

# Methodology for Assessing the Marine Navigational Safety & Emergency Response Risks of Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREI)

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## Acknowledgements

In December 2005 the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI), in co-operation with the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA), produced a document entitled "*Methodology for Assessing the Marine Navigational Safety Risks of Offshore Wind Farms*".

As with the 2005 edition, this 2013 version has been prepared to include data gained through operational knowledge since 2005, together with recent Marine Guidance Notes (MGN) produced by the MCA and to enable the risk assessment of all OREI types, including the associated emergency response issues.

Complied in co-operation with the DfT, MCA and those individuals and organisations which contributed useful feedback during the consultation period.

This methodology is not intended to be published in hard copy, but available online, along with a suite of technical support documents. A revised MGN will direct users to the on line guidance documentation.

### **Note:**

New Guidance and MGNs together with mandatory legislation may be promulgated at any time and developers should consult the DECC and MCA websites at regular intervals for such revisions or innovations.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This revised document has been produced by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) with the co-operation of key stakeholders as a methodology for assessing the marine navigational safety & emergency response risks of offshore renewable energy installations and other OREI types. With the exception of the MCA technical guidance, it conforms closely to the original version of December 2005. Developers who have produced Navigational Risk Assessments prior to the publication of this document should simply note the new guidance available and refer to it as and when appropriate.

Its purpose is to be used as guidance for Developers in preparing their navigation risk and emergency response assessments and includes a suggested template in which they may produce their submission. It also helps Government Departments in their review of those submissions.

The Methodology is centred around risk controls and the feedback from risk controls into risk assessment. It requires a submission that shows that sufficient risk controls are, or will be, in place for the assessed risk to be judged as broadly acceptable or tolerable.

The key features of the Methodology are that developers are to:

1. Produce a submission that is proportionate to the scale of the development and the magnitude of the risks.
2. Produce a submission based on assessing risk by Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) using numerical modelling and/or other techniques and tools of assessment acceptable to government and capable of producing results that are also acceptable to Government.
3. Estimate the “Base Case” level of risk based on existing densities and types of traffic and the existing marine environment.
4. Predict the “Future Case” level of risk based on the predicted growth in future densities and types of traffic and reasonably foreseeable future changes in the marine environment.
5. Produce a “Hazard Log” listing the hazards caused or changed by the introduction of the OREI or other OREI type, the risk associated with the hazard, the controls put in place and the tolerability of the residual risk.
6. Define the “risk controls” that will be put in place and create a Risk Control Log.
7. Predict the “Base Case with OREI” level of risk based on existing densities and types of traffic, the existing marine environment and with the OREI in place.
8. Predict the “Future Case with OREI” based on future traffic densities and types, the future marine environment and with the OREI in place.
9. Process this information into a submission including a claim that the risks associated with the OREI are Tolerable on the basis of “So Far As Is Reasonably Practical ” (SFAIRP) declarations.

And that Government will base their decision on assessing:

1. Whether the tools and techniques used in the assessments are acceptable.
2. Whether the claim in the submission shows that the OREI will meet the sought after level of marine navigational safety and emergency response.
3. Whether there is sufficient information with the submission to have confidence in the claim.
4. Whether there is sufficient information with the submission to have confidence that appropriate risk controls are, or will be, in place.

**Note to developers and their consultants:**

Although the specifics of this guidance are not mandatory, its use in carrying out marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessments is strongly recommended.

# Methodology

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Development of the Methodology

The project to develop a methodology for assessing the marine navigational safety risks of offshore wind farms and other types of OREI was originally, in 2005, carried out by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in conjunction with British Maritime Technology (BMT) Renewables Ltd. It has evolved with the close co-operation of developers, the Government, its agencies, and other stakeholders. Extensive consultation and research was carried out to ensure that the methodology is robust, verified, auditable and accountable in a local, national and international context. These features have been confirmed in the intervening five years and have been expanded to cover emergency response issues.

### 1.2 Risk Control

The Methodology is focused on risk controls and in preparing a Submission which shows that sufficient risk controls are in place for the assessed risk to be judged as “tolerable”.

The primary duty in law (HSWA 1974) is to reduce risk so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP). The mere fact that a risk falls into a ‘tolerable’ or ‘broadly acceptable’ band in a Criticality Matrix, or is below some numerical limit, does not prove that it has been reduced SFAIRP. Further reduction may still be reasonably practicable, however small the risk.

### 1.3 Structure

This document comprises two parts:

- A recommended Methodology (described in the Main Text);
- General Guidance & Suggested Techniques (described in the Annexes);

#### Methodology

Developers are invited to carry out marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessments in accordance with the spirit of the methodology and to submit the results in accordance with the standard format for a submission.

In carrying out these assessments, developers should address, so far as is reasonably possible, all three phases of the OREI’s life, i.e. construction, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning.

#### Guidance

Guidance to developers in applying the methodology is provided, as are annexes illustrating various methods of doing so. Although the specific aspects of this guidance are not mandatory, it is strongly recommended that developers carry out risk assessments in the spirit of the detail indicated.

## 1.4 Key Terminology

The key terminology used in this document is:

<b>Methodology</b>	The recommended process, as described in this document, for undertaking and presenting a marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessment to Government as part of the developers' Environmental Statement (E.S.).
<b>Guidance</b>	Guidance on techniques and tools that may be used in applying the Methodology.
<b>Marine Navigational Safety and Emergency Response Risk Assessment</b>	The body of information produced that is used as the basis of the marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessment carried out for inclusion in the developer's E.S. comprising: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Formal Safety Assessment ( FSA) supported by:</li><li>• Navigation risk assessment comprising:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>◦ General Navigation Safety Risk Assessment and</li><li>◦ Other Navigation Safety Risk Assessment</li></ul></li><li>• General details of Search and Rescue implications</li><li>• General details of Emergency Response implications</li></ul>
<b>General Navigation Safety Risk Assessment</b>	The part of the navigation risk assessment relating to collision, contact, grounding and stranding of vessels. Generally this assessment will be centred on a Hazard Log and other assessment techniques and appropriate tools, which may include numerical modelling and simulation.
<b>Other Navigation Safety Risk Assessment</b>	The part of the navigation risk assessment relating to the wider range of marine safety risks but excluding initial collision, contact, grounding and stranding. This assessment may be centred on a Hazard Log.
<b>Area Traffic Assessment</b>	The part of general navigation risk assessment that assesses the wider sea area, its marine environment, traffic and the OREI development to enable the prediction of the risk of collision, contact, grounding and stranding.

Specific Traffic Assessment	The part of the general navigation risk assessment that may be used, where required, to assess in detail the risk of more specific navigation issues and/or the proposed risk controls.
Acceptable Techniques	Techniques that are acceptable to Government in assessing the marine navigational safety and emergency response risks of offshore wind farms and other OREI types.
Acceptable Results	Results from applying the acceptable techniques that are themselves acceptable to Government. <b>Note:</b> An “Acceptable Result” is a result where the risk has been accurately assessed. It does not necessarily mean that the risk is acceptable.

*Table 1 - Key Terminology*

## 1.5 How the Methodology Was Originally Developed

### Risk Assessment

A number of risk assessment techniques may be appropriate for use in specific circumstances or in respect of a particular development.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) have had a major role in the development of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) techniques since the 1992 Carver Report.

To assist BMT Renewables in developing their original input to the Methodology, a series of illustrative risk assessments were undertaken by them, using their proprietary computer based simulation modelling tools and their own preferred processes.

## 2. USE AND COVERAGE OF THE METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 Use by Developers

The Methodology has been produced to assist Developers in preparing their marine navigation safety and emergency response risk assessments, and hence to identify the type and level of information that should be provided by the OREI developer in an application. It includes a template in which Developers may wish to follow in preparing their submission.

Developers are recommended to carry out marine navigation safety and emergency response risk assessments in accordance with the spirit of the Methodology and to submit the results in accordance with the standard format for a submission. This is shown in Section 7, Table 2.

The Methodology may be used by both developers and Government with reference to all types of offshore Renewable energy installations (OREI),

### 2.2 Coverage of the Methodology – Risk Areas

The methodology covers the marine navigational safety and emergency response risks for navigation and operations taking place within and around developments and the need for:

- Formal Safety Assessment, supported by:
- Navigation and emergency response risk assessment, including An overview of Search and rescue and Emergency response.

Note: With respect to operations carried out on wind turbines and other OREI structures, developers are directed towards the various Health & Safety Executive (HSE) guidance and requirements, including CDM regulations<sup>1</sup>.

### 2.3 Coverage of the Methodology – Physical Areas

The key risk areas to be covered by the methodology are:

- Risks associated with a development
- Cumulative risks associated with the development and the other OREI developments in the strategic OREI area
- In-combination effects on the risk of the development with other economic developments over the operational life of the OREI.

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<sup>1</sup> For initial advice see : <http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/fivesteps.htm>

## 2.4 Cumulative Impacts

Consideration of cumulative and in combination effects need to be undertaken, adopting a zonal approach for large developments, which will require a detailed consideration of the ‘worst case scenario. Nation Policy statement EN1 outlines the government approach to cumulative impacts<sup>2</sup>.

## 2.5 Relationship with the Environmental Statement

The Marine Navigational Safety and Emergency Response Risk Assessment (produced by applying this Methodology) forms part of the Environmental Impact Assessment as follows:

- A required part of the Environmental Statement is a Marine Navigational Impact Assessment
- A Marine Navigational Safety and Emergency Response Risk Assessment, produced by applying this Methodology, is required as part of the Marine Navigational Impact Assessment
- The marine navigational safety and emergency response risk aspects of the Marine Navigational Impact Assessment are largely based on the Maritime and Coastguards Agency’s Marine Guidance Note 371 (M + F)<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/47854/1938-overarching-nps-for-energy-en1.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/47854/1938-overarching-nps-for-energy-en1.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> Marine Guidance Note 371 (M+F) “Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREIs) – Guidance on UK Navigational Practice, Safety and Emergency Response Issues.” Maritime and Coastguard Agency, August 2008. This is available from [www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn371-2.pdf](http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn371-2.pdf).

### **3. SCOPE AND DEPTH OF THE DEVELOPER'S ASSESSMENT**

#### **3.1 Proportionality**

The scope and depth of the developer's assessment, together with the tools and techniques necessary to carry this out, should be proportionate to the:

- Scale of the development
- Magnitude of the risks.
- Considered on a case by case basis

#### **3.2 Judging Proportionality**

Developers are advised, prior to developing a submission to:

- Inform the MCA of their proposals and seek guidance
- Carry out a preliminary hazard analysis
- Define an appropriate programme of work
- Define the tools and techniques to be used
- Be prepared to change scope, depth, tools and techniques resulting from assessed risk as the full assessment progresses.

#### **3.3 MCA Guidance**

The MCA will:

- Give guidance if asked
- Be prepared in principle to accept a change in scope, depth, tools and techniques resulting from the assessed risk as the full assessment progresses.

#### **3.4 Examples of Proportionality**

##### **High Risk or Large Scale Development**

A development in an area where the potential risks are high, or a large-scale development, would probably require a submission based on a:

- Comprehensive Hazard Log
- Detailed and quantified Navigation Risk Assessment
- Preliminary search and rescue assessment or overview to agreed MCA requirements
- Preliminary emergency response assessment or overview to agreed MCA requirements
- Comprehensive Risk control log.

## Low Risk or Small Scale Development

A development in an area where the potential risks are lower, or a small scale development, might only require a submission based on a:

- Hazard list
- Navigation risk assessment based on qualitative techniques such as “expert judgement”
- Search and rescue overview, to agreed MCA requirements
- Emergency response overview, to agreed MCA requirements
- Risk Control List.

### 3.5 Preliminary Search and Rescue Operations Assessment or Overview

The scope of a preliminary assessment or overview should be proportionate to the scale of development and the magnitude of the risks. Developers should seek guidance from MCA as to the scope to be followed.

The OREI, may itself present risks to marine safety that generate the need for search and rescue operations or may hinder search and rescue operations not connected to the development itself.

Therefore the preliminary assessment should firstly consider all those features of the proposal which could present problems for the emergency services.

These considerations will include, but not be limited to, the detection, location and rescue of casualties<sup>4</sup> and safe operation of rescue assets within and near to the OREI by: other vessels, Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCCs) and MCA, Royal Air Force (RAF) or Royal Navy (RN) SAR helicopters and/or RNLI lifeboats or other rescue assets. They should also outline the details of the proposed turbine compliance with respect of an Emergency Co-operation and Response Plan (ERCOP) addressing individual turbine marking, lighting, rotor and nacelle control, emergency refuge and communications links. These should link to the developer's own contingency plans and safety management system, developed in conjunction with the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) in relation to its personnel working on turbines or operating within and close to the OREI. Such plans should form part of the Environmental Statement submission. It is recommended that any marine safety aspects of these be discussed and agreed with MCA. In particular, note should be taken of any recommendations made by the Nautical & Offshore Renewable Energy Liaison (NOREL) group with respect to helicopter operations within and around OREI, and to the requirements of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).

SAR helicopter services will develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for OREI emergency response. Developers should co-operate in the development of

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<sup>4</sup> Casualty is a generic term used by the Coastguard to describe persons, vessels or aircraft in distress or danger at sea.

specific procedures for each OREI (where this is required), given the different positions, sizes, shapes, layouts and turbine types, but general SOP principles (a SOP template for want of a better description) would be national.

Due to the differences in designs and layouts, the physiological demands and safety risks of OREI structures, the rescue of personnel from within OREIs is not part of the training or mission of search and rescue helicopter or lifeboat personnel. To ensure rapid and effective rescue of injured or ill persons from within OREIs, it is recommended that developers and operators create in-field Technical Rescue teams or capabilities. Such teams could be comprised of technicians or other employees who have received relevant training and qualification in technical rescue and immediate medical aid techniques and procedures. These teams would form the primary response to extract an injured or ill person from within an OREI and deliver them to the landing stage or helicopter winching area for onward evacuation by SAR unit.

Helicopter search & rescue trials were initially carried out by 22 Squadron, RAF Valley at the North Hoyle wind farm in 2005<sup>5</sup>. Such trials are ongoing in various onshore & offshore wind farms around the UK, evaluating procedures for both the evacuation and rescue of wind farm personnel together with third party casualties.

Since surface vessels will, in some circumstances, be the most appropriate means of rescue from within wind farms or close to other OREI, the assessment should give details of the nearest RNLI, or other lifeboat service, stations near to the site, and of any appropriate training which will be given to lifeboat crews. Such training might include the methods and equipment used in boarding turbines and platforms (but not operating within the OREI structures).

Where appropriate, i.e. in areas of high traffic density, where marine safety hazards of any type are seen to be significant, or where passenger vessel operations are common, DECC, in co-operation with DfT, may require a more detailed Search and Rescue Response Assessment to be undertaken later as a condition of a granted consent. However, where the frequency, or the consequences, of such incidents gives rise for even greater concern, a full assessment may be required before consent is granted.

Such a full assessment may, if deemed appropriate by MCA, include:

- Resource planning assessment
- Response planning assessment

The MCA will inform developers of their specific requirements in this respect.

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<sup>5</sup> “Offshore Wind Farm Helicopter Search & Rescue Trials Undertaken at The North Hoyle Wind Farm” See: [www.dft.gov.uk/mca/helicopter\\_wind\\_farm\\_sar\\_trials-3.pdf](http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/helicopter_wind_farm_sar_trials-3.pdf)

### **3.6 Preliminary Assessment or overview of the Required Emergency Response to the spills of Hazardous and Polluting Substances**

Developers should become familiar with the government's "National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations" (NCP) of which an updated version is now in the process of finalisation<sup>6</sup>. Such pollution, which includes oil and a variety of hazardous substances, may result from incidents occurring within or close to OREI.

The preliminary assessment should determine the likelihood of any such incident occurring, such assessment to be based on the general navigation risk assessment and the types of vessel expected to be found in the vicinity. The potential consequences of such an incident, with respect to seafarers, the environment, and the shore population should be considered.

Any circumstance created by the OREI development which may adversely affect counter pollution operations undertaken by the appropriate authorities should be specified. These circumstances should include counter pollution operations relating to incidents not caused by the development itself, but into whose area the resulting pollution may drift.

#### **Requirements for more detailed Emergency Response Assessments**

Depending on the above assessment, MCA in consultation with DECC, may require a more detailed emergency response assessment to be undertaken later as a condition of a granted consent. However, where the frequency, or the consequences, of such incidents gives rise for even greater concern, a full assessment may be required before consent is granted. Developers of specified OREIs may be required to develop individual Marine Pollution Contingency Plans (MPCP) broadly following the structures set out in the NCP.

MCA will inform developers of their specific requirements in this respect.

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<sup>6</sup> Details of changes to the NCP, and other information on its content can be obtained from the MCA's Counter Pollution Branch, via Ms. Gail Robertson, tel. 02380 329482

## 4. MARINE NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY GOAL

### 4.1 Background

The UK Government is committed to the development of offshore wind farms and other types of OREI as part of its renewable energy targets.

### 4.2 Proposed Navigation Safety Principles

Due to the lack of specified goals it is therefore prudent to consider the overarching UK principle of reducing risk to that which is “as low as reasonably practical” and that “relevant good practice risk controls are in place”.

This overarching principle is based on the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) document “Reducing Risks Protecting People”, which is a guide to the HSE’s decision-making process<sup>7</sup>. The document is aimed at explaining the decision-making process of the HSE<sup>8</sup> and therefore contains much useful information on risk-based decision making.

### 4.3 Implications of the Proposed Navigational Approach

#### Implications prior to Consent:

The implication of the proposed navigational safety goal is that safety will have to be managed through the life of an offshore installation. Through life safety management will include:

- Keeping up to date the marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessment
- Updating risk Assessments
- Updating risk mitigations and controls (including the provision of assets)
- Having a safety policy
- Having a commitment to install features designed to comply with latest MGN guidance.
- Meeting the requirements for lighting and marking in accordance with IALA O-139
- Running an effective ERCOP
- Keeping current a safety and operations plan
- Having an emergency plan
- Maintaining a safety culture
- Having a process for “Through Life Review”.

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<sup>7</sup> Reducing Risks Protecting People (RRPP or R2P2), ISBN 0 7176 2151 0, available as a download from [www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm](http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm)

<sup>8</sup> RRPP page vi

## Implications Post Consent

As much of this will involve work after the consent period is granted, at the consent application stage the developer's marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessment must make a commitment to:

- Marine navigation risk assessment
- Set in place the risk mitigations and controls (including the provision of assets) listed in the application
- Undertake any required post consent search and rescue and emergency response assessments.
- Define a safety policy
- Follow the RenewableUK Guidelines for Health and Safety in the wind energy and other OREI industries<sup>9</sup>
- Set in place a safety management system
- Install, operate and practice the Emergency Response and Co Operation Plan (ERCOP)
- Operate in accordance with a safety and operations plan
- Set up and periodically exercise an emergency plan
- Take positive action to create a safety culture including Board level responsibilities and Measurement with feedback of the level of compliance
- Undertake periodic risk reviews and implement the findings to keep the risk levels within the goals for the Marine Navigation Safety aspects of the OREI as part of their overall approach to safety.

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<sup>9</sup> See "Health & Safety" in : [www.renewableuk.com](http://www.renewableuk.com)

## 5. OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY

### 5.1 Key Features of the Methodology to achieve the Marine Navigational Safety Objectives

The key features of the Marine Safety Navigational Risk Assessment Methodology are risk assessment (supported by appropriate techniques and tools), creating a hazard log, defining the risk controls in a Risk Control Log required to achieve a level of risk that is tolerable , and preparing a submission that includes a Claim, based on a reasoned argument, for a positive consent decision.

<b>To produce a submission based on formal safety assessment:</b>	
1	<b>Define a Scope &amp; Depth of the submission proportionate to the scale of the development &amp; the magnitude of the risks</b>
2	<b>Estimate the “base case” level of risk</b>
3	<b>Predict the “future case” level of risk</b>
4	<b>Create a hazard log</b>
5	<b>Define risk controls and create a risk control log</b>
6	<b>Predict “base case with OREI” level of risk</b>
7	<b>Predict “future case with OREI” level of risk</b>
8	<b>Submission</b>

*Figure 1- Key Features of the Methodology*

## 5.2 Appropriate Risk Assessment Techniques

There are a wide range of risk assessment techniques available and the selection of the techniques should be:

- Proportionate to the scale of the development and the magnitude of the risk
- Acceptable to Government.

Techniques and tools appropriate to aspects of specific developments include:

- No action
- Expert judgement
- Qualitative assessment
- Quantitative calculations
- Simulations
- Trials
- Analysis of the real world situation.

