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1 Project Overview

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 The Inner City Safety Demonstration Project (ICSDP) is part of a family of Department for Transport (DfT) sponsored road safety demonstration projects, each conceived to address specific road safety issues. As the last major project to be identified, it was very much seen as the final stepping stone in tackling road safety in difficult environments with the inner city project considered the ‘ultimate challenge’.

1.2 PROJECT BACKGROUND

1.2.1 The project aimed to treat the complex road safety challenges of inner city Birmingham through a combination of route treatments, standalone projects and area-wide Education, Training and Publicity (ETP) activities.

1.2.2 It aimed to draw upon the experience and learning of the projects that came before it but delivered in a different context. The parallels with previous demonstration projects are significant and this provided an opportunity to validate or challenge conclusions reached on other projects.

1.2.3 As well as delivering the core aim of reducing road casualties there was a desire to develop a scheme that addressed wider social and economic objectives of inner city areas in Birmingham and elsewhere. Core objectives established by the project team were as follows:

- **Objective 1**: To have a measurable impact on road safety in actual and perceived terms. This primary aim was linked to DfT’s Road Safety Strategy casualty reduction targets, 2000-2010 (as set out in Tomorrow’s Roads: Safer for Everyone, DfT 2000, the targets expired in December 2010).

- **Objective 2**: To integrate road safety activity into the regeneration and other agendas and build partnerships for delivery. This sought to see how, through improved working across organisational barriers, enhanced outcomes could be achieved.

- **Objective 3**: To secure inclusive engagement and participation with a diverse community, and influencing local views about road safety. This reflected a wider aspiration of Birmingham City Council (BCC) to use its activities to engage with the community.

- **Objective 4**: To improve accessibility to jobs, services and leisure opportunities. Reflects the challenge of ensuring that investment in a variety of improvements could and should enhance life chances for the local community.

- **Objective 5**: To improve quality of life; a safer, vibrant, more stable community. Aligned with wider aspirations to improve opportunities and social cohesion in a very distinct part of Birmingham’s community.
1.3 LOCATION

1.3.1 The scheme area lies to the east of the city centre and covers an area of approximately five square miles. Within the area are several local shopping centres, schools, places of employment, leisure facilities and places of worship. The project area boundaries are set by the A47 to the north, by the A4040 and the River Cole to the east, and by the A45 to the south. These roads, combined with a myriad of railway lines to the west of the project area act as further physical constraints to movement.

1.3.2 In addition to the key roads mentioned above, Bordesley Green Road and Alum Rock Road serve as important arterial routes through the project area. East-west links are not common in the area and so those routes in the area tend to be congested and also tend to carry key public transport services.

1.4 ROAD SAFETY HISTORY

1.4.1 The key road safety issues in the area were:

- significantly higher rates of child pedestrian casualties (2.18 per 1000 child population vs. 0.3 and 0.2 for Birmingham City and England respectively);
- a high proportion, 64%, of pedestrian casualties with the cause attributed to ‘dangerous action in the carriageway’ (against a 7% national average);
- high numbers of accidents recorded along main roads through the area with only a handful of notable clusters;
- high numbers of hit and run accidents recorded;
- most pedestrians injured whilst crossing the road were not using a crossing and were masked by a vehicle; and
- excessive speed was recorded as a contributory factor in only 3% of incidents.

1.5 APPROACH

1.5.1 The overall project, ultimately delivered by BCC, comprised the following:

- four distinct scheme areas, two route based, involving traffic engineering and parking management;
- a small number of standalone schemes for individual junctions; and
- ETP initiatives targeting a number of key user groups where specific road safety problems had been identified.
**Alum Rock Road**

1.5.2 The scheme comprised two main areas of work; treatment of the main road and supplementary works on surrounding residential streets. This involved a range of traffic calming features (speed cushions, raised tables, and junction entry treatments), wider footways, and junction improvements at key locations to resolve congestion, safety and accessibility issues.

1.5.3 Improvements included pedestrian crossings, traffic calming where necessary, lighting for safety, improved footways (including surfacing and removal of obstructions) and provision of a new off-street car park.

1.5.4 Key measures delivered included:

- changes to parking & loading arrangements and improved pedestrian environment (west end of Alum Rock Road);
- Timed restrictions allow parking and loading according to the prevailing flow of traffic (i.e. no parking/loading for eastbound traffic, away from the city centre, during the PM peak) to reduce congestion;
- Restricting parking/loading to one side of the street during busy periods improves visibility for all users – the aim being to reduce accidents involving pedestrians crossing between parked vehicles; and
- Creating clearly defined parking/loading bays with footpath extensions and new markings has allowed the widening of footways and narrowing of traffic lanes on the carriageway to reduce both vehicle speeds and crossing distances for pedestrians – key contributors to accidents on the route.

