be used according to agreed upon early warnings and triggers. Partners appreciate this. They also see the management of the Facility as effective. They state that allocation decisions and disbursements are done quickly. Some also see the Facility as “filling a gap” rather than as a strict pool of resources for responding to emergencies early. DFID could tighten the controls for the Facility to ensure that it is used as intended rather than to meet partners’ budget shortfalls.

The inclusion of a third party contract for monitoring and evaluation services is both an innovation for humanitarian programming and a way of supporting reform across the humanitarian system. If successful, it will provide an on-line platform that will include near “real time” data from partner activities. This data will show which partners are doing what where and for whom and key performance proxies about life saving activities and resilience. This will enable partners to understand which approaches and innovations have the most positive impact. It will also give DFID an effective and timely way to monitor partner performance and results.

Partners have expressed dissatisfaction with how the monitoring and evaluation support was communicated and are still not clear what benefits it may provide. There are some indications that partners are wary of exerting resources on this when they have their own internal monitoring challenges.

Inherent to the Humanitarian Programme is a close working relationship between DFID and partners. The working relationship with DFID is strong and based on mutual respect and an appreciation of the knowledge and experience that DFID brings to the partnership. Partners see DFID as a strategic partner and one that can facilitate and improve how they deliver their programmes. Respondents are also frustrated. The resources that go into complying with an inordinate number of information requests diverts limited resources from other on-going work. It becomes difficult to prioritise. Partners inevitably give the minimal required attention to such requests, often assigning the completion of such requests to insufficiently experienced staff members. This may lead to a diminishing quality in the level of information that is subsequently provided to DFID.

### Conclusion

This Evaluation demonstrates few issues that may impede results going forward. Implementing partners largely understand the Humanitarian Programme’s approach and agree with its objectives and principles. Most are highly committed to doing business differently. While programme designs are not much different from what one would expect to see in other annually-funded humanitarian contexts, these may be adapted or proven effective because they are being implemented over multiple years. The increased support of third party monitoring and evaluation, largely accepted by partners as a new way of doing business, will support such programme adaptations and improvements. Thus, the programme is poised to be a catalyst for change should serve the most vulnerable Somalis while enabling partners to improve how they work.

## Recommendations

The following list includes abbreviated versions of the recommendations from this Evaluation. For the full versions, refer to Section 9 “Recommendations” and the noted section of the Report.

### Relevance

1. To increase its overall relevance, a different approach to the Theory of Change is required. This should address the uncertainty and volatility that has characterised humanitarian action in Somalia for 20 years and that will likely characterise it going forward. (Section 4.1.1)

### Coherence

2. Partners should develop a common definition of what community engagement means and the primary programmatic elements it includes. This definition should be common to both UN, INNGO, and other organisations funded by DFID. (Section 5.1.1)
3. Partners should develop a common definition and possible approaches for how they address gender equality. This definition should be common to both UN, INNGO, and other organisations funded by DFID. (Section 5.1.1)
4. Increase opportunities to draw on the definitions, policies and approaches used by OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC, and the CHF. These organisations are largely treated as separate to the UN and INGO consortia approaches. DFID is placed to facilitate this best.

### Efficiency

5. Develop a set of ratios and systemic-based indicators to gauge the effectiveness of resilience. These should draw on common models, best practices, and literature, related to financial management and complex adaptive systems. (Section 7.1.1)

### Effectiveness

6. Develop metrics for measuring community engagement and how this contributes to better results for beneficiaries. This may include an analysis of different community engagement methods and their advantages, disadvantages, constraints, opportunities and risks. (Section 8.1.2)
7. Investigate the potential “return” associated with longer start-up times that have occurred given the multi-year funding approach. (Section 8.1.2)
8. Ensure that IRF allocations are based on formal early warning and triggers rather than gaps in funding and/or budget shortfalls. (Section 8.1.2)
9. DFID should limit information requests to those that are directly pertinent to partner performance and results. Ad hoc information requests should be limited, if not eliminated. (Section 8.1.3)
10. Have a detailed plan for how M&E system will achieve core objectives and functionality. DFID should ensure that the third party M&E contractor focuses on key functionality and data collection before entertaining any additional functionality. (Section 8.1.4)

## 2. Methodology

### 2.1. Objective & Scope

DFID is conducting an evaluation (Evaluation) of the design and set-up of the Somalia Humanitarian Programme 2013 – 2017 (Humanitarian Programme; Programme). While originally conceived as a “Real time Evaluation” in the Terms of Reference, the Evaluation went beyond this scope in the data collected, its analysis, and how these pinpoint issues for both short-term and long-term programming. The scope of this Evaluation is from the establishment of DFID’s Business Case to December 2014.

The Evaluation’s objective is to collect and analyse relevant data associated with how DFID has designed and established the Programme, how partners have been identified and partnerships established, and how partners have worked together (and with DFID) to develop programme designs and activities. This provides a basis for analysing process and partner performance going forward.

The Evaluation abides by common standards for evaluations of this type including DFID’s “International Development Evaluation Policy.”<sup>2</sup> It also uses methodologies and tools for the collection and analysis of qualitative evidence that support evidence-based approaches to analysing subjective behaviours and attitudes that are integral to this Evaluation’s subject.

Because of the nature of the evaluation and affiliated evaluation questions, the focus is on the International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO) Consortiums and the United Nations Joint Strategy for Resilience. UNHCR, OCHA, ICRC, and the CHF are less engaged in partnership across the Humanitarian Programme. Their Programmes are more focused on discrete activities aligned with the Programme’s aims. Thus, they are treated less prominently than the aforementioned consortia.

### 2.2. Evaluation Questions

Primary evaluation questions include:

- ✓ Is the programme approach relevant given the humanitarian needs and context in Somalia? (Relevance)
- ✓ How coherent are the programmatic elements of the portfolio? (Coherence)
- ✓ Do activities, projects and expected outputs adequately address longer-term humanitarian, governance, and partnership issues within Somalia? (Connectedness)
- ✓ Is the work on value for money by partners sufficient for achieving economy, effectiveness and efficiency going forward? (Efficiency)
- ✓ To what extent does multi-year humanitarian funding improve outcomes for those in need of humanitarian assistance? (Effectiveness)

*Sub questions, data sources, and validation standards are included in the Annexes.*

### 2.3. Recipient


DFID is the main recipient of the Evaluation. It is also intended to support all partners engaged in the Programme. This Evaluation will be published externally and will generate learning for a wider group of DFID personnel and external stakeholders.

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<sup>2</sup> By common standards, we refer to OECD DAC, ALNAP, UNEG, and the World Bank IEG along with other research. The Evaluation also makes regular reference to “Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the OECD-DAC Criteria: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies.” Overseas Development Institute, London 2006.

## 2.4. Approach

The approach is based on systematic ways to collect and analyse data sets in different ways so that sufficient attribution can be determined. This is critical for determining evidence about subjective behaviours, attitudes and beliefs that contribute to issues of partnership, relevance, coherence, and how partners are delivering results in this early phase of the Programme. Answering these questions requires a diverse set of methodologies to get at common issues and to see how these relate to the evaluation questions. This includes assessing primary documentary evidence, comparative evidence, qualitative evidence from semi-structured interviews and surveys, e.g. precisely what people say in response to specific EQs and trends across what different cohorts say, and quantitative-based survey questions, e.g. ranking/rating questions. It also includes specific subject matter expertise to validate trends.



**Figure 1:** Convergence of Evidence

**Organisational Dynamics:** Organisational dynamics concern how different people are influenced by the places they work. Research suggests that people are highly susceptible to the linguistic, personal, social, and institutional norms prevalent in their organisations.<sup>3</sup> These can have a profound impact on how people work together to produce results. In this Evaluation, evidence for this is largely subjective as there are not yet sufficient results on the ground to demonstrate how different behaviours, attitudes, ways of working, combine to support specific results.

**Documentary Evidence:** A great deal of the evidence for this Evaluation is documentary, e.g. have partners addressed how their activities meet specific needs in Somalia, are there sufficient programmatic links, are there clear and detailed Value for Money (VfM) metrics in place, etc. Documentary evidence includes:

- Primary evidence (project design, budgets, any existing project delivery data, etc.);
- Secondary documentary evidence (reporting, research and academic treatments, etc.); and
- Comparative documentary evidence (research, reporting, and other materials from other humanitarian actors, donors, and academics working within and beyond Somalia).

**Qualitative Data:** The Evaluation uses discrete information from semi-structured interviews as a basis for establishing trends about what people say in response to specific questions. Evaluators collect summaries, phrases, and verbatim statements from respondents during interviews. These are then organised in a central database according to cohort and evaluation question. These statements are also qualified as an initial stage of analysis as being either “positive,” “neutral” or “negative.” This qualitative evidence is then analysed for common themes, subjects or issues. These then become the basis for additional analysis, including comparing them to Survey results and to documentary evidence. (See Section 3.6 below for more on the approach and use of qualitative evidence.)

**Survey Data:** A survey was designed to capture data about issues related to relevance, coherence, connectedness, and effectiveness. This survey, because of the limitations associated with surveys like this, is considered a secondary set of evidence, secondary to the qualitative evidence from semi-structured interviews, documentary evidence, and subject matter expertise.

<sup>3</sup> Dorian LaGuardia, *The Art of Organizational Dynamics: The Joys, Sorrows, and Mind-numbing Frustrations of Working with Other People*. Springer Press (forthcoming).

*Data & Analysis Report & Utilisation:* The Evaluation includes a Data & Analysis Report (D&A Report) that provides all qualitative and survey data and preliminary analysis. This was presented to stakeholders from DFID and the partners in a workshop on 2 February 2015. This gave stakeholders the chance to review these initial findings, indicate areas where further analysis may be required, and to otherwise have an opportunity to discuss what the evidence indicates. This is a primary facet of a utilisation focused evaluation that recognises the process as important as the final report for stakeholder acceptance of Evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.<sup>4</sup>

*Triangulation:* The Evaluation includes a reference marker as to whether conclusions are based on a convergence of evidence from the three primary sources, mainly documentary (D), qualitative (Q), and survey (S). This provides a shorthand of how and if all data sources were used. These are summarised as being either Grey (no data), Amber (some data), or Green (sufficient data). Examples of this include:



This example shows that there is some documentary evidence and sufficient levels of qualitative and survey data to support the conclusion.



This example shows that there is some documentary evidence, sufficient levels of survey data, and no qualitative data to support the conclusion.

## 2.5. Standards & Independence

The Evaluation’s analysis and approach adheres to the quality standards set out by the OECD DAC criteria for humanitarian evaluations.<sup>5</sup> This includes standards for independence and quality assurance, as well the use of standard evaluation levels. Ensuring that evidence supports findings, conclusions and recommendations and that their underlying analysis adheres to best practices and leading research assures independence.<sup>6</sup>

## 2.6. Structure

The Report is organised by standard OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation levels (relevance, coherence, connectedness, efficiency, and effectiveness) with corresponding evaluation questions cited in relevant sections. Conclusions and recommendations are included in each section with the recommendations repeated in a separate section towards the end of the Report. This approach conforms to this Evaluation’s Terms of Reference and subsequent Design Document.

## 2.7. Sources

The following sources provide the evidence for the Evaluation. All associated data and analysis are provided in the D&A Report included as a separate *Annex*.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Quinn Patton has published extensively on utilisation focused approaches. See Michael Quinn Patton, *Utilization-Focused Evaluations (4th Edition)*. SAGE Publications, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> See Development Assistance Committee (DAC), “Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies.” OECD, 1999.

<sup>6</sup> “Best practice” and “leading research” refer to OECD DAC, UNEG, and the World Bank IEG along with other research. These are cited as appropriate throughout the findings section.

The Evaluation includes the collection of quantitative and qualitative evidence from project management, project staff (Kenya and Somalia) and DFID staff. It does not include beneficiaries, government representatives, or stakeholders from projects beyond the Programme.

### 2.7.1. Sampling Strategy

Partners identified **186 people** relevant to the Evaluation:

	Total Number
UN	52
INGOs	110
NGOs	9
DFID	13
Other	2
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>186</b>

To identify relevant respondents, Partners were given a brief on the Evaluation’s Terms of Reference and other information about the Evaluation’s objectives, methodology, and process. These indicated that people who were involved in the project design, those working directly with DFID, and those who had insights into the constraints and opportunities associated with their early implementation were relevant. Some partners sought additional guidance and some requested a pre-selection meeting. These requests were welcome and granted.

Some partners, like the INGO consortia, had a much higher number of relevant respondents than other partners because of the nature of the consortium, e.g. that each partner had representatives that were involved in the design and management of their programmes. Others, like the UN, had fewer. In relation to local NGOs, these were identified by partners as being aware of the Programme, the work with DFID, and other aspects that made them relevant to the Evaluation.

There were some limitations associated with this sampling strategy. First, it was incumbent upon the partner to decide who was relevant. We had no way to judge these decisions nor if all relevant persons were included. Also, it did not include people who have left the partner organisations. The Evaluation focused on those currently in employment and who have immediate views on the subjects being treated by the Evaluation. Other limitations and issues are described for each source below.

### 2.7.2. Qualitative Data

**83 semi-structured interviews, or 45% of the total target population, were conducted:**

Cohort	Number of Interviews	% of Cohort Interviews	Total # in Cohort	% of Total Cohort
UN	27	33%	52	52%
BRCIS	26	31%	70	37%
SNS	15	18%	40	38%
Local NGOs	9	11%	9	100%
DFID	4	5%	13	31%
Other	2	2%	2	100%
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>45%</b>

The Evaluation had scope for up to 130 interviews across partners. In the end, the Evaluation selected **96 that were the most relevant** candidates from the different cohorts given the list of people provided by each organisation. This was based on ensuring a representation across organisations and ensuring that the people most involved in the design and early delivery of programmes were included. Every attempt was made to contact and schedule appointments with all 96 possible respondents. In the end, 83 were scheduled as indicated. There was no indication that the remaining 13 did not participate due to some perception of the Evaluation. They were simply unavailable. Of the 83 interviews, 6 were conducted via telephone. All others were face-to-face, one-to-one.

**INGOs represent more 49% of respondents** and so have more weight in calculations that include all cohorts. DFID, by contrast, is the least at 5%. This weighting is considered when conducting analysis and when relevant, UN and INGO responses are separated. DFID's comments are removed in these cases. When questions involve the Programme as whole, no separation is made. This could mean that INGO's are over-represented. Yet, they also represent a larger proportion of DFID's investment. (See Section 3 below.) Nonetheless, there is still some weighting toward INGOs that cannot be avoided given the approach, response rates, and other factors beyond the Evaluation's control.

The semi-structured interviews resulted in **1431 qualitative data points. This is approximately 17 per interview.** This represents a valid amount of data per interview. More qualitative data points represent informed respondents, those who have deeper experience or more detailed responses. In this way, expertise is captured without the risk of respondent/interviewer biases. It should be noted, therefore, that qualitative data graphs show the total number of responses and their break-out instead of the total number of respondents.

**Interviews used standard protocols**, as included in the D&A Report, with the possibility to ask additional questions relevant to the respondent. All questions are linked to specific EQs. Every interview was scheduled for 60 minutes and included one-to-one interactions, one interviewer to one respondent. Interviewers are trained to give respondents as much opportunity to speak their mind and to do so in their own terms. This means that there are few interjections by the interviewer. Instead, the interviewer focuses on recording the key points that people raise as well as the intent and context that influence these points. Interviewers then capture these in brief written statements, capturing verbatim statements as relevant. This results in a series of "bullet points" or brief statements that are then put into a central database for analysis.

There remains **a certain level of interpretation on the part of the interviewer.** Yet, as third parties, the interviewers have no stake in the issues being discussed and seldom have even a strong point of view on any issue. In any case, interviewers are trained to recognise and limit any internal biases they may have.

**Qualitative evidence is inherently messy.** Sometimes people say things that are seemingly un-related to the question. These are included from time to time and ranked according to the context and insights of the interviewer. Some data points are repeated when multiple respondents state the same thing and when they apply to different evaluation questions.

**Qualitative data points are ranked according to positive, neutral and negative.** The original interviewer does the first categorisation and then the Team Leader reviews this. Reasonable people could arrive at different rankings. However, they do reflect the insights of the evaluator who conducted the interviews who is trained to capture respondents' intents. **This is only the first stage of analysis.**

**Contextual analysis is conducted** to identify common themes and subjects from the qualitative data points. This ensures that the subjects, themes and other commonalities are derived from respondent data rather than being predetermined. This **approach is more systemic and emergent** than those generally used by with qualitative data analysis software that analyses whole transcripts of interviews and text. Inherently, these have a bias in the subjects and themes that the software then extracts from the reams of text. The

Evaluators set those variables and do so after or before the interviews. In our approach, the common subject, themes, verbiage or other data emerge from the comments themselves rather than being pre-determined.

