The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security

May 2014
The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security

Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty
May 2014

Cm 8829
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHAT IS MARITIME SECURITY?</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explaining the Maritime Domain</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Maritime Security Objectives</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing Maritime Security Risks</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUR APPROACH</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDERSTAND</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFLUENCE</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVENT</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTECT</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPOND</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELIVERING OUR OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1: To promote a secure international maritime domain and</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uphold international maritime norms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2: To develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 3: To protect the UK and the Overseas Territories, their citizens and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 4: To assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK Marine Area, regionally and internationally</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 5: To protect the resources and population of the UK and the Overseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUTURE DIRECTION</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX A</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Maritime Security Governance</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX B</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental Roles and Responsibilities for Maritime Security</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNEX C</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword
Foreword

The UK’s maritime industry directly contributes up to £13.8 billion to the UK economy¹ and indirectly contributes a further £17.9 billion.² The sector accounts for over 2% of the entire economy, supports one in every 50 jobs and creates nearly £8.5 billion in revenue for the UK Exchequer each year.³

The United Kingdom is an island nation with a strong maritime heritage and maritime interests throughout the world. Almost every aspect of our national life depends on our connections to the wider world, and most of these connections are provided by the sea. We depend on the sea for our prosperity and security and are reliant on a stable global market for the raw materials, energy and manufactured goods critical to sustaining our way of life. Recent trends such as globalisation, resource competition, population growth and climate change have changed the maritime domain to one that is simultaneously more connected – providing substantial growth opportunities for UK business; and more contested – in which developments in distant maritime regions can have an immediate and direct impact on our prosperity and security.

As a nation, we have always looked out into the wider world to shape and influence international events. This strategy explains how we organise and use our current national capabilities to identify, assess and address maritime security issues at home and overseas, and how we intend to improve our ability to do so in future through the most efficient use of available resource.

We will achieve the objectives set out here through a thorough understanding of the risks we face, coupled with an ambitious but pragmatic approach to the opportunities we could exploit – so as well as having the capabilities to respond to security incidents, we also undertake overseas capacity building, deterrence and diplomacy to disrupt potential future threats before they appear. This requires a comprehensive cross government approach to maritime surveillance, information gathering, and decision making, enhanced by regional and multinational cooperation, and supported by ongoing scrutiny to ensure we continue to improve.

The future will see further expansion in the global requirement for safe and secure seas as the offshore-energy sector continues to expand and maritime trade increases to meet the consumer demands of emerging countries and new consumer classes. We will seek to take advantage of this economic opportunity by continuing to promote London as the global centre for maritime business, promoting a stable maritime domain and the freedom of the seas, and maintaining the UK’s position as a driver of international cooperation and consensus.

William Hague
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Theresa May
Home Secretary

Philip Hammond
Secretary of State for Defence

Patrick McLoughlin
Secretary of State for Transport

¹ Department for Transport analysis.
² Oxford Economics research, Department for Transport Analysis.
³ Oxford Economics research.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary

Introduction

1.1 The UK considers ‘maritime security’ to be the advancement and protection of the UK’s national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world.

1.2 This strategy places the maritime domain in context and explains why it matters to the UK. It sets out our approach and the objectives we wish to achieve, as well as explaining how we intend to improve our efforts in future. Finally, it outlines the governance structure which will allow us to deliver effective and efficient maritime security.

The Maritime Domain Matters

1.3 While the sea is the lifeblood of our economy, conveying the vast majority of our trade and many of our vital resources, it can also be exploited by nations, criminals and terrorists. It thus requires national and international policing and regulation, and strong global partnerships to address areas of common interest, striking the appropriate balance between facilitating legitimate movement, and monitoring hostile activity. The maritime domain is also a complicated international system in which the UK is a leading player, using diplomatic, military and law enforcement levers to drive international cooperation and build capacity. In order for us to influence and intervene where necessary, we must carefully assess and prioritise the maritime risks and opportunities we face, and allocate our resources accordingly.

Our Objectives

1.4 The UK benefits from a strong position. We have highly competent policing, military and diplomatic capabilities; we are a centre of global trade with a large network of capable ports and maritime infrastructure supporting our economy; and our large coastline provides us with extensive resources, including fisheries and energy. While we assess that our capabilities are adequate to deliver this strategy and that we already have effective mechanisms in place to counter maritime security threats, the maritime domain is extensive and the future will see considerable expansion in the global use of the seas. Thus, in a climate of limited resources, we must maximise the effect of our assets, focusing on integration and cooperation wherever possible.

1.5 Analysis of the UK’s maritime security risks (covered further in Paragraph 3.7) identified terrorism, disruption to trade or freedom of navigation, maritime attack against UK infrastructure, arms proliferation, drugs and people smuggling as the areas of greatest significance.

1.6 We will therefore advance and protect our national interests by focusing our effort on five maritime security objectives:

1. Promoting a secure international maritime domain and upholding international maritime norms;

2. Developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance;

3. Protecting the UK, our citizens and our economy by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships;
Executive Summary

4. Assuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK Marine Area, regionally and internationally;
5. Protecting the resources and population of the UK and the Overseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism.

Our Approach to the Maritime Domain

1.7 In order to manage a security environment which incorporates the overlapping interests of multiple UK government departments and agencies as well as almost every nation and multiple international organisations, we need to work together to deliver maritime security outputs that are more than the sum of their parts. Therefore the two key principles we have adopted to guide our work are integration and collaboration – we will bring together the instruments of government, driving cooperation and efficiency; and we will work globally with allies and partners, including industry and the public, in pursuit of our mutual goals.

1.8 We will apply these principles of integration and collaboration to five core Maritime Security Tasks which support the delivery of the objectives described. These represent the strategic ‘ways’ of our approach – to UNDERSTAND, INFLUENCE, PREVENT, PROTECT and RESPOND.

1.9 The maritime domain is vast, but not uniform – the activity taking place within it is largely concentrated within ports, shipping lanes, waterways, fixed infrastructure, and fishing grounds, leaving large swathes of the world’s seas and oceans broadly empty. Our first challenge is therefore to monitor activity and identify that which has relevance to our security. We therefore invest significant resource in understanding the maritime domain – gathering intelligence, sharing information, building partnerships, analysing data and identifying concerns.

1.10 Once we understand, we seek to influence. Influence takes a number of forms, from diplomacy through to law enforcement, economic activity and military engagement. The aim is to help achieve our objectives by driving behaviour – persuading our allies to support us, or deterring adversaries from acting against our interests.

1.11 Where understanding and then influence fail, we aim to prevent maritime security concerns from arising or escalating. Prevention takes the form of pre-emptive work to build security capacity in areas of instability, but can also be in the form of responsive action. An example is the international work to improve regional stability and provide lawful economic opportunities to prevent piracy off the Horn of Africa.

1.12 When we are unable to prevent a threat from arising, we work to protect our interests by taking action to reduce the vulnerability of our shipping and maritime infrastructure (such as enabling the use of armed Private Security Companies through published guidance and existing legislation and the provision of military assets to deter violent behaviour) as well as efforts to increase our resilience in the event of an attack (for example through the establishment and implementation of protective security practices).

1.13 Throughout this systematic approach, we remain ready to respond whenever appropriate or necessary. This may take the form of law enforcement or interdiction action or, in the more extreme cases, the use of military force.

1.14 This strategy describes how the UK will apply the above approach to our five maritime security objectives (which are not in any order of priority):

1. To promote a secure international maritime domain and uphold international maritime norms.

We pursue an active and activist foreign policy, working with other countries to strengthen the rules-based international system. We are committed to freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes based upon international law. We use our best efforts to secure compliance by other states with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and work with allies to bring non-compliant states into compliance. Where disputes arise, we use diplomacy wherever possible to settle them, with recourse to judicial settlements if necessary. We maintain strong and effective representation in the key organisations dealing with these issues.
2. To develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance.

Maritime security is an international responsibility, but some states are more capable than others. In recognition of this, we need to carry out work to build intelligence, law enforcement, coastguard and military capabilities within specific states so that they are better able to police their marine area and contribute to regional and international efforts on the high seas.

3. To protect the UK and the Overseas Territories, their citizens and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships.

The Department for Transport (DfT) regulates port and ship security to ensure UK citizens and assets are protected at sea, assessing the terrorist risks, setting appropriate security levels for maritime traffic, providing intelligence-led security advice, and monitoring compliance. The Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) works with the operators of critical maritime infrastructure, including oil rigs and wind farms, to ensure that risk is understood and mitigated.

4. To assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK Marine Area, regionally and internationally.

The UK and global economies depend on international trade and energy. Where security is threatened, we work with our international partners, including through the deployment of our navies, to build understanding, deter threats and protect shipping engaged in lawful commerce. As a last resort, we are prepared to use force to prevent attacks and to uphold international law.

5. To protect the resources and population of the UK and the Overseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism.

The UK faces threats from the maritime domain including organised crime, terrorism, unlawful crossing of our borders, and illegal exploitation of our marine area (including fisheries).

To enable UK criminal law to be enforced at sea, power is vested in the police, Border Force, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Royal Navy. These agencies carry out surveillance, deter unlawful activity, and interdict suspect vessels. Police forces use local knowledge to respond to threats in their maritime regions while the NCA’s Border Policing Command provides a coordinated response to organised crime in the maritime domain. The Royal Navy and Border Force work together to patrol our waters, intercepting vessels when required.

Improving Maritime Security

1.15 We intend to take the following action to improve our maritime security efforts in the future.

- **Understanding:** We will harmonise understanding of the maritime domain through better use of existing cross-government resources, such as the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), and strengthening relationships with our industry and international partners. We aim to bring together existing separate activity focused on generating maritime understanding and will investigate how best to measure the effectiveness of these efforts;

- **Influence:** We will continue to work closely with our maritime partners – bilaterally, through championing regional security initiatives, by working towards an EU Maritime Security Strategy and through assertion of our freedom of navigation. The UK has declared an Exclusive Economic Zone, recognising the additional security benefits that this can bring;

- **Prevention:** We will share information, intelligence and best practice with our partners and continue our international capacity-building efforts in areas of key strategic importance, including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea;

- **Protection:** We will monitor developments in security technology to ensure that we stay ahead of the threat. We will exploit cross-government research and development in support of our joint maritime security goals;

---

4 The Persian Gulf is also known as the Arabian Gulf.
Executive Summary

- **Response**: We will seek better to coordinate joint operations between UK maritime departments and agencies. We will investigate opportunities to acquire equipment jointly which meets the common needs of different maritime-focused government departments and agencies.

Governance to Maximise Impact

1.16 Effective delivery of maritime security activity requires clear and robust decision making in government – to respond to incidents, to seek evidence, and to generate policy. This strategy sets out a more holistic approach to maritime security than we have taken in the past, bringing together myriad government activity under a single governance structure.

