Joint Doctrine Publication 01

UK Joint Operations Doctrine

Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
Joint Doctrine Publication 01
UK Joint Operations Doctrine

Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP 01), dated November 2014, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff.

Director Concepts and Doctrine

Conditions of release

1. This information is Crown copyright. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) exclusively owns the intellectual property rights for this publication. You are not to forward, reprint, copy, distribute, reproduce, store in a retrieval system, or transmit its information outside the MOD without VCDS’ permission.

2. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.
Authorisation

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is responsible for publishing strategic trends, joint concepts and doctrine. If you wish to quote our publications as reference material in other work, you should confirm with our editors whether the particular publication and amendment state remains authoritative. We welcome your comments on factual accuracy or amendment proposals. Please send them to:

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
Ministry of Defence Shrivenham
SWINDON,
Wiltshire,
SN6 8RF

Telephone: 01793 314216/7    Facsimile number: 01793 314232
Military network: 96161 4216/4217    Military Network: 96161 4232
E-mail: DCDC-DocEds@mod.uk

All images, or otherwise stated are: © crown copyright/MOD 2014.

Distribution

Distributing Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 is managed by the Forms and Publications Section, LCSLS Headquarters and Operations Centre, C16 Site, Ploughley Road, Arncott, Bicester, OX25 1LP. All of our other publications, including a regularly updated DCDC Publications Disk, can also be demanded from the LCSLS Operations Centre.

LCSLS Help Desk: 01869 256197
Military Network: 94240 2197

Our publications (including drafts) are available to view and download on the Defence Intranet (RLI) at: http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/Organisations/Orgs/JFC/Organisations/Orgs/DCDC

This publication is also available on the Internet at: www.gov.uk/mod/dcdc
Abstract

Purpose

1. The operational level of warfare provides the link between the strategic and tactical levels. This is the level at which Joint Force Commanders (JFC)¹ and their staff plan, conduct and sustain military operations, normally in a wider multi-agency and multinational context. Interoperability is a critical element of mission success and is enhanced by clear direction and orders, supported by doctrine.

2. Scope. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine provides:
   - an introduction to NATO operational-level doctrine; and
   - the national context to ensure its utility for a UK JFC and their staff.

3. JDP 01 will not duplicate information contained within Allied joint operational-level doctrine; instead it will reference the appropriate NATO publication. It also fills the gap in those planning and operations doctrine areas which are not fully addressed in existing NATO publications, or where we have a unique and relevant doctrinal or philosophical approach which must be retained. It will also provide the strategic context for national and coalition operations explaining:
   - how our national military instrument works alongside other levers of national power in pursuit of policy objectives;
   - our structures and processes for formulating strategy and for crisis management; and
   - any differences between UK and NATO processes.

Context

4. The high-level direction ‘to adopt NATO doctrine wherever we can and ensure compatibility wherever we cannot’ ² prompted a DCDC review of UK national and Alliance planning and operations doctrine. This review concluded that there are few fundamental differences in doctrinal approach. Therefore, UK Defence will use NATO’s operations planning and execution doctrine for both national and Alliance operations, augmenting it with national text where necessary.

¹ JFC: Throughout this publication Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example Joint Task Force (JTF), Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF), or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document. For operations in the UK, the Standing Joint Commander (SJC) is the JFC.

² Chief of Defence Staff and Permanent Under Secretary D/CDS/3/1/5 Putting NATO at the Heart of UK Defence, dated 13 July 2012.

JDP 01
Audience

5. JDP 01 is written to assist a JFC and their staff on operations and in their education and training. Tactical commanders and headquarters who seek to understand the processes they are supporting will also find it useful. It will also help other UK government departments and non-UK partners to understand our approach to operations.

Structure

6. JDP 01 is divided into three chapters.

   a. **Chapter 1 – National processes** describes our strategic structures and mechanisms for decision-making and crisis management.


   c. **Chapter 3 – Commanding the force** discusses command considerations in a range of contexts, addresses missions and identifies desirable characteristics in commanders.

Linkages

7. Above the operational level (where NATO joint doctrine is comprehensive), using the military instrument of power is addressed in the other national publications in the UK’s doctrine architecture. These are:

   - JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*;
   - JDP 02, *UK Resilience*; and
   - JDP 04, *Understanding*.

Along with JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*, these publications provide a JFC and their staff with a coherent portfolio of national doctrine, and the context for the supporting NATO and national doctrine.
8. JDP 01, *Campaigning*, and JDP 5-00, *Campaign Planning* have now been withdrawn. For operational-level doctrine and procedures for joint operations, you should refer to:

- AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*;
- AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning*; and the

We will retain JDP 3-00, *Campaign Execution* until AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* has been reviewed and its next edition published.

9. JDP 01, and the other national keystone doctrine publications, should also be read with the:

- *National Security Strategy*;
- *Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)*;
- *International Defence Engagement Strategy*;
- *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*;
- *New Operating Model: How Defence Works*;
- DCDC’s Strategic Trends Programme; and
- *Defence Joint Operating Concept*.

..............................................
“We all rely on each other. We all are integrated at the right level. We deeply admire the tribes and the backgrounds, the ethos we come from, and that can be as competitive as you need it to be, in an appropriate setting. But we are joint by definition.”

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KBE CBE ADC
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Contents

Abstract ......................................................... iv

Chapter 1 – National processes .............................. 1

Chapter 2 – Operational-level planning .................. 37

Chapter 3 – Commanding the force .................... 99
National processes

This chapter describes the UK’s strategic structures and mechanisms for Defence decision-making and adds the coalition context. It introduces planning and decision-making – the elements that contribute to operations design. It introduces Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine and AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning.

Section 1 – Defence governance ................................. 3

Section 2 – Overview of military planning and decision-making ......................................................... 12

Annex 1A – Representative Chief of Defence Staff’s Planning Directive ........................................ 23

Annex 1B – Representative Chief of Defence Staff’s Operation’s Directive ........................................ 28
War is the continuation of policy by other means.

Carl von Clausewitz

However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.

Winston Churchill
Chapter 1 – National processes

Section 1 – Defence governance

Overview

1.1. Understanding how the operational level of warfare provides the interface between the tactical and strategic levels of warfare is vital. Strategically, Defence is integral to our national security and directly supports our government’s policy objectives. The decision to commit our Armed Forces to operations rests with the Prime Minister, informed by the Cabinet and National Security Council, with advice from Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Parliament is normally consulted before military action, but such consultation may not always be possible. Decisions on Parliamentary handling will continue to be made at the discretion of the Prime Minister on a case-by-case basis. Parliamentary consultation should be factored into planning at an early stage.

1.2. Democratic control and political direction of our Armed Forces are exercised by Ministers, either individually or in committee. Desired outcomes are articulated as government policy, expressed as government intent in the form of a national strategic aim and translated into actionable objectives for across-government strategic planning. Ministers will decide on the approach for each situation, taking advice from a variety of across-government committees and the National Security Council.

1.3. As a military-strategic headquarters, the MOD’s Head Office plays an active part in supporting the National Security Council and developing the National Security Strategy and the associated Strategic Defence and Security Review outcomes. The Head Office’s role in directing operations and other military tasks is described in The New Operating Model – How Defence Works.

1 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine describes the levels of warfare.
2 The Secretary of State for Defence is a member of the Cabinet and National Security Council and chairs the Defence Council. As the government’s military adviser, CDS provides military advice to the Cabinet and National Security Council as required.
3 The Head Office does not command forces directly or involve itself in the day-to-day running of operations. However, it retains responsibility for conducting strategic-level operations with global impact (including counter proliferation, nuclear deterrence, strategic influence and strategic targeting).
4 The New Operating Model – How Defence Works, version 4.0, dated April 2014, is available through the Defence Intranet and the Internet.
National Security Council

1.4. The National Security Council is the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s national security objectives and how best to deliver them. It integrates, at the highest level, the work of the departments of state and other parts of government contributing to national security. The National Security Council meets weekly and is chaired by the Prime Minister. It brings together all senior Ministers with an interest in national security, including the Secretary of State for Defence. As the government’s principal military adviser, CDS attends as required. The National Security Council is supported by National Security Council (Officials). The latter is chaired by the National Security Adviser.

1.5. The Prime Minister and National Security Council, advised by the MOD and other government departments, set the strategic priorities for Defence and security. They also develop the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. Together these documents set the government’s national security priorities and determine how they will be delivered – including identifying the contribution the government may ask Defence to make. They also provide the strategic direction to overseas operations.

First National Security Council Meeting – the UK’s main forum for collective discussion of the government’s national security objectives
Figure 1.1 – Developing national strategy
Developing national strategy

1.6. The National Security Council determines policy and national strategic objectives through a process of political-strategic analysis. It also provides guidance for national planning. National strategic objectives are based upon the Prime Minister’s and Cabinet’s intent and draw on the framework of the National Security Strategy. National policy is then implemented through an integrated across-government strategy, coordinated through the Cabinet’s Overseas and Defence Secretariat (or another across-government body, as appropriate). Figure 1.1 shows how national strategy is developed.

1.7. Policies dictate ends. Strategy determines the ways and means of achieving the ends. Together policy and strategy describe what needs to be achieved, how, and with what. A successful national strategy sets out a path, using the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic and military, underpinned by information) to maintain political independence, achieve the long-term aims of the nation and/or protect its vital interests. Figure 1.2 shows the key questions the government answers when determining a national strategy.

Figure 1.2 – Determining a national strategy – key questions

5 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine introduces the instruments of power in Chapter 1 (diplomatic, economic, military and information) but, as a political-military alliance, NATO can only coordinate individual members’ economic and civil actions. The UK identifies diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power, all underpinned by information; these are described in more detail in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine. The Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) describes political, military, economic and civil instruments of power.
1.8. Answering these questions (which may require involving other nations’ governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations) should lead to a single, integrated whole-of-government strategy. Such an approach coordinates and synchronises the instruments of power. A lead department, acting on behalf of the government, will then:

- review, and where necessary, revise the policy outcome;
- assess progress and adjust priorities, across government, as necessary; and
- ensure the coherent and efficient use of national resources.

The current Defence Strategic Direction identifies the military tasks for Defence and directs our priorities.

1.9. Political-strategic analysis. Political-strategic analysis comprises the across-government analysis of a crisis and options for its resolution. Political-strategic analysis can be led by any nominated department. However, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), guided by routinely updated political-military estimates, usually leads on overseas policy including foreign security. Political-strategic analysis seeks to balance national priorities and resources in often complex and ambiguous circumstances. Any crisis is likely to be dynamic – and it will take time for political direction to evolve, especially where the UK intends to operate with other nations or multinational institutions (who may develop their responses at a different tempo). Consequently, a national response may take time to mature. Political-strategic analysis should provide:

- an understanding of the crisis situation;
- options open to the international community;
- options open to our government;
- how the UK may use its assets already in country or deploy additional assets; and
- any associated risks.

1.10. Contending with ambiguity. Evolving direction can significantly increase pressure in terms of compressing planning and preparation time. This demands that political and military leaders have to contend with ambiguity at the very time that...
they seek certainty and reassurance. The fact that uncertainty will be the norm is an important insight and doctrine can only mitigate its disruptive impact to a certain extent. Understanding why political decision-making and strategic direction occur as they do can go some way to helping leaders deal with uncertainty.

1.11. National decision-making timelines. Decision-making timelines may be intentionally ill-defined. Political leaders may wish to test reactions (both home and abroad) to the inference, announcement or execution of a particular action before committing to more comprehensive involvement. A decision can be made to not agree upon a definitive long-term course of action from the outset. This acknowledges the adaptive nature of crises, with intervention from any quarter inevitably altering the dynamics between actors and altering the relevance and/or viability of the objectives sought. Moreover, incremental decision-making may enable political leaders to manage risks with greater sophistication, making only those commitments that are necessary.

1.12. Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. Where a crisis affects multiple government departments, a collective response will be led by a nominated department (lead government department). Collective decision-making within central government is delivered through the Cabinet committee system; decision-making during emergencies follows the same pattern. Due to the unpredictable nature of crises, the government maintains dedicated crisis management facilities (Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms) which are only activated in the event of a major national emergency. The Prime Minister, Home Secretary or nominated senior Minister will chair key meetings involving Ministers and officials from relevant departments. Key external stakeholders may be invited to attend depending on the emergency. Meetings will cover all the strategic aspects of the response and recovery effort. Officials will identify options and provide advice to Ministers.

---

1.13. Cabinet Office decision-making. Meetings within the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms can be at a ministerial or official level and may be supported by:

- a situation cell which is responsible for ensuring that there is a single, immediate, authoritative overview of the current situation;
- communication and/or operations cells;
- an intelligence cell staffed by the intelligence agencies, Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, Defence Intelligence Staff and others as necessary;
- an impact management group or a recovery group; and
- the Joint Intelligence Committee.

The coalition context

1.14. Multinationality is likely to be an enduring theme. The UK can commit military forces on alliance or coalition operations as the framework or lead nation, or as a contributing nation. Multinational operations may be:

- under NATO;
- UN-sponsored;
- NATO-based coalitions, which may include non-NATO partners (for example Operation ALLIED FORCE, Kosovo, 1999) or Operation ELLAMY/UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Libya, 2011);
- operations involving both the UN and NATO (Bosnia, 1995);
- EU operations (Bosnia from 2004, Darfur from 2006); or
- informal coalitions, such as the cooperation in Kosovo in 1999 between NATO forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army, or in Afghanistan in 2002-03 between US forces and the Northern Alliance.

1.15. NATO’s operations doctrine. The NATO nations’ agreed framework for operations planning within, and by, the Alliance is contained in Military Committee document 133/4. The principles underpinning Alliance decision-making are addressed in NATO doctrine. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine considers the essential principles of Alliance doctrine at both the strategic and operational levels. It introduces the NATO operations planning system, the doctrine for which is covered in AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning.
National processes

AJP-01 and AJP-5, along with AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*, are ratified for UK use. AJP-5 is complemented by the Allied Command Operations *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD). This document articulates the NATO strategic and operational-level planning processes. It supports the NATO crisis management process and should be used by operations planners. This publication should complement, not substitute, this NATO higher level doctrinal and procedural guidance.

1.16. **Multinational decision-making.** Decision-making between nations involved in a multinational operation will be more complicated than in a purely national context. Consensus-building can be both complex and time-consuming. While the logic of establishing shared understanding and common goals across coalitions may be sound, the reality is complicated by political, doctrinal, interoperability and legal considerations.

1.17. **Motives.** The reasons why nations, groups and individuals choose to engage in a coalition, or to adopt a particular stance, will reflect a combination of factors. These include commitment to collective responsibility, self-interest, fear, self-preservation, shared values and beliefs, efficiency, and humanitarian concern. National troop contributions are often determined by the anticipated political benefits that such commitment brings. Those involved will have differing motivations and perceptions of the situation. These differences may cause ambiguity, mistrust and delay.
1.18. **Unity of purpose.** When we intend to act with other nations the outcome sought should be agreed between nations (accepting the time and complexity involved and (potentially) the reduced clarity of the outcome). At the very least, national perspectives should be harmonised to unify individual national efforts. While negotiation and consensus-building may need to precede agreement, some form of broadly-agreed desired outcome remains an essential start point for further planning. Formal direction must follow, delivered through national chains of command. In the interim, military preparations and some nations’ preliminary operations may already have started. Outside a formal alliance, achieving unity of command on a multinational operation may be politically challenging, but should be the goal. Where unity of command is unachievable, a multinational operation should strive for harmonisation of effort.14

1.19. **Benefits and challenges.** In multinational operations, nations have to balance the collective objectives of the alliance or coalition with their own respective national goals. The commitment by multiple nations to contribute military forces to accomplish agreed goals brings three advantages:15

- increased political strength and enhanced legitimacy across the international community;
- shared risk and cost; and
- increased military capability and effectiveness – perhaps the most difficult to exploit to full advantage due to interoperability challenges.

\[\text{In multinational operations, nations have to balance the collective objectives of the alliance or coalition with their own respective national goals.}\]
Section 2 – Overview of military planning and decision-making

Responsibilities

1.20. The Secretary of State for Defence. The Secretary of State for Defence heads the MOD and is responsible for all defence matters as well as providing strategic direction, endorsing resource allocation and setting the constraints on the use of force. Force levels and rules of engagement are subject to policy decisions that will be made by Ministers, taking into account legal advice. CDS, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and the Permanent Under Secretary are responsible for providing advice to Ministers to inform these decisions. These decisions are recorded in a CDS Planning Directive.  

1.21. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) coordinates input from the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Head Office, Joint Forces Command, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Director Special Forces and the single-Service commands. The DCMO is the focus for providing Defence advice within the government’s overall management and resolution of crises. It provides the conduit for all briefings to Ministers and directs and monitors deployed commands. This is shown in Figure 1.3 (over).

1.22. Chief of the Defence Staff. Following the Secretary of State for Defence’s direction, CDS (as the military strategic commander) is responsible for the planning, direction and conduct of all military operations. CDS, advised by the VCDS (their deputy for operational matters) and the single-Service Chiefs, is responsible for formulating the military strategy and making sure it is coherent with government policy. Through a CDS Operation’s Directive, CDS:

- appoints the operational commander;
- provides strategic direction;
- identifies the military conditions for success;
- designates the theatre and joint operations area;
- specifies forces levels and resources;
- promulgates the constraints on the use of force; and
- sets the strategic defence intelligence requirements.

1.23. The single-Service chiefs. Both individually, and through the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the single-Service Chiefs provide advice to the CDS on how to conduct operations. The single-Service Chiefs provide advice to the CDS on how to conduct operations.

16  See Annex 1A
17  See Annex 1B
current and future operations. In particular, they advise on how their Service could be employed to best effect.

1.24. **Head Office.** This Office supports CDS and the Chiefs of Staff Committee in:

- developing policy-informed military advice for Ministers on current and potential military operations;
- directing the military chain of command;
- ensuring the conduct of the operation reflects the Secretary of State’s direction; and
- ensuring the conduct of the operation is consistent with wider government policy.
National processes

The Head Office focuses on the strategic level. It defines the ways in which military force will help achieve our government’s ends (its current and future security objectives) and determines the military means required to deliver them.