This evidence is then compared with that from the Survey and then further assessed through documentary and relevant subject matter expertise. Findings are based on an examination of all these data sets and their strength and/or the correspondence between data sets.

Given the sampling strategy and limitations, there does not seem to be any inherent bias or uneven weighting to any one group. Analysis either presents each group as a distinct cohort and thus their overall representation is relevant or in total. In the latter, the overall representation, as a % of cohort interviews, is a fair approximation of the programme as a whole.

Further explanation, analysis and all related qualitative data is included in the D&A Report, provided as a separate *Annex*.

### 2.7.3. On-line Survey

An on-line survey was available to all 186-cohort respondents. This had a 55% response rate:

	Total Number	% of Total	Response Number	% of Cohort
<b>UN</b>	52	28%	30	58%
<b>INGOs</b>	110	59%	58	53%
<b>NGOs</b>	9	5%	7	78%
<b>DFID</b>	13	7%	6	46%
<b>Other</b>	2	1%	2	100%
<b>TOTALS:</b>	186		103	

This is sufficiently above the 30% minimum response rate noted in the Design Document for this Evaluation. This survey used both ranking/rating and open-ended questions. (See Survey Protocol in the D&A Report.) The survey was designed to compare with qualitative data from semi-structured interviews and other findings from primary and secondary documentation.

When survey graphs are represented throughout this Report, we include the number of actual respondents per question as compared to the total response rate.

## 2.8. Using Qualitative Data Graphs

Qualitative data is inherently difficult to analyse but can provide strong evidence for common behaviours, attitudes, beliefs and perspectives. It also provides insight into organisational dynamics that impact how people work together to deliver results.<sup>7</sup>

Qualitative analysis graphs demonstrate trends by categorising responses (as compared to actual respondents) to a set scale and organising them according to specific Evaluation Questions and cohorts. This is the first level of analysis. Additional content analysis is conducted in various ways to ascertain other relevant trends.

Each Qualitative Analysis Graph includes colour coded and numbered boxes for each piece of qualitative data. If there were 35 responses, as in the example below, there will be 35 corresponding boxes, with box “1” corresponding to statement “1,” box “2” to statement “2,” etc. It is expected that each question has a different number of responses—semi-structured interviews generate different numbers of responses for each subject.


Each respondent statement (data point) has been evaluated according to the following scale:

■ - Positive; achieved expected results    ■ - Neutral; Mixed results    ■ - Negative; did not achieve expected results

These rankings are subjective. They are based on the statement as confirmed by respondents and on their overall intent. Others may reasonably arrive at different conclusions.

Each qualitative data point includes identifiers as to stakeholder. Some qualitative data points are repeated as different cohorts often say precisely the same things and it is best to establish this linguistic trend. Every attempt has been made to preserve respondent’s anonymity although confidentiality cannot be assured.

### EXAMPLE:



<sup>7</sup> For a review of evidence based evaluations and the use of qualitative data, see “Evidence-based Evaluation of Development Cooperation: Possible? Feasible? Desirable?,” Kim Forss and Sara Bandstein. *Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (NONIE)*, World Bank, January 2008.

### 3. Overview of the DFID Humanitarian Programme for Somalia

The United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development’s (DFID) Somalia 2013 – 2017 Humanitarian Programme (Humanitarian Programme; Programme) aims to:

- Provide flexible multi-annual funding for humanitarian programmes specifically targeting the most vulnerable, including children and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
- Identify and target the chronically vulnerable with resilience enhancing activities designed to strengthen livelihoods and restore coping strategies and where possible to assist in the graduation away from humanitarian aid.
- Influence and promote change in the humanitarian system to ensure better coordination, responsiveness and targeting of aid; and
- Develop new and innovative ways to monitor implementation and outcomes, and building an evidence base to understand and ensure maximum impact for UK Aid.<sup>8</sup>

It is expected that this will lead to changes in the way humanitarian assistance is delivered in Somalia by:

- Responding to continued humanitarian needs in a timely manner with quality and well-targeted assistance; **(results)**
- Building resilience of Somalia’s chronic caseload of vulnerable people; **(resilience)**
- Continuing to promote change within the humanitarian system to achieve better outcomes for the people of Somalia; **(reform)**
- Building the evidence base for multi-year predictable humanitarian action. **(evidence)**<sup>9</sup>

The Humanitarian Programme aligns with current UK policies and guidance for humanitarian action. This includes the need to: “Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by increasing predictable multi-year funding linked to performance of major UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs.”<sup>10</sup>

The Humanitarian Programme includes approximately £145 million pounds for a combination of single organisations, subject-based consortia, analysis and logistics, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), and other support and research:

<b>Table 1: Recipients of DFID Support for the 2013 – 2014 Humanitarian Programme</b>	<b>Contribution</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)	<b>£26,000,000</b>	17.9%
Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCIS; Resilience Consortium. Includes NRC (lead), IRC, Concern, CESVI, and Save the Children)	<b>£21,000,000</b>	14.5%
Strengthening Nutrition Security in South Central Somalia (SNS; Nutrition Consortium. Includes Save the Children (lead), Concern, ACF, and Oxfam)	<b>£10,000,000</b>	6.9%
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Resilience Programme	<b>£10,000,000</b>	6.9%
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Resilience Programme	<b>£8,000,000</b>	5.5%
World Food Programme (WFP) Resilience Programme	<b>£8,000,000</b>	5.5%
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	<b>£14,000,000</b>	9.7%
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	<b>£1,867,633</b>	1.3%
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	<b>£1,700,000</b>	1.2%

<sup>8</sup> “Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017.” DFID. Page 5.

<sup>9</sup> IBID. Paragraph 34.

<sup>10</sup> “Humanitarian Emergency Response Review.” Chair: Lord (Paddy) Ashdown; Director: Ross Mountain. March 2011. “Recommendations,” page 60. This is also cited in the “Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017”

Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit	£1,700,000	1.2%
United Nations Humanitarian Air Services	£1,600,000	1.1%
Humanitarian programme support and reviews	£1,063,932	0.7%
Programme Monitoring and Evaluation	£3,936,068	2.7%
Emergencies and Rapid Response Facility	£36,132,367	24.9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>£145,000,000</b>	

The Emergencies and Rapid Response Facility (Internal Risk Facility; IRF) have the largest proportion of support. (Figure 1.) The IRF provides early and predictable funding. This too is innovative. It is complementary to the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and other funding mechanisms designed for early response. Differently from these, the IRF is designed to provide funding as soon as warnings of an emergency emerge. It includes triggers and other actions that should provide funding before an emergency reaches maturity.

The Humanitarian Programme has divided support across actors. (Figure 2) Nearly equal shares of Programme support go to INGOs and UN Agencies.

Resilience programming intends to support Somalis who face chronic humanitarian needs. In this context, resilience is meant to help households and communities better prepare, withstand and recover from conflict and climatic shocks. The BRCIS consortium and the United Nations (UN) Joint Strategy for Resilience that includes FAO, UNICEF, and WFP, are focused on resilience programming. Taken together, resilience constitutes 32% of all Programme contributions, the largest percentage overall.

The INGO Nutrition Consortium (SNS) commits to providing life saving assistance to those facing malnutrition while using the 4-year programme term to analyse the underlying causes of malnutrition in Somalia. This should provide insights into how to adjust programming in the future to address these root causes.

The UK Government has traditionally supported the CHF and continues to do so in this Programme. Amongst other facets, the Somalia CHF is recognised for its ability to work with many of the smaller local




Figure 3: Proportion of DFID Contributions across Subject Areas




Figure 2: Proportion of DFID Support by Organisation Type

NGOs and in being able to spread its funding across these and other partners. At the moment, the CHF is limited to annual funding and so it may not have direct benefits from DFID's multi-year funding approach. The UK Government also continues to support UNHCR's internally displaced persons resettlement programme and the breadth of working being carried out by ICRC.

#### **4. Relevance<sup>11</sup>**

##### **4.1.1. The Business Case<sup>12</sup>**

There were two distinct issues that prompted a new approach to humanitarian action in Somalia and another important factor that enabled this new approach. The first was the fraught humanitarian conditions in Somalia that include two devastating famines, the most recent in 2011 – 2012 that led to approximately 260,000 deaths. The second concerns global policy initiatives by the UK government that seek to change the "funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence." The enabling factor is the emergence of cost effective technology that can assist monitoring and evaluation.

Humanitarian action in Somalia has been complicated and results difficult to estimate. Mohammed Siad Barre used humanitarian aid as a political tool, rewarding supporters and using vital aid to suppress IDPs living in camps.<sup>13</sup> Following his regime's fall in 1991, competing coalitions of clan-based militias, or "warlords," fought over economically valuable land and used extortion to keep local peoples under control. This had devastating effects. In 1992 a famine killed an estimated 300,000 people. This led to the formation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in July 1992.<sup>14</sup>

These forces withdrew in 1995 leaving a fractured set of warlords, village elders, and others who managed to control villages or swathes of districts. There were efforts by the international community to form a centralised government including the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. Yet, the TFG never reached much farther than Mogadishu and, given other weaknesses, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) gained control in 2005.<sup>15</sup> This coalition of clans, mostly from rural areas in southern Somalia, did little to facilitate greater humanitarian access.<sup>16</sup> And, they were short lived. Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006 and toppled the ICU, thus destroying any semblance of a centralised government authority. This gave rise to the most radical and vocal of its members, al-Shabaab.<sup>17</sup>

By 2009 - 2010 further political chaos and conflict led to over 3 million affected people in need of humanitarian assistance. The intervening actions and policies of the United States to cut all food aid to Southern Somalia, the forced removal of humanitarian actors like CARE and WFP, the confluence of drought and rising prices for food commodities, and the on-going conflict between al-Shabaab, the TFG, and other factions, led in July 2011 to the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) and the Food

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<sup>11</sup> This section explores and answers the primary relevance/appropriateness question, mainly "Is the programme approach relevant given the humanitarian needs and context in Somalia?"

<sup>12</sup> This section corresponds to the evaluation questions "How does DFID's business case and other design documents/approaches treat the on-going and projected humanitarian needs in Somalia?"

<sup>13</sup> Politics as a factor in humanitarian aid is explored by Terrance Lyons, "Humanitarian Aid and Conflict: From Humanitarian Neutralism to Humanitarian Intervention." In James J. Hentz (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security*. Routledge, 2013.

<sup>14</sup> *IBID.* Page 247.

<sup>15</sup> For a history of how Islamic institutions have gained political power in different contexts, see Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

<sup>16</sup> This pattern of disenfranchised rural communities taking control when central authorities fall conforms to evolutionary patterns in the modern era. See, Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge University Press, 1979.

<sup>17</sup> For a report on the origins of Al Shabaab see: Rob Wise, "Al Shabaab." AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series; Center for Strategic & International Studies. Case Study No. 2, July 2011.

Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) declaring a famine in several areas of Southern Somalia.<sup>18</sup> An estimated 260,000 people were killed, coming close to the 300,000 killed in the 1992 famine.<sup>19</sup>

In 2011, the UK government began to initiate new policies and guidance that called on different operating models for humanitarian assistance. This is encapsulated in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR). This review, that includes policies and recommendations, stakes out seven areas for change in humanitarian response. These include anticipation, resilience, innovation, leadership, accountability, partnership, and the need to maximise limited humanitarian access that exists in many fragile state contexts like Somalia.<sup>20</sup> The HERR goes on to recommend to “Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by increasing predictable multi-year funding linked to performance of major UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs.”<sup>21</sup>

Information Communications Technology (ICT) also enables the new approach. The use of mobile electronic devices for collecting “real time” data in fields of operation has become more prevalent in humanitarian action.<sup>22</sup> The prices of related technologies, including “Smart” phones, have fallen making it more feasible for humanitarian actors to use these for data collection. This enables organisations to collect data with the benefit of GPS and pictures to validate project activities.

This is instrumental in Somalia where access is limited and partners depend on local actors for monitoring with the bulk of programme management conducted from Nairobi.<sup>23</sup> This “remote management” creates an information gap. Mobile phone based data collection shrinks this gap. The availability of “Smart” phones, and their prevalence amongst the general population in Somalia, also means that there is an opportunity to leverage ICT toward ever increasing levels of beneficiary engagement.<sup>24</sup>

#### **Why we need to work differently**

“Though unreliable, demographic data estimates a caseload of approximately on million chronically vulnerable people in south Somalia . . .the erosion of coping mechanisms over two decades of conflict and climate variation means that these communities are highly susceptible to the most minor shock or change in their situation.” (Paragraph 28)

“Short-cycle humanitarian assistance has proved successful in keeping people alive. Yet sustainable human security requires a longer-term humanitarian commitment.” (Paragraph 29)

From “Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017”.

<sup>18</sup> For a review of the factors that led to the famine, see: Daniel Maxwell and Merry Fitzpatrick, “The 2011 Somalia Famine: Context, Causes, and Complications.” *Global Food Security*, Issue 1, 2012.

<sup>19</sup> For an investigation into the famine, see: Daniel Maxwell, Kirsten Gelsdorf, Nicholas Haan, and David Dawe (Eds.) “The 2011 – 2012 Famine in Somalia.” *Global Food Security (Special Edition)*; Volume 1 (1). January 2013.

<sup>20</sup> “Humanitarian Emergency Response Review.” Chair: Lord (Paddy) Ashdown; Director: Ross Mountain. DFID, March 2011. This is also cited in the “Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017” although some of the themes are missing.

<sup>21</sup> IBID; “Recommendations,” page 60.

<sup>22</sup> Bryony Norman, “Monitoring and Accountability Practices for Remotely Managed Projects Implemented in Volatile Operating Environments.” Tear Fund and Humanitarian Innovation Fund; February 2012. This describes web-based project monitoring, global positioning systems, photography, and video monitoring.

<sup>23</sup> Access and remote management are critical aspects of humanitarian action. See: Sarah Collinson and Mark Duffield, “Paradoxes of Presence: Risk Management and Aid Culture in Challenging Environments.” Humanitarian Policy Group, March 2013; Abby Stoddard, Adele Harner and Jean S. Renouf, “Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote Management of Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas.” Humanitarian Outcomes, February 2010;.

<sup>24</sup> While this was a factor for a new approach, this Evaluation notes that there remains a significant gap between the investments humanitarian actors make in ICT and the actual ability to use ICT to effect efficiency, performance and results.

**Theory of Change: A Need to Address the Context in Somalia**


The Humanitarian Programme is a response to the context in Somalia, new UK policies for humanitarian action, and it seeks to leverage ICT to increase data for monitoring results, decision-making, and better performance and results.<sup>25</sup> The DFID Business Case sets out a Theory of Change that maps the relationships between inputs and outcomes/impact. It seeks to be the framework for understanding how to achieve Programme objectives:

- Provide flexible multi-annual funding for humanitarian programmes specifically targeting the most vulnerable, including children and IDPs.
- Identify and target the chronically vulnerable with resilience enhancing activities designed to strengthen livelihoods and restore coping strategies and where possible to assist in the graduation away from humanitarian aid.
- Influence and promote change in the humanitarian system to ensure better coordination, responsiveness and targeting of aid; and
- Develop new and innovative ways to monitor implementation and outcomes, and building an evidence base to understand and ensure maximum impact for UK Aid.<sup>26</sup>

The Business Case also explains how the Programme can be a catalyst for change given the history of humanitarian action in Somalia. Key elements of this include:

- Respond to continued humanitarian needs in a timely manner with quality and well-targeted assistance; **(results)**
- Build resilience of Somalia’s chronic caseload of vulnerable people; **(resilience)**
- Continue to promote change within the humanitarian system to achieve better outcomes for the people of Somalia; **(reform)**
- Building the evidence base for multi-year predictable humanitarian action. **(evidence)**<sup>27</sup>

The Theory of Change sets out the problem of a chronic caseload of 1 million people and then considers how the Internal Risk Facility, predictable multi-year funding, technical advisory and partnership approaches, and research, monitoring and evaluation can provide for improved targeting, higher quality partnerships, a faster response, time and greater value for money. These



**Figure 4:** DFID Theory of Change (Abbreviated) for the Somalia Humanitarian Programme

<sup>25</sup> The Evaluation uses “performance and results” as a more common way of describing the achievement of “outputs” (performance) and “outcomes” (results). This aligns the nomenclature to broader thinking and research about how organisations and people achieve objectives. Sometimes, the term “partner performance” is used. This refers also to the processes, procedures, and policies that organisations use to support how they achieve results.

<sup>26</sup> “Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017.” DFID. Page 5.

<sup>27</sup> IBID. Paragraph 34.

outcomes, in turn, should result in fewer Somalis in need of humanitarian assistance. It provides an analytical chain from the problem to the expected impact. (Figure 4.)

A Theory of Change's assumptions provide the most pertinent avenues for investigation, for ways to draw on evidence to see if this logical sequencing can have reasonable attribution towards expected impact. A recent study on the subject states that the "quality of a theory of change process rests on 'making assumptions explicit' and making strategic thinking realistic and transparent."<sup>28</sup>

The Business Case identifies eight assumptions.

