Future Identities: Changing identities in the UK – the next 10 years

DR15: How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Lucinda Platt
Institute of Education
January 2013

This review has been commissioned as part of the UK Government’s Foresight project, Future Identities: Changing identities in the UK – the next 10 years. The views expressed do not represent policy of any government or organisation.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Contents

1. Introduction and coverage ..........................................................................................................................2
2. Theoretical positions on temporal and generational identity change ..................................................3
3. Data, classification and terminology .....................................................................................................6
4. British identity ........................................................................................................................................13
5. Religious identity ....................................................................................................................................14
6. Psychological well-being, dual identities and acculturation .................................................................16
7. Identity as a marker of national belonging and behaviour ...................................................................21
8. Mixed ethnic identification and categorisation .....................................................................................24
9. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................26
10. Notes and caveats .................................................................................................................................27
    10.1 Regional differences .......................................................................................................................27
    10.2 The 10 year perspective ...............................................................................................................27
References ....................................................................................................................................................28
1. Introduction and coverage

This review outlines current and emerging findings on minority ethnic and religious identity change across generations in the UK. It explores research on the maintenance, decline or transformation of minority identities into the second, and, as far as evidence permits, the third generation. It relates these to some specific theoretical postulations in the literature in this area, and discusses the extent to which those positions are supported by contemporary evidence. Specifically, it draws on analysis of three key national data sets: Understanding Society: the UK Household Longitudinal Study, the Citizenship Survey and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study. Based on the premise that identities are a) a significant element of psychological makeup and b) are potentially consequential for (or founded in) behaviours and patterns of association, it explores ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ identities as well as majority and minority identities. That is, rather than perceiving identification as an either/or position, it considers the degree of identification. This allows for the fact that individuals may categorise themselves in particular ways without any strong attachment necessarily resulting from such self-description. It also assesses the evidence for association between identity and behaviour / attitudes. It evaluates what this evidence might imply for identity and identity change over the next 10 years.

The next section outlines briefly some key theories utilised and evaluated in the review. This is followed, in Section 3, by a short description of the key data sources from which the evidence is drawn and a discussion of definitions and measures. Subsequent sections look in turn at: British identity (section 4); religious identity (section 5); dual identities and psychological acculturation (section 6); identity and behaviour (section 7), and mixed ethnic categories and mixed identities (section 8). In each instance, the implications for the next ten years are drawn out. The review ends with some brief conclusions and two caveats or limitations.


2. Theoretical positions on temporal and generational identity change

There have been a number of arguments relating to posited patterns of identity change over time and across generations, which are relevant to the discussion in this paper. The key ones considered here are summarised in Table 1, alongside the chief proponent or proponents, the key claims made for the position, and an indication of whether support has been found for it in the UK case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory / position</th>
<th>Key claims</th>
<th>Support in UK case?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactive ethnicity</td>
<td>Highlights how hostile contexts or those which make ethnicity particularly salient can result in and thus account for a rise rather than diminution of ethnic identity. See e.g. Rumbaut (2008).</td>
<td>Some evidence that Black groups are more inclined to assert ‘black’ identity in the face of discrimination. See e.g. Heath (forthcoming) using the EMBES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>The other side of reactive ethnicity is for groups to respond to negative experience by feeling detachment from the society in which they live, though not necessarily with a corresponding ‘positive’ identification.</td>
<td>Some evidence of alienation of young Black men in the UK, i.e. not feeling a sense of belonging, even in the second generation, where up to a third of young Caribbean men feel weak attachment e.g. Heath and Roberts (2008) using the Citizenship Survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-ethnicity</td>
<td>Identification with a wider grouping than with a specific ethnic category, e.g. with ‘Asian’ rather than with Indian or Chinese. This may be reflected in self-expressed identity or in patterns of association and connectedness. See e.g. Lopez and Espiritu (1990). It may also relate to association with wider, transnational or global religious identity (e.g. Islam) rather than with a more ‘local’ ethnicity.</td>
<td>Muttarak (forthcoming) indicates that patterns of sociability tend towards being pan-ethnic rather than located in specific ethnic groups. It has been claimed that religious identities ‘trump’ ethnic ones in the second generation, but as indicated below, this does not seem to be supported by the survey evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory / position</td>
<td>Key claims</td>
<td>Support in UK case?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational identity</strong></td>
<td>International migration and refugee flows lead to dispersions of kin or communities and consequent identification across national boundaries. Transnational identity can be considered a form of minority integration, and can also link to pan-ethnicity in emphasising wider conceptions of community engendered by dislocation. See e.g. Faist (2000).</td>
<td>There have been specific studies of transnational identities and communities which have shown the salience of kin and community dispersion for maintenance of particular forms of identity and transnational patterns of behaviour and association. See e.g. Bauer and Thompson (2006). However, direct forms of connection (remittances, visits etc.) do not appear to be linked to patterns of non-national identity expression. See e.g. Platt (2012a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious revival</strong></td>
<td>In the face of general secularisation in the UK and Europe (and many other parts of the world), there have been claims that minority religious identities by contrast, are not subject to similar processes and instead Islam in particular is showing a revival across cohorts and generations.</td>
<td>There is little quantitative evidence to support claims of second generation religious revival. Indeed what there is suggests ongoing secularisation. See e.g. Güveli and Platt (2011). Though there is relatively high levels of transmission among Muslims. See e.g. Georgiadis and Manning (2011). Some suggestive evidence from analysis of religious affiliation across three generations using the Citizenship Survey, indicates their children may ‘revert’ to grandparental religious expressing, claiming Islam as a religion even when their parents do not practise. See Scourfield et al. (2012).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DR15 How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory / position</th>
<th>Key claims</th>
<th>Support in UK case?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Psychological) acculturation</strong></td>
<td>A cross classification of majority and minority social or psychological acculturation patterns. Focusing on psychological acculturation, minority groups can be integrated, where minority and majority identities are both strong; assimilated, where majority identity only is strong; separated where minority identity only is strong; and marginalised where both minority and majority identities are weak. See e.g. Berry (1997).</td>
<td>This is used as a way of describing different forms of identity rather than being an argument for particular outcomes. Nevertheless it is possible to explore whether forms of identity acculturation are associated with social or behavioural outcomes. The analysis outlined below stops at description of relative patterns across groups, and does not move towards exploring consequences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Data, classification and terminology