Various approaches to risk assessment, using the above techniques and tools, can be utilised.

The techniques selected will need to be justified in the Submission by developers.

## 5.3 Integrity of Risk Assessment

It is important that risk assessment should be of high integrity and not just a quoted risk number. Risk assessment should be used to:

- Prove that the activities (i.e. navigation, search and rescue and emergency response) remain feasible during construction, operation and decommissioning of the development.
- Produce an intelligent comparative value of the change in risk associated with the activity caused by the development
- Assess the sensitivity of the risk to changes
- Identify, evaluate and decide on appropriate risk controls.

In addition the discipline of risk assessment is to be used to identify issues that need to be considered in the:

- Hazard log
- Selection of Risk Control Options.

#### 5.4 Main Sections of the Submission

The main sections of the submission are:

1	<b>Summary</b>
2	<b>Risk claim supported by a reasoned argument &amp; evidence</b>
3	<b>Description of the marine environment</b>
4	<b>Description of the OREI &amp; how it changes the marine environment</b>
5	<b>Analysis of marine traffic</b>
6	<b>Hazard log</b>
7	<b>Navigation risk assessment</b>
8	<b>Search &amp; rescue and emergency response overviews</b>
9	<b>Risk control log</b>
10	<b>Major hazards summary</b>
11	<b>Statement of limitations</b>
12	<b>Through life safety management</b>

*Figure 2 - Main Sections of the Submission*

## 5.5 Progressive Development of the Submission

It is recommended that the submission is developed in stages as the scope and depth of each stage is dependent on the findings of the previous stage. The suggested stages are:

Stage 1: Obtain MCA Approval for approach to be taken

- Preliminary Hazard Analysis
- Define an appropriate Programme of Work
- Specify the tools and techniques to be used

Stage 2 : Traffic

- Understanding the Base Case densities and types of traffic
- Understanding the future densities and types of traffic

Stage 3 : Navigation risk assessment

- Area traffic assessment
- Specific traffic assessment (if appropriate)

Stage 4 : Formal Safety Assessment comprising

- Hazard identification
- Risk assessment
- Hazard log
- Risk control log

Stage 5 : Other Assessments (if required by MCA)

- Appropriate search and rescue assessment or overview
- Appropriate emergency response assessment or overview

Stage 6: Final Assessments and Submission Preparation.

## **6. MECHANISM FOR ASSESSING TOLERABILITY OF MARINE NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE RISK**

### **6.1 Tolerability of Individual Risks**

#### **Risk**

For each entry in the hazard log the risk shall be assessed against a risk Criticality Matrix

- There shall be no unacceptable risks (Note: The rating of criticality may, with suitable justification, be determined by those undertaking the assessment. “Unacceptable” risks are normally those with a criticality of 6 or 7 )
- All risks in between (e.g. criticality 3 to 5) shall be subject to an assessment of rule compliance and proposed risk controls. Further risk control options must be considered to the point where further risk control is grossly disproportionate (i.e. the SFAIRP principle) and an SFAIRP justification and declaration made.

#### **Evidence**

For each entry in the hazard log the quality of the evidence shall be assessed against an Evidence Matrix:

- There shall be no broadly acceptable risks (i.e. criticality 1 and 2) where the evidence supporting the risk assessment is less than “Expert Opinion – Written” (i.e. category E3).

#### **Risk Controls**

For each entry in the hazard log the risk controls shall be listed.

### **6.2 Tolerability of Societal Concerns**

It is unlikely that reducing all risks in the hazard log to a level which is “as low as reasonably possible” (SFAIRP) will be sufficient to give confidence that societal concerns are broadly acceptable. This is because many of the risks are interrelated in both cause and consequence and also the affected stakeholders may have different perspectives of perceived risks.

Therefore, as a minimum, an overall assessment of societal risk will need to be made as:

- An aggregate of all entries in the risk register; and for
- Major risks such as collision, contact, grounding and stranding

The level of Risk can, if appropriate, be determined in the form of an FN curve<sup>10</sup> and:

Base Case

- With the current traffic, existing marine environment without the OREI
- Is assumed to be tolerable

Base Case with OREI

- With the current traffic, existing marine environment and with the OREI
- The change against the base case needs to be assessed and judged against SFAIRP criteria

Future Case

- With the future traffic, future marine environment without the OREI
- Is assumed to be tolerable

Future Case with OREI

- With the future traffic, future marine environment and with the OREI
- The change against the future case needs to be assessed and judged against SFAIRP criteria

These calculations and their results shall both be based on techniques that are acceptable to Government.

*Note: These values of change and their tolerability are likely to be dependent on a number of variables used in the assessment of an OREI. These will include the size of the water space, its bathymetry and hence the sea room available for manoeuvring, and the variations in the marine operations taking place in the water space. The larger the space the lower the ratio of the OREI to base case risk.*

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<sup>10</sup> See Annex C4 – Measuring the level of risk

## 7. STANDARD FORMAT OF A SUBMISSION

### 7.1 Contents of a Marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessment Submission

Developers are invited to submit their assessments in the following format.

Sect.	Contents	Commentary on the Contents	Supporting information
1	<b>Summary</b>		
2	<b>Risk Claim supported by a Reasoned Argument and Evidence</b>	<p>This should be written in such a way so that, if read separately from the rest of the document, the reader can understand:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• If the developer is claiming that the OREI will achieve the sought for level of marine navigational safety</li><li>• the reasoning and evidence on which that claim is made</li></ul>	
		<p>It should include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Navigational Safety Claim</li><li>b. Supporting Reasoned Argument</li><li>c. Overview of the Evidence obtained</li><li>d. Detailed description of the tools and techniques used, describing in detail, and demonstrating where necessary, the tools and techniques used and their rationale. This will be necessary for gaining “acceptance” of tools and techniques by Government</li></ol>	
3	<b>Description of the Marine Environment</b>	<p>This description should include the:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Current marine environment</li><li>b. Future marine environment</li></ol>	<b>Annex B3</b>
4	<b>Description of the OREI Development and how it changes the Marine Environment</b>	<p>This description should include :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The proposed OREI</li><li>b. Any options</li><li>c. The future environment</li></ol>	<b>Annex B3</b>

<b>Sect.</b>	<b>Contents</b>	<b>Commentary on the Contents</b>	<b>Supporting information</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Analysis of the Marine Traffic</b>	This analysis should include: a. Current traffic densities and types b. Predicted future traffic densities and types c. The effect of the OREI on current traffic densities and types d. The effect of the OREI on future traffic densities and types	<b>Annexes</b> <b>B1</b> <b>B2</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Status of the Hazard Log</b>	This should include: a. Summary of Tolerable, SFAIRP and Intolerable Risks b. Graphical representation of all risks on a matrix	<b>Annex</b> <b>C3</b> <b>C4</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Navigation Risk Assessment</b>	The risk assessment should include: a. "Base Case" General Navigation Safety Risk Assessment b. "Future Case" General Navigation Safety Risk Assessment c. "Base Case with OREI" General navigation risk assessment d. "Future Case with OREI" General navigation risk assessment e. Future Options General navigation risk assessment f. Other Navigation Safety Risk - a summary of the other Navigation Safety Risks from the hazard log and the risk controls put in place to manage them	<b>Annex</b> <b>D1</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>Search and Rescue Overview and Assessment</b>	Assessment dependent on level agreed with the MCA. In high risk developments this may include, prior to or post consent: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Resource Planning</li><li>• Prevention Strategy</li><li>• Response Plan Assessment</li></ul>	<b>Section</b> <b>3.5</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Emergency Response Overview and Assessment</b>	Assessment dependent on level agreed with the MCA.	<b>Section</b> <b>3.6</b>

<b>Sect.</b>	<b>Contents</b>	<b>Commentary on the Contents</b>	<b>Supporting information</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Status of Risk Control Log</b>	An overview of the risk controls in the Risk Control Log	<b>Annex E1</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Major Hazards Summary</b>	A summary of the major hazards, how they have been assessed, how they will be controlled and what trials have been undertaken to develop the assessment or controls. Likely "Major Hazards" to be summarised are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collision and contact with other vessels and with OREI structures</li> <li>• Grounding</li> <li>• Contact with cables and snagging of them</li> <li>• Interference with communications, radar, etc.</li> </ul>	<b>Annexes F1 F2</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>Statement of Limitations</b>		<b>Annex E2</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>Through Life Safety Management</b>	An indication of, or a commitment to, the planned through life safety management including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updating risk assessments</li> <li>• Filling gaps in assessment</li> <li>• Safety Policy</li> <li>• Safety Management System</li> <li>• Safety and Operations Plan</li> <li>• Emergency Plan</li> <li>• Through Life Review plus details of</li> <li>• Compliance with the MCA's required Emergency Response Plan<sup>11</sup></li> </ul>	

*Table 2 - Contents of a marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessment submission*

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<sup>11</sup> Marine Guidance Note 371 (M+F) "Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREIs) – Guidance on UK Navigational Practice, Safety and Emergency Response Issues." Maritime and Coastguard Agency, August 2008. This is available from [www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn371-2.pdf](http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn371-2.pdf)

## 7.2 Explanatory Annexes

**Explanatory annexes may be included if appropriate to expand on the information given in the submission.**

	<b>Annex</b>	<b>Commentary of the Annex</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Background Information</b>	
<b>B</b>	<b>Setting the Scene</b>	This should include: a. Base Case densities and types of traffic b. Predicted Future Level of Traffic c. The Marine Environment – development of a Specific Technical and Operational Analysis
<b>C</b>	<b>Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment</b>	This should include: a. Development of Specific Influences on the Level of Risk b. Hazard log Worksheets or Database
<b>D</b>	<b>Appropriate Assessment Techniques and Tools</b>	This should include: a. Navigation risk assessment b. Appropriate search & rescue overview & assessment c. Appropriate emergency response overview & assessment d. Selection of Techniques that are acceptable to Government e. Demonstration that results from the techniques are acceptable to Government
<b>E</b>	<b>Deciding on the Risk Controls</b>	This should include: a. Risk Control Log Worksheets or Database

*Table 3 - Annexes to a marine navigational safety and emergency response risk assessment submission*

## 7.3 Electronic Distribution

The submission and its annexes shall be capable of electronic circulation (e.g. PDF or similar open standard files types from file download sites, over email, etc.).

## **8. INDICATIVE PROCESS FOLLOWED BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN ASSESSING A DEVELOPER'S SUBMISSION**

### **8.1 Introduction**

This section gives an indication of the process that will be followed by Government in assessing submissions.

### **8.2 Principle of the Process**

The principle behind the process followed by government departments is that they will seek the following in a developer's submission:

- A claim that if the planned risk controls are implemented and maintained the proposed OREI will achieve the sought for level of marine navigational safety
- Sufficient information for government departments, their agencies and other stakeholders to have confidence in the claim
- A declaration that the risk controls will be implemented.

### **8.3 Assessment of Information Supplied in the Submission**

Government Departments will assess if the submission includes information showing that:

- 1) The marine navigational safety requirements have been correctly identified based on Formal Safety Assessment
- 2) The submission makes a claim against the safety requirements that :
  - The rules have been complied with
  - As a minimum standard or relevant good practice, risk controls will be put in place
  - The risks are broadly acceptable; or
    - Tolerable with modifications; or
    - Tolerable with additional controls; or
    - Tolerable with monitoring

That further risk control is grossly disproportionate

- 3) The claim is backed up by a reasoned argument
- 4) The reasoned argument is built on the use of evidence and appropriate risk assessment tools and techniques

- 5) The evidence is quality checked
- 6) Techniques selected are acceptable to Government
- 7) The results from applying the techniques are acceptable to Government, such as calibration against known data.
- 8) NRA checklist has been completed

#### **8.4 Assessment of the Limitations of the Information Supplied in the submission**

Government departments will assess if the submission includes information showing that:

- 1) The nature, assumptions and limitations of the submission are set out and understood
- 2) The “absence of evidence of risk” is not taken as “evidence of absence of risk”.

## **9. INDICATIVE PROCESS FOLLOWED BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN RESPONDING TO A DEVELOPER'S SUBMISSION**

### **9.1 Background to the Response Process**

In defining the response process the broadly stated principles of good regulation, published by the Better Regulation Task Force will be applied. These require:

- The targeting of action: focussing on the most serious risks or where the hazards need greater controls
- Consistency: adopting a similar approach in similar circumstances to achieve similar ends
- Proportionality: requiring action that is commensurate to the risks
- Transparency: being open on how decisions were arrived at and what their implications are
- Accountability: making clear, for all to see, who are accountable when things go wrong.

### **9.2 How the Response Process links to the Consent Application Process**

The link can be summarised as follows:

The submission forms part of the developer's Environmental Statement based on an Environmental Impact Assessment, which is needed to support an application for the consents and licenses necessary for an offshore development In England and Wales through the Planning Inspectorate (The Infrastructure Planning Regulations 2009 Section 36, Electricity Act 1989, Section 56 Planning Act 2008) In Scotland the same NRA approach is adopted, applications should be to MS-LOT. In reviewing the NRA a number of bodies will be consulted including:

- Other Government Departments including the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence.
- A range of organisations such as Trinity House, Chamber of Shipping, Royal Yachting Association, the port authority (if relevant) National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, and the British Marine Aggregates Producers Association.

The relevant organisations are invited to advise on the potential marine navigational safety and emergency response risk impacts of the:

- Development itself
- Development in-combination with other planned developments
- Effect of these on other future developments.

The advice given will fall into the following categories:

- “No Objection”
- “No Objection” with conditions
- Holding objection, with a request for more information or analysis
- Objection with reasons.

Applicants are informed of this advice and invited to respond.

### **9.3      Ultimate Responsibility for consent**

The aim is to involve stakeholders at all stages with the aim of achieving consensus. However, DECC/DFT/MCA must make recommendations to Ministers where consensus is not possible, for example because different stakeholders hold opposite views based on deep-rooted beliefs.

## **10. GUIDANCE TO DEVELOPERS IN APPLYING THE METHODOLOGY**

The guidance is given in the following Annexes:

### **ANNEX A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

- A1 Reference Sources - Lessons Learned

### **ANNEX B: SETTING THE SCENE**

- B1 Understanding the base case traffic densities and types
- B2 Predicting future densities and types of traffic
- B3 Describing the marine environment

### **ANNEX C: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT**

- C1 Hazard identification in the Marine Environment
- C2 Risk Assessment in the Marine Environment
- C3 Influences on the level of risk
- C4 Tolerability of Risk

### **ANNEX D: APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES & TOOLS**

- D1 Overview of appropriate assessment techniques
- D2 The selection of techniques that are acceptable to Government
- D3 Demonstration that the results from the techniques are acceptable to Government
- D4 Navigation risk assessment – area traffic assessment techniques
- D5 Navigation risk assessment – specific traffic assessment technique

### **ANNEX E: DECIDING ON THE RISK CONTROLS**

- E1 Creating a risk control log
- E2 Marine Stakeholders and Stakeholders Organisations

### **ANNEX F: EXAMPLE CHECKLISTS**

- F1 Example hazard identification checklist
- F2 Example risk control checklist

**ANNEX G:**

G1 Terms, abbreviations and references

## A1

### Reference Sources – Lesson Learned

Prior to and during the development of this methodology (January to August 2005, updated 2013) a number of desktop and laboratory investigations and, where feasible, field trials in early UK wind farm developments, were carried out. Some of these trials reports and other documents with Lessons Learned are listed below.

Ref	Title	Date
1	<b>Assessing the Navigational Impact of Offshore Wind Farm Proposed for UK Sites – Guidance for Developers</b> Maritime and Coastguard Agency Project MSA 10/6/200, May 2002	2002
2	<b>Wind Energy and Aviation Issues - Interim Guidance</b> Wind Energy, Defence & Civil Aviation Interests Working Group ETSU W/14/00626/REP	2002
3	<b>UK Atlas of Recreational Boating</b> A compilation of the cruising routes, general sailing & racing areas used by recreational craft around the UK coast. <sup>12</sup> The Royal Yachting Association	2008
4	<b>Results of the electromagnetic investigations and assessments of marine radar, communications and positioning systems undertaken at the North Hoyle wind farm by QinetiQ and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency</b> QINETIQ/03/00297/1.1 MCA MNA 53/10/366	2004
5	<b>Guidelines for Health &amp; Safety in the Wind Energy Industry</b> British Wind Energy Association	2005
6	<b>Offshore Wind Farm Helicopter Search and Rescue - Trials Undertaken at the North Hoyle Wind Farm</b> Report of helicopter SAR trials undertaken with Royal Air Force Valley 'C' Flight 22 Squadron on March 22 <sup>nd</sup> 2005 Maritime and Coastguard Agency Project MSA 10/6/239, May 2005	2005

<sup>12</sup> "UK Atlas of Recreational Boating" See:  
[www.rya.org.uk/infoadvice/planningenvironment/Pages/boatingatlas.aspx](http://www.rya.org.uk/infoadvice/planningenvironment/Pages/boatingatlas.aspx)

7	<b>Interference to radar imagery from offshore wind farms</b> A Report compiled by the Port of London Authority based on experience of the Kentish Flats Wind Farm Development 2 <sup>nd</sup> NOREL WP4	2005
8	<b>Investigation of Technical and Operational Effects on Marine Radar close to Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm</b> <sup>13</sup> Investigation of Technical and Operational Effects on Marine Radar close to Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm – Report by the BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) April 2007	2007

*Table 4 - Some Trials Reports and other Lessons Learned*

Note :

Various trials and research projects are continuously being undertaken with respect to all offshore renewable energy installations. These include work on wind turbine effects on marine and military radars, the resolving of incompatibilities between marine navigation and aviation lighting, etc. Developers are advised to contact the Maritime & Coastguard Agency's Navigation Safety Branch if they have any queries relating to navigational safety or emergency response issues.

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<sup>13</sup> Investigation of Technical and Operational Effects on Marine Radar close to Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm. BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) April 2007 report. This is available from [www.dft.gov.uk/mca/kentish\\_flats\\_radar.pdf](http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/kentish_flats_radar.pdf)

## B1

## Guidance Understanding the Base Case Traffic Densities and Types

The risk assessment needs to be based on a sound knowledge of the traffic densities and types. This is one of the key inputs to assessing proportionality.

### Survey Area

The boundary of the Survey Area should be constituted at a position so that further extension of the boundary would not appreciably impact the results of the assessment, i.e. boundary effects are minimised. A general guideline could be applied that the area of direct interest adjacent to the OREI or OREI groups, should lie within the centre 1/4 to 1/3 of the Survey Area. However, it is the responsibility of the analyst to demonstrate that the Survey Area is appropriate.

#### B.1.1 Traffic Data Requirements

Marine navigation safety issues within and close to offshore OREI exist in many situations, and particularly where there is a combination of high traffic levels, different vessel operations and constrained water spaces, cumulative impacts and weather routing being key considerations. These aspects are inter-related with respect to offshore OREI. The risk is also dependent upon the type, size and nature of the vessels and their operations within the survey area. As such the classification of the traffic density, types, operations, sizes, drafts, speeds and routes, is key to the accurate representation of the present safety regime, and future impacts.

Compliance with planning requirements may result in an extension of the minimum survey coverage and period. MCA traffic survey requirements should be consulted.

#### B.1.2 Extracting Information from the Data

While the detailed requirements for such surveys are not provided the results must provide traffic information for the traffic as a whole and for each class of vessel. The type of data required may vary with the type of modelling or other appropriate technique used in the risk assessment but may include such parameters as, for example:

- the centrelines and excursion limits of representative routes and operations through and within the Study Area
- the average traffic volume of vessels passing along key routes
- key seasonal variations in traffic activity.

#### B.1.3 Design Traffic Densities and Types

A key issue following collection and collation of data is the accurate representation of “Design Traffic Densities and Types” in the risk assessment.

This raises the issue over whether average, peak or some intermediate values should be used as the base case and of the traffic limits appropriate to the assessment.

In some cases it might be appropriate to identify an average of the daily traffic densities and types for these routes or operations and for the survey area as a whole.

Routes and operational areas associated with and used by leisure craft, fishing vessels, aggregate dredging and other marine activities, should be identified. The seasonal variation of such traffic, if appropriate, should be closely examined and the data used to assess the specific risks relevant to these vessel types together with their interaction with larger vessels which might be navigating on through routes.

Developers should be aware of the fact that the traffic survey and assessment requirements cover all vessel types and sizes. In these respects many smaller vessels will not be equipped with the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and therefore will not be detected using that system alone. Similarly, if radar surveys are made from shore locations, account should be taken of the operational range of such radars based on antenna height and target vessel size. Where small vessels cannot be detected visually or by either of these two methods, alternative arrangements should be made to fairly assess traffic types, routes and operations within the whole of the area under survey.

