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Future Identities: Changing identities in the UK – the next 10 years

DR10: How will issues of power, conflict, and prejudice and discrimination impact upon notions of identity?

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1. Identity Matters

In this paper we are concerned with the relationship between difference, conflict and the future of identity. This concern is premised on the assumption that *identity matters*. In order to address our brief, then, it is necessary to start by making explicit both what we mean by identity and also how/why identity does matter.

2. Social identity

In recent years, social psychologists have focused on the importance of social identities and their relationship to group relations - where social identity refers to our sense of ourselves as members of a social group and the meaning that group has for us (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When a given identity is salient we then act in terms of the norms, values and beliefs associated with the relevant category (what it means to be male, middle class and so on) (Turner *et al*., 1987). What is more, we all have a range of social identities (being male, middle-class, catholic, conservative, a Manchester United fan, British…) which are salient in different conditions. For instance, I might think of myself in terms of my politics at election time, but in terms of my club identity when at a stadium. The implication is that we behave in terms of different norms, values and beliefs in these different contexts.

Social identity matters because it provides a prism through which we perceive the world, experience events in the world, decide how to act in the world and understand our relationships to other people. It tells who is and who is not of us, who is for us and who is against us. That alters as different identities become salient (someone who is 'other' when we think of ourselves in terms of our class identity may become a peer when we think of ourselves in terms of our national identity). It also alters as we define the same identity in different ways (the same person may be foreign if we define nationhood by birth but not if we define nationhood by residence and commitment).

In short, identity is important because it *constitutes collectivities* and *guides collective action*. That is, where a set of people share a common social identity, they are able to come together and act together to pursue common goals. They thereby constitute a social force that is capable of shaping the nature of society. But precisely for that reason, those who wish to shape society are concerned to define identities in such a way as to support their policies and projects. Where people have different projects they will therefore define identity in different ways - for instance those who favour welfarist policies might stress the cooperative nature of an identity whereas those who favour entrepreneurial policies might stress more our rugged individualism. It follows that identities are always contested and leaders always contest identity. Indeed political leadership involves a two-way dialogue whereby leaders seek both to reflect and represent, but also to craft the understandings of group identity held by their followers. As we have argued, leaders should be seen as *entrepreneurs of identity* (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

For present purposes, there are three important implications of this understanding. First, identity is not only an output of social process (e.g. social conflict fragments a sense of common identity with others) but also an input into these processes (e.g. a sense of

common identity with others makes social conflict less likely). Indeed, one of the major ways we may have of diminishing or accentuating conflict is through the ways in which we define the identities of those involved. In this sense, identity constitutes our most potent resource for managing processes of harmony and tension in society. Let us use a simple but potent example to underscore this key point.

In 1934, Goebbels wrote in a widely distributed pamphlet: “What is the first Commandment of every National Socialist? Love Germany above all else and your ethnic comrade [*Volksgenosse*] as yourself”. In 1940, the Bulgarian Association of Writers, campaigning against the deportation of Jews to the death camps, wrote: “They think and speak in Bulgarian, they forge their way of thinking and feeling out of Botev, Vazov, Pentcho, Slaveikov, Yavorov [all Bulgarian national heroes]. They sing Bulgarian folk songs and tell Bulgarian folk tales” (Todorov, 2001). In both cases, the authors are arguing for national solidarity. But in the former case the national boundary is drawn ethnically and excludes the Jewish population. In the latter case, the boundary is drawn culturally and includes the Jewish population. In practice this underlies the difference between the greatest crime of the twentieth century and one of the greatest acts of rescue (Reicher *et al.*, 2006). Here identity matters to the extent of being the difference between death and life.

The second implication of our argument is that the nature of social identities is always partly contingent upon leadership rather than being a simple reflection of social reality (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2010). This is not to say that reality is irrelevant. Any account of the nature of social groups and the relationship between them must necessarily be able to account for the experiences of the intended audience. Clearly, where people are suffering hard times and seek to account for their problems, it becomes more plausible to portray certain groups as an alien threat, especially where their influx correlates with the downturn (Staub, 1992). But people do not come to such conclusions spontaneously, nor are they inevitable. Rather they have to be formulated and popularised in a dialogue where leadership plays an important role. Equally, alternative leadership can offer a different and less pathologising version of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Reicher, McCrone, Hopkins, 2010)

The third implication, then, is that identity and conflict are not shaped by deterministic processes. We cannot, like soothsayers, predict the future of identity or of social conflict because these are shaped by human choices, political priorities and social policies. What we can do, however, is to indicate the way in which such choices, priorities and policies will impact on our sense of self and our relations to others. Or, to put the point the other way round, we can trace out different future scenarios depending on the paths we take in the present.

