Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review
Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review

Presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for Defence
By Command of Her Majesty

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Acknowledgement: Although the contents of this paper are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State for Defence is grateful for the advice he received from members of the Defence Advisory Forum: The Right Honourable Sir Menzies Campbell MP, Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Professor Colin S Gray, Professor Mary Kaldor, Sir David Manning, Sir David Omand, Sir John Parker, The Right Honourable Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Paul Skinner, General (Retired) Sir Rupert Smith, The Honourable Nicholas Soames MP and Philip Stephens.
These are unusually challenging times for Defence. We must respond to that challenge, as our future security and global standing relies on us doing so.

Our forces in Afghanistan - necessarily our current Main Effort - are fighting hard and making real progress. They are protecting Britain's national security by denying a safe haven to violent extremists. Their bravery in the face of a determined and resilient enemy is humbling and has reminded the British people that conflict is difficult and dangerous. We must continue to resource operations in Afghanistan appropriately. In December, I announced a package of adjustments to the Defence programme to reflect this priority.

But we cannot assume that tomorrow's conflict will replicate today's, and so in planning for the future we must anticipate a wide range of threats and requirements. While there is no external direct threat to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, there are a variety of evolving threats for which we must be prepared, from cyber warfare to the dangers posed by failing states. The world is a more uncertain place than previously and our ability to project force to counter threats will remain crucial to our national security. We will also retain vital responsibilities for domestic defence and resilience.

To respond to these challenges, I have said that the Government would hold a Strategic Defence Review immediately after the next election. The Review must contribute to decisions about the role we want the United Kingdom to play in the world and how much the nation is prepared to pay for security and defence. This Green Paper does not attempt to answer that fundamental question. Rather it opens discussion and sets out our emerging thinking on this and other key issues for Defence. Where possible it seeks to begin to build consensus; and in writing the Paper, I have consulted widely with academics, opposition parties and across government.

The last major Defence Review in 1998 gave us the basis from which to modernise Britain's Armed Forces. They have proved their value consistently in major overseas operations in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. And they have continued to fulfil additional responsibilities, from counter-piracy to humanitarian support and assistance in domestic emergencies.

Our deployment to Afghanistan has seen us engaged in a process of constant reform. We have adapted our approach to welfare, medical care, and other aspects of support to operations. We have had to learn how to deliver equipment to counter a complex and rapidly evolving threat in a unique environment. It is my belief that our Armed Forces and our national security will be further strengthened by the most thorough and systematic application of the lessons we have learnt over the last decade.

As we approach the next Defence Review, we must also confront the fact that despite our continued investment in Defence, we face challenging financial pressures: rising fuel and utility costs, increases in pay and pensions, and cost growth on major equipment projects. This is set against the backdrop of a global economic crisis which will constrain Government resources.
Our Armed Forces are our ultimate insurance policy. But we cannot insure against every risk. We will need to do things differently in the future and prioritise some activities over others. Hard choices and important decisions lie ahead, and it is right that they are taken in the context of a full Review. Ultimately, the success of our Armed Forces is underpinned by the men and women who serve, and the civilians who support them. They are our greatest asset and in reforming we must preserve their calibre and morale.

My overarching conclusion is that we must be more adaptable in the manner in which we structure, equip, train and generate our forces. We will legislate for regular future Defence Reviews to respond swiftly to evolving trends and threats. I also firmly believe that increasing globalisation ties our security to that of our allies - we cannot be unilaterally secure. Therefore we must increase cooperation with our international partners to deliver defence more efficiently and effectively.

I am determined that we take the tough decisions necessary to preserve our national security, and that we do so coherently and based on firm policy foundations. This Green Paper is the beginning of that process.
Introduction
Introduction

The Value of the Armed Forces

1 Our security and prosperity is delivered primarily through the maintenance of a stable, rules-based international order. We believe that disputes within or challenges to this system should be resolved by peaceful means. But, when that is not possible, force remains an essential element of our response. The Armed Forces provide a unique instrument for the country.

2 The Armed Forces have undertaken over 100 operations since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review – validating many of its principles. These include the major international operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. But military personnel have been deployed widely – from counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean to counter-terrorism in the UK. (An illustrative list of operations is at Annex A.)

3 Many of these operations have not required fighting. But when our forces have had to fight, the operations have often been characterised by hard and dangerous combat. We must maintain our ability and willingness to undertake such operations if we are to protect UK interests and citizens from the threats we now face.

Wider Security

4 The use of our Armed Forces must be fully integrated into our wider National Security Strategy. Their contribution must be coordinated with the full range of instruments which the Government can bring to bear at home and overseas. At home, they contribute to our ability to withstand man-made or natural disasters – our national resilience. Overseas, our ability to play a global military role complements our diplomatic efforts and enhances our influence on wider international developments.

5 Our security increasingly relies on effective international relationships. The continuing commitment of all NATO allies to collective defence and international security remains the critical underpinning of our security. The EU also plays an increasing role in promoting our interests.

Planning our Forces

6 We currently plan for the Armed Forces to be able to contribute to a wide range of operations - from counter-terrorism or direct intervention against hostile states to conflict prevention and disaster relief in the UK and abroad. In an international response to major crises, we aim to be able to contribute for a limited period up to two Naval Task Groups with one centred around an aircraft carrier, an Armoured Division and up to three Expeditionary Air Groups. For enduring crises, we aim to be able to contribute indefinitely a Naval Task Group, a Brigade and an Expeditionary Air Group. These planning assumptions are set out in Annex B.

7 The assumptions determine the forces we build, the equipment we procure and the training we undertake. We take decisions on the capabilities we need – such as ships, aircraft or Army numbers – based on the roles and missions we plan to undertake. The key task of the future Strategic Defence Review (SDR) will be to consider whether the current assumptions continue to reflect our interests and the likely demands on the Armed Forces.

Hard Choices

8 The international context has changed radically since the 1998 SDR. Our Armed Forces are engaged in a complex counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan and are contributing to enduring counter-terrorist operations at home and abroad. While we have substantially adapted our capabilities and approach in response to these challenges, it is clear that this process of adaptation and modernisation has to be accelerated. In parallel, we must develop the capabilities required to respond to...
future threats and challenges, which are not entirely predictable.

9 The Review must be able to drive radical change. We cannot proceed with all the activities and programmes we currently aspire to, while simultaneously supporting our current operations and investing in the new capabilities we need. We will need to make tough decisions - based on a clear understanding of our interests and the role of the Armed Forces in protecting them.

Key Strategic Questions

10 We must determine the global role we wish to play, the relative role of the Armed Forces and the resources we are willing to dedicate to them. This Government believes that the UK’s interests are best served by continuing to play an active global role, including through the use of armed force when required.

11 The Review must also consider a further six key questions for the Armed Forces:

● Given that domestic security cannot be separated from international security, where should we set the balance between focusing on our territory and region and engaging threats at a distance? International terrorist networks demonstrate the indivisibility of our security at home and abroad. The 1998 SDR argued that we should address threats at range before they are able to directly endanger the UK. Some countries, including a number of our allies and partners, have taken a different view, prioritising their efforts on their national territory or region, and making smaller contributions to operations overseas.

● What approach should we take if we employ the Armed Forces to address threats at distance? We have argued that we should, where possible, address the underlying drivers of insecurity – as we are currently doing in Afghanistan. We have therefore committed our forces to enduring and complex stabilisation operations. Some argue that such operations will in the future share many of the characteristics of the Afghanistan conflict. But we recognise there are other approaches focused on deterring, containing or disrupting threats.

● What contribution should the Armed Forces make in ensuring security and contributing to resilience within the UK? Recent events, including the floods in Cumbria and heavy snowfall across the UK, have demonstrated the utility of the Armed Forces in domestic resilience. All three Services also play a distinctive role in domestic counter-terrorism. We have to strike the right balance between forces available for domestic tasks and those available for deployment abroad.

● How could we more effectively employ the Armed Forces in support of wider efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen international stability? The Armed Forces and civilian defence experts play an important role in long-term Security Sector Reform and capacity building programmes with partner countries. They also provide significant support for wider government efforts on counter-proliferation. But resources for these activities must be balanced against support to current and preparation for future operations.

● Do our current international defence and security relationships require rebalancing in the longer term? Some have argued that our current relationships need to be adapted – or that additional relationships are needed – to reflect the changing world and our increasingly global security concerns.

● Should we further integrate our forces with those of key allies and partners? We are likely to undertake all operations – other than evacuation operations and defence of the Overseas Territories – alongside allies and partners. We are already dependent on allies in some key areas, such as space. Further integrating our capabilities with those of our key partners and allies, through role specialisation, joint capabilities or additional dependence, would place...
limits on our ability to act nationally. But it could deliver a more effective contribution to international security.

12 Given our current major commitment in Afghanistan, the Review will also have to decide:

- **To what extent and in what areas should we continue to refocus our current efforts on Afghanistan?**
  We have already made significant adjustments to our planning in order to prioritise the operation in Afghanistan. Most recently, in December 2009, the Secretary of State for Defence announced a package designed to enhance the support to our personnel on operations, made affordable by reductions elsewhere in the Defence programme.

**Aim of this Paper**

13 This paper is not intended to pre-judge the decisions of the future Review. It is intended to contribute to discussion of the key issues and, where possible, begin to build a broad national consensus on the direction we should take. It sets out our assessment of the UK’s interests, the changing international context in which we will promote them, the use of force in this changing context, including the lessons learned from our operations, and some key areas in which we believe we must adjust our policy and processes.