Additionally, it should be borne in mind that there are very great differences in the levels of training, equipment & manoeuvrability amongst the various vessel categories – for which see Table 10, section B.3.8.

### **Human Element**

For risk assessments where the scale of development and/or the magnitude of the risk has led to a risk assessment supported by simulation modelling then the typical behaviour of vessels in complying with the “Collision Regulations” should be extracted from available data and included in the assessment algorithms. Where appropriate the algorithms should include the results of Rule violations, mistakes, lapses or slips, these categories being transparent and variable amongst the simulation algorithms.

This should not be taken to indicate that the Maritime and Coastguard Agency sanctions any departure from the Collision Regulations or “special rules”. No such “special rules” will apply to areas around OREI unless they lie within sea areas controlled by appropriate authorities, e.g. port authorities, who would promulgate any necessary differences from the Collision Regulations.

**Note: It is unlikely that such “special rules” would impinge on any UK Round 2 or 3 offshore wind farm proposals.**

## B2

### Guidance Predicting Future densities and types of traffic

The methodology requires “Future Case” levels of Risk with and without the OREI to be assessed. Therefore, a prediction needs to be made of the future densities and types of traffic.

#### B.2.1 Traffic Forecasting

A forecast of future traffic activity at 10 year intervals over the expected life of the OREI should be made, dependent on:

- macro drivers (national/regional marine growth predictions) and local conditions (reasonably foreseeable developments, i.e. port & marine growth plans, etc)
- account should be taken of changes in vessel size anticipated over the forecast period. For example, if a local container port is set to improve its throughput by 50% in the next 20 years, but the vessels serving this facility will grow at a similar rate the traffic volumes will stay the same, although the vessel size, displacement and draft will increase – as also may speed.
- account should be taken of the future change in all marine activities, such as fishing, recreational craft, offshore exploitation, etc.

#### B.2.2 Techniques of Traffic Forecasting

A number of techniques may be used to forecast future traffic volume, routes and vessel types. Developers’ proposals for appropriate techniques for predicting future densities and types of traffic should be discussed with MCA at the commencement of the risk assessment.

#### Vessel Types, routes and operational areas


Various techniques may be used in assessing prime considerations such as whether the growth of traffic densities, or of vessel types, size, draft, etc., might lead to the non-viability of major traffic routes or operations due to the OREI location.

Local knowledge, together with that of international trade, fishing operations and all other activities potentially affecting the sea area will be vitally important in traffic forecasting. Together with sample assessments using stepped traffic growths of 20%, 40%, etc., such knowledge may be used to determine whether or not non-viability of major traffic routes is a credible possibility. It should be remembered that traffic within a particular area may reduce as well as increase due to a variety of controlling circumstances.

### B.2.3 Stochastic Forecasting

In addition to the stepped change techniques mentioned above, some techniques may use a stochastic, or probabilistic, approach. This method, which may be appropriate for some development sites, reviews prior historic traffic trends for the previous ten years or more and identifies the variability of relevant factors. The forecast model then creates various viable future scenarios.

Stochastic forecast techniques review prior historic growth trends (preferably for a time span of the previous 10 years or more) from a specific end point against the key economic/transport drivers and identify the variability of these factors. This variability is then introduced into the forecast model to create a range of viable future scenarios. Those carrying out stochastic forecasting should bear in mind the limitations of traffic data obtained from the Automatic Identification System (AIS).<sup>14</sup>



*Figure 3 – A Method of Statistical Forecasting*

If statistical forecasting is used, the adoption of a Design Traffic Level at the 95% confidence level is suggested, i.e. that only 5 % of the future growth scenarios develop traffic above that predicted. This exercise may be conducted for each class and the traffic levels combined.

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<sup>14</sup> See IMO requirements in: [http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic\\_id=754](http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=754)

## B3

## Guidance Describing the Marine Environment

Developers should use the following analysis as a starting point for a site specific technical and operational analysis including any extra site specific information and excluding (with a justification) information that is not applicable.

### B.3.1 Description of a Technical and Operational Analysis

The developer's technical and operational analysis and the navigational safety risk assessment will both be expected to include a description of:

1. The technical scope of the development and how this relates to maritime safety.
2. The structural details of turbines, platforms, devices and cabling.
3. The positioning, configuration and proposed structure of the development as a whole.
4. How the development will be built, commissioned, operated and decommissioned and how this relates to maritime safety.

The developer's analysis will be expected to cover navigational risks which will include appropriate search and rescue and emergency response overviews and how these will be assessed and managed over all phases of the OREI development.

The developer's analysis will be expected to include a systematic identification of:

1. Potential accidents resulting from navigation activities
2. Navigation activities affected by their proposed offshore OREI
3. OREI structures that could affect navigation activities
4. OREI development phases that could affect navigation activities
5. Other structures and features that could affect navigation activities
6. Vessel types involved in navigation activities
7. Conditions affecting navigation activities
8. Human actions related to navigation activities for use in hazard identification.

**Note: In this context “Navigation” includes the marine operations undertaken by vessels of all types and sizes. Examples of such operations include fishing, aggregate dredging, recreational activities, etc. Where military vessel activity takes place on a regular basis in a particular area, such activity should be taken into account.**

### B.3.2 Generic Technical and Operational Analysis

The following sections describe a generic technical and operational Analysis. In producing a site specific analysis developers should use this as a guide:

- adding site specific items
- removing (with justifications) items that are not applicable

*Note: The tables are labelled H1, H2, etc. as the main use of the technical and operational analysis is in the identification of hazards.*

### B.3.3 Potential Accidents resulting from Navigation Activities – Example Checklist

H1	Accident Category
	<i>All</i>
1	<b>General Navigation Safety Risks</b> <b>1. Collision</b> <b>2. Contact</b> <b>3. Grounding and Stranding</b>
2	<b>Other Navigation Safety Risks</b> <b>1. Foundering</b> <b>2. Capsizing</b> <b>3. Fire</b> <b>4. Explosion</b> <b>5. Loss of Hull Integrity</b> <b>6. Flooding</b> <b>7. Machinery Related Accidents</b> <b>8. Payload Related Accidents</b> <b>9. Hazardous Substance Accidents</b> <b>10. Accidents to Personnel</b> <b>11. Accidents to the General Public and Shore Populations</b> <b>12. Electrocution</b>
3	<b>Aviation Safety Risks<sup>15</sup></b> <b>1. Aviation Accidents</b>
4	<b>Other Safety Risks</b> <b>1. High Probability Events</b> <b>2. High Severity Outcomes</b> <b>Low Confidence / High Uncertainty Events</b>

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<sup>15</sup> Aviation Safety Risks are included in potential accidents list as a reminder that marine navigation and aviation risks interact, for example required marine lights vs. aviation lights and potential effects on search and rescue or dispersant spraying.

H1	Accident Category
	Note : Although not “accident categories” themselves the following search and rescue and emergency response activities may result from one or more of the above incident categories
5	<b>Search and Rescue</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Overall</b></li> <li><b>2. External to Internal</b></li> <li><b>3. Internal to Internal</b></li> <li><b>4. Internal to External</b></li> <li><b>5. External to External</b></li> <li><b>6. Worst Case</b></li> </ul>
6	<b>Emergency Response</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Overall</b></li> <li><b>2. External to Internal</b></li> <li><b>3. Internal to Internal</b></li> <li><b>4. Internal to External</b></li> <li><b>5. External to External</b></li> <li><b>6. Worst Case</b></li> </ul>

*Table 5 - Potential Accidents resulting from Navigation Activities*

#### B.3.4 Navigation Activities affected by an OREI – Example Checklist

H2	<b>Navigation Activity</b>
1	<b>All</b>
2	<b>Navigation on Passage</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Navigating or operating near an OREI</li> <li>2. Navigating or operating around an OREI</li> <li>3. Navigating or operating through an OREI</li> <li>4. Navigating or operating within an OREI</li> <li>5. International traffic</li> <li>6. National traffic</li> <li>7. Coastal traffic</li> <li>8. Short sea shipping traffic</li> <li>9. Fishing vessels</li> <li>10. Recreational craft</li> <li>11. All other traffic listed in section 6 below</li> </ul>
3	<b>Fishing operations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Single vessels</li> <li>2. Paired vessels &amp; others fishing in close proximity</li> <li>3. Crabbing</li> <li>4. Trawling</li> <li>5. Drift Nets</li> </ul>

<b>H2</b>	<b>Navigation Activity</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Recreational activities</b>
	1. Sail and power cruising
	2. Sail and power day sailing
	3. Sail and power racing
	4. Personal watercraft use (e.g. Jet Skiing)
	5. Windsurfing
	6. Kite Surfing and Kite Boarding
	7. Leisure or Sport Diving
<b>5</b>	<b>Anchoring</b>
	1. Routine Anchoring
	2. Emergency Anchoring
<b>6</b>	<b>Other Marine Operations close to or within an OREI</b>
	1. Aggregate Dredging, Dredging or Spoil Dumping
	2. Commercial Diving
	3. Construction Operations
	4. Servicing Operations
	5. Decommissioning Operations
	6. Oil and Gas Operations
	7. Salvage Operations
	8. Cable Laying
	9. Pipeline Installation
	10. Boarding and Landing of Pilots
<b>7</b>	<b>Special Events</b>
	1. Regattas and Competitions
<b>8</b>	<b>None</b>

*Table 6 - Navigation Activities affected by an OREI*

### B.3.5 OREI Structures that could affect Navigation Activities – Example Checklist

<b>H3</b>	<b>Structures</b>
<b>1</b>	Wind Turbines
	a. Foundation type
	b. Transition Piece
	c. Tower
	d. Nacelle
	e. Blades
	f. Platforms and superstructure fittings
<b>2</b>	Floating and fixed wave energy devices
<b>3</b>	Floating and fixed tidal energy devices
<b>4</b>	Offshore Installations ( if appropriate)
	a. Offshore Substation

	b. Offshore Service Bases
	c. Offshore Accommodation Bases
5	Cable
	a. Export Cable
	b. Inter-turbine Cabling
6	Sub sea Installations, including anti-scour material

*Table 7 – OREI Structures that could affect Navigation Activities*

### B.3.6 OREI Development Phases that could affect Navigation Activities – Example Checklist

H4	Development Phase
1	All
2	Pre-construction
3	Construction
4	Operation
5	Maintenance
6	Decommissioning

*Table 8 - OREI Development Phases that could affect Navigation Activities*

### B.3.7 Other Structures and Features that could affect Navigation Activities – Example Checklist

H5	Other Structures and Features
1	Wrecks
2	Oil & Gas Installations (Existing and projected)
3	Other OREI (Existing and projected)
4	Other Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (Existing and projected)
5	Other Exclusion or Safety Zones including Areas To Be Avoided (ATBA)
6	Fishing Grounds
7	Dredging and Dumping Areas
8	Diving Areas

*Table 9 - Other Structures and Features that could affect Navigation Activities*

### B.3.8 Vessel Types involved in Navigation Activities – Example Checklist

H6	Types of Vessel
1	All
2a	Large Vessels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bulk Carriers</li> <li>2. Bulk/Oil Carriers</li> <li>3. Chemical Tankers</li> <li>4. Container Vessels</li> <li>5. Cruise Vessels</li> <li>6. Liquefied Gas Carriers</li> <li>7. Oil Tankers</li> </ul>
2b	Medium Vessels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General Cargo</li> <li>2. Specialised Carriers</li> <li>3. Passenger</li> <li>4. Passenger Ferries</li> </ul>
2c	High Speed Craft (HSCs) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. High speed ferries</li> <li>2. Other high speed recreational and commercial craft</li> </ul>
3	Fishing Vessels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Fish Processing</li> <li>2. Fishing Vessels ( Various types and operations)</li> </ul>
4	Recreational Vessels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Sailing dinghies and Yachts</li> <li>2. Motor Boats</li> <li>3. Small Personal Watercraft</li> <li>4. Rowing boats</li> <li>5. Sports Fishing</li> <li>6. Windsurfer</li> <li>7. Kite Boards</li> <li>8. Tall Ships</li> <li>9. Recreational Submarines and dive support craft</li> </ul>
5	Anchored Vessels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. All</li> </ul>
6	Other Operational Vessels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Barges</li> <li>2. Dredgers</li> <li>3. Dry Cargo Barge</li> <li>4. Offshore Production and Support</li> </ul>

H6	Types of Vessel
	5. Salvage
	6. Tank Barges
	7. Tugs and Tows
7	Military Vessels
	1. Surface warships
	2. Submarines
	3. Royal Fleet Auxiliaries
8	Other Vessels
	1. Seaplanes
	2. Wing-In-Ground Craft (WIG)
	3. Hovercraft

*Table 10 - Vessel Types involved in Navigation Activities*

### B.3.9 Conditions affecting Navigation Activities – Example Checklist

H7	Conditions
1	All
1	Weather <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Restricted visibility (Fog, mist, haze, precipitation)</li> <li>2. Wind strength and direction</li> <li>3. Sea State</li> <li>4. Icing</li> <li>5. Light conditions</li> </ul>
2	Tides and local currents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Local Currents</li> <li>2. Tidal Streams and heights</li> </ul>
3	Time of Day <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Night</li> <li>2. Dawn</li> <li>3. Day</li> <li>4. Dusk</li> </ul>
3	Circumstances <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Planning access to shelter</li> <li>2. Vessel constrained by her draft</li> <li>3. Vessel engaged in fishing</li> <li>4. Vessel not under command</li> <li>5. Vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre</li> <li>6. Scheduled/Shuttling vessels</li> </ul>
4	Electronics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Vessels underway with no AIS (i.e. non SOLAS craft) or with AIS switched off</li> <li>2. Interference to Marine Radar, Navigation and Communications</li> </ul>
5	Other <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Overfalls and other local conditions</li> </ul>

Table 11 - Conditions affecting Navigation Activities

### B.3.10 Human Actions related to Navigation Activities – Example Checklist

H8	Human Actions
1	Violation
2	Mistakes
3	Lapse
4	Slip

Table 12 - Human Actions related to Navigation Activities

## C1

### Overview Hazard Identification in the Marine Environment

Marine accidents tend to be the result of a chain of events rather than a single cause and often involve human error, either in the cause of the accident or in the response to it.

The IMO encourages the formal of the causal chain of an accident including human error.

#### C.1.1 Causal Chains

The IMO FSA encourages the use of causal chains in risk assessment as it recognises that many risks will be the result of complex chains of events, with a diversity of causes and a range of consequences.

The causal chain used here is:




Figure 4 - Overview of Causal Chains

#### C.1.2 Human Element

FSA stresses the importance of the human element. It states "The human element is one of the most contributory aspects to the causation and avoidance of accidents. Human element issues should be systematically treated within the FSA framework". The following diagram lists the principle causes of "Human Error", here defined as examples of the active cause of an unsafe act recognising that some acts are intentional while other are not.




Figure 5 - Overview of the Human Element

### C.1.3 Compliance with the Collision Regulations<sup>16</sup>

The Hazard Identification should clearly identify and investigate where the OREI may make it more likely that Vessels will deviate from the COLREGS, either as an intended or unintended action.

This may include any effects which the OREI might make on the lights and shapes to be carried by vessels (e.g. interference to the visibility of navigation lights), on navigation marks ashore and at sea and to the light and sound signals made by vessels and navigational aids in particular circumstances.

### C.1.4 Effect of Non Compliance with the Collision Regulations

Ships do not always follow the COLREG. The Hazard Identification should include any reasonably foreseeable compliance with them.

<sup>16</sup> Merchant Shipping Notice MSN 1781 (M + F) The Merchant Shipping (Distress Signals and Prevention of Collisions) Regulations 1996

## C2

## Guidance Risk Assessment in the Marine Environment

FSA uses the classic definition of risk as a combination of probability and consequence.




Figure 6 - Classic Definition of Risk

Hazard Identification therefore requires an assessment to be made of the:

- probability of the cause
- magnitude of the consequence.

FSA also encourages the consideration of the influences on the causal chain of an accident as well as any direct causes and consequences.

This is done because in many marine accidents sequences these influences not only affect the probability of the cause but also the magnitude of the consequence in the same accident sequence.

Weather is a typical factor that affects both cause and consequence, indeed it is often a major factor, as are human error and remoteness.

<b>C3</b>	<b>Guidance</b> <b>Influences on the Level of Risk</b>
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Developers are invited to use the following analysis as a starting point for a site specific Influence Analysis including any extra site specific influences and excluding (with a justification) influences that are not applicable.

### C.3.1 Influence Analysis

The following sections describe a generic identification of the influences on the level of risk. In producing a site specific analysis developers should use this as a guide:

- adding site specific influences
- removing (with justifications) influences that are not applicable

**Note:** *The tables are labelled R1, R2, etc. as the main use of the Influence Analysis is on the assessment or risk.*

### C.3.2 Risk Factors – Example Checklist

R1	Risk Factors
1	<b>Site</b> 1. Location of OREI. 2. Alignment of OREI. 3. Layout of OREI. (e.g. grid, scattered or other layouts) 4. Proximity of other OREI
2	<b>Traffic</b> 1. Traffic routes, density, type and operations. 2. Potential growth or decline in traffic. 3. Seasonal variation in traffic. 4. Special traffic, e.g. dangerous goods, etc.
3	<b>Interrelations Between Vessels</b> 1. Blocking of escape routes or bad weather refuges 2. Bunching 3. Increase in “crossing” encounters 4. Increase in “end-on” encounters 5. Increase in “overtaking” encounters 6. Increase in traffic volumes 7. Loss of recreational cruising routes 8. Pinching

R1	<b>Risk Factors</b>
	9. Reduction in sea room for manoeuvring
	10. Reduction in water depth for manoeuvring
	11. Blocking of routes to safe havens and inshore anchorages
	12. Redirection of recreational craft and fishing vessels into routes used by other vessels, particularly larger and faster vessels.
4	<b>Navigator Behaviour</b>
	1. Lengthened navigation routes for leisure craft increase navigator fatigue (and hence error) and increase the criticality of weather windows.
	2. Enhanced navigational complexity and need for navigational awareness increase fatigue (and hence error)
5	<b>Other single vessel factors</b>
	1. Collision with OREI structures
	2. Fouling or contact with cables
	3. Grounding

*Table 13 - Risk Factors – Example Checklist*

### C.3.3 Influences on Causes – Example Checklist for a particular development (See also following example check lists)

R2	<b>Influence on Causes</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Vessel Traffic Management</b>
	1. Availability of Vessel Traffic Services (VTS).
	2. Availability of Pilot services.
<b>2</b>	<b>Aids to Navigation</b>
	3. Compliance with requirements for Aids to Navigation.( site and vessel)
	4. Failure (or non availability) of Aids to Navigation & other systems
	5. Site specific effects on aids to navigation e.g. masking by background lights, masking by structures and the effects of rotating blades, control responsibility for foghorns, etc.)
	6. AIS (Automatic Identification System) failure or not required to fit.
	7. Marking on charts of OREI structures and associated navigation aids
<b>3</b>	<b>Bathymetry</b>
	1. Accuracy of and changes to bathymetry (e.g. navigable channels, shifting sandbanks, anti-scour material, seabed mobility, etc.)
<b>4</b>	<b>Interference</b>
	1. Interference with vessel based communications.
	2. Interference with shore based communications.
	3. Interference with vessel based navigation. (e.g. GPS, radar,

R2	Influence on Causes
	compasses etc.).
	4. Interference to ship based radar e.g. shadowing and blind sectors and false echoes.
	5. Interference with shore based navigation. (e.g. VTS services, MRCC services, etc.)
	6. Interference to shore based radar e.g. shadowing and blind sectors and false echoes.
	7. Similar interference to helicopter and fixed wing aircraft radar used in SAR and emergency response.
	8. Electromagnetic interference from turbine generators, transformers, other structures or cables.
	9. Acoustic interference to sonar, diver communications, echo sounders, fish finders and acoustic release systems.
	10. Helicopter radar contact in a wind farm or other OREI interpreted as a vessel contact.
5	Future Technical Change
	1. Application of radar absorbing material to towers and blades, etc.

*Table 14 - Influences on Causes – Example Checklist*

#### C.3.4 Traffic Densities and types – Example Checklist

R3	Traffic Levels
1	Hindcast – ½ consent period (e.g. 10 years)
2	Current
3	Forecast – ½ consent period (e.g. 10 years)
4	Forecast – full consent period (e.g. 20 years)

*Table 15 - Traffic Levels – Example Checklist*

#### C.3.5 Circumstances – Example Checklist

R4	Circumstance
1	<b>Intentional Navigation</b>
	1. Intentionally navigating within a wind farm or other OREI site en route or to carry out activities.
2	<b>Accidental Navigation</b>
	1. Unintentionally navigating within a wind farm or other OREI site or being forced to do so to avoid collision with another vessel, etc.
3	<b>Emergency Navigation</b>
	1. Wind farm or other OREI site blocking passage to port of refuge, safe haven, inshore anchorage or inshore routes.
	2. Wind farm or other OREI site restricting anchoring.