1.17 A ministerial working group has been formed to focus on maritime security in its entirety. This group will meet regularly to consider maritime security issues and make decisions. Beneath this, a group of senior officials will meet to coordinate the cross-government work required to enact the decisions made by ministers. To reflect the cross-government nature of maritime security, the ministerial group will be chaired by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office while the officials’ group will be chaired by the Department for Transport. An additional forum will support regular dialogue with our industry partners. As with other areas of National Security, the National Security Council will engage when relevant.

SCOPE

2.1 This National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) contributes to and is fully coherent with Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), reflecting that the UK wishes to be a prosperous, secure, modern and outward-looking nation which promotes its values and ideas globally. Pursuant to the NSS, the NSMS aims to safeguard and promote our interests and prosperity by upholding the freedom of the seas, by mitigating national security threats (ideally at range) and by exploiting opportunities throughout the maritime domain.

2.2 Focused primarily on the five-year period from 2014 to 2019 but adopting a 20-year outlook where appropriate, the NSMS sets out our approach to these challenges, including how maritime capabilities support the delivery of objectives. By outlining cross-government priorities, this strategy sets out the whole-of-government approach, including our reliance on international partners, required to secure the seas and oceans that Britain depends upon for its national security and economic well being.

2.3 The NSMS formalises the structures which allow our Government departments jointly to identify solutions to the maritime security challenges faced by the UK, its Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories. Further, it identifies potential cost-efficient solutions to improve our effectiveness and rationalise our efforts on issues of cross-departmental maritime interest.

2.4 The NSMS is focused first and foremost on maritime security as set out at Paragraph 3.1 and while maritime safety is touched upon where it has direct relevance to security, the following areas are not considered further in this strategy:

- **‘Defence of the Realm’** i.e. the protection of the UK, our 3 Crown Dependencies and 14 Overseas Territories from concerted military attack. The response to such an attack would be authorised by the Cabinet and coordinated by the National Security Council;
- **Military Campaigns** i.e. coordinated UK military responses to direct threats or hostile acts. These are authorised by the Cabinet, coordinated by the National Security Council, and implemented by a number of departments;
- **Maritime Safety.** Maritime safety includes ship technical and quality standards, the training of crews and labour conditions, routing and nautical charts, and responsibility for life saving and pollution prevention and control. The responsibilities lie primarily with the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA);\(^6\)

---


\(^6\) The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is responsible for providing information and assistance to mariners, responding to accidents and emergencies at sea and around the UK coastline, and helping to save lives and prevent pollution. The MCA works nationally and internationally with partners in the shipping industry to promote the safe construction, operation and navigation of ships.
• **Natural disasters and major accidents.** The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are responsible for national emergency planning for flooding and coastal erosion in the UK. Support to our Overseas Territories is detailed in a White Paper published by the Government in 2012.\(^7\) The MCA is the lead agency for responding to maritime accidents within the UK Pollution Control Zone\(^8\) and Search and Rescue Region.\(^9\)

2.5 The NSMS is one of several strategies stemming from the NSS. In implementing the strategy we will ensure that it is aligned with related strategies, notably the CONTEST Counter Terrorism Strategy, the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, the International Defence Engagement Strategy, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, and the Cyber Security Strategy.

---


\(^8\) Established under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Extends out to 200 nm from the baseline (or to the international median line).

\(^9\) The UK Search and Rescue Region includes the Pollution Control Zone and extends to 40° West.
What is Maritime Security?
What is Maritime Security?

3.1 For the UK, and in the context of this National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), Maritime Security is:

The advancement and protection of the UK’s national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world.

Explaining the Maritime Domain

3.2 The seas and oceans account for 72% of the earth’s surface. This maritime domain is divided into a series of maritime zones (Figure 1) as detailed in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in which state authority, both in terms of law and capacity, diminishes in each zone as distance from the land increases.

3.3 UNCLOS is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. It defines the rights and responsibilities of states in their use of the world’s oceans, and establishes a framework for the conduct of maritime commerce, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention sets the geographical limits of maritime zones, and establishes rights and discretionary and non-discretionary responsibilities of coastal States, as follows:

Figure 1: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Zones (Source: MOD)
**Baseline.** The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on officially recognised large-scale charts;\(^{10}\)

**Internal Waters.** Covers all water and waterways on the landward side of the baseline (Figure 2). The UK is responsible for setting laws and regulating the use of these internal waters;\(^ {11}\)

**Territorial Sea.** From the baseline up to 12 nautical miles (nm). The UK is responsible for setting laws and regulating the use of these waters (Figure 2), subject to the right of vessels from other states to exercise innocent or transit passage. This zone is also referred to as Territorial Waters;

**Contiguous Zone.** A zone, that may not extend beyond 24 nm (or the international median line), in which a coastal State can intervene to prevent potential offences that may otherwise occur inside its territorial sea (relating to fiscal, customs, sanitary and immigration offences), and to apprehend vessels that have committed offences inside territorial waters and are endeavouring to escape. The UK does not currently claim a contiguous zone;

**Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).** This extends from the edge of the territorial sea up to 200 nm from the baseline. Within this area, a state may claim sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and overflight, provided these activities do not prejudice the economic interests of the coastal State. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables. The UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is the area within which the UK is responsible for enforcing fishing measures. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own zones within the EEZ in which they are responsible for fisheries enforcement;

**Continental shelf.** On the physical continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baseline the UK has the right to exploit the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil, together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, to the exclusion of others;

**High Seas.** The high seas are open to all states. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by international law. As a general rule, states have exclusive jurisdiction over their flagged vessels on the high seas and while engaged in innocent or transit passage through territorial waters. States also have a duty to effectively regulate their flagged vessels;\(^ {13}\)

### 3.4 Freedom of Navigation

Freedom of Navigation (FON) is the term given to the bundle of rights and freedoms that warships, merchant ships, aircraft and submarines enjoy to navigate

11. The term ‘UK’ includes reference to the UK Overseas Territories and British Crown Dependencies.
12. The limit remains 3 nm in British Indian Ocean Territory, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn, the Sovereign Base Areas, and Guernsey. The limit is 12 nm in the UK, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, the Isle of Man and Jersey. Where the United Kingdom currently claims three nautical miles of territorial sea, it formally reserves the right under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 and customary international law to claim a territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles.
What is Maritime Security?

It is vital to the security and economic stability of the UK. FON facilitates global maritime trade and provides the UK military with the legal landscape to allow it to respond to threats to security at range. FON rights are set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The stability of the UNCLOS regime, and in consequence maritime security, may be fundamentally undermined by excessive claims over sea areas or interferences with navigational rights and freedoms. HMG supports a programme to capture and record excessive geographical or jurisdictional maritime claims by states, including incidents of unwarranted interference with UK shipping, and directs diplomatic responses or demonstrations of UK counter-practice as appropriate.

The Scale of the Task

- The UK Marine Area extends over some 298 thousand square miles (3.5 times the UK terrestrial extent); (Figure 2)
- The marine zones of the UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies extend over some 2.32 million square miles (25 times the UK terrestrial extent); (Figure 3)
- Shipping carries 95% of British trade by volume. UK ports handle 393 million tonnes of international cargo and over 4.4 million containers annually;\(^\text{15}\)
- The value of UK goods imported/exported by sea is over £500 billion/annum. UK export growth of 30% to Asia, over 40% to Latin America and almost 70% to Africa is predicted;\(^\text{16}\)
- At any one time there are around 1,500 large commercial ships off the UK coast and every day 500 ships use the busy Dover Strait;\(^\text{17}\)
- There are around 675 UK direct-owned, 845 UK parent-owned, 1,151 UK-managed trading ships, 3,700 Red Ensign Group-registered ships and approximately 24,000 UK seafarers active at sea;\(^\text{18}\)
- Internationally, more than 55,000 merchant ships carry more than 8.4 billion tonnes of goods each year.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^\text{14}\) The seas beyond territorial waters are free from the sovereignty of all States. Access through the high seas does not rely on third state permission either in peacetime or conflict. Warships can operate in all the world’s oceans right up to the edge of the territorial sea unfettered by coastal State control.

\(^\text{15}\) DfT UK Port Freight Statistics, 2012.

\(^\text{16}\) Centre for Economic and Business Research Study, 1 July 2012 (http://www.cebr.com/reports/good-exports).


\(^\text{19}\) How Shipping Has Changed the World, M Stopford, 7 September 2010.
What is Maritime Security?

Establishing Maritime Security Objectives

3.5 The 2010 ‘Programme for Government’ set out the Coalition’s strategic priorities across the range of government business, with an emphasis on tackling the deficit and returning to economic growth. In the defence and security sphere, the 2010 NSS built upon this and emphasised two principal national security objectives: ensuring a secure and resilient UK; and shaping a stable world. For an island trading nation, maritime security has an important role to play in support of both our economic and wider national security objectives.

3.6 The UK’s maritime security objectives, along with the activity we will carry out to achieve them, are detailed below. The objectives are focused both on protecting our citizens and our economy, and on promoting a secure international maritime domain which will benefit all nations. They strike a balance between managing risks and creating and exploiting opportunities to strengthen the security of the maritime domain. They represent the strategic ‘ends’ of our approach.

UK Maritime Security Objectives

1. To promote a secure international maritime domain and uphold international maritime norms;
2. To develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance;
3. To protect the UK and the Overseas Territories, their citizens and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships;
4. To assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK Marine Zone, regionally and internationally;
5. To protect the resources and population of the UK and the Overseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism.

21 Not in any order of priority.

22 Vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes include the Dover Strait, North Channel, Irish Sea and the Pentland Firth; a southern corridor, connecting the Straits of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf. An eastern corridor, stretching from the East and South China Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean; and a western corridor connecting Europe with the Americas. The opening of the Northern Sea Route, running along the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacific may take on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in the medium term.
Assessing Maritime Security Risks

3.7 Our maritime security strategy requires us to identify the most pressing risks to the delivery of our objectives, and to put in place the ways and means to address them. On a biennial basis, the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) process is used to prioritise all major areas of UK national security risk – domestic and overseas.23 The NSRA was used as an evidence base for the 2010 NSS and underpinned its decisions on priorities. The risks identified in the NSRA are those which are likely to cause significant harm and disruption to the UK. For the purposes of this strategy, a more specific risk assessment was carried out – the Maritime Risk Assessment (MRA). Cognisant of, and consistent with, the NSRA, this assessment identifies the key risks that we face in the maritime domain. The 2013 Maritime Risk Assessment assessed the following risks to be those of highest priority, taking into account both likelihood and impact.

The Maritime Security Risks for 2014-15

- Terrorism affecting the UK and its maritime interests, including attacks against cargo or passenger ships;
- Disruption to vital maritime trade routes as a result of war, criminality, piracy or changes in international norms;
- Attack on UK maritime infrastructure or shipping, including cyber attack;
- The transportation of illegal items by sea, including weapons of mass destruction, controlled drugs and arms;
- People smuggling and human trafficking.