14 The paper argues that, in order to meet the range of challenges, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces must accelerate the process of reform. Our processes, people and equipment must become more adaptable to successfully confront the potential threats. We must improve our ability to operate in partnership across government and internationally. These are the two key themes of the paper.

15 The paper makes no recommendations on personnel numbers, equipment or basing arrangements, but points to further work designed to inform the future Review. A Strategy for Acquisition Reform that sets out a new approach to creating greater agility in the defence equipment programme is being published in parallel. This Green Paper also draws on more detailed independent analysis of future strategic trends and the changing character of conflict produced by the Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.
Chapter 1:
The Context for the Future Defence Review: Uncertainty and Affordability
Chapter Summary

The UK economy relies on trade and the free passage of goods and services. A stable international order is essential to our interests and security.

In the medium-term, success in Afghanistan is critical to UK security.

The next decades will see the development of a number of major trends, including a shift of power to the Asia-Pacific region and climate change. These trends will produce a wider range of potential threats to stability than we have previously faced, many of them transnational in nature. It will be harder to predict which threats will emerge as the most significant, leading to a future international context characterised by uncertainty.

International partnerships will remain essential to our security, both membership of multilateral organisations – like NATO, the EU and the UN – and bilateral relationships, especially with the US.

While the Defence Budget has grown by over 10% since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the forward Defence programme faces challenging financial pressures and the Government’s commitment to reducing the deficit emerging from our response to the global financial crisis means that future resources across government will be constrained.

Our Interests

1.1 The National Security Strategy describes the UK’s interests and the Government’s role in promoting and protecting them.

1.2 The Government must ensure the territorial defence of the United Kingdom and our Overseas Territories; ensure our citizens can go about their business without fear; and contribute to our resilience against the range of natural and man-made challenges.

1.3 But we cannot simply take a narrow, territorial-based view of our security. Our economy is exceptionally open to trade with many parts of the world and relies on the free passage of goods, services and information. A stable international order is essential if those interests are to prosper. We have strong overseas links. Over 12 million British citizens live overseas. And we have commitments, in particular through NATO, to contribute to the defence of others.

1.4 Nor can we restrict ourselves to a view of security which focuses exclusively on immediate threats. A threat which takes root in one region can spread, as has been the case in Afghanistan. A state which is allowed to pursue its interests by changing borders by force or flouting international agreements such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is likely to contribute to wider instability and weaken the international system.

1.5 We also use our Armed Forces to protect others – as a Force for Good. From anti-slavery campaigns in the nineteenth century to modern peacekeeping, British governments have used the Armed Forces to promote the values and norms to which we aspire and which are enshrined in the UN Charter.
We believe that these wide-ranging interests mean that domestic security cannot be separated from international security and that the UK has a particularly significant stake in the success of the international rules-based system. Our defence posture must reflect this.

The International Context

Afghanistan

1.6 Operations in Afghanistan are likely to dominate our activity in the early years of the period covered by the future Review.

1.7 Our Armed Forces are in Afghanistan to protect the UK’s national security by denying safe haven to violent extremists. The success of the mission is of critical importance to the security of British citizens and the UK’s interests, including the reputation of our Armed Forces. We will have succeeded when the Afghans themselves are able to prevent and suppress violent extremism within their borders.

1.8 The challenges of this operation are as demanding as any we have undertaken since 1945. Over 9,500 UK personnel are serving in Afghanistan, working alongside troops from over 40 other countries as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Together we are pursuing a counter-insurgency strategy, focussed on the people of Afghanistan designed to give them confidence in their future under the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Success will not be secured by military means alone: our strategy therefore combines civilian and military efforts in a comprehensive approach.

1.9 The military effort is designed to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) so they can provide the necessary security without the need for international troops. We have a clear, realistic and achievable strategy for the growth of the ANSF and a phased transition of security responsibility to the Afghan authorities. As this transition happens, our role will increasingly focus on training and support. Until we have made significant progress on this transition, Afghanistan must be our Main Effort across the Department.

1.10 Alongside Afghanistan, the Review must also consider the wider range of serious threats and unpredictable risks we face.

Global Trends

1.11 The National Security Strategy sets out the key threats to the UK’s security and the underlying drivers of those threats. It makes clear that while there is no external direct threat to the territorial integrity of the UK, there are a variety of evolving threats for which we must be prepared, and different environments and domains in which we must be prepared to act, from counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency to maritime security, cyber warfare and capacity-building in fragile states.

1.12 We believe five major trends will impact on the international context for defence in the coming decades. The rise of the Asia-Pacific region as a centre of global economic and political power will create a major global shift as dramatic as the end of the Cold War. Continuing globalisation will make the world ever more open and interlinked in communication, trade, culture and transport, and we must ensure that those lines of communication remain open if the UK is to prosper. We will see serious climate change, whose impact is likely to be most severe where it coincides with other stresses such as poverty, demographic growth and resource shortages. We are likely to see growing inequality in many parts of the world, as economic development creates new divisions within and between countries. Proliferation will remain a cause for concern. Several states continue to pursue nuclear programmes in countervention of their NPT commitments. Terrorists will continue to seek to exploit non-conventional means including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials, with wider access to advanced technologies increasing the risks.

1.13 The Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s
independent global scan, *Global Strategic Trends: Out to 2040*, published in parallel with this Paper, looks in greater detail at developments that will shape the wider strategic context.

**Threats**

1.14 There are likely to be three key categories of threat to which our and our allies’ and partners’ Armed Forces may have to respond.

- **Terrorism.** For the foreseeable future, Al Qaida and its associates are likely to remain the main threat to the UK. There remains a threat from domestic Northern Irish-related terrorism, particularly from Dissident Republican groups.

- **Hostile states.** In the foreseeable future, no state will have both the intent and capability to threaten the independence and integrity of the UK. But we cannot rule out a major shift in the international security situation in the longer term which would cause such a strategic threat to re-emerge. And conflicts between states remain likely; even where these do not directly involve the UK they may threaten UK interests.

- **Fragile and failing states** will also remain an enduring problem, with continuing conflict and instability creating a direct or indirect impact on our national security.

1.15 Our Armed Forces may also be required to provide support to other Government departments to deal with threats from:

- **International crime.** The spread of globalisation and advances in technology will increase the risk from transnational serious organised crime, increasing the impact of established forms such as drugs-trafficking and ‘new’ forms such as e-crime. In addition to the direct threat, organised crime and corruption thrive and undermine the rule of law in fragile states.

- **Natural disasters and accidents at home and overseas.** Events such as widespread flooding could demand cross-government efforts, including by Defence, to improve national resilience and manage the consequences.

**Positive Trends**

1.16 There are also positive trends. As the National Security Strategy says, we are more secure today than at most times in our history. The international political, economic, technological and social changes of recent years have brought benefits for an increasing proportion of the world’s population. Political freedoms have spread. No Soviet-style global rival to Western liberal democracy has yet emerged. Globalisation has supported economic growth in many parts of the world. If global political, economic and social progress can be maintained, an increasing part of the world will share interests which are similar to ours, and a stake in enduring international peace and security.

**International Partnerships**

1.17 The international security architecture has also broadened and deepened in recent years.

1.18 NATO has demonstrated that it can adapt to post-Cold War challenges, first by its outreach to central and eastern Europe, and its continuing enlargement; then by its essential contribution to resolving successive Balkans crises; and now by its lead role in Afghanistan. The current revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept – setting out its purpose and roles – is an opportunity to ensure the Alliance remains fit for the new challenges.

1.19 NATO’s security efforts are complemented by an increasing EU role in crisis management. In stabilisation operations in Bosnia and Africa, in counter-piracy operations off Somalia and in a wide range of civil missions from Georgia to Aceh, the EU has demonstrated it can play an important part in promoting our security. Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty offers
an opportunity to further our objective of developing more effective civilian and military capabilities as part of an integrated civil-military approach.

1.20 The UN’s unique role in the international architecture, building peace, security and governance is more important than ever. An effective UN is essential to managing the changing global security environment.

1.21 Within this multilateral framework, the UK has a range of close bilateral security and defence relationships. None is more important than that with the United States. The relationship is based on common values and interests which will endure in the 21st century, to our mutual benefit. The UK benefits greatly from bilateral co-operation in the nuclear, intelligence, science, technology and equipment fields. Our relationship also increases our impact on issues such as terrorism, proliferation and transnational crime that affect our security but over which in today’s globalised world our national influence is limited. In Europe, the return of France to NATO’s integrated military structures offers an opportunity for even greater co-operation with a key partner across a range of defence activity.

Complexity and Uncertainty

1.22 We can expect the major shifts in the global balance of power, climate change and potentially growing inequality to increase international instability and pose challenges to our interests.

1.23 A particular concern is the way in which threats and trends may combine. Hostile states, for example, can use terrorists to pursue non-attributable attacks. Terrorist groups can exploit fragile states or areas of states for basing and training - as we have seen in the Afghan - Pakistan border areas, but also in Yemen and Somalia. Terrorists and criminals will collaborate where they find common interests. Proliferation will increase the capabilities available to our adversaries. We must be realistic about our ability to identify future challenges or foresee the military operations we will be expected to undertake.

We conclude that there is currently no major conventional threat to the UK and its NATO allies and no single, overwhelming threat against which we should shape our Armed Forces. But the development of a number of major trends will produce a wider range of potential threats to stability than we have previously faced, many of them transnational in nature. It will be harder to predict which threats will emerge as the most significant, leading to a future international context characterised by uncertainty.

