

CIVILIANS IN DEFENCE

FURTHER REPORT

8 JUNE 2010

1. This is the second report submitted as part of the Civilians in Defence Study. It follows the interim report submitted in March and discussed at the Defence Board on 16 April. This report concentrates on the Department's core administrative functions, in particular those concerned with corporate services and property, and covers the work done by around 26,000 of the 86,000 civilians employed in defence. It proposes significant organisational reform which will lead to a range of efficiency savings. It is the Government's aim to reduce Ministry of Defence (MoD) running costs by at least 25% by 2015, and the savings indicated in this report are expected to be in line with that intention.

BACKGROUND

2. A description of the work done by the 86,000 civil servants, by organisational area and function, is at Annex A. Of these some 16,000 are being looked at through the previous Government's Operational Efficiency Programme: that programme - which explores opportunity for restructuring, privatisation, and contractisation - is already being used to examine the Department's Trading Funds, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the Defence Fire and Risk Management organisation, and the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency. It is expected that in some cases this will lead to significant change in the next twelve months, but that is not discussed here.

3. The earlier report set out a number of principles which should be applied to civilian work in MoD in order to maximise efficiencies. These Efficiency Principles are set out at Annex B. Following Defence Board agreement, these principles have been applied to the 26,000 civil

servants working in areas of enabling activity which the centre of the Department provides in support of all of its businesses (TLBs etc). These activities span finance, civilian and military HR, property management, information, contracting, vetting and guarding, although the last of these is not proposed for inclusion in the new structure.

4. Current arrangements vary from area to area; but basically staff in these activities are split among these areas: a small corporate function mostly located within the Head Office including “process owners” with some authority over the function; a number of free-standing delivery organisations; and staff employed in TLBs. The way in which they are presently organised does not make them ready candidates for immediate outsourcing, and in some cases neither does the nature of their work which is at the core of the MoD’s Department of State functions.

THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES

5. The four principles set out in the original report which apply particularly to this group, are as follows:

- a. The nature of the Ministry of Defence sometimes requires civilian personnel to be embedded in subordinate headquarters. Where these personnel carry out a corporate function they should be managed from a central focus responsible for the function so that efficiencies can be maximised and so that civilian manpower within the function can be deployed to best effect.
- b. Business support activities across the MoD should be organised into corporate structures, so that appropriate governance arrangements can be put into place, management can be made as effective as possible, and up to date systems and technologies can be utilised. These business services should be controlled centrally.
- c. Where it would add to the efficiency of MoD’s business, support activities should be exposed to alternative supply models, including the involvement of the private

sector where appropriate. The opportunities to exploit synergies across government should also be considered.

- d. The Ministry of Defence should ensure that it has organised its functions as efficiently and effectively as it can before it embarks on any contractorisation process – contractorisation should not be used to create synergies within external providers which should have been captured centrally before the outsourcing took place.


6. Applying these principles to the work done by these corporate staffs leads to the following conclusions:

- a. The functions are not 'managed from a central focus'. Although underpinned by common standards across Defence, they are overwhelmingly managed and organised within the delegated command/TLB structure. Each TLB has built up groups of staff who essentially deal with corporate issues, interpreted locally. In part TLBs have done this to supplement what they perceive as a poor service from central service delivery organisations. There are currently some 11,500 civilian staff based in TLBs involved in these areas of work.
- b. Process owners at the centre of the Department have, in some areas, remarkably little influence over setting policy and determining the operational framework applied to the particular process they are deemed to own, especially when these processes are carried out remote from the centre. Instead the TLBs have felt it necessary to develop their own centres of expertise and those at the centre of the Department have been unable to exercise the responsibilities for service delivery, efficiencies, and organisation which would normally be expected by those in such positions.
- c. The common information warehouses do not have the range and authority needed. Instead different areas of the Department invest in generating their own information, not always consistent with what might be available centrally. The

absence of authoritative single source data means that staff at all levels spend time producing reports, statistical returns, and so on which are demanded by the centre of the Department, often with no real knowledge of why the information is necessary.

