

EVALUATION OF THE
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON
WOMEN, PEACE AND
SECURITY: BASELINE STUDY

August 2015



Table of Contents

Acronyms	3
Executive Summary.....	5
1. Introduction	7
2. Overview of the NAP	8
3. Methodology.....	9
4. Findings.....	11
4.1. The NAP’s Fitness for Purpose	11
4.2. UK government staff capacity to deliver the NAP.....	14
4.2.1. Inclusion of NAP commitments in departmental strategies.....	14
4.2.2. Motivation among UK staff and implementing partners	17
4.2.3. UK staff access to WPS expertise and training	20
4.2.4. WPS Commitments in the CSSF	22
4.3. Progress in the six focus countries	23
4.3.1. Outcome 1 – Participation: UK efforts and their contribution	23
4.3.2. Outcome 2 – Prevention: UK efforts and their contribution	28
4.3.3. Outcome 3 – Protection: UK efforts and their contribution	32
4.3.4. Outcome 4 – Relief and Recovery: UK efforts and their contribution.....	37
5. Conclusion and Recommendations.....	40
About Social Development Direct and the evaluation team.....	42

Acronyms

AJACS	Access to Justice and Community Security
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
ANAOA	Afghan National Army Officer Academy
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
BSOS	Building Stability Overseas Strategy
CEFM	Child, Early and Forced Marriage
CHASE	Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
DFID	Department for International Development
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSW	Department for Social Welfare
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GAPS	Gender Action for Peace and Security
GBP	British Pounds Sterling
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GTG	Gender Thematic Group
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HRDs	Human Rights Defenders
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IP	Implementing Partner
JACS	Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MENAD	DFID Middle East and North Africa Department
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
NSPAW	National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OT	Operations Team
PEP	Post Exposure Prophylaxis
PSVI	Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative
RMCH	Reproductive, Maternal and Child Health
SAIC	Staff Appointed in Country
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SJD	Security, Justice and Defence
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SU	Stabilisation Unit
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Executive Summary

The UK National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 2014-2017 is intended as the realisation of the UK Government's commitment to put women and girls at the centre of efforts on conflict transformation, peace and stability, in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. The NAP is jointly owned by the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), with cross-departmental contribution from the Stabilisation Unit (SU). NAP commitments are intended to be implemented by the UK in all conflict-affected countries. In addition to the NAP the UK government has published an Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan focuses on six countries: Afghanistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Somalia and Syria.

This baseline evaluation was commissioned at the beginning of 2015 (6 months into the NAP) and research concluded in May 2015, therefore its findings represent early progress in the NAP. The evaluation established findings in three areas: 1. The NAP's fitness for purpose, 2. The UK's capacity to deliver on WPS, and 3. Progress in the six focus countries.

Findings: The NAP's Fitness for Purpose

This evaluation found that although the UK is successfully undertaking a range of WPS initiatives in conflict-affected states, these are not driven by the NAP. Rather, the NAP does very little to lead the agenda on WPS. In many ways this is an encouraging finding, illustrating that WPS issues have – to some degree – been internalised within the systems and practice of the UK government.

The evaluators found that the NAP is an overly complex document that, in its attempt to categorise initiatives according to the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 – participation, prevention, protection, or relief and recovery – creates artificial distinctions between programmes which typically have an impact across a range of WPS priorities.

The NAP's Implementation Plan was found to be particularly problematic in that the activities were drawn from pre-planned programmes in the six countries, meaning that the NAP is not driving these initiatives – rather, it serves as an instrument for showcasing them.

Findings: UK Capacity to Deliver on Women, Peace and Security Issues

The UK's capacity to deliver on WPS is generally high, with some room for improvement especially at an institutional level. Research amongst UK staff working in conflict-affected states indicated that WPS concerns are typically high on the agenda of UK programming.

A review of departmental strategies at Whitehall level found that there was little mention of WPS and the UK's NAP. As these strategies are renewed within the lifetime of the NAP, there is opportunity for these issues to be addressed.

In general the commitment of individual UK government staff members to WPS issues was found to be high. However, staff members expressed that they often struggle to understand how to mainstream WPS priorities in their programmes in practical terms. The Stabilisation Unit successfully runs short training programmes on WPS, however the numbers that can attend are limited and it remains a challenge to extend WPS training opportunities to a larger number of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) staff, particularly those working overseas.

The evaluation team found that there is an impressive rhetorical commitment to WPS in the UK's new cross-departmental Conflict Stability and Security Fund, however as the fund is only in its first year there is little evidence yet as to whether this is being realised.

Findings: Progress in the six focus countries

As the six NAP focus countries have different contexts, conflict dynamics, and WPS priorities there is a limitation to the conclusions that can be drawn across them. Nevertheless, some overarching findings emerged during the course of the research:

- The UK's efforts on WPS in the six focus countries studied are for the most part strategic, diverse, thoughtfully implemented and often innovative.
- There are challenges identifying and reaching Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that genuinely represent grassroots communities. In the majority of focus countries the UK is successfully supporting grassroots CSOs working on WPS issues. However, more could be done to move support beyond the prominent educated elites.
- Cross-departmental conflict analyses pays too little attention to WPS. Analysis (i.e. the Joint Assessments of Conflict (JACS)) have only been undertaken for two of the six NAP focus countries. WPS is not a priority within the analyses.
- The Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI) has been a successful vehicle for mobilising funds. The UK should consider ways to make funding longer-term and more predictable, such as making better use of the Conflict Stability & Security Fund (CSSF). PSVI should be complemented by an increased focus on the full range of issues facing women and girls in conflict situations.
- Most of the programmes addressing WPS focus on the symptoms of the problem rather than the social norms and structural factors that drive these problems.

The evaluation team noted that there was little difference between the UK's WPS priorities and activities in NAP focus countries compared with other conflict-affected states.

Principal Recommendations

- **Work on the UK's post-2017 NAP should begin early** in order to develop a follow-on NAP that is more fit for purpose, acknowledging the work done on WPS across all conflict-affected countries in which the UK works. There should be more focus on how to operationalise the NAP. The development of the NAP should be driven by the country offices rather than centrally and should be of sufficient duration that it can influence departmental and programmatic planning cycles.
- **WPS concerns should be institutionalised by including them in departmental strategies.** Most departmental strategies are due to be renewed within the lifetime of the NAP. In particular, inclusion of WPS in the newly revised Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is key. Further WPS should be included in programme planning at an early stage.
- **A review of PSVI activities would be beneficial** to ensure that PSVI is fully embedded in UK responses; complements wider policy; meets specific country needs; and maximises impact.
- **Training and capacity building on WPS should be made more widely available** to HMG staff in order to better equip them to mainstream WPS concerns in their work and programmes. This is particularly important for staff designing and overseeing programmes in the field. The training should offer support on practical implementation of WPS priorities in programmes.
- **There should be a greater focus on the underlying causes of challenges, human right abuses and inequalities experienced by women and girls in conflict affected contexts** rather than just responding to

the symptoms. In the interest of sustainability the UK should support more programmes that work on changing social norms that perpetuate violence against women and girls in and after conflict.

1. Introduction

This baseline evaluation of the UK's National Action Plan (NAP) on Women Peace and Security (WPS) for 2014-2017 was undertaken as part of the UK Government's efforts to ensure learning and accountability throughout the NAP's delivery. The evaluation includes: i) an assessment of implementation and effects on the ground (where possible) and ii) a consideration of the UK's contributions to deliver the NAP as a whole. The evaluation was undertaken through survey work, telephone interviews, desk based research and fieldwork. Although ostensibly a baseline assessment, the data gathering process was conducted from February - May 2015, meaning that the information captured reflects the status of the NAP already well into its first year, as the NAP was launched in June 2014, with the implementation plan published in December 2014.

Although the NAP applies to all the conflict-affected states to which the UK provides support, the UK government has identified six focus countries as priorities for targeted support: Afghanistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya, Somalia and Syria. This evaluation has focused on country-level efforts in these six countries. In addition, the evaluation has looked at UK policies, trainings, tools, expertise and strategies at a central level.

Recognising that the NAP covers a vast array of initiatives – operationalised through a large number of programmes and implementing partners – this evaluation has sought to highlight examples of best practice and effectiveness, consider obstacles and challenges to delivery, and reflect on a number of learning opportunities. The baseline has predominantly drawn on activity captured within the NAP Implementation Plan, but has, in many cases, examined additional UK programmes that advance or have the potential to advance WPS priorities.

It should be noted that the purpose of this evaluation is primarily to look at the direction of travel. Therefore the evaluation addresses whether the UK's programmes are appropriately conceived and targeted and effectively implemented in order to attain the NAP outcomes, whether the NAP's Implementation Plan is a suitable tool, and whether UK staff are equipped and resourced to deliver on the NAP outcomes.

This evaluation report is structured as follows:


- The report begins with an outline of the **methodology** and an **overview of the NAP**.
- The **findings** section constitutes the main body of the report, which includes the following parts:
 - **The NAP's fitness for purpose** looks at how the NAP and its Implementation Plan were formulated and why they are problematic with regard to delivering the UK's commitments on WPS.
 - The **UK government staff capacity to deliver the NAP** section examines whether the UK government has the necessary resources, tools and mechanisms in place to deliver on WPS commitments. In particular it looks at capacity and commitment of staff.
 - The section on **progress in the six focus countries** draws upon the findings from an analysis of country-level efforts in the six focus countries. While it has not been possible in this section to refer to every initiative that contributes to the outcomes, reference is made to programmes that are particularly notable for success, shortcomings or size.
- The main body of the report closes with a **conclusion and recommendations**. There are also more specific recommendations that can be found throughout the report.

2. Overview of the NAP

The UK's third NAP was launched in June 2014 and aims to serve as a guiding policy document for the implementation of the UNSCR 1325. It highlights the need to make the UK's work on WPS integral to efforts tackling violent conflict and building peace internationally, and to integrate gender perspectives into all work on conflict and peacebuilding.

The NAP focuses on conflict-affected states and is led by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), though it is jointly owned with Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Other government departments were consulted during the NAP's development and the Stabilisation Unit (SU) also has a role in its implementation. According to the NAP, staff working in UK embassies and DFID country offices in conflict-affected states were consulted, as well as a number of women who have been or who are affected by conflict. The Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS) civil society network conducted overseas consultative workshops in several focus countries.

The NAP is structured around five key outcomes. These are:



The first four outcome areas align with the four pillars of UNSCR 1325: Participation, Prevention, Protection and Relief and Recovery. Building UK capacity to deliver these outcomes through increased financial and staff resources, improved training and technical assistance as well as strengthened Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems and coordination mechanisms is the fifth outcome area.

Afghanistan, Burma, the DRC, Libya, Somalia and Syria constitute the six focus countries of the NAP. They were selected based on whether they were priority countries for the work of all three Departments (FCO, DFID and MOD) and for the National Security Council (NSC), and on an assessment of local appetite for change (judged through local consultations in-country). The country contexts are outlined briefly in the NAP, and the corresponding Implementation Plan published in December 2014 outlines details of the operationalisation of UK efforts in each context.

3. Methodology

Three evaluation questions were selected to guide the baseline evaluation, in collaboration with the WPS Whitehall working group.

- **Evaluation question 1:** To what extent has the UK effectively used policies, trainings, tools, expertise and awareness raising among staff to deliver its commitments outlined in the NAP?
- **Evaluation question 2:** To what extent has the UK supported appropriate, relevant and strategic efforts to deliver against the range of outcomes and outputs identified in the NAP?
- **Evaluation question 3:** How effective have UK efforts been in contributing to the four outcomes within the NAP (participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery)?

The evaluation team developed a detailed set of measures and qualitative and quantitative indicators to guide the research, which were presented in an inception report. Some UK CSOs were also given the opportunity to provide feedback during a meeting convened with representatives from the GAPS network.