There is an increasingly rich seam of data that can be mined to understand minority ethnic and religious identity in Britain – and its correlates and consequences. While the latest of the four decennial PSI surveys of ethnic minorities (Modood et al. 1997) has proved a rich and enduring source of analysis of many aspects of minority groups’ lives and identities (e.g. Nazroo and Karlsen 2003; and while much has been achieved in relation to patterns of identity and intergroup relations with the much less rich ethnicity data in surveys such as the Labour Force Survey (e.g. Manning and Roy 2010) and the General Household Survey (e.g. Muttarak and Heath 2010), three contemporary sources, described below, stand out for their potential for providing detailed analysis which allows for the complexity of the topic of minority identity.

1. The Citizenship Survey started out in 2001 as a biennial cross-sectional household survey of around 15,000 individuals living in England and Wales. From 2007/8 it moved to continuous fieldwork with annual data releases. The survey was explicitly designed to capture information about the involvement of individuals in a range of community and civic activities, their experience of their neighbourhood and attachment to it, as well as their experiences of local services, their networks and their experiences of discrimination. It has information on ethnicity of friendships, on ethnic mixing both outside and inside the home, on identity, on national belonging and on perceptions of fairness and prejudice within society. Since the survey is intended to capture ethnic group differences in ‘citizenship’ and community experiences, it comprises a core 10,000 person main sample with a booster sample of c. 5,000 members of minority ethnic groups. Recent surveys have also included a 1,200 person Muslim boost sample. It is a very valuable resource for researching ethnic group patterns of belonging, friendship and participation, and for making comparisons between minority and majority ethnic (and religious) groups.

2. Understanding Society: the UK Household Longitudinal Study is a panel study of around 40,000 households that started in 2009. All adults in the surveyed households are interviewed individually and are followed over time, with annual interviews, even if they move, and children aged 10-15 complete a self-completion instrument. A key feature of its design is a large (around 4,000 households) ethnic minority boost sample, focusing on achieving coverage of around 1000 adults from each of the Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups. Other minorities are included across the general population sample and as they were encountered in screening for the boost. There is a range of content facilitating analysis of ethnicity and ethnic identity. Some of this is asked of all respondents, such as country of birth of both parents and all grandparents of the respondent, and some additional content is only asked of the ethnic minority boost and a small general population comparison sample, such as strength of British identity. Moreover, certain questions in the additional content are only asked of minority group members, such as importance of parental ethnic group to the respondent. The data provide a rich resource for analysis of patterns of ethnic identity and identity change and development.

3. The Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) was carried out in 2010, in parallel and harmonised with the 2010 British Election Study. Its sample design focused on reaching analytical sample sizes for five major minority groups: Black Caribbeans, Black Africans,
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The total sample comprised 2,787 respondents, which also includes small numbers from other ethnic groups. As well as political behaviour and attitudes, the EMBES includes a range of identity measures, including national identity, religion, priority of British, religious or ethnic identity, religious participation, religious and ethnic discrimination, attitudes towards cultural maintenance and integration, friendship composition. This makes it an excellent resource for studying identity, its multidimensionality, and its behavioural and attitudinal correlates.

These three sources allow an extensive set of analyses around questions of ethnicity to be explored.

Much has been written on the subject of ethnic classification and terminology (see e.g. Burton et al. 2010); and this review is not the place to rehearse debates on terminology and ethnic group categorisation. It suffices to point out that the review works within a framework of reference to ethnic categories, with which individuals may identify. The categories are typically the ones used in the England and Wales Census, and the versions that are harmonised with the Scotland and Northern Ireland Census categories for UK-wide use (ONS 2012).