Strategy

1.25. Strategic outcome. The term strategic outcome describes our aim and strategic objectives for a particular crisis. How we articulate it will vary depending on:

- the nature of the crisis;
- the nature of the intended response (with varying degrees of emphasis on the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power); and
- the extent of collaboration envisaged with other nations, multinational institutions and international organisations.

A strategic outcome evolves over time, its definition and detail increasing as a crisis unfolds. Assumptions are inevitable and military commanders must ensure that assumptions are revalidated and military activity adjusted as required. Assumptions:

- play an important part in strategic planning;
- inform initial planning and how the commander envisages change;

18 Strategic objectives are reliant upon the contributions made by each of the national instruments of power. In describing strategic outcomes, military-strategic objectives are accompanied by diplomatic and economic objectives.
• ensure that long-term contingency planning is not delayed while waiting for definitive planning guidance; and
• must be recorded for future reference when validating planning.

1.26. **Political-military estimate.** The MOD helps inform national strategy by conducting a political-military estimate. The political-military estimate is seldom neatly-bounded from the outset. Rather, the political-military estimate develops over time with the across-government political strategic analysis and the continuing national and international political dialogue. Although it is MOD-led, key representation from the Cabinet Office and other government departments contribute to the process. The political-military estimate considers potential crisis areas around the world and assesses political implications against military feasibility and sustainability. It makes a vital contribution to:

- political-strategic analysis;
- developing national strategy; and
- any decision to initiate a CDS Planning Directive (as shown in Figure 1.1).

1.27. **Military strategy.** Military strategy is a subset of Defence strategy. It directs the use of the military instrument where it has been identified by the Government as part of a UK response to a specific challenge. Military strategy is a strategic headquarters function, owned by CDS and led on his behalf by Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations). Specifically, the aim of military strategy is to ensure coherent and effective strategic planning when using our Armed Forces. Military strategy is inherently joint. It also sits above single-Service interests, tying together military capabilities to deliver an effect that meets the short-term requirement, but is firmly rooted in a clear understanding of the long-term policy ends. Military strategy has a role to play in developing policy through delivering military advice including, ultimately, the advice delivered by CDS to the Prime Minister. It should respond to the requirements asked of it by politicians and policy-makers, but should also offer up options in support of the Government’s ambitions. Importantly, military strategy must, at all times, be rooted in Defence strategy and policy. Operational policy staffs are embedded within the military strategy function to ensure that planning and operational delivery take place within the boundaries defined by policy.

19 Prioritised by the Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement (STRIDE). Along with the Defence Engagement Board, STRIDE is the senior-level governance structure for defence engagement to ensure it delivers against policy goals and is coherent with other Strategic Defence and Security Review implementations strategies.

20 NATO defines military strategy as: that component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations. AAP-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*
1.28. **National strategic aim.** Figure 1.4 (page 18) shows how the instruments of power combine towards the national strategic aim. The UK’s strategic aim is the Government’s declared purpose in a particular situation. It is normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. The UK’s strategic aim may be articulated by Ministers, determined from UK foreign policy statements and official records, or through discussions between politicians and officials. Achieving the national strategic aim requires across-government and multiple agency contributions. The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose and strategic narrative for military and non-military leaders and organisations. The ability to influence participants involved in a crisis, rather than simply to intervene or act in a given situation, is critical to achieving the national strategic aim. For this reason, a national information strategy will normally be formulated by the across-government Information Strategy Group. The national information strategy articulates policy, desired outcomes and the strategic narrative to which all government departments must work. It includes the themes and messages to be communicated and the specific actions to be conducted. In multinational operations, the national information strategy must be nested within that of the Alliance or coalition.

1.29. **National strategic objectives.** A national strategic objective is a goal to be achieved through one or more instruments of national power to meet the national strategic aim. It may be explicit, or deduced from government policy, strategic direction or the decisions of the National Security Council. Strategic objectives are likely to require significant coordination across inter-governmental, international and departmental boundaries, even if allocated to a particular department to lead. In practice, formulating strategic objectives by consensus may be challenging. The process should be coordinated centrally, for example, through the Cabinet or National Security Council. Figure 1.4 also shows the diplomatic and economic contributions alongside the military contribution. Of note, the NATO definition of objective is ‘a clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation’. UK commanders and planners in NATO operations must appreciate the distinction between our national and NATO’s use of the term.

.................................
21 For example: minutes of Cabinet, National Security Council, Cabinet sub-committees and engagements with multinational partners.
22 Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/12, *Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution* describes narratives as compelling story lines which explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn.
23 National information strategy is the coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences to support policy objectives. *(JDP 3-45.1, Media Operations).*
24 Strategic narrative is described as communication that portrays a story designed to resonate in the mind of the audience that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan. *(JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution).*
25 See COPD page 1-15 which identifies how a NATO contribution of political and military effect is nested within a broader spectrum of international activity.
26 Op.cit., AAP-06; objective: a clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary’s force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander’s plan and towards which the operation is directed.
1.30. **Military contribution to the national strategic aim and national strategic objectives.** The military strategic end-state is the extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim and objectives. The military contribution must align with the diplomatic and economic contributions towards the same national strategic aim.

1.31. **Military strategic objectives.** The extent of the military contribution to the national strategic aim should be expressed in terms of military strategic objectives. Military strategic objectives may be discrete, support, or be supported by, other departments or agencies. Military strategic objectives both define and limit the military commitment. They are developed from one or more military response options. Once all objectives are achieved, this indicates the conclusion of the military effort (noting that others may remain involved long after security has been re-established). The military commitment may also be redefined to meet revised aims. Within the resources and constraints assigned to him, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for achieving these military strategic objectives. JFCs attain their military strategic objectives through one or more operations, each with specified operations objectives.

1.32. **Turning military strategic objectives into an operations plan.** The aim of all crisis management activity is to reach a desired outcome. However, direct correlation between objectives being achieved and a desired outcome being reached (favourable conditions ‘having been’ created) should not be taken as given when planning. This is because:

- crises are complex and that makes them inherently unpredictable;
- the effects, or conditions cannot always be created as desired and, even if created as intended, may not always generate the desired outcome and may create others;
- the desired outcome may be reached without the identified objectives being achieved;
- while the foreseen consequences of activities, whether desirable or not, can be planned for (and associated risks duly managed) the unforeseen consequences cannot;
- crises are not amenable to precise management or control;
- conditions exist, or not, as a result of a myriad of factors and influences; and
- while commanders may be expected to achieve realistic objectives, they cannot necessarily create specific conditions on the ground.

---

27 See AJP-5 and COPD for further detail.
28 JFC: Throughout this publication Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example Joint Task Force (JTF), Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF) or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document.
Figure 1.4 – Instruments of power combine towards national strategic aim

Legend
- Achieved through military/joint force activity alone
- Achieved through civil-military cooperation
The national strategic aim is the government’s declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. In a NATO context this would be coincident with, or contribute to, the NATO desired end-state.¹ (End-state: the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.) (AAP-06)

The desired outcome is a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively.

The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose for strategic- and operational-level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations.

A national strategic objective is a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power to meet the national strategic aim. In a NATO context these would be coincident with, or contribute to, NATO strategic objectives.

Military strategy is that component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations. (AAP-06).

The military strategic end-state is the extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim, expressed as a series of military strategic objectives.

Military strategic objectives are goals to be achieved by the military to meet the national strategic aim (and are the responsibility of the military-strategic commander (CDS)). NATO uses the same term; the NATO military strategic objectives are derived from the strategic objectives and ‘owned’ by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

An objective is a clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary’s force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander’s plan and towards which the operation is directed (AAP-06).


¹ See AJP-01 and AJP-5.
1.33. **Operations objectives.** The relationship between military strategic objectives and contributory operations objectives is important. Operations objectives relate to a single theatre of operations and are ‘owned’ by the respective JFC. While JFCs may achieve their assigned objectives, other contributions may be required to achieve the desired outcome. These include strategic-level contributions made by forces retained under the command of the military strategic commander. On a larger scale, achieving military strategic objectives may require a number of JFCs, in different theatres, to complete their respective operations objectives. Multinational operations add a further level of complexity to the process of developing operations objectives. This complexity can be mitigated by trusted partnerships founded on common doctrine, training and experience.

1.34. **Military strategic direction.** Operations design at the operational level is initiated by a CDS’ planning directive, which is issued to the Joint Commander (normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)). Once the Prime Minister decides to commit military resources, CDS’ Operations Directive provides authority to conduct operations. Annexes 1A and 1B are illustrative examples of CDS’ Planning and Operation’s Directives – they are for guidance only and can be modified as described. Small deployments or tasks should not require every aspect of the directives to be completed; operational staff work must always be concise.

1.35. **Strategic communication.** Strategic communication is defined as: advancing national interests by using all Defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people. It is primarily a philosophy, partly a capability and partly a process. Philosophy is the key element since it underpins aligning words, images and actions to realise influence. The CDS’ Planning and Operations Directives will articulate the desired information effect to the JFC, who will deliver the operational-level military contribution as part of the wider across-government strategic communication for an operation. This should be articulated through a strategic narrative or, where extra focus is required, a MOD departmental narrative from which JFCs will derive their key themes and messages. Themes provide an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad communication, while messages comprise narrowly focused communication directed at a specific target audience. In this way JFCs ensure that strategic communication can be supported by the deeds of the joint task force.

29 DCMO Standing Operating Procedures detail the process.
30 Op. Cit., JDN 1/12. This is a distillation of the National Security Council draft definition of ‘the systematic and coordinated use of all means of communication to deliver UK national security objectives by influencing the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, groups and states’.
31 Information effect is defined in JDN 1/12 as: the resultant attitudes and behaviours of audiences produced by words, images and actions.
The decision to commit the Armed Forces to operations rests with the Prime Minister, informed by the Cabinet and National Security Council, with advice from Secretary of State for Defence and CDS.

The National Security Council integrates, at the highest level, the work of the departments of state and other parts of government contributing to national security.

The Prime Minister and National Security Council, advised by the MOD and other government departments, set the strategic priorities for Defence and security.

Strategy determines the ways and means of achieving the ends.

Political-strategic analysis seeks to balance national priorities and resources in often complex and ambiguous circumstances.

Collective decision-making within central government is delivered through the Cabinet committee system.

The UK can commit military forces on alliance or coalition operations as the framework or lead nation, or as a contributing nation. The reality is complicated by political, doctrinal, interoperability and legal considerations.

Motives why nations, groups or individuals become part of a coalition include commitment to collective responsibility, self-interest, fear, self-preservation, shared values and beliefs, efficiency, and humanitarian concern.

Secretary of State for Defence provides strategic direction, endorses resource allocation and sets the constraints on the use of force.

The Head Office defines the ways in which military force will help achieve our government’s ends and determines the military means to deliver them.

The MOD helps inform national strategy by conducting a political-military estimate.

The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose and strategic narrative for military and non-military leaders and organisations.

A JFC is responsible for achieving military strategic objectives through one or more operations.

On a larger scale, achieving military strategic objectives may require a number of JFCs, in different theatres, to achieve their respective operation’s objectives.
The Annex forms an illustrative example of the content of a CDS planning directive. It does not constitute a template which is controlled by MOD staff. This example is for guidance only. You can make, where appropriate, changes. You do not need to keep to paragraph numbers – for example there may be one or more paragraphs per heading. It is, however, essential to keep the order of the paragraph headings so that an auditable and recognisable logic chain is kept. Where headings are inappropriate or not needed, this should be stated.

Notes:

National processes
Annex 1A – Representative Chief of Defence Staff’s Planning Directive

The Annex forms an illustrative example of the content of a CDS planning directive. It does not constitute a template which is controlled by MOD staff.

Issued by: Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Chiefs of Staff (COS)
Issued to: MOD Directorates
           Single-Service Chiefs
           Joint Forces Command
           Permanent Joint Headquarters UK (PJHQ UK)
           Director Special Forces (DSF)
Copy to: Other government departments (OGDs) as required

Directive to be completed through parallel staffing chain to 3 star level.

For directives, this is normally through CJO and DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops) chains-of-command. The process culminates when DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 forwards the directive to Secretariat Chief of Staff for approval. Until the draft leaves DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 – or equivalent – the document is being drafted for the appropriate 3* approval. On leaving the 3* office, the directive is ‘confirmed ready in all respects for signature by CDS.

This example is for guidance only. You can make, where appropriate, changes. You do not need to keep to paragraph numbers – for example there may be one or more paragraphs per heading. It is, however, essential to keep the order of the paragraph headings so that an auditable and recognisable logic chain is kept. Where headings are inappropriate or not needed, this should be stated.
National processes

CDS’ Planning Directive Op [****]

Preface

1. Review. [Who will review the directive (usually Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)) and when eg 6/12/18 months hence].

2. Scope. [Indicates the bounds of the directive and whether it supersedes a previous version].

Situation

3. [Brief description of the nature of the problem, the current political/military situation and what has been/is being done to address it. This may be broken down into background and current situation, if required].

Appointment

4. [If determined at this time] CDS has confirmed the appointment of [****] [Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) or 4* as appropriate] as Joint Commander (Jt Comd) [or designate] for this operation [potential operation].

Theatre of operations

5. [If determined at this time] Defined as the land, sea and air space of .... [A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Task Force Commander (termed the joint operations area (JOA), within which they conduct operations].

Direction

6. National strategic aim.32 ['the Government’s declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome’. The desired outcome is ‘a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence’. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose for strategic and operational level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations].

32 This may be referred to as Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG’s) strategic aim.
7. **National strategic objective.** ['a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim’. Note the difference between a desired outcome being reached and objectives being achieved; there can be no assumption of necessary causality. Not the effects, nor conditions, nor the outcome ultimately sought, can necessarily be created as desired – although the achievement of specific objectives can contribute].

8. **Military strategic end-state.** ['the successful completion of the military contribution to the desired outcome, reached when all the allocated military strategic objectives have been achieved’].

9. **Military strategic objectives.** ['goals to be achieved by the military instrument of power in order to contribute to the achievement of the national strategic aim’. Their successful completion indicates the achievement of the military strategic end-state].

10. **Strategic narrative.** ['the compelling storylines designed to resonate in the mind of its audiences that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan’].

11. **Information effect.** ['the resultant attitude and behaviour of audiences produced by the combination of words, images and deeds’].

12. **CDS’ Intent.** [A succinct articulation of CDS’ military strategic intent, including the strategic effects military forces are to realise, or contribute to, in collaboration with other government departments under an integrated approach].

Planning

13. You are to work with MOD Staff [Military Strategic Planning (MSP) Staff or the Strategic Planning Group (SPG)] to prepare a military strategic estimate for...

14. In consultation with MOD HQ, Joint Forces Command and the single-Services, you are to recommend:

   - What, if any, immediately available forces should be directed to move to the likely area of operations [operational command (OPCOM) arrangements of these forces to be considered prior to the issue of the CDS operations directive].

33 Command states are detailed in AJP-3 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* (available on the Defence Intranet).

JDP 01
National processes

- The appropriate level of Joint Force Commander (JFC).\(^{34}\)
- The size and shape of the joint force.

15. You are to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) to [region/country] in order to [purpose of the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team – see Chapter 3].

16. Assumptions. [The strategic assumptions on which military planning is to take place].

17. Constraints, restraints, limitations and freedoms. [To include legal, political, diplomatic, cultural, military (if known)].

18. Further instructions to follow.

Execution

19. In your capacity as Jt Comd you are to....

20. Coordinating instructions. [This paragraph may be issued separately if required]. To include:

- legal.
- political/rules of engagement.
- intelligence.
- targeting.
- information strategy. [Issued here or separately by the Information Strategy Group. This should include media policy as appropriate].
- force protection.

Resources

21. Task organisation. [If known at this stage].

22. Impact on current commitments and future availability of forces. [This section records the MOD headquarters decision on the regeneration of capacity and adjustments in readiness to meet future contingencies].

\(^{34}\) JFC: Throughout this publication Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example Joint Task Force (JTF), Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF) or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document.
Logistics

23. **Statement of logistic capability.** [To state any sustainment and training requirements, and provide indication of the availability of critical assets (if known)].

Command and signal

24. **Command.** The Jt Comd is to exercise command from Permanent Joint Headquarters [or other designated headquarters].

25. **Codeword.** The codeword for this operation is [****]. This codeword is OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE; however, its meaning is SECRET.

26. **Signals.** All message traffic on Op [****] is to bear the SIC [XXX], in addition to subject SICs.

Reporting

27. An executive summary of the military strategic estimate and proposed strategic options is to be submitted by [****].

DTG Z

Chief of the Defence Staff
[Original signed]
Authenticated
DOps
Annex 1B – Representative Chief of Defence Staff’s Operation’s Directive

The Annex forms an illustrative example of the content of a CDS operation’s directive. It does not constitute a template which is controlled by MOD staff.

This document is the property of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government and is not to be reproduced without the permission of the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

CDS No/Year

The CDS operation’s directive number is obtained from the CDS-Desk Clk1 (Ext 87690)

Copy No…..of……Copies

The final document for CDS signature should be in Arial – Font 12. The use of acronyms should be minimised to ensure clarity.

Formats and font size for signals should be as required by the signal software.

Experience has shown that, when drafting an operations directive, it is often better to draft as per the rules and conventions of Defence writing and then convert to signal format.

Ministry of Defence

Chiefs of Staff Committee

CDS operation’s directive [Cat 1, 2 or 3] [to] for [subject]

Operation [****]

[A very short abstract paragraph outlining the scope of the operations directive to be drafted by the author. This is used by the registry for filing purposes].
The Annex forms an illustrative example of the content of a CDS operation’s directive. It does not constitute a template which is controlled by MOD staff.

Signature Block
COSSEC – ASec(Cts)
for SECCOS
MOD HQ, Floor 5, Zone F
82019MB
DII: COSSEC ASEC (CTS)

Ministry of Defence
WHITEHALL
SW1A 2HB
Date: DD/MMM/YY
CDS No/Yr

Operation’s directive to be completed through parallel staffing chain to 3* level

For operations directives this is normally through CJO and DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops) chains of Command. The process culminates when DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 forwards the directive to SECCOS for approval. Until the draft leaves DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 – or equivalent – the document is being drafted for the appropriate 3 Star’s approval. On leaving the 3 Star’s office, the directive is ‘confirmed ready in all respects for signature by CDS’.