**Coventry Road**

1.5.5 All of the options considered included specific junction treatments to improve pedestrian facilities. Core elements included measures to reduce the traffic speeds between junctions, measures to discourage “through” traffic from Coventry Road on to the Small Heath Highway and measures to assist pedestrians to cross the road between junctions.

1.5.6 The scheme principally involved junction upgrades, pedestrian facilities and enhancements to the pedestrian environment and various other minor measures. Elements of traffic calming have also been included on surrounding roads.

1.5.7 Aims and objectives for the measures developed for Coventry Road are summarised as follows:

- widened footways, constraining vehicular access to forecourt areas and clearly defining driveway access points. The aim being to reduce conflict between pedestrians and vehicles mounting/crossing the footway to access forecourt areas and driveways;
• increasing the footway area and providing a clear boundary between the footway (public highway) and private forecourt areas discouraging blocking of the footway by vehicles that forced pedestrians onto the carriageway; and
• introducing pedestrian crossings, improved lighting for safety and improved footways (including surfacing and removal/prevention of obstructions), all aimed at improving pedestrian accessibility as well as tackling high levels of pedestrian casualties where there were previously few crossing facilities.

Green Lane
1.5.8 The scheme comprises parking and loading changes, junction upgrades and improved pedestrian facilities along Green Lane itself, and also extensive traffic calming on the residential streets that run between Bordesley Green and Green Lane. Aims and objectives for the measures developed for Green Lane are summarised as follows:
• junction improvements (Green Lane and Bordesley Green) to address some serious accident clusters, includes the introduction of parking restrictions to improve visibility;
• introduction of one-way streets (between Green Lane and Bordesley Green) to reduce conflict at side street junctions; and
• traffic calming on residential streets (between Green Lane and Bordesley Green) to reduce vehicle speeds and mitigate potentially higher speeds from one-way running.

Ward End
1.5.9 Aims and objectives are broader than for the other schemes where accidents were more clearly associated with particular key routes and junctions. In Ward End there were high levels of child pedestrian casualties spread throughout the area in both residential streets and on distributor roads.

1.5.10 Improvements ranged from speed reduction measures on link roads to improved facilities for pedestrians and an assessment of access arrangements on residential streets (often used as through routes by commuter traffic). Local centres were improved to ensure shops are more directly accessible to pedestrians and control parking around the shops to improve safety.

1.5.11 The key aims of the work throughout the area can be summarised as follows:
• reduce child pedestrian casualties through traffic calming on residential streets and targeted crossing and junction improvements;
• provide area-wide accessibility improvements to ensure that local centres, community facilities and public transport can be reached easily by walking and cycling; and
to develop a network of safe routes that provide for the main accessibility needs of people living and working in the area.

1.6 ENGAGEMENT OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

1.6.1 The Council planned to adopt an approach to consultation and engagement that differed significantly from conventional methods for engineering schemes. The intention was to develop schemes through regular and on-going engagement of the community from problem identification all the way through to finalising and delivering schemes.

1.6.2 Separate to the engagement with community groups there was recognition of the need to manage and engage the local councillors in the area.

Strategy

1.6.3 A consultation strategy was produced outlining the approach and programme for delivery. Three activities were planned:

- **Steering groups** – steering groups were to be set up that were representative of all of the users in the area. These groups would act as a sounding board throughout the project to assess acceptability and to develop and agree appropriate measures to ensure deliverability.

- **Phase 1: Engagement** - an information gathering exercise consisting of a letter drop with a basic questionnaire, information leaflet and A3 plan for consultees to mark up. Steering groups and design workshops were to be set up to further focus public and stakeholder involvement.

- **Phase 2: Optioneering** - a focused consultation seeking support from consultees on a number of designed options. These options were to be developed following information gathered from Phase 1 and the direction given by steering groups and design workshops. A separate consultation plan was to be developed for this.

1.6.4 BCC’s experience of working towards the delivery of their planned engagement approach presents a range of learning and improvement opportunities, many of which the Council has already adopted. The most significant barrier to successful delivery was not recognising early enough the complexities of the local community and the need for specialist skills to deliver that engagement successfully. The impact of this on the project was far-reaching. It emphasises the importance of getting this element right from the very start on consultation-based scheme development projects.

1.6.5 The role of consultation as a communication and decision-making tool was vital to the success of the project.
**Skills and resources**

1.6.6 At the outset of the project, the consultation was seen as something that, whilst being resource intensive, was deliverable with existing skills and resources in the highways team. This was primarily a result of a desire to ensure that the engineers involved in the design of the schemes were completely immersed in the scheme and were familiar with the expectations of the local community.

1.6.7 The experience in attempting to deliver the consultation exercise indicates that both the skills and resources available within the highways team were not sufficient to meet the complex requirements of the project. The difficulties experienced were varied but key elements were:

- staff were not experienced in how to develop consultation approaches that engaged the interest of some of the more difficult to reach groups;
- staff were not experienced at consensus building where there were conflicting interests; and
- the team did not have the mix of backgrounds required to enable all community groups to be engaged effectively – for example, some groups were unwilling/unable to talk to male members of staff.

