# SAFETY ALERT

**Part A, Part B, & Part C.**

**Subject:** Lucy Electric SABRE VRN2a

**Number:** SA 2015/17

<table>
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<th>DIO Sponsor: Bryan Dunn (Hd E&amp;C), SEE/DIO</th>
<th>Date of issue: 26 Nov 2015</th>
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**This Safety Alert is to be read by:**

1. Authorised Person (Electrical)
2. Authorising Engineer (Electrical)
3. DIO Service Manager
4. DIO’s Maintenance Management Organisations
5. Others

**Others who maybe interested in the content of this Safety Alert might include:**

Top Level Budget Holders, Prime Contractors, Private Finance Initiatives, Public, Private Partnership and other traditionally procured contracts, Project Managers, Site Estate Authority Teams and Property Managers with responsibility for MOD projects and Property Management Works Services (including the legacy work of EWCs/WSMs), Coordinating Authorising Engineers, Heads of Establishments and site/Regional Health and Safety Advisors.

**Summary:**

A ring switch when remotely called to close failed to operate. The ring switch was operated manually and failed to operate correctly – no spring pressure was felt (manual dependant operation) and the indication window was displaying both ‘off’ and ‘on’ indications.

| When it takes effect: | Immediately | When it is due to expire: | When updated or rescinded. |
Aim

1. To bring to the attention of appropriate persons the potential failure of the ring switches on Lucy Sabre VRN2a units and to instigate control measures and identify remedial works.

Introduction

2. Compliance with the contents of this Alert will enable compliance with the Health & Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and its subordinate Regulations.

3. The appropriate MOD officer shall arrange for and ensure the Maintenance Management Organisation (MMO) contractor to carry out all actions in accordance with this Alert.

4. Any work required as a result of this Safety Alert must be carried out in accordance with JSP 375 Part 2 Volume 3 – High Risk Activities on the Defence Estate.

5. On MOD Establishments occupied by United States Visiting Forces (USVF) responsibility is jointly held by USVF and DIO(USF). At base level this jointly managed organisation is to take appropriate action to implement the contents of this Alert. Where this Alert contains procedures which differ significantly from USVF practice, DIO (USF) code of practice will be issued.

Requirement

Part A.

6. The Authorised Person (Electrical) and Authorised Engineer (Electrical) are to immediately introduce the following Operational Restriction:

a. The ring switches on all Lucy Sabre VRN2a units are not to be operated live – dead operation only. (This operational restriction does not affect the live operation of the circuit breaker mechanism.)

b. The Operational Restriction is to be lifted by the Authorising Engineer (Electrical) when either:

   i. Lucy Electric (POC below) have confirm in writing, on receipt of the VRN2a unit’s serial number, it is not affected by this defect or,

   ii. Lucy Electric have undertaken the repair work and confirmed the unit can be brought back into service.

Note: Operational Restrictions are covered in JSP375 Volume 3, Chapter 2, Section 4.6.
Part B.

7. The MMO, on direction from the DIO Service Manager, should initiate the following tasks to enable the Operational Restriction to be lifted:

   a. The serial numbers of all Lucy Sabre VRN2a units are to be collected and forwarded to Lucy Electric at the contact details below. Lucy Electric will identify and confirm the VR2Na units affected by this Operational Restriction. (See para 6(b)i for VRN2a units where Lucy Electric have confirmed no further action is necessary.)

   b. Where defective VRN2a units are identified by Lucy Electric, arrangements are to be made for Lucy Electric to attend site and inspect & repair the defective units. (See para 6(b)ii for VRN2a units where Lucy have completed remedial works.)

8. Notify the DIO Service Delivery Performance Management Team, DIO SD-Perf Mgt Team (MULTIUSER) account, through their respective DIO Service Manager of the location (Establishment/Sub Station Designation) and serial number of all VRN2a units. **A nil return is required from Establishments with no installed VRN2a units.** The requested data is required by the 8th January 2016 and will be reviewed on 11th January 2016.

9. Where defective Sabre VRN2a units are identified on an Establishment, the 4Cs risk register should be suitably annotated including the introduction of the Operational Restriction.

10. The Point of Contact at Lucy Electric is:

    Emma Brennan (Energy Services Operations Manager)

    Telephone : +44 (0) 1844 267 322
    Mobile : +44 (0) 7909 533752
    Email : emma.brennan@lucyelectric.com

Part C.

11. On completion of the remedial work by Lucy Electric the MMO is to notify the DIO Service Delivery Performance Management Team, DIO SD-Perf Mgt Team (MULTIUSER) account, through their respective DIO Service Manager of the date remedial work was undertaken for a specific VRN2a unit and/or the date the operational restriction was lifted by the Authorising Engineer (Electrical).

Background

12. During fault switching a ring switch was remotely called to be closed by an actuator but failed. A manual operation was instructed but the ring switch would not close correctly – no spring pressure was felt and no normal ‘clunk’ was heard when the spring fired the switch over. The indication window was showing both ‘off’ and ‘on’ indications. Single phase volts were found further down the circuit.

13. The faulty unit was removed from service and returned to Lucy Electric for investigation. It was found that the mechanism latch was held up by leeching of fluid from the weld seam/gaps between the levers and boss: this caused the switch to become manual
dependant.

14. This is thought to be a ‘batch’ related issue and Lucy Electric are contacting affected customers directly. Lucy Electric have identified, from their records, two potentially defective Sabre VRN2A units were provided to MOD establishments and they have been contacted directly. However, the existence of other potentially defective units on MOD establishments cannot be discounted.

15. Related documents on NEDeRS are:

   b. SOP 2015/0399/00 dated 19 Oct 2015.
   d. DIN 2015/0030/00 dated 3 Nov 2015.

End.