While the language of race is normative in the US literature, the language of ethnic groups and their implicit association with ethnic categories dominates UK discussion. These categories are largely deemed to represent ‘groups’ even if they have been much critiqued (e.g. Ballard 1997), and even if some, such as ‘Black African’ bring together those from different national, linguistic and religious backgrounds and with historically very different relationships to the UK, and with different migration trajectories (e.g. English speaking students from Nigeria versus Somali refugees). For designating minority ethnicity, the categories used are largely those which were developed for the 2001 Census, though there have been some adjustments to these with the 2011 categories, which are increasingly being used in relevant data sources. It is worth pointing out that the development of the new census categories were themselves in part responses to different identity claims by particular groups who did not feel well-served by, or whose position within the 2001 categories was ambiguous (ONS 2007). Thus, for example, the 2011 categories included an explicit category of Arab. The continuing white / non-white dominance of the categorisation system means, however, that other groups continue to be split between self-ascription as ‘white’ other or as ‘other’ other. Thus Turks, for example, are not well-captured by a single group in the new classification. This review is thus not able to address the identity of such groups to any degree. Some of the smaller or more heterogeneous groups are also difficult to assess in terms of identity, since the composite group may not be especially meaningful.

Table 2 shows the harmonised 2001 and 2011 categorisations. It also shows adult population estimates in 2009 according to the 2001 categories (from the Labour Force Survey), and the proportions in the 2011 categories according to Understanding Society. Differences are likely to be associated with sampling design and variation in group coverage, though the estimates are fairly similar across the two.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Table 2: Ethnic group categories and distributions: adults aged 16 or over

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2001 Census categories</th>
<th>% adults in LFS 2009 (final quarter)</th>
<th>2011 Census categories</th>
<th>% in Understanding Society 2009/10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>White British / English/ Scottish /Welsh / Northern Irish</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsy or Irish Traveller</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other white</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Other white</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Black Caribbean</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>White and Black Caribbean</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Black African</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>White and Black African</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Asian</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>White and Asian</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other mixed</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Other mixed</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other black</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Other black</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DR15 How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2001 Census categories</th>
<th>% adults in LFS 2009 (final quarter)</th>
<th>2011 Census categories</th>
<th>% in Understanding Society 2009/10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic group</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Other ethnic group</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimates are weighted using relevant person weights. Note that the ethnic group categories for 2001 in the LFS are not harmonised across Northern Ireland, so Northern Ireland is excluded from these estimates. Since both estimates come from survey data, and have different survey designs, even with the application of weights to the distributions the effects of sampling variation and some effects of sample design are likely to remain.

The ESDS User Guide to ethnicity (2010) suggests that a combination of indicators, including those implicit in certain of these categories, such as nationality, skin colour, geographical origins and religion need to be used to gain a more comprehensive picture of the minority groups of the UK (see also Nandi and Platt 2012a). It is certainly the case that attention to multiple dimensions can refine our understanding of ‘groups’ and how different indicators of minority status intersect with self-ascription. It can also show how the meaning of particular categories or indicators can themselves change in their configurations over time.

For religious identity, religious affiliation to one of the main religions is the most commonly used, and typically a sufficient measure for categorisation to religious or ethno-religious group. Affiliation is also regularly used as a measure of religious identification, though it can be enhanced by drawing on measures of religiosity, such as strength of faith or frequency of religious practice. In some of the findings, religious groups (based on affiliation) are considered separately to ethnic groups in terms of identity patterns. In others, variation across ethno-religious groups, defined through both their ethnic group and their religious affiliation, is explicitly explored. Religious identity is also compared with ethnic identity when exploring dual or dominant identities, utilising questions fielded in the EMBES.

To measure British identity, it is possible to explore simply expression of British national identity, but also in some instances to look at the strength of identification. These have both been used to explore the question of minorities’ complementary and competing identifications, though the ‘story’ is largely consistent across them. British national identity (a response to the question ‘what do you consider your identity to be’ with British as an option) is more readily available and typically allows comparison with the majority as well as minorities. It can, though, clearly be conflated with citizenship (see Nandi and Platt 2012a), and thus provides little variation across the second generation. Strength of identity is less typically measured, though Understanding Society fielded a question on importance of British identity. It was asked of the ethnic minority boost sample and a small comparison sample from the general population sample. This allowed not only the fact but also the strength of identity to be explored. While it tends to invite responses at the upper end of the scale, as Figure 1 illustrates for selected ethnic groups, responses do cover the whole of the distribution.

---

1 The question wording was: “Most people who live in the UK may think of themselves as being British in some way. On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means ‘not at all important’ and 10 means ‘extremely important’, how important is being British to you?”
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Figure 1: Importance of Britishness across selected ethnic groups

Source: Understanding Society wave 1 2009-10

This strength of majority identity can therefore be explored in parallel with attachment to parental ethnicity, using a similar form of question and scale, as illustrated in Figure 2. From Figure 2 we can see that identification with parental ethnicity is somewhat more skewed towards the top of the scale, though the distributions are quite similar.