R4	Circumstance
<b>4</b>	<b>Forced Navigation</b>
	1. Wind farm or other OREI site forcing passage in more dangerous waters.
	2. Wind farm or other OREI site forcing passage in more congested water.

*Table 16 – Circumstances – Example Checklist*

### C.3.6 Influences on Consequences – Example Checklist

R5	Influence on Consequence
<b>1</b>	<b>OREI Design</b>
	1. Strength and robustness of wind turbine or other OREI structure.
	2. Collapse mode of impacted turbines or other OREI structure after collision
<b>2</b>	<b>Vessels</b>
	1. Vessel size.
	2. Vessel cargo. (e.g. polluting cargoes, hazardous cargoes, etc.)
<b>3</b>	<b>Search and Rescue</b>
	1. Adequacy of Search and Rescue provision (e.g. equipment, equipment location, communication, etc.).
	2. Availability of Search and Rescue resources (e.g. currently in commercial use, multiple SAR operations, etc).
	3. Ability to deploy Search and Rescue resources (e.g. helicopter operations affected by blade rotation, aircraft operations affected by search height restrictions, etc.).
<b>4</b>	<b>Emergency Response</b>
	1. Adequacy of Emergency Response provision (e.g. tugs, oil spill equipment, communications, etc.).
	2. Availability of Emergency Response resources (e.g. currently in commercial use, multiple ER operations, etc).
	3. Ability to deploy Emergency Response resources (e.g. state of contingency planning).

*Table 17 - Influences on Consequences – Example Checklist*

## C4

### Tolerability of Risk<sup>17</sup>

Determining whether the predicted level of risk from an OREI development is tolerable or not is in the first instance a matter of asking the following questions:

- i) is the risk below any unacceptable limit that has been established?
- ii) if so, has it also been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)?

The risk is only tolerable if the answer to both these questions can be demonstrated to be 'Yes'.

Brief guidance on addressing these two questions is given below.

#### **Question (i): is the risk below any unacceptable limit?**

The HSE has suggested that – as a very broad indication - an individual risk of death of 1 in 100,000 per annum should ... '*represent the dividing line between what could be just tolerable for any substantial category of workers for any large part of a working life, and what is unacceptable for any but fairly exceptional groups*'. For members of the public who have a risk imposed on them in the wider interest of society '*this limit is judged to be an order of magnitude lower – 1 in 10,000 per annum*'.

It is very important to note that these limits were originally proposed in the context of considering the tolerability of risks from onshore hazardous installations, such as nuclear or chemical plant. For such installations, it is relatively clear that the groups of people most exposed, who need to be considered as the limiting case, are workers at the site and/ or people living or spending a large proportion of their time in the vicinity. For an OREI development, identifying the most exposed groups is not easy. People on board passing vessels not associated with the OREI will in general only be exposed for a small proportion of time. Even those most involved with the development, e.g. service technicians using offshore accommodation between visits to OREI(s), may only be exposed to navigational risks for relatively short periods. This might suggest that the HSE's suggested limits could be relaxed. But such groups are already exposed to other risks at other times. For example, wind farm technicians are also exposed to risks from work at height, electricity and many other hazards. The navigational risk associated with OREIs cannot be allowed to 'use up' the entire risk 'budget'. Developers should therefore give very careful consideration to the question of who is exposed to risk and hence what limits may be appropriate.

It is also essential to note that the HSE's limits were intended to be applied to the total risk to a worker as a result of their occupation, or to a member of the public from a hazardous installation in their neighbourhood. As in the paragraph above, navigational risk is itself only one component of the risk to people, and the HSE limits cannot not be applied to it, or indeed to any further subdivision into components of the navigational risk, such as those vessel-vessel collision, vessel-OREI collisions, grounding, fouling of cables and so on. The IMO [Ref] recognises this, stating: '*... risk acceptance criteria always refer to the total risk to the individual and/or group of persons. Total risk means the sum of all risks that e.g. a person on board a ship is exposed to. The total risk therefore would contain risks from hazards such as fire, collision, etc. There is no criterion available to determine the acceptability of specific hazards....'*

The HSE is careful to note that any quantitative 'unacceptable' limits must be used with great caution. The concepts used in establishing them are complex, and the quantitative predictions that might be compared against them are fraught with uncertainty. It may not be helpful to attempt to define quantitative limits, and developers should consider whether there are other ways to define what is unacceptable. R2P2 notes that what is unacceptable '*...is often spelled out or implied in legislation, ACOPs, guidance, etc or reflected in what constitutes good practice*' such that there is no need to set an explicit quantitative boundary. Developers should therefore carefully justify any unacceptable limits they propose.

### **Question (ii): has the risk been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)?**

A primary duty on employers with regarding to health and safety in UK law (under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act, 1974) is to reduce risk 'so far as is reasonably practicable' (SFAIRP). For most purposes, this is synonymous with its being reduced ALARP. Establishing what is reasonably practicable involves considering whether further risk control measures are called for. This must be considered in terms of:

- whether the cost of further measures would be grossly disproportionate to the value of the benefit obtained and
- whether relevant good practice has been followed.

Further guidance on the concepts of gross disproportion and relevant good practice can be found in [R2p2] and elsewhere on the HSE website.

### **Wider considerations**

These two questions are ‘pure safety’ ones. In question (i) risk is considered in relation to what has been tolerated in other contexts and in question (ii) it is weighed against the cost of reducing it further. Other considerations are likely to be taken into account in the final claim or decision about whether or not, taking account of risk, a development should be consented. Risk will be weighed together with other effects, positive and negative, of the proposed development. Nevertheless, the two questions provide a useful framework for looking at risk ‘in its own terms’.

### **Reference**

Reducing Risks Protecting People (RRPP or R2P2). HSE, 2001. ISBN 0 7176 2151 0. Available to download at [www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm](http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm)

IMO MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.5. Amendments to the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)

IMO, 2006. Available to download at:  
[http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data\\_id=16406&filename=5.pdf](http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=16406&filename=5.pdf)

## D1

## Overview of Appropriate Risk Assessment

### D.1.1 Introduction

In their assessments and submissions developers will be expected to undertake appropriate assessment in support of their navigation risk assessment. This could also be extended to cover some aspects of search and rescue (SAR) and emergency response if this is required by MCA.

This Annex gives an overview of:

- the purpose of the appropriate assessment in a Developer's assessment and submission
- the types of appropriate assessment, for example modelling, sought for in a Developer's assessment and submission
- the hierarchy of appropriate assessment techniques appropriate to a Developer's assessment and submission
- the concept of a scenario to control the scope and depth of the appropriate assessment.

The Annex then includes:

- Guidance on Navigation Risk Assessment
- Area Traffic Assessment
- Specific Traffic Assessment

**Note:** Guidance on appropriate search and rescue overview and appropriate emergency response overview can be found in sections 3.5 and 3.6 of this document

### D.1.2 Purpose of an Appropriate Assessment Technique in Risk Assessment

The purpose of the appropriate assessment is to:

- Prove Feasibility

Demonstrate that the navigation activities (or search and rescue and emergency response activities) are feasible, with the wind farm or other OREI structures in place, during the phase of development, for the vessel types and with the conditions

- Quantify Risk

Produce a quantitative or qualitative value, acceptable to Government, of the change in risk caused by the development to the base risk associated with the activity and how this risk varies across vessel types

- Assess Sensitivity

Determine the sensitivity of the risk to the conditions and the risk factors

- Decide on risk controls

Identify, evaluate and decide on appropriate risk controls.

#### **D.1.3 Purpose of the Appropriate Assessment in Hazard Log Closure**

In addition, the discipline of the appropriate assessment technique is to be used to identify issues that need to be considered:

- to close the hazard log
- to develop the Risk control log.

#### **D.1.4 Types of appropriate assessment**

Depending on proportionality judgement leading to the scope and depth of the submission the following types of other appropriate assessment, for example numerical modelling, may be needed:

- In support of navigation risk assessment
- Area Traffic Assessment
- Specific Traffic Assessment
- For search and rescue and emergency responses assessments see Sections 3.5 & 3.6.

#### **D.1.5 Concept of the Scenario to Control the Scope and Depth of the appropriate assessment**

The various hazards identifications will generate a large number of situations that require further investigation.

The concept of the scenario is to set up a model (or assessment), that while it is not necessarily an exact representation an exact situation being assessed is sufficiently:

- widely defined to cover a range of situations in a single scenario
- applicable to generate reasonable estimations of feasibility, risk, sensitivity and the effect of controls.

#### D.1.6 Hierarchy of the appropriate assessment in support of Navigation Risk Assessment

The concept of the methodology is of a hierarchy of appropriate assessment, including numerical modelling, which starts at the area level and the results used to define, if necessary, more specific issues to be investigated.

For example the process followed to support the navigation risk assessment of a particular proposal might be:

1a	Area Traffic Assessment of the Strategic Area	
leading to		
1b	Area Traffic Assessment of the OREI Area	
leading to where necessary		
2a	Specific Traffic Assessment in and around the OREI Area	
leading to ( where necessary and appropriate to the development proposal)		
2b	Specific Traffic Simulation in and around the OREI Area	
leading to ( where necessary and appropriate to the development proposal))		
3	Specific Traffic Bridge Control Simulation in and around the OREI Area for training and research purposes	
	leading to ( where necessary and appropriate to the development proposal))	
4	Site Specific Trials	

*Table 18 – A Possible Hierarchy of Assessment and Trials in support of Navigation Risk Assessment*

##### Definition 1 – Area Traffic Assessment

Area Traffic Assessment assesses the marine environment, the traffic and the OREI development to predict the risk of collision, contact, grounding and stranding now and in the future. If appropriate it may need to be statistical in nature, in any case based on assessing the vessel traffic and the behaviour of vessels with relation to steering rules, speed changes, the route they wish to follow, etc., and the multiple interrelationships with a large number of vessels, of different types, navigating in the same environment over a long time and involved in a variety of operations which will each interact.

## Definition 2 - Specific Traffic Assessment

Specific Traffic Assessment might be used to assess in detail the risk of more specific navigation issues, and proposed risk controls, that could require a higher quality assessment and representation of:

- the manoeuvring capabilities of the vessels, including such parameters as their stopping distances and turning circles
- changes which may result in the mariners' domain size as manoeuvring sea room reduces
- details of the bathymetry.

It may also be of value to use a Navigation Simulator to train mariners in the navigation and operation of their vessels within and close to wind farms or other OREI. Research could also be carried out, by driving the ship in real time, in conjunction with other instructor/assessor controlled target vessels in encounter situations, to assess the feasibility and level of risk. This might include the risk of grounding or collision or contact with other vessels and structures within the OREI area or in nearby restricted water navigable channels. Such training or research should also include the ability for mariners to navigate in all circumstances using simulated radar and ARPA displays, as appropriate to their vessel types, integrated with the vessel control simulator and other simulated navigation and communication systems.

Simulators used to assess navigational risk in and near to offshore wind farms or other OREI must be capable of simulating all the navigational effects and phenomena relevant to, or peculiar to those specific OREI structures. These include, for example, the effects of such structures on vessel and shore based radar systems.

Any simulators used should comply with Section A- I/12 (“*Standards governing the use of simulators*”) of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping, 1978 as amended in 1995 and to date (“STCW Convention”, IMO).

**Note:** The Instructors and Assessors operating the simulator/s should be qualified and experienced as specified in Section A-I/12 Part 2 subsection 9 of that Convention (“*Qualifications of instructors and assessors*”).

For non-critical assessments MCA may grant permission for systems and personnel not reaching these standards and qualifications to operate acceptable proprietary systems in mutually agreed scenarios. Such permission should be sought from MCA by developers before the assessment takes place.

Some of the parameters worked out in this way may then be used in the definition of "rules" in the Area Traffic Modelling/Assessment.

### **Definition 3 - Specific Traffic Full Bridge Control Simulation**

For critical risks or significant investment decisions on risk control options it may be necessary to extend the assessment to simulation using full bridge simulators. A number of UK marine training and research establishments, together with some universities, have such systems.

### **Definition 4 – Site Specific Assessment**

Any numerical modelling, navigation simulator systems or other assessment techniques used in the risk assessment of a specific development will, singly or in combination with other tools and techniques, be required to fully:

- (a) include bathymetric and other site features data for the area using an Electronic Navigational Chart (ENC) base map or as determined by a site specific survey. In particular, depth contours and navigation channels relevant to various vessel types, sizes and operations should be taken into account with respect to the potential for colliding with other vessels or OREI structures and for grounding due to the limitations of water space or whilst avoiding a collision.
- (b) model or assess the effects of tide and tidal streams in the OREI area, plus any local currents so as to determine their effects on normal manoeuvring and operations and on vessels not under command, SAR, pollution control, etc.;
- (c) model or assess the effects on navigation and marine operations of various weather conditions such as wind, sea state and visibility;
- (d) use the survey traffic data supplied by the developers and other sources, including the DECC Marine Traffic Database, from a combination of radar surveys, Automatic Identification System (AIS) data and historical records;
- (e) model or assess typical fishing and recreational activities within and close to the OREI area, as in (d) above and their interaction with other vessel types navigating near and within that area. Such requisite background data to be supplied from the developers and other sources;
- (f) model or assess each vessel type with suitable draughts, dynamics and domains or equivalent parameters;
- (g) establish a baseline of marine activity without an OREI;
- (h) examine the effects of the OREI on this marine activity and traffic if no re-routing is recommended;
- (i) model or assess the chain of navigational events as vessels pass within or close to the OREI (i.e. where an alteration of course or speed made in an encounter with a turbine or other vessel produces a further encounter or encounters, including the avoidance of grounding in confined channels and shallow water effects);
- (j) model or assess the effect of the OREI on the necessary compliance of various vessel types to all of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1972, as amended, (The Collision

- Regulations or “COLREGS”) (e.g. power to sail, sail to fishing vessel, overtaking vessels, etc.) and to any local rules if the site lies within the area of an appropriate local authority;
- (k) examine the cumulative effects of all wind farms and other OREI, aggregate dredging, other offshore installations etc., within the proximity of the given site, given the traffic data by developers and the DECC Marine Traffic Database;
  - (l) recommend optimum routes based on the foregoing assessments if these are seen to be required;
  - (m) determine, on request, the increased passage distances produced by re-routeing of specific vessels;
  - (n) allow for power and steering failures within and close to the OREI together with suitable researched allowances for human error;
  - (o) Include the effects of the OREI on the detection of other vessels within or on the far side of it, such effects to include visual blind areas and radar effects such as shadow and blind sectors, spurious echoes and other effects, etc., using the typical beam widths, pulse lengths and powers of the vessel type radars involved;
  - (p) model all vessel types' compliance with Collision Regulations Rule 19 in relation to sub para (o) above;
  - (q) apply such effects to relevant port and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) radar sites;
  - (r) If required by MCA, investigate the effects of the OREI on helicopter SAR and fixed wing aircraft dispersal operations, etc., particularly any radar or thermal imaging effects;
  - (s) examine the hazards and the consequences of major incidents within or close to the OREI including wreck, collision involving large passenger vessels, etc.;
  - (t) include data and an overview of the consequences and control of oil and other pollutant spills;
  - (u) recommend minimum separation distances of the specific wind farm or other OREI boundaries from established navigational routes, from port approaches, from routeing schemes, from other OREI and from other offshore operations (see the MCA website for initial guidance);
  - (v) make navigational risk recommendations with respect to the construction and decommissioning phases of the development;
  - (w) include an overview of potential search and rescue activities and difficulties within and close to the OREI

**Note:** Post construction there is an ongoing requirement for OREI operators to monitor & review the impact which their activities are having on navigation and its safety. Where practical, feedback should also be obtained from commercial Masters, fishing vessel skippers, work boat crews and recreational sailors who regularly operate in and around different wind farm sites to get realistic information on their experiences in different conditions.

## D2

## Guidance Selection of Techniques that are Acceptable to Government

The purpose of this annex is to give guidance on how to select Modelling Tools or other Assessment Techniques that are, or will be, acceptable to Government.

This Annex describes:

- the process of selection of assessment techniques
- how to obtain MCA approval including:
  - the self declaration process
  - the extent of the process
  - the activities required
  - the information required
- the Method of Describing in the Submission the Techniques and Tools Used.

### D.2.1 Process of Selection of Assessment Techniques and tools

- The Assessment Techniques and tools used shall have been submitted to the MCA for approval including a self declaration.
- Whichever technique or tool is selected, the user is strongly recommended to consult with the MCA prior to its use in a specific assessment.

### D.2.2 Approved OREI Tools and Assessment Techniques

“Approved OREI Tools and Assessment Techniques” are those which are granted approval by the MCA for use with OREI, and which will subsequently join the list of those having previously having obtained such approval.

### D.2.3 How to Obtain MCA Approval for Tools and Assessment Techniques

The process of gaining MCA approval may consist simply of a self-declaration of the Verification<sup>18</sup> of the Tools and Assessment Methods.

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<sup>18</sup> Verification: Confirmation through the provision of objective evidence, such as examination by or demonstration to the verifier, that specified requirements have been fulfilled In software development, verification is the process of evaluating the (software) products of a given phase, or segment of work, to ensure correctness and consistency with respect to the products and standards provided as input to that stage. (ISO 9000:2000 TickIT guide 5.5 Revised 2007)

## Extent of Self Declaration

The extent of this process will depend on the development status of each tool and assessment method. This status is categorised as:

- approved maritime tools and assessment techniques designed or modified specifically for assessing navigational risk within and near to OREI (Type D1)
- Widely and publicly used maritime tools and assessment techniques (Type D2)
- Specialist maritime tools and assessment techniques (Type D3)
- Non marine tools and assessment techniques (Type D4)
- New tools and assessment techniques (Type D5).

### List of Approved Maritime Tools and Assessment Methods (Type D1)

These are either:

- Tools and assessment techniques designed or modified specifically for assessing navigational risk within and near to OREI approved by the MCA for use with the maritime environment.
- Tools and assessment techniques designed or modified specifically for assessing navigational risk within and near to OREI and approved by third party bodies acceptable to MCA for use with the maritime environment.

### Definitions

Widely and publicly used maritime modelling tools and assessment techniques (Type D2) are either:

- Maritime modelling tools or assessment techniques that are commercially available, quality controlled, with a proven track record and a large user base, but not necessarily with reference to offshore OREIs or other offshore structures.

or

- Maritime modelling tools or assessment techniques that are not commercially available but are quality controlled, have a proven track record and have been used on a large number of applications or projects, but not necessarily with reference to offshore OREIs or other offshore structures.

Specialist maritime modelling tools and assessment techniques (Type D3) are:

- Maritime modelling tools and assessment techniques that have been built up by a single user (or small group) and have been used on other specialist projects.

Non-maritime modelling tools and assessment techniques (Type D4) are either:

- Modelling Tools and Assessment Techniques that are commercially available and quality controlled but are capable of being used in a new way or domain.
- Modelling Tools and Assessment Techniques that are not commercially available but are quality controlled but are capable of being used in a new way.

The development of new modelling tools and assessment techniques (type D5) is to be encouraged. However, by their nature they will require more evidence of verification.

#### **D.2.4 Specific Activities to Obtain Approval of Tools and Techniques**

Depending on the status of the tools and techniques the activities to obtain approval shall include reasoned arguments and evidence for some, or all of, the following stages:

- statement of tool applicability
- clarification of conceptual model
- documented model/commented code
- demonstration of abilities
- peer/expert review
- comparison with real-world experience.

##### **Statement of Tool Applicability**

Explain how the tool is applied to the specific OREI assessment task. State how assumptions inherent in the tool affect the application to the OREI task.

##### **Clarification of Conceptual Model**

Document the conceptual model. This documentation should include:

- Objective(s)
- System structure/configuration
- Detailed description of the tool, and, if using numerical techniques, its algorithms.
- Logical rules & flow charts
- Input data sources.

##### **Documented Model / Commented Code**

- Provide evidence that computer modelling tool code is sufficiently documented to enable another competent person to see how it corresponds to the conceptual model.

### Demonstration of Abilities

- If required, demonstrate to Government departments and agencies the capabilities of the modelling tool or other assessment technique.

### Peer / Expert review

- Provide evidence that the modelling tools or other assessment techniques have been peer reviewed by government approved person or persons.

### Comparison with Real-World Experience

- Provide evidence that the modelling tools or other assessment techniques have been compared to real-world experience in similar applications.

