Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism

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Introduction
1.01 The UK faces a significant threat from international terrorism. Experience shows that crowded places are and will remain an attractive target for international terrorists. CONTEST sets out the Government’s strategy for countering terrorism. An important element of the strategy is to create safer places and buildings that are less vulnerable to terrorist attack and, should an attack take place, where people are better protected from its impact.

1.02 Whilst this guidance applies only to England, it may be of interest to Devolved Administrations. Designing-out crime and designing-in community safety are already central considerations in planning development. Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 requires all local authorities to exercise their functions with due regard to their likely effect on crime and disorder, and to do all they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder. Crime for these purposes includes terrorism, and good counter-terrorism protective security is also good crime prevention.

1.03 Local authorities should have regard to this guidance when preparing local development documents and the guidance is capable of being a material consideration in the determination of planning applications. The guide does not however set out new policy or specific legal requirements. It provides advice on how counter-terrorism protective security measures can be incorporated into new developments whilst ensuring that they are of high design quality. Although primarily directed at new developments, the advice is also relevant to improving the security of existing buildings and the public realm. It should be noted that Building Regulations do not include specific measures intended to deal with terrorist activity and therefore compliance with Building Regulations should not be assumed to indicate consideration of the issues raised in this guide.

What is a crowded place?

1.04 A crowded place is a location or environment to which members of the public have access that may be considered potentially liable to terrorist attack by virtue of its crowd density. What counts as a crowded place is a matter of judgment. Crowded places will be found in a wide range of locations including: sports stadia, pubs, clubs, bars, shopping centres, high streets, visitor attractions, cinemas, theatres and commercial centres. Crowded places can also include the public realm - open spaces such as parks and squares. A crowded place will not necessarily be crowded at all times — crowd densities may vary during the day or night, and may be temporary, as in the case of sporting events or open air festivals.
What other guidance is available?

1.05 The National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) has published a series of counter-terrorism protective security guidance booklets for the different crowded places sectors and links to the documents can be found on their website.

1.06 Information about counter-terrorism design and technical issues can be found in 'Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues'.

1.07 Specific requirements are in place for transport facilities, such as airports, railways and ports, some of which are legally binding. The Department for Transport can provide further information. Details can be found on the DfT website. Schools already address counter-terrorism within their broader security and emergency planning work.
2.01 This section provides advice on the matters that are taken into account when considering the risk of terrorist attack, the proportionate response to that risk and how best to integrate counter-terrorism protective security measures as part of good urban design.

Guiding principles

2.02 The Government’s aim in promoting counter-terrorism design principles is to create safer places and buildings so that people are better protected from terrorist attack. This is to be achieved within the context of Government’s overall aim to encourage the creation of buildings which are practical, sustainable, affordable, attractive, and also deliver social goals, for instance, by designing out crime.

2.03 As with any design considerations, it is most effective if counter-terrorism protective security measures are considered as early as possible in the planning and development process. This does not just mean at pre-application stage – it means from the point that any local policy is developed and developers consider acquiring land or consider any remodelling of existing buildings. It is particularly important that developers factor in likely protective security measures early because, based on the ‘user pays’ principle, their cost falls where the responsibility for those measures lies. As the level of risk varies, counter-terrorism protective security measures should be proportionate to the risk of terrorist attack to which the building or place is exposed.

Assessing risk

2.04 Assessments of risk are based on the threat of a terrorist attack, vulnerability to it and the impact if it should occur. A local police Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA) makes this assessment in their area using guidance issued jointly by the Home Office and NaCTSO. This ensures a standard approach is taken across the UK. The four levels describing the severity of the risk of a terrorist attack are described in Figure 1 below.
Counter-terrorism and good design

Counter-terrorism design principles

2.05 The local CTSA will advise prospective applicants on a range of measures, proportionate to the level of risk. Measures will aim to:

- Deter a would-be terrorist – by providing physical and electronic security measures, coupled with good management practices;
- Detect an intrusion – by providing alarm and visual detection systems with verification; and
- Delay an intrusion for a sufficient period of time to allow a response force to attend - by putting in place physical security measures.