1.6.8 The Council subsequently recognised that the approach being adopted was beyond their in-house expertise, but by that time it was too late in the process to be able to effectively start afresh.

1.6.9 Feedback from the project team in a post-completion review highlighted the lack of existing contacts available within local communities. This knowledge would have improved the team’s ability to engage the right people, in the right way, at the right time.

1.6.10 The level of linkage into the community is something that changed for the better throughout the life of the project, as the council moved towards more localised area management functions through a network of neighbourhood coordinators and management teams. This means that there are now local representatives from the council working in the community on a day-to-day basis, through which relationships and networks could be grown.

**Political interface**

1.6.11 Managing the relationship with elected officials (Cabinet Member and ward councillors) was a vital part of the process of achieving consensus, reaching compromise and also a necessary part of the decision-making and authorisation process. In particular with limited delegated powers to individual officers, the relationship with the Cabinet Member was particularly important.
1.6.12 The governance and management structures employed on projects such as this have a significant bearing on the outcomes and quality of delivery. Consideration should be given to the key roles and responsibilities and the links required both internally within the Council and with partner bodies. The management structures should then be established to positively support these relationships.

1.6.13 Where the inter-linkages were not so effective, feedback from consultation events was overturned by politicians leading to a perception from those engaged in discussions that their input had been disregarded. This had inevitable impacts in terms of trust and involvement later in the process.

1.6.14 The extremely low response rate had a number of other implications:
   - scheme options had to be developed from extremely limited data, resulting in uncertainty about whether the real issues and challenges were being addressed;
   - additional time had to be spent by the design teams developing their own understanding of the issues, with knock-on effects to budget and programme; and
   - there was little feedback from the local community on broader local issues despite responses indicating that road safety was not their primary concern.

1.6.15 The project was hampered by possible tensions between its stated aims of improving social capital and a community engagement methodology in which residents would be involved in planning and selection of options. There is scope for confusion here over the function of community engagement – whether it is to ensure the delivery of pre-existing aims, or to decide what needs to be done. Future projects will need to address the extent to which local communities may expect to challenge the stated aims of projects and/or be able to influence the aims and objectives of schemes, in order to avoid raising community expectations that are subsequently dashed.

1.6.16 The project was conceived as an innovative approach to widen the potential benefits of traffic interventions to include aspects of social capital including perceptions of participation and community well-being. While this is to be praised, there was a heavy reliance on a partnership infrastructure that was not fully in place at the start of the project. Where such innovations are planned in future, careful attention needs to be paid to such infrastructure, and the manner in which complex partnership working between agencies will be achieved.
1.7 SCHEME DEVELOPMENT

1.7.1 This section covers the design process, the interaction with the stakeholder engagement activities and lessons learnt through the process.

1.7.2 The council set itself aspirational targets about the level of engagement throughout the design process that the Council intended to deliver. The design teams would work very closely with stakeholder committees in each of the areas to act as sounding boards for the scheme options. The intention was that this would result in a bottom-up, community led approach to the design rather than the top-down approach generally preferred by the Council in its day-to-day activities. In reality this approach was hampered early on, as discussed above.

1.7.3 With some elements of the consultation process lacking sufficient input from local stakeholders to shape the design, it was necessary to revert to a traditional road safety engineering approach for some scheme areas. This was not the originally intended approach but rather more in response to deal with some of the shortcomings of the earlier phases of consultation.

1.7.4 This is not the case for the whole scheme and in areas where public engagement was more successful, or where stakeholders were suitably driven to contribute to the design process (i.e. traders in Alum Rock Road), scheme design was sympathetic to the needs highlighted. It proved difficult for the designers to maintain empathy with the projects aims and objectives as stakeholders’ concerns were far more concerned with everyday operational implications such as on parking, loading and traffic flow.

Skills and Resources

1.7.5 The single most challenging element of the whole project was the identification of a project manager able to manage the many and varied resources and the demands placed upon them. The Council had significant difficulties in sourcing the right person, despite the level of resource available to them. This is indicative of the challenges facing the civil engineering sector in terms of skills shortages.

1.7.6 In previous demonstration projects the most effective delivery has been seen when a single project manager works on the project from inception to delivery. However, in this case there were three different project managers during the later stages of the project. These changes reflected key stages in the project programme when new skills and requirements were needed. Despite the number of changes employed this approach was successful because of the comprehensive handover between managers that ensured complete continuity of knowledge and purpose.
Budget and Funding

1.7.7 The project did suffer from a significant risk of overspend that needed to be addressed mid-way through the scheme development. Value engineering delivered the necessary £1.5m savings but ideally this situation need not have arisen.