## D.2.5 Specific Information Required to Obtain Approval of Modelling Tools or other Assessment Techniques

The scope of information that should be included with the Self Declaration:

	Stage	Demonstration	Statement of Tool Applicability	Clarification of Conceptual Model	Documented Model / Commented Code	Peer / Expert Review	Comparison with Real World Experience
D1	Maritime Modelling Tools and Techniques Approved for Application to OREI	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
D2	Widely and Publicly Used Maritime Modelling Tools and Assessment Techniques	✓	✓			✓	
D3	Specialist Maritime Modelling Tools and Assessment Techniques	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
D4	Non Marine Modelling Tools and Assessment Techniques	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	<b>Stage</b>	Demonstration	Statement of Tool Applicability	Clarification of Conceptual Model	Documented Model / Commented Code	Peer / Expert Review	Comparison with Real World Experience
<b>D5</b>	New Modelling Tools and Assessment Techniques	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Table 19 – Self Declaration Information*

### Depth of Information

The Depth of Information required is dependent on:

- the level of risk the tool or technique is assessing
- the level of control (if any) the tool or technique has on the Risk.

Level of risk and control is likely to range from:

- Highest
  - Navigation tools used in real time navigation monitoring and management (also, if appropriate, SAR Tools used in real time search planning)
- High
  - Specific navigation situation tools used to evaluate high risk conditions and advise on important controls (also, if appropriate, SAR tools used in advance search planning)

### To:

- Medium
  - Specific navigation tools used to evaluate medium risk conditions
  - Marine traffic assessment tools uses to assess marine risk
- Low
  - Marine traffic assessment tools used to assess the economic impact of changed shipping routes.

It is up to the tool user to assess the level of risk and the level of control and provide an appropriate depth of information. IEC61508<sup>19</sup> may be used as a guide.

#### D.2.6 Specific Information Required when Describing the Tools and Assessment Techniques Used

The description of the modelling tools and other assessment techniques used (or proposed to be used) should include:

- the modelling tool name including the version number of the software
- the application that the tool or assessment technique is supporting e.g. supporting marine traffic assessment, specific navigation situation assessment, SAR resource planning, SAR response planning, oil spill assessment
- which OREI or OREI area
- description of the modelling tool concept
- a description of prior use of the tool in OREI, marine and other applications
- any pre or post processing software
- the hardware the modelling tool will be run on
- the approval status including reference to 3rd party certificates
- the self declaration status

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<sup>19</sup> International Standard IEC 61508 “Functional safety of electrical / electronic / programmable electronic safety-related systems (E/E/PES)” International Electrotechnical Commission

#### D.2.7 Specific Information Required when Describing the Assessment Methods Used

The following is an example of an assessment method description form.

Assessment Method	Description
Name of Method	
Use of Method	
Method Type (D1 to D5)	
Concept of Method	
Prior Use of Method	
Pre or post Processing	
Other relevant information	

*Table 20 - Example of Technique or Tool Description*

<b>D3</b>	<b>Guidance</b> <b>Demonstration that the Results from the Techniques are Acceptable to Government</b>
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The purpose of this annex is to give guidance on how to demonstrate that the result from applying the selected techniques are, or will be, acceptable to Government.

This Annex describes:

- the process for self-declaration of validated<sup>20</sup> results
- self declaration activities
- sources of real world information.

#### **D.3.1 Process for Self-declaration of Validated Results**

The submission shall include a self-declaration that the results have been validated.

For each validation activity on the results, a declaration should be made that present the results and findings, together with a clear statement. An example format of a validation statement is given below. One statement can be made to cover a multiple set of results.

#### **Example Format of a Validation Statement**

<b>Heading</b>	<b>Description</b>
Validation activity	
Results produced by (staff member)	
Results produced on (date)	
Pre or post Processing	
Simulation parameter settings (if relevant)	
Comparison data (where relevant) description & source	
Validation Conclusion	

*Figure 7 - Example Format for a Validation Statement*

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<sup>20</sup> Validation: Confirmation or ratification through the provision of objective evidence that the requirements for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled. (ISO 9000:2000 TickIT guide) Revised 2007

### D.3.2 Self Declaration - Activities

For all results presented, the documentation of results validation shall include reasoned arguments and evidence for the following:

- tuning of parameters
- consistency checks
- behavioural reasonableness
- sensitivity analyses
- comparison with real-world experience.

#### Tuning of Parameters

The submission should provide evidence that the modelling or other form of assessment has been carried out appropriately. Different methods have different parameters so the tuning required will differ. However, three key components, applicable in most models, are:

- choice of mathematical routines; choice of appropriate integration algorithms & statistical estimators
- convergence; increasing the resolution in a control dimension until changes of results are within satisfactory magnitude;
- mathematical formulae fitted to data should have some measure of goodness-of-fit calculated.

#### Consistency Checks

The submission should provide evidence that at key points (typically at the end), values of all parameters should be output & demonstrated that they are correct/consistent with the input. This checks that no inadvertent changes happened in the coding or running.

Similarly, variable distributions used should be checked.

#### Behavioural Reasonableness

The submission should provide evidence that the assessment has been exercised under a range of conditions and demonstrate that the results were reasonable.

- this is mainly a qualitative exercise but it should be checked that variables stay within their bounds. For example, key values of variables such as vessel speed, as simulated, should be compared with the input data;
- the conditions simulated should include some extreme events; more severe than the events to be simulated for real. Reasonable behaviour under extreme conditions gives good confidence in the results for less severe conditions.

## Sensitivity Analyses

The submission should provide evidence that the key input parameters have been varied by small amounts to determine the sensitivity of the results to changes in these inputs, and that the sensitivity has been examined for reasonableness.

- this sensitivity analysis is especially important for input parameters where there is uncertainty around the correct value to use.

## Comparison with Real-World Experience

The submission should provide evidence that results have been compared with real-world experience.

- real-world experience may be in the form of data from controlled experiments (e.g. trial manoeuvring of a ship) or data from natural experiments (e.g. statistics on marine accidents)
- wherever real world experience is presented, it shall include estimates of uncertainty (data validity)
- care should be taken in calibrating to fit results to real-world experience: While calibration improves the comparison with a specific case, it reduces the generality
- state all calibrations applied to the model during validation.

If comparison with real-world experience is not possible, the developer shall justify why this is so.

- This model-to-model validation is not as thorough as model-to-real-world validation (both models may be wrong), but may be acceptable. The greater the difference in the two types of models compared, the greater the confidence in the result if they agree. A good example would be comparison between a computer simulation & a physical (test tank) model.

### D.3.3 Sources of Real World Information

#### HM Coastguard

HM Coastguard (HMCG) keep records of incidents where they have been involved in the co-ordination of search & rescue activities. As HMCG is responsible for co-ordinating maritime emergency incidents (search and rescue and counter pollution) in the UK Search and Rescue region, this should be a comprehensive dataset for incidents where the Coastguard has been alerted. It is possible that some incidents are handled by other individuals/organisations and therefore not included in this data, but this is thought to be a small proportion when considering the sea areas potentially affected by OREI.

HMCG database records include incident date, location, vessel type & incident type. Some data will be freely available.

Additionally, for specific areas, HM Coastguard Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCC) may be able to help with local knowledge.

**Note:** HM Coastguard Centres are however not able to offer opinions on navigational risk assessments. Such opinions should be sought only from MCA's Southampton Headquarters, Navigation Safety Branch.

### Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) issue statistical reports on marine accidents (freely available via the web page, below) and can also provide, on request, statistics broken down to date, location, vessel type & accident type. Some data will be freely available.

Contact: <http://www.maib.gov.uk/>

MAIB data covers all accidents required to be reported under "The Merchant Shipping (accident reporting & Investigation) regulations 2005", available at <http://www.maib.gov.uk/resources/index.cfm> This is, broadly, all UK commercial vessels plus all foreign vessels in UK waters taking passengers to or from UK ports. This is thus useful but not exhaustive. Furthermore, incidents recorded in the MAIB database should all be included within HM Coastguard data. However, MAIB perform detailed investigative work on causes of accidents, which may be useful for understanding accident patterns or specific events. For example, the number of marine accidents reported to MAIB per year has varied quite widely.




Figure 8 – Number of Marine Accidents (1991 – 2008)

### **Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI)**

The RNLI statistician keeps records of all their lifeboat launches, including incident date, incident type & type of vessels involved. This will not be exhaustive (RNLI are not called out to all incidents) but does show detailed information on the range of incidents in an area.

Contact: <http://www.rnli.org.uk>

### **IHS FAIRPLAY**

IHS-Fairplay can provide, commercially, information on all global marine accidents involving vessels of 100 GRT & over, including vessel type, accident type & location.

Contact: <http://www.fairplay.co.uk/>

<b>D4</b>	<b>Guidance</b> <b>Navigation Risk Assessment</b> <b>Area Traffic Assessment Techniques</b>
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#### **D.4.1 Use of Area Traffic Assessment Techniques**

Area Traffic Assessment will required when there is uncertainty over the effect of the OREI on the ability of vessels to navigate and operate in the waters adjacent to and through the wind farm or other OREI area without suffering an increase in risk. Such risk will include amongst others the risks of contact, collision, grounding and stranding.

#### **Fundamental Requirements of Area Traffic Assessment**

The fundamental requirements of Area Traffic Assessment include:

- that it assesses all traffic in both the strategic OREI area (if appropriate for the particular development) and the OREI area itself
- that it assesses the movement of vessels through the water in a way that is representative of vessel navigation and activity
- that it assesses the real world behaviour of the vessels to the Collision Regulations including:
  - the effect of reduced visibility on compliance with the Collision Regulations coupled with the expected effects on vessel and shore based radars
  - a representative rate of human error in applying the Collision Regulations
  - a representative rate of deliberate non compliance with the Collision Regulations
- that it assesses the effect of manoeuvring in restricted waterways (defined from bathymetric data developed from Electronic Navigation Charts or from site specific surveys) including action by vessels to avoid shallow water
- that it is used to calculate:
  - as a minimum the frequency and density of interaction between vessels, vessels and shallow water, and vessels and OREI structures, to gain statistically significant information to assess the effect of the fundamental Risk Control Options of location, alignment, size and layout
  - the probability of collision, contact, and grounding
  - for specific vessel types the risk and tolerability of the risk.

## D.4.2 How to select the Situations Requiring Area Traffic Assessment

### Source of the Situations

The situations requiring assessment will come from:

- the need to evaluate the general effect of the OREI on the marine traffic and the navigational risks associated with a development
- the cumulative navigation risks associated with the development and the other OREI developments and other types of marine activity in the Strategic OREI Area
- the in-combination effects on the navigation risk of the development with other economic developments over the operational life of the OREI
- the need to evaluate the specific impact of the OREI due to the presence of specific marine traffic activity that may be present, or is planned, in close proximity to the OREI.
- the hazard log
- the risk control log.

### Study Area

It is anticipated that at least two study areas will be required.

- Study area 1 should be representative of an appropriate sea area which could be the full strategic area and used for evaluating cumulative and in-combination effects.
- Study area 2 should be representative of the OREI area and used to evaluate potential effects such as the introduction of separation schemes, safety and /or exclusion zones, etc., near to and within the OREI.

Guidance on the size of the OREI study area is provided in Annex B1 – “Understanding the Base Case Densities and Types of Traffic”. Having developed an appropriate area it is then necessary to identify the significance of key meteorological and oceanographic parameters, and the nature and distribution of marine traffic passing within the study area.

#### D.4.3 How to Define Scenarios for Assessment

The assessment should include, as a minimum, the following scenarios which have been proposed to assess the cumulative impact, but ensure the key drivers of increased marine traffic levels and navigation constraints can be isolated and identified.

item	Scenario	Objective
1	Present day “Base Case”	Provide assessment of present risk level for validation with historic data
2	“Future Case” based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Traffic types and densities mid way through the consent period (e.g. 10 yrs)</li><li>• Traffic types and densities at end of the consent period (e.g. 20 yrs)</li></ul>	Future assessment of study area risks with no OREI present
3	“Base Case with OREI”	Provide analysis of OREI (s) impacts only, unrelated to traffic increases or reductions
4	“Future Case with OREI” based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Traffic types and densities mid way through the consent period (e.g. 10 yrs)</li><li>• Traffic types and densities at end of the consent period (e.g. 20 yrs)</li></ul>	

*Figure 9 - Scenarios Requiring Area Traffic Assessment*

#### D.4.4 Requirements for Assessing a Scenario

Each of the Scenarios should be assessed to determine:

- Feasibility
- Risk
- Sensitivity
- Controls.

##### **Feasibility**

The feasibility of shipping operations through a particular water space or channel, adjacent or close to OREI developments is best developed with respect to the meteorological and oceanographic data collated above, and guidance on vessel navigation requirements.

Some aspects of the feasibility and desirability of navigation within channels might also be identified with reference to graphic outputs developed by simulation models which have the capability to place the instructor/assessor within an area traffic simulation. These tools may be used to assist in reviewing the relative sea room, and the navigation interactions within the Study Area.

### Risk

The risk associated with navigation within or close to wind farms and other OREI should be related to frequency and consequence. The analysis results should inform the key changes in risk of collision, contact and grounding/stranding as a result of the OREI development, with consequences being fed into SAR and Counter Pollution assessment. The assessment output should be tailored to identify:

- the quantitative risk level;
- if the “Future Case with OREI ” scenario develops broadly acceptable risk when judged against the present traffic environment, the “Future Case” (no OREI(s)), or are:
  - tolerable with modifications
  - tolerable with additional controls
  - tolerable with monitoring
- that further risk control is grossly disproportionate.

The output must provide specific data on collision potential between all vessel types routes and operations within the Study Area. The output should be in a format that the following key questions can be posed and answered:

- where are the areas of increased risk?
- what are the magnitude of collision, contact, grounding and other hazard increases?
- which vessel type’s routes and operations are most impacted, and where do these incidents occur?
- is the marine traffic assessment covering all the elements of navigation and other marine activities associated with key incidents, or should these scenarios be specifically addressed - perhaps within navigation simulations - to better encompass meteorological, oceanographic, navigation and human response factors?
- what SAR and Counter Pollution overview data may be generated from the key incidents?

Clearly the selection and identification of key incidents will be site specific, however the following threshold is recommended:

***All locations where vessel types and/or routes see an increase in risk of over 50% should be reviewed independently to identify further potential impacts from meteorological and oceanographic factors, or the applicability of mitigation measures***

### Sensitivity

Each of the principal scenarios defined above may be subject to sensitivity tests to examine the impact of key drivers. The sensitivities to be examined should be determined from the Influence Analysis. See Annex C5 Guidance on the Influences on the Level of Risk.

These include, but are not limited to:

- ***Adjacent wind farms and other OREI*** - These scenarios may require one or more analysis for each future year to address the impact of adjacent OREI developments.
- ***Variation in Traffic Mix*** – Key assumptions may have been made on port/terminal/marina developments and other types of marine activity that generate traffic within the Study Area. It may be appropriate to conduct sensitivity tests on the presence or absence of this associated traffic to evaluate its impact on the risk profile.
- ***Variation in Traffic Routeing Assumptions*** – Variations may be made in the routeing of traffic adjacent to and within wind farm(s) and other OREI to review the risk control measures available, and/or the sensitivity of risk to changes in these issues. This may include the minimum separation/exclusion from the OREI.
- ***Variation in Tidal Level*** – Channel widths and available sea room may be significantly impacted by changes in tidal level. Navigation and various marine operations may also be affected by tidal stream rates and directions. If these are key issues for the Study Area their impact should be addressed within sensitivity testing.
- ***Variation in Assessment Parameters*** – Should the techniques and tools adopted be particularly sensitive to variations in their parameters these features should be sensitivity tested. Examples include the perception distances adopted within the simulation, and the assessment of vessel “domains”.
- ***Weather routing, bad weather impacts on short sea services. Impacts on short sea crossings, scope to allow weather routing, seeking minimising violent ship movement and vessel stress.***
- ***Visibility and Vessel or Structure Detection*** – The principal scenarios may have been performed with base assumptions on the change in risk as functions of such limitations as loss of visibility or radar detection due to the

presence of an OREI, or lack of AIS data. Vessel interaction is particularly considered to increase as two vessels (who might be considered as completely blind to each other's presence) approach on either side of, close to, or within a wind farm. The layout of the wind farm will contribute to changes in this base profile. Key assumptions associated with this issue, and those associated with other OREI types, may be tested in a series of sensitivity analyses.

Area traffic simulations are frequently subject to variation in output between representative days due to random generation of traffic within the model. If a simulation approach is selected then the models should be run for sufficient time to create stable average results. Where comparison between scenarios is required these should be made on the basis of stable scenario results.

### **Effectiveness of Controls**

Where feasible the quantitative impact of modifications, controls, and monitoring should be identified. These may, but not necessarily, include:

- realignment of development boundaries and/or turbine/platform or other structure configurations
- possible safety zones
- recommended minimum separation distances of the specific OREI boundaries, and
- established navigational routes
- mandatory routeing schemes

### **D.4.5 Analysis and Presentation of Results**

Presentation of results should be clear and concise and in a form that can be understood by both experts and non-experts alike. This could take the form of graphical presentation supported by text and numerical data. Where large datasets are used and required for presentation these are best referenced in an annex from the main text. The presentation should include:

- the assessment technique used e.g. background, validation, references and methodology
- data inputs
- the results
- any assumptions and deviations to mainstream methodology used in the calculations
- conclusions on the impact of the assessment results with regards to OREI development.

The output should inform the operator and reviewer of the quantitative and/or qualitative changes in marine risk as a result of the OREI, and future activity.

This should be set against the marine environment that has been mapped for the Study Area. The assessment should, as a minimum:

- predict the vessel to vessel and vessel to structure encounters and grounding potential
- predict the contact/collision/grounding frequency distribution
- link to vessel types to predict contact and collision risk
- assist in the evaluation of the effectiveness of controls.

## Future Developments

The European Union Safety@Sea project <sup>21</sup> is investigating a shared format for the interchange of geospatial marine risk information and this format should be considered when available.

### D.4.6 Critical Parameters within the Assessment

The following are identified as critical parameters within area traffic assessment.

#### Critical Parameters Table

Ref:	Critical Parameter	Explanation
	Traffic Distribution	Positioning and width of vessel routes and operations
	Traffic Density & Type	Total densities and types of traffic in the assessment and potential for vessel interaction.
	OREI Location	Positioning and size of OREI, also orientation with respect to traffic streams and other vessel operations
	Route Relocation	Assumptions adopted in impacting the original traffic distribution
	Visibility	Assumptions adopted with respect to visibility through and close to the OREI and other means of vessel detection and tracking

*Table 21 – Area Traffic Assessment – Critical Parameters*

### D.4.7 Limitations of Assessment Techniques

All assessment techniques will have limitations, the extent to which these affect the results will depend upon the scenario, the data used, and, in the case of simulation, the algorithms used. It will be necessary to discuss the limitations of the specific assessment techniques to be used with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency or, in the case of developments within port limits, other competent navigation authority, before assessment work is completed.

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<sup>21</sup> <http://www.safetyatsea.se/>

From illustrative risk assessments the following were identified as potential limitations of area traffic assessment techniques.

### **Limitations Table**

<b>Ref</b>	<b>Limitation</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
	Validation on Vessel Class-by-Class basis	The quality of validation is a key issue, and where data exists the validation should be performed on a vessel by vessel basis.
	Perception Issues	Validation supports the adoption of the domain and Collision Regulations assumptions adopted in the Baseline case. However severe compression of routes and increases in traffic may bring about situations beyond the scope of the original validation requiring it to be reassessed.
	Near, Mid & Far Field perception	At present many assessment techniques conduct near field collision / grounding avoidance and middle and far field route following. The boundaries between local and far field navigation may be less distinct and assessment techniques with greater control and autonomy to "goal seek" will improve the veracity of the simulation.
	2D model	Many area traffic assessment techniques are 2D models. Greater consideration of risk issues and perception of navigation challenges be developed if the user was able to enter the model and review the simulation from the model ship's perspective.

*Table 22 - Area Traffic Assessment - Limitations of Assessment*

Key limitations should be presented within any submission, and the significance of the limitations identified.

### **D.4.8 Verification of Modelling Tools or Appropriate Assessment Techniques Used**

#### **General Guidance**

General guidance is given in Annex D2, Guidance on the Selection of Techniques that is Acceptable to Government.

#### **Specific Guidance**

For assessment based on modelling verification of the modelling tools used for the scenarios should include:

- Copies of the electronic model run files
- Paper copies (where possible) of the data used
- Paper copies of the results as graphics and text
- Functional description of the model

- Technical description of the model.

