Operational Plan 2011-2016
Lebanon
December 2014
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results 2015/16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery and Resources</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A: Changes to Operational Plan</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B: Human Rights Assessment</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Introduction**

In 2013 the UK became the first G7 country to meet the United Nations target of spending 0.7% of gross national income on international development. The Department for International Development (DFID) uses that investment to help countries to lift themselves out of poverty and leave poverty behind. Operational plans set out to the public how we plan to deliver results across policy areas and for every country we work in. These plans clearly explain why, and how, DFID is targeting its resources and what we expect to achieve; covering the period up until March 2016.

DFID is focused on spending in the right ways, on the right things, in the right places. The portfolio of our projects is already shifting to deliver a more coherent, focused and ambitious approach to economic development. We are helping to build strong and investable business environments in developing countries and improving access to finance for entrepreneurs.

Improving the prospects for girls and women in developing countries is a priority. Investing in girls and women is the smart thing to do, as well as the right thing to do. By unleashing their potential, we see returns for girls and women themselves, their families and communities, and for their economies and countries. No country can successfully develop if it leaves half its population behind.

Life-saving humanitarian assistance remains one of DFID’s most fundamental responsibilities. When disaster strikes or conflict erupts we are first on the ground to support the most vulnerable people. We are also increasing our efforts to help those countries that are at higher risk of natural disasters to become more resilient in the first place.

DFID continues to drive value for money in everything we do on behalf of the British taxpayer. We have improved our procurement and programme management, increased our internal audit oversight and we are ensuring that staff have the skills to deliver the Department’s priorities.

On the international stage we are working hard to agree a new set of global development goals to replace the Millennium Development Goals when they expire next year. We are determined to secure a clear and inspiring set of goals for the post 2015 development framework that leave no one behind.

Increasingly we will take new and innovative approaches and we will work with new partners. This will include businesses who are increasingly major development players. During Secretary of State’s time as co-chair of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, DFID played a key role in encouraging different development actors to work together and use internationally agreed principles for aid and development effectiveness.

As our operational plans set out, our approach to international development is ambitious and innovative. We are determined to ensure that every pound DFID spends has the biggest possible impact on the ground. Ultimately by investing in developing countries, we can end aid dependency for good and build a better, more prosperous world for us all.
Context

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has experienced unprecedented change since the start of the Arab Spring in 2010. The vision of political and economic reform held out by the Arab revolutions flared briefly but was quickly followed by widespread instability and conflict, and the rise of violent extremism particularly in the Syria-Iraq neighbourhood. Several countries in MENA remain at severe risk of instability and in danger of moving into deeper crisis. The immense costs of growing instability in the region, and increased risks to the UK of further deterioration, justify upfront engagement by the UK and international partners with MENA countries, focussed on dealing with ongoing crises, addressing the drivers of conflict, and tackling longer-term causes of poverty.

Lebanon, a country of 4.5 million people (World Bank) sits at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East, bordered by Syria and Israel. It is an Upper Middle Income Country with a GDP per capita of $9,900 (World Bank). Modern Lebanon came into being in the aftermath of the First World War as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Great Arab Revolt and French ambitions in the region. Lebanon has accepted several waves of refugees over the course of its history, many of which are of Palestinian origin.

Lebanon’s recent history has been shaped by its ethnic and religious make-up; a complex mix of various types of Christian, Muslim and other religious groups, between whom power is divided through their leadership of different national institutions. In 1975 this delicate balance broke down and the country descended into 15 years of civil war. Lebanon has also been drawn into repeated conflict with Israel, often through the activities of armed groups that operate on its territory. Lebanon’s politics today remains deeply divided along sectarian lines, with different stakeholders jockeying for access to power and resources.

Our work in Lebanon is inextricably linked to the humanitarian and stability consequences of the war in Syria. Since the start of the Syria crisis 1.2 million Syrians have registered or are awaiting registration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the number of additional unregistered refugees is believed to be significant. Most are women and children who are now living in host communities, widely scattered across the entire country. There are no formal refugee ‘camps’ in Lebanon; around 15% of refugees are housed in informal tented settlements, but most are renting rooms or living in unfinished or derelict buildings. Refugees in Lebanon survive by drawing on a mixture of donor funded services, informal work, borrowing, and other coping mechanisms, but these coping mechanisms are increasingly being exhausted. Public services in Lebanon, even prior to the Syria crisis, provided a basic safety net only for the poorest or those unable to access services from organisations linked to their religious group.