Four different research components, constituted the baseline methodology. These were designed to elicit findings for the three Evaluation Questions and are, as follows:

1. Online survey with HMG staff

In order to establish whether HMG staff working in conflict-affected countries were familiar with the NAP and incorporating WPS concerns into their work (alongside gauging broader perceptions and attitudes towards the NAP), an anonymised online survey was sent to the FCO, DFID, MOD and SU. In total, there were 213 respondents (out of 1,070 HMG staff invited to participate), representing an overall response rate of 20%.

2. Rapid document review and telephone/face-to-face interviews at Whitehall level

A Whitehall-level review was conducted in order to provide a high-level analysis of strategies and approaches being developed by central government. The evaluation team collected information through telephone and face-to-face interviews with Whitehall-based staff in strategic cross-cutting roles, as well as a rapid document reviews on the following three key components:

- Overarching departmental strategies and mechanisms to support WPS commitments;
- WPS training available to HMG staff – both specifically designed courses and opportunities to integrate WPS into wider courses;
- Conflict analysis tools and recent conflict analyses produced for each of the NAP's six focus countries – in particular the JACS documents.

3. A rapid document review and telephone interviews for four of the six focus countries (Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and Syria)

Interviews were conducted with staff members from DFID, FCO and MOD in each country (and at Whitehall level) in order to identify existing programmes and strategies – including overarching country strategies, any WPS or gender strategies, and conflict and peacebuilding strategies. Interviewees provided programme and strategic documents for review. Additional key informants related to programmes were interviewed in order to glean further detail on a selection of initiatives.

The research team deliberately sought out two types of programmes: i) those included in the NAP Implementation Plan and initiatives identified as directly addressing WPS, ii) large and new programmes that did not have WPS as a primary focus in order to assess mainstreaming efforts.

4. *In depth case studies on Burma and DRC*

In order to establish on-the-ground information and triangulate evidence of efficacy and appropriateness of the UK's WPS programming and activities, the research team selected two of the NAP focus countries for field visits. The field visits were preceded by desk research and each country was visited by a two-person team comprising a WPS expert and a country expert. During the field visits the teams conducted semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs) with HMG staff, civil society representatives, in-country women peace and security practitioners and experts, UK-funded programme staff, programme beneficiaries, donors, and government representatives. The teams also conducted a limited number of focus group discussions with beneficiaries and activists. In the DRC, the team visited Kinshasa, Bukavu and Goma. In Burma, the team visited Yangon and Kachin.

Limitations of the approach

Although a mixed-methods approach generated a rich and cross-referenced information base, the following limitations were experienced:

- The online survey may have delivered some biased results since respondents who chose to answer the survey may have had a greater interest in WPS and the NAP.
- The study was guided by the NAP's definition of the five outcome areas. However, as discussed, the distinction and organisation of these outcomes is problematic and presents a related set of limitations.
- The report is not a traditional early baseline assessment as it reflects a point eight months into implementation. Despite this, it does provide a baseline for evaluations going forward.
- With regard to the desk review, working with a mixed set of available documents has meant that the data gathered and reviewed presents something of a partial picture. For certain initiatives documents were not available, or where provided, content on progress and detail was limited – particularly regarding broader programmes with limited documented visibility of WPS components and/or mainstreaming efforts. In addition, many of the programmes that were reviewed did not have documents that demonstrated the most up-to-date status of the programme.

4. Findings

4.1. The NAP's Fitness for Purpose

In assessing the appropriateness, relevance and efficacy of UK efforts aimed to deliver against the NAP, it is critical to firstly consider the extent to which the NAP itself can be understood as an effective tool and vehicle for advancing the UK's work on WPS. **This evaluation found that although the UK is doing some excellent work on WPS there are shortcomings inherent in the design and operationalisation of the NAP, which means that the NAP is neither leading the WPS agenda nor doing justice to the breadth and quality of work that the UK is undertaking on WPS.**

It is important to note that this critique of the NAP is not a critique of the UK's work on WPS. In fact, **the overarching opinion of the evaluation team is that the UK is undertaking a significant body of good work on WPS, and is succeeding at placing the concerns of women and girls at the centre of many programmes in conflict-affected countries, and continually striving for improvement and innovation on WPS issues**

As outlined elsewhere, the NAP's outcomes and outputs were formulated at Whitehall level in line with the four pillars of UNSCR 1325. Following this, six conflict-affected 'focus' countries were elected and corresponding country offices invited to identify both live and planned programming efforts that would suitably fit within a plan for implementation and delivery against related indicators and targets. In this respect, the content of the NAP Implementation Plan can be understood as a retro-fitting exercise. As such, this approach has led to a number of shortcomings:

- **Attempting to categorise the activities and initiatives according to the four pillars of participation, protection, prevention and relief and recovery creates a false division and gives an incomplete and potentially confusing picture of the breadth of work that the UK is undertaking on WPS.** The four thematic pillars of UNSCR 1325 undoubtedly overlap with one another and by classifying each programme under only one pillar the programme's impact is represented in a limited manner.
- **Several of the outputs are so broad that the entire spectrum of UK WPS activities could reasonably be considered as contributing.** For example, Output 2.4 states *"the UK delivers a set of programmed activities that prevents violence against women and girls"* and Output 3.2 states that *"the UK will protect women and girls from gender-based violence"*. However, the activities that are included in the NAP under these outputs only refer to a limited number of activities carried out as part of programmes.
- **The country programmes in the Implementation Plan are not informed by the NAP** because they were already in place or in planning when the NAP was drafted. Therefore the NAP is not strategically driving activities or their design, and in many ways it is a misnomer to call this an 'implementation plan' – rather it is a matrix that gives an overview of some WPS activities taking place in the six NAP focus countries.
- **Focus country programmes and activities have inconsistently been included in the Implementation Plan.** The evaluators found a number of programmes that support WPS in the focus countries that had not been captured in the Implementation Plan, leading to an incomplete picture of the work that is taking place. For example, in Afghanistan a large-scale initiative focused on the grassroots participation of women through providing support to women's rights groups was not included – in fact, the Implementation Plan contained no content for Afghanistan under this output (1.1).
- **Further, if an initiative is not in the Implementation Plan it is unclear how it is reported against.** Particularly in Burma and DRC, where members of the evaluation team were able to undertake field visits,

it was clear that there were numerous initiatives undertaken by the UK that contributed to WPS but were not in the Implementation Plan. Often this was because the programme was designed after the NAP was put in place.

- **The three-year timeframe of the NAP is too short to judge efficacy in the six focus countries.** DFID programming cycles typically take a minimum of two years from conception through design to contract award and implementation. During the three-year lifespan of the NAP it may be possible for the policies to affect the top-level design of a programme, but the NAP is likely to expire before a programme is implemented and before even the preliminary impact is apparent. Moreover, the realisation of meaningful and sustainable change is arguably linked to longer-term strategic efforts, which by definition cannot be contained in a 3-year timeframe and can only be measured to a very limited extent.
- **There may be little difference between NAP focus countries and other conflict-affected countries in which the UK works.** Whilst beyond the scope of this baseline evaluation, a brief look across UK programming in other conflict-affected countries shows a wealth of WPS activity. This calls into question the utility of having ‘focus countries’ in conjunction with the fact that country offices do not receive any additional resources to implement the NAP priorities. It also means that the NAP and Implementation Plan in their current format only give a limited picture of the UK’s work on WPS in conflict-affected countries worldwide.
- **The current format of the Implementation Plan may struggle to achieve its goals in highly dynamic environments.** Conflict-affected states are, by their very nature, unstable and insecure. Since the start of the NAP, the UK has been forced to put on hold much of the programming that was taking place in Libya because security concerns made the operating environment untenable. As a result many of the targets in the Implementation Plan will not be achieved.
- **Several of the targets in the Implementation Plan are inadequately conceived for demonstrating impact,** and in some cases contained inaccuracies. E.g. in Somalia a target relating to PSVI activity under Outcome 2 required reporting against data not currently being captured by the implementing partner.
- **There is duplication with, and a lack of clarification on, linkages with other UK policies.** Output 3.3 of the NAP, which states that *“the UK will protect the rights of women and girls and will empower them by increasing the employment, health, education and training services available to girls”*, is drawn almost entirely from DFID’s Strategic Vision for Women and Girls, creating a necessity for double reporting.

Overall, the NAP is an overly complex document which, in its attempts to be detailed and accountable, short-changes the UK’s good work on WPS by attempting to classify activities into artificial and limiting sub-divisions. This over-complexity and sub-division is intensified at the level of the Implementation Plan. The result is a document that is not so much a forward-looking and strategic *plan*, but rather, a series of principles with pre-planned country activities retro-fitted and mapped against them.

This formulation and implementation of the NAP has been counterproductive for several HMG country offices in focus countries, many of whom viewed the NAP as an administrative burden adding little to the work they were already committed to undertaking on WPS. One HMG staff member consulted explained that the NAP is a *‘lens through which to look at issues, but we have other reasons for wanting to ensure proper participation and, accountability. We know there’s a lot to do [on WPS], but it’s not necessarily because there’s a National Action Plan that we’re doing it’*. Another said, *‘the issue is not lack of coherent policy but lack of buy in by staff’* On the

other hand, some HMG staff talked more positively about the NAP bringing “*crystallisation*” and “*a stronger story*” to WPS work. There was a sense that the NAP helped to give more coherence to work on WPS and provided a forum within which these issues could be discussed.

While there is little benefit to be gained from re-working the NAP in its current format, the evaluation team has a series of recommendations for the UK’s next NAP for 2017 and onwards:

Recommendations – Development of a future NAP

- Greater lead time should be given to the planning of the UK’s WPS NAP from 2017 onwards to allow for a truly consultative, integrated plan that can drive the WPS agenda. There should be greater attention given to the timing of these deliverables, .e.g. ensuring that requests for information and timeframes fall at the end of project cycles.
- The consultation process should be *consultative*, with an emphasis placed on gathering country-level input, with adequate support and guidance from Whitehall. This process may involve further dialogue with local stakeholders and implementing partners to more accurately and effectively capture targets and aspirational content.
- The next NAP should use the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 as overarching principles rather than as mutually exclusive categories. Further discussion and consideration is needed on the most appropriate and effective way to operationalise and implement NAP commitments more broadly. The UK should explore alternative or strengthened mechanisms for delivery, monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning in relation to the NAP, with an emphasis on increasing consolidation to reduce overlap and duplication.
- Consideration should be given to developing a NAP model and implementation plan that span a wider range of conflict-affected countries, and which may look to draw on regional and cross-country learning and collaboration where applicable.

4.2. UK government staff capacity to deliver the NAP

The NAP makes a commitment to ensure that all the necessary resources, tools and mechanisms are in place for HMG staff and departments to deliver and monitor the commitments. Although this is the fifth outcome area, it is the foundation upon which the rest of the NAP commitments are built, therefore the findings on this area are presented first in this evaluation.

4.2.1. Inclusion of NAP commitments in departmental strategies

HMG departmental and country strategies are written and renewed every few years and in the months since the UK NAP was launched, none of the central strategies analysed in this evaluation have been renewed. In this sense the findings very much indicate a baseline position.

The evaluation team reviewed six overarching departmental and cross-HMG strategies and business plans outlining key departmental and HMG priorities, and found that there was limited reference to WPS in general or the UK NAP in particular. Of the strategies and business plans reviewed, the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the Stabilisation Unit's Business Plan (2014-15) are the only documents to specifically mention the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the NAP, and to make related commitments.