2.06 Typical measures that help to deter, detect and delay a terrorist attack are set out in Table 1 below. They are grouped under four key counter-terrorism design principles: better blast resistance; better building management facilities; better traffic management and hostile vehicle mitigation measures; and better oversight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-terrorism design principles</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
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| Better blast resistance            | • external barriers or a strengthened perimeter to prevent a penetrative (ramming) or close proximity (parked or encroachment) attack;  
• use of building materials which reduce the risk of fragmentation including blast resistant glazing and structural design which reduces the risk of building collapse; and  
• install doors and locks which are better able to withstand entry from armed intruders and provide robust ground floor facade material, which together will help to provide cover for people caught up in a firearms attack. |
| Better building management facilities | • entrance arrangements which resist hostile entry;  
• the separation of general heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems for entrance areas, delivery areas and mailrooms from those occupying the main occupied spaces;  
• air intakes that are in a secure area and above first floor level;  
• hazardous material stores that are at a safe distance from the building; and  
• communications systems (eg public address systems) installed to pass on advice to those caught up in a firearms attack. |
| Better traffic management and hostile vehicle mitigation measures | • structural measures that prevent access to, or close proximity of, unscreened vehicles to the building or space; and  
• measures that reduce the speed of vehicles approaching the site or its defences, like bends or chicanes. |
| Better oversight | • clear lines of sight around a building;  
| | • absence of recesses on the façade or elevations of a building;  
| | • uncluttered street furniture;  
| | • well maintained and managed litter-free building surrounds that reduce the opportunity for suspicious hidden items and suspect activity to go unnoticed;  
| | • CCTV and security guarding to provide formal oversight;  
| | • orientating the building so that it overlooks public space and neighbouring buildings to support informal oversight by those who use and visit the location; and  
| | • well-managed access points and reception facilities that offer less opportunity for intruders to go undetected and may deter them from taking further action. |

2.07 In general, the more that a potential improvised explosive device can be separated from a building, the less critical a building’s form and fabric becomes.

2.08 It is often difficult to assess the blast resistance of an historic building and even more difficult to improve it by reinforcement. Counter-terrorism measures often therefore involve physical measures such as restricted access or better oversight. Where it is necessary to prevent vehicles from getting close proximity, care needs to be taken where there are historic ground surfaces. If there is valuable underground archaeology, shallow excavation or surface mounted/pinned barrier solutions will often be favourable. In especially sensitive locations, it may be better to prevent uncontrolled vehicular access to the surrounding streets completely, displacing the traffic management works to a less sensitive location.

2.09 Each site is clearly different and there is no “one size fits all” solution. Different sites present unique challenges and considerations that will often require bespoke solutions.

**Integrating counter-terrorism into the public realm**

2.10 Physical measures may be useful in the wider area as part of a range of measures necessary to provide satisfactory protection for a particular building. This is to help ensure that there is not a concentration of vehicle restrictions or displacement and streets and spaces are not unnecessarily congested with security infrastructure. Physical measures can also usefully be incorporated into the public realm as part of any general environmental improvements, particularly as most measures will also benefit crime prevention.

2.11 Measures could include street design that limits unscreened vehicular access to vulnerable target areas or structures, measures that monitor public safety or a visible security presence. The design of the measures will need to take into account the impact on transport and pedestrian movement around an area; the needs of key interested parties and people that live, work and visit a place or building, including the needs of disabled people; the need for measures to be unobtrusive; and any impacts on the historic environment (see also paragraphs 2.08, 3.12 and 3.13).

**On-going management and maintenance of counter-terrorism protective security measures**

2.12 Counter-terrorism protective security measures may require on-going maintenance to remain effective and to ensure that the quality of what was designed at the outset remains attractive and functional. These on-going costs need to be borne in mind when deciding which measures are most appropriate and deliverable over the life-time of the building or space. For more complex schemes a management and maintenance plan can be useful to provide a framework for periodic review of need and appropriateness of the measures, and for periodic checking of integrity and scheduled maintenance.

