



HMS ANTRIM
BFPO Ships
London



226/2

Flag Officer Third Flotilla
Fort Southwick
Nr Fareham.
Hants.

17 July 1982

HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT ROP

1. Forwarded.
2. HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT, with its obsolescent Wessex HAS 3, did extremely well during this testing period, meeting all the diverse tasks out of role, effectively and with marked success. The repair of the aircraft after action damage on 21 May was particularly creditable and well performed.
3. The Flight's performance in the operations off South Georgia 21 Apr - 2 May was recognised by the award of the Distinguished Service Order to the Flight Commander, and of Mentions in Despatches to the other aircrew. These were well earned.
4. I entirely agree with the recommendations made in this report.



Enclosure:

1. ANTRIM FLIGHT ROP.

Information:

1. CINCFLEET for FAWO
2. The Captain, HMS OSPREY
3. The C.O. 737 NAS

HMS ANTRIM

at sea

The Commanding Officer

HMS ANTRIM

15 July 1982

Sir

1. I have the honour to submit my Report of Proceedings for HMS ANTRIM
FLIGHT during Operations and from 1 April 1982 to 1 July
1982 as required by POF3 signal 19F/1AG/KAG/281627z JUN 82.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant

Annexes:

- A. Flight Chronology
- B. Narrative
- C. Flying Hours
- D. Flight Personnel
- E. Problems
- F. Details of Weapons Released
- G. Views on Operational Employment
- H. Relation between Peacetime Rules and Operational Reality

ANNEXE A - FLIGHT CHRONOLOGYXP142 c/s 406 of ANTRIM Flight

- APRIL 1 EXERCISE SPRING TRAIN HIGH SEAS FIRINGS (406 TARGET RECOVERY)
- 2 INTENSIVE VERTREP OF STORES AND WEAPONS FROM HOMEBOUND SHIPS TO CORPORATE SHIPS (406 EMPLOYED 6hrs 5mins)
- 4 ASSORTED ASW/OTHT EXERCISES
VERTREP
TRANSFER FOF1 TO 'GLAMORGAN'
- 5/6 CONTINUED SURF SEARCH/OTHT PRACTICE/HAG PROCEDURES
SONAR REMOVED (FOF1 DIRECTIVE)
- 7/9 VERTREP
- 10/11 ARRIVAL ASCENSION. INTENSIVE TROOP TRANSPORT TO SHIPS AND EMBARKATION OF STORES/EQUIPMENT
- 12/13 OPERATION SET UP TO RECOVER SOUTH GEORGIA
- 13/14 FURTHER SURF SEARCH/OTHT PRACTICE. R/V ENDURANCE 141100z
- 14 SURF SEARCH/OTHT PRACTICE. VERTREP (2 SORTIES)
- 15 VERTREP/HDS/TRANSFER OF MILITARY FOR BRIEFS & CONSULTATIONS
- 16-20 CONTINUOUS DAILY OTHT/SURF SEARCH PRACTICE/HDS/VERTREP
- Late 20 ARRIVAL OFF S. GEORGIA
- 21 RECONNAISSANCE OF S. GEORGIA BY 406.
- (SEE SEPARATE REPORT)
- 22 SAR RECOVERY AFTER SEVERAL FRUSTRATED ATTEMPTS
IN APPALLING WEATHER (SEE SEPARATE REPORT). TIDESPRING 2 x WX5 CREWS
RECOVERED AFTER THEY CRASHED IN DRIVING SNOW.
- 23
- 24/25 SONAR REPLACED OVERNIGHT IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE ARG S/M THREAT
- 25 1. INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED THAT ARG SUBMARINE SANTA FE MIGHT BE IN
AREA. 406 TASKED FOR SURF SEARCH BEFORE DAWN/PLYMOUTH WASP TASKED
TO BE AL 8. BRILLIANT LYNX SURF SEARCH TO WEST WITH ONE Mk46.
SANTA FE FOUND BY 406 AT 0855z AND ATTACKED WITH 2 x Mk11 D.C.
S/MASSESED UNABLE TO DIVE AND BOLTED FOR GRYTVIKEN UNDER ATTACK FROM
BRILLIANT LYNX/PLYMOUTH WASP AND LATER (1000z) ENDURANCE WASPS.
2. WITH LYNX OF BRILLIANT
FLIGHT.
- 26-30 CONDUCTED SUPPORT