1.7.8 In the context of an aspirational scheme design, seeking to address all the concerns of stakeholders and meet the aims and objectives of the project, the lack of budget monitoring is better understood. Meeting these demands is the most important aspect at the development stage and as such the budgetary impact may not be realised until later on in the process. The same issue was apparent at a number of authorities delivering schemes for the Mixed Priority Routes demonstration project.

1.7.9 It would be prudent in future for projects of this nature to be regularly budget reviewed to avoid the need for significant re-engineering after a large proportion of the consultation and design was complete.

1.7.10 Whilst opportunities were considered for funding from other council departments, there was no concerted effort to pursue funding from external sources. This was an approach that lots of other authorities have taken when delivering demonstration projects with funding sources ranging from regional and national bodies through to the European Union, with some leveraging in significant sums. To some degree this reflects the changing economic conditions at the point when the project was moving into construction. It was recognised that this should have been considered at the start of the project to allow for coordination of any awards.

Programme

1.7.11 Final scheme delivery dates varied considerably from the original programme with delays being occurred throughout the consultation and design phases. There were a number of influencing factors that impacted upon scheme delivery, some of which it would be difficult to address even in retrospect. Among these factors are:

- high staff turnover, particularly at project manager level, inevitably incurred delays as replacement staff got up to speed on a large and diverse project (this was mostly the case during the earlier stages of the project);
- consultation activities extended beyond those originally programmed, partially due to underestimating the scale of the task but also due to the difficulties engaging the community in the first round of consultation; and
whilst decision making on a day-to-day basis was devolved, there was difficulty gaining final cabinet approval for many different aspects of the scheme due to the conflicts between the schemes strategic objectives and issues with stakeholders.

1.7.12 However, in response to these issues, BCC instigated a number of changes to the management of the project to ensure that the later stages, particularly design approval through to construction on site, were not significantly delayed any further. As a result of this, a significant amount of time was clawed back in the programme to ensure delivery. The main actions that facilitated this are as follows:

- well defined project manager role – as the scheme progressed BCC developed a better idea of the skills and experience required of the project manager. As a result the performance of the project improved progressively; and
- project management handover – the final change of project manager was at a critical point in the delivery of the project; between detailed design completion and letting the construction contract. BCC ensured that the handover process was seamless with both project managers working in tandem to ensure that no problems would occur.

**Option Development**

1.7.13 The development of engineering options was informed by both “hard” data such as STATS19\(^1\) accident data and the results of Phase 1 consultation.

1.7.14 The results of Phase 1 (responses on key issues, expectation and aspirations) were to be mapped and analysed spatially, i.e. which issues were raised in what locations. This would allow road safety solutions to be developed that also addressed other concerns and expectations of local residents and others. Spatial analysis would also allow consultation results to be analysed in the context of the statistical data available for the area, allowing context-sensitive solutions to be developed easily and the rationale behind the design decisions to be illustrated graphically.

**Preferred Option Selection**

1.7.15 Following development of scheme options, the selection process of the preferred solution would be through further stakeholder consultation. Residents and other stakeholders were to be given an opportunity to comment on preferred options or request further improvements. The approach was to allow discussions with the design engineers and voting on design options through a series of local public exhibitions in order to identify the preferred scheme options.

\(^1\) STATS19 is the standard data collection form used by police to summarise key features of and road traffic accident. The data from this collection forms the basis of GB casualty and accident statistics.
1.7.16 It was envisaged that the development and selection of schemes based on a comprehensive engagement with stakeholders and regular discussion with the steering groups would simplify the political approvals process required to allow officers to move on to the detailed design process.

**Detailed Design and delivery**

1.7.17 There was recognition from the very earliest stages of the process that delivering multi-million pound works in an inner city area covering a number of locations was going to be on an extended timeline for both design and delivery. As a result the programme for delivery was intended to be:

- delivery of small scale “quick wins” to demonstrate intent and provide local benefits in advance of the disruptive major works; and

- delivering of major works to be delivered in the last 2 years of the programme, staggered to reduce cumulative impacts of road closures / capacity reduction / public transport re-routing.

1.7.18 This was a prudent and well-considered approach, recognising some of the barriers to delivery.

1.7.19 Delivery of the engineering schemes was very successfully managed following lessons learnt earlier in the project with regards to staff turnover affecting continuity in project management.

**Procurement**

1.7.20 BCC’s standing orders clearly identified the preferred approach to delivering major schemes – the development of detailed designs, contract drawings and Bills of Quantity. Competitive quotes would then be submitted for the works with final decisions being made by the relevant member of the Cabinet. It was the intention to use this approach for the procurement of the major works, in all likelihood let to a number of contractors and to be constructed in a staggered fashion to reduce the impact on the community of major roadworks running concurrently.

1.7.21 The Council also had the option of using their select list contractors for minor works where this was appropriate.