3.8 The Maritime Risk Assessment will be refreshed biennially in line with the timeframe for updating the NSRA.

3.9 Mitigating these risks, and achieving the maritime security objectives outlined above requires close coordination of national, regional and international activity across the maritime domain, and flexible response options that are proportionate, and both cost- and operationally-effective.24 While, with international partners, we will continue to maintain our contribution to maritime security on a global scale wherever possible, our national resources will be focused on safeguarding the following maritime interests (which are not in any order of priority):

- UK citizens and UK entitled persons in a vessel of any state;
- The UK Marine Area;25
- Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships;
- Maritime infrastructure in the UK, including maritime offshore installations;25
- UK-owned maritime offshore installations;25
- UK trade.26


24 And where possible allows the UK to overcome challenges at range.


26 While the security of the ship, its crew and cargo lie with the Flag State, HMG retains an interest in maintaining the safe passage of energy imports, food and manufactured goods through UK ports.
Our Approach
Our Approach

4.1 At the heart of our approach to maritime security are two key principles: integration and collaboration.

- **Integration:** Maritime security is a whole-of-government activity, reflecting the extent to which the UK’s security and prosperity is reliant upon the sea. This is reflected in the governance structure, which will be explained later, but which brings together 16 parties within Government to maximise the coherence and efficiency of our approach. Consistent with the National Security Strategy, the aim is to draw together and use all the instruments of national power and influence to deliver an output that is greater than the sum of its parts.

- **Collaboration:** Beyond our sovereign responsibility to protect our territorial sea, our infrastructure, our citizens and our interests from seaborne threats, we do not have to do everything ourselves. Maritime security is a truly international affair. The scale of the challenge means that working in close collaboration with our allies and partners, at the national, regional and multinational level, is the best way to uphold the rules-based international system which governs it.

4.2 The NSS set out eight National Security Tasks to support the delivery of the UK’s national security objectives. In a similar way, this strategy is built upon five core Maritime Security Tasks which support the delivery of the objectives described at Paragraph 3.6. These represent the strategic ‘ways’ of our approach – to **UNDERSTAND, INFLUENCE, PREVENT, PROTECT and RESPOND.**

**UNDERSTAND**

4.3 The starting point of this strategy is that we need to understand both the evolving strategic context and the maritime domain itself if we are to be able to identify threats and opportunities, to orientate ourselves rapidly to change and to focus our limited resources in the most efficient and intelligent way. Understanding also underpins the development of the Maritime Risk Assessment described earlier. In the maritime domain, understanding comes from three core activities:

- **Long-term horizon-scanning:** The Government has recently strengthened the internal architecture which allows it to take a long-term view of the future. From a security perspective, the key programme of work is the Global Strategic Trends (GST) programme, which is run by the Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). This supports a 30-year view of what established and emerging trends at the strategic level might mean for the maritime domain, allowing us to test the resilience of this strategy against possible future changes.

- **Terrorism Intelligence & Risk Analysis:** The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), and, for Northern Ireland, the Security Services,
Understand Case Study: The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)

Recognising the need for cross-government understanding of activity within the maritime domain, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review established a National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) to provide the UK with a comprehensive picture of potential threats to UK maritime security.

The NMIC brings together information and intelligence provided by Border Force, the MCA, the police, the Armed Forces, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Marine Management Organisation, the National Crime Agency (Border Policing Command) and other agencies and, supported by its international partnerships, incorporates additional global information to provide the UK with unified situational awareness of maritime activity in UK and international waters.

The NMIC's focus is on the here and now rather than delivering the longer-term strategic analysis undertaken elsewhere in government. It provides real-time information to assess the impact of maritime activity to the UK and contribute to decision making.

Its roles are to:

- Monitor and track maritime activity around the UK and areas of national interest, and collate that data within a trusted environment;
- Analyse and share information, enabling better understanding of maritime security issues;
- Act as a national focal point for regional and international partners on maritime domain awareness;
- Support government and industry decision making in times of need;
- Respond to government department and agency tasking to support their outputs on a case-by-case basis.

Since its inception in 2011, the NMIC has undertaken daily provision of data to support many maritime security operations and provided support to ensure the safety and security of the Olympic Games and during 2011 operations to protect civilians in Libya.

This strategy recognises the added value provided by NMIC to maritime stakeholders across government and in industry since its inception. Within revised maritime security governance arrangements (Annex A) maritime stakeholders are considering how NMIC can be utilised to maximum effect to support the UK’s maritime security objectives for 2014–15 and beyond.

provide a synthesised assessment of terrorist threats in the maritime domain by drawing upon and analysing intelligence from a wide range of sources. The Department for Transport (DfT), in conjunction with the CPNI, undertakes the analysis of terrorist risks to the commercial maritime industry (ports and shipping) and is responsible for liaison and advice to industry on terrorism threats and risks.

**Information & Non-Terrorism Intelligence Analysis:** Activity in the maritime domain produces enormous quantities of data every day. For example, international regulations require all larger ships to carry transponders which regularly transmit their position. In 2011, the UK established the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), which fuses together all-source data to create the most complete picture of daily maritime activity that the UK has ever had. Effective analysis and distribution of this fused picture underpins much of our maritime security activities. The National Crime Agency’s (NCA) intelligence hub provides a similar capability for serious and organised crime. At the same time, the UK has a well-developed network spread across a range of Government Departments and Agencies for gathering intelligence on illegal activities, or on emerging threats to UK national interests. This includes the work carried out by Defence Intelligence (DI) to provide maritime focused strategic intelligence to the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces.
Again, we aim to draw together and analyse such information in order to maximise warning time of impending threats, and to inform our national response.

**INFLUENCE**

4.5 The UK will exert all its levers of influence to uphold and strengthen the rules-based international system which governs the maritime domain, and which underpins our national security and prosperity. The ‘influence’ task is primarily the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and involves diplomatic activity through the UN Security Council, of which the UK is a permanent member, and through the associated bodies to promote maritime security and to uphold the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In addition, the UK will continue to play its part at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in supporting action to establish international standards for security across the maritime domain, and EU efforts to monitor standards within member states. Influence can also be achieved through economic and other pressures including the use of law enforcement and, where deemed appropriate and lawful, military activity to deter or interdict terrorism, illegal activity or other threats to maritime security.

**PREVENT**

4.6 The NSS emphasised the importance of tackling problems early and at source, rather than waiting until they manifest themselves closer to the UK. In this spirit, the strategy incorporates efforts overseas to prevent maritime security threats from occurring. This includes action to support the development of maritime security capabilities amongst partner nations. For example, the development of fishery protection capabilities can help to safeguard legitimate livelihoods for coastal communities in developing countries, and prevent them turning to illegal activities such as piracy, maritime crime or smuggling.

**PROTECT**

4.7 Our aim is to strengthen our protection against known threats, improving security and reducing vulnerabilities. Where, despite our actions, threats are manifested, we seek to maximise our resilience, response and recovery arrangements. The ‘protect’ task includes, for example, DfT security regulation and advice on protective practice to the commercial maritime industry; the deployment of Royal Navy units to enforce international maritime law and protect UK merchant shipping, as well as steps to reduce vulnerabilities at national infrastructure sites, such as ports and offshore installations. A key tenet of the Protect function is to ensure freedom of navigation, a policy spearheaded by the FCO and codified in international law through UNCLOS. Wherever possible we seek to minimise the impact of protection measures on trade, and will maintain close liaison with industry and other partners.

**RESPOND**

4.8 Where we have identified activities which may be illegal, or which may threaten our national interests (nationally or internationally), we have a range of capabilities which provide us with the ability to respond in a timely, precise and intelligent manner. This includes law enforcement assets to police the UK’s borders, to prevent the trafficking of illegal goods and to protect our economic resources, as well as a range of military capabilities which can, as a last resort, use lethal force to protect our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from seaborne threats.

---

28 The Shipping Defence Advisory Committee (SDAC) provides a long-established forum for Government-Military-Industry security and defence dialogue.
Delivering Our Objectives
Delivering Our Objectives

Objective 1: To promote a secure international maritime domain and uphold international maritime norms.

5.1 The UK pursues an active and activist foreign policy, working with other countries to strengthen the rules-based international system in support of our values. In the maritime domain, we are committed to freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes based upon international law.

5.2 A stable and secure maritime domain is essential to the smooth working of the global economy, with over 90% of global trade transported by sea. The high seas are often referred to as part of the ‘global commons’ – an area of resource that lies beyond the political ownership or control of any single nation-state. Their security is dependent upon international cooperation aimed at setting and enforcing appropriate and globally shared standards of action, consistent with international law, custom and practice.

5.3 The key international framework underpinning this collaboration is the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which 166 states are party, including the UK. UNCLOS defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans, establishing rules for shipping, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK is committed to upholding and, where necessary and through lawful means, enforcing UNCLOS in the interests of the international community as a whole.

5.4 The maritime domain is constantly evolving. Our long-term horizon-scanning activity ensures that we are alive to potential future changes, opportunities and risks to freedom of navigation and trade on the high seas, and the concomitant risks to regional and international stability when these are threatened. For example, horizon scanning has identified the Arctic region is critical to the UK’s national interests, with 29% of energy consumed in the UK being imported from Norway. Over the next 20 years, the impact of climate change will mean that previously impassable navigational routes, notably the North West Passage, Transpolar Route and Northern Sea Route will be open for longer periods. The latter of these (Figure 4) reduces the sailing distance between Felixstowe (the UK’s busiest container port) and Busan in Korea from 10,700 to 7,400 nm. This presents the UK with both opportunities for responsible commercial exploitation, and potential new maritime security threats. International cooperation, particularly through the Arctic Council, on which the UK has observer status, and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, of which the UK is a member, will be an essential means of managing these significant developments.

30 The Russian Government predicts that traffic through the Northern Sea Route will increase from 1.26 million tonnes in 2012 to 4 million tonnes in 2015 (http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6036).
Influence Case Study: Military Alliances

The UK is an important contributor to three military alliances which help deliver maritime security: NATO, the EU and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). These alliances operate groups of ships, aircraft and other assets in the strategically important regions of the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. By playing a part in these collaborative international organisations we gain from the benefits of regional understanding, influence and security that they deliver.

Following the re-organisation of the NATO Command structure, the sole senior maritime commander in the organisation is a British Vice Admiral based in the NATO Maritime HQ near London. Alongside broader NATO responsibilities, he/she commands two maritime security operations; Operation OCEAN SHIELD, focused on counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, and Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR providing broader maritime security in the Mediterranean. Both these operations are conducted primarily by task groups of warships provided by NATO member states but there is also a growing emphasis on drawing together the information from a network of sensors and sources to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain. The NATO task groups work closely with regional Navies and Coast Guards on operations and exercises to provide maritime security and to help to develop their capacity and capabilities.

The main EU contribution to maritime security is Operation ATALANTA – the first EU maritime mission. Under UK Command since its inception in 2008, ATALANTA is focused on counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean. It links into and supports EU missions ashore that aim to develop regional maritime capacity and to provide military training to strengthen the institutions of the Somali National Government.

