


MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

**Future Capabilities: Government Response to The House of Commons Defence Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2004-05**







**FUTURE CAPABILITIES: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE HOUSE OF  
COMMONS DEFENCE COMMITTEE'S FOURTH REPORT OF SESSION 2004-05**

Presented to Parliament by  
The Secretary of State for Defence  
By Command of Her Majesty

July 2005

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# **FUTURE CAPABILITIES: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEFENCE COMMITTEE'S FOURTH REPORT OF SESSION 2004-05**

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This paper constitutes the Government's response to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee's report, *Future Capabilities* (Fourth Report of Session 2004-05, HC 45-1), published on 17 March 2005. The Government welcomes the Report and pays tribute to the thorough investigation which the previous Defence Select Committee undertook in order to produce it.

*Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities* was published by the Ministry of Defence on 21 July 2004 as a supplement to the Defence White Paper (*Delivering Security in a Changing World*) of December 2003. The White Paper set out our analysis of the future security environment and a revised set of planning assumptions, which formed the basis for the proposals in the *Future Capabilities* Command Paper.

Our emphasis is on restructuring the Armed Forces to increase their flexibility and resilience in meeting the most likely operational demands in the future. In doing so, we have recognised areas where there has been a reduction in threat, as well as areas where technology has dramatically improved capability. Taken together, these changes are allowing us to reconfigure our Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century. We are using the additional resources made available to Defence in the 2004 Spending Review settlement to drive forward this programme of modernisation. The settlement provides us with an average annual real growth of 1.4%, amounting to an additional £3.7 Bn per year by 2007/08. This continues the longest period of sustained real growth in Defence spending for over 20 years.

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## Introduction

### Recommendation 1

**As we have previously stated, we agree with much of the policy analysis in *Delivering Security*. We welcome the Government's commitment to modernising the Armed Forces to equip them to face the security challenges of the future. Inevitably much of the analysis in the report focuses on areas where we still have concerns or questions. (Paragraph 10)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's endorsement of the policy analysis set out in our December 2003 White Paper, *Delivering Security in a Changing World*, and the Committee's recognition of the Government's commitment to modernising our Armed Forces. The programme of modernisation set out in the *Future Capabilities* Command Paper will ensure that our Armed Forces are well-prepared to face the security challenges of the future.

## Scales of effort and concurrency assumption

### Recommendation 2

**In our report into the Defence White Paper of December 2003 (*Delivering Security in a Changing World*), we identified two broad areas of potential risk from the MoD's policy analysis: a lack of resilience in the face of changing operational demands and too narrow a focus on the range of operational demands which the Armed Forces of the future may face. In this report we intend to look more closely at how the Future Capabilities proposals have addressed those areas of risk. (Paragraph 21)**

The Department does not agree with the Committee's observations. The policy set out in the 2003 Defence White Paper anticipated a broad range of operational demands, from peace keeping to intervention operations, summarised in a revised set of 18 Military Tasks. The tasks provide the framework for developing our force structure requirements.

The changes to our force structure will ensure we are optimised for the most likely and most frequent operational tasks, whilst retaining the capacity to reconfigure for the most demanding but less frequent large scale operations. We also recognise that the force structure may need to change over time as threats, technology and coalitions evolve. This will provide a resilient force structure that will remain flexible enough to respond to an uncertain future.

## The financial context

### Recommendation 3

**MOD must press ahead with the full implementation of its plans to re-invigorate the Smart Procurement initiative, which it continues to maintain will deliver equipment projects to time and cost. Only if these plans are successful will it be able to exploit the forecast savings from reductions in existing equipment. MOD must also ensure that its efficiency programme delivers its targets as useable additional funding. Those funds will be needed to deliver the ambitious programme of transformation set out in *Future Capabilities* within the proposed timescales. (Paragraph 33)**

The Department accepts the Committee's recommendation; indeed, it is already pursuing these points with vigour. In October 2004 the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) launched a major performance improvement programme, 'DPA Forward'. This is a single, coherent programme which aims to ensure the more consistent application of Smart Acquisition principles. There are four major work-streams - Performance, People, Processes and Projects - focusing on issues such as key supplier management, skills and workforce planning, project review and assurance and whole life management. The DPA has seen a significant improvement in performance against key targets for 2004-05, achieving or partly achieving all of its key targets for the first time since the inception of the Agency. We will continue to work hard to ensure that this improvement is sustained.

Through the Department's efficiency programme, we plan to achieve efficiency improvements worth £2.8 billion annually by 2007/08, of which three-quarters will be cash savings that will be re-allocated within the Defence Programme in accordance with Defence priorities. The remainder of the efficiency improvements are aimed at getting the most out of our people and assets, so will also make a very significant contribution to the effective provision of military capability.

#### **Recommendation 4**

**Service accommodation across the defence estate is too frequently of a poor standard. Although the Future Capabilities proposals focus on operational needs, MOD must not lose sight of the necessity to find funds to bring accommodation for all service personnel up to an acceptable modern standard. We recommend that MOD commits itself to a clear timetable within which the necessary improvements will be made. (Paragraph 36)**

The Department notes the Committee's recommendation. We remain committed to improving the infrastructure needed to support our servicemen and women and their families, and plan to invest over £5 billion to maintain and improve the quality of the defence estate over the next 4 years. A significant proportion of this investment will be in improved Service accommodation.

Firstly, the improvement to Single Living Accommodation (SLA) remains at the forefront of the Department's agenda. The improvement to SLA is being achieved through a robust programme of projects, including private finance initiatives. Project SLAM (SLA Modernisation) is the main centrally-managed initiative to upgrade accommodation across England and Wales, and is providing high-quality en-suite accommodation for all ranks, with modern, well-designed buildings and associated landscaping. Phase 1 of Project SLAM runs until the end of December 2007, and has a delivery target of 9000 bed-spaces. The intention is to deliver further improvements after that date. As well as Project SLAM, there are a number of additional projects which are delivering further upgrades to domestic and overseas Single Living Accommodation.

Additionally, we are making good progress in bringing all core stock of Service Family Accommodation in Great Britain to the highest standard, with over 55% of long-term housing already at this level. In addition, the new Housing Prime Contract, to be let later this year, will improve the maintenance, condition and servicing of over 40,000 houses in England and Wales. The Department also proposes to spend £105 million up to March 2009 to upgrade the condition of its accommodation for Service families in Cyprus, Germany and Gibraltar.