This example is for guidance only. Deviations, where appropriate, are permitted. It is not necessary to keep to paragraph numbers – for example there may be one or more paragraphs per heading. It is, however, essential to maintain the order of the paragraph headings so that an auditable and recognisable logic chain is maintained. Where headings are inappropriate or not needed, this should be stated.

To generate tempo for an immediate response to short notice crises, it may be recommended to CDS, through DOps, that a number of paragraphs or annexes are deferred until a later date. This will be initiated by a strategic planning group team leader in consultation with the joint commander.
CDS’ Operation’s Directive [Cat 1,2 or 3] [to] for [subject]

Operation [****]

References:

A. [Only include References referred to within main body]

General

1. Review and responsibility. This operations directive supersedes [previous directive] and gives my direction to you, [the Joint Commander (Jt Comd)/as required], for planning the UK’s future military commitment [to / in …]. This operations directive will be reviewed by [author] no later than [date].35

2. Appointment. [Nomination of Jt Comd and broad illustration of responsibilities. Example: You are appointed Jt Comd for Op [****] and you are to exercise operational command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned to the operation from Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Northwood. Within your area of responsibility (AOR), you are responsible to me for the conduct of operations of all assigned UK naval, land, and air forces, including their intelligence, logistics, communications, administrative, and medical support].

3. Direction. I shall provide strategic direction for operations through Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)) [or alternative commander].

4. Task organisation. UK forces assigned to this operation are detailed at Annex xx. Any recommendations for proposed change should be made to MOD where appropriate.

Military options. [A brief description of…]

5. Consultation and management of expectation. [A brief description of…]

Current situation

[A brief description of nature of the problem and what has been/is currently being done in mitigation. This section is often broken into political and operational]

35 The review date will be retained against the directive for monitoring purposes by COSSEC/CDS Registry, but it is the responsibility of the author to review the document and to propose any changes/updates required. The author may also propose the directive to be cancelled.
paragraphs but could be broken down into sub-headings of background and current situation, if required.

6. Political.

7. Military.

8. Humanitarian.

HMG’s strategic aim

9. [National intent and position as articulated by Cabinet Office in consultation with other government departments (OGDs)].

HMG’S objectives

10. HMG’s objectives are as follows:

a. Political objectives.

b. Military strategic objectives. [Derived from national strategic objectives, these objectives define criteria for success – their successful achievement indicates the military strategic end-state].

c. Information effect. [Derived from the strategic narrative, this defines the resultant attitude and behaviour of audiences produced by the combination of words, images and deeds].

CDS intent

11. My intent is to [This is the part in which CDS will state his intent, therefore it must accurately reflect what the military is expected to have to achieve.

It should be succinct, clear and offer subordinates an understanding of their role to enable them to achieve his intent.

It must reflect military-strategic level intent avoiding, where possible, operational and tactical level direction, be in effects based language and incorporate the integrated approach if required.
With directives dealing with major campaigns there may be benefit in articulating intent through a CDS’ military strategy paragraph, which should include intent, approach and main effort.

Execution

12. [This specifies the detailed effects to be achieved by the Jt Comd and subordinate commands as appropriate. The Strategic Planning Directive and summary of options from the military strategic estimate will form the basis for this paragraph and should reflect the mission statement and tasks generated by the Jt Comd].
   
   a. Main effort.
   
   b. Specified tasks.

Constraints and/or assumptions

13. The following are additional constraints:
   
   a. Joint area of operations.
   
   b. International and domestic law.

[as required] – could include: UN instructions or protocols, detention, other operations, political

Coordinating instructions

14. The following instructions apply:
   
   
   b. Intelligence and security.
   
   c. Key themes and messages.
   
   d. Training.
   
   e. Force protection (FP).
   
   f. UK Special Forces (SF).
Service and administrative support

15. [Detail should be kept to a minimum and if necessary reflected in the appropriate Annex]. Headings might include:
   a. logistic planning – logistic governance – sustainability.
   b. movement.
   c. medical.
   d. financial accounting and host nation support.
   e. welfare and personnel.
   f. managing casualties.
   g. repatriating the dead.
   h. welfare and personnel.

Command and signal

16. The following arrangements will apply: [Layout below is illustrative and could be used for a multinational operation]
   a. Relationships.
      (1) National.
      • Strategic.
      • Operational.
      (2) NATO/EU/UN.
   b. Command and control.\(^{36}\)
      (1) National command. All UK forces remain under national command.

\(^{36}\) Command states are detailed in AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (available on the Defence Intranet).
National processes

(2) **Full command.** Single-Service Commanders retain full command of all forces assigned. Director Special Forces (DSF) retains full command of all assigned SF.

(3) **Operational command.** You are to exercise OPCOM of UK assigned naval, land and air forces.

(4) **Operational control.** You may delegate operational control (OPCON) of UK assigned forces in theatre to the Joint Force Commander (JFC),\(^{37}\) once his HQ is established. OPCON of submarines will remain with CTF311. OPCON of SF forces will remain with DSF unless D Ops directs otherwise.

(5) **National Contingent Commander.** Usually embedded within a joint task force headquarters when the UK is a contributing nation to a multinational force. The relationship and division of responsibility between the National Contingent Commander and the Permanent Joint Headquarters must be made explicit.

c. **Signals.** All message traffic on OP XX is to bear the SIC XXX/XXX in addition to subject SICs.

d. **Information management/information exploitation plan.** DII(HO) is the MODUK Information System (IS) of choice for the transfer, publishing and filing of strategic information up to UK SECRET. Documents will be published by the Current Commitments Team (CCT), Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) or PJHQ on the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) website under OP XX using the team site hosted on DII.

e. **Communications security (COMSEC)/computer security (COMPUSEC).**

**Reporting**

18. **[Reflect strategic and military strategic battle rhythm requirements: example – until further notice; you are to keep MODUK HQ informed by Daily Brief at 0600z.]**

\(^{37}\) **JFC:** Throughout this publication Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example Joint Task Force (JTF), Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF) or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document.
Codeword


Day/Month/Year  Chief of the Defence Staff

CDS No/Yr

Annexes:

[The full list of possible Annexes is in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), Annex C. Requirement to be determined by the author.]

Chapter 2 addresses developing strategic direction as well as planning and managing the military contribution to multinational, multi-agency and national operations.

Section 1 – Operations design ........................................... 39
Section 2 – Multinational crisis management ................. 43
Section 3 – Multi-agency crisis management ............... 46
Section 4 – UK Defence’s approach ......................... 51
Section 5 – Operations led by the EU, US and UN ........ 61
Annex 2A – Planning with other government departments ........................................... 67
Annex 2B – Crisis management groups ...................... 75
Annex 2C – Planning at the strategic and operational level ........................................... 80
Appendix 2C1 – Planning processes ......................... 84
Annex 2D – Representative Joint Commander’s Mission Directive ........................................... 87
Annex 2E – European Union military planning ........ 93
In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but **planning is indispensable.**

Dwight D Eisenhower

The commander must **decide how** he will fight the battle **before it begins.** He must then decide who he will use the **military effort** at his disposal to **force the battle to swing** the way he wishes it to go; he must make the enemy dance **to his tune** from the beginning and not vice versa.

Viscount Montgomery
Chapter 2 – Operational-level planning

Section 1 – Operations design

2.1. The operational level is: the level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. The scale and level of command at the operational level is not pre-defined but should assume a size and shape that meets the demands of the operation. Depending on the operation type and scale, the operational level could be at component command. The operational level is therefore best defined by function. The operational level provides the link and gearing between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions will lead to achieving the desired end-state. Activities must be linked by the operational level to the aims of the overall strategy, but the strategy should also be linked through the operational level to what is tactically realistic; this is operations design.

2.2. The main activities within operations design are analysis and planning. Analysis is continuous. Operations planning is initiated if a major contingency is anticipated, or a change to an existing plan is required.

2.3. Analysis. Before embarking on an operational-level planning process, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a thorough and up-to-date understanding of the strategic context. The process of analysis, underpinned by intelligence, informs the JFC who then applies their reasoning and judgment to develop and execute military operations. Understanding is crucial; it provides insight and foresight on what can, and cannot, be influenced, and where the boundaries lie.

39 Modified AAP-6 definition taken from Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine.
41 JFC – throughout this publication, Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example, Joint Task Force (JTF)/Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF)/Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document.
42 See JDP 04, Understanding.
Operational-level planning

2.4. **Planning.** Planning must answer three questions:

- what are the features of the current (crisis) situation;
- what should the (more favourable) situation look like at the end; and
- how should the situation change or be changed?

Planning addresses how to attain specified objectives designed to contribute to close the gap between the current situation and the desired outcome. Achieving the end-state is not a discrete activity, but rather it is nested within a broader framework.

a. Military actions (to realise specific effects and subsequently attain objectives) are frequently inter-woven with the actions, intended effects, and associated objectives of other non-military actors. Whether or not such inter-dependencies are reflected in formal supporting and supported relationships, participants are unlikely to be entirely effective without coordination and cooperation.

b. Operations planning links strategic ends with tactical action. Ends and action are dynamic and subject to:

- the constraints and urgencies of time;
- changes in political intent and strategic priorities (potentially spanning a number of concurrent operations) which influence an operation from above; and
- changes in the tactical situation (including correlating forces) which influence an operation from below.

2.5. **Collaborative planning.** JFCs will have to synchronise their work with that of other nations, commanders, headquarters, departments and agencies. JFCs should consult to get their views and conduct initial planning early to inform subsequent discussions. Collaborative planning is more effective when a commander and all planning contributors are physically collocated. This encourages full participation, detailed negotiation, and the timely and equitable consideration of all points of view. The understanding stage must involve the commander. Thereafter, where commanders themselves cannot participate personally, then trusted and empowered representatives should act on their behalf to maintain momentum.

2.6. **Planning doctrine and processes.** Operations design is outlined in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*. The doctrine for operational-level planning is addressed in AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning* (with national
green text) and the necessary processes in the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD). AJP-5 contains:

- an overview of NATO planning;
- doctrine on operational art and design within operational-level planning; and
- detail on conducting the operational-level planning process including the operational-level estimate.

The COPD provides:

- an overview of NATO crisis management and planning;
- procedures on developing situational awareness;
- the planning process at the NATO strategic level;
- the planning process at the operational level;
- operations assessment; and
- all relevant formats.

2.7. AJP-5’s operational-level planning process nests within the NATO crisis management process described in the COPD. Figure 2.1 (on the next page) shows these linkages.

"Understanding is crucial; it provides insight and foresight."
Figure 2.1 – Linkages between strategic and operational-level planning

**SHAPE strategic operations planning**

- Phase 1: Indicators and warnings of potential crisis
- Phase 2: Assessment of the crisis
- Phase 3: Military response options development
- Phase 4a: Strategic CONOPS development
- Phase 4b: Strategic OPLAN development, force generation
- Phase 5: Execution assessment and OPLAN review
- Phase 6: Transition

**Operational-level planning**

- Step 1: Initiation of the OLPP
- Step 2: Problem and mission analysis
- Step 3: COA development
- Step 4: COA analysis
- Step 5: COA validation and comparison
- Step 6: Commander’s COA decision
- Step 7: CONOPS and OPLAN development
- Step 8: Campaign, assessment, plan review and revision

**Legend**

- COA: Course of action
- OPLAN: Operational plan
- MRO: Military response option
- JFC: Joint Force Commander
- SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe
- SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
- OLPP: Operational-level planning process

**Section 2 – Multinational crisis management**
Section 2 – Multinational crisis management

2.8. **UK commitment to multinational operations.** Multinational operations are normally facilitated by selecting a lead or framework nation, in many cases under the mandate of the UN or other recognised international organisation.\(^{43}\) However, multilateral planning may have no specified lead nation, particularly when nations’ levels of commitment have yet to be determined. When the UK is considering whether to contribute to a multinational operation, the MOD provides advice on the level of any UK military commitment, and the associated military strategic objectives.

2.9. **Permanent Joint Headquarters in multinational operations.** Chief of Defence (CDS) delegates operational command (OPCOM) of UK forces to a nominated UK Joint Commander (normally Commander Joint Operations (CJO)). CJO may further delegate operational control (OPCON), tactical command (TACOM) or tactical control (TACON) to a subordinate UK or multinational commander.\(^{44}\)

a. **UK-led operations.** When the UK is the lead/framework nation, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) forms the nucleus of the multinational headquarters, augmented as necessary by staff from other participating nations. The UK also provides staff to form the nucleus of a deployed multinational Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).

b. **Non UK-led operations.** When the UK is not the lead or framework nation, CJO acts as UK coordinator of supporting command functions and coordinates the activities of the single-Services and the Joint Forces Command in deploying, sustaining and recovering UK forces assigned to the operation. CJO may also provide staff from PJHQ to a multinational headquarters and will specify national caveats.

2.10. **The Joint Force Commander in multinational operations.** To understand the effect JFC’s actions may have on coalition cohesion, they must know the terms and conditions under which other nations contingents have been provided. CJO, acting as the coordinator of supporting command functions, should ensure that multinational objectives complement those of the UK and that the proposed UK contribution is feasible within available capabilities. Other nations’ liaison officers based at PJHQ, and reciprocal UK liaison officers based abroad, provide valuable links with other nations’ military planning headquarters.

\(^{43}\) Forces generated under a ‘framework nation’ are commanded by an officer from that nation, which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the headquarters. (JDP 3-00, Campaign Execution, 3rd Edition). Note: the framework nation is likely to tell the language and procedures adopted.

\(^{44}\) These command states are defined in AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations..
Operational-level planning

NATO operations

2.11. When the UK contributes to NATO crisis response, the process described in Section 4 (crisis response planning) is applied. This ensures that the UK’s participation accords with the government’s intent and timely contributions are made to NATO planning.45

2.12. The MOD is responsible for liaising on strategic issues, both with NATO Headquarters (through the UK Military Representative and with Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE also functions as Allied Command Operations (ACO).

2.13. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) will respond to, and proactively support, the NATO planning process. DCMO will support the North Atlantic Council (NAC)46 early in its considerations, prior to issuing the activation warning and in such a way that the UK’s intended participation is made clear before NATO confirms its force generation plans. A strategic planning group/current commitments team is likely to be the principal vehicle through which the UK contributes to NATO planning and responds to force preparation, transfer of authority and activation order instructions. PJHQ is responsible for coordinating operational matters with SHAPE, the Allied Joint Force Commands47 and with deployed UK forces.

---

45 See AJP-5 and the COPD.
46 The North Atlantic Council is the highest level of NATO decision-making.
47 NATO has two headquarters at the operational-level of command – Joint Force Command Brunssum (The Netherlands) and Joint Force Command Naples (Italy).
2.14. Command and control arrangements are specified in the concept of operations which will detail the conditions for transfer of authority from national to NATO command. SACEUR will normally delegate OPCON to an appointed JFC once the force is constituted. In turn, SACEUR, may sub-delegate OPCON based on operational requirements.

Multinational planning considerations

2.15. Doctrine. Doctrine varies between nations, although the UK intent is to work within a recognised multinational planning framework wherever possible (the COPD) and employ NATO doctrine. Even when common doctrine is used, there will be differences in interpretation and application. Commanders and planning staff must ensure these differences are identified and addressed.

2.16. Influencing, and being influenced by, allies. Staffs acting in multinational roles can be expected to represent their nations’ interests.

a. National interest. UK commanders and staff should represent and promote the national interest, either as an explicit planning priority or objective or, more generally in shaping multinational intent. They should expect other nations’ representatives to do the same.

b. Unique capabilities. The UK may be asked to contribute unique capabilities or particular staff skills, which should be exploited fully. Other nations will also possess capabilities that the UK may desire.

c. National caveats. UK JFCs and staff should seek to develop trust and close working relationships with other national representatives. While there is a tendency to adopt the norms and standards of a surrounding culture, they should always act within UK national guidelines. It is preferable to be frank about national caveats or other reservations and to seek out areas where the UK’s positive contribution could benefit the multinational force. If in doubt, UK JFCs and their staff should seek national guidance.

2.17. Multinational cohesion. Maintaining cohesion across the international community is a strategic priority in any multinational operation. It builds and maintains operations authority and increases the likelihood of future force contributions. Cohesion must be monitored as part of operations assessment and JFCs must devote significant time and effort to building and maintaining partnerships and trust.

48 See AJP-5.
49 See AJP-3.
Section 3 – Multi-agency crisis management

2.18. Multi-agency planning. Within an integrated approach, commanding military forces does not necessarily confer command or control of the overall situation. Where control is vested in another government department, JFCs should support coordinated planning with military advice and contribute to the collective execution of the overall mission. They should also consider the impact of having to assume responsibility for some, or all, of the non-military lines of operation if the security or political situation precludes delivery by other agencies or authorities. The resource implications of such a contingency may be significant and JFCs should be prepared to prioritise their efforts accordingly.

2.19. Departmental processes and cultures. Each department will have differing timelines, planning capacity, priorities, culture and approach to risk. It should not be assumed that a military approach will be universally acceptable or understood and this may introduce frictions, misunderstandings and uncertainties. Annex 2A outlines Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Stabilisation Unit practices and culture. In the early stages of an operation, where conditions are non- or semi-permissive, the military will often be the principal contributor. When giving advice, commanders must use plain, jargon-free language and recognise that certain words can be laden with hidden meaning and values. Where command and control arrangements are unclear, commanders should be prepared to coordinate activity.

Where control is vested in another government department, JFCs should support coordinated planning.

