

Appendix I I: Additional material relating to Neil Putnam

How Neil Putnam came to be debriefed in 1998

1. Neil Putnam is a former Detective Constable of the South East Regional Crime Squad (SERCS). He worked alongside John Davidson in 1994.
2. In the main report we have considered the corruption problem that faced the Metropolitan Police in the 1990s, and led to the formation of Operation Othona. In December 1997, as the terms and scope of the Public Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence were being finalised, the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, Sir (now Lord) Paul Condon, appeared before the Home Affairs Committee and described a significant existing corruption problem.
3. This public comment coincided with the investigation of corruption within the Metropolitan Police being investigated more overtly. CIB3 emerged in January 1998.
4. One of its first investigations was named 'Operation Russia'. A convicted drug dealer, Evelyn Fleckney, began to give information about her dealings with a number of corrupt officers based in SERCS at East Dulwich. Fleckney was debriefed by a team within CIB3, and her allegations were investigated. The investigation led officers to search the home address of Neil Putnam, who was then a Detective Constable in SERCS, on 6 July 1998. Putnam was not arrested but he was told that he was under investigation for corrupt activities and he was suspended from duty.
5. On 13 July 1998, Neil Putnam contacted officers from CIB3 and confessed to two acts of corruption, which he said had involved other SERCS officers. He was charged with the offences and remanded into custody. Later the same day, Putnam was produced from custody and questioned in a debriefing exercise which lasted until October 1998. He confessed to many other offences and implicated a number of other officers, including Robert Clark, Christopher Drury, "Officer K", "Officer R", O'Connell and, significantly for the purposes of this Review, John Davidson.
6. In October 1998, Neil Putnam pleaded guilty to 16 offences, occurring between 1991 and 1997. His sentence was adjourned until after he had given evidence in the trial of Robert Clark and Christopher Drury.
7. Neil Putnam gave evidence on two occasions: firstly, in the trial of Clark and Drury, and then again in the trial of "Officer K", "Officer R" and O'Connell. In the first trial, his evidence sat alongside that of Evelyn Fleckney, the convicted drug dealer who was also giving evidence against former police officers. In the second trial, Neil Putnam's evidence was the key evidence in the case against the three defendants.
8. In February 2000, in between the two trials, he was sentenced to three years and 11 months' imprisonment. On 24 April 2000, he was released on licence subject to a Home Detention Curfew.

Neil Putnam's allegations in 2006

9. In a television documentary recorded in 2006, 'The Boys Who Killed Stephen Lawrence', Neil Putnam made it clear that in 1994 John Davidson had told him that he had a corrupt relationship with Clifford Norris, the father of David Norris, at the time of Stephen Lawrence's murder. Further, Neil Putnam stated that he had told his debriefing officers about this at the time of his debrief in 1998.

10. If correct, this would suggest the following:

- i) John Davidson had made an admission to a corrupt link to Clifford Norris.
- ii) That there had been an effort by someone in the Metropolitan Police to prevent this allegation from emerging into the public domain.

In the context of our terms of reference, both of the above propositions are of obvious significance.

11. Our main report summarises the arguments in support of and against Neil Putnam's allegations. In this appendix, we have set out some of the supplemental material relevant to these arguments.

12. We have divided the material into the following sections:

- A. What Neil Putnam told the police in 1998 about the alleged corrupt practices of John Davidson, as recorded in the police records
- B. What Neil Putnam told the journalist Graeme McLagan in 2000 about John Davidson
- C. Graeme McLagan's relationship with the Metropolitan Police Service
- D. What Neil Putnam told the journalist Vikram Dodd in 2002 about John Davidson
- E. What Neil Putnam told the journalist Mark Daly in 2006 about John Davidson
- F. The Independent Police Complaints Commission's conclusions in 2006
- G. What Neil Putnam said about this issue during the course of the retrial of *R v Clark and Drury* in 2011
- H. Other material relevant to this issue

A. What Neil Putnam told the police in 1998 about the alleged corrupt practices of John Davidson, as recorded in police records

In this section we have set out the recorded accounts given by Neil Putnam in 1998, both in the notes of the debrief and in his statements.

From the typed copy of the Debrief Notes 28 July 1998:

Dover Police Station
Officers: DC Esposito, DS Walsh
Time commenced: 16.03
"Informant 1"

Early December 1994 John Davidson came into office stating "Informant 1" had been in touch stating there was going to be a lorry hi-jack of Freemans Catalogue parcel order. Location M25 junction with A217 @ Redhill turnoff.

Everyone scrambled, myself and Peter Lawrence got early message to go to the venue and carry out a recce. Nothing happened, stood down at about 16.00hrs.

Overnight information to Dulwich RCS office that a Freemans lorry driver had been kidnapped. This matter was being investigated at Walworth Road Pol. Stn.

Davidson spoke to OIC, a detective sergeant who apparently was not happy with his story.

Later phone call from "Informant I" to Davidson that the team had had the lorry off. The driver was in on the job. "Informant I" had apparently been offered the entire consignment. "Informant I" was not interested but suggested he would view the consignment so that Davidson could be informed. The subject that had relayed this information to "Informant I" was called "AA". The next day we plotted up "AA's" H/A. Davidson apparently knew him from his days at Penge. Surveillance carried out on "AA" followed to Camberwell

... [describes the surveillance operation]...

I went to garage with Roger Pearce where male carrying box was seen to enter. Found Freemans box containing stereo cassette player.

Questioned subjects denied he had keys to target premises... Persons arrested for handling – cursory search – found items of property in a cupboard. Within 20 minutes Davidson returned having followed informant away. Davidson asked me to be exhibit officer. I also arrested subject and took him back to Walworth. OIC of the original hi-jacking suggested the job be transferred in its entirety to Walworth CID. Upon returning to the target venue I found that the sacks containing the property had been opened. "TK" from Freemans was present in addition to man from Riders who had arrived from Chatham depot. Davidson informed me that all the property should be restored to Freemans for a stock check then photographs. I asked Davidson why all the property was in disarray. Davidson inferred the property had to be checked.

"Officer H", "Officer Br" and possibly "Officer R" assisted me to put the property back into sacks sealed with MPS exhibit labels.

Property returned to Freemans premises believed. Keys handed to DS at Walworth Road.

Several days later Davidson suggested to go out for an Indian meal in the East End. I suggested to meet in Hollands. Usual meeting venue, near Arbour Sq. In fact, we met near Aldgate, a grotty pub.

Davidson already in P.H. when I got there. With either "Officer C" or "Officer R". Davidson said we're not eating, we've got other things to do. I was annoyed at this, I felt they could have pre-warned me.

Davidson handed me £40 or £50. I asked what it was for. Davidson replied "Look at it as a Sergeants Christmas box". He added that as much electrical goods were separated from the lorry job and these items were given to "Informant I". I took the money. I had a quick drink and left. Money was in ten pound denominations.

Those arrested were subsequently acquitted at court. PII application invariably a great deal of evidence omitted from trial. Jury believed defence given by a man who owned the American Spray Co.

I believe that there was a payout from Freemans to "Informant I" due to the substantial recovery.

3 August 1998:

Interviewing officers: DC Hibberd, DC Esposito
1.32pm

'John Davidson (O.J.) was sponsored by DI Ken Holmes, and John came on the RCS during the summer of 1994. Had another DS come on at a similar time but he retired and took an ill-health. John D had quite an influence on the team due to experience/confidence/efficiency. He typified what a DS should be like. He had an air of authority that people like Steve Crosby didn't have. John hadn't been on team long (one month) when we did the smash and grab job we discussed. "Informant I" and the watches. We were sharing a car as he lived fairly near to me. We used to go for a drink together sometimes after work. "He's amazing "Informant I", he can get rid of anything for you." At the end of what he said it was like "Do you know what I mean?" It was understood by me to be that anything we came across on the squad "Informant I" could get rid of it. Their relationship had gone back years, and I understood that such transactions had occurred in the past. Other people in John's police 'cliché' also used "Informant I" as an informant, namely "Officer B", "Officer R2". But I can't say that they used him for corrupt purposes.

'I built up quite a good friendship with him. I played for the vets team he was managing. During the time I was there "Informant I" put up the Freemans job/cocaine job/plus info re Eugene Carter (South London) that was passed over to the other team at Dulwich. "Informant I" was well respected in the criminal fraternity. I recall that John said he was known as an informant in criminal circles, but that they all informed at different times. By time of cocaine job I was sharing with "Officer L" and Davidson was with "Officer C" and "Officer R" as they played golf. Although he was known as O.J. I never found him obnoxious. He was a nice guy.

'Technically he finished his time on the RCS, however, he had been suspended in September, or before October 1995 for involvement in the Reg Grundy affair. Went around to see him in the summer. Said that they were never to do it in police time. They were to do it in job time...

"Officer R" became co-handler of "Informant I" in the end. "Informant I" got shot in late 95/96. I'd gone on leave. Messages came through and "Informant I's" wife had asked John and "Officer R" to see him in hospital. He was on bail and so permission was refused. "Officer R" went to hospital and there was a scuffle in the hospital between "Officer R" and uniformed officers and Duty Officer. "Officer R" was suspended for failing to obey a lawful order.'

7 August 1998:

Dover Police Station
Interviewing officer: DC Hibberd
11.20am

'I have been asked about who was present on the Cudworth job and I recall it was Clark, Drury, "Officer R", "Officer K", John Davidson (O.J.) and some others. "Officer R" told me some time after I came back from leave (possibly a few weeks) that something strange went on and Clark and Drury did the stop on Cudworth and sent everyone else away. He said he stayed for a little while and watched them. They were near the boot of a car talking to Cudworth. Then he went off. The conversation between "Officer R" and I continued and "Officer R" said he didn't trust Clark at all because at one time Bob Clark had given John Davidson some cannabis to get rid of via "Informant I". Clark had apparently kept this cannabis in his garage and Clark had caused Davidson embarrassment on the cannabis was rubbish. O.J. was angry about it. I've got a feeling that some of the cannabis from the Cudworth job may have been given to O.J. to make up for this earlier incident.'

18 August 1998:

Interviewing officer: DS Walsh
1.13pm

In discussing "Officer S": "... He had served on nearly every squad in the Met. At the time of the murder of David Norris the supergrass "Officer S" was very worried, as he seemed upset. ... I believe at some time he was handling Norris. I remember a drink up at one time after the death of Norris that "Officer Br" raised his pint glass and said "Here's to David Norris, he will be missed". I got the impression that they might have been making some money out of him.'

Neil Putnam's statements in 1998

In a statement made by Neil Putnam dated 22 September 1998 he described the hijack of the Freemans lorry in December 1994. He said that the information came from "Informant 1" which was passed to Davidson. He and "Officer L" went to investigate possible locations for the hijack. They were subsequently joined by Davidson. They were later told to stand down and Davidson indicated that the hijack had happened in a different area. They were to follow the suspect to the lorry load and the informant. He was handed £40/£50 by Davidson who said that they had taken electrical equipment from the Freemans load. They took items which "Informant 1" was interested in and could sell.

In a statement made by Neil Putnam dated 2 October 1998 he described an allegation relating to stolen watches in August 1994. He was asked to take a box of Omega watches back to Chigwell Police Station after a police sting operation. He took two watches from the box. He was working with Davidson on the August bank holiday Monday. During conversation with him Davidson mentioned that he had a registered source who went by the pseudonym of "Informant 1", who he referred to as a 'good villain' who had the ability to sell on any commodity. Putnam told Davidson that he had two watches to sell. Davidson said that it would not be a problem for "Informant 1" to get rid of them for him. They met with "Informant 1" later that day in a pub on Eltham High Street and negotiated terms. The next day they met again and "Informant 1" gave them £150. He then gave Davidson £75.

In a statement made by Neil Putnam dated 14 September 1998 he described Davidson's involvement in a cocaine deal in April/May 1995. Information was passed to Davidson from "Informant 1" about a cocaine deal. Putnam was deployed as part of the surveillance team. They observed the drug deal and then went in for a raid. Davidson allowed the male seller to leave, suggesting that the search of the vehicle had been negative. Then he saw Davidson take a white carrier bag from the car containing a brick shaped object. The next day he was paged to meet Davidson at a pub in Beckenham. Davidson handed him a plastic bag and told him to search through it and look for his share in there. The bag was full of white envelopes – about eight or nine. He took one with the name 'Neil' written on it. Davidson then explained that the cocaine had not been as profitable as he had hoped it would be. The envelope contained £500.

The decision not to prosecute John Davidson based on Neil Putnam's account

The three allegations set out in Putnam's statements were investigated by CIB3. It is clear that there was some documentation which corroborated the fact that events of this type had happened on the dates and occasions identified by Neil Putnam. However, the only evidence that corrupt activity had taken place was Putnam. Both John Yates, the officer in charge of Operation Russia, and Martin Polaine, the Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyer advising on the prosecution of officers, have confirmed to our review that a decision was taken that Neil Putnam's account had to be corroborated by independent evidence before a prosecution would be brought.

In respect of John Davidson, a copy of a single page advice on charge has been found. It is undated and the name of the author has been cut off the bottom of the copy provided to us (DI 10 from the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) files). It reads as follows:

'Operation Russia: Phase IV:
John Davidson, "Officer C" and "Informant 1"
Advice

1. I am asked to advise whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed against any/all of the above in relation to:

- i) The watches enquiry (Davidson & "Informant 1")
- ii) The "cocaine in the street" job (all three)
- iii) The "Freeman's enquiry" (Davidson and "Informant 1")

2. The watches enquiry: In effect the only evidence is the uncorroborated account from Putnam. The reported burglary at "Informant 1's" address gives rise to suspicion, but nothing more bearing in mind the lapse of time and the limited detail available from the jeweller. There is not a realistic prospect of conviction against each suspect on the present evidence.

3. The "cocaine in the street" job: Both in relation to [text missing] taking of the cocaine by Davidson and the subsequent corrupt payment to Putnam, the only evidence capable of being called [text missing] that of Putnam himself. Although "Informant 2" has been seen [text missing] officers and gives an account which largely tallies with Putnam's, he is unwilling to assist any further. In the absence of supporting/corroborative evidence, there [text missing] insufficient to proceed to prosecution.

4. The "Freeman's enquiry": Putnam alleges that Davidson gave him £40–£50, representing the proceeds from the electrical goods sold on by "Informant 1". There is, however, nothing to corroborate the allegedly corrupt payment. In relation to the theft from the lorry itself we can show the "Informant 1" was granted "P.I." status to view the lorry load and that someone called "Peter" tied up Griffiths, the driver, who [text missing] unwilling to make further identification. However, we have at present, nothing more. Accordingly, it is my view that there is insufficient to proceed against either Davidson or "Informant 1".

5. In conclusion, all of the above matters fall short of the corroboration requirement. However, if additional evidence becomes available, please re-submit for further advice'.

Comment

1. The extent of the allegations made by Neil Putnam against John Davidson, **as recorded in the police records**, do not contain the following:

- i) Any reference to Clifford Norris.
- ii) Any reference to the Stephen Lawrence case.

2. Neil Putnam did comment on David Norris (deceased) and was clear that this person had died before he had joined SERCS.

3. We have not seen anything to suggest that Neil Putnam was ever asked about whether John Davidson had ever mentioned corruption activity to him in the context of the Stephen Lawrence case. We have commented on this in our main report.

B. What Neil Putnam told the journalist Graeme McLagan in 2000 about John Davidson

In 2000, after Neil Putnam had been released from his prison sentence, he was interviewed by a BBC journalist, Graeme McLagan. McLagan had made previous documentaries about police corruption and had been present during the course of the Operation Russia trials. We have sought to speak to Mr McLagan during the course of this Review. After some initial contact, Mr McLagan did not respond to our written requests for a meeting.

Neil Putnam was interviewed at length by Mr McLagan. We have obtained what we understand to be the unedited transcripts. We have not, at the time of writing, been able to obtain the unedited footage of this interview. The programme 'Bent Coppers' was broadcast in October 2000, and was followed by publication of a book in the same name.

The following are extracts from the full interview of Neil Putnam:

NP: When he came to work for CID "... if you wanted to succeed or get further, if you wanted anything you had to pay for it... It wasn't sort of done as overt corruption or things like that, but it was petty minor things that might happen in the office". The Regional Crime Squad was 'fragmented, disorderly, lack of discipline'. On his first day he was told that there was a means of earning money corruptly.

[05:22:35]

Qu: There was another informant called Dave Norris who was murdered just before you joined the Regional Crime Squad. What did you learn of him and his importance?

NP: Well I knew that when I first joined the Squad that he was spoken of quite a lot... everything, the work that they did, everything used to come from David Norris, and there was an awful lot of work generated... And I firmly believe that when that man was alive there were corrupt practices going on around him... I think it was recycling drugs, maybe recycling a lot of stolen property. It could be a number of things... But that's about as far as I know because I didn't ask the questions... But it was obvious and evident from the way several officers spoke that the good old days when Dave Norris was about are gone... it's difficult for me to be able to talk about that because it was before I was there.

Comment

This reference to David Norris is significant. In due course, it was suggested that Neil Putnam had confused David Norris (deceased) with Clifford Norris. This section reveals that he was clear that David Norris (deceased) had been murdered prior to his arrival at SERCS.

[06:15:34]

Neil Putnam estimated that in his branch of the Regional Crime Squad about 10% of the office were involved in corrupt activity.

[07:32:04]

Putnam described the difference between 'meat eaters' and 'carnivores': "It's meat eaters that are the main players, the main people who were corrupt, it was not an expression I ever heard before but that's what he was referring to, that the grass eaters were people that dallied around beneath the feet of the meat eaters and they were the people who were taking the prize cuts, as it were."

[08:10:21]

Describing the debriefing process Putnam said: "There were three officers from ClB in the main, they would come down each day, that was Saturdays and Sundays as well, and I would tell them what had happened. First of all we'd write everything down in what they called a debrief book, and then another day it would be a taped interview and culminating towards the end of my detention there that everything was transposed onto proper statement forms."

[08:11:02]

Putnam described the two stages of his debrief after John Yates spoke to him and demanded that he was open about all of his offending.

[08:13:01]

In relation to his pension, Putnam said that he was not sure what he was going to get; there was a misunderstanding about whether or not he would get his pension for service over 22 years. He decided to tell the officers everything; he said, "I spent the next two weeks I think it was when I got everything off my chest and cleared up everything."

[08:21:17]

Putnam stated that at one point during his debrief he was visited by the head of the Witness Protection Scheme, Chris Jarratt, who "was asking after my general welfare, and then after a short period of time started talking about Terry O'Connell and basically saying that he couldn't believe that Terry O'Connell was corrupt and that I'd made a mistake... I had already named Terry O'Connell, and that I must have made a mistake, I must be wrong, and that was I absolutely sure that I was right in what I was saying. And I felt that there was a veiled threat in there. There was a veiled threat that he didn't want me to give evidence against Terry O'Connell".

[08:31:04]

Qu: What about others who were involved in the corruption who were never prosecuted; what do you think about the ones that got away?

NP: That one day I think it will catch up with them, somewhere or another. But I don't hold any grudge against them or anything like that. They got away with it because of lack of evidence because of procedural difficulties or whatever. And that's in their favour. There's not a lot really I can say about them. You know, they were fortunate. They were just very, very fortunate.

Qu: You told Complaints Investigation Branch about a Sergeant, that's Sergeant Davidson, who gave you £500 in an envelope for a job; he was never prosecuted. Were you told why?

NP: Yes, I actually asked the question "what's happened to him?" and I was told that it wasn't in the public interest for him to be prosecuted because of his involvement in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

Qu: And what was his involvement with that?

NP: Well he'd been the family liaison officer I understood, and I think that he'd been involved in some sort of corruption that they'd uncovered in that. But they wasn't party to what it was or told, but they said that it wasn't in the public interest, and that was told to me by CIB3 officers.

Qu: In what way could it not to be in the public interest?

NP: Because it would embarrass the Metropolitan Police too much.

Qu: What, to have someone who was involved in the Lawrence Inquiry?

NP: Because of the amount of criticism that the Metropolitan Police have suffered, because of the reports into the investigation, that it would be... If these allegations came out, became public, it would... They said it would be just too much for the Metropolitan Police to bear. It would drag them down.

Qu: Because the Lawrence family have always said that there was corruption, some kind of corruption was involved.

NP: Yes, I've read that, yes.

Qu: ... In that whole case, and he would be evidence that one of the officers involved was...

NP: Oh yes, I mean as far as I was concerned, I mean what happened between myself and Sergeant Davidson happened. I don't know what the allegation was against him on the Lawrence Inquiry, but yes, I mean in my mind Sergeant Davidson was committing acts of corruption with me.

Qu: And do you think there was sufficient evidence there for it to proceed against him?

NP: If they had gone for some corroboration, yes I mean just on my word alone, no. But then that's only fair and right on the rules of evidence, but if they'd had other corroboration then yes, he should have been prosecuted.

Qu: Do you think that that corroboration was there, or could have been there?

NP: It could've been there but I have no idea who they spoke to or anything like that. I was never party to that.

Qu: That he was one person that you specifically asked what had happened to...

NP: Yes, I wanted to know what had happened to him.

Qu: Did you ask that because you suspected there was something...

NP: I'd been told that some of the others had been charged at that time, and I was just sort of marking it off in my mind so I knew what position I was at and what position everybody else was at. And so I asked... Because Davidson hadn't been mentioned for a while.

Qu: And you expected him to be charged, did you?

NP: Yes I did, yes. I expected everybody to be charged.

Comment

In this interview, Neil Putnam did not mention that John Davidson had told him that he had a corrupt relationship with Clifford Norris and went as far as to say that he was unaware of what the allegations against Davidson were. It is clear, however, that he expressed surprise that Davidson's links to corruption had not been revealed to the Public Inquiry.

From *Bent Coppers* (the book) published in 2000:

"Putnam joined the SERCS team at East Dulwich just after Norris – their start informer – had been shot dead by contract killers, hired by criminals, who wanted him permanently silenced. Norris was rumoured to have had corrupt relations with the police, confirmed for Putnam when he was told by one of his new colleagues that Norris had been 'a good earner' for the squad. Putnam could tell anticorruption officers little more about Norris, but Fleckney knew plenty about him."

C. Graeme McLagan's relationship with the Metropolitan Police Service

We have considered what weight should be attached to Neil Putnam's apparent failure to mention his allegation of Davidson's corrupt relationship with Clifford Norris to Graeme McLagan in the documentary in 2000.

It is clear that Graeme McLagan was given extensive access to Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) files after the Operation Russia trials and before his documentary in 2000. We have sought to establish why this level of access was granted, by whom, and whether it was indicative of an inappropriate relationship with the journalist.

From our interview with John Yates:

John Yates:

"I was always interested in corruption and, you know, current affairs. I have known McLagan for some time. He was not a favourite of many people. He was quite a difficult character, quite a thorn in the side of the Met, but, again, a very thorough dogged determined journalist. I have a lot of respect for him, actually. He was always decent to me. He took a great deal of interest in all the corruption cases from the word go, so he was probably as knowledgeable as anybody, to be honest, on the big picture of what was going on and who was relevant to who. We obviously – I say 'we' – the Met obviously cooperated with him in his book..."

"I think that everyone knew he was going to write a book, so I think that it would be John Stevens' decision. Roy Clark might have been the decision maker, but John Stevens would have been... to actually do that level of cooperation on something so public and so sensitive, it would have been..."

MR ELLISON: So he would have been saying "I am writing a book, anyway"?

MR YATES: He might have even been Commissioner territory, to be honest.

MS MORGAN: Yes.

MR YATES: I would have thought.

- MR ELLISON: And somebody would have said, "Well, let's help him out a bit"?
- MR YATES: Yes, well, rather have an informed book than a speculative book.
- MR ELLISON: Yes.
- MR YATES: So he was given access to a lot of material, but it was, like, come into a room, you can read it, you can't take it away, you cannot copy it sort of thing, as I recall.
- MS MORGAN: And that was being facilitated, I think, by DS Hibberd, is that right?
- MR YATES: Well, he might have been doing some of the disclosure and redaction, you know...
- MS MORGAN: Who was one of your officers on Russia.
- MR YATES: Yes.
- MS MORGAN: But he was just assisting getting the material or was he involved in...
- MR YATES: Simply identifying... I think that Neil would have been doing the scrutiny of the material, what is in there, do we need legal advice on whether we can actually – you have got some stuff in there, haven't you? – what we can show this guy and what we cannot show him.
- MR ELLISON: Were you involved in that process? You cannot help us as to the sort of things that would have been – you know, we can't show him that as opposed to, yes, we can show him this?
- MR YATES: I mean, my view...
- MS MORGAN: Were you aware that there was a process, because we know from the documents –
- MR YATES: I know there is a process, but...
- MS MORGAN: – it was being reviewed.
- MR ELLISON: You would not have expected it to have been keys to the cupboard.
- MR YATES: No. But he would go...
- MR ELLISON: If you were not involved, I will have to ask others, but things like the CIBIC database, you know the intelligence database...
- MR YATES: He never saw that.
- MR ELLISON: Quite. The sort of things that he would have been seeing would have been more evidential stuff?
- MR YATES: More stuff that actually would have been – you know, if you sat through every court case, like he did, actually, all the stuff was sort of non-disclosed material.
- MS MORGAN: You have mentioned the training video. And you obviously, yourself, were in the eventual 'Bent Coppers' programme.