1. "We assume that approximately 1 million chronically food insecure Somalis constitute a relatively stable group with long-term predictable needs.
2. "We assume multi-year funding will provide an opportunity for more innovative solutions to be found, will allow for more timely assistance and cut both the costs of meeting slow-onset emergency needs (by arriving sooner) and reduce the level of need in the future.
3. "Multi-year contract will result in NGOs being able to retain staff, avoid costs of rehiring, and mean that staff are better connected, had [sic] detailed contextual knowledge and are able to implement emergency responses quicker.
4. "The assumption is that only by making multi-year funding available is making people resilient possible.
5. "We also assume there will be a need to draw on the proposed Internal Risk Facility of £10 million per year that will allow DFID to respond to unforeseen emergencies, such as flood affected populations, or movements of IDPs due to the continued conflict and climate change.
6. "Multi-year funding allows for greater innovation and so reform of the humanitarian system in Somalia.
7. "We also assume that DFID Somalia's technical advisory and programme management functions will benefit from multi-year funding by reducing the considerable time currently taken to work up proposals and contracts and project completion reports with implementing partners on an annual basis.
8. "We assume that the inclusion of a dedicated RME function, funded throughout the 4 year period, will result in significant learning, and continued programme refinement, and so greater impact."<sup>29</sup>

These assumptions, by and large, focus on how multi-year funding may contribute to improved programming, innovations, and processes, with an emphasis on the latter.

The first assumption cannot be proven. There is little evidence that there are 1 million "chronic" cases in Somalia. It is not clear if people move in and out of humanitarian need or even if the data that indicates "1 million in need" is based on sound data. Population statistics in Somalia are problematic. The Business Case cites the OCHA Humanitarian Dashboard that, in turn, cites FSNAU data. FSNAU, in turn, relies on UNDP population figures from 2005 for projected population estimates for August – December 2013 (7,502,654).<sup>30</sup> The World Bank puts the figure at 10,495,583 for 2013, or a 29% difference.<sup>31</sup>

Pointing out these discrepancies is not meant to be pedantic. It illustrates the inconsistencies in basic population figures and thus the problem associated with knowing how many people are in need, the fluctuations in these numbers, and how these compare to the population at large. Population and related statistics are unreliable. This makes the analysis of the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance and if they are a dynamic or chronic group nearly impossible. This assumption links all the way to the expected impact, mainly fewer Somalis in need. If population numbers are unreliable how would one demonstrate a reduction in said numbers?

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<sup>28</sup> Isabel Vogel, "Review Report: Review of the Use of Theory of Change in International Development." DFID, April 2012. Page 5.

<sup>29</sup> "Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017. DFID. Paragraphs 143 – 151.

<sup>30</sup> "Current IPC Population Estimates (27 August 2013)." FSNAU.

<sup>31</sup> In 2012, UNFP Somalia conducted a Population Estimation Survey for Somalia. The results have not been made public. See: [http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/somalia/2013/03/12/6401/population\\_pess/](http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/somalia/2013/03/12/6401/population_pess/)


Assumptions 2, 3, 6 & 7 assume that improved processes will result in more timely and effective aid. This assumes that there has been a deficiency in business processes to date. Linking business processes to actual results is challenging in any context.<sup>32</sup> The context in Somalia would seem more relevant to the results of humanitarian action. The conflict, climatic, and geo-political issues noted in the rest of the Business Case seem more important than the business processes that support organisational actors. It is not that business processes are not important. They just seem secondary or tertiary to these more prevalent issues.

This leaves the 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> assumptions. The fourth assumes that resilience is only possible through multi-year funding. Resilience is a dynamic condition whose variables are seemingly infinite. It surely has to do with basic nutrition, food security, assets, access to markets, and access to livelihoods. Yet, it is more closely associated with complex adaptive systems where it is the equilibrium in the system that is the point of analysis; not the factors that may disrupt that disequilibrium. Resilience is dynamic. Multi-year funding may create opportunities for better resilience based programming but again, the causal chain between multi-year funding and resilience is diluted.

The 5<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> assumptions seem likely to be proven. The availability of short-term funding for the sudden onset of a crisis or emergency seems likely in the context of Somalia. The approach of the IRF also intends to provide funding before an emergency matures. There also seems to be compelling research that demonstrates that increased research, monitoring and evaluation can improve learning and programme “refinement” and hence impact.<sup>33</sup>

### Volatility and Uncertainty

There has been progress in the stability and security in Somalia since the famine of 2011 - 2012. The government has become stronger as al-Shabaab recedes to fewer areas of operation. The August 2012 election of President Hassan Sheikh and the formation of the government signal a viable central government that could provide greater stability. The President accepted the New Deal through the development of an inclusive Somali Compact that sets out priorities for stability and sustainable economic development.<sup>34</sup> In 2014, the government developed Vision 2016, establishing a roadmap for achieving a national political settlement. It addresses a revised Federal Constitution, the difficult issues surrounding federalism, and the preparations for 2016 elections.<sup>35</sup> Donors and international cooperation actors have increased their activities and are looking to this government as a committed and engaged partner.



**Figure 5:** Does DFID’s Humanitarian Programme address the volatility and uncertainty in Somalia? (Survey; 89 responses out of 103)

While this bodes well for stability, Somalia is still characterised by an incessant volatility and uncertainty that plagues people’s lives. It will take time for central government activities to not only increase stability

<sup>32</sup> This Evaluation uses methodologies and tools to do this but similar evaluations or studies were not found in relation to humanitarian actors in Somalia.

<sup>33</sup> For a review of the use of evidence, see Dennis Dijkzeul, Dorothea Hilhorst and Peter Walke, “Introduction;” in “Special Issue: Evidence Based Action in Humanitarian Crises.” *Disasters*, Volume 37, July 2013. “Promoting Innovation and Evidence Based Approaches to Building Resilience and Responding to Humanitarian Crises: A DFID Strategy Paper.” DFID 2012.

<sup>34</sup> “The Somali Compact.” The Federal Republic of Somalia. This includes five peace and state building goals: inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services.

<sup>35</sup> “Vision 2016: Framework for Action.” The Federal Republic of Somalia, February 2014.

for people across the country, let alone to provide increased governance, security, and services. While diminished, al-Shabaab continues to make deadly attacks in Mogadishu and in South Central Somalia. Humanitarian actors continue to be targeted and killed. And, while there is increasing political stability, climatic shocks remain a certainty for many.

### IRF: Getting Ahead of the Curve in Emergency Response

The IRF is way to ensure that assistance can be provided before a crisis “reaches maturity” and “results in better outcomes for people than provision of emergency aid.”<sup>36</sup> The IRF includes approximately £36 million over the four year Programme or 25% of all support. The IRF will draw on warning signs from a number of sources, including FSNAU and FEWS NET, and will be reviewed at least three times a year by the DFID Somalia Humanitarian Adviser who may make subsequent recommendations. Triggers will be established for action and with other donors, mainly the USA and EC. It is expected that the IRF will become an instrument for the whole Humanitarian Community.


Early indications of the use of the IRF signal that it has been able to release funding early, as intended, and that the timeline between allocation and disbursements is less than that of other emergency funding like the CERF. As noted in Section 8.1.3, 79% of responses about the early funding mechanisms are positive.

### Reviewing the Business Case and Theory of Change

The Business Case provides an argument, an actual case, for humanitarian investment in Somalia. It was a winning case given that the UK government has contributed £144 million into the four-year Programme. It recognises the chronic needs of people in Somalia. It commits to multi-year funding and a new approach to humanitarian action. It includes the IRF that can serve people who are the victims of climatic and conflict related shocks by providing early funding that can stave off the worst aspects of an emergency. It includes an investment of 3.8% of the overall Programme value into a suite of M&E approaches and tools, including mobile data collection technology and on-line platform for monitoring analysis and decision-making. It is ambitious. It combines different programming approaches, funding periods, and accountability standards that should enable partners to work more effectively individually and collectively. This should have a knock-on effect for results.

The Theory of Change sets out a strategy for achieving the four primary objectives set forth in the Business Case. Here, the expected impact—fewer Somalis in need and increased resilience—is not supported by sufficiently related outcomes and assumptions (the outputs are relatively well conceived in that they reflect what can be expected from the selected partners).

The Theory of Change focuses on processes that have little direct relation to the issues that have caused the protracted humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Increased efficiency and improved business processes may lead to increased partner performance but it is not clear just how better these organisations will need to be to impact the dire needs, volatility and uncertainty that characterise the humanitarian context in Somalia.



**Figure 6:** Relevance of DFID’s multi-year funding approach to humanitarian needs in Somalia. (Survey; 90 responses out of 103)

<sup>36</sup> “Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017. DFID. Paragraph 112.



**Conclusion:** The Business Case reflects the context and needs in Somalia and stands as a relevant case for changing the way humanitarian aid is delivered. It reflects the convergence of issues related to how humanitarian aid was delivered prior to, during and after the 2011 – 2012 famine and reflects a new UK policy approach that includes anticipation, resilience, innovation, leadership, accountability, partnership, and the need to maximise the limited humanitarian space that exists in Somalia.

However, the intervention logic associated with the Theory of Change does not adequately reflect the context in Somalia and the expectations associated with new UK policies and guidance. It rests on a series of faulty assumptions and misses a focus on the inherent volatility and lack of access that is prevalent in Somalia. This lack of links between the Theory of Change and the context in Somalia make this element less relevant.

**Recommendation 1:** To increase its overall relevance, a different approach to the Theory of Change is required. This should address the uncertainty and volatility that has characterised humanitarian action in Somalia for 20 years and that will likely characterise it going forward. It should increase the focus on programmatic links to this context rather than on process improvements amongst partners. This new approach should include new ways of thinking about interventions and activities and how they combine to contribute to results. This requires an adaptive, flexible and options-based approach to how the Theory of Change is articulated. It should include more relevant assumptions, and “if this then that” logic tress between outputs, outcomes and impact. This would reduce the linearity inherent in the Theory of Change as articulated and instead better reflect the complexity that it hopes to explain. This may lead to options and actions that are aligned with the Business Cases’ stated objectives and UK policy and guidance about new ways to deliver humanitarian aid. This could include graduated funding over time and based on programmes’ and projects’ abilities to have “proof of concept” for their approaches and then plans for either scaling-up or extending the reach of certain activities. This pilot--proof of concept--scale up model not only reflects the uncertainty in Somalia but also the uncertainty surrounding what actually works. The Theory of Change would indicate the expected outputs, outcomes, and assumptions that would exist in each step of a graduated, or options-based planning approach.<sup>37</sup> It is also based on best practices and common tools for delivering results in complex operating contexts.

#### 4.1.2. Partners Experience<sup>38</sup>

##### Respondent Perceptions on Relevance

Partners interviewed as part of this Evaluation (respondents) see the multi-year approach as relevant. The quantitative survey for this Evaluation asked respondents about seven areas:

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<sup>37</sup> For a review of how options based planning is being used in the public sector, see: Richard Neufville, “Real Options: Dealing with Uncertainty in Systems Planning and Design.” *Integrated Assessment*, Volume 4, Issue 1: 2003. For a good survey on options based strategies, see: Tome Copeland and Peter Tufano, “A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options.” *Harvard Business Review*, March 2004.

<sup>38</sup> This section corresponds to the evaluation questions “Is partners’ experience, individually and collectively, relevant to current and projected humanitarian needs in Somalia?” and “Are partners’ approaches and expected results relevant to DFID’s theory of change?”




Figure 7: Is the DFID Business Case and approach relevant for the following areas? (Survey; 87 - 89 responses out of 103)

Figure 7 illustrates that there is a general consensus that multi-year funding has relevance across a range of subjects. Differences between subjects are also illustrative. Over 40% of respondents view quality partnerships, innovations, and adaptive/responsive programme/project designs as being “highly relevant.” Faster delivery times and issues related to connectedness, e.g. links to government, are viewed as less so.

Qualitative evidence demonstrates that, most respondents are positive about their programmes’ relevance to the DFID Programme (77%). (Figure 8) The most common issues raised in relation to their programmes’ relevance concern their long-term experience in Somalia and community engagement.

Community engagement is not only relevant but also critical for access. The context in Somalia has meant that humanitarian actors have had to negotiate access “village to village”.<sup>39</sup>

Respondents also raise issues that thwart their programmes’ relevance.

(Figure 8) High turnover in staff is a perennial problem with many organisations and

is more prevalent in INGOs. The need for longer-term strategies and planning are also clearly relevant and, as intended, at least particularly addressed through multi-year funding. The “dynamics on the ground” while relevant also speak to the limits of “long-term experience.” This long-term experience has not proven to be a guarantor of results although it is important for access. The “position of health in the programme” relates to overall coherence (See Section 5.) Respondents note that the absence of health creates an unnecessary divide between nutrition and health related activities. This may be related to the divide between humanitarian and development activities and how resources are organised in DFID.

While the Humanitarian Programme includes key consortia, it also includes funding to single partners who have not changed their programmes *per se* but that are benefitting from multi-year funding and other aspects of the Programme’s design. This includes direct support to ICRC, OCHA, and UNHCR. In total, this




Figure 8: Is Partners’ experience relevant to current and projected humanitarian needs in Somalia? (Semi-structured Interview)

<sup>39</sup> Daniel Maxwell, Kirsten Gelsdorf, Nicholas Haan, and David Dawe (Eds.) “The 2011 – 2012 Famine in Somalia.” *Global Food Security (Special Edition)*; Volume 1 (1). January 2013.

support is approximately £17.567 million or 12% of total Programme support. Each of these organisations plays specific roles within the Programme and are complementary to broader Programme objectives.



**Conclusion:** Partners are positive about their programme’s relevance to the Humanitarian Programme’s objectives. This includes various ways in which the Programme’s approach is relevant to operating and process issues including delivery times, partnerships, targeting, innovation, adaptive/responsive project management, policy leverage, and links to local and federal government. Of these, evidence trends towards partnership, adaptability/flexibility, and innovation. These are all relevant, to be sure, as are those where partners have more mixed views. Qualitative data also includes community engagement and long time experience in Somalia as points of relevance for partner programme designs. These too reflect the context in Somalia and the issues put forward in the DFID Business Case.

Respondents’ comments also lack any mention of the relevance of the consortium approach. This is a prominent feature of the Programme and the fact that partners do not relate it to relevance (or to effectiveness as described below) is a finding in itself. This also supports other findings and conclusions in this Evaluation. While the competencies and experience of the core partners are relevant to the needs of Somalia, it is not clear how their combined efforts in consortia are any more relevant to Somalia’s needs than if they were acting alone. There is little evidence that partners are not simply combining expertise and resources for greater scale rather than for greater relevance, or as addressed later, for greater effectiveness. If there are greater demonstrable results from the UN and INGO consortia during the 4-year programme, than this will need to be reconsidered to see if the consortia approach is directly attributable to these results.

**Recommendations:** None.

## 5. Coherence<sup>40</sup>

Coherence concerns the extent to which different actors’ definitions, policies and approaches are complementary or contradictory. This is important as it can lend to the ability of humanitarian actors to work together during emergencies, e.g. to avoid having to define and align definition, policies and approaches as a precursor to action.<sup>41</sup> Coherence provides a basis for greater effectiveness and impact. If definitions, policies and approaches are complementary, fewer resources will be required during start-up. There should be a coherence that inherently promotes synergies, economies of scale, and scalability.

In the DFID Humanitarian Programme, especially during the design and early delivery phases, coherence concerns how different partners define key concepts, like resilience and gender equality, and whether there are policies or procedures that may support or constrain partners’ actions. This is a preliminary assessment. It seeks to ensure that there are no glaring contradictions in this early period that could manifest into significant problems later. The Evaluation also looks at issues of accessibility to see if partners are sharing information, practices, or strategies for limited accessibility and denied access in Somalia.

### 5.1.1. Definitions<sup>42</sup>

The Humanitarian Programme includes many technical definitions. The list would be far too long and detailed to present here but an analysis of these has been central to the third party M&E activities. This

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<sup>40</sup> This section explores and answers the primary coherence question, mainly “How coherent are the programmatic elements of the portfolio?”

<sup>41</sup> “Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the OECD-DAC Criteria: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies.” Overseas Development Institute, March 2006. Page 33.

<sup>42</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: “Are partner definitions, policies, and approaches complementary or contradictory to each other and to DFID?”

analysis shows that most partners are using standard definitions and tools for their primary activities with understandable variation given targeting, needs and different contexts. The M&E third party contractor charged with leading the independent suite of M&E services (Transtec) has also been working to standardise definitions and tools across partner activities.<sup>43</sup> This is fairly novel. Having a third party contractor who is working to harmonise definitions, tools and approaches increases the coherence of technical definitions and approaches. The impact of this should relate to increased monitoring data and information for project adaptations, decision-making, and the identification of best practices and innovations that can lead to increased results.

