


# Commercial mitigation of imbalance risk DECC workshop 12 April 2013

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# Introduction

- We have identified a number of options to treat imbalance risk commercially (both through changes to market rules and regulatory interventions)
- Dealing with imbalance risk depends on the chosen route to market. We have identified seven options
- Choice of route will be determined by:
  - size (e.g. licence thresholds)
  - wider business context
  - appetite for risk
  - ability and desire to access other sources of value (e.g. embedded and trading benefits)
  - regulatory rules (e.g. FiT bands)



















































































# Options in summary

- Four broad types
  - informational remedies
  - regulatory interventions
  - rules changes
  - improving market access and routes to market
- They are not mutually exclusive
  - some can be (and might need to be) combined
- At this stage a bit abstract
  - needs a clear assessment of the detriment - Baringa are doing this
  - so only preliminary views at this stage
- Mott MacDonald are also looking at technical mitigations

# Assessment criteria

- Preliminary assessment against several criteria:
  - imbalance risk reduction
  - impact on system efficiency
  - competitive effects, including impact on end user prices
  - improvement to investor confidence
  - consistency with other stated objectives (EMR, liquidity and cash-out)
  - finally, complexity and ease of implementation
- Are these the right criteria?
- Are some more important than others?

# Preliminary assessment

Classification	Options	Imbalance risk reduction	Improve-ment to system efficiency	Impact on competition	Improve investor confidence	Consistent with EMR aims	Consistent with liquidity aims	Consistent with cash-out aims	Complexity	Implementation
Information remedies	Standard offtake contracts									
	Information hub									
	Guidance on allocation									
Regulatory interventions	Obligation for suppliers to offer terms									
Contractual interventions	Imbalance risk indexation									
Varying/ improving access to existing markets	Green electricity market									
	Licence-lite supply									
	Changing Gate Closure									
	Allowing netting of generation and demand									

# Standard offtake contracts

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standard terms and other key commercial parameters in the contract could be designed for PPAs and offtakers.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transaction costs would be reduced (legal fees, time required).</li> <li>Simplification of negotiations.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The mechanism could be administered by government or Ofgem.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Could improve overall efficiency and reduce costs to consumer.</li> <li>Low cost to implement.</li> </ul>

# Guidance on risk allocation

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Publication of guidance document or code of practice on imbalance risk allocation.</li> <li>▪ Details of technologies and project sizes where particular imbalance.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Financial impact dependent on strategy of generator.</li> <li>▪ Simplification of negotiations.</li> <li>▪ Better understanding of managing imbalance risks.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mandatory through Ofgem or voluntary (good practice) through a trade association.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased transparency could benefit generators and other stakeholders.</li> <li>▪ Low cost to implement.</li> </ul>

# Obligation on suppliers to offer terms

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Require suppliers to offer PPA terms in certain circumstances.</li> <li>▪ Could be minimum requirements (e.g. contract duration, change of law provisions).</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased competition for generators.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Implemented through a supplier licence condition.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ It is not clear if generators would be more likely to obtain an economically viable PPA.</li> <li>▪ Suppliers may question the efficacy of the licence condition.</li> </ul>




# Imbalance risk indexation

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ E.ON UK proposal – SPAM.</li> <li>▪ Set the CfD strike price based on the current average cost of balancing and adjust each year using a balancing index.</li> <li>▪ One index per technology.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mitigates long-term imbalance uncertainty.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government, through CfD FiT design.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improves investor confidence but complex and unknown costs.</li> <li>▪ Not obvious it would spur PPA market.</li> </ul>

# Realising value

## Unit electricity costs 2013-14 industrial user

(HH meter, HV connection)



# Licence-lite supply

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Junior supply licence without being direct party to industry codes.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Allows generator to access retail rates without having to invest in systems to comply with codes.</li> <li>▪ Senior supplier would manage imbalance.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ofgem introduced changes to supply licence in March 2009 to allow for licence-lite, but it has only be defined at high level.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Potential to increase competition by opening up innovative supply solutions.</li> <li>▪ Facilitates consolidated balancing.</li> <li>▪ Greater London Authority has recently applied for licence-lite supply licence – work should happen anyway.</li> </ul>