- MAY 1 1. CONTINUED SUPPORT OF 'M' COMPANY AT GRYTVIKEN
 2. EVACUATION OF B.A.S. PERSONNEL AND STORES FROM OUTLYING STATIONS AND TRANSFER TO ANTRIM
- 2-7 SAILED I/O WITH TIDESPRING FOR ASCENSION. CONDUCTED VERTREP/HDS SORTIES DAILY
- 7 R/V WILL LSL GROUP. TRANSFER OF B.A.S. PERSONNEL AND GEAR
- 9 TRANSFERS/HDS BETWEEN LSLs
- 10-11 INTENSIVE SURF SEARCH/ASW SCREEN
 111630z - POSSUB HIGH 4 GAINED. Mk46 FIRED AGAINST SUBMARINE CONTACT BUT COMMAND ASSESSED MARINE LIFE. SHOWED BRG/RANGE MOVEMENT, DIVING IN AND OUT OF LAYER, DOPPLER SHIFT AND FIRED THREE DECOYS DURING PURSUIT. SHOWED ALL CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBMARINE (SEE SEPARATE REPORT)
- 12-16 CONTINUED SUPPORT OPS WITHIN LSL GROUP
- 16 JOINED UP WITH FEARLESS GROUP
- 17 SOOTAXs FOR TACTICAL DISCUSSIONS. EMBARKED SBS.
- 18/19 ECU CHANGE
- 20 ECU CHECK TEST FLIGHT
 NIGHT OF INSERTION OF SBS HEAD CONTROLLING ONE WESSEX 5.
 2 LANDING ZONES ESTABLISHED BY 406
- 21 DAY OF INTENSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON SAN CARLOS WATER. FLIGHT SMALL ARMS AND GPMG ON FLIGHT DECK. 2 SERIOUS AND 1 MINOR CASUALTY SUFFERED BY FLIGHT. 406 PEPPERED WITH 30mm CANNON AND SHRAPNEL DAMAGE. PLACED UNSERVICEABLE!
- 21-28 RECTIFICATION OF ACTION DAMAGE WITH ASSISTANCE OF MARTSU TEAM FROM ATLANTIC CONVEYOR.
- 28-31 SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN CVBG. 30 MAY 406 UNDERTOOK RECOVERY OF HERCULES AIR DROP STORES
- 31 PROCEEDED TO S. GEORGIA AS AIR DEFENCE SHIP (AFTER ARG C130 BOMBING OF 'BRITISH WYE')
- JUNE 1-26 1. DAILY SUPPORT OPERATIONS/VERTREP/HDS AT S. GEORGIA
 2. CONTINUATION PROGRAMME OF TRAINING. OTHT/ASW/NGS
 3. REPLACEMENT OF MRS 3 GYRO AND GUN BARRELS
- 27 RETURNED TO FALKLANDS TEZ
- 28 HDS TO HERMES FOR CONSULTATIONS
- 29 1. 406 INTO PORT HOWARD TO PICK UP ONE PASSENGER FOR TRANSFER TO UK
 2. DEPART TEZ FOR UK

ANNEXE B - NARRATIVE

1. On 1st April 1982 HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT found itself, towards the end of EXERCISE engaged in target recovery for the High Seas Firings associated with that exercise. The substantial remains of an upturned yacht were discovered by the helicopter (406), which were subsequently destroyed by the ship's demolition team after a thorough investigation into the contents of the boat by ship's divers.
2. The night of 1/2nd April brought the news that HMS ANTRIM together with a substantial number of SPRINGTRAIN ships would be required to support Government policy in the South Atlantic. Accordingly, 406 was engaged on 2nd April in replenishing stores, ammunition and personnel from ships which were homeward bound. Large amounts of ammunition, missiles and torpedoes were taken on while ANTRIM returned her practice rounds to home-going ships. During the night and following day, on orders from FOF1, the sonar installation was removed from the helicopter (XP142) and the aircraft converted to the long range surveillance role/OTHT role with the addition of an overload fuel tank. Several non essential brackets and fittings were removed to optimise the space required for possible troop transport.
3. The passage to Ascension Island was marked by sorties devoted to inter-ship vertrep and training in surface search/OTHT/HAG techniques. Particular attention was paid to silent, long-range operations with minimal use of radar - one sweep every fifteen minutes - unless targeting information was being passed. The EXTACS OTHT procedure and the new Whippet procedure produced by FOF1 were perfected and seemed to work well.
4. HMS ANTRIM arrived at Ascension Island early on 11 April and the days of 11/12 April saw 406 engaged in the continuous vertrep of stores, ammunition and the transport of troops to HMS PLYMOUTH, RFA TIDESPRING and ANTRIM. Whilst at Ascension, it was disclosed that these three ships were to combine with HMS ENDURANCE coming up from the south and embark on OPERATION the plan for the recovery of South Georgia. As the ships made their way south, with 'M' Company Royal Marines embarked in RFA TIDESPRING and elements of ANTRIM, the helicopters practiced techniques which would be useful later. ANTRIM's helo conducted OTHT/ surface search sorties and also HAGs with PLYMOUTH's Wasp. Meanwhile the two Wessex HU 5s in TIDESPRING conducted trooping drills. The period 12 - 21st April was marked by an intensive training period and by a large number of sorties devoted to troop transport between the ships for consultation and training purposes. A GPMG was fitted in the starboard cabin window of 406.
5. After a rendezvous and series of briefings with HMS ENDURANCE on 14th April, the (30nm north) on the morning of 21st April. As the ships were working in ZULU time, the sun never rose before 0930 every morning. The initial military plan was to the