- d. The main service delivery organisations within the Department – the People Pay and Pensions Agency (PPPA), the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (SPVA), the Financial Management Shared Service Centre (FMSSC), employing some 2,500 people – remain isolated from each other under separate management, and unable to deliver the efficiencies which should come from the centralisation of enabling services, through systems integration, streamlining of processes, and staff rationalisation. Some aspects of these delivery organisations also suffer from poor reputation, which has sometimes been deserved because of problems in their delivery record when they were first set up. It is this poor reputation in part which has driven the TLBs into creating their own staffs, often as a kind of insurance policy.
- e. All of this has meant that over the years the way that these functions have been delivered has become fragmented and stove-piped with a consequent reduction in corporate best practice standards, the development of bespoke systems, and a shortage of skills in the groups concerned. This has caused staff numbers to rise and has led to more people working in the TLB construct than should be necessary.

The current arrangements can be expressed diagrammatically as follows:




A NEW MODEL

7. It is possible to put right the weaknesses identified here but only by a significant shift in the way the Department is organised and in particular the creation of new and authoritative sources of service. Such a model would:

- a. Give process owners much greater control, accountability and authority over what goes on in their process across the Department. This will involve process owners taking responsibility for selecting key staff, providing TLB holders with high level support and guidance and setting the policy framework that will apply across all businesses and groups.
- b. Put a number of business delivery services in a single organisation, to be known here as Defence Business Services (DBS), which will be responsible for carrying out the demands of the process owners in the most cost-effective and efficient way. This will have within it a number of functional divisions, starting with finance, civilian HR, part of military HR (the SPVA), commercial, information, and vetting. Over time it is possible that other functions will be added.

c. These arrangements would look like this



d. Create a new defence property vehicle, to be known here as Defence Property (DP), replacing the current Defence Estates, which will hold ownership of all MOD's property and land assets, manage and maintain these assets to best advantage and originate plans for disposals.

8. None of this will reduce the authority of Budget Holders, Commanders in Chief and others in the TLBs. The TLBs will now be the customers of these new services and, as such, will have a key influence over the level of service provided to them. The difference will be that in future they will receive information, data, advice and other services from pooled resources, and the numbers of civil servants working in these areas in the TLBs and often embedded there will be determined by process owners and the DBS.

THE GOVERNANCE OF THE NEW ORGANISATION

9. For such an arrangement to work, all elements of this structure will be linked to each other in radically new ways. It is not a matter of salami slicing the current structure, or of the same people doing the job they now do but reporting to different line management; it is a radical shift in the way that the Department delivers its enabling services which will have implications for all elements of the organisation.

10. In particular it makes it possible to set up relationships which continuously incentivise everyone involved to make savings. The process owners can be incentivised to simplify processes, the DBS and Defence Property to drive down the cost of delivery, and the TLBs to influence the quality of the service they receive with the confidence that they will be listened to. This will require new arrangements both for governance and for the funding. All of this is set out below.

Process Owners

11. The process owners will be expected to take on full responsibility for the framework of regulation and policy, and for the context within which the delivery organisations will operate. To do this they will be responsible for agreeing the funding provided to the DBS (based upon the level of service required to be delivered to TLBs, line managers and staff). This will be a shifting rather than a fixed environment, and process owners must be agile and prepared to adjust the demands made on the DBS because of legislative, financial, departmental or civil service wide changes.

12. Process owners will take on responsibility for the staff across the function, including those allocated to or sometimes bedded out in TLBs; the process owner will set standards, select key staff, determine training and manage the function as a single entity. Having direct responsibility for staff in the TLBs will give the process owners a clear idea of the work of the businesses, and avoid unnecessary calls for information between Head Office and the TLBs in

the current construct. The process owner will also specify the standard required from functional staffs in DBS (see below).

13. Above all, process owners must do everything they can to simplify processes and drive down numbers, for example by ensuring that policy requirements are no more onerous than they need to be. This will make it as easy as possible for the DBS to drive efficiencies out of the system.

Defence Business Services

14. Defence Business Services (DBS) will enable the cross-departmental delivery of services from a single point. This would include, initially, the whole of what is now the People Pay and Pensions Agency, the Service Pay and Vetting Agency, the Defence Vetting Agency and most of the Financial Management Shared Service Centre. These staffs will be reinforced by other staff drawn from those in the TLBs currently working in these functions, but the number transferred will be significantly smaller than those currently required. There are some 6,500 civil servants in total involved in work that will be delivered by the new organisation but this will be reduced considerably as part of setting up the DBS, and once the DBS is established there should then be further savings.

15. For this to work there would need to be the early appointment of a suitably qualified Chief Executive and Finance Director. The Chief Executive will, from the outset, be required to focus on the efficiency of the constituent parts of the DBS, possible synergies between them, how service delivery will improve, and how the numbers of staff can be reduced, including by outsourcing where appropriate.