- MR YATES: Yes.
- MS MORGAN: Were you aware of any Met input into the format of that programme and how it was presented?
- MR YATES: No, we would not have had. We very rarely get any form of editorial. We never get any editorial control. You sometimes get a preview. So, no, we didn't, as far as I am aware.
- MS MORGAN: As far as you are aware, so, as far as you are aware, there was no editing process based on Met representations?
- MR YATES: McLagan is the one to tell you that, but I can't imagine we would. We never ever...
- MS MORGAN: And it wasn't with you if it was with anyone?
- MR YATES: No. We would never get that sort of – especially with McLagan.
- MS MORGAN: And to understand the training video, that was a separate video or to be used from the same footage, I am sorry, just to be clear?
- MR YATES: I can't remember. I just remember it was a significant coup really to be able to – not parade, but use this officer who had, you know, fallen on difficult times to be able to sort of use to train. It was quite innovative, really, and a jolly good idea.

We have been unable to establish exactly what took place and why Graeme McLagan was granted access to the files in this way. It is clear, however, that in preparing material for Mr McLagan to review there was some concern that disclosure relating to John Davidson might raise further questions about his relationship with Clifford Norris.

In a memorandum dated 14 August 2000, David Hamilton (MPS Solicitor) advised DS Hibberd about the documents requested by Graeme McLagan. In relation to the complaints history of ex-DS John Davidson, Mr Hamilton stated:

"As before this material is confidential and should be treated as such. Additionally, if confidence were to be breached consideration would have to be given to the effect on any on-going trials in this series should any of the contents of the complaints history be leaked.

"Disclosures relevant to DS Davidson's contact with the Norris family could have an adverse effect on the Commissioner's position in the on-going High Court action by Mr and Mrs Lawrence. Part of their claim is based on misfeasance in public office and alleges wrongdoing in relation to dealings between police and the Norris family."

D. What Neil Putnam told the journalist Vikram Dodd in 2002 about John Davidson

Neil Putnam's clearest allegation of a corrupt relationship between John Davidson and Clifford Norris was made in the 2006 documentary 'The Boys Who Killed Stephen Lawrence'. It is clear, however, that this documentary developed the account which Neil Putnam had given to another journalist, Vikram Dodd, in April 2002. The only notes which have been made available to us of this account are those published on *The Guardian* website, as follows:

"A former police officer, Neil Putnam, alleged in a BBC programme on July 26 2006 that the Metropolitan Police covered up testimony that the killers of Stephen Lawrence were shielded by a corrupt detective, John Davidson. Mr Putnam claimed that Mr Davidson had a corrupt relationship with Clifford Norris, a notorious gangster and the father of David Norris, one of those named by locals as responsible for the black teenager's murder in April 1993 at a bus stop in Eltham, south-east London. Scotland Yard denies covering up crucial information, saying that after his arrest Mr Putnam gave anti-corruption officers information about Mr Davidson being corrupt but did not provide a link with Mr Norris. Mr Davidson, who now runs a bar in Spain, denies any wrongdoing and was never prosecuted for any alleged offence. Mr Putnam himself was convicted of corruption after confessing to offences."

The Guardian spoke to Mr Putnam in February 2001 when he was in a witness protection programme. Here we present audio extracts from the interview.

Clip 1: On alleged corruption in the investigation

"It was just us two on duty and he said 'Old Man Norris', I assumed Old Man Norris was Clifford, that 'he had been putting some work our way'. By that I assumed he was giving information. It was not until later on that I started to realise that there was corruption going on, the whole investigation was blighted by it."

Clip 2: On alleged links between Clifford Norris and John Davidson

"Clifford Norris was never going to admit to anything; the minute he does that, the boys are in the dock... and he'd be in the dock for perverting the course of justice, so he's covered that way, everything is deniable. John is not a stupid man, quite the reverse."

Clip 3: On the police decision not to pursue corruption matters

"I remember the words. It would be too much of an embarrassment for the Metropolitan Police, and it was likely if it came out it could destroy the Metropolitan Police, those were the exact words, destroy the Metropolitan Police."

The article which was published in *The Guardian* on 30 April 2002 read as follows:

"Faltering corruption inquiry sets back hopes of new charges"

"Scotland Yard's hopes that it could get the Crown Prosecution Service to bring new charges over the Stephen Lawrence murder; through fresh investigation into police corruption, have foundered because it has so far been unable to find proof supporting allegations against two former detectives..."

"Fresh investigations began 18 months ago after John Davidson, a detective sergeant who played a key role in the first, failed, Lawrence murder inquiry, was named as a partner in crime by a former detective colleague in South-East London. He was accused of selling drugs and helping to divide up the proceeds. Mr Davidson, a burly Scot nicknamed "OJ" - for obnoxious Jock - by his former colleagues, is now running Obama in Spain. In 1998 he was arrested at his London home and it was raided over corruption allegations, that he was released without charge. He had recently retired from the Met, decorated and having served 30 years. He denies all wrong doing..."

"One particularly disturbing feature of the investigation, as the MacPherson enquiry subsequently discovered, was that the drug dealer father of one of the chief suspects, Clifford Norris, was using his connections to try to bribe and threaten witnesses. He was known to have police contact. Mr Norris'

son, David, and other suspects, when eventually arrested, stonewalled their way through interrogations. Mr Davidson has now been named as having corrupt links with a south-east London drug dealer at around the time of these events. Ex-detective constable Neil Putnam has claimed Mr Davidson was one of a group of corrupt local detectives. Mr Putnam said many of his own former colleagues were colluding with informants to steal and re-sell drugs and other goods seized from criminals.

“Five detectives, including Mr Putnam himself, were subsequently convicted and jailed, in one of the Met’s worst scandals of recent years. Mr Davidson denies being involved and he was never charged. The Lawrence’s family solicitor, Imran Khan, says that they were never told of the existence of Mr Putnam’s evidence at the time of the MacPherson enquiry. Mr Khan said: ‘If we had had those statements, we would have recalled Davidson to be re-examined... if we had known about Putnam, it would have affected the whole line of questioning of every officer. There needs to be an independent investigation into corruption in this case.’

“Neil Putnam, a stocky, hard drinking South Londoner, was a detective constable in the now disbanded South East Regional Crime Squad, when he was joined at the end of 1993 at East Dulwich police station by a new sergeant, ‘OJ’ Davidson. ‘OJ’ was fresh from the collapsed Lawrence investigation where he had been in charge of the ‘outside team’ which interviewed witnesses and tried to develop informants in the case.

“It was not long before the two men were playing football together, and visiting each other’s houses. The Scot was invited to the christening of Mr Putnam’s child. Mr Davidson concedes the two men were colleagues, but denies they were friends.

...”

Although others have been convicted on Mr Putnam’s evidence, it was decided that there were insufficient grounds to prosecute Mr Davidson. He denies doing corrupt deals with criminals, and denies knowing Clifford Norris.

Mr Putnam continues to tell a different story. He says Mr Davidson hinted to him he had some prior knowledge of Clifford Norris. “It was just us two on duty and he said ‘Old Man Norris... had been putting some work our way’. By that I assumed, giving information.” Mr Davidson denies saying this.

Mr Grieve’s officers cannot prove one way or another whether Mr Putnam is telling the truth about Mr Davidson’s character. In other cases where he gave evidence in court, corroboration was discovered. Mr Putnam’s claims alone are not sufficient to charge Mr Davidson. Neither Mr Davidson’s informant in the drugs case, nor the drug courier who had allegedly lost his cocaine, proved willing to co-operate. The Grieve team has also been unable to find concrete evidence of any relationship between Clifford Norris and either of the suspected two detectives in the context of the Lawrence case.

In November 2006, Vikram Dodd sent a letter to the IPCC (DI 62) in which he answered questions posed by the investigators in the following way:

“Was there any mention made to me in the interview with Neil Putnam, of corruption associated with the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation?

“All of Neil Putnam’s references to corruption are contained in the published article ‘Stephen Lawrence: Faltering corruption inquiry sets back hopes...’ *The Guardian* 30 April 2002.

“Did Neil Putnam mention John Davidson at all?

“Any mention of Davidson is included in the published article. For example, we quote Neil Putnam saying ‘it was just us two on duty and he said Old Man Norris... has been putting some work our way’. By that I assumed... giving information.

“Was there any mention of any association between John Davidson and Clifford Norris?

“In the article I explain that Neil Putnam asserts that Clifford Norris and John Davidson were linked. The article sets this out as follows:

“The two men split £250 proceeds from a stolen consignment of Omega watches.

“December 1994 – John Davidson gave him £40 or £50 he describes as ‘Sargey’s Christmas box’ – part of the proceeds from the sum of a recovered haul of electrical goods from a hijacked lorry.

“Spring 1995 – after a cocaine dealer was stopped at a Dulwich pub: ‘I saw Davidson take from the car white carrier bags. I could see that there was a brick-shaped object inside. He just turned around and walked away’. The next day he gave Mr Putnam £500 in an envelope, saying it was his share of the proceeds. All of Neil Putnam’s claims in relation to John Davidson and references to him and to Clifford Norris are included in the article.

“Did he ever mention Clifford Norris as being ‘a good earner’?

“No he did not. See... above: any reference he made to me about Clifford Norris is included in the article itself.

“Did he mention David Norris (deceased)?

“He did not mention David Norris: if he had done it would have been included in the article.”

...

“In summary, all of the details you request are dealt with in the article – if there had been more to say, it would have been published.”

E. What Neil Putnam told the journalist Mark Daly in 2006 about John Davidson

We are grateful to the assistance provided to this Review by the journalist Mark Daly. He has explained to us the circumstances in which he came to speak to Neil Putnam in 2006 and the enquiries that he made into the allegations of corruption, which we have summarised in our report.

In the documentary, Neil Putnam said the following about John Davidson:

PUTNAM: “I said that, um, the four suspects had recently been at court that week or something like that. Uh, that’s my recollections of it. Um, I made some comment about them. And John’s literally follow in and, and turned round and said that, uh, one of the boys, uh, Norris, um – John had been, they’d looked after the boy – and the father because the, uh, old man Norris was uh, basically, he was [giving] them the information. Uh, the police information and that, uh, they were looking after the boy for his sake to continue the information coming on because they were getting some

good results. From old man Norris. And also that, uh, John basically turned around and said that, um, they've had some good, really good results off of it"

MD: "So, are you saying that – basically Davidson admitted to you that he was acting corruptly in the Lawrence case?"

PUTNAM: "I would say that John Davidson admitted to me that he was, um, engaged in corrupt practices with the father of the, the son of, of, of the Norris family and that, um, they were doing that for the sake of so-called protection of the informant but, uh, at the cost of justice really"

MD: "The last time I spoke to you, [you] mentioned that [Davidson had] said it had been a good earner."

PUTNAM: "Oh yeah, John had said that his relationship was one that that he'd earned out of, he'd earned out of it. It had been an earner for him. Um, but that was as far as the conversation went."

MD: "Davidson was taking money from Clifford Norris?"

PUTNAM: "Uh, quite possibly, yes."

MD: "In one of Britain's most famous murder cases, you're telling me that a section of the investigating team was corrupt and in the pocket of Clifford Norris, the father of one of the suspects?"

PUTNAM: "From my conversation that I had with John Davidson on that day, I would say that John Davidson was receiving cash from Clifford Norris by his expression that he was getting a nice little earner out of it."

John Yates was asked about the allegations of corruption being made about John Davidson. He said the following: "From all of the evidence that I have seen, all of the intelligence that I have seen, I have no doubt that he (Davidson) was corrupt." Mr Yates stated that Neil Putnam was "a credible witness and a witness of truth", but he denied that Neil Putnam had made the allegation of a corrupt link between John Davidson and Clifford Norris at the time of his debrief.

F. The Independent Police Complaints Commission's conclusions in 2006

Following the broadcast of 'The Boys Who Killed Stephen Lawrence' on 26 July 2006, Mr and Mrs Lawrence made separate complaints to the IPCC against the Metropolitan Police. John Wadham, the Deputy Chair of the IPCC, made a decision that there would be an independent investigation. The relevant parts of the terms of reference of that investigation were as follows:

"I a. To investigate the allegation that ex Detective Sergeant John Davidson had a 'corrupt relationship' with Clifford Norris.

"I b. To investigate whether any such 'corruption' tainted the actions of DS Davidson either directly or indirectly in the first investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence.

“2a. To investigate the allegation that ex Detective Constable Neil Putnam provided information to the Metropolitan Police concerning the ‘relationship’ of DS Davidson and Clifford Norris and in particular that:

“No action was taken by the Metropolitan Police in relation to this information.

“The information was not passed to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

“2b. To investigate the allegation that the Metropolitan Police despite knowing or strongly suspecting that DS Davidson was ‘corrupt’ misinformed and/or withheld such knowledge/ suspicion from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

“2c. To make recommendations regarding any possible criminal or misconduct culpability revealed.”

The investigation was conducted by a team of investigators from the London and South East region. Three Commissioners were appointed to oversee the investigation and to establish a Strategic Support Group (SSG). The Chair of the SSG was a Commissioner from the Wales and South West region.

The IPCC reported that it had been given ‘full access’ to material held by the Metropolitan Police relating to Operation Russia, and it took possession of a number of documents, including the records of debriefing interviews with Neil Putnam.

As part of its investigation, the IPCC interviewed “a number of police officers, former police officers and witnesses including: members of Mr Putnam’s family, leading counsel, former members of the CPS, and members of the media.”

The IPCC recorded that it had been given full access to information available to the MPS relating to the original investigation into Stephen Lawrence’s death, and material generated by other investigations such as the Police Complaints Authority/Kent complaint investigation.

Significantly, the IPCC also recorded that it had been given “access to confidential information held by the Anti-Corruption Command of the Metropolitan Police. Access was obtained to reports concerning alleged ‘corruption’ of a number of former officers of the Metropolitan Police. It was apparent at the outset that the MPS conducted a number of different inquiries over the possibility that ‘corruption’ may have been a feature of the Murder Investigation. Copies of these reports have been obtained”.

The IPCC considered the process by which Neil Putnam was debriefed and the information that he provided.

“It is clear from the documentation examined by the IPCC investigation team, that there was confusion as to whether David Norris (deceased) was related to Clifford Norris. From enquiries made during this investigation, there is no apparent relationship between the two men.”

Summary of the relevant accounts given to the IPCC

Neil Putnam

Mr Putnam was interviewed by the IPCC on 14 September 2006. He gave the following account:

He had never had any significant dealings with John Davidson until he joined the Regional Crime Squad. Davidson sat at a desk next to him and was his Detective Sergeant.

His relationship with Davidson was very good. He played in a football team which was coached/managed by Davidson. He visited Davidson's house on a number of occasions and met his family. Davidson came to his son's christening.

Davidson was known as 'OJ' – Obnoxious Jock – and he had been told that he was the sort of man who didn't suffer fools.

After he was arrested he was taken to the Magistrates' Court and then remanded into custody. He was taken to Folkestone. He was kept there until September when he was granted bail. All of the debriefing was done in Folkestone.

They were working together on a Sunday before a bank holiday Monday (either May or Whitsun) either in 1993 or 1994. It was a couple of months after Davidson joined the team. They were investigating robberies of jewellers in South London. "We were waiting in the office, there was only John and I in the office on this Sunday afternoon and we were just generally chatting, waiting for a phone call... we started having a conversation and I brought up the fact that John had been on the Lawrence Inquiry, and I can't remember what the question was I asked him exactly, but it was something along the lines that that must have been a tough one to be on something like that and he responded and then somehow, and I don't know quite how it came around, but he suddenly came out with the fact, he turned around and said that... he had been... I'm sure he'd been the Family Liaison Officer dealing with the family, the Lawrence family and that I then came up with the fact, I said 'You know it's so obvious that those boys were guilty' and everything else, and I remember he sort of laughed and turned round and said that he'd been dealing with Old Man Norris, that he'd been looking after him, Old Man Norris had acted as an informant for them and that they'd looked after him and that he'd looked after them, and it had been... and then he said the words it was a little earner."

Putnam was aware of the connection between the Norris boy and his father, and he knew that the South East Regional Crime Squad was currently working on Clifford Norris, "so you know I was a bit taken aback by it, but I just thought at that time I was also engaged in corrupt practices with other members of my team, so we didn't say anything more about it... and that's what I told the police later."

He knew from his experience that Davidson was referring to losing or hiding evidence, and that Clifford Norris had paid for it to protect his son, "he was giving them information and money in exchange for them doing whatever they did".

He concluded that more than one officer must have been involved because "police do not work corruptly independently".

He interpreted "Old Man Norris" as being the father of the boy Norris, the person who is known as Clifford Norris. "The only other man by the name of Norris that I knew was a man called David

Norris, who'd been an informant of the Metropolitan Police for many years, and I knew he was dead, he'd already been killed... and I knew it wasn't him because it was... because we were also talking in the context of the Lawrence Inquiry". He knew that Clifford Norris was "a criminal, I knew he was a gangster, he was a drug dealer".

He did not mention this to anyone prior to his arrest.

During the course of his debriefing exercise, he was visited by Detective Superintendent Yates, who told him that he had to tell them everything that he knew about corrupt practices or else he would be thrown out of the Witness Protection Scheme.

He explained his debriefing process and said "they would ask me to tell them about a subject and I would talk about it and they would write it down in a large A4 book. I remember that we spoke about John Davidson, I gave them all the details of the corruption that I was involved in with John Davidson that was... theft of some cocaine... he sold watches for me, and when he gave me some money from selling electrical goods... but then included in that time I turned round and told them about Stephen Lawrence and the conversation I'd had with John at East Dulwich Police Station in the RCS. I remember quite clearly Pat Walsh turning round and saying that 'that would blow the Metropolitan Police wide apart' because at the time we had the Macpherson Inquiry going on and there had already been some criticisms, basically it would blow the Metropolitan Police wide apart and that they would speak about it. As far as I was concerned it was recorded in the book, in the A4 book which I was then invited to sign... I remember asking whether they wanted me to make a statement about what I said, they said no, not at this time, because other people would want to speak to me regarding that and I assumed by the people at the Macpherson Inquiry".

There were dozens of A4 notebooks that were used, "a kind of light blue Banner notebook". He assumed that everything that he was saying was written down. It was recorded at the same time that he was telling them about the other Davidson allegations. Walsh and Esposito were there. Hibberd could have been around on the fringes.

The debriefers said that they were going to have to "take that back" because it was something that they could not make a decision on. He is sure that it was recorded in a notebook, although it may not have been in the same notebook as the other Davidson allegations.

Walsh did not say "this will blow the Met apart" in the debrief, it was after the debrief when he came to see him and asked him if he was sure about Lawrence. It is possible that Esposito was there as well, but he cannot be sure. Walsh seemed to him to be suggesting "are you sure you wanna be saying this".

This was not tape-recorded. Only the parts where he was admitting his own criminality were tape-recorded.

There was no statement about it and he thought that the "Macpherson people" were going to come and see him to take a statement.

He subsequently asked what was happening about it and was told that the Macpherson people would come and see him.

When he had finished giving evidence and had been released from prison he had a meeting off the M25, at Clackett Lane. He met with Bob Morrell and Simon from Witness Protection. They discussed his pension and a letter that they had written asking for no more than a 25% reduction in his pension. As they were eating he asked what was happening with the Stephen Lawrence issue as the

Macpherson people had never come to see him. Bob Morrell told him that they did not think that he was needed. He assumed that Morrell knew what he was talking about. That was the last time that he spoke to any police officer about it.

He was shown some hardback A4 books and asked whether they were the books used in the debrief. He thought that there were more books, it seemed to him that there was a pile of books about 12–18 inches high.

He is pretty sure that when he mentioned Davidson's connection to Clifford Norris it was not just informal "chit-chat".

He did not discuss these matters with Witness Protection because they were not interested.

He told his wife Gail, who was incensed by the allegation, and raised it again with his debriefers in either January or February 1999. They said that someone would be in touch and he left it at that.

He was surprised that he had not been called to give evidence at the Inquiry. When he saw the boys coming out, and the demonstrations, he thought "why haven't I been called?" He mentioned this to someone when he was staying in Horsham. He cannot remember who it was.

He told Gail, Graeme McLagan, Vikram Dodd and Mark Daly.

He cannot recall if he mentioned it to his solicitor.

He may have discussed it with other detainees, but he did not know their true names.

Graeme McLagan called him after the Daly programme was broadcast and asked why he did not tell him about it because he would have used it. He said to McLagan that he did know all about it, and that had been why he and Gail had approached McLagan.

He told Gail whilst he was on remand in custody. Within days of the committal proceedings in *Clark and Drury*, Gail called Graeme McLagan and told him about the Davidson allegation. After he was released, McLagan got in touch and came to see him at his home address about the *Panorama* programme.

He was interviewed extensively by McLagan and he cannot say if he mentioned the Davidson issue. He is certain that he mentioned it at some point in his discussions with McLagan. He believes that "they put that in the too difficult box".

The next time he spoke to McLagan was when *Bent Coppers* (the book) was being published.

Putnam was asked about the expression "good earner" used in *Bent Coppers* to describe David Norris (deceased). He said that he was sure that Davidson was referring to "Old Man Norris", and that they were discussing it in the context of the Lawrence Inquiry. "The conversation I had with OJ was about Stephen Lawrence and it was old man Clifford being Clifford Norris, Old Man Norris being Clifford Norris, definitely, without a shadow of a doubt."

Subsequently he got a call from Vikram Dodd and they met up. He told Dodd about the conversation with Davidson. He told Dodd that he had been told that it would "blow the Met apart".

Mark Daly came to see him, having spoken to Vikram Dodd. He asked him if he would be surprised to learn that the Met was denying all knowledge of it. He was incensed by this and decided to do the programme.

The notes of his debrief were put to him and he cannot explain why it does not appear in the criminality or the intelligence books which cover Davidson.

Graeme McLagan

Graeme McLagan was spoken to by the IPCC on 30 August 2006. He stated the following:¹

McLagan referred to his notebooks of contact with Neil Putnam, indicating that there was no reference to Clifford Norris in the notes.

He had gained access to Putnam via an intermediary, who had stressed that one of the reasons that Putnam wanted to talk concerned the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

The contact started whilst Putnam was in prison, but McLagan did not speak to Putnam until after he was released.

Putnam's motivation for speaking to him appeared to be that he was a Christian and felt the need to confess and unburden himself, and also he felt badly about the Stephen Lawrence case and wanted to assist, particularly because he knew that John Davidson had been involved and he had told CIB that Davidson was corrupt.

McLagan got hold of copies of Putnam's three statements relating to Davidson.

He has no recollection of any mention of Clifford Norris or Davidson's connection to Clifford Norris in the Stephen Lawrence case.

He did not pursue the Davidson matters in the *Panorama* programme in 2000 because John Yates had told him that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. There was therefore only one small reference to Putnam having labelled Davidson as corrupt. Yates had explained to McLagan the lengths that they had gone to in order to corroborate the Davidson allegations. McLagan was told by Yates that the details had been passed on to the Public Inquiry and that it had been Lord Macpherson's decision not to pass them on to the interested parties.

McLagan stated that in the interviews there was no mention of Clifford Norris or any conversation about him being a "good earner". The interview gave Putnam an ideal opportunity to detail any allegations he had about Davidson and any association with Clifford Norris. If there had been anything, he would have expected him to say it at the time.

As to the original, unedited footage, McLagan was unable to assist as to whether this had been retained.

In relation to page 279 of *Bent Coppers* in which David Norris (deceased) is described as being "a good earner", McLagan stated that this comment was not attributable to a single individual, but rather was a general comment in SERCS when Putnam joined.

One of Putnam's key concerns was the manner in which the Stephen Lawrence case had been managed and that what he had said about Davidson's corruption should have been explored.

¹ From the IPCC interview notes [D68]

After the programme, Mark Bright and/or Vikram Dodd contacted him to ask for access to Putnam. McLagan told them that Putnam did not wish to see them and it was not progressed.

About two years previously Mark Daly had approached him in connection with the corruption allegations in Stephen Lawrence. McLagan was of the opinion that the corruption allegations had already been explored.

He bumped into John Yates at the Old Bailey, who told him that he had had a disturbing interview with Mark Daly. Daly had told Yates that he had spoken to the Macpherson Panel and all of them had said that Yates did not pass on any information regarding the potential corruption of John Davidson, which would have been of interest to them over the Stephen Lawrence case. Yates was very disturbed by this and had subsequently secured written proof that he had provided this information.

He had seen an advance copy of the Daly programme when he was freelancing at the BBC. He expressed his concern at the time. He felt that they were acting on “flimsy, hearsay” evidence. He considered it to be “poor journalism”. He felt that the programme should have included Macpherson’s comments about alleged corruption.

In relation to Vikram Dodd’s article, he feels that Putnam has enlarged on things as time has gone on.

He was spoken to again on 13 June 2007. He stated the following:²

He confirmed that from the transcripts of the *Panorama* interview with Putnam in 2000 there were two pages which related to John Davidson, and one earlier mention. The earlier mention had been when there was discussion about the disposal of money from Briar Cottage. The conversation finished abruptly and then the next recording started with a conversation about the nickname “O.J.” He confirmed that there may have been some conversation not covered by the tape.

He stated that there had been no mention of Clifford Norris and that the interview had presented Putnam with a significant opportunity to do so.