## Maritime

### Recommendation 5

**None of the four naval standing commitments in the Atlantic Ocean and east of Suez is a Cold war legacy undertaken on behalf of NATO. It is hard to see which could easily be dropped. Since the decision on which it is to be has not yet been made, it appears that the Government has decided that a specific number of commitments can be cut, without knowing which they will be. But ships are already being withdrawn. The commitments cannot be sustained if the ships are not available. We recommend that MoD announces a timetable for the decision and for withdrawal from the chosen commitments (Paragraph 44).**

The Department notes the Committee's recommendation. Over the past few months, as part of routine business to reassess tasking priorities, we have reviewed our approach to some of the Royal Navy's standing tasks and commitments. As a result, from the end of this year we will be implementing changes to three of our six Standing Tasks, with no change to the other three.

The Atlantic Patrol Task (North) provides a presence and support for the UK Overseas Territories in the Caribbean, a deployment generally needed most during the hurricane season. In the future, a destroyer or frigate will be tasked to be routinely in the Caribbean region only during the higher-risk hurricane months (July to October), with a Wave Class Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker, equipped with an aviation capability, on station for the duration of the hurricane season (May to November). These vessels will continue to contribute to the UK's counter narcotics effort in the Caribbean. In addition, from the end of this year, operational tasking to support Iraqi Naval forces in the Arabian Gulf and to provide a contribution to Global Counter Terrorism in the Indian Ocean will be carried out by a single destroyer or frigate. The decision was based on an assessment of the situation in the Indian Ocean, where other coalition forces make a contribution to Global Counter Terrorism, allowing us to share tasking. The operational situation is under constant review, and short term, focussed deployments are planned when required.

The Royal Navy will continue to be able to support simultaneously three overseas contingent operations. We will continue regularly to review Royal Navy tasking to ensure that Defence requirements are met and changes are made in accordance with Defence priorities.

### Recommendation 6

**We welcome the announcement of the Physical Integrator for the Future Aircraft Carrier as an indication that progress is being made with the procurement strategy for the future carriers. We emphasise again the importance of de-risking the project ahead of final contracts being signed. But it is equally important, particularly where the contractual arrangements are as complicated as in this case, that the responsibilities for the various elements of the programme are clearly defined and allocated. (Paragraph 56)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's continued support for the future aircraft carrier (CVF) project, specifically with respect to the recent announcement of the selection of Kellogg Brown and Root UK Ltd (KBR UK) as the preferred Physical Integrator for the

project. The selection confirms our commitment to the project and the CVF Alliance. KBR UK will now join the Department, BAE SYSTEMS and Thales UK as a participant in the Alliance. The role and responsibilities of each participant, including the Physical Integrator, will be detailed in the final Alliance Agreement. Work is continuing with the companies to define the details of this Agreement.

We continue to de-risk the project ahead of the main investment decision. Currently, a core activity for the project is the development of an optimum shipbuild strategy. KBR UK will take the lead on this work, supported by all the Alliance Participants, including the Department as the client. Ultimately, decisions will be made by all Alliance participants based on cost effectiveness and best long term value for money while taking due account of the capability, capacity and resources of UK industry. As the client, the Department has retained the right to have the final say on all work allocation and selection decisions.

#### **Recommendation 7**

**There is little evidence in Future Capabilities that MoD has factored the risks of attrition into its calculations for a number of key future equipment programmes, particularly in the maritime environment. (Paragraph 61)**

The Department does not accept the Committee's conclusion. Our planning and acquisition processes seek to provide equipments/force elements sufficient to meet the maximum number that we plan to be able to deploy at any one time, plus the number that we need to hold in the force structure to generate that deployable requirement. For some equipments, most notably fast jets, historical evidence shows that losses do occur as a result of accidents in peacetime training. In such cases, allowance for attrition losses would be made into the acquisition.

This type of attrition is not, however, routinely experienced in the maritime environment. Therefore, rather than taking an approach that assumes loss when calculating the future fleet size of warships and submarines, the issue of attrition is addressed by incorporating survivability and redundancy into warship design. While there are four examples of major warships lost in the last 30 years, all of them occurring during the Falklands conflict, the survivability of most vessels in the Falklands and subsequent operations suggests that the present approach provides the best way of delivering operational success within the finite resources available to Defence.

#### **Recommendation 8**

**We believe that Admiral West's concerns about the availability of the SSN fleet must be addressed. If there is a risk of further delays to the bringing into operational service of the Astute submarines, serious consideration should be given to postponing the withdrawal from service of HMS Superb and Trafalgar. (Paragraph 63)**

The Department notes the Committee's recommendation. The Astute programme is, however, now progressing well, with the build of the first of class, HMS Astute, proceeding to schedule. Since the restructuring of the Astute contract in February 2003, BAE SYSTEMS has achieved all project anchor milestones and the programme remains on course to deliver within its revised time and cost estimates. There are hence no grounds for delaying the planned withdrawal of HMS Superb and HMS Trafalgar from service. We will continue to monitor the situation closely.

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## Land

### **Recommendation 9**

**There are compelling arguments for ending the arms plot and we strongly endorse and welcome the decision to do so. There are, however, a number of issues relating to the practical implementation of the decision which have not yet been resolved. It is incumbent on MOD and the Army Board to provide answers to these as soon as possible. Additionally further information is required on the means by which career soldiers in two and three battalion regiments will be given a breadth of experience comparable to that they could have expected under the arms plot. (Paragraph 74).**

The Department welcomes the Committee's endorsement of the decision to end the arms plot – the process by which infantry battalions re-role and re-locate every few years. The Infantry Arms Plot no longer provides the best means of delivering operational capability: it restricts the availability of battalions; involves recurrent losses in expertise as battalions re-role; and makes career planning haphazard. It also requires frequent changes of location and is disruptive to family life. This is not practical for a modern, expeditionary Army.