Finally, the UK has an important role in CMF, a broad coalition of 29 nations with a shared interest in contributing to maritime security in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

5.5 The UK Government is concerned by the tensions in the South and East China Seas. The UK has significant political and economic interests in the Asia Pacific region, as reflected in the recent strengthening of our diplomatic network there. It is important that all nations in the region resolve any maritime disputes peacefully and within the rule of law, while protecting and promoting freedom of navigation and trade.

5.6 The UK works to promote a secure international maritime domain through active diplomatic engagement to build and enhance key relationships. This involves working with international partners to safeguard maritime security by ensuring compliance with existing international law, and where necessary developing new international agreements which help to defend the maritime domain and enable freedom of movement on the high seas. The principal means are:

- To use best efforts to secure compliance by other states with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and promote other agreements complementary to UNCLOS;
• To monitor situations where the rules in UNCLOS are not being complied with and, in collaboration with allies and partners, to use best efforts to bring States into compliance;
• Where a dispute occurs, to use appropriate diplomatic efforts to secure our interests and, if necessary, to use the available means of judicial settlement;\(^\text{31}\)
• To maintain strong and effective representation in the key organisations dealing with Law of the Sea issues.

Objective 2: To develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance.

5.7 Many coastal States do not have the capacity to govern their maritime zones effectively. This, and the failure of some Flag States effectively to administer their Flag Vessels, or enforce maritime security in their territorial seas, creates the conditions for a wide spectrum of crime which impacts upon stability ashore. Piracy and theft are just two manifestations of maritime insecurity which, in areas such as the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea, threaten not only national but also regional stability. £90 billion of UK maritime trade transits the Horn of Africa every year and the cost of piracy to the global economy has been estimated at over £12 billion.\(^\text{32}\) In Nigeria alone the equivalent of around 100,000 barrels of crude oil are stolen every day, with a market value of between £2 billion and £5 billion per year.\(^\text{33}\)

5.8 Fisheries are also a vital natural resource. Fish represents over 25% of all protein consumed in many of the poorest countries,\(^\text{34}\) but it is also a global export industry worth more than £80 billion in 2011, more than half of which comes from developing countries. While this is an essential source of revenue, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is estimated to be worth up to £15 billion every year.\(^\text{35}\) The theft of natural resources, whether energy supplies or fish, can have a very severe impact upon the economies of developing countries, feeding corruption and instability which, in turn, affects the stability and security of the maritime domain.\(^\text{36}\)

5.9 The 2010 NSS emphasised the importance of tackling at root the causes of instability. As a result, the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence published the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS),\(^\text{37}\) which sets out Government’s strategic approach to addressing instability and conflict overseas.

5.10 In the maritime context, the Government recognises that instability at sea usually stems from problems on the land. In seeking to address these challenges at source, and to prevent threats to maritime security from emerging, we aim to employ a sophisticated and integrated approach drawing upon a wide range of Government Departments and agencies. This can include:

• Work to build the intelligence, law enforcement, coastguard and military capabilities of States so that they are better able to police their own waters, and successfully detain and prosecute those who break the law;
• Efforts to strengthen States’ economies, for example by seeking recognition of an Exclusive Economic Zone;
• Development efforts to reduce poverty and increase stability;
• Political efforts to foster peace and reconciliation initiatives in conflict-affected countries at the national, regional and local levels.

Maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea presents a significant risk to economic development, peace and security in West and Central Africa, and the reduction of these risks will contribute to the security and prosperity of other nations including the UK. A number of partners engage in capacity building activities with countries in the region, and the UK identified that better coordination of international efforts could help avoid duplication of effort, facilitate joint projects and best use of resources, and therefore maximise capacity building efforts to tackle maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea was discussed under the G8 peacekeeping/peace building experts group in 2011 with the aim of improving the coordination of international maritime capacity building in West and Central Africa. The UK presented a paper at the April 2012 meeting suggesting the establishment of a larger, informal group that involved all countries conducting capacity building work in the Gulf of Guinea. The first initial meeting of this new grouping was held in July 2012. Subsequently, under the UK Presidency of the G8 in 2013, this group became formalised and known as the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG). The FOGG is an official-level group comprising international partners actively engaged in working to support States in the Gulf of Guinea region on maritime security. It includes representatives from the G8 plus Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, as well as the EU, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the International Maritime Organisation.

The FOGG has helped reduce duplication of effort while maximising international support to tackle maritime crime. Specifically, to date, the FOGG has delivered:

- The establishment of a G8++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea Coordination Platform. The Platform details all activities planned or undertaken by international donors and helps target assistance and avoid duplication;
- A clear statement of international support for regional ownership of maritime security capacity building, with targeted international assistance to support this aim;
- Agreement on clear and consistent political messages;
- A mechanism for the delivery of financial support from international partners for the industry-led initiative to establish a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea;
- A framework for a joint strategy for pursuing prosecutions in the region.

In sum, the FOGG has reduced duplication of effort while maximising support from international partners to discuss political developments which contribute to tackling maritime crime.

Some of our current activities, designed to prevent the emergence of maritime security threats, include:

- Full and active participation in international action, e.g. the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Experts Group;
- Developing the maritime capacity of coastal States to combat crime e.g. the Regional Fusion Law Enforcement Centre - Safety, and Security at Sea (REFLECS-3) based in the Seychelles and through training and capacity building projects in coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea including Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Togo, Sao Tome and Principe, Ghana and Nigeria;

---

38 REFLECS-3, opened in February 2013, brings together experts to share intelligence and information to tackle the king-pins and financiers of piracy. It supports regional initiatives to tackle organised crime in Somalia and across the Indian Ocean. The UK committed £550 000 toward construction costs and provided legal advisors, and the Centre’s first co-director. International partners include the Seychelles, the USA, Tanzania, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Australia, INTERPOL and the EU Naval Force. The CPS has also provided prosecution advice to Kenya.
• Being a contracting party and key donor to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP);
• Working in close partnership with UK industry, including by supporting the proposed industry-led initiative to establish a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) for the Gulf of Guinea;39
• Promoting and contributing to overseas maritime governance building programmes including the international deployment of Royal Air Force Command and Control aircraft, Royal Navy warships, or Naval Task Groups, to areas of potential tension. For example we are providing cross-government assistance in regions including the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, East and West Africa and the Caribbean;40
• Development of other States’ judicial procedures and assistance with the construction and operation of prisons, e.g. support to Somalia in establishing an effective, internationally recognised, prosecution and detention process;
• The forward deployment of training teams to work in partnership with other nations to train, mentor and assist state-led maritime security elements, including in Albania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and the United Arab Emirates;
• Working in partnership with states and international legal organisations to tackle transnational maritime crime, including through information sharing;
• Contributing to EU and NATO efforts to build partner capacity and uphold maritime norms.

Objective 3: To protect the UK and the Overseas Territories, their citizens and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships.

5.12 The Government’s primary responsibility is to protect its citizens, both in the UK and abroad. We therefore take steps to ensure that our people are protected irrespective of their location.41 This includes working with our European and international partners to raise security standards. In addition, the global economy and the UK’s dependence on maritime trade means that the Government requires that reasonable steps are taken to protect specific maritime assets of UK economic interest – ships, cargoes and infrastructure – from harm.

Port and ship security

5.13 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations’ specialised agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. The IMO’s International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) sets international standards for the security of ships, and the areas of ports from which they operate, in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Within Europe, the IMO standards are mandated through European legislation.42 The ISPS Code requires all ports and ships which fall under the Code to take appropriate security measures based on a standardised risk assessment framework.

5.14 The DIT sets the security levels with which maritime interests in the UK, UK Overseas Territories, Crown Dependencies, and Red Ensign Group shipping must comply. This process takes account of the maritime threat assessments provided by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre

39 MTISC is intended to be the regional information portal for merchant shipping operating in the Gulf of Guinea. A successful trial, conducted in February 2013, involved the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), INTERPOL, the EU Joint Research Centre, the Royal Navy (RN), the Ghana Navy (GN), industry and the IMO. This centre will open in 2014.

40 The deployment of Royal Navy ships is decided by a cross-Government group which determines priorities based on risk to UK interests and the strategic effects required.

41 Including onboard ships and offshore infrastructure.


43 Article 3.1 of the ISPS Code applies to the following types of ships engaged on international voyages: passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft; cargo ships, including high-speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and upwards; and mobile offshore drilling units and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages. In addition, the UK has extended the provisions of the ISPS Code to certain categories of domestic ships.
Delivering Our Objectives

(JTAC), the vulnerability of assets, and existing security measures which help to mitigate the threat. To communicate these requirements, DfT issues instructions to the UK port and shipping industries which explain which security measures ports and ships in the UK, and UK-flagged ships overseas, are required to put in place. As part of this process DfT maintains close liaison with industry.

5.15 Compliance is monitored and measured through a comprehensive programme of inspections and reviews:

- DfT operates a risk-based security inspection programme covering port facilities in the UK, UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, and UK passenger ferries and cruise ships;
- The programme includes the review and approval of the security required from industry partners (Port Facility Security Plans, Port Security Plans, Ship Security Plans) and the undertaking of security assessments at ports/port facilities;
- Security compliance of the UK-flagged commercial cargo fleet is undertaken by the MCA. As part of this security compliance programme, the MCA provides the communication infrastructure for the receipt of ship security alerts and undertakes inspections of overseas ships arriving in UK ports;
- DfT and MCA hold ships assessed to have serious security deficiencies at UK ports, and have powers to compel ports to rectify security deficiencies.

5.16 SO15 Counter Terrorism Command has lead responsibility for the initial notification of maritime terrorist incidents involving a vessel that may affect the UK’s interests. Our national response is administered through Operation STERN and involves partner agencies and organisations. The Senior National Co-ordinator Counter Terrorism (SNCCT) has overall responsibility for managing the initial UK policing response.

Counter-piracy policy for UK-flagged shipping

5.17 Recent years have seen a growth in the threat from piracy. This has been particularly prevalent on the coast of East Africa, and a growing trend highlights the potential for major international maritime crime, including piracy, to migrate to other areas. The FCO leads on counter-piracy policy with the DfT, MOD, Home Office, BIS, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), a number of other Government Departments and industry playing a significant role. The FCO sets out HMG’s approach to piracy in Somalia on its website.

5.18 DfT is responsible for the development of counter-piracy policy for UK flagged shipping, including the policy in relation to engaging armed guards. This is set out in the DfT’s Interim Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of Armed Guards to Defend Against the Threat of Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances.

5.19 The Government is working to promote the highest standards, including on human rights, across all private maritime security companies. The FCO is supporting the UK Accreditation Service to conduct a pilot, to accredit certifying bodies to independently certify Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) to the ISO 28000 standard, incorporating the requirement of the ISO PAS 28007 guidance. This sets out guidelines for PMSCs providing privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships. The FCO are contributing to the funding of the newly-established International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers Association. The Association, made up of governments, industry and civil society organisations, will independently monitor implementation of the International Code of Conduct. The Government encourages the clients of PMSCs to take into account both accredited certification, and membership of the Association, when contracting PMSCs.