We will seek to do so in relation to three of the most acute challenges facing our society. The first concerns our response to increasing migration flows in an era of globalisation. The second concerns our treatment of Muslim communities in an era of international insecurity. The third concerns our reaction to domestic disorder in an era of austerity.

2.2 Challenges, Responses and Futures

2.2.1 Migration

In recent years there has been a powerful argument that an increase in migration and growing diversity in local communities will undermine social solidarity, will lead people (like turtles) to draw into their shells, and will disrupt any sense of shared identity in the nation (Goodhart, 2004; Putnam, 2007). This argument has been all the more influential because it has not come from the usual anti-immigration suspects but rather from liberal sources. Indeed it has explicitly been promoted on liberal and welfarist grounds. That is, support for welfare provision depends upon a sense of a shared identity and a willingness to support 'people like us'. Once that is eroded, people will be less willing to pay their taxes and so the NHS and other cherished national institutions will come under serious threat. More extreme versions of this formulation suggest that, precisely because of the erosion of national identity, migration and diversity will lead to tensions and even conflicts between groups (Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001).

There are various problems with these ideas, for all their popularity. First, areas of greater diversity are generally areas of greater deprivation, deprivation is a stronger predictor of lack of cohesion than diversity, and once deprivation is taken into account, the relationship between diversity and (loss of) cohesion reduces or disappears (Laurence & Heath, 2008; Letki, 2008). Second, it is not that the closer people get to migrants the more they reject them. Indeed any problems that do arise seem to come when people ostensibly inhabit the same communities but actually live entirely separate lives. The more that different groups interact (or even know others who interact with the other group) the better their relations are (Hewstone, 2009).

But more fundamentally, perhaps, this pessimistic view of migration and diversity is rooted in widespread but mistaken assumptions about group identity and group processes. One is that migrants will necessarily be seen as outgroup members. The other is that relations between groups are necessarily fraught and rooted in discrimination. Put these two together and, yes, it follows that migration will create social divisions and social tensions. Yet demographic categories are not necessarily psychological categories. It may be true that people are migrants but that does not mean we will see them as such. We could equally easily see them as fellow workers, as ordinary families, as new members of our communities. But equally, even if we do see them as migrants we might treat them positively in terms of local norms of hospitality and compassion. To dislike or even hate others, more is needed than casting them as 'other', notably the notion that they are a threat to us (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008).

It follows then, that the relationship between migration and social conflict depends on the ways in which we construe social identity - and, more particularly, how we see *ourselves* rather than how we see others (although the two are interconnected). Thus rejection of migrants depends upon a definition of self which excludes incomers and which constitutes them as a problem for us. Goodhart, for instance, presupposes that we see our nationhood in ethnic terms and therefore reject 'ethnic others' (Goodhart, 2006). However there is no need to view nations in ethnic terms, one can also see them in civic terms (where all those, of whatever descent, who live in the country and are committed to the country, are accepted as nationals). Moreover, there is evidence that where nationhood is defined in civic as opposed to ethnic terms, attitudes to migrants are more positive (Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009).

What is more, there is no need to relate to migrants in ethnic terms. One can also identify in terms of locality (we are from Leicester, Kilburn, Glasgow etc.) and then ask about the way migration relates to the meanings associated with the relevant place. Mary Hickman and her

colleagues (Hickman, Mai, & Cowley, 2012) have shown, through detailed analysis of different localities, that where a place is defined in terms of a successive history of migrations and in terms of a developing mixture of populations and cultures, then new migrants are accepted more easily and cohesion (understood not as bland uniformity but as an accommodation of differences) is maintained. Conversely, where local identity is defined in terms of a settled 'indigenous' population (and where the reality of previous migrations and cultural variety is suppressed) then new migrants are seen as more problematic and the potential for conflict is heightened.