In the post-arms plot era we will move largely to multi-battalion regiments, to facilitate a system of posting that provides sufficient variety for our soldiers. Work is underway to produce an individual posting and relocation policy, which will offer more diversity and broader experience than is possible under the current single battalion arms plot process

We also recognise that decisions have yet to be taken on some other issues relating to the implementation of the decision to end the arms plot, including on how best to preserve the 'golden thread' of individual regimental identities. These issues are under active consideration, and it is very important that decisions are reached in full consultation with the Regiments concerned.

### **Recommendation 10**

**We believe that it would have been helpful, both for our inquiry and for wider reassurance of the fairness of the decision-making process, if MoD had been prepared to publish not only the raw manning and recruitment statistics for individual infantry battalions but also its own analysis of those statistics. (Paragraph 76).**

The Department notes the Committee's conclusion. The Committee was provided with a graph illustrating moving trend lines, which represented a further analysis of the 'raw' manning data that we had previously submitted. This same material was used by the Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) to support its deliberations last year.

### **Recommendation 11**

**The infantry was subject to two separate processes: the first to determine the details of the restructuring of the regiments and the second to decide on where the reduction of the four infantry battalions would fall. In practice these two processes were conducted together. The Secretary of State announced both the proposed new structure for the infantry and the decisions on battalion reductions at the same time. Much public commentary has also combined these two processes, but they are distinct and the arguments for each are quite different. (Paragraph 80).**

The Department agrees with the Committee's conclusion that the changes to the infantry described are two quite separate processes. The reduction of four battalions is possible

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due to the improved security situation in Northern Ireland, coupled with the decision to end infantry battalion re-rolling (the Arms Plot). However, the intention to fix infantry battalions by role (and largely by location) will lead to individual posting rather than unit moves. This has led to the requirement to adopt a new structure of large, multi-battalion regiments to make it possible for individuals to move between battalions for role variation. Despite the different drivers for the reduction and restructuring, it was logical to consider both factors together when developing the infantry proposals.

#### **Recommendation 12**

**We regret that the Secretary of State has refused to publish the minutes of the Army Board's deliberations on the future Army structure. A more open approach, which might have demonstrated that the Army Board had arrived at its recommendations on the basis of sound and objective arguments, would have reaped significant benefits in terms of support from serving and retired members of the army for the proposals overall. (Paragraph 81)**

The Department notes the Committee's observation. We believe we have been very open and transparent throughout the process; there have been numerous debates, statements and appearances by witnesses before the Committee. We have consistently made clear our reasoning behind the decisions on restructuring. A careful balance has to be struck between the benefits of disclosure and maintaining adequate room for open discussion within the Department. We judge that to release the minutes in question would prejudice the effective formulation of Government policy, discouraging consideration of the full range of options and thereby interfering with the effective conduct of business.

#### **Recommendation 13**

**We are concerned that if the size of the Army is only just enough to man the proposed force structure a similar lack of resilience, to that experienced in the Army in the past, may be experienced in the future. (Paragraph 85).**

#### **Recommendation 14**

**If since 1998 the strains have principally been felt among the supporting elements, in the future they may be more apparent in front line units. We remain concerned that the current emphasis on expeditionary operations, on what we termed in our earlier report 'the projection of force,' risks undervaluing the continuing need to be able to deploy a presence of significant numbers of 'boots on the ground'. We have also previously expressed our concern that MoD is giving insufficient priority to the role which the Armed Forces may in the future be called upon to fulfil in respect of defence of the homeland. MoD's emphasis is on an expeditionary strategy under which the threat from international terrorism is 'dealt with at source'. (Paragraph 86)**

#### **Recommendation 15**

**We conclude that many front line units in the Army have for some years been experiencing an operational and training cycle whose intensity is unsustainable over the longer term. We are not convinced that MOD's statement of average tour intervals is an accurate or fair reflection of the strain on particular units or on individuals. The strengthening of support elements proposed in Future Capabilities is welcome and deserved, but we are concerned that the strengthening has been achieved at the expense of the total establishment of the infantry. (Paragraph 90)**

The Department does not accept the Committee's conclusion that the Army's future

force structure may lack resilience, nor does it accept that strengthening of support elements is being achieved at the expense of the infantry. The main purpose behind the move to the Future Army Structure (FAS) is to ensure a more robust and resilient force structure that is better able to conduct and sustain the expeditionary operations that our Armed Forces are most likely to face in years to come.

The Department welcomes the Committee's support for our plans under FAS to bolster key enablers, such as engineers, logisticians and intelligence operatives, without which our Armed Forces could not deploy. We are also aware of the limitations in our current methodology for assessing harmony levels; average tour intervals do not expose fully the impact on specific trades and specialisms. We are addressing this issue through the introduction of a more sophisticated method of monitoring which will report against the Army's harmony guidelines by rank, cap badge, budget area and operational pinch-point. But the greater emphasis under FAS on specialists in high demand trades will be complemented by a significant strengthening of the capability of the infantry .

The size of the infantry envisaged under the restructuring is judged to be at the right level to meet the challenges of the modern security environment. As the security situation in Northern Ireland improves, the Army's manpower requirement will reduce from around 104,000 to around 102,000; until then, we expect the strength of the Army to remain broadly as it is today. The manpower that is freed up as a result of changes in Northern Ireland will allow the infantry to regain around 500 posts, thereby reducing the need for back-filling and resulting in establishments for the remaining infantry regiments that are more robust and resilient. Furthermore, phasing out the Arms Plot will also permit us to make a much better use of the resources we have, with fewer battalions tied up in re-rolling and re-training. Overall, more infantry battalions will be routinely deployable in the future than now.

In addition to this greater availability of infantry battalions in the future, the shift under FAS from the current mix of light and heavy forces to a more balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces will give the Army more transportable forces. We will therefore be able to respond to short-notice expeditionary operations more quickly and effectively, ensuring that we can get 'boots on the ground' more rapidly and that we can respond to a wider range of possible contingencies.

Finally, the Department does not accept the Committee's conclusion that, in preparing the Armed Forces for the most likely expeditionary operations, insufficient priority is being given to the important role they will continue to play in homeland defence. We no longer face a traditional' conventional threat to the UK and would anticipate lengthy period of warning were one to develop, so current Defence policy rightly emphasises the role of the Armed Forces in supporting wider foreign and security policy objectives. But as the 2003 Defence White Paper explained, the Armed Forces contribute specific capabilities to standing home commitments and are held ready to support the civil authorities if requested to do so. The Department works closely with the Government's Civil Contingencies Secretariat to ensure a coordinated approach to domestic contingency planning, which properly reflects the lead role and responsibilities of the civil authorities and the substantial enhancements to the capability of the security and emergency services since 2001.