5.20 The UK Armed Forces work with international partners to police, intercept and interdict illegal activity to provide freedom of navigation and safety in areas of high risk.


46 A combination of physical and procedural security measures, including searching, screening and the designation of restricted areas.
47 The Metropolitan Police Service response on behalf of UK policing to the notification of a potential terrorist incident at sea.
Protect Case Study: Counter Piracy Off Somalia - An International Dilemma

The fall of the Somali government and the ensuing civil war in 1991 marked the beginning of a long period during which Somalia lacked effective governance. Consequently, instability, terrorism, crime and corruption flourished throughout the failed state. The consequent freedom to conduct illicit activity from Somalia’s 2,100 nm coastline was seized by international criminal and terrorist elements manifesting itself in piracy, people trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling (including narcotics and weapons), illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping. Figure 5 shows the vast area of risk generated by this illicit activity. It is estimated that 40% of the world’s traded material – fuel, food, manufactured goods and trade (£600 billion of which is en-route to or from European ports) transits through the High Risk Area annually.

A global response was required to reduce the permissiveness of this environment to illegal activity and to then rebuild the governance and capability of the failed state. The UK contributed Royal Navy warships to EU, NATO and CMF task forces to patrol and intercept renegade ships within the High Risk Area as well as providing the leadership under a UK Admiral and staff to coordinate multi-national activity from a headquarters just outside London. This international answer, including the authorisation for Private Security Companies to embark on our merchant ships and the issuing of policy guidance – including industry issued self-protection measures, and reporting procedures – to Shipping Companies when coming into contact with pirates significantly reduced opportunities for illegal activity in the area. With a lack of guaranteed financial return, the incentives for many of the criminal elements disappeared – however it remains important to dissuade any future return to such practices.

As an example of the comprehensive nature of the UK approach, a number of prevention measures have been taken:

- UK-led international efforts to develop regional justice and the rule of law programmes in Somalia and the wider Indian Ocean region including developing prosecution capabilities in the Seychelles and Mauritius, and a detention capacity in Somalia;
- In order to generate legitimate employment for the population, the UK is developing opportunities in Somalia by supporting prosperity and tackling poverty with the Department for International Development (DfID) engaged in a 4-year, £250 million, programme – one example of which is the support to the economic and alternative livelihood program which aims to create 45,000 jobs;
- The UK is actively encouraging the Somali Government to declare an EEZ in order to bring certainty to its maritime claims.

From a peak of 47 ships in 2010, the international effort reduced piracy by over 80% by 2012 and in 2013 there was not a single successful attack.

Security of energy and communications infrastructure

5.21 The UK’s coastline is home to a significant number of critical energy assets, including much of the civil nuclear power infrastructure, which provides on average 16% of the UK’s electricity. In addition, the security of gas and oil import terminals, and undersea pipelines in the North Sea, are critical to the delivery of a robust energy supply. Within the UK Marine Area there are approximately 300 gas and oil rigs and a rapidly increasing number of offshore wind farms.48 The Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is responsible for setting the security and resilience approach for energy infrastructure.

5.22 With over 95% of all intercontinental digital traffic traveling through underwater cables (Figure 6) rather than satellites,49 it is important that we protect this essential flow of information, on which the global economy relies, from physical or cyber attack, as well as ensure compliance by coastal States with the freedom to lay cables conferred by UNCLOS.50 While measures to allow the redistribution of data flow and resilience of the onshore Cable Landing Stations will continue to be the primary mitigation actions, response options may be required in the future.

5.23 The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is engaged with asset owners and operators to ensure that risks to critical marine and coastal infrastructure are fully understood, and that proportionate mitigation strategies are in place. Procedures to regain control of offshore installations that have been overrun by subversive elements are practised on a regular basis.

Food Security

5.24 Around 40% of the food consumed by the UK is imported, and over 91% of that arrives by sea. The dependency on a small number of specialised ports through which the imported food arrives creates vulnerability. Defra, working closely with other departments, has commissioned work to mitigate this vulnerability and thus increase the resilience of UK food supply.

---

48 One of 19 operational sites, the London Array (opened in July 2013) is the world’s largest offshore wind farm – consisting of 175 turbines capable of generating enough energy to power nearly half a million UK homes.


Objective 4: To assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK Marine Area, regionally and internationally.51

5.25 The oceans are a medium connecting peoples and nations. Both the UK Marine Area and the world’s maritime superhighways are increasingly a crucial supply of resources and conduits of trade (Figure 7). National prosperity is often dependent on distant resource, and the Government is clear on the importance of the international system to our national interests: the UK depends on open trade routes and a stable global market for the critical supply of energy, raw materials, food and manufactured goods. The likelihood and impact of disruption is elevated in strategic ‘chokepoints’: straits like Dover, Gibraltar and Hormuz where the proximity of land funnels ships into higher densities.

5.26 Because the global economy is vulnerable to disruptions to maritime routes, we and other nations consider their protection an important output of Government requiring international action. The UK achieves this by applying a combination of diplomatic, military and law enforcement effort, informed by accurate real-time situational awareness:

- We maintain a range of international alliances and partnerships which provide a powerful lever to preserve free movement of trade when routes are threatened;
- We deploy Royal Navy ships acting independently or as part of an international force to maintain vital trade routes and ensure freedom of navigation, including a persistent forward presence in the Atlantic, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. We also deploy specialised Naval shipping and capabilities to key chokepoints in order to understand and influence these areas, and if necessary to take action to prevent and respond.
- Should the security situation deteriorate such that safe passage cannot be guaranteed, we will take action to reduce the level of risk in the area. This could include military protection to transiting ships or other UK maritime interests, or lowering the risk through deterrence.

5.27 The potential for maritime criminality to threaten vital energy trade and transport routes is mitigated through coordinated, cross-government effort, outlined in more detail at Objective 5.

---

51 Vital Maritime Trade Routes include the Dover Strait, North Channel, Irish Sea and the Pentland Firth; a southern corridor, connecting the Straits of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf. An eastern corridor, stretching from the East and South China Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean; and a western corridor connecting Europe with the Americas. The opening of the Northern Sea Route, running along the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacific, may take on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in the medium term.
Protect Case Study: Maintaining Freedom of Navigation in a Strategic Chokepoint

While threats to Freedom of Navigation commonly take the form of excessive geographical jurisdictional claims, in relation to the world’s key maritime chokepoints they may also be physical. The Strait of Hormuz, which separates the Persian Gulf from the Arabian Sea, is a key route for all shipping both in and out of the Gulf area. All ships have a right of transit passage through the Strait, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), yet periodic threats to close the Strait do arise. The Persian Gulf remains an economic centre of gravity with 17 million barrels of oil and 3.5 billion cubic feet of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) passing through the Strait of Hormuz daily – representing over 20% of worldwide trade. Any threat of disruption would have a profound effect on world oil and gas prices and many economies: HM Treasury analysis predicts that a 30-day closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have an impact on the global economy lasting at least four years. Consequently, it is a key strategic chokepoint, not only for the countries of the region, but globally – and freedom of navigation for all ships must be maintained.

The geographical nature of the Strait, which is 21 miles across at its narrowest point, makes shipping highly vulnerable to disruption. For relatively little cost the Strait could be closed for some considerable time by state or non-state actors. Conflict or an increase in tensions in the area would have a similar effect.

In order to mitigate this risk, to deter attempts to disrupt the Strait, and to maintain freedom of navigation to and from the Gulf, an international military coalition, including the UK Armed Forces, operates in the region. Since 2006 the Royal Navy has maintained four forward-deployed Mine Countermeasure Ships (MCMVs) operated out of Bahrain. This expeditionary force, supported by a ship from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and a Command and Control element, is part of the international effort to maintain the movement of the world energy supply. The success of this effort continues to be dependent on wider political engagement and whole-of-government activity across the region, including intelligence and information sharing.

5.28 As outlined at Objective 5, within the UK Marine Area, a permanent prevent and respond capability is provided by Border Force Cutters, Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels and the Royal Navy Fleet Ready Escort.

Objective 5: To protect the resources and population of the UK and the Overseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism.

5.29 Threats from the maritime domain include the illegal entry of people and goods, criminal activity including terrorism, organised crime incorporating a maritime component, and the deliberate or wilful failure to observe laws to protect resources such as fish stocks or Marine Protected Areas. Organised crime costs the UK more than £24 billion per year\(^2\) and while this is not confined to seas and waterways, the characteristics of the maritime domain lend themselves to certain types of activity, including drug and people trafficking. In addition, we face periodic maritime hazards, such as flooding, pollution or extreme weather events. As mentioned in Paragraph 2.4 while these are not considered maritime security threats, the national response will require coordination of government assets and personnel normally employed on maritime security tasks. To enable UK criminal law enforcement to be conducted at sea, power is vested in a number of government agencies – the police, Border Force, National Crime Agency and the Royal Navy, among others.

Protecting our territory and resources

5.30 Border Force is responsible for securing the UK border and facilitating the legitimate movement of goods. This is achieved by carrying out immigration and customs controls for people and goods entering the UK, with Border Force officers working at 140 sea and air ports across

the UK and overseas. The three Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and five Border Force fast patrol ships (Cutters) are the main contributors to the protection of the UK’s Marine Area, carrying out reconnaissance, deterrence and interdiction at sea.\(^{53}\) The UK also operates an airborne maritime surveillance capability.\(^{54}\) Together these efforts:

- Deter unlawful activity across our maritime borders;
- Provide reconnaissance to locate, identify, track and interdict traffic approaching the UK;
- Have the capability to carry out enforcement operations and act upon intelligence including through the interdiction of vessels suspected of carrying out illicit activity;
- Provide a law enforcement capability in remote harbours, ports and coastlines where there is limited shore presence, and provide operational seagoing capability to partner organisations such as the police or National Crime Agency (NCA).

5.31 Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels and Border Force Cutters work together to improve their combined effect by coordinating patrols, exchanging specialist personnel and sharing information. The Border Force Cutters are used primarily in coastal waters to intercept drug shipments and other restricted or prohibited goods being trafficked by sea while the Royal Navy specialises in offshore patrolling, with a proven high-seas ship intercept capability. Both classes of ship can also be used to insert specialist Maritime Counter Terrorism (MCT) teams. A number of Royal Air Force aircraft and the Fleet Ready Escort of the Royal Navy (a Frigate or Destroyer) are also held at very short notice to respond to major intelligence-led risks, maritime terrorism incidents or other escalating events within the UK Marine Area. This multi-layered reconnaissance, deterrence and interdiction capability will be further improved with the introduction of new RN Offshore Patrol Vessels in 2017 and the next generation of Border Force Cutters in 2020.