Strategy	References to WPS/1325	References to the UK NAP	References to WPS issues
FCO Business Plan 2013-2015	X	X	PSVI (NB: not framed as a WPS issue or NAP commitment)
DFID Business Plan 2012-2015	X	X	Preventing VAWG (NB: not framed as a WPS issue or NAP commitment)
MOD Business Plan 2012-2015	X	X	
Stabilisation Unit Business Plan 2014-15 (March 2014)	"Gender, Peace and Security" one of six thematic priorities	Mentioned	Related to current NAP: Building National Capacity
Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010	X	X	X
Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 2011	Brief mention	Mentioned	Related to previous NAP: participation, including supporting women's role in peace processes, and protection: driving international action on 1325 and related Security Council Resolutions
Operational Plan 2013-2015 DFID Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department	X	X	VAWG, including building the evidence base and risk assessments in humanitarian settings

The SU's Business Plan is the only overarching document amongst those reviewed to make commitments related to the current NAP. The Business Plan identifies WPS as a priority for the Unit with specific activities including the provision of technical advice to the cross-government Working Group on WPS, delivery of SU NAP commitments, provision of technical advice to the FCO PSVI team and development and dissemination of a range of lessons, guidance and training on WPS issues. The other strategy to mention WPS and the NAP by name is the BSOS, however these references are brief and outline commitments related to the previous NAP.

There are however WPS commitments made in strategies which are not framed as such, nor are they referenced in regard to the NAP. For example, the FCO's Business Plan makes reference to the PSVI; and DFID's Business Plan outlines improving the lives of women and girls, and strengthening and improving work on fragile and conflict-affected countries and in humanitarian response.

The evaluation team also requested to review standalone departmental WPS, gender or related strategies. Out of the four departments questioned, **only DFID was able to provide specific gender strategies**: *DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women* (2011) and *Stepping up a Gear for Girls and Women: Updates to DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women, to 2020 and beyond* (2014). However, the evaluation team found that DFID's 2011 *Strategic Vision* contains limited reference to conflict, though the light-touch refresh published in 2014 signals a movement towards recognising the importance of working on WPS.

FCO interviewees provided information on a draft *Women's Rights Paper*. It was established that this paper brings together departmental work on PSVI, WPS and work on women's rights in peacetime, and is likely to provide an overview of the FCO's NAP commitments. Although predominantly focused on women's rights in times of peace, the paper aims to map the links between the FCO's work on women's rights and WPS. Other key documentation was also in draft form at the time of review and therefore the team were unable to access it, including the *Children in Armed Conflict Strategy*.

Neither the MOD nor the SU have standalone gender or WPS strategies which could be reviewed. Whilst there are no MOD guidelines focused on WPS or gender, the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre within the MOD is now incorporating WPS and PSVI within all relevant military doctrine. In addition the MOD plans to appoint a senior-level Military Champion on WPS and PSVI. The champion will provide advice and direction on inclusion of WPS and gender issues in the department.

There were differing views across departments on the usefulness of the overarching business plans to ensure the effective delivery of NAP commitments. Whilst one DFID staff member noted that exclusion of a particular issue is indicative of its perceived importance rather than a "deal breaker", staff from FCO and MOD suggested the business plans may be too high-level to capture WPS issues and the NAP. Staff members mentioned a number of critical factors for delivering on NAP commitments:

- Political ownership and backing;
- Senior-level engagement;
- Accountability mechanisms other than departmental business plans, for example the annual reports to Parliament. New accountability mechanisms were mentioned as being an important factor in the successful implementation of DFID's *Strategic Vision*, with accountability lying with the heads of DFID country offices rather than Social Development Advisers.

The evaluation team found that while the PSVI had received high-level political ownership and senior engagement, the NAP did not have the same kind of senior level championing. Therefore it was left to individually committed HMG staff members to drive the NAP agenda.

There are various mechanisms for reporting on WPS within the three departments and the SU, however the FCO, DFID, MOD and SU will report collectively to Parliament on an annual basis through the Cross-Whitehall Working Group on WPS, starting in autumn 2015. The FCO, DFID and the MOD also produce annual reports for Parliament, outlining progress towards their business plans and reporting on their accounts each financial year.

Country-level strategic documents varied across the focus countries. For example, in Afghanistan the NAP is positioned as 'guiding' the country office's work on gender, with an emphasis on the '*increased political and*

economic participation of women’ as a key factor in advancing their own life chances, as well as diminishing the risk of Afghanistan remaining in conflict. Tackling violence against women and girls is foregrounded as a ‘strategic priority’, alongside regular engagement with the Afghan government and civil society on ‘*progress and input into the reporting on progress and annual updating of the UK NAP*’. Further, in the British Embassy Kabul Defence Section Plan (2014-2015), under its first objective (Support Defence Diplomacy & Alliances), specific reference is made to support to the ‘*National Action Plan for Women, Peace & Security by strengthening the role of women in the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and the ability of the ANSF to protect women through the training of future female leaders at ANAOA [Afghan National Army Officer Academy]*’.¹ However, in Libya, there were no overarching strategy or gender/WPS-specific documents available for review.

Strategy		References to the NAP
AFGHANISTAN	Operational Plan (2011-2016)	✓ Cites the latest NAP as ‘guiding’ the country’s work on gender.
	Two-pager outlining UK support to women and girls	✓ Afghanistan’s status as a NAP priority country is highlighted. UK efforts are described as supporting women and girls to improve their political, economic and social status, and priorities are ordered across the following thematic areas: Violence; Education; Economic Empowerment; Political; Health and Policy.
	British Embassy Kabul Defence Section Plan (2014-2015)	✓ Under the Plan’s first objective (Support Defence Diplomacy & Alliances), specific reference is made to support the ‘National Action Plan for Women, Peace & Security by strengthening the role of women in the ANSF and the ability of the ANSF to protect women through the training of future female leaders at ANAOA’.
BURMA	Operational Plan (2011 – 2015)	✗ Although the Plan doesn’t make specific reference to the NAP it contains a detailed Gender Annex that outlines WPS commitments amongst other gender-related efforts.
DRC	Operational Plan (2011-2016)	✗ No explicit reference is made to the NAP, but the Plan contains a commitment to ‘ensure the priorities of girls and women are prominent in all key programmes’.
LIBYA	DFID Middle East and North Africa Department (MENAD) Regional Operational Plan (2011-2016)	✓ Within the Human Rights Assessment under a standalone section on women, the Plan states that ‘[t]ogether with the FCO and MoD, DFID has developed a MENA component to the UK National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325’.
	DFID MENAD Gender Strategy (2012-2015)	✓ Two key objectives are highlighted: 1) getting economic assets to women and girls, and 2) preventing violence against women and girls by working with FCO and MoD to ‘support implementation of the UK national action plan on 1325 and ensure that joint DFID/FCO/MOD funds such as the conflict pool and Arab partnership contribute to tackling violence’.


¹ British Embassy Kabul Defence Section Plan (2014-2015)

SOMALIA	Operational Plan (2011-2015)	✘ No explicit reference is made to the NAP. The majority of activity falls within the delivery of health and sexual and reproductive health services. Priorities under the humanitarian pillar highlight protection, emergency health and nutrition activities reaching women and girls in conflict areas.
	An overview document capturing DFID Somalia’s Gender Strategy	✘ No explicit reference is made to the NAP. This document draws attention to the promotion of gender equality throughout DFID Somalia’s programmes, which are focused on reducing the negative consequences of the gender-based marginalisation of women, men, girls and boys.
	FCO Human Rights Implementation Strategy 15/16	✓ Somalia’s status as a focus country under the NAP and PSVI is highlighted. The strategy includes targets focused on supporting and rebuilding the justice sector, the establishment of governmental human rights institutions, and improving the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations.
SYRIA	Operational Plan (2011-2016)	✘ The NAP is not specifically named, but a series of wider gender commitments are outlined, asserting that ‘we will pay particular attention to ensuring that our programmes adequately meet the needs of women and girls’, and further, this portfolio will be ‘well aligned to DFID priorities of leading in emergencies and changing the lives of girls and women’.
	DRAFT Syria Gender Strategy (2014-2016)	✓ Specific reference is made to results targets for 2014 to 2016, which are described as being captured in the UK’s NAP on UNSCR 1325.

4.2.2. Motivation among UK staff and implementing partners


As part of this evaluation, an online survey was sent to a total of 1,070 HMG staff working on conflict-affected countries regarding WPS and the NAP. Of the 213 respondents, half stated that they were aware of the NAP’s existence and familiar with the contents, but **only 1 in 5 had read the NAP and understood how it applied to their work**. A small proportion (9.5%) worked closely with the HMG WPS Working Group compiling the implementation plan for the NAP.

Survey result: Are you familiar with the UK’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAP) 2014-2017?




There was a broad range of familiarity with the NAP by survey respondents in the six focus countries, ranging from those who were unaware of the NAP to those who worked closely with the HMG WPS Working Group. However, it was of concern that there were a few respondents in Afghanistan, the DRC, Somalia and Syria who were unaware of the NAP, and at least a third of survey respondents in all of the focus countries who have no familiarity with its contents (i.e. are either unaware of the NAP or only aware of its existence). Considering the probability that the survey was more likely to have been completed by individuals with more interest in WPS and gender issues, it may be surmised that the level of awareness is lower than the statistics reveal.

Survey result: Familiarity with the UK NAP on WPS 2014-2017 (by focus countries)



Almost a third (31%) of survey respondents had used the NAP, with the highest usage of the NAP being by SU respondents (55%).

Survey result: Have you ever used the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2014 – 2017 to inform your work in planning or implementation? (by government department)



Use of the NAP varied in the focus countries, with highest levels of usage by Somalia respondents (73%), followed by Afghanistan (38%) – both above the average usage rate for survey respondents. However, respondents from the other four focus countries had lower than average NAP usage rates: Burma (25%), Syria (17%), DRC (14%), and Libya (0%). Nevertheless, due to the small number of respondents from the six countries, caution needs to be exercised in analysing by country.

Interestingly, there were differing perceptions amongst interviewed Whitehall staff as to the level of awareness of NAP commitments, and the WPS agenda more broadly:

- Some felt that there was not a high level of awareness of WPS and the NAP amongst staff and that consequently other terminology, including PSVI, is preferred by some.
- Staff noted that HMG staff who participated in the SU’s conflict and stabilisation training courses had rarely heard of the UK NAP.
- Others felt that the WPS agenda has high visibility, but warned that pushing the NAP without being realistic and explicit about practical challenges on the ground might mean that the agenda would quickly “lose its currency” and that careful consideration was needed to develop a sophisticated approach to sensitising staff.

It should be noted that as part of the in-country evaluation of Burma, implementing partners were also asked about their awareness of and familiarity with the UK’s NAP. The majority of implementing partners were only vaguely aware of the UK NAP. This feedback was somewhat disappointing, since the UK country office in Burma had undertaken efforts to inform implementing partners about the NAP and had held a launch event. However, **whether or not the implementing partners were familiar with the UK NAP may be a nugatory point if they are implementing WPS priorities in their programmes.**

With regard to motivation, **9 in 10 (90%) survey respondents say they feel personally committed to addressing WPS through their work**, although it could be that those people who were personally committed to WPS were more likely to fill out the survey. However, possible areas of concern that arose from the online survey include:

- 1 in 4 (25%) survey respondents saying efforts to address WPS are not recognised and rewarded in their team/department;
- 1 in 5 (20%) saying they do not have access to necessary WPS expertise if/when they need it; and
- 1 in 5 (19%) saying their team/department does not allocate sufficient financial resources to support WPS efforts.

The evaluation team also found that HMG staff in country offices were more receptive to the NAP and felt more positive about it when there was strong communication about the NAP and a shared purpose amongst the different departments with regard to the delivery of the commitments. The Burma country office was noted as an example where strong inter-departmental communication and collaboration on WPS were fundamental to a shared programme of work and a positive attitude towards the NAP.

4.2.3. UK staff access to WPS expertise and training

Even when UK staff are aware of the NAP commitments, implementation can be a struggle if they lack the expertise, or knowledge about where to access the expertise, which would enable them to include WPS concerns in their programming. In the survey of HMG staff conducted for this evaluation, 1 in 10 survey respondents reported having faced obstacles in accessing the necessary expertise to help them address WPS issues in their work, with difficulties being most frequently experienced by DFID respondents (16% of respondents) and FCO respondents (5%). DFID survey respondents in half of the six focus countries – Somalia, DRC and Afghanistan – also said they had experienced difficulties in accessing necessary expertise.