#### **Recommendation 16**

**We regret that disputes over the outcome of the restructuring of the infantry seem to have been fomented by the perceived lack of transparency in the Army Board's**

### **deliberations and decision-making processes. (Paragraph 93)**

The Department notes, but does not accept the Committee's views on the infantry restructuring process. A wide-ranging and detailed consultation exercise was conducted in order to inform decisions on the new infantry structure. Indeed, the outcome of the restructuring reflected what was put forward by each Infantry Division: neither the Department nor the Army imposed a solution.

### **Recommendation 17**

**We urge the Army Board to bring forward recommendations on measures to maintain the 'golden thread' of regimental heritage, as soon as possible. The identity of individual regiments is derived from more than just cap badges. It depends rather on a complex fabric of related elements. As well as the range of local links and the matter of accoutrements, these include issues such as museums, recruitment and the siting of headquarters. How these are to be preserved is still unclear, but that preservation will be central to the successful implementation of the future infantry structure. (Paragraph 95).**

The Department notes the points made by the Committee; indeed, maintaining the 'golden threads' of antecedent regiments has been a guiding principle throughout the restructuring process. Although the new regiments, created by bringing together antecedent single battalion regiments, will wear a common capbadge and uniform, we are confident that individual battalions will be able to retain a level of personal identity to provide continuity alongside a more sustainable structure for the future.

The antecedent regiments themselves will play a pivotal role in determining how best to maintain their heritage within the new regimental structure. Committees have been formed for each of the new regiments, and will consider, amongst other issues, dress and regimental assets. The future of Infantry Regimental Headquarters will be considered separately.

### **Recommendation 18**

**We recommend the MOD sets out its proposals for the long term military commitment in Cyprus, including the purpose of that commitment and the force levels required to sustain it, in its response to this report. (Paragraph 99)**

The Department accepts the Committee's recommendation. The Department has recently completed a review of its long-term military requirements in Cyprus. The Department has concluded that the Sovereign Base Areas remain of strategic significance, and that force levels will therefore remain as they are at present.

### **Recommendation 19**

**The increase in military capability, derived from the whole package of proposals for the future of the army structure, will be delivered as much by the reinvestment of the lost infantry posts into more robust unit establishments and 'hard-pressed pinch point areas' as by the ending of the arms plot. (Paragraph 103)**

The Department notes the Committee's assessment of the benefits that the elements of the implementation of the Future Army Structure (FAS) will bring. FAS will ensure that we get far more military capability out of the resources we have. Under the Arms Plot, as many as 11 battalions in the current order of battle are likely to move location, re-train or

re-role during any 12 month period. At any one time, as many as seven may be unavailable for operations. This is simply not efficient. Ending the Arms Plot will mean that many more of the 36 infantry battalions we will have in the future will be available to deploy on operations at any given time.

Our capability will be further enhanced by the reinvestment of posts into the enabling elements such as engineers, logisticians and intelligence operatives, without whom our combat forces could not operate and who have been in the greatest demand on all types of expeditionary operations. FAS also means that each deployable brigade will be fully manned and have its own integral enablers. This will be crucial in achieving the sustainable expeditionary capability that the changing strategic environment dictates.

#### **Recommendation 20**

**We support the Secretary of State's proposals for retaining Challenger tanks following the re-rolling of the brigades. The combination of the unpredictability of future military operations and the proven value of the Challenger 2 would, in our view, make any decision to dispose permanently of a significant number of them, before the introduction of an effective and proven medium weight capability, foolhardy. (Paragraph 110)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's endorsement of the Defence Secretary's decision to retain the great majority of Challenger 2 (CR2) tanks following the re-rolling of the brigades. The effectiveness of the CR2 has been demonstrated during operations in Iraq, and will remain one of the building blocks of the Army's heavy capability as it moves to the Future Army Structure (FAS).

#### **Recommendation 21**

**We conclude that the decision to re-role one armoured brigade to medium (and the consequential re-rolling of a medium brigade to light) is consistent with the experience of recent operations and the assessment of the future security environment in Delivering Security, but that assessment also identified the requirement for a medium weight capability. We are concerned that even the initial delivery of the equipment to provide that medium weight capability (ie FRES) will not take place for some years after the re-rolling of the brigades. (Paragraph 112)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's endorsement of plans to develop a medium weight capability. The Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) will underpin the balanced force that the Future Army Structure (FAS) will bring into being by replacing a range of ageing armoured fighting vehicles, whilst at the same time meeting the future medium weight requirement. We are committed to moving forward expeditiously with this key programme. In the meantime, we are planning on the incremental development of an interim medium weight capability, using existing vehicles where appropriate.

The Committee should be aware that the number of 'medium' (or, currently, mechanised) brigades will not change as a consequence of the re-rolling; the net effect will be to re-balance our forces by increasing to three the number of light brigades (including the Air Assault and Commando brigades), at the expense of a 'heavy' (armoured) brigade.

#### **Recommendation 22**

**If FRES encounters significant further difficulties or delays the Army will have no choice but to acquire new, currently available, vehicles to replace the existing**

### **outdated and increasingly unserviceable fleet. (Paragraph 114)**

The Department notes the Committee's concerns. Although replacement of vehicles in our current armoured fleet is an important aspect of the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) programme, it is only one driver for the project. FRES will also provide a major part of a rapidly deployable medium weight capability for the future. This capability must have sufficient growth potential to enable it to accept upgrades throughout its life as technology develops. There is no armoured vehicle currently available that meets this requirement.

The current planning assumption is that initial FRES variants will be introduced into service early in the next decade. The relative value for money and risk of the various options available for FRES are being considered carefully during the initial Assessment Phase and will be important considerations at Main Gate. When the risk management work of the Assessment Phase is complete, the Department will be better placed to balance the competing requirements of replacing the existing, outdated fleet and procuring a medium weight capability for the future.