Our own evidence - derived from very different, experimental, methods - complements this analysis. For instance, when for homogenously-defined Irish Protestant community members the Catholicism of Polish migrants is made salient, such migrants are rejected more (than when it is not) (van Rijswijk, Hopkins, & Johnston, 2009). Similarly, when Scots are led to define their identity in homogenous ethnic terms they become less supportive of Chinese migrants (Wakefield *et al.*, 2011). These studies do not only confirm the point that definitions of 'us' are critical to the reception of migrants (and that negative social relations derive precisely from homogenising definitions which cast migrants as an intrusive alien 'other'). They also show that these definitions are not set in stone and that people will accept (and act upon) different formulations.

We are reminded here of a famous observation by the great French theorist of nation, Ernest Renan ([1888] 1990). He argued that the essence of a nation (and the same could be said of any community) is that they not only have things in common but that they have also forgotten their differences. To be French, one has forgotten if one is Burgundian, Alan, a Taifale or a Visigoth. Forgetting is clearly important, but we would amend the point somewhat. That is, where one does forget previous differences and erect a community on the myth of commonality so one’s ability to accommodate future changes will be diminished. The practical question, then, is how can we ensure that a less amnesic, more diverse and more accepting version of identity becomes more accepted in our communities?

The answer takes us back to our general discussion of identity in the previous section and, specifically, our argument concerning the relationship between social reality and the role played by leadership in shaping social identities. Thus, it is crucial to start by creating a context which minimises the purchase of versions of identity that problematise migrants and that allow them to be represented as the source of difficulties for existing members of the community. This means ensuring that questions of poverty and social inequality are addressed in areas of settlement and of ensuring that any increase of population is matched by increased social provision.

At the same time, however, such economic policies must be matched by leadership in the social and cultural domain so as to promote a notion of community as a developing relationship between diverse streams of people. To employ a metaphor that is often used in the Scottish context to denote a society open to newcomers (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), it is important to insist that no community or country is 'pure bred' but rather, we are all 'mongrel nations'. There are many levels on which this can be achieved.

Perhaps the most important lies in the telling of history; and school history books in particular are crucial in telling us who we are and how we relate to others (Bar-Tal, 2006; Reicher, McCrone, & Hopkins, 2010). Instead of telling histories as the journey of a single people through time, we need to address the ways in which we have been formed through a continuous series of encounters and interchanges - in terms of trade, of diplomacy, of war

and of migration - and that peoples always represent a weaving of different strands (Wolf, 1982). There is a fascinating and recently discovered example of such a text relating to French identity, originally commissioned by UNESCO but never published. It bears the evocative title 'We are all Mixed-Blood' (*Nous Sommes des Sang-Mêlés*) and it is written to illustrate the premise that: "one must look for a sense of history in meetings, interactions and interconnections, mixings, interdependences rather than in events and in acts of violence" (Febvre & Crouzet, 2012, p. 14, translation by the authors). It provides a rich and suggestive example of what inclusive British histories could look like.

But school books are not the only medium of telling 'our' story. Notions of identity are enshrined in the people we honour through public statues, the way we name our roads and public spaces, the civic museums we create and how we populate them. A local instance of exemplary practice - the Verdant Works in Dundee - may be of use here (Dundee Heritage Trust, 1998). This is an old Jute Mill which in part tells about the industrial and class history of Dundee, in part it tells how women became employed and empowered through the industry, in part it tells about exchanges with the Indian sub-continent from which the raw materials came. By interweaving class, gender and ethnicity it provides a rich, dynamic and open vision of local identity.

Going further, the nature of identity is also signaled by a wide range of institutional practices: what is celebrated and how, the nature of leisure activities, the use of food and drink and so on. All practices and all traditions - which, whatever their claim to continuity are always being reinvented (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) - need to be interrogated on the basis of how they define identity, who they include and who they exclude. This is a process we have dubbed an 'institutional identity audit' (Reicher, McCrone, & Hopkins, 2010)

Finally, identity is signaled by the physical environment and particularly by boundaries between the spaces in which people live, work and take their leisure. It is far easier to view certain people as 'other' if they are consigned to 'other' places where 'we' rarely go. Moreover, it is easier to denigrate these 'others' where the places to which they are consigned are unattractive and dilapidated. Indeed, there is clear evidence that residential and school segregation is linked to discrimination and conflict (Burgess & Wilson, 2003; Cantle, 2001). For these reasons alone it is important to address the range of policies (settlement policy, housing policy, education policy, planning policy) which promote or else contest segregation.