Training on WPS is available to HMG staff through the Stabilisation Unit. Since September 2014, the SU has run four WPS training courses, which a total of 110 participants have attended. Each course has between 27-31 participants from a range of HMG departments. The courses are delivered in London and are funded by the Stabilisation Unit. They are open to UK-based staff and those living and working overseas, including Staff Appointed in Country (SAIC). **Feedback from attendees on the SU's WPS course has been overwhelmingly positive, with most stating that they came away with an improved understanding of the WPS agenda.** The main critique was that the courses may have been overly theoretical and **a practical understanding of how to apply WPS concerns to their work would have been useful.** This concern was reflected also by HMG staff in Burma, where many recognised the importance of WPS and were willing to incorporate it in the programming, but sometimes struggled to see how to do so. The evaluation team is aware of a number of new guidance pieces that were under development by the SU at the time of this baseline evaluation but had not been finalised or disseminated. These new products may help address these concerns.

SU staff interviewed for this evaluation referred also to WPS and NAP training materials available on the SU's training portal, however the evaluators found that these materials are only available to those attending the course and have not been made more widely available to HMG staff.

The SU's Gender and Conflict Adviser is also tasked with delivering bespoke training on request, which can target specific regions or institutions across HMG. Bespoke trainings have recently included a London-based session on gender for the FCO's Middle East and North Africa network which was attended by a number of staff in post in the MENA region, a session which looked at integrating gender into the CSSF, and a training session on gender to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Another method that the UK uses for delivering training on WPS issues is to integrate it into broader training programmes. Both of the SU's foundation and practitioner courses on Conflict and Stabilisation include one-hour sessions on WPS. In

addition, the SU's Security and Justice course, which provides a practical introduction to the sector, includes a session on how to integrate gender into security and justice programming.

Within DFID, no formal training on gender is offered. However, the capacity of DFID staff on gender issues is currently built in a number of ways, including through a cascading of the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014. The Head of Profession for Social Development has recently conducted a number of seminars with different teams and departments within DFID on what the act means for their work and how to integrate gender into business cases and programming. WPS issues and the NAP have reportedly been informally discussed during these sessions.

The Crown Agents Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Operations Team (CHASE OT), which maintains a database of deployable humanitarian experts to provide skilled specialists to DFID, now offers a thirty minute training session on Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) in emergencies as part of the induction series for new members.

In February 2015, the FCO launched the Diplomatic Academy as a centre of excellence to enable FCO staff at all levels to share knowledge, expertise and learning. The academy is currently developing foundation level in-person and online training content on conflict, which includes material on WPS. The draft materials currently briefly outline what the WPS agenda is, why it is important, and outlines the four pillars; however, it does not refer to the UK NAP or related commitments, and the accompanying statistics focus on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and not the broader range of issues that WPS covers.

The Human Rights Department offers training courses on human rights for FCO staff that contain reference to UNSCR 1325 – the advanced level of the course includes a one-hour session on WPS, including an outline of relevant legal framework, debate and discussion on UK policy. Annually, approximately 150 FCO staff receive training on human rights.

There is currently no standalone WPS training delivered to serving military personnel. However, the Operational Training and Advisory Group, which manages pre-deployment training for military personnel, plans to incorporate a training module for pre-deploying troops, which will complement their existing training on the Law of Armed Conflict, and International Humanitarian Law. The training module will be developed in conjunction with the Stabilisation Unit's recent analysis on the Conflict Related Sexual Violence training the UK currently delivers to overseas troops.

The UK's Defence Academy is responsible for post-graduate education and the majority of command, staff, and leadership training for members of the UK Armed Forces and MOD Civil Servants. An SU Civilian Liaison Officer based at the Defence Academy has recently been working with the SU Gender and Conflict Adviser to ensure WPS-related issues are addressed in training, although factors other than the NAP were deemed to have been the main influence here. A WPS lecture may also be included in the Defence Academy's Intermediate Command and Staff Course later this year.

The evaluation team identified a number of challenges with regard to the delivery of WPS training to HMG staff:

- **The stand-alone training offered by the Stabilisation Unit is limited to relatively small numbers.** Although standalone training is delivered quarterly, its ability to raise awareness of the NAP and WPS across HMG is limited given the relatively small numbers of participants that can take part and the fact that it is UK-based.
- **Training courses are aimed at a wide group of people whose areas of work and levels of understanding vary a great deal;** meeting such diverse needs is challenging. Possible solutions to this would be to create further bespoke training to address specific needs and to identify and make use of external training opportunities when they arise (currently HMG staff may be accessing external training but no team has oversight of this). However, designing and delivering bespoke training courses is time consuming and the SU has limited resources to allocate here.
- **Time constraints make it difficult for many to access training.** It is also a concern that some staff members may approach training on WPS *“as a tick box exercise for anything they do on gender”* as one DFID staff member suggested. The SU's forthcoming review of learning opportunities may propose some helpful solutions to these problems; particularly the suggested movement towards a central mapping and modularisation of training, whereby every staff member working in or on a conflict-affected or fragile environment would have a mapped out

development process ahead of them, using a number of providers including the Defence Academy, Diplomatic Academy and SU, both through online and face-to-face training.

- **The scope and range of training related to WPS delivered to HMG staff is difficult to capture as it is delivered by a range of teams, departments and institutions and at various levels.** It would be useful to develop a better oversight of relevant training currently available and to target training programmes which currently do not include WPS issues or those which do cover issues related to gender and conflict but which might not include information on the UK NAP.

4.2.4. WPS Commitments in the CSSF

Of particular note to this evaluation is the newly formed CSSF which has been active as of April 2015. It has now replaced the Conflict Pool and looks to provide a clear entry-point for the advancement of WPS efforts. The CSSF brings together existing UK capabilities and resources from across government, creating a fund with a total value of just over £1billion GBP in its first year (2015/16). The Fund is jointly owned by all NSC departments, including the Home Office, DFID, FCO, MOD and the agencies. It is overseen by a Joint Secretariat housed in the FCO. The CSSF will provide guidance on programming from in-house experts, which should result in more effective programming around key issues such as gender mainstreaming and provide greater strategic vision for the Fund. This is due to be enhanced by delivery of training for CSSF staff and the provision of regional conflict advisors. These efforts respond to the need to build capacity across teams, particularly with regard to gender mainstreaming and WPS.

The CSSF *Thematic Information Paper on WPS* outlines the ways in which WPS has been integrated into the Fund. It states that all CSSF initiatives should be assessed during their design phase to ensure that they maximise the potential positive impacts relating to WPS. It is also noted that for ongoing/existing initiatives, assessments should be conducted as well, and feasible adjustments made to ensure that initiatives are in line with the WPS strategy.

The CSSF Joint Secretariat will maintain oversight of WPS/gender sensitive programming. To support this process, a system for tracking resource allocation against gender equality results, is in development. The method will apply a Gender Equality Policy Marker tool, developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to categorise CSSF projects in line with their contribution to gender equality. The OECD outlines that an activity should be classified as gender equality focused if its aim is to advance gender equality and women's empowerment or reduce discrimination and inequalities based on sex. It categorises programmes as 'principal', 'significant' or 'no contribution' to gender equality.

Since the CSSF is in its early stages and details on potential programmes are limited, the first round of categorisation achieved limited results and needs to be refined. At present, projects have largely been categorised according to the component titles and subject matter. As such, this presents only an indicative assessment since it does not capture the quality of WPS activities in these programmes, nor does it capture WPS commitments in programmes which may have unrelated titles.

Results from the online survey conducted have indicated a relatively strong link between the CSSF and the NAP – representatives from a range of government departments used the NAP to inform objectives for their CSSF programmes, and to ensure alignment with HMG policy. The fact that links between CSSF programme and the NAP on WPS have been drawn by a number of different government departments is encouraging.

Recommendations – Strengthening HMG capacity and commitment to deliver WPS

- WPS in general and NAP priorities in particular should be included in all departmental strategies at both a central and country level. In particular, the revision of the DFID Country Operational Plans in late 2015 should see the inclusion of WPS and the NAP in all conflict-affected countries. Rhetorical commitments to this agenda and mechanisms must be met with resources, support and appropriate tools to help operationalise these objectives.
- Training on WPS and NAP priorities should be made more widely available to HMG staff. In particular, staff need more support on how to integrate WPS priorities into their programming. The possibility of offering an online training course should be considered.

- WPS must be mainstreamed into training courses at the FCO's Diplomatic Academy and the MOD's Defence Academy.
- The CSSF provides a strong opportunity for delivering on WPS commitments, and as such the method for monitoring and assessing the CSSF's work on WPS needs to be refined and monitoring results provided.

4.3. Progress in the six focus countries

Overall, it is important to recognise that each of the NAP focus countries represents a unique context, and that corresponding UK country office teams have differing priorities based on their analysis of the context in conjunction with wider UK policy and strategy. Thus, very few generalisations can be drawn about the design and delivery of WPS across countries. This part of the evaluation therefore focuses on a snapshot of some emerging common themes, as well as highlighting examples of progress and good practice, challenges and missed opportunities from the six focus countries under each of the NAP outcome areas.

As outlined, the evaluation team has notable concerns around the structure and content of the NAP itself, and its Implementation Plan. Nevertheless, it has been necessary to use this framework for the purpose of assessing and evaluating country-level UK efforts. Activities taking place at a Whitehall-level rather than in the six focus countries have not been captured in this section. Further, in some instances, namely Libya, deterioration in the security and political situation has hampered the delivery of WPS activities and the realisation of targets outlined in the NAP Implementation Plan.

This section provides an overview of a selection of key points only, drawing on a snapshot of relevant examples. The evaluation team reviewed a large number of initiatives and a top-line summary of these is provided in a table under each relevant outcome area. Individual country reports have been compiled and have remained internal to HMG. All information on programme activities is as of May 2015. Because of the breadth of each outcome area every programme cannot be explored in detail in this report and the evaluation team has been guided by the NAP's own categorisation of programmes.

4.3.1. Outcome 1 – Participation: UK efforts and their contribution

The NAP and its Implementation Plan adopt a broad understanding of 'participation', including the 'grassroots participation' and 'political participation' of women and girls, as well as the development of strategies for countries and ministries to 'foster meaningful participation'. This shows that the UK recognises that conflict resolution and longer-term peacebuilding require broader participation of women at all levels of society beyond track one diplomacy. Thus, UK objectives and initiatives cover a broad range of activity; from the shorter-term employment of peacekeeping operations to their longer-term employment in government and the security services, from technical support to engage women in peacebuilding processes to processes of constitutional change and longer-term state-building, and the inclusion of support to women's lobbying and activism at multiple levels.²

A selection of UK initiatives reviewed as part of the baseline is captured in the summary table below. It should be noted that these are predominantly the programmes and activities that the NAP Implementation Plan determines as contributing to this outcome, and as such this is not an exhaustive list.