16. The organisation will need a clear business focus both to emphasise its role as a supplier to the Department's requirements, and to enable the CEO to drive through the efficiencies required. The Chief Executive will also make recommendations in due course around the

movement of DBS, in whole or in part, to Trading Fund or a Government-owned Company (GovCo) status. Over time, private sector capital and management might sensibly be introduced into DBS and it will be a responsibility of its Board to keep this under review. For all this to happen a Board will be set up along business lines. The Board's membership should include people with deep experience of business service delivery, in particular a non-executive independent Chair, the Chief Executive and Finance Director and Non-Executive Directors.

17. The DBS should operate to maximise the efficient delivery of those business services placed upon it by the process owners. The process owners will consult closely with the TLBs (where they will have representation) both to determine those requirements and to monitor delivery. This will be a significant shift from the current arrangements and will place far greater emphasis on the role of the process owner to understand the needs of the TLBs. It will be important, however, for the DBS also to have direct links with the TLBs, and the DBS CEO will need to establish customer feedback arrangements so that DBS is given immediate and thorough analysis of the services being delivered and the way they are perceived.

18. Appropriate budgetary and financial arrangements would need to be set up as follows:

- Process owners will be seen as the primary users of DBS. Having discussed their requirements with the TLBs, they would place the demand for the services on to the DBS. DBS would then cost the services and inform the process owners.
- Process owners will be provided with funding for the delivery of the activities of the function across the department. A large element of this funding would be consumed by the activities of the relevant part of the DBS.
- A budget will be agreed for the delivery of the DBS services. Where resources do not allow for the delivery of the services required collectively, the Chief Executive will discuss with the process owners what adjustments in the level of services are necessary.

- For this to happen the process owners themselves must be set up to act collectively. A suitable chairperson, such as 2nd PUS should convene a forum annually to coordinate the demands of process owners on DBS which both DBS and representatives of TLBs would attend.
- The Chief Executive will also be required to drive down its costs continuously through techniques such as leaning and through streamlining its activities.

Defence Property

19. The property area shows many of the same organisational characteristics as other areas. There is a central organisation – Defence Estates which employs some 2700 people – though it does not have the levers to discharge its responsibilities efficiently. Responsibility in practice is shared with TLBs who employ a further 1,000 staff of their own, which leads to the Estate programme being developed bottom-up and single service focused. Customer views are provided largely in TLB silos and there is no clear means to ensure all funding is targeted towards agreed defence priorities meaning that money is not spent efficiently across the board, whilst potentially failing to identify the opportunities for rationalisation / disposal that would come through a ‘joined-up’ approach.

20. Applying the principles would lead to bringing together the requirement setting into a single corporate organisation which will own and manage the Department’s estate as a single entity. This new property organisation would also take the role of managing the various soft FM contracts (catering, cleaning etc) which have currently been set up by TLBs and should seek to outsource many of the 2,300 personnel who still provide these services in-house. This will achieve considerable staff savings and will also provide a more focussed way of identifying value in the estate itself.

21. The organisation must be professional in its ability to maximise the effectiveness of the defence estate, identify savings, and meet the department’s demands. Much the same

considerations apply to Defence Property as would apply to DBS. It must be headed by an appropriately qualified Chief Executive and Finance Director who would be responsible to an oversight board along the same lines as that for the DBS, under an independent non executive Chair.

22. At the same time, the TLBs must retain a considerable influence over the estate and property they occupy, and systems would be introduced which mirror closely the landlord-tenant relationship seen commonly across the private sector. This would work as follows:

- The TLBs are the end users (or 'tenants') of the defence estate.
- Defence Property would be responsible for producing a consolidated defence requirement through engagement with the Department's capability staff and individual TLB planning teams. This would then be agreed by the Defence Board and the funding transferred to Defence Property, who would be accountable for the provision of a fit-for purpose estate.
- Defence Property would prepare and maintain an Estates Rationalisation Plan after consultation with the TLBs, and submit it regularly to the Defence Board. A periodic target for capital receipts would be set.
- Defence Property would have senior representatives based in each TLB so that customer feedback and requirements were regularly sourced.

23. Further consideration should be given to charging TLBs for the properties and estate that they occupy in order to give them a continued incentive to reduce the size of their footprints.

The TLBs and other businesses

24. None of this means that the essential principles of delegation to TLBs have come to an end. There will still be an arrangement whereby budget holders will receive delegations from the Department for their core tasks and be held accountable for their delivery. The difference

will be that they will do so drawing on services, advice, information, and support which are provided from joint resources.