Accordingly, it was decided that ANTRIM's Wessex 3 would lead the TIDESPRING Wessex 5s using radar up onto the glacier. A preliminary reconnaissance was made on 21st April at first light (0930z) by ANTRIM's Wessex HAS 3 on to the and conditions, although there was some driving rain and wind, appeared suitable for the operation. ANTRIM's Wessex returned to pick up 4 troops and the Wessex 5s alternately landed on ANTRIM and embarked troops. The three helicopters headed into Bay but by the time the formation had reached Possession Bay the operation had to be abandoned due to thick low cloud and driving rain and snow storms. The formation returned to the ships and a later attempt was made to get onto the glacier at 1315. This time the weather had improved somewhat so the formation penetrated crossed to and climbed up onto amidst swirling low cloud. The cloud and visibility problem was exacerbated by frequent driving snow squalls and sudden violent changes in wind speed and direction. Furthermore, spacial awareness was made difficult by the vast layers of white snow, cloud and snow squalls. However, all three helicopters landed on the glacier in the required landing zone and disgorged their troops and equipment. The formation then left the area via Antarctic and to avoid

compromise by possible Argentine Observation Positions.

6. The night of 21/22nd April was quite remarkable. The barometer fell to 960mb in 8 hours from 995mb and we suffered at the hands of a storm force 10 with gusts to 70kts all night. Not surprisingly, the radiod to say that their position had become untenable and that they might not survive another 12 hours up there. Thus it was decided to extract them by helicopter from their predicament using the same formation as before. As the three helicopters re-entered it was realised that the meteorological conditions would be worse than on the previous day. Swirling low clouds swept across the glacier interspersed with raking snow storms. Also, the violent winds gusting up to 70kts then dropping to 10kts created problems with severe mechanical turbulence over the mountains. The two Wessex 5s were left to orbit in as ANTRIM's Wessex 3 made three attempts to get herself onto the The two Wessex 5s landed on a spit of land between to conserve fuel, but in the end all three aircraft had to return to their respective "mothers" for fuel. A second attempt was mounted immediately and this time all three aircraft successfully succeeded in climbing the glacier. and the helicopters landed to in a welcome respite in the weather. Even as the he weather closed in again, the snow being whipped up and wind blowing strongly. YA, one of the Wessex 5s decided to lift as he had been the first . As he transitioned forward he seemed to loose his bearings in the ensuing white out and the aircraft was seen to crash in the snow, ending up on its side after a skid of some 50 yards. The other two aircraft, lifted and landed next helicopter to . The other Wessex 5, YF, dumped fuel and 406. The meteorological conditions were still severe with visibility down to almost nothing. Once d, 406 took off and made its way down the glacier with YF in company astern. As 406 transitted a small ridge on the glacier, YF in the descent was seen to flare violently striking the top of the ridge and roll over on its side. There was no reply when called on the radio. 406 with her to returning to the ship 30 miles to the north. 406, having

The weather prevented two attempts at getting onto the glacier, although contact was established by radio and it was returned to the ship to wait for a break in the weather. At 1635, about an hour later, 406 returned and managed . Having 406 staggered back to ANTRIM somewhat

7. Later, during the night of 22/23rd April

ing
 Consequently, ANTRIM's Wessex was launched Oz. After an in the area of and evading any possible Argentine activity ashore, and 8nm down-wind by whilst the helicopter was engaged in a creeping line ahead search. The

8. That afternoon, intelligence was received to indicate that the Argentine Guppy Class submarine 'Santa Fe' might be in the South Georgia area. The commander of the Task Group ordered all ships - except HMS ENDURANCE which was conducting separate operations in Hound Bay - to retire to the north east at 200nm in order to reassess the situation. Further reports indicated that the 'Santa Fe' might attempt to enter Grytviken in the night of 24/25th April were received and it was decided to close the island again to a range of 50nm to launch ANTRIM's Wessex for a surface search/ASW sortie at first light on 25th April. Also, a Lynx from HMS BRILLIANT, which had joined on 14th April to supplement our depleted helicopter capability, was tasked to conduct a surface search simultaneously with ANTRIM's Wessex 3, out along the coast towards Bird Island armed with one Mk46 Torpedo. HMS PLYMOUTH's Wasp was placed at Alert 8 armed with AS12. In view of the submarine threat, the sonar was re-fitted to ANTRIM's Wessex during the night of 24/25th April.