He stated that he had visited Jubilee House to be given access to covert material involving Evelyn Fleckney and Bob Clark in accordance with an undertaking by the MPS. When he arrived there, there was no one there to meet him and eventually he was dealt with by Neil Hibberd. After taking advice, Hibberd produced a transcript of the covert product, together with an undertaking which he had to sign. There was no mention of John Davidson at that time.

When asked about the Hibberd/Hamilton Memorandum in August 2000, he said that he believed it must have been at about the same time as his visit to Jubilee House “bearing in mind the nature of the requests which do seem to suggest a connection between JD and Norris”.

He set out his rationale for the requests that he made. In relation to David Hamilton’s response, he felt that someone somewhere had mixed up the two Norrises and this may have been Neil Putnam.

He made it clear that he would have pursued any suggestion that Davidson had been mixed up with Clifford Norris, and had this been mentioned to him then he would have brought it up with John Yates during their subsequent contact.

He felt that Daly’s work had been “bad journalism” as there was absolutely no evidence on the corruption issue.

² From the IPCC interview notes [D177]

When discussing Operation Russia and Davidson's evidence to the Macpherson Inquiry he felt that the Met did not appear to have held anything back, stating that Davidson's activities had been mentioned during the Home Office Select Committee in December 1997.

Statement of John Yates dated 9 February 2007 to the IPCC:

"I do not believe it has ever been established if there were any close links, corrupt or otherwise, between Davidson and Clifford Norris, although I am aware now that Davidson may have been present at arrests/searches of Clifford Norris' address at some stage during the 1990s."

John Yates stated that he believes that Putnam has mistaken Clifford Norris for David Norris (deceased) who was handled by Davidson.

In relation to what the Inquiry was told about Davidson, Yates stated that he raised the issue with DAC Clark and Dept Comm Stevens in late July/August 1998, as soon as they had been raised by Putnam. A letter was then written to Macpherson highlighting the potential issue and a reply was received.

"I am as certain as I can be that Putnam never raised issues around Clifford Norris and an alleged corrupt relationship with John Davidson at any time during his debriefing under the auspices of Operation Russia."

Statement of DS Murrill dated 11 December 2006:

He supervised the debrief of Putnam: "I do recall that Neil Putnam had not mentioned John Davidson in connection with the Stephen Lawrence enquiry by way of providing any evidence or suggestions that Davidson was in any way involved in covering up the murder." Murrill suggested that the details of what was known were communicated to Macpherson in a letter from AC Roy Clark.

Statement of DCI Hibberd dated 24 January 2007:

He was one of the officers involved in debriefing Neil Putnam.

"Neil Putnam never passed information to me about a corrupt relationship between Clifford Norris and ex-Detective Sergeant John Davidson." He was the single point of contact for Graeme McLagan "who claimed that he had been given unrestricted access to a number of anti-corruption investigations". He assisted McLagan in getting material. "McLagan asserted that he had been given unrestricted access to all of the Operation Russia investigation material by the then Deputy Commissioner, Sir John Stevens." Documents considered by Hibberd included a complaints history relating to Davidson. States: "Historically it is believed that Davidson was a co-handler of David Norris (deceased) who was the uncle of Stephen Norris, suspected of involvement in the murder of Stephen Lawrence." [This same error appears in Yates' statement.] He stated that at the time he prepared his report he believed that "David Norris had been related to a Stephen Norris who I believed to be one of the suspects". States that at no time did Putnam mention Clifford Norris or any corrupt link to Davidson.

Statement of DS Walsh dated 7 February 2007:

One of the debriefing officers stated that Putnam's allegations are "without substance or foundation". Never mentioned Clifford Norris or any corrupt relationship with John Davidson.

Statement of Paul Bennett dated 3 October 2006:

A family protection/welfare officer, who provided witness protection for Putnam. He could not recall Putnam mentioning Clifford Norris or John Davidson.

Statement of Vincenzo Esposito dated 29 November 2006:

A debriefing officer did not recall Putnam mentioning a corrupt relationship between Davidson and Clifford Norris.

"I'm confident that if NP made allegations regarding X and Y that involved him or certainly involved members of the force that were complicit in acts of corruption then we would have to note it down because we didn't know what he was going to say... and would tend to suggest that if Neil did mention any relationship between Davidson and Clifford Norris then it would be in these books, unless the one allegation he did make we simply didn't write down for whatever reasons which seems bizarre because we wrote down so much."

He stated that if such information had been given it should have been in the Davidson section of the notes.

In 'chats' with Putnam: "He would talk about a lot of things, but we were there simply as someone to listen to what he was saying. He spoke about a lot of things, but we were there simply as someone to listen to... if he did start talking about specific operational matters we would try and steer him away from that as it was not the correct forum to discuss such things."

"The name David Norris does not mean anything to me, nor does the name Clifford Norris... I have no recollection of Neil Putnam ever making the allegation that John Davidson had a corrupt relationship with Clifford Norris at any time, nor do I recall ever hearing about this allegation from any of my colleagues at any time... I can't say if I discussed the Lawrence investigation with him; it might have come up as the Macpherson Inquiry was going on at the same time so it would have been a topical issue but I really can't remember."

Conclusions expressed by the IPCC

"The CPS Visa Team were of the opinion that it was the lack of corroborative evidence which resulted in their decision not to prosecute Davidson, rather than a 'public interest' reason. Indeed, the CPS view was that, had there been independent evidence, the likelihood was that Davidson would have been charged.

"So the assertion made to both McLagan and Mr Daly that Davidson was not charged because it was not in the Metropolitan Police's interest, owing to his involvement in the Lawrence murder investigation, is not sustainable.

"A former member of the CPS, who in 1998 was part of the 'Visa Team'... was seen by the IPCC investigation team... He was aware of the fact that John Davidson was a member of the Lawrence investigation team. He also states that he was aware that Davidson had an association with Clifford Norris and when he saw the programme, 'The Boys Who Killed Stephen Lawrence', he was not surprised at the 'link' being mentioned. This was an important part of the IPCC investigation to establish the 'link' between Davidson and Clifford Norris; however, the CPS barrister was unable to establish the source of the information that linked the two.

“There is no evidence to support that Neil Putnam told his debriefing officers of an alleged ‘corrupt relationship’ between John Davidson and Clifford Norris which had influenced the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence.

“The evidence from the transcripts of the *Panorama* programme, ‘Bent Coppers’, broadcast in December 2000 is compelling in that it clearly provided Mr Putnam with his opportunity to raise the alleged ‘Clifford Norris/John Davidson link’. There is no evidence to suggest that he did.

“There is no doubt that Neil Putnam told officers debriefing him about the allegations of ‘corruption’ involving him and John Davidson. He also provided evidence to help convict former colleagues of corruption. It is clear that he also told family members and others, including journalists, about the allegations. The officers involved in the debriefing of Mr Putnam deny that he told them of any specific ‘corrupt relationship’ involving Davidson and the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation... There is no corroborative evidence to support the allegation that Mr Putnam told any Metropolitan Police Officer of a ‘corrupt link’ between Clifford Norris and John Davidson or of any specific ‘corruption’ involving the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation. I am of the view that this ‘allegation’ is not substantiated.”

As to the alleged failure to advise the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry of concerns relating to Detective Sergeant Davidson, the IPCC concluded:

“It is clear that Davidson had already given evidence to the Inquiry before Putnam had implicated him in any ‘criminal allegations’. It is also apparent that Putnam had not been arrested when the correspondence between the Inquiry and the Deputy Commissioner took place in June 1998.

...

“The IPCC investigation team has examined the personal files of the Officer ‘XX’ and of ex-Detective Sergeant Davidson, and whilst both former officers were operating in the detective areas in South London it does not appear that they were ever on the same squad or station. However, it is accepted that police officers are associated to colleagues from other stations and areas.

“There is no evidence to suggest that the Metropolitan Police withheld information concerning the integrity of Davidson from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. In fact, it is clear from the correspondence obtained during the investigation that the MPS ensured Sir William Macpherson was aware of the emerging facts concerning the allegations around Davidson.”

As to the consideration of corruption issues generally:

“It has been established that four reports were compiled in 1999/2000 concerning ‘intelligence around corruption issues, and links with known criminals’. However, no evidence has been discovered in relation to the ‘corrupt relationship’ of any officer on the Lawrence Murder investigation.

“The IPCC investigation has attempted to establish a ‘proven link’ between John Davidson and Clifford Norris. This has resulted in interviewing a convicted murderer serving a term of life imprisonment and researching the files of retired and deceased police officers.

“There are a number of concerns about the ‘activities’ of a former Metropolitan Police Commander and his link with ‘corruption’. Previous investigations have been undertaken and nothing proven against the former officer.

...

“To date the IPCC investigation has not been able to establish a ‘link’ between Clifford Norris and John Davidson, or any ‘corruption’ in the original Stephen Lawrence murder investigation.

“We have found no evidence in support of the ‘allegations’ made during the course of the programme. The former member of the CPS does state that he believes that he was advised of an ‘association between Clifford Norris and John Davidson’; however, he was unable to find any document to source this fact.”

During the course of the IPCC investigation, comment was made by a number of former senior officers from the MPS that “CIB3 were determined to investigate any ‘allegations of corruption’ and had there been evidence to suggest ‘corruption’ affected the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation they would have investigated the allegations with rigour.”

G. What Neil Putnam said about this issue during the course of the retrial of *R. v Clark and Drury* in 2011

We have explained the circumstances of this retrial in our main report, including summarising the position adopted by the Prosecution in relation to Neil Putnam. The significant parts of his evidence are as follows:

[Questions asked by A. Jones QC for Robert Clark]

Q – Is what you said to the IPCC investigators true?

NP – Yes

...

Q – Can you just help us... how you came to appear on the *Panorama* to say these things about Detective Sergeant Davidson?

NP – I was approached by Mark Daly of the BBC. He had got my telephone number from the reporter, by Vikram Dodd... Mark Daly came to visit me and asked me some questions and basically at first I didn't want to do anything at all. But he kept pestering me and pestering me and pestering me and he came up eventually and turned around and said that, you know, basically that everything was going to be denied by the police and CIB that I had ever said anything at all regarding the Lawrence Inquiry. And I thought, I have said it before, and I will say it again, so I said yes, I agreed to do the programme.

Q – Were you paid for doing the programme?

NP – No, not at all, never received a penny.

Q – Have you tried to sell this story to the papers at all?

NP – No.

Putnam clarified that he was taken to Horsham after he was found guilty and it was at this point that he asked whether anyone was going to see him from the Macpherson Inquiry. He asked Officer Esposito, Officer Walsh and also Detective Inspector Murrill about this.

He spoke to Bob and Simon on the M25; they were discussing his pension and he asked again if anyone from the Macpherson Inquiry was going to see him about what he had said about Stephen Lawrence. They said that they did not think they would because it wasn't needed. He was surprised.

He was asked what he knew of DS Davidson's involvement in the Lawrence investigation. They discussed the case in early summer or late spring. It was either the May Day bank holiday or the Whitsun bank holiday. Putnam asked Davidson about the Lawrence Inquiry and the police investigation.

"... and I can't remember exact how the exact words that I used but eventually... it was along the lines that he said that they had looked after Old Man Norris."

"And that they had had a little earner out of it."

He did not know who the "they" were.

Q – Old Man Norris meant who?

NP – The father of one of the boys that was accused.

Q – Was he referring to a David Norris who had been killed in 1990?

NP – No, definitely not.

Q – Did you ever know that David Norris?

NP – I only saw him from a distance on one or two occasions.

Putnam clarified that this was said on a Sunday when it was just him and DS Davidson in the office.

He stated that he had sent this to Walsh and Esposito when they would be debriefing him. He looked at his diary to identify possible dates when this was said. He cannot recall how they responded. "... all I do recall is DS Walsh coming in and saying to me that this was going to blow the Metropolitan Police apart."

He was not aware that Davidson had given evidence to the Lawrence Inquiry in June 1998.

He believed that there were more notebooks than have been produced.

Q – Did you tell anybody else what you told the police about this about Davidson and the Lawrence Inquiry?

NP – I told my wife.

Q – When did you tell her?

NP – After I had confessed what I did. What I did was I promised her that every time I confess to something to the officers that I would, in my next phone, tell her what so she knew exactly what was going on, so I told her and I can't remember if I told her on the phone or I told her on the next visit that she had, and I told her about that and she was, I would say, quite incensed by it to be honest.

He was aware that his wife had spoken to the journalist Graham McLagan in 1999 after the committal.

Vikram Dodd had contacted him not long after he came out from prison.

NP – ... I know I told them about it, I remember it being written down, ... but I remember them saying... They turned around and said they were going to get somebody from Macpherson Inquiry.

The notes of what he had said about Davidson on 28 July 1998 were put to him.

Asked about the 2000 *Panorama* he said:

"I told Graeme McLagan. I know we spoke about it, but as I seem to recall, the director, the female, a lady director, I can't remember, she didn't want to get dragged down with that side of it, she said that was something else."

Putnam stated that he had already disclosed the information to the investigating team when he was in Folkestone. There was no question of not disclosing it because he was on parole.

A letter was shown to him during the course of questioning which appeared to be a letter from him to his solicitor Colin Reynolds whilst he was in custody dated 23 June 1999.

The letter refers to financial affairs and the settlement of his pension; it contains the following words: "I understood that my pension will be paid out after sentence with interest. Have we been misled yet again by my former employer? Originally, they passed a matter of pay until sentence and now this. I feel if forfeiture is made against me I'm being further punished. Not only do I receive a term of imprisonment from the courts, but I received a financial penalty. The long term implications were not exactly good before, but I feel now as though I am falling down an abyss. I had hoped for a bit of good faith from CIEP and particularly John Yates who I have described in the past as an honourable man. It seems to me they wanted a pound and a half of flesh from me... I see non-cooperation with the Crown as one means, also as Gail has mentioned, certain sections of the media are interested in speaking to me, particularly concerning possible corrupt cover up by senior Scotland Yard officials in relation to a recently well-publicised matter."

Q – Now is that a reference to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry?

NP – It was, yes. ... there were certain members... People, I knew at that time that it was Graham McLagan wanted to speak to me and that I would tell him and it would all be publicised.

Q – Tell him what?

NP – The conversation I had overheard or I had had with John Davidson.

He was asked why this did not feature in his 1999 statements and said: "I had assumed that the Macpherson Inquiry and the officers that were involved who were attached to that would come and see me and take a statement from me regarding it."

Putnam was asked about his knowledge of Davidson's relationship with "Informant I".

Putnam confirmed that he was sure that he had told the debriefers about the link between Davidson and Clifford Norris, although in cross-examination he made it clear that he did not have a specific recollection of it being written down. When Walsh said that the information would blow the Metropolitan Police apart, Esposito may not have been there; that would have been in the custody suite area.

When asked if he could have been mistaken as to who he was referring to and whether this could be David Norris, Putnam said: "It was never, ever David Norris. It was never David Norris. I knew that David Norris was dead. When I was talking to John Davidson and John was talking to me I knew then that David Norris was dead and the person that we were talking about was Clifford Norris; no one else."

On Graeme McLagan:

Q – Do you accept that, in the course of that *Panorama*, you did not make specific reference to Davidson Lawrence and the little earner that Mr Davidson told you about?

NP – Not on what was broadcast, no... I cannot recall the conversation – all the conversations I had with Graeme McLagan all those years ago.

...

Q – Is it fair to say that you cannot specifically remember whether you told Graeme McLagan about the Davidson Lawrence issue about which you're giving evidence today?

NP – I have told him about it at some point, but I don't know when. I don't even recall whether it was recorded by the cameraman.

When asked if he was aware of the allegations made against Davidson during the Public Inquiry, he said, "I still don't know to this day."

Putnam described his decision to speak to Mark Daly about these allegations as being "the biggest mistake I ever made... I ended up losing my wife because of it. I ended up getting divorced, but that's another story because she didn't want me to carry on pushing it forward".

A number of the debriefing and witness protection officers also gave evidence, as did the journalist Graeme McLagan. They all stated that Neil Putnam had not mentioned the allegation of a corrupt link between Davidson and Clifford Norris to them.

Gail Putnam gave evidence in support of her former husband and the circumstances in which he had spoken to Graeme McLagan.

H. Other material relevant to this issue

We have also considered the following material capable of supporting Neil Putnam's account:

- i) Information provided to us by the journalist Michael Gillard.
- ii) A recollection of the CPS lawyer Martin Polaine.

Michael Gillard

During the course of our Review, we have spoken to the journalist Michael Gillard. Mr Gillard has written extensively on the subject of police corruption, including in an updated edition of his book *The Untouchables*. During the course of our meeting, and subsequently in writing, Mr Gillard indicated that:

- i) after much consideration he felt unable to engage with our Review;

- ii) this was on the basis that the review lacked “the necessary independence and credibility” as a result of Mark Ellison’s involvement in the retrial of *R. v Clark and Drury* and the position that he adopted in relation to Neil Putnam.

In our main report we have explained how we have sought to address this suggestion of a lack of independence. On 2 September 2013, Mr Gillard provided us with an extensive note. We summarise the assertions made in this note as follows:

- i) Putnam had turned supergrass against his former detective colleagues Clark and Drury in 1998. He had also claimed that John Davidson, a Met detective on the initial Lawrence murder inquiry, had admitted in 1994 that he had been in a corrupt relationship with the gangster father of one of the suspects, David Norris.
- ii) Putnam has consistently said that he mentioned the Davidson admission to his Met handlers in 1998 but there was a high-level cover-up to hide him from the Macpherson Public Inquiry. He also claims a BBC journalist assisted the Met cover-up by suppressing the allegation in a *Panorama* documentary about Putnam. There can be no doubt that all this goes directly to the remit of your review, which is operating to the civil standard of proof.
- iii) During the *Clark and Drury* retrial, Mark Ellison QC cross-examined Putnam on the basis that he was lying about corruption and cover-up in the initial Lawrence murder inquiry. Police officers and the BBC journalist, however, who denied the cover-up, were presented as witnesses of truth.
- iv) Mr Gillard indicated that he strongly disagreed with any such conclusion and believes there is enough on the balance of probabilities to recommend an independent inquiry into the link and cover-up claims.
- v) There had been an unprecedented row within the BBC over Putnam, editorial standards and McLagan’s relationship with senior figures in the Met, in particular former Assistant Commissioner John Yates, who ran the Putnam supergrass operation.
- vi) McLagan was a witness in the *Clark and Drury* retrial. He was summonsed by the prosecution effectively to confirm on oath what he had told the IPCC in 2006, that Putnam had never mentioned the link and cover-up in their dealings for his *Panorama* ‘The Bent Cop’ broadcast by the BBC in December 2000.
- vii) The IPCC was conducting an investigation after the BBC broadcast in July 2006 of journalist Mark Daly’s documentary (‘The Boys Who Killed Stephen Lawrence’) in which Putnam spoke about the link and cover-up.
- viii) McLagan was very critical to the IPCC of the BBC and Daly’s documentary. The note of his interview also revealed a very close relationship between McLagan and the Met’s senior management at the time he made his *Panorama* documentary and subsequently. In the retrial, McLagan tried unsuccessfully to prevent disclosure of the IPCC note of his interview, which he nevertheless accepts is accurate.

We have included consideration of many of the issues raised by Mr Gillard in our main report.

The recollection of Martin Polaine

As we have indicated above, in his statement to the IPCC in 2006, Martin Polaine, the CPS lawyer advising on Operation Russia, stated that when he saw 'The Boys Who Killed Stephen Lawrence' he was not surprised by the suggested link between John Davidson and Clifford Norris. We have spoken to Mr Polaine as part of our Review and we explored this issue with him as follows:

- MS MORGAN: ... Were you aware of Davidson giving evidence before Macpherson at that stage, so prior to the Putnam debrief?
- MR POLAINE: I don't know. Out of interest, I was keeping quite an eye on Macpherson, but I can't remember...
- MR ELLISON: We can jog your memory on that because I think that it is quite difficult to remember the dates. He gave evidence I think originally in June 1998, but he certainly came back to be cross-examined by the family on 16 July.
- MR POLAINE: Yes.
- MR ELLISON: And there had been a disclosure exercise between those dates which involved the inquiry?
- MR POLAINE: Yes.
- MR ELLISON: So he was one of the final witnesses when he came back to give evidence in July?
- MR POLAINE: Yes. I don't know. For obvious reasons, I was keeping an interest, a sort of weather eye on it, you know, from reporting I might have been aware.
- MR ELLISON: Would you have been aware that he was pretty much at the top or equal top billing of their list for the potential corruption that they were alleging in the Lawrence investigation, because Davidson was a prime target?
- MR POLAINE: Yes.
- MR ELLISON: You were aware of that?
- MR POLAINE: Yes.
- MS MORGAN: Were you aware of the overall suggestions of corruption linked to Clifford Norris that were being made at that point on behalf of the family?
- MR POLAINE: I think that I would have been in the sense of simply by dint of, you know, keeping myself apprised of what was being said at the Inquiry, so I think that I would have been.
- ...
- MS MORGAN: Coming on then to what you were able to say to the IPCC in 2006, and set against everything that you told us about the chronology, you commented to the IPCC that you were not surprised at a suggestion of a link between Clifford Norris and John Davidson.

MR POLAINE: That is right, yes.

MS MORGAN: Can you help us any more with that?

MR POLAINE: Literally, when I heard that in the *Panorama* programme, it was, it didn't come as a surprise. I genuinely don't think it was sort of déjà vu or something. My recollection is that at an early stage, obviously, when I was looking at Fleckney's debrief, the name David Norris arose and, of course, that was the unconnected David Norris, the David Norris who was murdered.

MS MORGAN: Yes.

MR POLAINE: And I remember getting clear in my own mind who that David Norris was at a very early stage. I think that even with the Met solicitors, there seemed to be some confusion over the two David Norrises, but I remember getting that very clear at an early stage. The reason is that, obviously, when you read in the debrief that he was murdered, it was "Hang on, who is this?" I remember knowing that at an early stage. I have got this recollection – and I still have this recollection – of someone – and hand on heart I don't think from CIBIC, I think from the investigative side – someone saying to me about the link between Davidson and Clifford Norris. That is why when I heard what Putnam was now alleging I wasn't surprised. I still have got that recollection of some sort of briefing – and when I say "briefing", an oral briefing where I was getting background on this, so at a fairly early stage I would say.

MS MORGAN: So fitting into the chronology, as we have been through it, you said that you didn't know about Davidson, he wasn't particularly on your radar.

MR POLAINE: That is right.

MS MORGAN: You may have known about the allegations as they were in Macpherson and the potential significance of him as a corrupt player.

MR POLAINE: Yes.

MS MORGAN: You know about what Putnam has said in the debrief.

MR POLAINE: Yes.

MS MORGAN: And then you know about Davidson as a picture from the intelligence.

MR POLAINE: Yes.

MS MORGAN: At what stage, do you think, it might be that...

MR POLAINE: I would say this must have... after Putnam's debrief, this must have been, I would say, around about the time of the advice file, either the advice was before that or something like that, but it must have been around that time. Certainly, you know, in my mind I would say it was certainly before I had given the advice. I suppose that one is looking at, depending on when the advice file was submitted, I think that one is talking about July or August, I guess. But, you know, I still have that recollection.

- MR ELLISON: Can I just come back, because trying to plug that into the context of what was going on at the time, July 1998, if you are keeping a weather eye on Macpherson, the allegation that Davidson must have been connected to Clifford Norris is coming out in the Macpherson Inquiry.
- MR POLAINE: Yes.
- MR ELLISON: So the context in which you are having it mentioned to you by somebody who is connected to the investigation, which seems to be around about the same time, is what is the person telling you about Davidson and Clifford Norris?
- MR POLAINE: I am just trying to work back. The fact about association, certainly.
- MR ELLISON: So confirmation of some sort that, as a matter of fact, there is a connection between Davidson and Norris.
- MR POLAINE: You see, I can't remember it being a case where, you know, I heard it in the Inquiry and then said to CIB3, "Oh, is this right?" My recollection is actually of being given some sort of oral briefing or being told that orally, not in confirmation of something that I had asked. My recollection – and you know what it is like, as time goes past, you try to work out whether you have been contaminated by later things and that is what is actually quite difficult. My sort of recollection is it being flagged up to me, Davidson's relevance to the Lawrence case, and it being flagged up the association between Davidson and Clifford Norris. In my recollection, if I strip away, you know, anything that might have contaminated me afterwards, that is what I seem to recollect.
- MR ELLISON: Can I just wind forward a little bit, because Macpherson reports in February 1999 and in the report, presumably you have cast an eye over that?
- MR POLAINE: Yes, absolutely.
- MR ELLISON: He is saying that there is not a shred of evidence that Davidson and Norris had any connection at all.
- MR POLAINE: Yes.
- MR ELLISON: Can you remember what you thought then when you read that in comparison to what you had been told as to whether there was a connection? In other words, was it incongruous or not? I am just trying to use it as some sort of test for actually what was being conveyed to you in the summer.
- MR POLAINE: That is a fair point.
- MR ELLISON: Did you think, "That's strange, you know, they told me there was"?
- MR POLAINE: Yes. I can't remember... I mean, I did go through the Macpherson report, but I can't remember a reaction either way. I genuinely cannot remember a reaction either way. It would be helpful to sort of, you know, time that. But all I can remember is this oral briefing at a very early stage. That is all I can remember.
- MS MORGAN: And who would have given that oral briefing?