The influx of refugees serves to exacerbate some of Lebanon’s existing vulnerabilities. Lebanon’s political settlement is fragile and difficult to maintain, based on power sharing between the different religious groups based on their demographic strength. Lebanon suffers from a number of deep-seated structural economic issues, centred on debt and unemployment. Few substantive economic decisions are taken collectively, unless there is a crisis. 45% of government revenue is spent just on servicing its debt. The remainder of the government’s budget is spent on salaries, subsidies and some limited service provision. There is very little money left for any investment in expanding services, such as education, health or electricity. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), unemployment has climbed to around 20%, and for the young and better educated is estimated to range between 30% and 45%.

Tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities have been brewing for some time and there have been intermittent outbreaks of conflict and violence, growing in frequency. Some areas in the north and east of Lebanon have seen their populations more than double and the impacts are real. The Lebanese government has tried to increase spending to support the provision of public services for the new population, for example in education, but the gaps between need and provision remain large. Syrian refugees are able to work in Lebanon if they have the correct paperwork, and are outcompeting poorer Lebanese, other Syrians who lived in Lebanon prior to the crisis and other immigrant workers for low paid, unskilled jobs in the informal sector.

There are serious concerns about the activities of extremist and terrorist groups, linked to the conflict in Syria, operating in Lebanese territory – including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). And refugee numbers continue to increase, with large numbers continuing to enter each week despite efforts by the Lebanese government to restrict access. There is a risk that the lack of economic opportunities, inequality and marginalisation, corruption or poor governance could create an enabling environment for radicalisation and violent extremism. Finding a means by which refugees can live in Lebanon with sufficient economic security and
Operational Plan 2011-2016

access to services, and co-exist peacefully with host communities, will therefore be a guiding principle of DFID's work in Lebanon.
Vision

Overview

The UK Government’s long-term vision for MENA is a prosperous, stable region based on open, democratic societies with greater social, economic and political participation of its people. In support of this goal over the short to medium term, DFID is working to promote regional stability in line with the UK government’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy. Across the region DFID is supporting countries to manage current conflict and crises, tackling the drivers of instability and conflict, and where possible, supporting political and economic reform alongside longer term development.

In line with this, the UK’s vision is for a Lebanon that is stable and sovereign, where the rule of law and human rights are respected, and increasingly resilient to the threat of violent extremism.

In support of this vision, DFID’s objective in Lebanon is to preserve or strengthen stability and social cohesion, with refugees and host communities increasingly able to co-exist peacefully, with their resilience against extremism and radicalisation strengthened.

In the medium term, based on this foundation, DFID will support Lebanon in reducing its reliance on international donor support and transitioning to a national-led response to the Syria crisis supported by increased economic opportunity and drawing on more sustainable sources of finance and investment.

DFID will deliver this by:

- Providing humanitarian assistance that over time strengthens refugee resilience on a sustainable basis – focused on the basic needs, including shelter, food, water, health, and hygiene and sanitation, of the poorest and most vulnerable refugees and, increasingly, vulnerable Lebanese;

- Supporting improved public service delivery in the areas most affected by the influx of refugees – DFID will play a leading role in supporting education for refugees and host communities in a way that supports the integration of different communities as part of the No Lost Generation Initiative, as well as strengthening local, municipal services;

- Mitigating the risks of conflict and violent extremism by addressing inequalities and marginalisation, poor governance and weak state legitimacy – especially in the area of jobs and livelihoods. However, we will need to explore and better understand the complex causes of radicalisation. We will do this by building up the evidence for what interventions work well through research and evaluation.

What we will not be doing

Given Lebanon’s Upper Middle Income status, DFID will focus its resources on key sectors, such as education, municipal level service provision and livelihoods, where we judge we can have an impact and leverage policy change. We will not provide financial aid directly to the central government or support large-scale, direct service provision.