9. At 0810z on h April ANTRIM's Wessex 3 launched d transitted 50nm towards

the mouth of Cumberland Bay. Visibility was about 2nm wind 310/15 with full cover
 of stratus at 400ft with broken stratus at 1000ft. A totally silent transit was
 achieved and the area of Cumberland Bay searched visually. One sweep on radar was
 conducted and a tiny echo was detected at 0855z 350 BARFF PT 5nm. ANTRIM's Wessex
 closed to investigate and at 2nm the contact was identified as the Argentine Gupp
 'Santa Fe'. The submarine was immediately attacked with 2 x Mk46 Depth Charges
 which exploded very close to its port casing. (See separate report). After some
 violent careering, the submarine headed for GRYTVIKEN with oil streaming from the
 hull. PLYMOUTH was requested to launch her Wasp and BRILLIANT's Lynx was called in
 to deliver a Mk46 Torpedo if the submarine showed any sign of diving. The 'Santa Fe'
 however, showed little capability of diving after the depth charge attack. After a
 short burst of machine gun fire from NATRIM's Wessex, BRILLIANT's Lynx released its
 Mk46 torpedo and closed to harrass the submarine with GPMG fire until the arrival
 of PLYMOUTH's Wasp, speeding in from 40nm under the control of ANTRIM's Wessex.
 ENDURANCE announced that her AS12 Wasps would be airborne shortly to deliver AS12s
 ENDURANCE Wasps subsequently achieved missile hits on the submarine fin which did
 little damage as they punched through the G.R.P. fin before exploding. The submari
 subsequently abandoned alongside the B.A.S. Pier at GRYTVIKEN.

10. After a hurried conference, the Task Group Commander decided to go ahead with
 the assault on . At 1445, ANTRIM's Wessex led BRILLIANT's two to
 land opposite fter a bombardment demonstration for
 the benefit of the Argentines had taken place. It took an hour to land our troops and
 equipment using these three helicopters. Later that day ANTRIM's Wessex flew two
 more sorties in support of the operation, one as an airborne communication link and
 another to take ANTRIM's M.O. ashore to deal with the only Argentine casualty.

11. The period 26/30th April was taken up consolidating the areas around GRYTVIKE
 and Leith before heading north with TIDESPRING to take the Prisoners of War to
 Ascension Island. Most helicopter tasks involved the support of 'M' Company and the
 establishment as a garrison ashore. In addition, ANTRIM took on the evacuation of
 British Antarctic Survey personnel and two female ITV reporters who were all trans-
 ferred from ashore and from HMS ENDURANCE on 2nd May. On 2nd May ANTRIM and TIDE-
 SPRING headed north meeting up with HMS ANTELOPE and the LSL Group coming south on
 7th May. After giving custody of TIDESPRING to ANTELOPE for her return to Ascension,
 ANTRIM assumed responsibility for the LSL Group's transit to the TEZ in the Falkland
 For the flight, this meant frequent HDS/Vertrep sorties and an intensive period of
 regular surface search and ASW sorties. This continued until the LSL Group rendez-
 voused with the FEARLESS Group on 15th May. On 11th May, ANTRIM's Wessex had gained
 what appeared to be a very valid submarine target and had fired a Mk46 with no succe-
 against it. This incident is the subject of a separate report in Annex F.

12. During the period 15/20th May the aircraft was employed in numerous HDS/Vertrep
 sorties as the Task Force converged on the Falklands. On 18th May, it was discovered
 that the Wessex Gazelle engine had to be rejected due to excessive oil loss and
 leakage which indicated that the engine bearings had possibly worn to an unacceptable
 degree. The E.C.U. was replaced by the afternoon of 20th May and a sortie planned
 that night to ourselves
 and a Wessex 5 from RFA TIDEPOOL, at the start of the Falklands invasion.

13. Late in the afternoon of 20th May TIDEPOOL's Wessex 5 arrived and was stowed
 in the starboard waistwhile briefings took place.

First it was planned to use a thermal imaging device in the Wessex 5 to assess the
 strength of the Argentine forces on the ground, before HMS ARDENT and HMS ANTRIM
 led the assault ships through the small gap which constitutes Falkland Sound.
 Obviously it was essential to neutralise any potential opposition in Fanning Head
 which dominated San Carlos Water. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 took off at 2215z and flew while
 the Wessex 5 was ranged. After take-off, the Wessex 5 was vectored by the Wessex 3
 over and around the so that it could use its thermal
 imaging equipment. Their

14. Before the Wessex 5 returned to ANTRIM for fuel and to the Wessex 3 then launched and tried to make the LZ while the Wessex 5 loaded up. Initially it looked as if 406 would be unable to land using radar and instruments alone as some low stratus cleared 406 made a dummy run at 600ft, using PALOMA BEACH as a departure point both visually and for radar. Without actually being able to make out the contours or the type of surface we turned and made a second run, establishing a form of hover over our assessment of the LZ at 100ft. In the end it was decided to use the landing lamp for the final stages of descent to land, as the risk of discovery was considered less than that of landing in total darkness. embarked and established a BARDIC T with torches. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 now held 5 nm to the north while vectoring the Wessex 5. The Wessex 3 then recovered to take north west of s, following the same procedure to achieve the LZ as in the first. Simultaneously, s, following the same by the Wessex 5 were controlled by 406 until the to the

15. The 21st May was a heady experience for everyone aboard HMS ANTRIM as the Argentine Air Force attacked the Task Force as it established itself on the beach-head at San Carlos. The flight had drawn small arms and a GPMG and attempted to shoot down incoming Argentine aircraft as they ran in from the unprotected stern sector. Unfortunately, during two strafing runs by Argentine aircraft using 30mm Cannon three members of the Flight were injured (two seriously) and the helicopter peppered with cannon shot and shrapnel. By the end of the day, damage to the aircraft was assessed as repairable although there was still a hole in the Flight Deck through which a 1000lb had had to be removed. With the assistance of a MARTSU team from ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, ANTRIM's Wessex 3 was surveyed and flying again on 28th May 1982.