2.13 In addition to formal measures, informal measures and oversight can be provided in a range of ways, for example:
• by putting trained staff into spaces - park rangers for larger spaces and on-site maintenance for smaller spaces can provide effective oversight that is flexible and responsive. In addition, a wide range of services within the space like interaction with the community, locking up, checking for damage and maintenance tasks will also help; and

• by local interested parties working together e.g. local community groups managing spaces or using spaces for community events and activities.
Counter-terrorism and the planning process

Plan making
3.01 Planning reform underway including through the Localism Act and the draft National Planning Policy Framework is aimed at delivering a more effective, streamlined service that is plan-led. Local planning authorities, with the police and other partners, should work to ensure that an appropriate local strategy is in place to guide proposals for higher risk buildings and spaces where they exist.

Development management
3.02 Pre-application discussions between prospective applicants and the local CTSA are vital to ensure that the applicant is aware right at the beginning of the design process of the level of risk and the sorts of measures available to mitigate this risk in a proportionate and well-designed manner. Where the development has an impact on the historic environment, then early contact with English Heritage is recommended too.

3.03 There may be a number of risks in any given development or place and they may be assessed at any of the four levels (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2). The local CTSA will distinguish between those measures needed to mitigate risk in the two highest risk severity categories (i.e. high and medium-high) and those in the lower two categories (i.e. medium and low). The local CTSA, and in some cases other specialist advisers, will advise applicants on specific counter-terrorism protective security measures that would mitigate the level of risk they have identified. Any measures, contingency plans and monitoring arrangements that the local CTSA advises will be proportionate to the risk posed and any implications on business and local authorities will be kept to a minimum.

3.04 Ideally, applicants and the local CTSA should come to an agreement on how best to mitigate identified risks, taking into account the cost of different measures, and the impact on the function and design of the building or place. Where the local CTSA is satisfied with the proposed design, they will support the planning application.

3.05 Where the level of risk falls within the two higher categories and the local CTSA is not satisfied with the measures that are proposed, the local CTSA is likely to object to the planning application, setting out the measures that they believe need to be incorporated. When determining the planning application, the local planning authority will need to consider whether or not the additional measures recommended by the local CSTA can be appropriately achieved through the planning system. Where particular measures are considered appropriate, the local planning authority should then consider whether these measures are:

- proportionate, taking into account, for example, whether there are particular operational or other reasons why full compliance has not been considered possible; and
• balanced with other relevant material considerations.

3.06 If the local planning authority considers that particular measures are not appropriate, proportionate and balanced with other material considerations they may refuse the application or impose a planning condition that requires these measures to be put in place.

3.07 Where the risk assessments fall within the two lower categories, the local CTSA will provide the applicant with advice as to how to mitigate risks. This advice will recognise that implementation, whilst desirable, will not be the highest priority given the lower risk assessment. The local CTSA will not however object to the planning application if the proposed measures are not incorporated.

3.08 A Section 106 (of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990) agreement can require a management and maintenance plan where the local planning authority considers it necessary. This could include the circumstances where measures can be removed when they are no longer required. Where security infrastructure is to be located on the public highway, Section 278 (of the Highways Act 1980) agreements may be considered necessary. Such agreements ensure that the Highway Authority is able to retain full control over the public highway whilst the security measures are in place. Both of these agreements can be used to ensure that the whole-life cost of installation, management and maintenance are met by the beneficiaries of the security measures.

Sensitivity in planning applications

3.09 Where applications have been certified by the local CTSA (or the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure) as providing counter-terrorism protective security measures that are proportionate to the risk, there is no need for the applicant to include any sensitive information. The local planning authority would not need to request further details unless it considers such information to be critical to determining the application.