25. Nonetheless, this approach will have a significant impact on TLBs. Corporate staff costs would be transferred out. Staff working in the TLBs in these areas will not “belong to” the TLB in the present way – rather they will be representatives of either process owners or the DBS/Defence Property, and will be responsible for delivering services, information, and advice. The numbers of staff required to carry out the work, and the choice of key individuals, will be a matter for the DBS/Defence Property or the process owner and not for the TLB. At the same time, the TLBs will be far from passive in this process. They will have discussions with the DBS, normally through the process owner, about what kind of services they require, and where individual specialisations have responsibility for particular groups of staff (for example niche areas of HR management) the DBS will provide specialist support. Moreover TLBs will be expected to feed back to the process owner any concerns they have about services being delivered. If they believe that the provision of services is making it impossible for the TLB holder to deliver his business in the most cost effective way, they will have the means to bring that to their attention immediately.

The Command Secretaries

26. The Command Secretaries will continue to discharge a vital role. They would not be head of a free-standing group of staff as at present, but they will remain as the principal civil service advisor to the budget holder and, in the case of Front Line Commands, senior uniformed staff. They will have particular responsibilities as Senior Finance Officer and they will be responsible as now for Parliamentary and presentational aspects of the TLBs’ activity which it is inappropriate to transfer to Defence Business Services. In addition to this they will have a particular role in the new structure in monitoring the effectiveness of the services being provided, and feeding back to the process owners and the DBS any particular concerns about the level of service or changes in requirement.

HOW THIS MODEL WOULD BE APPLIED TO FUNCTIONAL AREAS

27. The precise way in which these arrangements would apply to specific corporate functions will vary, depending on the nature of the function, the numbers employed, and existing structures. The proposals are as follows:

(a) Civilian HR (Currently about 1,600 civil servants employed across the Department.)

The position of DGHRCs as process owner would be strengthened and delineation between Head Office and PPPA clarified. The process owner would assume direct control for a small number of senior business partners in TLBs. The PPPA would be moved into DBS and its role expanded. TLBs would lose direct control of existing HR staffs.

(b) Military HR (4,500 civil servants) The SPVA would be moved in its current form into the DBS, and would continue its rationalisation programme. Existing work to examine opportunities for rationalisation in other areas should continue with DCDS(Pers) as process owner. In time it might be possible for SPVA, in the DBS, to take on other functions and deliver them across the board.

(c) Finance (about 3,500 civil servants) The role of DG(Fin) as process owner would be strengthened to take on responsibility for deciding on financial structures and processes across the Department. TLBs would lose direct responsibility for their own financial staffs. Key individuals in the TLBs in budget management roles would report direct to the process owner, and new structures would be developed within the DBS for the provision of information, guidance and advice across the board. The FMSSC would move into DBS.

(d) Commercial (2,500 civil servants) The position of DGDC as process owner is currently weak. Staff will be transferred from DE&S so that all enabling functions that support commercial activity would be grouped in one place. DGDC would have a strengthened role

in the training and development and standard setting across the commercial community, and would also have a role in the oversight of key appointments of commercial staff. Some routine commercial activity would be transferred into the DBS.

(e) Estates (6,000 civil servants including 2,300 Soft FM delivery staff) Defence Estates would cease to exist in its present form and become Defence Property with an expanded remit. A single requirement setting organisation should be established.

(f) Vetting (450 civil servants) The Defence Vetting Agency in its current form would be moved into Defence Business Services.

(g) Guarding (7,500 civil servants) The position of DBR as process owner should be strengthened and given a greater say in resource allocation. Consideration should be given to moving the MPGS into a new expanded agency so that all guarding resources are in the same place. Renewed attention must be given to examining opportunities to squeeze value out of the MGS, including through contractorisation.

(h) Information (250 civil servants) The Corporate Memory delivery function (archive services, libraries, internet services etc) would transfer to the proposed DBS, along with the services currently provided by DASA.

(i) Secretariat (300 civil servants) The process owner role in the heart of the Department needs to be strengthened and the secretariat community looked at as one. Secretariat staffs would remain in place in the TLBs.

CROSS-GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCIES

28. All of this is constructed to make changes within Defence, and to reorganise the provision of services within Defence in the most cost effective manner. There has been talk of a government wide approach to these issues, whereby these same services might be provided, in whole or in part, from central organisations or from other departments. Nothing in this report prevents that from happening should it be appropriate, but this report concentrates on the art of the possible, capable of being delivered within a defined timescale. By producing more streamlined and better organised internal structures, MoD would be in a better place to engage with any new cross-government delivery mechanisms. It is however possible that the size and specialised nature of Defence means that it will not immediately lend itself to broader initiatives.