The Defence Programme

1.24 We will have to prioritise our responses to these threats. The more we prepare to do, the higher the cost. The wider financial context means resources across government will be constrained.

1.25 The package of changes to the Defence programme announced in December 2009 demonstrates how we can prioritise in the medium-term. The future Strategic Defence Review must set priorities for the longer-term, while establishing a Defence programme which is affordable.

1.26 We should not underestimate the scale of that challenge. The core Defence Budget has grown by over 10% since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, in addition to the funding for our operations provided from the Reserve, which has totalled over £18 billion since 1998. This is the longest sustained period of growth in 20 years. Government spending on wider security, including counter-terrorism, has also increased significantly.

1.27 But there are also real increases in costs: both short to medium term pressures such as foreign exchange movements or fuel increases which may persist into the longer term; and systemic pressures which can be expected to endure.

1.28 The longer-term pressures apply to two of the principal blocks of expenditure: equipment and personnel.

1.29 On the basis of experience in the United Kingdom and internationally, if we continue to search for a technological edge, including
improved protection for our personnel, we can expect the cost of successive generations of equipment to continue to rise at above the rate of inflation.

1.30 We face similar pressures on personnel numbers. On average, military pay is increasing at between 1 and 2% above the rate of inflation (in line with average UK earnings). Pension contributions, allowances and the costs of accommodation are also increasing at rates above inflation. The consequence is that since the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review these costs will have risen by up to 6% in real terms by 2010/11.

1.31 These are enduring trends, and other advanced militaries around the world face the same challenge. Historically, rising unit costs have been offset by increases in capability and changes in the nature of the threat which have led us to reduce numbers of both personnel and platforms. But there are limits to how far capability improvements or efficiency can compensate for numbers.

Managing these systemic pressures on overall numbers of personnel and platforms will therefore be a key question for the future Review. We will need to establish a better balance between operational output and supporting activity and between the quality and quantity of our major platforms.
Chapter 2: The Context for the Future Defence Review: Complexity and the Use of Force
The Context for the Future Defence Review: Complexity and the Use of Force

Chapter Summary

The use of force as an option is becoming more complicated. It is likely to become more difficult to use force in the way in which we have used it in the last two decades.

We have learnt and incorporated many lessons from operations conducted since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Many of our assumptions about joint working and expeditionary capabilities have been validated. But experience has shown that our operations have developed in more complex ways than we envisaged. We have sometimes underestimated the intricacy of working in multi-national operations and with non-military actors.

Looking ahead, the future character of conflict will grow more complex. We are likely to face a range of simultaneous threats and adversaries in challenging operating areas - such as fighting in urban areas against enemies concealed amongst civilians.

We are also likely to be subject to greater scrutiny from the media and public, both in the UK and overseas. Communications is now a key component of any campaign.

Technological development, especially in the fields of cyberspace and space, may further change our understanding of conflict. It is likely to be more difficult to maintain our technological edge over some adversaries, or to bring that edge to bear on others, with a profound effect on the way we operate.

Lessons Learned

2.1 We have looked back at the range of operations we have undertaken since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and its subsequent updates - the 2002 New Chapter and the 2003 White Paper. Many of their principles have been validated.

- Joint operations have become the norm. Our ability to integrate our activities across land, sea and air - including in the enabling functions of logistics and communications - has meant that the sum is greater than the parts.

- Our expeditionary capabilities have demonstrated their value in a wide range of operations. We have been able to rapidly deploy and sustain forces in a range of operations from Sierra Leone to Afghanistan.

- Networking our forces - by integrating sensors, decision-makers and weapons systems - has multiplied their effect. It has improved situational awareness and increased the tempo of our operations, particularly at the tactical level.

- The Armed Forces have made an important contribution to international and domestic counter-terrorism efforts within the clear framework provided by the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, and a distinctive approach to national resilience.

- Conflict prevention - based on an integrated diplomatic and military approach - has been notably successful, for example in Macedonia and Sierra Leone.

- Our wider contribution to conflict management and resolution, for
example in southern Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo, has strengthened the UK’s role and efforts.

- Where we have maintained an enduring commitment, our Defence Diplomacy efforts have contributed to important long-standing relationships and enabled international partners to make a more effective contribution to international stability.

- Special Forces have demonstrated their value across a broad spectrum of activity, from operating alongside our conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to capacity-building with partners or hostage rescue.

2.2 We have successfully completed a wide range of highly challenging operations. Few nations could have done this. But our ability to succeed depends on the ability of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence to learn lessons and adapt accordingly:

- Our assumption that we could “go first, go fast and go home” has proved false. We believed that we could deploy our forces for the most difficult early intervention stage of a conflict, and leave the subsequent stabilisation and development tasks to partners. But we have not been able - or wished - to disengage as we had planned. We have therefore further improved our ability to sustain deployed forces, including, for example, through additional procurement of strategic lift.

- The international and national policy and legal framework is having an increasing impact on our operations. Defence continues to make an important contribution to tackling terrorism overseas, following the lines set out in the SDR New Chapter in 2002. The role of Defence in working with other departments to tackle the drivers of terrorism, and to build security capacity, is crucial - although the scope for conducting overseas counter-terrorism operations is narrower than envisaged in 2002.

- In many cases, our operations have developed in much more complex and dynamic ways than we envisaged and planned for, and we have not been able to adapt as rapidly as we would have liked.

- Our plans have not always fully reflected the fact that our objectives were dependent on non-military actors and could not be achieved by the Armed Forces alone. We must continue our efforts to integrate our military operations into wider political efforts. The UK Afghanistan/Pakistan Strategy - published in 2009 - sets out our strategic approach and guiding principles for the UK contribution to international efforts in Afghanistan and guides the work of the relevant Government departments. It provides a model for future strategic planning.

- We have underestimated the challenges of operating in multinational operations. In particular, in our focus on our geographical area of responsibility, for example in Basra, we may have placed insufficient emphasis on the multi-national operational level. In the later stages of operations in Iraq, the full integration of UK staff into US and coalition headquarters significantly improved the coordination of our contribution. We are taking that lesson forward in Afghanistan.

- Our deployment of formed headquarters and formations for limited periods has not reflected the need for “campaign continuity”. We have now extended the tour lengths for key headquarters personnel and are looking at options that would ensure greater continuity throughout the headquarters. We are clear that we need to go further to produce better campaign continuity.

- Strategic communications have been treated as a supporting activity rather than as a decisive factor; and as a unilateral activity which fails to take full account of adversaries’ communications aims and activities. We have now established a cross-
government mechanism to coordinate communications, including monitoring the activity of our adversaries.

- We have found it challenging to identify and rapidly implement lessons in doctrine. This is inherently difficult, but in some areas we have already moved a long way. The Army recently issued a new Counter-Insurgency Doctrine, and we now have a dedicated training facility for counter-insurgency in the UK.

- In relation to equipment, we have had to learn how to deliver more rapidly, and then support more effectively, an unprecedented range of new and modified types of equipment to counter a complex and rapidly evolving threat in a unique environment. We have, for example, delivered hundreds of new protected patrol vehicles in months rather than years, and have found that maintaining such a large and diverse fleet in such a demanding environment - repairing battle damage and ensuring our troops have the best possible protection at all times - has required us to revolutionise our technical support both in theatre and back in the UK. Similarly, the transformation of our counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capability in Afghanistan - through urgent procurement of additional equipment and the establishment of a new C-IED Task Force and training and intelligence-exploitation facilities - demonstrates what can be achieved, leading to a greater number of devices being defeated or dismantled. Our challenge is to make sure we apply the lessons we have learnt in these areas to the way we develop and acquire our future capabilities and in all areas of training, tactics and equipment, both in Afghanistan and for future campaigns.

2.3 Often, innovation within the operation has minimised the adverse impact of these weaknesses. In our current operations, we have incorporated those insights into our strategic policy. Our Afghanistan/Pakistan Strategy, and General McChrystal’s strategy, are based on a clear understanding of the challenges we face, a long-term vision founded on integrated political, development and military action and an overarching regional approach. Our Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) procedures are delivering the equipment our forces need as the requirements evolve. The Government has approved over £5.5 billion of UORs in Afghanistan since the operation began.

2.4 The increasing complexity of the use of force has important implications for our policies and doctrine, suggesting we need to be able to adapt more rapidly and operate more effectively in partnership.

The Changing Character of Conflict

2.5 Our operations have also provided insights into the changing character of conflict. A detailed study by the Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, undertaken in consultation with our key allies and partners, is summarised in an independent paper, *The Future Character of Conflict*, published in parallel with this Green Paper.

2.6 The study concludes that in many of our future operations we are likely to face a range of simultaneous threats and adversaries in an anarchic and extended operating area. The study characterised such operations as:

- **Contested** - access and freedom of manoeuvre – even as we attempt to deploy into the regional theatre – will have to be fought for;

- **Congested** - we are likely to be unavoidably drawn into urban areas, the littoral and lower airspace;

- **Cluttered** – we will find it difficult to discriminate between a mass of ambiguous targets – friendly forces, other international actors such as non-governmental organisations or development agencies, media representatives, local civilians and our adversaries;
● Connected – key lines of communication, including critical military infrastructure, maritime chokepoints and computer networks, will be vulnerable to attack and disruption; and

● Constrained - legal and social changes will place additional limits on our actions.