---

2 This question was not asked of those with majority ethnicity.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Figure 2: Importance of parental ethnicity by selected ethnic group

Source: Understanding Society wave 1 2009-10

The distribution of responses to the Britishness question is similar to, though more detailed than, the distribution of responses to a question asking about strength of belonging to Britain in the Citizenship Survey, which has been used as a measure of attachment (Heath and Roberts 2008). This belonging measure is illustrated in Figure 3. Overall, we can see that there appears to be a tendency across ethnic groups to express strong feelings of Britishness, of national belonging and of attachment to their heritage, as expressed through the importance of parental ethnicity. How these intersect at the individual level is considered further below.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Figure 3: Strength of belonging by selected ethnic group

Source: Citizenship Survey 2008/9

Across the three studies utilised here, the combination of standard ethnic and religious categories with a range of different measures capturing specific elements of identity offers the potential for substantial insights into questions of: minority identity, identity change across generations, and the extent to which identity is correlated with other aspects of experience and behaviour.
4. British identity

We first review the evidence here on British identity, using the measure of importance of British identity outlined above. Other analysis using simple national identity measures or strength of belonging indicates that minority groups tend to have rather strong levels of British identity, but that this changes with time, being greater among the second generation and with time since immigration for the first generation. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have been shown to express rather higher levels of British identity, and white minorities rather lower, other things being equal. Recent analysis of Understanding Society (Nandi and Platt 2012b) looking at the importance of British identity scale was consistent with these findings.

This analysis of Understanding Society showed that, controlling for age, sex, generation and other salient factors, all minority ethnic groups had a significantly higher ‘Britishness’ score than the White majority, with the exception of Chinese and Caribbean ethnic groups. However, when exploring differences across ethno-religious groups, Christian Caribbeans had a higher Britishness score than White Christians, though the size of difference was smaller than that for other ethno-religious groups, including Indian Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, Pakistanis Muslims and Black African Muslims. This last group had the greatest difference from White Christians in their evaluation of the importance of British identity for themselves.

Other factors which tended to increase the importance of Britishness (which were held constant in the estimation of ethno-religious associations) were: being in a partnership, being older, qualifications below university level, and being second or third generation. It was not possible to discern any difference between second and third generation. Importance of Britishness was lower for those who were living in East of England, South East, South West and Scotland as compared to those living in London; those who were attacked or insulted in the last year; those living in ethnically mixed households; and those with political affiliations (strong or not) for the Conservative or Labour Party compared to those who could not vote or did not have any political preferences. These patterns are perhaps as one might expect from other research. It shows that British identity is in fact lower among those who are more engaged in political terms and more highly educated. Such individuals perhaps bring a more critical approach to the question, but this does not necessarily make them less integrated within UK society.

In the next 10 years we can expect to see minorities expressing stronger British identities, as findings indicate that this is the overall trend. Given the extent of minority attachment to Britishness, this is likely to happen even if educational profile changes, with more highly educated having lower British identification, or if cohort shifts occur, with later cohorts being less inclined to identify as British. It is also likely to be reinforced by increasing proportions of British-born among minorities. Over multiple generations there may be a reversal towards majority levels of British identification. However, it is unlikely that this will be observed in the next 10 years. If, as expected, minorities make up a larger section of the population over time, this may mean an overall increase in attachment across the population, though this will depend on whether there is an increase in majority attachment to individual country identities (Wyn Jones et al. 2012). There may, however, be some countervailing forces, such as discrimination and harassment, which reduce attachment and increase politicisation, and cause a shift in this overall trend.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

5. Religious identity

As well as widespread, albeit largely unfounded (Heath forthcoming), concerns about separation and lack of commonality, there is an increasing focus in debate and the literature on religious identity as an alternative or dual source of identification (Jacobson 1997). Theories of religious revival as well as a number of qualitative studies have indicated that religious identification may increase across generations, and that it may substitute for ethnic identity in the second and subsequent generations. There are also anxieties associated with these claims, particularly as they relate to Muslims. However, neither the claims nor the anxiety appear particularly well evidenced. While rates of secularisation appear slower among Muslims, for various reasons which may include some component of religious revival as well as hostile attitudes, the overall pattern still seems to be one of some degree of secularisation (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). For those who do continue to assert strong religious identities in the second generation, the meaning or implications of their religiosity may itself be different from the religious in the first generation. For example, they may feel that they are asserting a ‘pure’ version of the faith (Voas and Fleischmann 2012), or one that is compatible with less ‘traditional’ attitudes or behaviours in other domains (Geogiadis and Manning 2011). This cannot be captured in the measures considered here, but further investigation could investigate the correlates of religiosity to ascertain if such changes are evident. I discuss dual or relative identification in Section 6; here, some of the evidence on religious identity and religious revival is briefly reviewed.

There are clear differences between groups in the strength of their religious affiliation and its espoused importance to them. Thus, when looking at ethnic groups, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Black Africans seem significantly more likely to assert the importance of their religion to their identity. This also corresponds to a greater tendency of Muslims to assert their religious identity as important compared to those with other religious affiliations. However, analysis of the EMBES showed that across all groups the generational pattern appears to be clearly one of ‘assimilation’, or secularisation across generations. This is consistent with other studies, but at odds with claims of ‘religious revival’. Testing whether there was a different pattern for Muslims specifically provided no evidence that they experience a separate pattern, counter to this secularising trend, across the generations. This is also consistent with earlier findings from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (Güveli and Platt 2011).