### *Resilience*

Resilience is one of the most challenging concepts for the Humanitarian Programme. With roots in the sciences of physics and mathematics, “resilience” was used technically to describe the capacity of a material or system to return to equilibrium after a displacement.<sup>44</sup> In humanitarian action, resilience has emerged as a way to ensure that people’s longer-term needs are incorporated into immediate humanitarian actions. It provides both a framework for how people anticipate, withstand, and recover from shocks as well as a way to make programmatic links between recovery, development and sustainability. While the subject still tends to swirl in academic debates,<sup>45</sup> its principles are critical for ensuring that humanitarian stakeholders are able to spot opportunities for resilience as part of their programming.<sup>46</sup>

A review of resilience as a concept across the Programme shows that partners define resilience primarily in terms of individuals’, households’ and communities’ capacities to anticipate, withstand, and recover from both climatic and conflict based shocks. (See Table 2 below.) Resilience thus treats how and when people become vulnerable as compared to other programmatic approaches that address precise and discrete needs. Vulnerabilities change given the context. Threats emerge and then dissipate. Thus, resilience programming seeks to address these dynamics and increase peoples’ abilities to become more resilient over time.

DFID has adopted a working definition of resilience that draws on the distinct vulnerabilities that people face during disasters:

Disaster Resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses - such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict - without compromising their long-term prospects.<sup>47</sup>

This, as with partner definitions, include the ability of people to predict, withstand and recover from climatic and conflict-based shocks. UNICEF includes the preservation of “integrity” as an element of resilience while FAO includes foci on diversification of income sources and livelihood strategies.

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<sup>43</sup> See Transtec “Inception Phase Report.” July 2014.

<sup>44</sup> This is the basis for complex adaptive systems, a methodology that has expanded from material sciences and systems theory to look at impact and results in complex operating environments. For a review on how CAS moved from the physical to the social sciences, see: Jason Brown Lee, “Complex Adaptive Systems.” CTS Technical Report, March 2007. For a review of how resilience is used and defined in various science, see: Patrick Martin-Breen and J. Marty Anderies, “Resilience: A Literature Review.” The Rockefeller Foundation, September 2011.

<sup>45</sup> A. V. Bahadur, Ibrahim, M. & Tanner, T. “The Resilience Renaissance? Unpacking of Resilience for Tackling Climate Change and Disasters.” Strengthening Climate Resilience Discussion; Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex; 10 August 2012.

<sup>46</sup> For a fair overview, see Simon Levine & Irina Mosel, “Supporting Resilience in Difficult Places.” Overseas Development Institute, April 2014; & Adam Pain & Simon Levine, “A conceptual Analysis of Livelihoods and Resilience: Addressing the ‘Insecurity of Agency’.” Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, November 2012. For a more econometric approach, see: Prabhu Pingali, Luca Alinovi and Jacky Sutton, “Food Security in Complex Emergencies: Enhancing Food System Resilience.” *Disasters*, Vol. 29, Issue Supplement 1; June 2005.

<sup>47</sup> “Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper.” DFID, November 2011.


**Table 2: Programmatic and Corporate Definitions of Resilience**

Org/ Consortium	Resilience (Programme Level)	Resilience (Corporate Level)
<b>BRCiS</b>	Includes conceptual and programmatic level definitions. At conceptual level it includes a set of characteristics related to coping mechanisms. At a programmatic level, it includes linking both rehabilitation and development and an integrated approach to food security, WASH, livelihoods, and shelter. (Proposal)	N/A
<b>UNJSR</b>	Resilience is the ability to withstand threats or to adapt to new strategies in the face of shocks and crises, in ways that preserve the integrity of individuals, households and communities (while not deepening their vulnerability) with a focus on merging humanitarian and development programming to better address overlapping risks and stresses. (Proposal)	N/A
<b>FAO</b>	Resilience is the ability to anticipate, absorb and recover from external pressures and shocks in ways that preserve the integrity of individuals, households and communities while not deepening vulnerability. This includes both the ability to withstand threats and the ability to adapt if needs be, utilising new options in the face of shocks and crises. When households, communities and networks for goods and services are resilient, there are positive livelihood outcomes: sufficient income, food security, safety, proper nutrition, good health etc., and ecosystems are preserved and protected. (Proposal)	In a food security context, resilience is defined as “the ability of a household to keep with a certain level of well-being (i.e. being food secure) by withstanding shocks and stresses.” "Measuring Resilience: A Concept Note on the Resilience Tool." FAO
<b>UNICEF</b>	UNICEF defines resilience as the ability of children, families, communities and systems to withstand, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses (e.g. natural disasters, epidemics, socio-economic instability, conflict) in ways that support economic and social development, preserve integrity and do not deepen vulnerability. Programming aims at improving the “ability” mentioned in this definition – with ability covering (a) capacity (knowledge, attitudes, practices) and (b) local community control over and accountability of delivery of social services. (Inception Phase Report)	At a global policy level, UNICEF has defined resilience as “good programming plus three”, with the “three” standing for (1) mainstreaming risk-informed programming (2) strengthened humanitarian-development nexus and (3) building of new ‘non-traditional’ partnerships. (Inception Phase Report)
<b>WFP</b>	Resilience is understood as the ability to anticipate, resist, absorb and recover in a timely and efficient manner from external pressures and shocks in ways that preserve integrity and do not deepen vulnerability, including the ability to withstand threats and to adapt to new options in crises. (Proposal; WFP uses the UNJSR definition.)	Building resilience is about concerted efforts to enhance the capacities, assets and systems of the most vulnerable households, communities and countries to prepare for, withstand and bounce back better from recurrent shocks. "Building Resilience through Asset Creation." WFP, November 2013.

**Gender Equality:** While not prominent, gender equality is included in partner programme and project designs. In a review of relevant documentation, there is no common definition of gender equality or how this will be approached. Sometimes it is treated substantively, with clear operational indications. In other places, it is more superficial. There is little mention of common tools, like the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gender marker. The gender marker includes guidance, tools and tips for its use and should become a prevalent way of making gender equality fully operational.

**Community Engagement/Accountability to Affected Populations:** There is not a common definition or approach that underpins definitions of community engagement. Community engagement is a highly prevalent feature of programme designs and yet it is vague enough to include nearly any interaction with beneficiaries or communities.

**Climate and the Environment:** This is not a focus of the Humanitarian Programme. While it does become a feature of some programme designs, like those of BRCiS, FAO, and WFP, there are few consistent definitions or approaches that characterise these.



**Conclusion:** There is a fairly standard way that partners define resilience. With some understandable variation, this includes how individuals, households and communities anticipate, withstand and recover from climatic and conflict-based shocks.

Other cross-cutting issues do not have the same level of coherence. Gender equality, while addressed in most project designs, does not include a clear definition (let alone a common one) of what gender equality means in the context of Somalia and thus how partners will address it. This includes little reference to the IASC gender marker or other available tools. Community engagement is so loosely defined as to include nearly any engagement with individuals, households, and communities. While not a prominent feature of programme designs, climate change and the environment also lack common definitions especially amongst those partners who have this as a feature of their approach, e.g. BRCiS, FAO and WFP.


**Recommendation 2:** Partners should develop a common definition of what community engagement means and the primary programmatic elements it includes. This definition should be common to both UN, INNGO, and other organisations funded by DFID.

**Recommendation 3:** Partners should develop a common definition and possible approaches for how they address gender equality. This may draw on common tools and approaches like the IASC gender marker. This applies primarily to those partners working at the consortium level, e.g. BRCiS, SNS, FAO, UNICEF and WFP.

### 5.1.2. Procedures & Policies <sup>48</sup>

Procedures and policies should be complementary, or more particularly, efficient enough to avoid duplications and waste. While UN organisations in the Programme have procedures and policies set at the corporate level, the INGO consortia have needed to establish procedures and policies to ensure that they are maximising members’ contributions.

This Evaluation considers procedures related to budgeting, planning, M&E, and reporting. Respondents have mixed views about each. As Figures 9 and 10 illustrate, respondents from UN organisations see planning amongst them and with DFID as problematic. In semi-structured interviews, this was often explained as concerning the different timelines and corporate priorities that constrain actual joint programming. The policies, tools and approaches to planning are not easily



**Figure 9:** Are the following complementary across partners? (Survey)

complementary and so present challenges. The members of the UN Joint Strategy for Resilience are attempting to remedy this although no tangible results were forthcoming at the time of this Evaluation.

<sup>48</sup> This section answers the evaluation questions: “Are partner procedures complementary or contradictory to each other and to DFID, e.g. procedures for budgeting, planning, monitoring and evaluation, reporting, etc.?”

Respondents from UN organisations also say that there is lack of complementarity in reporting between themselves and DFID. As described in Section 8.1.3, this concerns the ad hoc information requests that DFID makes that go beyond standard reporting requirements.

Respondents also commented on the need to use the DFID log-frame instead of their own corporate approach to log-frames. This, they state, is a duplication and the DFID log-frame misses key elements of the way they structure their programmes. In reviewing the relevant partner log-frames, this was not seen as perfectly accurate. In most instances, it is a matter of organisation and lay-out rather than substance.

INGOs were more positive generally. A review of related documentation shows minimal procedural or policy constraints within the two INGO consortiums. For BRCiS, there have been regular joint trainings and other activities to ensure that all members understand consortium level policies and procedures. For SNS, there were delays in placing key consortium management staff and this may have impeded the harmonisation of policies and procedures across members yet there is little direct documentary evidence for this.




Figure 12: Are the following complementary to DFID? (Survey)




Figure 11: How do partners describe coherence within the Programme? (Semi-structured interviews)



Figure 10: What contributes/constrains the coherence of DFID’s Programme? (Survey; open-ended question)



**Conclusion:** Policies, procedures, and approaches (as described in “Effectiveness” below), are largely complementary. Or rather, no major constraints emerge from this Evaluation’s analysis. Most partners state that policies and procedures for budgeting, planning, M&E and reporting are complementary amongst themselves and with DFID. The INGO consortia have done joint planning and are required to have a single budget as managed by the consortium lead organisation. Through the work of the third party M&E contractor, there is also an emerging coherence across M&E definitions, standards and approaches.

For UN organisations, constraints are noted for planning and reporting. Joint planning, working to have all three agencies in the Joint Strategy for Resilience working in the same areas amongst other planning issues, has proven challenging. Progress was being made at the time of this Evaluation. Moving to an actual joint programme, as intended, may address some of these issues. UN organisations also see a gap between reporting requirements and DFID information requests. This is seen as an issue related to partnership and addressed in “Effectiveness” below.


The OCHA CHF provides an area where there could be greater coherence between what the consortiums are doing and what CHF recipients are doing and as aligned with the Humanitarian Response Plan. There is also a seeming disjoint between what multi-year funding implies for coherence when compared to the annual funding cycle for the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP).

UNHCR’s programme is specific to the return of IDPs. They also have approaches to targeting and M&E that could prove complementary to other Programme Partners. The same holds true for ICRC. They do many of the same activities and so they also serve as a point of reference and comparison. While ensuring strict coherence between these organisations’ policies and procedures is not strictly necessary for results, there is an opportunity for greater analysis of how different approaches are complementary.

**Recommendation 4:** Increase opportunities to draw on the definitions, policies and approaches used by OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC, and the CHF. DFID is placed to facilitate this best. This will not only increase coherence but also promote opportunities for the identification of best practices and innovations, a hallmark of the Programme’s approach. The CHF, in particular, represents 18% of the portfolio and represents the seconded largest support amount after the IRF. The CHF represents an opportunity to explore coherence and issues of complementarity in how the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and clusters align with the HRP. This too should not only provide useful comparisons but will also serve as an interesting comparative to the multi-year funding approach.


### 5.1.3. Accessibility<sup>49</sup>

Accessibility is a key issue in many humanitarian contexts.<sup>50</sup> This is especially an issue in Somalia where many cannot travel freely and where areas of conflict and increased security risk can change on a daily basis. A review of partner documentation shows that there is a relatively coherent approach to issues of accessibility and denied access. The INGO consortia include security briefs and reports about denied access and its effects at a redistrict level. ICRC has robust localised data about access and where and when to seek access. The other UN organisations also have their policies and sources of intelligence about access and instances of denied access.



**Figure 13:** Are there complementary procedures in place for addressing issues of accessibility/denied access? (Survey; 75 responses out of 103)

Partners have mixed views about complementary procedures for accessibility and denied access. 27% say that such systems exist while 38.5% say they do “somewhat.” This matches the complexity of the issue and what can and cannot be done. Given that documentary evidence illustrates a fairly in-depth analysis and review of accessibility and denied access, this presents something of a contradiction. This may be due to the fact that issues of accessibility are a regular occurrence. They happen so often that respondents expect there to be more systems, more intelligence, more strategies for negotiating access. While this is understandable, the context in Somalia is uncertain and volatile. There is no level of intelligence that can prevent instances of denied access.



**Conclusion:** Are current systems for sharing intelligence and alerts about accessibility and denied access enough? They may not be but there also may not be any more that can be done. There are still repeated issues related to denied access that not only cause delays and increased costs but that also have a direct impact on results. It prevents partners from serving the people in need.

Is more coordination and intelligence sharing possible? Undoubtedly. There could be greater systems in place for the sharing of intelligence about denied access. The mobile data collection technology could provide a way of alerting partners to issues as a way to supplement other intelligence. Yet, this requires significant advances in how this technology may be used. Broader intelligence sharing and alerts also go beyond the Programme.

**Recommendations:** None.

<sup>49</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: “Are there complementary procedures in place for addressing issues of accessibility/denied access?”

<sup>50</sup> Sarah Collinson and Mark Duffield, “Paradoxes of Presence: Risk Management and Aid Culture in Challenging Environments.” Humanitarian Policy Group, March 2013; Abby Stoddard, Adele Harner and Jean S. Renouf, “Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote Management of Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas.” Humanitarian Outcomes, February 2010.


## 6. Connectedness<sup>51</sup>

Connectedness concerns the links between humanitarian activities and longer-term and interconnected issues that could diminish sustainability or longer-term impact of humanitarian action.<sup>52</sup> Connectedness is central to the Humanitarian Programme’s design. Somalia is one of the most severe, protracted humanitarian crises globally and is in response to the long-term conflicts and climatic shocks that have plagued the country for at least 20 years. The Humanitarian Programme’s focus on resilience and the supposed 1 million people who are chronically in need of humanitarian assistance is a response to the connectedness of issues in Somalia that cause the long-term humanitarian needs. By focusing 32% of its support on resilience combined with a four-year approach, DFID is responding to the long-term.

Connectedness also relates to the partnerships that exist between actors. It relates to how a variety of actors, each with different mandates, interests, capacities, and management expertise, coalesce to deliver life saving assistance. It relates to how they work along different supply chains and how other coordination bodies support or constrain their actions. Do the HC and HCT play roles in how partnerships are formed and how they are leveraged toward results? In relation to the Programme, do multi-year funding and the consortium approach promote partnerships in ways that contribute to results?

If there is connectedness through resilience and other programming that has a longer-view than most emergency response, if there are links between partners so that they can achieve more together than individually, then connectedness also expects that there are links to other local actors who can sustain these efforts. Connectedness addresses how humanitarian action is linked to local and national government and other civil society actors. They can provide the infrastructure to minimise climatic, conflict-based and other shocks. They can help move populations out of chronic need and toward development.

When respondents were asked about connectedness, or how activities, projects, and outputs address the longer-term humanitarian, governance and partnership issues in Somalia, they had diverse views.



**Figure 14:** Do activities, projects and expected outputs address longer-term humanitarian, governance, and partnership issues in Somalia? (Semi-structured interviews)

Figure 14 illustrates that 43% of comments were positive about key connectedness issues while 23% were negative. 34% of responses were neutral or mixed about connectedness. Survey results support this trend.

<sup>51</sup> This section explores and answers the primary coherence question; mainly “Do plans, project designs, initial activities, and expected outputs/outcomes adequately address longer-term humanitarian, governance, and partnership issues within Somalia?”

<sup>52</sup> “Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the OECD-DAC Criteria: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies.” Overseas Development Institute, March 2006. Page 27.

Survey respondents had similarly mixed views for governance and partnership although there was much greater belief that projects and activities address longer-term humanitarian issues. (Figure 15.)

A review of partner and consortium documentation is similarly mixed. Some, like SNS and FAO, put active coordination and partnership with other actors as a prominent aspect of their approach. SNS has had meetings with the Ministry of Health, FSNAU, BRCiS, UNICEF, the Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP), and the food security cluster.<sup>53</sup> FAO’s programme has multiple links to local and federal government including the secondment of Ministry staff at project levels, the active training of Ministerial staff, and the joint development of technical approaches and systems that are intended to be run by government actors going forward.<sup>54</sup> UNHCR’s programme concerns the return of IDPs and so it does have links to various actors but in the specific context of return. OCHA and the CHF do have links to local and federal government through the work of the CAP and HCT.