Alignment to DFID and wider UK government priorities

DFID’s approach to Lebanon is aligned with the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review and the UK government’s Humanitarian Policy. Our work will be taken forward as part of the National Security Council strategy for addressing the Syria crisis and the recent advances of the ISIL in the region and we will play an active role in delivery of the Conflict Security and Stabilisation Fund (CSSF).
## Results 2015/16

**Headline results** (Those with a * are directly attributed to DFID. In all other cases DFID is contributing to the results.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar / Strategic Priority</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Expected Results (end year included)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian – Poverty, hunger &amp; vulnerability</td>
<td>Number of monthly food rations received*</td>
<td>610,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian – Poverty, hunger &amp; vulnerability</td>
<td>Number of individuals benefiting from the distribution of relief packages*</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian – Poverty, hunger &amp; vulnerability</td>
<td>Number of children supported by psycho-social interventions*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian – Water, sanitation &amp; hygiene</td>
<td>Number of people with access to clean water sources per month (peak month)*</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian – Health</td>
<td>Number of medical consultations for emergency trauma and primary healthcare cases*</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Number of children supported in formal and non-formal education*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50,000 – 2014/15 50,000 – 2015/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Security</td>
<td>Number of beneficiaries of improved municipality services*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>350,000 – 2014/15 350,000 – 2015/16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We do not forecast results for humanitarian indicators, in line with DFID guidance.

The baseline shows the results of DFID funded programmes delivered in 2013.

Results for food include cash and vouchers which are provided for the purchase of food.
Headline results

There are no milestones or targets for the humanitarian indicators as it is not possible to comprehensively anticipate needs. This is in line with DFID guidance. New results for the education and governance and security programmes will be developed further once the design of the programmes are finalised. As this is a new Operational Plan progress against results will only be reported from 2014/15 onwards.

Evidence supporting results

There is a mixed range of supporting evidence for this Operational Plan on which our core assumptions are based. Humanitarian needs are based on the UN Regional Response Plan 2014 (RRP 6). The RRP is based on forecasted doubling of refugee numbers in 2014 and includes both humanitarian and development programming needs. Information on longer term needs is under development and the UN Resident Co-ordinator’s office is developing a 2 year plan to guide donors (the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan). We are also working across Whitehall and with partners to strengthen our own knowledge.

There is a strong evidence base for the humanitarian interventions which are primarily standard humanitarian programmes delivering food, shelter, water and sanitation as well as medical interventions. DFID’s humanitarian programming aims to be as needs-based as possible and funding decisions are influenced by the outcomes of various vulnerability assessments that have been carried out in Lebanon (including the 2 iterations of the WFP-led Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) and sectoral surveys carried out by UN agencies/international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)). DFID also looks to support efficiencies in the response, including the use of cash as a multi-sector response tool and innovative projects with positive impacts for Syrians and Lebanese alike, which are increasingly important in light of reduced funding.

We have used the government’s national planning documents and other reports such as those produced by UN agencies and International Financial Institutions, and our own analysis as evidence to support programming that addresses broader stability issues. We have drawn particularly on the 2013 World Bank Impact Assessment and the work on the 2015/16 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan as the analysis underpinning our strategic choices. We have also chosen to work where we believe there is both a gap in the market and an opportunity: for example, on education, where there happens to be a visionary minister and a solid sector-wide plan (Reaching All Children with Education). This made it easier to back this sector with confidence.

For our support to local municipalities, we are funding independent research to look at the linkages between our programme interventions and local community tensions so that in future years programme design can be informed accordingly.

Work on jobs and livelihoods are at an early stage, but there is consensus among the Lebanese government and the international community, supported by a growing body of evidence, that this is a critical driver of instability. It is also an area that is currently woefully underserved by donors.

Evidence supporting work on countering violent extremism is also limited. There is a highly complex picture of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that interact with each other in context specific ways. It is possible to identify statistically significant links between certain factors but these do not amount to causal relationships.

While a sound hypothesis can be set out that our humanitarian and additional support promotes stability, it is too early to identify a strong basis of evidence to back this up. During the life of this plan we will work to build up the evidence required to show the impact of our interventions. Any programmes without a strong evidence base will be designed to ensure that they contribute to building an evidence base for future interventions.
Delivery and Resources

Instruments of delivery
We will channel the majority of our humanitarian support in line with RRP6/the new Lebanon Crisis Response plan through:

- **UN agencies** such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF, informed by the 2013 Multilateral Aid Review Update and our own 2014 Annual Review. Where organisational weaknesses have been identified, we will seek to mitigate these through programme design and influence our partners to address these weaknesses. We will push UN agencies to take a longer term approach less based on emergency provision and more on promoting coping mechanisms.

- **INGOs**, who are able to deliver results in Lebanon. We have moved from short term emergency support to longer term multi-year funding.

For programming that targets broader stability objectives we will work mainly with:

- **The government of Lebanon**, in areas where our relatively small but flexible and grant-based resources can have an impact in helping to build service capacity or leverage policy reform, such as education or municipal authorities.