NUMBERS AND COSTS

29. Taken together these arrangements apply to about 26,000 civil service jobs at a cost to the Department of about £1.2bn in total, as set out above. They will work in different ways in each of the functions considered. In certain functions the change of emphasis will lead to an up-skilling of staff and improved levels of service – this will be so for example in the Secretariat and the Commercial area. But most important, in many of these functions, a shift from TLB control of the building blocks to a single central design with the removal of duplication and a single overview of process, will drive simplification and will make it possible to deliver the same or better level of service with fewer staff and at less cost.

30. Experience in the private sector shows that standardisation and simplification of processes can deliver savings in the region of 15%-25% of the total cost of the function. Sharing and consolidation of activity, enabled through the greater use of shared services can deliver a further 10%-15% of the total cost. Together, therefore a minimum of 25%-40% of savings potentially can be achieved. Further savings may be achieved by contractisation but these have not been considered in this present report.

31. Analysis of how these proposals might apply to current arrangements in Defence bears this out. If this structure can be imposed quickly and with complete support of everyone concerned, it is estimated that some 2,000 out of these jobs can go in the short term mainly from the civilian HR, finance, and estate functions. This would require working with the process owners, the TLBs, the new management of DBS and Defence Property to agree the staffing structures that would be appropriate after consultation with the Trade Unions. This would be a top down process, and could begin as soon as the decision to move to this model was announced, so that at the time of the formal setting up of the DBS some of these savings could already have been taken.

32. However this is just the beginning. Further rationalisation should come quickly once the DBS and Defence Property are up and running with new Chief Executives, through internal efficiencies, outsourcing and process simplification. There would also be savings within the commercial function and quite possibly within Military HR. It is difficult to be precise about the numbers of further savings, but from experience elsewhere it is expected that there should be a minimum of a further 1,500 saving in the first four years delivering a total reduction over 3,500 posts.. On top of this we expect the new property vehicle could be expected to reduce the number of civil servants by early outsourcing of some 2,000 staff not yet covered by Soft FM contracts.

33. Very simply we calculate that a reduction of 3,500 civil service jobs would give a gross annual saving of about £130M, but there are problems in making too automatic a linkage between jobs that are no longer needed and cash savings. To remove a job is one thing, but to achieve the saving is another. Under the Department's present procedures, staff who are no longer required go into a redeployment pool, where they continue to be paid. They will then seek to fill other vacancies which occur, after re-training if necessary. This is not an instant process and there are already over a thousand people in the redeployment pool. The extra pressure placed upon the redeployment pool by staff whose jobs are no longer required

following these changes will strain these arrangements even further, and will lead to more staff remaining in the redeployment pool on full pay. Unless these arrangements are changed, the savings which will come from reducing the number of jobs will not be realised.

34. We calculate that, making certain assumptions about rates of re-absorption, the actual savings given that the department will continue to pay staff in the redeployment pool, would take about four years to be achieved in full, and would be very small indeed in the first year. The alternative would be to introduce redundancy which under present terms would involve a one-off payment of up to around £260M. Organisations outside the public sector would incur the exceptional costs associated with such restructurings on the basis that the ongoing savings expected would more than outweigh the upfront costs.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

35. The Terms of Reference also require us to consider the balance between military and civilian personnel in the Department. On average, a military person costs almost twice as much as a civilian. Unless there are particular requirements therefore, it makes no sense to put military personnel into a post that a civilian could occupy. Where this is necessary for the proper performance of a role, the cost should necessarily be part of the costs of the function. Where it is done at the behest of the military for non-operational reasons not particular to the post, the extra costs should be met by the respective military TLB.

MOVING FORWARD

36. To achieve such savings requires dedicated and intense change management and will draw on skills not necessarily available in MoD. The immediate priority is to set up a dedicated team to carry forward this work in consultation with the process owners and customers. To the extent that the necessary skills are not available, they will need to be recruited or bought in.

37. To commence the work, next stages are likely to involve:

- the appointment of suitably qualified Chief Executives and Finance Directors to DBS and to Defence Property;
- detailed work with the TLBs on deciding what work will go into DBS and DP, and the structure of the way services will be delivered across the Department's businesses;
- a new and more aggressive approach by process owners across the board, concentrating on simplification of systems;
- preparation for new budgetary arrangements that will allow simplified cost identification during 2011/12;
- early decisions on how to deal with the surplus staff; and
- consultation with the Trades Unions.