16. Due to the damage sustained on 21st May HMS ANTRIM was withdrawn from San Carlos Water to the CVBG until 30th May, when she detached to South Georgia to protect the STUFF there after the Argentine C130 attack on 'BRITISH WYE' the previous day. LACK was transferred from 826 NAS in HMS HERMES to replace the injured POACMN. For the month of June, 406's task consisted mainly of Vertreps/HDS and general support of 'M' Company ashore while the ship undertook its air defence task. Also, ice patrols and surface searches were undertaken for the protection and information of the STUFF. Interspersed with these secondary roles, the flight undertook an intensive period of ground and air training. On 28th June HMS ANTRIM returned to the TEZ for final transfers with HMS HERMES and one helicopter sortie into West Falkland before leaving the TEZ on 30 June on her way home to England, in company with RFA BLUE ROVER.

ANNEXE C - FLYING HOURS - OPERATION

1. FLYING HOURS

<u>APRIL</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
P1 (FLT CDR)	55.25	6.35	62.00
P2	61.35	2.30	64.05
FLT OBS	52.40	5.35	58.15
ACMN	64.00	2.30	66.30
<u>MAY</u>			
P1 (FLT CDR)	28.45	17.55	46.40
P2	28.35	14.00	42.35
FLT OBS	30.05	16.55	47.00
ACMN	26.05	9.20	35.25
<u>JUNE</u>			
P1 (FLT CDR)	29.30	0.30	30.00
P2	26.05	0.30	26.35
FLT OBS	28.00	0.30	28.30
ACMN	29.55	0.00	29.55

2. SORTIE DETAILSa. April

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TASK</u>
1	0.45	PTA RECOVERY)
1	2.20	PTA RECOVERY) EX SPRINGTRAIN
2	0.35	CHECK TEST FLIGHT
2	0.30	HDS/VERTREP/LOADLIFTING
2	1.30	" " "
2	0.40	" " "
2	1.25	" " "
4	2.00	SURF SEARCH/OTHT
4	2.05	VERTREP/SURF SEARCH
4	0.45	SURF SEARCH/VIPTAX
5	2.05	SURF SEARCH/OTHT
6	3.35	SURF SEARCH/OTHT/HAG
7	1.45	VERTREP
9	0.35	VERTREP
10	2.25	ASCENSION ISLAND VERTREP
10	2.00	TROOP/STORES LIFT FROM ASCENSION
11	2.30	" " " " "

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TASK</u>
11	2.45	TROOP/STORES LIFT FROM ASCENSION
11	2.00	" " " "
11	0.35	" " " "
11	1.30	" " " "
13	1.45	SURFACE SEARCH/OTHT
14	2.00	" " "
14	0.40	VERTREP
14	1.00	" "
15	0.45	" "
15	0.45	" "
16	2.50	SAGEX/HAG/SURF SEARCH
17	1.00	HDS/VERTREP
18	0.45	" "
18	1.35	" "
19	1.00	SURF. SEARCH/OTHT
20	1.30	VERTREP/HDS
20	1.00	SURF SEARCH/OTHT
20	3.15	" " " "
21	1.30	" " " "
21	1.10	" " " "
22	3.20	" " " "
22	0.35	" " " "
23	1.40	" " " "
25	2.00	SURF SEARCH. ARA SUBMARINE ATTACKED WITH 2 x Mk11 D.C. AND DISABLED
25	1.00	
25	0.30	TROOP COMMS LINK
25	0.30	MEDEVAC TO GRYTVIKEN
26	2.00	HDS/SOOTAX
26	0.45	LOAD LIFT
26	4.15	
27	0.25	TRANSFERS
27	3.30	TRANSFERS
27	1.20	TRANSFERS
27	2.20	
28	3.30	HDS/VERTREP/TRANSFERS
30	3.40	LOAD LIFT/STORES/PHOTEX