- **Other donors**, such as the US or EU and the **International Financial Institutions** who are providing larger scale support and who we can partner with to channel targeted resources to meet the particular needs of refugees and host communities as part of bigger, more sustainable interventions.

- **UN agencies and international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs)**, with a proven track record of operating successfully in Lebanon.

Other Regional Activity
We are at the forefront of the international community’s response to the Syria crisis in Lebanon. We are supporting the government to help minimise refugees’ negative impact on the economy and society and manage the impacts on host communities. We are supporting and shaping the government’s efforts to ensure plans are clear and prioritised and co-ordinate key NGO and UN delivery partners. We are working closely across Whitehall to ensure we have a joined up, coherent response to the Syria crisis in Lebanon.

Maximising the impact of our people
To ensure we can continue to deliver a high quality programme our staff will need strong programme management skills with a focus on risk management and risk mitigation. We will also ensure strong senior oversight and clear accountability for all programmes. As staff will also travel frequently around Lebanon and the wider region it is critical that all our staff are appropriately trained in personal security and safety, which we will continue to prioritise.
Planned Programme Spend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar/Strategic</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2015/16 (provisional*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource £'000</td>
<td>Capital £'000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Security</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62,200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Expenditure figures for 2015/16 are indicative. DFID works in a variety of challenging environments, including fragile and conflict affected areas. Humanitarian work is often reactive and can be scaled up or down. An element of flexibility within funding allocations is necessary to ensure that we can balance the need for long term planning alongside the ability to respond where necessary to changing requirements.

2015/16 planned programme spend for Jordan and Lebanon have been drawn from both MENA Regional and Syria allocations for 2015/16, which leaves the latter teams with reduced spending plans when compared to 2014/15. However this is a structural change only and there is no net change on the agreed allocations.

The 2014/15 figures are presented here to show programme spend over time but are also included in the MENAD Regional and Syria Operational Plans.
Planned Operating Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2015/16 (provisional*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£'000</td>
<td>£'000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontline Delivery Costs – Pay</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontline Delivery Costs – Non Pay</td>
<td>888</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative costs - Pay</td>
<td>688</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative costs – Non Pay</td>
<td>321</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td>3,575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Expenditure figures for 2015/16 are indicative. DFID works in a variety of challenging environments, including fragile and conflict affected areas. Humanitarian work is often reactive and can be scaled up or down. An element of flexibility within funding allocations is necessary to ensure that we can balance the need for long term planning alongside the ability to respond where necessary to changing requirements.

These figures represent total operating costs for delivery of the MENAD Regional, Lebanon and Jordan Operational Plans.

These operating costs do not reflect the full costs of delivering the programme as most of the humanitarian programmes are multi-country and are managed by the Syria team in London.
Delivering Value for Money

**DFID Lebanon is maximising the impact of every pound that is spent on poor people’s lives.**

There is a compelling argument for making targeted interventions now, both to support people in need, as well as to prevent greater instability in Lebanon. DFID in Lebanon is committed to delivering Value for Money (VfM) in all aspects of its work. Careful selection of partners is a key part of our approach to ensuring VfM. We will also maximise the impact of our programming while minimising the financial cost to the UK taxpayer, using the UK government ‘3E’ framework of effectiveness, efficiency and economy, in line with National Audit Office (NAO) guidance. Key to this will be ensuring that our partners provide VfM in their operations and consistently demonstrate what they are doing to improve VfM. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) identifies areas where each UN agency needs to improve its VfM. We have developed priority areas for action based on performance. These areas will provide the basis for our institutional engagement with each UN agency. For NGO partners we will continue to agree VfM improvements as part of assessing proposals and monitoring programmes. On our support to municipalities and on education, we are ensuring value for money by making smart choices on our delivery partners based on capacity, national reach/scale, political will, and where we can have most impact with limited finance and staff.

We have made good progress in ensuring VfM throughout the programme by:

- Developing a VfM approach paper for our overall Syria and neighbouring countries response which was agreed by the Syria Humanitarian Programme Board in February 2014;
- Ensuring agreement letters to UN agencies include MAR recommendations as well as priority performance targets;
- Providing guidance to partners on DFID’s expectations on VfM in programmes, covering all 3 dimensions of VfM based on the 3 Es;
- Embedding analysis of VfM in the programme approval processes;
- Monitoring VfM regularly as part of assessing programme performance;
- Building on evidence where it exists and where it does not have process in place to generate high quality evidence;
- Supporting reform of the Conflict Pool which links into our wider stability work, to ensure a more rigorous approach to allocation and results monitoring.