For others, including WFP, UNICEF, and ICRC, there is a sufficient level of focus on governance and partnership yet these are not prominent to their approaches. WFP does have a strategic objective to “strengthen the capacities of governments to reduce hunger.” This seeks to support the government in establishing food security policies and approaches. Yet the only output for this is capacity building without strict targets.<sup>55</sup> UNICEF does not mention links to local or federal government in its proposal although it does include a community health strategy that includes the training of local health




Figure 16: Do projects and activities address longer-term issues in Somalia? (Survey; 74 - 77 responses out of 103)



Figure 15: What would strengthen the connectedness of your organisation’s activities and projects to the humanitarian issues in Somalia? (Survey; open-ended question)

<sup>53</sup> “Quarterly Progress Report.” SNS, April – June 2014. Page 8.

<sup>54</sup> FAO Inception Phase Report and a review of their log-frames.

<sup>55</sup> “DFID Concept Note: Nutrition Interventions under the Joint Resilience Strategy.” WFP, January 2014.

workers.<sup>56</sup>

ICRC lacks this connectedness given the independence and principals that underline their programme approach.

Respondents describe common constraints to connectedness. These include the difficulty in having qualified government counterparts and the uncertainty, volatility, and security issues associated with working in al-Shabaab controlled areas. There is simply a dearth of viable partners. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated an antagonism toward humanitarian actors, often banning access, demanding payments, looting humanitarian goods, and kidnapping and killing humanitarian workers. Humanitarian actors have to enter into negotiations with al-Shabaab leaders. This is tricky. They need to balance access with strict humanitarian principles.<sup>57</sup> It may be better, as the lack of connectedness in particular partner programmes suggests, to avoid such links altogether.

It has also become a crowded field. Development actors are working closely with the federal government. They are working toward the Somali Compact and Vision 2016. Development actors *are* making links to the government. (See Section 4.1.1.)

When respondents were asked what could strengthen connectedness going forward, common issues emerge. (Figure 16.) Increased government capacity relates, as above, to both FAO's regular activities in this area and, with SNS, to the need for community health workers who can support their projects.<sup>58</sup> Others recognise that having trained government counterparts will be essential to increased partnership and connectedness. Partners recognise the need but it may simply be impractical and untimely. The links between emergency relief and rehabilitation and development has proven challenging in many humanitarian contexts.<sup>59</sup> Why push the issue now?

As noted in Section 8.1.3, some respondents state that there is insufficient dialogue within DFID between the humanitarian and developmental programmes. Respondents from UN organisations who have integrated programme approaches most often state this. They claim this limits connectedness. When this was explored in greater depth, most state that the result of this is a duplication of efforts. The same person from the Agency needs to work with different people on DFID's side. This is different from diminishing opportunities for linking humanitarian and development programmes and projects.



**Conclusion:** The Humanitarian Programme includes inherent connectedness given its focus on resilience, the deployment of consortiums, and in being a multi-year programme. Resilience, as defined and practiced by the relevant partners, focuses on how people anticipate, respond and recover from conflict and climatic shocks. It expects that people return to the same or a better state of equilibrium than that prior to the shock. DFID expects that by focusing on resilience more Somalis will be able to graduate out of a chronic need for humanitarian assistance. They will move toward recovery and development.

Partnership, as addressed in “Effectiveness,” is also a prominent feature of the Programme's design. Multi-year funding allows for partnerships to develop, for the sharing of knowledge and best practices, and for the potential to have a positive impact on results. While the specific contribution to results will need to be measured, the potential is significant.

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<sup>56</sup> “UNICEF Resilience Proposal.” UNICEF, September 2013 & “DFID Resilience Inception Document.” UNICEF, July 2014.

<sup>57</sup> For a review of humanitarian actors have negotiated access, please see: Joe Belliveau, “Red Lines and al Shabaab: Negotiating Humanitarian Access in Somalia.” Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre, March 2015.

<sup>58</sup> “Quarterly Progress Report.” SNS, April – June 2014. District level briefs.

<sup>59</sup> Janice K. Kopinak, “Humanitarian Aid: Are Effectiveness and Sustainability Impossible Dreams?” *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, March 2013.

While connectedness includes making links to civil society and local and federal government, making such links with humanitarian programming may be premature. Only FAO and SNS have prominent links to government actors. Partners recognise this as a constraint and yet development actors are already entering the field. It makes sense to keep connectedness for humanitarian action at the programming level rather than to try to establish links to recovery and development through government, at least at this time.

There are also few explicit links to DFID development programming. This too may be appropriate given the humanitarian needs and some of the experimental approaches associated with the Programme. Increased in-house collaboration is always attractive. Yet it is not clear what type of results might be achieved through such increased collaboration. Perhaps these links could be strengthened in the future but there does not seem to be a need to do so at this time.

**Recommendations:** None.

## 7. Efficiency<sup>60</sup>

### 7.1.1. DFID, Value for Money and the Humanitarian Programme in Somalia<sup>61</sup>

DFID promotes VfM as a key approach in its programmes. The National Audit Office (NAO) defines VfM as being “the optimal use of resources to achieve intended outcomes.”

The principals that guide DFID’s approach to VfM include:

1. VfM is about maximising the impact of each pound spent to improve people’s lives;
2. Decisions to invest require a judgment as to whether the expected results justify the costs; and
3. To maximise the impact of UK aid, one needs to be clear about the results (outputs and outcomes) expected as well as the costs.<sup>62</sup>

To do this, VfM addresses economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness. It also considers where and how these are related to logical frameworks from inputs to impact. (Figure 17.) In this way, it provides an integrated approach to using financial data to determine overall value and returns on investment.

Even simple calculations of VfM are being challenged in the literature.<sup>63</sup> Determining value and returns is a regular feature of financial management. This includes a myriad of tools for calculating returns in complex operating environments where many variables that can impede results can be unknown. This includes discount cash flow analysis, net present value, return on equity equations, working capital ratios, amongst countless others that, while derived from corporate

#### DFID’s Approach to VfM

**Economy:** Are we or our agents buying inputs of the appropriate quality at the right price?

**Efficiency:** How well do we or our agents convert inputs into outputs?

**Effectiveness:** How well are the outputs from an intervention achieving the desired outcome?

**Cost-effectiveness:** How much impact on poverty reduction does an intervention achieve relative to the inputs that we or our agents invest in it?

“DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (VfM).”  
 DFID. Julv 2011. P. 4.

<sup>60</sup> This section explores and answers the primary efficiency question, mainly “Is the work on value for money by partners sufficient for achieving economy, effectiveness and efficiency going forward?”

<sup>61</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: “Does DFID have adequate mechanisms to measure value for money for individual partners and for the Programme as a whole?”

<sup>62</sup> “DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (VfM).” DFID, July 2011. Page 3.

<sup>63</sup> P. Jackson, “Value for Money and International Development: Deconstructing Myths to Promote a More Constructive Discussion.” OECD, 2012.


finance, can lend to measuring value and effectiveness in humanitarian contexts.<sup>64</sup> These include social returns on investments.<sup>65</sup>

For economy, DFID’s approach to VfM focuses on procurement and ensuring that partners have appropriate procurement guidelines in place that include competitive local and international purchasing. For efficiency, it works with partners to review business processes and to identify areas where efficiencies could be improved and where economies of scale may be achieved. This includes an analysis of transaction costs. There is little evidence of the use of outside models and tools for business process reengineering as would often be used to assess efficiency.<sup>66</sup>


For effectiveness and cost effectiveness, DFID uses indicators related to the most pertinent cost centres as proxies for overall effectiveness.

There are limits to what can be done. The processes that underpin humanitarian action are as complex as the context and peoples they serve. As Figure 18 shows, this includes every step from identifying the need to reporting on results.<sup>67</sup> Efficiency and effectiveness include all of these elements, their interworking, and how they, in total, contribute to results and expected value.

There is also a lack of tools, both at DFID and amongst partners. ICT and the data it organises are central to financial management. One



**Figure 17:** VfM and the Causal Chain. “DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (VfM).” DFID, July 2011.



**Figure 18:** Humanitarian Aid Processes. From “Business Process Management in International Humanitarian Aid.” (Peterken & Bandara, 2015)

<sup>64</sup> “Valuation” is its own distinct field within financial management and includes diverse approaches and tools for calculating the value of different endeavours. For a classic treatise, see Robert C. Merton, *Continuous Time Finance*. Wiley-Blackwell, 1992.

<sup>65</sup> Social Return on Investment has become a prevalent feature of financial management for public sector enterprises. See the SROI Network ([www.thesroinetwork.org](http://www.thesroinetwork.org)). The UK Cabinet office has also published guidance on social return on investment that mirror the logical framework approach used by DFID. See, “A Guide to Social Return on Investment.” Cabinet Office, April 2009.

<sup>66</sup> Business Process Reengineering (BPR) constitutes a whole field of management. The term was originally coined by the Boston Consulting Group in the 1980s. It includes looking at processes and how to maximize efficiencies through an evaluation of bottlenecks, opportunities for automation, and more rationale decision making processes. For a review of the way BPR has been implemented in different contexts, see Varun Grover, Seung Ryul Jeong, William J. Kettinger, and James T. C. Teng, “The Implementation of Business Process Reengineering.” *Journal of Management Information Systems*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Summer 1995.

<sup>67</sup> Hugh Peterken and Wasana Bandara, “Business Process Management in International Humanitarian Aid.” J. vom Brocke and M. Rosemann (eds.), *Handbook on Business Process Management (Second Edition)*. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

needs the numbers in timely way to do the necessary analysis. Some estimates put the level of ICT investment at around 2.4% of budgets for INGOs compared to 5.9% in private sector organisations.<sup>68</sup> It is clear that an investment bank or a technology company has the resources to invest in the latest and most robust ICT. Public sector organisations do not. This limits these organisations from having the internal systems and analytical rigour necessary for value estimation and return on investment approaches.

The Humanitarian Programme's Business Case sees the move to multi-year funding as the preferred option in relation to VfM. It states that the current "pattern of humanitarian response is not sustainable" because of the continued shocks that impact people in Somalia. It sees annual funding cycles as directly contributing to chronic caseloads. It states: "A consequence of 20 years of annual programmes is the growing number of chronically food insecure households and of people in need of short-term humanitarian assistance."<sup>69</sup> It is assumed that moving to multi-year funding will reduce this caseload.

The Business Case states that by combining immediate life-saving activities with resilience over a 4-year Programme, partners will be better equipped to deliver their programmes efficiently and effectively. It states: "providing more timely assistance in response to shocks should both cuts [sic] the number in need of assistance and the cost of that assistance."<sup>70</sup>

This implies that the "value" will be in the reduction of those in need. This may be difficult to demonstrate. The causal links between partner activities in the uncertain and volatile context of Somalia, let alone the inconsistencies in actual population figures, may prove elusive. Yet, without this basic logic, the link between the problem and the expected impact, conducting financial analysis associated with effectiveness may be unproductive.<sup>71</sup>

There are other inherent constraints to measuring quantifiable results in life-saving and resilience programmes, let alone humanitarian action more broadly.

For life saving activities, there tends to be a dichotomy between reach and numbers of lives saved. For instance, it may be very expensive to reach certain populations as compared to others who are in equal need of humanitarian assistance. Given limited resources, would VfM dictate that those who are "cheaper" to reach provide a better return? This would be the assumption (if not the focus) if it is the number of people who no longer need assistance as a primary objective. Should they be prioritised over those who are harder to reach?<sup>72</sup>

Resilience presents a more difficult constraint. The nature of resilience is dynamic. It involves various factors that converge and diverge around individuals, households, or communities over time. They move from equilibrium, to disequilibrium, and then back to another state of equilibrium. Resilience implies their ability to return to the same state or a better state than that from before the shock. Given this dynamism, resilience cannot be easily distilled into discrete components to which to assign a cost.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> IBID, page 258.

<sup>69</sup> "Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017. DFID. Paragraph 210.

<sup>70</sup> IBID, paragraph 211.

<sup>71</sup> Philip White, Anthony Hodges, and Mathew Greenslade, "Guidance on Measuring and Maximising Value for Money in Social Transfer Programmes (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)." DFID, April 2013. Page 11.

<sup>72</sup> This dilemma is addressed in: Rachel Scott, "Imagining More Effective Humanitarian Aid: A Donor Perspective." OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, No. 18, OECD Publishing, 2014. Page 18.

<sup>73</sup> A literature review was conducted as part of this Evaluation and yet no academic or other best practices emerged regarding how to measure the cost effectiveness of resilience.



**Conclusion:** DFID's general approach to VfM for the Humanitarian Programme is grounded in practical approaches to economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness. It seeks competitive and cost sensitive procurement strategies including possible economies of scale and/or discounts for bulk purchases such as plumpy'nut. It seeks a limited number of discrete indicators that can be linked between discrete inputs and outputs and then extrapolates conclusions from this for overall effectiveness.

The complexity of humanitarian programming, especially resilience, requires a more systemic approach to measuring the cost effectiveness of certain approaches and outputs. There are ample models for this in different sectors and they could be adapted for the Humanitarian Programme.

Measuring the effectiveness of discrete interventions in resilience is a systemic exercise rather than a linear one aimed at linking one discrete input to another discrete output. Resilience is dynamic, not linear. Deterministic approaches of study, e.g. those that seek to define a standard set of variables and then measure their changes over time, may miss variables that are more relevant to how the system works and how variables and conditions combine to increase or decrease resilience.<sup>74</sup> One review of resilience states:

Although deterministic dynamical systems can generate behavior sufficiently complex to be of interest to resilience studies, they cannot capture key elements that are of interest to resilience scholars: novelty, and adaptation. These concepts are core to systems that evolve, and all social ecological systems (SESs) fall into this category. Thus, dynamical systems are limited to the study of SESs at a particular point in time (with a fixed configuration) and cannot capture their evolutionary dynamics. The class of systems referred to as complex adaptive systems (CASs), on the other hand, are aimed at capturing the key features of systems that do evolve.<sup>75</sup>

This and related literature and best practices indicate that systemic approaches to measuring change must be deployed when considering resilience.

**Recommendation 5:** Develop a set of ratios and systemic-based indicators to gauge the effectiveness of resilience. These should draw on common models, best practices, and literature, related to financial management and complex adaptive systems. This will then give a sufficient basis for measuring effectiveness and cost effectiveness from a VfM perspective. This can include the costs associated with different combinations of discrete activities in a particular moment in time and that demonstrably led to increased results. It is this holistic approach that not only better aligns with resilience but that is also the foundation for the myriad of approaches, tools and models that have been used to estimate the value of complex endeavours.

#### 7.1.2. Partners work with VfM<sup>76</sup>

Partners exhibit satisfaction in the way DFID has worked with them to integrate VFM principles and approaches into their work. Survey results show that 68.6% of respondents say that their organisations have incorporated VfM principles and approaches. (Figure 19.) This is confirmed through qualitative statements. There, 58% of comments are positive with only 10% Negative. (Figure 20.)

This Evaluation has also included a documentation review of VfM materials. This includes a review of indicators, budgetary models, and other tools that partners use for VfM. Here too, most partners have incorporated such tools with some, like FAO and SNS, going beyond expectations and developing full models for related budgets and expenses. While their focus is on economy and efficiency, their work


<sup>74</sup> This is the primary feature of econometric approaches to studying resilience. These often look at distinct conditions, livelihoods, assets, food security, as the primary drivers for resilience and then measure changes in these over time. See: Prabhu Pingali, Luca Alinovi, and Jacky Sutton, "Food Security in Complex Emergencies: Enhancing Food System Resilience." *Disasters*, Volume 29, June 2005.

<sup>75</sup> Patrick Martin-Breen and J. Marty Anderies, "Resilience: A Literature Review." The Rockefeller Foundation, September 2011.

<sup>76</sup> This section answers the evaluation questions: "Have partners integrated value for money principles and approaches into their work?" and "Do partners demonstrate an adequate understanding of economy, efficiency and effectiveness to support effective financial management?"


demonstrates a sufficient level of integration of VfM principals and approaches.

Respondents state particular appreciation with the way that DFID officers have worked with them. (Figure 20) Respondents say that training and support has always been interesting and that the DFID officer in charge of this process has an understanding of each partners’ context and internal constraints.



**Figure 19:** Have partners integrated VfM principles and approaches? (Survey; 67 responses out of 103. This lower response rate is due to number of respondents with practical insights into VfM.

Many express recognition of VfM as important and useful. Some state that this surprised them. They thought DFID’s approach to VfM might be a duplication of what they knew, what their organisation already did, or otherwise a waste of time. This was not the case.