<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	84.00	7.35	91.35

b. May

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TASK</u>
1	0.50	CHECK TEST FLIGHT/SURF SEARCH
1	1.00	VERTREP
1	0.45	TO GRYTVIKEN
1	0.40	TRANSFERS/VERTREP
2	0.35	TO GRYTVIKEN
3	2.20	HDS/VERTREP
3	0.50	HDS/VERTREP
4	1.15	VERTREP/TRANSFERS
5	1.30	JUMPEX
6	1.05	TRANSFERS/DLPs/OAs ON TIDESPRING
6	0.15	TIDESPRING TO ANTRIM
6	0.15	TIDESPRING TO ANTRIM
6	1.00	HDS/CHECK TEST FLIGHT
9	0.25	IN FLIGHT TRACK
9	0.30	TRANSFERS/CHECK TEST FLIGHT
9	0.15	SOOTAX
9	0.55	HDS
10	1.30	ASW SCREEN. ONE Mk46 LOAD
10	1.35	" "
10	1.20	" "
11	1.30	SURF SEARCH
11	0.55	LOAD LIFT
11	0.35	SURF SEARCH
11	1.30	ASW SCREEN
11	1.35	ASW SCREEN. 1 x Mk46 FIRED v. S/M CONTACT (SEE REPORT)
11	0.25	ASW SCREEN
12	2.15	SURF SEARCH/VERTREP
13	2.25	SURF SEARCH
13	1.30	LOW LEVEL RUNS/901 WORK-UP
15	2.35	SURF SEARCH/SONAR C.T.F.
15	0.30	MAIL/HDS
16	1.00	MAIL/SURF SEARCH/SONAR & FCS CTF
16	0.40	MAIL RUN
17	2.30	CAPT & OPS TO FEARLESS/SURF SEARCH
17	0.20	CAPT & OPS RETURN
20	1.45	ECU CTF/TRANSFERS WITH INTREPID
20	4.35	
28	0.40	CHECK TEST FLIGHT
28	1.00	JUMPEX
29	2.40	DUTY SAR ON FEARLESS

b. May (cont'd)

DATE	DURATION	TASK
29	3-35	HDS/MAIL RUN
30	0-30	TO HERMES & RETURN (1 PAX)
30	1-00	C130 STORES PICK-UP
31	2-45	VERTREP

c. June

3	1-00	'M' COMPANY TASKING
3	2-05	VERTREP
4	1-40	VERTREP/PAX
4	2-10	MAIL TRANSFER/GRITVIKEN & RIN
6	1-50	ICE RECCE/GRYTVIKEN & RIN
10	0-45	HDS
10	1-45	VERTREP
11	0-35	TRANSFERS TO ENDURANCE
11	1-20	IFP
11	0-20	VERTREP
12	1-15	VERTREP
12	1-40	JUMPEX
13	0-30	VERTREP/SOOTAX
14	1-30	NGS/WHIPPET
16	1-15	VERTREP
17	2-30	PAX TRANSFER/VERTREP REGENT TO ENDURANCE
17	0-45	DLP/OA/EMERGS
18	2-45	TRANSFERS/HDS
18	2-30	VERTREP
18	0-10	TRANSFERS
19	2-05	HDS/TRANSFERS
21	2-00	HDS/TRANSFERS
21	1-30	TARGET RUN/JOUT TRAINING
22	0-35	HDS
22	1-00	HDS/PAX TRANSFERS
23	1-45	HDS/VERTREP
23	2-00	HDS/VERTREP
23	0-30	HDS/VERTREP
24	1-55	HDS/VERTREP
24	0-30	VERTREP
26	0-50	PAX TRANSFERS
27	0-30	1 PAX ANTRIM TO RESOURCE + STORES
28	0-35	CAPT & CDR(S) TO HERMES & RIN

- 5 -

<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
April	84.00	7.35	91.35
May	40.35	16.55	57.30
June	46.10	0.30	46.40
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>170.45</u>	<u>25.00</u>	<u>195.45</u>

ANNEXE D - HMS ANTRIM FLIGHT PERSONNEL - OPERATION

1. Flight Personnel.

<u>FLT CDR</u>	LT CDR	RN	CD17793K
<u>P2</u>	SUB LT	RN	CD27272M
<u>FLT OBS</u>	LT	RN	CD21684T
<u>ACMN</u>	A/POACMN		(Until 21 May)
	LACMN		(29 May - 17 July) D124602A (ex 826 NAS)
<u>SMR</u>	CAEA(M)		DO63193F
<u>R1</u>	AEMN(R)		DO80539W
<u>L1</u>	AEA(L) 1	(Until 21 May)	DO58003Y
	AEMN(L) 1	(1 July onwards)	DO67695W
<u>M2</u>	AEA(M) 2		D136449G
<u>R2</u>	POAEM(R)		DO78611L
<u>L2</u>	POAEM(L)		DO66878G
<u>M3</u>	LAEM(M)		D121250W
<u>R3</u>	AEM(R)		D168918G
<u>L3</u>	AEM(L)		D175582T
<u>M4</u>	AEM(M)		D179096M
<u>M5</u>	AEM(M)		D164682W

2. Casualties.

AEA(L) - During an Argentine air attack of 21 May was severely wounded by 30mm Cannon shrapnel from a round which exploded one foot from him as he took cover behind the helicopter in the port sidelane. He sustained the following injuries: Multiple shrapnel wounds to both eyes, torso and legs, resulting in permanent total blindness. Casevaced to UGANDA via CANBERRA. Relief - AEMN(L) joined 1 July 1982.

A/POACMN - During the same Argentine air attack of 21 May was wounded by 30mm Cannon shrapnel as he sought to take cover in the hangar after helping man a GPMG on the Flight Deck. He sustained multiple wounds to legs and buttocks. Casevaced to UK but now fully fit for duty. Relief - LACMN joined 29 May to 17 July 1982 ex 826 NAS.