50 NATO’s comprehensive approach to crisis management is addressed in AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine.
2.20. **Multi-agency leadership.** An integrated response is most likely to succeed if a single figure, ideally formally empowered, orchestrates the activities of all the agencies involved. How the role is agreed, and the formal authority that the leader is granted, varies on a case-by-case basis. For UK national operations, an ambassador or political appointee, or a military commander, may be appropriate. In multinational operations undertaken by the UN, the Special Representative of the Secretary General is likely to be appointed the leader. On other occasions, particularly where there is no single nation or international organisation orchestrating events, other mechanisms may generate the required leadership.\(^{51}\)

2.21. **Across-government bodies.** Departmental coordination within the UK is enhanced through across-governmental bodies, often facilitated by the Cabinet Office, with both strategic and operational responsibilities. These include:

- facilitating inter-departmental strategic planning to develop strategies and policies to deal with specific crises;\(^{52}\)

- coordinating departmental contributions to the across-government strategy and monitoring national progress; and

- providing liaison and coordination for JFCs and other government departments in theatre.

2.22. **Integrated planning at the operational level.** There is no universal template for collaborative planning between military and non-military organisations at the operational level. The processes are dictated by the nature of the situation, the variety of actors and the extent of their involvement. Figure 2.2 (on the next page) illustrates possible variations in inter-departmental collaboration, using three illustrative scenarios in which the military act:

- alone (A);

- in loose cooperation with other government departments as part of a multi-agency operation (B); or

- with close inter-agency collaboration under a unified across-government plan developed by the controlling department (C).

---

\(^{51}\) For example, Lord Ashdown’s appointment as the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina – a position created under the Dayton Agreement.

\(^{52}\) A body of this type may develop national strategic objectives, having been given the national strategic aim by the Cabinet Office.
Operational-level planning

While all three models envisage a single national strategy, military planning may be developed in relative isolation from other departments (A), or in coordination with them (B); or subordinate to an agreed across-government strategy (C).

The integrated approach is best served by applying model C.

Figure 2.2 – Models of integrated planning at the operational level

2.23. International and non-governmental organisations. The UK needs to coordinate and harmonise its military actions with those of other agencies, including international organisations, non-governmental organisations, donors and regional organisations. The onset of operations usually acts as a catalyst for coordination under either loose, or more formalised, frameworks. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) normally establishes a humanitarian operations (or coordination) centre in any humanitarian crisis. UN agencies and non-governmental organisations attend coordination meetings hosted by UN OCHA,
but there may be other non-governmental organisation forums where stakeholders address common issues and concerns.

2.24. **Humanitarian organisations.** Commanders must understand the different needs and perspectives of humanitarian organisations. Each is likely to have a distinctive culture and unique aim, and some may not accept coordination with/by military forces (or even to be seen to cooperate with them). Each organisation should be treated separately, requiring an individual approach, and JFCs may need to adopt unfamiliar working practices to facilitate collaboration. They should aim to create a broad dialogue, seek advice and benefit from the expertise and insights of different organisations. Many organisations may have been in a particular operating environment for years and have unique and valuable experience.

2.25. **Inter-agency collaboration.** There is no template by which JFCs may support an integrated approach. Figure 2.3 offers three models.

   a. **Predominantly inter-agency.** Greatest collaboration is achieved where the majority of national and multinational partners work to an agreed strategic plan, ideally with an empowered leader. Some agencies may remain unwilling or unable to operate in this way and aspects of inter-agency working remain challenging.

   b. **Multi-agency and inter-agency.** Unity of purpose is achieved through inter-agency working, where military and other government department staffs establish long-term collaborative practices. Such arrangements may be self-established or prescribed. This approach is enhanced by collocation. Multinationality, and the presence of international organisations and non-governmental organisations, makes this approach more demanding and therefore, ideally requires common procedures to be adopted.

   c. **Multi-agency.** At the lowest level of collaboration, JFCs coordinate with other government departments, multinational partners, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. In such circumstances, an integrated approach is enabled through civil-military cooperation, without establishing firm relationships. This approach allows coordination or de-confliction, but does not enable a collaborative approach with agreed outcomes.

53 Indeed, Oslo Guidelines state that military forces should only be used in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief as a last resort and where they bring a capability that cannot be provided by non-mil means in the timescale. UN OCHA Oslo Guidelines Rev, 1.1 November 07. (www.unocha.org)
2.26. **Private military and security companies.** At an early stage, JFCs should consider the impact of private military and security companies on their actions and operations. Most of these companies are multinational and provide a range of armed and unarmed services. This includes:

- risk management;
- governance and development activities;
- security provision;
- force and close protection; and

- *The term applies to all private military and security companies wherever they are registered or based, and to their local subcontractors. It does not apply to Defence industry contractors, if their activity is regulated through existing export controls, an export licence has been issued, or the commercial proposals are wholly within the terms of that licence. Additionally, unarmed contractors providing logistic support on operations to the MOD and covered by JSP 567. Private security companies that operate solely in the UK domestic market are not classified as private military and security companies.*
Operational-level planning

- military training to government, corporate and non-governmental organisation clients.

JFCs should consider coordinating, or at least de-conflicting, their actions, with such companies.

2.27. Contractor support to operations. This is an increasingly important element in the overall provision of support to operations. It is addressed in JDP 4-00, *Logistics for Joint Operations* and AJP-3.13, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces*.

Section 4 – UK Defence’s approach

2.28. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation. The MOD’s DCMO conducts three types of planning to support both national and multinational operations.

a. Crisis response planning determines, often at short notice, an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis.

b. Contingency planning is based on a mixture of intelligence and assumptions addressing how our Armed Forces might be involved in future crises. This does not imply an endorsed intent by the government. It may be impractical to gauge the likelihood of a contingency plan being enacted. However, where resources need to be expended to reduce or mitigate risk, the potential impact of a crisis must be assessed to inform prioritisation.

c. Current operations planning manages a current operation, prevents escalation and sustains military activity. Such planning tends to follow crisis response planning, when military activity is (or is envisaged to be) prolonged. It may also involve elements of contingency planning to address potential changes in the situation, when we think we may be reaching a desired, or acceptable, outcome.

2.29. Crisis management groups. Crises can impact across government, and a variety of task-organised, multifunctional groups monitor both potential and emerging crises. These groups will plan and manage crisis response through to its end. Annex 2B describes the principal crisis management groups (with their detailed procedures being covered in DCMO standing operating procedures).
2.30. Planning context. Figure 2.4 shows planning in an across-government context. It shows how actions contribute to effects that lead to achieving decisive conditions that support operations objectives. These actions are undertaken by diplomatic and economic contributors, not just the military. Actions by any contributor can have both anticipated and unanticipated effects on other contributors’ intended effects – few contributors exist in isolation.
2.31. **NATO or coalition context.** When we operate in a NATO or coalition context, diplomatic and economic contributions will be planned and executed by all contributing nations. Therefore, JFCs may have to contend with more than just other nations’ military actions. As a coalition increases in diversity, the chances of unintended (negative or positive) consequences on others’ intended effects will increase. Also in theatre will be multiple other actors whose actions and inactions may also impact on the JFC’s plan. This complexity places great emphasis on the closest possible collaborative planning from the outset and from the highest levels downwards.\(^{55}\)

**Crisis response planning**

2.32. Crisis response planning, summarised in Annex 2C, requires agility to cope with uncertainty, ambiguity and change. Appendix 2C1 gives guidance on how the principal actors interact dynamically to produce the major planning outputs required.

2.33. **Political-military estimate and political strategic analysis.** A crisis can arise, or change in nature or seriousness, at short notice. Alternatively, a crisis may develop slowly, with time for a current operations group to form and deliberate (allowing contingency planning to occur). In a NATO context, this period is addressed in Phase 1 of the NATO crisis management process.\(^{56}\) The MOD engages in across-government political strategic analysis (see Chapter 1) to consider options for how the UK might respond (a political decision, ultimately for the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the National Security Council). In the case of a rapidly emerging crisis, an early political-military estimate, conducted by a nominated strategic planning group, is used to identify possible (but as yet unformulated) desirable outcomes. It will also evaluate potential military response options and associated risks, for consideration by the Director of Operations\(^ {57}\) and the CDS. In a NATO context, planning will be initiated by a strategic warning order. This will be initiated by direction from the North Atlantic Council SACEUR to conduct a strategic assessment.\(^ {58}\)

2.34. **Chief of Defence Staff’s planning directive.** Having conducted the political-military estimate, and subject to the outcome of the political strategic analysis, the strategic planning group drafts CDS’ planning directive (see Chapter 1 and Annex 1A) to start the military-strategic estimate. In the early stages, guidance to planners may be:

- heavily-caveated;
- based on multiple assumptions; and

\(^{55}\) AJP-01 discusses NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and acknowledges this complexity.

\(^{56}\) COPD, Chapter 3, Phase 1 – Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential/Actual Crisis.

\(^{57}\) The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS(Mil Strat & Ops)).

\(^{58}\) See COPD Chapter 3, Phase 2 – Strategic Assessment and Annex B, Appendix 2 – SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment template.
Operational-level planning

- liable to change as circumstances and political choices mature.

CDS’ intent, articulated within their planning directive, provides a unifying function for those engaged in concurrent, but potentially discrete, planning activities across the DCMO. Planners may need to make assumptions to maintain planning momentum and confirm or update them as the situation evolves. Broad environmental and functional contributions from the outset enable comprehensive and concurrent planning. For PJHQ to progress the military-strategic estimate, a planning directive is issued as early as possible. It provides: strategic direction\(^9\) (either in draft or final form); assumptions and constraints;\(^6\) and planning direction.\(^6\)

In a NATO context, strategic assessment, followed by developing military response options,\(^4\) will result in SACEUR producing their strategic planning directive. This forms part of the strategic plan development phase.\(^5\)

2.35. **Military-strategic estimate.** On receiving CDS’ planning directive, a military-strategic estimate is conducted by the PJHQ contingency planning team with the MOD’s Strategic Planning Group and Current Commitments Team. Inputs to this process include:

- CDS’ planning directive;
- a summary of the political-military estimate;
- outputs from across-government planning; and
- the National Information Strategy.

In a NATO context, further inputs may include:

- the strategic and operational warning orders;
- SACEUR’s strategic assessment;
- draft military response options;
- A North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive with Military Committee guidance; and
- SACEUR’s strategic planning directive.

\(^9\) Strategic direction includes: the national strategic aim; potential national strategic objectives; the military strategic end-state and/or military strategic objectives; the strategic narrative; information effect; CDS’ intent; and relevant extracts from the National Information Strategy.

\(^6\) Assumptions and constraints are agreed with the FCO and DFID, and any relevant operating constraints and freedoms, to ensure that effort is not wasted in re-exploring discounted possibilities.

\(^4\) Such as authority to deploy an operational liaison and reconnaissance team or, subject to operations security to engage with the Defence industrial base (see JDP 4-00).


2.36. **Scope.** The military-strategic estimate scopes the feasibility of a military contribution to crisis response and evaluates options for submission to Ministers. The military-strategic estimate:

- uses techniques such as illustrative operations planning, risk analysis and operational analysis\(^{64}\) to test options.
- provides a critical opportunity for military planners to indicate to political decision-makers how events might unfold, what forces may be required (and the opportunity costs involved in their committal), what casualties might result, financial costs, and prospects of success or failure.
- should be periodically revisited during operations, including during multinational operations where the UK may not have the lead in planning but may be able to exert influence based upon rigorous analysis.

A summary of the military-strategic estimate, briefed through the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is used by the Secretary of State and CDS to advise Cabinet on the practicality and implications, immediate and longer term, of a military contribution to any response. Identifying and communicating strategic risk is an important element of the military-strategic estimate process.\(^{65}\)

2.37. **Chief of Defence Staff’s Operation’s Directive.** When the Prime Minister decides to commit military forces, CDS issues detailed direction by means of a CDS Operation’s Directive drafted by a current commitments team (see Chapter 1 and Annex 1B). It includes three main elements.

a. **Strategic direction** comprising: national strategic aim; national strategic objectives; military strategic end-state and military strategic objectives; strategic narrative and information effect; CDS’ intent; and any constraints at the operational level.

b. **Force composition and conduct** which identifies the elements of the joint force, designates the theatre of operations, and provides guidance on anticipated duration, sustainability and any legal issues including rules of engagement. The operations directive may also outline strategic risks identified by the military strategic headquarters, and any threats or opportunities these may present at the operational level.

---

\(^{64}\) See AJP-5.

\(^{65}\) Risk is addressed in AJP-01.
c. Command and control issues including:

- command appointments;
- command relationships;
- guidance on coordination with all parties,\(^{66}\) and
- command and control arrangements.

CDS may issue an Operation’s Directive (either draft or initial) on a limited distribution before all information is available and may also delegate the development of certain sections, such as coordinating instructions.

2.38. Joint Commander’s mission directive. CDS will nominate a Joint Commander; this is normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). The Joint Commander, with authority from CDS planning and operations directives, issues a Joint Commander’s Directive to empower JFCs and direct the enabling functions of deploy, sustain and recover. Annex 2D is representative of such a directive.

2.39. Collaborative planning. Crisis planning takes place collaboratively between the MOD, CJO, PJHQ and the assigned JFC. Liaison officers should be exchanged between JFCs, planning entities, contributing components, the Stabilisation Unit and other government departments who have been involved in planning.\(^{67}\)

2.40. Planning the deployment. Planning for deploying the force, including headquarters and augmentees, should begin at the earliest opportunity. This enables JFCs to:

- identify any constraints;
- establish the broad deployment timeline;
- meet the lead times for chartering aircraft and ships; and
- conduct wider engagement with industry.

Deployment planning should remain covert until an announcement has been made to commit forces, and must always be subject to operations security. PJHQ orchestrates force deployment, although the JFC’s headquarters will shape much of the planning to ensure that it meets the JFC’s intent.

2.41. Planning the military operation. Operations planning in support of any integrated across-government or multinational planning may be completed before deployment planning begins, but they frequently overlap (catered for by JFHQ)

\(^{66}\) Including: the single-Services, Joint Forces Commander, Director Special Forces (DSF) and Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM), allies, other government departments, host nations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

\(^{67}\) See COPD Chapter 4, Phase 3 Operational Estimate and Phase 4 Operational Plan Development.
participation in PJHQ’s contingency planning team and the establishment of a situational awareness group). A planning sequence is described below.

a. From the outset, JFHQ staff branches are represented on PJHQ’s contingency planning team. This keeps JFCs informed on progress and they will also represent the JFC’s views at the strategic/operational interface. JFCs will begin to formulate their plans in parallel with the contingency planning team, and they may issue a warning order.

b. JFCs and/or members of their staff may conduct a reconnaissance to theatre, normally as part of an operational liaison reconnaissance team. The Joint Commander should outline the aim of such reconnaissance and any constraints, such as duration, limits on movement and liaison authority. The exact nature, size and duration of the reconnaissance party may vary, but it should include allies or coalition partners, potential host nations and other government departments.

c. JFCs undertake operational-level planning in collaboration with subordinate commanders, other government departments, international organisations, non-governmental organisation representatives and coalition partners. To ensure that the most recent information and assumptions are available to all planning teams, there should be a continuous exchange of information between strategic, operational and tactical headquarters.
2.42. **Relationship with the operational liaison and reconnaissance team.** A deployed operational liaison reconnaissance team may satisfy information and intelligence requirements emerging from both the military-strategic estimate and the operational estimate. It may also generate new issues for clarification up the chain-of-command. An operational liaison reconnaissance team may remain in place and form the core of the JFC’s deployed headquarters.

### Contingency planning

2.43. Contingency planning addresses potential military involvement in future crises (see Appendix 2C1). The Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement (STRIDE) highlights intelligence collection requirements and areas of potential instability that are likely to affect UK interests. To reduce the time taken to produce detailed plans in the event of a crisis, CDS directs CJO to develop contingency plans in the form of generic joint planning guides and more specific joint contingency plans.

2.44. **Joint planning guides** comprise generic planning data for a country, region or theatre, or for the military contribution to a particular type of operation, such as a non-combatant evacuation operation or a disaster relief operation. MOD, PJHQ, the single-Service Chiefs, Joint Forces Command or other government departments may identify a need for a joint planning guide; this requires CJO approval. If approved, the following steps are taken.

- CJO instructs PJHQ J5 to compile the planning guide, outlining the planning parameters, likely objectives, timelines and any political or military constraints.
- PJHQ will form a contingency planning team who identify any other government department or Stabilisation Unit plans for that area.
- A reconnaissance may be conducted with the British military representative, or military intelligence liaison officer, and any other government department representatives in theatre. Joint planning guide reconnaissance is normally carried out discreetly by a small team.
- Once the reconnaissance is finished, the contingency planning team circulates a draft joint planning guide for comment by other government departments, proposed supporting commands, and relevant Embassies/High Commissions via the Consular Division of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**Operational-level planning**

The operational-level planning process and associated formats are in the COPD.
• Once all comments have been incorporated, and the joint planning guide has been approved by CJO, it is maintained by PJHQ.

2.45. Joint contingency plans detail the military capabilities needed to conduct specified operations and deployment options, and include readiness states and associated risks. The requirement for a joint contingency plan may be identified by MOD, PJHQ, the single-Service Chiefs or the Joint Forces Command, but is initiated by a CDS planning directive. Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)) orders the formation of a strategic planning group to conduct a political-military estimate, engage with other government departments, and draft CDS’ planning directive (see Annex 1A). Once PJHQ receives the directive, a contingency planning team is formed, in concert with the MOD, supporting commands and other specialist staffs including other government departments. The contingency planning team undertakes a military-strategic estimate, may conduct a reconnaissance, and drafts the joint contingency plan. Depending on the intended operation, the final joint contingency plans may be submitted to the Commander Joint Forces Command and single-Service Chiefs of Staff for approval or, via CDS and the Secretary of State, to the Cabinet. The joint contingency plan is issued and maintained by PJHQ.

2.46. Indicators and warnings. Implicit within contingency planning is the need to develop indicators and warnings. These comprise key events or signs which alert planners to an imminent crisis. Indicators and warnings should be selected that provide sufficient notice to activate contingency plans or, if necessary, develop new plans in time to pre-empt, rather than react to, an emerging situation. The Cabinet Office’s six-monthly review of the Countries at Risk of Instability forms the basis of indicators and warnings assessments. Within the MOD, Defence Intelligence is responsible for monitoring indicators and warnings and for linking into other security organisations such as NATO.