**Figure 20:** Have partners integrated VfM principles and approaches? (Semi-Structured Interviews)

Respondents state that while some have their own organisational processes and analytics in place for measuring value and costs, the DFID approach provides a useful framework and practical tools for thinking about these issues. For the INGO consortia, DFID is helping them create and integrate VfM standards across their work. SNS is using the DFID budget model that provides automated graphs for key VfM indicators. No respondent saw DFID’s approach to VfM or how DFID supports their use of it as futile or a waste of time. Nearly all agreed that VfM was important both for more effective project designs and for addressing the limited financial resources available for their programmes.

Although in the minority, some respondents did indicate that DFID’s approach was not aligned with internal organisational systems and procedures and that it did not take into account their and other tools for measuring value. This could be a constraint to the integration of proposed principles and approaches.

The Survey included a number of open-ended questions that asked people to provide written responses regarding how economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness support programme outcomes.<sup>77</sup> This was meant to assess respondents’ understanding of VfM principles and approaches.

<sup>77</sup> See the “Data & Analysis Report” included as a separate Annex for the responses to this question.

**Table 3: Response rates and those judged to be substantive in related survey questions.**

	Economy	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Cost Effectiveness
<b>Response Rate</b>	42%	43%	41%	39%
<b>Substantive Response Rate</b>	28%	31%	34%	31%

The table above shows that between 39 – 42% of survey respondents provided written responses. 40% seems reasonable given that not all respondents are involved in VfM. Of those, between 28– 34% provided substantive answers, e.g. longer exposition and examples of how each supports programme objectives. These were judged purely on their substance—not on their efficacy.

This shows that around 30% of those involved in VfM took the time and provided substantive responses.<sup>78</sup> While this remains inconclusive, it is an indication that a fair number of key people across partners do have a fair understanding of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and cost effectiveness and how these relate to programme outcomes.



**Conclusion:** Partners express satisfaction with how DFID has worked with them to incorporate VfM principles, approaches and tools into their work. They appreciate how DFID’s practical approach to VfM is complementary to their own internal approaches, even if they don’t always fit with these. A relative sample of respondents demonstrate knowledge of how economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness support programme outcomes.

**Recommendation:** None.

## 8. Effectiveness<sup>79</sup>

### 8.1.1. What does effectiveness mean in the context of humanitarian action in Somalia?

Effectiveness is a pre-condition for partner performance and results. It is the mechanics and machinery that drive toward impact. How well are different partners working? How are they working together and with DFID? Are there sufficient business processes, partnerships, networks, communication channels and practices, and other elements to ensure that partners can maximise their core competencies towards the needs of peoples in Somalia?

When partners involved in this Evaluation were asked what made their programmes effective, engagement with communities in Somalia was the most prevalent response. (Figure 21.) This is a mainstay of humanitarian action in Somalia. Humanitarian actors have had to negotiate with local communities for access for the last 20 years. They have learned, often painfully, that the ability to work with clans and other community-based power structures is essential toward being able to reach those in need.

Community engagement is also a prominent feature of programme and project design. There is a growing body of literature that suggests that community-centred programme designs lead to greater impact.<sup>80</sup> It can mean many different things. It can include the BRCIS approach to resilience that has an adapted

<sup>78</sup> This will be used as a benchmark for future process evaluations.

<sup>79</sup> This section explores and answers the primary effectiveness question, mainly “Is there early evidence that multi-year humanitarian funding may improve outcomes for those in need of humanitarian assistance?”

<sup>80</sup> The community engagement literature is expansive. It has also evolved to ensure that humanitarian principles guide community level engagement and that the people in need of humanitarian assistance both become central to project design, leadership, and, eventually, management. For a review of this, see Dayna Brown and Antonio Donini, “Rhetoric or Reality: Putting Affected People at the Centre of Humanitarian Action.” ALNAP Study, ALNAP/ODI, 2014.

community/participatory approach. It can include UNICEF’s competencies in facilitative/participatory community ownership. It can include FAO’s approach that has specific technical tools for animal husbandry and agricultural yield, amongst others, which depend on engagement with pastoralists and farmers. All of these and others may contribute to effectiveness.

Somalia has its own constraints, issues and opportunities that may be met through community engagement. The historical antecedents, including the 2011 – 2012 famine, the lack of a strong central government, the volatility and uncertainty that persists across the country, and the combination of climatic and conflict-based shocks that negatively impact communities, all signal a fractured and diffuse context for humanitarian action. For most, the basis of society and belonging lies at the community and clan levels, at least for now.

The other issues raised by respondents are also instructive. It is here that respondents recognise that there can be an additional level of effectiveness associated with being part of a consortium. This is explored below to see if partners are doing things differently because of the consortium approach and because of multi-year funding. Experience in Somalia, as noted in Section 4.1.2, is also critical but it is not clear that the 20-years of experience has thus far had a long-term positive impact on the humanitarian context in Somalia. Standardised tools and approaches are treated below and in “Coherence” above. Longer-term design is also treated below and in “Connectedness” above.

### 8.1.2. Multi-Year Funding and Programme Design

#### Programme Design & Early Delivery<sup>81</sup>

Respondents are positive about how multi-year funding supports programme designs. Figure 22 shows that 72% of comments were positive about how multi-year funding contributes to programme design. This is supported by the Survey that shows a similar trend. (Figure 23.) Each of these is analysed below.

#### Community Engagement


The most commonly cited difference concerns “more community engagement and dialogue with communities that can support more beneficiary commitment.” They key aspect of these responses is the sense of “more”. Multi-year funding allows them to do more community engagement. Few would state that that was not a prevalent part of their organisation’s approach prior to multi-year funding. Yet, *how much more* are they doing because of multi-year funding?



Figure 21: What makes your programme effective? (Survey; open-ended question)

<sup>81</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: “Are partners doing anything differently because of multi-year funding, e.g. different approaches to project/programme design?”

A review of partner’s proposals and inception phase reports illustrate that this depends on the partner. The BRCiS approach depends on participatory community design and so it is prevalent. The SNS approach does not depend so much on community engagement (except regarding access) but actually the analysis of underlying causes that cause malnutrition. This depends on community involvement but is secondary to the analytical focus of this approach. The UN Joint Strategy for Resilience does not depict any more community engagement than each agency might do in isolation. FAO’s resilience programme is based on an econometric approach to pre-determined facets of resilience and this would be largely the same in any country context. WFP’s programme design does not include new approaches or increased levels of engagement. UNICEF is exploring new ways to engage with communities, to facilitate their understanding and ownership of activities and approaches and yet this seems part of




UNICEF’s core corporate competencies. For **Figure 23:** Are partners doing anything differently because of multi-year funding? (Semi-structured interviews.)

OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC, and the CHF, there isn’t a great deal of expectation that these organisations’ would have different approaches to their programme designs.

**Planning**

Evidence suggests that multi-year funding has allowed partners to do “more or any planning and related assessments and strategies.” With both the INGO consortia and the UN Agencies involved in the Joint Resilience Strategy, there has been a longer inception period that has included, at least based on documentary evidence, more planning.



**Figure 22:** Has multi-year funding made a positive difference in the inception and early delivery phases of the Programme? (Survey; 62 responses out of 103. This lower response rate is due to number of respondents with practical insights into the impact of multi-year funding.

This is more prevalent with BRCIS and SNS yet in different ways. BRCIS's approach depends on planning with the 102 target communities themselves.<sup>82</sup> SNS has required more inter-partner planning to align methods and tools.<sup>83</sup> There does not seem to be a difference, or a need of a difference, in relation to how OCHA, UNHCR and ICRC do their planning.

The UN Joint Strategy for Resilience has included less "planning" per se but more collaboration and partnership-building. The Inception Phase Report includes joint area-based planning, improved M&E, joint advocacy, and joint analytical work.<sup>84</sup> Documentation review indicates that the Agencies are not acting in the same geographic regions consistently. There is also little evidence of joint M&E systems. In fact, even reporting has been relegated to each Partner rather than providing regular reports from the Joint Strategy level. They are meeting together and developing a joint strategy but this does not include significant increases in planning.

It is not clear that FAO, UNICEF and WFP have done any more planning individually than might be required if multi-year funding were not a factor.<sup>85</sup> UNICEF has developed a specific plan for the resilience programme but it is not clear if this is substantively different from what they might do for an annual programme. Both FAO's and WFP's approach conforms with corporate strategy and planning mechanisms. They cannot move away from these and yet there seems to be some resistance or compromises they have made to satisfy DFID planning requirements, e.g. the use of the DFID log-frame template, that have increased their "planning" but for reasons associated with donor relations rather than with "better" planning. It is a question of whether or not WFP and FAO's corporate strategies and planning mechanisms, amongst other partners, are not more appropriate for expected performance and results. They may be forged on global experience and a knowledge of what is possible and practical given corporate policies and procedures.<sup>86</sup>

It is unclear from the early delivery phases whether any changes in planning have resulted in increased performance or better results. This will be an area of investigation in the next Process evaluation.

### *M&E*

The development of analytics and M&E approaches is a prominent feature of partner programme designs. This is supported by DFID and, as the Business Case states, "each partner is expected to monitor their project/programme."<sup>87</sup> A review of M&E approaches and activities, however, does not indicate any significant difference or innovation that could be linked to multi-year funding.<sup>88</sup> In any case, the mere fact that the Programme spans four years does provide more opportunities to gauge performance and results and to make adjustments/adaptations as required.

### *Staff Retention*

INGO respondents state that multi-year funding has allowed them to attract and retain staff. They say that multi-year funding allows for longer employment terms and thus attracts those looking for a commitment. This contributes, respondents state, to their ability to attract more qualified staff.

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<sup>82</sup> "Inception Phase Report." BRCIS, March 2014.

<sup>83</sup> "Quarterly Progress Report." SNS, April – June 2014.

<sup>84</sup> "A Strategy for Enhancing Resilience in Somalia." FAO, UNICEF & WFP, July 2012. Pages 2, 3.

<sup>85</sup> This is based on a review of programme documentation.

<sup>86</sup> Planning approaches and tools cover a breadth of different needs and contexts. In international cooperation and development, results based management has become a prevalent form of planning for results. For a review of how result based management has been instigated by donors and others, see: "Results Based Management in the Development of Co-Operation Agencies: A review of Experience." OECD DAC, November 2001.

<sup>87</sup> "Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017." DFID. Paragraph 347.

<sup>88</sup> This is confirmed by assessments of M&E systems. See "Inception Phase Report." Transtec, July 2014.

There is little way in this Evaluation to verify this. It is clear from documentation that there have been delays in filling posts. For instance, there were noted delays in filling the consortium level M&E position for the SNS consortium, amongst other key positions. The BRCiS consortium notes similar delays.<sup>89</sup> This may also be related to finding the best-qualified candidates. In any case, future process evaluations can measure retention and staff satisfaction over the course of the Programme, including comparative analysis.

### *Peace of Mind*

Both INGO and UN respondents state that multi-year funding provides “peace of mind,” implying that they are less insecure or worried about their own job prospects or their project’s prospects after one year. They implied that this “peace of mind” was related to their capacities to devote more attention to planning, research and thinking. Some state that they have been frustrated in annual funding cycles by having to “always be doing proposals.” The “peace of mind” that a multi-year Programme provides is surely true. The impact of this on partner performance and results remains unclear. It is clear that the multi-year approach has provided more time for collaboration. It may give people the space to explore and innovate.

### *Negative Comments*

Some respondents did say that nothing has changed. They were in a minority. There is evidence that supports their views. At project levels, there is little that has changed. With the exception of BRCiS who is supporting a range of community directed activities, the partners are doing the same activities they would do in most humanitarian contexts. Actual targeting and programming show few changes. At this time, the changes are largely theoretical—related to the planning and thinking of the management teams. These may not have had the time to trickle down to on-the-ground activities.

The other negative comment concerns the time it has taken partners to “get up and running.” This seems manifestly true. Inception Phase reports were provided between March and June after winning the contract. This is between four and six months from contract award. In an annual programme, this would be nearly half the time spent on inception. It is unclear if this time will have a significant return. On collaboration, if this results in increased partner performance and results this may prove to be a good investment. If not, one may question the value of DFID’s investment into partners learning “how to work together,” as described in related qualitative evidence.

There remain other questions about *more* planning and *more* community engagement. More of each of these may provide better performance and results but this is largely unknown at this time.



**Conclusion:** While the INGO consortia approaches are inherently different, most partner activities abide by traditional designs, approaches and activities. The INGO consortium approaches combine different activities in novel ways and based on a four-year trajectory. The BRCiS approach to resilience is new, combining community based planning with a community led approach to programming. Yet, the elements, the actual activities are largely

the same. In the UN Joint Strategy for Resilience, there is little indication of a difference to how these partners are working together. WFP’s programme elements conform with corporate approaches and activities. FAO’s approach to resilience is the same as in other country contexts. UNICEF has approached resilience differently but it is not clear how much this has to do with multi-year funding.

Community engagement is the most prevalent difference that partners cite. Yet, community engagement is essential to most approaches and designs, multi-year funding or not. It is prevalent in humanitarian activities globally. This is not a valid difference. It may be that partners are doing more community engagement than would be normally possible. The link between more community engagement and better performance and results will need to be analysed as part of subsequent impact and process evaluations.

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<sup>89</sup> These human resources issues are described in each consortia’s quarterly reports.

Partners raise other differences. These include increased planning, better analytics for targeting and M&E, greater staff attraction and retention, and the peace of mind associated with not having to do resource mobilisation annually and the assurance that their programme will survive for multiple years. Each of these has some degree of importance. The analytics for targeting and M&E could have a direct positive impact on results and learning. Staff retention is surely key but there have been delays in recruitment and there is not yet an indication of how long staff will stay in post. Peace of mind may give people more time to devote to programme and project designs. Each of these may indeed contribute to increased results.

**Recommendation 6:** Develop metrics for measuring community engagement and how this contributes to better results for beneficiaries. This may include an analysis of different community engagement methods and their advantages, disadvantages, constraints, opportunities and risks. This should be done by and at the consortium level.

**Recommendation 7:** Investigate the potential “return” associated with longer start-up times that have occurred given the multi-year funding approach. As respondents note, the period of inception was much longer than in annual humanitarian programmes. Respondents state that this has allowed them to develop better targets and plans, amongst other things. It has also allowed partners to collaborate more and to strengthen their partnerships. There should be a clear return on these as related to increased performance (outputs) and results (outcomes).

#### Early & Flexible Funding<sup>90</sup>

The IRF intends to provide funding before a crisis reaches maturity and “results in better outcomes for people than provision of emergency aid.”<sup>91</sup> It includes approximately £36 million over the four year Programme or 25% of all support. As described in the Business Case, the IRF will draw on warning signs from a number of sources, including FSNAU/FEWS NET, and will be reviewed at least three times a year by the DFID Somalia Humanitarian Adviser who may make subsequent recommendations. Triggers will be established for action with other donors, mainly the USA and EC, and will become an instrument for the Humanitarian Community rather than simply for DFID.

Early indications of the use of the IRF signal that it has been able to release funding early, as intended, and that the timeline between allocation and disbursements is less than that of other emergency funding like the CERF.

Partners express an appreciation of the IRF. As Figure 24 shows, 79% of comments are positive. Partners state that the IRF has been used to meet gaps and that they have been impressed with the efficiency of the decision making, allocations, and disbursements.





Figure 24: How has early and flexible funding supported partners? (Semi-structured interviews)

At the same time, a documentation review indicates that the IRF may not always be used to provide funding before an emergency reaches maturity and as based on formalised warnings and triggers. There are indications, although not conclusive, that UN organisations have requested IRF funds because of

<sup>90</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: “How has early & flexible funding supported partners in the inception phase and early delivery phases of their programmes?”

<sup>91</sup> “Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017. DFID. Paragraph 112.

budgetary gaps. They can argue that this then presents an emergency or a likely emergency if their projects are not adequately funded. This seems different from the IRF’s intent.



**Conclusion:** The IRF stands as an innovative approach for ensuring that funding is available prior to when an emergency reaches maturity. This is exceptionally important in the context of Somalia. The delays in responding to early warnings, amongst other things, led to the 2011 - 2012 famine and 260,000 deaths.<sup>92</sup> The IRF seeks to remedy this by providing an allocation of funds that can be used according to agreed upon early warnings and triggers.

Partners appreciate the IRF. They state that allocation decisions and disbursements are done quickly. Yet, some also see the IRF as “filling a gap” rather than as a strict pool of resources for responding to emergencies early. This seems especially prevalent amongst UN agencies.


**Recommendation 8:** Ensure that IRF allocations are based on formal early warning and triggers rather than gaps in funding or budget shortfalls. Providing budgetary support through the IRF may dilute its intent. It also may prevent partners from taking necessary steps to avoid such budgetary shortfalls.