- MR POLAINE: That is what I was trying to work out. I am pretty sure it wasn't anyone on the intelligence side. I think that it was someone on the investigative side. Now, the reality is who would it have been? Bob Murrell would be, you know, a likely candidate, I would think, because he was the one often... who was delivering papers and you would often have a conversation around issues, but I can't remember it coming from Bob and I think that I would have done. John Yates or Barry Howe, I guess, although I did see other members of Operation Russia and other officers would come up. In terms of discussions on those things at that early stage, it would tend to be confined to John Yates, Barry Howe and Bob Murrell, really.
- MS MORGAN: Given the nature of what you were looking at, the way you were approaching it, this was a briefing, not just a sort of chat, a gossip, you know, I use that word, but that wasn't the nature of the way you conducted your discussions?
- MR POLAINE: No. Obviously, sometimes, let's say, Bob Murrell might bring in the papers, you know, he might come into our rooms and we might stand and have a two or three minute discussion about what he had just given in and he might flag up if, you know, other things were expected in a couple of days, you know, this sort of thing. My recollection is... I mean, I am not suggesting anything terribly formal, but equally I am not saying standing in the corridor and saying, "By the way", you know. I remember this being – I don't think... It wasn't at Jubilee, I am saying it would have been, I think, at Ludgate Hill. On this one, I don't have a recollection of it being at Jubilee House.
- MS MORGAN: Just in the time frame that Mark identifies, reading the report at the end, so before the end of Macpherson...
- MR POLAINE: I would say in my own mind that this is before I had written the advice.
- MR ELLISON: Just to come back to the point, so your recollection is that it was a sort of statement by somebody who was in a major police investigation that there was a connection between Davidson and Norris, not that there was alleged to be in Macpherson, but that there was. In other words, it was some confirmation of there having been some relationship...
- MR POLAINE: My recollection is of the fact of it being said.
- MR ELLISON: Yes, but it is what was said.
- MR POLAINE: Absolutely. The fact of the association being said. Now, what I can't remember is, oh, did somebody say to me, just in case I had missed it, for instance, "Oh, this has just been alleged in the Macpherson Inquiry". I don't remember whether it was said like that or not, but the only thing that I would say is that, if it had been that, then scrawl forward to when Putnam comes forward to *Panorama*... You see when he then came forward, what I thought was, "Oh yes, that is what he did say", i.e. Putnam. So what was in my mind as of 2006 was that that is what Putnam said previously. If somebody had said to me, "Oh, don't forget last week it was alleged at the Inquiry that there was a link", then I would have been surprised if Putnam said it.

- MR ELLISON: So it is somebody from the investigation saying "This has been raised as a reality" and you think it was in the context of Putnam?
- MR POLAINE: Well, given that the time of when I think it was said, in other words, around about the time when I got the advice file before or I was going to get that or something, around that time, when, obviously, you have got Putnam who has just been debriefed, that is... Do I remember somebody saying "Oh, Putnam has just said..." No, I don't remember. It was the fact of, so I have obviously tied that, I suppose, to Putnam.
- MR ELLISON: You had assumed that it was from Putnam?
- MR POLAINE: Yes. I have never had a recollection of someone saying to me, "Putnam has just said", but, obviously, what my recollection is that somebody from the investigation saying to me that there is this association and time-wise it is that summer of 1998.
- MR ELLISON: Which you put down in your head to something that you think must have come from Putnam?
- MR POLAINE: Yes, that is a fair point.
- MR ELLISON: Was this an inconsequential fact in the context of the Macpherson Inquiry and the Norris/Davidson issue or something that you thought at the time "that's significant"?
- MR POLAINE: Well, not that it had any significance for my advice, but in terms of, you know, it put the individual in context. No, I mean, it wasn't... at that time it wasn't an earth shattering piece of news, because it had no bearing on that advice file.
- MR ELLISON: On your work?
- MR POLAINE: Yes.
- MR ELLISON: But you were keeping an eye on Macpherson.
- MR POLAINE: Yes, and also at this time I was still getting an understanding about the nature of a particular target or suspect, who they might be linked with. You know how you try to build a picture, so it was that more than anything.
- MR ELLISON: Did it ever appear in any of Putnam's debriefs that you were presented with?
- MR POLAINE: I don't remember seeing it in a debrief, no.

Appendix I2: Additional material relating to John Davidson

In reaching the conclusions set out in our main report, we have also had regard to the following material (summarised below):

- A. The career history of John Davidson
- B. John Davidson's role in the original investigation
- C. The discipline history of John Davidson prior to 1998
- D. Extracts from John Davidson's evidence to the Public Inquiry in 1998
- E. Miscellaneous documents relating to John Davidson

A. The career history of John Davidson

In order to place the allegations which have been made against John Davidson into context, we have established his career history as follows:

8.1.68

Joined the Glasgow City Police.

29.6.70

Transferred to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and served at Peckham Police Station. He was engaged in street duties, Home Beat and the Crime Squad.

December 1973–March 1976

Served as a Trainee Detective Constable at Peckham Criminal Investigation Department (CID), East Dulwich CID and Camberwell Crime Squad.

March 1976–November 1982

Served as a Detective Constable with the following postings: Southwark CID, M District Robbery Squad (Camberwell), Flying Squad New Scotland Yard, Catford CID and Catford/Lee Road/Sydenham Crime Squad.

November 1982

Promoted to Detective Sergeant at Peckham CID.

February 1983

Posted to Peckham Crime Squad 'Beat Crimes' Office.

October 1984

Posted to Peckham CID.

March 1986

Posted to SO1(7) Serious Crime Task Force.

January 1991

Posted to Penge CID.

October 1991

Posted to Beckenham Pro-Active Unit.

July 1992

Posted back to Penge CID (as an Acting Detective Inspector).

November 1992

Posted to 3 Area Major Incident Pool (where he was at the time of the murder of Stephen Lawrence on 22 April 1993).

April 1994

Posted to HO13 (South East Regional Crime Squad, SERCS), where he served alongside ex-Detective Constable Neil Putnam. (It was during this time that it is alleged that he engaged in corrupt activity with other SERCS officers.)

August 1994

Whilst posted to SERCS he was involved in the surveillance operation to trace and arrest Clifford Norris.

7.12.95

He was suspended from duty in respect of an investigation into his business relationship with an Australian businessman (Reg Grundy).

16.2.96

He reported sick for work.

30.3.98

He left the police on 'medical retirement'.

April 1998

He was due to appear before a Police Discipline Tribunal.

23.4.98

He was served with a Salmon Notice by the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, alleging failings in the handling of certain witnesses, including the 'informant' "James Grant", failings in his liaison with other police officers and in the interviews of Gary Dobson and Luke Knight.

24 and 27 April 1998

John Davidson gave evidence to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

16.7.98

John Davidson was recalled to give evidence before the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

B. John Davidson's role in the original investigation

The following chronology summarises John Davidson's role in the first weeks of the investigation, following Stephen Lawrence's murder on 22 April 1993. We have redacted the names of some individuals to protect their identities.

23.4.93

The following events are included for completeness, although John Davidson did not become involved in the investigation until 24 April:

13.50: Message Number 4 – First anonymous caller states “a group of youths on the Kidbrooke Estate who always carry large knives and threaten people. They may have been involved in last night’s stabbing. Two of them are Neil Acall [sic] and Dave Norris”. The message includes reference to 102 Bournbrook Road.

17.00: Team briefing

19.45: “James Grant” (not real name) comes to Plumstead Police Station and is seen by DC Budgen. Information provided by “James Grant” was recorded in Message Number 40 as follows: “A male attended RM [Plumstead] and stated that the persons responsible for the murder on the black youth, are Jamie and Neil Acourt of 102 Bournbrook Road SE3 together with David Norris and 2 other males identity unknown. That the Acourt Brothers call themselves ‘The Krays’. In fact you can only join their gang if you stab someone. They carry knives and weapons most days. Also, David Norris stabbed Stacey Benefield a month ago in order to prove himself. Benefield was taken to the Brook Hospital and told police he didn’t know who assaulted him. He then went on to say that a young Pakistani boy was murdered last year in Well Hall, that Peter Thompson who is serving life was part of the Acourts gang. That in fact one of the Acourts killed this lad. They also stabbed a young lad at Woolwich town centre called ‘Lee’. He had a bag placed over his head and was stabbed in his legs and arms in order to torture him. Jamie is described as white, 17 years, about 5’9”, black hair, medium build. Neil is described as white, also 17 years, about 5’5”, black hair, stocky build. Both are ‘twins’, apparently the house they live in was occupied by their mum, who has since left. Believed identity of the informant established.”

24.4.93

08.18: Action 34 allocated to DS Davidson ‘T/ST from N35 Wilden’

[resulted on 18.5.93 at 19.03 by DS Davidson: ‘Result – Mr Wilden passed the scene of Lawrence’s collapse on the west footway. No relevant information to add... S53 refers’]

10.00: Action 62 allocated to DS Davidson ‘T/ST from Bettles N50 re: vehicles and occupants seen’

[resulted on 26.4.93 at 19.08 by DS Davidson: ‘Result – Mrs Bettles and her 30 year old daughter, Susan, seen. No further useful information at this stage. Statement from Mrs Bettles attached. PDFs attached’]

15.17: Action 74 allocated to DS Davidson ‘Identify and research Stacey N53’ (linked to Action 75 also allocated to DS Davidson ‘Research assault on Stacey Benefield N53’ [resulted on 29.4.93 at 22.00 ‘Result – Crime sheet and statement attached. Mattie Farman to be seen re witness of assault on Stacey’]

15.18: Action 77 allocated to DS Davidson ‘I/D and research Andy Goodchild N54’ [resulted on 12.5.93 at 14.30 ‘Result – believed to be Acourt? Or Gary Dobson or David Norris’]

15.19: Action 80 allocated to DS Davidson ‘I/D and research local youths known as the Krays’ [resulted on 16.5.93 at 09.49 ‘Result – “The Krays” appear to be the Acourt brothers at 102 Bournebrook Road, being researched by DC Chase’]

16.30 approx: “James Grant” attends the police station again and speaks to DC Budgen and DS Davidson. DS Davidson was “engaged re informant”

19.11: Action 85 allocated to DS Davidson ‘T/ST N79 Ames re knowledge of incident and I/D friend’ [resulted on 25.4.93 at 15.30 ‘Result – Kellie Ann Ames seen and statement taken, She was with Sarah Courtney, 133 Langbrook Road (statement taken) Tammy Lovejoy...’]

Two anonymous letters are recovered from telephone kiosk and windscreen of a police car implicating Neil and Jamie Acourt, David Norris and Gary Dobson in the murder.

25.4.93

DS Davidson speaks to Stacey Benefield and takes statement.

26.4.93

10.03 Action 133 allocated to DS Davidson 'T/ST Mr C NI 41 Re information he wishes to give' [resulted on 29.4.93 at 15.22 'Result – C seen statement taken and attached']

10.18: Action 109 allocated to DS Davidson 'T/ST NI 07 SP – believed knows suspects' [resulted on 20.5.93 at 11.18 'Result – SP can give no evidence re this incident, but gives info of a general nature and names "Lee" as Lee Pearson']

27.4.93

07.41: Action 131 allocated to DS Davidson 'Liaise with DC May NI 37 Re Statement of Marple NI 36' [resulted on 29.4.93 at 11.51 'Result – on 26.4.93 with DC May – RA – I saw Jason Marple who although aged 17 has a mental age a great deal lower... Jason is too confused to be of any material use']

DS Davidson speaks to "James Grant" again at a public house, with DC Budgen. Computer-aided dispatch (CAD) message recorded in relation to this meeting and was also recorded in M152: "Met an informant known as 'James Grant' in local public house. He states that the person who was approached by some blacks to find out the Acourts address then was threatened by the Acourts not to tell them. The lad in question is BB who lives in... He also stated that CC saw four assailants run past the house (i.e. Dickson Road) after the assault. He left tasked to find out any more that he could. Grant then rang to say that he thinks he may have found a witness who stated to him that Neil stabbed him in the bottom part and David stabbed him in the top part. He said that this witness was on a bus, he is going to firm up the info and contact us on 28 April 1993. He stated earlier that the Acourts and Norris would probably say nothing and Dobson would crack up and probably tell all. He also said that there was a fifth blonde unknown kid present."

28.4.93

11.30: Action 148 allocated to DS Davidson 'T/ST from Linda Williams NI 76 – Drove past Dickson Road' [resulted on 30.4.93 at 14.40 'Result – Miss Williams saw 4 youths could not I/D but all white one wearing a green V jacket (described in statement) at 22.26 at Well Hall R/abt... Make enquiries to I/D jacket']

11.33: Action 149 allocated to DS Davidson 'Re-interview P NI 04 re info on suspects' [resulted on 19.5.93 at 09.45 'Result – see A109 for result']

DS Davidson takes a statement from Matthew Farman.

Duty states of both DS Davidson and DC Budgen: attended Greenwich Police Station [Dispute as to whether an attempt was made to register "James Grant" as an informant through DCI Leslie Owens].

29.4.93

14.14: Action 150 allocated to DS Davidson 'ID fully research NI 84 Leroy NI 85 Mathew NI 86 Steph' [resulted on 17.5.93 at 14.21 'Result – spoke again with Mr P who stated that they were the names he thought his daughter had spoken about. Spoke to his daughter SP who states she didn't know these names, no further assistance']

30.4.93

10.36: Action 180 allocated to DS Davidson 'T/ST Mattie Farman N240 re assault on Benefield' [resulted on 30.4.93 at 14.58 'Result – Farman seen @ h/a 28.4.93 and MG11 and Pdf obtained corroborating Benefield re assault. Farman states that 991 only to be used in the event that offenders are charged with other more serious offences']

10.37: Action 181 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview Stephanie Hilton N241 re info on possible' [text cut off], [resulted on 1.5.93 at 14.54: 'Result – I attended... Spoke with Mrs Harris and her daughter Stephanie Hilton who stated that her friend Marsha Whire of... had been told by Michelle Casserly that Gary Dobson, Jamie Neil Almond had committed the murder']

DS Davidson speaks to Lee Pearson.

1.5.93

15.20: Action 193 allocated to DS Davidson 'Liaise with Janice Casserly N265' [resulted on 5.5.93 at 18.07 'Result – spoke with Mum and daughters Tara & Michelle. ["Witness K"] went round 102 Bournbrook Road & saw the Court brothers with others. DT has apparently been chased recently by the Acourts with knives. A young lad 11 yr old is apparently a witness – name to be obtained... RA interview DT re knowledge of Acourts']

15.26: Action 202 allocated to DS Davidson 'T/ST ["Witness K"] N277 re info told to her by Casserly N260' [resulted on 17.5.93 at 11.34 'Result – ["Witness K"] seen and states that Michelle Casserly stated that the Acourts & Dobson were responsible for the murder. This was said at school See A193']

15.57: Action 195 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview & T/ST Adam Abbott N270 re knowledge of incident' [resulted on 17.5.93 at 14.51 'Result – saw Alan Abbott at his H/A in the presence of his mother but he refused to confirm the rumour. He did say he was approached by Stephen Lawrence's brother who asked him to find out "who killed his brother" but told him he didn't know. States he wasn't approached by anyone (i.e. the killers) but his mother thinks he is lying and although worried about him, she can understand why he will say nothing']

16.00: Action 196 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview Louis Catano N271 re knowledge of incident' [resulted on 14.5.93 at 12.27 'Result – saw Louis Cateano at his home address... Dickson Road. He stated that on the night he was in his bedroom with his girlfriend and his bedroom faces the rear of the house. The first thing he knew of anything was when he saw policemen searching the back gardens. No useful info'].

16.09: Action 189 allocated to DS Davidson 'I/D suspected brothers mentioned by Tara and Michelle' [resulted on 16.5.93 at 15.53 'Result – spoke with Miss O'Shea – no further useful info – see A193']

4.5.93

10.33: Action 166 allocated to DS Davidson 'T/ST Cook N210 was in vicinity at the time of murder' [resulted on 20.5.93 at 14.34 'Result – Emma Cook of... was interviewed in the presence of her father. He was not prepared to allow his daughter to make a written statement. Emma stated that she left the H/A of SS at about 22.30 and she then walked down Well Hall Road towards the Well Hall Roundabout. She crossed over the road onto the west footpath. As she passed the bus stop close by the junction with Dickson Road, she remembers seeing two RC/3 youths standing on the pavement. These two youths moved out of her way in order to allow her to pass by. Emma is certain that she recognises one of these youths as being Stephen Lawrence (from appeal notice). Emma walked to the roundabout, turned right and then walked to her home along Rochester Way. As she was turning into Rochester Way, she heard a noise coming from the direction of the cinema on the opposite side

of the roundabout. She did not see anyone when she looked across the road, and when asked she said she did not see any of these persons whilst walking home that evening. She knows the Acourt brothers, the Lambs, David Norris and Dobson. She is sure that she did not see any of these persons whilst walking home that evening']

11.15: Action 212 allocated to DS Davidson 'I/D & research re Arbuthnot family' [resulted on 5.5.93 at 11.26 'Result – 1. Spoke with MC who stated that he had been told by SS that the Acourts were responsible. MC also states that from another source David Norris stabbed the victim (Lawrence). 2. Arbuthnots believed to be Acourts']

5.5.93

13.32: Action 260 allocated to DS Davidson 'ID & AMP research Zack Punt N396 and AMP Blue N397' [resulted on 24.6.93 at 11.49 'Result – Zack Punt. Zakory Edward Punt... Info called at 102 Bournbrook on Friday 7.5.93 to pick up Acourt for work']

13.33: Action 261 allocated to DS Davidson 'Liaise with DS May re informant' [resulted on 30.6.93 at 15.49 'Result – spoke to DS May who stated that he would attempt to update this info to date he has nothing further to add']

6.5.93

07.51: Action 272 allocated to DS Davidson 'T/ST ["Witness K"] N415 re knowledge of suspects' [resulted on 13.5.93 at 12.25 'Result – ["Witness K"] stated that on the night of the stabbing he heard about it, went for a look and presumed that as there were so many police about that it was a murder. He says he then called on the Acourts, would not give a reason why, but when pushed said yes, he suspected that they would have something to do with it. He said when he went there it was about 22.30 (he repeated the time several times). I think by the time he was seen it was rehearsed. He states he saw the two Acourts and Gary Dobson, among others, and that one has his t-shirt off but he doesn't know which one. He refused to name anyone else and refused to make a statement. He, although 22 yrs, appears to behave as a 12/13 yr old (his mother will endeavour to find the truth)']

07.51: Action 273 allocated to DS Davidson 'Trace & interview 11 yr old witness & T/ST re Knowle' [resulted on 19.5.93 at 12.30 'Result – ["Witness B"] is undoubtedly a Walter Mitty. I saw him twice once with DC Canavan and a second time with DC Hughes and because of other info I then asked that DS Kirkpatrick see him. He tells a story of a fight he saw the circumstances are such that he only thinks he saw this. He told people that he saw the murder but completely gets the venue wrong. No statement taken']

07.52: Action 275 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview RT N262 re knowledge of incident' [resulted on 9.5.93 at 12.30 'Result – briefly interviewed RT and DT at their H/A. They stated that they had no knowledge of the stabbing other than rumours that the Acourts were responsible. RT states that the info re Norris telling him he was responsible is wrong and that Norris has not been in his house let alone tell him anything. DT states that he was chased on the past by the Acourts with knives but not assaulted. Neither would make statements']

07.54: Action 278 allocated to DS Davidson 'Conduct House to House in Purneys Rd SE9 tracing' [resulted on 21.5.93 at 17.03 'Result – spoke to Jane at No 19 Purneys Rd – no info, does not know about murder, no useful info']

08.29: Action 283 allocated to DS Davidson 'I/D & AMP research ["Witness K"]' [resulted on 18.5.93 at 14.38 'Result – ["Witness K"] (22 yrs) of... Rochester Way... Associate of the T family, believed involved "theft from m/v". Simple, acts about 14 yrs']

Message 276 completed by DC Budgen which reads as follows: "The above person ["James Grant"] stated that the Acourts have asked on numerous occasions whether they could purchase knives. They have a fascination with knives, that they usually hide them under the floorboards, that Lee Pearson was stabbed by Neil Acourt, also a Stacey was stabbed by Neil's friend. He is described as white 5'8" medium build mousy hair, curly. They the Acourts haven't been seen in the Well Hall area since the murder."

7.5.93

Arrest and interviews of Gary Dobson, Neil Acourt and Jamie Acourt.
DS Davidson interviewed Gary Dobson.

10.5.93

14.21: Action 296 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview Mrs C N283 re knowledge of murder' [resulted on 19.5.93 at 10.20 'Result – Mrs C seen and has nothing further to add. Did not wish to make a statement. The S family enquiry carries on']

14.29: Action 298 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview Lee Pearson N447 re assault' [resulted on 20.5.93 at 15.52 'Result – Lee Pearson interviewed and MGI I completed but not signed. Several attempts made to have the MGI I signed to no avail. Offence occurred o/s kebab shop and Pearson stabbed in the legs causing him to collapse']

16.10: Action 312 allocated to DS Davidson 'Research Matthew Farman N240' [resulted on 20.5.93 at 15.17 'Result – Matthew Farman I/D and in system, witness re attempted murder of Stacey Benefield, full copy LIO in system']

16.15: Action 319 allocated to DS Davidson 'I/D and fully research the Arnolds' [resulted on 19.5.93 at 12.09 'Result – I spoke to MC at length at his H/A and he has heard through rumour control inc the SS, MS. The Arnolds are believed to be the Acourts. All rumour no useful info']

16.22: Action 329 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview N536 Terry Hughes re knowledge of murder' [resulted on 25.5.93 by DC Tomlin who took over the action on 20.5.93]

11.5.93

12.19: Action 342 allocated to DS Davidson 'Liaise with DS Ashwell N545 RCS Northfleet' [resulted on 24.6.93 at 10.28 'Result – no further useful info from DS Ashwell despite calls from this office. He left it saying if there was any update he'd be in touch. He states that he only got the name McKenna from his informant, not Gary McKenna']

12.21: Action 346 allocated to DS Davidson 'Interview & AMPT/ST from Nicola Friar N355 re her movements' [resulted on 2.6.93 at 14.27 'Result – MGI I completed. Briefly she states that she stayed with Caetano 22.4.93 from 19.00 that evening until 06.30 the following morning. Neither of them left the house during her stay. She recalls policemen searching the rear garden at midnight. They have been seeing one another for three years at least, two or three times a week. Says she has never heard of the Acourts, Norris, Dobson nor has heard Louis mention them']

17.5.93

DS Davidson takes a statement from "Witness K".

27.5.93

11.00: Action 297 're interview SS N253 re knowledge of murder'. DC Canavan records result, indicating the following: "Mrs C seen by DS Davidson and DC Hughes. Stated that the police had

already seen SS and refused to give any more information. Her husband stated firstly that SS had said to him he had seen something then changed it to MS (SS's brother) had told him SS had seen something. Mrs C refused to make a statement. MS spoken to by DS Davidson and he denies having any such information. SS has been seen by me and DC Chase on at least three occasions. He denies having been a witness to any part of the incident and has stated that on the evening he was at home with his girlfriend Emma Cook who left and went home at about 22.30. Verified by Emma and SS's mother. SS is convinced that Neil and Jamie Acourt, Gary Dobson and David Norris are responsible but can give no evidence or grounds to support this information."

3.6.93

DS Davidson involved in the arrest and interviews of Luke Knight.

C. The discipline history of John Davidson prior to 1998

By 1998, a number of discipline investigations had been undertaken in relation to John Davidson, although none resulted in any formal discipline finding against him.

The following summary has been obtained from a complaints history prepared by CIB2 (a number of the original files are no longer available):

Document 573: Copy of the complaints history of Davidson from CIB2:

7.5.96: OGI 7/95/444 Disobedience to orders, falsehood and prevarication [false duty states, transported unauthorised passenger] [Reg Grundy issue]. 'Had Davidson not retired he would have appeared before a full discipline board for these matters'.

19.10.05: OGI 7/96/443 Disobeyed a lawful order: meeting with an informant contrary to written instructions. 'Had Davidson not retired he would have appeared before a full discipline board for these matters'.

In addition, we have considered an additional complaint file (OGI 85/186) held by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC):

Complaint made by 'EA', which was eventually not proceeded with and was resolved through correspondence. The complaint was categorised as an allegation of 'abuse of authority' arising from a search of Mr A's premises on 26 November 1984. It was alleged that Davidson and other officers conducted a search of Mr A's premises without a warrant. "Our client alleges that one of the officers in question told him that they knew he was involved in drugs and that they would be back soon and if they did not find anything, they might just bring a parcel with them." Subsequent checks showed that the police did have a warrant.

John Davidson's health issues permitted his retirement prior to the resolution of outstanding disciplinary matters. We have considered the following records of the view held within the MPS about the basis of his medical retirement:

File note from Howard Gosling, Staff Officer to the Director of Personnel Management, dated 10 March 1998:

"['Officer M', 'Officer P', 'Officer B', 'Officer R'], DS John Davidson

The aforementioned officers were subject to an internal investigation by CIB2. On the day they were confronted with the evidence each went sick and declined to be interviewed. All apart from ['Officer R'] have pursued the medical retirement option... If a subsequent injury award is sought in this case, the officer considering the papers is strongly advised to draw the relevant paperwork and seriously

consider the possible default by the officers and its relationship to the wording of Regulation B4 of the Police Pension Regulation.”