With these various points in mind, we can now point to two alternative scenarios concerning the relationship between migration and the future of identity. If policies of dispersal do not attend to existing problems in areas of settlement, and if no attention is paid to homogenising versions of local and national identity, then a space is created for voices which target migrants and mobilise social discord. The potential for disunity and for social conflict becomes greatly heightened. If, on the other hand, careful attention is paid to the economic conditions and social provision in areas of dispersal, and if all the means listed above are employed to create an inclusive understanding of identity, then migration need not disrupt and may even enhance cohesion.

To finish our discussion of migration, let us take just one instance of policy which happens to be topical at the point when we are writing and which is emblematic of the different choices and different paths before us. The Home Secretary, Theresa May has announced that the Citizenship Test will be changed so as to have more emphasis on history and less on practical issues relating to living in the UK. The Chief Executive of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, Habib Rahman, has responded by saying that this "will give migrants an

abundance of knowledge they will not use. This is another measure to limit access to the UK" (*The Guardian*, 2nd July 2012). While we agree that practical understanding is important for social participation in communities, our concern is not with emphasising history *per se*, it is with *what sort of history*? Will it be a history which celebrates a supposed national essence, embodied in great figures who have allowed us to impose ourselves on the world, or else a history which tells how, what and who we are is ever-evolving through our encounters in the world? What is more, which of these histories will we teach to those who grow up here? On that, much of our future hangs.

2.2.2 Relations with Muslim Communities

Having dealt with issues of migration at some length, we are in a position to be much briefer when it comes to relations with Muslims in the UK and the prospect of conflict. Many of the issues discussed above apply here too, notably the need to define communities and to shape institutional practices inclusively. To cite just one telling piece of research, a Canadian team of researchers showed that the simple act of getting people to do a task in a room with a Christmas tree in it, lowered mood and lowered performance amongst non-Christians (Schmitt *et al.*, 2010). This gives pause for thought concerning the celebration of religious festivals in public institutions.

Here, however, we wish to address a somewhat different identity issue. Much of the concern about the potential for radicalisation in Muslim communities is framed in terms of fragile British identities (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006) or else in terms of a general fragility to identity which may be caused by a myriad of factors from family rejection to the pains of growing up. In this context, it is argued, radicals can step in with the offer of a tight cohesive group which provides a solace to these vulnerable individuals. Indeed the government's general counter-terrorism strategy (Prevent) is, in part at least, based on this assumption (HM Government, 2008) as are specific interventions such as WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent) training workshops for members of local communities (Blackwood, Hopkins, Reicher, 2012 a).

We suggest that this approach has many attractions, not least that it sees radicalisation as deriving from normal processes that can affect anyone rather than reflecting something pathological in Muslim communities identity (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2012 a). Nonetheless, it is empirically problematic to suggest that Muslims lack identification with Britain as a whole (Maxwell, 2006) or that Muslim identification comes at the expense of British identity (Hopkins, 2011). It is also conceptually problematic to consider radicalisation as deriving simply from problems amongst Muslims or within the Muslim community. To do so takes our analytic gaze away from the acts of the majority community and the way in which the actions of majority group members or their representatives (notably the police) impact on the stance of the minority.

To be more concrete, our work suggests that encounters with the police and with security staff, especially around sensitive sites such as airports, plays a crucial part in shaping identity and redefining relations of authority within the Muslim community. Ironically, the issues are particularly acute amongst those who identify strongly as British (or as Scots) and who see their Muslim identity as reinforcing their sense of Britishness (or Scottishness) through shared moral values. Here, the experience of being viewed as 'other' (through excessive surveillance) and being treated as 'other' (through being stopped, searched and questioned) is experienced as profoundly negative precisely because it involves the denial of a valued identity.

What is more, the experience of having one's Britishness denied leads people to feel, first, that they are less able to influence fellow Muslims to engage in mainstream society and, second, to feel more understanding (and even more sympathetic) to the stance taken by more confrontational Muslim voices (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2012 b). In other words, it is the nature of intergroup relations between Muslims and authorities which determines the balance of influence within Muslim communities. Where people feel rejected, it will give more plausibility to those who argue that those who reject them are the enemy.