Current operations planning

2.47. Operations may be short or continue for years. They may be continuous or intermittent; the military contribution may fluctuate in importance compared with that of the other instruments of power. Irrespective of length, intensity or character, the organisations and processes outlined above provide an adaptive framework for planning and managing operations.
Operational-level planning

2.48. Doctrine for conducting operations (management rather than design) is covered in JDP 3-00, *Campaign Execution*\(^{68}\) and AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*. There are two aspects that are particularly relevant:

- **operations review** is relevant because it requires commanders and headquarters at all levels (as well as non-military actors) to communicate, interact and understand each other.

- **termination and transition** is relevant because it involves an aspect of operations, with potentially strategic implications, that requires extensive planning beyond the operational level.

2.49. **Operations review.** DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops) is responsible to CDS for monitoring current operations and keeping ongoing operations under strategic review. The DCMO, through operations planning and management processes, provides the information necessary to validate objectives, confirm or modify plans for achieving them, and adjusting capability and resource allocations accordingly. This continual review process, illustrated at Appendix 2C1, takes place at different stages.

a. **At the national strategic level,** the government’s political strategic analysis, the consequent across-government strategy or plan, and associated national strategic aim and objectives are periodically reviewed through policy, strategy and senior officials’ groups. Regular revisions to political-military estimates feed this review process. Any re-appraisal of the government’s intended role for the military, informed by such review, may result in new direction being issued and a need to review the military-strategic estimate.

b. **At the military strategic level,** the output of across-government review, ongoing monitoring (by the Chiefs of Staff), and assessments of risk and opportunity (from the Joint Commander at PJHQ and the JFC in theatre) all inform the overall assessment of current and projected progress towards achieving military strategic objectives. This process can be called a strategic review – the form and conduct of which varies from one operation to another. It may result in a review of the extant CDS operations directive, and/or a force level review to confirm or adjust the balance of forces between commitments. Where the situation is judged to have changed significantly, or political intent to have altered, a strategic planning group may be needed to refresh or conduct a further political-military estimate and a revised military strategic estimate.

---

68 As part of the ongoing plan to adopt NATO doctrine, JDP 3-00 will be withdrawn when AJP-3 is revised.
c. At the operational level, CJO and deployed JFCs will keep ongoing operations under review, using assessment, risk analysis and periodic stock-takes.

2.50. Termination and transition. Termination and transition operations are complex. They can feature periods of significant strategic and operational-level risk and both have to be factored into planning from the outset. Planning issues include:

- pre-empting the end of hostilities with contingency plans to undertake essential post-conflict activities;
- ensuring forces withdraw in good order;
- making adequate provision for force roulement and any necessary changes in presence, posture and profile;
- switching weights of effort to different types of military activity as the nature of an operation changes over time; and
- planning to ensure enduring security (which may necessitate forces in overwatch) and transition from military to civil primacy requiring civil-military collaboration.

Section 5 – Operations led by the EU, US and UN

European Union operations

2.51. The European Union (EU) planning process is described in Annex 2E. In EU-led operations, the EU’s permanent military elements – the European Union Military Committee and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) – provide the principal coordination points for the UK MOD. During the early stages of a crisis, the DCMO functions as normal in its national capacity. EU crisis management procedures envisage the EUMS drawing upon planning expertise from either EU member states and/or NATO (under the Berlin Plus agreement) as the crisis unfolds. For the UK, this expertise is provided by the MOD and PJHQ’s links with the European Union Military Committee mirror those with NATO’s Military Committee; the UK military

---

69 See JDP3-00 and AJP-3.
70 At the time of publishing, further detail of the planning issues were covered in AJP-01(E), (study draft) and AJP-3.4.5 Building Stability (study draft).
71 For example, ensuring military/defence support to ongoing stabilisation efforts.
72 The NATO, Berlin Plus agreement, 21 June 2006 includes the exchange of classified information and access to NATO assets and capabilities,
representative attends both. DCMO activity will focus on the UK’s contribution to any proposed EU response, while maintaining oversight of any additional planning support likely to be required by the EUMS.

2.52. The EU has three models for operational headquarters, described in Annex 2E. UK planning implications are outlined below.

a. EU-led operations with recourse to NATO assets. If the EU requests NATO support, the relationship between the DCMO and the EU would be comparable to the NATO model. NATO’s Combined Joint Planning Staff (in ACO – JS) would provide planning support at the request of the EU. Deputy SACEUR (a UK 4* appointment) would be the likely choice to fulfil the functions normally performed by SACEUR, as the Military Strategic Commander, for NATO-led operations. The dual-hatted UK military representative is the link with both NATO Headquarters and the EU.

b. EU-led operation without recourse to NATO assets. If NATO assets are not employed, a nation will act as a framework nation using one of the five designated operational headquarters. If PJHQ is selected as the operational headquarters, specific EU multinational headquarters procedures are activated. If another operational headquarters was chosen, some PJHQ staff and extra augmentees would deploy there. Augmentees could include:

- key nucleus staff pre-nominated and trained, drawn mainly from PJHQ/JFHQ, and immediately available for the EU role;
- primary augmentee multinational staff, pre-nominated and trained, including civilian/military staff from the EUMS and other EU nations;
- primary augmentee parent nation staff nominated and trained staff from other UK headquarters to augment the multinational headquarters; and
- additional augmentee multinational staff, not pre-nominated, to be made available if required.

c. EU operations centre. The EUMS maintain the capability to form an operation headquarters. PJHQ may contribute personnel on request.

73 Located in the UK (PJHQ), France, Germany, Italy and Greece.
74 Particularly where there is a civil/military aspect or where no national headquarters has been identified – EU Principles for EU Headquarters, agreed by the European Union Military Committee, 2 June 2005.
2.53. If the UK is the framework nation, the decision on who to appoint as operational commander should consider CJO’s role in other operations, the availability of alternative commanders (possibly drawn from the joint command group) and the staff required to support a UK national contingent. The roles and tasks of CJO and the PJHQ may split along EU and national lines. CJO may act as:

- operational commander and joint commander; or
- operational commander (with CDS selecting another joint commander); or
- joint commander (with CDS selecting another operational commander).

2.54. When the UK provides the JFHQ as the core element of the EU force headquarters, the designated force commander is subordinated to EU operational command. When the force commander is not from the UK, a separate national contingent commander is the link to PJHQ. Where the UK provides the operation headquarters, then it is responsible for providing communications to the force headquarters. Where JFHQ provides the framework of an EU force headquarters, it is responsible for providing communications down to subordinate commands.
United States-led operations

2.55. The UK often operates within a US-led coalition. The US command and planning doctrine is detailed in US Joint Publication (JP)-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and JP-5, *Joint Operation Planning*.75 It differs from that of the UK and NATO. The US President is the Commander-in-Chief of all US forces, assisted by the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises them but does not enjoy a separate level of command equivalent to the UK MOD. Instead, combatant commanders have a direct link to the US President through the Secretary of Defense.

2.56. Within a US-led coalition, the MOD and the DCMO remain the focus for national planning, linked through the British Defence Staff United States and the US Joint Staffs, with PJHQ deploying a small staff to liaise with the combatant commander. A senior British military adviser or national contingent commander is likely to deploy to assist the combatant commander in developing options for any UK involvement.76

United Nations and other multinational operations

2.57. **UN operations.** The UN’s role and organisation is described in Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*.77 UN operations may be mounted by a single nation or on a multinational basis as a coalition/alliance. Command and control structures vary depending on the nature and scale of operations, but the UN normally forms a theatre/force headquarters from among the contributing nations.78


PJHQ and the Senior British Military Adviser/National Contingent Commander should coordinate closely to ensure that the US combatant commander receives coherent UK advice.

Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations* is being developed.

Subordinate to, but often within, the predominantly civilian mission headquarters.
2.58. For operations conducted under a UN mandate, the military force commander acts in support of the civilian Head of Mission, normally a Special Representative of the Secretary General (although in simple operations, the force commander may be appointed Head of Mission). The Head of Mission’s planning staff is responsible for developing coordinating plans that reflect international consensus. These plans must be continually reviewed against mission objectives and the changing situation on the ground.

2.59. **Cooperative operations.** UK forces may deploy on a national basis alongside other national contingents, who then agree to de-conflict or cooperate outside the framework of a recognised multinational command structure.\(^79\) The most likely bilateral cooperative operation is the UK-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) concept.\(^80\) These cooperative operations are most likely to occur during non-combatant evacuation operations, peacekeeping and limited intervention. Although there may be joint objectives, it is likely that each nation also has individual national imperatives, objectives and responsibilities. UK involvement in cooperative operations demands the appointment of a JFC, with a joint task force headquarters to conduct in-theatre liaison between national forces.

---

79 This could be in accordance with extant memoranda of understanding or status of forces agreements.
80 See UK-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) User Guide available through the Defence Intranet.
Operational-level planning

**Key points**

- The operational level is: the level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.

- Understanding is crucial; it provides insight and foresight on what can, and cannot, be influenced, and where the boundaries lie.

- Military actions (to realise specific effects and subsequently attain objectives) are frequently inter-woven with the actions, intended effects, and associated objectives of other non-military actors.

- Operations planning links intent at the strategic level and action at the tactical level.

- Multinational operations are normally facilitated by selecting a lead or framework nation, in many cases under the mandate of the UN or other recognised international organisation.

- The UK intent is to work within a recognised multinational planning framework wherever possible and employ NATO doctrine.

- Commanders must use plain, jargon-free language and recognise that certain words can be laden with hidden meaning and values.

- Commanders must understand the different needs and perspectives of humanitarian organisations. Many organisations may have been in a particular operating environment for years and have unique and valuable experience.

- When we operate in a NATO or coalition context, diplomatic and economic contributions will be planned and executed by all contributing nations. Therefore, JFCs may have to contend with more than just other nations’ military actions.

- The military strategic estimate scopes the feasibility of a military contribution to crisis response and evaluates options for submission to Ministers.

- Operations planning in support of any integrated cross-government or multinational planning may be completed before deployment planning begins, but they frequently overlap.

- JFCs undertake operational-level planning in collaboration with subordinate commanders, other government departments, international organisations, non-governmental organisation representatives and coalition partners.

- Doctrine for conducting operations (management rather than design) is covered in JDP 3-00, *Campaign Execution* and AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*. 
2A.1. **Understanding other departments.** A guiding principle of an integrated approach is that institutional familiarity will enhance collaborative working and trust. Just as doctrinal knowledge enhances our conduct of multinational operations, understanding other government departments enhances cooperation and planning. This principle has equal applicability when operating with international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

2A.2. **Lead government department.** Lead government departments’ responsibilities for planning, response and recovery from emergencies are addressed in the ‘gov.uk’ website. In addition, the Department for International Development (DFID) leads on disasters overseas, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) leads non-combatant evacuations.

2A.3. **Variance in approach.** Each of the principal government departments involved in crisis planning in the context of conflict (FCO, DFID and the MOD), with the interdepartmental Stabilisation Unit facilitating these processes, has a unique way of doing business. Generally, differences may be caused by several factors.

   a. **Size and structure.** The FCO and DFID are smaller than the MOD and have different structures.

   b. **Culture.** The military culture, based on authority and discipline, is often directive. Civilian practice, however, often needs to be consultative, democratic and less hierarchical.

   c. **Crises orientation.** We have traditionally been resourced, prepared and trained as a contingency against future crises which, when they occur, usually attract further funding from the Treasury. Conversely, other government departments...
Operational-level planning

departments tend to view crises as a continuum of ongoing, day-to-day business that they manage within existing funds.

d. **Planning approaches.** Due to the characteristics of military crisis response, and the planning resources available, we use a formal approach to planning. Some other government departments follow broadly similar lines. However, in certain situations, more fluid models are appropriate, to allow flexibility according to the political nature of the situation. The approach to policy-setting and decision-making may be progressive and iterative.

e. **Risk appetite.** Military operations involve risk, including that to life. While other departments can, and do, work in hazardous locations, they may withdraw their personnel if they judge the situation to be too dangerous.

2A.4. **Understanding ourselves.** Military planners engaged in multi-agency operations should recognise that military practice can appear alien to civilian partners. While other departments recognise the military’s competence, they often have difficulty recognising where and how they can engage effectively. Military processes are sometimes seen by other government departments as cumbersome, labour-intensive and introspective. In particular, civilian planners often cite the sense of ‘unstoppable momentum’ that characterises the military response to a new crisis. This, while a key characteristic of our ‘can do’ spirit, may not be conducive to influence by other government department representatives. Military liaison officers and embedded personnel in other government departments play an important role in enabling successful planning. They can identify the correct interface points and enhance mutual understanding, as well as permanently represent their own commanders’ position. The value of effective liaison is stressed throughout the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

**Department for International Development**

2A.5. **Purpose.** DFID’s primary focus is poverty reduction, including working towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Goals for poverty reduction, which is reflected in the Department’s objectives and targets. The UK, along with most western countries, is a signatory of the Paris Declaration. This calls on donor nations to work with the governments of states in crisis, as partners, in developing poverty-reducing strategies. DFID will always seek to draw representatives of afflicted states into its planning processes. To deliver sustainable development, DFID must work with other donor nations, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and the agencies of the crisis state, to ensure a coherent international development effort. Consequently, DFID gives priority to working with such partners.
2A.6. Processes. DFID has developed specific analysis and planning methodologies. Analysis is often conducted by in-country DFID offices which tend to have greater devolved power than other departments’ deployed representatives:

2A.7. Country assistance plan. A country assistance plan (CAP) is compulsory for all countries or regions where DFID works (where a threshold of £20M of funding has been reached), and considerable weight is placed upon gaining a detailed understanding of the situation before the plan is written. A number of assessment tools have been developed to help achieve this, some of which – including the ‘country governance assessment’ and ‘fiduciary risk assessment’ – are compulsory. Others, such as the ‘strategic conflict assessment’ and ‘drivers of change’ assessments, will only be done where and when needed. Country assistance plans should provide a long-term strategy and are usually reviewed every three years.

2A.8. Logical framework analysis. Once developed, country assistance plans could be broken down further into separate sectors, for example education, health or governance and addressed through a collection of programmes and projects. An important tool when developing these projects is ‘logical framework analysis’ or ‘logframe’. This should lay out the hierarchy of objectives within the project, identify key assumptions, state means of objective verification, and highlight any indicators of progress, thereby capturing the logic in the plan.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2A.9. Purpose. The UK’s foreign policy objectives are articulated as departmental strategic objectives, including four policy goals, in those areas where the FCO leads the UK’s international engagement. The policy goals cover:

- countering terrorism and weapons proliferation;
- preventing and resolving conflict;
- promoting a low carbon, high-growth global economy; and
- supporting the development of international institutions.

2A.10. Diplomacy. The FCO is not resourced for significant crisis response. Instead, it considers each situation within the context of an ongoing dynamic of international diplomatic relations. As a result, the FCO tends to focus on immediate issues, in what is frequently a rapidly changing situation.

   a. With the exception of the crisis management plans held by diplomatic posts, detailed contingency plans are of limited use to the FCO as they can very quickly become out-of-date and may restrict future flexibility.

84 Described in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-51, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.
Furthermore, diplomacy tools tend to involve the fostering and subsequently exploiting personal relationships. Diplomacy, therefore, is a far more individual process than the task-oriented activities carried out by either DFID or the MOD, requiring few formal strategies and plans.

b. It is usual to find the UK’s diplomatic position articulated within ‘lines to take’, Ministerial briefing papers, policy statements and ‘e-grams’ from ambassadors. These are usually the outcome of intense dialogue between regional desks, policy departments, UK missions (to the UN or EU), and embassy staffs, as well as with appropriate other government departments. This results in an agreed view that is then taken forward by FCO staff in Whitehall and the network of embassies, high commissions and other diplomatic posts overseas.

**Stabilisation Unit**

2A.11. **Purpose.** The Stabilisation Unit was established in 2004 as a tri-departmental unit of the MOD, FCO and DFID. The Stabilisation Unit’s aim is to deliver integrated conflict prevention and stabilisation expertise for fragile and conflict-affected states, in support of the Government’s objectives. The Stabilisation Unit works in partnership with ‘parent’ government departments and has a deployable capability comprising civil servants and civilian experts.

2A.12. **Objectives.** The Stabilisation Unit has seven objectives. They are to:

- coordinate and oversee the delivery of stabilisation activity in priority regions;
- provide expertise on stabilisation and conflict, sharing lessons to inform the Government’s policy and practice;
- provide effective security and justice advice and support (including policing) to fragile and conflict-affected states;
- maximise the contribution of UK policing capabilities in support of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy objectives;
- safely deliver the right people to the right place at the right time and deliver a new UK team of experts dedicated to combating and preventing sexual violence in conflict, in support of the wider FCO initiative;
• increase the support to, and understanding of, stabilisation, including promoting the role of the Stabilisation Unit and the importance of the integrated approach; and

• successfully implement the changes to the Stabilisation Unit resulting from the 2012 review.

2A.13. Processes. The Stabilisation Unit supports across-government analysis of the drivers of conflict and sources of stability in conflict states, known as the joint analysis of conflict and stability. The Stabilisation Unit also facilitates an integrated approach to strategic planning for conflict and stability. There is inter-departmental guidance that covers joint analysis and the integrated planning process. Analysis and planning for particular contexts are formally commissioned by the National Security Council, the Building Stability Overseas Board or other senior officials.

2A.14. Joint analysis of conflict and stability. The joint analysis of conflict and stability approach can be used in active conflicts, and in situations that are fragile, but currently peaceful. The process can be light-touch or in-depth, depending on the available timescales and customer needs, and is focussed at the strategic level. The approach is based on three phases.

a. Phase 1. Phase 1 reviews what is already known, establishes objectives, and agrees the timing and the scope of the study. The focus is on drawing in all relevant parts of the Government to agree on key questions and map out existing UK interests and priorities.

b. Phase 2. Phase 2 requires detailed analysis responding to the objectives set out in Phase 1. A governmental team carries out desk and field studies, examining drivers, actors and dynamics in conflict, and sources of resilience and other opportunities for peace. The team provide a set of detailed conclusions and recommendations for further consideration by the Government.

c. Phase 3. Phase 3 focuses on using analyses. It aims to ensure that the findings of analysis inform subsequent UK policy and action.