2.7 Our adversaries will likely avoid engagement on our terms. They will adapt rapidly to exploit our vulnerabilities, for example by fighting in built-up areas or concealing themselves amongst civilians. They may extend the conflict to areas where we are less prepared or protected – for example, our home territory or the routes by which we deploy towards the area of operations.

2.8 Our Armed Forces are likely to be pursuing complex objectives: defeating or deterring an adversary; protecting civilians; supporting local authorities; and promoting long-term security and governance. They will be working alongside diplomats, development agencies and local authorities and in many cases following their guidance.

2.9 The study contrasted that with the well-defined battlefield experienced in the first Gulf War. The challenge for our and our allies’ armed forces will increasingly be to: understand and make sense of this complex environment; establish the policy and legal framework to enable any operations that might be required; find our adversaries amongst the multiple actors in a cluttered environment; when necessary, strike them with due care for proportionality and civilian casualties; and throughout, explain our actions to both our own population and the populations and authorities of the countries in which we are operating through effective strategic communications.

2.10 Social change within the UK will also impact on our operations. We should expect our – and the wider international – public to scrutinise our actions. There will also be increasing legal scrutiny of our actions. We must be able to demonstrate that we meet the high standards we set ourselves on protection of civilians, protection of our own personnel and respect for the local and regional authorities. British citizens will expect to be informed of our activities. Their support will depend on our being able to explain that our objectives are in the UK’s interest and our approach is both feasible and proportionate, including in human lives.

2.11 This analysis has potentially significant implications for our future capabilities, skills and approach. It confirms many of our current priorities – for example, in enhancing surveillance and reconnaissance, further improving the precision of our armaments and integrating our strategic communications. But it suggests we must do more. Our preferred way of warfare – concentrating force, bringing technology to bear and seeking rapid defeat of our adversaries – may not be as effective as it has been in the past.

We must become better at adapting to evolving and unforeseen challenges. We have set in hand work to consider these implications further and to build understanding and an evidence base to support future decisions.

Strategic Communications

2.12 The last decade has seen a revolution in the media. We now live in an age of 24 hour media, with the internet able to communicate any event across the globe, instantly. This has a direct consequence for modern warfare. Communications is a key component of any campaign.

2.13 The media will have wide-ranging access to our operations. They will help – and force – us to meet our obligations to inform the public of our activities. Openness will also strengthen our policy and resolve. It enhances public and media understanding of the challenges we face, and therefore maximises the exchange of ideas about how we can better meet those challenges.
2.14 In recent years we have increased our engagement with the media and the public to better inform them of the role we play across the world. But we could go further, including better use of formats such as social networking sites and blogs. Preparation of this paper, for example, benefited from discussion on the Kings of War blog. We should consider adopting the arrangements we have put in place for Afghanistan – such as a single military spokesman - for future operations. We must also ensure that our strategic communications are coordinated with our partners. There will be occasions when the need for operational security will override the case for openness. But we must guard against that being used routinely to avoid transparency.

2.15 We need to recognise the importance of recent social, political and technological changes. Developments in communications and the spread of democratic government mean the views of individuals will increasingly affect our security. In the past, we have focused primarily on influencing governments. But we must now give greater weight to the ways in which we can engage individuals or non-state groups. In Afghanistan, the success of our operations will depend on the extent to which we and our ISAF partners can win the hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan. In wider efforts to promote stability – for example where we and our allies are building partnerships or providing training - we must ensure that our activities are explained clearly and transparently to the wider societies who will shape the countries’ longer-term policies.

Emerging Technologies, Technological Edge and Bringing Technology to Bear

2.16 Some emerging technologies may radically change our understanding of conflict or our ability to conduct operations.

2.17 Cyber Space, in particular, poses serious and complex challenges for UK security and for the Armed Forces’ operations. Our increasing dependence on cyber capabilities creates opportunities but also serious vulnerabilities. Cyber attacks are already an important element of the security environment and are growing in seriousness and frequency. The most sophisticated threat is from established and capable states but cyber eliminates the importance of distance, is low cost and is anonymous in nature, making it an important domain, not just for hostile states, but terrorists, and criminals alike. Cyber space is critical to much of our military effort here and overseas and to our national infrastructure. We have to be able to defend against intelligence gathering or more malicious activities, not just to protect our routine business, but also our ability to conduct high-tempo operations.

2.18 The National Security Strategy highlighted the new domain of cyber space and noted that the UK needs to develop military and civilian capabilities, both nationally and with allies, to ensure we can defend against attack, and take steps against adversaries when necessary. The new Cyber Security Strategy published alongside the updated National Security Strategy in 2009 set out how the Government is responding. The Ministry of Defence has been integral to the Government’s establishment of an Office of Cyber Security to provide strategic leadership across government and a Cyber Security Operations Centre to improve our ability to analyse and respond to threats.

2.19 The Ministry of Defence is working with other Government departments in the new structures to develop options for enhanced cyber capabilities within Defence. We will also continue working with key allies and partners including through NATO and the EU.

2.20 The National Security Strategy also set out the increasing challenges we face in Space. The Armed Forces’ dependence on space has grown rapidly over recent years. Access to space-derived information is now critical to our ability to conduct operations. This makes us vulnerable. The development of offensive counter-space capabilities is a particular concern. But,
given our reliance on assets we do not control, there is also a risk of loss of access in periods of high demand - such as during large-scale operations or in the event of a sudden reduction in existing capacity. A continued close relationship with the US underpins our access to space capabilities. But we intend to look closely at how we contribute to allied programmes or develop national capabilities.

2.21 More broadly, it is likely to become more difficult - though not impossible - for our Armed Forces and our key allies and partners to maintain a technological edge over the range of potential adversaries. There are two principal reasons.

2.22 Research and development investment in defence technology in emerging nations has been increasing significantly over the past decade. Some key equipment produced by these countries is already as capable as equivalent equipment produced by the UK and our key allies and partners.

2.23 Civil investment in research and development, both nationally and globally, is now much larger than equivalent defence spending. Much of this research is developing technology – for example in communications, materials or biomedical science – which could be used in a military or wider security context. But the Ministry of Defence and our international partners in defence can expect to have less visibility of and expertise in such cutting edge technology than we have had in the past.

2.24 Loss of our technological edge in significant areas of military capability would have a profound effect on the way we operate. For at least the last twenty years, we have operated on the underlying assumption that our equipment would be more effective than our adversaries’. If it were not, our operations would be more hazardous. Our casualty rates, in particular, could be expected to increase markedly.

2.25 We must also ensure we can bring technology to bear on the challenges we face. The most immediate threats may not be posed by the most advanced technology. The unique tactical threat posed by, for example, an improvised explosive device or suicide bomber, can rapidly negate an assumed technological edge. We must be able to adjust our programmes rapidly to access the right technology in response.

2.26 A key challenge for Defence will be to monitor and respond to the increasing breadth and pace of technological change. We will need to develop a greater understanding of the requirement for technological edge in our systems and of the risks associated with losing it. We will need to be more agile in exploiting new technologies in our own capabilities. We need to recognise that the technology we require depends on the threat we face.
Chapter 3: Adaptability and Influence
Adaptability and Influence

Chapter Summary
Against the combined challenges of uncertainty, affordability and complexity, we will not be able to develop capabilities against every eventuality. We will have to do things differently, to respond rapidly to changing circumstances, if Defence is to continue to offer an appropriate range of options to policy-makers.

In particular, we must continue to increase our adaptability, flexibility and agility across Defence in our planning processes, the roles our forces are trained for, our methods of force generation, the equipment we buy and how we buy it.

We must aim to improve our understanding and anticipation of the challenges we face.

And, given the range of threats we face, we must also expand the options available to prevent conflict and achieve our objectives without the use of force – including through deterring conflict and contributing to the UK’s soft power.

Adaptability

3.1 Individual military and civilian personnel have demonstrated their ability to adapt rapidly to challenges - from operations in Afghanistan through responses to domestic crises. Their adaptability and initiative has been at the heart of our successful operations. But there is a widely held view within Defence that our structures and processes have hindered strategic adaptation to evolving challenges and have not been as effective as they should have been in supporting commanders’ innovation on the ground.

3.2 External observers have also commented on the challenges we have faced in redirecting our resources and programmes towards the immediate requirements of our operations. For example, maintaining around 10,000 personnel on operations when there are currently around 100,000 personnel in the Army has proved challenging. There are similar challenges in the Royal Navy and RAF. We have improved campaign continuity, increasing the number of longer postings for senior commanders and specialists to over 100 since early 2008, and strengthening our language and intelligence capabilities. But the enduring nature of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations has raised more fundamental questions about how we generate and sustain forces, which will be considered in the Review.

3.3 Our key international partners and allies in Defence face similar challenges. The long lead-times associated with developing military equipment or fully trained high quality military personnel limit our ability to adapt our force structures and capabilities quickly. Departmental cultures, and the interests of the single Services and other stakeholders, may not effectively balance the incentives for change against those for continuity.