5.32 Our fishing industry directly employs over 12,000 people and UK fishing vessels land over 600,000 tonnes of fish with a value of £770 million each year; fish stocks are also a critical source of revenue for many of our Overseas Territories.\(^{55}\) The Marine Management Organisation (MMO) and the Devolved Administrations work with partner organisations to secure fish stocks, prevent the importation of illegal fishing products and protect the environment from illegal activities:

- In England, the MMO co-ordinates an enforcement programme for monitoring, control and surveillance of all sea fishing activity around the coast of England, and UK vessels operating outside those waters. The programme includes the inspection of fishing vessels at sea and in port, inspections of fishing industry premises, fish markets and other locations around the coast and further inland by marine enforcement officers. Inspections at sea are carried out by the Royal Navy under an agreement with the MMO;
- In Northern Ireland, the Northern Irish Government co-ordinates a programme for monitoring, control and surveillance of sea fishing activity. This programme includes the activities described for England’s programme, above. The Department for Agriculture and Rural Development of Northern Ireland carries out inspections at sea, with the support of the Royal Navy;
- In Wales, the Welsh Government and the MMO co-ordinate a programme for monitoring, control and surveillance of sea fishing activity. This programme includes the activities described for England’s programme, above. A Welsh team of Marine Enforcement Officers carries out fisheries protection and enforcement with the support of the Royal Navy for inspections at sea. Welsh Marine Enforcement Officers have a range of assets at their disposal including two Fisheries Patrol Vessels;

\(^{53}\) Future Coastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement Surveillance and Interdiction Study, RUSI/Dstl, dated 26 July 2013, demonstrated that the UK is doing more with fewer homeland based maritime assets when considered against international partners or comparable nations. Although the report was favourable on the output of our UK based forces and agreed that current levels were consummate with current risk, it recommended that further reductions should not be made without detailed analysis.
\(^{54}\) Currently delivered by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Border Force, the Marine Management Organisation and Marine Scotland.
• In Scotland, fisheries protection is carried out by Marine Scotland – a directorate of Scottish Government. Marine Scotland operates shore-based fisheries compliance officers and a support headquarters, as well as a fleet of 3 Marine Protection Ships, and 2 aircraft. In addition, the UK Fisheries Monitoring and Control Centre is located in Edinburgh and run on behalf of the UK by Marine Scotland.

5.33 The UK’s rights and responsibilities regarding the maritime security and sustainable management of the waters of its 14 Overseas Territories are defined within UNCLOS. Where these territories are uninhabited, the UK Government administers these responsibilities directly. Where they are inhabited, we work in partnership with the territorial administrations, helping to build the necessary legislative capacity and other mechanisms to safeguard their maritime security and manage their marine resources sustainably. In addition to maintaining Permanent Joint Operating Bases in Gibraltar, the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus,56 the British Indian Ocean Territory and the Falkland Islands,57 when appropriate, we deploy specific military capabilities to reassure the citizens of the overseas territories and, if necessary, deter hostility.

5.34 In the Southern Ocean, we remain committed to strong and effective engagement in support of our sovereign responsibilities for the security of the British Antarctic Territory (BAT), South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) (shown in Figure 3). The UK is a party to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty which froze existing territorial claims and prevented new claims from being submitted. By maintaining our strong leadership position within the Antarctic Treaty System and an active and influential continuous presence in Antarctica, we will ensure effective international management of the Southern Ocean maintaining a clear focus on conservation and sustainable management of resources, as well as the long-term prohibition on commercial hydrocarbons/minerals related activities.

5.35 The Police National Maritime Security Strategy (PNMSS) sets out the protective security posture undertaken by the police and partners, to counter the combined landside, seaward and sub-surface threat from terrorism and crime in an integrated programme of activity. The UK is divided into Portal Regions where close-to-shore protective security activity is undertaken including:

• The Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA). This is used to detail the relevant threats to the security of the maritime region and an assessment of the effectiveness of the security measures in place to mitigate those risks;
• Regional Maritime Security Plans. These consider the detection, deterrence or disruption of waterborne and landside attacks within the portal region, and build upon other security plans and codes already in place such as: the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Port Facility Security Plans; Port Security Plans; Ship Security Plans; Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) site security plans; Government Security Zones; and other miscellaneous plans. The police work with stakeholders to ensure that these plans are comprehensive and collectively provide a coherent security framework.

5.36 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Special Branch police operating at ports work closely with the National Crime Agency’s Border Policing Command, the NMIC, Border Force, and other agencies to assess and respond to threats. This includes ensuring that individuals of known interest are identified and appropriate action taken, and that those previously unknown individuals of potential interest are identified through intelligence wherever possible. Routine policing brings together a suite of techniques and assets focused on risk assessment, data gathering, information sharing and community influence to combat maritime risks. In Scotland, this function is led by Police Scotland’s Border Policing Command which brings together all agencies operating at the border, including the National Crime Agency.

56 The Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia were retained by the UK under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. (http://www.sbaadministration.org/images/admin/docs/SBAA_Treaty_of_Establisment.pdf).
57 RAF maintains an air station on Ascension Island.
Respond Case Study: Defeating Transnational Crime at Home and Overseas

In August 2013 the National Crime Agency (NCA) received intelligence that a South American organised crime group planned to use a merchant ship to transfer cocaine to the UK. The NCA requested support from its partners at the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) to identify and track ships sailing from South American ports. Government maritime experts at the NMIC filtered a vast quantity of data to identify a ship that met the profile provided by the NCA. The NMIC was able to make use of global, regional and national surveillance systems to track the ship throughout its journey. The NMIC’s collaborative environment allowed a single harmonised product to be delivered to those with response responsibilities. On arrival in the UK Territorial Sea, the ship was boarded by a specialist Border Force Search Team, and narcotics were discovered in a concealed compartment. As a result of close multi-nation and cross-government working, Class A drugs were prevented from reaching the UK and the individuals involved were arrested. Post-event analysis, and the criminal investigation of this case, presented a compelling picture of further illicit activity which we continue to monitor.

Later, in October 2013, the Royal Navy Ship HMS LANCASTER, in its role as Atlantic Patrol Task (North) protecting the security interests of the Caribbean Overseas Territories and Bermuda, seized £58 million worth of cannabis and cocaine in the Caribbean. LANCASTER, alerted to suspected traffickers by a Canadian tanker, gave chase using her Lynx helicopter, and the embarked Royal Marine sniper team shot out the speedboat’s engine. Once stopped, a United States Coast Guard team apprehended those on board and recovered 400 kg of cocaine. Just days earlier, the warship recovered marijuana weighing 1.2 tonnes. HMS LANCASTER was working with the US-based Joint Inter Agency Task Force South (JIATFS), contributing to a 15-nation effort to prevent the transfer of illicit goods in Central America and drug trafficking from South America to the Caribbean and on to the UK.

The National Crime Agency (NCA) is an important, new and powerful intelligence-led body that has an unprecedented mandate to lead the whole of law enforcement’s fight against serious and organised crime affecting the UK. Its remit is broad, with a determined and nationally coordinated strategy to pursue those individuals and groups who pose the greatest risk to the public. While the NCA’s activity is not confined to specific domains (land, sea or air), the activity of one of its four commands, the Border Policing Command (BPC), includes the maritime domain. BPC brings together the NCA’s overseas capability and its border capability into a single operational response to disrupt and prevent serious, organised crime in the maritime domain and ensure that all law enforcement agencies operating in and around the UK’s border are working to achieve the same ends. The BPC representatives within the NMIC support NCA’s efforts to make the border more secure and prevent criminal exploitation of the maritime domain.

Internationally, the UK has the ability to deploy military and law enforcement personnel at range to conduct effective counter terrorist activity. In addition, the UK is a signatory to several multinational treaties and agreements which promote cooperation to interdict vessels on the high seas. These include vessels suspected of illegal activity such as carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction or constituent parts, or prohibited narcotic or psychotropic substances.

Separately, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Bermuda and Hampshire Constabulary in October 2013 to provide a framework for police co-operation to investigate serious crimes committed on board Bermudian registered ships when Hampshire is the first port of call post incident. This MoU will be subject to an annual review to monitor and evaluate its effectiveness.

---

Future Direction
Future Direction

6.1 The future will see considerable expansion in the global use of the seas as both UK and international offshore-energy sectors continue to expand, fishing intensifies, maritime trade increases to meet the consumer demands of emerging countries and new consumer classes, and seabed mining becomes a reality. Between 2014 and 2020 the transportation of global maritime cargo is predicted to double while the number of floating oil and gas platforms is predicted to rise from under 300 today to over 600 by 2030. In addition, there is likely to be a huge expansion in the offshore renewable energy market with potentially 100 times as many offshore wind turbines in operation by 2030.

6.2 To counter potential threats, and ensure that our nation, our markets, and our seas remain secure and prosperous, the UK will continue to utilise diplomatic, development, intelligence, military, and law enforcement levers.

6.3 In order to continue to deliver our maritime security objectives in the most effective and efficient manner, we will focus on the following priorities between 2014 and 2019.

UNDERSTAND

• **Horizon Scanning.** We will use preparations for the 2015 National Security Strategy to harmonise horizon scanning across Government, and will review the Maritime Risk Assessment biennially to identify future threats. This horizon scanning will help us anticipate future resource competition which may require mitigation. In addition, we will assess the security implications of future growth in the marine transportation and offshore-energy sectors and the potential for international tension as the Northern Sea Route increases in significance.

• **Maritime Domain Awareness.** Through the proven framework of the NMIC, we will continue to build coherence across departments and agencies, and develop a robust, accurate and timely understanding of maritime activity affecting our interests domestically and internationally. Working closely with the private sector, and our international partners, we will share situational information, harmonise future regional and international maritime domain awareness initiatives, and provide the maritime industries accredited to the UK with the situational awareness information necessary to support coordinated action.

• **Aerial Surveillance.** In order to deliver more cost-effective aerial surveillance of the UK Marine Area while satisfying the needs of the MCA, Border Force and MMO, we will work to harmonise contracted Aerial Maritime Surveillance provision by 2015. This new provision will take full advantage of advances

---


in technology and deliver some contingent capability to other agencies and government departments. The UK Armed Forces requirements and capabilities in air-based Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), including future maritime surface and sub-surface surveillance, will be considered in 2015, within the Strategic Defence and Security Review process.

- **NMIC.** The creation of the NMIC in SDSR 2010 has proven a great success. Under new governance arrangements, Border Force will take lead agency responsibility for NMIC, supported by a Management Board reporting to the National Maritime Security Committee (Officials) (as outlined at Annex A). Work is ongoing to define the NMIC’s future role, initiate its relocation, strengthen information sharing, and maximise its cross-government effect.

- **MCA.** The Future Coastguard Programme will deliver a single maritime safety response organisation, linked together by a robust information and command and control network. This will allow vessel traffic risks to be coherently assessed and managed.

- **Measures of Effectiveness.** We will develop a framework for qualitative assessment of the effectiveness and significance of action taken to deliver the UK’s maritime security objectives.

### INFLUENCE

- **NATO.** We will support NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy. While the NATO Strategy has a wider remit and a more military focus than the NSMS, it shares many of the same overarching objectives, namely preservation of freedom of trade; maintenance of traffic flow through chokepoints; protection of infrastructure; the prevention of proliferation, terrorist activity and crime; and the protection of citizens aboard private vessels. In addition, we will train routinely with our NATO Allies in order to maintain a level of interoperability that allows rapid and effective collective maritime security when necessary.