However, religious affiliation and religiosity do appear to be relatively strongly transmitted among Muslims, and from high initial levels. There is thus a substantial degree of persistence over the generations, and secularisation will be a slow process for some groups, Muslims in particular. There is some interesting suggestive analysis from Scourfield et al (2012) that generational shifts may be ‘reversible’. That is, children of non-practising parents may nevertheless assert a religious faith; and this appears to be particularly the case among young Muslims.

There is a small amount of work that has explored the extent to which ethnic and religious identities are implicated in one another. These have not so far been clearly disentangled, but they do suggest, that contrary to assumptions in the literature from other European countries, national identity may in fact support or co-occur with greater religiosity.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Overall the evidence suggests that over the next 10 years it is unlikely that we will see a tangible increase in secularisation across ethnic minority groups; though there will be a slow process towards this, which will become evident in later generations. Among Muslims we might expect change to be slower than for other groups, but this does not imply that we can expect to observe a major religious ‘revival’.
6. Psychological well-being, dual identities and acculturation

The presumption of this review is that identity or identities are part of a person’s psychological make-up and that a clear ethnic or national identity can be positive for mental well-being. Strong identity formation is regarded as core to individual development, and social identity theory has argued that identity development is dependent on making an association with social groups (Tajfel 1981). Building on Erikson’s understanding of identity development that passes through a series of stages to culminate in stable identities, Phinney (1990) explored the development of ethnic identity specifically. Locating ethnic identity development in adolescence she outlined the stages of exploration and conflict that culminate in the possession of a stable ethnicity, which in turn has been linked to a series of positive psychological outcomes, protecting against stress and enhancing self-esteem. While the focus has been on adolescent identity development, the ‘stages’ of exploration and move towards stability can be induced by dramatic changes in context, such as through migration. Moreover, for those who do not attain a stable ethnic identity, there may be ongoing negative consequences in terms of internalising negative ascriptions of one’s group and feelings of lack of self-worth.

Identity is also, and in line with the working definition in the review, assumed to have personal and social aspects to it. As discussed in the literature (for example Abrams 1996) these may shift between the private and social domains, as context makes them particularly salient as public identities, or as attachment to a public form of identification becomes embedded in personal self-realisation.

One particular context that is likely to heighten the salience of identification in interpersonal relations is the experience of discrimination. The consequences of processes of ascription in terms of discrimination and harassment can render alternative ‘chosen’ identities harder to sustain, although strength of identification may itself shape responses to discrimination (Operario and Fiske 2001). On the one hand, the psychological consequences of personal identification with a ‘devalued’ identity can have negative consequences for self-esteem; on the other hand experience of discrimination can result in politicised assertions of identity that aim to mobilise common experiences across those discriminated against. The invocation of ‘Black’ identity can be thought of here (Mirza 1997). This is discussed further in Section 7, below.

Individuals’ identities may thus shift – for example from minority to majority identities, within the same lifetime. While it is hard within existing data to chart such changes extensively, they are widely considered as core to ethnic identification, which is regarded as situational and contingent. Some evidence is provided by shifts in responses to Census questions, particularly in the US, for example among Hispanics (Bates et al. 2006). Simpson and Akinwale (2007) have also shown how self-categorisation can be unstable or respond to the availability of categories, though overall stability seems to be the dominant picture.

At the same time, holding a strong identity, either minority or majority, could be seen at the individual level as being positive, with a lack of strong identification, or marginalisation being most damaging. Thus, it is worth considering what patterns of identification different minorities
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Express. Whether, for example, they express dual identities, or one form of identification predominates, or ethnic identification is overall fairly weak.

First we look at dual identity simply in terms of whether minorities assert that they hold two identities equally or whether they prioritise one potential element of their identity over another. The EMBES asked three questions inviting groups to compare the British and ethnic aspects of their identity, their religious and British identities and their ethnic and religious identities. As Figure 4 shows, most people and across generations tended to assert that the components of their identity were ‘equal’. Thus, they held dual identities. For dual ethnic and religious identities the pattern was relatively stable across generations, whereas, consistent with the analysis of Britishness, above, equal identities and favouring of British identity, over both religion and ethnicity, tended to increase from the first to the second generation.

![Figure 4: Comparative and dual identities by generation](image)

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) 2010
Note: Base= 2538 ethnic group v. Britishness; 2214 Religion v. Britishness; 2244 Religion v. ethnic group.

When exploring whether there were any distinctive features of those who preferred religion to ethnicity and whether there were any generational influences on this, analysis showed that even after controlling for other relevant factors, there was remarkable consistency in the patterns of asserting a religious over an ethnic identity across the generations. Thus, in this relative domain, there is little generational change. However, it is important to note that
DR15 How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Preference or expressions of ‘equality’ do not say anything about the strength of the identity. ‘Equally’ could represent two weak or two strong identities.

There is an intriguing finding that there may be greater substitution of religious identity for ethnic identity among Indian Hindus in the second generation, but this appears to be the only group to buck the trend. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the pattern by religious affiliation. A breakdown by ethnic group, showed a similar pattern for Indians versus other groups.

![Figure 5: Estimates of those preferring religious over ethnic identities, by generation and religious group (%)](image)

Source: EMBES 2010. Controls for age, sex, partnership status, time since arrival (for immigrants), friendship networks, organisational membership, experience of discrimination set to their means.