3.4 We have set in hand work to address these issues. The package of capability enhancements to support the mission in Afghanistan announced in December 2009 demonstrated the way in which programmes can be reprioritised to reflect the most pressing requirements. Reserve funding for equipment and other military spending on Afghanistan, which comes over and above the Defence Budget, continues to increase year on year – from £750 million in the first year our forces were deployed in Helmand,
to over £3.5 billion this year, and higher again next year. But it is right that the core Defence programme also does more, especially on longer term enhancements which will benefit the Afghan campaign but also build our long term capability. The December package totalled some £900 million over 3 years. It included 22 new Chinook helicopters, an additional C-17 transport aircraft, and a range of enhancements in dismounted close combat infantry equipment, battlefield communications, and ISTAR. This was funded through pushing down hard on headquarters costs and overheads; further reducing the number of civilians working in the Ministry of Defence, over and above the 45,000 reduction already made since 1997 and the 23,000 reduction in the last four years; pressing for further savings in travel and subsistence, external assistance, consultancy, and non-essential training; and withdrawing from service early some lower priority capabilities, including some older fast jets, and the Nimrod MR2. Such adaptation is likely to become a more regular and necessary part of our business. We have identified a range of measures which we believe, taken together, will facilitate such adaptation and drive the next stage of defence reform.

3.5 In setting our policy, we:

- propose to legislate for regular defence reviews to ensure our strategic policy can be adapted rapidly to reflect changes in the external environment, internal pressures in Defence or an enhanced understanding of the requirements on our forces;

- are undertaking a full review of our strategic planning processes to simplify the link between our high-level policy and the force structures it drives in order to increase the ability of Ministers to direct change; and

- are looking at how we could restructure the senior planning and decision-making processes to ensure they fully reflect operational demands, including by enhancing the authority of the Chief of Joint Operations.

3.6 In setting our programme, we are studying the options for:

- generating more adaptable forces. Many of our forces are already operating outside their primary roles. We need to strengthen this trend towards taking on multiple roles;

- prioritising our investment in capabilities with wide utility, which are likely to be effective in a range of scenarios and against a range of threats. These would include, for example, support helicopters;

- creating greater flexibility between Regular and Reserve Forces to ensure access to a wider range of skills and a larger personnel pool;

- developing a greater understanding of the appropriate balance between technological edge and larger numbers of platforms; and

- relying on being able to reconstitute military capabilities, to enable us to access a full range of balanced capabilities with appropriate warning time without having to maintain those capabilities at all times.

3.7 In the Strategy for Acquisition Reform, published in parallel with this paper, we set out how we might create greater agility in the equipment programme through:

- creating a more affordable long-term programme, within which we can balance, and rebalance, our requirements in response to priorities;

- increasing our use of mature technologies when setting requirements. This would reduce the risk that research and development could lead to delays and cost increases in the programme; and

- increasing our use of spiral or modular development, in which we build a capability to meet our current requirements but with the capacity to upgrade that capability by adding
functions or technologies as they become mature or new threats emerge.

3.8 With the aim of improving the balance between operational output and supporting activity, we are looking at how we can:

- improve the ratio of personnel who are available for deployment against overall personnel numbers;
- improve the ratio of deployable equipment against overall equipment holdings; and
- introduce greater flexibility in our deployment patterns where that creates increased operational effect.

3.9 We are determined to increase the breadth and depth of debate within the Department to ensure we have a clear basis for our decisions, rooted in a clearer understanding of the demands we make of our Armed Forces and the challenges they face. We:

- have restructured our Lessons Learned process to increase the ability of operational commanders to draw on the experience of their predecessors and create a new strategic level link into the strategic planning process;
- will improve the pace at which we update and implement new doctrine in light of our experience and adaptation on operations. Further empowering the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre could create an additional engine for change; and
- aim to increase our exchange with external parties and to facilitate greater debate within the Department.

The aim of this work is to create a more open and operationally focused Department, capable of understanding and adapting more rapidly to the challenges we will face.

Understanding and Anticipation

3.10 Better understanding and foresight will be critical to support our adaptation.

3.11 Our ability to anticipate threats will help us adapt for future crises – for example by re-roling forces or reshaping our forward procurement programme. Better understanding of the underlying drivers of conflicts and the behaviour of key actors will help us adapt our operational structures and processes to more effectively manage the conflicts or potential conflicts in which we are engaged.

3.12 We believe we have not been as effective as we should be in shepherding our information and experience and providing genuine insight at the strategic, operational and tactical level. In particular, we must aim to develop:

- more effective long-term horizon scanning processes, which are fully integrated across Whitehall, and feed more effectively into our strategic planning within Defence;
- a deeper, more effective understanding of the countries and regions in which we have significant interests, including through enhanced engagement with partners in those regions;
- a better understanding of the dynamics which underlie conflicts we are engaged in, including where power and authority lies and how local people will impact on our objectives; and
- means to challenge our established perspectives, which are vulnerable to an excessive focus on military issues, such as our adversaries’ capabilities or casualties.

3.13 We can continue to improve our performance through more effective partnership:
● with other Government departments – for example closer dialogue with the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Intelligence Agencies and Department for International Development country or regional experts;

● with our international partners, who bring different perspectives and, in some cases, greater experience or knowledge; and

● with external experts in academia or civil society, in the UK and more widely.

3.14 We can also make greater use of our own people's experience as they move in and out of operations or postings and our procedures for learning lessons from this operational experience to ensure that we build a body of knowledge which allows us to improve our understanding and adjust our policies. We are already putting these changes in place.

Influence

3.15 Given the range of threats we face, we must also expand the options available to achieve our objectives without the use of force.

Deterrence and Reassurance

3.16 The ultimate example of our exerting influence against a specific threat is nuclear deterrence. Our approach was set out in the 2006 White Paper on the Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent. We retain a minimum strategic nuclear deterrent designed to “deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our national interests that cannot be countered by other means”. It also contributes to NATO’s collective security and assists in reassuring key allies. The UK has made significant unilateral contributions to our objective of multilateral disarmament and is at the forefront of efforts to create the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons. However, we have to begin the process of renewal of the Trident submarine system because not to do so would effectively commit us now to unilateral disarmament at a future date regardless of the threats pertaining at that time.

3.17 Deterrence has, however, always been a wider concept. We define it as convincing a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict of any kind would outweigh the potential gains. Conventional deterrence therefore is a key aspect of defence influence. NATO has played a central role in our deterrence posture.

3.18 Complementing deterrence is reassurance. Reassurance requires us to be able to demonstrate that we can provide our friends with military support when they are threatened. In limited circumstances, we have judged that we also need the option of extending our influence to coercion. This can involve military action although it also covers the use of Defence assets in support of economic or diplomatic action such as sanctions regimes. Where coercion is not possible, we have pursued containment – which requires elements of deterrence but with strategic endurance.

3.19 We may wish to place greater emphasis on how these influence measures contribute to wider Government objectives in an uncertain world.

We have set work in hand to enhance our understanding of this package of influence measures, including the most effective model and capabilities to signal our intent.

Defence Diplomacy and Security Co-operation

3.20 The Strategic Defence Review of 1998 introduced the new task of Defence Diplomacy. This described a range of activities contributing to conflict prevention, arms control, counter-proliferation and confidence-building measures, including through the long-term maintenance of defence relationships, supporting partners’ forces through
training, capacity building and advice on Security Sector Reform.

3.21 These tasks harnessed the UK’s military and civilian defence expertise and reputation to build long-term partnerships and shape other countries’ behaviour and capabilities.

3.22 The Defence investment in this range of activity is modest. But we believe it has made a significant contribution to conflict prevention and a stable rules-based international order disproportionate to the resources we have invested.

We are therefore working with the FCO and DFID to better understand the contribution Defence Diplomacy and security co-operation makes to wider Government efforts and to identify options for further investment in those activities.
Chapter 4: Partnership
4.1 A renewed emphasis on partnership is an essential element of our response to the range and scale of domestic and international challenges we face.

International Relationships

4.2 Our international relationships will become increasingly important to our security for the period covered by the future Strategic Defence Review.

4.3 Our current relationships are mutually reinforcing. NATO remains the cornerstone of our security. However, as Europeans, we must take greater responsibility for our security together. Stronger European defence co-operation offers many opportunities, not least in the wider role defence should play in resolving conflict and building peace. The UK will greatly improve its influence if we and our European partners speak and act in concert. A robust EU role in crisis management will strengthen NATO. Playing a leading role at the heart of Europe will strengthen our relationship with the US.

4.4 The Review will need to determine where there is scope to increase the effectiveness of those relationships in delivering our security or to rebalance our investments across the organisations. In particular:

- how we can strengthen European nations’ contribution to global security, including through more effectively aligning resources and priorities;
- how we can further improve co-operation between NATO and the EU;
- how we increase equitable burden-sharing within NATO and the EU, particularly with respect to operational deployments;
- whether there is scope for increased role specialisation or capability-pooling within NATO and the EU in order to create a more coherent and capable output;
- whether we should increase our investment in UN peacekeeping, and in particular our contribution of forces to UN operations;
- where we could offer further assistance in strengthening the strategy and planning functions for UN operations at headquarters level;

Chapter Summary

We should increase the options available to policy-makers through more effective partnerships. This includes looking at how to get the most from our international partnerships including through adjusting our contribution to existing organisations and considering the merits of new structures. We should consider the case for greater international role specialisation.

We must examine how we can accelerate improvements in the planning and delivery of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to meeting overseas security challenges, by engaging partners in Whitehall and elsewhere.

We must be more responsive to the authorities and citizens of the countries in which we are operating.
● how we continue to streamline and improve the cost-effectiveness of each organisation; and

● how we most effectively generate influence within coalitions and with our key partners.