Gerry Grimstone

THE EFFICIENCY PRINCIPLES

- i. The Ministry of Defence is a Department of State which contains the senior military headquarters of the United Kingdom. It formulates defence policy in support of the Government, provides Armed Forces to deliver that policy, and makes it possible for the Government to direct and equip those Armed Forces. Anything it does other than that must be critically examined.
- ii. The Ministry of Defence should carry out its responsibilities as efficiently and effectively as possible and should be sized and structured appropriately to do so. This structure should be agile enough to ensure the appropriate level of responsiveness to emerging issues.
- iii. Some of the responsibilities exercised by the Ministry of Defence must be carried out by its own directly-employed people – either the armed forces or civil servants. Putting operational activities aside, these responsibilities cover, for example, providing direct advice to Ministers and Parliament, making major decisions on the expenditure of public money, acting as an “intelligent customer” in the interface with industry, or acting in some international role where other governments would expect to be talking to Crown Servants in the UK. Within these areas, some jobs can only be carried out by the armed forces and some can only be carried out by civil servants, but other jobs can be done by either group.
- iv. Where it is possible for work to be done by either the armed forces or the civil service, the balance should be determined pragmatically, but the most cost effective solution should be chosen unless there is a specific reason not to do so. Such reasons should be made explicit.
- v. Where it is not necessary for people directly employed by the MoD to do the work, value for money should determine who does it.

- vi. The nature of the Ministry of Defence sometimes requires civilian personnel to be embedded in subordinate headquarters. Where these personnel carry out a corporate function they should be managed from a central focus responsible for the function so that efficiencies can be maximised and so that civilian manpower within the function can be deployed to best effect.
- vii. Business support activities across the MoD should be organised into corporate structures, so that appropriate governance arrangements can be put into place, management can be made as effective as possible, and up to date systems and technologies can be utilised. These business services should be controlled centrally.
- viii. Where it would add to the efficiency of MoD's business, support activities should be exposed to alternative supply models, including the involvement of the private sector where appropriate. The opportunities to exploit synergies across government should also be considered.
- ix. The Ministry of Defence should ensure that it has organised its functions as efficiently and effectively as it can before it embarks on any contractorisation process – contractorisation should not be used to create synergies within external providers which should have been captured centrally before the outsourcing took place.
- x. If legislation is needed to effect any of the above it should be sought.
- xi. Powerful executive management, a change function, and continuing external challenge will be needed if progress is to be made.

STATISTICAL DATA**MOD CIVILIANS IN DEFENCE BY BUSINESS AREA**

Organisation / Functional Grouping	FTE ¹
TRADING FUNDS	
Hydrographic Office	1,000
Met Office	1,900
Defence Scientific and Technology laboratories	3,500
Defence Support Group	3,400
MOD BUSINESS AREAS	
Head Office	1,600
People Pay and Pensions Agency	1,000
Defence Vetting Agency	500
Defence Intelligence Service	1,600
Service Personnel & Veterans Agency	900
Financial Management Shared Services	800
Ministry of Defence Police and Guarding	7,500
Defence Academy	400
Science Innovation and Technology	400
Army Recruiting and Training Division	3,400
Fire and Rescue Service	1,100
Service Children's Education	1,100
Army Personnel Centre	600
Army Primary Healthcare Services	800
RFA	2,300
United States Visiting Forces	1,600
DE&S	
Defence Storage and Distribution Agency	3,100
Joint Support Chain - Other	1,700
3 x Naval Bases	1,200
Corporate Services	4,100
Integrated Project Teams	6,100
DE&S Other	500
Front Line Commands (LAND, AIR, FLEET, PJHQ)	
Corporate Support ²	1,900
Administrative Support	7,500
Estates	2,800
Driving	1,100
Storekeeping	1,400
Front line Commands - Other Functions	4,400
Defence Estates	
Defence Estates	2,800
Other	
Locally Employed Civilians	10,500
Miscellaneous	2,100
TOTAL	86,600³

¹ Figures are indicative as drawn from several data sources but broadly equitable to April 09.

² Corporate Support includes personnel employed in HR (Service and Civilian), Finance and Commercial

³ Figures are rounded to the nearest hundred, sub-totals have been rounded separately and so may not equal the sum of their rounded parts.