- **European Union (EU).** We will aim to play a leading role in developing an EU Maritime Security Strategy, ensuring that it is coherent with the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy and sea basin strategies.

- **Regional Security Initiatives.** Regional Security Initiatives are cooperative agreements between groups of states with common maritime security interests. The UK will champion these through diplomatic efforts and strengthen regional institutions, as the principal method for delivering effective security in areas of potential instability within the maritime domain.

- **Rules-Based International System.** Freedom of Navigation operations provide an enduring strategic benefit to UK security by protecting our maritime rights and freedoms, encouraging lawful practice and preventing excessive geographical and/or jurisdictional claims gaining legal traction in international law. We will continue to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations to ensure that the UNCLOS provisions are respected. Operations will be agreed and reviewed jointly by the FCO and MOD.

- **The UK Marine Zone.** The UK declared EEZ came into force on 31 March 2014. In addition, consideration into statutory powers will be examined in relation to the declaration of a Contiguous Zone for the UK.

---

62 While the Government took the difficult decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme in 2010, core aircrew skills have been maintained through personnel placement with some of our key Allies.


65 Such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

66 This EEZ declaration related to the UK only. It does not include the Overseas Territories.
PREVENT

• **International Cooperation.** We will help to build strong, legitimate maritime capability by working with our regional and international partners, including our Overseas Territories, to share information and intelligence, best practice on protective security and, where appropriate, interdiction capabilities in order to ensure security at identified points of vulnerability.

• **Capacity Building.** In cooperation with our international and regional partners, and UK industry, we will continue to encourage nations to invest in protective security, maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities, and the legal structures to enable effective policing of their maritime zones. Our national effort will be focused on developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of allies and partners in areas of political, military, or economic importance, including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.

• **Presence.** In order to engender a secure maritime domain, anticipate instability internationally, and be ready to take fast, appropriate and effective action, we will, where appropriate, maintain a persistent maritime presence both internationally and within our marine zone.

PROTECT

• **Innovation.** We will continue to monitor the latest innovative technological developments in security screening and detection equipment with a view to sponsoring joint trials with UK industry and our European and international partners. This will allow us to exploit the latest research and development activity and deliver effective and low cost solutions to future maritime threats.

RESPOND

• **Interdiction.** In order to allow the rapid and effective deployment of interdiction assets in support of maritime security objectives, capability needs will be regularly reviewed and options for closer operational and tactical coordination and cooperation between the maritime forces of the UK law enforcement agencies and the UK Armed Forces explored. The interdiction and enforcement capabilities within UK waters will be further improved with the introduction of new RN Offshore Patrol Vessels in 2017.\(^6^7\)

• **Enforcement.** Linked to the above we will investigate options for harmonizing the empowerment of officials across agencies to allow enforcement in the widest range of circumstances, both within the UK Marine Area and beyond.

• **Research and Development.** Where maritime security interests clearly overlap, cooperative research and development across government, and where possible internationally, will become the norm.

• **Common Acquisition.** We will build the evidence base for greater flexibility, interoperability, cost-effectiveness and coherence in relation to maritime security. This will include identification of new or shared capability requirements and investigation of the feasibility and benefit of delivering common systems, equipment and platforms.

---

\(^{67}\) Future Coastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement Surveillance and Interdiction Study, RUSI/Dstl, dated 26 July 2013, demonstrated that the UK is doing more with less homeland based maritime assets when considered against international partners or comparable nations. Although the report was favourable on the output of our UK based forces and agreed that current levels were consummate with current risk, it recommended that further reductions should not be made without detailed analysis.
Annex A
UK Maritime Security Governance

Introduction
I. In order to deliver greater coherence to government and industry workstreams on maritime security a revised governance structure has been established (Figure 8). The existing Ministerial Working Group on Counter-Piracy has been expanded to cover all maritime security matters, and renamed the Ministerial Working Group on Maritime Security (MSWG). The Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) has been merged with the National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC), and will now have both an officials forum and an industry forum. The National Security Council, as the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s objectives for national security, may, when relevant, task the MSWG. Details of the new governance structure are provided below.

Ministerial Working Group on Maritime Security
II. The Ministerial Working Group on Maritime Security, which meets regularly, has responsibility to:
• Provide oversight for the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS);
• Provide oversight on maritime security more generally;
• Co-ordinate and drive forward national and international security issues relating to the maritime domain.

III. Chaired by the FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, the Working Group members represent the Attorney General’s Office; Cabinet Office; the Department for Transport; the Home
Office; the Ministry of Defence; the Ministry of Justice; the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.

National Maritime Security Committee (Officials) (NMSC(O))

IV. The cross-Government NMSC(O) is responsible for:

- Maintaining an overview of maritime security risks and commissioning updates from Departments and Agencies on a biennial basis (to coincide with updates to the NSRA where practicable), and identifying to Departments and Agencies where there are gaps or where further mitigation / capability may be needed;
- Maintaining an overview of, and co-ordinating and challenging, the delivery of cross-government maritime security work streams in order to implement the future work programme set out in the NSMS and decisions taken by the Ministerial Working Group on Maritime Security;
- Communicating maritime security priorities to the NMSC(I) and ensuring there is effective co-ordination of government and industry maritime security work streams;
- Commissioning and coordinating updates from Departments and Agencies to the NSMS, ensuring that cross-government maritime security activity is coherent with the NSMS;

V. Chaired by the Director of DfT Maritime Directorate, the NMSC(O) members represent the Cabinet Office, the Department for Transport, the Home Office (Office for Security and Counter Terrorism), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Royal Navy, the Department of Energy & Climate Change, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the National Crime Agency, Border Force, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, the National Maritime Information Centre, the police, the Marine Management Organisation, and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Scotland Office, Wales Office, and Northern Ireland Office.

National Maritime Security Committee (Industry) (NMSC(I))

VI. The NMSC(I) is the senior forum for interaction between the commercial maritime industry and Government on maritime security matters. It is responsible for:

- Providing a high level forum for consultation between Government and key industry maritime security stakeholders on maritime security initiatives;
- Acting as the NMSC(O) industry stakeholder advisory group;
- Providing strategic direction relating to existing and proposed maritime transport security policies;
- Providing assurance that the UK’s maritime transport security regime is commensurate to current risks and is being delivered effectively;

VII. Chaired by the maritime transport industry, the NMSC(I) draws its members from key senior level maritime transport industry strategic stakeholders and senior government officials. Other organisations and specialist individuals will be requested to support working groups, or attend meetings as necessary, in order to inform discussions on specific issues.
Annex B
Annex B

Departmental Roles and Responsibilities for Maritime Security

This annex outlines the roles and responsibilities of departments and agencies in connection with maritime security. **Border Force (BF)** checks arriving crew and passengers and regulates goods both in and out of the UK. The long coastline of the UK makes it challenging to control arriving ships. Maritime transport can arrive and depart from the largest ports in the UK, for example Dover, through to harbours or small stretches of beach. Border Force has permanent presence at large ports and deploys officers to smaller ports based on intelligence and/or risk but not all known ships are met by Border Force officers. To enhance intelligence Border Force is actively involved at the NMIC and builds partnerships with coastal communities to improve monitoring of the coastline. It has a fleet of five fast patrol ships used for UK coastal enforcement, intervention, surveillance, and stop-and-board activity.
Through the **Border Policing Command (BPC)**, the **National Crime Agency (NCA)** is a vital part of the Government’s wider approach to delivering increased security at the border and tackling all serious and organised crime threats before they reach the UK. The BPC brigades the NCA’s operational response overseas and at the UK border into a single entity. The BPC leads border partners in driving the allocated control strategy activity, setting out the multi-agency response to the threats, and leading and coordinating action to address them.

The **Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)** is an interdepartmental organisation, with resources from industry, academia and a number of government departments and agencies that provides intelligence-led and risk-based integrated security advice (across the physical, personnel, cyber and human factors disciplines) in response to industry requirements. CPNI’s advice is derived from expert knowledge about how to make the national infrastructure less vulnerable. Through advice delivery CPNI aims to protect national security by helping to reduce the vulnerability of the national infrastructure to terrorism, espionage and other threats. Key partners within the maritime domain include DfT and Police.

The **Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)** is the Government Department responsible for prosecuting criminal cases investigated by the police and other investigating bodies in England and Wales. In Scotland, this function is carried out by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, and in Northern Ireland by the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (PPS). As part of the UK’s counter-piracy effort, the CPS has provided advice on prosecutions to the authorities of the Seychelles, Kenya, Somalia and Mauritius.

**Defence Intelligence (DI)** provides strategic defence intelligence to the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. It provides timely intelligence products, assessments and advice to guide decisions on policy and the commitment and employment of the Armed Forces; to inform defence research and equipment programmes; and to support military operations. DI is also an essential element of the UK’s wider intelligence machinery, contributing staff and resources to the UK’s national intelligence committee – the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) – and also to the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).

The **Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)** is responsible for driving ambitious action to tackle climate change and for delivering secure energy on the way to a low-carbon future. DECC holds policy responsibility for the security of the UK’s energy sector, which includes offshore renewable energy sources and offshore Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), as well as CNI sites and civil nuclear sites on the UK’s coastline.

The **Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)** is responsible for policy and regulations relating to: the natural environment, food supply/resilience, fisheries, international trade in plant and animal material, environmental protection and pollution.

The **Department for Transport (DfT)** is the security regulator responsible for the security of ports/port facilities in the UK and the UK’s Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, and for the UK-flagged shipping fleets. It ensures that the UK balances commercial interests with safety, security and environmental considerations while promoting a successful, safe and sustainable UK shipping and ports sector. It encourages shipping companies to be UK registered; implements and influences International and European Union safety and security legislation; and ensures the efficient delivery and modernisation of marine aids to navigation. The DfT represents the UK at the IMO as well as representing the UK at the EC’s Maritime Regulatory Security Committee (MARSEC).  

The **Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)** is responsible for coordinating the promotion of British interests overseas and supporting UK entitled personnel and businesses across the globe. It has overall responsibility for ensuring the integrity of UNCLOS and for representing the UK in bilateral and multilateral discussions on Law of the Sea issues. It also represents the UK in the International Seabed Authority, which deals with deep sea mining. It works with other countries to

---

68 MARSEC is a Regulatory Committee established by virtue of Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 725/2004. It assists the Commission with regard to its activities under Directive 2005/65/EC. The Regulatory Committee is chaired by the Commission and consists of experts representing all Member States.
strengthen the rules-based international system and is responsible for the coordinating efforts across government to ensure the safety, security and governance of the Overseas Territories, delivered through Royal Navy presence in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. The FCO also plays a leading role in identifying and funding the development of maritime capacity building initiatives in coastal States to combat maritime crime around the world, together with other Government Departments and international partners.

The **Home Office (HO)** is responsible for UK immigration, security, and law and order, including counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism.