4.5 Beyond Europe and North America, the Review should consider the merits of formalising our long-standing bilateral relationships and where new and expanded partnerships could bring mutual advantage and reinforce global and regional security. For example, regional security organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the African Union are already playing an important role in ensuring international stability and there is scope to further improve links between these organisations and the EU and NATO. In the recent economic crisis, the G20 emerged as critical to coordinating the response of the international community. Some argue that we must similarly expand the international security architecture to better include emerging powers.

Partnerships across Government

4.6 Stronger, more effective partnership with other Whitehall departments, the Intelligence Agencies, police forces and others at the national level will become ever more important to achieving our national security objectives.

4.7 The National Security Strategy has provided a framework for a strengthened cross-government approach.

4.8 The CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy is an example of this partnership in action. It sets out the Government’s approach and priorities and co-ordinates the actions of a number of Government departments both at home and abroad. The Armed Forces make a distinctive contribution.

4.9 Our operations have also provided impetus to develop this cross-government approach in conflict situations. We have made major strides forward with what is called the Comprehensive Approach – a unified approach to defence, diplomacy and development. There has been progressive improvement, driven particularly by our experiences in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, since early 2008 we have doubled the number of deployed civilian experts and we now have an integrated structure, headed jointly by a UK senior civilian representative and the UK Commander Task Force Helmand, and focused on the rapid delivery of stabilisation effect in an insecure environment, alongside military operations.

4.10 The Stabilisation Unit - jointly owned and staffed by DFID, FCO and MOD - has improved the UK’s ability to plan, deploy and direct activities in fragile and failing states, including countries emerging from conflict. In particular, it has established a new Civilian Stabilisation Group with over 800 deployable external experts and over 200 civil servants with the right skills and experience to help countries recover from conflict.

4.11 The Government is also developing a new Conflict Strategy to bring together different departments and agencies to maximise our effectiveness in preventing and responding to conflict. The Ministry of Defence is playing a full role in its development and will implement its conclusions in partnership with other Government departments.

4.12 But we are clear that more remains to be done to build on these developments. In particular, we need to ensure that the potential role and contribution of all key and supporting actors are considered more carefully at the early stages of planning, to strengthen collective responsibility and accountability for producing results on the ground.

Involving Local People and Authorities

4.13 We must also integrate the authorities and citizens of the countries in which we are operating into our Comprehensive Approach. When we operate overseas,
local people must be at the centre of our policy. Only local people will determine whether, in the long-term, a country or region will establish self-sustaining stability. They have a right to be consulted on the path that they will take towards that stability. Ultimately, they will lead and own this path. Their knowledge and understanding will also enhance the prospects of our success.

4.14 We must continue to improve our ability to engage a wide range of actors: from former warring factions through political leaders and the criminal justice sector to civil society groups. This will require further cultural transformation. And it will require close coordination with other international actors. But more meaningful engagement will strengthen our operations.
Chapter 5:
People, Equipment and Structures
People, Equipment and Structures

Chapter Summary
We must ensure our people, equipment plans and decision-making structures are capable of supporting the adaptation we need.

Our advantage will, more than ever, be based on the skills and agility of our people, military and civilian, and the pace of change means that individuals may need to learn new skills many times in their careers. We will need to look at the overall employment and remuneration package for the Services to ensure we can recruit and retain the right people. And we will need to enhance the flexibility of our forces, including through greater integration of the Reserves.

We need flexibility in our equipment programme: this is covered in the Strategy for Acquisition Reform published in parallel to this Paper. We will also need to take important decisions on which industrial capabilities we consider it essential to maintain in the UK and where we can usefully collaborate internationally.

We must also ensure that the Ministry of Defence is configured to deliver the programme of change that this paper suggests by looking at simplifying the business model of the Department and increasing its efficiency. We must consider whether the senior structures and current relationships between the Head Office, three Services and other Defence organisations – such as Defence Equipment and Support or the Permanent Joint Headquarters – are as effective and as efficient as possible. We should study whether the trend to ‘purple’ or tri-service working has delivered the benefits intended and whether it should be taken further.

Our People

5.1 People are the most critical element of Defence. Our Service men and women accept the risk of death or life-changing injury while defending UK interests. They must be ready to use lethal force in increasingly complex situations. More and more of their civilian colleagues also work alongside them in conflict zones.

5.2 On a daily basis, we see evidence of the bravery and compassion of our people on the front line, as well as the selfless commitment of those that support them, both Service and civilian, and the untiring support of their families.

Future Demands

5.3 Our military advantage will, more than ever, be based on the skills and agility of our people. The skills we require, whether provided by the Armed Forces (including Reserves), by the Civil Service, or commercial contractors and industrial partners, will change. And the pace of that change means that individuals may need to learn new skills many times in their careers. Our training will need to evolve to ensure our people can form the core of more adaptable forces. We must ensure we continue to recruit and retain the right people and develop them throughout their careers, and improve our ability to recruit widely to ensure we reflect the society we represent.

5.4 We must also ensure we make most effective use of the range of people who deliver defence activities. We may be able to enhance the flexibility of our forces, through greater use and integration of the Reserves. This could enhance Defence capability while increasing the opportunities available to our people.

We are therefore studying the options for creating a more flexible approach to Defence manning as part of a Whole Force concept.
Impact of Service Life

5.5 The country makes unique demands of Service men and women, both in terms of what they do and the impact on their lives. They have little choice in where or how they serve, and are routinely separated from their families.

5.6 The Government has a responsibility to look after the welfare of our forces, their families and veterans. In meeting that commitment, the principles laid out in the Service Personnel Command Paper will become ever more important. Responsibility is shared across government, the Devolved Administrations and local authorities. Those who have suffered mental or physical injury as a result of their service deserve special care. The same is true for the families who suffer bereavement or support the injured.

5.7 Our responsibilities do not end when our military personnel leave the Services. How a nation looks after those who serve is an important test of its moral values. The Government will continue to act as a champion for our veterans and work closely with the charitable sector which makes such a huge contribution to their welfare.

5.8 In return for our Forces’ commitment, the Department provides a comprehensive package of support including salary, pensions, allowances and accommodation made available at a discounted rate.

5.9 However, what people in this country expect – from housing through pay and healthcare to the age they will continue working – is changing. The Armed Forces’ career and reward model may not have kept pace with these changes. The provision of accommodation, for example, is a potential disincentive to home ownership and may not represent the best investment we can make in helping families and personnel deal with the demands of Service life.

5.10 These are clearly sensitive issues. The ways in which we recruit, retain, support and reward our personnel go to the heart of the military ethos and the nation’s commitment to its Armed Forces. Any change must fully reflect the operational needs we face today, ensure that we continue to attract sufficient people with the right skills, and then retain them by providing appropriate rewards and opportunities. We must provide a framework which the nation regards as fair and appropriate for its Armed Forces.

Civilian Personnel

5.11 The Department’s civilian personnel (from engineers, intelligence analysts, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, to Police and Fire Officers, the Guard Service and the teams in Head Office who support Ministers and the Service Chiefs) make a significant and distinctive contribution to Defence. Fewer than 2% work in the Whitehall Head Office and many are deployed on operations. Over the past decade, civilian and military personnel have worked in an increasingly integrated way, and this has improved the effectiveness with which activities are undertaken across Defence.

Equipment and Industry

5.12 Our Strategy for Acquisition Reform will help us create an affordable long-term equipment programme, make better decisions about what we buy, ensure it delivers the right performance to time and cost and enhance our ability to adapt to change.

5.13 Acquisition is vital for Defence. It equips and supports the Armed Forces so they can deliver success on the battlefield, and be ready for potential military action in the future.
5.14 Acquisition on the scale and complexity required for Defence presents formidable challenges. This Strategy charts the way ahead. It explains how we will reinforce existing lines of reform, for example by further increasing skills in project management. But it also addresses other obstacles to successful acquisition, including the need to keep our plans for new military equipment realistic. The main elements of the Strategy are measures to:

- ensure our equipment plans are – and remain – strategically aligned, affordable and achievable;
- improve skills, management and decision-making; and
- strengthen our relationship with industry.

5.15 This will require an effective relationship with a strong defence industry. In 2005, the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) set out a comprehensive statement of how the Government would engage with industry on the acquisition of equipment, support, and services. The DIS will be updated during the future Review, in the light of future military capability requirements. We will have to revalidate our overall approach to:

- Operational Sovereignty. Our Armed Forces rely on assured overseas sources for some important equipment and support but there are cases where specific industrial capability must be located in the UK for operational reasons.
- International Collaboration. There are operational, industrial and economic benefits from working with other countries on acquisition. However such acquisition involves risks, constraints, and potentially costs. We must choose the right approach for each project. But the Review must set guidelines.
- The broader benefits to the UK from our acquisition. The Ministry of Defence must provide the Armed Forces with the equipment they require at best value to the taxpayer. However, our annual global expenditure with industry and commerce – some £20 billion per annum – means that our decisions have a significant and long-term impact on the UK’s industrial base and therefore on the livelihood of many of our citizens.

5.16 Support for defence exports remains an important aspect of defence policy, in that it can reduce equipment costs to the UK taxpayer, support jobs, facilitate bilateral defence links with allies and friends and enables countries to take responsibility for their defence and security needs. It is therefore in the MOD’s interest to work with industry to take account of possible future exports when developing equipment for the UK Armed Forces. Longer term certainty on our future equipment requirements will also help industry plan their investment in new technology.

We are beginning consultation with our partners in industry and across government, to ensure we have a sound basis for decisions on these issues in the future Review.

Managing the Department

5.17 We must ensure the Ministry of Defence is capable of delivering the programme of change that this paper suggests is required.