1.7.22 This considered approach offered the opportunity for flexible procurement but reduced risk of cost escalation as the schemes had been developed to a construction stage by the Council’s in-house design team.
1.7.23 However, with little time in the programme to allow for the full competitive tendering process to be followed, BCC took a different approach to employing contractors on the scheme. Contractors were asked to provide two different sets of costs for comparison, a scale of staff rates and then costs for a range of 'standard' materials/works as deemed appropriate for the project. Contractors were then employed based upon these rates and costs with additional ‘non-standard’ aspects of the work quoted separately on an on-going basis. This enabled construction to start before the detailed design was fully complete as the process negated the need for a full Bill of Quantities for each element of the scheme, whilst costs submitted by contractors enabled the council to get an indication of the likely costs against the designs as they were completed. There are no indications that this approach had any significant impact on the overall implementation costs.

1.8 EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PUBLICITY

1.8.1 ETP was always considered to be a fundamental part of the project, albeit in a supporting role to the engineering interventions. As a result the implementation of the proposed schemes was delayed (in most cases) to tie in with the implementation programme. Since that time the value of the ETP, working across organisational borders, has been recognised and some elements of the approach are funded beyond the end of the project.

1.8.2 The intended approach was to develop ETP using:

- STATS19 data to identify key risk areas;
- outputs from the Phase 1 consultation to identify areas of concern from local stakeholders; and
- experience from DfT’s Neighbourhood Road Safety Initiative where similar areas/problems had been treated in other towns and cities.

1.8.3 The intention was to deliver ETP in a manner that reinforced and supported the engineering works being delivered. They would therefore be delivered in a similar timescale, i.e. mainly delivered towards the end of the project programme.

1.8.4 The programme was developed following a year of detailed research with some projects aimed at specific age groups and others at a broader audience, including parents. Many of the activities centred on delivering educational initiatives in local schools, including the Madrassa (Islamic school) at Green Lane Mosque and others throughout the area. All engaged the help and support of the schools, religious leaders and parents as a means to encouraging participation and maximising the impact of the schemes.
1.8.5 The early stages in the process of developing ETP required an assessment of community need and how ETP could complement the engineering schemes, addressing those aspects of road safety that engineering interventions are least able to do.

1.8.6 The Council certainly did not recognise this in the early stages of the project and this was to the detriment of the project as a whole. Early analysis and development of ETP proposals was undertaken by road safety experts with a singular focus on casualty statistics that did not help the development of a broad-based ETP approach.

1.8.7 Later in the project BCC employed a specialist team. This had significant benefits in terms of improvement in the depth and breadth of understanding and insight. As a result a number of the initiatives developed during the latter stages were given funding to take them beyond the duration of the DfT funding.

1.8.8 In hindsight the Council recognised that some of the links within the community developed through the ETP process would have been extremely beneficial during the early stages in the consultation and engagement process.

1.8.9 With a solid programme of work supported by a clear rationale developed through research and work with schools, mosques and neighbourhood officers, the Council opted to fund ETP projects through Local Transport Plan (LTP) funding beyond the March 2009 time limited DfT funding.

**Schools**

1.8.10 All schools in the project area were visited by the ETP team to deliver road safety education programmes that had been developed according to the different age groups and requirements of the different areas within the project area. A programme was developed with The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) for use in the Green Lane area, ‘Learning by Doing’, taking children out onto the streets and teaching them basic skills to cross the road safely and develop hazard awareness. Schools in the Green Lane area were subject to a concentrated effort as the highest numbers of child casualties were in this area.

1.8.11 Evaluation of the effectiveness of the schemes was an important aspect of the work and an assessment criteria was developed based upon RoSPA’s ‘stay alive’ package with support from the University of the West of England (UWE). This assessed knowledge retention by the children through re-visiting schools three months after programmes were delivered. Following overwhelmingly positive results from the assessment, work was rolled out to other areas.
Mosques

1.8.12 The ETP team needed to undertake research before they were able to develop any strategies or projects, particularly establishing the best routes into the community – chiefly the much smaller mosques dotted throughout the area that were not necessarily designated places of worship. There was also existing knowledge of the area with officers working in road safety education, particularly with schools as well as some in-roads via the safer routes to school programme.

1.8.13 Again work was concentrated, although not exclusively, in the Green Lane area. In conjunction with Green Lane Mosque a steward scheme was developed to train people at the Mosque to escort children safely on their journey to and from prayer. This was an issue flagged up by the engineering team working in the area that had identified problems with pavement crowding and behavioural issues with large crowds of children leaving the Mosque. As a result the steward training programme was augmented by improvements to the highway with pavement widening and installation of guard railing. High visibility jackets and umbrellas were provided by the ETP team for the guides and children.

1.8.14 With training of community members complete, the steward scheme is an on-going, self-sustaining activity that requires no further funding. There are established contacts at the council should there be any need for advice or support in the future.