Complaints history as at 5.9.96:

7.5.96: SERCS unauthorised meeting with an informant

19.10.95: CIB Management [OGI 7/95/0444]

John Davidson’s medical report dated 3 September 1996: “The Director of Occupational Health saw DS Davidson... on 21 August 1996 and he considered that there are sufficient grounds to justify a medical retirement due to a noise induced hearing loss and tinnitus. If this is accepted as an injury on duty by the line management, an injury award of 20% would be appropriate in this case.”

File note prepared by Commander Roy Clark, Co-ordinator of SERCS, dated 14 October 1996:

“Davidson is, in my opinion, attempting to avoid a Discipline Board and to obtain an enhanced pension in the process. I feel we should resist at all costs such a venture as it damages the image of the Police Service in the eyes of the public and does nothing to reassure officers who do not involve themselves in circumstances resulting in discipline hearings and are content to retire on ordinary pension grounds.”

D. Extracts from John Davidson’s evidence to the Public Inquiry in 1998

Friday 24 April 1998

In response to questions about “James Grant” and Stacey Benefield

A. [John Davidson]: ... James Grant was the name I gave him.

Q. [Mr Lawson QC]: In due course you became what I think is known as his “handler”?

A. Yes, sir, along with DC Budgen.

Q. You found out who he was and you had information about his known associates presumably?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. ... you were persuaded by what you discovered in the fairly early course that he had a source very close to the Acourts?

A. I believed his source had somebody sourced to the Acourts. I think he was getting it thirdhand. I still think he got it thirdhand.

Q. Rather than secondhand?

A. Rather than secondhand, yes, sir.

Q. Nonetheless, apparently reliable information?

A. Yes, sir, I checked most of the information he gave us on the Friday and Saturday, and I personally dealt with it and it checked out; it was reliable. The bits that could be checked out were reliable.

Q. If we go back to your statement, did part of your checking take you to Stacey Benefield? Bear in mind one of the allegations he made related to the assault on Stacey Benefield.

A. Yes, in fact the next day, the Sunday, I saw Stacey Benefield.

...

Q. You took the statement from him. Was he an apparently credible witness?

A. I believed everything he said was true, yes, sir.

Q. Can you just help us about this. I appreciate you were not in charge of the enquiry. This was on the 25th April, was it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You recognised as an experienced detective sergeant that, quite apart from the information being received on the murder, what was here being alleged by Benefield would justify, would it not, the immediate arrest of Norris and Acourt?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know why either or both was not arrested, in fact, until the 13th May in relation to this...?

A. I can't say the full reason; it was the decision of the SIO as to when these arrests would be made and why they would be made. I can't say a reason for all of them. I can understand why he want to arrest him initially for the murder, and this as a follow-up, but that is an opinion of the SIOs, not mine, sir.

...

Q. There was certainly an opportunity presented there, all other considerations apart, to go out and arrest Neil Acourt and Norris straightaway?

A. I think one of the – if my memory serves me right, one of the reasons that this arrest was held back was because Benefield was very, very reluctant to make or sign this statement or give evidence initially, and he was making it as he believed that Acourt and Norris would have been arrested for the murder and therefore they couldn't come back and stab him, being released on bail on this matter.

...

Q. Looking ahead a little bit, if I may, it was a little later that you obtained confirmation from the Lee who was mentioned in the Grant information, Lee Pearson, of his having been involved in an attack?

A. Yes, by the time I found who Lee was, and it was later on, he refused to make a statement or get involved at all. He was too frightened of these people.

...

Q. Though much later down the track, in fact there was an acquittal at the end of the day, was there not there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In circumstances which left something to be desired, I think?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Said even more elliptically.

A. A comment on the jury system, sir.

...

A. We followed up all the information which he gave us including the youth on the bus.

...

A. "B", yes.

Q. You said about him what here appears that he is undoubtedly a Walter Mitty?

...

A. That's correct, sir. In fact, his mother told me that this is not unusual for him to believe he sees things when he reads them in the papers and I found him a very, very easily led witness.

...

On the timing of the arrests

Q. ... You say you have seen the records made for anonymous information?

A. I would have done, yes, sir.

Q. But the decisions were not yours?

A. No, sir.

Q. It was the sort of information that was being received, such as we have looked at here and some you were getting, such as from Grant, presumably was widely known within the office?

A. Yes, sir. The information would be known throughout the squad of what was being said, not necessarily by whom, but what was being said and the strength of that information.

Q. There must, presumably, have been quite a bit of talk in a professional interest about when or whether these blokes were going to be arrested?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Insofar as that is concerned, what was the talk at the town, just generally, in week 1 of the investigation?

A. There was talk, I believe, with some of the lads in the office as to when in actual fact we were going to strike.

Q. When they were going to –

A. When they were going to arrest the Acourts. I was always of the opinion to leave that to the SIO who had worked with him on several occasions on other murders and thought of him a very good detective, so I –

Q. Which one are you talking about?

A. I am talking about Mr Weeden.

...

Q. Did Mr Weeden, I was going to generally, discuss with you why the arrests were being deferred?

A. Not personally, no.

Q. Again, as an experienced detective officer yourself, you would have recognised that there was certainly by the end of the weekend, if not before, more than enough information to justify arrest?

A. I recognised there was more than enough information to arrest them, yes, sir, but I wasn't aware that, in fact, at the time there was surveillance units and such as the like set up on the houses. I could only imagine that there was other reasons.

Q. For deferring arrest?

A. For deferring arrest.

Q. Were you involved in the investigation thereafter, after 1993?

A. The only involvement I had after 1993: when I left this enquiry I was called back in, as I was on the Regional Crime Squad, and I assisted Mr Mellish in observations, surveillance and eventual arrest of Norris's father. I believe the thing was set up in order to take Norris's father away from the scene and perhaps then get witnesses to actually come forward, because there was a big fear in the estate of the Norris name.

Q. May I just ask you, when – ?

A. And in fact, if I can add, when he was arrested he had on him two loaded firearms and in his farmhouse he [has] an Oozi submachine gun with a silencer. This man was a very dangerous and frightening individual, sir.

Q. Presumably you knew that before his arrest, did you?

A. Yes, sir, in fact I dealt with him through the Stacey Benefield case.

...

On the interviews of Gary Dobson

Q. [Mr Lawson QC]:... We understand, Mr Davidson, that you had something of a reputation for being a good interviewer. Putting false modesty to one side, is that right, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was because of the information from Grant that, if anyone was going to crack it, it was going to be this one?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that why you were sent into bat, so to speak, with him?

A. I believe that was the reason I was picked for Dobson, yes, sir.

Q. You did interview him at some length, did you not, during the course of that day?

A. Yes, sir.

...

Q. There is one matter in particular that you have referred to in your witness statement at (WIT00010219), where you say in the second paragraph, as we see on that screen there: "I am aware of the criticism. I failed to challenge Dobson's denial of association with Norris by using the surveillance photograph showing the two together."

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. "I wasn't aware we had a photograph at the time."

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. "Had I been aware, I would certainly have put it to him."

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. "I have not been informed by any other officer that we had a photograph showing Dobson and Norris together."

A. That's correct.

...

A. ... I am very annoyed because – whether it would have made a difference I don't know, but it has certainly given me more of a lever when questioning him when he was denying association with someone I had a photograph of.

Monday 27 April 1998

Questions asked by Mr Mansfield QC (on behalf of the Lawrence family): '... is there anything were you to be facing, which I realise you may not now, but were you to face it all again is there anything you think you might have done differently?

A. Personally, no.

Q. Nothing at all?

A. Nothing that I would have done differently.

Q. No mistakes, no delay which you feel was deleterious, in other words had a bad effect, nothing like that?

A. By me?

Q. Yes, by you?

A. Not that I can recall, sir, no.

...

On his attitude to whether or not it was a racist murder

Q. ... did anything strike you, stand out when you read those statements to you?

A. I am not being vague, sir, but I don't know exactly what you are talking about. What would strike out? A boy was murdered, a young lad was murdered by four or five other young lads outside a bus stop, what would strike me about that, sir?

Q. Yes, what would strike you about that, officer?

A. It was a murder, sir, it was the most heinous offence it could be.

Q. And?

A. And, was there an and sir?

Q. Yes there is an and. I am not going to take all day about it, obviously, I just wondered if it occurred to you that it was a race attack?

A. At the stage of reading the statements I was aware there was alleged four or five white lads attacked two black lads. In my mind I would think that may have been a race attack. There was a call out, I believe, of a racial nature which again would put it in my mind that it may be a race attack. From other information I gleaned during the enquiry I would say that the persons that were believed to be allegedly responsible were persons that would have killed anyone had they been there at the time. I do not think in my own mind this was a race attack. I believe this was thugs attacking anyone, as they had done on previous occasions with other white lads.

Q. What I want to suggest to you very clearly, in what became very clear – I think it will save time if you will accept – during the Dobson interview you made it clear to Mr Dobson that you personally did not think this was a race attack, did you not?

A. By that time I didn't, no, sir.

Q. By that time you did not think it was?

A. I didn't think it was, no, sir.

Q. That is your view today, is it not?

A. It is, sir.

Q. Do you know the definition, the ACPO definition of a racial incident?

A. No, sir.

Q. You do not. Has anyone ever told you what it is?

A. Probably.

Q. Probably, but you have forgotten?

A. I would imagine, from my memory and my experience in a job, a racial incident is one which is caused by or through racism. It can be anything from a shout, in this case there was a shout, to an out and out racist attack, but because these lads had attacked whites before very, very similarly with a similar knife, the ones we believed, I believed this was thugs. They were described as the Krays. They were thugs who were out to kill, not particularly a black person, but anybody, and I believe that to this day that that was thugs, not racism, just pure bloody minded thuggery.

Q. I do not want to debate with you about the nature of racism but do you recognise that thugs who may kill white people for a variety of reasons, but who kill blacks because they are blacks are committing a racial crime?

A. Yes, sir I recognise that if they were killed because he was black that is racist.

Q. That is exactly what this case was about but you refused to recognise it, did you not?

A. I still refuse to recognise it, sir. I am very surprised that anybody knows it is about that because it has never been cleared up anyway, sir.

Q. Or is it because you know a great deal more about the Norrises?

A. I arrested his father.

Q. You arrested his father. When?

A. After this incident. In order that Mr Mellish could then try again with his statement to get witnesses because he was causing the witnesses to be in fear and alarm on the estate.

Q. I will come back to Mr Norris in a moment.

...

Q. I am going to suggest to you straightaway, Mr Davidson, that that in itself was a neglect at the very beginning to appreciate the nature of the attack and to bother to pursue it. Do you follow?

A. I know what you are saying, sir, I don't say it is a neglect, I still say it wasn't a racial attack. It was thugs attacking a poor young innocent lad. He was attacked and killed had he been black, white, green, blue or yellow he would still have been attacked and killed because they picked that man at that time, not for any other reason. Stacey Benefield was white. Lee Pearson was white,

several other lads were white. I only recently discovered that one called Kevin London was black, I didn't know that at the time.

...

... There is no special way of dealing with the witnesses in this murder than the witnesses in other murder involving gangs etc. We all know how to deal with vulnerable people or we should or we shouldn't be on the murder squad.

Q. I suggest you put most of the ones off in this enquiry and that is why they did not come forward in the end, did you not, Mr Davidson?

A. I put most of who off, sir?

Q. You put them off?

A. Who did I put off, sir?

Q. Emma Cook?

A. I put Emma Cook off, I didn't put Emma Cook off at all, sir... I dealt with two of the witnesses, sir. I provided through the Yard safe houses. I provided different identities for them. I took them away and I looked after them for a long time in this.

Q. Are these two known by initials?

A. No, they are known now by names they were Stacey Benefield and Matthew Farnham. This was the very first part of the information that I dealt with, sir, and I dealt with thoroughly and I ended up dealing with them as minding their witnesses.

Q. Was there any provision for Emma Cook, Michelle Casserly?

A. Michelle Casserly, in front of her mother used the most venomous language I have heard from a young girl to me as I walked in when I was being perfectly charming to her mother. I was trying to look after her as a girl. When a girl of 14 or 15 whatever she was at the time comes out with a mouthful in front of me I know I am up against something that is a little bit different, sir.

...

On the records relating to the handling of "James Grant"

THE CHAIRMAN: We saw it [Davidson's duty state] on Friday and it does bear out, in fact, what Sergeant Davidson says, does it not?

MR MANSFIELD: His duty state does?

A. I am not going to do something and not put it in the duty state. I got paid a lot of money at the time by the police.

Q. Please be careful, Mr Davidson?

A. I am very careful, sir. I am not going to do something on a Friday for the police and not show it on the duty sheet on a day I am off playing golf.

Q. Really?

A. I would never, ever go and do something for the police when I was playing golf elsewhere. Good God, what are you suggesting, sir? Are you suggesting that I would falsely say I was somewhere when I was somewhere else.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Davidson?

A. I am not here for this, sir. I am not here for this at all.

THE CHAIRMAN: You must calm down because Mr Mansfield is entitled to ask the questions, so just take –

A. He is not entitled to suggest I would do that, sir.

...

Q. Unless, Mr Davidson, to put it bluntly you really did not want this informant's material to be effectively followed up. Do you follow the point?

A. I can see what you are suggesting, sir, and I would always give my all in every murder. I don't like your suggestion, sir. I would give everything in every murder to solve it and I don't like the fact you are inferring I would do anything different in this. Once again, sir, he is accusing me of racism and bad racism.

Q. A refusal by an informant, Mr Davidson, is an important matter, a refusal of a source?

A. No, sir [not] necessarily, sir. Why do people need to know that he has refused, they would know I would ask. They don't need to know he is refused that would put him as a bad informant not a good one.

Q. Did you tell senior officers that he was refusing?

A. The senior officer would ask straightaway, yes I would tell them, I wouldn't write it down though.

Q. They have been interviewed as well about this?

A. I have no doubt they have, sir.

Q. I will ask you to be –

A. Another thing I wouldn't do is get the source and not tell him. Why would I do that, sir, because I didn't want to clear up this murder? That is a terrible accusation, sir. I sorry, I don't want to sit and take this, sir. Do I have to sit here? He is accusing me of trying to stop this murder by racism. I have been in loads of incidents –

THE CHAIRMAN: Just stop for the moment.

THE WITNESS: I won't have that, sir, he is accusing me of racism openly in a Public Inquiry.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Davidson, you must take a pause if you will. You must know what the suggestion that is made in this case is.

THE WITNESS: I have never been accused directly of racism, sir, and I don't accept it.

...

On his knowledge of the Norris family

Q. [Mr Mansfield QC] The others that I want to ask you about specifically which you had got from the message the day before and I will come back to this in a moment because the name is mentioned on your message here Norris, David Norris?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. By the 27th at the very least, did you know that name by reputation?

A. I couldn't tell you when I knew that, but certainly by reputation I may have done, sir.

Q. I want to ask you carefully –

A. Not that particular Norris.

Q. No.

A. I knew the name Norris inasmuch as there was two at that time. One is dead and one is, I think, still incarcerated in prison.

Q. I will not ask for the reference but Mr Crampton when interviewed indicated that the two lots of Norrises, particularly the father of this one, was extremely well known amongst police officers. That is how he put it?

A. I had never come across him at all in my service but I may well have been aware of the name Norris.

Q. I am not suggesting you necessarily had come across him but do you agree when you first came on to this that the name Norris would have rung a great number of bells, would it not?

A. It didn't in fact, sir, with me.

Q. It did not?

A. No, I first of all thought it was the other Norris and when I discovered it wasn't I didn't know this one.

Q. Well, you certainly knew that it was not the other Norris?

A. No, the family, I thought it was connected with the family, that Norris family and discovered it wasn't. So I didn't know his father at all.

Q. But you knew by reputation about Cliff Norris?

A. No, I didn't. It was an area of London I hadn't worked, sir, he wasn't that famous.

Thursday 16 July 1998

John Davidson: ... I remember going to Greenwich and I remember meeting Mr Owens and I remember the purpose was to register the informant and I remember we left the informant's docket with him, but other than that that is the only time I met him, I don't remember anything else about the registration, sir, or that actual incident.

... Mr Owens may be the actual controller of the informant on paper, but for all intents and purposes in practice it [the SIO] was Mr Weeden, yes, sir.

Q. [Mr Lawson QC]: What you said, if I can just ask you about this, is he, Mr Weeden, gave you carte blanche to contact Grant and get such information as you could?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He, Weeden, was aware of the visits that you made to see Grant and asked how meetings or outcomes of meetings recorded and where were the records deposited. You said that they were recorded on the murder squad message forms deposited by you with the murder squad for action and onward transmission to Owens?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you help us about this, Mr Davidson, that does not appear to correspond with the ordinary rules for the logging of meetings with informants?

A. No, that is correct, sir.

Q. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any other written rules that applied, special rules, if you like, for AMIP teams?

A. No, sir, not that I was aware of for that time.

Q. In relation to – I do not want to go through all of the detail of this, but I imagine you will agree that in relation to the handling of informants and arrangements for meetings with informants there were strict rules about the obtaining of prior authority, were there not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the requirement for there to be maintained a log of authorised meetings?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Which was not done?

A. If it wasn't done, it wasn't done by Mr Weeden, sir. Mr Weeden keeps the log of authorisations of meetings with informants.

Q. But did you go to Mr Weeden –

A. Mr Weeden was aware that each day I was going out on the earliest days of the Murder Squad I would have been told I was out looking for Grant. Grant couldn't be phoned. He wasn't – Any pre-emptive meetings were previously authorised. How many times we were going out looking for him for further information or to firm up certain parts of information – it was a case of going out and finding him. A lot of times we didn't find him and a few occasions we did, but the actual authority to go and do that would be given by Mr Weeden. He would know we were going out for that purpose, among other purposes.

Q. That is the carte blanche you referred to?

A. That was the carte blanche, yes.

Q. As opposed to the ordinary rules, you anticipate?

A. Yes, the ordinary rules, I believe, were brought in very properly for policy for meeting with informants. This was a completely different ball game, sir. This was an informant registered for various reasons, but an informant [inaudible] registered for safeguards which the police haven't brought in, but I have dealt with informants all my service, sir; and in this case it was a case of trying to get information for the murder and Mr Weeden gave us carte blanche to do that.

...

Q. If you think about it, what was the reason for registering him?

A. Because of the information he was giving on that and other matters. He wasn't merely giving us information that he believed he knew who had committed the murder of Stephen Lawrence. He gave us information on other offences, although for that matter he had to be registered as an informant.

Q. What from the police view point would be the advantage or disadvantage of him being a registered informant as opposed to just an ordinary informant?

A. As a registered informant we could use him further; and it was my intention at that stage to take him beyond the Lawrence enquiry and use him as an informant in that area; and I didn't have an informant in that area, sir.

Q. Did you ever use him again?

A. No, sir. I did apply for a reward. I think I told you this in the first one.

Q. We have seen that?

A. Which he would never ever have been paid if he wasn't a registered informant, but I applied for this reward for me to give James Grant and they offered £50, sir; which was derisory. I wouldn't touch that. I was embarrassed.

...

MR MANSFIELD QC: Mr Davidson, in 1993 there were very clear rules, procedures and protocols dealing with informants, were there not?

A. There was, yes, sir.

Q. This is an area of particular concern and significance, is it not?

A. It is, sir.

Q. You cannot afford to make mistakes because you put at risk the lives of others?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. There is very tight security in relation to information that relates to registered informants?

A. Yes, sir.

...

Q. You see, I will make it perfectly, I may have done before, but I will make it plain again, that Mr Grant was marginalised in this whole enquiry but, because Mr Grant had a particular relationship with the associates of the suspects and because he had already been told he was going to be registered, you had to go through the pretence of registering him. Do I make myself clear?

A. I know what you are suggesting, sir. If you could give me a reason for going through the pretence of registering him, for actually doing a docket, for giving it to a DCI who now says it didn't exist, for then putting in a rewards letter to being paid, which, if it was all false, would surely have slapped straight back in my face. I can't see any reason for – I can't see any reason at all, sir – let me finish – for making up a false registration. Everything that he told us went into the Murder Squad, so it mattered not if it was on a docket or not. The information that went into the Murder Squad, I followed up the information. I managed to get full statements from Benefield –

Q. Can I –

A. No, no, I will finish sir. I followed up every bit of information he gave me, and he copied it all down to the man, that I can't see any reason not to register him once I told him I was registering him. Is there any reason you can give me, sir, that I would do that?

Q. Yes?

A. Would you tell me then, sir?

Q. Certainly. I am not going through all the matters we have been through before about following it up?

A. Yes, but you are saying that I did it falsely but followed it up. Why would I do that?

Q. I will come to it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because this particular informant, and I am not going to disclose who it is –

A. Nor am I.

Q. But he is particularly important and significant, is he not, by the nature of the relationship?

A. What relationship, sir?

Q. The relationship that he has with the scene, the location and certain individuals who are associates of the suspects. You know who he is, do you not?

A. I know who he is, yes.

... This particular person, Mr Grant –

A. Yes.

Q. – was particularly significant because of a link, a relationship, an association he had with someone else known to an associate of the suspect, was he not?

A. I now see what you are getting at.

Q. Yes. "I now see what you are getting at." Because he had been told he was going to be registered, do you follow – you asked the question so I am giving you the answer – because he was told by Mr Budgen that he was going to be registered, and because he had that special relationship that you have put on that piece of paper, you were stuck with somebody who is, in fact, very important to this investigation, were you not?

A. Stuck with somebody. I was quite pleased that I had a good informant, sir.

E. Miscellaneous documents relating to John Davidson

28 April 2003

Intelligence report prepared by DS Richard Oliver, dated 28.4.03, concerning Operation Abelard, with specific emphasis on John Davidson. It states that Davidson was attached to the initial investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan in 1987. "DS Davidson has been investigated by this command (ACC) in the past and is known to associate with some of the subjects of not only Operation Abelade, but also several other DPS investigations."

Undated reports

Intelligence report in which Davidson is referred to as a "corrupt police officer", prepared by DC Dennis McCarthy and dated 4.8.06.

Intelligence report detailing an incident reported by DS L, when Davidson (who was by then retired) contacted the OCG and asked L to conduct a check at the Passport Office to identify the wife of a client.

Intelligence report relating to SK who was under investigation for conducting Police National Computer (PNC) checks for John Davidson, believed to be working for Mayfare Associates at the time.

Overall summary of position pre-2006

This report summarises the intelligence held on the IDG database relevant to ex-DS John Davidson prior to 27.7.06 as follows: "Intelligence suggests that Ex-DS John Davidson was a corrupt police officer." The report summarises the content of the intelligence reports referred to above but also includes an additional document containing the following:

“Precis of intelligence held on this officer within the IDG (CLUE) database: Intelligence suggests that Ex-DS John Davidson may well have been a corrupt police officer. During his service he handled a number of informants at least one of which was a high profile criminal who was himself a known ‘corrupter’ of police officers.”

Report on “Informant 1” [and Operation Samoyed]

“The purpose of this report is to outline an investigation conducted by the Metropolitan Police Service’s Anti-Corruption Squad into the activities of ‘Informant 1’ who is strongly suspected of having had corrupt relationships with police officers since his registration as an informant in 1988. He is a career criminal who operates primarily in the South East of London. A number of his previous police handlers are strongly suspected of having been corrupt. These include ex-detectives John Davidson, Officer B, Officer F, Officer G and the still serving Detective Constable R...

“In October 1998 ‘Informant 1’ was afforded the protection of the National Crime Squad Witness Protection Unit (NCS WPU) after his identity as an informant became known to major criminals in the London area through a suspected leak at the NCS Northfleet office... In November 1999, a covert CIB(3) investigation, Operation Curlew, commenced into ‘Informant 1’ activities. The purpose of this investigation was to establish whether ‘Informant 1’ was currently engaged in criminal activity, principally police corruption, and then pass the operation to one of the CIB(3) evidential teams.”

Action 11360: Action requested by DSI Yates on 15.2.01

“That an urgent ‘trawl’ be made of the IICIC databases to establish if anything is held whereby ex DS John Davidson (OJ) and Dave Norris are mentioned together. This request has come from the High Court in relation to the current appeal by ex DC Robert Clark and ex DS Christopher Drury as various allegations/innuendos are being made at court.”

Appendix I3: Article in *The Guardian* published on 23 June 2013

The Guardian, 23 June 2013 (Rob Evans and Paul Lewis)

Police ‘smear’ campaign targeted Stephen Lawrence’s friends and family

Exclusive: former undercover officer Peter Francis says superiors wanted him to find ‘dirt’ shortly after 1993 murder.

A police officer who spent four years living undercover in protest groups has revealed how he participated in an operation to spy on and attempt to “smear” the family of murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence, the friend who witnessed his fatal stabbing and campaigners angry at the failure to bring his killers to justice.

Peter Francis, a former undercover police officer turned whistleblower, said his superiors wanted him to find “dirt” that could be used against members of the Lawrence family, in the period shortly after Lawrence’s racist murder in April 1993.

He also said senior officers deliberately chose to withhold his role spying on the Lawrence campaign from Sir William Macpherson, who headed a public inquiry to examine the police investigation into the death.

In extracts from a joint Guardian and Channel 4 investigation, police whistleblower Peter Francis reveals disturbing details about his undercover deployment [Link to video: Undercover police officer: ‘How I spied on the Stephen Lawrence campaign’](#)

Francis said he had come under “huge and constant pressure” from superiors to “hunt for disinformation” that might be used to undermine those arguing for a better investigation into the murder. He posed as an anti-racist activist in the mid-1990s in his search for intelligence.