### 8.1.3. Multi-Year Funding and Partnership<sup>93</sup>

Partnership relates to connectedness (Section 6) and yet for the Programme it is also essential for the expectations related to multi-year funding. This includes an expectation for greater responsiveness, adaptability, flexibility, and innovation that are most likely derived through the close coordination and partnership amongst actors. In this way it has a direct relation to effectiveness.

Partnership is key to how organisations work together in humanitarian contexts. The Principles of Partnership (PoP) were endorsed in 2007 as a response to a changing reality in the field of humanitarian assistance. The intention for the PoP is to create a shared understanding of how more effective partnership contributes to increased effectiveness.<sup>94</sup> This led to partnership being added as a fourth pillar in the humanitarian reform process, both as a strategy to improve results but also as a commitment to change the way in which humanitarian actors worked together.

It is noticeable that the partnerships expected in the Programme are separate from those in the HCT or clusters. While all Programme partners are involved in the clusters in different ways and at different times, this does not have a direct bearing on their work together within the Programme. This is not because of a gap between the objectives set forth in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and those for the Humanitarian Programme. The HRP strategic objectives for 2015 include life-



**Figure 25:** Have partners worked together in ways that could contribute to or constrain results going forward? (Semi-structured interviews)

<sup>92</sup> Daniel Maxwell, Kirsten Gelsdorf, Nicholas Haan, and David Dawe (Eds.) “The 2011 – 2012 Famine in Somalia.” *Global Food Security (Special Edition)*; Volume 1 (1). January 2013.

<sup>93</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: “Have partners worked together to date in ways that could contribute to or constrain results going forward?”

<sup>94</sup> The principles are equality, complementarity, transparency, accountability, results-oriented and responsibility



- ◆ **Good engagement; everyone takes it seriously:** While some partners state that they have limited resources and that this can prevent them from participating as much as they'd like, nearly all said that the commitment and seriousness by which people take the partnership is remarkable.
- ◆ **Resilience is difficult:** This is perhaps an understatement and yet it crystallises the somewhat exasperated tone of respondents who are directly involved in resilience. As noted in Section 7.1.1, resilience is a dynamic. It depends on contextualised variables. It is systemic and so does not lend itself to common models or frameworks. This makes programming for results as complex and challenging as the subject itself. While this must be surely difficult for partners, it is through their discussions that programmatic options may emerge. This "difficultness" may actually prove to be an asset.
- ◆ **Need to coordinate more beyond consortium and with UN:** While not a prominent feature, some respondents say that there can be more interaction with the UN, especially between BRCIS and the UN Joint Strategy for Resilience. Respondents also note opportunities to share knowledge and information with other consortia working in Somalia, such as the Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP).
- ◆ **Took a long time to get a shared vision:** A shared vision is important and yet its value is relatively difficult to substantiate. Methodologies in this and future evaluations will use linguistic determinism to assess commonalities in behaviours, attitudes, and understandings of abstract and theoretical concepts. Even if it can be established that a shared vision exists, it will be nearly impossible to judge whether the time it took to establish a "shared vision" was "too long;" just that it exists.
- ◆ **Challenges in coordination remain:** Some of the noted challenges include having sufficient resources to maximise individual partner roles in the consortium and the need for more coordination in the field. Resources concern smaller partners who say they don't have the staff to participate in many of the consortium level meetings. Coordination in the field relates to "remote management" a common feature of humanitarian programming in Somalia.

#### UN<sup>98</sup>

- ◆ **Knowledge and information sharing has been positive:** Respondents state that while this may not have a direct relation to expected results at this point, the sharing of information and knowledge in joint meetings prove useful toward enabling partners to work together. They state that this knowledge sharing has been necessary for organisations to learn how to work together and to identify potential synergies. Many state that this was particularly pronounced in the work on the baseline in Dolow where various levels of staff needed to work together "on the ground."
- ◆ **Risk analysis/management has been improved (also due to DFID's support):** A review of related documentation does not indicate a clear difference in how risk management processes have been improved. They are present in related proposals and inception phase reports. Yet, risk management's value lies in how it is operationalized. It depends on being a tool rather than a framework for pre- and post project delivery.<sup>99</sup> One may argue that risk strategies are articulated better given the time available in the longer inception phase that multi-year funding provides.
- ◆ **Close, active collaboration/coordination:** There is evidence of a number of well-attended meetings between the three agencies. Respondents report that these are largely constructive although there has been some "jockeying" and competition. Some respondents also state that one of the agencies has been unnecessarily forceful in other agencies' adoption of approaches and tools. Most state that these meetings have progressed, that working relationships are stronger now.

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<sup>98</sup> IBID.

<sup>99</sup> For an interesting perspective on how to analyse and operationalise risk, see Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff. "The Right Game: Use Game Theory to Shape Strategy." *Harvard Business Review*, July – August 1995.

- ◆ **Are moving forward on a joint programme:** This was a new initiative at the time of this Evaluation. An actual joint programme could remedy some of the constraints that have impacted partnership for the UN Joint Strategy for Resilience to date.
- ◆ **Working at community level has proven very useful and a good place for innovative thinking:** As with other aspects of this Evaluation, partners regularly cite community engagement as something they are doing differently/more of because of multi-year funding. Evidence suggests that their work here is not much different from what they have done in other contexts. This is not the case for all partners. BRCiS has spent a considerable amount of time working with communities as part of its overall project design. SNS has also done a lot of work to understand the issues that are contributing to chronic malnourishment. Yet, the UN organisations largely abide by corporate approaches and policies and thus are limited in using any opportunity that multi-year funding may provide to do more innovative community engagement.
- ◆ **There still remains a sense of competition amongst partners:** While respondents state that this competition has dissipated, it remains a factor in how they work together. Respondents describe the dominance of one partner's approach, both in terms of experience and in the analytics that underpin it. Respondents describe this approach as complicated and far removed from their own approaches and yet also find it difficult to convey this to the relevant partner.<sup>100</sup>
- ◆ **Coordination is too formal:** Respondents describe meetings as lacking spirited discussion where issues can be threshed out and solutions agreed. This may be expected in many new "teams" and may change over time.
- ◆ **Coordination is not resulting in tangible programmatic changes on the ground; not even working together everywhere:** This is confirmed in a review of inception phase reports and available quarterly reports. There is little indication that partners are doing much different. In terms of partnership, their work together is new and it may contribute to results. To achieve this, a great deal more will have to be done to ensure that partnerships are geared toward performance and results. Partners are not working in the same communities. This is due to internal politics and funding constraints, according to relevant respondents. If working together in Dolow was a fount head of shared best practices and partnership, not working together in the field presents a missed opportunity.
- ◆ **Big gap between what is discussed and agreed in Nairobi and what happens in Somalia; there is little decision making authority for officers working in Somalia:** This relates to remote management and while an important issue it is more general to working in Somalia than having to do with the Programme or multi-year funding. Multi-year funding may enable partners to build relationships between Nairobi and Somalia that could diminish these gaps in communication and decision-making.
- ◆ **Organisations have different funding levels and so it is not an even playing field:** While this may impede partnership as described, this does not have a direct correlation with multi-year funding.
- ◆ **There has been a push by one UN ORG to use their approach and this hasn't been as collaborative as it could be:** As noted above, respondents describe the dominance of one partner's approach, both in terms of experience and in the analytics that underpin the approach.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Best practices dictate that we are generally opaque about specific partners and yet those involved will be able to surmise to whom this analysis relates.

<sup>101</sup> IBID.



**Conclusion:** Multi-year funding has increased opportunities for partnership, especially in the consortia. While links to results are uncertain, there is enough promise in the various aspects that partners cite to expect that partnership will have a positive impact on results.

There does not seem to be, at this early phase of the Programme, as much cross-partnership between the consortia or other organisations who are part of the Humanitarian Programme. There are some exceptions. SNS and FAO have sought out partnerships beyond the Programme. This is less prominent for others.

The Humanitarian Programme puts additional demands on partners while also prompting new opportunities. It raises expectations for improved planning and programming. It expects partners to increase flexibility/adaptability, and innovation. This is different from other coordination bodies. If the multi-year funding approach, amongst other features of the Programme, prove to have a more positive impact on partner performance and results it may raise the question of multi-year funding for the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) in Somalia and beyond. It challenges, in essence, the entire annual funding model for humanitarian action.

**Recommendation:** None.

**Working with DFID**


Partner respondents have mixed views about the partnership with DFID. As Figure 27 illustrates, 42% of responses are positive and 37% are negative—one of the largest proportions of negative comments in all the qualitative data collected as part of this Evaluation.<sup>102</sup>

Many respondents see DFID as being responsive, informed and engaged. They describe, using various examples, how Humanitarian Programme staff respond to queries quickly and that they are nearly always available for critical meetings or forums where issues are addressed.

Many respondents cite examples of how DFID exhibits flexibility for accommodating issues as they arise. Respondents cite examples of where there have needed

programme adaptations or where there have been issues associated with security and access that have impacted results. In each, respondents state that DFID replies with an understanding of the context and of its implications. The work with the partner to solve the problem. “They are real humanitarians” was a common refrain.

Partners also cite DFID’s capacity to provide “ground breaking thinking.” This not only concerns DFID’s global track record of providing leading research on humanitarian issues but, as described by respondents, the knowledge and thinking espoused by the Humanitarian Programme’s advisors. Respondents express satisfaction that the DFID officers not only fully understand humanitarian action but also the context in



**Figure 27:** Have partners worked with DFID in ways that could contribute to or constrain results going forward? (Semi-structured interviews)

<sup>102</sup> UN comments about partnership have the second largest proportion of negative comments at 35% with all respondents’ comments about partnership third with 25% of negative comments.

Somalia. Respondents state that the DFID Humanitarian Advisors often prompt different ways of thinking about an issue, possible solutions, and with a focus of how to move forward and drive toward results

These and other comments support respondents' conclusion that DFID is a "real strategic partner." DFID officers understand the context, work with partners to solve issues, all while maintaining a distinct governance position.

Respondents also note a negative "flip" side to this. Respondents, especially within UN organisations, state that DFID makes an inordinate number of information requests that go beyond formal reporting agreements. The fact that DFID officers are engaged and strategic also means they may have more questions, respondents explain. When asked if DFID is comparatively worse than other donors, respondents say invariably yes and substantively so. These requests are accommodated, respondents explain, because of donor relations and because of the appreciation they have for DFID as a strategic partner.

A fair number of respondents state that there is a gap between their work with DFID development and humanitarian advisors. For the UN partners, in particular, it is often the same staff that work on programmes with humanitarian and development components. Respondents state that they often have to explain things twice and/or that there are contradictory or confusing requests or assumptions about programmes and activities from DFID. For instance, some state that the Joint Health and Nutrition Programme, administered from the development side of DFID, has direct humanitarian, resilience, and other components and yet there doesn't seem to be an adequate understanding of this within DFID. Other issues raised by respondents relate to evaluation activities that seem to duplicate issues or neglect the complexity associated with partner programme approaches.



**Conclusion:** Inherent to the Humanitarian Programme is a close working relationship between DFID and partners. While this is a characteristic of all DFID programmes, the multi-year aspect implies that DFID has more opportunities to work with partners to adjust programme designs as issues and relevant data emerge. DFID supports organisations. It brings "smart money" to the partnership, a term used to describe private sector investors who bring more than simply cash.

The working relationship with DFID is strong and based on mutual respect and an appreciation of the knowledge and experience that DFID brings to the partnership. Partners see DFID as a strategic partner and one that can facilitate and improve how they deliver their programmes.

DFID is an engaged and informed partner and by embarking on multi-year programming of this type it is also prompting partners to think and work together. It is catalysing change. It is also, as the investment in third party M&E demonstrates, committed to delving into what is possible in data collection and analysis. It is committed not just to evidence but to prompting evidence for better programming, decision making, and as a basis for determining best practices and opportunities for innovation. Being a catalyst to change, however, can prove challenging on multiple fronts.

Respondents are also frustrated. The resources that go into complying with an inordinate number of information requests diverts limited resources from other on-going work. It becomes difficult to prioritise and may lend to a diminishing quality in the level of information that is subsequently provided to DFID. It may prompt "cut and paste" approaches to reporting where exposition is missing, substance lost. This, in turn, may cause DFID to form negative impressions of partner performance simply because the reporting is of a poor quality. A review of related documents supports this possibility. There is often a gap between how principle officers describe their programmes and then how they are presented in written materials. This may prove unsatisfactory to DFID, give the impression of a lack of competence, and otherwise sully the working relationship.

There is also a frustration that while partner programmes often integrate humanitarian and development approaches, e.g. in the connectedness and linkages to government or to longer-term strategies, DFID's

humanitarian and development advisors do not seem adequately informed of the others' work or aligned in their thinking about partner approaches.

**Recommendation 9:** DFID should limit information requests to those that are directly pertinent to partner performance and results. Ad hoc information requests should be limited, if not eliminated. If ad hoc requests arise, DFID should ensure that partners can choose not to respond.

#### 8.1.4. Multi-Year Funding and a New Approach to Monitoring & Evaluation<sup>103</sup>

DFID has increased the prominence of M&E as part of the Humanitarian Programme. This includes direct financial support to partner M&E systems and activities as well as a third party suite of M&E support services.

The Business Case lays out five opportunities associated with quality data collection, analysis and findings:

1. Compare and contrast different delivery approaches;
2. Systematic and robust M&E of cluster performance;
3. Capitalise on links with wider resilience-building agenda in Somalia;
4. Join M&E of Humanitarian Programme with DFID initiatives on UN reform; and
5. Contribute to learning and knowledge sharing at an institutional level.<sup>104</sup>

While the direct support for partner M&E systems is a prominent feature in DFID programming, the use of a third party contractor to provide additional support is new. This investment in 3<sup>rd</sup> party M&E is nearly £4 million pounds or 3% of the total Programme amount over four years. The use of a third party contractor for such a significant amount of M&E activities is not available to the humanitarian programmes of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, or Afghanistan where there are protracted humanitarian contexts.<sup>105</sup> DFID respondents for this evaluation state that this level of commitment for third party M&E is fairly unique across DFID programming.

The third party M&E is novel in both its monitoring and evaluation. The monitoring approach is built around an analytic system that allows for the collection of data across partner activities and that then analyses this data to ensure that partners are delivering what is expected, when it is expected, and to the people expected. A primary element of this monitoring approach is an online, integrated data collection and analysis platform. This allows DFID to assess progress in near "real time" and to work with partners constructively when and if things go wrong.

The evaluation approach provides a comprehensive set of analytics that draws from the data collected for the monitoring platform, although not exclusively. This includes three impact evaluations, three process evaluations (of which this Evaluation is a part) and 2 – 4 Real Time Evaluations.

The primary elements include:

- **Comprehensive Analytical Framework:** includes evidence links across partner log-frames and links these to specific evaluations questions, tools and approaches for answering these questions. This provides evidence chains across partner activities that then link to DFID's log-frame and Theory of Change.

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<sup>103</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: "How do DFID's approaches to M&E, including the suite of third party M&E products and approaches, contribute to M&E effectiveness?"

<sup>104</sup> "Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017." DFID. Paragraph 345.

<sup>105</sup> Review of relevant Business Cases from DFID development tracker.

- **Real-time M&E Platform:** This provides DFID with an online ‘real time’ window into what partners are doing where and for whom in addition to key proxy indicators related to Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) treatment, Food Consumption (FCS), Coping Strategies/Food Security (CSI), household income/consumption levels, household asset values, and indicators for social cohesion.
- **3<sup>rd</sup> Party Monitoring:** This includes dedicated, in-house trained monitors who can conduct third party monitoring of partner projects as specific needs arise and as based on activities central to DFID’s expected outcomes and impact.
- **Call Centre:** A Call Centre will make direct calls to between 15,000 and 20,000 beneficiaries monthly. This will further confirm that services have been delivered and may be used to collect additional information about expected outputs and outcomes.
- **Evaluation Strategy:** Combination of process, impact, and real time evaluations that will be both iterative and responsive to the issues that arise over the course of the Programme.


#### Partner Perspectives on DFID’s M&E Support

Survey results are positive about DFID’s M&E Support. 56.7% of respondents state that DFID supports their approach to M&E. (Figure 28) This general assessment is challenged when compared to qualitative evidence from semi-structured interviews. While the question there was more focused, it reveals a greater number of neutral and negative comments. (Figure 29.)

Positive comments relate to the recognition of this level of M&E support, both direct support to partner activities and third party support, and the opportunities these present. Opportunities cited by respondents focus on the ability to have sufficient data to make informed programme decisions and to better understand what works. This includes the use of mobile data technology important for remote management and the potential of having a common platform for sharing information.