LT CDR - During Argentine air attacks of 21 May Lt Cdr took cover in the Avcat Fuel Space to avoid 30mm Cannon fire and he sustained minor shrapnel injuries to right shoulder and right hand small finger.

ANNEXE E - PROBLEMS

1. Complement Qualification and Training. The only complement problem experience during Operation was as a result of the CASEVAC of the Flight L1 AEA(L)1. The L2, a POAEM(L), did not have the necessary experience to cope with the inevitable F.C.S. diagnosis and rectification that was required.
2. Own Support. The standard fit of tools and equipment was found to meet all maintenance needs. It is recommended that a CHADWICK HELMUTH dynamic balancing and in-flight tracking equipment be carried by the flight as a permanent item and a number of additional spares be held, namely, spare oleos and FCS and Sonar equipment modules. The addition of a few minor items of test equipment would enable full 2nd Line Sonar equipment servicing to be available.
3. Ship's Support. At least one more Depth Charge cradle is required for weapon resupply, otherwise ship's support was good.
4. UK Support. No problems.
5. Clearances. Modification. New Equipment. Clearance was requested to operate the Wessex 3 up to 14000lbs Max.A.U.W. within the same parameters as the Wessex 5. The service deviation issued constrained the clearance to Operation only. It is considered that in the light of experience this additional payload, especially in the surface search role, significantly increases the operational capability of the aircraft and it is recommended that the restriction to Operation only be lifted. After manufacture of the Exocet Radar Reflector the device was fitted to the port Weapon Carrier as a temporary measure pending issue of the NSM as the operational requirement for some form of decoy/defence was considered urgent. This was found to be an unsuitable mounting position suffering excessive vibration on the carrier and the bracing struts and was subsequently removed. The NSM has not yet been received. It was established that the device produced a tanker size echo on 992 Radar at 15 - 20nm and appeared to be effective although very direction sensitive.
The inclement weather prompted the manufacture of a plywood insert to replace the starboard after cabin window when the GPMG mounting was fitted. The insert located using the window jettison lugs and with the aid of standard drawer handle centrally positioned allowed the plate to be withdrawn into the aircraft and the gpmg and swivel fitted to the mounting. The insert when fitted also reduced the light level in the cabin and thus improved the Observer's operating conditions for the radar.
6. Tasking/Fatigue/Morale. The majority of tasking was generated internally to meet the various Military requirements for HDS, trooplift, Vertrep and in the Surface Search role. During transits south a pre-dawn surface search and OTHH sortie was flown out to ranges of 100nm giving coverage to approximately 130nm. During the short periods with the CVBG, the dunking tasking comprised 2 x 3hr slots in 24hrs which could be achieved when not hampered by sonar unserviceability. The greatest fatigue factor experienced was the constant HDS/Vertrep requirement which when coupled with defect rectification and maintenance required some maintainers to be turned to in their defence watch off-watch period. The requirement to replace the sonar equipment and carry out an ECU change to meet urgent operational requirements required some of the flight to work continuously for over 30hrs. Although the task was most commendably achieved recovery time for those maintainers involved was at least 48hrs. It is recommended that prolonged operations of this nature only be contemplated when a guaranteed long stand-down can be accepted on completion.

Flight morale throughout Operation was good. The emphasis on individual responsibility is considered to be the biggest simple motivating factor.

ANNEXE F - DETAILS OF WEAPONS RELEASED1. 2 x Mk11 DC Deployed v. ARA SANTA FE

a. On 25th April 1982 Wessex HAS Mk3 (c/s 406) was launched before dawn on a surface search of Cumberland Bay, South Georgia from position 070 BARFF PT 48nm. Conducted total radar/radio silent transit to the mouth of Cumberland Bay in the following weather:

W/V 310/15
 Vis 1/2 nm
 Cloud 8/8 500ft (which lifted from 0920z onwards)
 Sea State 3/4

The helicopter was armed with 2 x Mk11 Depth Charges

b. After a preliminary visual search of Cumberland Bay, the radar was operated for one sweep. A tiny contact was detected 350 BARFF PT 5nm and 406 closed to investigate visually. Again radar/radio silence was maintained. At 3/4 nm the Argentine submarine 'SANTA FE' was identified heading 310°(T) into sea with her casing clear. She appeared about to dive after exiting Cumberland Bay. Her speed was about 8kts and it was decided to allow for ballistic corrections to run in over the submarine and release the Depth Charges when directly over it.

The run in was conducted heading 310° 90kts and at 150ft. The weapons were released together and were seen to explode alongside the port side of the 'SANTA FE' within 15-20ft. The submarine was seen to move heavily sideways through the water and started to yaw violently in a random manner until she gained directional control and headed back to Grytviken.

c. Damage Assessment.(1) First Impressions.

- I. Oil was seen to be streaming from the submarine shortly after the Depth Charge attack.
- II. The violent yawing was due to the action damage which put her port engine out of action.