## **Air**

### **Recommendation 23**

**If, as now seems the case, MoD is content to pay off the Jaguars two years before their replacement, because upgrades to the Tornado F3 and Harrier (including the Storm Shadow, Brimstone and Maverick missile systems) have considerably enhanced their capability, is a new aircraft to replace the Jaguar necessary? (Paragraph 122)**

The Department does not accept that the decision to bring forward the out-of-service date for Jaguar calls into question decisions on future aircraft numbers and fleets. Typhoon represents a step change in capability beyond the legacy systems that it is due to replace. It is due to replace not only Jaguar capabilities but Tornado F3 as well.

The decision to bring forward the out-of-service date for Jaguar was taken in the light of a revised requirement for deployable fast jet aircraft and reflects the enhanced capability of Tornado GR4 (it is Tornado GR4 rather than F3, our primary air defence aircraft, that has received an upgrade) and Harrier GR9, and the initial offensive support capability of Typhoon.

In the first instance, Typhoon will be primarily engaged in the air defence role, replacing the Tornado F3. The incremental introduction of a full range of capabilities will make it a multi-role aircraft, fully able to take on the offensive support role. Enhancements to the Harrier GR9, including the fitting of Brimstone and Maverick missile systems, will further improve our offensive support capabilities.

### **Recommendation 24**

**The capabilities of the Typhoon will be fully demonstrated as it begins to enter service and as, at some point, it sees operational action. If, however, it delivers its advertised capabilities, it will clearly represent a very significant increase in the firepower available to the RAF. (Paragraph 123)**

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The Department welcomes the Committee's recognition of the planned capabilities of Typhoon and the impact this will have on the effectiveness of the RAF. We are working closely with industry to manage the introduction of the range of Typhoon capabilities in a timely fashion. Signature in December 2004 of the Tranche 2 contract represented further important progress towards this goal. Under this contract, the RAF is due to receive a further 89 aircraft.

Typhoon will provide the RAF with an exceptional weapons system, which will be the cornerstone of its future fighting capability. Recent operations have continued to demonstrate the vital role of air power on the modern battlefield. In multi-role Typhoon we will have a system capable of delivering this requirement into the future as new threats emerge.

**Recommendation 25**

**We note that 'substantial progress' has been made to identify ways of reducing the weight of the STOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, but that has been at the expense of a two year delay to the programme. And it seems that there may well be further delays. (Paragraph 129)**

**Recommendation 26**

**We recommend that MoD sets out in its reply to this report when it now expects the first JSF-equipped future carrier to be operational. (Paragraph 130)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's support for the substantial progress made within the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project – which will meet the UK's Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement - in tackling the issue of weight growth. The UK continues to play a very active part in the team established by the JSF Programme Office and Lockheed Martin to mitigate excess aircraft weight. The weight mitigation work has identified the required weight savings, and we remain confident that this issue will not cause further delays to the programme.

The intention is to introduce the JCA progressively onto the future carriers in order to de-risk the integration of the various complex elements of the Carrier Strike capability. We expect to be taking delivery of the aircraft from 2011 and that the first JCA-equipped future carrier will be operational from 2014.

**Recommendation 27**

**We welcome the announcement in *Future Capabilities* that the four currently leased C-17s and a fifth will be purchased. (Paragraph 131)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's support for our investment in the C-17 aircraft. C-17s make an extremely valuable contribution to Defence. Purchasing the leased assets and adding a fifth C-17 to the fleet will enable us to enhance the essential lift capability they provide for operations.

The C-17s are very effective in quickly delivering heavy equipment, vehicles and troops directly to the operational theatre. Operations in Iraq proved the value of our current four C-17s for rapid and assured deployment; they added considerable capacity and deployed a large proportion of the personnel and stores required to travel by air to the Gulf. Their capability was also demonstrated in Afghanistan, where they were successfully used to drop humanitarian aid to large numbers of displaced persons across the country.

### **Recommendation 28**

**Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) is an essential enabler to extend the range and endurance on station of combat aircraft in attack and defence and is already in short supply in coalition operations. Carrier based expeditionary operations will be severely constrained without access to AAR. We are encouraged that a decision on the Preferred Bidder for FSTA has finally been taken, but we are concerned at the amount of work which still remains to be done before a final decision to proceed will be taken. (Paragraph 133)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's support for the decision taken on Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA). The bid from AirTanker Ltd was judged to offer the best prospective value for money solution to the FSTA requirement and single bidder negotiations are now being pursued. The aim is to conclude the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract as soon as possible, but the project is the highest value PFI to be considered by the Department to date, and it is also a complex project with a number of unique aspects that set it aside from other more typical PFI deals. The Committee will therefore understand why care is being taken to ensure that all the issues associated with the provision of the PFI service are considered and agreed between the Department and AirTanker, before the contract is concluded.

We are working to ensure that the build-up of the FSTA fleet integrates smoothly with the planned withdrawal from service of the current air-to-air refuelling VC10 and Tristar fleets.

### **Recommendation 29**

**We are concerned that the significant reductions in RAF manning in the short term ignore a predictable increased requirement in the medium to longer term, with the effect that a short term gain may undermine longer term resilience. (Paragraph 137)**

The Department does not accept this conclusion. The Department is not predicting an increased requirement for RAF manpower in the medium to longer term. New equipment, estate rationalisation, improvements in logistics provision and the introduction of the Joint Personnel Administration system, together with new initiatives such as multi-skilling and new support procedures which mean that fewer engineers will be required to support new aircraft entering service will all enable us to maintain or enhance our capability with fewer people.

Furthermore, our planning assumptions have already taken into account the need to generate sufficient combat ready crews and the training requirement to accommodate the transition to Typhoon. It is not correct to imply, as the report does, that this has somehow been overlooked.

### **Recommendation 30**

**We are concerned that the recognition in Future Capabilities of the operational value of helicopters does not seem to be matched by the priority or urgency which MoD gives to their future procurement plans. (Paragraph 143)**

The Department does not accept this conclusion. The Department fully recognises the operational value of helicopters, and is investing considerable effort and resources in the Future Rotorcraft Capability (FRC) programme – some £3 billion over 10 years. We expect the FRC programme to provide significant improvements in how we support our

helicopter fleet, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. It will ensure that we can provide an enhanced capability that is both coherent and cost effective.