It is strongly advised that quality assurance procedures accompany the operation and management of the modelling process.

#### D.4.9 Guidance on how to Validate the Assessment Results

##### General Guidance

General guidance is given in Annex D3, Guidance on the Demonstration that the Results from the Techniques are Acceptable to Government.

##### Specific Guidance

Validation of the results can be achieved with the acquisition of reference data with known results – an intrinsic role of the Baseline scenario.

#### D.4.10 Performance Standards Sought for in the Modelling Tool or Assessment Technique

##### Performance Standards Table

The following table is an indication of the performance standard required from assessment techniques and tools used.

Ref	Performance Standard	Comment	Importance H/M/L
1	<b>MGN Requirements</b>		
1.01	Simulation	Computer simulation techniques are suggested to be used, where appropriate, with respect to the displacement of traffic and, in particular, the creation of “choke points” in areas of high traffic density.	H
2	<b>Meteorological and Oceanographic Parameters</b>		
2.01	Bathymetry	Critical parameter for boundaries of safe navigation, and route development.	H
2.02	Visibility (radar blind and shadow sectors around Wind Farms and other OREI)	Key impact on vessel interaction adjacent to and within OREI.	H

<b>Ref</b>	<b>Performance Standard</b>	<b>Comment</b>	<b>Importance H/M/L</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Navigation Activities – Traffic</b>		
3.01	Route Geometry (where relevant)	Key driver for simulation	H
3.02	Traffic distribution across routes (where relevant)	Significant impact from traffic spread across routes.	H
3.03	Variation of Vessel Types	Key driver for derivation of risk and water space impacts.	H
3.04	24 Hour traffic Variation	Significant impact, particularly for scheduled traffic, fishing and tidal dependency.	H
3.05	Speed profile	Major driver of dwell time and risk.	H
3.06	Vessel Length	Consistent with vessel type represented.	H
3.07	Vessel Length Variation	Consistent with vessel type represented and survey data.	H
3.07	Vessel domains	Consistent with vessel type represented.	H
3.09	Vessel draughts	Consistent with vessel type represented and loaded state.	H
<b>4</b>	<b>Navigation Activities – Simulation Rules for the Movement of Vessels</b>		
4.01	Ship types	Capable of modelling all the vessel types expected in and close to the OREI.	H
4.02	Vessels dynamics – vessel to vessel and vessel to structure manoeuvring	Consistent with vessel type represented	M
4.03	Vessels dynamics – turning, manoeuvring	Significant dependent upon available sea room, etc.	L
4.04	Vessel acceleration / deceleration	Low order if consistent validation applied.	L
<b>5</b>	<b>Navigation Activities – Simulation Rules for the Behaviour of Mariners</b>		

<b>Ref</b>	<b>Performance Standard</b>	<b>Comment</b>	<b>Importance H/M/L</b>
5.01	Collision Regulations	Vessel responses in accordance with all Collision Regulations including those relating to reduced visibility.	H
5.02	Collision Regulations – Human Error	Vessel responses not in accordance with Collision Regulations.	H
5.03	Collision Regulations - Violation	Vessel responses in violation of the Collision Regulations.	H
<b>6</b>	<b>Navigation Activities – Simulation Rules for Manoeuvring in restricted waterways</b>		
6.01	Vessel recognition	Recognition of turbines, shallow water and other obstructions.	H
6.02	Vessel type	Different rules for vessels of different types.	H
6.03	Tides and Tidal Streams	In accordance with predictions in the area.	M
<b>7</b>	<b>Scenario Flexibility</b>		
7.01	Traffic growth or reduction scenarios	Account needed of GDP growth, port developments, fishing and other activities.	H
7.02	Multiple simulations	Models with “typical” daily activity and statistical traffic variation require multiple runs for stable result reporting.	H
7.03	Multiple OREI	Critical ability for cumulative impact assessments.	H
7.04	Vessel Routeing Options & Control measures, i.e. safety zone	Development of alternate route structures.	H
<b>8</b>	<b>Results Assessment</b>		
8.01	Visualisation	Ability to place the instructor / assessor within the simulation.	H
8.02	Display – Route and Activity Structures	Ability to show the Route and Activity Structures on a GIS map or ENC chart.	H

Ref	Performance Standard	Comment	Importance H/M/L
8.03	Display – Route and Activity Details	Ability to show the details for each route and activity (e.g. speed, hourly rate, course variations, etc.).	H
8.04	Display – Risk Map	Ability to display Risk as coloured areas on a GIS map or ENC chart.	H
8.05	Display – Historical incidents	Ability to overlay historical incident on the Risk map.	H
8.06	Encounter Frequency	Ability to calculate and display encounter frequencies.	H
8.07	Collision probability	Derived from validated encounter frequency	H
8.08	Contact probability	Derived from validated encounter frequency.	H
8.09	Grounding probability	Derived from validated encounter frequency.	H
8.10	Vessel Types and Routes Analysis	Ability to break down risk, encounters and probabilities into vessel types and routes.	H
8.11	Vessel Specific Risk Controls	Focus and identify key classes featuring increased risk to focus detailed assessment & risk control.	H

Figure 10 - Area Traffic Assessment – Performance Standards

#### D.4.11 Illustrative Example of an Area Traffic Modelling Process

##### Starting Point

The starting point for the marine traffic assessment process is:

- obtain Traffic Survey Data<sup>22</sup> traffic in the OREI area from the up to date traffic survey (MGN requirement) as well as the traffic in the wider strategic OREI area from the DECC Marine Vessel Traffic Survey Database
- define the Baseline meteorological and oceanographic conditions.

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<sup>22</sup> How to obtain and distribute traffic data. For information see the DTI Traffic Database

## Baseline meteorological and oceanographic Conditions

The techniques used should assess the significant features identified by the Technical and Operational Analysis. See Annex B3 – Defining the Marine Environment – Description of the OREI Development and how it changes the Marine Environment.

The bathymetry of the Study Area should be identified using data derived from Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs) or site specific surveys. The key areas of shallow water and the vessel types potentially impacted by these areas (at the limits of the tidal range) should be identified. This constraint should be adopted when examining the potential routeing and operations of vessels within, around and through OREI. Particular attention should be paid to identifying those areas of shallow water which may, due to the diversion of traffic around an OREI, be a potential grounding hazard.

Tidal streams may affect the safety of navigation and, in certain areas local currents may also do so. Regions within the Study Area should be mapped that possess tidal stream or current speeds over 1, 2, 3 ...etc ... knots. Regions of particularly high rates should be identified, and their potential impact on the navigation of vessels highlighted.

As a guide the Canadian Coast Guard consider that following<sup>23</sup> limits possess the potential to impose navigation constraints in reduced sea room, and increase the risk of grounding or poor vessel response during collision avoidance.

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<sup>23</sup> Source: Canadian Coastguard “Preliminary Threat Rating”

LENGTH (feet)	GROSS TONNAGE	BEAM (feet)	DRAUGHT (feet)	Vessel Types	Significant Tidal Stream or local Current Speed (knots)	
					Along Track	Across Track
100 0 + 300,000	80,000 - 300,000	140' - 200'	54' - 80'	Ocean-going Tanker, Ore and Bulk Carrier	3	2
800 - 1000	30,000 - 100,000	95' - 175'	26' - 64'	Ocean-going Tanker, Ore and Bulk Carrier	3	2
630 - 800	10,000 - 60,000	60' - 140'	20' - 54'	Tanker, Ore and Bulk Carrier, General Cargo	7	3
550 - 630	8,000 - 30,000	55' - 105'	20' - 42'	Tanker, Ore and Bulk Carrier, General Cargo	7	3
300 - 550	2,500 - 20,000	43' - 105'	16' - 38'	Tanker, Ore and Bulk Carrier, General Cargo	7	3
300 - 600	2,500 - 13,000	56' - 90'	13' - 20'	Car Ferry	7	3
200 - 300	10 - 1,500	12' - 70'	2' - 9'	Car Ferry	6	4
200 - 300	2,000 - 3,500	23' - 65'	9' - 20'	Tanker, Bulk Freighter, Self Unloader, Fish Factory	7	3
200 - 250	2,000 - 3,000	40' - 60'	8' - 20'	Small Tanker, General Cargo, Fishing (Long Liner)	6	3
150 - 200	1,500 - 2,500	30' - 50'	6' - 15'	Small Tanker, General Cargo, Fishing (Long Liner)	6	2
90 - 150	200 - 800	12' - 50'	4' - 15'	Small Tanker, General Cargo, Fishing (Dragger, Long Liner)	4	2
65 - 100	40 - 250	13' - 28'	5' - 15'	Tugs, Small Draggers, Long Liners, Pleasure Craft	4	2
45 - 65	20 - 160	9' - 16'	4' - 15'	Tugs, Work Boats, Small Draggers, Inshore Long Liners, Pleasure Craft	4	2
32 - 45	8 - 50	4' - 14'	3' - 9'	Tugs, Work Boats, Fishing (Cape Islanders, Trollers), Pleasure Craft	4	3
25 - 35	4 - 20	4' - 11'	3' - 5'	Tugs, Work Boats, Fishing Trollers, Pleasure Craft	5	4
12 - 25	1 - 7	3' - 8'	2' - 4'	Tugs, Work Boats, Inshore Fishing, Pleasure Craft	5	5

*Figure 11 – Tidal Streams and Currents with the Potential to Impose a Navigation Constraint*

Following the development of the traffic routeing, areas where vessels are subjected to tidal stream or local current rates that exceed their potential limits should be identified. This identification would then be taken forward during the review of results to identify if high marine traffic risk areas also coincide with areas of significant rates that may further increase the local risk profile. These areas of potential constraint should be re-reviewed when examining the distribution of collision potential developed from a marine traffic model, as an aid to identifying whether more detailed navigation assessment is required.

The prevailing winds in the Study Area should be identified and presented. Sea areas upwind of OREI developments should be highlighted and the traffic volume passing through these areas reviewed.

The visibility within the Study Area should be identified and presented. Particular attention should be paid to the presentation of periods of reduced visibility.

**Note:** Where visibility lies below 1,000 metres the term “fog” is used & where between 1,000 and 2,000 metres the terms “mist” or “haze” are used.

### **Marine Traffic Modelling (MTM)**

Where marine traffic modelling is appropriate it consists of a three step process of:


- building the traffic model within a suitable simulation modelling tool
- baseline assessment and validation of the model
- forecasting using the model.

#### **Step 1 – Building the Model**

The principle steps of building the model will be dependent on the modelling tool used but the key steps are likely to be:

- Traffic Review and Development
- Set up Simulation Rules for the movement of vessels
- Set up Simulation Rules for the behaviour of mariners
- Set up Simulation Rules for manoeuvring in restricted waterways.

The key elements associated with Traffic Review and Development are illustrated below:



*Figure 12 – Area Traffic Assessment Illustrative Example - Traffic Review and Development Flow Chart*

### **Step 1.1 - Traffic Review and Development including**

- Characterisation of the traffic data in a format capable of being assessed
- Analysis and capture of vessel timings, vessel types, routeings and operational areas. The route or operational area should be identified by geometric boundaries consistent with those identified from field surveys, and directly related to the traffic distribution mapped in the field surveys. It is suggested that, where appropriate, route widths should encompass the lateral deviation associated with +/- 2 standard deviations of the displacement of the traffic associated with movement between two locations. As a minimum the route width should accommodate 95% of all traffic transiting each route. It is noted that this process will result in variable route widths (dependent upon the sampled traffic activity).
- **Note:** In this context a “Route” is taken to be a track along which a significant number of vessels can be shown to navigate on largely parallel courses. “Operational areas” are those where fishing operations, recreational sailing and other marine activities take place and in which courses and speeds may vary considerably and frequently. Those interactions between vessels on routes and vessels engaged in activities in

operational areas should be fully assessed as should those of all vessels with OREI structures.

- Definition of no-route based vessel activity or operation. Where any traffic activities not consistent with point-to-point traffic are identified (i.e. recreational day sailing or fishing), the volume of this traffic should be identified and distributions developed that best fit the available data.
- Recognition of traffic complexity. It should be emphasised that the route structure collected from survey data should capture the distribution of the full range of vessels active in the Study Area. For example if there are a variety of vessels (coastal vessels, deep sea vessels, fishing, day sailing, high speed ferries, etc.) associated with marine traffic in the Study Area, all of these may have separate traffic distributions, time histories and vessel characteristics. All these elements and the associated complexity should be sampled and represented to as high a degree of fidelity as is feasible.
- Map routeings and operations onto a geospatial map of the area extracted from ENC charts or from site specific surveys.
- Define traffic in baseline year (See Annex B1 -Understanding the Base Case densities and types of traffic for further information). The traffic variation along routes and in operational areas should be representative of that identified from field surveys and should mimic the hourly variation in activity identified for “typical” daily conditions.
- Define traffic in future years (See Annex B2 – Predicting Future densities and types of traffic for further information).

The aim of the traffic review and development is to develop a comprehensive representation of present and future marine traffic in offshore waters, within the vicinity of the OREI. Vessel movement timings, types and routeings must be identified to develop a statistically representative sample of activity. This data may, if appropriate, allow the development of diverse vessel tracks into key characteristic routes to map present activity.

### **Step 1.2 – Set up Rules for the movement of vessels through the water including:**

- the navigation manoeuvring characteristics of the vessels
- Realistic routes with appropriate traffic volumes, route widths, and speed profiles. The speed profile of vessels moving along a route should be representative of data identified from field surveys. This should identify vessel speeds, including average vessels speeds, together with changes in speed along routes as vessels pass across the Study Area. (Similar rules apply to vessels engaged in activities within operational areas.)

The aim of the rules for movement is to set up credible vessel behaviour; however it is recognised that the complexity of modelling this behaviour for multiple vessels within a traffic simulation may require a simplification of the navigation characteristics and thus numerical modelling may not be the appropriate technique for particular scenarios.

### Step 1.3 – Set up Rules for the behaviour of mariners including:

- how they respond to the Collision Regulations (in both single and multiple encounter situations) and in all conditions of visibility.
- human error and deliberate violation in applying the Collision Regulations.

The aim of the rules for behaviour is to set up credible mariner behaviour. A key part of the representation of vessel interactions will also be to identify how vessels may interact following actions by one or more vessels which deviate from those required by the Collision Regulations. Analysis of the traffic survey data or the DECC Marine Vessel Traffic Database may provide this information. Failing that a credible estimate must be made.

### Step 1.4 – Set up Rules for manoeuvring in restricted waterways including:

- differing behaviour for different classes of vessel
- different behaviour for different tides
- different behaviour for different tidal streams

The aim of the simulation rules for restricted waterways is to set up credible vessel and mariner behaviour appropriate to potential hazards.

## Step 2 – Baseline Assessment and Validation of the Technique or Tool

This step is crucial; if the technique or tool cannot be validated for the base case year then it cannot be used to predict future years. Maritime incident data for the Strategic OREI Area and the actual OREI Area should be sought, analysed and mapped to both the encounter frequencies and frequency density and the collision, contact, grounding and stranding probabilities and probability densities.




Figure 13 – Area Traffic Assessment Illustrative Example - Baseline Assessment and Validation Flow Chart

**The principle steps of building a numerical model would encompass:**

- Running the baseline model
- Interpreting the results
- Development of causation factors
- Model acceptance/refinement.

**Step 2.1 – Running the Baseline model including:**

- Multiple simulations of characteristic daily activity (for cases where the simulation develops random vessels to target frequencies)
- Review of simulations to ensure stable average activity is being presented.

**Step 2.2 – Interpreting the results**

- Review of boundary conditions and assessment of Study Area for validation
- Spatial mapping of model output (“encounters” or “domain violations”), this may be done on a global basis or in greater detail for different vessel types.

**Step 2.3 – Development of Causation Factors**

- Mapping of historic incident data in Study Area
- Identification of causation factor (Incidents from historic record/model output) for collisions and groundings. Where no site-specific data is available analysis by Fuji adopted in IALA Waterway Risk Assessment Program may be adopted if appropriate, this program being devised largely for use in closed boundary waterways such as rivers and canals.

**Step 2.4 – Model Acceptance / Refinement**


- Review of model incident distribution accuracy
- Adoption of model if distribution of incidents accurately represented, else investigation of key model parameters and reassessment.

The validation of the model allows the quantitative assessment of collision and contact risk to be conducted, rather than purely representing the risks as qualitative increases in hazard.

**Step 3 – Forecasting using the model or other appropriate technique**

This step uses the model or other technique to assess:

- future case without OREI
- base case with OREI
- future case with wind OREI



*Figure 14 – Area Traffic Assessment Illustrative Example - Forecasting using the Model or other Assessment Technique Flow Chart*

- **Step 3.1 –Future Case without OREI**
- Review forecast data
- Identify distinct vessel type, operation or route, traffic increase allocations
- Apply vessel type, operation or route, traffic increase allocations
- Represent future vessel size increases where appropriate
- Where appropriate run model, develop collision/grounding/ contact distribution
- Assess collision, contact, grounding and stranding distribution, for all vessels, and specific areas/vessels/ routes/operations identified as suffering significant increases in collision/grounding/contact risk.
- Identify Risk Regime Environment. It is recognised that the safety of marine operations are, in general, improving. Although predicted incident magnitudes and distributions may be factored to account for this improvement if supported by a review of historic incident frequency, the proviso that large area, multi-structure Round 2 wind farms and other OREI represent hazards to vessels not previously encountered should be taken into account.
- This case should be reviewed against the Baseline and identifies the impact of traffic increases alone on the local risk environment.

### Step 3.2 - Base Case with OREI

- Review routes impacted by OREI
- Elicit, or make judgement where appropriate, regarding the relocation and distribution of routes. For those cases where, for example, a route bisects a wind farm it is necessary to make judgements of whether to pass through the wind farm , as smaller vessels might be expected to do, or, in the case of larger vessels, to normally leave it to port or starboard. These should be reviewed with respect to the origin and destination of the traffic, navigable water space and the presence of other obstructions.
- Determine a minimum anticipated vessel clearance, for all anticipated types of vessel, as they pass an OREI boundary. In this element guidance may be taken from the initial MCA recommendations on boundary clearance distances from shipping routes<sup>24</sup>.
- The width of the original route at the closest point of approach to the OREI must be developed. As a first guide a width 50% that of the original route width at this location to mimic the compression of traffic expected as the OREI perimeter could be adopted as a virtual way mark. Again the initial MCA guidance on boundary clearance distances from shipping routes should be taken into account.
- Assess collision/grounding/ contact distribution, for all vessel types, and specific areas/vessels/routes/ operational areas identified as suffering significant increases in collision/grounding/contact risk.
- Impact of limited visibility. A key aspect of the wind farm case is the inclusion of loss of visibility and vessel detection capability due to the presence of wind farms. One approach would be to identify the increase in collision risk as a result of limited visibility and apply this increase in risk to all traffic encounters between two or more vessels. Potentially unable to detect each other because of the wind farm.
- This case should be reviewed against the baseline and identifies the impact of the wind farm or other OREI alone on the local risk environment.

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<sup>24</sup> “Shipping Routes – Wind Farm Template” MCA: [www.dft.gov.uk/mca](http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca) Safety info / Navigation Safety / Offshore Renewable Energy Information


### **Step 3.3 –Future Case with OREI**

Adopt traffic density and type allocation as per Step 3.1

- Adopt route and area of operation structures as per Step 3.2.
- Assess collision/grounding/contact distribution, for all vessels, and specific areas/vessels/routes/operations identified as suffering significant increases in collision/ grounding/contact risk.
- This case should be reviewed against the Baseline and identifies the impact of the future traffic changes and wind farms or other OREI on the local risk environment.
- This will identify the cumulative impact of changes in the traffic volumes and OREI placement and should be used as the basis for risk assessment and contingency planning.
- The acceptability level may, if appropriate, be plotted on an F-N curve of the risks within the Study Area should be examined.

Key risk areas identified in the marine traffic simulation should be scrutinised, and reviewed with respect to the local marine environment and specific navigation simulations.

**Example Treatment of Limited Visibility due to Wind Farms and Impact on Collision Risk**



For this example it is assumed that the position at which a vessel would have normally made sighting and avoiding action occurs at  $T_1$ . In this case this coincides with the boundary of the wind farm; however this may not necessarily always be the case. Assuming neither vessel is aware of the other as they pass the wind farm, the vessels finally may have clear visibility of each other at  $T_2$ . A collision risk multiplier of some determined value (not necessarily that shown above) could then be applied for decreases in the perception distance at which acquisition is made. This may be applied for each and every vessel to vessel encounter.