3.10 Where the local planning authority asks for further information to make a decision, but this cannot be supplied, they will refuse (or fail to determine) the application. When the appeal goes to inquiry, the applicant would apply to the Secretary of State for a national security direction under Section 321 Town and Country Planning Act 1990, such that the ‘closed evidence’ would only be seen by named persons, probably including a special advocate to represent the interests of those who cannot see or hear the ‘closed evidence’ (see paragraphs 6-23 of the Memorandum to DCLG Circular 02/2006 ‘Crown Application of the Planning Acts’).

Historic environment

3.11 It is good practice for the applicant to discuss with the local planning authority what level of detail should be included in the application in order for a decision to be made. In these cases, or where the local planning authority has asked for further information as described above, the applicant may be willing to submit all the information required to the local planning authority, but would prefer them to keep the security information separate from the main Planning Register, making it available to enquirers only after specific request. The CTSA or other security adviser will need to certify that the information to be kept separate is sensitive before this procedure can be followed. The detailed procedure is set out in a letter from Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) dated 24 May 2007 to Chief Planning Officers and in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Memorandum to DCLG Circular 02/2006 ‘Crown Application of the Planning Acts’.

3.12 Counter-terrorism protective security measures have two key impacts on the historic environment: visual and physical. For temporary works, minimising physical impact is more important and reversibility is a key principle - however, for more permanent measures, both visual and physical impact are important. In conservation areas, World Heritage Sites, sites within the setting of listed buildings or scheduled monuments and registered parks and gardens, the impact on character and on historic fabric, including ground surfaces and underground archaeology needs to be considered. Where historic burials are anticipated, special precautions and appropriate consent may be necessary. Works within the curtilage of a listed building or involving the building itself may also require listed building consent.
3.13 Technology, such as CCTV cameras, needs sensitive positioning to minimise visual and physical impact. ‘Technology’ generally has a limited life and works to accommodate it need to be completely reversible. Applications for planning permission and/or listed building consent therefore need to be accompanied by detailed plans, for example, specifying methods of fixing where works affect the historic fabric.
Annexes
Annex A: Sources of counter-terrorism advice

National Counter-Terrorism Security Office
The National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) is a police unit that provides advice on counter-terrorism protective security and business continuity. NaCTSO trains, tasks and coordinates a nationwide network of specialist police advisers known as Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs). The primary role of these advisers is to provide help, advice and guidance on all aspects of counter-terrorism protective security across a variety of business sectors. There is at least one CTSA in every police force in the UK. The core role of the CTSA is to identify and assess local critical sites within their force area that might be vulnerable to terrorist or extremist attack, then to devise and develop appropriate protective security plans to minimise impact on that site and the surrounding community.

Organisations on the Register can be engaged to provide costed protective security advice or to develop or comment on other advice received from CTSAs.

Architectural Liaison Officers/Crime Prevention Design Advisers
Police Architectural Liaison Units provide crime risk management and “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design” advice within their police force area in order to reduce opportunities for crime and disorder. Local arrangements are in place whereby local planning authorities consult on relevant planning applications. The Architectural Liaison Officer / Crime Prevention Design Adviser will notify their policy force CTSA if there is a counter-terrorism protective security dimension that warrants more detailed scrutiny.

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is a Government authority which provides protective security advice to businesses and organisations across the national infrastructure. CPNI sponsors the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists (RSES) who have met professional competence standards as determined by the Institution of Civil Engineers.
End notes
1) Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as:
The use or threat of a specified action where the use or threat is designed to influence the
government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section
of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial
or ideological cause. The action is a specified action if it involves serious violence against a person;
involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life, other than the person committing
the action; creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; or is
designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

2) https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/threat-levels.html
3) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat/
4) http://www.nactso.gov.uk
5) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat/protect
6) http://www.dft.gov.uk
7) http://www.dft.gov.uk/transportforyou/access/peti/inclusivemobility
8) http://www.nactso.gov.uk
9) http://www.cpni.gov.uk

10) Further advice on the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists (RSES) are also available from
the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) (see website: http://www.ice.org.uk). ICE details can also be
found on http://www.cpni.gov.uk and http://www.nactso.gov.uk