Our Organisation

5.18 The Department’s business model - the way we organise and manage Defence - has developed over time, through a series of incremental changes. People within the Department and external observers have questioned whether it is optimised to support the successful management of the full range of Defence activity. We need to better reflect the role of operations in recent years.

5.19 Change must be considered carefully in the light of the risks associated with reorganisation highlighted in the Haddon-Cave Report. The future Review will offer an opportunity to re-examine the model
and to determine whether and how we might be able to improve on it.

We are therefore undertaking detailed studies to identify whether there is a case for significant adjustment to the model we use to manage the Department. We will look again at the senior structure and relationships within and between Head Office, the three Services and the other major areas of Defence, and the scope to reap further dividends from strengthening the joint approach.

5.20 As part of this work, we will review alternative models. Many of our allies and partners are facing similar challenges to those identified in this Green Paper. We will also consider what we can learn from the business models adopted by other Government departments and large organisations in the private sector.

Efficiency

5.21 The Department has pursued a wide-ranging efficiency agenda since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and is aiming to deliver efficiency savings of £3.15 billion over the current Comprehensive Spending Review period.

5.22 It will be important to ensure that a legitimate focus on modernisation and efficiency does not prejudice the delivery of military capability or the safety of our people. But there should be scope for further efficiencies over the medium to long term.

We have set work in hand to identify the potential for greater flexibility and efficiency in a range of areas, including:

- the use of civilians in Defence, including the distribution of tasks between military and civilian personnel and the scope for further reductions, including through sourcing functions from other providers where that would provide better value for money – this is an independent review being led by Gerry Grimstone;

- opportunities to improve value for money and efficiency in key enabling areas, for example through further reforms in equipment support, Service and civilian personnel management, training and IT, and through procuring goods and services in collaboration with other Government departments;

- whether the number of senior civilian and military personnel is justified;

- the scope for further rationalisation of the defence estate; and

- how to better instil a culture of continuous improvement throughout the Department.
Chapter 6:
Key Questions for the Future Strategic Defence Review
Key Questions

6.1 This paper is intended to contribute to preparation and discussion of the future Strategic Defence Review.

6.2 The Review must be based on the global role we wish to play, the relative role of the Armed Forces and the resources we are willing to dedicate to them. This Government believes that the UK’s interests are best served by continuing to play an active global role, including through the use of armed force when required.

6.3 The Review must also consider a further six key strategic questions for the Armed Forces:

- Given that domestic security cannot be separated from international security, where should we set the balance between focusing on our territory and region and engaging threats at a distance?
- What approach should we take if we employ the Armed Forces to address threats at distance?
- What contribution should the Armed Forces make in ensuring security and contributing to resilience within the UK?
- How could we more effectively employ the Armed Forces in support of wider efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen international stability?
- Do our current international defence and security relationships require rebalancing in the longer term?
- Should we further integrate our forces with those of key allies and partners?

6.4 Given our current major commitment in Afghanistan, the Review will also have to decide:

- To what extent and in what areas should we continue to refocus our current efforts on Afghanistan?

6.5 We would welcome public discussion of these issues.

Further Work

6.6 We have already begun to look at how we have divided and described our current missions and tasks as set out in Annex B and will need to make judgements on their relative priority as the Review progresses.

6.7 In Chapter 2, we have set out some of the new challenges we are likely to face in future conflict. We are investigating, in particular:

- the potential implications for our structures and capabilities of our assessment of the likely future character of conflict, including how we can improve our use of strategic communications; and
- options for enhancing our cyber capabilities and structures to ensure we can defend, and take steps, against adversaries when necessary; and where we might increase our contribution to allied space capabilities or invest in our own national capabilities.

6.8 In Chapters 3 and 4, we have set out the need to do things differently, to respond rapidly to changing circumstances.
and increase the options available to policy-makers through more effective partnerships. We are investigating:

● how we can drive greater agility and adaptability through the Ministry of Defence, in particular how we can:

● improve strategic planning processes to more effectively reflect operational demands and to improve the ability of Ministers to direct change;

● generate more adaptable forces and capabilities through, for example, multi-roling and reconstitution;

● create greater agility in the equipment programme through adjusting how we set our requirements or an increased emphasis on mature technologies; and

● generate and sustain forces more effectively and efficiently across the full range of future missions and tasks.

● how we can improve our foresight and understanding of the threats and challenges we may face for the period of the Review;

● how we can more effectively achieve our objectives without the use of force, in particular though deterrence and reassurance and through the defence contribution to the UK’s soft power;

● where there is scope to increase the effectiveness of our international partnerships, including through adjusting our contribution to existing organisations and considering the merits of new structures;

● how we can further improve the integration of our activities into wider Government objectives through more effective partnership working, such as the Comprehensive Approach.

6.9 In Chapter 5, we have set out some of the implications for our people, equipment and organisation. We are investigating:

● the options for establishing a more flexible approach to Defence manning, through greater use and integration of the Reserve Forces;

● the overall employment and remuneration package for Service personnel and the potential benefits of simplifying military terms and conditions of service and offering alternative models for accommodation;

● whether there is a case for significant adjustment to the model we use to manage the Department, including looking again at the senior structure and relationships within Defence and the scope to reap further dividends from strengthening the joint approach.

6.10 We intend to engage widely across government, with international partners and with others on this work.

The Future Review

6.11 We do not underestimate the challenges of the future Strategic Defence Review. We are determined to use it to drive the next round of change in Defence. This paper is intended to contribute to the wide-ranging debate that should underpin that. We would welcome discussion of the issues it raises.
Annex A
Illustrative List of Operations Since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review

A.1 The following is an illustrative list demonstrating the range of operations in which the UK Armed Forces have been involved since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Where operations endured for more than one year, only the first year is mentioned. A number of operations which started before 1999 and lasted into this period, such as our UN commitment in Cyprus, are not included. Our classified operations have also been excluded.

1999

- **Bosnia.** Continuing contribution to NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR).
- **Kosovo.** Major contribution to NATO air and land operations in Kosovo which became Kosovo Force (KFOR); UK personnel were finally withdrawn in March 2009.
- **Iraq.** Royal Air Force (RAF) continuing enforcement of Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones which had started in 1991.
- **East Timor.** Royal Navy (RN) Destroyer, Infantry Battalion and air assets deployed to support UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET).
- **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).** UK deployment of military observers to monitor the peace agreement.

2000

- **Sierra Leone.** This started as a civilian evacuation operation but expanded to include support to the Government of Sierra Leone, assistance to UNAMSIL and then training support to the Sierra Leone Army.
- **Belize.** Humanitarian assistance to Belize after Hurricane Keith.
- **UK.** Deployment of 2,500 Service personnel in the wake of widespread flooding throughout England to assist with evacuation of the population and building flood defences.
- **UK.** Deployment of over 100 military petrol tankers and over 600 personnel to provide emergency fuel during the oil refinery blockade.

2001

- **Afghanistan.** Following ‘9-11’, RN and RAF assets assisted US forces in reconnaissance and strike operations against the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan. This assistance continued with the UK contribution to leading the first International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.
- **Macedonia.** UK leads NATO operation of 3,500 troops to implement weapons amnesty and collection.
- **UK.** Some 2,000 Service personnel assisted police in containing the outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease, enhancing command and control and supervising the disposal process.
- **UK.** 500 personnel deployed to provide fire cover during a strike on Merseyside.

2002

- **UK.** Service personnel train and deploy as fire-fighters during the fire brigade strike. Up to 19,000 personnel were
trained and at times deployed from August 2002 to June 2003.

2003

- **Iraq.** UK sends 46,000 servicemen to support the coalition force on operations against Iraq.
- **DRC.** UK contribution of 120 personnel to EU deployment in response to UN Security Council Resolution to prevent large scale humanitarian and civil crisis.

2004

- **Ivory Coast.** UK and other citizens evacuated from Ivory Coast.
- **Bay of Bengal.** Transport aircraft, RN surface ships and Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) support relief efforts following the tsunami in the Bay of Bengal.
- **UK:** Assistance to the police in Glasgow with Search and Rescue and aerial photography after explosion at Plastics Factory.

2005

- **Pakistan:** Earthquake relief to Pakistan including heavy lift helicopters, air transport, Royal Engineers teams and other personnel.
- **Russia:** RN successful rescue of crew of Russian AS-28 submarine trapped on ocean floor.
- **UK:** Logistics and planning support to police at G8 summit at Gleneagles.
- **UK:** Assistance to police after ‘7-7’ London bombings, including setting up a temporary mortuary, provision of Bomb Disposal, CBRN and Search Teams.

2006

- **Lebanon:** Evacuation of 4,500 UK and other nationals from Lebanon to Cyprus, involving 2,500 Service personnel and a Naval Task Group.
- **UK:** 100 troops deployed to remove trees and dangerous obstacles after severe storm.

2007

- **Belize:** HMS Portland, RFA, Army and RAF personnel provide crisis response, restoration of power and provision of water in the wake of Hurricane Dean.
- **Nepal:** Support to UN mission providing assistance to election commission.
- **UK:** Provision of over 1,000 specialist and general service personnel following flooding in Tewkesbury and Gloucester. This included 6 Search and Rescue helicopters which rescued 250 people, the building of emergency flood defences and distribution of food and water.
- **UK:** Explosive Ordnance Disposal, (EOD) technical and logistic support after the Glasgow Airport attack.
- **UK:** Provision of Search and Rescue after train crash in Cumbria.