*Figure 15 – Area Traffic Assessment Illustrative Example - Treatment of Limited Visibility*

<b>D5</b>	<b>Guidance</b> <b>Navigation Risk Assessment</b> <b>Specific Traffic Assessment Techniques</b>
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### **D.5.1 Use of Specific Navigation Assessment Techniques**

Specific Traffic Assessment may be required to answer detailed questions about the feasibility and risk associated with specific navigation activities in or around an OREI. Typically such assessment could be performed in response to:

- areas of “High Risk” identified by the Area Traffic Assessment
- the need for an “SFAIRP declaration” in the hazard log
- the need to evaluate the effectiveness of a Risk Control in the risk control log
- a request to evaluate the ability for SAR operations and for emergency response vessels (e.g. emergency towing vessels) to render assistance to vessels, in and around an OREI.

### **D.5.2 How to Select the Situations Requiring Specific Traffic Assessment**

The situations which may require Specific Traffic Assessment could come from:

- the navigation risk assessment - Area Traffic Assessment results

e.g.: problems identified in the Area Traffic Assessment results and not able to be assessed by this method. With respect, for example, to such factors as the creation of “choke points” including the identification of vessel types affected and potential influential parameters

- the hazard log
- the risk control log
- a need to give an overview of the Emergency Response Operations
- a need to evaluate the track of a vessel with engine (or other) failure

#### **Other Sources**

It is important the selection also takes into account the following as evaluation may be important to gain consent irrespective of the risk estimate:

- local knowledge

e.g. sand waves or scouring on spring tides affecting bathymetry

- concerns of stakeholders

e.g. visual and radar obstruction or spurious effects caused by the development

- some of the specific concerns of the technical guidance

## Need for Assessment

The need for assessment of these situations comes from MGN guidance. An evaluation of all navigational possibilities which could be reasonably foreseeable, by which the siting, construction, establishment and de-commissioning of an OREI could cause or contribute to an obstruction of or danger to navigation or marine emergency services is required.

Specific traffic assessment may therefore be required to assess the risk of more specific navigational issues where the actual manoeuvring capabilities of the specific vessels involved in relationship to:

- the bathymetry
- the environmental conditions
- other traffic
- human action, inaction and error
- the OREI development structures

are, or may be, critical to comply with the Collision Regulations and avoid incident.

## Type of Assessment

Once identified, these situations may need to be converted to scenarios that are capable of being examined and risk assessed using suitable tools. These tools include real and fast time manoeuvring and ship handling simulators. The basic scenario can then be subjected to parametric variation to investigate the hazard, the risk associated with the hazard and the effectiveness of any risk control measures.

Feedback from the results can be used to drive the parametric variation or modify the scenario based on emergent findings and thus test the appropriateness of any risk controls. It may identify further situations to be assessed or alternative risk controls to be evaluated.

### D.5.3 Safety Zones

Safety zones for construction, maintenance and decommissioning will be applied for routinely through DECC.

The Government's position in relation to operational safety zones for OREI is that a case must be made for the establishment of such zones,. Compelling risk assessed arguments would be required for the establishment of a safety zone which excludes all vessels from the OREI area.

The IMO/UNCLOS safety zone at 500 metres considered with respect to other types of offshore structure does not imply that a direct parallel can be applied to wind farms or other types of OREI. It is used to illustrate an existing limitation but

where the personnel expected to be found on structures and the potential for environmental damage are primary considerations.

#### D.5.4 How to Define Scenarios for Assessment

Once a situation has been selected, a scenario or numbers of scenarios may need to be defined to fully explore the situation. It is important that the scenario definition is robust, i.e. that it is capable of broad interpretation and not narrowly focused on a unique situation.

Each scenario requires a core or base starting point which will include:

- the ENC charts of the OREI location or site specific bathymetric surveys
- modifications to the ENC chart with details of the OREI configurations
- the characteristics of the subject vessel or vessels.

Analysis based on Annex B3 (Guidance on Defining the Marine Environment) and Annex C3 (Influences on the Level of Risk) should be used as the source of information for the use in the scenario.

The details of the OREI that need to be added to the ENC chart include:

##### Shape and configuration

- size (number and type of structure, spacing)
- location
- orientation

##### Associated structures

- ancillary platforms
- floating structures
- transformers
- meteorological towers

##### Development Status

- proposed
- part constructed
- completed and operational
- being decommissioned

##### Marking

- navigation lights
- aviation lights
- AIS marks




Figure 16 - Example of an Electronic Navigational Chart modified with a wind farm

### Scenario Planning

The particular scenario which has been defined will then drive the definition of site specific parameters which need to be defined and investigated.

Each scenario needs to be defined by the base case plus the relevant parameters selected for parametric variation.

This can be extended as necessary to include all relevant parameters and levels of parametric variation. Control measures may form part of the original scenario or may be derived from the results in which case new control measures can then be used to redefine the base scenarios.

### Minimum Clearance Distances of Wind Farm Boundaries from Shipping Routes

MCA provides preliminary guidance in the form of a shipping route template to developers in setting the distance of a wind farm boundary from a recognised shipping route. The template combines the results of researched ship domain theory with those of radar and detection trials carried out at wind farm sites, to indicate the inter-relationship between shipping routes, offshore wind farms and the avoidance of collision between vessels and contact with wind farm structures. The template indicates the process by which consent applications may be considered by Government.

The template is not a prescriptive tool but needs intelligent application. For example, there may be opportunities for the interactive boundaries to be flexible where vessels are able to set themselves greater clearance distances from turbines, providing more reassurance without significant penalty and, conversely, at shipping route nodal points greater clearances from turbines may have to be set. The template, however, takes no account of the sea area bathymetry or of other hazards to navigation.

The positioning of an interactive boundary will be site specific and will require interpretative flexibility but is to be evidence based. The marine traffic survey information will inform such boundaries. Traffic surveys should establish any route traffic bias where mariners may naturally offset themselves to starboard to facilitate passing encounters in accordance with the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collision at Sea (“Collision Regulations” or “COLREGS”). Additionally, the marine traffic surveys should identify vessel type or category or operation which may consequently require larger domains. In the approaches to ports this is particularly relevant. UK Hydrographic Charts and/or site specific surveys will supply the necessary bathymetric data. All this additional information will influence where boundaries need to be established.

#### **D.5.5 Simulator Specifications for Training Mariners Operating within or Close to OREI or for Assessing an Appropriate Scenario**

If a navigational simulator exercise is to be used to train mariners operating within or close to offshore wind farms and other OREI developments or for assessing an appropriate scenario using subject mariners then this will require a technique which can accurately represent and apply the various parameters to the base case. Such a tool can range from a “desk top” exercise to a Full Mission Simulator System, the choice of tool and its parameters having been discussed with MCA. Suitability experienced and qualified instructors/assessors and Mariners are required, particularly when the “man in the loop” (Mariner) is an important element in the scenario. Occasionally, however, non-mariners may be required as control groups. The required qualifications of instructors and assessors are those detailed in Section A-I/12 subsection 9 of the IMO’s STCW Code.

The mariner’s domain and general approach to navigating close to any offshore development structures will be directly related to the relevant subject, his skill and experience, the size and type of his vessel and crucial to the relevance of the results.

## Implementing the Scenario in a Modelling Tool

If simulation modelling is selected as the assessment technique the modelling tool will need to be set up to include the following attributes:

- the manoeuvring characteristics of the Vessel
- interface with the Mariners / subjects

e.g. vessel steering and power controls

- information on the Environment eg;
  - ENC Chart derived information
  - Meteorological and sea conditions
  - Interactive traffic
- information Display to the subjects eg;
  - 3-D Views e.g. bridge, bridge wing, etc.
  - Integrated radar simulation and other navigation information
  - Ship dimensions, draft, type and loading Information
- the Parameters of the Scenario.

<b>E1</b>	<b>Guidance</b> <b>Creating a Risk Control Log</b>
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The concept of offshore renewable installations (OREI) and potential risk is accepted and therefore developers will be expected to manage risk by the identification, application and proven worth of risk controls.

### **E.1.1 Background**

OREI are in an environment where there are already considerable controls and mitigations (comprising rules, risk controls, risk mitigations and emergency plans) in place to manage risk. The developer is responsible for:

- interfacing with these existing controls and mitigations
- implementing new controls and mitigations for new risks (or change in level of existing risks).

### **E.1.2 Risk Control and Mitigation**

To meet the Marine Navigational Safety Objectives:

- appropriate assets have to be identified, consultations with appropriate stakeholder bodies held, agreement with the competent body reached, and the assets have to be put in place by the responsible body.
- applicable rules have to be identified, consultations with appropriate stakeholder bodies held, agreement with the competent body reached, and the rules have to be implemented by the responsible body.
- standard or relevant good practice risk controls have to be identified, consultations with appropriate stakeholder bodies held, agreement with the competent body reached, and the risk controls have to be implemented by the responsible body.
- risk control options have to be identified, consultations with appropriate stakeholder bodies held, agreement with a competent body reached, on risk controls that are capable of reducing risk to that which is As Low As Reasonably Practical and are assessed by risk assessment and the assessment used to decide if they will be incorporated
- emergency and contingency plans need to be put in place and exercised.

### E.1.3 Assets supporting Navigation Activities

Assets are of three main type functions:

- to reduce probability of an accident (typically called risk prevention assets)
- to reduce the consequence of an accident (typically called risk mitigation assets)
- emergency response.

Any given asset may be involved in all three.

### E.1.4 Suggested Process for Creating a Risk Control Log

The suggested process for creating a risk control log is:

#### Risk Control Description

- identify all the relevant risk controls
- define the type of control (asset, rule, good practice and/or option)
- define what effect of control (prevention, mitigation and/or emergency response).

#### Risk Control Description – Example of Spreadsheet Format

DESCRIPTION			RISK CONTROL TYPE				RISK CONTROL EFFECT		
C1			Asset	Rule	Good Practice	Option	Prevention	Mitigation	Emergency Response
1	All								
2	Vessel Assets								
	1	Emergency Response - Requisitioned Vessels	✓						✓

Figure 17 – Example Risk Control Log - Risk Control Description

#### Consultation, Approval & Implementation

- identify appropriate stakeholder bodies for consultation
- identify the competent body for approval
- identify the responsible body for implementation.

### Consultation, Approval & Implementation – Example Spreadsheet Format

DESCRIPTION			CONSULTATION, APPROVAL & IMPLEMENTATION		
C1			Appropriate Stakeholder Bodies for Consultation	Competent Body for Approval	Responsible Body for Implementation
1	All				
2	Vessel Assets				
	1	Emergency Response - Requisitioned Vessels			

Figure 18 – Example Risk Control Log - Consultation, Approval & Implementation

### Implementation Options

- identify the possible project phases for implementation (i.e. during pre-construction, construction, operation, maintenance and/or decommissioning phases)
- identify the best phase for implementation (e.g. O = Optimum, P = Possible, C = Costly, N = Not Feasible).

### Implementation Options - Example of Spreadsheet Format

DESCRIPTION			IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS			
C1			Pre-Construction	Construction	Operation	Maintenance
1	All					
2	Vessel Assets					
	1	Emergency Response - Requisitioned Vessels			O	

Figure 19 – Example Risk Control Log - Implementation Options

### Implementation Plan

- describe the chosen plan for implementation
- highlight Risk Controls that are controlling major risks that are not being implemented by the developer.

### Implementation Plan – Example of Spreadsheet Format

DESCRIPTION			IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
C1			
1	All Vessel Assets		
2	Emergency Response - Requisitioned Vessels		

*Figure 20 – Example Risk Control Log - Implementation Plan*

## E2

### Guidance Marine Stakeholders and Stakeholder Organisations

There are a large number of stakeholders who will have an interest in the effect on Navigation of the OREI and it is important that their views are recognised and they are consulted through the appropriate stakeholder organisation.

This section gives an indicative list of:

- Stakeholders
- Stakeholder Organisations

#### E.2.1 Stakeholders

<b>Human Stakeholders</b>
Mariners
Sailors
Fishermen
Crew
Passengers
General Public
<b>Navigation Stakeholders</b>
Commercial shipping
Fishing
Recreational Mariners
Port Authorities
Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
Ministry of Defence
<b>Navigation Support Stakeholders</b>
Search and Rescue Services
Salvors
HM Coastguard
<b>Wind Farm Stakeholders</b>
Developer
Owner
Operator
Construction
Maintainers
Installers
<b>Wind Farm Insurance Stakeholders</b>
Turbine Insurers
Warranty Insurers
Liability Insurers
<b>Society Stakeholders</b>
Shore Populations
General Population

<b>Shipping Stakeholders</b>
Owner, Operator or Manager
Master
Crew
Crew Agency
Trade Unions
Families
<b>Shipping Insurance Stakeholders</b>
Hull Underwriters
Cargo Underwriters
P & I Clubs
<b>Ship Operations Stakeholders</b>
Cargo Owners
Charterer
Terminal Operators
Stevedores
<b>Shipbuilding Stakeholders</b>
Designers, Ship-builders & Repairers
Equipment Makers
Commercial Services (e.g. ship chandlery)
<b>Regulatory Stakeholders</b>
International Maritime Organisation
Port State Control
Flag State
Coast State
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
General Lighthouse Authority
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
<b>Other Stakeholders</b>
Professional Bodies
Training Establishments
Legal Services
Marine Consultants
Media
Environment and Pressure Groups

Table 23—Example Stakeholders

### E.2.2 Stakeholders Organisations

### E.2.3 Organisations Representing Stakeholders – Example Checklist

Association of British Insurance
Banks
British Ports Association
BWEA (including developers)
CEFAS or SEAFISH
Chamber of Shipping
Crown Estates
DEFRA
Developer
DFT
DTI
Legal
MCA
MoD
National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations
Nautical Institute/Institute of Navigation
Representatives of Other Countries
Representatives of UK Regions
Representatives of three strategic areas
RNLI
Royal Yachting Association
Trinity House
UK Harbour Masters Association
UK Hydrographic Office
UK Major Ports Group
UK Offshore Aggregate Dredging Association
UKOOA

*Table 24 – Example of Organisations Representing Stakeholders*

<b>F1</b>	<b>Example</b> <b>Hazard Identification Checklist</b>
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DESCRIPTION			
Ref			Description of Causal Chain (Event Sequence) (Accident Sequence)
<b>General Navigation Safety</b>			
<b>Collision</b>			
1	2	01	a Vessel navigating near an OREI collides with another vessel that is navigating near an OREI
1	2	01	b Vessel navigating near an OREI collides with another vessel navigating around an OREI
1	2	01	c Vessel navigating around an OREI collides with another vessel that is navigating around an OREI
1	2	01	d Vessel navigating around an OREI collides with another vessel that is navigating through an OREI.
1	2	01	e Vessel navigating through an OREI collides with another vessel that is navigating through an OREI.
1	2	02	a Fishing vessel collides with another navigating vessel navigating near, around or through an OREI
1	2	02	b Presence of fishing vessels causes collision between other navigating vessels.
1	2	03	a Recreational vessel collides with another navigating vessel navigating near, around or through an OREI
1	2	03	b Presence of recreational vessels causes collision between other navigating vessels.
1	2	04	a Anchored vessel collides with another navigating vessel navigating near, around or through an OREI
1	2	04	b Presence of anchored vessels causes collision between other navigating vessels.
1	2	05	a Vessel engaged in operations collides with another navigating vessel navigating near, around or through an OREI
1	2	05	b Presence of vessels engaged in operations causes collision between other navigating vessels.
1	2	06	a Vessels engaged in servicing a an OREI (e.g. a mother and daughter vessel arrangement) collide with each other
1	2	06	b Vessels engaged in servicing an OREI (e.g. a mother and daughter vessel arrangement) collide with another navigating vessel navigating near, around or through an OREI
1	2	06	c Presence of vessels engaged in servicing an OREI (e.g. a mother and daughter vessel arrangement) causes collision with other navigating vessels
1	2	07	a Vessel engaged in a special event collides with another navigating vessel navigating near, around or through an OREI
1	2	07	b Presence of vessels engaged in a special event causes collision between other vessels.
1	3		<b>Contact</b>
1	3	01	a Vessel under control makes contact with an OREI structure
1	3	01	b Vessel servicing an OREI structure makes contact with an OREI structure (Special case of 3.01a)
1	3	01	c Vessel not under command makes contact with an OREI structure
1	3	01	d Drifting vessel makes contact with an OREI structure.
1	3	02	a Vessel under control makes contact with an offshore sub-station
1	3	02	b Vessel not under command makes contact with an offshore sub-station

				<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
				<b>Description of Causal Chain (Event Sequence) (Accident Sequence)</b>
<b>Ref</b>				
1	3	02	c	Drifting vessel makes contact with an offshore sub-station.
1	3	03	a	Vessel under control makes contact with an offshore service base
1	3	03	b	Vessel not under command makes contact with an offshore service base
1	3	03	c	Drifting vessel makes contact with an offshore service base
1	3	04	a	Vessel under control makes contact with an offshore accommodation platform
1	3	04	b	Vessel not under command makes contact with an offshore accommodation platform
1	3	04	c	Drifting vessel makes contact with an offshore accommodation platform
1	3	05	a	Vessel under control makes contact with a wind turbine blade.
1	3	05	b	Vessel servicing a wind turbine makes contact with a wind turbine blade. (Special case of 3.02a)
1	3	06	a	Vessel not under command makes contact with a wind turbine blade
1	3	06	b	Drifting vessel makes contact with a wind turbine blade (Special case of above)
1	3	07	a	Vessel under control makes contact with a fixed structure associated with an OREI (e.g. transformer platform)
1	3	07	b	Vessel servicing an OREI makes contact with a fixed structure associated with an OREI
1	3	07	a	Vessel not under command makes contact with a fixed structure associated with an OREI
1	3	07	b	Drifting vessel makes contact with a fixed structure associated with an OREI (Special case of above)
<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>			<b>Grounding and Stranding</b>
1	8	01	a	Vessel under control grounds or becomes stranded on a foundation structure and/or anti scour material.
1	8	01	b	Vessel servicing an OREI structure grounds on a foundation structure and/or anti scour material. (Special case of the above)
1	8	02		Vessel under control grounds or becomes stranded on a collapsed wind turbine
1	8	03	a	Vessel not under command grounds or becomes stranded on a foundation structure and/or anti scour material
1	8	03	b	Drifting vessel grounds or becomes stranded on a foundation structure and/or anti scour material (Special case of the above)
1	8	04		Due to restricted manoeuvring a vessel navigating near an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	05		Due to restricted manoeuvring a vessel navigating around an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	06		Due to restricted manoeuvring a vessel navigating through an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	07	a	Due to naturally shifting sand banks a vessel navigating near an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	07	b	Due to naturally shifting sand banks a vessel navigating around an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	07	c	Due to naturally shifting sand banks a vessel navigating through an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	08	a	Due to the effect of scour a vessel navigating near an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	08	b	Due to the effect of scour a vessel navigating around an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
1	8	08	c	Due to the effect of scour a vessel navigating through an OREI grounds or becomes stranded.
<b>2</b>				<b>Other Navigation Safety</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>			<b>Foundering and Capsizing</b>
2	1	01	a	Subsea obstacle snags fishing equipment heeling vessel and causing it to founder or capsize.