Significant progress has been made on the FRC programme in recent months. First, a Heads of Agreement deal has been signed with Agusta Westland, committing us to exploring the possibility of working together towards a long-term partnering and business transformation arrangement. Second, we have announced that the Future Lynx project is the preferred procurement option for meeting some of our requirements of FRC. The Future Lynx project has already benefited from extensive assessment work and de-risking and we believe that it represents a highly capable, value for money solution to our requirement. We expect to reach a main gate investment decision later this year, subject to continuing negotiations to agree acceptable contract conditions and prices. The contract is potentially worth over £1 billion.

## **Network Enabled Capability**

### **Recommendation 31**

**We welcome the commitment of MoD and the Armed Forces to the successful introduction of Bowman. Recent operational experience has demonstrated the Army's need for a modern communications system. If MoD's ambitions for Network Enabled Capability are to be realised, the effective and timely introduction of the programmes which will support NEC is essential. (Paragraph 149)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's acknowledgment of our commitment to the successful introduction of Bowman. The continuing good progress on the implementation of Bowman was demonstrated by the deployment of a core capability to Iraq with 12 Mechanised Brigade in April 2005. We continue to work closely with industry to achieve the delivery of the full Bowman capability needed to support the realisation of NEC objectives. Bowman will be a key enabler for the UK's Network Enabled Capability (NEC), alongside other new communications and information systems such as CORMORANT - delivering the theatre-wide area communications network for voice and data for deployed forces, and SKYNET 5 - providing a strategic long range communications service, both of which are already in service. We will continue to work to ensure the timely introduction of future NEC programmes to enable us to realise our full ambitions for Network Enabled Capability.

### **Recommendation 32**

**Despite the efforts made to move to a more joint procurement process, the principal items of network enabling equipment due to become available in the next few years still seem to bear the hallmarks of single Service procurement. We recommend that MOD sets out in its response to this report how it plans to move from the connectivity of communication and surveillance programmes to their integration by 2015. (Paragraph 150)**

The Department does not agree that the principal Network Enabled Capability (NEC) programmes coming into service in the next few years 'bear the hallmarks of single Service procurement', although we do see the full integration of these programmes as a priority. The three phases in our concept of NEC - connectivity, integration, and synchronisation - acknowledge that the requirements for programmes now coming into service (such as CORMORANT and Bowman) pre-dated NEC, which is why we have allowed for a period of integration.

During the integration phase we will direct resources to ensure that programmes are networked in a manner that achieves maximum effect at the front line. To help us do this we are currently conducting research to indicate where our investment priorities should lie and where resources can be best utilised. We have put in place initiatives such as NITEworks, a joint MOD/Industry experimentation facility, and an Integration Authority to help us to do this.

### **Recommendation 33**

**If MoD is to exploit NEC both as a central element in the transformation of the Armed Forces and as a contribution to its strategic objective of bringing 'real weight' to large scale US-led operations, it will need not only to ensure that adequate resources continue to be devoted to it but also to develop a coherent and joint doctrinal framework, compatible with that of the United States, without which it will not be possible to realise the benefits of fully integrated NEC. (Paragraph 152)**

The Department agrees with the Committee's recommendation. Indeed, the UK remains fully engaged with the United States at all levels and this dialogue ensures that the UK, US and NATO perspectives on Network Enabled Capability (NEC) remain consistent. The UK is currently engaged with the US Office of Force Transformation on operational case study work, which will shape the future direction of NEC development in both the UK and the United States and help to maintain a coherent approach.

## **Support and Logistics**

### **Recommendation 34**

**The end-to-end logistics review identified a range of major changes with the aim of improving logistic effectiveness and securing substantial efficiency gains. Although MoD appears to be making progress in implementing the review, we note that future improvements will be dependent on the continuing achievement of efficiency targets. We recommend that MoD sets out a timetable for the full implementation of the review. (Paragraph 157)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's acknowledgement of progress in this important area. The End to End logistics review was combined with the DLO Change Programme on 1 April 04 to form the Defence Logistics Transformation Programme (DLTP). This merger brings together a single timetable of logistics transformation activity across Defence aimed at delivering savings in excess of £1bn by 08/09. We continue to press on with the implementation of this programme.

The ultimate aim of the programme is to provide more flexible logistics support to the Armed Forces. Specifically, the programme will deliver over the four year period:

- simplified end-to-end processes from 'foxhole to factory', with demand driven by the operational commanders and users;
- support optimised to enable 'effects-based operations', achieving the desired effect with fewer resources;

- improved force-level readiness and sustainability;
- consistent and improved supply chain performance;
- improved platform reliability, availability and sustainability;
- ‘lean repair loops’ – improved turn-round times and reduced spares holdings;
- the introduction of a performance-based regime against which we can measure success and sustain the process of continuous improvement.

### **Recommendation 35**

**We note that there are a range of programmes and initiatives in the logistics area which are expected to deliver substantial efficiency savings. However, we are concerned that only some of these will be re-invested in logistics and to hear that ‘life in the logistics area will not get easier’. We have previously noted that the measures to strengthen logistic support for land forces, by providing additional personnel, are to be resourced by reductions in infantry numbers. Given the crucial role of logistics and the shortcomings noted in recent operations, we are concerned that MoD is continuing to resource the total logistics effort in a piecemeal rather than a holistic manner. (Paragraph 162)**

The Department disagrees with the Committee’s assertion that logistics is being funded in a piecemeal rather than holistic fashion. The Defence Logistics Transformation Programme (DLTP) brings together a single programme of logistics transformation to provide properly-resourced, prioritised investment whilst at the same time delivering efficiency savings. Underlying improvements to the way in which we deliver logistics capability will free up resources for re-investment in a number of priority areas for Defence, of which logistics itself is an important one.

There is a need to put the DLTP leader’s remark that ‘life in the logistics area will not get easier’ into its proper context. To the extent that we will continue to set demanding targets for effectiveness and efficiency in logistics support, this is indeed the case. These targets have, however, a crucial part to play in driving the delivery of the more flexible and improved logistics support the Armed Forces require.