² FCO, DFID, MoD (2014) *UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security, 2014-2017*. London: FCO. Annex B

Pillar One: Participation of Women in Peace Processes and Decision-making	
Outcome: Active inclusion of women, and women and girls' interests, in decision-making processes related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.	
AFGHANISTAN	<i>Strengthening Civil Society in Afghanistan (Tawanmandi)</i>
	<i>Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT II)</i>
	<i>Increasing Women's Political Participation and Dialogue Activities (IWPPD)</i>
	<i>Support to Afghanistan's Political Governance Institutions and Processes</i>
	<i>Free & Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA)</i>
	<i>Women's Security During Election Campaign – An Early Warning System</i>
	<i>Promoting the Effective Participation of Political Parties and Political Coalitions</i>
	<i>Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)</i>
	Strengthening the role of women in the security forces through EUPOL and training initiatives to support recruitment and retention of women within ANAOA. Support to police salaries.
	At the point of review an Afghan National Action Plan on 1325 had been developed and was awaiting sign-off.
BURMA	MOD consultation meetings with women's groups
	<i>Programme for Democratic Change (PDC) in Burma</i>
	<i>Programme of Support to Conflict Affected People and Peacebuilding in Burma – including the Peace Support Fund</i>
	National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women (NSPAW) – no 1325 NAP currently in place.
DRC	<i>Sustainable access to water sanitation and hygiene in the Democratic Republic of Congo</i>
	<i>Localization of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 in the Democratic Republic of Congo</i>
	DFID Chairing of the Gender Thematic Group (GTG) sub-group on Female Political Participation and Leadership
	DFID consultancy to improve gender responsiveness of I4S monitoring framework
	<i>Police reform project (SSAPR) – CLOSED</i>
	DRC government produced its NAP on WPS in 2010, before the period of the current UK NAP.
LIBYA	<i>Ensuring Libyan Women's Inclusion in the Reconstruction & Political Process – Phase III</i>
	<i>Democratic Constitutional Process in Libya</i>
	<i>Supporting Libya's Elected Women Legislators</i>
	<i>Security, Justice and Defence (SJD) Programme</i>
	<i>Supporting the High National Elections Commission in delivering elections and other electoral events</i>

SOMALIA	<i>Core State Functions Programme (CSFP)</i>
	<i>Somalia Stability Fund (SSF)</i>
	<i>Health Consortium for the Somali People (HCS)</i>
	National Action Plan on Ending Sexual Violence was presented at the Global Summit in London, June 2014.
SYRIA	<i>Support to Governance Structures in Syria</i>
	<i>Capacity Support for Civil Society</i>
	<i>Women organising for change in Bosnia and Syria</i>
	<i>Strengthening participation in Syrian peace processes</i>

Output 1.1 The UK encourages grassroots participation by women and girls.

The evaluation team found that **the UK has supported numerous initiatives that encourage the grassroots participation of women and girls in all of the NAP focus countries through a mixture of activities, including the provision of funding to CSOs and support for women’s participation at local level in service delivery programmes.**

Many of the UK supported initiatives have been implemented **through sub-grant delivery mechanisms, which have included capacity building and wider mentoring efforts.** Programmes in Afghanistan and Syria have focused on strengthening the capacity of local CSOs and committees to deliver a wide range of service-delivery packages identified by, and delivered through, communities. These activities have strengthened platforms to influence and inform broader social and political processes and provided opportunity to address key themes, including women’s rights and access to justice. They have further provided particularly effective opportunities for sustainable impact at community-level, and have worked to ensure the equitable participation of women as both beneficiaries and participants.

Additionally, grassroots efforts in several focus countries have placed key emphasis on enhancing governance and accountability structures, with a focus on ensuring women’s representation in devolved decision-making positions. This was evidenced in Somalia’s health consortium programme where women were represented on District Health Boards, and in the DRC through a sustainable Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programme, involving women’s participation within water point management committees.

Some initiatives have been notable for their strategic nature and innovation. For example, in Burma the MOD’s monthly open-invitation meetings provide a platform for CSOs to meet directly with UK representatives and raise concerns at a senior diplomatic level. Building relationships with CSOs is most commonly the area in which DFID would take the lead, and this opportunity of a civilian-military forum for discussion is a welcome initiative.

The evaluation team noted some common concerns across the six countries with regard to supporting grassroots participation of women and girls. For example, the **capacity of CSOs remains weak in many contexts**, which was highlighted by several HMG staff members, with an emphasis on the need for ongoing support and capacity building to ensure the delivery and monitoring of quality activities and the realisation of impact at outcome level.

Across all of the focus countries to a greater or lesser extent, HMG staff reported **limitations in direct access to CSOs.** Despite best intentions, some UK initiatives have struggled to find implementing partners with the right set of skills to deliver the programmes, and have been unable to directly monitor and evaluate these efforts.

The limitations in UK country office human resources and administrative capacity means that the most effective way of funding a significant number of grassroots organisations is through sub-contracts to large programmes or funds, which has

resulted in **limited opportunity to develop relationships between CSOs and UK country offices**. In both DRC and Burma, CSOs that were visited by the evaluation teams – particularly outside the capital – complained about the gatekeeper role of the larger programmes and the lack of direct access to HMG staff.

Support to grassroots CSOs varied between countries. While funding to CSOs was found to be strong in five of the focus countries, in DRC the evaluation team found a significant lack of current funding to women’s networks and local CSOs that work on gender and/or women, peace and security issues – whether on advocacy or to implement specific projects.

Identifying the right CSOs was evidenced as a key challenge. Finding mechanisms for genuine grassroots organisations to receive UK support on WPS issues – particularly where the security situation or time and resource constraints prohibit travel around the country – was shown as a persistent problem. In several of the focus countries, the same small handful of CSOs, often based in the capital, remain successful at writing proposals and winning grants. While they may have the competencies to meet donor requirements, they are not always representative of the ‘ordinary’ members of society.

Output 1.2 The UK encourages meaningful political participation by women and girls.

The evaluation team found **evidence to support the centrality of ensuring meaningful and quality political participation; while participation is the outcome that is perhaps easiest to measure quantitatively, it is the qualitative evidence that is the most revealing and critical.** Particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments, finding and identifying women and organisations that can credibly and effectively represent and deliver to other women and girls can be extremely challenging, and there is a risk of supporting an elite that are the most prolific or best at responding to donor requirements. The evaluation team found that several UK programmes under political participation are cognisant of this and made efforts to ameliorate the risk.

For example, in Afghanistan the FCO’s work with the Research Institute of Women, Peace and Security has focused on **unpacking the structural barriers to political participation**, and DFID are currently conducting a scoping study to better understand the challenges faced by women Provincial Councillors. Further, in the Syrian context, a number of efforts were made to capitalise on burgeoning, operational women’s rights movements and activist groups who were able to share lesson-learning across different contexts and to provide input to developing strategies for women’s participation at different levels. As discussed above, however, translating this participation into meaningful action remains key.

In the DRC, women’s participation in politics has been extremely low over the last decade. Interviews conducted during this evaluation suggested that many CSOs and NGOs have initiatives on women’s political participation, but only a few donors are engaged in funding programmes and there is a shortfall of funding. The UK has not given any recent funding to women’s political participation, and although DFID support has been planned for an elections project, there are no plans to focus on women’s political participation.

Perhaps the most notable challenge for the WPS agenda in the DRC has been the extremely weak participation of women in the stabilisation and peacebuilding processes, and the failure of international agencies, donors and diplomats – including the UK - to prioritise this agenda. In addition the international community’s own strategy, the *International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy* (I4S) for DRC is very weak on gender. The UK (DFID) recognised this and in 2013 financed a consultant to work with the UN peacekeeping operation United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and other actors to improve the gender-responsiveness of the I4S monitoring framework, as well as lobbying successfully for a gender advisor to be attached to MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit. In the Somalia context there was a similar lack of initiatives focused on women’s political participation, but an acknowledgement of efforts and resources that will be directed to this area moving forward, particularly in light of the lead-up to the 2016 elections. Indeed, several of the UK offices in the focus countries successfully supported activity aligned with electoral processes and enhancing the participation of women as voters and candidates.

In many of the focus countries WPS entry points have been **linked to peace processes**. In Burma for example, the participation pillar currently dominates the WPS agenda because of the ongoing peace negotiations since 2011. There are

CSOs and campaigners who have repeatedly protested the absence of women at the head negotiating table (they are present in greater numbers as support and technical staff). However several stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation argue that a more strategic entry point would be for women to ensure that they are involved with the subsequent political negotiations, rather than struggling for a place at the already over-subscribed peace negotiations. Others have argued that **the gender of negotiators is not important, rather the issue is whether or not they represent the rights of women and girls**. As HMG staff are currently seeking methods of supporting women to be involved in these processes, this evaluation team believes that a considered strategy is the most important requirement.

Output 1.3 The UK encourages governments to develop strategies for their countries and ministries that foster meaningful participation by women and girls.

The NAP's focus on increasing the proportion of women in national security services in the focus countries is a broad interpretation of UNSCR 1325. It is a **more strategic and long-term perspective than merely focusing on the representation of women in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions and is to be commended**.

The UK had committed to supporting women in the security services in Afghanistan, DRC and Syria. Programmes range from **initiatives on retention to improving the living conditions of female cadets**. The initiative in DRC was part of the DFID-funded police reform project, however this programme was closed down in 2015 due to a UK ministerial decision in response to human rights abuses committed by the police in Kinshasa. Unfortunately, this has significantly reduced the UK's influence in the important area of security sector reform, including the gradual progress that was being made on women's participation and gender-responsive policing.

Under this output in the Implementation Plan, supporting other countries to develop their own WPS NAPs is mentioned. Of the six focus countries, Somalia, Afghanistan and DRC all have their own WPS NAPs developed or under development. However, **this evaluation found that the focus on supporting countries to develop WPS NAPs should be treated with caution**. The development of a WPS NAP, if done correctly, is a process that consumes a great deal of resources from both civil society and government. In a conflict and post-conflict context, it is often the case that finite resources could be better used to actually deliver WPS programmes. Often there are alternative policies already in place that may provide a better focus for support, such as the Burmese National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women (NSPAW) or the DRC's National Gender Strategy. The evaluation team found that in Burma large efforts around participation were being put into developing and implementing a strategy for the NSPAW, ensuring participation in the peace and political negotiations, and preparing for women's participation in the upcoming elections – in this context, therefore, developing yet another document seemed surplus to requirement.

Recommendations – Participation

- UK programmes should strive to support CSOs that genuinely represent the grassroots communities. This can be achieved through more direct contact with CSOs, particularly outside the capital.
- There should be greater focus on qualitative results and the importance of meaningful, informed and high quality participation rather than a sole focus on driving quantitative progress.
- UK support to political participation should be strategic by seeking the most appropriate entry points to peace and political discussions and moving beyond the numbers of women at the table.
- Caution should be exercised with committing to supporting the development of NAPs, as this process is often not the most productive use of CSO and government WPS resources in a post-conflict environment.

4.3.2. Outcome 2 – Prevention: UK efforts and their contribution

In the NAP, objectives under the prevention outcome are focused on the elimination of impunity and providing support to programming and broader activity at national and international levels to work to prevent Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG). UK initiatives range from the development of policy, guidelines and protocols on VAWG to controls on small arms and efforts to improve data collection for VAWG.

The evaluation found that the UK is undertaking **numerous relevant and effective programmes** to prevent violence against women and girls. However, in many cases the ability to deliver prevention programmes depends on the ability to have access to communities – in the case of Libya and Syria access is severely restricted and as such capacity to deliver programmes in these contexts is particularly challenging. Issues of remote management and M&E more broadly are also particularly challenging when dealing with the sensitive nature of much of the programme content attached to VAWG initiatives.

A selection of UK initiatives reviewed as part of the baseline is captured in the summary table below. It should be noted that these are predominantly the programmes and activities that the NAP Implementation Plan determines as contributing to this outcome, and as such this is not an exhaustive list.