The use of mobile data technology and using digital information as a way to support better decision making is not only aligned with the Business Case but also with broader DFID policies and guidance. DFID’s Digital Strategy includes six priorities:

1. Providing greater transparency;
2. Open policy making that is part of the Civil Service Reform Plan;
3. Improving digital elements of programmes, including increasing mechanisms for citizen feedback;
4. Improving capacities for DFID staff, including listening, networking, influencing and engaging;
5. Getting access to resources and the right tools; and
6. Improving the quality and consistency of transactions.<sup>106</sup>



**Figure 28:** Has DFID supported your approach to M&E? (Survey; 83 responses out of 103.)

While some of these principles relate more to internal DFID policies and information sharing, they also describe issues relevant to partner expectations for the current M&E suite of services.

<sup>106</sup> “Department for International Development Digital Strategy 2012 – 2015.” DFID, December 2012. Page 5.

Many respondents are positive about the primary third party contractor involved in the provision of M&E services and support. In addition to the technical components of their work, they also provide guidance and support on M&E practices, approaches, and tools. As noted in other documentation, the aims of the M&E approach overall have necessitated greater direct M&E support to partners. This includes advice on interpreting indicators and results, advice on different M&E tools and approaches, the development and design of M&E survey instruments, including the electronic forms that provide the basis for the on-line platform, and other aspects that have proven useful to partners while being integral to the M&E suite of services.<sup>107</sup>

Figure 29 shows a range of concerns that partners have with DFID’s M&E support. For respondents from UN organisations, these centre on how the third party M&E suite was communicated and rolled-out. These respondents state that the purpose and the intent of the support was not made sufficiently clear and that there was ample confusion about what precisely would be provided, when, and under what conditions.

DFID did provide a communications circular early in the process but there is ample evidence that the scope of the M&E services was not sufficiently clear. As relevant respondents from DFID and the third party contractor explained, this was also because the full scope, the full potential of the M&E support, evolved from its inception phase. There was a common vision of what was to be achieved but the elements that would need to be in place to achieve this vision were not perfectly clear until at least a year into the process.<sup>108</sup> This led to understandable confusion and frustration on the part of some partners.

Respondents also describe a certain level of naiveté from the M&E contractor about the constraints associated with sharing data, integrating external data collection




Figure 29: How do DFID approaches to M&E, including those of third party M&E products and approaches, contribute to M&E design? (Semi-structured interviews)

<sup>107</sup> For a review of the support provided by the independent contractor, see the “Transtec Annual Review.” Transtec, July 2014.

<sup>108</sup> “Transtec Annual Review.” Transtec, July 2014.

systems, and related corporate policies and procedures. These needed to be settled prior to the implementation of the remote data collection technology, the platform, or other key elements of the monitoring side of the support. Yet, DFID and the M&E contractor continued to push partners to share data and adopt components of the M&E services, according to respondents. This led to various conflicts and accusations that slowed progress and could have derailed some of the more positive aspects of DFID's support.<sup>109</sup>

The INGOs were early adopters of the mobile data collection technology and platform and integrated it into their programmes by May 2014. In September 2014, the contractor changed its technology partner to better accommodate the functionality needs for the Programme. The INGO consortia were both already using the previous technology partner's services, including mobile data collection and the on-line platform. While respondents from the INGO consortia express frustration with the functionality of that system, they were also frustrated with having to change suppliers. This change of suppliers and inconsistent functionality and reliability contributed to the majority of neutral and negative comments expressed by INGO respondents.



**Conclusion:** The inclusion of a third party contract for integral M&E services is both an innovation for humanitarian programming and an audacious way of supporting reform across the humanitarian system.<sup>110</sup> If successful, it will provide an on-line platform that will include near “real time” data from across partner activities. This data will show which partners are doing what where and for whom and key performance proxies about life saving activities and resilience. This will enable partners to increase their performance and to understand which approaches and innovations have the most positive impact. It should also enable DFID to make more informed funding decisions, increasing the support for approaches and activities that are proving successful while decreasing funding for those that are not.

Getting this level of data from partner activities in Somalia represents an opportunity. Partners, donors, and other humanitarian stakeholders have needed to work in Somalia without the clear evidence that what they are doing is having an impact. This is compounded by the reliance on local actors to delivery programme activities. The quality for these actors varies and yet, even here, there is limited data about their quality. For instance, UNICEF has a fairly robust quality assurance system for its partners. It seeks to rank them according to the quality and timeliness of their reporting and other demonstrable facets of their work. This is positive. Yet, it still tends to be process oriented rather than based on whether they are doing what is intended for those most in need. Having real time data collection with GPS and pictures, and other indisputable evidence about what is actually happening on the ground will provide an unprecedented level of information to partners.

DFID is providing an opportunity to be truly evidence based. The Programme's M&E approach should allow partners to know what works and what doesn't. It should provide the intelligence to allow them to adapt and adjust and to make decisions that are directly aligned with impact. It also provides a foundation of data and preliminary analysis for answering broad impact-based questions about the Programme as whole. It has the potential to not only increase results and impact on Somalia. It could be a model for evidence-based programming for global humanitarian action.

While this vision for M&E in humanitarian action has tremendous potential, the realisation of this vision is proving challenging. Convincing partners to share data, manoeuvring through the different organisational

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<sup>109</sup> The precise nature of these conflicts involves specific people and organisations and so it is not appropriate to describe them with any specificity here. They are well known to DFID and the principles.

<sup>110</sup> There is a whole field of management that holds that significant change and actual paradigm shifts in the ways different organisations operate requires “big audacious goals.” These are important to not galvanise support, create momentum, and shatter procedures and habits embedded in traditional systems. This was largely stated by Jim Collins work. For an early review, see: Jim Collins, “Turing Goals into Results: the Power of Catalytic Mechanisms.” *Harvard Business Review*, July 1999.

policies about sharing data, the development of a robust and easy to use technology for diverse users in Somalia and Nairobi, and doing so in ways that ensure analytical rigour, are proving daunting. The third-party M&E contractor is showing progress and yet it will still take another 3 – 6 months to have a fully operational system in place.<sup>111</sup>

Partners have expressed dissatisfaction with how the M&E support was communicated and are still not clear what benefits it may provide. There are some indications that partners are also wary of exerting resources on this when they have their own internal M&E challenges. The M&E contractor should become more focused and pragmatic so that all stakeholders can realise the full potential of this innovative M&E approach.

**Recommendation 10:** Have a detailed plan for how M&E system will achieve core objectives and functionality. DFID should ensure that the third party M&E contractor focuses on key functionality and data collection before entertaining any additional functionality. The M&E approach needs “proof of concept” and to demonstrate the value of the approach to partners and other stakeholders. While the vision remains important, the approach has reached a stage where considerable focus will be needed to ensure its reaches its potential.

#### **8.1.5. The Response of External Stakeholders<sup>112</sup>**

Unfortunately, data collected for this was inconclusive. There was also no comparative or documentary evidence available that shows for how other actors may view the programme and the early actions of its partners. This question will be central to future process evaluations.

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<sup>111</sup> “Transtec Annual Review.” Transtec, July 2014.

<sup>112</sup> This section answers the evaluation question: “How have external stakeholders responded to DFID multi-year humanitarian funding?”

## 9. Recommendations

The following recommendations stem from the finding and conclusions presented in this Evaluation. Each of these is related to continued effectiveness and expected results of the Humanitarian Programme going forward. They include the primary stakeholder and a ranking according to being “urgent”, “important” or “desirable.” The recommendations are taken verbatim from the main body of the report and should be referenced for the analysis and conclusions that underpin them.

Recommendation	Evaluation Level	Implied Stakeholder	Ranking	Timing
<p><b>Recommendation 1:</b> To increase its overall relevance, a different approach to the Theory of Change is required. This should address the uncertainty and volatility that has characterised humanitarian action in Somalia for 20 years and that will likely characterise it going forward. It should increase the focus on programmatic links to this context rather than on process improvements amongst partners. This new approach should include new ways of thinking about interventions and activities and how they combine to contribute to results. This requires an adaptive, flexible and options-based approach to how the Theory of Change is articulated. It should include more relevant assumptions, and “if this then that” logic tress between outputs, outcomes and impact. This would reduce the linearity inherent in the Theory of Change as articulated and instead better reflect the complexity that it hopes to explain. This may lead to options and actions that are aligned with the Business Cases’ stated objectives and UK policy and guidance about new ways to delver humanitarian aid. This could include graduated funding over time and based on programmes’ and projects’ abilities to have “proof of concept” for their approaches and then plans for either scaling-up or extending the reach of certain activities. This pilot--proof of concept--scale up model not only reflects the uncertainty in Somalia but also the uncertainty surrounding what actually works. The Theory of Change would indicate the expected outputs, outcomes, and assumptions that would exist in each step of a graduated, or options-based planning approach.<sup>113</sup> It is also based on best practices and common tools for delivering results in complex operating contexts.            (Section 4.1.1)</p>	Relevance	DFID	Important	January 2016
<p><b>Recommendation 2:</b> Partners should develop a common definition of what community engagement means and the primary programmatic elements it includes. This definition should be common to both UN,</p>	Coherence	UN & INGO Consortia	Desirable	July 2015

<sup>113</sup> For a review of how options based planning is being used in the public sector, see: Richard Neufville, “Real Options: Dealing with Uncertainty in Systems Planning and Design.” *Integrated Assessment*, Volume 4, Issue 1: 2003. For a good survey on options based strategies, see: Tome Copeland and Peter Tufano, “A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options.” *Harvard Business Review*, March 2004.

INNGO, and other organisations funded by DFID. (Section 5.1.1)				
<b>Recommendation 3:</b> Partners should develop a common definition and possible approaches for how they address gender equality. This may draw on common tools and approaches like the IASC gender marker. This applies primarily to those partners working at the consortium level, e.g. BRCIS, SNS, FAO, UNICEF and WFP. (Section 5.1.1)	Coherence	Partners	Important	July 2015
<b>Recommendation 4:</b> Draw on definitions, policies and approaches used by OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC, and the CHF. DFID is placed to facilitate this best. This will not only increase coherence but also promote opportunities for the identification of best practices and innovations, a hallmark of the Programme’s approach. The CHF, in particular, represents 18% of the portfolio and represents the seconded largest support amount after the IRF. The CHF represents an opportunity to explore coherence and issues of complementarity in how the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and clusters align with the HRP. This too should not only provide useful comparisons but will also serve as an interesting comparative to the multi-year funding approach. (Section 5.1.2)	Coherence	DFID	Desirable	December 2015
<b>Recommendation 5:</b> Develop a set of ratios and systemic-based indicators to gauge the effectiveness of resilience. These should draw on common models, best practices, and literature, related to financial management and complex adaptive systems. This will then give a sufficient basis for measuring effectiveness and cost effectiveness from a VfM perspective. This can include the costs associated with different combinations of discrete activities in a particular moment in time that demonstrably led to increased results. It is this holistic approach that not only better aligns with resilience but that is also the foundation for the myriad of approaches, tools and models that have been used to estimate the value of complex endeavours. (Section 7.1.1)	Efficiency	DFID/VfM	Desirable	December 2015
<b>Recommendation 6:</b> Develop metrics for measuring community engagement and how this contributes to better results for beneficiaries. This may include an analysis of different community engagement methods and their advantages, disadvantages, constraints, opportunities and risks. This should be done by and at the consortium level. (Section 8.1.2)	Effectiveness	UN & INGO Consortia	Important	May 2015
<b>Recommendation 7:</b> Investigate the potential “return” associated with longer start-up times that have occurred given the multi-year funding approach. As	Effectiveness	Transtec	Desirable	Before next

<p>respondents note, the period of inception was much longer than in annual humanitarian programmes. Respondents state that this has allowed them to develop better targets and plans, amongst other things. It has also allowed partners to collaborate more and to strengthen their partnerships. There should be a clear return on these as related to increased performance (outputs) and results (outcomes). (Section 8.1.2)</p>				process evaluation
<p><b>Recommendation 8:</b> Ensure that IRF allocations are based on formal early warning and triggers rather than gaps in funding and/or budget shortfalls. Providing budgetary support through the IRF may dilute its intent. It also may prevent partners from taking necessary steps to avoid such budgetary shortfalls. (Section 8.1.2)</p>	Effectiveness	DFID	Urgent	On-going
<p><b>Recommendation 9:</b> DFID should limit information requests to those that are directly pertinent to partner performance and results. Ad hoc information requests should be limited, if not eliminated. If ad hoc requests arise, DFID should ensure that partners can choose not to respond. (Section 8.1.3)</p>	Effectiveness	DFID	Desirable	On-going
<p><b>Recommendation 10:</b> Have a detailed plan for how M&amp;E system will achieve core objectives and functionality. DFID should ensure that the third party M&amp;E contractor focuses on key functionality and data collection before entertaining any additional functionality. The M&amp;E approach needs “proof of concept” and to demonstrate the value of the approach to partners and other stakeholders. While the vision remains important, the approach has reached a stage where considerable focus will be needed to ensure its reach is potential. (Section 8.1.4)</p>	Effectiveness	DFID/Transtec	Urgent	April 2015

## 10. Annexes

### 10.1. Evaluation Questions & Sources of Evidence

<b>Evaluation Questions and Evidentiary Sources</b>	<b>Primary Source</b>	<b>Secondary/ Validation</b>
<b>Relevance/Appropriateness</b>		
<b>Is the programme approach relevant given the humanitarian needs and context in Somalia?</b>	DOC-Primary	Mixed
How do DFID’s business case and other design documents/approaches treat the on-going and projected humanitarian needs in Somalia?	DOC-Primary	
How does DFID’s business case address the perceived volatility and uncertainty within Somalia?	DOC-Primary	DOC-Comp; Qual; Survey
Is partners’ experience, individually and collectively, relevant to current and projected humanitarian needs in Somalia?	DOC-Primary	Qual; DOC-Comp
Are partners’ approaches and expected results relevant to DFID’s theory of change?	DOC-Primary	Qual; Survey
<b>Coherence</b>		
<b>How coherent are the programmatic elements of the portfolio?</b>	Mixed	Mixed
Are partner definitions, policies, and approaches complementary or contradictory to each other and to DFID, e.g. in relation to gender equality, resilience, multi-year funding, value, etc.?	DOC-Primary	DOC-2nd; DOC-Comp
Are partner definitions, policies, and approaches complementary or contradictory to other humanitarian actors in Somalia, e.g. in relation to gender equality, resilience, multi-year funding, value, etc.?	DOC-Primary	DOC-Comp; Qual
Are partner procedures complementary or contradictory to each other and to DFID, e.g. procedures for budgeting, planning, monitoring and evaluation, reporting, etc.?	DOC-Primary	DOC-Comp; Qual
How do partners describe their roles within the Programme? (Is there coherence in these descriptions?)	Qual	Survey
How do partners describe the Programme to external stakeholders, e.g. other donors, UN organisations, INGOs/NGOs, government, etc. al.?	Qual	Doc-Primary; DOC-2nd
How do partners describe the Programme to beneficiaries, if at all?	Qual	Doc-Primary; DOC-2nd
Are there complementary procedures in place for addressing issues of accessibility/denied access?	DOC-Primary	DOC-Comp; Survey
<b>Connectedness</b>		
<b>Do activities, projects and expected outputs adequately address longer-term humanitarian, governance, and partnership issues within Somalia?</b>	Mixed	Mixed
<b>Efficiency</b>		
<b>Is the work on value for money by partners sufficient for achieving economy, effectiveness and efficiency going forward?</b>	DOC-Primary	Qual; Survey
Have partners integrated value for money principles and approaches into their work?	Doc-Primary	Qual; DOC-2nd
Do partners demonstrate an adequate understanding of economy, efficiency and effectiveness to support effective financial management?	Qual	Doc-Primary; DOC-2nd
Does DFID have adequate mechanisms to measure value for money for individual partners and for the Programme as a whole?	Doc-Primary	Qual; DOC-2nd
<b>Effectiveness</b>		

<b>To what extent does multi-year humanitarian funding improve outcomes for those in need of humanitarian assistance?</b>	Mixed	Mixed
To what degree has multi-year humanitarian funding enabled DFID to design a different type of programme in Somalia?	Doc-Primary	Qual; DOC-2nd
How has early & flexible funding supported partners in the inception phase and early delivery phases of their programmes?	Qual	DOC-Primary
Are partners doing anything differently because of multi-year funding, e.g. different approaches to project/programme design?	Qual	DOC-Primary
Have partners worked together to date in ways that could contribute to or constrain results going forward?	Qual	Survey; DOC-Primary
How have external stakeholders responded to DFID multi-year humanitarian funding?	Survey	DOC-Primary; DOC-2nd; Qual
How do DFID approaches to M&E, including the suite of third party M&E products and approaches, contribute to M&E design?	Qual	Survey, DOC-Primary



## 10.2. D&A Report

Please see separate Annex.

### 10.3. Bibliography

*The Evaluation included a review of all available project documentation. Unless cited in the main body of the report, these materials are not included here. Please refer to the Transtec “Inception Phase Report,” cited below, for a list of all programme documentation reviewed as part of this Evaluation.*

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