Parents

1.8.15 Parents were the hardest to reach group for the ETP team with a lack of willingness to participate in any school activities and no established mechanisms through which to encourage attendance of events and training. A strategy was developed using the following methods:

- Project staff actively sought out parents at the start and end of the school day when dropping off or collecting children from school;

- Teaching assistants volunteered to provide support in doing this in order to demonstrate the school’s support and address the language barrier in place with many parents;

- Development of photo books to use as part of the education programme to make materials accessible and easy to understand for both young children and parents for whom language might be an issue; and

- Support was given from the Imam at the local mosque to speak to parents and help encourage participation.
1.8.16 With a large proportion of parents successfully engaged, the project team implemented the road safety education programme for parents and children together whilst also expanding work to include projects targeted at parents. This included a programme of child car seat clinics and fitting events that targeted both existing parents through the school work and new parents through workshops with ante-natal groups in the area.

Lessons Learnt

1.8.17 With ETP being incorporated into the project relatively late in the context of the whole scheme programme, it was felt that a different approach could have been taken for this element of work especially considering the value for money that ETP work offers. This includes the following:

- involvement from the beginning of the project to understand objectives and work together with designers, particularly in development of a project brief;
- giving more emphasis to smaller local projects rather than the area wide improvement ‘Streets Ahead on Safety’ branding that had a general lack of understanding from the public;
- extending the young people’s project to work with parents throughout the area;
- spending longer working with schools to get greater involvement;
- running smaller events in a number of different areas in place of the June 2008 road safety fun day;
- enhancing staff resource early on for delivery of the project; and
- providing continued education project throughout the delivery process for new families coming into the area.

1.9 MEASURING SUCCESS

1.9.1 Criteria for measuring success were established at the outset of the project. Details are provided below on the assessment methodology for each objective.

- **Objective 1** - To have a measurable impact on road safety in actual and perceived terms.
- **Objective 2** - To integrate road safety activity into the regeneration and other agendas and build partnerships for delivery.
- **Objective 3** - To secure inclusive engagement and participation with a diverse community, and influencing local views about road safety.
- **Objective 4** - To improve accessibility to jobs, services and leisure opportunities.
Objective 5 - To improve quality of life; a safer, vibrant, more stable community.

1.9.2 Section two of this report summarises the key results. The results are mixed with some significant successes and some where the challenge was not met. This reflects the real difficulties that the Council experience in delivering this project and demonstrates that such projects ought not to be entered into lightly.

1.9.3 Whilst all of the safety objectives might not have been met the project should not be considered a failure from a casualty reduction perspective. The sheer number of casualties in the area – it represented nearly 11% of all casualties in Birmingham but with 7.5% of the population – means that reasonable rates of return were achieved.

1.9.4 Even with the added expense and difficulty of delivering this project as a demonstration project, a first year rates of return of 70% was delivered. With the benefit of their experience and with the necessary focus, similar projects could give attractive rates of return. If these projects are combined with significant regeneration then business cases should be easy to develop.

1.10 CONCLUSION

1.10.1 The project has been a mixed success but with significant learning throughout the delivery process and certainly demonstrating value for money in the rate of return on the scheme despite casualty reductions not being as large as hoped. In many cases the learning has resulted in BCC implementing organisational change that is being carried through to all other projects.
2 Findings

2.1 EARLY RESULTS

2.1.1 This section provides a summary of the early findings of the project. Data shown here is taken from the final project report, which can be found at [HYPERLINK TBC](#). It should be noted that at the time of writing only 12 months of post-completion accident data is available to assess the impact of the scheme in casualty reduction terms. Furthermore, work on the ETP elements of the project was extended beyond completion of engineering scheme construction and therefore there is scope for improvement in these results as the impact of ETP work is realised in future years.

2.1.2 At this stage, we can only provide an indicative view of the impact of the scheme and results should be treated with caution and will need to be revisited upon the availability of a full three years of post-completion accident data.

2.2 MEASURING SUCCESS

2.2.1 Criteria for measuring success were established at the outset of the project and details are provided below on the assessment methodology for each objective. Full details of the assessment against each objective can be found in the full project report [HYPERLINK TBC](#).

Objective 1 - To have a measurable impact on road safety in actual and perceived terms

- Full accident data analysis and trend reporting by Birmingham City County using STATS 19 (police accident report) and traffic survey data.
- Feedback from Birmingham University research on perceptions of safety.

Objective 2 - To integrate road safety activity into the regeneration and other agendas and build partnerships for delivery

- Evaluation undertaken by Birmingham University with the use of questionnaires and one-to-one stakeholder interviews as part of a Partnership Assessment Tool (PAT) to rate the effectiveness of partnership working.
- An evaluation measuring the strategic objectives against outcomes on the ground - understanding what the key aims of partnerships are and testing their impact at grass roots/street level.
Objective 3 - To secure inclusive engagement and participation with a diverse community, and influencing local views about road safety

- Birmingham University to validate success and whether people feel engaged through questionnaires and stakeholder interviews to gauge perceived success.