### **Recommendation 36**

**We find it surprising, given the substantial investment to create a state-of-the-art aircraft repair facility at DARA St Athan, that MoD has announced that support of Tornado GR4 aircraft will be moved to the Main Operating Base at RAF Marham. We expect MoD to work closely with all interested parties to ensure that DARA St Athan has a future and we expect MoD to keep this Committee informed of the current study reviewing the strategic options for the future of DARA St Athan. (Paragraph 179)**

The Department notes the Committee’s recommendation. The decision to concentrate on-aircraft support of the Tornado GR4 ‘forward’ at Marham was based on comprehensive analysis of the most cost-efficient solution for maintaining the aircraft, including a full comparison of investment options for both Defence Aviation Repair Agency (DARA) St Athan and RAF Marham.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces made clear, in announcing his decision on the depth support of fixed wing aircraft on 25 November 2004, that this would have significant

implications for DARA as a whole and that, in particular, the currently envisaged workload would not be sufficient to sustain the Red Dragon facility at St Athan on an economic and viable basis after 2009 if no alternative work could be found. Since the announcement, we have continued to work closely with all interested parties to explore alternative options for the use of the Red Dragon facility.

#### **Recommendation 37**

**We are aware that the revision and concentration of Tornado maintenance in the RAF was driven by a need to reduce both costs and manpower, as well as to improve procedural efficiency. If these drivers are not to have an adverse impact on operational effectiveness, the new arrangements at RAF Marham will need to match, if not exceed, the high standards set by the skilled workers at DARA St Athan. We expect MoD to monitor this closely. (Paragraph 180)**

The Department acknowledges the Committee's recommendation. The high standards set by RAF tradesmen at both RAF Marham and those transferring in from RAF Lossiemouth will remain subject to exacting Quality control measures. As part of the Defence Logistics Organisation's (DLO) transformation process, the Tornado project team is seeking to agree a series of partnered support solutions with two prime contractors, BAE Systems and Rolls Royce Defence Aerospace. One such proposed contract, the Tornado GR4 Combined Maintenance and Upgrade programme will, if awarded, provide a further layer of Quality scrutiny of RAF technicians from the aircraft Design Authority. A further benefit of the new arrangements is that the skill-of-hand techniques required for deep-strip of aircraft will enhance the capabilities of those technicians subsequently deployed in support of first-line maintenance, providing a positive impact on operational effectiveness.

#### **Recommendation 38**

**We find it of real concern that if problems are experienced at RAF Marham, MoD may be dependent upon the original manufacturer of the aircraft to undertake repairs. One of the reasons why DARA was created in the first place was to provide 'assured access to repair capabilities and a capacity for surge workloads in times of crisis'. It is not apparent how the proposed arrangements at RAF Marham will meet this requirement. (Paragraph 181)**

The Department notes the Committee's conclusion, but we would continue to have a number of ways of handling surge workloads in times of crisis. Those options include, in the short-term, increasing RAF labour productivity through reprioritisation of tasks, reduction of leave or training or an increase in working hours. For sustained periods of surge, we will continue to be able to use the existing arrangements that allow the use of approved aircraft maintenance organisations.

RAF mechanical aircraft technicians learn during basic training the skill-of-hand techniques required to undertake aircraft repairs. Refresher courses are available and those personnel who are required to undertake the most demanding of structural repairs attend longer pre-employment training courses. Many structural repairs can be undertaken by any skilled tradesmen and the Forward Support (Fixed Wing) organisation is already established to undertake the most technically demanding of repairs. As with the current system, where repair capabilities are required in the future, the Design Authority will provide advice and our technicians will carry out the repair.

### **Recommendation 39**

**A key logistics lesson identified from Operation Telic was the need for a robust system to track equipment and stocks both into and within theatre. MoD is now investing in a system to deliver an 'in-transit visibility system to help us from the deployed location to the front-line'. However, it is disappointing that MoD could not assure us that such a system would be fully functioning by 2007. We look to MoD to set out a clear timetable for the early introduction of the system, and to ensure that the required number of personnel with the appropriate training are available to operate the asset tracking system. (Paragraph 187)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's acknowledgement of our investment in asset tracking. We are making significant progress on the development of this capability to enable us better to track stocks into and within theatre, through a combination of improvements to existing Information Systems, the introduction of new capability, and a rationalisation of business processes. Learning from problems we have encountered in the past, our method now is one of evolution and risk reduction rather than a 'revolutionary' approach. Importantly, the development of this capability for all three Services has been brought into a single programme with a single Senior Responsible Officer. We anticipate that a comprehensive system will be in place by the end of 2006 with work completing in 2007. Work continues with considerable urgency to deliver the full capability, mindful of the need to ensure that risk is sensibly managed and that value for money is assured.

Turning to individual elements, in the area of consignment tracking we have made several significant improvements to our core systems. In particular, we have allocated resources to retain the Total Asset Visibility capability, an in-transit visibility system, procured as an Urgent Operational Requirement for operations in Iraq. We have also integrated VITAL, one of the core tracking systems, with deployed inventory management systems. This is a key improvement, which delivers improved visibility of stocks in the deployed space and reduces the workload for the troops who operate these systems. Further improvements to the VITAL system are planned.

We have also taken steps to improve policy, doctrine and training. Policy and doctrine have been improved to make it easier for troops to understand what they need to do to contribute to asset visibility. A range of improvements have also been made to courses at the Service schools, to enhance the training on asset tracking systems that we provide.

Future improvements will include enhancements to systems for the Management of Joint Deployed Inventory, extending their coverage to ensure visibility of stocks much closer to the front line. It is planned that the improved system will be rolled out in mid 2006. Finally, a new system, Management of Materiel in Transit is currently being designed. This system will deliver the capability to monitor and facilitate the effective control of materiel in transit through the Supply Chain. The Initial Operating Capability for this system is planned to be rolled out in the second quarter of 2006.