2A.15. Integrated planning. Ideally the goal in any conflict-affected environment is to achieve an inclusive political settlement that creates the conditions for sustainable peace. Integrated planning (illustrated in Figure 2A.1) helps the Government think through its priorities, level of ambition, how best to engage in a given country and ensures value for money (economy, efficiency and effectiveness). Planners should:
Operational-level planning

- identify whether there is a UK interest and an intention to engage;
- clarify governance and coordination roles for the UK inter-departmental team early on through written terms of reference;
- ensure that there is a shared understanding across government departments of objectives and key drivers;
- consult closely with people in theatre;
- understand the plans and intentions of local actors;
- identify whether or not assistance is welcomed by the state, and whether or not the operating environment is permissive;
- identify key stakeholders in the international effort, the extent of their authority or influence, and whether one state or multinational body is positioning itself to lead;
- establish the legal boundaries around any intervention;
- decide on options for activity on the basis of consensus, after fully considering the range of options (if there is no consensus, planners should refer to the National Security Council (Officials) or delegated authority);
- secure Ministerial and/or senior level support;
- establish baseline measures and an integrated monitoring and evaluation framework from the outset; and
- implement agreed activity.
2A.16. **Initiation.** Any department may initiate integrated planning – and planning is an iterative process. Following any rapid-onset crisis, the Government’s leadership will be provided at the highest level by the Prime Minister and the National Security Council (NSC). National Security Council (Officials) is the Permanent Secretary-level group that supports the NSC. It will provide the steering group that agrees the aim, objectives and associated owners of the integrated plan, as well as the exit conditions. Below this there will be a core group of working-level officials.
Operational-level planning

2A.17. **Deployment.** The types of teams that deploy, and the timing of the deployment, will depend on the assessment of the crisis. Planning can be done on a contingency basis, rather than leading inevitably to action. It may also be the case that, during the planning process, Ministers and officials conclude that there is no reasonable chance of success. Plans will therefore need to be revisited at appropriate intervals. If teams are to deploy, then one of the key early considerations will be whether or not there is a consular crisis and a need to evacuate UK nationals. Another consideration will be the nature, relevance and accuracy of the information that already exists, and whether further scoping is essential to make informed decisions about activity in the local context.

2A.18. **Implementation.** Successfully implementing a plan will depend on clear and open lines of communication. Figure 2A.2 is for illustrative purposes and must be adapted to the specific context, depending on the scale of the intervention and whether or not there is a major UK military deployment. Activity will continue until Ministers and officials are satisfied that exit conditions have been met.

---

**Legend**
- SRO  Senior reporting officer
- DFID  Department for International Development

Figure 2A.2 – Implementation
Annex 2B – Crisis management groups

Where footnoted, the material has been extracted from the online version of How Defence Works – The New Operating Model. This is the single, authoritative, web-based source of information on how Defence works.

Monitoring

2B.1. **The Defence Engagement Board.** The Defence Engagement Board is chaired jointly by Director General Security Policy and by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Director General Defence and Intelligence.\(^{85}\) It provides the strategic context which should govern, and prioritise, using Defence assets to pursue the wide range of thematic strategies which also exist. These strategies include:

- building stability overseas strategy;
- counter terrorism (‘CONTEST’);
- counter proliferation;
- cyber security;
- organised crime;
- overseas territories;
- countries at risk of instability; and
- prosperity, consular and emerging powers.

All international defence engagement and other activities will come together in the FCO-led country business plans in line with the direction of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.\(^{86}\)

2B.2. **The Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement.** Below the Defence Engagement Board is the 1* level Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement (STRIDE). It is jointly chaired by Head Military Strategic Plans of the MOD, and Head Security Policy of the FCO, and brings together relevant stakeholders from across MOD and wider government. The STRIDE is responsible for ensuring implementation of the International Defence Engagement Strategy, in accordance with the strategic direction from the 3* Defence Engagement Board. STRIDE meets four times a year.

\(^{85}\) *How Defence Works – The New Operating Model*, April 2013, paragraph 2.55.

Response to emerging crisis or a change in strategic circumstances

2B.3. Current operations group. A current operations group is chaired by Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) or the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) in his absence and attended by selected staffs from across the MOD. A current operations group may be convened in response to an emerging crisis, or to study a particular aspect of a current operation (such as a change in strategic direction). In the case of the former, it provides situational awareness, orientates the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) to the crisis, and considers the utility of (as well as any risks involved in) military intervention, to inform the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and hence Ministers.

2B.4. Strategic planning group. A strategic planning group is usually led by the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy) (ACDS (Mil Strat)), and includes members from across the MOD as required. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J5 and other government departments are also usually represented. A strategic planning group may be formed prior to a current operations group to initiate a political-military estimate to inform across-government political strategic analysis. Subsequently, once a decision has been taken to initiate more detailed planning, a strategic planning group drafts CDS’ planning directive to the Joint Commander.

2B.5. Permanent Joint Headquarters contingency planning team. A contingency planning team, led by J5, includes staff from across PJHQ, the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and, where appropriate, the Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters (JFLogCHQ), Joint Forces Command, Defence Equipment and Support, and the single-Services. A contingency planning team may form in parallel with the associated MOD strategic planning group. Leadership and membership varies according to the priority, scale and complexity of the planning task (which may involve either contingency or crisis response planning). On receiving CDS’ planning directive, a contingency planning team conducts a military strategic estimate. A contingency planning team may also (re-)form to address longer-term issues as part of current operations planning. The PJHQ contingency planning team process ensures that single-Service commands (including Joint Forces Command for joint enablers) are appropriately engaged in the PJHQ planning and decision-making processes for both contingent and current operations. This also feeds into the DCMO.88

87 In fast moving crises, a contingency planning team may form before a strategic planning group to maximise planning time. In any case, for emerging crises and situations, the strategic planning group and contingency planning team work as a single entity, aided by video teleconferencing.
Managing commitments

2B.6. Current commitments team. A current commitments team is formed at the onset of a crisis, or when CDS’ planning directive is issued. It forms under an Operations Directorate lead (at 1* or OF-5 level), and includes staff from across the MOD. It liaises with PJHQ, the single-Services, Joint Forces Command, other government departments and, where required, with multinational partners. It functions throughout a crisis, providing a strategic focus for the DCMO. A current commitments team coordinates advice to CDS, PUS and Ministers, and, from policy, provides clear and unambiguous direction and guidance for conducting operations. Accordingly, a current commitments team, with the associated strategic planning group:

- formulates relevant military objectives in relation to the outcomes sought;
- prepares ministerial submissions and responses to parliamentary questions;
- develops CDS operation’s directive to the Joint Commander (see Annex 1B).

Thereafter, a current commitments team focuses on current issues concerning the deployment, activity, sustainment and recovery of forces.

2B.7. Permanent Joint Headquarters operations team. Once CDS operation’s directive is issued, an operations team – led by PJHQ J3\(^\text{89}\) and drawing upon other expertise as required – develops the Joint Commander’s Mission Directive (see Annex 2C).

2B.8. Operational liaison and reconnaissance team. An operational liaison and reconnaissance team is despatched to a theatre of actual, or potential, operations at the outset of an emerging crisis or as part of contingency planning. It adds significantly to situational awareness and facilitates planning. The JFHQ has the core of two operational liaison and reconnaissance teams on permanent standby, comprising a team leader and core intelligence, operations, logistics and communications staff. JFLogCHQ has a single, more logistics- or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief-focussed team at similar notice. When required, staff from PJHQ, the single-Services, Joint Forces Command, the Stabilisation Unit and other government departments may participate to inform decision-making at the strategic and operational levels. Where this wider representation is not possible, core operational liaison and reconnaissance team members should take checklists provided by those excluded from deploying, to ensure that the requisite information

\(^{89}\) This may be an entirely new operations team, or an existing one whose area of responsibility is relevant to the new operation.
Operational-level planning

is acquired. Where possible, an operational liaison and reconnaissance team should integrate with in-theatre UK diplomatic structures. Reconnaissance should use military intelligence liaison officers (if deployed), UK military training teams (if applicable), Embassy or High Commission staffs and other in-country sources such as international organisations, non-governmental organisations and international commercial organisations. Increasingly, operational liaison and reconnaissance teams will be integrated teams to support across-government analysis, including personnel from MOD, FCO, DFID and the Stabilisation Unit as required. Operational liaison and reconnaissance team activities may include the following tasks.

a. **Liaison.** Liaising with host-nation authorities, allies, potential coalition partners and other important agencies and organisations already present in the area of interest.

b. **Reconnaissance.** Detailed reviews of, for example, appropriate locations for command and control elements, requirements for memoranda of understanding, existing or new status of forces agreements, or the need for access, basing and overflight.

c. **Reviewing existing plans.** Reviewing existing contingency planning.

d. **Advising and reporting.** Reporting through PJHQ, the operational liaison and reconnaissance team either returns to the UK to backbrief their findings, or it remains in theatre to facilitate the entry of a joint task force headquarters (or equivalent) and bolster any advance elements.

Crisis management group relationships

2B.9. **Strategic planning group/other government departments.** Links between the MOD and other government departments are formalised in strategic planning group meetings, current operations groups and through a variety of other across-government engagement, but considerable *ad hoc* liaison is achieved during routine staff discussions and other contacts.

2B.10. **Strategic planning group/current operations group.** The strategic planning group leader is usually a member of the current operations group. Other members of the strategic planning group may also be present at current operations groups, albeit as capability directors or specialists rather than as strategic planning group members.

90 While ideally there should be a separate reconnaissance at each level (strategic, operational and tactical), pressures of time and practical constraints imposed by the host nation may dictate that they be conducted concurrently.
28.11. **Strategic planning group/current commitments team.** In the early stages of a crisis, a strategic planning group is committed to developing plans and then, as events unfold, refining them with PJHQ J5. During this process, the Group’s Secretariat is responsible for raising submissions to Ministers, through the Director Operational Policy, on matters requiring their decision or attention. A strategic planning group has no active involvement in coordinating current operations, which is the remit of the current commitments team. The presence of a strategic planning group member within such a team ensures that current operations remain harmonised with strategic aims and helps the team to produce CDS’ operation’s directive. As the crisis develops, the strategic planning group member also provides planning insights to the current commitments team.

“When written in Chinese, the word ‘crisis’ is composed of two characters. One represents danger and the other represents opportunity.”

John F. Kennedy
## Annex 2C – Planning at the strategic and operational level

### Crisis management group

**MOD Chiefs of Staff Committee**
- Principal crisis and commitments management body
- Strategic coordination with other government departments (OGDs)
- Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) advice to Ministers
- Military strategic direction

### Crisis response planning

- Provides strategic direction
- Approves joint contingency plans (JCP) or pass to Ministers for approval
- Military strategic direction

### Contingency planning

- Reviews commitments against national strategic objectives
- Balance of forces across commitments
- Directs future strategy and force levels

### Current operations planning

### Crisis monitoring groups

**STRIDE**
- Strategic Regional Implementation group for Defence Engagement
  - Ensures regional strategy direction is reflected in command plans
  - Provides advice to the Defence Engagement Board on defence engagement regional strategies
  - Reviews progress against delivery of regional strategies and Defence Engagement Board priorities

**MOD Defence crisis management brief**
- Establish common understanding
- Assists decision making
- Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs
- Establish common understanding
- Assists decision-making
- Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs
- Establish common understanding
- Assists decision-making
- Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis management group</th>
<th>Crisis response planning</th>
<th>Contingency planning</th>
<th>Current operations planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis response group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD current operations group</td>
<td>• Provides Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat &amp; Ops)) with appropriate expert advice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provides initial briefing to CDS and Chiefs of Staff (COS)</td>
<td>• Decides on forming a strategic planning group (SPG)/current commitments team (CCT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD strategic planning group</td>
<td>• Political/military estimate</td>
<td>• Political/military estimate</td>
<td>• Refine/revise political/military estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Long-term planning (MOD J5)</td>
<td>• CDS’ planning directive</td>
<td>• Maintain long-term planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaison with other government departments</td>
<td>• Submissions to Ministers</td>
<td>• Contribute to cross-government strategy/plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Interaction with Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Update CDS directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Produce military options paper for DCDS (Mil Strat &amp; Ops)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CDS’ planning directive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ contingency planning team</td>
<td>• Close liaison with MOD</td>
<td>• MSE</td>
<td>• Reviews/refines MSE in liaison with CCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conducts military strategic estimate (MSE) with SPG/CCT</td>
<td>• Joint planning guides (JPG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MSE summary</td>
<td>• JCPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis management group</td>
<td>Crisis response planning</td>
<td>Contingency planning</td>
<td>Current operations planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis orchestration groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD current commitments team</td>
<td>• Monitoring of current ops and issues (MOD J3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordinate reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Staffs MSE (in conjunction with PJHQ contingency planning team (CPT))</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaison with other government departments and allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaison with other government departments on current issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>• CDS’ operations directive review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ministerial submissions</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Force Level Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CDS’ operations directive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ operations team</td>
<td>• Expanded from CPT</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Support CDS operations directive reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Run current ops for Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Initiate PJHQ review process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Joint commander’s mission directive (in conjunction with CPT)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Update/reissue extant Joint commander’s mission directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ/JFHQ/JLogCHQ operational reconnaissance and liaison team</td>
<td>• Theatre reconnaissance</td>
<td>• Theatre recce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential forward planning nucleus for deployed joint task force headquarters</td>
<td>• Review/ develop contingency planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inform/conduct initial campaign planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operational-level planning

Operational-level planning
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Management Group</th>
<th>Crisis response planning</th>
<th>Contingency planning</th>
<th>Current operations planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ situational awareness group</td>
<td>Monitor the development of crisis</td>
<td>Conduct campaign assessment</td>
<td>Conduct operations planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iteratively refine operations planning</td>
<td>Initial and deployment planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ planning groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>Campaign planning</td>
<td>Conduct deployment planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployment plans</td>
<td>Subsequent orders and plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Issue subsequent orders and direction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operational-level planning
Appendix 2C1 – Planning processes

Crisis response planning

Operational-level planning

Legend
- CCT
- CDU
- COG
- CPT
- DCM
- DSF
- HQ
- IO
- MOD
- OGD
- PJHQ
- Single Service

Crisis to Political strategic analysis

CDS to Cabinet

CDS to SOF in Cabinet

CDS Directive

Military strategic estimate

Military strategic estimate summary

CDS Planning Directive

Operational estimate

JTJHQ (or other HQ) Collaborative planning

JTJdirection

Tactical missions and tasks

Current Commitments

Team
Chief of Defence Material
Chief of the Defence Staff
Chief of the Defence Support
Current Operations Group
Contingency Planning Group
Defence Crisis Management
Director of Special Forces
Director, International Operations
Joint Force Commander
Joint Task Force Commander
Joint Task Force Headquarters
Ministry of Defence
Non-governmental organisation
National Security Council
Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
Permanent Joint Headquarters
Strategic Planning Group
Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement

STRIDE

1. Survey
2. Triage
3. Rescuer
4. Isolate
5. Decontaminate
6. Escort

NSC

Cabinet Office/sub-committee

OGL

OLRT

Out of theatre

Theatre

UK

Non-governmental organisation

National Security Council

Other government department

Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team

Permanent Joint Headquarters

Strategic Planning Group

Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement

United Kingdom
Current operations planning

Changing situation

Legend
CCT Current Commitments Team
CDM Chief of Defence Materiel
CDS Chief of Defence Staff
COG Current Operations Group
CPT Contingency Planning Team
DCMO Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DSF Director Special Forces
IO International organisation(s)
JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters
MOD Ministry of Defence
NCC National Contingent Commander
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NSC National Security Council
OGD Other government department
OT Operations Team
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
PM Prime Minister
SofS Secretary of State
SPG Strategic Planning Group
STRIKE Strategic Regional Implementation group for Defence Engagement

Operational-level planning

Strategic level
CABINET
Cabinet
Cabinet Office/sub-committee
National strategy

COG Committee
CDS to SofS to PM
CDS Directive review

CDS

CDM

Current Commitments Team
Chief of Defence Materiel
Chief of Defence Staff
Current Operations Group
Contingency Planning Team
Defence Crisis Management Organisation
Director Special Forces
International organisation(s)
Joint Task Force Headquarters
Ministry of Defence

DSF

Director Special Forces

IO

International organisation(s)

JTFHQ

Joint Task Force Headquarters

MOD

Ministry of Defence

NCC

National Contingent Commander

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

NSC

National Security Council

OGD

Other government department

OT

Operations Team

PJHQ

Permanent Joint Headquarters

PM

Prime Minister

SofS

Secretary of State

SPG

Strategic Planning Group

STRIKE
Strategic Regional Implementation group for Defence Engagement
Annex 2D – Representative Joint Commanders’ Mission Directive

This example is for guidance only. Deviations, where appropriate, are permitted. It is not necessary to keep to paragraph numbers – for example there may be one or more paragraphs per heading. It is, however, essential to maintain the order of the paragraph headings so that an auditable and recognisable logic chain is maintained. Where headings are not needed, this should be stated.

The Joint Commanders’ Mission Directive

Issued by: [The Joint Commander]

Issued to: [The Joint Force Commander (JFC), National Contingent Commander (NCC), or other subordinate commander as appropriate] and, in conjunction with other directives to: [Reference to other extant directives to subordinate commanders within the same joint operations area]

References:

Situation

1. [Describes the generic circumstances leading to the requirement for the operation including:]

2. The legal basis for Operation [***].

3. Operational situation.

[91 JFC: Throughout this publication Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example Joint Task Force (JTF), Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF) or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document.]

JDP 01
Operational-level planning

   a. Strategic aim.
   b. Strategic end-state.
   c. Political objectives.
   d. Strategic narrative.
   e. Information effect.

5. Coalition strategy.
   a. Coalition strategy.
   b. Coalition strategic centre of gravity.

6. UK's military strategy.
   a. Chief of Defence Staff’s intent.

Concept of operations

[The Joint Commander may provide an outline concept for the deployment, sustainment and recovery of a Joint Force, or more detailed instructions in Annex A].