We will continue to improve VfM and our risk management and financial performance by:

- Embedding VfM at key steps in our project cycle management processes and ensuring that appropriate tools are used;
- Ensuring all staff make VfM considerations a priority in programme management;
- Monitoring and ensuring VfM through our implementing partners’ systems, making sure that the benefits are captured and estimated in monetary terms in a cost effective way;
- Comparing the administrative and unit costs of our partners in order to identify best practice;
- Overcoming the scarcity of good quality data and evidence to assess VfM;
- Generating evidence on best practice in VfM work in fragile and conflict affected states;
- Ensuring all staff understand the latest corporate guidance on VfM, including through induction training;
- Improving risk management of financial performance and increased quality of forecasting and variance analysis through improved usage of systems;
- Using our quarterly risks and results portfolio review to ensure programme quality.
Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring

MENAD will carry out on-going monitoring to assess progress against this Operational Plan and the Results Framework. Due to the nature of the environment in which we work, it is also important that we focus on monitoring and managing risks, as well as results, and we take appropriate action to review results anticipated as the context evolves:

How: We will make sure all of our programmes have a monitoring framework, which will track progress in delivering outputs. All programmes scoring consecutive B’s or a C in their annual review, or which cause concern for other reasons, will have a detailed Performance Improvement Plan. We will continue to develop a programme level results database to capture a single set of verified information for forecasting and recording actual results and other key project level data. At Operational Plan level we will maintain risk frameworks as well as results frameworks, and monitor both together.

Who: DFID staff will assess performance in relation to the overall Operational Plan and make sure that all programmes deliver the information required for monitoring the indicators in the results framework. We will work closely with partners, who will be responsible for the actual monitoring of progress in programmes, assessing their monitoring systems. In areas where access is highly constrained due to insecurity we will set up independent monitoring.

When: Each programme will develop its own reporting timetable but at a minimum each programme will be monitored annually. Risks will be monitored quarterly and progress towards Operational Plan objectives will be reviewed every 6 months and recommendations will be made to the team leader where performance needs to improve.

What: Monitoring information will be used to influence the future direction of the programme and to reconsider approaches where necessary. At an Operational Plan level, the information will be used to determine areas of strong and weaker progress, so that remedial action can be taken where progress is slow.

Evaluation

The MENAD Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy\(^1\) is the framework for our approach to evaluation during implementation of this Operational Plan. It sets out guidance for programmes to evaluate, plan, manage and communicate findings from evaluations.

Projects operating in Lebanon often do so with innovative approaches and in a high risk context. Consequently, high level of evaluation is required. For all programmes with a budget of £5 million and over, an independent evaluation will be considered at the programme design stage, where possible in conjunction with partners. We will strive to ensure that lessons from these evaluation studies (as well as any from other donors and agencies) feed into DFID’s broader knowledge base.

Building capacity of partners

As well as building the monitoring and evaluation skills of its own staff, DFID works with a range of partners in the MENA region, some of which are non-traditional partners for DFID, and it is an important part of the work of MENAD to engage them on the importance of solid monitoring and evaluation in joint programmes, and the importance of building a solid evidence base for working in the region.

\(^1\) This strategy is kept under reviewed to ensure it is still appropriate for MENAD’s rapidly evolving environment.
Transparency

Transparency is one of the top priorities for the UK government. It helps people see where money is going and for what purpose. It helps improve value for money and makes governments everywhere more accountable to their citizens. DFID is a world leader in aid transparency and has an ambitious vision for both DFID and its partners. We will ensure that we play our part in continuing to work towards that vision – set out in a suite of commitments the Aid Transparency Guarantee (ATG), Aid Transparency Challenge (ATC) and DFID’s Open Data Strategy.

Actions to ensure DFID meets its commitments in the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee

We are committed to transparency about our work, except in circumstances where release of information could put DFID staff or others at risk. We will support DFID’s transparency commitments by:

- Ensuring that all information in the public domain is comprehensive, accessible, accurate, timely and written in plain English.

- Publishing a summary of this Operational Plan in English and Arabic on the DFID website.

- Ensuring the UN’s Financial Tracking Service and DFID’s Development Tracker are kept up to date.