- Feedback collated from ETP team regarding initiatives undertaken as part of the ICSDP and resulting on-going work.

Objective 4 - To improve accessibility to jobs, services and leisure opportunities

- Mental mapping and perception analysis undertaken by Birmingham University including journey analysis and understanding behaviour both in daylight and at night.

- Accessibility assessed based on origin within the zone and travel behaviour assessed to cover perception of quality, time, cost, reliability and image of transport.

Objective 5 - To improve quality of life; a safer, vibrant, more stable community

- Feedback collated from community surveys and relevant statistics in comparison to baseline data.

2.2.2 Levels of success have been varied against these objectives, but whilst some areas have not been as successful as had been hoped in terms of meeting quite challenging targets, there has largely been positive change recorded. Whilst the Project Report covers these in detail, a summary of the key findings against each objective is provided in Table 2.1 below.
### Table 2.1: Summary of outcomes against objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Objective 1 - To have a measurable impact on road safety in actual and perceived terms | • Casualty reduction, whilst outperforming the rest of Birmingham and the control site, has not reached the targets set.  
• Perception of personal security has been improved.  
• Fear of crime has been reduced. |
| Objective 2 - To integrate road safety activity into the regeneration and other agendas and build partnerships for delivery | • The council has successfully delivered work with other bodies, particularly through the development and delivery of ETP projects.  
• There was some difficulty in developing partnerships through the project upon which some of the broader objectives depended. |
| Objective 3 - To secure inclusive engagement and participation with a diverse community, and influencing local views about road safety | • Whilst some success has been achieved through different aspects of the project, there has not been the level of success hoped in broader terms. The Council was aspirational in terms of the approach and objectives and staff demonstrated strong commitment, enthusiasm and flexibility to overcome difficulties. Consultation and engagement was however rendered difficult by the shortage of skilled staff involved in the consultation process. |
| Objective 4 - To improve accessibility to jobs, services and leisure opportunities | • Overall it would seem as though the interventions have had a positive impact on the perception of the area and its actual use in terms of pedestrian activity. User perception surveys show a marked increase in terms of accessibility through the majority of the project area. |
| Objective 5 - To improve quality of life; a safer, vibrant, more stable community | • Overall, the surveys show an improvement in terms of quality of life and social capital in the ICSDP area from April 2008 to September 2009. Nevertheless, the area still scores lower than the rest of the city in this regard. Due to the scale of some of the changes observed, it would be reasonable to conclude that some of the extent of the positive changes observed in our surveys could be linked with the ICSDP project. |
2.3 ROAD SAFETY IMPACT

General Reduction in casualties and casualty rates

2.3.1 Table 2.2 shows all casualties by severity for the whole project area against the background of City Wide data and the Coventry control site for comparison.

Table 2.2: Casualty reduction - full project area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>All Casualties (annual average)</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before</td>
<td>After</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Area</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham City</td>
<td>5339</td>
<td>4861</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry (Foleshill Ward)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.2 This analysis indicates that in terms of achieving the aimed-for targets, the overall level of reduction (target 40%) was not as successful as hoped. However, it did out-perform the rest of Birmingham and the control site.

2.3.3 The overall figures are encouraging with a demonstrable increase over the background trend shown by city-wide and control site data, particularly for child casualties. A more significant decrease is shown in the number of people Killed or Seriously Injured (KSI) (Table 2.3). This trend is reflected in child casualties (Table 2.4) where there is a more significant reduction overall and with KSI’s.

Table 2.3: Casualty reduction by severity - full project area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>All Casualties (% reduction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Area</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham City</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry (Foleshill Ward)</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.4: Child casualty reduction by severity - full project area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Slight</th>
<th>Serious</th>
<th>Fatal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Area</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham City</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>+25</td>
<td>-16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry (Foleshill Ward)</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perception of Safety**

2.3.4 In nearly all cases across all of the project areas there was a marked reduction in the proportion of people believing that the activities in question were unsafe or very unsafe. The sole exception to this is Ward End where there was a significant worsening of the perception of safety for which there is no obvious explanation.

Table 2.5 – changes in perception of safety 2008 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews considered it was either a little or very unsafe…</th>
<th>Coventry Road</th>
<th>Bordesley Green</th>
<th>Ward End</th>
<th>Alum Rock</th>
<th>Heartland Hospital</th>
<th>ICSDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To cross the road where they were interviewed.</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To walk alone during the day in the area where they were interviewed.</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To walk alone after dark in the area where they were interviewed.</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 2008 - 2009</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To walk alone during the day in the area where they were interviewed.</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-39%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To walk alone after dark in the area where they were interviewed.</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additional Casualty Analysis

2.3.5 There is further insight into the casualty reductions from classified casualty data. However it should be noted that a slightly different ‘after’ period was used (January to December 2009) that incorporates the final stages of construction work, as no detailed analysis had been undertaken for the more up to date 12 month after period.