One issue when looking comparatively at dual identities and strength of identification is to ascertain what the comparator would be. Majority identities are not – and to a certain extent cannot be – typically considered in such identity frameworks. One potential comparison is to look at identities with the four countries of the UK relative to British identity across the white ‘British’ majority. Identities post-devolution is not within the scope of this review, but there is the potential in such devolved identities to provide a counterpoint to understandings of identity that are purely based on considerations of those categorised as ethnic minorities in the UK (Nandi and Platt 2012b). Heath and Roberts (2008) argued that singular identities were in fact more common among the devolved administrations than among minority groups.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

It is possible to build on these insights into multiple identification using a version of Berry’s (1997) acculturation framework to plot psychological acculturation and its patterns across ethnic groups and generations. The four-cell Berry model is constructed by taking measures of importance of British identity and importance of parental ethnicity, and splitting them into high or low (at the overall median). Thus high and low on the two key dimensions are relative concepts, distinguishing those in the top and bottom half of the distribution on the two identity measures, rather than attempting to represent some absolute evaluation of strong or weak identification. As Figure 6 illustrates, having a strong minority identity only can be equated to Berry’s category of ‘separation’, a strong British identity to ‘assimilation’, both a strong British and minority identity to ‘integration’, or weak minority and British identities to ‘marginalisation’.

**Figure 6: Implementation of Berry model to measure psychological acculturation in the UK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Maintenance</th>
<th>Contact Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum of strength of identification with father’s and mother’s ethnic groups</td>
<td>Strength of identification with being British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Median</td>
<td>&gt; Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=Median</td>
<td>&lt;=Median</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integrated Assimilated Separated Marginalized

Source: Nandi and Platt (2012b).

Nandi and Platt (2012b) analysed ethnic group differences in acculturation using this framework. They employed multinomial regression to test the chances of being in each of the three other categories relative to being in the separated group across ethnic groups and holding a range of other relevant factors expected to be associated with acculturation outcomes, such as education and political engagement, constant. They found that there was variation across groups in the chances of different acculturation outcomes relative to maintaining solely a separated identity. In summary, the findings showed that:

- British identification doesn’t necessarily mean rejection of minority identification.
- Muslim Pakistanis are not more likely to have a separated (strong minority only) identification than any other group – in fact the opposite is the case.
- Indian Sikhs, Indian Hindus and Black African Christians seem least likely to have a marginalised identity (weak ethnic and weak British).
- Those with strongly political affiliations are less likely to have a separated identity than those without.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

There was also a clear generational pattern: compared to first generation, 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} were more likely to report integrated, assimilated or marginalized identities. This is consistent with other analysis showing the decline over generations in attachment to minority identities, though it doesn’t indicate that such minority identification necessarily disappears. If minority identity weakens over generations that typically, though not necessarily, means the substitution of a British identity: 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation are also more likely than the first to be ‘marginalised’ (have weak minority and majority identities), with likely consequences for their psychological wellbeing. We see again that identities are not constructed on a pole, but are potentially complementary. However, the patterns are quite complex and vary with groups.

Dual identities can also be expressed as composite, ‘mixed’ identities. These are usually assumed to incorporate expression of different aspects of parentage or ‘origins’, but the desire to acknowledge such multiple origins is similar to and can itself be seen as a form of dual identification that acknowledges different communities of association. However, while dual identities may be considered as adaptive ways of managing competing (or complementary) affiliations, the assertion of mixed identity appears more ambiguous (Panico and Nazroo 2011), and may instead indicate a more liminal position. Mixed identities are discussed further in Section 8, below.

Overall we would expect to see a greater degree of British identity, either in conjunction with minority ethnic identification or on its own, among minority ethnic groups over the next 10 years. Dual identities are common and investment in one identity does not preclude investment in another. However, the development of dual identities is not a necessary consequence of generational shift. With declines in minority identification over generations, unless there is a viable alternative to minority identity, it is possible that there will be heightened loss of identity and sense of belonging.

It is also possible that the overall trend will become disrupted if there are other changes in how people perceive the nation. Further moves from devolution towards actual independence of the smaller countries of the UK (or at least Scotland) may shift understandings of Britishness and may even create some form of ‘crisis’ around what it means. Since English identity has not typically been one that has been accessible to minority groups, such events could therefore leave something of a vacuum in national belonging among minorities.
7. Identity as a marker of national belonging and behaviour

There is an assumption that identification has consequences. That is, it is not only part of psychological well-being but also has meaning for behaviours, patterns of life and the more nebulous but potentially significant experience of 'belonging'. The stronger minority group attachment to British identity than that found among the majority, evidenced in a number of studies, may thus put anxiety concerning national belonging and 'integration' or even 'incorporation' of minorities to rest. Nevertheless, it is worth considering empirically the relationship between identification and other measures of 'belonging' and between identity and behaviour.