In practical and policy terms, the implication is that a priority must be put on shaping intergroup relations so as to empower more conciliatory forms of leadership. Whatever is gained in the short-term by surveillance of Muslim communities and Muslim organizations may be lost in the long-term by signaling to people that they are viewed as suspect. Instead of posing problems about the relationship between Muslim and British culture, it may be more productive to stress the commonalities (an issue forcefully endorsed by several of our respondents) and how being Muslim can make it *easier* to feel British. Whether we envisage a scenario of increased tensions with Muslims in the future (with a vicious cycle of increased surveillance and increased distrust) or else a more harmonious future (with a virtuous cycle of increased trust and increased self-policing) is contingent upon these issues.

2.2.3 Riots

The dominant response to the UK riots of August 2011 had much in common with the way in which Muslim radicalism is explained. That is, conflict was understood as a result of processes within certain marginalised groups which prevent them from developing a robust and rounded sense of self and which make them easy pickings for pathological groups (in this case, gangs) (Reicher & Stott, 2011). The riots, that is, are to be understood as resulting from broken communities and a 'feral underclass' as the Justice Minister, Ken Clarke put it (*The Guardian*, Sept 5, 2011). Once again, this focus obscures the way in which relations between groups played their part in creating conflict and, more precisely, the way in which relations between underprivileged local communities and the police created tension and then violence.

There is by now a robust literature which links urban riots to economic downturns and, more specifically, to the perception that the way cuts are administered is unjust (Ponticelli & Voth, 2011). However, the link is generally indirect and depends upon the way in which economic factors impact on everyday experiences and the types of interaction people have (literally) on the street. Thus young men without educational or employment prospects hang around in public places where they are seen as a threat and treated as such by the police. Add to this a racial element and strong feelings of resentment and anger begin to develop. Thus 48.7% of the population in Haringey (where the riots began) is non-white (as opposed to 13% in England and Wales as a whole) (Haringey Council, 2011). Between April and June 2011 the police stopped people in Haringey 6,894 times, in 6,807 of these cases there was no conviction and black people were 26 times more likely to be stopped than whites (Reicher & Stott, 2011).

These resentments were encapsulated in the shooting of a local black man, Mark Duggan. When family and friends protested peacefully, they were ignored. Rather, the police used large numbers to disperse the gathering crowds using indiscriminate tactics in which anyone present was caught up. In this context, the influence of conciliatory voices diminished and that of radical voices urging retaliation was increased (the link to processes of Muslim radicalisation is palpable). Tottenham was a classic anti-police riot in which police officers, police property and 'outsider' properties were targeted (*The Guardian*, 2011; Reicher & Stott, 2011). Crowd

members were neither mindless nor indiscriminate in what they did. They acted meaningfully and collectively in terms of a radicalised social identity (Reicher, 1984).

Subsequently, it is true that the police struggled to assemble the resources to deal with the resulting disorder and this has been used to call for more repressive policing and the use of curfews and water cannon as the solution to rioting. But this misses the point that the rioting started through the lack of engagement between police and community, the imposition of policing upon the community and the development of a sense of local community in which black experience was emblematic of an embattled and oppositional identity in which the state, the police and institutions of privilege were seen as outgroups.

The solution, then, lies in avoiding the initiation of processes of “othering” and not by using language (‘feral underclass’) or policies (indiscriminate curfews) which entrench the outsider identity of these communities as a whole. These processes can take a number of forms including (a) a 'social audit' which considers the full costs (including criminality, policing and disorder) of all policy decisions - such as the 75% cut in Haringey's youth services announced in January 2011 as part of £41 million spending cuts leading to the closure of 13 youth centres, after-school clubs and employment support (*Hornsey and Crouch End Journal,* March 1, 2011); (b) reconsideration of police stop and search policies and practices, and of racial bias in the selection of targets; (c) support and funding for police-community engagement initiatives in marginalised communities.

In line with our earlier discussion of residential segregation in the context of migration, it is also important to address the housing and benefit policies which run the risk of increasing residential class/race divisions in cities such as London and which, moreover, may give rise to a sense of illegitimate exclusion from areas of privilege and affluence - thus entrenching the preconditions for future conflict.

In sum, an approach which locates problems within rioting communities will facilitate the formation of oppositional identities, will empower conflictual leadership and will thereby increase the likelihood of future rioting. An approach which locates problems in the relations between privileged and underprivileged communities, which addresses the differentials between them and which privileges engagement with and re-inclusion of those who are marginalized, promises a more positive future.