Table 2.6: Classified casualty data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Before (annual average)</th>
<th>After (2009)</th>
<th>% Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedal Cycle</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle &lt;125cc</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle &gt;125cc</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi/Private hire</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus/Coach (incl Minibus)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods vehicle &lt;3.5t</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods vehicle &lt;7.5t</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods vehicle &gt;7.5t</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First Year Rate of Return (FYRR) on casualty reduction

2.3.6 A key part of the assessment in road safety terms, the first year rate of return places a monetary value on casualty reduction to put the investment in the scheme into perspective, shown in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: FYRR analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Casualty Classification</th>
<th>Killed and seriously injured (KSI)</th>
<th>Slight</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First year casualty reduction (number of casualties fewer than ‘before’ annual average)</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-78.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident cost* £000s</td>
<td>260**</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost saving £000s</td>
<td>4680</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>5,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme cost (£000s)</th>
<th>7,240</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Year Rate of Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FYRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYRR (adjusted**)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.7 Calculation of the FYRR excluding fatalities has been included to demonstrate the efficacy of the project without the considerable cost weighting that applies through reductions in fatalities.

2.4 CONCLUSIONS

2.4.1 The evaluation of the project has shown that the project has faced a variety of challenges due to its novelty, its scope and its context of implementation. In addition, the project covered a very wide area with a variety of sub-areas with very diverse road safety, demographic and socio-economic profiles. This diversity means that the project had to accommodate a variety of needs and ways of participating in local decisions across the sub-areas.

2.4.2 It was difficult to manage residents’ expectations as the project was seen as a solution to almost all issues in the area when in fact the main solutions envisaged were limited to road safety schemes and the budget was only of £6 million. There seems to have been a mismatch between the wider objectives of the projects and the means to achieve them.

2.4.3 The project aimed to bring together representatives of the various areas using a partnership approach. This was a challenge as this way of working was only starting to be implemented in the City at the time. Consequently, the project did not benefit from existing relationships and processes although these have since developed during the implementation of the project.
3 Recommendations

3.1.1 The ICSDP has provided a significant learning experience. Combined with previous lessons learnt from the Neighbourhood Road Safety Initiative and Mixed Priority Routes, there are a number of core recommendations for any local authority considering undertaking a similar challenge. These are:

3.2 SETTING OBJECTIVES AND EVALUATION

- Be clear about what the objectives are and how they will be measured. Think about how the setting of objectives can tie into additional funding streams.
- Plan to collect data that supports and informs both the design and evaluation of the project.
- Ensure that objectives have credibility with local people and councillors.

3.3 BUDGET AND PROGRAMME

- Develop a detailed plan for the whole project and use it as a tool to monitor and manage progress. Challenge those elements of the programme most affecting overall duration.
- Integrate communication into the programme to maintain interest from stakeholders.
- Consider all possible streams of funding and consider how to sell the concept to budget holders beyond transport.
- Undertake regular programmed reviews of construction costs to manage drift and expansion of brief (and so costs). Act early on any results.

3.4 SKILLS AND RESOURCES

- Plan to bring in consultation and engagement specialists unless such skills are available locally.
- Consider the role of project manager carefully. Plan for a rounded individual to work on the project for the duration OR for careful and comprehensive handovers.
- Plan for a changing project team composition through the different phases of the project.

3.5 CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT

- Carefully consider the key messages to be given out during the project. Ensure they are aligned with local people’s and local politicians’ aspirations.
- Consider how other public sector and voluntary sector organisation in the area can contribute to the engagement and consensus building activities.
• Plan for significantly more effort than required for conventional, stand-alone projects.
• Recognise the local, short-term pressures politicians come under and seek ways to solve their problems as part of the process.

3.6 DESIGN
• A data-led approach to designing schemes provides transparency and assists in explain decisions and compromises to stakeholders.
• Engage other parts of the local authority where consultation feedback identifies problems. Design solutions to these problems into the scheme.
• Consider ETP as part of the solution from the very start. Actively question where ETP can address problems more effectively than an engineered approach.
• Keep the quality of the finish separate from the engineering solution to maintain control of budgets.

3.7 IMPLEMENTATION
• Challenge the conventional approach to procuring contractors. More flexible and quicker routes may be required to keep the project on programme.
• Ensure sufficient resource is available during the construction phase as this is likely to be more demanding than conventional projects.
• Be prepared to modify designs on-site when unanticipated constraints are identified.
• Plan for extended lead-in times for utilities companies when working in major urban areas.