Pillar Two: Prevention of conflict and violence against women and girls	
Outcome: Prevention of conflict and all forms of structural and physical violence against women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence.	
AFGHANISTAN	Engagement with European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and support to Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) gender strategy.
	Engagement on Human Rights Defenders (HRDs)
	<i>Security Sector in the Ministry of Interior (SSMI)</i>
	<i>Investing in Partnerships with Men to Promote Women’s Rights in Afghanistan</i>
	<i>Support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)</i>
BURMA	<i>Promoting Access to Justice: Towards a Violence Free Environment for Women and Girls</i>
	<i>PSVI/Violence Against Women and Girls’ component for the Defence Academy’s Senior Leadership Programme and Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context (MDSWC)</i>
	<i>Humanitarian Response for Conflict-Affected People in Kachin State, Burma</i>
	<i>Enhancing protection from sexual violence and towards the elimination of gender discrimination in Burma/Myanmar</i>
DRC	<i>Enhancing a multi-sectoral approach to the prosecution of sexual violence crimes by supporting, health, legal and law enforcement professionals in the documentation, collection and preservation of forensic evidence (PSVI)</i>
	<i>Creating a Space, Raising a Voice: Protecting and Empowering Adolescent Girls in Humanitarian Contexts (COMPASS) Programme</i>
	<i>Program Support to Land Governance for Peace, Stability and Reconstruction in DR Congo Post Conflict</i>

LIBYA	<i>Supporting the implementation of the Libyan Transitional Justice Law</i>
	<i>El Kul: independent news and information for Libyans</i>
	<i>Al-Maidan Libya Youth Content Partnership</i>
SOMALIA	<i>Promoting Rights, Protecting Women: Prevention of and Response to GBV against Women and Girls in Mogadishu (PSVI)</i>
	<i>Joint Health and Nutrition Programme (JHNP)</i>
SYRIA	<i>Expanding Local Capacity and a Network of Syrian Health Professionals and Allied Human Rights Defenders</i>
	<i>Strengthening the Support Network for Women and Young Girls Fleeing the Civil War in Syria</i>

Output 2.1 The UK develops new research protocols, policy, programmes, and guidance regarding the prevention of conflict

The UK has undertaken to work on a number of areas with regard to policies, protocols and guidance. This evaluation looked in particular at the NAP commitment to review the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) and conflict sensitivity assessment tools.

The JACS approach was developed following a commitment to develop an integrated cross-HMG approach to understanding conflict and stability in fragile countries. **This evaluation found that the JACS guidance on the inclusion of NAP commitments, WPS issues and on gender more broadly is inadequate.** The focus of the 2012 JACS Guidance is on the JACS *process*, emphasising the need for each JACS to be jointly commissioned and carried out cross-departmentally rather than the *content* of related outputs and products. There is no requirement for a gender perspective to be taken in the JACS, although the guidance does make brief references to the need to consult women, as well as young people and the elderly, and to consider women as actors in conflict.

One of seven key principles is to consider alignment with UK policies, however **the evaluation team found that alignment to the NAP was lacking.** In fact, a 2014 SU assessment of the produced JACS stated, “*WPS issues are barely addressed in any JACS, despite the commitment made by the UK’s [previous] National Action Plan*”. The review also found reluctance amongst some staff to a proposed requirement to consider WPS issues in JACS conflict analysis, with some arguing that there should only be a focus if this had been identified and prioritised during the initiation phase and development of the Terms of Reference (ToRs).

Rapid review of a selection of completed JACS

So far, 26 JACS have been produced, however **JACS have only been carried out for two of the six NAP focus countries: DRC and Somalia.** The evaluation team reviewed six final JACS reports to assess the extent to which NAP commitments and WPS issues are currently reflected in JACS analysis; DRC (2012), Bosnia & Herzegovina, (2014), Kosovo (2014), Mali (2012), Serbia (2014), and Western Balkans (2014).

A rapid review of these six reports identified the following key findings:

- There is little to no attention paid to WPS issues, gender, or women’s and girls’ empowerment.
- None of the reports explicitly refer to the WPS agenda or to the current or previous UK NAP.
- Five out of six JACS make very brief references to women, three of which focus on women’s vulnerability to different forms of violence, whilst the other two refer to women’s representation in public life.
- The DRC JACS makes most reference to WPS issues, however this is still very limited, with three brief references to sexual violence, including shifted cultural norms normalising sexual violence, successes in the prosecution of Congolese soldiers for sexual violence through mobile courts, and sexual violence as a visible manifestation of “a

militarised elite and disempowered and brutalised population". The report does not make any recommendations related to sexual violence in the DRC context.

- None of the JACS propose any HMG response focused on WPS or gender.

Implications for the lack of attention to the NAP, WPS and gender in JACS are potentially significant if the JACS is increasingly used to inform CSSF programming. According to one SU staff member, this would be *"a missed opportunity – the WPS agenda will not be given the profile that it perhaps otherwise would. That is a key implication."*

HMG has fulfilled its commitment outlined in the current NAP to review the JACS, however the guidance is yet to be updated based on this review. The commitment to conduct gender-sensitive conflict analysis outlined in the NAP's Intervention Framework is not currently being met through the JACS, with the review of relevant documentation suggesting there is still a long way to go in this regard.

Output 2.2 The UK develops new research, protocols, policy, programmes and guidance regarding violence against women and girls

The NAP commits the UK to develop and disseminate protocols, policies and guidance on preventing VAWG. DFID's VAWG helpdesk query service provides a rapid-response desk research, analysis and advice service to DFID staff and other government departments. To date, the helpdesk have responded to 86 requests for expert advice and rapid research, including queries from DFID, FCO and the SU on a range of diverse VAWG issues, including support to survivors of sexual violence in conflict, the links between gender, VAWG and stabilisation, and mapping NAPs (existing and planned) on VAWG, WPS, and SGBV in DFID's focus countries. The helpdesk have also provided guidance to DFID country offices on VAWG (including DRC, Sudan, Burma, Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana, and India), as well as responding to six queries relating to violent extremism and VAWG in Syria and Iraq.

DFID's flagship research programme on what works to prevent VAWG was launched in 2014. It includes a component focusing on VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies, which has recently conducted formative research in Kenya and South Sudan, and published an evidence brief summarising recent systematic reviews on VAWG in conflict and humanitarian settings.

Output 2.3 The UK works to end impunity related to conflict-related violence against women and girls

The NAP frames gender sensitivity of security and justice sector programmes and tackling the culture of impunity at a national and international level under this output.

This evaluation found that while **there are many areas in which the UK had succeeded** in its NAP commitments on security and justice programming, there were also opportunities for improvement. In general it was found that in a field that is typically male-dominated, **WPS activities have the ability to gain more traction when they are mainstreamed into broader security and justice programmes**. For example in Burma, the UK's MOD included a session on UNSCR 1325 and PSVI in the training courses it designed and delivered to the Burmese military (Tatmadaw). Although these programmes are modest in length – just two weeks – and the section on UNSCR 1325 and PSVI is limited to a mere 90 minutes, they serve as a strategic entry point for further engagement with and exerting a positive influence on the Tatmadaw and other security forces. One limitation noted by the evaluators was that the UNSCR 1325 and PSVI sessions were delivered by staff of a UN agency, whereas previous experience of the evaluation team shows that military personnel respond better to military personnel as trainers – particularly on a subject that tends to be easily dismissed.

DFID Burma is also in the early stages of designing a multi-year security sector reform (SSR) programme. Staff interviewed about the programme design were keen to emphasise that WPS would play a significant role in the programme and this was viewed by the evaluators as a significant opportunity to mainstream WPS priorities into security sector programming. However, knowledge and understanding of WPS was not highlighted as a required skill in the job advert for the SSR Adviser

designing the programme, so it will be important to ensure that gender and WPS expertise is included or provided in another manner.

Also in Burma, the work that the UK supported on the training of paralegals and the establishment of legal aid centres highlighted some of the difficulties around quantitative measures and short-term programmes run through the PSVI. The evaluation team found that while access to justice was clearly a priority focus area for women and girls in Burma, the hurried programme was not succeeding in delivering the promised paralegals because of limited training time and poor retention rates.

The DRC has been a major priority for the UK's PSVI over the last three years and the initiative has supported several projects to combat sexual violence in Eastern DRC. The two main focus areas of the PSVI initiatives have been combating impunity around sexual violence and providing services to survivors of sexual violence. The evaluation team found that UK-funded projects have made some important contributions in terms of providing support services to survivors, however while prosecutions have increased, they still remain at a very low level. Furthermore, **a question about whether a punitive approach focused on prosecution is actually the most effective way to prevent sexual violence or other forms of VAWG remains.**³

At a global level, the UK held a Global Summit as part of the PSVI where it launched the *Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict*, which contains practical and political commitments to end the use of rape and sexual violence as weapons of war and places emphasis on punishment for perpetrators. The commitment to end impunity for acts of sexual violence is an important step. However, there are limitations, the lack of enforceability of the commitments is demonstrated by countries such as South Sudan, who signed the agreement even whilst embroiled in a civil war in which the state security services are regularly accused of acts of sexual violence.

PSVI

Since its launch in June 2012, the UK's Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI) has succeeded in drawing widespread international public attention. The UK has since hosted a Global Summit on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict, developed an international protocol on the documentation and investigation of sexual violence in conflict, and created a pool of experts which can be deployed to conflict settings around the world.

The objectives of the PSVI complement WPS and a number of PSVI programmes throughout the six focus countries have contributed to the implementation of the NAP. However, now that PSVI has established itself, the successful strategies that have been used to roll out PSVI work should be reviewed.

The evaluation team found that the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI) has been a successful vehicle for mobilising funds. However funding cycles that are longer-term and more predictable would be more effective; the CSSF may be one vehicle for achieving this. The evaluation found insufficient evidence that the programmes funded by PSVI are driven by locally identified priorities.

Output 2.4 The UK delivers a set of programmed activities that prevents violence against women and girls

In all six focus countries, the UK has delivered programmed activities to contribute to preventing violence against women and girls. The NAP implementation plan specified that these programmes would fall under three areas: 'safe spaces' programming to protect adolescent girls from violence in conflict and post-conflict settings; innovative programming to prevent VAWG in conflict and post-conflict settings, and the design and delivery of projects on preventing sexual violence in partnerships with PSVI Global Summit participants.

The country where most of these activities takes place is DRC, given the high rates of sexual violence perpetrated in the conflict there. There are a number of relevant programmes funded by both DFID DRC and through central funding

³ See Heise (2012) *What works to prevent Intimate Partner Violence: An Evidence Overview*. London: STRIVE; What Works (2014) *Evidence Review on What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls*.

mechanisms, including the PSVI and central DFID funding. However, all of these programmes are in their inception phases or at fairly early implementation stages, so there is not yet any information on impact and in some cases, implementation plans are not yet fully elaborated.

In Burma, much of the activity on prevention of VAWG is focused on internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kachin and Rakhine state, where DFID funds several International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to WASH initiatives as part of a package of humanitarian programming. The spot check that was undertaken at one IDP camp managed by one implementing partner as part of this evaluation. Whilst only one spot check was made and further exploration is recommended it indicated that minimum standards may not always be being met. The evaluators noted that washing areas of men and women were closely facing each other with no privacy or security and there were no lights around the latrines. This same implementing partner, however, was running successful Gender Based Violence (GBV) prevention and response programmes in several camps – an activity that DFID was not funding. Evaluators felt that an opportunity had been missed to join up the organisation’s GBV work with their WASH programme.

In all countries, the evaluation team noted **a need for broader engagement with men and boys across the WPS agenda**, perhaps taking the lead from a new FCO project in Afghanistan where efforts are focused on building partnerships with male leaders and community members in order to counter GBV.

Output 2.5 The UK will work at home and abroad to prevent specific forms of VAWG

The UK’s commitment to work at home and abroad to prevent specific forms of VAWG – focusing on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and Child, Early and Forced Marriage (CEFM) – is unusual for a WPS NAP because it is not specifically an issue that is linked to conflict and there is a question whether the NAP is the most appropriate framework to address these important issues. This holds particular significance in the Somalia context, where FGM is almost universally practiced. In discussion with HMG staff, however the **UK’s NAP was described as providing a helpful and coordinated tool for discussion of sexual violence in Somalia, which brought together FGM and PSVI under one framework.**

Recommendations – Prevention

- Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability should be undertaken for all six of the NAP focus countries, and a focus on WPS should be included in guidance for writing all JACS.
- WPS priorities should be mainstreamed into security sector programmes from the outset.
- The MOD should consider training and make available a small cadre of military personnel who are able to offer training on WPS to militaries in conflict-affected countries.
- A review of PSVI activities would be beneficial to ensure that: PSVI is fully embedded in UK responses and harmonised with wider WPS policy; specific country needs are being met; and funding is long-term and predictable enough to have lasting impact.
- There should be broader engagement with men and boys on issues of WPS across all conflict-affected countries in which the UK is working.