There are clear ethnic group and generational differences in patterns of interethnic sociability, experiences of discrimination, and perceptions of prejudice. If we look, for example, at patterns of sociability, there are differences in the composition of friendship networks and patterns of sociability across ethnic and religious groups (Platt 2009; Muttarak forthcoming), and these are also quite often gendered as well (Platt 2012b). For example, Platt (2009) showed that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were more likely to engage in social activities at home or in others' houses, while Black Africans were more likely than other groups to participate in organised activities. Looking directly at composition of networks and the relationship between ethnic or religious identity and behaviour, patterns of contact with those of other groups were greater among all minorities than among the majority and they were similar among Muslims to other minorities. In addition, the share of minority groups having White British close friends increases markedly between the first and second generation. Arguments for groups living separate lives appear to have little basis in the patterns of association. Nevertheless, there are some distinctive features of minority group experience. For example, Muslim women are less likely to have a close friend than Muslim men or other women, even though typically close friendships are more common among women (Platt 2012b).

Muttarak has also charted a move towards pan-ethnicity in the UK. That is, she finds that the South Asian groups (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi) show a tendency to choose those of other South Asian groups as close friends, and the Black groups (Black Caribbean, Black African, mixed White and Black African and Mixed White and Black Caribbean) tend to form interethnic ties with each other, rather than with South Asians. This study provides interesting initial evidence for the existence of this form of pan-ethnic associational identity in the UK. The extent to which it is shaped by patterns of exposure rather than preferences is hard to determine, but the analysis does indicate that preferences may play a role.

When focusing on the relationship between minority status and a range of attitudes and experiences, the second generation are more embedded in non-group contexts but also more sensitive to inequalities (Table 4; see also Heath forthcoming). Among ethnic minority groups, those who are most at risk of alienation are also those most likely to be more closely linked into majority contexts. Thus, simple assumptions about behaviour stemming from identity or about the conditions under which feelings of commonality emerge do not reflect the complexities of the ways in which minority groups interact with, and respond to, their varying contexts.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Behavioural and attitudinal expressions of identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group belonging</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel much in common with British people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel much in common with co-religionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel much in common with co-ethnics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioural or attitudinal measures</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have most or all friends from same ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belong to a religious or ethnic association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend worship regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pray privately regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have experienced ethnic discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have experienced religious discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel much in common with British people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel much in common with co-religionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel much in common with co-ethnics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider that Government treats people like them fairly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider that government treats people of their ethnic group fairly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree that non-White are held back by prejudice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider that Black and Asian people should maintain their beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that minorities should maintain their customs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DR15 How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree that minorities should mix and integrate</th>
<th>More likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010. Note: all differences that are less or more likely indicate statistically significant differences across the generations. “Equally likely” indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between generations.

Thus, rather than looking for identity as a direct pathway to, or marker for, integration or alienation, it may make more sense in future analysis to explore whether identity moderates patterns of disaffection that seem more marked in some groups (e.g. Caribbeans – see Heath forthcoming; Heath and Roberts 2008) than others. It is also important to consider the role of politics and political commitment which may in fact act as a stronger marker of engagement than identification. What is worth noting as well is that neither the patterns of identification nor those of alienation map onto the group most strongly highlighted as being the ‘other’ in the UK, that is, Muslims.

Over the next ten years, the level of interaction between minorities and majority – and with each other – is almost certain to increase, although some variation between groups and in patterns of interaction is likely to remain. At the same time, it is hard to see that some apparent patterns of alienation across certain groups are likely to dissipate. These patterns of alienation are not, however, so striking that they indicate an emerging crisis. Nevertheless, if there is a heightened perception of inequalities in treatment and in life chances in younger generations, those who feel less connection with their minority identity may find themselves in a marginalised position in terms of identity and belonging. Rather than seeing reactive ethnicity as aligned with a heightened sense of ethnic identity, the implication is more of disaffection where majority identity is not accessible but is not necessarily substituted by a strong positive alternative. Socio-economic factors, such as the scarring consequences of the current recession, may also be important and make it more plausible that patterns of alienation could become entrenched.
8. Mixed ethnic identification and categorisation

The growth of mixed ethnicity has sometimes been presented as an objective fact – a growth that is accounted for by increasing intermarriage and minority group ‘assimilation’, at least in the social-emotional sphere. Thus the US literature, for example, has celebrated the growth in mixed race partnerships as a ‘barometer’ of race relations. However, mixed ethnicity is not simply the fact of having parents of different ethnic groups. Nor does it necessarily align with assimilation in the economic sphere (Platt, 2012a, c). Mixed race / mixed ethnicity is also an identification – either a self-categorisation or sometimes a categorisation ascribed by parents. This ascription of children by parents has been shown to vary in the US according to neighbourhood composition (Holloway et al. 2012). That is, parents categorise their children both in line with and as a reaction to the population by whom they are surrounded. Children may then absorb and adopt these parental ascriptions but also may adapt and change them. In adolescence and adult life they may assume mixed identities instead of mono-racial ones, or redefine themselves from two attributed ethnicities to just one. The contingency of ethnic identity is held to be most evident among those of mixed ethnicity, with greater scepticism within this ‘group’ in relation to forms of ethnic identification.