- Continuing our efforts, in liaison with the DFID press office, to keep international and local journalists informed of our activity and results achieved.

Supporting transparency in our work

- We are committed to being transparent about our work, except in circumstances where release of information could put DFID staff or others at risk.

- We will increase opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback on project performance.

- We will seek similar levels of transparency from our partners (CSOs, contractors, other donors)

- We will push other donors for transparency in their funding allocations towards the Syria crisis, in co-ordination with the UN.

- We will also work with others to push for improvements in UN reporting on needs, gaps, and the response.
Annex A: Changes to Operational Plan

N/A – This is a new Operational Plan
Annex B: Human Rights Assessment

Human rights context
The human rights picture in Lebanon is mixed. Freedom House considered Lebanon’s media to be ‘partly free’ in its 2014 Freedom of the Press report. It assessed that ‘Lebanon’s media environment remained among the freest in the region in 2013’. The Human Rights Committee of the Lebanese Parliament has drafted a Human Rights Action Plan, but this has not yet been adopted by a parliamentary vote. The law does not specifically prohibit all forms of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The UN Committee Against Torture concluded in 2014 that torture was ‘a pervasive practice’. Lebanon’s security agencies have taken steps to improve human rights and community trust, such as the adoption of a Code of Conduct by the Internal Security Forces, with UK support. UNRWA assess that ‘Palestine refugees are unable to claim the same rights as other foreigners living and working in Lebanon’.

Economic and social rights: Lebanon ranks 65th on the Human Development Index for 2014, no change from 2013. Though officially a middle income country in terms of GDP, Lebanon suffers from a poverty rate of around one in four (on a measure of $4 a day). The World Bank assesses that around 170,000 more will be pushed into poverty in 2014 as a result of the Syria crisis. Lebanon’s progress towards the achievement of the MDGs has been challenged by a complicated political situation and spillovers of the Syrian crisis, particularly the health MDGs. Available data shows that Lebanon met the targets of the education goal (enrolment rates are 90-100%) and the three health goals, especially reducing child and maternal mortality (under-five mortality rate is 9, maternal mortality rate 25) but these achievements are now at risk. Lebanon is not expected to achieve the poverty reduction goal (MDG1) and the environmental sustainability goal (MDG7).

Non-discrimination: Lebanon’s record on women’s empowerment and gender balance is mixed, ranking 80 on the Gender Equality Index. Maternal mortality ratio is 25, female seats in Parliament 3.1%. Labour force participation rate: Female 22.8%, Male 70.5%. Lebanon has acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1997), with a reservation on women’s choice of family name. However, there are a number of discriminatory provisions which hamper women’s access to their human rights. Personal status laws, relating to marriage and family, are based on religious laws, under which women cannot transfer Lebanese nationality to their children.

Civil and political rights: Lebanon scores 4.5 (‘Partly Free’) on Freedom House’s civil and political liberties scale. The EU election observer mission concluded that “the 2009 parliamentary elections marked an important step towards the consolidation of democracy in Lebanon” but presented 36 recommendations for action. Lebanon underwent the UN Universal Periodic Review process in 2010 and accepted 69 of the Committee’s recommendations (rejecting 40). Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and does not have legislation in place to address the specific needs of refugees and asylum-seekers.

Direction of travel: Freedom House assessed that civil rights in Lebanon were affected by political paralysis stemming from the Syrian conflict that prevented the passage of a new electoral law and led to the postponement of national elections until late 2014. Legislative progress on social and economic rights is largely stalled due to a political stalemate which makes Cabinet and parliament decisions very difficult. However there have been some positive developments on women’s empowerment: in 2014, Parliament passed a law criminalising domestic violence, though it stopped short of criminalising marital rape. A record number of women candidates (45) registered for the 2013 Parliamentary elections, which were postponed. However, during 2014 there has been an increase in reports of violence against Syrian refugee communities (ref: Human Rights Watch’ and BBC reports).

UK approach and focus
- Support positive trends on social and economic rights
- Work to address inequalities and, in particular, rights of women and girls
- Uphold civil and political rights particularly key issues highlighted in context analysis

4 http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon
5 https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/lebanon-0#.VJF9xpSIC9I
8 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28011950
• **Build more inclusive and accountable institutions**, including parliamentary and electoral systems and judicial and security institutions.

• **Empower citizens to claim their rights** for example through strengthened voice and accountability in service delivery.

• Monitor and address reports of **human rights violations against refugees**, raising concerns with the relevant authorities or institutions.