2008

- **Gulf:** Sea mine-clearance in Northern Gulf by RN mine-clearance and diver teams, making sea lanes safer for oil tankers.
- **Burma:** Deployment of two RN surface vessels to assist after Cyclone Nargis in Burma.
- **Turks and Caicos:** RN frigate and RFA deployed to assist after Hurricane Ike providing communications, repairing the hospital and clearing the airfield.
- **Tristan da Cunha:** RN and Army personnel undertake emergency repairs to the harbour at Tristan da Cunha.
● **UK:** EOD and technical support to Avon & Somerset Police with ‘Bristol bomber’ investigation.

### 2009

● **Horn of Africa:** Contribution of surface vessels to maritime counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

● **Trinidad and Tobago:** HMS Iron Duke supported the security of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, and during this deployment also seized 5.5 tonnes of cocaine in the Caribbean.

● **UK:** Command and control support, survey teams, engineer reconnaissance of routes and bridges and Search and Rescue deployed to assist Civil Authorities in managing the Cumbria floods.

### 2010

Our current overseas commitments show approximately the following numbers of our Armed Forces, from all three Services, deployed. This does not include Defence Attachés, training teams, exercises, visits and some classified operations:

- Afghanistan: 9,500
- Middle East Theatre and waters (including Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Iraq): 1,800
- Standing Naval Overseas Commitments: 4,000
- Cyprus: 2,700
- Falkland Islands: 1,200
- Brunei: 500
- Gibraltar: 300
- Balkans: 11

The Armed Forces also maintain the following standing commitments:

- Independent Nuclear Deterrent.
- Northern Ireland – residual support to the Civil Authority
- Defence of UK airspace and waters
- Defence of the Overseas Territories.
Annex B
Defence Planning Assumptions


Military Tasks

B.2 We plan to be able to undertake the following four broad categories of military tasks (MTs).

Standing Strategic Tasks. This group covers the nuclear deterrent, strategic intelligence and data gathering:

- **MT 1.1 – Strategic Intelligence.** The collection, analysis, fusion and distribution of strategic defence intelligence.
- **MT 1.2 – Nuclear Deterrence.** The provision of an operationally independent strategic nuclear capability, including its protection.
- **MT 1.3 – Hydrographic, Geographic and Meteorological Services.** Hydrographic survey, geographic mapping, survey support and meteorological services needed to support defence commitments.

Standing Home Commitments. These encompass protection of UK sovereignty, security at home in support of other Government departments (OGDs), and the projection of the Armed Forces’ public profile:

- **MT 2.1 – Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA).** The provision of authorised military support to the civil authorities and the community. Defence capabilities are provided in response to a significant national crisis and in specific circumstances when the civil authority lacks capability or capacity.
- **MT 2.2 – Integrity of the UK.** The maintenance of the integrity of the UK through the location, identification, interception and engagement of hostile and renegade air and sea craft, including maritime counter-terrorism. This also includes the conduct of port and route survey.
- **MT 2.3 – Public Duties and VIP Transport.** The Department provides military capabilities for state ceremonial, routine public duties and to promote the Armed Forces in the public eye.

Standing Overseas Commitments. These describe obligations to our Overseas Territories (OTs), our commitment to international alliances and partners as a means of safeguarding UK interests overseas and the promotion of UK influence and support around the world:

- **MT 3.1 – Defence and Security of the Overseas Territories.** The Ministry of Defence is responsible for external defence and security of the UK’s OTs and provides support and assistance to the civil authorities as required.
- **MT 3.2 – Defence and Security of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).** The defence and security of the Cyprus SBAs, including the provision of strategic communications facilities and a mounting base in the region.
- **MT 3.3 – Security Co-operation: Support to Current and Future Contingent Operations.** This includes:
  - Encouraging partner nations to contribute to international operations.
  - Assisting partner nations to help increase their capability to conduct Peace Support Operations (PSO).
  - Reaching agreement to permit access to training facilities in other countries for UK forces.
MT 3.4 – Security Co-operation: Strengthen International Peace and Stability and Support Wider British Interests. This includes:

- Assisting partner nations improve the capacity of their security structures.
- Supporting arms control and counter-proliferation efforts.
- Developing and sustaining alliances over the long-term.

Contingent Operations Overseas. These demonstrate a range of contingent operations which may demand the committal of UK Armed Forces.

- MT 4.1 – Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. When appropriate, and at the request of the FCO or DFID, the Armed Forces may be required to contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief operations either on a national basis or as part of a co-ordinated international effort.
- MT 4.2 – Evacuation of British Citizens Overseas. In cases where civil contingency plans prove insufficient, the Armed Forces may be used to evacuate entitled UK personnel from countries where their lives may be at risk.
- MT 4.3 – Peacekeeping (PK). PK operations will either follow Peace Enforcement, Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development (see below) or be initiated by an agreement or cease-fire. They will be conducted in a generally benign environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. Acting within a coalition, UK forces must be able to act cohesively with the International Community and other instruments of national power to reduce tension and increase campaign authority.
- MT 4.4 – Peace Enforcement (PE). PE operations will generally follow an intervention operation or externally negotiated peace settlement. Acting within a coalition, UK forces must be able to act cohesively with other instruments of the International Community or national power to secure and/or implement a cease-fire or settlement. The level of campaign authority will be uncertain, and a high risk of conflict escalation could exist across a wide geographic area. The military will be in support of the civil/political effort in the implementation of the mandate.
- MT 4.5 – Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development (MASD). MASD operations are likely to follow an Intervention operation or a PE deployment. UK forces will normally be acting as part of a coalition with responsibility to support the recognised governing entity. These operations will tend to be complex and dynamic requiring a broad spectrum of military effects. The intensity will be variable across the theatre in time and space and there will be a handing off to the developed local security forces as soon as practicable. These operations are likely to be enduring in nature.
- MT 4.6 – Power Projection (PP). PP is the military component of a diplomatic strategy to persuade an opponent by credible threat of the use of force that the UK has the means and intent to enforce its will. The intent should be to coerce or deter an opponent, usually through the forward deployment of military capabilities. While the intent will be to avoid decisive engagement, sufficient combat power must be deployed rapidly to credibly serve as a precursor to further operations should coercion or deterrence fail.
- MT 4.7 – Focused Intervention (FI). The existence of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and asymmetric threats from state and non-state actors requires the
ability to intervene to disrupt or destroy the threat. This task describes the rapid and localised use of military capability.

- **MT 4.8 – Deliberate Intervention (DI).** This would include UK Armed Forces in a coalition context, conducting operations to remove an aggressor’s forces from the territory of a friendly state. This is likely to require the full range of military capabilities to contribute to the defeat of a state adversary, but post-conflict liabilities should be substantially easier as the rightful authority is reinstalled. It is expected that any follow-on liability is likely to be small and non-enduring.

### Scale of Effort

**B.3** We categorise the UK contribution to an operation by three generic scales of effort; Small, Medium and Large. The following list gives some idea of the size of forces which might be assigned to each of these scales of effort. These numbers do not constrain the size of any specific mission, but they act as a yardstick for explaining our contribution in planning terms.

- **Small Scale (e.g. Sierra Leone in 2000).**
  - RN: 1 Task Group containing approximately 1 Submarine and 10 Ships
  - Army: 1 Battlegroup
  - RAF: 1 Expeditionary Air Group comprising approximately 25 Fixed Wing and 10 Rotary Wing aircraft

- **Medium Scale (e.g. Kosovo in 1999).**
  - RN: 1 Task Force containing approximately 2 Submarines and 20 Ships.
  - Army: 1 Brigade.
  - RAF: 1 Expeditionary Air Group comprising approximately 70 Fixed Wing and 20 Rotary Wing Aircraft

- **Large Scale (e.g. Iraq in 2003).**
  - RN: 1 Task Force containing approximately 3 Submarines and 40 Ships
  - Army: 1 Division
  - RAF: Up to 3 Expeditionary Air Groups comprising approximately 130 Fixed Wing and 50 Rotary Wing aircraft

### Concurrency

**B.4** We also make planning assumptions on the number of operations we might undertake simultaneously. We plan that routinely, and without creating overstretch, we should be able to mount:

- an enduring medium scale military assistance to stabilisation and development or peacekeeping operation simultaneously with an enduring small scale peacekeeping or power projection operation and;

- a limited duration small scale power projection, peace enforcement or focused intervention.

**B.5** We believe that we should seek to avoid committing to two concurrent UK medium scale operations. However, there will be occasions when it will not be possible to draw down an enduring medium scale commitment prior to a second operation at medium scale. Accepting that it will place greater stress on our current force structure and cause harmony guidelines to be exceeded for many force elements we plan that we should be able to reconfigure our forces rapidly to carry out:

- an enduring medium scale peacekeeping or military assistance to stabilisation and development or peacekeeping operation;

- an enduring small scale peacekeeping or power projection operation simultaneously with;
- a limited duration medium scale power projection, peace enforcement or focused intervention operation.

**B.6** We plan that, given time to prepare, we should be capable of undertaking:

- a demanding one-off large scale intervention operation while still maintaining a commitment to a simple enduring small scale peacekeeping operation.

**B.7** We also take account of the need to meet standing commitments, for example quick reaction alert aircraft for the integrity of the UK Airspace.
Contact Address

We would welcome views and opinions on the issues raised in this document. These can be sent by e-mail to: MoDDefence-GreenPaper@mod.uk or by mail to: Tom McKane, Director General Strategy, Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB

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