Certainly, we see that the self-ascribed mixed population is less likely than other groups to express strong British identification (Nandi and Platt 2012b). The mixed population is overwhelmingly youthful (Platt 2012c), which is also linked to strength of identification. But even when holding age and other relevant factors constant, mixed groups were the only minority group (albeit an aggregate category) that did not have a stronger British identity than the White majority. This may be unsurprising given that the largest ‘mixed’ category is White and Black Caribbean, and as shown, these groups tend to score lower on the Britishness scale than other groups. It may be that country (English, Scottish, Welsh), rather than British identities are more available to those of mixed ethnicity, as they are to the White majority. However, that is unlikely to explain this finding since those who self-categorise as of mixed ethnicity make up only a share (around a third, see Figure 7) of those whose parents are of different ethnic groups. If a mixed ethnic category is defined according to parental ethnicity rather than self-ascription, we see that a larger share identify with the majority (partly as a result of having parents of different ‘white’ ethnicities), and yet for this larger, ‘objective’ mixed group it is no longer the case – as we might expect – that they are less likely than other minorities to identify more strongly as British: they still have stronger British identification than the ‘non-mixed’ majority, despite being apparently closer to that majority. Thus, the very adoption of a mixed ethnicity seems in some ways to tend towards an ‘oppositional’ identity, relative to the other choices available.
How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

Figure 7: Self-reported ethnic group of UK residents whose parents were of different ethnic groups


In the next 10 years, it seems likely that the mixed ethnicity population will continue to grow, and at a fairly fast rate (though from a relatively small base). This will be due both to the ‘fact’ of inter-ethnic partnerships – and the extent to which those whose parents are of different ethnic groups assert a mixed identity rather than a mono-ethnic one. However, the extent to which mixed categories continue to represent satisfactory or appealing options may itself change, as may the constituency who use them to make specific ‘heritage’ claims. The lack of strong identificational attachment to Britishness among this group may suggest that there is a diffusion of identity, of which this growth is both a marker and in part a cause. However, despite the fact that there will be a large increase in those self-defining as mixed ethnicity, even over the next decade, in population terms this will still represent a very small share of the total. Thus, the mixed group is unlikely to drive major changes in patterns of identity across the nation.
9. Conclusions

This analysis of minority identity across generations has shown that there are some common features as well as some distinctive patterns across ethnic groups. Across groups we can observe a generational shift towards more majority-orientated identities and for the social relationships within which identities are embedded. At the same time, dual identities appear to be the norm rather than the exception and, if anything, they also increase in the second and subsequent generations. However, groups are moving at different rates; and the patterns for religious identity, British identity and minority ethnic identity do not all assume consistent trajectories. Indeed, a consequence of dual identity formation is that they may reinforce each other as much as substitute for one another. Where starting levels are very different, for example in the strength of religious identities, transmission is also stronger and thus change in terms of secularisation is taking place at different rates for different groups, even if on a common trajectory.

We also see that there is a tendency for marginalisation to increase in certain circumstances across generations. While exposure to other groups increases, so does sensitivity to injustice and prejudice. In the second generation, the consequences can be a lack of either strong minority or strong majority identity and some corresponding indications of alienation, though this only seems apparent for some sections of the Black population. At the same time, among the mixed group, it is possible that rejection of categorisation is an explicit response to the heightened awareness of the contingency and complexity of ethnic identity. Perhaps paradoxically, those who are used as the ‘marker’ of an integrative society seem to be least likely of all minorities to express categorical identification with national identity. As this group increases in size and as a proportion of minority groups, there may be some potential for patterns of strong minority identification with the majority to shift.

Maintenance of dual identities, ethnic origin ties, and strong religious commitment are clearly not felt to be at odds with national belonging or represent ‘separation’. However, minority and majority ethnic identities may themselves be called into question with competing forms of identity (that are covered in other reviews). For example, we saw that political engagement and greater levels of education were associated with lower levels of attachment to Britishness. Education and financial security support individual self-determination and promote ‘elective’ identities. They tend, correspondingly, to reduce the importance of ascriptive identities. Thus, rather than representing disengagement from the polity, the substitution of elective for ethnic identities may present alternative routes for identificational integration and participation in a national story. To the extent that this can be expected to increase over the next decade, it indicates an alternative way of evaluating minority groups’ dual and alternative identity formation.
10. Notes and caveats

10.1 Regional differences

There was an explicit interest for this review in exploring regional variation within the UK; and analysis has tended to show that patterns of ethnic and religious identity and of Britishness show regional variation. There is, in particular, a London effect in analyses of Britishness, of psychological acculturation and patterns of friendship and association. Thus London is associated with greater importance of Britishness, and with having an assimilated or integrated identity (i.e. in which Britishness forms a part). London as an area of great diversity and high ethnic minority populations would seem to reinforce patterns of identification and transmission, while other regions clearly had specific patterns of identification. However, it was not clear how to interpret the relationship between region and patterns of identity.

10.2 The 10 year perspective

The discussion so far has been looking ahead 10 years from the perspective of relative population stability. Thus, it is effectively extrapolating from age / generational changes. However, the next 10 years could continue to see substantial migration, and from groups that are somewhat different to those that currently form the main categories. The comments on the 10 year perspective are thus subject to the caveat that major changes in minority group composition may alter the conclusions of this report.
DR15 How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?

References


How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?


How might we expect minorities’ feelings of ethnic, religious and British identity to change, especially among the second and third generation?