3. Conclusion

We have shown, in three domains that are of importance to the future of UK society, issues of social identity play a critical part in determining whether our future will be more or less unequal, more or less discriminatory, more or less conflictual. In this sense our argument is more about the place of identity in the future of social relations than the future of identity in and of itself.

We hope to have demonstrated that identity is perhaps our primary resource in managing relations between groups. Moreover, we have sought to outline some of the ways in which we can deploy that resource to best effect. To create inclusive identities that bring people together rather than set them at odds with each other it is necessary to deploy a range of economic, social and cultural policies which both shape the context in which we live our lives and also provide the resources by which we make sense of our world. Good leadership at every level – national government, local government and institutional management – is about combining the practical and the rhetorical to create a coherent and cohesive notion of who ‘we’ are.

At the same time as social identity is an input into social processes, it is also an output. Exclusive definitions of identity which problematise certain ‘others’ create a reality of conflict and division, they create social and physical segregation which in turn reinforce the plausibility of accounts of the world in terms of exclusive identities. Inclusive definitions of identity which reconceptualise erstwhile others as part of ‘us’ serve to bring people together, to facilitate intermingling socially and spatially, and to undermine the plausibility of the world in terms of exclusive identities.

We face a choice between vicious circles of group conflict and virtuous circles of group harmony. An understanding of identity processes is necessary to allow us to determine which path we follow.

Appendix: Outlining future scenarios

In this paper, we suggest that the impact of structural changes on groups and relations between groups will depend upon policies we implement in the present, and the ways these policies impact on our understanding of who we are. This means that we cannot mechanically predict 'the future of identity'. What we can do, however, is to indicate the challenges that face us in society and the ways in which different types of policy are likely to lead to more or less inclusion, harmony and cohesion in society. To summarise our argument, then, we will first outline the broad challenge to a cohesive society and then, in each of the three areas we have considered (migration; relations with Muslim communities; riots), look at the specific issues and outline the policies which will increase the probability of a cohesive/harmonious future.

In overall terms then, one of the most striking changes in our society concerns the increase of geographical mobility. Migration, nationally and (particularly) internationally is increasing and, if anything, is likely to increase still further. At the same time, the development of new communications technologies (such as social media) makes it easier for migrant communities to cohere and to maintain their culture. This implies a complex combination of identities whereby, say a person is British and Muslim and Pakistani and female. The key question, and the key challenge, is whether these various identities are in tension or else in harmony with each other. Is it that this person is variously British and Muslim and Pakistani and female, or is it that she can think of herself seamlessly as a British Muslim Pakistani female?

This is the issue of intersectionality. It is important to stress, however, that it is not simply a matter of migration and ethnicity. One can equally ask whether other groups, based on class, culture, sexuality and so on are seen and accepted as fully part of the local or national community and hence the dynamics of cohesion and of alienation that we describe are applicable to a broad range of phenomena.

To hold intersectional identities, it is not enough for the minority to be motivated, it is critically important for the majority to accept the possibility. For example, British Muslims can only be British in a Muslim way (and Muslim in a British way) if other British people treat this as reasonable and indeed as something to be celebrated (Hopkins, 2011). Where the majority deny the possibility of intersectionality (that is, they insist that you cannot be British if you insist on being Muslim), then minority group members' sense of their citizenship will be compromised (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011). This is likely to undermine their well-being. It is also likely to increase the potential for disaffection and conflict.

In the following table, then, we summarise ideas from our paper concerning what can be done to promote a harmonious intersectional Britain and what would undermine it.

Challenge	Policies for harmony
Migration: creating inclusive communities	1. Cultural and educational policies which define identity in terms of encounters between communities rather than an unchanging 'essence' of Britishness 2. An 'institutional identity audit' which ensures that institutional practices do not exclude particular groups 3. Housing, planning and educational policies which address residential and school segregation
Relations with Muslim communities: overcoming the climate of fear	1. Cultural and educational policies which emphasise the commonalities between Muslim and British identities rather than the tensions between them 2. Targeted security policies based on dialogue with community members rather than broad surveillance of Muslim individuals and organizations
Riots: reintegrating marginalised communities	1. Communications policies which recognise conflict as arising out of relations between rioters and other groups rather than factors within rioting communities. 2. Housing policies which mitigate against residential segregation based on class/race 3. A systematic 'social audit' of the impact of spending decisions on different racial/class groups 4. Prioritising policies of re-engagement between the police and local communities, and the development of targeted strategies, tactics and technologies of public order management.

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