4.3.3. Outcome 3 – Protection: UK efforts and their contribution

Under the NAP, the protection of women and girls’ rights and their inclusion in economic and social development has been positioned as essential to building states which are responsive to their citizens, and societies that are equal. The UK supports a wide range of activity under this outcome area covering advocacy, the delivery of technical assistance to national governments and multilateral organisations, survivor-centred SGBV programming and broader efforts looking to build women and girls’ assets and access to basic services through targeted interventions in areas such as education and health.

A selection of UK initiatives reviewed as part of the baseline is captured in the summary table below. It should be noted that these are predominantly the programmes and activities that the NAP Implementation Plan determines as contributing to this outcome, and as such this is not an exhaustive list.

Pillar Three: Protecting the Human Rights of Women and Girls	
Outcome: Women and girls’ safety, physical and mental health and economic security are assured and their human rights upheld in conflict and post-conflict situations.	
AFGHANISTAN	Lobbying Afghan government through bilateral and multilateral channels to ensure women’s rights are integral to its new policies.
	<i>Comprehensive Response to Sexual Violence Against Women in Afghanistan (PSVI)</i>
	<i>Supporting Employment and Enterprise Development programme (SEED)</i>
	<i>Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility Phase II (CARD-F II)</i>
	<i>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)</i>
	<i>Strengthening Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence</i>
BURMA	<i>Promoting Access to Justice: Towards a Violence Free Environment for Women and Girls - component to support the operationalisation of NSPAW.</i>
DRC	Political engagement on Code de la Famille, legislation. Also features under Outcome 1 in the Implementation Plan)
	Capacity building around gender approach of programmes.
	<i>Accès aux Soins de Santé Primaires (ASSP)</i>
	<i>Support and Protection of vulnerable girls and young women (VGYW) living and working on the streets of Tshangu District, Kinshasa Province, DRC – Phase II (La Pépinière)</i>
	<i>Creating a Space, Raising a Voice: Protecting and Empowering Adolescent Girls in Humanitarian Contexts (COMPASS) Programme</i>
LIBYA	Only one activity listed in the Implementation Plan and no other initiatives flagged by staff - this references support to the delivery of a Crime Scene Investigator’s course under the SJD programme. Also features under Outcome 1 in the Implementation Plan.
SOMALIA	The British Peace Support Team (Eastern Africa) (BPST(EA)) training initiatives in Kenya to personnel from AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia)
	<i>Core State Functions Programme (CSFP)</i> . Also features under Outcome 1 in the Implementation Plan.
	<i>Joint Health and Nutrition Programme (JHNP)</i> . Also features under Outcome 2 in the Implementation Plan.
	<i>Health Consortium for the Somali People (HCS)</i> . Also features under Outcome 1 in the Implementation Plan.
SYRIA	<i>Project BATAL (Hero) Support to Syrian Civil Defence</i>
	<i>Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS)</i>

Output 3.1 The UK will increase the quantity, quality and culture of protection available to women and girls overseas

UK commitments under this output area include driving forward the normative framework for women and girls in conflict and post-conflict states through working with the UN and national governments. The NAP discusses the provision of technical expertise and support to national and multilateral organisations and governments to improve gender-sensitive programming and military engagement.

Providing such support to national and multilateral organisations and governments has been attempted by the UK to some degree in all of the six focus countries. **However the challenge faced by the UK across almost all countries is to secure equal commitment from state governments in countries that are trying to address a number of competing priorities.** For example in Burma, the UK committed to attending the Sector Working Group on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, however the group, chaired by the Department for Social Welfare (DSW), only meets infrequently. Pursuing initiatives without the government is not a viable alternative so the UK must use diplomatic pressure to drive forward the initiatives. Whilst in contexts like Somalia and Afghanistan there have been a number of current commitments and statements which have rhetorically and emphatically positioned the prioritisation of women's rights and protection, the extent to which this is followed through with robust and resourced implementation is limited. In the DRC, there are multiple overlapping policies and plans on gender, sexual violence and WPS, but almost no implementation of any of the commitments that they contain.

The inclusion of a specific military engagement element to output 3.1 presents a significant entry point. With regard to Somalia, a number of MOD-led sponsored courses were identified as taking place for AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia) personnel throughout 2014 and 2015, covering content such as GBV, child protection, and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The MOD has also provided some training for MONUSCO personnel in the DRC, which included gender training as well as the deployment of a military gender field advisor to support the UN mission. Whilst it is very encouraging to see a number of these activities taking place, **there appears to have been a lack of visibility of these, as well as a lack of engagement with other HMG departments on the training that is taking place for the UN forces.** A wider lesson of application may be to encourage greater collaboration between MOD and other WPS actors within HMG in order to ensure our joint efforts in this area are effective and coherent as possible.

Output 3.2 The UK will protect women and girls from gender-based violence

As with many of the commitments under Outcome 3, the evaluation team found this output to be too wide-ranging in its ambition, to the extent that almost any WPS activity could be categorised under it. The NAP commits the UK to providing multi-sector, survivor-centred programming to prevent and respond to all forms of violence against women and girls in conflict-affected states.

Given the importance of this output, it is disappointing that there are no activities in Burma in the Implementation Plan. It should be noted, however, that this does not mean that the UK is not undertaking work in Burma to protect women and girls from GBV: as has been demonstrated under the other outcome areas, there are numerous programmes aimed at improving WASH standards in IDP camps and access to justice, etc. **The UK-funded United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) support programme to prevent and respond to GBV in Kachin and Rakhine was positively reported by beneficiaries.**

Afghanistan's PSVI project focused on providing psychological counselling/treatment for victims of sexual violence, shelter, protection and legal support alongside undertaking awareness raising activities. A number of achievements were noted, including a fully functioning psychological treatment unit within the Ministry of Women Affairs (overall a strong local partner), which has been shown to be a critical element to successful programming in this area. However, an overarching concern was the lack of sustainability and longer-term impact of these efforts. In addition – and relevant across a number of PSVI activities – resource allocation was limited, most activities are tied to implementation periods of a year and there appear to be notable gaps in terms of strategic design and sustainability. In Afghanistan, as in all other focus countries, the need for a greater focus on addressing social norms has been evident across a number of different outcome areas. Arguably

a focus on this area may be the most effective means and mode by which transformational change can be ultimately realised.

In the DRC **the evaluation team found a number of encouraging initiatives, including UK-supported work on improving service standards for the treatment of sexual violence victims**, and specifically ensuring that the Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) kit is delivered to survivors within 72 hours; a project which trained faith leaders and community action groups to support survivors of violence and ensure that cases were referred to the relevant support services; and a project to support vulnerable young women and girls working and living on the street of Kinshasa. One area on which there has been inadequate focus in the DRC, however, has been the socio-economic reintegration of SGBV survivors

Output 3.3 The UK will protect the rights of women and girls and will empower them by increasing the employment, health, education and training services available to women and girls

As with output 3.2, this output is so wide-ranging it risks losing meaning, and the Implementation Plan does not adequately reflect the amount of work that is being done by the UK. NAP commitments in this output range from ensuring girls complete primary and secondary school in conflict-affected states, to providing economic assets to women and girls in conflict-affected states, and implementing security and justice programming to improve 10 million women's access to justice worldwide. **The disparate range of activity captured under this output makes it difficult to draw conclusions and common themes across country experiences.**

The 'protective' elements of security and justice programming are positioned in relation to the strengthening of referral and justice systems, as well as efforts to increase women's representation within security services such as the police. These efforts were particularly notable in Syria and Afghanistan, where work on women in policing appears to remain a relatively nascent and complex area with progress in both countries highlighted as modest overall, yet symbolically significant. **Obstacles and challenges to advancing this work range from issues attached to institutional capacity and buy-in as well as pervasive, negative social norms which manifest at a community, social and cultural level, as well as more specific perceptions around security sectors being more broadly predominantly 'male' spheres.**

A related initiative in Syria focused on **increasing numbers of women in civil defence** emphasised the steady increases in acknowledgement of the relevance of this work and acceptance amongst the male leadership within the civil defence teams, as well as in the wider community. Engaging more with men in this area may provide a particularly helpful entry point.

The UK has supported innovative and community-supported models in its access to justice programming for women and girls, including the use of mobile courts and paralegals through Somalia's DFID-led CSFP programme, which reached a number of GBV survivors in remote environments.

With regard to building women's and girls' assets and access to basic services, the NAP Implementation Plan highlights **DRC and Somalia programmes as delivering support primarily focused on essential reproductive, maternal and child health (RMCH) services.** In fact, the majority of Somalia's WPS portfolio falls within, or links to, health programming in some way. HMG staff interviewed emphasised that the health spend was, out of necessity, the largest gender spend.

The development of women's and girls' skills and assets are important mechanisms through which they can protect and empower themselves, and which can result in longer-term benefits beyond the life of HMG programmes, hence the prominence of these areas across broader HMG strategy and policy. For example, education and increased literacy enables girls and women to participate in political processes and develop a political voice, as well as allowing communities to access vital information that may enable them to realise their rights. In this respect, whilst education features as only one output in the NAP, it may present a crucial opportunity to advance the WPS agenda more widely. The Girls' Education Challenge is named in the NAP and is specifically referenced in relation to Afghanistan, DRC and Somalia. Unfortunately, aside from the Vas-Y-Filles programme in DRC, there were no country-level documents available for review, therefore it was not possible to judge the output-specific merit of these activities or progress to date. In the DRC, DFID's education programme is working to improve access to primary education for boys and girls and is tracking gender ratios for enrolment and completion, as

well as working to tackle financial and socio-cultural barriers which impact differently upon girls and boys. At present, the focus of this programme is not on teaching methods or the curriculum, but in the longer term these will be important areas to address for tackling discriminatory gender norms in Congolese society.

In the Implementation Plan, the multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is referenced in relation to UK support to government education programmes. The programme accounts for almost half of DFID’s bilateral spend and presents a noteworthy opportunity in terms of reach and impact. In reality, the scope of this programme extends far beyond the provision of education initiatives, which is one small component of a large portfolio driving structural reform and creating conditions for growth across a number of different sectors. Overall a number of mechanisms have been put in place to support gender mainstreaming, such as specific objectives and targets in individual project results frameworks and the overall ARTF Results Framework, and providing technical support to government partners to embed gender teams and focal points within projects in ministries and agencies. This is also reflected through HMG’s own prioritisation of the need to strengthen the ‘gender impact’ of the ARTF as outlined in DFID Afghanistan’s Operational Plan. The extent to which these efforts can be deemed effective is still to be determined. As highlighted in discussion with HMG staff, there appears to have been a specific effort in 2014 to scale up gender results monitoring, as well as to establish guidelines and tighten project reporting requirements to support this work, but challenges linked to the multi-donor set-up and at implementing partner level, amongst others, remain.

In the DRC DFID’s new La Pépinière programme is focused on the economic empowerment of adolescent girls and will start with a phase of research into the situation of girls in Kinshasa, as well as developing pilot projects to build evidence about ‘what works’ to economically empower adolescent girls. At the same time, on the basis of evidence generated, it will aim to influence key government stakeholders, donors and civil society to prioritise targeted policies and programmes for girls and young women. However, research shows that **women face significant barriers to employment in the formal sector and most women work in the agriculture or informal sector.**⁴ **There is therefore still significant work to be done to ensure that DFID DRC’s new private sector development programme and the existing Making Markets Work for the Poor programme have a specific focus on improving the livelihoods of women and girls through looking at access to employment, assets and credit.**

Recommendations – Protection

- There should be better visibility of the WPS training that the UK government is providing to UN forces, and better communication between UK departments to coordinate the training.
- There needs to be a stronger definition of what is meant by ‘protection’, with more focus on social norms as a way of achieving transformational change in regard to WPS.