7. Joint Commander’s intent.

8. Joint Commander’s interim operational end-state.

9. Joint Commander’s operational end-state.

10. Joint Commander’s key themes and messages.

11. Scheme of manoeuvre. [As appropriate, covering deployment, sustainment and recovery].

12. Main effort.
13. **Policy context.** The concept of operations will be directed by Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) within a developing policy context articulated by MOD UK through:

   a. Strategic guidance.

   b. Engagement with the other nations’ governments [as required].

   c. Engagement with UK other government departments.

   d. Engagement with a coalition chain of command.

   e. Strategic presentation.

**Mission**

14. [A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose].

**Specified tasks**

15. [Listed by component commander].

16. **Command of forces assigned.** The UK command and control architecture is described here with the detail reflected in Annex B.

**Coordinating instructions**

17. Operational timings.

18. **Intelligence.** Chief of Defence Intelligence will retain overall direction for Defence Intelligence. Specific instructions are contained in Annex D.

19. **Information strategy.** Adheres to UK information strategy and covers information operations, psychological operations, media operations and civil-military cooperation.

20. **Force protection.** [Direction at Annex J].


22. **Joint targeting.** [Guidance at Annex II].
Operational-level planning

23. Training. [Direction at Annex BB].


25. Detainees and prisoners. [Direction at Annex PP].

26. Deployment of civilians. [Details of all civilians and MOD employees deploying on operations are passed to PJHQ. Instructions for deployed contractors are contained in the Appendix 2 to Annex FF].

27. Status of forces. [Reference to legal status is governed by the Annex to relevant United Nations Special Representatives].

28. Lessons identified. [As directed by PJHQ SOP 7033].


Logistics

30. Logistic direction. [Contained in Annex R].

31. Personnel. [Personnel issues are contained in Appendix 2 to Annex R].

32. Medical. [Medical instructions for UK forces deployed are contained in Annex QQ].

33. Visitors. [Theatre visits policy].

UK command and control

34. Command and control. [UK command relationships are shown at Annex B, with tabulated command relationships at Appendix B-2. This paragraph will specify the supported command].

   a. National command. [All forces remain under national command or otherwise as determined here]

   b. Full command. [Single-Service Chiefs retain full command of UK assigned forces].
c. Coalition management. [PJHQ, working within MODUK’s policy direction, has the responsibility for operational liaison with national capitals on coalition force levels and operational matters].

d. Maritime forces. [Outlines the promulgation method for changes of OPCOM of Maritime forces between Chief of Naval Staff/First Sea Lord and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)].

e. Special forces.

f. Senior British Military representative. [OPCOM CJO or as otherwise directed in CDS’ Directive].

35. COMBRITFOR. [Nominated here].

36. National veto. [CJO’s direction on national veto policy].

37. Liaison. [Assigns a coordinating authority and guidance for matters that cannot be resolved in theatre – details if required in Appendix 4 to Annex B].

38. Reporting. [Timing and issues of importance requiring report].

   a. Routine reporting.

   b. Incident reporting.

   c. Post-operation reporting. [Including the requirement to capture lessons. Details if required in Annex LL].

39. Codeword/SIC. [The codeword is usually OFFICIAL SENSITIVE; however its meaning is SECRET].

40. Communications and Information Systems plan. [Outlines the responsibilities for UK national and coalition communications and information systems. Details as required in Annex Q]].

41. Information management. [Details the requirements to keep records. Specific Information Management instructions are contained in Annex CC].

Joint Commander [Name].

Date

JDP 01
Operational-level planning


- A. Concept of operations
- B. Task organisation and command relationships
- D. Intelligence
- E. Rules of engagement
- J. Force Protection
- Q. Communications and information systems
- R. Logistics
- AA. Legal
- BB. Training and mission rehearsals
- CC. Command information management
- FF. Financial support
- II. Joint targeting
- LL. Lessons learned.
- PP. Military police
- QQ. Medical
- TT. Public affairs
European Union capability

2E.1. The EU has the capacity to conduct EU-led operations if the EU Council elects to do so. The Council exercises overall responsibility for planning and conducting EU-led operations, either civilian or military, delegating political control and strategic direction to the Political and Security Committee.

2E.2. EU-led operations could involve a range of instruments of power, including diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and civil, as well as military and, therefore, these need to be coordinated. The EU, especially the European Commission, could already be engaged in areas where UK national or coalition military operations are being considered. Alternatively, the EU could become engaged either militarily, or in other ways, in crises where the UK has a strategic interest.

Permanent military structures

2E.3. Permanent military structures are provided by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) who are located in Brussels.

   a. **EU Military Committee.** The EUMC is responsible for providing the Political and Security Committee with military advice, and recommendations, on all military matters, and for directing all military activities within the EU’s remit. The Chairman of the EUMC acts as the primary point of contact for the operation commander\(^{92}\) during EU-led military operations.

   b. **EU Military Staff.** The EUMS provide early warning, situation assessment, and conduct planning at the political and strategic level for Petersberg tasks,\(^{93}\)

---

\(^{92}\) The EU title assigned to the officer performing the (broadly) equivalent role of a Joint Force Commander.

\(^{93}\) The Petersberg tasks are an integral part of the Common Security and Defence Policy. They were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17) and cover: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992.
Operational-level planning

including identifying appropriate European national and multinational forces. This could include developing military strategic options, preparing an EUMC Initiating Military Directive to the Operation Commander, and coordinating military planning with the EU’s Commission and Parliament.

2E.4. In the event of a crisis, the EU assesses options, usually in consultation with nations and other international organisations, especially NATO. Military aspects of the crisis should be examined by the EUMC, drawing on the expertise of the EUMS. At an appropriate juncture, following the development of a crisis management concept, the Council should approve a general political assessment and a cohesive set of options. Thereafter, the EUMC should issue a Military Strategic Option Directive to the Director General of the EUMS, formally inviting him to draw up one or a series of military strategic options.

2E.5. Once the Council has decided to take action, and a military strategic option has been selected, an operation commander should be appointed, a chain of command designated, and an operation headquarters selected. There are three options available.

a. EU-led operations with recourse to NATO planning assets. NATO’s ACO-J5 planning staff generate initial planning support for the EU, and provide planning staff and facilities thereafter. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe would be the likely choice as operation commander.

b. EU-led operation without recourse to NATO planning assets. If NATO planning assets were not to be employed, one nation could elect to act as the framework nation, using one of five potential EU operation headquarters (located in the UK (Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)), France, Germany, Italy and Greece).

........................................
94 The EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level is at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2010687%202008%20INIT
95 EU crisis management procedures envisage the need for the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to draw on operations planning expertise from either EU Member States and/or NATO.
96 These terms differ from NATO terminology since the EU structures and way of handling crises are different from NATO. Wherever possible, however, NATO terminology has been adopted.
97 Broadly equivalent to Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).
99 The EU defines a framework nation as: a Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed should, have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control. A framework nation provides the Operation commander/operation headquarters and the core of the military chain of command, together with its staff support, the computer information systems and logistic framework, and contributes with a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation. Although EU concepts and procedures remain applicable, procedures may also reflect those of the framework nation. EU Framework Nation Concept 11278/02, dated 25 July 2002.
2E.6. Selecting a force commander and force headquarters could occur simultaneously or, if alternatives are available, wait for the operation commander to be appointed. The most likely command and control template, based on a framework nation model, would have both the operation and force headquarters formed by the same nation, although other command and control combinations are possible. Where a framework nation model is used, other EU nations, as well as EUMS personnel, could be expected to provide personnel to fill posts in both headquarters.

2E.7. Following a Council decision to take action, the EUMC should issue an Initiating Military Directive to the operation commander, which directs him to begin operational-level planning. The EU planning methodology is very similar to that of NATO, and the outputs include a concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plans (OPLANS), and ultimately generate, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a joint force. The EU process is, however, initially more ‘linear’ than NATO’s, which can conduct operations planning in parallel at various levels. This is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate NATO. Hence subordinate levels of command have to be established for a particular operation before planning in parallel can commence. Efforts to streamline the process, for example, by designating an operation commander and operation headquarters early, are used as much as possible.

2E.8. Although exact command and control arrangements for any EU-led military operation should be mission-dependent, they normally encompass three levels of command, as shown in Figure 2E.1.

---

100 Particularly where there is a joint civil/military aspect or where no national HQ has been identified; EU Principles for EU HQs, 2 June 2005.
102 On some occasions, the operation commander may not be selected until after the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) has been issued. This is less preferable, as early appointment allows a commander to engage fully in the planning and direction process.
2E.9. **Comprehensive approach.** EU planning for EU-led operations takes into account the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management. Such planning cannot be conducted in isolation. The tools available to the EU in times of crisis are wide ranging across its institutions and policy areas and comprise political and humanitarian, as well as military, actions. This comprehensive approach leads to an important principle in EU military headquarters at all levels, which is the development of links, dependent on the mission, to ensure coordination with: governments and authorities in the crisis area; authorities of force contributing nations; EU representatives and bodies (for example, the EU Police Mission); international organisations and non-governmental organisations; supporting headquarters; and national intelligence organisations.
Notes:

Operational-level planning
Chapter 3 discusses command considerations in integrated, multi-agency and multinational contexts. It addresses the UK’s interpretation of mission command and identifies attributes desirable in coalition force commanders. It discusses the impact of multinationality on organisational agility and addresses national contingent command. It also introduces some media, legal and political considerations for commanders.

Section 1 – Command ................................. 101
Section 2 – Command approach ............................. 105
Section 3 – Command in a wider context ............................. 107

Nelson image © Government Art Collection; Woodward image © Imperial War Museum
“Leadership........ is just plain you.”

Viscount Slim

“...

We learn something new everyday. No matter how gifted people are, they can always learn and should be constantly and actively seeking to do so. You learn by doing but you must also be able to relate your experience to a wider context. Hence the need to be self-critical, self-examining and also the importance of reading and thinking.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge
Chapter 3 – Commanding the force

Section 1 – Command

3.1. Command embraces authority, responsibility and accountability. It has a legal and constitutional status – codified in Queen’s Regulations. It is also vested in a commander by their superior. Authority enables an individual to influence events and order subordinates to implement decisions. While commanders can devolve specific authority, they retain overall responsibility for their command – responsibility is thus fundamental to command. Accountability involves a liability and obligation to answer for properly using delegated responsibility, authority and resources; it includes the duty to act. Thus, a commander who delegates responsibility should grant sufficient authority to subordinates to enable them to carry out their task. Subordinates remain accountable to their superior for executing assigned tasks.

3.2. Exercising command includes the process by which a commander makes decisions, conveys their intent and impresses their will upon subordinates. It comprises three inter-related aspects.

a. Decision-making. Timely, accurate and effective decision-making (including assessing risk) enables adaptive command, optimises tempo and leads to success on operations. The art of command depends on recognising when to decide and when to act. Both rely on good judgement and intuition, based on situational understanding. However, commanders may need to identify fleeting opportunities and exploit them on the basis of incomplete information. Decisions should be communicated effectively and, where possible, personally. This inspires confidence and promotes cohesion between commanders and their subordinates. The ability to make difficult decisions and remain resolute, particularly when the outcome is uncertain, underpins strong leadership.

b. Leadership. Commanders have sole responsibility for ensuring that their plan delivers the best chances of success. The way in which they exercise leadership is determined by their character, style and experience, as well as the mix of personalities within their force or organisation. The intangible nature of the relationship between commanders and their subordinates may affect the
Commanding the force

...way in which forces are employed and the enterprises they undertake. Different situations demand different styles of leadership, requiring varying amounts of regulation, delegation, inspiration and coercion. Leadership is examined in more detail in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*.

c. **Control.** Control is coordinating activity, through processes and structures, to enable a commander to manage risk and achieve success. The extent of military control over a situation will be influenced by a range of external and internal factors. Control may be delegated to specialist staff, systems or processes. But commanders may need to retain personal control to ensure that their intent is achieved. Through appropriate decentralisation and delegation, commanders should seek to increase their subordinates’ freedom to act.

3.3. A commander’s immediate subordinates may themselves be senior, experienced commanders, including those from other nations. Subordinates should have confidence in their commander’s professional ability, judgement and firmness of purpose. Commanders should explain the rationale underlying their chosen course of action so that their subordinates understand the reasoning behind their decision and have a clear sense of purpose. Where this does not happen, subordinates should have confidence that their commander’s decisions are properly considered and valid. Furthermore, commanders should always be prepared to make use of the ideas and objections of others. Good ideas are not the sole preserve of senior ranks.
3.4. Commanders may have to exercise their command when there is uncertainty, risk, violence, fear and danger. Their success depends largely on experience, flexibility and determination. Ultimately, it is the commander’s ability to shape those aspects amenable to control and retain sufficient capacity for the unexpected that must prevail.

3.5. **Principles of joint and multinational command.** The principles of joint and multinational command are:

- unity of command;
- continuity of command;
- clear chain of command;
- integration of command;
- the manoeuvrist approach; and
- mission command.

These are detailed in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Chapter 6 but mission command, as described in NATO doctrine, has a slightly different nuance to that adopted by our forces. The two are fully complementary but, while Allied doctrine focuses mission command at the joint operational level, we encourage using it down to the lowest levels. Our national commanders should not automatically expect allies to apply mission command as described below. This is important when the UK is acting in a commanding role, and equally when acting as a subordinate. UK commanders operating in an alliance context should understand mission command.

**Mission command**

3.6. The UK’s philosophy of mission command has four enduring tenets:

- timely decision-making;
- thorough understanding of a superior commander’s intent;
- clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil intent; and
- determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion.

3.7. The fundamental guiding principle is the absolute responsibility to act, or to decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander’s intent. This approach requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but which is responsive to superior direction when subordinates overreach themselves.

---

103 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine.
104 Mission command, in an Alliance context, is described in AJP-01.
3.8. In practical terms, mission command has five essential elements:

- commanders must ensure that their subordinates understand their intent, their own contributions and the context within which they are to act;
- commanders should exercise a minimum of control over their subordinates, consistent with their experience and ability, while retaining responsibility for their actions;
- subordinates are told what effect they are to realise and why;
- subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions; and
- subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent.

3.9. Mission command assists subordinates to understand their commander’s intent and their place within the plan. This enables them to execute activity with the maximum freedom of action.

3.10. Mission command requires delegating authority and agile execution. A commander should be pragmatic when applying mission command as not all subordinates are equally capable. A commander should be flexible in the extent to which they delegate their authority; this will depend upon the situation, the nature of their command, the degree of multinational and multi-agency interaction, and the predominant activities being undertaken. Delegation will also depend on commanders’ and subordinates’ abilities, training, personalities and experience.

3.11. Uncertainty or ambiguity within a particular operational context may drive a commander to exercise more, rather than less, control. A commander may need to intervene to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks that may not be fully appreciated by subordinates, but they should be wary of unnecessary intervention. This tends to create risk-aversion and a dependency culture amongst subordinates.

“A commander should be pragmatic when applying mission command as not all subordinates are equally capable.”
Section 2 – Command approach

3.12. Effective command, including the processes and systems that underpin it, is a vital component of delivering military operations. The operational-level commander (Joint Force Commander\textsuperscript{105} (JFC)) is responsible for both the plan and its subsequent execution. Their personal effectiveness is determined by a combination of ability, intellect and intuition. However, it is often their instinct and vision that confer distinct advantage. Moltke referred to this decisive aspect as ‘talent’:\textsuperscript{106}

‘Thus war becomes an art – an art, of course, which is served by many sciences. In war, as in art, we find no universal forms; in neither can a rule take the place of talent.’

Moltke\textsuperscript{107}

and T E Lawrence as the ‘irrational tenth’:

‘Nine tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books; but the irrational tenth is like the flash of the kingfisher across the pool and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct sharpened by thought, practising the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as reflex’

T E Lawrence\textsuperscript{108}

3.13. Intellect and practical ability embody the particular skill that a JFC brings to an operation. This skill is applied through a variety of established principles, practices and procedures, themselves honed through training, education and experience. While attention tends to focus on the additional benefit of a commander’s instinct, this is most effective if it is based upon skilled and drilled professionalism.

\textsuperscript{105} Throughout this publication, Joint Force Commander (JFC) is used when referring to the operational-level commander of a joint force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example, Joint Task Force (JTF)/Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF)/Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)). JFC is used in this way throughout NATO doctrine. The UK’s Joint Forces Command will not be abbreviated in this document.

\textsuperscript{106} Moltke ‘the Elder’ Helmut von, \textit{Military Works}, 1912.

\textsuperscript{107} T E Lawrence, \textit{The Evolution of a Revolt}, 1920.
Commanding the force

3.14. Understanding equips leaders with the insight and foresight needed to make effective decisions, as well as manage the associated risks and second-order and subsequent effects. JDP 04, *Understanding* develops the commander’s approach to understanding, whether as an individual, as part of a team, or in a coalition.108,109

3.15. Moral and physical courage are important qualities in a commander, at whatever level, although at the operational-level moral courage is particularly important.110 Command styles are heavily dependent on personality, but in deciding on an approach to command, JFCs may consider the following issues.

a. **At what level are decisions to be made?** Avoid the danger of commanding too little and interfering too much. Consider the command responsibilities and authority in relation to the type of opponent (conventional, irregular and so on).

b. **How to maintain morale?** Consider combining four characteristics – effective leadership, strong discipline (self and group), a feeling of comradeship and self-respect.

c. **How to build relations?** Consider the importance of generating trust, shared confidence and knowledge from similar experiences, noting the value of credibility.

d. **How to bond the headquarters?** Mission command is as applicable to subordinate staffs as it is to subordinate commanders to deliver effective control and coordination.

e. **How to disseminate their intent widely?** JFCs should personally issue their mission and concept of operations, and be closely involved in articulating how they are going to command the operation. These elements, but especially commander’s intent where JFCs express the overall effect they wish to achieve against the adversary, are critical in enabling subordinates to act purposefully when faced with unforeseen opportunities, or in the absence of orders.

f. **How to extend their personal influence?** The need to influence both domestic and international decision-makers is an important factor. In multinational operations, identifying the point where the greatest national influence can be achieved, underpinned by the contribution of credible and robust military forces, is vital.