# A different consolidation model?

- Provide a competitive route to market for community projects
- Framework contract with preferred provider(s) based on public sector energy procurement:
  - use consolidation and expertise to maximise benefits available to generators
- Fixed period and standard terms, joining windows for new projects:
  - SSP until e.g. 1 April or 1 October, then join
- Bespoke pricing based on wholesale markets at each joining window:
  - permit choice of selling strategies/ technology types
  - governance and reporting arrangements for transparency

# Green electricity market

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Power auctioned on an organised platform on a rolling basis.</li> <li>▪ e.g. GPAM, based on current NFPA e-Power auctions.</li> <li>▪ CfD reference price could be price achieved in auction.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Generators would benefit from route to market with reduced basis risk.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government, through powers sought in the <i>Energy Bill</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Route to power for suppliers and liquidity benefits.</li> <li>▪ Increased investor confidence.</li> <li>▪ <b>Cost of balancing is priced into auction results, but does this create the right incentives?</b></li> </ul>

# Emerging conclusions

- Many possible ways to mitigate balancing risk through contracts or rule changes
- Two key variables:
  - definition of problem and its quantum
  - which assessment criteria are most important
- Informational remedies are no regrets and “fit” with need to educate concerning EMR and to manage the transition
  - no reason why good practice cannot be defined and disseminated
- On-going work on balancing SCR and licence-lite?
- There are more extensive interventions, if they are considered proportionate to scale of problem
- Don't forget different business/ financing models

# Reference slides

# Assessment of all options

Classification	Options	Imbalance risk reduction	Improvement to system efficiency	Impact on competition	Improve investor confidence	Consistent with EMR aims	Consistent with liquidity aims	Consistent with cash-out aims	Complexity	Implementation
Information remedies	Standard offtake contracts	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Information hub	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Guidance on allocation	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Regulatory interventions	Standardised imbalance risk sharing	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Obligation for suppliers to offer terms	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Capping imbalance price	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	De minimis balancing provision	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Banded imbalance charges	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Contractual interventions	Imbalance risk indexation	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	CfD strike price re-opener	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Varying/ improving access to existing markets	Green electricity market	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Licence-lite supply	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Extending fixed F1 threshold	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Changing Gate Closure	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Allowing netting of generation and demand	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Information imbalance charge	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Centralised renewables market	Centralised renewables market	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●



# Information hub

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development of publically-available information in a centralised hub.</li> <li>▪ data and information can currently be found on Elexon and National Grid websites.</li> <li>▪ potential to share more real-time system balance data and price information with the market.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Of itself this option does not provide mitigation of imbalance risk.</li> <li>▪ It could be introduced in combination with standard offtake contract and guidance on risk allocation options.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Suppliers could be asked to develop and maintain. site as alternative to more radical interventions.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased data and information should help all market participants.</li> </ul>

# Standardised imbalance risk sharing

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standard imbalance risk sharing practices for generators and suppliers.</li> <li>Backstop measure supporting standardised offtake contracts and guidance on imbalance risk allocation.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This measures should result in an improvement of terms for generators.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implemented through a new licence condition for suppliers.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Should result in financial benefit for consumers by lowering overall premia for imbalance costs.</li> <li>Would this introduce greater rigidity?</li> </ul>

# Capping imbalance price

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Set a limit on maximum liability a generator faces through electricity cash-out process.</li> <li>▪ The cap could be set at a maximum charge/MWh in a HH period or at a % above wholesale market price.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Generator would be protected from extreme cash-out prices.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Implemented through BSC modification and formal consultation.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Depending on how costs of balancing are recovered, the costs for other participants could increase.</li> <li>▪ Government has stated throughout EMR that cash-out processes should reflect costs incurred to balance system.</li> </ul>