The **Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)** assesses the threat worldwide from international terrorism to UK maritime assets. It analyses incoming intelligence from a wide range of sources on potential maritime terrorist threats and produces assessments detailing their judgement on their credibility and plausibility. JTAC regularly reviews the intent and capability of terrorist groups to conduct maritime attacks and communicates this information in the form of JTAC threat levels. JTAC sets the threat levels (terrorism) for UK commercial maritime assets, military vessels and important maritime areas such as choke points. These threat levels communicate JTAC’s view on the likelihood of a terrorist attack on maritime assets in that location and are used by wider government as the basis for assessments of the risk to shipping worldwide.

The **Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)** is the United Kingdom Maritime Authority. It acts as the safety regulator for UK flag shipping, and operates the UK Ship Register. It also coordinates the activities of the ship registers of the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies via the Red Ensign Group (REG). It has responsibility for the implementation of international maritime safety conventions and codes, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the International Convention of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers. It inspects foreign flag merchant ships calling at UK ports for compliance with regulatory instruments. It is the UK’s National Competent Authority (NCA) for the long-range identification and tracking of ships (LRIT) and for the operation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS). The MCA supports DfT in its role as security regulator by being responsible for cargo ship security compliance activity.

The **Marine Management Organisation (MMO)** is a non-departmental public body responsible for implementing a marine planning system designed to integrate the social requirements, economic potential and environmental imperatives of our seas; implementing the marine licensing regime; enforcement of fishing activity of all nationalities within English waters.

**Marine Scotland** is the directorate of Scottish Government responsible for marine and fisheries issues in Scotland. In addition to a number of shore-based fisheries compliance officers and a support headquarters, Marine Scotland operates a fleet of 3 Marine Protection Ships, MPV Minna, MPV Jura and MPV Hirta, and owns 2 aircraft.

The **Ministry of Defence (MOD)** is responsible for defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories; providing strategic intelligence; supporting counter-terrorism work (CONTEST); and providing military assistance to the civil authorities.

The multi-agency **National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)**, established in 2011, harmonises departmental and agency activity to help secure the UK advantage in the maritime domain. It delivers improved identification and assessment of surveillance and operational risks to maritime security and provides a permanent architecture for facilitating national, regional and international information sharing.

---

69 The Vessel Traffic Monitoring Directive imposes an obligation on Member States to monitor certain activities, to receive reports on accidents and incidents, to communicate information to other Member States and to initiate action internally within the UK on receipt of information from other Member States pursuant to the Directive.
The **Police Service** – the police seek to prevent crime in Inland Waterways, Ports, Harbours, UK Territorial Waters and Offshore Energy Installations. Through the Police National Maritime Security Strategy they work with partner agencies to provide proportionate protective security in and around the UK. They also have a global responsibility to investigate crimes committed on British Ships.

The **Royal Air Force (RAF)** protects Britain’s interests, citizens, territory and trade through the intelligent application of Air Power, exploiting the inherent speed of reaction, speed of reach and speed of effect that this offers – to enable flexible political choice and, ultimately, to deliver military effect. In concert with allies, partners and the other Services, the RAF provides support to international maritime security and deters threats to UK prosperity and security. The RAF maintains a number of aircraft and units ready to respond at extremely short notice to threats to the UK; the roles include Quick Reaction Alert (to sustain Control of the Air), Attack, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Internationally, the RAF works with partners to counter illegal maritime activity, including piracy, drug smuggling and other illegal trade, particularly in the Mediterranean, the Gulf, the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, and it also contributes to the development of maritime air surveillance capabilities.

The **Royal Navy (RN)** protects Britain’s interests, citizens, territory and trade through judicious use of its ships, submarines, aircraft, Royal Marines and training teams. In concert with allies and partners, the RN promotes international maritime security and deters threats to UK prosperity and security. For the UK Marine Area, the RN maintains a number of ships and units ready to respond at short notice and 3 Offshore Patrol Ships (OPV) delivering a permanent at sea presence; the primary role is an armed response capability to deter or interdict terrorism and other criminal activities, with the OPVs also having a secondary responsibility to deliver fisheries enforcement under a Marine Management Organisation (MMO) contract. Internationally the RN, including the Royal Marines, works independently, bilaterally or as part of an EU, NATO or other Maritime Task Forces reinforcing and developing international relationships and deterring or countering illegal maritime activity, particularly in the Northern Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, East and West coasts of Africa, the Caribbean and South Atlantic and contributes to the development of maritime governance capacity and capabilities in areas of strategic maritime importance.

**SO15 Counter Terrorism Command (CTC)** sits within London’s Metropolitan Police Service. This CTC is responsible for providing a proactive and reactive response to terrorism, domestic extremism and related offences, including the prevention and disruption of such activity; supporting the National Coordination of Terrorist Investigations outside London; assessing, analysing and developing intelligence to aid operational activity; being the police single point of contact for international partners in counter-terrorism matters; assisting in the protection of UK interests overseas and the investigation of attacks against them.

The **UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)** office in Dubai is the primary point of contact for merchant ships and liaison with military forces in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The Maritime Trade Information Centre (MTIC) in Portsmouth supports UKMTO outputs.
Annex C

Glossary

**Baseline:** This is usually the low water mark around the coast. But there can be straight baselines across the mouths of bays, and all rocks, reefs etc above the sea at low water but submerged at other times extend the baseline if they are within 12 nm of the mainland or an island. The UK baseline is delineated in the Territorial Waters Order in Council 1964 (as amended by the Territorial Sea (Amendment) Order 1998, SI 1998/2564). Marine waters to the landward side of the baseline are known as internal waters.

**Crown Dependencies:** Crown Dependencies are the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Isle of Man. The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK but are self-governing dependencies of the Crown. They have their own directly-elected legislative assemblies, administrative, fiscal and legal systems and their own courts of law. The Crown Dependencies are not represented in the UK Parliament.

The Ministry of Justice is responsible for managing the constitutional relationship with the Crown Dependencies.

**Contiguous Zone:** The band between 12 nm and 24 nm, in which a coastal State can intervene to prevent potential offences that may otherwise occur inside territorial sea (relating to fiscal, customs, sanitary and immigration offences), and to apprehend vessels that have committed offences inside territorial waters and are endeavouring to escape. The UK does not currently claim a contiguous zone.

**Continental Shelf:** The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

**Exclusive Economic Zone:** Under UNCLOS, an EEZ is capable of extending to 200 nm from the baseline. Details of the UK EEZ are found in the Exclusive Economic Zone Order 2013 (S.I. 2013/3161)

**Flag State:** The role of ship registration and the rights of ships to fly national flags is set out in Article 91 of UNCLOS.70

**Freedom of Navigation (FON):** This is the term given to the rights and freedoms that warships, merchant ships, aircraft and submarines enjoy to navigate on, over, and under the world’s seas; it is vital to the security and economic stability of the UK and facilitates global maritime trade and provides the UK military with the legal framework to allow it to respond to threats to security at range. FON rights are set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

**Hazards:** Non-malicious risks which occur naturally, by accident, or where the architect of the threat was not malicious.

---

**High Seas:** All parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state. The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by the UN Convention on the High Seas and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states: freedom of navigation; freedom of fishing; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; freedom to fly over the high seas. These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.

**Interdict:** Intercept and prevent the movement of a prohibited commodity or person.

**Internal Waters:** see ‘Baseline’.

**Marine Area:** The area of sea within the seaward limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the state, and any area of sea within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, and the area of sea within the limits of the state’s sector of the continental shelf (including the bed and subsoil of the sea within those areas) (see also ‘UK Marine Area’).

**Marine Protected Area:** Marine area protected by Government due to its ecological importance.\(^{71}\)

**Maritime Domain:** All areas and things of, under, relating to, or bordering on a sea or ocean including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, ships and other conveyances.

**Maritime terrorism:** The undertaking of terrorist acts and activities in the maritime domain, using or against ships or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against anyone and their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.

**Piracy:** Consists of any of the following acts: Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft or against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating the two acts described previously.

**Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged ship:** The REG is a group of British Shipping Registers. It is made up from the United Kingdom, the Crown Dependencies (Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey) and the UK Overseas Territories (Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, St Helena and the Turks & Caicos Islands) which operate shipping registers from their jurisdiction. Any ship registered in the UK, a Crown Dependency or UK Overseas Territory, is a “British ship” and is entitled to fly the Red Ensign flag.

**Southern Ocean:** The Convention Area, which covers around 10% of the Earth's surface, is defined in the CAMLR Convention as the area south of the Antarctic Convergence. The Convention also applies in the area south of 60°S to which the 1959 Antarctic Treaty applies.

**UK Continental Shelf:** The seas within the UK sector of the continental shelf comprise the area of sea outside the UK territorial sea but within an area specified in an order under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (c. 29). Rights in the continental shelf extend to mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species.

**UK Entitled Persons:** Entitled persons are non-UK citizens for whom HMG has accepted responsibility for their safety and security.

**UK-flagged Ship:** Merchant ships are required to register under a national flag to determine the legal jurisdiction under which they operate and their associated tax obligations. UK-flagged ships are those registered in the UK.

**UK Marine Area:** As detailed in the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, this consists of the following: (a) the area of sea within the seaward limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom, (b) any area of sea within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, (c) the area of sea within the limits of the UK sector of the continental shelf

---

(b), and includes the bed and subsoil of the sea within those areas. The area of sea mentioned in subsection (c) is to be treated as part of the UK marine area for any purpose only to the extent that such treatment for that purpose does not contravene any international obligation binding on the United Kingdom or Her Majesty's government.

**UK Overseas Territories:** Anguilla; Bermuda; British Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean Territory; The British Virgin Islands; The Cayman Islands; The Falkland Islands; Gibraltar; Montserrat; The Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie & Oeno Islands; Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (including Gough Island Dependency); South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands; Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) Akrotiri and Dhekelia (on Cyprus); The Turks & Caicos Islands.

**UK Territorial Sea:** The UK territorial sea is defined by the Territorial Sea Act 1987 as the sea extending 12 nm from the baseline. For the most part, the territorial sea of the UK does not adjoin that of any other state. Where it does so, in the English Channel, the Territorial Sea (Limits) Order 1989 (SI 1989/482) sets out the limits of the territorial sea in the Strait of Dover. Within the territorial sea, the UK has jurisdiction for the sea itself, the seabed subjacent and the air above. This is subject to the right of innocent passage by ships of all other states. A graphical representation of this area is available at: https://www.ukho.gov.uk.

**United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):** Also called the Law of the Sea Convention, UNCLOS is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. UNCLOS came into force in 1994. 166 countries and the European Union have joined the Convention.

**Vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes:** Vital Maritime Trade Routes include: the Dover Strait; North Channel; Irish Sea and the Pentland Firth; a southern corridor connecting the Straits of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez; the Red Sea; the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf; an eastern corridor stretching from the East and South China Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean; and a western corridor connecting Europe with the Americas. The opening of a northern corridor, running along the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacific may take on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in the medium term.