## **Operating with Allies**

### **Recommendation 40**

**We support MoD's determination to maintain a strong defence relationship with the United States. We note the assumption that the most complex large scale operations will only be conducted as part of a US-led coalition. It will be important to ensure**

**that the Armed Forces's commitment to maintaining a capability for large scale operations is strengthened by this assumption. (Paragraph 193)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's endorsement of the requirement for a close defence relationship with the United States. As the 'Future Capabilities' Command Paper sets out, significant investment is planned in capabilities which are of the most value in Deliberate Intervention operations, where significant combat power may be required to defeat or destroy an adversary. Specifically this will include investment in Special Forces; a range of Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets, developing our own network and integrating with the US network; amphibious and Carrier Strike task groups; an air expeditionary task force capable of both long-range strike and support to land operations; and a land manoeuvre division capable of conducting offensive operations.

#### **Recommendation 41**

**We are encouraged by the progress NATO has made since the 2002 Prague Summit. We welcome the declaration of Initial Operating Capability of the NATO Response Force. We note the Secretary of State's belief that in some areas NATO is still wedded to Cold War structures and tasks. We recommend that the Government makes the pursuit of continuing NATO transformation a key priority. (Paragraph 204)**

The Department agrees that the continuing pursuit of the modernisation of NATO remains a key priority. As the Committee recognises, NATO has made good progress since the Prague Summit in 2002 in transforming its capabilities through initiatives such as the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of its military command structures.

However, more needs to be done if we are to ensure that NATO remains able to adapt to a changing international security environment. There is a particular need for a comprehensive modernisation package which addresses headquarters reform, improved political dialogue and decision-making, force generation, and greater coherence in budgetary and resource processes to ensure that NATO remains in a strong position to act quickly when new challenges arise.

The Government therefore welcomes the NATO Secretary-General's current initiative which is looking at extending the transformation process to the central administration and management of the Alliance. We see this work as a high priority, and are working with Allies to ensure that the Secretary-General is given the full support he needs in driving this important programme forward.

#### **Recommendation 42**

**Whatever the UN's perceived shortcomings in recent years it is in the UK's interests to promote its reform in line with the recommendations of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. MOD must play its part in that effort. (Paragraph 209)**

The Department welcomes the Committee's support for the recommendations of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Those recommendations were subsequently taken forward in the UN Secretary General's report "In Larger Freedom"

which was itself warmly welcomed by the UK Government . The Department is studying the Secretary General's report carefully and is contributing to a consolidated Government response. This work is in addition to that already being undertaken by the Department in support of UN reform.

The UK has since 2000 been playing a full part in the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations designed to improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. A rolling "UK Action Plan", funded through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and jointly managed by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence, currently includes the following priorities:

- Improve integrated planning and management to ensure coherence between peacekeeping and UN development and humanitarian agencies efforts;
- Ensure UN missions have robust mandates and include strategies for at least five years;
- Improve UN rapid deployment, including through the development of a leadership in UN missions;
- Increase the pool of trained military personnel, police and other civilian staff;
- Ensure better EU/UN/African Union co-operation to deliver effective peacekeeping in Africa;
- Assist the UN and Troop Contributing Countries to put in place effective policies and mechanisms to prevent and redress sexual misconduct by peacekeepers.

## Conclusion

### Recommendation 43

**Historically the Armed Forces have had difficulty recruiting to the full manning levels. Failure to do so in the future could seriously undermine the sustainability of the force structure set out in Future Capabilities. The MOD needs to recognise that, under its proposals, there will be very little, if any, fat left in the Armed Forces manning figures. Full recruitment will be a necessity rather than an aspiration. (Paragraph 218)**

The Department notes the Committee's conclusion. The aim of our force structure changes is to ensure the Armed Forces are better structured for the pattern of operations we are likely to face in the future, thereby making them more robust and resilient. Our future manpower requirement reflects these changes to our force structure, together with improvements to the way the Armed Forces will be supported. Recruiting at the right levels and retaining our people will, of course, remain central to our future manpower strategy. We firmly believe that the modern, flexible Armed Forces we are developing will continue to offer a variety of very worthwhile and highly rewarding careers.

## Capability gaps

### Recommendation 44

**The Future Capabilities proposals have been driven by a particular vision of future operational requirements. It may take another decade before the capabilities to deliver those requirements are in place. In the meantime equipment withdrawals and personnel reductions may leave gaps in capability. Those gaps, in turn, may create risks. Some of those risks, in our view, need not have been taken. (Paragraph 219)**

The Department does not accept the Committee's conclusions. Our force structure

is designed to ensure we have the capabilities required to achieve the full range of Military Tasks. As a consequence, our emphasis is on restructuring the Armed Forces to increase their flexibility and resilience in order to be ready to meet the most likely operational demands of the future. In some areas, such as anti-submarine warfare and air defence, there is already a reduced level of threat. In others, for example the introduction of the current generation of precision weapons to our offensive air capability, new technology has dramatically improved capability. Taken together, these changes have allowed us to reconfigure the platforms or units we hold now. In other areas, such as medium weight capability, we are adapting the existing force structure to deliver better capability now, while recognising that it will not be fully optimised until the introduction of new equipment. Over the longer term, we aim to take advantage of new technology and equipment to achieve the full range of military effects we are seeking more efficiently and effectively. It would therefore be very wrong to suggest that the force structure changes we are now implementing risk creating gaps which will not be filled until new capabilities emerge.

## Narrow vision

### Recommendation 45

**The longer term vision is for an expeditionary, high-intensity and network-enabled package of forces, capable of contributing ‘real weight’ and thus influence to US-led operations. Its achievement depends on the timely delivery of a range of new and sometimes unproven equipment programmes. We believe that that vision takes a somewhat narrow perspective on the range of demands which our Armed Forces might be expected to meet in the future. The decision to commit the Armed Forces to the realisation of that vision is a demonstration of the Government’s confidence in the enduring relevance of the analysis of the future international security environment in *Delivering Security*. (Paragraph 220)**

The Department does not accept the Committee’s conclusion. The vision as set out in this conclusion would indeed be narrow, but it is not the one set out in the *Future Capabilities* Command Paper or the 2003 Defence White Paper. The security environment of the 21st century is characterised by uncertainty and our force structure and future capabilities have been designed accordingly: to be flexible and adaptable. While at one end of the spectrum our forces will be capable of high intensity intervention operations alongside the US, the emphasis for the future will be on capabilities which also contribute to a wider range of military tasks, including enduring peace enforcement and peace keeping operations. The inherent flexibility and adaptability of the Armed Forces will, therefore, be enhanced by the changes now underway.







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