108 JDP 04, *Understanding*.
109 Command philosophy is addressed in more detail in AJP-01.
110 Further detail on the moral and physical component of fighting power is provided in JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine.
g. **Where to locate their command?** Where, and how best, to command a force is a challenge. JFCs must make time to go forward, make their own estimate of the situation, and see their commanders and troops. Communications allow JFCs more flexible options for command and control and headquarters location. This should be tempered by the risks of:

- increasing their vulnerability;
- potentially removing them from locations of political influence (especially when they have chosen to collocate their own headquarters at the diplomatic focal point); and
- becoming unnecessarily and adversely entangled in tactical activity.

h. **How to remain agile?** The UK’s approach to command emphasises agility as a way of dealing with complexity and optimising effectiveness. By remaining agile, JFCs are able to seize and retain the initiative, and maintain decision advantage over their opponent(s), to exploit opportunities and reinforce success. To fully exploit all resources, JFCs should identify any change in the weight of effort required in relation to different activities. This ensures that opportunities created by success are not wasted and that we minimise redundant activity.

---

Section 3 – Command in a wider context

3.16. In an integrated approach, the need to coordinate and synchronise or, at the very least de-conflict, the capabilities and activities of other agencies, creates a more complex environment for operational-level decisions. A commander’s ability to make decisions is strengthened by:

- an empathy for different organisational cultures, engendered by institutional familiarity, trust and transparency, and through frequent personal contact and information sharing;

---

Commanding the force

- **information superiority** which ensures that the potentially overwhelming volume of information available to a commander does not obstruct or overload their capacity for decision-making;\(^\text{112}\)

- **personal communications** of decisions to subordinates; and

- **confidence** particularly when information is ambiguous or incomplete.

AJP-01, Chapter 6 addresses decision-making at the operational-level. Joint Doctrine Note 3/11, *Decision-making and Problem-solving: Human and Organisational Factors*\(^\text{114}\) addresses improved decision-making in all complex problem solving, by understanding better the factors that influence the way individuals, groups and organisations think and behave.

\(^{112}\) See Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/13, *Information Superiority*.

\(^{113}\) See *JDN 3/11, Decision-making and Problem-solving: Human and Organisational Factors*. 
Legal considerations

3.17. All military operations must be conducted within a legal framework. The laws that apply will vary depending upon the nature of the operation. The applicable law may be a combination of international and domestic (national) laws and will include human rights law. Failing to comply with the law, or even perceived failure, can significantly undermine campaign authority. JFCs should ensure that:

- they, and those under their command, understand their legal responsibilities and obligations and are trained on the relevant rules of engagement;

- all commanders ensure they are compliant with the law, and observe rules of engagement, by exercising command authority over their subordinates;

- in a multinational context, they consider the differing national policy positions and legal obligations of respective national contingents;

- any suspected unlawful activity is reported immediately and thoroughly investigated; and

- commanders have access to specialist legal advice.

Political considerations

3.18. JFCs may find that political realities, both national and multinational, preclude defining clear strategic objectives, either for the operation as a whole or for individual troop contributing nations. In these circumstances they may have to derive their own end-state from the limited direction they have received.

3.19. Due to the challenges faced by national and multinational strategic decision-making bodies, JFCs may spend a disproportionate amount of time managing their strategic links at the expense of time spent in their own headquarters or dealing with subordinate commanders. This may be further compounded by the demands of hosting visiting political and military dignitaries to cultivate and maintain positive strategic relations.

3.20. The requirement to coalition-build (advising, encouraging and informing multinational partners) and the need to manage crises by consensus in multinational and multi-agency operations, slows down decision-making. It also introduces uncertainty, and places even greater time pressure on JFCs. However, handling these

----------------
114 For more on campaign authority, see JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine.
issues, including frequent visits by senior partners, is not just desirable, but a core feature of command.

**Command alongside other government departments**

3.21. At the operational and tactical levels, each government department will monitor and conduct activity, including allocating manpower and resources, within its own area of responsibility. Consequently, JFCs may play a vital role in helping to coordinate a range of competing priorities and to sequence activities. Their headquarters may have to act as the focal point for an integrated approach in a non-permissive environment.

3.22. The overriding consideration is to focus effort on achieving any national strategic aim and objectives. Reaching a shared understanding of the situation and potential responses to it, facilitates the coordinated application of the instruments of national power, and retains the cultural and professional diversity required to address complex problems.

**Command in a multinational context**

3.23. A UK commander may find himself acting as a:

- JFC on a multinational operation where the UK is the lead or framework nation;
- UK national contingent commander where the UK is contributing forces to an operation led by another nation;
- UK component commander within a multinational component command headquarters; or
- commander in an alliance/coalition appointment.

3.24. Operating multinationally, either as part of a formal alliance or an *ad hoc* coalition, introduces many challenges for both the multinational JFC and contributing nations’ national contingent commanders. Regardless of the UK commander’s role, they should be cognisant of both perspectives.\(^{115}\)

**Attributes of a coalition force commander**

3.25. A multinational force commander requires political acumen, patience and tact. Their key challenges will include achieving unity of effort (although they may aspire to unity of command) and fostering organisational agility.

\(^{115}\) AJP-01, Chapter 6 discusses the nature and challenges of operational-level command in a multinational context.
3.26. A force commander should understand each national contingent’s particular strengths, weaknesses and political objectives, as well as its national ethos, history and culture. They should balance capabilities and distribute the workload and risk equitably, so that no one nation sustains disproportionate casualties or receives undue credit, either of which may weaken the cohesion of a multinational force.

3.27. Common doctrine and agreed structures underpin unity of effort within an established alliance. *Ad hoc* coalitions may have sub-optimal command structures and can be hampered by the range of national political aims. Cultural or procedural differences between national contingents may also create friction and reduce tempo. A force commander may be required to accept no more than unity of purpose in such circumstances.

3.28. Initially, consensus and cooperation may be based on little more than an agreement on the art of the possible. This should be developed progressively through mutual trust, understanding, patience and respect for national perspectives and positions, and promoted through personal and professional relationships between a multinational force commander and national contingent commanders. To improve their perspective on any national agendas and foster improved relations across the coalition, a force commander should invest time in engaging personally with any national political representatives who visit their area of operations.

3.29. A force commander should appreciate the linguistic and cultural challenges of multinational operations, recognising that it is their responsibility to communicate with all subordinates including those for whom English is not the first language.
Clarity and brevity are important, as is using simple English and defined terms, noting that even these may not translate directly into another language.

3.30. Force generation will be carried out at the military-strategic level, with limited consultation with the force commander. So, what JFCs think they need to achieve the mission, may not be matched by the respective national force contributions.

3.31. The presence of international and contributing nations’ media, and the need to align national positions, is a further factor to be addressed by the force commander. A proactive and coordinated approach is essential. Supportive media coverage plays a major role in maintaining the endorsement of both the international community and domestic audiences. These are fundamental factors in maintaining coalition morale and cohesion.

Multinational command – organisational agility

3.32. The impact of multinationality on organisational agility is often significant. The most fundamental impact is one of time and tempo; activities take longer to plan and execute, and maintaining high and common tempo is challenging. Decisive engagement with an opponent (who may be more agile) is more difficult to achieve than in national operations. While a range of factors may contribute towards a lack of organisational agility in multinational operations, the two most prevalent are interoperability and information management.

a. Interoperability. Nations will contribute a broad range of equipments, technologies, languages, doctrine and training to coalition operations. While some alliances, most notably NATO, attempt to mitigate interoperability issues through standardisation, problems will remain. Any lack of interoperability, which impacts on the principles of war or operations, will significantly limit the JFC’s plans. JFCs will need to understand the interoperability challenges and ensure their operations design accommodates them.

b. Information management. Despite technological advances, the challenges of gaining and interpreting information remain. In multinational operations, problems are exacerbated by the limitations and constraints on information management. Many nations’ communications and information systems (CIS) are incompatible. The constraints on handling and sharing information and intelligence also compound the difficulties faced by JFCs. NATO’s information management requirements are addressed in the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive and AJP-6.116

116 AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems.
National contingent command

3.33. Each national contingent commander is a key decision-maker in their own right, though none share the JFC’s authority. A national contingent commander should consider the following.

a. Influence.
   - Shaping coalition plans based on personal relationships.
   - Advising JFCs on national capabilities and limitations (such as interoperability and rules of engagement).
   - Identifying and managing levels of risk for national forces.

b. Direct.
   - Exercising operational control of national forces, and directing/approving their use in line with national direction.
   - In close liaison with the NATO Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters, de-conflicting, prioritising and, where appropriate, directing the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of national forces.
   - Assuring logistic, medical and communications and information systems support.
   - Determining and coordinating national force protection policy and posture.
   - Coordinating and shaping national media.

c. Support.
   - Acting as a figurehead – building and sustaining national contingent cohesion.
   - Providing legal advice.

117 In a UK/France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) context this would be with the Combined Joint Support Group Headquarters.
Facilitating strategic intelligence integration, and command and control architecture.

Inform.

Determining any need for military strategic support.

Reporting tactical and operational developments (including risks to strategic objectives).

Developing memoranda of understanding and status of forces agreements with host nation(s) as required.

3.34. JFCs must understand the national political sensitivities of each of their contingents; any anticipated points of difference should be resolved early. If a national contingent commander believes that an order is contrary to national interests, they retain the ability to veto it. Political sensitivity over coalition operations and risk-aversion in contributing nations’ governments both mean that the potential for national veto remains a key factor in coalition operations.

3.35. National limitations on the JFC’s freedom of action can arise due to many factors.

a. Nations and their national contingent commanders may see their mission in different terms. Some may perceive long-term reconstruction as the priority and others may prioritise counter-insurgency and its urgent security requirements. Time spent conceptualising is seldom wasted; it will help to reduce coalition friction and shocks.

b. The command authority passed to the force commander is sometimes complicated by differing national interpretations of command authority.

c. The rules of engagement given to JFCs regarding using force may not be the same as those imposed by nations on their contingents. Furthermore, different contingents may interpret the Laws of Armed Conflict differently.

d. Individual nations may have different outlooks on force protection reflecting varying attitudes to risk. In some cases, JFCs may be constrained by having to provide additional force protection for a national contingent.

e. The targeting process, which may require agreement from all coalition members to each and every target, is likely to be written into the coalition mandate.
f. Nations place constraints on how to employ their forces, including restricting using national contingents to specified areas or types of activity.

Some of these constraints may only come to the attention of a commander during the course of planning an operation, when issuing orders, or in reaction to events (such as casualties, an unwelcome task, or changes in public opinion).

A commander’s relationship with the media

3.36. The media has become so important in maintaining public and political support that a commander cannot disconnect himself from it, nor should they allow it to be the sole focus of their efforts. Military operations, and particularly the senior commanders involved, invariably attract media scrutiny.

3.37. JFCs should anticipate such attention, which may be highly intrusive, and prepare themselves and their headquarters accordingly. They should be honest about their ability to deal with the media and carefully balance using a media spokesperson with their own appearances. There are likely to be moments where the message is so important that they must deliver it personally. Occasionally, the issue may be of such a critical nature that they may have to compromise operations security. In every instance JFCs must ask themselves – who am I engaging, and for what reason? They should not be overly passive in their dealings with the media, but should engage actively using as many channels as possible to persuade, rebut and advocate the message(s).

After the debacle of Suez in 1956, Operation MUSKETEER’s commander, General Keightley, summed up the over-aching problem of relationships with the media:

‘The one overriding lesson of the Suez operation is that world opinion is now an absolute principle of war and must be treated as such.’

General Keightley

118 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/fifties-britain/lessons-suez.htm
Commanding the force

Key points

• Command embraces authority, responsibility and accountability.

• Exercising command includes the process by which a commander makes decisions, conveys their intent and impresses their will upon subordinates.

• Different situations demand different styles of leadership, requiring varying amounts of regulation, delegation, inspiration and coercion.

• Commanders should always be prepared to make use of the ideas and objections of others. Good ideas are not the sole preserve of senior ranks.

• Mission command assists subordinates to understand their commander’s intent and their place within the plan.

• Effective command, including the processes and systems that underpin it, is a vital component of delivering military operations.

• Moral and physical courage are important qualities in a commander, at whatever level, although at the operational-level moral courage is particularly important.

• All military operations must be conducted within a legal framework. The laws that apply will vary depending upon the nature of the operation.

• The overriding consideration is to focus effort on achieving any national strategic aim and objectives.

• Operating multinationally, either as part of a formal alliance or an ad hoc coalition, introduces many challenges for both the multinational JFC and contributing nations’ national contingent commanders.

• A multinational force commander requires political acumen, patience and tact.

• A force commander should appreciate the linguistic and cultural challenges of multinational operations, recognising that it is their responsibility to communicate with all subordinates including those for whom English is not the first language.

• JFCs must understand the national political sensitivities of each of their contingents; any anticipated points of difference should be resolved early.

• The media has become so important in maintaining public and political support that a commander cannot disconnect themselves from it, nor should they allow it to be the sole focus of their efforts.

Lexicon

Commanding the force
**Lexicon**

## Part 1– Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied Administrative Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>current commitments team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJEF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief(s) of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>contingency planning team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDS (Mil Strat &amp; Ops)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>joint contingency plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jt Comd</td>
<td>Joint Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFLogCHQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>military strategic estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDP 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>other government department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLRT</td>
<td>operational liaison and reconnaissance team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>operational command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRIDE</td>
<td>Strategic Regional Implementation group for Defence Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACOM</td>
<td>tactical command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCDS</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 2 – Terms and definitions

agency
A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

analysis
The examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context. (JDP 01, 2nd Edition)

area of interest
The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. (AAP-06 (2014))

area of operations
An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for the conduct of specific military activities. (AAP-06 (2014))

assessment
The process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems.
Note, in the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification. (AAP-06 (2014))

baseline
The criteria to which assessments of progress are referred for correlation. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)

campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-06 (2014))
Lexicon

campaign authority
The authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation.

Note: It is an amalgam of 4 inter-dependent factors:

- the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action;
- the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively;
- the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate;
- and the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

(JDP 02, 2nd Edition)

campaign plan
A campaign plan is the actionable expression of a Joint Force Commander’s intent, articulated to subordinate commanders through plans, directives and orders.

(JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition, Change 2)

campaign rhythm
The regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a Joint force, to regulate and maintain control of a campaign. (JDP 01, 2nd Edition)

civil-military cooperation
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.

(AAP-06 (2014))

centre of gravity
Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

(AAP-06 (2014))

command
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.

(AAP-06 (2014))
commander’s intent
A concise and precise statement of what a JFC intends to do and why, focused on the overall effect the Joint Force is to have and the desired situation it aims to bring about. (JDP 01, 2nd Edition)

components
Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

contingency plan
A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6(2014))

contingency planning
Planning, in advance, for potential military activity in the future. (JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition, Change 2)

contingents
Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

control
The authority exercise by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. (AAP-06 (2014))

crisis management
The coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result. (AAP-06 (2014))

crisis response planning
Planning, often at short notice, to determine an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis. (JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition)

current operations planning
Planning to manage a current operation, to prevent escalation, and to sustain the necessary military activity to achieve the desired outcome. (JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition)
decisive condition
A specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. (JDP 01, 2nd Edition)

desired outcome
A favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. (JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition)

directive
A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (AAP-6 (2014))

force protection
The coordinated measures by which threats and hazards to the Joint Force are countered and mitigated in order to maintain an operating environment that enables the joint commander the freedom to employ joint action. (JDP 3-64)

framework nation
Forces generated under a ‘framework nation’ are commanded by an officer from that nation, which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the headquarters.
Note: The framework nation is also likely to dictate the language and procedures adopted. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)

information management
The integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 6-00, 3rd Edition)

information strategy
Coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences in support of policy objectives. (JDP 3-80.1)

intelligence
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engages in such activity. (AAP-06 (2014))
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
The activities that synchronises and integrates the planning and operation of collection capabilities, including the processing and dissemination of the resulting product. (JDP 2-0, 3rd Edition)

joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6(2014)).

joint commander
The Joint Commander, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

joint force
A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 0-01.1) or (derived from ‘Joint’ AAP-6)

joint force commander
A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a Joint force. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

joint operations area
An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

joint targeting
The process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritising targets, and the synchronisation of fires with other military capabilities and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. (AJP-3.9)

lead nation
Forces generated under a lead nation are commanded by an officer from that nation, from his own Joint Force Headquarters (augmented with Liaison Officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute National Contingents and National Contingent Commanders. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition)
lines or groupings of operation
In a campaign or operation, a line or grouping linking Decisive Conditions, and hence Campaign objectives, in time and space on the path to the campaign end-state. (JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition)

manoeuvre
Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (AAP-06 (2014))

manoeuvrist approach
An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

measurement of activity
Assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose. (JDP 01, 2nd Edition)

mission command
A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

multi-agency
Activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation. (JDP 0-1, 2nd Edition)

multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. (AAP-06(2014))
non-governmental organisation
A private, not for profit, voluntary organization with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organized at local, national or international level.
Notes:
1: A non-governmental organization does not necessarily have an official status or mandate for its existence or activities.
2: NATO may or may not support or cooperate with a given non-governmental organization. (AAP-06(2014))

operation order
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-06(2014))

operational analysis
The application of scientific methods to assist executive decision-makers. (AAP-06(2014))

operational art
The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AAP-06(2014))

operational level
The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (AAP-06(2014))

operations security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-06(2014))

situational awareness
The knowledge of the elements in the battlespace necessary to make well-informed decisions. (AAP-06(2014))

strategic communication (in Defence)
Advancing national interests by using all defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people. (JDP 5-00, 2nd Edition, Change 1)
supporting commander
A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-06(2014))

target
The object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation, neutralisation or destruction by military forces. (AAP-06(2014))

targeting
The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them, taking account of the operational requirements and capabilities. (AAP-06(2014))

theatre of operations
A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the Joint Operations Area), within which he conducts operations. (JDP 01, 2nd Edition)

understanding
The perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making. (JDP 04)