“I had to get any information on what was happening in the Stephen Lawrence campaign,” Francis said. “They wanted the campaign to stop. It was felt it was going to turn into an elephant.”

“Throughout my deployment there was almost constant pressure on me personally to find out anything I could that would discredit these campaigns.”

Francis also describes being involved in an ultimately failed effort to discredit Duwayne Brooks, a close friend of Lawrence who was with him on the night he was killed and the main witness to his murder. The former spy found evidence that led to Brooks being arrested and charged in October 1993, before the case was thrown out by a judge.

The disclosures, revealed in a book about undercover policing published this week, and in a joint investigation by the Guardian and Channel 4’s *Dispatches* being broadcast on Monday, will reignite the controversy over covert policing of activist groups.

Lawrence’s mother, Doreen, said the revelations were the most surprising thing she had learned about the long-running police investigation into her son’s murder: “Out of all the things I’ve found out over the years, this certainly has topped it.”

She added: "Nothing can justify the whole thing about trying to discredit the family and people around us."

In a statement, the Metropolitan police said it recognised the seriousness of the allegations – and acknowledged their impact. A spokesman said the claims would "bring particular upset" to the Lawrence family and added: "We share their concerns."

Jack Straw, the former home secretary who in 1997 ordered the inquiry that led to the 1999 Macpherson report, said: "I'm profoundly shocked by this and by what amounts to a misuse of police time and money and entirely the wrong priorities." Straw is considering personally referring the case to the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

Francis was a member of a controversial covert unit known as the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS). A two-year investigation by the Guardian has already revealed how undercover operatives routinely adopted the identities of dead children and formed long-term sexual relationships with people they were spying on.

The past practices of undercover police officers are the subject of what the Met described as "a thorough review and investigation" called Operation Herne, which is being overseen by Derbyshire's chief constable, Mick Creedon.

A spokesman said: "Operation Herne is a live investigation, four strands of which are being supervised by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and it would be inappropriate to pre-judge its findings."

Francis has decided to reveal his true identity so he can openly call for a public inquiry into undercover policing of protest. "There are many things that I've seen that have been morally wrong, morally reprehensible," he said. "Should we, as police officers, have the power to basically undermine political campaigns? I think that the clear answer to that is no."

Francis has been co-operating with the Guardian as a confidential source since 2011, using his undercover alias Pete Black. He assumed the undercover persona between 1993 and 1997, infiltrating a group named Youth Against Racism in Europe. He said he was one of four undercover officers who were also required to feed back intelligence about the campaigns for justice over the death of Lawrence.

Francis said senior officers were afraid that anger at the failure to investigate the teenager's racist killing would spiral into disorder on the streets, and had "visions of Rodney King", whose beating at the hands of police led to the 1992 LA riots.

Francis monitored a number of "black justice" campaigns, involving relatives of mostly black men who had died in suspicious circumstances in police custody.

However, he said that his supervising officers were most interested in whatever information he could gather about the large number of groups campaigning over the death of Lawrence.

Although Francis never met the Lawrence family, who distanced themselves from political groups, he said he passed back "hearsay" about them to his superiors. He said they wanted information that could be used to undermine the campaign.

One operation Francis participated in involved coming up with evidence purporting to show Brooks involved in violent disorder. Francis said he and another undercover police officer trawled through hours of footage from a May 1993 demonstration, searching for evidence that would incriminate Brooks.

Police succeeded in having Brooks arrested and charged with criminal damage, but the case was thrown out by a judge as an abuse of the legal process. Francis said the prosecution of Brooks was part of a wider drive to damage the growing movement around Lawrence's death: "We were trying to stop the campaign in its tracks."

Doreen Lawrence said that in 1993 she was always baffled about why family liaison officers were recording the identities of everyone entering and leaving their household. She said the family had always suspected police had been gathering evidence about her visitors to discredit the family.

"We've talked about that several times but we never had any concrete [evidence]," she said.

There is no suggestion that the family liaison officers knew the purpose of the information they collected.

Francis claims that the purpose of monitoring people visiting the Lawrence family home was in order "to be able to formulate intelligence on who was going into the house with regards to which part of the political spectrum, if any, they were actually in". The former policeman added: "It would determine maybe which way the campaign's likely to go."

In 1997, Francis argued that his undercover operation should be disclosed to Macpherson, who was overseeing the public inquiry into the Met's handling of the murder. "I was convinced the SDS should come clean," he said.


However his superiors decided not to pass the information on to the inquiry, he said. He said he was told there would be "battling on the streets" if the public ever found out about his undercover operation.

Straw said that neither he nor Macpherson were informed about the undercover operations. "I should have been told of anything that was current, post the election of Tony Blair's government in early May 1997," he said.

"But much more importantly, [the] Macpherson inquiry should have been told, and also should have been given access to the results of this long-running and rather expensive undercover operation," the family and people around us."






Daily Mail
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1997
NEWSPAPER OF THE YEAR 35p

WIN UP TO
£50,000
INSTANT CASH EXTRA
TODAY'S AMOUNT: PAGE 69

**Jonathan Cainer: How you
can find your Valentine**
SEE PAGES 50-52

MURDERERS

The Mail accuses these men of killing. If we are wrong, let them sue us



Gary Dobson Neil Acourt Jamie Acourt Luke Knight David Norris

THE Daily Mail today takes the unprecedented step of naming five young men as murderers.

They may not have been convicted in a court of law, but police are sure that David Norris, Neil Acourt, Jamie Acourt, Gary Dobson and Luke Knight are the white youths who killed black teenager Stephen Lawrence.

We are naming them because, despite

COMMENT: Page 8

a criminal case, a private prosecution and an inquest, there has still been no justice for Stephen, who was stabbed to death in a racist attack almost four years ago.

One or more of the five may have a valid defence to the charge which has been repeatedly levelled against them. So far they have steadfastly refused every opportunity to offer such a defence.

Four have refused to give any alibi for

that night in April 1993. One initially offered an alibi, but it did not stand up when police checked it out.

This week the five refused to answer any questions at the inquest on Stephen, citing their legal right of privilege not to say anything which might incriminate them.

The Lawrence case threatens to damage race relations and the reputation of British justice.

If these men are innocent they now have every opportunity to clear their names in a legal action against the Daily Mail. They would have to give evidence

and a jury in possession of all the facts would finally be able to decide.

Yesterday the jury at Southwark Coroner's Court had little doubt of one thing. It took only 30 minutes to decide unanimously that the 18-year-old A-level student was unlawfully killed, the victim of "a completely unprovoked racist attack by five white youths".

The criminal cases against Norris, 20, Neil Acourt, 21, Jamie Acourt, 19, Dobson, 21, and Knight, 20, failed because of a lack of evidence. But if they thought they had got away with the killing they

Turn to Page 6, Col. 2

INSIDE: Andrew Alexander 12, Femal 19, Diary 39, Friday First 42-48, Letters 53, TV 54-56, Coffee Break 67-69, City 70-72, Sport 73-80

How the police

By STEPHEN WRIGHT
Crime Correspondent

THROUGHOUT the four-and-a-half year murder investigation, police have claimed that a 'wall of silence' has foiled their efforts to bring the culprits to justice.

The PCA report exposes this as a myth, saying that vital witnesses did come forward during the early days of the inquiry but they were not treated properly.

There is considerable evidence that the people of Eltham came forward with valuable information albeit in some cases reluctantly, it says. The early information was vital, it could only have come from sources close to the suspects since street rumour and gossip would not have had time to develop. Responding to information in order to produce evidence should have been a primary focus of the murder investigation.

Numerous weaknesses in this area have been identified by the complaint investigation. For example information received by the murder incident room very soon after the murder included two anonymous notes and several anonymous telephone calls naming four of the suspects who were eventually arrested.

The complaint investigation four years later has been able to identify several of the 'anonymous' telephone callers and has established the means by which the identity of the anonymous letter writer can be confirmed.

Greater effort at the time might have identified the sources of the information and produced crucial evidence.

The report says that within an hour of a national television appeal on the day after the murder, a man went to Eltham

Public's great wall of silence was a myth



Police Station 'with a substantial amount of information about possible suspects. This includes serious assaults apart from the attack on Stephen Lawrence,' the report states.

But the potential of this witness was 'not appreciated by senior officers'. Of further damage to the inquiry was the fact that although the informant's name was known to some officers, he was officially recorded as being 'anonymous'.

Officers involved in the subsequent review of the murder inquiry and later the second murder investigation both believed the man's identity was not known.

PCA investigators have, however, established the man's identity and say this information came from a 'vital witness'. Else-

where the report says that during the first few weeks of the murder inquiry, leads from a number of sources, including police informants, would have corroborated information linking four of the suspects to a number of assaults with knives.

The 14-page report sets out the details of the inquiry into Stephen's death, the Lawrence family's subsequent complaint and the Metropolitan Police review and re-investigation.

It identifies 'serious shortcomings' in a police investigation blighted by 'significant weaknesses, omissions and lost opportunities'.

Here we analyse its findings and recommendations, which make sobering reading for commissioner Sir Paul Condon and his senior officers.



The search for justice: Neville and Doreen Lawrence, above, refused to let their son's murder rest.

Left, how the Daily Mail supported their battle to find the killers of Stephen, right.

The first response

THE Lawrence family complained that police reacted poorly on the night of the murder, saying there was a 'casual approach' to the incident.

Appropriate road blocks were not set up to catch the suspects, they claimed. Officers arriving on the scene, the Lawrences alleged, lacked proper first aid skills and 'didn't want to get their hands dirty with a black man's blood'.

The report says the officers who arrived at the scene first 'did

what they could' for Stephen. But it adds that the seriousness of his injuries was 'not fully appreciated' and 'incorrect assumptions were made about the appropriate first aid measures required'.

The final PCA report will include recommendations on first aid training for police officers. In general, says the preliminary report, the police response at the murder scene was 'prompt and professional'. By the time Stephen died seven roadblocks

were in place — including the scene of the attack and where he fell. House-to-house inquiries started immediately afterwards and a search started for the murder weapon using a large portable light.

The report sympathises with the Lawrence family who, it says, were not fully briefed on the immediate police investigation. 'They were understandably angered and disillusioned by the limited answers they received.'

The investigation

TWO of the suspects could have been arrested for a separate offence of attempted murder on evidence gathered during the first weekend, says the report.

'This might have assisted the investigation of Stephen Lawrence's murder. However the detective superintendents responsible did not take this opportunity although they were aware that it was available.'

Their reasons for this decision will be one of a number of professional judgments to be commented upon in the Investigating Officer's final report.

The report also criticises forensic testing of suspects arrested. Officers were not properly briefed or debriefed. 'The evidence shows that forensic testing at the homes of those arrested was not carried out to the standards required in this investigation.'

A number of sources of potential forensic evidence from the murder scene were not properly handled and therefore not properly eliminated from the inquiry. Surveillance methods also come in for criticism. Four days after

the murder, several suspects were under surveillance but an independent expert says this operation 'lacked clear objectives and proper guidance'. It adds scathingly: 'Any benefit from this operation was not fully exploited. Indeed evidence shows that the surveillance operation missed an opportunity to prevent the loss of potential evidence.'

In another disturbing finding, the report says there was confusion among senior detectives as to who was exactly in charge of the investigation. After the arrests of the main suspects, the detective superintendent in charge of the investigation was 'unavoidably absent' (on private family business) and two senior colleagues argued over who was in charge of the conduct of the inquiry. Each claimed the other was in charge.

During the inquest earlier this year, the Lawrence family claimed that local intelligence on racist thugs could have been used on the night of the murder to identify the suspects. The report says, however, that there is no evidence that these records could have aided the inquiry.

The charge of racism

THE Lawrence family said the investigation into Stephen's death contrasted 'sharply' with the murder of a white boy called Richard Everett.

He was stabbed by a gang of Asian youths in King's Cross. In the Everett case, police made early arrests resulting in a conviction. This, said the Lawrences, was further proof of a 'lack of commitment' by police investigating their son's death.

They added that 'undue attention' was given to their son's background and his friends because police were not treating it as a racist attack and this played in a key part in allowing the culprits to escape justice.

But the report states that police did, in fact, regard it as racially motivated 'from the beginning'. It finds 'no evidence to support the allegations of racist conduct by police officers'.

The re-investigation

THE report is highly critical of a review of the initial murder investigation, carried out four months after Stephen's death, and a second murder inquiry started in mid-1994.

Both are described as misguided and hindering the hunt for the killers.

The internal review was commissioned by the deputy assistant commissioner for South-East London and was intended to give 'fresh impetus' to the inquiry. It concluded that the 'investigation has progressed satisfactorily and all lines of inquiry correctly pursued'.

PCA investigators take a different view. 'The review inaccurately maintained the position that much of the information available to the murder investigation team was based on anonymous or hearsay information only, which had limited their ability to achieve a successful prosecution. The complaint investigation has produced evidence showing that there were a substantial number of errors, omissions and lost opportunities in the first murder investigation.'

'In this respect the review did not fulfil its terms of reference and did not give fresh impetus to the murder

investigation. The reassurance it gave to the officer in charge of the case and to senior Metropolitan Police Service officers was ultimately highly damaging.'

Following a meeting between Sir Paul Condon and the Lawrence family in 1994, a new detective superintendent was appointed to lead a fresh murder inquiry. His brief was to pursue 'creative and original approaches to the murder investigation'. But this inquiry was fundamentally flawed, too, says the PCA report.

Senior officers remained under the impression that the identity of the person entering the police station 21 hours after the murder was not known, it says. 'Nor were they aware of the identity of the author of the anonymous letters naming the suspects. The complaint investigation has demonstrated that the means to identify both sources of information was available.'

The report adds: 'The Investigating Officer has concluded that of the many items outstanding from the first investigation, 11 remain potentially fruitful lines of inquiry which have not yet been properly followed up. However the passage of time must by now have diminished their potential evidential value.'

Daily Mail, Tuesday, December 16, 1997

Page 7

Let Stephen down



Father's anger at Condon

Continued from Page One

and said, 'Oh, he's just a black fellow, we're not going to do anything'. Nobody tried to save my son's life.

'He was lying on the ground for 20 minutes before the ambulance came. I just can't understand this conclusion of no racism — it's either racism or corruption. There's an answer and we haven't got to that.'

The report, which will be passed to Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, the retired judge heading the public inquiry into the killing, said it had not been for the persistence of Mr Lawrence and his wife Doreen much information may never have come to light.

The charges against the five youths arrested were dropped and an attempt by the family to bring a private prosecution collapsed.

At an inquest in February this year, a jury decided that 18-year-old Stephen had been unlawfully killed by five white youths 'in a completely unprovoked racist attack'. The Daily Mail then took

the unprecedented step of naming the five prime suspects as the killers and urged them to sue us if we were wrong.

Sir Paul accepted there had been problems during the initial stages of the inquiry which might have affected the outcome.

He said: 'I have had the privilege of meeting the Lawrences twice. I have expressed my regret, my apologies that this didn't lead to a prosecution. I am deeply saddened, deeply sorry, that the Met didn't bring this to a satisfactory conclusion.'

He said the initial murder inquiry team had been inundated with information and officers were already struggling to cope with ten other murder inquiries.

'Many of the omissions and failures are systemic failures,' he said.

'The report acknowledges that a lot of hard work went into this case. The officers worked day and night. There was no lack of effort. What they were unable to do was systematically deal with the pressures they were faced with.'

Sir Paul added that the Met had learned from the case and now

had a different method of distributing murder inquiry workloads to prevent detectives becoming similarly overstretched.

The case is still not yet closed and there were still 11 leads to be followed through, he added.

The prospect of success is limited by the passage of time and a continuing reluctance of key witnesses to give evidence.

The family's solicitor Imran Khan said they were still considering legal action against officers who may have been negligent.

When the PCA investigation was ordered many officers feared it could degenerate into a witch-hunt. It was conducted by Kent Police and a number of Met officers had discipline notices served on them during their inquiries.

During one interview a senior detective who conducted a review into the original investigation was allegedly referred to at one point as the 'defendant'.

Police involved in the case have maintained that everything humanly possible was done to catch the killers.

Comment — Page EIGHT

The prime suspects

BOTH detective superintendents decided against making an early arrest because they felt they had only 'anonymous or hearsay information which did not provide reasonable grounds for arrest'.

The PCA report criticises this policy. 'Their judgement has been tested against the records of the murder investigation.'

'These show that four days after the murder, 20 pieces of information pointed to the suspects who were eventually arrested. Some came from known sources and the complaint investigation has established that some of the anonymous sources could have been identified if appropriate action had been taken.'

'Information acquired from a local resident and available during the first weekend after the murder might have produced evidence placing the suspects at the scene on the night of the murder. However this was not followed up until six days later.'

'The report says that witnesses were treated poorly during the murder inquiry while identity parades were organised badly.'

'Although identification evidence was crucial to detecting this crime, the first identification parade suffered from a lack of preparation and poor communication.'

'As a result a key witness withdrew co-operation; not all potential witnesses were given the opportunity to identify suspects; not all the suspects appeared in the parade; and the wrong questions were asked of the witnesses.'

'Later identity parades suffered from similar weaknesses although not to the same extent.'

The senior officers

THE two senior officers chiefly responsible for the investigation into Stephen Lawrence's death, so heavily criticised in the report, were Detective Superintendents Ian Crampton and Brian Weedon.

Although no officers were named in the PCA report it was damning of numerous aspects of the handling of the whole investigation.

However, despite the fact that Metropolitan Commissioner Sir Paul Condon did not rule out disciplinary hearings against officers yesterday, there can be no action against the two superintendents because they have both retired.

During the first days of the inquiry the murder hunt was conducted by Detective Superintendent Crampton. After his initial inquiries he handed over the reins to Detective Superintendent Weedon.

Both had careers built on reputations for thoroughness although neither had dealt with as high profile a murder before and despite the failure of the investigation both men have privately and publicly consistently defended their actions.

At the time of the inquest into Stephen's death Mr Weedon said: 'I

totally refute any suggestion that the police have been slow to act or reluctant to pursue information which has been given to them.'

Other senior officers later took over the investigation.

The report said weaknesses had been identified 'in the leadership, direction and quality of work of the first murder investigation'.

'Available information was not dealt with systematically and lacked the necessary analytical approach to maximise its potential to produce evidence.'

'The quality of supervision of officers was poor and assumptions were made about the standard of work being carried out that would not have withstood proper scrutiny.'

'Decisions were taken without full appreciation of the available information. The implementation of certain decisions (such as those to make arrests) was rushed and suffered from a lack of proper preparation and planning.'

'In general, the complaint investigation has identified a large number of oversights and omissions which resulted in the murder investigation failing to operate to an acceptable standard.'

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Appendix 15: Article in *The Observer* published on 14 March 2010

***The Observer*, 14 March 2010 (Tony Thompson)**

Inside the lonely and violent world of the Yard's elite undercover unit

For four years, Officer A lived a secret life among anti-racist activists as they fought brutal battles with the police and the BNP. Here he tells of the terrifying life he led, the psychological burden it placed on him – and his growing fears that the work of his unit could threaten legitimate protest

They got drunk together, stood shoulder to shoulder as they fought the police and far-right activists, and became so intimately acquainted with each other's lives that in the end they were closer than brothers. But it was all a sham. Hidden among the close-knit and highly motivated group of violent far-left activists was a serving police officer, operating deep undercover, whose presence was intended to bring the group to its knees.

That man, known only as Officer A, has now come forward to give his account of the years he spent working for Scotland Yard's most secret unit, the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), on a mission to prevent disorder on the streets of London. For four years in the mid-1990s, he lived a double life six days a week, spending just one day a week with his wife and family.

Week after week, year in and year out, he lived and breathed the life of a hardcore Trotskyist agitator with a passion for heavy drinking, a deep-seated hatred of the police and a predilection for extreme violence. It was a persona that took him to the heart of some of the most violent groups in the capital at a time when tensions between extreme left and extreme right were at their peak. "I never had any respite when I was back at home. I simply couldn't relax," said Officer A. "The respite for me was being back in my undercover flat because that was where I was supposed to be. Even if my targets were not there, I felt more at ease. I had a really good time with my targets and enjoyed their company enormously – there was a genuine bond. But I was never under any illusion about what I was there to do. They were not truly my friends. The friendship would last only up until the point when they found out what I really was. I was under no illusion about what would happen to me if they did."

The SDS started life in 1968 after anti-Vietnam war protests turned violent in Grosvenor Square, London, outside the US embassy. No one had been prepared for the unprecedented level of violence directed at the police. It was a wake-up call to senior officers in the Metropolitan police who realised they needed a new way to gather intelligence about the hate-filled "subversives" they now had to deal with.

Known as the "hairies" because they had to look like the agitators they were mixing with, the 10 undercover officers who made up the unit were given new identities, flats, vehicles and "cover" jobs while working in the field for years at a time. Officer A had joined the Met in 1986 straight from school. Having discovered an interest in political ideology and public affairs, he initially wanted to join the security service but found that entry was barred to all but Oxbridge graduates.

His best chance of doing that kind of work, he was told, would be to join the Met and apply for a job in Special Branch, essentially a wing of MI5. Having distinguished himself during cadet training and his two-year probation, he joined Special Branch after four years in uniform and spent three years working to counter Irish terrorism before being recruited to the SDS.

“The day you join the SDS, you have a big leaving do. Although you’re still a police officer, being in the SDS means you won’t be seeing any of your police friends for at least five years. During your deployment, your only official link to the Met is your payslip,” he said. SDS officers use the same methods as Frederick Forsyth detailed in *The Day of the Jackal* to choose their new identities. This involves applying for the birth certificate of someone who died at an early age and using this to fabricate a cover story. “That first step gives you a name, a flat, a vehicle and a life story that makes it all real.”

Before being deployed in the field, SDS officers are taken into a room and interrogated about every aspect of their cover story by two experienced operators. If they pass this test, they are then told the cautionary tale of how an SDS officer’s cover was blown when his targets asked him to explain the death certificate for the cover name he was using and had to jump from a second-floor window to escape.

Officer A’s initial target was a young student union activist who was a key member of an up-and-coming Trotskyist organisation that had led a violent protest against BNP paper-sellers in Brick Lane, east London. The organisation was considered one of the most violent in the capital at the time and its leader soon became a priority SDS target.

Officers normally spend months getting to know their targets and winning their confidence. In the case of Officer A, however, it took far less time. “I enrolled at the college where the target studied and on my first day there I heard a bit of an altercation while I was in the queue for lunch. A few things were said to one of the female staff, some of which had a bit of a nasty racial overtone. I pushed forward to intervene. It all got a bit heated and the guy who was giving the abuse took a swing at me. Big mistake. He was soon on the floor, out cold.

“A close friend of my target was in the canteen at the time and had seen the whole thing. A couple of hours later, I was in the student union picking up some passes and the bloke who had watched me fight was there again. He turned to my target, who was sitting next to him, and said: ‘That’s the one I was telling you about.’ A little later, my target came over and introduced himself.”

Officer A eventually agreed to attend a small demonstration the following weekend. When the event turned violent, he found himself standing next to his target and others from the group as they launched a series of attacks on uniformed police. “The one thing all these groups have in common, both on the left and the right, is a total hatred of the police,” he said. “It means you are having to maintain a false identity in a completely hostile environment. Under those circumstances you have no choice but to engage in acts of violence. That day developed into a major ruck. At the end no one would have believed I was a police officer.

“If anyone had accused me [of being a police officer] there would have been a dozen people willing to come forward and swear it wasn’t true. We were all buzzing when it was over,” said Officer A. “We couldn’t wait for the next event. Because of what we’d all been through, I was accepted by them right away.”

Officer A wasn’t the only one attacking his former colleagues. At the time of his deployment, other SDS officers had infiltrated opposing right-wing groups such as the BNP and Combat 18, as well as other far-left groups. It was a time of extreme racial tension and violent clashes with the police and rival political parties were rife. Two weeks later, Officer A took part in a much larger, far more violent, protest in Welling, south-east London, against a BNP-run bookshop that served as the party’s headquarters. Intelligence he obtained revealed that the demo was to be far larger than had been expected and that a particularly violent faction was planning to storm the bookshop and set fire to it, trapping any BNP members inside.

As a result, police leave was cancelled for that weekend and more than 7,000 officers, including a large mounted contingent, were deployed. Instead of being spread out along the entire route, police focused on blocking the main roads leading to the bookshop and forcing the march along a route that would take it away from its target. A violent confrontation ensued with a group of hardcore protesters – Officer A among them – attacking the police lines in an attempt to break through. Dozens of police and protesters were injured in the clashes.

Despite the violence, the operation was deemed to be a success for the police and Sir Paul Condon, the then Met commissioner, went to meet members of the SDS to thank them.

"I didn't have any qualms about what I was doing," said Officer A. "I was clear that my role was to target subversives and prevent disorder. The consequences of that day would have been far worse had the SDS not been involved."

At that time, some of the SDS officers were known as "shallow paddlers" because they spent only limited time with their targets. Others, like Officer A, were "deep swimmers" who immersed themselves in the role. During one operation to infiltrate an Animal Liberation Front cell, one officer is said to have lived in a squat for 18 months, virtually 24/7.