(2) Subsequent Findings. Conversation with the CO of the SANTA FE and inspection of the submarine confirmed the following:

- I. Port shaft and engine were rendered unserviceable
- II. He was unable to dive after D.C. attack
- III. An oil tank had split
- IV. Electronic gear had sheared off bulkhead mountings throughout the submarine
- V. An HP air line had fractured

(3) Observation. Despite the proximity of the weapon (within advertised 'kill' range), some of the blast effect was dissipated through the surface.d. Recommendations

- (1) That the Depth Charge is still a viable weapon against surfaced or shallow targets.
- (2) That the explosive charge be increased.

b. After another five minutes contact the sonar performance seemed likely to degrade further (Dome Leakage light illuminated periodically) and contact still posed a threat to the force. No advice was given by ANTRIM at this stage PLYMOUTH's Wasp asked to join with Mk46.

e. Observations. Although the Command considered this target to be marine life, both the Observer and the Aircrewman were convinced that a submarine was held during this action. Although intelligence intimated that an Argentine threat was low in this area, the contact gained seemed to fit all the criteria for a submarine. Possibly it was a submarine from another Navy.

3. POSITION OF HMS ANTRIM DURING ACTION

ANNEXE G - VIEWS ON OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

1. Operational employment during Operations consist almost entirely of the functions not best suited to the Wessex HAS Mk 3. However, by removal of the Sonar equipment and associated support framework the aircraft proved to be a most viable proposition and achieved almost 100% serviceability in the non-dunking roles. Approximately 1000lbs of equipment was removed from the aircraft by judicious removal of the Sonar equipment support framework. This weight gain was optimised by carriage of the port weapons carrier and drop tank. This configuration, with the clearance to 14000lbs A.U.W. gave the aircraft an excellent Surface Search capability (120nm range, 2hrs 40mins endurance). Addition of the H.W.R.2 further improved the search capability although limited to warning only. Troop carrying and load lifting was comparable with the Wessex 5 although there was no form of seating or means of restraint for the troops. The aircraft proved ideally configured for night/dawn covert insertion employing the radar and doppler for accurate navigation to the L.Z. An average example of 8 troops to 50nm range and return with 20 mins endurance in hand is feasible if the Service Deviation to 14000lbs Max.A.U.W. is employed.
2. The removal and refitting of the sonar was achieved remarkably quickly by the flight (approx 24hrs) and when set to work operated well for a short period. It has, however, suffered consistent problems since the initial success which can be attributed to the carriage of troops and equipment or, the as yet undiscovered shrapnel damage to the wiring looms.
3. It is considered that the requirement for an ASW Sonar fitted aircraft embarked in a DLG be reviewed if the ship is to be further employed in Operation
4. If the requirement for dunking sonar is confirmed, it is recommended that the Wessex HAS Mk3 surface search capability be enhanced by the fit of Orange Crop ESM equipment and that the feasibility of fitting ARI23163 as an EXOCET jammer be investigated. It is intended to demand FCS and Sonar Equipment spares and modules in excess of allowance to ensure an autonomous 2nd Line and repair capability.
5. In the event of the ASW Dunking requirement being deemed of limited value, then it is considered that the ship's requirement for an aircraft capable of surface search and attack, ESM Search, trooping, Vertrep, Exocet defence and S.A.R. is best met by the embarkation of a Lynx Flight. The advantages of commonality of equipment and the safety aspects of twin engine performance does not require re-emphasis. If an aircraft type change is not considered feasible, it is recommended that the Sonar Installation be removed completely and troop seats fitted where possible in addition to the equipment at para.4.
6. It is further considered that the amount of night Vertrep sorties flown by most capable aircraft during the operation indicates that it should become an important part of training requirement for shipborne operations. It was found that the height required by the aircraft and the time spent over the deck made the operation considerably more difficult than a normal approach and landing sequence.

ANNEXE H - RELATION BETWEEN PEACETIME RULES AND OPERATIONAL REALITY

1. Inevitably, the achievement of an operational task became the aim despite peacetime rules and regulations. However, the policy of abiding by the rules where possible was adopted and it was only necessary to contravene them where compliance would hinder or extend the task unacceptably. At the event these occasions were found to be surprisingly rare. It is considered that the regulations contained in NMERS were extremely restrictive and that movement and stowage of weapons, ammunition and pyrotechnics could not always be achieved without contravention of the rules. Application of common sense, an awareness of the rules and sound knowledge of the armament stores were the criteria to decide an unacceptable or acceptable action.
2. Flight deck operations also evolved as a compromise between expediency and rigid application of the rules. The emphasis fell firmly on the F.D.O. to employ his experience and common-sense for the control of personnel, stores, lighting, etc. on the flight deck especially during darkened operations. The use of a consistently serviceable loop system and telebrief would have eased his problem considerably.
3. The areas where greatest divergence from the normal Flight Safety practices were experienced were during troop lifts where suitable survival suits, seating and ear protection were not available.