4.3.4. Outcome 4 – Relief and Recovery: UK efforts and their contribution

The UK NAP takes a very specific perspective on the relief and recovery pillar of UNSCR 1325, choosing to focus particularly on the humanitarian needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations. This is unusual, since most NAPs take a broader view of relief and recovery which go beyond the humanitarian needs and include elements such multi-donor trust funds, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, truth and reconciliation commissions, health and education and other areas.

A selection of UK initiatives reviewed as part of the baseline is captured in the summary table below. It should be noted that these are predominantly the programmes and activities that the NAP Implementation Plan determines as contributing to this outcome, and as such this is not an exhaustive list.

⁴ Shapiro et al (2011) *Gender, Education, and the Labour Market in Kinshasa*.

Pillar Four: Addressing Women's and Girls' Needs in Relief and Recovery	
Outcome: Women and girls' specific needs are prioritised in conflict and post-conflict relief efforts.	
AFGHANISTAN	DFID Humanitarian Programme for Afghanistan
BURMA	Humanitarian Response for Conflict-Affected People in Kachin State
	Humanitarian Assistance in Rakhine State
DRC	Humanitarian assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
SOMALIA	Multi-year Humanitarian Programme
SYRIA	Syria Humanitarian Assistance

Output 4.1 Response to the needs of women and girls in humanitarian situations

Under this fourth outcome the NAP has only one output: to provide a rapid response to the needs of girls and women in humanitarian conflict and post-conflict situations. **The majority of the UK's efforts under this outcome are channelled through contributions to large-scale humanitarian programmes, often delivered through multi-donor and multi-partner funds. This means that the initiatives benefit from scale, but that the UK has less direct influence compared to bilateral initiatives.**

In Syria, the majority of DFID's WPS activity is channelled through their humanitarian programme. Efforts include targeted GBV programmes, alongside gender mainstreaming across a variety of multi-sector initiatives – including protection, education and health programmes. Judging the efficacy of these efforts has been challenging as details pertaining to **WPS components or gender mainstreaming efforts within broader programmes were frequently not captured in project documents or where provided only presented a limited picture.** Targeted activities delivered through a GBV programme demonstrated some particularly effective contributions, including efforts focusing on delivering functioning 'safe spaces' for women and girls, challenging social norms, supporting effective coordination of GBV actors in Syria (and regionally), and providing GBV survivors with comprehensive services. This programme also spoke to a number of activities in place to support coordination with neighbouring countries and across borders, in light of a transition to a 'whole of Syria' approach.

One potentially interesting programme in DRC was the centrally funded IRC programme, 'Creating a Space, Raising a Voice: Protecting and Empowering Adolescent Girls in Humanitarian Contexts'. The evaluation team visited one of the targeted areas where the programme inception is underway and the 'safe spaces' approach will work with girls, boys, families, communities and service providers to try to improve the status of and support the empowerment of girls, as well as addressing their specific safety needs.

The importance of supporting long-term financing in humanitarian contexts emerged during the evaluation. In protracted settings like Somalia, this was shown to be particularly relevant and the issue of **short-termism was described as one of the 'biggest obstacles' for HMG actors, presenting wider application across the board.**

In Burma, the Implementation Plan commits the UK to training medical staff and caseworkers in the GBV guiding principles in the conflict-affected states of Rakhine and Kachin. Through UNFPA, the UK has also funded two GBV coordinators to work in these two states. The coordinators are proving to be significant in working with humanitarian organisations, both national and international, to coordinate activities and to support local CSOs with best practice for dealing with survivors of GBV. **When interviewed as part of the fieldwork, UNFPA stressed that the UK support had been essential for initiating the GBV programming in Rakhine, which would have otherwise struggled to get off the ground.**

Through UNFPA the UK is also supporting the establishment of Women and Girls Centres to provide services, including around GBV response, in conflict-affected areas. What is important to note in these centres is that the staff who were interviewed by the evaluators emphasised that although they are responding to high levels of GBV, the vast majority of cases are not instances of GBV in conflict but rather they are more often cases of domestic violence (including intimate partner violence) or assault within the community. That is not to say that the conflicts have not contributed to the conditions that have caused the high levels of GBV – trauma, increased levels of alcohol consumption, cramped conditions in IDP camps, etc. – but that as mentioned previously with respect to Eastern DRC, to focus on sexual violence committed by combatants is to only focus on a smaller part of the problem.

Recommendations – Relief and Recovery

- Responses to SGBV need to focus on a broader understanding of what violence looks like in conflict-affected and humanitarian settings, and adopt a more nuanced approach to address issues such as intimate partner violence, for example.
- The UK should include a requirement to report on WPS issues in humanitarian programming, starting at the most basic level of mandatory disaggregation of data by gender by implementing partners in humanitarian programmes' M&E frameworks.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Although this evaluation was originally envisaged as a baseline, the timing – well into the first year of the NAP – meant that it served in part as an early progress report. Additionally, the process of conducting the evaluation has revealed considerable flaws in the design of the NAP and its Implementation Plan. Therefore, although the original purpose of the evaluation was to establish the NAP's baseline and direction of travel, it has been important to highlight the NAP's design flaws in order to present a fair overall picture of the UK's work on WPS, and ensure that there is sufficient lead time to address these shortcomings in a subsequent UK NAP.

The evaluation found that although the UK is successfully undertaking a wide range of predominantly well-considered and thoughtfully implemented programmes on WPS, these are not the result of the NAP and are barely influenced by the NAP. Instead, the NAP and its Implementation Plan unsuccessfully attempt to exclusively categorise pre-planned UK activities into the four outcomes (participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery) thence into ever more niche sub-divisions, resulting in a disorganised collection of programmes that does not represent the programmes' wide-ranging impact. While through this additional administrative workload is created – particularly for the six focus country offices – this has little substantively improved impact on women and girls. The evaluation team has found only limited evidence of the NAP serving to drive the agenda on WPS, for example, one of the successes of the NAP is that it appears to be serving to promote the mainstreaming of the WPS agenda in UK programming.

A positive aspect of the above finding is the evidence that WPS concerns are generally considered and prioritised throughout the majority of UK government programming in conflict-affected states, without the need for an action plan to be pushing the agenda. This evaluation has found that in the first year of the NAP, the UK has implemented a range of strategic contributions to improve peace and security for women including: supporting women's organisations operating in conflict contexts, building capacity of women and girls to participate at all levels, preventing several forms of violence against women and girls (VAWG), ensuring the safety of women and girls' physical and mental health and economic security, and meeting the needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict relief efforts. There are several examples of innovative and strategic programming, but also opportunities to improve efforts. There have also been examples of HMG staff at country-level coordinating cross-departmentally to create a joint effort that represents more than the sum of its parts.

One of the key areas identified for improvement at a central level has been for WPS and the NAP to be included in the strategies of HMG departments and country offices. Training on WPS needs to be made more widely available and visible, and practical support given to HMG staff to enable them to translate WPS rhetoric into action for their programmes.

The evaluation team found that the current system of implementing WPS priorities without a specified budget line to be beneficial to ensure that WPS priorities are mainstreamed and 'owned' by all HMG-supported programmes and HMG staff – rather than being a standalone 'initiative'. In contrast, the PSVI has a dedicated budget line and risks being implemented alongside wider WPS efforts but with limited complementary and harmonisation. The evaluation found that more could be done to ensure that PSVI complements wider WPS efforts, responds to local need and is funded in a longer-term and more predictable way, ensuring sustainability of impact.

Although all six focus countries have very different situations, there were some recurring issues that were noted throughout the evaluation. One of these was the need to ground WPS interventions in a thorough and nuanced understanding of the local context – an approach that many of the evaluation's interviewees felt to be missing. It is essential that UK initiatives are designed with recognition of the specific drivers of conflict and VAWG at a country level, and are grounded in appropriate contextual analysis.

WPS was sometimes perceived by HMG staff in the six focus countries to not be a 'priority' in conflict-affected contexts – eliciting statements emphasising a need to "*get the basics right*". However, there is robust evidence to demonstrate that the causes, dynamics and consequences of conflict are gendered in multiple ways and it is therefore ill-informed to think that addressing women, peace and security issues can wait. HMG staff also emphasised a lack of adequate human resourcing and capacity to deliver WPS work (at different levels e.g. HMG, government, implementing partner, local partner). In

particular, FCO teams did not have the staff resources to oversee the PSVI programmes that were used in many instances to deliver the NAP outputs.

The need for long-term, multi-year financing (specifically for WPS-related activity) in order to deliver meaningful and sustainable change was consistently raised. The challenge of short-termism was described by some HMG staff as one of the 'biggest obstacles', and a desire to move beyond adaptive and reactive funding expressed. CSOs and implementing partners also complained of short term initiatives intended to tackle WPS issues that had deep-rooted structural origins.

It was also noted that despite the best intentions and planning of the UK teams implementing WPS programming, there were varying challenges in all six focus countries in terms of the countries' political will and capacity to move forward on WPS concerns. Whilst there are a number of legislative and rhetorical commitments from governments, the extent to which these efforts will be rolled out and implemented is yet to be determined.

The current NAP on WPS runs until June 2017. Considering the length of time it takes for an HMG programme to be designed and rolled out, the evaluation team recommends focusing on the opportunities:

- **Work on the UK's post-2017 NAP should begin early** in order to develop a follow-on NAP that is more fit for purpose, acknowledging the work done on WPS across all conflict-affected countries in which the UK works. There should be more focus on how to operationalise the NAP. The development of the NAP should be driven by the country offices rather than centrally and should be of sufficient duration that it can influence departmental and programmatic planning cycles.
- **WPS concerns should be institutionalised by including them in departmental strategies.** Most departmental strategies are due to be renewed within the lifetime of the NAP. In particular, inclusion of WPS in the newly revised Strategic Defence and Security Review is key. Further WPS should be included in programme planning at an early stage.
- **A review of PSVI activities would be beneficial** to ensure that PSVI: is fully embedded in UK responses; complements wider policy; meets specific country needs; and maximises impact.
- **Training and capacity building on WPS should be made more widely available** to HMG staff in order to better equip them to mainstream WPS concerns in their work and programmes. This is particularly important for staff designing and overseeing programmes in the field. The training should offer support on practical implementation of WPS priorities in programmes.
- **There should be a greater focus on the underlying causes of challenges, human rights abuses and inequalities experienced by women and girls in conflict affected contexts** rather than just responding to the symptoms. In the interest of sustainability, the UK should support more programmes that work on changing social norms that perpetuate violence against women and girls in and after conflict.

About Social Development Direct and the evaluation team

Social Development Direct (SDDirect) is a leading provider of social development consultancy and research services, with a specialism in gender. The organisation is consulted regularly on issues relating to women, peace and security and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325. For example, SDDirect has previously been engaged by UNIFEM to support development of the UN Secretary General's indicators on women, peace and security in 2010, and in 2012 by UN Women to manage baseline studies in four countries for their global programme on SCR 1325. An SDDirect team also updated the DFID Guidance Note on addressing violence against women and girls through security and justice programming, and has led support for the development of a Nigerian WPS National Action Plan through our partnership on the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme.

The team for this evaluation brings together over 70 years collective experience in conducting complex evaluations and in working on conflict prevention and peace building issues, with significant field experience in Afghanistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Additional team member experience includes writing a UNSCR 1325 baseline on behalf of the Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare in South Sudan; leading a team to conduct a gender situation analysis and participatory gender audit for DFID in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and writing online guidance for UNWomen on working with the security sector to address VAW.

Evaluation Team

Melissa Booth – Burma Researcher
Federica Busiello – DRC Researcher
Erika Fraser – Online Survey Lead
Félicité Langwana – DRC Researcher
Harri Lee – Whitehall Research Lead
Sarah Maguire – Technical Advisor
Lyndsay McLean Hilker – DRC Team Leader and Technical Advisor
Rachel Mohun – Researcher
Sally Neville – Team Leader
Anna Parke – Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and Syria Researcher
Victoria Schauerhammer – DRC Researcher and Quality Assurance
Lydia Stone – Team Leader
Maphie Tosha – DRC Researcher