As months turned to years, Officer A's personal life was beginning to suffer, and his relationship with his wife and children was under particular pressure. One major cause of stress was that he was spending so much of his time fighting with fellow police officers and was now on the wrong side of a riot shield. "It was a total headbender," he said.

Once inside the groups they were ordered to infiltrate, it was relatively easy for SDS officers to rise to the top because they were often prepared to work long hours on boring, administrative jobs. Often they tried to become membership secretaries or treasurers, where their position gave them access to the records and secret agendas that were so useful to the security services. Often more efficient than those around them, operatives had to strike a balance to ensure they did not end up running the organisations they were trying to destroy.

In the aftermath of the Welling riot, senior Met officials began to express concern that the so-called "black campaigns" that had sprung up in the aftermath of the murder of Stephen Lawrence in April 1993 had the potential to lead to further bloodshed on the streets of the capital. "It had only been a couple of years since the beating of Rodney King led to the riots in LA. When young black men started dying in police custody and racist murders were going unsolved, a lot of people were getting increasingly angry," said Officer A. Fearing they were in danger of losing control, the SDS decided to target these new groups.

Having won the trust of several high-profile anti-facism and anti-racism activists on the far left, Officer A was ideally placed. Over the next two years he worked his way up to become branch secretary of Youth Against Racism in Europe, a leading anti-racist organisation that was a front for the far-left group Militant. Getting alongside these new targets called for a different approach, said Officer A. "You get given a file on your target that tells you everything you need to know. You become that person's brother. You know everything that makes them tick. You know how much they like to drink, you know where they like to drink. You know what kind of music they like, you know what kind of women they like. You become the brother they never knew they had. None of it is ever said to the target, it's far more subtle than that. The first time they get in the car, it will be just the right kind of music playing. The first time a redhead walks by it will be: 'God, I'm really into redheads.' It's all done fantastically cleverly."

“When your target is a man, it is just a matter of becoming his best friend. If your target is a woman, that becomes impossible. SDS officers would get together for regular meetings and you always knew if something was going on. If someone started talking about getting good information from a female target, we all knew there was only one way that could have happened. They had been sleeping with them.” He himself had slept with two members of his target group. Although not officially sanctioned, such activity among SDS officers – both male and female – was tacitly accepted and in many cases was vital in maintaining an undercover role. “You can’t be in that world full-time for five years and never have a girlfriend or boyfriend. People would start to ask questions,” said Officer A.

But the pressures continued to grow. “At first, I could convince myself that my job was about fighting subversion, but once I began targeting the groups set up to win justice for those who had died in police custody or had been victims of racism, it was clear that what the loved ones of the deceased wanted was justice. My presence in the groups made that justice harder to obtain. The remit was to prevent disorder, but by providing intelligence you rob these groups of the element of surprise. If every time they have a demonstration the agitators are prevented from causing trouble, they are less effective. Once the SDS get into an organisation, it is effectively finished.

“If I were a regular police officer and I wanted to plant a bug in your house or your office, I would need to get all kinds of permissions. But the SDS can put a person in your car, in your house, in your life for 24 hours a day for five years and nobody outside the SDS will know anything about it.

“While I was undercover, my targets would refuse to talk on the phone because they felt it wasn’t safe, but they had no qualms about inviting me into their homes to talk about their plans. I couldn’t get over the irony of it. If the SDS had been in existence at the time of the Suffragettes, their campaigns would never have got off the ground and they would have been quickly forgotten.”

The constant strain of living a double life was also beginning to take its toll. “I couldn’t get out of role. Even after 18 months I was having trouble leaving the undercover persona behind. One time I was out swimming. Someone said something derogatory and my angry persona took over. It was an immediate reaction. There was blood everywhere.”

Before they were deployed, every SDS officer was visited at home to ensure they were married. “They introduced that rule after one officer refused to come out of the field. It turned out he just enjoyed being with his contacts so much that he was willing to give up his police salary and everything that went along with it in order to stay with them. Now you have to be married on the basis that, if you have something in the real world to come back to, you are less likely to want to remain in role. That’s the theory.”

The pressure began to become intolerable when a public inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence was announced. “There was concern that my role within the campaigns might emerge during the inquiry,” he said. “In the end the SDS decided not to disclose it themselves. Because the remit was to prevent disorder, it was felt that if it had emerged at the time, it would have led to more violence.

“Looking back, I should have done something. I should have dealt with this 11 years ago. I am coming forward to get closure for the things I did back then. By the end I’d spent four years fighting the police. When I came back to Special Branch I had to suppress who I was. I was no longer the same person. I hated the job and everything about it.”

Officer A was later diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. He sued the Met and received an out-of-court settlement. The Metropolitan police, meanwhile, has refused to comment on any matters connected to the SDS.

Appendix I6: Attorney-General's 'undertaking' given to Peter Francis



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21st November 2013

Dear Mr Ellison,

Thank you for your letter of 23rd October concerning the possibility of an undertaking being offered to Peter Francis should he agree to assist your review. Following consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service the Attorney General is prepared to offer Mr Francis an undertaking in the following terms:

This is an undertaking provided to Peter Francis in respect of his provision of evidence to the Stephen Lawrence Review being carried out by Mark Ellison QC. 'Evidence' includes oral evidence, any written statement made by Mr Francis preparatory to giving evidence to the Review or during the course of his testimony to the Review, and any document or information produced to the Review by him.

This undertaking applies only to evidence given about matters which are within the terms of reference of the Review and limited to what has been published in the media as to what Mr Francis has said regarding his tasking and reporting connected to the Lawrence campaign.

No evidence Mr Francis may give before the Review, nor any evidence as defined above, will be used against Mr Francis in any criminal proceedings.

The Attorney General is content for you to make public the existence of the undertaking should you wish.

Yours sincerely

Kevin McGinty
Deputy Legal Secretary
kevin.mcginity@attorneygeneral.gsi.gov.uk

Appendix 17: Operation Herne: Report 1 – Use of covert identities, dated 16 July 2013

Operation
Herne

Report 1 • Use of covert identities

Mick Creedon

Chief Constable Derbyshire Constabulary

Operation Herne

Executive Summary

History

The **Special Demonstration Squad (SDS)** was an undercover unit formed by the Metropolitan Police's Special Branch. It operated between 1968 and 2008, during which time it infiltrated and reported on groups concerned in violent protest.

Operation Herne

Operation Herne (formerly Soisson) was formed in October 2011 in response to allegations made by the **Guardian** newspaper about alleged misconduct and criminality engaged in by members of the SDS. Similar matters had been previously aired as early as 2002 in a BBC documentary.

Operation Riverwood

On 4th February 2013 the Metropolitan Police received a public complaint from the family of Rod Richardson, a young boy who had died in the 1970s. It is alleged that an undercover officer working for the **National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU)** had used this child's details as his covert identity. This matter was referred to the **IPCC**. The matter was returned to the force and is currently subject of a 'local investigation'.

National Public Order Intelligence Unit

The NPOIU was formed within the MPS in 1999 to gather and coordinate intelligence. In 2006 the governance responsibility for NPOIU was moved to the Association of Chief Police Officers, after a decision was taken that the forces where the majority of activity was taking place should be responsible for authorising future deployments. In January 2011 the NPOIU was subsumed within other units under the National Domestic Extremism Units within the MPS.

In January 1995 large numbers of police from London, Kent and Hampshire were drafted to the West Sussex harbour of Shoreham in response to protests surrounding the export of live animals to Europe. The **Animal Liberation Front (ALF)** and another animal extremist group named '**Justice Department**' had a strong base in the community there. This led to a number of protests and in October 1995 there was a further demonstration in Brightlingsea, Essex. This resulted in a record number of police being deployed to prevent widespread public disorder. Ad-hoc protest groups emerged and the need for first hand high quality intelligence was evident. This led to undercover

operatives being required to infiltrate these animal extremist organisations.

The purpose of the NPOIU was:

- 1 To provide the police service with the ability to develop a national threat assessment and profile for domestic extremism.
- 2 Support the police service to reduce crime and disorder from domestic extremism.
- 3 Support a proportionate police response to protest activity.
- 4 Help the police service manage concerns of communities and businesses to minimise conflict and disorder.

Control of the NPOIU moved to ACPO in 2006 under the direction of the ACPO National Co-ordinator for Domestic Extremism, **Assistant Chief Constable Anton Setchell**. He was replaced by **Detective Chief Superintendent Adrian Tudway** in 2010. The NPOIU worked with the **National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit (NETCU)** and the **National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET)**.

The NPOIU now exists as part of the **National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU)** under the Metropolitan Police Service Specialist Operations and is run by **Detective Chief Superintendent Chris Greaney**.

Deceased identities

On 5th February 2013 the **Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC)** questioned **Deputy Assistant Commissioner Gallan** about the alleged practice that SDS officers had used the details of dead children, as part of a cover identity for undercover police officers. At the time DAC Gallan was based in the MPS Directorate of Professional Standards and was in overall command of Operation Herne. Her appearance before the HASC led to considerable media coverage and some negative commentary. As a result of the media coverage, Operation Herne has now received enquiries from fourteen (14) families regarding seventeen (17) children.

Operation Herne review

One hundred and forty-seven (147) named individuals are believed to have served as police officers within the SDS at all ranks from Chief Superintendent down. This covers the forty (40) years that the unit was in existence and not all the police officers were deployed in undercover roles.

At this stage one hundred and six (106) covert identities have been identified as having been used by the SDS between 1968 and 2008.

Forty-two (42) of these identities are either confirmed or highly likely to have used the details of a deceased child.

Forty-five (45) of these identities have been established as fictitious. Work continues to identify the provenance of the remaining identities.

Operation Herne

Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND)

The policy of 'neither confirming nor denying' the use of or identity of an undercover police officer is a long established one used by UK policing. It is essential so as to provide for the necessary operational security and to ensure undercover officers are clear that their identity will never be disclosed by the organisation that asked them to carry out the covert activity. The duty of care owed to such officers is an absolute one and applies during their deployments, throughout their service and continues when they are retired.

Please note that this is an interim report specifically about the use of the identities of deceased children and infants. It does not seek to cover either all of the activities of the SDS nor has it been able to completely provide all the answers regarding the use of covert identities. The report clearly explains the use of the tactic and is submitted early given the need to deal with the public concerns and is provided in agreement with the Home Office who sought to have this matter concluded before the parliamentary summer recess.

1

The History of the Special Demonstration Squad

- 1.1 The Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), initially known as the Special Operations Squad (SOS), was created in 1968 by the Metropolitan Police's Special Branch in response to the Anti Vietnam War demonstrations that took place in Grosvenor Square, London on 18th March. At that time demonstrators were targeting the United States Embassy, and it was feared that lives would be lost during the increasingly violent clashes. The unit was created with direct support and funding from the Home Office.
- 1.2 Between March to October 1968, a small number of Special Branch officers were deployed to infiltrate the groups of demonstrators to provide intelligence about those organising the public disorder. These officers were successful in infiltrating the anti-war movement and were able to pass key intelligence to assist with the policing of the demonstrations. At the time, the Special Branch's activity was acknowledged as invaluable in keeping the Home Secretary of the day 'well informed'.

Funding & Authorisation

- 1.3 Initially, the SDS was funded and authorised by the **Deputy Under Secretary of State**. At its inception the Deputy Under Secretary of State was **Sir James Waddell** and the enquiry team has a quantity of signed correspondence and other documentation from him (and his successors) relating to the squad.
- 1.4 At the end of 1968, as a result of political developments abroad and the SDS's apparent early successes it was decided that the unit should continue. Subsequently, over the intervening years the SDS expanded its remit beyond reporting upon left wing extremism to include the far right, Irish terrorist groups and any groups that were intent on committing serious public disorder.

The Squad is renamed

- 1.5 Between November 1972 and January 1973 the SOS was renamed the '**Special Demonstration Squad**' (SDS) to reflect its evolving remit. The unit's name was then changed again around 1997 to the '**Special Duties Section**', and it remained so until it was closed in 2008.

Operation Herne

Home Office

- 1.6 At the insistence of the Home Office, the squad was to be maintained with the strictest secrecy, so as not to compromise the Government or its sensitive operations. It appears that significant dedicated funding was provided by the Home Office to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on the grounds of paying for operational security. This issue of secrecy is a prevailing theme, and was used to justify many deployment decisions. Until the later years of the SDS's existence, very few people outside of the MPS Special Branch knew of it.
- 1.7 Over a period of time it was established that long term covert deployments would provide the best intelligence yields. Initial deployments of officers were for several years. However Operation Herne has established that there was no formal selection or training processes, little legal guidance to operatives and the SDS often had to break new ground. Practices evolved over time, as a result of officers reporting on their activities and personal initiatives and then sharing these with their colleagues. Officers were selected directly and on personal recommendation, almost always from within the MPS Special Branch.

2

Operation Herne (Formerly Operation Soisson)

- 2.1 In October 2011 **DAC Mark Simmons (at the time the Director, Directorate of Professional Standards)** instructed that a full review of the SDS was necessary, following allegations made by the Guardian newspaper over the preceding months about the conduct of officers from the unit. These claims included allegations that a former SDS officer (**N14**) had a relationship with a woman whilst he had worked undercover and that he had gone on to father children with her. It was also further claimed that SDS officers had given evidence in their covert names without the court's knowledge and that this was grounds to support a miscarriage of justice.
- 2.2 Initially the review consisted of a scoping exercise and the need to gather knowledge of the SDS - still known only to a very few within the MPS. Following this work and the launch of the enquiry, the review team was provided with six thousand (6,000) paper records and a large number of computer exhibits in the form of hard drives and floppy discs. Interrogation of these exhibits has been complicated by the encryption and levels of security, but to date this work has revealed approximately fifty thousand (50,000) separate documents. This resource has continued to expand as further relevant material has been recovered (i.e. from the MPS General Registry). All documents have been scan-read, and are in the process of being placed onto secure HOLMES and indexed

- 2.3 During the initial review of material, Operation Herne identified the SDS practice of using all or part of the genuine details of deceased children to construct their covert identities. One document in particular, the 'SDS Trade Craft Manual', described the method of constructing a false identity. The methodology was justified in the Manual as the only viable means to provide a robust backstopped covert legend that would stand scrutiny. However the document's provenance is questionable, and it was written in such a way that suggested that the practice had fallen out of use by the mid-1990s.

Operation Riverwood

- 2.4 On 4th February 2013, the Guardian (**Paul Lewis**) published an article about an alleged under cover officer (UCO) who it was claimed had used the identity of a baby that had died. It was alleged that the UCO had worked for the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) between 1999 and 2003 using the name of Rod Richardson. Over the following days a detailed account including photographs appeared in the paper.
- 2.5 The NPOIU was merged with National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) and National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET) to form the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) in 2010. It is currently managed by SO15 within the MPS. Paul Lewis's article made further allegations of sexual relationships between different SDS officers and those they were sent to infiltrate.
- 2.6 On the same day the Directorate of Professional standards received correspondence from **Tuckers Solicitors** representing a woman named **Ms S**. The letter alleged that the Metropolitan Police had used the identity of her deceased son, Rod Richardson. The letter lodged an official complaint to the MPS on behalf of Ms S. This matter was referred to the **Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)** on the 28th February 2013. Initially the IPCC determined that the mode of investigation would be 'supervised'. However the complaint has now been returned to force to deal as a 'local investigation.'
- 2.7 The findings and recommendations of the investigation have been reported to the IPCC.

Operation Herne

Home Affairs Select Committee

- 2.8 On the 5th February 2013 DAC Patricia Gallan appeared before the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC). The use of deceased children's identities was a key theme in the questions from members of the HASC. During the hearing, DAC Gallan confirmed that the practice had indeed taken place and when questioned by the Committee she declined to apologise as the enquiry was ongoing. HASC has made a number of requests, for the Metropolitan Police to fully investigate the issue of the use of children's identities, to apologise for the use of the tactic and for Operation Herne to complete its enquiries as soon as possible.

Previous publicity

- 2.9 Significantly, the alleged practice by the SDS of using deceased children's identities has been reported publicly before. In 2002 a BBC 2 documentary called 'True Spies' raised this very issue and this in turn subsequently generated further media interest in this process. In a later online article, 'Subverting the subversives', the BBC asked rhetorically, 'How would you handle taking the identity of a dead child to work under cover?' Despite wide publicity, at the time, the MPS did not receive any complaints.
- 2.10 The issue of the use of the identities of deceased children and infants by undercover police officers has since been subject to considerable media coverage and a number of questions in Parliament. In addition, a number of Members of Parliament have written to Operation Herne on behalf of their constituents about the same issue.
- 2.11 On the 9th February 2013, due to increasing media and parliamentary interest, the **Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe** decided to appoint an independent lead for Operation Herne to bring greater objectivity and transparency, and to further reassure the public of his determination to seek the truth about the allegations about the SDS. He approached the **Chief Constable of Derbyshire Mr Mick Creedon QPM**, as an independent senior officer from an external force to lead Operation Herne.
- 2.12 On the 11th February the **Home Secretary (Rt Hon Theresa May MP)** endorsed this decision and publicly announced that, the Chief Constable of Derbyshire had been appointed to lead the investigation.

'Given the seriousness of the latest allegations, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe and the Chairman of the Independent Police Complaints Commission have agreed that it would be appropriate for a senior figure from outside the Metropolitan Police to take over the leadership of the investigation.'

Public Enquiries

- 2.13 As a result of the media reporting surrounding the questions raised at HASC on the 5th February 2013, Operation Herne opened a Casualty Bureau response in case of a large number of public contacts. To date fourteen (14) enquiries from the families of seventeen (17) separate children have been received. The enquiries were from concerned members of the public who want to know whether the SDS had used their deceased relative's identities.
- 2.14 In addition, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request has been received from **Duncan Hames MP** about the alleged practice of using children's identities by members of the SDS.
- 2.15 All of the enquiring members of the public have been personally visited by a family liaison officer from Operation Herne, and a letter acknowledging their enquiries has been hand delivered on behalf of Chief Constable Mick Creedon.

3

How the SDS constructed identities

- 3.1 In his statement, the former SDS Chief Inspector N69 who served between 1986 and 1987 stated that,

‘...new recruits were instructed on how to go about obtaining false birth certificates. They would obtain details of a deceased person of a similar age from Somerset House and then use those details to go about creating their legend.’
- 3.2 This is supported by the SDS Tradecraft Manual (an organic document of initiatives, operational learning, guidelines and suggestions from established UCOs to assist other UCOs in their deployments) which states that the identities of deceased children (generally aged between 8 and 14 years) were routinely used by the SDS prior to 1995 to obtain passports, driving licences and other documents. ‘By tradition, the aspiring SDS officer's first major task.... was to spend hours and hours at St Catherine's House leafing through death registers in search of a name he could call his own....’ The manual stated that this practice was ‘unsafe’, but there were no alternatives.

(The author of this statement is unknown. The Tradecraft Manual was compiled over a number of years)
- 3.3 A manual entry dated June 1995 provides the first evidence of the cessation of this practice when it comments that, ‘...names are no longer obtained from the Death Register at St Catherine's House.’

8

Operation Herne

- 3.4 As the SDS became more established it appears that officers could spend considerable amounts of time researching a suitable subject to assume an identity. According to N2 (a former SDS UCO and later cover officer) efforts would be made to research the existence of close family members. Names that were too unusual or too common would be discounted, as too would cases where the deceased had died in unusual or memorable circumstances. In preference, children were chosen that would have died between four (4) and eight (8) years of age and would be of broadly the same age as the UCO. Given the fact that the unit was established in 1968, and the youngest officers at that time would probably have been in their mid twenties, it is the case that some of the identities used could relate to children born as early as 1940.
- 3.5 In a video interview provided to the Guardian by the former SDS Officer N43, he described how it was common practice to weave ones own memories into that of the child he had based his covert identity upon. N43 stated that he was unhappy about using a child's details and he felt that he was stamping on their memory. N43's legend was also typical of the backstopping created by the SDS officers at the time.
- 3.6 Significantly, N43 has claimed that he had no choice, either he used the identity or he would have had to have left the unit. It is absolutely clear that the use of identities of deceased children was an established practice that new officers were 'taught'. It was what was expected of them, and was the means by which they could establish a cover identity before they were deployed. Whatever their views are now about this practice, this was not done by the officers in any underhand or salacious manner - it was what they were told to do.

4

Why were deceased identities used by the SDS?

- 4.1 As outlined in the SDS Tradecraft Manual, the practice of using a genuine deceased identity was developed to create a plausible covert identity that was capable of frustrating enquiries by activists and one that could be used to generate a birth certificate thereby giving access to a range of necessary documentation in support of the covert identity.

- 4.2 To date Operation Herne has not discovered who directly introduced the tactic to the SDS - it is simply not yet known who instigated the technique in the SDS.

In 1943, members of the Security Services devised a complex sting called Operation Mincemeat. This Operation involved using the body of a drowned vagrant and false identification papers to make the Nazis believe a false information feed, ahead of the allied D Day Landings. The operation was made into a book by Ewen Montague, a play and a famous film based on these true events called '[The Man Who Never Was](#)' (1956).

- 4.3 Operation Herne has internal SDS documentation apparently written in 1996, called, 'Operational Security v Department of Social Security Records'. This document explains that even though the practice had been phased out it was still the, '[... traditional method of finding a false identity \(using a genuine birth certificate\).](#)'

- 4.4 Clearly the practice was well documented and it is apparent that the SDS was aware that the activists they were trying to infiltrate were also aware of this technique. According to the retired N2 he found himself in a situation where he had penetrated an organisation and was then asked by the group to help trace a mole among them.

- 4.5 In 1971 the author **Frederick Forsyth** published his book, 'Day of the Jackal'. This popularised the technique of how to create a false identity by researching a person that had died in childhood who had a similar date of birth and then basing a credible legend around that subject.

- 4.6 In the case of SDS officers the subject chosen had to have had an 'existence' to show up in case of basic research, by suspicious activists. A genuine identity of a deceased person was needed, as there was no viable means of inserting a fictitious entry into the records of births held by **General Records Office** (Formerly located at Somerset House in London). Moreover, if an activist was able to obtain the details of an under cover officer's birth details it would have been extremely straight forward to attend Somerset House and search the book binders to prove or disprove that the details were apparently genuine.

- 4.7 Before the transition to computer based records, although a birth certificate was never intended to be an identification document they were regularly used to apply for other documents, such as driving licences or passports. In the absence of any other documentary proof, birth certificates were used as effective identification. Indeed before modern developments they might be the only proxy identity document that most members of the public would possess.

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- 4.8 Much of the work carried out by the SDS was highly sensitive and placed the UCOs at considerable risk. The need to protect their identities was of paramount importance and in the case of the Department of Social Security and the General Records Office, the SDS was highly wary of staff with activist sympathies who might be able to make unauthorised hostile searches. This again led the UCOs to have to create false identities using the details of deceased children.
- 4.9 The use of a genuine identity based upon a deceased child enabled an undercover officer to apply for other genuine identity documents to act as props, to give the officer credibility and to prevent hostile enquiries. It is still unclear how in the early years the SDS officers obtained genuine identity documents for their covert names.

5

When were deceased identities used?

- 5.1 It is unclear when exactly the SDS started to use deceased identities to create their legends. To date Operation Herne has established that the earliest confirmed officer that used a deceased identity as part of his legend was in the field between 1976 and 1981. It appears that the early (post 1968) deployments did not have to be so reliant on the covert identity. The apparent change in policy is still being investigated.
- 5.2 Operation Herne has identified details of thirty-seven (37) police officers who had apparently worked for the SDS in some form by 1971; however due to the lack of detailed records the review has as yet been unable to identify whether they were all UCOs and if so establish any details of their cover names or dates of birth to cross check against General Records Office's birth and death returns.
- 5.3 It is believed that from about 1971, at least some of the officers who were deployed could have used a deceased child's identity as part of their cover. A number of this first tranche of officers are still alive and efforts are in hand to locate and interview them. The issue of whether they used a child's identity will of course be put to them, as will questions around their selection, training and support and who authorised the use of the tactic. As these enquiries are undertaken the figures of the actual numbers of identities used may change.

- 5.4 According to comments within the SDS annual review of 1994 to 1995 and internal memorandum written by N53 in 2002, the SDS practice of using deceased children's records to construct their covert identities was phased out starting in November 1994. The SDS annual review states that N26 was the first officer to have obtained a completely fictitious identity. This was not only good for ethical reasons, but it also reduced the risk of compromise, particularly where an officer might be confronted by 'their' own death certificate.
- 5.5 It is unclear whether the practice within the SDS had completely stopped by 1995, or was one gradually being phased out. There is the potential of an officer assuming an identity based on a deceased child in 1993/94 and maintaining this for several years whilst operationally deployed. If this were the case it would clearly be problematic to stop the tactic whilst the identity was in use. This means that there is the potential that the tactic was still in use until the late 1990's even though the policy had changed.
- 5.6 To date Operation Herne has been unable to find any documentary proof to confirm the end of the use of this tactic. A number of witnesses have yet to be spoken to and they may be able to clarify the position. Where former SDS officers have been asked about the practice they have freely acknowledged it happened for operational reasons and was what they were introduced to when they were recruited to the unit.
- 5.7 This report has already explained that the tactic was based upon the officer creating an identity that fitted broadly with his or her age range. The youngest officers to work in the SDS as an undercover operative were in their early 20's – meaning that the identity used would be that of a child born some twenty or so years earlier. The SDS was created in 1968 and it is known that the tactic was in use by the early 1970's – meaning the deceased children would have been born in the 1940's and early 1950's. With very few exceptions the tactic was effectively ended in the mid-1990's, meaning that any identity would have been based on a child born at the latest in the mid-1970's. Given this timeframe, it is the case that there won't have been a need to use the real identity of a child born at any time in the last almost forty (40) years. Accepting the disquiet over the tactic, the public should be reassured by this and that the tactic has a very historical perspective

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6

How many identities are involved?