				<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
				<b>Description of Causal Chain (Event Sequence) (Accident Sequence)</b>
<b>Ref</b>				
2	1	01	b	Subsea cable snags fishing equipment heeling vessel and causing it to founder or capsize.
2	1	01	c	Subsea fallen over turbine or other OREI structure snags fishing equipment heeling vessel and causing it to founder or capsize
2	1	02	a	Subsea obstacle snags anchor heeling vessel and causing it to founder or capsize.
2	1	02	b	Subsea cable snags anchor heeling vessel and causing it to founder or capsize.
2	1	02	c	Subsea fallen over turbine or other OREI structure snags anchor heeling vessel and causing it to founder or capsize.
<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>			<b>Fire</b>
2	4	01		Wind turbine or other OREI structure fire requires emergency rescue of servicing staff
2	4	02		Wind turbine or other OREI structure fire requires repair of burnt out structure (and therefore deployment of support vessels) which may affect routeing of vessels and the establishment of a wider safety zone
2	4	03		Release of fire suppression (real or spurious triggers) releases inert gases into the air intakes of supporting helicopters
2	4	04		<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified where an OREI can cause a fire on a vessel (or vice versa) other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>			<b>Explosion</b>
2	5	01		Leaking gas (e.g. from an underground gas field or from batteries) builds up in tower and explodes resulting in abandoned remains of an OREI and increased risk of contact
2	5	02		<i>No other reasonably foreseeable cause of an OREI structure explosion has been identified other than by terrorism which is excluded from Formal Safety Assessment.</i>
2	5	03		<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified where an OREI can cause an explosion on a vessel other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding.</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>			<b>Loss of Hull Integrity</b>
2	6	01		<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified where an OREI can cause a loss of hull integrity on a vessel (or vice versa) other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding.</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>			<b>Flooding</b>
2	7	01		<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified where an OREI can cause flooding on a vessel (or vice versa) other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding.</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>			<b>Machinery Related Accidents</b>
2	10	01		OREI machinery accident requires emergency rescue of servicing staff.
2	10	02		Blade failure results in the blade (or parts of the blade) hitting a navigating vessel or a person on the vessel
2	10	03		Ice on blade comes off hitting a navigating vessel or a person on the vessel
2	10	04		Dropped object from a maintenance or installation operation hits a navigating vessel or a person on the vessel
2	10	05		Blade failure results in a floating blade entering the seaways
2	10	06		OREI structure control failure results in a failure of turbine navigation aids (e.g. lighting) resulting in non detection of the OREI and increase risk of powered contact
2	10	07		<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified an OREI where can cause a machinery related accident on a vessel (or vice versa) other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding.</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>			<b>Payload Related Accidents</b>
2	11	01		<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified where an OREI can cause a machinery related accident on a vessel other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding.</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>			<b>Hazardous Substance Accident</b>

				<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
<b>Ref</b>			<b>Description of Causal Chain (Event Sequence) (Accident Sequence)</b>	
2	12	01	<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified where an OREI can cause a machinery related accident on a vessel other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding.</i>	
<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>		<b>Accidents to personnel</b>	
2	13	01	Accidents caused by Transfer to/from servicing vessel (or helicopter) to an OREI	
2	13	02	Accidents caused by Transfer between servicing vessels	
2	13	03	Accidents within an OREI structure requiring rescue of personnel.	
2	13	04	Toxic fume build up from electrical fluids or batteries (or asphyxiation from fire suppression) in an OREI structure requiring rescue of personnel.	
2	13	05	Person in water (unaided, in floatation device, life raft or life boat) requires rescue	
2	13	06	Bad weather (or other event) preventing egress from an OREI structure resulting in marooning and requiring rescue.	
<b>2</b>	<b>14</b>		<b>Accidents to the General Public</b>	
2	14	01	OREI causes vessel with hazardous substance on board to be routed closer to areas of habitation.	
2	14	02	<i>No reasonably foreseeable accident has been identified where an OREI can cause an accident to the general public other than as a consequence of a collision, contact, grounding or a stranding.</i>	
<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>		<b>Electrocution</b>	
2	16	01	Vessel hits turbine structure or other OREI structure sufficiently hard to breach cable insulation	
2	16	02	Anchoring vessel drags up export cable and shorts cable to the anchor	
2	16	03	Servicing (or SAR) helicopter operations case an electric discharge between the helicopter and an OREI structure	
<b>3</b>			<b>Aviation Safety</b>	
<b>3</b>	<b>17</b>		<b>Aviation Accidents</b>	
3	17	01	Helicopter flying to a turbine, OREI structure, sub-station, service base or accommodation base hits blades or tower and crashes	
3	17	02	Helicopter flying to a nearby installation or in transit hits blades, tower or other OREI structure and crashes	
<b>4</b>			<b>Other Safety</b>	
<b>4</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>High Probability Events</b>	
4	20	01	Contact between a service vessel and an OREI structure when transferring personnel	
4	20	02	Injury of service personnel when transferring to/from an OREI structure	
4	20	03	Man overboard of service personnel when transferring to/from an OREI structure	
4	20	04	Navigation in potential safety zones	
<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>		<b>High Severity Outcomes</b>	
4	21	01	A major incident with a large Cruise Vessel or Passenger Ferry leading to a major search and rescue event	
4	21	02	Emergency response operations following a major incident with a large oil tanker leading to large scale pollution	
4	21	03	Emergency response operations following a major incident with a Liquefied Gas Tanker close to a major centre of population resulting in a large scale explosion risk	
<b>4</b>	<b>22</b>		<b>Low Confidence/High Uncertainty</b>	
4	22	01	No risks have been identified where there is significant uncertainty in the assessment, the probability or of the outcome	
<b>5</b>			<b>Search and Rescue</b>	
<b>5</b>	<b>30</b>		<b>Overall</b>	
5	30	01	Presence of an OREI increases the risk of an accident (e.g. collision, contact, stranding or grounding) and also inhibits search and rescue.	
<b>5</b>	<b>31</b>		<b>External to Internal</b>	

				<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
<b>Ref</b>			<b>Description of Causal Chain (Event Sequence) (Accident Sequence)</b>	
5	31	01		Person or vessel requiring search and rescue drifts into an OREI and the presence of the OREI restricts search and rescue.
<b>5</b>	<b>32</b>			<b>Internal to Internal</b>
5	32	01		Activities within an OREI both generate an increased need for search and rescue and the presence of the OREI inhibits search and rescue.
<b>5</b>	<b>33</b>			<b>Internal to External</b>
5	33	01		Activities within a an OREI generate an increased need for search and rescue in the areas surrounding the OREI
<b>5</b>	<b>34</b>			<b>External to External</b>
5	35	01		Person or vessel requiring search and rescue drifts through an OREI and the presence of the OREI inhibits search and rescue during the transit stage.
<b>5</b>	<b>35</b>			<b>Worst Case</b>
5	35	01		Search and Rescue operations following a major incident with a large Cruise Vessel or Passenger Ferry
<b>6</b>				<b>Emergency Response</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>30</b>			<b>Overall</b>
6	30	01		Presence of an OREI increases need for emergency response from Foundering, Capsizing, Collision, Grounding or Stranding.
6	30	02		Present an OREI ce of inhibits ability to provide emergency response.
<b>6</b>	<b>31</b>			<b>External to Internal</b>
6	31	01		Pollution outside an OREI drifts into the OREI and presence of the OREI inhibits clean up
<b>6</b>	<b>32</b>			<b>Internal to Internal</b>
6	32	01		Activities within an OREI both generate an increased risk of pollution and the presence of the OREI inhibits clean up.
<b>6</b>	<b>33</b>			<b>Internal to External</b>
6	33	01		Activities within an OREI generate an increased risk of pollution in the areas surrounding the OREI
<b>6</b>	<b>34</b>			<b>External to External</b>
6	34	01		Pollution from outside an OREI drifts through the OREI and the presence of the OREI inhibits clean up during the transit stage.
6	34	02		Routeing of vessels (or post collision, contact or grounded vessel) results in hazardous cargoes closer to areas of population
<b>6</b>	<b>35</b>			<b>Worst Case</b>
6	35	01		Emergency response operations following a major incident with a large oil tanker
6	35	02		Emergency response operations following a major incident with a Liquefied Gas Tanker close to a major centre of population

*Table 25- Example Hazard Identification Checklist*

<b>F2</b>	<b>Example</b> <b>Risk Control Checklist</b>
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DESCRIPTION		RISK CONTROL TYPE				RISK CONTROL EFFECT		
C1		Asset	Rule	Good Practice	Option	Prevention	Mitigation	Emergency Response
1	All							
2	<b>Vessel Assets</b>							
1	Emergency Response - Requisitioned Vessels	✓						✓
2	Search and Rescue – Inshore	✓						✓
3	Search and Rescue - Lifeboats	✓						✓
4	Search and Rescue Requisitioned Vessels	✓						✓
5	Tugs	✓						✓
6	GLA Tenders	✓						✓
7	OREI Support Vessels	✓						✓
3	<b>Aviation Assets</b>							
1	Search and Rescue - Helicopter	✓						✓
2	Oil Spill Dispersant - Aircraft	✓						
4	<b>OREI Assets</b>							
1	AIS Base Station on / depicting OREI	✓						
2	VTS Radar on OREI	✓						
3	Marks and Lights	✓					✓	
4	Sound Signals	✓					✓	
5	CCTV	✓						
5	<b>OREI Control Room Assets</b>							
1	AIS monitoring	✓				✓		
6	<b>Coast State Shore-based Assets</b>							
1	Marine Radar, Navigation and Communications Systems	✓				✓		
2	Marine Rescue Coordination Centres	✓						✓
3	Vessel Traffic Service	✓				✓		
4	Shore Radar	✓				✓		
5	Lighthouses	✓				✓		
7	<b>Coast State Marine Assets</b>							
1	Buoys	✓				✓		
2	Marks and Lights	✓				✓		
3	External Assets	✓						
4	GPS and Galileo	✓				✓		
8	<b>Other Assets</b>							

DESCRIPTION			RISK CONTROL TYPE				RISK CONTROL EFFECT		
C1			Asset	Rule	Good Practice	Option	Prevention	Mitigation	Emergency Response
	1	Pilot Services	✓				✓		
	2	Charts	✓				✓		
<b>1</b>		<b>Consent</b>							
	1	Deny consent to the OREI					✓	✓	
<b>2</b>		<b>Configuration and Design</b>							
	1	Optimise location, alignment, size and layout			✓		✓		
	2	Minimum safe (air) clearances		✓			✓		
<b>3</b>		<b>Site Designation</b>							
	1	Designation of the site as an area to be avoided (ATBA)				✓	✓		
	2	Safety zones of appropriate configuration, extent and application to specified vessels				✓	✓		
	3	Marine traffic safety zone.				✓	✓		
<b>4</b>		<b>Routeing and Routeing Management</b>							
	1	Implementation of routeing measures within or near the development.				✓	✓		
	2a	Manage traffic through VTS from OREI Control Centre				✓	✓		
	2b	Manage traffic through VTS from MCA Control Centre				✓	✓		
	3a	Alert traffic via AIS tracking in OREI Control Centre			✓				
	3b	Alert traffic via AIS tracking in MCA Control Centre			✓				
	4a	Continuous watch by multi-channel VHF, including Digital Selective Calling (DSC) from OREI Control Centre			✓		✓		
	4b	Continuous watch by multi-channel VHF, including Digital Selective Calling (DSC) from MCA control centre			✓		✓		
	5a	Monitoring by radar, AIS and/or closed circuit television (CCTV) from OREI Control Centre				✓	✓		

DESCRIPTION			RISK CONTROL TYPE				RISK CONTROL EFFECT		
C1			Asset	Rule	Good Practice	Option	Prevention	Mitigation	Emergency Response
	5b	Monitoring by radar, AIS and/or closed circuit television (CCTV) from MCA Control Centre				✓	✓		
	6	Remote radar (and AIS) sensing by pilot for remote pilotage							
	7	Appropriate means to notify and provide evidence of the infringement of ATBA's, or safety zones				✓	✓		
	8	Speed limits to control wash				✓	✓		
5	<b>Marking</b>								
	1	External Marking of Offshore wind farms and other OREI types		✓			✓		
		[GLA Requirements. Based on IALA Recommendations O-117 On The Marking of Offshore wind farms Edition 2 and O-131 The Marking of Offshore Wave and Tidal Energy Devices Edition 1]							
	2	Internal Marking of Offshore wind farms and other OREI		✓			✓		
	3	Marking of Individual Structures		✓			✓		
	4	Marking of Groups of Structures (all OREI)		✓			✓		
	5	Other navigational aids				✓	✓		
6	<b>Communication and Training</b>								
	1	Promulgation of information and warnings through notices to mariners and other appropriate media MCA website "Navigation Safety" info.		✓	✓		✓		
	2	Marking on Navigation Charts		✓			✓		
	3	Adding OREI navigation training to mariner training syllabuses				✓			
7	<b>Reducing need for Operations within OREI site</b>								
	1	Turbine integrity reducing need for maintenance.				✓	✓		
	2	Strength of foundation design.				✓	✓		
8	<b>Safety Management</b>								
	1	Operator's Safety Management System			✓			✓	
	2	Operators Safety and Operations Plan			✓			✓	
	3	Operators Emergency Plan			✓			✓	
	4	Local and National Emergency Plans			✓			✓	

		DESCRIPTION	RISK CONTROL TYPE				RISK CONTROL EFFECT		
C1			Asset	Rule	Good Practice	Option	Prevention	Mitigation	Emergency Response
	5	Contingency plan if GPS switched off/failed							
		Emergency Response Plan	✓				✓	✓	✓
<b>9</b>		<b>Regulatory</b>							
	1	Application of the principles of the Port Marine Safety Code to OREI				✓			
	2	Mandatory switching on of AIS in and around wind farms				✓			
	3	Mandatory fishing boat tracking systems switched on in and around OREI				✓			
	4	Mandatory leisure craft "AIS" switched on in and around OREI				✓			
<b>10</b>		<b>Search and Rescue</b>							
	1	SAR response planning.			✓			✓	
	2	SAR asset provision planning.			✓			✓	
	3	Turbine mast design (e.g. including safe refuge).		✓				✓	
		Standards and procedures for wind turbine generator shutdown		✓			✓		
<b>11</b>		<b>Emergency Planning</b>							
	1	Salvage response planning.			✓			✓	
	2	Salvage asset provision planning.			✓			✓	
	3	Oil Spill response planning			✓			✓	
	4	Oil Spill asset provision planning			✓			✓	

Table 26 - Example Risk Control Checklist

## G1

## Terms, Abbreviations & References

### G1.1 Marine Accident Categories

	Category	Description
1	<b>Foundering</b>	To sink below the surface of the water.
2	<b>Collision</b>	Collision is defined as a vessel striking, or being struck, by another vessel, regardless of whether either vessel is under way, anchored or moored; but excludes hitting underwater wrecks.
3	<b>Allision</b>	Defined as a violent contact between a vessel and a fixed structure.
4	<b>Contact</b>	Contact is defined as a vessel striking, or being struck, by an external object that is not another vessel or the sea bottom. Sometimes referred to as Impact
5	<b>Fire</b>	Fire is defined as the uncontrolled process of combustion characterised by heat or smoke or flame or any combination of these.
6	<b>Explosion</b>	An explosion is defined as an uncontrolled release of energy which causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.
7	<b>Loss of Hull Integrity</b>	Loss of Hull Integrity (LOHI) is defined as the consequence of certain initiating events that result in damage to the external hull, or to internal structure and sub-division, such that any compartment or space within the hull is opened to the sea or to any other compartment or space.
8	<b>Flooding</b>	Flooding is defined as sea water, or water ballast, entering a space, from which it should be excluded, in such a quantity that there is a possibility of loss of stability leading to capsizing or sinking of the vessel.
9	<b>Grounding</b>	Grounding is defined as the ship coming to rest on, or riding across underwater features or objects, but where the vessel can be freed from the obstruction by lightening and/or assistance from another vessel (e.g. tug) or by floating off on the next tide.
10	<b>Stranding</b>	Stranding is defined as being a greater hazard than grounding and is defined as the ship becoming fixed on an underwater feature or object such that the vessel cannot readily be moved by lightening, floating off or with assistance from other vessels (e.g. tugs).

	Category	Description
11	Machinery Related Accidents	Machinery related accidents are defined as any failure of equipment, plant and associated systems which prevents, or could prevent if circumstances dictate, the ship from manoeuvring or being propelled or controlling its stability.
12	Payload Related Accidents	Payload related accidents include loss of stability due to cargo shifting and damage to the vessel's structure resulting from the method employed for loading or discharging the cargo. This category does not include incidents which can be categorised as Hazardous Substance, Fires, Explosions, Loss of Hull Integrity, Flooding accidents etc.
13	Hazardous Substance Accidents	Hazardous substance accidents are defined as any substance which, if generated as a result of a fire, accidental release, human error, failure of process equipment, loss of containment, or overheating of electrical equipment; can cause impairment of the health and/or functioning of people or damage to the vessel. These materials may be toxic or flammable gases, vapours, liquids, dusts or solid substances.
14	Accidents to Personnel	Accidents to personnel are defined as those accidents which cause harm to any person on board the vessel e.g. crew, passengers, stevedores; which do not arise as a result of one of the other accident categories. Essentially, it refers to accidents to individuals, though this does not preclude multiple human casualties as a result of the same hazard, and typically includes harm caused by the movement of the vessel when underway, slips, trips, falls, electrocution and confined space accidents, food poisoning incidents, etc.
15	Accidents to the General Public	Accidents to personnel are defined as those accidents which lead to injury, death or loss of property amongst the population ashore resulting from one of the other ship accident categories. <sup>25</sup>
16	Capsizing	The overturning of a vessel after attaining negative stability

Table 27 - Marine Accident Categories

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<sup>25</sup> This definition is interpreted from MGN 371 rather than a generally recognised marine accident category.

## G 1.2 Risk Terms used in this Methodology

Term	Definition
Accident	An unintended event involving fatality or injury, property loss or damage or environmental damage.
Accident Category	A designation of accident reported according to their nature.
Consequence	The outcome of an accident.
FN Curve	The cumulative frequency (F) of an accident versus the number (N) of fatalities.
Formal Safety Assessment	A rational and systematic process for assessing the risk associated with an activity and for evaluating the costs and benefits of options for reducing these risks.
Frequency	The number of occurrences per unit time (e.g. per year).
Hazard	A potential to threaten human life, health, property or the environment.
Individual Risk	A direct measure of the frequency of fatalities for individuals.
Initiating Event	The first in a sequence of events leading to a hazardous situation or accident.
Risk	The combination of the frequency of occurrence and the severity of the consequence.
Risk Control Measure	A means of controlling a single element of risk.
Risk Control Option	A grouping of risk control measures into a practical regulatory option.
Societal Risk	An indirect measure of the magnitude of the event taking into account public aversion to large accidents.

Table 28 - Risk Terms used in this Methodology

### G 1.3 Abbreviations used in this Methodology

	<b>Full Name</b>
AIS	Automatic Identification System
BMT	British Maritime Technology
CBA	Cost Benefit Analysis
CEFAS	Centre for Environment, Fisheries and aquaculture Science
CPA	Coast protection Act 1949
CURR	Cost per Unit Reduction of Risk
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
DfT	Department for Transport (in the UK)
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry (in the UK)
DTLR	Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions
ER	Emergency Response
ETA	Event Tree Analysis
EU	European Union
FEPA	Food and Environmental protection Act 1985
FMEA	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FSA	Formal Safety Assessment
FTA	Fault Tree Analysis
GCAF	Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality
HAZOP	Hazard and Operability Studies
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
LOHI	Loss of Hull Integrity
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MGN	Marine Guidance Note
MRCC	Maritime Rescue Control Centre
MRSC	Maritime Rescue Sub Centre
MSN	Merchant Shipping Notice
NCAF	Net Cost of Averting a Fatality
NCP	National Contingency Plan
OSIS	Oil Spill Information System
PLL	Potential Loss of Life
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCM	Risk Control Measure
RCO	Risk Control Option
RNLI	Royal National Lifeboat Institution
RPPP	HSE Document Reducing Risks, Protecting People
RZPZ	HSE Document Reducing Risks, Protecting People
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARIS	Search and rescue Information System
SRMD	Search and Rescue Methodology Database
VTS	Vessel Traffic System

Table 29 - Abbreviations used in this Methodology

#### G1.4 References

Ref	Title
1	MGN 371: Marine Guidance Note 371 (M+F) “ <i>Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREIs) – Guidance on UK Navigational Practice, Safety and Emergency Response Issues.</i> ” Maritime and Coastguard Agency, August 2008. This is available from <a href="http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn371-2.pdf">www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn371-2.pdf</a>
4	Reducing Risks Protecting People (RRPP or R2P2), ISBN 0 7176 2151 0, available as a download from <a href="http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm">www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm</a>
12	Merchant Shipping Notice 1781 (M + F) “ <i>The Merchant Shipping (Distress Signals and Prevention of Collisions) Regulations 1996</i> ” Maritime and Coastguard Agency, May 2004. This is available from <a href="http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/msn_1781-2.pdf">www.dft.gov.uk/mca/msn_1781-2.pdf</a>
13	Marine Guidance Note 372 (M+F) “ <i>Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREIs): Guidance to Mariners Operating in the Vicinity of UK OREIs</i> ” Maritime and Coastguard Agency, August 2008. This is available from <a href="http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn372.pdf">www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mgn372.pdf</a>
38	ISO 9000:2000 TickIT Guide Revised 2007
Various	“Results of the electromagnetic investigations and assessments of marine radar, communications and positioning systems undertaken at the North Hoyle wind farm by QinetiQ and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency” MCA website: <a href="http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/effects_of_offshore_wind_farms_on_marine_systems-2.pdf">www.dft.gov.uk/mca/effects_of_offshore_wind_farms_on_marine_systems-2.pdf</a> , hence Safety Information / Navigation Safety, OREI  “Investigation of Technical and Operational Effects on Marine Radar close to Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm. BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) April 2007 report. This is available from <a href="http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/kentish_flats_radar.pdf">www.dft.gov.uk/mca/kentish_flats_radar.pdf</a>

Table 30 - Some References used in this Methodology