# De minimis balancing provision

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Participants that are out of balance (in either direction) to a defined level would not face energy imbalance charges.</li> <li>▪ Could be set at MWh or fixed percentage</li> <li>▪ Tolerance band would be for all technologies.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ All generators benefit equally. In proportionate terms, smaller generators may see greater benefit.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Implemented through BSC modification and formal consultation.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Suppliers and aggregators will see lower risks from dealing with generators but some consolidation value could reduce.</li> <li>▪ Cash-out prices may not reflect costs incurred to balance system.</li> </ul>

# Banded imbalance charges

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Two (or more) bands for imbalance charges in tiered approach.</li> <li>Lower band would set charge for participants that are out of balance by up to a given proportion; imbalance above this band will be charged at higher rate.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All generators benefit equally. In proportionate terms, smaller generators may see greater benefit.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implemented through BSC modification and formal consultation.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>imbalance charges for those further out of balance than the low band would be exposed to higher prices.</li> <li>Cash-out prices may not reflect costs incurred to balance system.</li> </ul>

# CfD strike price re-opener

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ This option would allow for strike prices to be adjusted after they had been set if it were deemed necessary.</li> <li>▪ The trigger could be increased balancing costs making contact uneconomic.</li> <li>▪ Strike price could be changed without affecting other terms of CfD.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Generator would have reassurance on balancing risks and should be able to PPAs easier.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government, through powers sought in the <i>Energy Bill</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cost of CfD scheme likely to be higher and become more unpredictable.</li> </ul>

# Information imbalance charge

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ There is a provision in current market rules to charge participants that deviate from their FPN.</li> <li>▪ This is currently set to zero.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Create sharper incentives on parties to accurately forecast their output/ consumption.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The functionality exists within the BSC.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ New charge on generators and suppliers, those worst at forecasting would face higher charges.</li> <li>▪ Could reduce the overall imbalance and imbalance charges.</li> <li>▪ A new charge could be detrimental for investor confidence.</li> <li>▪ Any reason to believe current requirements on notifications are not working?</li> </ul>

# Extending fixed FiT threshold

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Extend the fixed FiT threshold beyond the current 5MW to, for example, 10MW.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provides a route to market option for smaller-scale generators with guaranteed incomes.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Requires a change to Energy Act 2008 to enable secondary legislation (FiT Order) to reflect threshold. Changes to primary legislation could be made via the <i>Energy Bill</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased investor confidence.</li> <li>▪ Could exacerbate balancing costs.</li> <li>▪ Consistency with other objectives?</li> </ul>



# Change Gate Closure

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gate Closure is the last point at which parties can notify their contract position to NETA central systems.</li> <li>Reduce from current one hour to e.g. 45, 30 mins.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Generators could see decreased exposure to imbalance charges as forecasts could be more accurate.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ofgem, secondary consideration under Balancing SCR.</li> <li>Ofgem's initial timetable sees any new arrangements in place in 2015.</li> <li>Technical working group unenthusiastic.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Suppliers could also see financial benefit through improved contracting and lower imbalance charge exposure.</li> <li>Increases complexity but real benefits?</li> </ul>

# Net generation and demand

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Dual trading accounts introduced at Neta Go-Live.</li> <li>▪ Allow parties to net off their volumes in settlement so there is one overall imbalance (where applicable).</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Allows parties on both sides of the market to reduce imbalance exposure.</li> <li>▪ Provides additional opportunities for generators to contract.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Can be changed through standard industry code modification process.</li> <li>▪ Ofgem's could issue directions under EBSCR.</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Could reduce costs of balancing for BSC parties.</li> <li>▪ Possible impact on system operation.</li> <li>▪ contracts notified under Neta and traded contracts not the same thing.</li> </ul>

# Centralised renewables market

<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Separate market for renewables where output is aggregated and auctioned.</li> </ul>
<b>How it helps</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Eliminates risk of imbalance for generators.</li> </ul>
<b>Who undertakes it</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To be considered under Future Energy Trading Arrangements (FETA).</li> </ul>
<b>Pros and Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Forecast error and overall imbalance should fall.</li> <li>▪ Lower balancing costs for suppliers, but crowds out market for aggregators.</li> <li>▪ Stakeholders have voiced concerns over unintended consequences.</li> <li>▪ Significant time and costs to implement.</li> </ul>