- 6.1 A core part of this enquiry has been the identification of the personnel that worked for and managed the SDS and this includes those at chief officer level who oversaw the activities of the unit. In carrying out this work, Operation Herne will establish those 'operational' staff: their roles, their recruitment and training, their attachment dates and whether they based their covert legends wholly or partly on a deceased person. As a result, a number of lists have been identified from the material. These lists are however incomplete and at times contradictory. In a number of cases the information would appear to have errors.
- 6.2 In 2002 N53 provided a series of internal memoranda in relation to a joint operation called Operation Wisdom. This operation was led by the **National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)**. It concerned the identification, by the passport service, of approximately 1200 names where a passport had been applied for with a duplicate birth certificate after a death certificate had been issued. In a minute dated 2nd February 2002, N53 explained that he believed that between 1968 and 2002 there had been one hundred and two (102) SDS officers who had been provided with covert identities. N53's documentation stated that the majority of these UCO's would have used a deceased child's identity. This report is however not complete and does not hold the covert identities given to these UCO's.
- 6.3 To date Operation Herne has verified one hundred and six (106) covert names that were used by members of the SDS. Of these one hundred and six (106), forty two (42) have been either confirmed or can be treated as highly likely to have used a genuine deceased child's identity. These numbers should not be treated as absolute and may change as the enquiry continues.
- 6.4 Operation Herne has been able to establish that forty-five (45) of the identities provided in the list of 106 covert identities have been created from totally fictitious details. This assessment is based upon the research of documentary evidence within the Herne material, interviews with former SDS officers and enquiries internally within the Metropolitan Police. The dates of the deployment are also significant, as after 1994 the practice was no longer required as it was deemed unnecessary and potentially too risky in respect of potential compromise.

- 6.5 Of the remaining SDS identities in use, research continues to establish whether they are also of real people or whether they were invented. Efforts have been frustrated as there is no exhaustive list of all of the SDS's covert identities, and a number of subjects have no dates of birth or even full names. However, in the incidences where an age can be established the majority are again of young children that have died.

7

SDS Management Oversight

- 7.1 A range of officers at different ranks and roles have been interviewed by the investigation team. The information provided corroborates totally the belief that for the majority of the existence of the SDS the use of deceased children's identities was accepted as standard practice. So far forty (40) have been spoken to by Operation Herne.
- 7.2 Former **Commander N85**, (Head of Special Branch between 2000 and 2004 and SDS UCO between 1978 and 1980) states that,
- '...a life of deception needs a true name to withstand scrutiny. I used an accepted practice; however, I did everything I could to avoid using the surname. There was no moralising about the process, I didn't think of it as stealing a child's identity. This was a long term political infiltration which was seen as justified. It was for Queen and country and peace and democracy. It was the way it was done. A registered birth was the strongest foundation; other methods were not available at the time'.
- 7.3 Retired **N85**, who served as the SDS Commander between 1986 and 1988 states that (Special Branch) spent, 'half our lives' at Somerset House building legends - each operative had to devise an identity for themselves. 'I inherited an approved system, ...we had the safety net that this information would never become public knowledge.'
- 7.4 Former **N67** (who served as an SDS field officer between 1981 and 1984) states that when he started at the SDS he was told to create his own identity. Although there was not one specific training manual, there was a reference folder with tried and tested best practice.
- He was aware that this documentation could help him create his legend. He gave his supervisors a list of possible identities that he researched at St Catherine's House.

Operation Herne

- 7.5 N67 researched individuals that were born between 1951 and 1952, approximating to his own year of birth. He chose an individual who had died abroad and in turn created a legend blending his own biographical details to make his covert identity more believable.
- 7.6 Although the practice was clearly widely used by the SDS, Operation Herne has identified at least one example where an officer covertly deployed before 1994 did so, without using the details of a deceased child. The retired officer explained in an interview that he had adopted an aunt's surname and that he had successfully used it as part of his cover name.

8

Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy

- 8.1 The policy of 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND) is a tactic adopted by police officers responding to questions at court, where there are concerns that an answer to a specific question could compromise the identity of a source or some other covert asset. It appears that the policy, although long accepted as best practice, did not derive from specific legislation. However, it has been incorporated into both Criminal Procedures and Investigatory Powers Act (CPIA) 1996 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000, in regards to the management of sensitive and public interest immunity information.
- 8.2 The concept of NCND has its roots in common law and has been regularly applied since in a number of stated cases. It also has a basis in the Human Rights Act 1998 under Article 2 (Right to life), Article 6 (Right to a fair trial) and Article 8 (Right to Privacy). Essentially a police officer will only identify an informant if required under law. Relevant cases include:
- 8.3 **R v Agar 1990:**
Case law prevents the defence from questioning to identify the existence of a potential informant.

8.4 *Attorney General v Briant* 1846 (15 M. & W. 169) and *Mark v Beyfus* 1890 (25 QBD 424):

Which both support that an informant's identity should be protected on public interest grounds, to ensure that potential future informers aren't put off from providing assistance to Law enforcement agencies.

In *Agar*, the defendant appealed against conviction on the ground that the judge had erred in ruling that questions could not be put to police witnesses for fear of identifying informants, thereby weakening the defendant's attack on the police: The Court of Appeal held that notwithstanding the special rule of public policy which inhibited the disclosure of the identity of informants, the public interest in ensuring a fair trial for a defendant outweighed the public interest in protecting the identity of a police informer if the disclosure of the informer's identity was necessary to enable the defendant to put forward a tenable case that he had been entrapped by the police and the informer acting in concert.

In *Beyfus*, the judge stated that –

'I do not say it is a rule which can never be departed from; if upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of opinion that the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to shew (sic) the prisoner's innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the policy that **must prevail**. But except in that case, this rule of public policy is not a matter of discretion; it is a rule of law, and as such should be applied by the judge at the trial, who should not treat it as a matter of discretion whether he should tell the witness to answer or not.'

8.5 The CPS Disclosure Manual states '...it is a standard response to adopt a neither confirm nor deny (NCND) approach.'

This is reiterated in the NPIA Guidance on the Lawful and Effective Use of Covert Techniques (2008) which states that,

'Neither confirming nor denying **in all cases** ensures that a failure to deny in any particular case does not amount, in effect, to confirmation. Confirming that there was no CHIS in a particular case would not cause immediate harm but could contribute to incremental damage in the longer term.'

The most recent relevant guidance is the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) published by the College of Policing. Within the media guidance section this APP states that:

'There must be a credible media strategy that does not allude to the use of undercover techniques, even when they have been referred to in court or elsewhere in the public domain.'

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A media strategy should contain entries to the effect that no information will be passed to the media that might lead to:

- The identification of an undercover officer of covert human intelligence source.
- Revelations of covert tactics/techniques or methods.
- Revelations regarding the existence or details of particular items of technical equipment.
- Disclosure of any other sensitive process or procedure.'

8.6 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) provides that undercover officers are dealt with by the legislation for covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) and that any authorisation must consider the potential risks against the CHIS. A risk assessment is required with consideration of other safety measures. RIPA creates obligations for the authorising officer to protect all CHISs, and this responsibility will be ongoing, even when a CHIS has ceased acting as an informant.

8.7 Although under cover officers may eventually be required to give evidence, in many cases a court will grant them special measures to protect an officer's identity.

8.8 Lastly, under common law, as an employer the MPS also has responsibilities for the safety of its staff, and potentially the outing of an officer could expose them to risk. This duty of care remains for officers who have left the service.

8.9 Operation Herne is clear that the use of this tactic was sanctioned at the highest level, was deemed as operationally necessary and was one that newly appointed undercover officers were trained in. Despite this it is clear that this tactic has been the cause of recent considerable concern and was not something that officers were always comfortable with. The question has to be addressed as to whether the parents or family members of those deceased children whose identities were used should be contacted and told of what was done. Whilst there is a strong argument that families should be contacted, this needs to be balanced against the long established NCND policy, the ongoing duty of care to the officers, the significant operational security considerations and the potential impact on elderly family members who may have dealt with their bereavement decades earlier.

9

Legal Advice regarding potential criminal offences

- 9.1 Operation Herne has received independent advice through the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).

The CPS appointed **Mr Simon Ray QC** (6 King's Bench Walk, the Temple EC4) to advise on the practice of using a deceased person's identity to form a covert one.

Mr Ray's advice considered the following offences:

- 1 The Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981;
- 2 Deception offences under the Theft Act 1968 and the Theft Act 1978
- 3 The Perjury Act 1911;
- 4 Misconduct in a public office, contrary to common law.
- 5 Offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988.
- 6 Identity Documents Act 2010.

- 9.2 As the SDS officer's management team were fully aware that documents were applied for in false names, any offences under Sec 15 Theft Act 1978 are unlikely to apply. There would be no offences under the Road Traffic Act as the relevant section has only been triable 'either way' (and therefore not subject to a time-limit to commence proceedings) since January 2004. Before this the offences were summary only and would have had to have been commenced within three years of commission.

- 9.3 Counsel's advice refers to the case of **R v More** [1987] which was an appeal against conviction for forgery.

After a review of the facts and the legislation Mr Ray has advised that:

- 1 Birth certificates, passports and driving licences obtained to support alias identities of undercover officers are not false instruments for the purposes of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981.
- 2 The use of an alias / false identity in itself does not amount to a deception offence under the Theft Act 1968 or the Theft Act 1978.
- 3 It is unlikely that section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911 (concerned with false statutory declarations) is engaged. However, to reach a definite conclusion it would be necessary to analyse individual applications for official documents such as passports and driving licences.

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- 4 In using the details and birth certificates of deceased persons to create aliases, Mr Ray has concluded that identities for undercover SDS officers, in the circumstances described does not amount to misconduct in a public office.

It is Mr Ray's opinion that in the circumstances described that where applications were made with the knowledge and under the orders of senior officers, for the purposes of law enforcement, '...in my view it is unlikely that the dishonesty necessary to make out an offence...would be present.'

11

Conclusions

- 11.1 Operation Herne has both documentary proof and witness accounts to confirm that the genuine details of deceased children were extensively used by members of the SDS until around 1995 so as to create cover identities and thereby enable the officers to infiltrate a range of violent protest groups.
- 11.2 Over the years the SDS management team were aware of the practice and indeed it was actively promoted to officers recruited to the unit. Many of the SDS managers had worked on the unit as undercover officers themselves before returning later in their careers. Whilst there was no formal training programme for an officer recruited to the unit, it is clear that once recruited, the officer was instructed to establish a covert identity and to do so they routinely made use of the tactic of using the identities of deceased children.
- 11.3 The genuine identities of the deceased children were blended with the officer's own biographical details.
- 11.4 It is apparent that regardless of the significant ethical issues, the practice of using a genuine identity was an imperfect solution of the time to address the need to backstop a cover identity and that the unit had little choice before 1994. It was around this time that other practices were in place to ensure that viable fictional profiles could be created without using deceased children's details.
- 11.5 The genuine identities of deceased people are no longer used to construct covert legends. No accredited police undercover unit carries out this practice.
- 11.6 Operation Herne has to date concentrated the work around the use of identities of deceased children by the MPS SDS unit. It also is known that the NPOIU also used this tactic and that the NPOIU UCOs were initially trained by SDS officers. It is not surprising that the tactic was repeated given the similar mission of the two units and the cross over of staff.

- 11.7 Operation Herne **has not yet researched** the broader development of covert undercover tactics in policing in England and Wales. Nevertheless as the routine use of undercover tactics in police forces developed in parallel to the SDS, it is highly possible that the establishment of covert identities through the use of details of deceased children was more widely practiced.

It is a fact that UCOs working in the field of serious and organised crime also need to establish secure covert identities, create legends, obtain documentation and if necessary withstand intensive scrutiny by their targets. It would be a mistake to assume that the use of identities of dead children was solely within the SDS and the NPOIU, and the possibility is that the tactic was more widely used.

Operation Herne will consider this aspect. It is not in the terms of reference of this enquiry to consider whether this use of deceased children's identities was more widely used by other agencies involved in covert undercover tactics.

- 11.8 There is understandable public, political and media concern about the use of the identities of deceased children, irrespective of the context, of the operational rationale, of any perceived necessity and of any legal considerations. It is right that the public is now properly reassured that this tactic no longer takes place. A number of safe guards are in place to ensure that undercover policing is now properly regulated and managed - and these include:

- 1 A clear legislative framework within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
- 2 The College of Policing (COP) 'Authorised Professional Practice' (APP) Oversight
- 3 A national training course for UCOs
- 4 Authority levels for UCO deployments being at Assistant Chief Constable level - although the RIPA legislation places this at superintendent level.
- 5 The need for detailed reviews and renewal of any such authorised deployments, always considering necessity and proportionality.
- 6 Clear 'use and conduct' being stipulated in any such deployments which definitively articulate in any activity that a UCO may engage in.

Protocols are now in place that allow for the creation of identities and documentation without the need to resort upon the tactics that the SDS had to rely upon.

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Herne

- 11.9 The deployment of properly trained and managed under cover officers to both disrupt and investigate crime is an approved vital policing tactic and has the full support of the courts, the wider public, Parliament and the Home Office. The issue of the historical use of covert identities based on the details of deceased children, however morally repugnant, should not detract from the importance of this tactic and the bravery of officers who have previously and still chose to volunteer to work in this field.
- 11.10 The integrity of the technique and the identity of UCOs must be protected and NCND should be used wherever appropriate.

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Herne
Published July 2013

Appendix I8: Documents relating to the covert recording of Duwayne Brooks and his solicitor

D7987

Main Line of Enquiry		Family Liaison	✓	Community Concern Assessment		Media Strategy		Resources	
Arrest Strategy		Search Strategy		Forensic Strategy		Sensitive Issues	✓	Other (Specific)	SIAM

DECISION:

At Gairn update meeting held on 23/00.
 Minutes by D. Dept. Deighton.
 Agreed Strategy / priorities set @ Meeting 22⁵.



for DEI Jones to attend meeting with
 Jane Deighton re Duwayne Brooks on 24⁵
 and for DEI Jones to seek authority and
 deploy covert recording device for meeting
 D.E. Chantler not to be aware.

REASON:

To provide update for NAC. Minute R.I.V.E.I.F.
 to consider proposed strategies and review documentation
 re PTK/18 and the way forward.

to prepare for meeting with Jane Deighton. - Sec.
 Duwayne Brooks.

to seek authority for covert recording of meeting.
 for accurate record in light of any overt action
 or arguments advanced by Jane Deighton.
 (Separate report) - Approved.

	M Jones	23/00
Officer Making Entry	Sign/Print	Date & Time
	315	09/00
Officer Making Decision (if different)	Sign/Print	Date & Time

1A.
Form 728

METROPOLITAN POLICE

(C.O. DIVN./BRANCH CO24
Reference to (Divn STATION 4 A.M.I.T.
papers DEPTFORD.
Registry Folio No. 24 May, 2000
G.O./Police Order refers

Re : Deployment of Covert Audio Recording Equipment.

-1-

C D.A.C. Grieve,

This report is submitted seeking authority to deploy covert audio recording equipment at a proposed meeting that will take place on the 24th May 2000. This meeting will be with Jane Deighton (Solicitor), Duwayne Brooks, D.C. Charlton FLO, D.C.I. Jones and include yourself.

A All contact with such individuals is a delicate matter. Therefore at the meeting, I submit that covert audio recording equipment be deployed due to the sensitivity and nature of the meeting, and to afford suitable protection for yourself and I, in light of potential allegations of unhelpfulness, lack of perceived co operation or other complaint.

Such deployment will also provide a precise record of any conversation, which might be necessary to counter any future allegations made against Police, and will clearly show that we have acted with integrity.

It will also ensure that what is said by all parties can be corroborated by the Senior Investigating Officer in his record of enquiry, we also know that in enquiries such as this there is potential for witnesses to change their statements, particularly where Duwayne has given numerous accounts already and is publicly stating that he intends NOT to give evidence in the future.

CID The report is now submitted in accordance with "in confidence memorandum 3/96" for your formal approval.


Michael JONES
Detective Chief Inspector.

All minutes to be numbered in consecutive order

402

No. 477

File No.

/

/

Minute
Sheet
No.

- 1 -

Report by DCI JONES re deployment of covert audio recording equipment


1A

DAC GRIEVE, Director Racial and Violent Crime Task Force

Report as at 1A refers. May your authority be granted for deployment of such equipment.

CO24
24.5.00


Michael JONES
Detective Chief Inspector

Authorised re 'A' and B of the scene.
It is of interest that Duwayne Brooks
denies B(i.) and says the public
statements that he will not give
evidence are untrue
24⁵/00 6.05p 

M.P.81(E)

[P.T.O.]

Main Line of Enquiry		Family Liaison	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Community Concern Assessment		Media Strategy		Resources
----------------------	--	----------------	--	--	----------------	--	-----------

Arrest Strategy		Search Strategy		Forensic Strategy		Sensitive Issues	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specific)
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DECISION:



Meeting on pre-arranged @ office of Deputy Gendall
 Suburban on 16/8/00 with Mr Chalk: Mr
 Gendall, John Deyle & D. Brooks.




to: carefully keep record meeting -
 (Spenda Spence up at the Canadian. Police.
 Michael (intelligence))

(Meeting of 16/8/00 by Mr Chalk.) left office.

REASON:

Pre-arranged meeting kept, decision
 to carefully record met (House Mr Chalk).
 agreed by Mr Gendall - time record required

		15/8/00 15:00
Officer Making Entry	Sign/Print	Date & Time

			11:00
Officer Making Decision (if different)	Sign/Print	Supervised Review	Sign/Print Date & Time

Appendix I9: Documents supplied by Greater Manchester Police

*Agree to R. Lynn M/C N/A
to SG*


Your reference:

Our reference:

Date: 8th September 1998



D. Wilmot, Esq., Q.P.M., B.Sc., D.L.
Chief Constable,
Greater Manchester Police
P.O. Box 22(S. West PDO)
Chester House
Boyer Street,
Manchester M16 0RE



METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE
Lawrence Review Team

New Scotland Yard
Broadway
London SW1H 0BG
Telephone 0171-230 1212

Direct line 0171-230 0137

Dear Chief Constable,

You will be aware that the Lawrence Inquiry is visiting Manchester in October. The London hearings have all been at the Elephant and Castle and policing the hearings has presented us with many challenging issues. The arrangements have been the responsibility of the local divisional commander, Chief Superintendent John Godsave. Over the months John has provided a very useful liaison with the Inquiry team who think highly of him.

The secretary to the Inquiry, Stephen Wells, will shortly be writing to you about arrangements for the Part II hearings in your force area. He may suggest that your staff contact Chief Superintendent Godsave while planning for the hearings. This suggestion was discussed at a recent meeting with Stephen Wells and has the support of the Commissioner.

If your staff would find it useful to speak to him then he may be contacted at Walworth Police Station.

Yours Sincerely,

Sara Thornton

Sara Thornton
Superintendent

*∴ No differentiation
anticipation to
the Inquiry team*

*in Experience & previous
x met somewhere
different Q.*

Area (P1)

GMPICSV3.BAT

Retrieval Result

RETRIEVED MESSAGE TEXT

0743:03/10/98
Priority 1

Address Codes PG/IN/010:1723 07/10/98 Sent via: ZS XB ZD ZE

Retrieval Sec. No. THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY

Heading THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY HEADED BY SIR WILLIAM MACPHERSON
WILL VISIT MANCHESTER ON MONDAY 12TH AND TUESDAY 13TH OCTOBER 1998.

THE HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE AT THE JARVIS PICCADILLY HOTEL, PICCADILLY
GARDENS, MANCHESTER, AND IT'S PURPOSE IS TO TAKE EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL
ORGANISATIONS AND GROUPS WHO HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE INQUIRY.

THE HEARING WILL BE HELD IN PUBLIC.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE REGARDING GROUPS OR
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE LIKELY TO ATTEND THE ENQUIRY, BE FORWARDED TO

PLEASE BRING THIS MESSAGE TO THE ATTENTION OF DIVISIONAL/SUB DIVISIONAL
AND DEPARTMENTAL COMMAND.

Enter Y to END

Result

PT NO MODE Type 1-3388-gmp LAN

Appendix 20: Documents supplied by West Yorkshire Police

CONFIDENTIAL



MINUTE SHEET

Date: 6 October, 1998

Ref:

To: A/DCI [REDACTED]

cc:

From: Detective Constable [REDACTED]

Tel Extn: [REDACTED]

Subject: Mohammed AMRAN

1. Following a request from yourself via Detective Sergeant [REDACTED] I have conducted discreet background enquiries into the subject Mohammed AMRAN. His full details and reference indices are as follows:

Mohammed AMRAN [REDACTED] @ Bradford



2. AMRAN is the son of a Pakistani immigrant namely [REDACTED] who originated from Faizalabad, Pakistan. His [REDACTED] uncles, [REDACTED] and the late [REDACTED] were heavily involved in Pakistani politics notably [REDACTED] who was a keen supporter of [REDACTED]. In the past the family had entertained prominent members of [REDACTED] at their homes in [REDACTED] including the former Prime Minister [REDACTED].

Whilst [REDACTED] was in power [REDACTED] was given a Government post in Rawalpindi which was generally recognised as a reward for his campaigning whilst domiciled in the U.K. Clearly AMRAN has been raised in a family environment that has always taken Politics seriously which undoubtedly would have influenced his present career path.


3. Mohammed AMRAN first came to the attention of the West Yorkshire Police in 1995 for a variety of reasons which I will summarise as follows:



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4. By mid 1996 AMRAN had become the Chairman of the Manningham Young Peoples Forum a body which formed after the Manningham riots through the Safer Cities Project. The group was based in "The Cop Shop" the former Toller Lane Police Station and was seen as a means by which the youth of the area could express their views and be heard.

Whilst in this role AMRAN has become a very high profile figure within the City and well known to both Police and Politicians alike. From this position AMRAN applied for the post of Commissioner for the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). He was interviewed in

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November 1997 by Sir Herman OUSELEY and successfully appointed by the Cabinet Office in March 1998.

On account of his work with the C.R.E. AMRAN has stood down as chairman of the "Young Peoples Forum" (as it is now known dropping "Manningham" to reflect it's district wide support). He has been replaced by Miss Amria KHATUN, aged 24.

In his capacity as Commissioner for the C.R.E. AMRAN will be appearing at the Lawrence inquiry to be held at the Stakis Hotel on Wednesday 21 October 1998. Superintendent Richardson is due to address the inquiry (see attached "flyer").

5. Over the last 3/4 years AMRAN has come into close contact with many prominent Politicians and is now on close personal terms with Marsha SINGH, the Bradford West Labour M.P. He is known and respected by Lorna WHITE the Home Office Race Relations Advisor and would appear [REDACTED] to have the ear of Jack STRAW. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. AMRAN runs a business under the name of "STREETWISE SECURITY". This was formed following advice that the Asian Mela Festival should be "Policed" by local people from the Manningham area. Under the guidance of [REDACTED] the company was formed, headed by AMRAN.

7. Whilst investigating this man's background I have been advised that care must be exercised in what is said and what questions are asked about AMRAN within Police circles. Although there are no known obvious sources of AMRAN within the organisation he clearly does carry influence and any further enquiries need to be discrete.

He has never featured in any previous Special Branch investigation nor have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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14

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

No financial investigations have been conducted into the affairs of AMRAN at this stage. If such matters are to be considered I would again reiterate that any investigations would have to be conducted with the utmost discretion.

Submitted for your information.

[REDACTED]

DC

2. *See the report into this man as per the report by Ace Bethson. This runs as far as we can go with discrete info. at this time.*

[REDACTED]

3. A/DCL [REDACTED] DC [REDACTED] well-researched report indicates that this individual is capable of fomenting public disorder amongst Asian and Black Youth. As such our enquiries are being conducted properly with the H.O. Guidelines for S.B. work (para 13 "public order"). Submitted for the information of all Mr. Bethson.

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4

7/10.

Det. Insp. 7.10.98.



16
MINUTE SHEET

Date: 9 October 1998
To: ADC [REDACTED] Special Branch
From: Assistant Chief Constable Norman Bettison
Subject: MOHAMMED AMRAN

ACC/NGB/[REDACTED]
Tel: 22113

CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED]

An excellent report from DC [REDACTED] It is refreshing to know that this sort of research capability is always available. I now have a good feel for the subject who has been researched. Given that this man is likely to be increasingly prominent in Bradford politics, could DC [REDACTED] brief Superintendent Richardson and Inspector Baines, both of whom are giving evidence to the MacPherson Enquiry on 20 October, along with Mohammed Amran.

I will pass a copy of the confidential report to ACC Designate Lloyd Clarke, who is also giving evidence on those dates. I shall ask Mr Clarke to return the documents once he has seen them. These reports should not be circulated any more widely.

Thank you once again for the report. Please let DC [REDACTED] see my comments above.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Norman Bettison".

N G BETTISON
Assistant Chief Constable
Divisional Operations (West)

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